Opinion issued February 25, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00460-CV

———————————

GARELD DUANE ROLLINS, JR., Appellant

V.

H. PAUL PRESSLER III, NANCY PRESSLER, PAIGE PATTERSON, 

JARED WOODFILL, WOODFILL LAW FIRM F/K/A/ WOODFILL & 

PRESSLER, L.L.P., SOUTHWESTERN BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL 

SEMINARY, AND FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF HOUSTON, Appellees

On Appeal from the 127th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2017-69277C

DISSENTING OPINION

The allegations of sexual abuse in this case are undeniably horrific. However, 

because the law and the summary-judgment record compel it, I must dissent.
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In a summary-judgment proceeding, an issue is conclusively established if 

reasonable minds could not differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts in 

the record. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 681 

(Tex. 2017). I agree with the majority that Paul Pressler and the other defendants 

aligned with him (“Pressler Defendants”), as summary-judgment movants, had the 

burden to conclusively negate application of the unsound mind tolling doctrine to 

Rollins’s claims. See Erikson v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019). But I 

disagree with the majority’s determination that the Pressler Defendants failed to 

meet this burden. Considering the Pressler Defendants’ evidence regarding the 2004 

lawsuit filed by Rollins against Pressler in Dallas and the judicial admissions made 

in Rollins’s pleadings, reasonable minds could not differ and would necessarily

conclude that Rollins was of sound mind in 2004 when his causes of action in this 

suit accrued. 

Legal Principles: Unsound Mind

Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.001(a)(2) provides that a person 

is under a legal disability for purposes of the statute of limitations if that person is 

“of unsound mind.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.001(a)(2). When a person 

is of unsound mind at the time that his cause of action accrues, the applicable statute 

of limitations will be tolled until the disability is removed. See id. § 16.001(b). “The 

purpose of section 16.001(a)(2) is to protect a person of unsound mind by ensuring 
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that a legally disabled person’s right to bring suit will not be precluded by a statute 

of limitations, prior to removal of the disability.” Gribble v. Layton, 389 S.W.3d 

882, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing Ruiz v. 

Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. 1993)).

Generally, persons of unsound mind and insane persons are synonymous;

however, a person may be of unsound mind without having been adjudicated 

incompetent. Doe v. Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 362 S.W.3d 707, 722–23 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); see Hargraves v. Armco Foods, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 546, 

547 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (noting that section 16.001 does not define 

“unsound mind” and citing former probate code defining “unsound mind” as 

“persons non compos mentis, mentally disabled persons, insane persons, and other 

persons who are mentally incompetent to care for themselves or manage their 

property and financial affairs”). The unsound mind tolling provision applies to a 

person who suffers from an inability to participate in, control, or understand the 

progression and disposition of his lawsuit. See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 755.

The Pressler Defendants’ Evidence

Here, the summary-judgment record shows that, in November 2003, Rollins 

and Pressler had an altercation in a Dallas hotel room. In July 2004, Rollins filed 

suit against Pressler in a Dallas court based on the altercation. Rollins sued Pressler 

for simple assault, citing Penal Code section 22.01(a)(1), which provides that a 
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person commits the offense of assault if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 

causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1).

In September 2004, the Hon. Ruby Sondock mediated the dispute. As a result 

of the mediation, Rollins and Pressler settled and entered into a confidential 

settlement agreement and a release of claims. Each party, including Rollins and his 

attorney, signed the settlement agreement. By signing the agreement, each party 

represented “that execution indicates [a] thorough understanding of the contents.” 

Under the terms of the 2004 settlement, Pressler agreed to pay Rollins $1,500 

per month for 25 years, totaling $450,000.

1

In return, Rollins agreed to release and 

dismiss his claims against Pressler. The record reflects that the case was then nonsuited. From October 2004 until October 2017, when this suit was filed, Pressler 

paid Rollins $1,500 per month, totaling approximately $234,000. 

Analysis

The Pressler Defendants’ evidence, showing that Rollins prosecuted and 

settled the Dallas lawsuit against Pressler in 2004, conclusively negated Rollins’s 

claim that he was of unsound mind in 2004. Even taking as true Rollins’s claim that 

he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol abuse, the Pressler 

Defendants’ evidence sufficiently demonstrated that, in 2004, Rollins had the ability 

1 Pressler also agreed to pay Rollins’s attorney $100,000. It is noteworthy that 

attorney, Daniel Shea, represented Rollins in the 2004 lawsuit and that Shea filed 

this suit for Rollins in 2017, advocating that Rollins was of unsound mind in 2004. 
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to participate in, control, and understand the instant lawsuit. See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d 

at 755.

Significantly, the 2004 Dallas lawsuit and this lawsuit have much in common. 

