GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Military Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

September 1999 MILITARY 

READINESS

Full Training Benefits 

From Army’s Combat 

Training Centers Are 

Not Being Realized

GAO/NSIAD-99-210

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283334 Letter

September 17, 1999

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Army operates three combat training centers: the National Training 

Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center 

(JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center 

(CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. According to Army Regulation 350-50,1

 the 

Army established the combat training centers for several reasons: (1) to 

increase unit readiness for deployment and warfighting; (2) to produce 

bold, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and operational 

exercises; (3) to embed doctrine throughout the total Army; (4) to provide 

feedback to Army and joint combined participants; and (5) to provide a 

data source for lessons learned to improve doctrine, training, leader 

development, organizations, and materiel focused on soldiers to win in 

combat. To achieve these purposes, the Army spends about $1 billion a 

year to provide training at these centers.

In view of the importance of such training to the Army’s readiness and in 

response to your request, we reviewed the training provided to active Army 

units at these centers. Our objectives were to determine (1) whether units 

training at the centers are adequately prepared for the exercises, (2) 

whether training exercises are realistic in terms of expected battlefield 

conditions, (3) whether pre-positioned equipment adequately supports the 

training mission, (4) how units use lessons learned at the centers, and

(5) how the Army uses the results of the exercises to help revise training 

and improve the Army’s training doctrine. 

In addition to visiting all three centers, we also surveyed all commanders at 

the 123 active-duty battalions that trained at one of the centers during fiscal 

1

This regulation, dated May 25, 1995, establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for Army-wide 

management of the Combat Training Center Program. It is currently being revised.

Letr
B-283334

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

year 1998. The responses we obtained provided us with information on 

home station training prior to deploying to a combat training center (CTC), 

the usefulness of the exercises, and the ability of units to utilize the training 

once they returned to home station. On February 26, 1999, we provided the 

preliminary results of our work during a subcommittee hearing held at 

Nellis Air Force Base.2

Results in Brief Although the majority of units that trained at the Army’s combat training 

centers in 1998 favorably assessed their training, neither the Army nor 

individual units are achieving the full benefits of this training. This is 

because (1) many units are arriving ill prepared for the exercises,

(2) training is not as realistic as it could be, (3) the condition and age of 

pre-positioned equipment has adversely affected training at two centers, 

and (4) neither individual units nor the Army itself is able to effectively 

capitalize on lessons learned from the centers’ exercises.

Personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo have adversely 

affected units’ ability to prepare for their rotations to the centers, and as a 

result, units are arriving ill prepared to engage in the exercises. Although 

units should be proficient at battalion-level tasks when they arrive at the 

centers, many have trained only to the company level, and their leaders 

struggle with the more complicated planning and synchronization tasks 

required for the battalion- and brigade-level exercises conducted at the 

centers. In February 1999, Army Forces Command issued new guidance 

that requires unit commanders to establish training “gates” at their home 

stations to gauge whether their units are prepared to move to more 

complex training levels, including training center exercises. Since the 

guidance does not address the causes of insufficient preparation—

personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo—strict adherence 

to the guidance may simply serve to exclude some units from valuable 

training center experiences.

Because units lack proficiency at the battalion level, the centers routinely 

modify conditions in ways that provide less challenging and thereby less 

realistic scenarios than might be encountered on a real battlefield. The 

centers frequently restrict the use of chemical weapons, mines, obstacles, 

artillery, and tactics, and they do not consistently replicate the conditions 

2

Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not Being 

Realized (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-92, Feb. 2, 1999).

Letr
B-283334

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

that would be expected on future battlefields—terrorist actions, operations 

in urban terrain, civilians on the battlefield, and interactions with the 

media. By limiting conditions and not accurately portraying current and 

future threats, the training centers undermine realism and limit the value of 

training exercises.

The poor condition and age of some pre-positioned equipment at the 

National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center further 

degrade training. At the National Training Center, 15 percent of all tank and 

fighting vehicle crews on average are excluded from training because their 

vehicles are broken down; on some days, the number reaches 25 percent. 

In addition, the older equipment used at both centers differs substantially 

from the equipment soldiers have trained on at home, and valuable training 

time is wasted simply becoming familiar with it. As of July 1999, the Army 

was considering various alternatives to improve pre-positioned equipment 

at the National Training Center.

Commanders cannot take full advantage of the lessons learned at the 

centers due to ineffective take-home materials, a lack of training 

opportunities once they return home, and personnel turnover that prevents 

them from attending to the identified weaknesses. As a result, units are not 

able to address weaknesses identified during training center exercises.

Although the centers have collected large amounts of data, the Army has 

never standardized data collection and therefore cannot combine 

information to assess trends. Nor has the Army established performance 

measures or a methodology to periodically assess whether the centers are 

achieving their objectives. Consequently, the Army cannot take full 

advantage of its lessons learned and does not know the extent to which 

center exercises are improving unit and leader proficiency. Establishing 

such performance measures is consistent with good management 

principles and is consistent with the Government Performance and Results 

Act, which calls on all government entities to evaluate the results of their 

programs through the use of performance measures.

This report makes recommendations to the Secretary of the Army that 

would permit units to conduct limited independent training at the centers 

prior to beginning the actual exercises, improve the realism of training, and 

enable the Army to better capitalize on lessons learned at its centers by 

establishing performance measures and an assessment plan.
B-283334

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Background To achieve the objectives set out in Army Regulation 350-50, the Army 

designed the combat training centers to create a realistic training 

environment, challenge unit leaders with missions against a well-trained 

opposing force, and provide in-depth analyses of performance to units and 

their leaders. Combat training center exercises consist of both 

force-on-force engagements against an opposing force and separate 

live-fire exercises under conditions that are intended to closely parallel 

actual warfare. In addition, the regulation indicates that the scope of 

exercises at the centers should be brigade level or below. Active Army units 

in the United States train at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 

California, or Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, about 

once every 18 months, and those in Europe train at the Combat Maneuver 

Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, about every 12 months. Each of the 

National Guard’s enhanced brigades train at the NTC about once every 8 

years. 

The Army’s three combat training centers offer distinctly different training 

environments. The National Training Center offers an open, mountainous, 

desert setting that allows several battalions to train simultaneously during 

force-on-force exercises against the opposing force. The training area at 

the NTC is roughly the size of Rhode Island. (See fig. 1.)
B-283334

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Figure 1: Desert Environment at the National Training Center

The Combat Maneuver Training Center is the only training area available to 

Army forces in Europe for the conduct of battalion-level exercises. 

According to center officials, geographical limitations of the center’s rolling 

wooded terrain do not allow brigades to train at doctrinal distances, and 

two battalions can only train simultaneously with some acknowledged 

doctrinal degradation. (See fig. 2.)
B-283334

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Wooded Terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center

The training areas at the Joint Readiness Training Center include 

swamplands, dense forests, and simulated civilian villages complete with 

role players, as figure 3 shows.
B-283334

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Mock Civilian Village at the Joint Readiness Training Center

The NTC and the CMTC sponsor exercises designed to train armor and 

mechanized infantry units, such as those from the 1st Armored and 3rd 

Infantry Divisions, in a high intensity threat environment. The JRTC 

provides nonmechanized or light forces, such as the 82nd Airborne and the 

10th Mountain Divisions, with exercises in a low-to-medium threat 

environment. Both centers, however, do provide training for task forces 

made up of heavy and light units operating together. The CMTC and the 

JRTC also have constructed mock towns for training in urban warfare. 

Forces from the other military services as well as special operations units 

are also brought into the exercises at all three centers. Brigades and 

battalions deploy to these centers with their associated combat service and 

service support units.

Each center has an active Army battalion or cavalry regiment, consisting of 

450 to 2,400 soldiers, permanently stationed there to serve as a dedicated 

opposing force. These units are organized and specially trained to replicate 

a hostile force complete with distinctive uniforms, visually modified 

vehicles, and both U.S. and non-U.S. weapons (see fig. 4).
B-283334

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Figure 4: Opposing Force Vehicle and Soldier at the National Training Center

At the NTC and the JRTC, the Army has established pre-positioned stocks 

of equipment that units draw and use during the exercises. The NTC 

equipment consists of about 3,800 major pieces of equipment, including 

tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, personnel carriers, recovery 

vehicles, and various types of wheeled vehicles. Generally, units training at 

the NTC ship their wheeled vehicles and unique equipment items to the 

center, and they draw their tracked vehicles from the pre-positioned 

stocks. The pre-positioned equipment at the JRTC consists of about 1,100 

major pieces of equipment, mainly wheeled vehicles. Units ship their 

tracked vehicles to this center for training. The CMTC does not have a 

pre-positioned stock of equipment.

