75872 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 7, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–25–03 Airbus: Amendment 39–16536. 

Docket No. FAA–2010–0850; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–076–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective January 11, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 

B2–1A, B2–1C, B4–2C, B2K–3C, B4–103, B2– 

203, and B4–203 airplanes, certificated in 

any category, all serial numbers. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 27: Flight Controls. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

In accordance with design regulation, the 

THSA [trimmable horizontal stabilizer 

actuator] has a failsafe design. Its upper 

attachment to the aeroplane has two load 

paths, a Primary Load Path (PLP) and a 

Secondary Load Path (SLP), which is only 

engaged in case of PLP failure. Following the 

design intent, engagement of the SLP leads to 

jam the THSA, indicating the failure of the 

PLP. 

Tests carried out under the loads-measured 

during representative flights have 

demonstrated that, when the SLP is engaged, 

it does not systematically jam the THSA. In 

addition, laboratory tests have confirmed that 

the SLP will only withstand the loads for a 

limited period of time. 

This condition of PLP failure during an 

extended period of time, if not detected and 

corrected, would lead to the rupture of the 

THSA upper attachment and consequent 

THSA loss of command, resulting in reduced 

control of the aeroplane. 

* * * * * 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Actions 

(g) Within 2,500 flight hours after the 

effective date of this AD, do a detailed visual 

inspection for metallic particles, cracks, 

scratches, and missing materials of the THSA 

upper attachment and screw shaft, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A300–27–0203, dated June 8, 2009. 

Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals 

not to exceed 2,500 flight hours. 

(h) If during any inspection required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, any metallic 

particle, crack, scratch, or missing material is 

found, before further flight, contact Airbus to 

obtain approved corrective action 

instructions, and accomplish those 

instructions accordingly. 

(i) Doing the corrective actions specified in 

paragraph (h) of this AD is not a terminating 

action for the repetitive inspections required 

by paragraph (g) of this AD. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(j) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Dan Rodina, 

Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 

227–2125; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using 

any approved AMOC on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify your 

principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or 

principal avionics inspector (PAI), as 

appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, 

your local Flight Standards District Office. 

The AMOC approval letter must specifically 

reference this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain corrective 

actions from a manufacturer or other source, 

use these actions if they are FAA-approved. 

Corrective actions are considered FAAapproved if they are approved by the State 

of Design Authority (or their delegated 

agent). You are required to assure the product 

is airworthy before it is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has 

approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(k) Refer to MCAI European Aviation 

Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2010– 

0019, dated February 5, 2010; and Airbus 

Mandatory Service Bulletin A300–27–0203, 

dated June 8, 2009; for related information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) You must use Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A300–27–0203, excluding Appendix 

01, dated June 8, 2009, to do the actions 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS–EAW 

(Airworthiness Office), 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; 

telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 

93 44 51; e-mail: account.airwortheas@airbus.com; Internet http:// 

www.airbus.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

22, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–30309 Filed 12–6–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0934; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–113–AD; Amendment 

39–16537; AD 2010–25–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell 

Douglas Corporation Model DC–9–30, 

DC–9–40, and DC–9–50 Series 

Airplanes, Model DC–9–81 (MD–81), 

DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD–83), 

and DC–9–87 (MD–87) Airplanes, and 

Model MD–88 and MD–90–30 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

McDonnell Douglas Corporation 

airplanes listed above. This AD requires 

modifying the fuel boost pumps for the 

center wing, and forward or aft auxiliary 

fuel tanks. This AD results from fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent possible sources of ignition in a 

fuel tank caused by an electrical fault in 

the fuel boost pumps. An ignition 

source in the fuel tank could result in 

a fire or an explosion and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective January 11, 

2011. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of January 11, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: For Boeing service 

information identified in this AD, 


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contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 

Attention: Data & Services Management, 

3855 Lakewood Boulevard, MC D800– 

0019, Long Beach, California 90846– 

0001; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 2; fax 206–766–5683; e-mail 

dse.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. For 

Argo-Tech service information 

identified in this AD, contact Argo-Tech 

Corporation, 23555 Euclid Avenue, 

Cleveland, Ohio 44117; telephone 216– 

692–6000. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Serj 

Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, 

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 

Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, California 90712–4137; 

telephone (562) 627–5254; fax (562) 

627–5210. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC– 

9–30, DC–9–40, and DC–9–50 series 

airplanes, Model DC–9–81 (MD–81), 

DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD–83), 

and DC–9–87 (MD–87) airplanes, and 

Model MD–88 and MD–90–30 airplanes. 

