United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 1996 TACTICAL

INTELLIGENCE

Accelerated Joint

STARS Ground Station

Acquisition Strategy Is

Risky

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-71

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270674 

May 23, 1996

Congressional Committees

The Army and the Air Force are jointly developing the Joint Surveillance

Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). The Army is responsible for the

development, test, production, and fielding of Joint STARS ground station

modules (GSM). Because of the cost and importance of the Joint STARS

effort and concerns about the GSMs’ performance in prior tests, we

reviewed the Army’s test and acquisition plans for the Common Ground

Station (CGS), the next GSM version. We conducted this review under our

basic legislative responsibilities. We are addressing this report to the

committees of jurisdiction because it identifies problems and calls for

corrective action that the Department of Defense (DOD) has indicated an

unwillingness to take. We are suggesting that Congress may wish to take

the necessary action to ensure that DOD addresses the problems we have

identified.

Results in Brief The Army’s acquisition strategy to accelerate production of the CGS system

unnecessarily risks millions of dollars on an unproven system. The Army

had anticipated procuring 22 CGS systems in 2 years of low-rate initial

production (LRIP) at an estimated cost of about $138 million. However, the

Army contracted for 18 systems in the first LRIP year, 8 more than

originally planned and 14 more than needed for a planned fiscal year 1998

operational test and evaluation (OT&E)1

 of the CGS. Furthermore, the Army’s

fiscal year 1997 budget request reflects a plan to acquire 16 systems in the

second LRIP year, 4 more than originally planned. Because earlier GSM

versions have performed poorly in developmental level tests and have yet

to complete an OT&E, and because OT&E can be a key internal control to

ensure that decisionmakers have objective information available on a

weapon system’s performance, we believe that buying more systems than

are needed for OT&E significantly raises the risk of procuring a costly and

ineffective system.

At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the

Army accelerated the program and moved the first fielding date for the CGS

from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 1998. However, DOD and the Army do

not have analyses demonstrating an urgent need to field the added

1

OT&E is the primary means of assessing weapon system performance in a combat-representative

environment. It is defined as (1) the field test, conducted under realistic conditions, to determine an

item’s effectiveness and suitability for use in combat by typical military users and (2) the evaluation of

the results of such a test.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

capabilities of the CGS system 4 years earlier than originally planned or

showing that expected benefits of accelerated procurement, prior to the

successful completion of an OT&E, outweigh the associated risks.

DOD believes that (1) the Army’s acquisition strategy espouses prudent risk

and (2) the CGS is not an immature system but rather it has the same

functional baseline as the Light GSM. Our concern with DOD’s approach is

that it relies heavily on the functional baseline of the Light GSM when that

system has experienced poor test results, and that the Light GSM and other

earlier GSMs have not successfully completed an OT&E. For example, the

Light GSM passed only 1 of 12 performance-related criteria during tests in

1994 and 1995. Moreover, the OT&E for the CGS is not scheduled until fiscal

year 1998. The risks of systems starting production before operational

tests are conducted are numerous. They include reliability that is

significantly less than expectations, systems that cannot meet current

specifications, systems that are never fielded and/or retired after fielding

because of poor performance, and systems that require significant and

expensive post-fielding repairs for faults identified during OT&E. Given

these facts, we believe the Army’s acquisition strategy contains risks that

could be easily mitigated.

Background Joint STARS is a multiservice, multimode radar system that is to provide the

capability to locate, track, and classify wheeled and track vehicles beyond

ground line of sight, during day and night, under most weather conditions.

It is to provide Army Corps and Division commanders an “electronic

high-ground” from which to observe enemy forces across the forward line

of their own troops into an enemy’s first and second echelons. The Joint

STARS radar is mounted on an Air Force E-8 aircraft, a Boeing 707 variant.

