United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1996 CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Emphasis Remains

Insufficient to Resolve

Continuing Problems

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-103

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-258889 

March 29, 1996

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

U.S. forces face an increasing number of potential enemies capable of

waging chemical and biological warfare. Experiences during the Gulf War

and subsequent Department of Defense (DOD) studies suggest that U.S.

forces may not be sufficiently prepared to survive and fight in a chemically

or biologically contaminated environment. In accordance with the House

National Security Committee report on the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 1996, we evaluated U.S. chemical and biological

warfare defense capabilities.

By using the Gulf War experience as a baseline and applying DOD and

military service readiness standards, we examined the preparedness of

early deploying U.S. ground forces to survive and fight in a chemical or

biological environment. Our objectives were to determine (1) DOD’s actions

to address chemical and biological warfare defense problems identified

during the Gulf War and (2) the current preparedness of U.S. ground

forces to operate in a contaminated environment. This report summarizes

the information we provided to your staff on February 29, 1996. In

addition, information contained in this report was summarized in a

statement for the record1

 provided to the Subcommittee on Military

Research and Development, House Committee on National Security, on

March 12, 1996.

Background For decades, the United States has struggled to prevent the proliferation of

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the number of

countries that possess nuclear, biological, or chemical capabilities grows

each year. As a result, countries possessing these weapons could threaten

the interests of the United States in every possible theater of the world.

The Gulf War experience exposed (1) weaknesses in the U.S. forces’

preparedness to defend against chemical or biological agent attacks and

1

Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-123, Mar. 12, 1996).

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(2) the risks associated with reliance on post-mobilization activities to

overcome deficiencies in chemical and biological readiness. Post-conflict

studies confirmed that U.S. forces were not fully prepared to defend

against Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons and could have

suffered significant casualties had they been used. Units and individuals

often arrived in theater without needed equipment, such as protective

clothing and adequate chemical and biological agent detectors. Active and

reserve component forces required extensive chemical and biological

training before and after arrival in Southwest Asia. Medical readiness

problems included inadequate equipment and training. Biological agent

vaccine stocks, and policies and procedures for their use, were also

inadequate. While post-mobilization and in-theater activities increased

readiness, equipment and training problems persisted to varying degrees

throughout the conflict. Complacency and the absence of command

emphasis on chemical and biological defense prior to deployment were

among the root causes of this lack of preparedness. We previously

reported on these problems in May 1991.2

Since the Gulf War, Congress has expressed concern about the

proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and the readiness of U.S.

forces to operate in a contaminated environment. In November 1993, the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 

(P. L. 103-160) directed the Secretary of Defense to take specific actions

designed to improve chemical and biological defense and to report

annually to Congress on the status of these efforts.

Results in Brief Units designated for early deployment today continue to face many of the

same problems experienced by U.S. forces during the Gulf War. Activities

undertaken by DOD since the war are improving the readiness of U.S.

forces to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated

environment. However, equipment, training, and medical shortcomings

persist and are likely to result in needless casualties and a degradation of

U.S. war-fighting capability.

Today, chemical and biological defense activities at all levels (from the

Joint Staff to individual Army and Marine units) tend to continue to

receive a lower level of emphasis than other high-priority activities, such

as performing traditional operational mission tasks. This lower emphasis

is seen in the funding, staffing, monitoring, and mission priority given to

2

Chemical Warfare: Soldiers Inadequately Equipped and Trained to Conduct Chemical Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-91-197, May 29, 1991).

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chemical and biological defense activities. Army officials contend that

increased operational deployments coupled with reduced forces and

budgetary constraints force commanders to make decisions regarding

which aspects of operational preparedness to emphasize and those for

which they are willing to accept increased risk. Thus, many commanders

have accepted a level of chemical and biological defense unpreparedness

and believe the resources currently devoted to this area are appropriate,

given other threats and current budgetary constraints. Activities to equip,

train, and otherwise prepare U.S. forces to operate in a contaminated

environment have therefore received insufficient attention to resolve many

continuing problems.

Problems

Experienced in the

Gulf War Remain

Although DOD is taking steps to improve the readiness of U.S. ground

forces to conduct operations in a chemical or biological environment,

serious weaknesses remain. Many early deploying active and reserve units

do not possess the amount of chemical and biological equipment required

by regulations, and new equipment development and procurement are

often proceeding more slowly than planned. Many units are not trained to

existing standards, and military medical capability to prevent and treat

casualties on a contaminated battlefield is very limited.

Early Deploying Units Lack

Required Equipment

During the Gulf War, units and individuals often deployed without all the

chemical and biological detection, decontamination, and protective

equipment they needed to operate in a contaminated environment. For

example, some units did not have sufficient quantities or the needed sizes

of protective clothing, and chemical detector paper and decontamination

kits in some instances had passed expiration dates by as much as 2 years.

These shortages in turn caused logistical problems, such as the rapid

depletion of theater equipment reserves, and required extraordinary

efforts by logisticians and transporters to rectify the situation during the

6-month interval between deployment and the initiation of major combat.

Had chemical or biological weapons been used during this period, some

units might have suffered significant, unnecessary casualties.

To prevent this problem from recurring in future conflicts, in 1993 the U.S.

Forces Command (FORSCOM) revised its requirements regarding the

amount of chemical and biological defense equipment early deploying

active and reserve units are required to store on hand.3

 This action was

3

FORSCOM is responsible for training and equipping all Army forces located in the continental United

States. The revised requirements are contained in FORSCOM Regulation 700-2 (June 15, 1993).

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intended to ensure that these units would have sufficient equipment on

hand upon deployment until in-theater logistical support could be

established.

We found that neither the Army’s approximately five active divisions

composing the crisis response force (divisions with mobilization to

deployment requirements of less than 30 days) nor any of the early

deploying Army reserve units we visited were in full compliance with the

new stock level requirements. All had shortages of various types of critical

equipment. For example, three of the active divisions had 50 percent or

greater shortages of protective clothing (battle dress overgarments), and

shortages of other critical items (such as protective boots, gloves, hoods,

helmet covers, mask filters, and decontamination kits) ranged from no

shortage to an 84-percent shortage depending on the unit and the item

concerned.

Shortages in on-hand stocks of this equipment were often exacerbated by

poor inventorying and reordering techniques, shelf-life limitations, and

difficulty in maintaining appropriate protective clothing sizes. For

example, none of the active units we visited had determined how many

and what sizes of chemically protected overgarments were needed.

FORSCOM officials told us the Army’s predetermined standard formula for

the numbers of different clothing sizes needed by the average unit was

often inaccurate, particularly for support units that are likely to have

larger percentages of female soldiers. Furthermore, shortages of chemical

protective clothing suits are worsening because most of the active

divisions we visited had at least some of these items on hand with 1995

expiration dates. Unit stock levels are also being affected by problems

with the availability of appropriate warehouse space at most of the

installations we visited.

