March 23, 2015

Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission’s 

website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-

China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the 

public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the 

Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report.

Michael Pilger, Research Intern, Security and Foreign Affairs

and

Caitlin Campbell, Senior Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs

Diminishing China-North Korea

Exchanges: An Assessment
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2 

Introduction

This report seeks to quantify changes in the bilateral relationship between China and North Korea by examining 

hundreds of discrete exchanges between Chinese and North Korean officials as reported by the Director of National 

Intelligence Open Source Center (OSC) from January 2009 to December 2014.1 The authors categorized these 

exchanges by type (cultural, economics and trade, health, military, party-to-party, tourism, and science and 

technology) and by seniority of the participants (see Figure 1) and evaluated trends in these categories over time.*

Finally, this report assesses trends in China-North Korea exchanges in the context of overall China-North Korea

bilateral relations.

Key Findings

Trends in the frequency and content of China-North Korea exchanges between 2009 and 2014 appear to support 

the assessment, widely shared in the China- and North Korea-watching communities, that relations between Beijing 

and Pyongyang have soured in recent years.2 Since 2010, the number of reported high-, senior-, and presidentiallevel exchanges has fallen significantly, and in 2014 reached its lowest point in six years (see Figure 2). Though 

OSC reported three times as many China-North Korea exchanges in 2014 as in 2009, this increase was due primarily 

to the tripling of reported low- and medium-level exchanges, which rarely produced major policy outcomes (see 

Figure 3).†

Figure 1. Seniority Levels of China-North Korea Exchanges

Level of Exchange Parties to Exchange‡

Lower-Level 

Exchanges

Low-Level Minor academic, bureaucratic, consular, corporate, expatriate, local 

government, tourist, and/or youth delegations

Medium-Level

Ambassadors, low-ranking representatives of prominent government 

organizations and ministries, and/or members of the National People’s 

Congress (China) and Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea)

Upper-Level 

Exchanges§

High-Level

Vice ministers, low-ranking general officers in the Chinese and North Korea

militaries, and/or nonranking members of the Central Committee of the 

Chinese Communist Party and the Central Committee and Politburo of the 

Workers’ Party of Korea

Senior-Level

Premiers, vice premiers, vice presidents (China), cabinet ministers, Politburo 

Standing Committee members (China), Central Military Commission 

members (China), high-ranking general officers in the Chinese and North 

Korean militaries, ranking members of the Central Committee and Politburo 

of the Workers’ Party of Korea, president and vice president of the Supreme 

People’s Assembly Presidium (North Korea), and/or state councilors (China)

Presidential-Level President (China) and/or supreme leader (North Korea)

Leadership changes in China and North Korea could suggest an explanation for the decline in upper-level 

exchanges. In December 2011, North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il passed away, and his son, Kim Jongun, succeeded him as supreme leader. In 2012, at the beginning of Kim Jong-un’s reign, China was preparing for 

its once-in-a-decade leadership transition. The uncertainty surrounding both of these leadership transitions could 

explain the drop in upper-level exchanges from 2011 to 2012: each country’s administration may have focused 

attention on its own domestic politics at the expense of maintaining the bilateral relationship. Since 2013, however, 

 

* Although OSC reporting on China-North Korea exchanges is robust and reliable, it should not be considered comprehensive as it may 

not account for all exchanges, such as secret or unreported exchanges. Moreover, the content and relevance of individual exchanges is 

often unclear due to a lack of publicly available information.

† Much of the increase in low-level exchanges was due to a rise in cultural, economics and trade, tourism, and science and technology 

exchanges.

‡ Exchanges involving officials of different seniority levels are categorized according to the seniority level of the highest-level official 

involved in the exchange.

§ Upper-level exchanges include only substantive interactions between upper-level officials. They do not include ceremonial events (e.g., 

wreath-layings) or official announcements and communications (e.g., letter correspondence).
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 3 

the frequency of upper-level exchanges has not returned to the level seen during the administrations of President 

Hu Jintao and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il. The overall drop in upper-level exchanges since 2013 suggests 

declining China-North Korea exchanges are the product of a conscious decision by one or both of the 

administrations of President Xi Jinping and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un.

