NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE EDWARD HARRELL, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0352

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2019-123786-001 

The Honorable Dewain D. Fox, Judge

The Honorable Michael Mandell, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Brian Coffman

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert W. Doyle

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 7-12-2022
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Lawrence Harrell appeals his conviction and sentence for 

manslaughter. He challenges the exclusion of certain evidence concerning 

the victim’s reputation and the scope of the State’s redirect examination of 

two witnesses. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 One evening, Harrell and his pregnant girlfriend, Candida 

Tolbert, went out to get some fast food. While walking up to an outdoor

order window, they encountered the victim, whom they knew. Initially, 

Harrell and the victim greeted each other and shook hands, but their 

meeting quickly turned confrontational, with the victim accosting both 

Harrell and Tolbert. The exchange escalated when Harrell swung at the 

victim and then pursued him as he dropped his belongings and backed 

away. Within seconds of throwing his first punch, Harrell brandished a gun 

and fired a single shot that struck the victim in the buttocks and traveled 

through his left leg in a downward trajectory, severing several major 

arteries. 

¶3 After firing the shot, Harrell grabbed the victim’s belongings

and then fled the scene. The victim also attempted to flee but was only able 

to limp a short distance before collapsing on a nearby sidewalk.

¶4 Although witnesses called 9-1-1, by the time emergency 

responders arrived, the victim was in “grave condition” and lying in a large 

pool of blood. Medical personnel rendered first aid, but the victim 

succumbed to his gunshot injuries, dying shortly after arriving at a local

hospital. 

¶5 Detectives reviewed surveillance videos recorded by the 

restaurant’s security cameras. By isolating still images from a surveillance 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. See State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

3

video and distributing the pictures through the Silent Witness program, 

detectives identified Harrell and Tolbert. Although multiple surveillance 

videos depicted Harrell’s and Tolbert’s initial encounter with the victim, 

none captured the shooting because the three had moved out of the security 

cameras’ fields of view following Harrell’s initial swing. By the time Harrell 

moved back into one camera’s view―18 seconds after later―he had already 

shot the victim. 

¶6 After interviewing Harrell and Tolbert, the State charged 

Harrell with one count of second-degree murder. The State also alleged 

aggravating circumstances and that Harrell had historical prior felonies and 

committed the offense while on probation. 

¶7 At trial, Harrell acknowledged shooting the victim, but 

claimed he acted in self-defense and to protect Tolbert and their unborn 

child. He explained that the victim, despite the initial handshake greeting,

had threatened to kill him and Tolbert, so he swung at the victim in 

anticipation of an attack. According to Harrell, the victim then punched him 

to the ground and crouched down over him. While the victim allegedly 

pinned him down, Harrell called to Tolbert for help and she moved toward 

him, offering the gun. Harrell claimed that as he struggled for the gun, the 

victim reached toward his own waistband. Purportedly fearing that the 

victim would withdraw a gun, Harrell shot the victim.

¶8 After a 12-day trial, a jury found Harrell guilty of the lesser 

offense of manslaughter. The jury also found two aggravating factors―that 

the offense involved the use of a deadly weapon and that it caused 

emotional or financial harm to the victim’s immediate family. At the 

sentencing hearing, the superior court found that Harrell had two prior 

felony convictions and sentenced him as a category 3 offender to a term of 

20 years’ imprisonment. Harrell timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Exclusion of Reputation Evidence

¶9 Harrell contends he should be granted a new trial because the 

superior court precluded evidence that the victim had a reputation for 

carrying a firearm. Harrell argues that the exclusion of this reputation 

evidence infringed on his ability to present a full defense―that he 

reasonably believed the victim posed an imminent threat to his safety.

¶10 We review evidentiary rulings for a clear and prejudicial 

abuse of discretion. State v. Ayala, 178 Ariz. 385, 387 (App. 1994). In 
STATE v. HARRELL

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conducting our review, we defer to the superior court’s assessment of 

relevance and unfair prejudice. See State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 122 (1985) 

(noting that deference is appropriate because the superior court is best 

positioned to balance probative value and prejudice). A court abuses its 

discretion when the reasons given for its decision are unsupported by the 

record, “clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of 

justice.” State v. Gentry, 247 Ariz. 381, 385, ¶ 14 (App. 2019); State v. Cowles, 

207 Ariz. 8, 9, ¶ 3 (App. 2004).

¶11 Before trial, Harrell moved to admit evidence of the victim’s 

other acts under Arizona Rules of Evidence (Rule) 404(b). Harrell asserted

that the other-act evidence, and his knowledge thereof, was admissible to 

prove he reasonably believed that the victim posed a threat to his life.

Specifically, Harrell sought to introduce evidence that the victim “was an 

active” gang member, had “participated in a turf war,” had “mercilessly 

beat” two people, had conducted “at least four drive by shootings,” and 

“ha[d] been known to carry a gun on his person.” 

