Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 

and Kinser, JJ. 

DENNIS JACKSON MOORE 

v. Record No. 990776 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 March 3, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 

provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) cured a defect in felony 

proceedings in a juvenile and domestic relations district court 

caused by the Commonwealth's failure to notify the defendant's 

biological father of the proceedings pursuant to the 

requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -264. Code § 16.1-

269.1(E) states, in material part: "An indictment in the 

circuit court cures any error or defect in any proceeding held 

in the juvenile court except with respect to the juvenile's 

age." In deciding this issue, we also consider the impact, if 

any, of Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) 

(per curiam), aff'g 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998), on 

the present appeal. 

 On July 27, 1996, Dennis Jackson Moore (the defendant) shot 

and killed Vance Michael Horne, Jr., in a parking lot at a 

 1

Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

February 2, 2000. 
recreational facility in Henrico County. The shooting occurred 

after the defendant approached Horne's companion, Jonathan 

Bradley Cooper, held a gun to Cooper's back, and demanded a neck 

chain that Cooper was wearing. Cooper gave the chain to the 

defendant, who nevertheless shot Horne in the head and fled from 

the scene. 

 On October 15, 1996, the Commonwealth issued four juvenile 

petitions against the defendant, age 17, in the Henrico County 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the juvenile 

court). The petitions charged the defendant with the murder of 

Horne, the robbery of Cooper, and two counts of use of a firearm 

in the commission of a felony. The four petitions were served 

on the defendant, his mother, Darlene Moore, and his stepfather, 

Howard Moore. The defendant had lived with his mother and 

stepfather for about 16 years, but had not been adopted by his 

stepfather. The defendant's biological father, Dennis Fleming, 

was not given notice of the initiation of proceedings in the 

juvenile court. 

 The defendant's mother and stepfather attended all the 

proceedings in the juvenile court. The record does not show 

that the defendant's biological father was present at any of 

those proceedings. The juvenile court held a preliminary 

hearing under Code §§ 16.1-269.1(B) and (C), and certified the 

2
four felony charges to the grand jury of the circuit court 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(D). 

 The defendant was indicted by the grand jury on the four 

felony charges. The defendant did not challenge the circuit 

court's jurisdiction or raise an objection to the proceedings 

based on the lack of notice to his biological father in the 

juvenile court. The defendant was tried by a jury and convicted 

of all four offenses. The circuit court sentenced the defendant 

to a term of 60 years' imprisonment for murder, with 20 years 

suspended, a term of 20 years' imprisonment for robbery, with 15 

years suspended, and a total of eight years' imprisonment on the 

two firearm convictions. 

 The defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of 

Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the 

admissibility of a statement he made to the police. He did not 

argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try his case 

or assert error based on the lack of notice to his biological 

father in the juvenile court. A panel of the Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court's judgment in an unpublished opinion. 

Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1088-97-2 (March 16, 1999). 

 The defendant filed a petition for appeal in this Court, in 

which he alleged a purported jurisdictional defect in his 

convictions. He argued that, under our decision in Baker, the 

circuit court's judgment was void because the Commonwealth 

3
failed to provide notice to his biological father of the 

proceedings in juvenile court. We awarded the defendant this 

appeal on the sole issue whether the circuit court lacked 

jurisdiction to try him on the four charged offenses. 

 The defendant contends that the Commonwealth's failure to 

comply with the notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-243 

and –264 deprived both the juvenile court and the circuit court 

of subject matter jurisdiction over his case. He argues that 

Code § 16.1-269.1(E) applies only when the circuit court has 

obtained jurisdiction over the charges by virtue of "valid" 

proceedings in the juvenile court. He asserts that the 

preliminary hearing in the juvenile court was invalid because of 

the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the statutory notice 

requirements and, thus, that the indictments in the circuit 

court were void and could not be cured by the provisions of Code 

§ 16.1-269.1(E). We disagree with the defendant's arguments. 

 The term "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the power 

granted to the courts by constitution or statute to hear 

specified classes of cases. Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 

371, 514 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1999); Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 

Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1947). Code § 16.1-241 grants 

the juvenile court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over "all 

cases, matters and proceedings" concerning a juvenile who is 

alleged to have been delinquent. The classes of offenses 

4
committed by the defendant are included within this grant of 

jurisdiction. 

 With certain exceptions that are not pertinent here, Code 

§ 19.2-239 grants the circuit court "exclusive original 

jurisdiction for the trial of all . . . indictments . . . for 

offenses committed within their respective circuits." 