That NPRM was published in the 

Federal Register on August 29, 2008 (73 

FR 50894). That NPRM proposed to 

require modifying the fuel boost pumps 

for the center wing, and forward or aft 

auxiliary fuel tanks. 

Relevant Service Information 

We have reviewed Boeing Service 

Bulletins DC9–28–212 (for Model DC– 

9–30, DC–9–40, and DC–9–50 series 

airplanes, and Model DC–9–81 (MD– 

81), DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD– 

83), DC–9–87 (MD–87), and MD–88 

airplanes) and MD90–28–010 (for Model 

MD–90–30 airplanes), both Revision 1, 

both dated June 16, 2009. Revision 1 of 

the Boeing service information makes 

minor updates and specifies that no 

additional work is necessary on 

airplanes changed in accordance with 

Boeing Service Bulletin DC9–28–212 or 

MD90–28–010, both dated February 22, 

2008 (referred to in the proposed AD as 

the appropriate sources of service 

information for accomplishing the 

modification). 

Boeing Service Bulletins DC9–28–212 

and MD90–28–010, both Revision 1, 

both dated June 16, 2009, recommend 

concurrent accomplishment of the 

modification specified in Argo-Tech 

Service Bulletin 398000–28–2, Revision 

1, dated December 2, 2008. Argo-Tech 

Service Bulletin 398000–28–2, dated 

November 8, 2007, was referred to in the 

proposed AD as the appropriate source 

of service information for accomplishing 

a concurrent modification of the fuel 

boost pumps. 

We have revised paragraphs (c), (g), 

and (h) of this AD to reference Revision 

1 of the applicable Boeing and ArgoTech service information. We have also 

added a new paragraph (i) to this AD 

(and reidentified subsequent 

paragraphs) to give credit for actions 

done in accordance with the original 

issues of the Boeing and Argo-Tech 

service information. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received. 

Request for Alternative Method of 

Compliance (AMOC) 

American Airlines (AA) asks that we 

revise the modification requirements in 

the NPRM, and in lieu of the 

modification, a one-time inspection of 

each affected fuel boost pump be 

mandated to ensure that the stator lead 

wire is of proper length and positioned 

away from the pump rotor/shaft 

assembly. AA states that after operating 

the affected airplanes for over 24 years 

with over 75,000,000 flight hours in 

service, it has not found any chafing of 

the fuel pump lead wire during shop 

teardown. 

We do not agree with the commenter’s 

request. We have determined that a onetime inspection of the wiring leads 

would not be effective at preventing a 

single failure within the pump from 

creating an ignition source. Argo-Tech, 

the original equipment manufacturer 

(OEM), has reported two instances of 

lead wire contact with the rotor 

assembly, which could have resulted in 

chafing and energized rotor assembly. 

Therefore, the data provided by this 

commenter does not support the request 

to utilize one-time inspections in lieu of 

the modifications required by this AD. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Request for Risk Assessment 

The Air Transport Association (ATA) 

on behalf of its member AA 

recommends that we update our risk 

assessment in view of service data 

provided in the AA comments, in 

addition to the current fleet size and 

remaining service lives of the affected 

airplanes. ATA also suggests correcting 

the deficiencies noted in the service 

instructions (specified under ‘Request to 

Revise Argo-Tech Service Information’) 

and publishing a supplemental NPRM 

after those discrepancies are corrected. 

AA asks that prior to issuing the AD 

we accomplish a risk assessment 

regarding fuel tank system safety that 

takes into account the number of Model 

DC–9, MD–80 and MD–90 airplanes 

estimated to be operating within the 

compliance times required by the AD. 

AA also asks for the projected 

operational life of these airplanes after 

the AD compliance date and wants the 

results of this risk assessment reported 

to Boeing and affected operators. AA 

states that, when the FAA evaluated 

these design reviews, it established four 

criteria intended to define the unsafe 

conditions associated with fuel tank 

systems that require corrective actions. 