Army officials at FORSCOM and in the active units we visited were aware of

these shortages. They said that the operation and maintenance funds

normally used to purchase this equipment had been consistently diverted

by unit commanders to meet other higher priority requirements such as

base operating costs, quality-of-life considerations, and costs associated

with other-than-war deployments such as those to Haiti and Somalia. Our

review of FORSCOM financial records showed that while the operation and

maintenance account included funds budgeted for chemical and biological

training and equipment, very little had actually been spent on equipment

during fiscal year 1995 at the FORSCOM units we visited. Army records were

inadequate to determine for what purposes the diverted funds had been

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used except by reviewing individual vouchers. We did not attempt to

review these because of the time and resources such a review would

require.

Army officials acknowledged that increasing operation and maintenance

funding levels was unlikely to result in increased unit chemical equipment

stocks unless in operation and maintenance funding increases are

specifically designated for this purpose. Numerous other activities also

dependent on operation and maintenance funding are being given a higher

priority than chemical defense equipment by all the early deploying active

Army divisions we visited. The cost of purchasing this equipment is

relatively low. Early deploying active divisions in the continental United

States could meet current stock requirements for an additional cost of

about $15 million. However, some may need to acquire additional

warehouse storage space for this equipment. FORSCOM officials told us that

due to a variety of funding and storage problems, they were considering

decreasing chemical defense equipment contingency stock requirements

to the level needed to support only each early deploying division’s ready

brigade and relying on depots to provide the additional equipment needed

on a “just-in-time” basis before deployment.

FORSCOM officials told us that other potential solutions were also being

considered, such as funding these equipment purchases through

procurement rather than operation and maintenance accounts, or

transferring responsibility for purchasing and storing this material on

Army installations to the Defense Logistics Agency. It is unclear to what

extent this and other alternatives might be effective in providing the

needed equipment prior to deployment.

Research and

Development Progress Is

Slower Than Planned

At the beginning of the Gulf War, U.S. forces were vulnerable because the

services lacked such things as (1) effective mobile systems for detecting

and reporting chemical or biological agents; (2) a decontaminate solution

suitable for use in sensitive interior areas of aircraft, ships, and vehicles;

and (3) a suitable method for decontaminating large areas such as ports

and airfields. Protective clothing was problematic because it was heavy,

bulky, and too hot for warm climates.

In response to lessons learned in the Gulf War and subsequent

congressional guidance, DOD has acted to improve the coordination of

chemical and biological doctrine, requirements, research, development,

and acquisition among DOD and the military services. During 1994 and

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1995, DOD planned and established the Joint Service Integration and Joint

Service Materiel Groups, which are overseen by a single office within

DOD—the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy/Chemical and

Biological Matters). The Joint Service Integration Group is to prioritize

chemical and biological research efforts and establish a modernization

plan, and the Joint Service Materiel Group is to develop the research,

development, acquisition, and logistics support plans.

These groups have begun to implement the requirements of Public Law

103-160. However, progress has been slower than expected. At the time of

our review, the Joint Service Integration Group expected to produce its

proposed (1) list of chemical and biological research priorities and

(2) joint service modernization plan and operational strategy during

March 1996. The Joint Service Materiel Group expects to deliver its

proposed plan to guide chemical and biological research, development,

and acquisition in October 1996. It is unclear whether or when DOD will

approve these plans. However, fiscal year 1998 is the earliest that DOD can

begin their formal implementation if they are quickly approved.

Consolidated research and modernization plans are important for avoiding

duplication among the services and otherwise achieving the most effective

use of limited resources. DOD officials told us progress by these groups has

been adversely affected by personnel shortages and other assigned tasks.

DOD’s efforts to develop and improve specific equipment have had mixed

results. The Fox mobile reconnaissance system, fielded during the Gulf

War, features automated sampling, detection, and warning equipment.

However, due to budgetary constraints, DOD approved the acquisition of

only 103 of the more than 200 Fox systems originally planned. Early

deploying Army mechanized and armored divisions have been assigned 

6 Fox vehicles each, the Marine Corps has 10, and virtually all the

remainder have been assigned to a chemical company from which they

would be assigned as needed in the event of a conflict. Our discussions

with Army officials revealed concerns about the adequacy of assigning

only 6 Fox vehicles per division. They said a total of 103 Fox vehicles

might be insufficient to meet needs if chemical and/or biological weapons

are used in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts, particularly until

the Army’s light divisions and the Marine Corps are equipped with a

planned smaller and lighter version of a reconnaissance system. In

January 1996, DOD also began to field the Biological Integrated Detection

System, a mobile system for identifying biological agents, and plans to

field 38 by September 1996.

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Other programs designed to address critical battlefield deficiencies have

been slow to resolve problems. DOD’s 1995 Annual Report to Congress

identified 11 chemical and biological defense research goals it expected to

achieve by January 1996. Of these, five were met on time. Of the remaining

goals, two will not be achieved by 1997, and it is unclear when the

remainder will be achieved. An effort ongoing since 1987 to develop a less

corrosive and labor-intensive decontaminate solution is not expected to be

completed until 2002. Work initiated in 1978 to develop an Automatic

Chemical Agent Alarm (designed to provide visual, audio, and

command-communicated warning of chemical agents) remains

incomplete, and efforts to develop wide-area warning and

decontamination capabilities are not expected to be achieved until after

the year 2000.

Army and Marine Forces

Remain Inadequately

Trained for Effective

Chemical and Biological

Defense

Army and Marine Corps regulations require that individuals be able to

detect the presence of chemical agents, quickly put on their protective

suits and masks, decontaminate their skin and personal equipment, and

evaluate casualties and administer first aid. Units must be able to set

alarms to detect agents, promptly report hazardous agent attacks to higher

headquarters, mark and bypass contaminated areas, and remove

hazardous agents from equipment and vehicles. Commanders are required

to assess their units’ vulnerability to chemical or biological attacks,

determine the level of protection needed by their forces, implement a

warning and reporting system, employ chemical units to perform

reconnaissance and decontamination operations, and ensure that adequate

measures are in place to evacuate and treat casualties. Training for these

tasks is accomplished through a variety of live and simulated exercises

conducted at units’ home stations and at combat training centers such as

the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at 29 Palms, California.

Since the Gulf War, the services have acted to improve their chemical and

biological training. They (1) issued policy statements on the importance of

chemical and biological readiness, (2) revised doctrinal guidance and

training regulations, and (3) collocated chemical defense training for all

four services at the Army’s Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama.4

Commanders were instructed to ensure that their units were fully trained

to standard to defend and sustain operations against battlefield chemical

and biological hazards. Further, they were instructed that chemical and

4

The Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Realignments and Closures has recently recommended

relocating the U.S. Army Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

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biological training must be fully integrated into unit exercises and must

test the capability of commanders, staffs, and units to perform their

mission under chemical and biological conditions.