To add realism to the exercises and provide a real-time assessment of 

casualties, force-on-force exercises are conducted using the Multiple 

Integrated Laser Engagement System. This system, carried on both 

equipment and troops, lets both soldiers and units know immediately if a 

kill or near kill is scored. Separate live-fire exercises at the NTC and CMTC 

(at nearby Grafenwohr) are conducted against sophisticated target arrays 

and involve armor, infantry, artillery, and air elements. At the JRTC, 

live-fire exercises involve operations in urban terrain as well as combined 

arms exercises. The JRTC and the CMTC also conduct mission rehearsal 
B-283334

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

exercise’s3 for units deploying to Bosnia and other contingency operations. 

All of the centers also have a cadre of experienced officers and 

noncommissioned officers who serve as exercise observers and 

controllers. In this capacity, they are responsible for coaching, mentoring, 

and evaluating training units at all levels of organization. The centers also 

provide unit leader training programs for the units prior to their 

deployment to the centers.

The NTC and the JRTC are the joint responsibility of two Army commands 

in the United States: the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command. In Europe, the 7th Army Training 

Command is the parent organization for the CMTC.

Many Units Are Not 

Adequately Prepared 

for Training

Many units arriving at the training centers cannot take full advantage of 

training opportunities because they lack the requisite skills to effectively 

execute brigade- or battalion-level missions,4

 which is the level of training 

that the centers are designed to provide. Over 50 percent of our survey’s 

respondents cited personnel shortages, personnel turnover, or high 

operating tempo as one of their top three reasons for being ill prepared for 

their training experiences. (Other factors reported as adversely affecting 

training are shown in app. I.) The Army Forces Command recently initiated 

actions to establish training gates to certify a unit’s readiness for training 

center exercises. 

Decreased Readiness for 

Battalion-level Training

Senior-level officials at all three training centers acknowledged the units’ 

lack of preparedness for the training. They told us that many units arriving 

for training now are substantially less prepared than in the past. The 

commanders of the opposing forces that we talked to said they had 

observed a marked decline in unit proficiency. For example, the opposing 

force commander from the National Training Center, during congressional 

hearings in February 1999, said that the proficiency level of units arriving at 

the National Training Center is much lower now than in the past. He 

3

Mission rehearsal exercises are designed to train units to conduct peacekeeping operations by 

replicating the operational environment where they will be deployed and providing realistic training 

scenarios.

4

A division is divided into brigades, its brigades into battalions, its battalions into companies, and 

companies into platoons, and platoons into squads. For a unit to operate proficiently at the next level, 

it needs to have developed proficiency at the level below. 
B-283334

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

believes that commanders, staffs, and soldiers at every level—platoon to 

brigade—display a decreasing level of knowledge, skill, and ability to plan, 

conduct, and sustain combat operations. He also told us that, in his 

opinion, training at the NTC would be improved if the training focus were 

changed from the brigade to battalion level. Accompanied by the NTC’s 

Opposing Force (OPFOR) Commander, we observed some of these 

inadequacies ourselves as one training unit conducting a “deliberate 

attack” quickly shifted to a “movement to contact” soon after the exercise 

began. The OPFOR Commander pointed out that (1) the training unit’s 

commander demonstrated no effective command and control over his unit 

and had no reconnaissance plan and (2) his unit had no plan to breach 

obstacles constructed by the OPFOR. He added that this unit was typical 

of most units training at the NTC today. Responses to our questionnaire 

from units that trained at a combat training center in fiscal year 1998 

confirmed this perception. Nearly half of the 96 respondents (47 percent) 

said their unit was only somewhat or marginally ready to execute 

battalion-level tasks at the training center.

According to Army Forces Command documents, during the late 1980s and 

early 1990s, units reporting to the centers had to undergo an external 

evaluation to certify that they were ready for training. Regulations required 

units to be trained at the battalion level at their home station, and the 

training centers provided the next level of proficiency that could not be 

achieved at home station. In March 1998, the Army dropped the 

prerequisites that units train at the battalion level at their home station and 

be certified as trained before undertaking NTC exercises. According to 

training center officials, this change was in recognition of the fact that 

many units were simply unable to meet these requirements due to 

personnel shortages and high operating tempo. According to Forces 

Command Regulation 350-50-2, battalions participating in force-on-force 

training at the JRTC should have completed train-up exercises from 

platoon through battalion level within 6 months of going to the center, but 

this requirement is not enforced for the same reason. The CMTC only 

requires units to arrive with trained platoons rather than trained companies 

or battalions in recognition of home station training constraints. In 

addition, unlike the other centers that conduct battalion- and brigade-level 

exercises during the entire training rotation, the CMTC provides units with 

exercises that start at the platoon level and build toward battalion-level 

exercises.
B-283334

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Factors That Adversely 

Affect Training

Units responding to our survey identified personnel shortages, high 

personnel turnover, and high operating tempo as the three primary reasons 

they were unable to adequately prepare for their training rotations to the 

combat training centers.

Personnel Shortages Personnel shortages affect training at the centers by limiting the options 

commanders have to execute missions. Personnel shortages have many 

causes.5 These include (1) Army-wide shortages of certain specialties and 

personnel at specific levels, such as combat troops, technical specialists, 

experienced officers, and noncommissioned officers; (2) personnel 

transferred to fill vacancies in deploying units; and (3) personnel 

temporarily borrowed from their units to meet other Army or installation 

requirements. As of April 30, 1999, the Army reported an on-board strength 

of about 469,000, which is 11,000 below its authorized strength of 480,000. 

The current on-board number is also about 10,000 less than the on-board 

number from a year ago at this time.

Some shortages are quite pronounced. For example, for fiscal year 1998, 

the infantry battalions that trained at the JRTC on average arrived with only 

42 of their 54 authorized rifle squads. Many of these consisted of six 

soldiers on average rather than the nine authorized. In other words, units 

arrived with only about half of the personnel authorized for their rifle 

squads. In recent testimony, the commanding general of the Seventh Army 

Training Command stated that over the past 18 months, personnel 

shortages caused units to deploy to the CMTC without fully manned 

infantry squads and tanks. He cited that dismounted infantry strength 

averaged 64 percent, ranging from 30 percent to 100 percent, and that only 

80 percent of the tanks had the required number of personnel. 

Results from our survey confirmed the units’ problems with personnel 

shortages. For example, 10 of the 13 units that trained at the CMTC in 

fiscal year 1998 and responded to our questionnaire said that a shortage of 

personnel at the company and platoon level was one of the three factors 

that had the most negative impact on training. According to the 

Commanding General of the Joint Readiness Training Center, insufficient 

staffing is the single biggest factor adversely affecting training. He noted 

that units that arrive at the center under strength cannot effectively train or 

5

Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, Mar. 20, 1998).
B-283334

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

maximize their training experience. Of the 36 units that trained at the JRTC 

in fiscal year 1998 and responded to our questionnaire, 18 said that a 

shortage of personnel was one of the primary factors that negatively 

affected battalion-level training for the exercises. Written comments 

provided by units responding to our survey were also revealing, as shown 

in the following examples:

“At the time of the rotation, I could only man 18 of the 24 Blackhawks in my battalion. 

Personnel shortages in both aircrews and senior NCO’s adversely affected the training 

during our rotation.”

“The impact of personnel shortages is obvious when examined against the requirements of 

an Infantry Company and platoon. The battalion was short one line platoon per company. 

We were given approximately two weeks prior to deployment to integrate a platoon from a 

sister battalion. The lack of key leaders in the 11-20 [infantry-sergeant] series had a negative 

impact on company commanders’ and platoon leaders’ ability to conduct effective training.”