AA adds that the percentage of 

operating time during which fuel tanks 

are exposed to flammable conditions is 

one of these criteria; the other three 

criteria address the failure types under 

evaluation. AA notes that the evaluation 

apparently did not take into 

consideration the number of Model DC– 

9, MD–80 and MD–90 airplanes in 

operation. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

request. Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) resulted in 

design approval holder (DAH) 

evaluation of the fuel tank system 

design and identification of failures 

within the fuel tank system that could 

result in ignition sources. We evaluated 

the analyses provided by the DAH and 

determined that foreseeable single 

failures of the fuel pump could result in 

an ignition source. As a result, we 

determined that mandatory corrective 

action is needed to correct single 

failures that could result in an ignition 

source. SFAR 88—Mandatory Action 

Decision Criteria Memorandum, dated 

February 25, 2003, specifies SFAR 88 

AD determination is based on unsafe 

condition evaluation criteria, including 

single failures that can result in a 

catastrophic failure. We have made no 

change to the AD in this regard. 


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Request To Change NPRM 

Requirements 

ATA, on behalf of its member AA, 

requests that we do not require a design 

change that is a reliability enhancement. 

AA requests that the NPRM requirement 

to replace the current pump connectors 

with gold-plated connector pins, as 

specified in the applicable service 

bulletins and NPRM, be changed. AA 

states that installation of gold-plated 

connector pins is not an SFAR 88- 

related design change intended for 

preventing an ignition source. AA adds 

that the installation of gold-plated pins 

is intended to improve the reliability of 

the connector interface. AA also notes 

that the cost to install gold-plated pins 

is $1,352 per pump. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

concern and provide the following 

clarification. This AD does not require 

using gold-plated connector pins to 

install the pumps, although the ArgoTech service information recommends 

installing the new pump assembly 

electrical connector using gold-plated 

connector pins; the accomplishment 

instructions do not specify that only 

gold-plated connector pins must be 

installed. Installation of gold-plated 

pins is a reliability improvement and is 

not identified as a design change 

solution to mitigate ignition source 

caused by an energized rotor assembly. 

Energized rotor assembly could result 

from chafing of fuel pump internal lead 

wires to the rotor assembly; therefore, 

we are not mandating the installation of 

gold-plated connector pins. We have 

made no change to the AD in this 

regard. 

Request To Identify Additional 

Guidance 

AA asks that the NPRM refer to FAA 

Advisory Circular (AC) 20–62D, dated 

May 24, 1996, as guidance for 

acceptable, equivalent consumable 

materials and parts for use during 

modification of the fuel boost pumps in 

accordance with 14 CFR 43.13(c). AA 

states that the procedures in Argo-Tech 

Service Bulletin 398000–28–2 do not 

allow operators to use such materials. 

AA notes that in some cases it does not 

stock certain adhesives, conversion 

coatings, sealants, etc., due to supplier 

delivery issues, the identification of 

improved products, standardization 

efforts, and health and/or environmental 

issues. AA adds that it has identified 

acceptable, equivalent materials that 

meet or exceed the performance of the 

original materials; operation of the fleet 

depends on identifying and utilizing 

acceptable, equivalent materials for 

airplane maintenance. AA concludes 

that AC 20–62D provides information 

and guidance for use in determining the 

quality, eligibility, and traceability of 

aeronautical parts and materials 

intended for installation on U.S. typecertificated products and to enable 

compliance with the applicable 

regulations. AA notes that this AC does 

not exclude ADs or other regulatory 

actions from its applicability, and 

contends that the guidance in this AC is 

applicable to the NPRM. 

Although it is true that FAA AC 20– 

62D, dated May 24, 1996, in general 

applies to owner/operator maintenance 

and repair practices in use prior to 

issuance of SFAR 88, we do not agree 

that this AD should refer to AC 20–62D 

as guidance. During development of 

SFAR 88 we received reports of ignition 

sources being created by lack of control 

of past maintenance and overhaul 

practices. We included a requirement 

that critical design configuration control 

limitation be defined by the DAH so that 

doing maintenance or overhaul would 

not inadvertently bypass safety critical 

design features of the fuel tank system. 

We have determined that past 

maintenance practices for fuel systems 

using the guidelines of AC 20–62D are 

not applicable to the fuel system type 

design changes mandated by SFAR 88. 

The requirements of this AD take 

precedence over the guidelines of AC 

20–62D. The commenter suggested it 

has identified ‘‘acceptable equivalent 

materials that that meet or exceed the 

performance of the original materials.’’ 

The commenter must request AMOC 

approvals from the FAA for these 

materials. Therefore, we have made no 

change to the AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise Argo-Tech Service 

Information 

AA asks that we direct Argo-Tech to 

revise Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 

398000–28–2, dated November 8, 2007, 

to include the following specific 

tolerances to avoid potential AD 

enforcement issues for AA and other 

operators. 

