alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   In connection with the Quarterly Report of EntreMetrix Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the Report), I, Scott W. Absher, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Dated:  December 17, 2007/s/ Scott W. AbsherBy:  Scott W. AbsherIts:  President   A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to EntreMetrix Corporation and will be retained by EntreMetrix Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ERIC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. JAC OB O FLORE S-VASQUEZ, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 14-50066

D.C . No. 3:13-c r-02162-GPC M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Southe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Gonz a lo P. C urie l, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 17, 2015 * * B e fore : O’ SC ANNLAIN, LEAVY, a n d FER N ANDEZ, C irc uit Judge s. Ja c obo Flore s-Va s que za

ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt a nd c ha lle nge s the 48-m onth se nte n c e im pose d following his guilty -ple a c onvic tion for atte m pte d re e ntry

of a re m ove d a lie n, in viola

tion of 8 U.S.C . § 1326. W e have jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a nd we a ffirm . 

# FIL ED FEB 24 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).Flore s-Va sque z c o nte nds tha t his sente nc e viola

te s theSixth Am e ndm e nt be c a use the fa c t of theprior c onvic tion tha t subje c t e d him

to a highe r statutory m axim um unde r se c tion 1326(b) wa s not a dm itte d by him or prove n to a

jury . The Supre m e C ourt re

je c t e d this a

rgum e nt in Alme ndare

z-Torre s v . Unite d

State s , 523 U.S. 224, 239-47 (1998). Flore s-Va sque z ’ s c onte ntion tha t A l me ndare z-Torre s ha s be e n ove rrule d is inc orre c t. Se eAlle y nev . Unite d State

s , 133 S. C t. 2151, 2160 n.1 (2013) (de c lining to rev isit holding in Alme ndare z-Torre s ); s e ealso United State

s v . Graje d a , 581 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th C i r. 2009) (Supre m e C ourt pre c e de nt is c ontrolling until it is e

xplic i tly ove rrule d by

the C ourt). AFFIRM E D.

1 4 - 5 0 0 6 6 2
# 52.222-45 [Reserved]

**Parent topic:**52.222 [Reserved]
[J-11-2015][M.O. – Stevens, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

PATRICK RAY HANEY,

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 698 CAP

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on 3/12/14 in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division ofFayette County at No. CP-26-CR0002075-2011

SUBMITTED: February 25, 2015

DISSENTING OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: December 29, 2015

Consistent with my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Woodard , ___ Pa.

___, ____ A.3d ___, 2015 WL 7767271 (Dec. 3, 2015), which I incorporate here by

reference, I respectfully dissent. In both Woodard and the present case, I would hold

that the trial courts erred in admitting into evidenc e color photographs of nude, battered,

open-eyed, deceased children taken during autopsies, en compassing full body portraits

and facial close-ups. As I explained at greater length in Woodard , I believe that such

graphic, visceral portrayals of dead children create an u nacceptable risk of influencing

jurors to reach conclusions based on factors other than a st rict application of the law to

the facts. See id. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___, 2015 WL 7767271, at *24-2 6 (Saylor, C.J.,

dissenting). 1 The impact is heightened in the present case, given that the trial court

1 This case and Woodard suggest the potential for confusion in this area of the law in terms of what this Court means by the word “inflammato ry.” The Woodard majority credited a trial court’s finding that one set of autopsy photographs of a naked, battered (continuedF)[J-11-2015][M.O. – Stevens, J.] - 2

apparently permitted the jurors to have unfettered access to these pictures during their

deliberations, see N.T., March 11, 2014, at 265. Accord Woodard , ___ Pa. at ___, ___

A.3d at ___, 2015 WL 7767271, at *10 (highlighting, as a factor favoring affirmance of

the trial court’s decision to admit autopsy photographs, the fact that “the jury was not

given the photographs to examine during deliberation s[.]”).

(Fcontinued) child were not inflammatory, see Woodard , ___ Pa. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___, 2015 WL 7767271, at *10; whereas, the present majority credits another trial court’s finding that similar pictures were inflammatory. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 21. The majority, however, provides no explanation for why the visceral im pact of the two sets of photographs upon lay jurors may have been different.

From my own point of view, having reviewed both sets o f pictures, I fail to see any material difference in this regard.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Young Min Kwak, Appellant.