In spite of these efforts, many problems of the type encountered during

the Gulf War remain uncorrected, and U.S. forces continue to experience

serious training-related weaknesses in their chemical and biological

proficiency. In a series of studies conducted by the Army from 1991 to

1995, the Army found serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and

biological skills. For example, a 1993 Army Chemical School study found

that a combined arms force of infantry, artillery, and support units would

have extreme difficulty in performing its mission and suffer needless

casualties if forced to operate in a chemical or biological environment.

The Army concluded that these weaknesses were due to the force being

only marginally trained to operate in a chemical and biological

environment. Many of these problems had been identified a decade ago.

For example, the Army found similar problems in three other studies of

mechanized and armored units conducted by the Chemical School in 1986,

1987, and 1989.

Our analysis of Army readiness evaluations, trend data, and lessons

learned completed from 1991 to 1995 also showed serious problems. At the

individual, unit, and commander level, the evaluations showed a wide

variety of problems in performing basic tasks critical to surviving and

operating in a chemical or biological environment. These problems

included (1) inability to properly don protective masks, (2) improper

deployment of detection equipment, (3) inability to administer first-aid to

chemical or biological casualties, (4) inadequate planning on the

evacuation of casualties exposed to chemical or biological agents, and

(5) failure to integrate chemical and biological issues into operational

plans. More detailed information on these problems is contained in

appendixes I and II.

Our work showed that the Marine Corps also continued to be affected by

many of the same problems experienced during the Gulf War. Marine

Corps 1993 trendline data from its combat training center at 29 Palms,

California, showed that (1) submission of chemical and biological warning

reports were not timely, (2) units and individuals were inexperienced with

detection equipment, and (3) units did not properly respond to a chemical

attack, issue alarms to subordinate elements, and follow proper

unmasking techniques following a chemical attack.

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Joint Exercises Include

Little Chemical or

Biological Defense

Training

Current U.S. military strategy is based on joint air, land, sea, and special

operations forces operating together in combat and noncombat

operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise

Program is the primary method DOD uses to train its commanders and

forces for joint operations. Our analysis of exercises conducted under the

program showed that little chemical or biological training was being done.

In October 1993, the Joint Staff issued the Universal Joint Task List for the

regional commanders in chief (CINC) and the services to use to help define

their joint training requirements. The list includes 23 chemical and

biological tasks to be performed, such as gathering intelligence

information on the enemy’s chemical and biological warfare capabilities,

assessing the effects of these agents on operations plans, and performing

decontamination activities. In fiscal year 1995, 216 exercises were

conducted under the CJCS program. These were planned, conducted, and

evaluated by each CINC.

Our analysis of the exercises conducted by four major CINCs (U.S. Atlantic,

Central, European, and Pacific commands) in fiscal year 1995 and planned

for fiscal year 1996 showed little joint chemical or biological training is

being conducted. Overall, these CINCs conducted at least 70 percent of the

total number of CJCS exercises held in fiscal year 1995 and planned for

fiscal year 1996. However, only 10 percent of the CJCS exercises they

conducted in 1995 and 15 percent of those to be conducted in fiscal year

1996 included any chemical or biological training. Of the exercises

conducted, none included all 23 tasks, and the majority included less than

half of these tasks. Appendixes III and IV show the amount of joint training

being conducted by these CINCs.

Two reasons account for the little amount of joint chemical and biological

training. First, notwithstanding Joint Staff guidance to CINCs on the need to

train for chemical and biological warfare threats, the CINCs generally

consider chemical and biological training and preparedness to be the

responsibility of the individual military services. Second, most of the CINCs

have assigned a lower priority to chemical and biological issues than

others that they feel more directly relate to their mission. In this regard,

CINCs and other major commanders have made a conscious decision to

better prepare for other, more likely threats and to assume greater risk

regarding chemical and biological defense.

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Biological Agent Vaccine

Stocks and Immunization

Plans Remain Inadequate

For many years, DOD has maintained a medical research and development

program for biological defense. However, at the time of the Gulf War, the

United States had neither fielded equipment capable of detecting

biological agents nor stocked adequate amounts of vaccine to protect the

force. When the Gulf War started, DOD also had not established adequate

policies and procedures for determining which vaccines needed to be

administered, when they were to be given, and to whom. According to DOD

officials, this caused much DOD indecision and delay and resulted in U.S.

forces being administered varying types of vaccines about 5 months after

they began arriving in theater and only a month or so before the major

ground offensive began. Sufficient protection was not provided by the time

the offensive began either, since virtually all biological agent vaccines

require a minimum of 6 to 12 weeks or longer after immunization to

become effective.

Since the Gulf War, DOD has increased the attention given to biological

warfare defense. DOD consolidated the funding and management of several

biological warfare defense activities, including vaccines, under the new

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. In November 1993, DOD

established the policy, responsibilities, and procedures for stockpiling

biological agent vaccines and determined which personnel should be

immunized and when the vaccines should be administered. This policy

specifically states that personnel assigned to high-threat areas and those

predesignated for immediate contingency deployment to these areas (such

as personnel in units with deployment dates up to 30 days after

mobilization) should be vaccinated in sufficient time to develop immunity

prior to deployment. DOD has also identified which biological agents

constitute critical threats and determined the amount of vaccine that

should be stocked for each. At present, the amount of vaccines stocked

remains insufficient to protect the force.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high-ranking DOD officials have not yet

approved implementation of the established immunization policy. No

decision has yet been made on which vaccines to administer, nor has an

implementation plan been developed. DOD officials told us the

implementation plan should be developed by March 1996, but this issue is

highly controversial within DOD, and it is unclear whether the

implementation plan will be approved and carried out. Until such an

implementation plan is developed and approved and immunizations are

given, existing vaccines cannot provide the intended protection from

biological agents for forces already stationed in high-threat areas and

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those designated for early deployment if a crisis occurs and biological

agents are used.

Problems also exist with regard to the vaccines available to DOD for

immunization purposes. Only a few biological agent vaccines have been

approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Many remain in

Investigational New Drug (IND) status. Although IND vaccines have long

been safely administered to personnel working in DOD vaccine research

and development programs, the FDA usually requires large-scale field trials

in humans to demonstrate new drug safety and effectiveness before

approval. DOD has not performed such field trials because of the ethical

and legal considerations involved in deliberately exposing humans to toxic

or lethal biological agents; nor has it effectively pursued other means of

obtaining FDA approval for IND vaccines. IND vaccines can therefore now be

administered only under approved protocols and with written informed

consent.