¶12 At an evidentiary hearing on the motion, Harrell testified that 

he (1) learned of the victim’s gang affiliation from friends and social media, 

and (2) heard “[t]hrough mutual friends,” family members, and from social 

media that the victim had been involved in a turf war between rival gangs 

and, as part of that activity, had (a) participated in drive-by shootings, and 

(b) beaten multiple people, including a 15-year-old child. Recounting three 

occasions that he observed the victim possess a gun, Harrell also testified 

that the victim was “just known [] to have a gun.” 

¶13 After hearing Harrell’s testimony, the superior court granted 

his motion in part, allowing specific-act evidence that the victim carried a 

gun in Harrell’s presence admissible. But apart from the acts for which 

Harrell had personal knowledge, the court found his testimony “lacking in 

credibility and speculative.” Accordingly, the court precluded evidence 

that relied on “third party accounts,” i.e., the victim’s purported gang 

membership, participation in drive-by shootings, and physical assaults.

Moreover, applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court found the 

probative value of the excluded evidence was substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403. 

¶14 In a motion to reconsider, Harrell moved to admit evidence 

of the victim’s character and specific other acts, including the victim’s 

reputation as a “drug dealer who was known to carry a gun,” under Rules 

404 and 405―again arguing that the excluded evidence was admissible to 
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

5

show that he “justifiably feared for his life and acted reasonably to defend 

himself.” The superior court denied the motion. 

¶15 Undeterred, Harrell moved in limine to admit evidence of the 

victim’s reputation for violence, including, among other things, that he 

carried a gun. In support of his motion, Harrell submitted an offer of proof,

stating, in relevant part: “Harrell heard that [the victim] carried a weapon.” 

¶16 At the outset of trial, the superior court again conducted a 

Rule 403 balancing test and precluded Harrell from testifying that the 

victim had a reputation for possessing a gun, specifically noting the poor 

“quality of the evidence” supporting the assertion and its minimal

probative value. The court revised the previous ruling in part, however, 

allowing Harrell to testify to the victim’s general reputation for violence. 

¶17 “The constitutional right to due process guarantees a criminal 

defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State 

v. Rhodes, 219 Ariz. 476, 478, ¶ 10 (App. 2008) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). The constitution does not, however, guarantee a 

defendant the right to present a defense “in whatever manner and with 

whatever evidence [the defendant] chooses.” State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 

393, ¶ 36 (2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In other words, a 

defendant’s right to present evidence in support of his defense, though 

constitutionally protected, is nonetheless subject to the rules of evidence. 

See id.

¶18 In general, relevant evidence is admissible unless it is 

otherwise precluded by the federal or state constitution, an applicable 

statute, or rule. Ariz. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if “it has any 

tendency” to make a fact of consequence in determining the action “more 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ariz. R. Evid. 

401(a). Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value 

“is substantially outweighed” by a danger of unfair prejudice. Ariz. R. Evid. 

403.

¶19 Character evidence is generally inadmissible “to prove that a 

person acted in conformity therewith,” but “an accused may offer proof of 

[a] victim’s reputation for violence when an issue of self-defense is raised.” 

State v. Zamora, 140 Ariz. 338, 340 (App. 1984) (citing Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)(2) 

(permitting evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim offered 

by an accused)); see also State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 121, ¶ 37 (App. 2009) 

(“When offered to prove a defendant reasonably feared for his safety and 

used a reasonable degree of force in light of that fear, character evidence is 
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

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not propensity evidence; rather, it is offered to prove the defendant’s state 

of mind and the reasonableness of his actions.”). To establish a justification 

defense, a “defendant may offer into evidence specific instances of violence 

committed by the victim,” if he “knew of them,” or “reputation or opinion 

evidence that the victim ha[d] a violent or aggressive character trait.” State 

v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 558-59, ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 405(a) (permitting the introduction 

of reputation or opinion evidence concerning a character trait). This type of 

evidence is admissible “to show that the defendant was justifiably 

apprehensive of the decedent and knew that the decedent had a violent 

disposition, and that this may have affected the defendant’s thinking about 

the need to respond with deadly physical force.” Connor, 215 Ariz. at 559, 

¶ 14 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

¶20 At trial, the superior court permitted Harrell to testify that the 

victim had a reputation for violence, that he had seen the victim in 

possession of a gun on multiple prior occasions, and that his knowledge of 

the victim’s specific acts and character caused him to fear for his life and 

the safety of Tolbert and their unborn child. The superior court precluded 

Harrell from testifying, however, that other people had told him that the 

victim carried a gun. 