[814 NYS2d 614]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie Wittner, J.), rendered November 25, 2002, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 17 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

After a shot was fired in an adjacent courtroom, outside the jury’s presence but possibly within its hearing, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a mistrial, or for individual inquiries of the jurors *(see People v Buford,*69 NY2d 290, 298-299 [1987]). The court’s instructions and its inquiry directed to the jury as a group were sufficient to avoid any prejudice. The incident had no connection to defendant or the case on trial, and there was no reason to *386believe it would render any juror unqualified to continue serving *(see People v Figueroa,*4 AD3d 118 [2004], *lv denied*2 NY3d 799 [2004]). Furthermore, the court had the opportunity to observe the jurors’ demeanor in evaluating whether the incident had any apparent effect.

The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. There was extensive evidence of defendant’s intent to kill the deceased, with whom defendant had reason to be angry. Among other things, there was forensic and medical evidence supporting the inference that defendant fired a shot downward at the fallen victim, fatally perforating his carotid artery. Furthermore, the evidence did not indicate that defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the necessary intent.

There was no de facto amendment of the indictment at the close of the People’s case *(see People v Rivera,*84 NY2d 766, 770-771 [1995]). The indictment charged defendant with causing the death of the named deceased “with intent to cause the death of another person,” but without naming the other person. This language tracked Penal Law § 125.25 (1), and was sufficient to allege both direct intent to kill the victim and transferred intent, that is, a theory that defendant intended to shoot someone else but missed and hit the victim instead *(see People v Fernandez,*88 NY2d 777, 781-782 [1996]). There is nothing in the wording of the indictment, or in the circumstances of the case, that would lead defendant to mount a defense limited to transferred intent.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Tom, J.P., Andrias, Friedman, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.
52.223-1 Biobased Product Certification.

As prescribed in 23.406(a), insert the following provision:

Biobased Product Certification (May 2012)

As required by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and the Energy Policy Act of

2005 ( 7 U.S.C. 8102(c)(3)), the offeror certifies, by signing this offer, that biobased products (within

categories of products listed by the United States Department of Agriculture in 7 CFR part 3201,

subpart B) to be used or delivered in the performance of the contract, other than biobased products

that are not purchased by the offeror as a direct result of this contract, will comply with the

applicable specifications or other contractual requirements.

(End of provision)

Parent topic: 52.223 [Reserved]
§ 623.1 Purpose and scope. ( a ) The regulations in this part set forth the policies, procedures, and requirements for the Emergency Wetlands Reserve Program (EWRP). Under the EWRP, NRCS will make offers to purchase wetland conservation easements from persons owning croplands that were damaged by the 1993 Midwest floods if those lands have the potential for restoration to wetland conditions and if the owner voluntarily agrees to restore and maintain those conditions. The easements are to be purchased to promote the restoration and maintenance of wetland characteristics, such as hydrologic conditions of inundation or saturation of the soil and hydrophytic vegetation. The functions and values of the wetlands for wildlife habitat, water quality improvement, flood water retention, floodway enhancement, ground water recharge, open space, aesthetic values, and environmental education will thus be promoted. The wetland conservation easements will permanently prohibit use of the affected land as cropland. Additionally, the easement shall require permanent maintenance of the wetland conditions, except in the case of natural disaster.
( b ) The EWRP is available only in the following States: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Certain cropland areas within these States have been determined to have been inundated by the Midwest floods of 1993. As more fully defined and described in this part, eligible land may include farmed wetlands or prior converted wetlands (wetlands converted prior to December 23, 1985), together with adjacent lands on which the wetlands are functionally dependent so long as the likelihood of successful restoration of such land and the potential wetland values merit inclusion in the program with reasonable costs.
**Exhibit 33.2**

** **

**WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK**

** **

**SERVICER’S REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

 

 

Washington Mutual Bank (the “Asserting Party”) is responsible for assessing compliance as of December 31, 2006 and for the periodfrom January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 (the “Reporting Period”) of the Platform Transactions (as defined below) with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB (12 CFR part 229.1122), except the following criteria1(iii) and 3(i)(C) and (D), which we have concluded are either (i) not applicable to the servicing of the mortgage loans included in the Platform Transactions (each, a “Mortgage Loan”), or (ii) performed by other parties with respect to theMortgage Loans (such criteria, after giving effect to the foregoing exceptions, the “Applicable Servicing Criteria”)**.**  The transactions covered by this Servicer’s Assessment are those securitizations of pools of mortgage loansthat were completed on or after January 1, 2006 and prior to January 1, 2007 for which the Asserting Party performed servicing functions set forth in Item 1122(d), that included one or more classes of publicly offered securities registered with the Securities andExchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, and for which the Asserting Party has an obligation to deliver an Assessment of Compliance pursuant to Item 1122 (the “Platform Transactions”).

