[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-15618

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A088-483-671

TIANCHI ZHANG, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(December 5, 2017)

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Tianchi Zhang, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA determined that Zhang waived 

any challenge to the IJ’s denial of his asylum claim based on political opinion, and 

it held that he failed to meet his burden of proving he was eligible for asylum 

based on religious persecution because he did not provide sufficient, reasonably 

available corroborating evidence. It held that he thus necessarily failed to meet his 

burden of proof for withholding of removal, and that he had presented no 

persuasive argument for reversing the IJ’s finding that he failed to prove he was 

eligible for CAT relief.

When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the 

extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 

F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). Additionally, we “may review a final order of 

removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to 

the alien as a matter of right.” Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)

§ 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). The exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and 

precludes review of claims not presented to the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). Findings of the IJ not reached 

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by the BIA are not properly before us. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 

403 (11th Cir. 2016).

We review agency factual determinations under the substantial-evidence 

test, and we “must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable, 

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Silva v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). We 

may not reweigh the evidence from scratch; rather, we “view the record evidence 

in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of that decision.” Id. Findings of fact may be reversed only if 

“the evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise.” Chen v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006). To the extent that the BIA’s 

decision was based on a legal determination, we review it de novo. Silva, 448 F.3d 

at 1236.

To meet the burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, an alien must, with 

credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily 

protected ground, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the alien will be persecuted on 

account of a protected ground. Id. Past persecution creates a rebuttable 

presumption of well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). 

Well-founded fear means “a reasonable possibility of personal persecution that 

cannot be avoided by relocating within the subject country” or “a pattern or 

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practice in the subject country of persecuting members of a statutorily defined 

group of which the alien is a part.” Id. § 208.13(b)(2). The protected statutory 

grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and 

political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

To be entitled to withholding of removal, a petitioner must establish that he 

would more likely than not be persecuted on a protected ground, which is a higher 

evidentiary threshold than the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum. Rivera v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 815, 820–21 (11th Cir. 2007). “If an applicant is unable 

to meet the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for asylum, he is generally precluded from 

qualifying for either asylum or withholding of [removal].” Id. at 821 (quotation 

omitted). 

To be eligible for CAT relief, an alien must demonstrate that it is more likely 

than not he would be tortured if removed to his country of origin. 8 C.F.R. §§ 

208.16(c)(2), 208.17(a), 208.18(a)(1). “Torture” is defined as “any act by which 

severe pain or suffering. . . is intentionally inflicted on a person for . . . any reason 

based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or 

at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 

person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 208.18(a)(1). To constitute torture, an 

act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 

suffering. Id. § 208.18(a)(5). 

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An applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to meet his burden of proof 

without corroboration, but only if “the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that [his] 

testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to 

demonstrate” eligibility for relief from removal. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). In determining whether the applicant has met his burden of 

proof, “the trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other 

evidence of record.” Id. “Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant 

should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such 

evidence must be provided” unless the applicant does not possess it and cannot 

reasonably obtain it. Id. 

As an initial matter, the BIA correctly concluded that Zhang waived his 

political opinion asylum claim by making no argument about it to the BIA, and 

thus it is unexhausted. Additionally, the BIA did not reach his arguments about 

credibility and whether the facts of his testimony show past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution so those issues are not properly before us.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Zhang did not meet 

his burden of proof for asylum and withholding of removal based on religious 

persecution because he failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. 

Zhang’s testimony was not so credible, persuasive, and specific to compel a 

finding that he did not need any more corroboration than the testimony he 

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provided. Furthermore, he was on notice that he needed to provide corroborating 

evidence, and acknowledged that he could have provided more, yet he did not 

because he did not believe it necessary. These admissions prove fatal to Zhang’s 

case, since they demonstrate that he could have reasonably obtained corroborating 

evidence to support his claim. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s 

conclusion that Zhang did not meet his burden of proof for CAT relief, as he 

offered no proof that Chinese officials continued to search for him after he left or 

would again harm him, in a way that would rise to torture, upon his return. 

PETITION DENIED.

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