Notably, upper-level exchanges between party officials appear to have ceased completely (see Figure 4). Previously, 

the close historical relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Workers’ Party of Korea had been 

the foundation and primary vehicle for conducting the bilateral relationship,3 but nearly all upper-level exchanges 

are now explicitly government sponsored: they occur through official bureaucratic and diplomatic channels, rather 

than by the friendly and often informal party-to-party meetings that were common until 2013.

What Does This Mean for the Future of China-North Korea

Relations?

Public meetings and exchanges, particularly between upper-level officials, are important not only for cultivating 

productive working relationships between two countries, but also for signaling to domestic and foreign audiences 

the importance each side assigns to bilateral ties. In the case of China-North Korea bilateral contacts, projecting 

amicable ties does not appear to be a priority for at least one (and maybe both) of the countries. This perception 

becomes more compelling when contrasted with China’s warming relations with South Korea in recent years. 

Observers are quick to point out that President Xi has met with South Korean President Park Gyeun-hye seven 

times but has yet to meet Kim Jong-un,4a striking fact given that China is a longtime ally of North Korea (which is 

still technically at war with South Korea).

The decline in China-North Korea exchanges is one of several recent developments that suggest an overall souring 

of the bilateral relationship:

*

 Since late 2012, North Korea has drawn criticism from China and others with a series of tests demonstrating 

its ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities. In December 2012, a North Korean rocket put the country’s 

first satellite into orbit, likely using ballistic missile technology in violation of United Nations resolutions.5

In February 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in eight years.6In 2014, North Korea fired 

more than 100 projectiles over the course of at least 18 missile tests—at least ten of which used ballistic 

missile technology in violation of United Nations resolutions—according to open source reporting.

7

 Parallel to Beijing’s outreach to Seoul, Pyongyang has sought to diversify its foreign relations by reaching 

out to its former patron Russia, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries.8

 Kim Jong-un unexpectedly purged and executed Jang Song-taek, his uncle and second-highest official in 

North Korea, in December 2013. Mr. Jang had been the chief North Korean agent in North Korea’s 

engagement with China, and official North Korean statements about the circumstances of his purge and 

execution suggest his relationship with China was treasonous. 9 The event stunned and upset Chinese 

officials, and Mr. Jang’s execution likely has had the effect of discouraging other North Korean officials 

from seeking close ties with Beijing.10

Nevertheless, the deterioration of China-North Korea bilateral contacts and the overall decline in China-North 

Korea relations do not seem to reflect a shift away from China’s long-standing strategic objective of stability†in 

North Korea. China’s perception that the United States seeks to encircle and contain China with regional alliances 

and partnerships shapes its fear that North Korean instability or collapse could provide a pretext for U.S. military 

intervention and allow Washington greater influence over the future of the Peninsula.

11 China’s overriding 

imperative to avoid this scenario drives its economic and political support for Pyongyang despite rising tension in 

the bilateral relationship. North Korea, for its part, is in no position to reject China’s support. Dr. Sue Mi Terry, 

senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute, testified to the Commission that 

“by some estimates, Beijing provides some 80 percent of North Korea’s consumer goods, 45 percent of its food, 

 

* For an in-depth discussion of China’s troubled relationship with North Korea, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, p. 446-469.

† Stability, in China’s perception, is characterized by the absence of unrest, upheaval, or other sudden shifts in a country’s internal 

situation, and often is synonymous with regime stability.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4 

and 90 percent of its energy imports. Sino-North Korean trade accounts for nearly 90 percent of North Korea’s 

global trade, while official Chinese investment accounts for almost 95 percent of foreign direct investment in the 

North.”12 As long as these dynamics sustain, Beijing is unlikely to significantly change its policy toward North 

Korea. 

Figure 2. Upper-Level Exchanges between Chinese and North Korean Officials, 2009–2014.