• Include an appropriate minimum 

radius for the noted dimension in Figure 

1, ‘‘Machining Mask,’’ of that Argo-Tech 

service bulletin. AA notes that it does 

not have a tolerance call-out on the 1.25 

diameter drill or cut-through dimension. 

• Include an appropriate minimum 

radius in Figure 2, ‘‘Housing Machine 

Details,’’ of that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin. AA notes that it does not have 

a minimum dimension for the ‘‘R 0.010 

Max’’ radius dimension. AA adds that 

some amount of radius (greater than R 

0.000) is necessary at the locations 

shown; therefore the minimum radius 

should be specified. 

• Include an appropriate maximum 

dimension in Step 3.D.16 of that ArgoTech service bulletin which specifies 

‘‘Etch wire insulation of 4 stator lead 

wires and ground lead wire ends a 

minimum of 0.75 inch (19 mm) using 

Teflon etchant (Tetra-Etch).’’ AA infers 

that there is a corresponding maximum 

dimension for this task. 

• Correct and clarify Step 3.D.17 of 

that Argo-Tech service bulletin, which 

specifies ‘‘Strip 0.25 +/¥ 0.625 inch.’’ 

AA notes that the tolerance for this 

dimension is greater than the nominal 

dimension. AA adds that it is not 

common practice to have .XXX 

tolerance on .XX dimension. 

• Include appropriate dimension for 

Step 3.D.19 of that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin which specifies ‘‘1 inch (25 

mm) maximum exposed lead wire 

length permissible at connector end 

after potting.’’ AA infers that there is a 

corresponding minimum dimension to 

adhere to for this task. 

• Include an appropriate tolerance for 

Step 3.D.21 of that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin which specifies ‘‘Lead wires 

must exit potting cup at 45 degree 

angle.’’ AA requests the following 

additional changes: 

• Allow ‘‘industry accepted’’ 

alternative methods of compliance for 

part reidentification (including vibroetch, if acceptable) and permanent 

marker (Sharpie). AA notes that Step 

3.D.31 of that Argo-Tech service bulletin 

specifies ‘‘Ink stamp new stator and 

housing assembly part number (219980– 

1) on stator and housing assembly.’’ AA 

adds that many repair stations and 

operators (including AA) do not 

reidentify parts using ink stamps; an ink 

stamp identification process would 

typically be used by a type certificate 

holder (TCH) or OEM, but not by an 

operator. AA states that there are many 

acceptable ‘‘industry standard’’ methods 

for reidentification of parts, including 

vibro-etch (for ‘‘non-fatigue’’ critical 

parts) and permanent marker (Sharpie). 

• Remove the type of material 

specified on page 5, paragraph C.(2) of 

that Argo-Tech service bulletin, ‘‘Parts 

and Material Supplied by the Operator’’ 

which references ‘‘Primer, Yellow, Zinc 

Chromate, P/N TT–P–1757.’’ AA notes 

that the reference to this material should 

be removed because it is not called out 

in the Accomplishment Instructions of 

that Argo-Tech service bulletin. AA 

adds that this material is called out in 

the component maintenance manual 

(CMM 28–20–6), but only for protecting 

pins used in the Volute assembly, which 

is not affected by the NPRM. AA states 

that this product is a known carcinogen 

and many operators (including AA) and 


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repair stations have removed it from 

inventory. 

We acknowledge the inconsistencies 

in Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000– 

28–2, dated November 8, 2007, as noted 

above by the commenter. As specified 

under ‘‘Explanation of Relevant Service 

Information,’’ above, Argo-Tech has 

revised the subject service bulletin to 

provide clarification and address all of 

the inconsistencies noted. We have 

revised this AD to refer to the revised 

Argo-Tech service bulletin. 

AA also requests that there be a 

change in the language in Step 3.D.18 of 

Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000–28– 

2, dated November 8, 2007, which 

specifies ‘‘Solder leads to receptacle 

connector (50) per MIL–STD–2000 

***’’ to read ‘‘Solder leads to 

receptacle connector (50) per MIL–STD– 

2000 (or equivalent procedure).’’ AA 

notes that in some cases it utilizes 

internal process specifications to 

accomplish the equivalent of industry 

standard processes. AA adds that its 

Material and Process Specification P17– 

1 STD–2000 provides soldering 

processes equivalent to MIL–STD–2000. 