It is to provide real-time information simultaneously to operators in the

aircraft and operators in Army GSMs. These GSMs are to have the ability to

supplement this radar data with unmanned aerial vehicle imagery and

electronic intelligence reports. Through fiscal year 2001, the total cost of

the Army’s Joint STARS development and acquisition is estimated at

$1.4 billion.

Since the Joint STARS program inception, four versions of GSMs have been

developed prior to the CGS. They are the Limited Procurement Urgent, the

Interim GSM, the Medium GSM, and the Light GSM. Descriptions of the

various GSMs are provided in appendix I. Production quantities by fiscal

year and GSM variant2

 are detailed in table 1.

2

The Interim GSM never entered production and no future production is planned.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

Table 1: GSM Production Quantities by

Fiscal Year and Variant

Fiscal Year

Limited

Procurement

Urgent

Medium

GSM

Light

GSM

CGS (original

planned buys)

1987 3

1988 6

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993 5

1994 7

1995 8

1996 2 10a

1997 12b

1998 12

1999 10

2000 10

2001 7

2002 6

2003 6

Total 9 12 10 73

aThe Army actually ordered 18 systems in this year.

bThe Army’s fiscal year 1997 budget request reflects an intent to acquire 16.

The CGS Acquisition Plan The Army recently issued a solicitation for the CGS system and selected a

contractor to produce the system. It awarded an 8-year production

contract3

 on December 14, 1995, and made a fiscal year 1996 commitment

to the production of 18 systems,4

 the maximum production allowed by the

solicitation. The CGS system is to provide the same functionality as the

Light GSM with an initial enhancement of the integration of secondary

imagery data, and planned additional enhancements provided by

post-award contract modifications.

3

The CGS contract contains one firm fiscal year’s commitment to production and options for

production during the following 7 fiscal years.

4

Under its approved acquisition strategy, the Army anticipated buying 10 of 22 LRIP systems in the first

LRIP year. The Army’s actual commitment to 18 systems includes the 10 originally anticipated, 2 for

North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces experimentation, and 6 for, as yet unrequested/undefined

other service or allied uses. Any of the remaining six not otherwise distributed are to be given to Army

users.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

The CGS acquisition strategy provides for 2 years of LRIP, during which the

Army anticipated buying 22 CGS systems at an estimated cost of about

$138 million, though it received approval from DOD to procure up to an

additional 16 CGS systems to accommodate other service and allied

requirements. The Army’s first year commitment to 18 systems and current

plan to acquire 16 systems in the second year raises the estimated 2-year

LRIP cost to over $153 million. Regarding program cost, DOD stated that the

CGS LRIP quantity includes not only the number needed for testing

purposes, but considers production rate efficiencies and cost factors. It

believes that producing only four prior to test would require the stop and

restart of production, resulting in loss of skilled people, inefficient use of

contractor resources, and higher costs. The CGS LRIP quantity does not,

however, reflect consideration of production rate efficiencies and cost

factors because under the CGS contract’s pricing structure, the planned

second LRIP year acquisitions can be purchased in later years at lower cost.

In sum, under the CGS contract, the Army can save millions of dollars by

lowering future CGS LRIP acquisitions to the minimum quantity necessary to

maintain the contract5

 and then contracting for those systems in the

post-LRIP years.

The Light GSM and the Medium GSM were scheduled to be operationally

tested during a Joint STARS multiservice OT&E. That test was delayed and

then altered because of the deployment of Joint STARS assets to the

European theater to support Bosnian operations. The Army now plans to

evaluate the Medium and Light GSMs during that deployment and follow-on

tests, if needed. It also plans to conduct an initial OT&E of the CGS system in

the first quarter of fiscal year 1998. The degree and length of that initial

OT&E will depend on how similar the CGS system is to its predecessors,

which will be a function of the approach that the CGS contractor follows.