Source: Commission staff judgments based on data from Open Source Center PRC-DPRK Exchange Charts, 2009–2014.

Figure 3. Lower-Level Exchanges and Total Exchanges between Chinese and North Korean Officials, 

2009–2014.

Source: Commission staff judgments based on data from Open Source Center PRC-DPRK Exchange Charts, 2009–2014.

Figure 4. Upper-Level Party-to-Party Exchanges between Chinese and North Korean Officials, 2009–2014.

Level of Meeting 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Presidential-Level 2 4 1 3 0 0

Senior-Level 1 0 3 0 0 0

High-Level 2 0 0 1 0 0

Total 5 4 4 4 0 0

Source: Commission staff judgments based on data from Open Source Center PRC-DPRK Exchange Charts, 2009–2014.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Number of Exchanges

Year

Presidential-Level

Senior-Level

High-Level

Total Upper-Level

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Number of Exchanges

Year

Lower-Level

Total
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 

Endnotes

1 Open Source Center, PRC-DPRK Exchange Charts. OSC IDs: KPP20100126032001, KPP20100423032001, KPP20100709032002, 

KPP20101005032001, KPP20110114032002, KPP20110408032007, KPP20110830032002, KPP20111020032004, 

KPP20120119032002, KPP20120405032002, KPP20120827032002, KPP20121026032001, KPP20130117032001, 

KPP20130415032001, KPR2013071219948731, KPO2013102811769617, KPR2014032519725582, KPO2014041423869917, 

KPR2014072121546812, KPR2014102725433732, and KPR2015012312127978. 

2 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, November 2014, pp. 448–458; U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, 

written testimony of Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent 

Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014; and Scott 

Snyder and See-won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: China’s Red Line on the Korean Peninsula,” Comparative Connections: A 

Triannual e-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 16:1 (May 2014): 103. http://csis.org/files/publication/1401qchina_korea.pdf. 

Several interlocutors with whom the Commission met during its July 2014 trip to Seoul, South Korea, echoed this assessment.

3 Bates Gill, China’s North Korea Policy (United States Institute of Peace, July 2011), p. 6. 

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/China%27s_North_Korea_Policy.pdf.

4

Jonathan D. Pollack, Is Xi Jinping Rethinking Korean Unification? (Brookings Institution, January 20, 2015).

http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2015/01/20-xi-jinping-korean-unification pollack; Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, 

“China-Korea Relations: China’s Red Line on the Korean Peninsula,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual e-Journal on East Asian 

Bilateral Relations 16:1 (May 2014). http://csis.org/files/publication/1401qchina_korea.pdf.

5 Duyeon Kim, North Korea’s Successful Rocket Launch (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, December 18, 2012). 

http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/northkorea/articles/north_koreas_successful_rocket_launch/.

6

International Crisis Group, Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (December 9, 2013), p. 8. 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.

7 Choonsik Yoo, “UPDATE 2-North Korea Fires Short-Range Missiles in Apparent Exercise,” Reuters, February 27, 2014. 

http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/02/27/korea-north-missiles-idINL3N0LW3SG20140227; Ashley Rowland and Yoo Kyong Chang, 

“North Korea Launches 2 More Missiles, South Says,” Stars and Stripes, March 2, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/northkorea-launches-2-moremissiles-south-says-1.270832; Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Tests Rocket Launcher with Range Beyond Seoul, 

South Says,” New York Times, March 4, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/world/asia/north-korea-tests-rocket-launcher-withlonger-range-south-says.html; Judy Kwon and Halimah Abdullah, “North Korea Launches Missiles into Sea,” CNN, March 6, 2014. 

http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/asia/north-korea-missiles/; Paula Hancocks and K.J. Kwon, “North Korea Fires Short-Range 

Rockets, South Says,” CNN, March 17, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/16/world/asia/nkorea-missile-launches/; K.J. Kwon and Ben 

Brumfield, “North Korea Launches 30 Short-Range Rockets into the Sea, South Korea Says,” CNN, March 22, 2014. 

