Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic

and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations.

Posting of the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues

addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for

U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the public release of this

document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the

Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report.

The author thanks Richard Bejtlich and Jon Lindsay for their review of early drafts. These experts do not necessarily 

agree with or endorse the staff report’s assessments and statements contained herein, and any errors should be 

attributed to the author.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

Staff Report

January 14, 2015

China’s Position on the Sony Attack: Implications for the U.S. 

Response

by

Jordan Wilson

Research Fellow, Security and Foreign Affairs
1

Background

In late November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment confirmed it was the victim of a cyber attack that

crippled its networks and stole large quantities of personal and commercial data.

1 On December 19, the 

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) publicly identified North Korea as responsible for these crimes, 

describing the attack as “destructive” and “coercive” in nature.2 President Obama pledged the United States 

would respond “proportionately” and “in a place and time and manner that we choose.”

3 On January 2, 

2015, the United States imposed financial sanctions on North Korea’s arms industry as a “first step in 

retaliation.”

4,* Analysts and news media have suggested further steps could include listing North Korea as 

a state sponsor of terrorism, bringing down its propaganda websites, and targeting its computer hardware,5

with a kinetic response termed “the remotest of possibilities.”6

U.S. officials reached out to China’s government following this attribution in an effort to “share 

information,” “express our concerns,” and “ask for their cooperation,” as stated by one representative.7 The 

United States reportedly asked specifically for assistance in a “blocking action” to eliminate North Korea’s 

ability to carry out future attacks,8as Chinese state-owned enterprise China Unicom is a crucial conduit for 

nearly all of the regime’s telecommunications.

9 Beijing has yet to publicly respond to the U.S. overture or 

officially acknowledge North Korean involvement, stating only that China “is against all forms of cyber 

attacks,” including those launched by a state “using facilities beyond its own national borders against a 

third country.”

10

As China has received attention as a potential factor in this attack, is in a unique position to influence North 

Korea, and is a key player in the development of international norms in cyberspace, its reactions to U.S. 

decisions on these matters are of particular interest. 

Was China Involved in the Attack against Sony?

President Obama said on December 20 the U.S. had found “no indication that North Korea was acting in 

conjunction with another country."11 Some analysts have suggested, however, that China could have played

a role in the attack, but the Administration has avoided public accusations for diplomatic reasons.

Arguments for China’s involvement have largely drawn on its physical proximity to North Korea’s cyber 

infrastructure as well as political ties to its leadership; one U.S. senator made the case that carrying out an 

operation of this size required China “being involved or at least knowing about it,”12 a statement swiftly 

criticized by China’s government.13 Other sources suggest the Sony attack could have been routed through 

Chinese servers14 or that a network of as many as 1,000 North Korean hackers operating in China could 

have played a role,15 particularly the “Bureau 121” group reportedly working out of North Korean-owned 

locations in Shenyang.16

None of these assertions has been accompanied by substantive evidence of knowledge or assistance on the 

part of China’s government, however.† Proximity is insufficient to prove complicity, as reports show the 

 

* North Korea experienced recurring Internet failures over several days beginning December 22, 2014. Some have 

speculated the outages were the result of a U.S. cyber attack, but to date there has been no evidence to support this 

claim. Former director of operations at U.S. Cyber Command Maj. Gen. Brett Williams, USAF (Retd.) has stated it is 

“unlikely this was the result of U.S. actions,” as it was not a “proportionate response” as promised, and the United 

States would likely use a more sophisticated and targeted approach to impact the North Korean leadership directly.

Interview with Lawrence O’Donnell, MSNBC, Television, December 22, 2014. http://www.msnbc.com/the-lastword/watch/what-s-behind-north-korean-internet-outage--376176707647. 

† According to Richard Bejtlich, Chief Security Strategist at FireEye, Inc., the presence of these units in China could 

constitute “state-ignored” responsibility if China’s government knowingly allowed North Korean hackers to operate 
2

Sony attack was routed through servers in Bolivia, Italy, the United States, and five other countries as 

well.17 Furthermore, evidence indicates North Korea is capable of having conducted the operation on its 

own;*its cyber forces have benefited from a surge in investment and training in recent years,18 and 

previously developed a similar but more rudimentary malware called DarkSeoul, used to attack South Korea

in 2013.19 FBI Director James Comey referred to “clear links” to this malware, as well as numerous other 

lines of evidence indicating North Korea’s responsibility, in detailed remarks given on January 7.

20

 

Will China Assist the U.S. Response?

It is unlikely China will cooperate with U.S. government actions against North Korea, based on three 

factors:

 First, U.S.-China cyber cooperation is currently at a low point, marked by China’s suspension of 

the “U.S.-China Cyber Working Group” in May 2014 in response to the FBI’s indictment of five 

People’s Liberation Army officers for cyber espionage.

21 Recent efforts to restart dialogue on the 

subject have proven unsuccessful.22 China considers the United States’ current stance to be

hypocritical and threatening to its interests, and has used information on U.S. cyber activities from 

recent intelligence leaks to justify avoiding collaboration and to build traction with other likeminded nations.23 Given this atmosphere, China is extremely unlikely to assist the United States 

with a defining response in the cyber domain, particularly in such a politically-charged matter.