We do not agree that the language in 

Step 3.D.18 of that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin should be changed. The process 

specified reflects the pump design 

standard as qualified by Boeing and 

Argo-Tech, and certified by the FAA in 

accordance with Boeing compliance 

data. In addition, the process is CDCCL 

controlled in the associated fuel pump 

component maintenance manual. ArgoTech has revised Argo-Tech Service 

Bulletin 398000–28–2 to provide 

clarification for the language in Step 

3.D.18 of that service bulletin. 

In addition, AA points out that page 

5, paragraph C.(2) of that Argo-Tech 

service bulletin specifies in ‘‘Parts and 

Material Supplied by the Operator’’ 

under ‘‘Curing Agent, Epoxy Resin, P/N 

Versamid 125’’ that ‘‘EPI–CURE–3125’’ is 

equivalent to ‘‘Versamid 125.’’ AA notes 

that the specified curing agent is no 

longer procurable under the name 

‘‘Versamid 125,’’ and according to its 

purchasing department ‘‘EPI–CURE 

3125’’ is the same product. AA asks that 

this clarification be included. 

We do not agree that the requested 

clarification should be included in that 

Argo-Tech service bulletin. Argo-Tech 

continues to use and procure Versamid 

125, which is also a CDCCL-controlled 

consumable in the associated fuel pump 

component maintenance manual. We 

have made no change to the AD in this 

regard. 

Request To Revise Boeing Service 

Information 

AA asks that we direct Boeing to 

revise Boeing Service Bulletins DC9– 

28–212 and MD90–28–010, both dated 

February 22, 2008, to accurately depict 

the physical boundaries of the center 

wing tank. AA states that page 7 of 

Boeing Service Bulletin DC9–28–212 

illustrates a typical ‘‘twinjet’’ airplane 

and shows the correct locations of the 

forward and aft auxiliary tanks for 

Model DC–9 and MD–80 airplanes. AA 

notes that the center wing tank is not 

illustrated properly because the drawing 

points to what appears to be a small 

access panel on the right wing. AA adds 

that past experience indicates that 

service bulletin illustrations can often 

be inconsistent with the configuration of 

the actual airplanes, engines, or 

components. AA indicates that this 

issue was found during an FAA audit of 

ADs on Model MD–80 fleet in April 

2008; the findings indicated that some 

of the illustrations used to conduct the 

audit did not accurately reflect the 

production or post-production 

configuration of the airplane affected by 

the AD. 

We do not agree with the commenter. 

As specified under ‘‘Explanation of 

Relevant Service Information,’’ above, 

Boeing has revised the Boeing service 

bulletins referred to in the NPRM. 

However, per the Boeing type design 

and maintenance manual data, the 

center wing tank pumps and access door 

are located on the right wing, not the 

left, as inferred by the commenter. 

Therefore, we have made no change to 

the AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise Certain Sections in 

the Argo-Tech Service Information 

AA asks that we direct Argo-Tech to 

revise the illustrations in the figures 

depicted in the stator and housing 

assembly modification procedure in 

Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000–28– 

2, dated November 8, 2007, to include 

the following note: 

Note: The configuration illustrated in this 

figure is for reference only, and may vary 

from the operator’s configuration. Any 

discrepancies between the illustration and 

the operator’s configuration do not 

necessarily constitute non-compliance with 

the requirements of this SB. 

AA adds that past experience 

indicates that service bulletin 

illustrations can often be inconsistent 

with the configuration of the actual 

airplane, engine, or components. AA 

notes that this issue was brought to light 

during an FAA audit of ADs on the 

Model MD–80 fleet in April 2008; the 

findings indicated that some of the 

illustrations used to conduct the audit 

did not accurately reflect the production 

or post-production configuration of the 

airplane affected by the AD. AA adds 

that the FAA claimed these 

discrepancies were findings of noncompliance. 

We do not agree with the commenter. 

The figures included in that Argo-Tech 

service bulletin reflect the pump design 

standard qualified by Boeing and ArgoTech and certified by the FAA in 

accordance with Boeing compliance 

data. A review of that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin shows that none of the figures 

contain ‘‘reference only’’ information; 

therefore, it would not be consistent to 

label some parts of the figures and not 

others. Including a ‘‘reference only’’ note 

may allow an obvious part discrepancy 

to escape further scrutiny. Therefore, we 

have made no change to the AD in this 

regard. 