During the Gulf War, DOD requested and received a waiver from the FDA

requirement for written informed consent since this was a contingency

situation. If DOD intends to use vaccines to provide protection against

biological agents to personnel already assigned to high-threat areas or

designated for rapid deployment, then it needs to make the required

decisions for proceeding with immunizations and either using IND vaccines

or obtaining FDA approval for them. DOD officials told us they hoped to

acquire a prime contractor during 1996 to subcontract vaccine production

with the pharmaceutical industry and take the actions needed to obtain

FDA approval for existing IND vaccines.

Army Medical Units Often

Lack Chemical and

Biological Defense

Equipment

Medical units assigned to support the early deploying Army divisions we

visited often lacked certain types of equipment needed to treat casualties

in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. For example,

these units are authorized chemical patient treatment sets and patient

decontamination kits that contain items such as suction apparatuses and

airways, aprons, gloves, scissors, and drugs and chemicals for treating or

decontaminating casualties. Overall, the medical units we visited had on

hand only about 50 to 60 percent of their authorized patient treatment kits

and patient decontamination kits. Some units we visited had not been

issued any of these kits. Further, our inspection of some kits showed that

they were missing critical components, such as drugs used for treating

chemical casualties. Army officials said that the shelf life of these items

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had expired and that operation and maintenance funds were not available

to replace them.

Forward medical support for combat units, such as battalion aid stations

and mobile army surgical hospitals, need to be capable of operating in

contaminated environments. However, none of the medical units we

visited had any type of collective shelter that would enable them to

provide such treatment. Army officials acknowledged that the lack of

shelters would virtually prevent any forward area treatment of casualties,

and would cause greater injury and death rates. They told us that older

versions of collective shelters developed to counter the Soviet threat were

unsuitable, unserviceable, and no longer in use. While new shelters—both

a field hospital version and a small mobile version mounted on a

vehicle—are in development, they are not expected to be available for

initial issuance to units until at least fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

Furthermore, Army officials told us that the Army plans to limit issuance

of the mobile shelters to about 90 percent of the crisis response force, has

canceled plans for a tracked version for mechanized and armored

divisions, and might not purchase the currently planned version due to its

funding priority.

Methods to Ensure That

Medical Personnel Receive

Chemical and Biological

Training Need

Improvement

Military physicians assigned to medical units supporting early deploying

Army divisions need to be trained to treat and manage casualties in a

chemical or biological environment. All Army physicians attend the

Medical Officer Basic Course and receive about 44 hours of training on

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) topics. The Officer Advanced

Course provides another 40 hours of instruction for medical officers when

they reach the rank of major or lieutenant colonel, but is optional. Also

optional, the Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties Course

provides 6-1/2 days of classroom and field instruction to military health

care providers and is designed to establish the essential skills needed to

save lives, minimize injury, and conserve fighting strength in a chemical or

biological warfare environment. During Operation Desert Storm, this

course was provided on an emergency basis to medical units already

deployed to the theater. These three courses constitute the bulk of formal

military medical training specifically oriented toward chemical and

biological warfare casualty treatment, with some additional training

provided through other shorter courses.

Our examination showed that of the physicians either currently assigned

to medical units in selected early deploying Army divisions or designated

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to report to these units at deployment, only a limited number had

completed the medical officer advanced and casualty management

courses. The percentage of physicians that had attended the advanced

course ranged from 19 to 53 percent, while from 3 to 30 percent had

attended the casualty management course. Army medical officials told us

that the demands of providing peacetime medical care to military

personnel and their dependents often prevented attendance at these

courses. Furthermore, the Army had made no effort to monitor whether

these physicians had received this training, and attendance of the casualty

management course was neither required nor targeted toward physicians

assigned to early deploying units or otherwise needing this training.

We also found little or no training is being conducted on casualty

decontamination from chemical or biological agents at most of the early

deploying divisions and medical units we visited. There was usually

confusion among these units regarding who was responsible for

performing this task. According to Army doctrine, tactical units are

expected to conduct initial casualty decontamination before their

evacuation or arrival at forward medical treatment facilities. Army lessons

learned from Operation Desert Storm noted that some units lacked

understanding of the procedures and techniques used to decontaminate

casualties. This situation had not been corrected at the time of our review.

Problems Remain Due

to Limited Emphasis

on Chemical and

Biological Defense

Although DOD has taken actions to improve chemical and biological

defense since the Gulf War, DOD’s emphasis has not been sufficient to

resolve many serious lingering problems. Our measurement of key

indicators—DOD funding, staffing, mission priority, and

monitoring—showed that chemical and biological defense tends to be

relegated a lower level of priority than other threat areas.

Funding Historically, DOD has allocated less than 1 percent of its total budget to

chemical and biological defense. Annual funding for this area has

decreased by over 30 percent in constant dollars, from approximately

$750 million in fiscal year 1992 to $504 million in fiscal year 1995. Funding

for chemical and biological defense activities could decrease further if the

Secretary of Defense agrees to a recent proposal by the Joint Staff. In

response to a recent Joint Staff recommendation to reduce

counterproliferation funding over $1 billion over the next 5 years, DOD

identified potential reductions of approximately $800 million. DOD officials

told us that, if implemented, this reduction would severely impair planned

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chemical and biological research and development efforts and reverse the

progress already made in several areas. For example, procurement of the

Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm would be delayed well into the next

century, as would the light NBC reconnaissance system.

At the time we completed our work, DOD officials told us that DOD was

considering reducing the amount of the proposed funding reduction to

about $33 million, resulting in a far less serious impact on chemical and

biological warfare programs. However, we believe that the limited funding

devoted to chemical and biological defense, the tendency to reduce this

funding to avoid cuts in other operational areas, and the tendency of

commanders to divert operation and maintenance funding budgeted for

chemical and biological defense is indicative of the lower priority often

given this area.

Staffing Chemical and biological defense activities were frequently understaffed

and heavily tasked with other unrelated duties. At the CINC and military

service levels, for example, chemical officers assigned to CINC staffs were

often heavily tasked with duties not related to chemical and biological

defense. At FORSCOM and U.S. Army III Corps headquarters, chemical staff

positions were being reduced, and no chemical and biological staff

position exists at the U.S. Army Reserve Command. Finally, according to

DOD officials, the Joint Service Integration and Joint Service Materiel

Groups (the groups charged with overseeing research and development

efforts for chemical and biological equipment) have made less progress

than planned due to staffing shortages and other assigned tasks.

Mission Priority The priority given to chemical and biological defense matters varied

widely. Most CINCs appear to assign chemical and biological defense a

lower priority than other threats. CINC staff members told us that

responsibility for chemical and biological defense training was primarily a

service matter, even though the Joint Staff has tasked the CINCs with

ensuring that their forces are trained in certain joint chemical and

biological tasks. Several high-ranking DOD officials told us that U.S. forces

still face a limited, although increasing, threat of chemical and biological

warfare.