The CGS solicitation provided functional specifications such that the

proposals received may or may not represent significant hardware and

software differences from already procured GSMs. The degree of

technological difference between the CGS system and its predecessor

systems, the Light GSM and Medium GSM, depends on the approach taken by

the contractor. That difference will, in turn, influence the degree to which

the Light and Medium GSM’s performance during any OT&E can and should

be relied upon as an indicator of the CGS’s maturity to continue production.

Furthermore, the more similar the CGS system is to its predecessors, the

less extensive its initial OT&E will need to be.

5

A program official stated and our review of the contract indicates that the Army needs to commit to

only one system in each option year of the contract to maintain it.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

The Army Has Not

Justified Accelerated

Production

The Army began procuring CGS systems prior to the completion of an OT&E

by any GSM. However, the Army did not perform any risk analyses

demonstrating that there was (1) an urgent need for the added capabilities

of the CGS system or (2) any significant benefit to be derived from its

accelerated procurement. According to DOD, the revised CGS development

and production schedule fields ground stations in synch with E-8C aircraft

deliveries. Under the prior development schedule, the Army planned to

continue to buy pre-CGS model ground stations—presumably also in synch

with E-8C aircraft deliveries. Furthermore, an Army official in the program

executive office that has oversight of the Army’s Joint STARS program

stated that the Air Force is behind in its E-8C delivery schedule and that,

as a result, GSM acquisition is currently scheduled ahead of aircraft

fieldings.

LRIP Acquisitions Prior to

OT&E Raise Program

Risks

Over the years, we have reported on numerous instances in which

production of both major and nonmajor systems were optimistically

permitted to begin under LRIP and continue based on factors other than the

systems’ technical maturity. In our November 1994 report on the use of

LRIP in the acquisition process,6 we detailed a number of examples of

systems that entered LRIP before operational tests were conducted and that

later experienced significant problems. For example, a year into the LRIP of

the Navy T-45A aircraft, OT&E demonstrated that the T-45A was not

effective in a carrier environment and was not operationally suitable

because of safety deficiencies. Subsequent major design changes included

a new engine, new wings, and a modified rudder.

DOD believes that, unlike the Navy T-45A aircraft, the CGS is not a new,

immature system. It has stated that the CGS system uses 100 percent of the

Light GSM mechanical design, rack structure, power distribution, lighting,

ventilation, and air conditioning. It has also stated that the Light GSM

software baseline is the CGS baseline and that the CGS system represents

the Light GSM functional baseline with the addition of product

improvements. However, the CGS contractor may make configuration

changes that could represent significant hardware and software

differences from already procured GSMs.7

 Furthermore, DOD’s position is

also contradicted by the 2-year delay of the GSM full-rate production

decision to follow a CGS OT&E and by the Joint STARS integrated product

6

Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely

(GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).

7

Although the contractor that produced the Medium and Light GSMs was awarded the CGS contract,

uncertainty remains as to how technologically similar the CGS system will be to its predecessors.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

team’s call for an independent assessment of the CGS’s testing risk, given

the nature and extent of the configuration changes that the selected

contractor may make.

The risks of systems starting production before operational tests are

conducted are numerous. They include reliability that is significantly less

than expectations, systems that cannot meet current specifications,

systems that are never fielded and/or retired after fielding because of poor

performance, and systems that require significant and expensive

post-fielding repairs for faults identified during OT&E. While there is an

operational need for Joint STARS, and despite the desire of operational

commanders to have more capable systems as soon as possible, the fact

remains that the Army has not adequately justified the urgency or benefits

to be derived from accelerated fielding of the CGS in 1998 versus the

originally planned fielding in fiscal year 2002.

Prior Test Results Further

Indicate Risk

The Army’s CGS acquisition strategy seems to ignore the fact that to date

the GSMs have undergone limited testing and demonstrated disappointing

results in those tests. That acquisition strategy allowed the Army to begin

procuring CGS systems without demonstrating resolution of issues raised

as a result of prior tests and will allow it to continue procuring systems

without demonstrating resolution of those issues.