“Prior to NTC, personnel statistics [overall level of manning] were 85 percent. Shortages at 

the platoon level leadership impacted on small unit proficiency/effectiveness. Unit 

maintained two rifle platoons instead of the TOE [authorized] three platoons.”

“The battalion went to the NTC at 80 percent fill and 20 percent of the personnel were new.”

“We were not plussed up [augmented from other units] to attend our CTC training. My 

company-sized units were authorized 70 soldiers but deployed with only 55.”

“The battalion borrowed 16 tank crews from other units to field enough tanks to fight at the 

NTC. Also [the unit] went into platoon/company training with only 2 of 14 tank drivers 

trained to properly operate their vehicles.”

Personnel Turnover Personnel turnover also hampers units preparing for their rotations to the 

training centers. Of the 96 units that responded to our survey, 49 said that 

turnover had the most negative impact on battalion-level training at home 

station, and 54 said that turnover had the most negative impact at the 

company and platoon levels (see app. I).

More than half of the respondents to our questionnaire said that personnel 

turnover had a negative impact on company- and battalion-level training. 

Many told us that personnel turnover requires them to teach basic tasks 

more often, which reduces the time available to develop proficiency at 

higher levels. Some of the specific comments provided included the 

following:
B-283334

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

“High personnel turnover coupled with a shortage of Non-Commissioned Officers degraded 

the battalions’ ability to train and sustain readiness levels. New soldiers entering the 

battalion may not have a first line supervisor to train them.”

“120 days before going to the NTC, the battalion had massive personnel turnover. 

Examples: 39 percent turnover of warrant officers, 33 percent turnover of crew chiefs,

54 percent turnover of armament repairers. We went to the NTC with troops that had no 

home station training with the unit.”

“Personnel turnover at the mid grade and senior level NCO [levels] doesn’t allow the unit to 

build a solid base. Assignments to Recruiting Command, AC/RC, [active personnel 

supporting reserve component units] Korea and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), they all 

continue to eat away from your NCO experience within the battalion. The continuous drain 

of NCOs from the battalion after a CTC rotation decreases readiness and unit cohesion.”

High Operating Tempo The Department of Defense’s (DOD) October-December 1998 Quarterly 

Readiness Report highlighted high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) as a key 

factor that has stressed today’s Army. It noted that force size had 

decreased 34 percent since the end of the Cold War, while missions had 

increased 300 percent. As of mid-February 1999, brigades or task forces 

from all but 3 of the Army's 10 divisions were either committed to certain 

parts of the world or were preparing for or recovering from contingency 

operations. In addition, in June 1999, elements of another division (the 

82nd Airborne Division) were committed to operations in Kosovo. The 

Army’s contribution to the international security force in Kosovo, in 

addition to existing commitments in Bosnia and elsewhere, are likely to 

further degrade training at home stations. Units in Europe will be 

especially affected since the 1st Infantry Division in Germany has been 

tasked to provide the majority of the Army’s contribution to that effort. 

The increase in operations other than war (OOTW) since 1991 has 

significantly affected the ability of U.S. military forces to prepare and 

continue to be ready for expected wartime missions. As we reported in 

May 1999,6

 OOTW has affected the combat capability of the military 

services, especially Army units because they generally require more 

recovery time. While the primary mission of combat units is the 

destruction of enemy forces, OOTW primarily focus on peacekeeping tasks 

such as conducting presence patrols, inspecting weapons storage sites, and 

establishing checkpoints. Because units do not conduct armored 

6

Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies (GAO/NSIAD-99-69, 

May 24, 1999).
B-283334

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

maneuver operations and are relieved from gunnery qualification 

requirements while engaged in OOTW, the skills of individual personnel as 

well as entire units decline. For example, units from the 1st Infantry and 

1st Armored Divisions located in Germany were unable to train on many 

mission-essential tasks at the company- or battalion-levels during repeated 

deployments to Bosnia. Therefore, officials at the Combat Maneuver 

Training Center adjusted their training model for units from these divisions 

to reflect a decreased skill level in units. Several days were set aside at the 

beginning of training for the units to conduct uninterrupted training at the 

company level to refine skills prior to beginning exercises against the 

opposing force. Unit and center officials told us that this time spent at the 

beginning of the rotation paid great dividends during the remainder of the 

training exercises because they were better prepared to fully participate.

Of the 96 units who responded to our questionnaire, 48 said that OPTEMPO 

had a significant negative effect on training at the company and platoon 

levels at home stations. The following are representative of the comments 

provided by many of the respondents: 

“High OPTEMPO and personnel tempo virtually eliminate any opportunity to conduct 

meaningful collective training or develop strategies for correcting deficiencies .”

“There is too much on everyone’s agenda. As soon as we returned from JRTC, [I] sent

3 companies to Southwest Asia and 1 company to Haiti.”

“[It is] difficult to conduct battalion-level training while [the] unit is being asked to provide 

people and equipment to support multiple brigade and above taskings.”

“High OPTEMPO severely limits the battalion’s collective training opportunity. You simply 

move from one ‘big event’ to the next without chance to pause, evaluate, [or] develop [a] 

strategy to correct deficiencies.”

Since February 1999, when we reported our preliminary findings at a 

congressional hearing, the Army has taken steps to address the 

preparedness of units for combat training center exercises and the 

adequacy of equipment used during the exercises.

Training Gates Established 

to Certify Units’ Readiness 

to Train at Higher Levels

On February 26, 1999, the Commanding General of Army Forces Command 

issued new training guidance to all unit commanders. This guidance, which 

is expected to be fully implemented by the end of fiscal year 2000, requires 

all unit commanders to establish clearly defined objective criteria to serve 

as “gates” during home station training for determining whether their unit 
B-283334

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

is prepared to move to a more complex training level. The guidance 

requires units to develop a certification program that includes an 

assessment of whether units, staffs, and leaders are prepared for the next 

higher level of training. Unit assessments will be made using the training 

tasks, training conditions, and performance standards contained in the 

Army Training and Evaluation Program guidance that the U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has developed for each type of 

Army unit.

The guidance also established home station training gates for units 

preparing to conduct combat training center exercises. For example, 

active units must complete an externally evaluated battalion task force 

maneuver exercise, a company and task force fire coordination exercise to 

synchronize both direct and indirect fire weapon systems, platoon-level 

gunnery exercises, and a certification that unit staffs are proficient in 

making tactical decisions. According to the guidance, battalions that do 

not demonstrate proficiency through the formal external evaluation 

process must be retrained and demonstrate proficiency before going to a 

training center.

Army Forces Command officials expect the gate strategy to have a positive 

effect on training by identifying unit shortfalls and requiring units to 

develop basic proficiency foundations before progressing to more complex 

training. The guidance issued by Forces Command, however, does not 

address how commanders might overcome the factors that they told us had 

the most negative impact on developing proficiency at home stations: that 

is, personnel shortages, personnel turnover, and operating tempo. These 

factors are not likely to dissipate, and they will make it difficult for 

commanders to achieve the goals of this new initiative. Under this training 

strategy, it is possible that some units might be precluded from a combat 

training center experience if they are unable to demonstrate the required 

proficiency. Also, there is an additional consequence of this strategy in that 

the OPTEMPO for leaders of the units not going to the CTCs will increase, 

because the external evaluators must come from units not preparing for 

CTC exercises.
B-283334

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Training Conditions 

Are Routinely Limited 

and Current Threat Not 

Always Portrayed 

According to Army Regulation 350-50, training at the combat training 

centers is designed to increase a units’ proficiency by replicating the most 

realistic and challenging battlefield available. However, because units are 

arriving at the centers with lower levels of proficiency than in the past, the 

training centers now routinely adjust training conditions to compensate for 

the degradation. The centers routinely limit the capability of their 

opposing force by restricting its use of chemical weapons, mines, 

obstacles, artillery, and tactics. The following examples illustrate these 

limits:

• A ceiling is placed on the numbers, types, and times that the opposing 

force can use chemical weapons and mines. As a result, units that 

initially demonstrate a low level of training in chemical environment 

operations or breaching mine obstacles will face fewer of these events.

• A ceiling is also imposed on the numbers, types, and time of 

employment for artillery. The opposing force commander must obtain 

permission to use additional artillery above this ceiling from center 

officials, who determine whether the additional artillery fires will 

detract from the training objectives.