At Army corps, division, and unit levels, the priority given to this area

depended on the commander’s opinion of its relative importance. For

example, one early deploying division we visited had an aggressive system

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

for chemical and biological training, monitoring, and reporting. At another,

the division commander made a conscious decision to emphasize other

areas due to limited resources and other more immediate requirements,

such as other than war deployments and quality of life considerations. As

previously discussed, Army medical officials told us that the demands of

providing peacetime medical care to military personnel and their families

often interfered with medical training oriented toward combat-related

subjects such as chemical and biological casualties.

Officials from Army major commands, corps, divisions, and individual

units said that chemical and biological defense skills not only tended to be

difficult to attain and highly perishable but also were often given a lower

priority than other areas for the following reasons:

• too many other higher priority taskings,

• low levels of monitoring or interest by higher headquarters,

• the difficulty of performing tasks in cumbersome and uncomfortable

protective gear,

• the time-consuming nature of chemical training,

• heavy reliance on post-mobilization training and preparation, and

• the perceived low likelihood of chemical and biological warfare.

Monitoring The lower emphasis given to chemical and biological matters is also

demonstrated by weaknesses in the methods used to monitor its status.

DOD’s current system for reporting overall readiness to the Joint Staff is the

Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). This system measures

the extent to which individual service units possess the required resources

and are trained to undertake their wartime missions. SORTS was established

to provide the current status of specific elements considered essential to

readiness assessments, such as personnel and equipment on hand,

equipment condition, and the training of operating forces. The SORTS

elements of measure, “C” ratings that range from C-1 (best) to C-4 (worst),

are probably the most frequently cited indicator of readiness in the

military.

In a 1993 effort to improve the monitoring of chemical and biological

defense readiness, DOD required units from all services to assess their

equipment and training status for operations in a contaminated

environment and report this data as a distinct part of SORTS. DOD’s 1994 and

1995 annual reports to Congress on nuclear, biological, and chemical

warfare defense reported the continued lack of an adequate feedback

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

mechanism on the status of chemical and biological training, equipment,

and readiness.

We found that the effectiveness of SORTS for evaluating unit chemical and

biological readiness is limited. While the current report requires unit

commanders to report shortages of critical chemical or biological defense

equipment, it leaves the determination of which equipment is critical up to

the commander. The requirements also allow commanders to subjectively

upgrade their overall SORTS status, regardless of their chemical and

biological status. For example, one early deploying active Army division

was rated in the highest SORTS category (C-1) despite rating itself in the

lowest category (C-4) for chemical and biological equipment readiness. In

addition, SORTS does not require reporting of some critical unit and

individual equipment items if they are being stored at corps, rather than

unit level, and SORTS reports are sometimes inaccurate due to poor

equipment inventorying techniques.

Furthermore, while individual units must fill out these reports, divisions

are not required to do so. FORSCOM officials told us that most of the early

deploying active Army divisions did not complete summaries of this report

for at least 4 months in 1995 and that FORSCOM did not monitor these

reports for about 6 months in 1995 due to a lack of personnel and other

priorities. FORSCOM officials told us they normally performed only limited

monitoring of unit chemical and biological readiness and relied mostly on

unit commanders to report any problems. The U.S. Army Reserve

Command does not have an office or individual assigned to monitor

reserve units’ chemical and biological equipment and training status.

With the exception of SORTS, the monitoring of chemical and biological

readiness varied widely. At the CINC level, virtually no monitoring was

being done. None of the CINCs we visited required any special reports on

chemical or biological matters or had any special monitoring systems in

place. At lower levels, monitoring was inconsistent and driven by the

commander’s emphasis on the area. At both division and corps levels,

monthly briefings, reports, and other specific monitoring of chemical and

biological readiness were sometimes required and sometimes not,

depending on the commander’s view of the importance of this area.

Other methods the Army uses to monitor chemical and biological

proficiency are (1) after-action and lessons-learned reports summarizing

the results of operations and unit exercises at the Army’s combat training

centers and (2) operational readiness evaluations. The effectiveness of

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

these tools is hindered by the varying amounts of chemical and biological

training included in unit rotations at the combat training centers and the

frequent lack of realism under which chemical and biological conditions

are portrayed. Unit commanders influence the amount of chemical and

biological training to be included in exercises at the centers and how and

when it will be used in the exercises. In some cases, Army officials said

that these exercises often include little chemical and biological training

and that in others it is conducted separately from more realistic combat

training.

Operational readiness evaluations (ORE), on the other hand, were more

standardized in the areas of chemical and biological proficiency that were

assessed. FORSCOM used OREs to obtain external evaluations of active,

reserve, and National Guard unit readiness and to identify areas needing

improvement. These evaluations focus on unit ability to perform its

wartime missions prior to mobilization and deployment. OREs consist of a

records check of personnel, logistics, training, and mobilization data and

an assessment of a unit’s ability to perform critical collective and

individual mission tasks, including chemical and biological defense tasks.

However, since the second quarter of fiscal year 1995, the Army has

discontinued OREs at all active units and certain Army National Guard

units.

Marine Corps monitoring of chemical and biological matters was more

extensive than the Army’s. The Marine Corps conducts standardized

Operational Readiness and Commanding General Inspections, Combat

Readiness Evaluation Programs, and Marine Corps Combat Readiness

Evaluations that assess chemical and biological proficiency. The Corps

also requires monthly reports to division commanders that assess home

station training in several specified chemical and biological areas.

However, the effectiveness of some of its evaluation tools is also

questionable for some of the same reasons as those we found for the

Army.

As discussed earlier, Marine Corps trend data and lessons-learned

information from its main combat training center at 29 Palms, California,

showed serious weaknesses in units’ chemical and biological proficiency.

Despite these deficiencies, in 1994 the Marine Corps decided, as a result of

downsizing, to discontinue comprehensive exercises and evaluations of

unit chemical and biological defense proficiency at the 29 Palms combat

training center and concentrate instead on fire support and maneuver

training. Marine chemical and biological training is therefore now largely

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

relegated to the home station training exercises and evaluations

mentioned above.

Like the Army, the Marine Corps now relies on unit commanders to

determine the amount of chemical and biological training needed at their

home stations based on their assessments of their units’ capabilities and

the evaluations described above. The commander’s primary source of

determining unit chemical and biological readiness is the Operational

Readiness Inspection. Our analyses of these inspections conducted in 1994

and 1995 for the 2d Marine Expeditionary Force showed that units were

trained with a few minor deficiencies. The other evaluations for the same

time period showed little discussion of chemical and biological

proficiency. Marine Corps officials stated that unless problems are found,

these programs would not include discussions of these matters. In the few

instances where the evaluations discussed chemical and biological

matters, they for the most part concluded that the units were trained.