Indictments for murder, robbery, and use of a firearm are 

encompassed within this statutory grant of authority. Thus, the 

circuit court also had subject matter jurisdiction over the 

classes of offenses committed by the defendant. 

 A court's authority to exercise its subject matter 

jurisdiction over a case may be restricted by a failure to 

comply with statutory requirements that are mandatory in nature 

and, thus, are prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of that 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425, 

428, 192 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1972); Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 

159-60, 156 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1967); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 

73, 80, 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966). In Baker, for the reasons 

stated by the Court of Appeals, we affirmed the Court of 

Appeals' judgment voiding circuit court convictions of a 

juvenile because the Commonwealth had failed to comply with the 

mandatory notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –

264. 258 Va. at 2, 516 S.E.2d at 220. The Court of Appeals 

held that a "plain reading of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 

5
manifests legislative intent that both parents be notified and 

dispenses with this requirement only when the trial judge has 

certified on the record that the identity of a parent is not 

reasonably ascertainable." Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 

at 312, 504 S.E.2d at 397. 

 The trial court's judgment in Baker was void because the 

notice of initiation of juvenile proceedings was not served on a 

required party, the juvenile's biological father. Id. Thus, 

although the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over 

the felony indictments before it, the court lacked authority to 

exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over those offenses 

because the Commonwealth failed to comply with the mandatory 

notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –264. 

 Although the juvenile proceedings in the present case 

suffered from the same type of notice defect that occurred in 

Baker, we conclude that Baker is inapposite to a resolution of 

the present appeal. The offenses at issue in Baker were 

committed before July 1, 1996. See 28 Va. App. at 308-09, 504 

S.E.2d at 395. Thus, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E), 

which apply only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996, 

were not before us in Baker.2 See 1996 Va. Acts ch. 755, cl. 7, 

and ch. 914, cl. 7. 

 2

We also note that in Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. ___, 

___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000) (decided today), which did not 

6
 Since the defendant committed the four charged offenses 

after July 1, 1996, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) are 

applicable to the resolution of his case. As previously noted, 

that section provides in relevant part: "An indictment in the 

circuit court cures any error or defect in any proceeding held 

in the juvenile court except with respect to the juvenile's 

age." Under the plain language of this statute, an indictment 

by a grand jury cures any defect or error, except one regarding 

a juvenile's age, which has occurred in any juvenile court 

proceeding. 

 The Commonwealth's failure to notify the defendant's 

biological father of the initiation of juvenile court 

proceedings, as required by former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –264, 

created a defect in those proceedings. Baker, 28 Va. App. at 

313, 504 S.E.2d at 398. However, under Code § 16.1-269.1(E), 

that defect was cured when the grand jury returned indictments 

against the defendant on the offenses certified to it by the 

juvenile court. This curative statutory provision permitted the 

 

involve the defendant here, the offenses at issue were committed 

before July 1, 1996. We held that the Commonwealth's failure to 

give notice of the initiation of juvenile court proceedings to 

the juvenile's father, as required by former Code §§ 16.1-263 

and -264, was not subject to waiver by the juvenile's failure to 

object to this defect in the proceedings. Id. at ___, ___ 

S.E.2d at ___. We also held that the provisions of Code § 16.1-

269.6(E) did not effect a waiver of this defect. Id. at ___, 

___ S.E.2d at ___. 

7
circuit court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction and to 

try the defendant on the offenses set forth in the indictments.3

 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 

of Appeals.4

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, concurring. 

 I concur in the result reached by the majority in this 

case. However, I write separately to reiterate my belief that 

the notice requirement at issue is not a prerequisite for the 

juvenile court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction. 

Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 990665, 259 Va. ___, ___ 

S.E.2d ___ (2000) (this day decided) (Kinser, J., dissenting); 

see also Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 667, 222 S.E.2d 

517, 518 (1976) (holding that mandatory requirement of written 

notice was not jurisdictional). 

 3

Since Baker is inapposite to the present case, we reject 

the defendant's additional contention that the Court of Appeals 

was required to reverse his convictions, sua sponte, after the 

Court's decision in Baker. 

4

We do not address the defendant's contention that the 

Commonwealth's failure to comply with the notice requirements of 

former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -264 denied him due process, because 

the defendant failed to raise this objection in the trial court. 

Rule 5:25; see Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 393, 464 

S.E.2d 131, 139 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996). 

8