• Opposing force reconnaissance elements are now limited to destroying 

a specific number of friendly vehicles with artillery at night. This limit is 

imposed to ensure that training units have sufficient forces to 

commence their mission in the morning.

Officials at the centers emphasized that providing scenarios with the most 

challenging conditions versus limiting the conditions to better match unit 

capabilities involves trade-offs. On the one hand, it makes sense to limit 

exercise complexity so units can accomplish some training objectives. 

However, on the other hand, without exposure to the full spectrum of 

threat that units will almost certainly face, units may not be adequately 

prepared to face the most demanding threats. Moreover, as one Army 

official told us, many commanders come away from their training with an 

unrealistically high assessment of their individual and unit capabilities 

because they leave the centers thinking that their units performed well, 

when serious unit weaknesses might have been uncovered had training 

conditions not been adjusted to reduce exercise complexity.

In addition to a less challenging battlefield, the NTC and the CMTC, for the 

most part, are still using a 1970s Soviet threat model to replicate specific 

enemy capabilities. In the future, however, DOD officials believe that U.S. 

forces will most likely face a different type of threat, one whose systems 
B-283334

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

are not fully known in advance of conflict and one that will require new 

approaches to defeat. They also believe that operations in urban settings, 

terrorist activities, and civilians on the battlefield will typify future threats 

and conditions. Past operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and more 

recently the situation in Kosovo show that the Army’s mechanized and 

nonmechanized forces may need to be prepared to conduct their traditional 

missions (attack, defend, and movement to contact) in urban settings 

where civilians are present and concerns about collateral damage are real. 

Moreover, these operations have shown the importance of knowing how to 

effectively deal with local foreign officials and the media. These 

conditions, however, are not realistically portrayed at all the combat 

training centers. Table 1, which summarizes our observations and data 

provided by officials at the centers, shows that the Joint Readiness Training 

Center has done the most to incorporate expected conditions into its 

exercises, while the National Training Center has done the least.

Table 1: Comparison of Training Features at the Army’s Combat Training Centers

Source: Developed by GAO from data provided by CTC officials.

Officials from all the training centers told us that the JRTC more 

completely portrays the complex environment that units and leaders 

operate in today because it was established to train Special Operations 

Forces and light forces that in the past were tasked to address these types 

of complexities. In contrast, armored units training at the NTC and CMTC 

have been tasked primarily with planning, developing, and maintaining the 

capability to conduct open-area maneuver warfare. According to the 

Commanding General of the NTC, however, this is not the case today 

because Operation Desert Storm showed potential enemies that they 

cannot win on open ground against U.S. forces. Consequently, in his view, 

future conflicts will draw all types of forces into cities and urban areas 

where the enemy can mix with the general population. The Army’s Forces 

Command is studying how to sustain the training relevancy of the combat 

National Training Center

Joint Readiness Training 

Center

Combat Maneuver Training 

Center

Operations in urban terrain No Yes Limited to dismounted infantry

Terrorist activities Usually limited to security tests Yes No

Civilians on the battlefield Usually confined to one 

roadblock

Yes Based on unit proficiency

Dealings with local officials Only before exercises begin Yes Based on unit proficiency

Media on the battlefield Only before exercises begin Yes Based on unit proficiency
B-283334

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

training centers, and it plans to change the opposing force tactics and 

training scenarios at all centers by the end of the first quarter in fiscal

year 2001 to make them more relevant to threats and mission requirements 

expected in the next 10 to 15 years. We are currently reviewing the 

services’ efforts to train their personnel in urban warfare in more detail, 

and expect to issue our report in early 2000.

Maintenance Problems 

and Aging Equipment 

Limit Training

Pre-positioned equipment at the NTC and JRTC does not adequately 

support the centers’ training mission. A high rate of use at the NTC makes 

equipment maintenance a challenge, and, despite additional funding from 

the Congress, many tank and fighting vehicle crews are excluded from 

training because their vehicles are broken down. In addition, the majority 

of units training at both the NTC and JRTC lose valuable training time as 

they learn to operate equipment that is much older than the equipment they 

use and maintain at home stations. The Army has no pre-positioned 

equipment at the CMTC.

Maintenance Problems The equipment pre-positioned at the NTC is driven three to five times as 

many miles each year as any unit’s home station equipment, according to 

the NTC commander. Each tank and fighting vehicle at the NTC is run 

about 3,000 miles per year. Such usage, compounded by the rugged terrain, 

heat, and sand at the NTC, creates a significant maintenance challenge for 

center officials.

To meet this challenge, the center uses a combination of contractor 

services and Army personnel for maintaining equipment. The contractor is 

responsible for servicing the equipment, and two Army direct support 

companies and one general support company stationed at the center make 

repairs.7

 According to Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1, paragraph 

3-5a, the NTC also maintains two brigade sets of equipment designed to 

ensure equipment issued to a training unit is operationally ready. Despite 

these efforts, the Army Inspector General and Army Forces Command 

separately reported the typical unit begins training with only 85 percent to 

90 percent of needed vehicles rated as fully mission capable (FMC) due to 

maintenance backlogs. Equipment rated as FMC does not necessarily meet

7

A direct support company repairs equipment by replacing parts. A general support company repairs 

equipment by rebuilding major component assemblies.
B-283334

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

the Army’s equipment maintenance standards.8 Moreover, because of the 

extensive use of the vehicles (over 300 miles per rotation) and repair parts 

shortages, the number of vehicles that are mission capable rapidly 

decreases to 65 percent to 75 percent over the course of the rotation, 

according to the NTC commander. He also has acknowledged that on 

average, 15 percent of all tank and fighting vehicle crews miss training each 

day because their equipment needs repair. 

Units responding to our survey provided written comments that highlight 

their concerns related to the pre-positioned equipment at the centers. For 

example,

“The equipment available for draw at the NTC is in horrible condition. Soldiers should not 

have to draw broken equipment that requires several days or even weeks to repair.”

“Extreme waste and abuse. Equipment issued in unsafe condition. The draw and turn in 

took longer than the actual days in training.”

“Our battalion’s poor maintenance posture during the rotation adversely impacted our 

overall training experience as a battalion. Over one third of our soldiers spent the majority 

of the rotation in the UMCP [Unified Maintenance Control Point] because of broken 

equipment. During the draw, over one half of the M1s [tanks] [and] M2s [fighting vehicles] 

that we drew were deadlined (inoperable due to needed repairs).”

Over the past 2 years, the Congress has provided the Army $120 million in 

additional funding for the operation and maintenance of the pre-positioned 

equipment at the NTC. According to Army Headquarters officials, these 

funds were programmed for the maintenance and upgrade of NTC 

equipment and were to be used for repair parts, depot-level repairs, and 

supplies and services. Despite this additional funding, the maintenance 

problems at the NTC have become so acute that training units must send 

some of their own maintenance personnel to the center 2 weeks prior to 

training to repair broken equipment for issue.

The NTC’s June 1999 update to its strategic plan, which sets forth its 

mission and business goals and assesses performance toward these goals, 

also confirms a continuing problem with pre-positioned equipment. The 

8

FMC is defined in the glossary of Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, as equipment that can 

perform all of its missions without endangering the lives of the crew and operators. Equipment can be 

rated as FMC and have inoperable systems that degrade its mission flexibility and usefulness. For 

example, an M1A1/A2 tank can be FMC with the driver’s night sight, and commander’s independent 

thermal viewer all inoperable. 
B-283334

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

center’s mission capable rate goal for its tracked vehicle fleet is 90 percent. 

However, the actual monthly mission capable rate for these vehicles ranged 

from 65 percent to 80 percent the first 6 months of fiscal year 1999. In 

response to these rates, the center’s strategic plan states that the consistent 

performance below the 90-percent goal is primarily due to the poor 

condition of the fleet.

Aging Pre-positioned 

Equipment at the NTC and 

JRTC Lessens the Training 

Benefit 

The commanders of the NTC and JRTC have also expressed concerned 

about the age of their pre-positioned equipment. At the Joint Readiness 

Training Center, units are using 30-year-old, 21⁄2-ton, and early model 5-ton 

trucks with manual transmissions, while at home stations, units operate 

5-ton trucks with automatic transmissions. At the NTC, the situation is 

similar. Pre-positioned tanks at the NTC are all first-generation M1-A1 

models and the Bradley Fighting Vehicles are all first-generation M2-A1 

models. However, at home stations, the Army units have second- and 

third-generation tanks and third- and fourth-generation fighting vehicles. 