Rollins filed the 2004 lawsuit against Pressler based on assaultive conduct

committed by Pressler against Rollins prior to 2004. In this case, Rollins sued the 

Pressler Defendants for torts associated with assaultive conduct committed by 

Pressler against Rollins before 2004. To distinguish the suits, Rollins points out that, 

unlike here, nothing in the Dallas petition or settlement agreement indicated that 

sexual abuse played any part in that suit. Even so, Rollins’s filing of the Dallas 

lawsuit necessarily showed that he understood that Pressler had committed tortious 

conduct against him for which he was entitled to seek redress, thereby demonstrating 

Rollins’s ability in 2004 to recognize tortious conduct and to identify Pressler as a 

tortfeasor capable of harming him. And, while the 2004 lawsuit is based on simple 

assault, as defined in Penal Code section 22.01, and the instant suit is based on sexual 

assault, as defined in Penal Code section 22.011, both offenses are categorized as 

assaultive offenses in Chapter 22 of the Penal Code, indicating an underlying 

commonality in the nature of the claims. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(1), 

22.011.

The Pressler Defendants’ evidence also showed that Rollins participated in 

the filing, prosecution, and disposition of the 2004 Dallas suit. For the petition to 
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have been prepared and filed, Rollins necessarily would have relayed to others what 

had occurred in the Dallas hotel room. Although the petition reflects that Rollins’s 

mother was also a plaintiff in the suit, she claimed only that Pressler had breached 

an informal fiduciary duty to her. She did not join Rollins’s assault claim or 

otherwise indicate that she sued on Rollins’s behalf. Nothing in the petition indicates

that she was acting as Rollins’s guardian or that Rollins did not control his own 

claims. Cf. Gribble, 389 S.W.3d at 884, 894 (reflecting that mother of individual, 

determined to be of unsound mind, filed suit on his behalf as his court-appointed 

guardian). It is reasonable to infer that Rollins, a named plaintiff, was in control of 

his claims; it would not be reasonable to infer the opposite. See Nixon v. Mr. 

Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (providing that 

court reviewing summary-judgment evidence must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of non-movant).

The evidence also reflects that, after engaging in mediation, Rollins signed his 

name to the settlement agreement, acknowledging that he understood its terms. The 

agreement reflects that Rollins agreed to the settlement on his own behalf and agreed 

to release his claims against Pressler. The agreement states that each signatory 

warranted and represented that he had authority “to bind the party . . . for whom such 

party acts” and that the “claims . . . are owned by the party asserting same.” The 

settlement document reflects that Pressler agreed to make the payments to Rollins
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and that, in return, Rollins agreed to release his claims and dismiss the suit, which 

he did. The record reflects that Pressler paid Rollins the agreed amounts for thirteen 

years, totaling approximately $234,000.

Rollins intimates that he was of unsound mind in 2004 for purposes of 

bringing this suit because he had, to some degree, repressed his memories of the 

sexual abuse. He also asserts that he was unable to bring suit based on the sexual 

abuse sooner because Pressler had convinced him that the abuse was divinely 

sanctioned. However, limiting the unsound mind inquiry to the specific subject 

matter of the suit has no support in Texas law. 

As mentioned, Texas courts have considered persons of unsound mind as

being synonymous with insane persons, indicating that the unsound mind inquiry is 

based on the person’s general mental state and ability to manage his own affairs 

rather than the person’s specific mental state relating only to the subject matter of 

the lawsuit. See Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 362 S.W.3d at 722–23; Hargraves, 

894 S.W.2d at 547. And Texas courts have generally applied the doctrine of unsound 

mind to toll limitations in cases in which a plaintiff’s mental impairment was

substantial and prolonged, preventing the plaintiff from being aware of, and able to 

assist with, his lawsuit. See, e.g., Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 753 (holding unsound mind 

tolling applied when plaintiff had severe and permanent head injury); Palla v. 

McDonald, 877 S.W.2d 472, 474–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) 
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(reversing summary judgment on limitations when plaintiff suffered from permanent 

brain damage and blindness). 

In contrast, the record here, including judicial admissions made by Rollins in 

his pleadings, reflects that Rollins engaged in activities demonstrating an ability to 

manage his own affairs, participate in a lawsuit, and understand his legal rights. 

Specifically, the record reflects that, during adulthood, Rollins was employed, 

attended college, traveled abroad, possessed a driver’s license, drove a car, and was 

convicted of criminal offenses, including theft and numerous charges of driving 

while intoxicated. See Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 362 S.W.3d at 724 (noting 

evidence showing that plaintiff had been employed, attended college, remained 

married, and had children tended to show he was sound mind). I agree with the 

majority that these past activities, under the facts of this case, do not alone establish 

that Rollins was of sound mind. See Myers v. St. Stephen’s United Methodist Church, 

No. 01-96-001460-CV, 1998 WL 723887, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

Oct. 8, 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). But these past activities 

do provide important context for the Pressler Defendants’ evidence of the Dallas 

lawsuit, which did conclusively establish that, when his claims in this suit accrued

in 2004, Rollins had the ability to participate in, control, and understand the 

progression and disposition of a lawsuit against Pressler for tortious conduct. See 

Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 755; cf. Myers, 1998 WL 723887, at *4 (reversing summary 
9

judgment because movant had not presented conclusive evidence that plaintiff was 

not of unsound mind at time his cause of action accrued).

Based on the record, I would hold that the Pressler Defendants met their 

summary-judgment burden to conclusively negate the application of the unsound 

mind tolling doctrine. Because the majority reaches the opposite conclusion, I 

respectfully dissent.

Richard Hightower

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Hightower.

Hightower, J., dissenting.