AA also asks that we direct Argo-Tech 

to revise Figure 2 [‘‘Housing Machining 

Details’’] of that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin, to include the following note 

regarding deviations: 

Note: Deviations to the requirements of 

Argo-Tech SB 398000–28–2 that are reviewed 

and approved in writing by Argo-Tech are 

considered FAA-approved Alternative Means 

of Compliance (AMOCs) to the requirements 

of this AD. 

AA states that, Figure 2 includes 

specific machining dimensions for the 

housing; during the process of 

machining and inspecting parts in its 

shops, it occasionally finds 

discrepancies between the dimensional 

specifications contained in the repair or 

modification procedures and the actual 

measured dimensions on the part. AA 

adds that in these cases, it contacts the 

TCH or the OEM, as applicable, to 

request and obtain technical 

concurrence to deviate from 

dimensional specifications. AA notes 

that since that Argo-Tech service 

bulletin is a subject of the NPRM, it 

would also need to request and obtain 

an AMOC approval for this deviation. 

AA concludes that if the published AD 

has provisions to allow the OEM to 

review, disposition, and approve minor 

deviations to the dimensional 

specifications contained in that ArgoTech service bulletin, it would alleviate 

the need for operators to request 

individual AMOC approvals from the 

FAA for these deviations. 

We do not agree with the commenter. 

Dimensional tolerances, as provided by 

the OEM, must be maintained to make 

sure a part is within the design 

specification limits and is maintained 

and operated in accordance with the 

instructions for continued airworthiness 


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75876 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 7, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

(ICA) of the certificated product. Any 

deviations must be reviewed and 

approved; therefore, we can not preapprove an AMOC procedure for 

addressing all future unforeseeable 

quality issues in any AD. We have made 

no change to the AD in this regard. 

Request To Include Revisions to 

Component Maintenance Manual 

(CMM) 

AA asks that we direct Argo-Tech to 

revise any references to CMM 28–20–6 

to include ‘‘Revision 6,’’ which is the 

mandated revision level specified in 

related rulemaking (AD 2008–11–15). 

AA states that paragraphs 1.K.1 and L. 

of Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000– 

28–2, dated November 8, 2007, list 

‘‘Component Maintenance Manual 28– 

20–6’’ with no revision level specified, 

and there are several references to 

‘‘CMM’’ in paragraph 3., 

‘‘Accomplishment Instructions,’’ with no 

revision level specified. AA adds that, 

to ensure consistency and strict legal 

compliance in regard to work 

accomplished on the subject fuel boost 

pumps (and volutes), that Argo-Tech 

service bulletin should specify that all 

work be done in accordance with CMM 

28–20–6, Revision 6. 

We do not agree with the commenter. 

The CMM revision level is not specified 

in that Argo-Tech service bulletin since 

the special compliance item (SCI) is the 

controlling critical design configuration 

control limitation (CDCCL) definition 

document, so the need for AMOCs 

related to CMM revisions is not an 

issue. The compliance time in this AD 

is 5 years, and the CMM could be 

revised several times during that period. 

Specifying the CMM revision level in 

Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000–28– 

2 would necessitate revising both the 

Argo-Tech and Boeing service bulletins 

after every revision of the CMM, which 

would require operators to request an 

AMOC for each Boeing service bulletin 

revision. In light of these facts, we have 

made no change to the AD. 

Request To Clarify Certain Actions in 

Paragraph (g) 

Northwest Airlines (NWA) agrees 

with the intent of the NPRM. NWA asks 

that we include a clarification in 

paragraph (f) of the NPRM that excludes 

post-production removal of an auxiliary 

fuel tank to release operators from doing 

actions in the Boeing service 

information that no longer apply. NWA 

states that this would prevent the need 

for an AMOC request. 

We agree with the commenter. The 

actions required by paragraph (g) of this 

AD (referred to as paragraph (f) in the 

NPRM) do not apply to certain 

airplanes; therefore, we have clarified 

the language in paragraph (g) to specify 

that, for airplanes on which the 

auxiliary fuel tanks have been removed, 

the actions do not apply. 

Request To Clarify Unsafe Condition 

Boeing asks that we clarify the 

description of the unsafe condition to 

note that the potential fuel tank ignition 

source, an energized fuel pump rotor 

assembly, is not caused by 

uncommanded or dry operation of the 

fuel boost pumps. Boeing states that 

uncommanded running of a fuel pump 

results from failures in its command and 

control electrical circuit and does not 

contribute to development of an 

energized rotor assembly condition. 