However, Marine Corps officials told us that these home station

evaluations do not expose units to the same training rigor and battlefield

conditions as exercises conducted at 29 Palms and therefore are

questionable indicators of actual unit chemical and biological defense

proficiency. Thus, the extent that the Marine Corps has corrected the

chemical and biological problems it encountered during Operation Desert

Storm and since is uncertain.

Conclusions Although DOD has improved chemical and biological defense capability

since the Gulf War, many problems of the type experienced during this

war continue to exist. This is in large part due to the inconsistent but

generally lower priority DOD, and especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the warfighting CINCs, assign chemical and biological defense relative to

other priorities. These problems are likely to continue given current

reductions in military funding and the limited emphasis placed on

chemical and biological defense, unless the Secretary of Defense and the

CJCS specifically assign a higher priority to this area. Until these problems

are resolved, U.S. forces are likely to encounter operational difficulties

and could incur needless casualties if attacked with chemical or biological

weapons.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

Recommendations We could not determine whether increased emphasis on chemical and

biological warfare defense is warranted at the expense of other priorities.

This is a matter of DOD’s military judgment and congressional funding

priorities.

In view of the increasing chemical and biological warfare threat and the

continuing weaknesses in U.S. chemical and biological defense

capabilities noted in this report, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense reevaluate the priority and emphasis given to this area throughout

DOD. We also recommend that the Secretary, in his next annual report to

Congress on NBC Warfare Defense, address (1) proposed solutions to the

deficiencies identified in this report and (2) the impact that shifting

additional resources to this area might have on other military priorities.

If the Secretary’s reevaluation of the priority and emphasis given chemical

and biological defense determines that more emphasis is needed, and if

efforts by the Joint Service Materiel and Joint Service Integration Groups

prove less effective than desired, the Secretary should consider elevating

the single office for program oversight to the assistant secretary level in

DOD rather than leaving it in its present position as part of the Office of the

Assistant Secretary for Atomic Energy. The Secretary should also consider

adopting an increased single manager concept for the execution of the

chemical and biological program. This would provide a single manager

with more authority, responsibility, and accountability for directing

program management and acquisition for all the services.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following

specific actions designed to improve the effectiveness of existing

activities:

• Direct FORSCOM to reevaluate current chemical defense equipment stock

requirements for early deploying active and reserve units to determine the

minimal amounts required to be on hand to meet deployment

requirements and to determine any additional storage facility

requirements. If chemical defense equipment stock requirements are

retained, we recommend that FORSCOM take the actions necessary to see

that early deploying units can and do maintain these stocks.

• Review some services’ practice of funding the purchase of this equipment

through Operation and Maintenance, rather than Procurement, funds. This

review is necessary because Operation and Maintenance funds intended

for chemical and biological defense equipment and training are too easily

and frequently diverted to other purposes, and the uses of these funds are

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

not well recorded. A consistent DOD system for funding these activities and

recording the amount of funds spent on chemical and biological defense

would greatly improve oversight of the resources and emphasis directed to

this area. We recommend that DOD also consider at least temporarily

earmarking Operation and Maintenance funds to relieve existing shortages

of this equipment if current funding practices for purchasing this

equipment are retained.

• Consider modifying SORTS to require active Army divisions to complete and

submit SORTS division summaries for chemical and biological reporting

categories, and implementing changes that would require overall unit

readiness assessments to be more directly affected by their chemical and

biological readiness status. More emphasis should be placed on accurately

inventorying and reporting unit stocks of critical chemical and biological

defense equipment through SORTS and other monitoring and reporting

systems. SORTS reporting requirements should also be modified to more

accurately reflect shortcomings in units’ ability to meet existing chemical

and biological training standards.

• Determine and direct the implementation of an effective and appropriate

immunization program for biological warfare defense that is consistent

with existing DOD immunization policy.

• Direct that DOD medical courses of instruction regarding chemical and

biological warfare treatment techniques, such as the Management of

Chemical and Biological Casualties Course, be directed toward those

personnel occupying positions in medical units most likely to have need of

this training and that medical units assigned such personnel keep adequate

records to determine whether the appropriate number and types of their

personnel have attended such courses.

• Direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that tactical unit training

addresses casualty decontamination and that the current confusion

regarding responsibility for performing casualty decontamination is

corrected.

• Direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine

Corps to ensure that all combat training centers routinely emphasize and

include chemical and biological training, and that this training is

conducted in a realistic manner. Further, we recommend that the

Secretary and the Commandant direct units attending these centers to be

more effectively evaluated on their ability to meet existing chemical and

biological training standards.

• Direct the CINCs to routinely include joint chemical and biological training

tasks in exercises conducted under the CJCS exercise program and evaluate

the ability of joint forces to perform chemical and biological tasks.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
B-258889 

Further, we recommend that the Secretary direct the CINCs to report

annually on the results of this training.

Agency Comments DOD generally concurred with the report findings, and acknowledged that a

relatively low emphasis has been placed on chemical and biological

defense in the past. DOD also concurred with 9 of the10 report

recommendations. In commenting on this report, DOD stated it has recently

increased the emphasis and funding given to chemical and biological

defense and has begun a number of initiatives that are expected to address

many of the problems we identified. DOD’s full comments and our

evaluation are shown in appendix VI.

A discussion of our scope and methodology is in appendix V. We

conducted our review from October 1994 to December 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the House

Committee on National Security, and the Senate and House Committees

on Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix VII.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Recurring Weaknesses

in Army Chemical and

Biological

Capabilities, Fiscal

Years 1994-95

24

Appendix II 

Army Chemical and

Biological Trendline

Data From Combat

Training Centers,

Fiscal Years 1989-90

26

Appendix III 

CJCS Exercises That

Include Joint Training

Tasks, Fiscal Years

1995-96

27

Appendix IV 

Extent to Which 23

Joint Chemical/

Biological Tasks Are

Included in Planned

CJCS Exercises,

Fiscal Year 1996

28

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Contents

Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

29

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

Secretary of Defense

32

Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

42

Abbreviations

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CINC commanders in chief

DOD Department of Defense

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FORSCOM U.S. Forces Command

IND Investigational New Drug

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

ORE operational readiness evaluation

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I 

Recurring Weaknesses in Army Chemical

and Biological Capabilities, Fiscal Years

1994-95

Task

2d Armya

(percentage of units

inadequately

trained)b

5th Armyc

(percentage of units

inadequately trained)