 

The Asserting Party has assessed its compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria for the Reporting Period, using the Applicable ServicingCriterion, and has concluded that it has complied in all material respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria with respect to the Mortgage Loans.

 

Deloitte & Touche LLP, a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report on the Asserting Party’s assessment ofcompliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria for the Reporting Period.

 

Dated:  March 14, 2007

 

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK

 

           

By: ___*/s/ H. John Berens*

Name:  H. John Berens

Title:    Senior Vice President
23.505 Contract clause.

Except as provided in 23.501, insert the clause at 52.223-6, Drug-Free Workplace, in solicitations

and contracts.

Parent topic: Subpart 23.5 - Drug-Free Workplace
Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:96-cr-00035-MP

KATIA ELENA CARVAJAL,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on Motion to Dismiss Case by USA as to Katia Elena

Carvajal, Doc. 41. The United States recites that the defendant has fled to Peru, and the

likelihood of an arrest in Peru and successful extradition to the United States is remote. 

Accordingly, the United States requests the warrant for the defendant’s arrest be quashed, and

the case dismissed. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Motion to Dismiss Case, Doc. 41, is GRANTED. 

2. The warrant for Katia Elena Carvajal is QUASHED. 

3. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 2010

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge
32.1005 Solicitation provision and contract clause.       (a) 						            Insert the clause at 52.232-32, Performance-Based Payments, in-                                                         (1) 								                Solicitations that may result in contracts providing for performance-based payments; and                                                            (2) 								                Fixed-price contracts under which the Government will provide performance-based payments.                                                                             (b)                                                         (1) 								                Insert the solicitation provision at 52.232-28, invitation to Propose Performance-Based Payments, in negotiated solicitations that invite offerors to propose performance-based payments.                                                            (2) 								                Use the provision with its Alternate I in competitive negotiated solicitations if the Government intends to adjust proposed prices for proposal evaluation purposes (see 32.1004(e)).    **Parent topic:** Subpart 32.10 - Performance-Based Payments
# 52.208-3 [Reserved]