Boeing adds that a fuel pump inlet 

exposed to the ullage (dry operation of 

a fuel pump) is a necessary condition 

for propagation of an ignition source 

into the fuel tank, but does not 

contribute to development of an 

energized rotor assembly condition. 

We agree with the commenter for the 

reasons provided. We have changed the 

description of the unsafe condition 

accordingly. 

Request To Revise Costs of Compliance 

Section 

AA asks that we incorporate more 

accurate labor estimates. AA states that 

for Group 1, Configurations 1 and 2, the 

NPRM specifies 1 work hour for a total 

cost per product of between $1,550 and 

$16,118. AA notes that the cost impact 

estimates do not take into account the 

cost to accomplish the modification in 

the shop. AA adds that for those 

airplanes the estimate should be 9 work 

hours at an average rate of $90 per work 

hour; for a total cost of $2,385 and 

$2,940 for parts per MD–82 airplane. 

Total labor and parts cost would be 

$5,325 per MD–82 airplane. AA 

concludes that the total fleet cost would 

be $1,262,025. 

AA also states that for Group 3, 

Configurations 1 and 2, the NPRM 

specifies 3 work hours for a total cost 

per product of between $1,710 and 

$16,278. AA notes that the cost impact 

estimates do not take into account the 

cost to accomplish the modification in 

the shop. AA adds that for those 

airplanes the estimate should be 27 

work hours at an average labor rate of 

$90 per work hour, for a total cost of 

$2,430 and $8,820 for parts per MD–83 

airplane. AA concludes that the total 

fleet cost would be $1,035,000. 

After considering the data presented 

by commenter, we agree that the 

number of work hours required is higher 

than our previous estimate, although not 

as high as provided by the commenter. 

Depending on operator’s capabilities to 

change (modify and reinstall) a pump 

we have provided two estimates; a 

minimum and a maximum cost per 

airplane. The minimum cost represents 

the cost for operators who have repair 

shop resources and the capability to 

modify a pump and reinstall it. The 

maximum cost represents the cost for 

operators who choose to replace the 

pump with an OEM pump. The total 

labor hours to change (modify and 

reinstall) a pump by operators is 

approximately 7 hours. The total labor 

hours for replacing a pump with an 

OEM pump is approximately 3 hours. 

Depending on airplane grouping, there 

may be a minimum of 2 pumps or as 

many as 6 pumps per airplane. The cost 

impact information, below, has been 

revised to add a second table to indicate 

this higher amount. 

Explanation of Change to Applicability 

We have changed the applicability in 

this AD to identify model designations 

as published in the most recent type 

certificate data sheet for the affected 

models. 

Explanation of Additional Paragraph in 

the AD 

We have added a new paragraph (e) 

to this AD to provide the Air Transport 

Association (ATA) of America subject 

code 28; Fuel. This code is added to 

make this AD parallel with other new 

AD actions. We have reidentified 

subsequent paragraphs accordingly. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Explanation of Change to Costs of 

Compliance 

Since issuance of the NPRM, we have 

increased the labor rate in the Costs of 

Compliance from $80 per work hour to 

$85 per work hour. The Costs of 

Compliance information, below, reflects 

this increase in the specified hourly 

labor rate. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 804 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The following 

table provides the estimated costs for 

U.S. operators to comply with the 

modification specified in this AD. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 7, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 75877 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Airplane group— 

number of pumps Configuration Work hours 

Average 

labor rate 

per hour 

Parts Cost per product 

Group 1—2 pumps ..... 1 7 per pump ................ $85 Between $1,470 and $7,600 ... Between $4,130 and $16,390. 

Group 1—2 pumps ..... 2 3 per pump ................ 85 $16,038 (per new pump) ......... $32,586. 

Group 3—6 pumps ..... 1 7 per pump ................ 85 Between $1,470 and $7,600 ... Between $12,390 and 

$49,170. 

Group 3—6 pumps ..... 2 3 per pump ................ 85 $16,038 (per new pump) ......... $97,758. 

* Note: For Group 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 airplanes, the costs are calculated by the number of pumps per airplane; the range in the table above includes the fewest to the greatest number of pumps per airplane. Group 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 airplanes are included in that range. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–25–04 McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation: Amendment 39–16537. 