¶21 On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. The superior 

court did not permit Harrell to testify that the victim had a reputation for 

carrying a gun because Harrell failed to offer any substantive evidence to 

support this assertion. Indeed, the court excluded Harrell’s proffered 

testimony concerning the victim’s purported reputation for carrying a gun

as wholly speculative, predicated on “mere rumor,” and lacking any 

“indicia of reliability.” While the excluded evidence was arguably relevant 

to explain Harrell’s state of mind, the court properly applied Rule 403’s 

balancing test and determined the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 

outweighed the slight probative value of Harrell’s proffered testimony. 

Stated differently, given the paucity of evidence supporting Harrell’s offer 

of proof, the superior court acted well within its discretion by limiting the 

scope of his reputation testimony. See State v. Zaid, 249 Ariz. 154, 158, ¶ 13 

(App. 2020) (considering the strength of evidence supporting reputation 

testimony in determining whether the superior court properly excluded the 

testimony).

¶22 Moreover, even if the superior court improperly curtailed 

Harrell’s reputation testimony, such error was necessarily harmless. See id. 

at 160, ¶ 22 (explaining the improper preclusion of a defense witness’s 

testimony is harmless when “the witness’s testimony would have been 
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

7

merely cumulative of other evidence in the case”) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). First, consistent with the superior court’s finding, the 

mere possession of a gun provides “minimal probative value on the 

possessor’s aggressive character.” Zamora, 140 Ariz. at 340. Second, and 

more importantly, the superior court permitted Harrell to testify about 

multiple occasions when he observed the victim in possession of a gun. Of 

the “methods of proving character” permitted by the evidentiary rules, 

“evidence of specific instances of conduct is the most convincing.” State v. 

Lehman, 126 Ariz. 388, 391 (App. 1980) (internal quotation omitted). Given 

his testimony that he knew the victim’s reputation for violence and had 

actual knowledge of the victim’s prior possession of a gun, Harrell had the 

opportunity to present his full defense to the jury and argue that he feared 

for his life when he shot the victim. In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged 

during his closing argument that Harrell contended that the victim’s 

reputation for carrying a gun led him to fear for his life. See State v. Romero, 

240 Ariz. 503, 510, ¶ 15 (App. 2016) (“Whether an error is harmless may also 

be considered in the context of a party’s ability to present the substance of 

his claim or defense.”). Therefore, the superior court did not err, much less 

commit reversible error, by excluding Harrell’s testimony that the victim 

had a reputation for carrying a gun.

II. Scope of State’s Redirect Examination

¶23 Harrell also argues he should be granted a new trial because 

the superior court, over defense counsel’s objections, permitted the 

prosecutor to question two witnesses on redirect examination concerning 

matters outside the scope of cross-examination. Implicit to this argument, 

Harrell contends that the court’s rulings deprived him of his right to fully 

confront adverse witnesses.

¶24 We review a superior court’s evidentiary rulings and 

restrictions on witness examination for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Romero, 248 Ariz. 601, 606, ¶ 22 (App. 2020). While no rule expressly limits 

the scope of redirect examination, see Ariz. R. Evid. 611 (governing how a 

court “should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 

examining witnesses and presenting evidence”), as a general practice, 

courts restrict questioning on redirect examination to the subject matter of 

cross-examination. See State v. Hicks, 133 Ariz. 64, 68-69 (1982); see also State 

v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 611 (1995) (concluding evidence introduced on 

redirect examination of victim was within the scope of cross-examination, 

given the defendant’s cross-examination attack on purported 

inconsistencies in the victim’s direct testimony), rejected on other grounds by 

State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 106 (1996); State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 581 (1993) 
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

8

(holding a defendant was not entitled to recross-examination when redirect 

examination raised “nothing new”).

¶25 In the event a prosecutor elicits new evidence on redirect, 

however, defense counsel may request the opportunity to recross-examine 

a witness. State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 550-51 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds by State v. Conn, 137 Ariz. 148, 151 (1983). Although the right to 

confront and question adverse witnesses is of “fundamental importance,” 

a defendant is entitled to recross-examination only for the limited purpose 

of “clarify[ing] any new or confusing matters brought out during redirect.” 

Id.

A. Tolbert’s Trial Testimony

¶26 On direct examination, Tolbert testified that Harrell, alone,

possessed a gun on the night of the shooting. When questioned about a 

recorded conversation that she had with Harrell on the second day of trial, 

in which she stated, “[s]upposedly I’m the one that gave you the gun,” Tolbert 

reiterated that she “never had possession of a gun ever.”

¶27 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Tolbert 

whether she “ever stole a gun” from a named third party. Rather than 

answering directly, Tolbert responded by repeatedly stating that defense 

counsel’s question had “nothing to do with” the underlying events. In a 

lengthy and argumentative exchange, defense counsel then confronted 

Tolbert with a statement she made to Harrell during anotherrecorded phone 

call. When pressed, Tolbert admitted that she did state she had stolen a gun 

during that conversation, but she maintained that defense counsel had 

taken the statement out of context. 