Found in

Gulf War

Donning protective masks

Active

National Guard

U.S. Army Reserve

39

57

84

50

88

81

Yes

Decontamination

Active

National Guard

U.S. Army Reserve

33

61

48

10

60

75

Yes

School-trained NBC officer

Active

National Guard

U.S. Army Reserve

5

31

35

17

34

19

Not

applicable

Preparing for a chemical

attack

Active

National Guard

U.S. Army Reserve

67

77

50

23

50

60

Yes

Responding to a chemical

attack

Active

National Guard

U.S. Army Reserve

63

53

56

15

67

60

Yes

Integrating chemical and

biological tasks into

training

Active

National Guard

U.S. Army Reserve

26

31

29

0

35

40

N/A

(Table notes on next page)

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix I 

Recurring Weaknesses in Army Chemical

and Biological Capabilities, Fiscal Years

1994-95

aIn June 1995, the 1st Army, located at Fort Meade, Maryland, and the 2d Army, located at Fort

Gillem, Georgia, were consolidated. The new consolidated unit is called the 1st Army. Our review

of operational readiness evaluation (ORE) covered the 138 evaluations conducted by the former

2d Army in fiscal year 1994 and the first half of fiscal year 1995. Second Army OREs included 138

units—19 Active, 31 Army Reserve, and 88 National Guard.

bBased on the results of our ORE analysis, we considered units to be inadequately trained if they

were classified by the Army as being either untrained or partially trained.

cIn May 1995, the 6th Army located at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, and the 5th Army

located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, were consolidated as the new 5th Army. Our review of OREs

covered the 83 evaluations conducted by the former 5th Army in fiscal year 1994 and the first half

of fiscal year 1995. Fifth Army OREs included 83 units—18 Active, 28 Army Reserve, and 37

National Guard.

Sources: Operational Readiness Evaluations, 2d and 5th Continental U.S. Armies, and Chemical

Lessons Learned, Documents From Operations Desert Shield/Storm, August 1990 through

July 1991.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix II 

Army Chemical and Biological Trendline

Data From Combat Training Centers, Fiscal

Years 1989-90

Task measured Percent untrained Found in Gulf War

Battle Management

Use of chemical units/officers

Casualty evaluation 

Threat analysis

Advising commanders

Intelligence preparation of battlefield

94

92

60

75

60

Yes

Contamination avoidance

Employment of chemical alarms

Use of detection kits

Implementation of warning system

90

86

73

Yes

Decontamination

Planning

Execution

45

80

Yes

Protection

Distribution of protective gear

Donning appropriate gear

Unmasking procedures

Administering first aid

50

73

100

83

Yes

Note: Data collected from 31 rotations of infantry, airborne, special operations, armored cavalry,

mechanized and motorized infantry, air assault, and heavy and light forces from October 1988 to

October 1990.

Source: Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) Trendline Study from the Command Training

Centers Final Report, U.S. Army Chemical School, March 1991, and Chemical Lessons Learned

Documents from Operations Desert Shield/Storm, dated August 1990 through July 1991.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix III 

CJCS Exercises That Include Joint Training

Tasks, Fiscal Years 1995-96

Number of joint exercises

Exercises that include

chemical/biological tasks

Command 1995 1996 1995 1996

CENTCOM 88 64 2 2

EUCOM 57 69 7 6

PACOM a 31 a 13

USACOM 9 6 6 5

Total 154 170 15 26

Note: CENTCOM, Central Command; EUCOM, European Command; PACOM, Pacific Command;

USACOM, Atlantic Command.

aPACOM did not provide information for fiscal year 1995.

Source: U.S. Central, Atlantic, European, and Pacific commands.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix IV 

Extent to Which 23 Joint Chemical/

Biological Tasks Are Included in Planned

CJCS Exercises, Fiscal Year 1996

Command

Total planned

exercises with

chemical/ biological

tasks 23 tasks 15-22 tasks 10-14 tasks 5-9 tasks 1-4 tasks

CENTCOM 2 0 1 1 0 0

EUCOMa 6 a a a a a

PACOM 13 0 0 0 1 12

USACOM 5 0 0 0 2 3

aEUCOM did not provide information on specific chemical and biological tasks done in its joint

exercises.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Military

Readiness, House Committee on National Security, requested that we

provide a current assessment of the ability of early deploying U.S. ground

forces to survive and operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated

environment. Our objectives were to determine (1) DOD’s actions to

address chemical and biological warfare defense problems identified

during the Gulf War and (2) the current preparedness of these forces to

operate in a contaminated environment.

To determine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) actions to correct the

problems identified in the Gulf War, we reviewed DOD’s

Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense annual reports

submitted in 1994 and 1995 to Congress, lessons-learned documents, and

other studies prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army, and the

Marine Corps. We performed a similar analysis of problems identified in

routine training exercises conducted under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff Exercise Program and at the Army’s combat training centers—the

National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint

Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Combat

Maneuver Training Center, located at Hohenfels, Germany; and the Marine

Corps Air Ground Combat Center at 29 Palms, California. We also

analyzed operational readiness inspections and evaluations and other

Army and Marine Corps documents that assessed the results of home

station training exercises.

To determine the preparedness of U.S. ground forces to operate in a

chemical or biological environment, we focused on three areas: the

availability of critical chemical and biological defense equipment, such as

protective suits, masks, and alarms; the adequacy of chemical and

biological training, including the extent to which tasks are conducted in

joint and service training; and the availability of medical countermeasures

to prevent and treat chemical and biological casualties, including supplies

of critical vaccines and medical procedures to decontaminate and

evacuate casualties.

Regarding equipment availability at the units visited, we compared

equipment on hand with that required by Army and Marine Corps

regulations. To determine training adequacy, we analyzed Army, Marine

Corps, and Joint Staff training guidance specifying chemical and biological

tasks to be done as well as after-action and lessons-learned reports to

identify any weaknesses. We also analyzed the training exercises

conducted under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program to

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

determine the extent that joint exercises include chemical and biological

defense training. To assess the adequacy of medical countermeasures, we

interviewed DOD officials and analyzed lessons-learned reports from the

Gulf War to determine what problems had occurred. We then assessed

medical unit equipment availability and training, the training provided to

military physicians for the treatment and management of chemical and

biological casualties, and the adequacy of biological agent vaccine stocks

and policies and procedures for their use.

We also assessed the efforts by DOD, the Joint Staff, and CINCs to monitor

chemical and biological readiness. We interviewed key officials, examined

guidance and reporting requirements, and analyzed reports to determine

the extent that chemical and biological matters are included.