Docket No. FAA–2008–0934; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–113–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective January 11, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas 

Corporation Model DC–9–31, DC–9–32, DC– 

9–32 (VC–9C), DC–9–32F, DC–9–32F (C–9A, 

C–9B), DC–9–33F, DC–9–34, DC–9–34F, DC– 

9–41, DC–9–51, DC–9–81 (MD–81), DC–9–82 

(MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD–83), and DC–9–87 

(MD–87), MD–88, and MD–90–30 airplanes; 

certificated in any category; as identified in 

Boeing Service Bulletins DC9–28–212 and 

MD90–28–010, both Revision 1, both dated 

June 16, 2009. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent possible 

sources of ignition in a fuel tank caused by 

an electrical fault in the fuel boost pumps. 

An ignition source in the fuel tank could 

result in a fire or an explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

Subject 

(e) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

Compliance 

(f) Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

Modification 

(g) Within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD: Modify the fuel boost pumps 

for the center wing, and forward or aft 

auxiliary fuel tanks, as applicable, by doing 

all the applicable actions specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletins DC9–28–212 (for Model 

DC–9–30, DC–9–40, and DC–9–50 series 

airplanes); and Model DC–9–81 (MD–81), 

DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD–83), DC– 

9–87 (MD–87), and MD–88 airplanes) and 

MD90–28–010 (for Model MD–90–30 

airplanes), both Revision 1, both dated June 

16, 2009. For airplanes on which the 

auxiliary fuel tanks have been removed 

before the effective date of this AD, the 

actions for the auxiliary fuel tanks specified 

in this paragraph are not required. 

Prior or Concurrent Action 

(h) Prior to or concurrently with 

accomplishing the modification required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD: Do the modification 

specified in Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 

398000–28–2, Revision 1, dated December 2, 

2008. 

Credit for Actions Done In Accordance With 

Previous Issue of the Service Information 

(i) Actions done before the effective date of 

this AD in accordance with the service 

information identified in Table 1 of this AD 

are acceptable for compliance with the 

corresponding requirements of paragraphs (g) 

and (h) of this AD. 

TABLE 1—CREDIT SERVICE INFORMATION

Document Date 

Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000–28–2 .................................................................................................................................. November 8, 2007. 


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75878 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 7, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

TABLE 1—CREDIT SERVICE INFORMATION—Continued 

Document Date 

Boeing Service Bulletin DC9–28–212 ......................................................................................................................................... February 22, 2008. 

Boeing Service Bulletin MD90–28–010 ...................................................................................................................................... February 22, 2008. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(j)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, ATTN: Serj 

Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion 

Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los Angeles 

Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount 

Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712– 

4137; telephone (562) 627–5254; fax (562) 

627–5210; has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(k) You must use the applicable service 

information contained in Table 2 of this AD 

to do the actions required by this AD, unless 

the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

TABLE 2—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Document Revision Date 

Argo-Tech Service Bulletin 398000–28–2 ................................................................................................................ 1 December 2, 2008. 

Boeing Service Bulletin DC9–28–212 ...................................................................................................................... 1 June 16, 2009. 

Boeing Service Bulletin MD90–28–010 .................................................................................................................... 1 June 16, 2009. 

(2) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & 

Services Management, 3855 Lakewood 

Boulevard, MC D800–0019, Long Beach, 

California 90846–0001; telephone 206–544– 

5000, extension 2; fax 206–766–5683; e-mail 

dse.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. For Argo-Tech 

service information identified in this AD, 

contact Argo-Tech Corporation, 23555 Euclid 

Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44117; telephone 

216–692–6000. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

November 24, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–30518 Filed 12–6–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0670; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–339–AD; Amendment 

39–16526; AD 2010–24–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A318–111 and A318–112 Airplanes and 

Model A319, A320, and A321 Series 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Damage to the lower lateral fittings of the 

80VU rack, typically elongated holes, 

migrated bushes [bushings], and/or missing 

bolts have been reported in-service. In 

addition damage to the lower central support 

fitting (including cracking) has been 

reported. 

In the worst case scenario a complete 

failure of the 80VU fittings in combination 

with a high load factor or strong vibration 

could lead to failure of the rack structure 

and/or computers or rupture/disconnection 

of the cable harnesses to one or more 

computers located in the 80VU. This rack 

contains computers for Flight Controls, 

Communication and Radio-navigation. These 

functions are duplicated across other racks 

but during critical phases of flight the 

multiple system failures/re-configuration 

may constitute an unsafe condition. 

* * * * * 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

January 11, 2011. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of January 11, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–2141; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 

14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that 

would apply to the specified products. 


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