¶28 On redirect, the prosecutor told Tolbert that he wanted to ask 

her “some follow-up questions” to provide her “an opportunity to explain” 

her stolen gun statement to Harrell. In response to the prosecutor’s 

questions, Tolbert again asserted that her statement to Harrell about 

stealing a gun was “unrelated” and “ha[d] nothing to do with this [case].” 

At that point, the prosecutor referred Tolbert to her direct examination 

testimony and the recorded, mid-trial conversation she had with Harrell. 

Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning, 

contending that it veered “[o]utside the scope of cross.” The superior court 

overruled the objection, and the prosecutor continued, asking questions

(with limited success given Tolbert’s lack of cooperation and overall 

reluctance to testify) concerning the chronology of events―whether

Tolbert’s statement to Harrell that she had stolen a gun predated Harrell’s 
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

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trial claim that she had furnished him with a gun on the night of the 

shooting. 

¶29 Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the 

prosecutor’s questions on redirect examination did not exceed the scope of 

questioning on direct and cross-examination. Although the prosecutor did 

not question Tolbert on direct examination regarding the relative timing of 

her conversations with Harrell, he clearly asked her about the timing and 

content of the second conversation (which included the statement about 

Tolbert supposedly giving Harrell a gun). Likewise, defense counsel did not 

question Tolbert about the relative timing of her recorded conversations with 

Harrell, but he clearly cross-examined her regarding the content of the first 

conversation (which included the statement about Tolbert stealing a gun).

Because the prosecutor’s questions on redirect examination were simply 

responsive to defense counsel’s questioning―albeit the prosecutor 

juxtaposed the two recorded conversations when previously each had been 

addressed separately―and Tolbert, on redirect examination, merely 

reiterated what she had said during direct and cross-examination, Harrell 

had a full opportunity to confront Tolbert and question her testimony.

Accordingly, the superior court acted within its discretion by overruling 

Harrell’s objection.

B. Lead Detective’s Trial Testimony

¶30 Neither the prosecutor on direct examination nor the defense 

attorney on cross-examination questioned the lead detective about Harrell’s 

appearance during his police interrogation or whether investigators took 

photographs of him at that time. On redirect, however, the prosecutor 

asked the lead detective whether law enforcement officers photographed

Harrell on the day of his interview, approximately three weeks after the 

shooting. Defense counsel objected to the question, asserting it exceeded

the scope of cross-examination. After the superior court overruled the 

objection, the prosecutor asked the detective whether he observed any 

injuries on Harrell during the interrogation, and the detective testified that 

he saw none. 

¶31 When the prosecutor finished his redirect examination 

moments later, defense counsel informed the superior court that he had 

follow-up questions for the detective that could be handled either through 

recross-examination or by recalling the detective to testify during the 

defense’s case-in-chief. The court denied defense counsel’s request for 

recross-examination and invited defense counsel to simply recall the 

detective to the stand. 
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

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¶32 As part of the defense’s case-in-chief, defense counsel recalled 

the detective to testify. At the outset, defense counsel told the detective that 

he wanted “to clear up some things” from the detective’s prior testimony. 

But on direct examination, defense counsel did not ask the detective any 

injury-related questions. On cross-examination, however, the prosecutor 

asked the detective whether Harrell reported any injuries during his 

interview, and the detective testified that Harrell did not. The prosecutor 

also presented the detective with photographs taken of Harrell on the day 

of his interview and again asked the detective whether any injuries 

appeared visible that day. The detective again confirmed that he saw no 

signs of injury to Harrell on the day of the interview, either in person or in 

the photographs. On redirect examination, defense counsel directed the 

detective to examine one of the photographs and asked whether it reflected

a “dark mark” over Harrell’s left eyebrow. The detective responded, 

“[t]here’s a discoloration.” In a follow-up question, defense counsel asked 

the detective whether the discoloration may have been a “healing cut[],” 

and the detective answered, “I don’t know.” 

¶33 On this record, we find no reversible error. While the injuryrelated questions posed to the detective on redirect during the State’s casein-chief arguably exceeded the scope of both direct and cross-examination, 

defense counsel had ample opportunity to question the detective, during 

the defense’s case-in-chief, about Harrell’s injury status at the time of the 

police interview. Indeed, immediately after the prosecutor concluded 

redirect examination of the detective during the State’s case-in-chief, 

defense counsel told the superior court that any arguable infringement on 

Harrell’s right to confront the detective could be remedied either through 

recross-examination or by recalling the detective to testify. Because Harrell 

had a full opportunity to challenge the detective’s injury-related testimony 

when defense counsel recalled the detective to testify, the superior court’s 

rulings on the scope of witness examination did not deprive Harrell of his 

constitutional right to present a full defense and confront all adverse 

witnesses against him.
STATE v. HARRELL

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.