In December 1991, a decision was made that the Medium GSM would

undergo a limited user test rather than a traditional initial OT&E. The

absence of important functionality, including an unmanned aerial vehicle

interface, a production representative data link, Defense Mapping Agency

electronic map databases, and trained military operators, prompted this

decision. Based on the results of this test, which occurred in early 1993,

the Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command provided an overall

assessment of the Medium GSM’s performance. It stated that the Medium

GSM “consistently demonstrated potential to be operationally effective” and

that the Medium GSM “demonstrated potential to be operationally suitable”

(emphasis added). However, this was not a finding that the Medium GSM

was operationally effective or suitable. The Command also noted that the

“current software lacks robustness and reliability, and limits mission

performance.” One of the Command’s recommendations was that prior to

LRIP fielding, the Medium GSM “must successfully complete an

independently evaluated operational demonstration including

simultaneous employment of all software, interface, and tactics,

techniques, and procedures corrections.” The Medium GSM has yet to

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

successfully complete an independently evaluated operational test. Its

initial OT&E was to be the multiservice OT&E.

The Medium GSM follow-on system, the Light GSM, was also to participate in

the multiservice OT&E. Like the Medium GSM, the Light GSM has yet to

complete an OT&E. The Light GSM has, however, undergone other tests,

including a Force Development Test and Evaluation (FDT&E) in September

1994; reliability confidence testing from October through December 1994;

and a follow-on demonstration at Eglin Air Force Base in January 1995. In

May 1995, we reported to the Secretary of Defense8

 that based on a

preliminary review of those test results, it was clear that the Light GSM had

not met the DOD-set LRIP exit criteria9

 and that our preliminary analysis

indicated that, at best, the Light GSM had only passed 2 of the 12 Light GSM

performance-related LRIP exit criteria. At the same time, the DOD Director

of OT&E concluded that the Light GSM had only passed 1 of the 12 Light GSM

performance-related LRIP exit criteria. The Director recommended a formal

review of the program to identify the causes of problems, solutions, and

appropriate tests to demonstrate the solutions. In a June 30, 1995,

memorandum, the Director, commenting on efforts to resolve 55 specific

problems identified in the Light GSM testing, stated that his goal “was to see

that the Army had identified the key problems and was working effective

fixes for those problems.” He added that he wanted the Joint STARS

multiservice OT&E “to have a reasonable chance of success.” According to

an OT&E official, the Director’s assessment of the Light GSM’s performance

during those tests has not changed. The issue of the 55 specific problems

was resolved based on the Director’s satisfaction “that the Army has

identified a process to fix the various problems that have been

identified . . . .”

In response to a draft of this report, DOD commented that

In some instances, problems were attributed to shortfalls in operator training or another

non-materiel cause. The majority of deficiencies involved software fixes, not major

hardware redesign. The Army has also gained experience operating the GSMs assigned to

the III Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps and in training and preparation for multi-service

OT&E. In November 1995, the Program Executive Officer for Joint STARS certified the system

ready for OT&E, which attests to the developer’s confidence in system maturity.

8

Production of Joint STARS Light GSM (GAO/NSIAD-95-172R, May 26, 1995).

9

Exit criteria define program achievements for a phase of the acquisition program that are measures of

progress (risk reduction). In the event exit criteria are not met, a program delay or review may be

triggered.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

DOD believes that the GSMs’ prior test results indicate only prudent program

risk. It states that the series of tests used in development of the GSMs,

including a limited user test, FDT&E, reliability confidence testing, and

other demonstrations, have been a continuous fix-test-fix process, which

has identified shortfalls, determined fixes, and verified or tested the

results. It also notes that during the current deployment of Joint STARS to

the European Theater (Bosnia-Herzegovina), members of the Army and

the Air Force test commands will conduct an operational evaluation of

Joint STARS performance. Although the Army and the Air Force plan to

operationally evaluate Joint STARS during that deployment, how well the

Army’s process has worked remains to be demonstrated through the Light

GSM’s performance during an OT&E.