http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/22/world/asia/north-korea-rockets/index.html; Euan McKirdy, “North Korea Ups Stakes with Latest 

Missile Launch,” CNN, March 26, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/26/world/asia/north-korea-rodong-missile-launch/; Louis 

Charbonneau, “U.N. Security Council Members Condemn North Korea Missile Launch,” Reuters, March 27, 2014. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/us-korea-north-un-idUSBREA2Q2E220140328; Jonathan Cheng, “North Korea Hypes ‘New’ 

Missile Launch,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/27/north-korea-hypes-new-missilelaunch/; Narae Kim, “North Korea Launches Two Missiles, Defies UN Ban,” Reuters, June 29, 2014. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKBN0F405H20140629; Jonathan Cheng, “In Run-Up to Xi 

Visit, North Korea Seeks Spotlight,” Korea Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), June 30, 2014. 

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/30/in-run-up-to-xi-visit-north-korea-seeks-spotlight/; K.J. Kwon and Jethro Mullen, “North 

Korea Fires Two ShortRange Rockets into Sea,” CNN, July 1, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/asia/north-korea-missiles; 

Jung-Yoon Choi and Hyung-Jin Kim, “North Korea Fires Missiles into Ocean,” Associated Press, July 8, 2014. 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/north-korea-missiles_n_5568880.html; Jeyup S. Kwaak, “North Korea Launches Two ShortRange Missiles,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2014. http:// online.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-launches-two-short-range-missiles1405222190; Yonhap News Agency, “N. Korea Fires Two Ballistic Missiles: Seoul,” July 13, 2014. 

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/07/13/26/0301000000AEN20140713000253315F.html; Associated Press, “North Korea 

has Launched Nearly 100 Missile and Rocket Tests in 2014 as Kim Jong-un Seeks World’s Attention,” July 14, 2014. 

http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/07/14/north-korea-has-launched-nearly-100-missile-and-rocket-tests-in-2014-as-kim-jong-un-seeksworlds-attention/; Associated Press, “North Korea Fires Short-Range Missile into Sea,” July 26, 2014. 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/26/north-korea-fires-short-range-missile-sea/; Associated Press, “North Korea TestFires Missiles as Pope Visits South,” August 14, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/north-korea-missile-test-popefrancis-south; Tass (Moscow), “North Korea Fires Short-Range Ballistic Missile into Sea of Japan - media,” September 1, 2014. 

http://en.itar-tass.com/world/747478; and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Reported to Test Short-Range Missiles,” New York Times, 

September 6, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/asia/north-korea-reported-to-test-short-range-missiles.html.

8 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, November 2014, pp. 452–453.

9 Christopher Woolf, “Execution Challenges North Korea's Friendship with China,” Public Radio International, December 13, 2013.

http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-12-13/execution-challenges-north-koreas-friendship-china; Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, ChinaNorth Korea Relations: Jang Song-thaek’s Purge vs. The Status Quo (Asia Centre, February 2014), p. 2. 

http://www.centreasia.eu/sites/default/files/publications_pdf/note_china_north_korea_relations_after_jang_song_thaek_s_purge_februa

ry2014_0.pdf; and Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, The Demise of Jang Song Thaek (Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 

13, 2013). 

 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 6 

 

http://csis.org/publication/demise-jang-song-thaek; Mathieu Duchâtel, Tactical Pause in China’s Economic Engagement with North 

Korea (Jamestown Foundation, May 7, 2014).

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42331&cHash=3c5a4051938fc7565e731e9950c00

473#.VO4tQPnF-So.

10 Jonathan D. Pollack, Is Xi Jinping Rethinking Korean Unification? (Korea Research Institute for Security-Brookings Joint Conference on 

Cooperating for Regional Stability in the Process of Korean Unification: Contingency Preparations with the ROK-U.S. as Anchor, 

Seoul, Republic of Korea, January 20, 2015).

11 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North 

Korea, testimony of Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent 

Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014. See also 

International Crisis Group, Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (December 9, 2013), pp. 13–15. 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.

12 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North 

Korea, written testimony of Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.