Our comparison of serial numbers on the fighting vehicles at the NTC with 

Army inventory records shows that some vehicles came off the assembly 

line in 1981, the first year they were produced, and that the average age of 

all the NTC’s fighting vehicles is 13 years. Army Forces Command data 

show about a 40-percent commonality between the equipment training 

units have at home station and what they draw from NTC pre-positioned 

stocks.

Requiring units to use older equipment with different capabilities creates 

(1) safety problems because soldiers are not familiar with fire control 

systems and switch locations, (2) performance degradation because target 

identification and designation systems are different, and (3) maintenance 

problems because older vehicles do not have built-in diagnostic systems. 

As a result, the centers are obliged to devote training time to teaching 

soldiers how to operate obsolete equipment, which is “a waste of valuable 

time and resources,” according to the JRTC commander. In addition, 

maintenance personnel have to maintain and repair equipment that is 

different than that owned by the unit and for which they have been trained, 

which degrades the usefulness of the training for them.

Army Study Reviews 

Alternatives to Improve 

Equipment

The Department of the Army Headquarters is currently reviewing the 

results of the Army Forces Command’s January 1999 study of options 

available for providing the equipment needed for training at the NTC. The 

study concluded that the current system of pre-positioning tracked and 
B-283334

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

wheel vehicles was ineffective because of the significant difference 

between the equipment at the center compared to the equipment units 

trained on at home stations. Although there are several different models of 

each type of vehicle assigned to the operational units, even the least 

modernized unit does not have some of the older equipment models 

pre-positioned at the NTC. This difference between training center and 

home station equipment, according to the study, significantly impedes 

training since crews have to be retrained to use and maintain older 

equipment.

The study examined three alternatives for meeting the equipment needs of 

units at the NTC. The first alternative, the modernization of the equipment 

at the center, was discounted because (1) $976 million would be required to 

modernize the tracked vehicles, (2) maintenance costs at the centers would 

increase, and (3) a large number of personnel would be needed to support 

equipment issue and turn-in. The second alternative, requiring units to ship 

all needed equipment to the center, was discounted because of the 

transportation costs to the training units. The alternative recommended by 

the study is to (1) modernize the wheeled vehicles at the center and (2) 

require the units to ship their tracked vehicles to the center at an estimated 

cost of $222 million through fiscal year 2009. This alternative, according to 

the study, would avoid the cost of modernizing the tracked vehicles, allow a 

reduction in contract maintenance costs of an estimated $104 million 

annually, and eliminate the necessity of training units on older equipment. 

The Army had not made a decision on whether to accept the recommended 

alternative as of July 1999.

Exercise Results Are 

Not Routinely Used to 

Improve Proficiency

According to the Army’s training center regulation, take-home packages are 

provided to each unit to document all of its after action reviews, describe 

performance strengths and weaknesses, and recommend a focus for home 

station training. However, we found that ineffective take-home packages 

and a lack of training opportunities at their home stations diminish the 

value of units’ training experiences at the centers. Consequently, systemic 

weaknesses demonstrated by units during training center exercises are not 

being addressed.

Responses to our survey indicate that 30 percent of the commanders felt 

that take-home packages were marginally useful or not useful. Another

35 percent believed the take-home packages to be somewhat useful. 

Several commanders described their packages as worthless because they 

were written in generic language and lacked specificity. One commander 
B-283334

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

noted that the package arrived a full 3 months after the rotation ended; 

another noted that he had not received any feedback or materials from his 

unit’s rotation to the training center. A third described the take-home 

materials as an afterthought, built around the shortcomings of people, not 

systems. Finally, one seemed surprised at his package, noting that its 

content did not seem to match the comments provided at the after-action 

reviews provided during the exercise. 

Commanders also cited limited training opportunities when they return to 

home station as inhibiting units from using training center results to 

improve their skills. Most units begin a support and recovery cycle9

immediately following training center exercises and at the same time begin 

to lose many of the people who participated in the exercise. Forty-two 

percent of the units who responded to our questionnaire said training 

center exercises were only marginally useful or not useful at all after only

3 months. Only 22 percent of the commanders said their units had been 

able to maintain unit strengths at the company level and train on 

weaknesses after returning to home station. Moreover, 26 percent and

27 percent, respectively, said their units had been able to conduct only a 

minimum amount of training at the company or battalion levels.

Another reason for the limited usefulness of exercise results is the 

significant personnel turnover that occurs in units following training center 

exercises. One commander at Fort Hood, for example, said that personnel 

turnover had left the battalion mostly untrained within 30 days of its return 

from the NTC. His unit lost 16 tank crews that it had borrowed from other 

units for the exercise, 14 platoon leaders had changed jobs, and 4 company 

executive officers and 10 platoon leaders also left the unit. As result, the 

unit that was left to put its lessons learned to use was far different from the 

one that trained at the center. Table 2 summarizes the percent of key 

leaders lost by units within 90 days after training at a center in fiscal year 

1998, as reported to us by unit commanders who responded to our 

questionnaire.

9

A support and recovery cycle is a period of time after a major exercise during which units, for example, 

provide leave for personnel, repair and clean equipment, or order new spare parts.
B-283334

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Table 2: Key Leaders Lost Within 90 Days in Units That Trained at the Combat 

Training Centers (fiscal year 1998)

Note: Based on responses from 96 units.

Source: Developed by GAO from questionnaire responses.

When information provided by commanders on personnel turnover and 

training accomplished by the units 90 days following training center 

exercises is compared with the readiness reported by the units for the same 

90-day period, a significant disparity is revealed. The formal readiness 

assessments submitted10 do not reflect the lack of opportunity to train on 

weaknesses identified during the exercises or the rapid loss of experienced 

leaders following the training. As a result many units reported very high 

levels of readiness for months after their training center exercises even 

though serious training shortcomings identified at the centers had not been 

corrected and the majority of senior unit leaders had been lost due to 

personnel turnover. Fifty-four of the 96 battalions that returned our survey 

reported the same or a higher level of overall readiness, personnel 

readiness, and training readiness, even though 95 percent reported a 

significant loss of key personnel during the first 90 days after the training 

center exercises and 76 percent of the commanders reported being unable 

to work on all weaknesses identified at the center. 

Key leader Percent of units that lost this leader

Battalion commander 21

Battalion executive officer 55

Battalion personnel officer (S-1) 53

Battalion intelligence officer (S-2) 56

Battalion operations officer (S-3) 57

Battalion maintenance officer (S-4) 53

10Under the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
B-283334

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Assessment Plan 

Needed to Better 

Integrate Lessons 

Learned Into Army 

Training and Doctrine

The Army has not implemented a plan for adequately assessing training 

results for the purpose of integrating them with the Army’s training and 

doctrine development activities. Consequently, the Army is not effectively 

capitalizing on the lessons that it learns from its training centers. 

Specifically, improvements to training and doctrine are hampered by a lack 

of standardized data to assess trends and performance measures to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the centers in meeting their objectives.

Centers Lack Standardized 

Data 

The Army has gathered large amounts of data at its combat training centers 

for more than 15 years. However, despite being one of the Army’s key 

objectives for establishing the centers, past data collection efforts have not 

consistently been used to improve Army training and doctrine. Because it 

has not standardized data collection programs at its centers, information 

from the centers cannot be combined to assess trends. Moreover, each 

center has a different contractor for data collection and each uses its own 

proprietary computer software. The cumulative effect is that much of the 

information collected cannot be used by the Army’s Combined Arms Center 

(CAC) to develop lessons learned from the exercises. For example, one 

study conducted by the Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL)11

revealed that 90 percent of the instrumentation data collected at the CTCs 

is not sent to CALL to be archived. However, even if the data were sent to 

CALL, it does not have the capability to read the data.