Delaying Commitments

Would Lower Cost

The Army’s commitment to its currently planned second year LRIP buy of

16 CGS systems prior to the completion of the CGS OT&E would raise not

only the program’s risk but also its cost. The CGS contract provides

decreasing unit costs over its 8-year life. Furthermore, a program official

stated and our review of the contract indicates that the Army needs to

commit to only one CGS system in the second LRIP year to maintain the

contract. If the Army buys one system in fiscal year 1997 and 37 systems in

the third and fourth years of the contract, it could save over $5 million

while obtaining the same 4-year buy of 56 systems currently anticipated

given its fiscal year 1997 budget request and approved acquisition strategy.

These savings can be seen in a comparison of tables 2 and 3. Table 2

details the first 4 years of the contract’s variable CGS acquisition costs

under the Army’s anticipated future buy schedule. Table 3 details the first

4 years of those costs under a plan that minimizes the size of the second

year LRIP commitment.

Table 2: Cost of Anticipated 4-Year

Acquisitions Fiscal Year

1996 (LRIP)

Fiscal Year

1997 (LRIP)

Fiscal Year

1998

Fiscal Year

1999 Total

Quantity 18 16a 12 10 56

Costs $34,907,358 $24,834,952 $18,825,622 $14,931,544 $93,499,476

aIn its acquisition strategy, the Army anticipated buying 12 systems but now plans to buy 16.

Table 3: Cost of 4-Year Acquisitions

With Minimized Future LRIP Fiscal Year

1996 (LRIP)

Fiscal Year

1997 (LRIP)

Fiscal Year

1998

Fiscal Year

1999 Total

Quantity 18 1 20 17 56

Costs $34,907,358 $1,885,766 $28,479,972 $22,975,513 $88,248,609

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

Recommendation The Army lacks an analysis justifying a need to accelerate the fielding of

the CGS system and can save millions of dollars by minimizing production

in its second year of CGS production. Furthermore, there are inherent risks

in procuring systems prior to their successful completion of an OT&E and

the benefits of the Army’s acquisition strategy do not clearly outweigh the

associated risks. We therefore recommend that the Secretary of Defense

direct the Secretary of the Army to limit the future system procurement to

the minimum quantity necessary to maintain the CGS contract (i.e. one

system in each contract option year) until the CGS has successfully

completed an OT&E.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our conclusion

that the Army’s CGS acquisition strategy was unnecessarily risky and our

recommendation to reduce that risk. DOD took the position that the

acquisition strategy espouses prudent risk in balance with program cost,

schedule, and technical requirements.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

In light of DOD’s unwillingness to have the Army revise its acquisition

strategy for the CGS, Congress may wish to take the actions necessary to

limit the number of CGS systems to be procured under LRIP prior to the CGS

successfully completing operational testing.

Scope and

Methodology

During this review, we interviewed officials at and reviewed documents

from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology and the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation in

Washington, D.C. We also visited officials and reviewed documents from

the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen, Maryland,

and the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command, Office of

the Program Manager for Joint STARS, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

We conducted this review from August 1995 to April 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force. We will also make

copies available to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Thomas J.

Schulz, Charles F. Rey, Bruce H. Thomas, and Gregory K. Harmon.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
B-270674 

List of Congressional Committees

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Chairman

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix I 

Ground Station Module Descriptions

Limited Procurement Urgent (LPU). The LPU GSMs were produced and

deployed as replacements to the AN/UPD-7 Ground Station Terminal. They

receive data from the Mohawk Side Looking Airborne Radar and do not

receive/process data from Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

(Joint STARS) E8 aircraft. The Army acquired nine LPU GSMs. They are

expected to be decommissioned no later than fiscal year 1997.