We met with key DOD, Joint Staff, and service officials to discuss chemical

and biological problems and the efforts to correct them; as well as

readiness issues, including the emphasis placed on chemical and

biological matters and other issues. At the DOD level, we contacted officials

in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

(Chemical and Biological Matters); the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence

Center, Fort Detrick, Maryland; and the Joint Program Office for

Biological Defense. At the Joint Staff level, we met with officials in the

offices of the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Weapons

Technology Control Division, and the Director for Operational Plans and

Interoperability (J-7), Joint Exercise and Training Division. At the

commander in chief (CINC) level, we contacted officials at the U.S. Atlantic,

Central, European, and Pacific Commands. At the Army, we held

discussions and reviewed documents at U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort

McPherson, Georgia; the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Atlanta, Georgia;

the Office of the Army Surgeon General, Falls Church, Virginia; the Army

Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama; the Army Medical Command

and the Army Medical Department Center and School, Fort Sam Houston,

Texas; the Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Aberdeen,

Maryland; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases,

Fort Detrick, Maryland; Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington,

D.C.; and the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Fort

Detrick, Maryland.

We interviewed officials and reviewed documents at the Army’s III Corps

Headquarters, Fort Hood, Texas; the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters,

Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and the Marine Corps’ Combat Development

and Combat Systems Development Commands, Quantico, Virginia.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix V 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We visited four of the 5-1/3 active Army divisions composing the crisis

response force as well as the 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and

the 25th Light Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

We visited the 2d U.S. Army (now 1st U.S. Army) headquarters, Fort

Gillem, Georgia; the 5th U.S. Army headquarters, Fort Sam Houston,

Texas; the 90th U.S. Army Reserve Command, San Antonio, Texas; the

98th U.S. Army Reserve Support Command, Little Rock, Arkansas; and the

143d Transportation Command, Orlando, Florida. We also visited a

chemical company, a chemical detachment, a chemical brigade

headquarters, a signal company, an engineer group, and a transportation

detachment from the U.S. Army Reserves that, at the time of our review,

were designated for deployment in less than 30 days from mobilization.

We visited the following Marine Corps Units:

• II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;

• II Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;

• II Marine Force Service Support Group, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;

and

• II Marine Aircraft Wing, Cherry Point, North Carolina.

We conducted our work from October 1994 to December 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 19.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 19.

See comment 1.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 19.

Now on p. 19.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 20.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 20.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 20.

Now on p. 20.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 20.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

See comment 4.

Now on p. 20.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated March 20, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. Our report acknowledges that a single office within DOD currently has

responsibility for chemical and biological program oversight and

execution. However, as we noted in our report, many aspects of joint

military service planning of research, development, acquisition, and

logistics support for chemical and biological activities are dependent on

the effectiveness of the committee-like Joint Service Integration and Joint

Service Materiel Groups. The effectiveness of these groups in resolving

interservice chemical and biological issues remains to be seen, and the

Joint Service Integration Group was continuing to have start-up staffing

problems at the time of our review. Some DOD officials have expressed

concern regarding the ability of these groups to obtain sufficient support

and emphasis from the individual services to be effective. We believe more

of a single manager approach to this planning should be considered if

these groups are unable to effectively address current problems and

develop timely solutions. We have slightly modified our recommendation

to clarify our position on this point.

2. We agree that the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) is

not intended to function as a detailed management tool. However, the

current system leaves significant opportunity for broadly inaccurate

reporting of unit chemical and biological preparedness status. For

example, although 3 of the 5-1/3 Army divisions composing the crisis

response force had 50 percent or less of the protective clothing required

by regulations for chemical and biological defense, these shortages were

discernable through SORTS for only one of these divisions. This type of

problem was evident during the Persian Gulf conflict, as after-action

reports and other analyses revealed that units reporting 90 to 95 percent of

their equipment on hand through SORTS actually had far less serviceable

equipment for a variety of reasons, thereby causing logisticians and

transporters to make extraordinary post-mobilization and

post-deployment efforts to fill requisitions for unit shortages.

Furthermore, during our review, at least one early deploying division was

able to report C-1 for individual protective equipment status (90 percent or

more of equipment on hand) although less than 50 percent of the required

protective clothing and other items were actually available (C-4 status).

This occurred because Army regulations allow units to forego reporting on

equipment stored in facilities not specifically controlled by the unit. In this

case, the division’s chemical defense equipment was stored in a

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

warehouse controlled by corps headquarters, and reporting these

shortages through SORTS was therefore not required, even though the corps

headquarters and the division were physically located on the same

installation. In this case, the level of stockage was not only inadequate for

the division, but for other early deploying units within the corps as well.

Also, leaving SORTS reporting mandatory for individual units, but optional

for divisions, not only complicates the process but also makes review by

higher commands such as U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) much more

difficult.

Finally, DOD’s annual reports to Congress acknowledged continuing

problems regarding the accountability and management of NBC defense

item inventories. While we concur that SORTS is not an appropriate tool for

detailed management, we believe the assessment it provides, particularly

regarding unit inventories of critical chemical and biological defense

equipment, needs to be reasonably accurate in order to provide a

meaningful readiness assessment. As long as units are required to be

capable of defending themselves and operating in a contaminated

environment, we believe that a readiness evaluation system that permits

an overall unit readiness rating of C-1 while chemical and biological

equipment readiness is rated C-4 could easily provide misleading

information about that unit’s actual combat readiness. Also, requiring at

least a moderate level of chemical and biological readiness in order to

achieve a high overall readiness rating would do much to emphasize

chemical and biological defense, and thus address some of the disparity

that often occurs between the level of emphasis placed on chemical and

biological defense by DOD policy and guidance and that actually being

applied at unit level (see comment 4). We are therefore retaining this

recommendation.

3.There is no question that Army doctrine and manuals are clear about

who has responsibility for patient decontamination. However, both

medical and tactical units we visited that were involved in implementing

these tasks were often unaware of the doctrine and, consequently, usually

had not either planned or trained to perform these functions.

4. We concur that military service training documents and standards

require commanders to ensure that units and individuals are trained to

defend and survive in a contaminated environment. However, there

appears to be a difference between the policy and guidance established

and the extent to which it has been effectively applied. For example, while

the last two FORSCOM commanders have issued NBC defense training

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Secretary of Defense

guidance requiring commanders to ensure that units are fully trained to

sustain operations and defend against battlefield NBC hazards, the various

DOD readiness and evaluation mechanisms we reviewed continue to

indicate that many units are in fact not trained to DOD standards for

chemical and biological defense. Our report also shows that Army unit

commanders have not met FORSCOM requirements for unit on-hand stocks

for critical NBC equipment, and that FORSCOM has not provided either the

funds or the supervisory oversight needed to ensure compliance.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Donald L. Patton

William W. Cawood

Rodney A. Ragan

Penny A. Berrier

Jay S. Willer

Atlanta Field Office Cherie’ M. Stark

Zachary R. White

Stacey E. Keisling

Kansas City Field

Office

Benjamin Douglas

Joseph F. Lenart, Jr.

(703082) Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-103 Chemical and Biological Defense
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