The problems with data collection and analysis at the Army’s training 

centers have existed for a long time. In July 1986, we reported that the 

Army had not adequately defined its analysis needs and corresponding data 

requirements, nor developed criteria for performance measurement.12 We 

concluded that the Army had spent millions of dollars collecting 

information that it was reluctant to rely on for developing Army-wide 

lessons. Today, the situation is not fundamentally different.

In 1995, CAC developed a plan for collecting, analyzing, archiving, and 

disseminating combat training center data. During the period January 

through June 1995, CAC, with contractor assistance, identified the data 

11The Center for Lessons Learned, a component of the Army’s Combined Arms Center, collects, 

analyzes, and disseminates lessons learned from training and actual operations to the total Army via 

written reports and an electronic database.

12Army Training: National Training Center’s Potential Has Not Been Realized (GAO/NSIAD-86-130,

July 23, 1986).
B-283334

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

needs of the centers, Army schools and doctrine proponents, and unit 

leaders. The ability of data collection systems to meet these needs was 

then assessed. The study group concluded that the data being collected did 

not support the needs of most users outside the centers, and CAC 

developed a master plan to meet the requirements. The in-depth plan 

provided the framework for on-site teams of 10 personnel to collect and 

collate data at each center from units, training center observer-controllers, 

and the existing instrumentation systems. However, the Army’s Training 

and Doctrine Command decided not to fund the program. The estimated 

cost to implement this plan was about $2 million. Consequently, the data 

collected today is essentially the same as was collected in 1995, and a plan 

for implementing data collection methods to meet Army needs and fulfill 

one of the objectives for establishing the centers has still not been 

implemented.

Centers Lack Performance 

Measures

An even more fundamental weakness is that the Army has no standard 

performance measures to gauge how well the centers are carrying out their 

assigned responsibilities nor has it conducted an assessment of the center’s 

effectiveness either individually or collectively. A set of measures would 

provide a set of benchmarks that the Army could use to better focus the 

training conducted at these centers and better gauge whether training at 

the centers is improving the readiness of the Army’s units to fight in these 

larger formations. Establishing such performance measures is a 

fundamental management principle and is consistent with the Government 

Performance and Results Act, which calls on all government entities to 

evaluate the results of their programs through the use of performance 

measures.

Without such measures, the Army is left to a subjective ad hoc system of 

measurement. For example, a 1998 review by the Army’s Center for 

Lessons Learned showed that units training at the NTC have continued to 

make many of the same mistakes since 1994 (see table 3). The Army has 

not developed a similar analysis for the other centers because the data 

needed is not available.
B-283334

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Table 3: Examples of Recurring Problems Demonstrated by Units at the NTC Since 1994

Note: The examples shown were identified in the source analysis as continuing through each quarter 

since 1994.

Source: Analysis of NTC exercise results conducted by the Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned.

In October 1996 TRADOC established a remedial action program (T-RAP) 

to correct unit deficiencies and improve performance using trend 

observation to (1) identify recurring problems affecting unit performance, 

(2) develop and implement comprehensive solutions, and (3) validate that 

Battlefield operating 

system Problem area Examples

Maneuver Direct fire planning 

and execution

Company/teams tend to develop a scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire 

and maneuver. Inadequate fire control within companies results in ineffective 

placement of fires on the enemy.

Movement formations 

and techniques

Forces do not take effective action when in contact with the enemy. Units have 

problems massing combat power and fight piecemeal.

Use of dismounted 

infantry

Battle staffs seldom consider dismounted infantry in planning. Dismounted 

infantry is not integrated with the scheme of maneuver. Commanders do not 

specify a clear task and purpose for dismounted infantry. 

Fire support Integration of fire 

support with 

maneuver

Commanders do not integrate artillery with maneuver forces, resulting in 

inadequate support, unclear orders, and confusion. As a result, commanders 

cannot control or mass all weapons systems.

Command and control Battle tracking and 

predictive analysis

Staffs do not give their commanders sufficient information for effective mission 

analysis. Units do a poor job of reporting information to the tactical operations 

center.

Military decision 

making process

Staffs lack the training required to conduct the military decision-making process to 

standard. Commanders often dominate the planning process. Commanders too 

often spend most of their time at the main command post supervising staff. 

Troop leading and 

discipline

Company/team leaders do not regularly conduct precombat checks or 

inspections. Small arms weapons are not properly maintained and cleaned. 

Field sanitation standards are not enforced. Noise and light discipline are not 

maintained.

Mobility and survivability/ 

nuclear, biological, chemical

Force protection When units encounter chemical agents, they do not have a plan to react. Units 

are generally unprepared to conduct thorough chemical decontamination 

operations.

Obstacles 

coordination and 

integration

Obstacles are not planned or emplaced to enhance the overall capabilities. 

Commanders have weak knowledge of obstacle integration procedures. 

Fratricide incidents are increased because minefield records are incomplete or 

not forwarded to higher headquarters as required.

Breaching operations Units fail to plan deliberate breach operations even when mission analysis clearly 

indicates that it is appropriate. Fundamentals of breaching operations are not 

understood or implemented.

Combat service support Medical support 

planning and 

execution

Medical personnel do not see wounded soldiers in a timely manner. The typical 

died-of-wounds rate is seldom below 50 percent. Casualty evacuation is a 

serious problem.
B-283334

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

solutions are implemented. The program has not been very successful 

because accurate and complete data to use in identifying recurring 

problems were lacking and the program lacks an enforcement mechanism 

for implementing changes. According to Army officials, the Army’s 

Combined Arms Center plans nevertheless to re-emphasize the T-RAP 

program. However, the benefits that could be derived from Army efforts to 

reverse negative trends through T-RAP cannot be realized until a 

comprehensive data collection and analysis plan is implemented at the 

CTCs.

Notwithstanding the fact that 83 percent our survey’s respondents said that 

the exercises were very useful in enhancing battalion- and company-level 

proficiency, they also identified aspects of training at the CTCs that they 

believe should be changed to make the exercises better in preparing units 

to accomplish assigned missions. Table 4 shows the areas where the 

commanders believe improvement is needed.

Table 4: Aspects of Training That Commanders Believe Need to Be Improved

Source: GAO survey on CTCs.

As shown by the table, a number of respondents felt that their training 

center experiences could have been enhanced through better take-home 

packages, improved procedures for drawing pre-positioned equipment, and 

more effective after action reports. For example, 27 of the 96 respondents 

believed that improvements could be made in the take-home packages for 

use at home station. 

Conclusions The Army is operating training centers that are rightfully the envy of the 

rest of the world’s armies, allied and enemy alike. Collectively, they offer 

diverse physical environments that provide realistic battlefield conditions 

Training aspects Total NTC JRTC CMTC

Number of respondents 96 40 41 15

Take home materials for use at home station 27 10 15 2

Equipment draw procedures at the CTC 23 16 5 2

After action reviews 21 9 11 1

Live-fire exercises 20 8 8 4

Deployment from home station to the CTC 11 4 4 3

Force-on-force exercises 10 3 3 4
B-283334

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

enabling the Army’s personnel to experience the closest thing possible to 

actual combat. Their sophisticated instrumentation and network of trained 

observers provide unparalleled opportunities to develop leaders and 

improve the readiness of the Army’s units to engage in combat. Over

83 percent of the units responding to our survey believed their training at a 

combat training center was very useful in enhancing their unit’s combat 

proficiency. However, the objectives the Army established for its combat 

training centers to increase unit readiness, produce bold leaders, embed 

doctrine, and provide feedback and a data source for lessons learned are 

not being fully realized.

Several persistent problems—personnel shortages, turnover, and high 

operating tempo—have decreased the benefits of training exercises at the 

combat training centers because they have inhibited units from being fully 

prepared for the training. The Army’s Forces Command has recently taken 

a first step toward improving unit preparedness for training at the NTC and 

JRTC by requiring units in the future to be certified as ready for the 

training. Notwithstanding the benefits of a certification program, the 

problems related to personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating 

tempo are likely to continue to adversely affect training at home stations, 

and the Army has not factored those problems into the certification 

process.

Optimally, units would be fully resourced and allowed to conduct several 

months of uninterrupted training in preparation for training center 

exercises. But, in today’s environment, where a smaller force is being used 

for an increased number of operations, such a situation is not feasible. In 

recognition of the impact of these factors on home station training 

programs, one center—the CMTC—has provided units with preparatory 

training time at the center before exercises begin. Unit commanders and 

center officials believe this investment has resulted in effective training for 

the units. 