**Parent topic:**52.208 [Reserved]
52.226-3 Disaster or Emergency Area Representation.       As prescribed in 26.206(a), insert the following provision:          Disaster or Emergency Area Representation (Nov 2007)                                       (a)                   *Set-aside area.* The area covered in this contract is: ________________________________________________ [*Contracting Officer to fill in with definite geographic boundaries.*]                                          (b)                   *Representations.* The offeror represents that it □ does □ does not reside or primarily do business in the designated set-aside area.                                          (c) An offeror is considered to be residing or primarily doing business in the set-aside area if, during the last twelve months-                                                         (1) The offeror had its main operating office in the area; and                                                            (2) That office generated at least half of the offeror’s gross revenues and employed at least half of the offeror’s permanent employees.                                                                             (d) If the offeror does not meet the criteria in paragraph (c) of this provision, factors to be considered in determining whether an offeror resides or primarily does business in the set-aside area include-                                                         (1) Physical location(s) of the offeror’s permanent office(s) and date any office in the set-aside area(s) was established;                                                            (2) Current state licenses;                                                            (3) Record of past work in the set-aside area(s) (*e.g.*, how much and for how long);                                                            (4) Contractual history the offeror has had with subcontractors and/or suppliers in the set-aside area;                                                            (5) Percentage of the offeror’s gross revenues attributable to work performed in the set-aside area;                                                            (6) Number of permanent employees the offeror employs in the set-aside area;                                                            (7) Membership in local and state organizations in the set-aside area; and                                                            (8) Other evidence that establishes the offeror resides or primarily does business in the set-aside area. For example, sole proprietorships may submit utility bills and bank statements.                                                                             (e) If the offeror represents it resides or primarily does business in the set-aside area, the offeror shall furnish documentation to support its representation if requested by the Contracting Officer. The solicitation may require the offeror to submit with its offer documentation to support the representation.                                 (End of provision)    **Parent topic:** 52.226 [Reserved]
§ 58.334 Pasteurization. The milk or cream shall be pasteurized at the plant where the milk or cream is processed into the finished product or by procedures as set forth by the Administrator. ( a ) *Cream for butter making.* The cream for butter making shall be pasteurized at a temperature of not less than 165 °F. and held continuously in a vat at such temperature for not less than 30 minutes; or pasteurized by HTST method at a minimum temperature of not less than 185 °F. for not less than 15 seconds; or it shall be pasteurized by any other equivalent temperature and holding time which will assure adequate pasteurization. Additional heat treatment above the minimum pasteurization requirement is advisable to insure improved keeping-quality characteristics. Adequate pasteurization control shall be used and the diversion valve shall be set to divert at no less than 185 °F. with a 15 second holding time or its equivalent in time and temperature to assure pasteurization. If the vat or holding method of pasteurization is used, vat covers shall be closed prior to holding period to assure temperature of air space reaching 5 °F. higher than the minimum temperature during the holding time. Covers shall also be kept closed during the holding and cooling period.
( b ) *Cream for plastic or frozen cream.* The pasteurization of cream for plastic or frozen cream shall be accomplished in the same manner as in paragraph (a) of this section, except, that the temperature for the vat method shall be not less than 170 °F. for not less than 30 minutes, or not less than 190 °F. for not less than 15 seconds or by any other temperature and holding time which will assure adequate pasteurization and comparable keeping-quality characteristics.
§ 4279.245 Personal and corporate guarantees. ( a ) Unconditional personal and corporate guarantees are required for the full term of the loan from Persons owning 20 percent or greater interest in the borrower.
( b ) When warranted by an Agency assessment and its credit evaluation, guarantees may also be required of parent, subsidiaries, affiliated companies, Persons owning less than a 20 percent interest in the borrower, or Persons whose ownership interest in the Borrower is held indirectly through intermediate entities.
( c ) The Agency may require the guarantees to be secured.
( d ) Partial guarantees and exemptions to the requirement for guarantees may be requested by the Lender and are subject to concurrence by the Agency approval official on a case-by-case basis when warranted by an Agency assessment and its credit evaluation in accordance with § 4279.215(b). If partial guarantees are required, the partial guarantee will be at least equal to each owner's percentage of interest in the Borrower multiplied by the loan amount.
( e ) All personal and corporate guarantors must execute Form RD 4279-14, “Unconditional Guarantee,” and any guarantee form required by the Lender. The Agency will retain the original, executed Form RD 4279-14. ( 1 ) Any amounts paid by the Agency on behalf of an Agency Borrower will constitute a Federal Debt owed to the Agency by the Borrower.
( 2 ) Any amounts paid by the Agency pursuant to a claim by a Lender will constitute a Federal Debt owed to the Agency by a guarantor of the loan, to the extent of the amount of the guarantor's guarantee.
( 3 ) In all instances under paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this section, Interest charges will be assessed at the Promissory Note Interest rate on the date a loss claim is paid.
Order filed March 3 , 2020

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 18

- 00372

- CR

____________ HOLLY LYNN HARRISON , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 368th District Court Williamson County, Texas Trial Cou rt Cause No. 16

- 0276

- K368



### ORDER

On J anuary 28, 2020 , this Court rendered its judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and ordering a new trial. On January 28, 2020, appellant, Holly Lynn Harrison, filed a motion requesting this Court to set reasonab le bail. T ex. C ode Crim. Proc

. a rt. 44.04(h). We find that we have jurisdiction to set bail following a reversal of the trial court’s judgment. See T ex. R. App

. P. 51.2(c) (1)

. We find appellant’s motion meritorious, grant the motion, and ORDER the appel la n t, Holly Ly nn Harrison, released on bail upon her giving good and sufficient bond, signed byappellant as principal and with sureties as required by law, in the sum of $ 35,000 , total,

pending final disposition by the trial court below. See Tex. Code Crim

. Proc. art. 44.04(h). Any conditions on bail must be set by the trial court, and any sureties on bail must be approved by the trial court. Foreman v. State , 565 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. a r ts. 17. 40

– .49 (allowing magistrate to set conditions on bail), 44.04(h) (requiring trial court to approve sureties); Leonard v. Stat e , 376 S.W.3d 886, 890 (Tex. App.

– Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (holding trial court has authority to set reasonable conditi o ns for bail set under section 44.04(h)) )

PER CURIAM



### Panel c onsists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.