Interim Ground Station Module (GSM). The Interim GSM receives and

processes data from both the Joint STARS E8 aircraft and the Mohawk Side

Looking Airborne Radar. Eight engineering and manufacturing

development Interim GSMs were developed and fielded to the XVIII

Airborne. These systems represent the current GSM contingency force. The

Interim GSM was deployed to Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield. No

production is planned.

Medium GSM. This module provides enhancements to the Interim GSM

capability. Its development stemmed from a Department of Defense (DOD)

decision that was made in fiscal year 1989 to restructure the Army Joint

STARS GSM program. The Medium GSM enhancements include a downsized

electronic suite, an enhanced man/machine interface with extensive Built

In Test/Built In Test Equipment capabilities, and the ability to

simultaneously display and analyze data from multiple sensors. The Army

acquired 12 Medium GSMs.

Light GSM. This module is housed in a light weight multipurpose shelter, a

standard integrated command post shelter variant, mounted on a High

Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle. It is to provide the

light/contingency forces a C130 Drive-on/Drive-off Joint STARS capability.

The Light GSM has a prime and support vehicle, each with a

trailer/generator in tow. It is supposed to be able to operate on the move,

receive unmanned aerial vehicle imagery and intelligence reports, and

incorporate electronic map backgrounds. The Army plans to acquire a

total of 10 Light GSMs.

Common Ground Station (CGS). The CGS system is to provide Light GSM

functionality with the addition of the integration of secondary imagery

data. Further enhancements are expected and are to be achieved through

post-award modifications to the contract. Two versions of this ground

station are being contemplated (i.e., a light and heavy CGS). The Light CGS

will be patterned on the Light GSM two-vehicle configuration. The heavy

CGS is to be a track-mounted system, intended to provide the heavy forces

a high speed, cross-country/off-road GSM. It is to be integrated into a

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix I 

Ground Station Module Descriptions

Bradley Fighting Vehicle variant. Integration of the CGS capability into a

tracked vehicle is part of the preplanned product improvement initiatives

and will not be included in the fiscal year 1996 CGS contract award. Initial

CGS fielding is planned for fiscal year 1998. The Army currently anticipates

the acquisition of 73 CGS systems.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 1-2 and

pp. 5-6.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 2, 8, and 9.

See p. 5.

See p. 2.

See pp. 2, 5, and 6.

See pp. 5 and 6.

See comment 1.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 4 and 8.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-8.

See pp. 6-8.

See p. 8.

Now on p. 9.

See comment 2.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 9.

See comment 3.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated January 24, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. While the CGS contractor has prior experience developing and producing

ground stations, those ground stations have undergone limited testing and

demonstrated disappointing results. Among its previous work, the CGS

contractor developed and produced the two immediate predecessor GSMs

to the CGS, the Medium and Light GSMs. As we stated in our report, based

on the results of a limited user test of the Medium GSM, the Army

Operational Test and Evaluation Command stated that the Medium GSM

consistently demonstrated the potential to be operationally effective and

the potential to be operationally suitable. It noted that the “current

software lacks robustness and reliability, and limits mission performance.”

It recommended, among other things, that prior to LRIP fielding the

Medium GSM “must successfully complete an independently evaluated

operational demonstration including simultaneous employment of all

software, interface, and tactics, techniques, and procedures corrections.”

Furthermore, the Light GSM passed only 1 of 12 performance-related

criteria during developmental testing, and neither the Medium nor the

Light GSM has yet successfully completed an OT&E.

2. We continue to believe that the CGS acquisition strategy risks millions of

dollars on systems that have not yet been demonstrated operationally

effective and suitable. We have, however, revised the report to reflect the

Army’s apparent commitment to evaluate the operation of the Joint STARS

system during deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. We have revised our recommendation to allow the Army to maintain its

CGS contract in effect and thus avoid a break in production. Because the

contract provides decreasing unit costs over its life, and since the Army

has already committed to 18 first-year LRIP systems, we want to further

limit LRIP pending successful completion of an OT&E.

(707119) Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-71 Tactical Intelligence
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100