The problems of maintaining pre-positioned equipment and the age of it 

have also detracted from units training experiences at the NTC and the 

JRTC. Because of the amount of equipment that is not in service at any 

given time, units and personnel miss valuable training experiences at the 

centers that cannot be emulated at home station. The problem of being 

unfamiliar with equipment also degrades the training experience.

Training conditions at the centers are being made less stringent to 

compensate for unit shortcomings. As a result, the threats and conditions 
B-283334

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

that units will certainly face on future battlefields are not routinely 

portrayed. These threats and conditions such as dealing with terrorists, 

operations in urban terrain, and civilians on the battlefield are not routinely 

incorporated into the exercises at each of the centers. By limiting the 

conditions and not accurately portraying current and future threats, the 

value of the training provided at these centers is diminished. Moreover, 

because many of the conditions cannot be replicated at home stations, 

units and their leaders are being denied the best opportunity to prepare for 

the demanding conditions of present and future operations. 

The Army has not made a commitment to achieving its objective of 

collecting data at the centers to facilitate Army-wide lessons learned, 

research, and doctrine development. Until the Army implements a plan to 

collect the information needed by all organizations and establishes 

performance measures consistent with the Government Performance and 

Results Act, one of the most important reasons for establishing and 

operating the centers will remain unmet.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commanders of 

the Army Forces Command, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

and the Seventh Army Training Command to take the following actions to 

enhance the value of the Army’s combat training centers to the Army and to 

units training at the centers. 

• Amend training exercise schedules at the centers so that time is 

allocated at the beginning of each training rotation for units to conduct a 

limited amount of internal unit training before the center’s 

observers/controllers and OPFOR begin training with the units. While 

this might lengthen the total training time by a few days, the gains in unit 

synchronization and execution skills and the improved familiarization 

with pre-positioned equipment can be expected to increase the training 

benefits to units and their leaders.

• In accordance with Army Regulation 350-50, paragraphs 1-5 and 1-6, 

which stipulates that the centers will use the most realistic and 

challenging training conditions available, incorporate into the exercises 

at each combat training center the full spectrum of threats, opposing 

forces capabilities, and conditions that units are likely to encounter in 

future conflicts, especially ones that cannot be easily duplicated at 

home stations. Specific emphasis should be afforded to operations in 

urban terrain, dealing with terrorists, operations with military forces 
B-283334

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

from other countries, and activities involving civilians on the battlefield 

and interactions with the media.

• Develop and implement a comprehensive data requirements and 

collection plan to enable center officials to systematically collect data 

that can be used to improve training and doctrine. This plan should 

include (1) an approach for linking the centers by using compatible 

computer software so that Army-wide assessments can be made,

(2) performance measures and the methodology to be used to 

periodically assess whether the centers are meeting their objectives, and 

(3) the specific information needed by research organizations, training 

and doctrine development commands, the centers, and units. The data 

collection plan developed by the Army Combined Arms Center in 1995 

would serve as a good basis for developing a current plan to collect and 

analyze pertinent data for Army-wide use.

We are not making any recommendations on the pre-positioned fleets at 

NTC and JRTC since the Army is currently reviewing various alternatives to 

address the problems noted in this report and by others. Nevertheless, it is 

important that the Army promptly decide on a course of action to deal with 

these problems if units are to derive maximum benefits from their training 

at the centers.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report (see app. IV), DOD said that it 

generally concurred with our findings and recommendations. With respect 

to our recommendation to amend training exercise schedules so that time 

is allocated at the beginning of each training rotation for units to conduct 

internal training, DOD said the idea had merit and that it would review the 

balance and prioritization of training events at the centers to maximize 

training effectiveness. Although DOD did not elaborate on what such a 

review would entail, we believe that it is reasonable to expect that the 

review would compare the training needs identified during a unit’s home 

station training and readiness evaluation in preparation for CTC training to 

the skills needed for units to successfully conduct battalion- and 

brigade-level exercises. It is also our expectation that the Army would 

consider alternatives for facilitating internal unit training after units arrive 

at the training centers. For example, there may be opportunities to 

streamline the activities presently conducted by units at the centers at the 

beginning and end of their force-on-force exercises. Alternatively, some 

force-on-force training could be sacrificed to allow time for initial internal 

training. Finally, on rare occasions, the centers might need to lengthen a 

rotation by a day or two. DOD also stated that the Forces Command 
B-283334

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

commander has recently addressed this issue by requiring that units in the 

future pass mandatory training gates prior to a CTC rotation. Our report 

discusses this change but notes that, problems with unit training are likely 

to persist because the Army has not factored personnel shortages, 

turnover, and high operating tempo into this initiative.

With respect to our recommendation that the training centers provide the 

most realistic and challenging training conditions possible, incorporating 

the full spectrum of threats and enemy capabilities, DOD stated it has 

already started a comprehensive review of the opposing force and 

battlefield dynamics at the centers. According to DOD, the results of this 

review, which are expected in the fall of 1999 will form the basis for 

developing future CTC training scenarios that train units to counter the full 

spectrum of threats.

With regard to our recommendation to develop and implement a 

comprehensive data requirements and collection plan for the centers to 

provide the Army with data to improve training and doctrine, DOD stated it 

will, as we suggested, use the CTC Data Master Plan developed by the Army 

Combined Arms Center in 1995 as a basis for implementing such a system. 

DOD also noted implementation of a more effective data collection and 

analysis system for the centers is essential to the Army’s renewed emphasis 

on identifying training deficiency trends and developing corrective actions.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from the date of 

this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the 

Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense and the Honorable Louis 

Caldera, Secretary of the Army. Copies will also be made available to 

others upon request.
B-283334

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Key contacts and contributors on this assignment are listed in appendix V.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, National Security

 Preparedness Issues
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Letter
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Factors Adversely 

Affecting Home Station

Training as Reported 

by Units on Our Survey

36

Appendix II

Results of Our Survey 

on Army Combat 

Training Centers

37

Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

39

Appendix IV

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

42

Appendix V

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

45

Tables Table 1: Comparison of Training Features at the Army’s Combat

Training Centers 17
Contents

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Table 2: Key Leaders Lost Within 90 Days in Units That Trained at the 

Combat Training Centers (fiscal year 1998) 23

Table 3: Examples of Recurring Problems Demonstrated by

Units at the NTC Since 1994 26

Table 4: Aspects of Training That Commanders Believe Need to Be 

Improved 27

Table I.1: Battalion-level Training 36

Table I.2: Company/Platoon-level Training 36

Figures Figure 1: Desert Environment at the National Training Center 5

Figure 2: Wooded Terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center 6

Figure 3: Mock Civilian Village at the Joint Readiness Training Center 7

Figure 4: Opposing Force Vehicle and Soldier at the National Training 

Center 8

Abbreviations

CAC Combined Arms Center

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CMTC Combat Manuever Training Center

CTC Combat Training Center

FMC fully mission capable

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

NTC National Training Center

OPFOR Opposing Force

OPTEMPO Operating Tempo

OOTW operations other than war

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

T-RAP TRADOC Remedial Action Program
Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Appendix I

Factors Adversely Affecting Home Station

Training as Reported by Units on Our Survey ApenxIdi

Table I.1: Battalion-level Training

Table I.2: Company/Platoon-level Training

Notes: Based on responses from 96 battalions that trained at an Army Combat Training Center during 

fiscal year 1998.

Respondents identified multiple factors in their responses.

Number of respondents

Personnel shortages 55

Personnel turnover 49

Overall operating tempo 45

Training ranges and maneuver space 32

Special duties and personnel taskings 29

Training money 26

Other 14

Equipment condition 6

Peacekeeping operations 4

Equipment shortages 2

Number of respondents

Personnel shortages 61

Personnel turnover 54

Overall operating tempo 48

Special duties and personnel taskings 30

Training ranges and maneuver space 26

Training money 14

Other 11

Equipment condition 7

Peacekeeping operations 5

Equipment shortages 4
Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Appendix II

Results of Our Survey on Army Combat 

Training Centers ApenxIdi

In relation to your unit’s wartime mission and the expected conditions and 

threat, how useful or relevant were the exercises at the combat training 

center (CTC) in each of the following areas?

Notes: Based on responses from 96 battalions that trained at an Army Combat Training Center during 

fiscal year 1998.

Respondents identified multiple factors in their responses.

Very useful

Somewhat

useful

Marginally

useful Not useful No response

Number of respondents

Battalion-level proficiency in general 80 15 1 0 0

Company-level proficiency in general 81 15 0 0 0

METL proficiency for:

- Combat arms units 65 7 5 3 16

- Combat support units 54 17 3 4 18

- Combat service support units 63 23 4 1 5

Individual proficiency for:

- Combat arms soldiers 60 14 4 3 15

- Support soldiers 62 14 2 3 15

- Service support soldiers 76 17 2 0 1

Unit deployment procedures 55 31 9 1 0

Supply/maintenance procedures 56 33 5 1 1

Sustainment operation 65 28 2 1 0

Medical treatment and evacuation 60 27 9 0 0

Personnel replacement 27 37 21 11 0

Military operations in urban terrain 19 14 22 35 6

The handling of civilians on the battlefield 42 27 17 10 0

Responding to terrorist activities 22 26 26 19 3

Responding to chemical attack 39 38 11 6 2

Coordinating joint operations 9 25 22 33 7
Appendix II

Results of Our Survey on Army Combat 

Training Centers

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

In relation to your unit’s wartime mission, how would you describe the 

following aspects of CTC training in relation to improving the ability of 

your units and overall readiness?

Considering the personnel turnover in your unit and training opportunities 

since the CTC rotation, how useful were the exercises in relation to 

determining training needs and assessing unit readiness at each of the 

following time intervals?

Very useful

Somewhat

useful

Marginally

useful Not useful No response

Number of respondents

Deployment from home station to the CTC 50 34 10 1 1

Equipment draw procedures at the CTC 20 23 33 13 7

Force-on-force exercises 75 18 1 1 1

Live fire exercises 60 16 9 3

After action reviews 61 25 9 1 0

CTC take-home materials for use at home 

station

31 34 23 7 1

Follow-on training conducted since return to 

home station

36 37 20 3 0

Very useful

Somewhat

useful

Marginally

useful Not useful No response

Number of respondents

Immediately upon return to home station 59 23 8 6 0

One month after return to home station 43 34 13 5 1

Two months after return to home station 34 37 19 4 2

Three months after return to home station 26 40 22 6 2

Now 25 30 29 11 1
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApenxIdi

The objectives of our review were to determine (1) whether units training 

at the Army Combat Training Centers are adequately prepared for the 

exercises; (2) whether training exercises are realistic in terms of expected 

battlefield conditions; (3) whether pre-positioned equipment adequately 

supports the training mission; (4) how units use lessons learned at the 

centers; and (5) how the Army uses the results of the exercises to help 

revise training and improve the Army’s training doctrine. Our review 

focused on active component Army units.

An important tool for our review was a questionnaire sent to each 

commander of all 123 battalions that trained at one of the three Army 

Combat Training Centers in fiscal year 1998. We received complete 

responses from 104 (85 percent) of the units. Eight of these responses 

were unusable because the respondents were not with the unit when it 

trained at the center in 1998. We tabulated results from the remaining 96 

valid responses for report purposes. The valid responses represent 40 units 

that trained at the National Training Center (NTC), 41 that trained at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and 15 that trained at the Combat 

Manuever Training Center (CMTC). 

We also consulted with staff from the Army Inspector General’s Office 

regarding their study of the Army’s Combat Training Centers.

To determine whether units training at the centers are adequately prepared 

for the exercises, we visited all three Army combat training centers. At the 

centers, we interviewed key center officials from the command operations 

group, the opposing force commanders, and center observer/controllers. 

At each of the centers, we also spoke with and obtained information from 

unit commanders and personnel who were participating in exercises at 

each of the centers about their preparations for their rotation to a training 

center. We also visited the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort 

Stewart, Georgia, to obtain information from the command staff of five 

battalions that used the National Training Center in fiscal year 1998. Lastly, 

through the use of our questionnaire, we obtained information from 96 

battalions regarding their experiences in preparing for a CTC rotation. We 

also obtained personnel information regarding the Army’s on-board 

strength and operating tempo from various sources, including the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) quarterly readiness report. To determine 

whether training exercises are realistic in terms of expected battlefield 

conditions, we had discussions with the command operations group, 

opposing force commanders, and observer/controllers at each of the 

centers, and we observed unit training exercises at the combat training 
Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

centers. At each center the Army provided an experienced escort officer to 

ensure our understanding of mission objectives and actions taken by the 

training unit in response to the opposing force threat. We also visited the 

Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, 

Virginia, to determine the basis for the threats portrayed at the combat 

training centers; we interviewed responsible officials at TRADOC’s 

Intelligence Directorate and reviewed appropriate documentation. We 

used data from our survey to obtain information from units that had trained 

at the centers about the scenarios and battlefield conditions portrayed at 

the centers. We also reviewed pertinent documentation from the Army’s 

Forces Command.

To determine whether pre-positioned equipment adequately supports the 

training mission we reviewed pertinent documentation from the NTC and 

JRTC, observed equipment being issued, discussed equipment maintenance 

and age problems with appropriate officials at the training centers, 

compared equipment on-hand at the National Training Center with Army 

inventory records to determine the age of equipment at the center, and 

solicited information from unit commanders using our questionnaire. We 

also worked closely with officials from the Army’s Inspector General’s 

Office who reviewed equipment issues at the centers during the same time 

frame as our study.

To determine how units use lessons learned from the centers we reviewed 

after action reports to determine their organization and the specificity of 

their comments and recommendations, we attended after action reviews at 

the centers, and we solicited information from battalion commanders who 

completed our questionnaire. We also compared (1) personnel turnover in 

these units as well as their training to correct problems identified at the 

centers during the 3 months following CTC training and (2) the readiness 

reported by these unit commanders under the Status of Resources and 

Training System for the same 3-month period. We made this analysis to 

determine whether these factors were used to report readiness.

To determine how the Army uses results of training exercises to help revise 

training and improve doctrine, we performed work at Department of the 

Army Headquarters, Army Forces Command Headquarters, Army Training 

and Doctrine Command Headquarters, and Seventh Army Training 

Command Headquarters. At these locations, we interviewed responsible 

personnel and obtained existing Army regulations concerning Army 

assessment requirements and procedures. We also visited the Army’s 

Combat Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There we met with 
Appendix III

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

responsible officials at the Center for Army Lessons Learned and obtained 

appropriate documentation.

We conducted our review from September 1998 to July 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenxIVdi
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness
Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness

Appendix V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApenxVdi

GAO Contacts Carol R. Schuster (202) 512-5140

William M. Solis (202) 512-5140

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Ray S. Carroll Jr., Lester L. Ward, 

and Paul A. Gvoth Jr., made key contributions to this report.

(703250) Lret
Appendix V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-210 Military Readiness
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the 

following address, accompanied by a check or money order made 

out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary, VISA and 

MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are 

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and 

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list 

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone 

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain 

these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET, 

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at: 

http://www.gao.gov
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00
PAGE 49 GAO/XXXX-98-??? NAME OF DOCUMENT
Contents

Page 50 GAO/XXXX ???

Figure 1: Desert Environment at the National Training Center 5

Figure 2: Wooded Terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center 6

Figure 3: Mock Civilian Village at the Joint Readiness Training Center 7

Figure 4: Opposing Force Vehicle and Soldier at the National Training 

Center 8
Contents

Page 51 GAO/XXXX ???
Contents

Page 52 GAO/XXXX ???

Table 1: Comparison of Training Features at the Army’s Combat

Training Centers 17

Table 2: Key Leaders Lost Within 90 Days in Units That Trained at the 

Combat Training Centers (fiscal year 1998) 23

Table 3: Examples of Recurring Problems Demonstrated by

Units at the NTC Since 1994 26

Table 4: Aspects of Training That Commanders Believe Need to Be 

Improved 27

Table I.1: Battalion-level Training 36

Table I.2: Company/Platoon-level Training 36
Contents

Page 53 GAO/XXXX ???