 Second, China to date has withheld judgment on whether North Korea was involved in the attack 

at all,

24 and implied the FBI’s statement offers insufficient evidence to substantiate the U.S. claim.25

This is consistent with China’s refusal to assign blame for North Korea’s provocative actions in the 

past, including the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and bombardment of a South Korean 

island in 2010,26 indicating it probably will take the same course in this case. 

 Finally, China has actively censored reports on the cyber attack domestically,

27 limiting its citizens’ 

access to the flood of media output detailing North Korea’s crimes. This would be an unlikely 

course of action to take if China were preparing to condemn or act against North Korea. 

How Would China React to a U.S. Cyber Operation against North Korea?

In the case of a clear, attributable counterattack in cyberspace by the United States against North Korea, 

China most likely would respond with strong condemnation through official channels. Two considerations 

support this assumption:

 First, in the current contentious atmosphere of bilateral cyber relations, China is better able to 

defend its stance by condemning a unilateral move by the U.S. to define boundaries in this domain

than by acquiescing to or supporting it. Affirming the “redline” drawn by U.S. retaliation would do 

harm to China’s position, as it would have had no input into the process of the line’s establishment 

and has found little common ground with the United States on setting such boundaries in the past.28

 

in Shenyang and carried their network traffic. The U.S. Government has made no statements regarding whether 

China had such knowledge. Richard Bejtlich, Chief Security Strategist, FireEye, Inc., interview with Commission 

staff, January 9, 2015.

* This refers to North Korea’s use of either internal units or third party criminal groups to carry out the attack. The 

public FBI statement refers to the North Korean government’s “responsibility” and does not distinguish between 

these types of forces. For practical purposes such as identifying North Korea’s intent and capability to launch such 

an operation, there is no difference. 
3

Condemning the U.S. operation, on the other hand, would be a costless move, as it is not likely to

undermine the dialogue further while the two sides have yet to even begin identifying areas of 

agreement.

 Second, while a “second strike” such as this would be unprecedented, China’s past responses to 

other U.S. actions in the cyber domain are informative. Chinese official statements and domestic 

scholarly and media articles have excoriated U.S. cyber deterrence policies,29 stating in one article 

the United States is “playing a dangerous game with cyber deterrence” and “militarizing 

cyberspace.”

30 Responding to U.S. cyber attribution efforts, some have called these cases “typically 

fictitious” and accused the United States of being too quick to attribute “improper individual 

behaviors” to state actors.31 Revelations of U.S. acts of cyber espionage led to descriptions of the

United States as “the biggest cyber villain in our age.”32 This theme suggests a similar response

from Beijing in the case of an unmistakable U.S. cyber attack for deterrence purposes. 

Could a Response Deter Future Chinese Cyber Operations against the U.S.?

Responsive action against North Korea in any form takes the United States into uncharted territory in the 

worldwide cyber domain. The Sony cyber attack is a new type of event, as conducting a cyber operation 

against a company for coercive purposes goes beyond traditionally subtle cyber espionage, yet falls short 

of an “act of war” that causes equivalent to a traditional military attack.33,* As stated by a former White 

House cybersecurity advisor, the United States’ decision will “indelibly serve to influence future nationstate behavior.”

34 The costs imposed will help determine whether actions in this gray zone between 

computer network exploitation and computer network attack, creating “harms between the concepts of war 

and peace” as termed by one analyst,35 are deterred in the future, not only from North Korea but from state 

and non-state actors worldwide.

Past U.S. responses such as the FBI indictment or official denunciations have in no way discouraged

Chinese state-sponsored intrusions into government and industry networks thus far. This case provides a 

new opening, however, for the United States to solidify its declaratory policy, define what is acceptable, 

and potentially change the calculus of actors in this domain in regards to this new type of attack.

36 It can 

take this action without incurring the costs of disrupting an already weakened cyber dialogue with China, 

in which finding common ground on such redlines has been highly challenging.37 Although typical cyber 

espionage activities would remain unaffected, should Chinese entities ever in the future contemplate similar

“gray zone” cyber operations against U.S. industry networks for coercive purposes, the precedent set by the 

U.S. response to North Korea likely will influence their calculations.

Conclusion

China’s likely position on the Sony attack and the developing U.S. response is that of a nonaligned and 

disapproving third party. A forceful and unmistakable retaliation offers the United States the opportunity 

to define redlines and enhance its security in this challenging domain, while incurring few costs due to the 

current stalled state of U.S.-China dialogue on cyber issues. 

1 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Update on Sony Investigation, December 19, 2014. 

http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation; Associated Press, “Sony Saga Blends 

 

* This is the most current, albeit ambiguous, definition given by U.S. officials for an “act of war” in cyberspace. See 

Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Cyber Combat: Act of War: Pentagon Sets Stage for U.S. to Respond to 

Computer Sabotage with Military Force,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2011. 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.

 
4

 

Foreign Intrigue, Star Wattage,” New York Times, December 20, 2014. 

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/12/20/us/politics/ap-us-sony-hack.html; and Lori Grisham, “Timeline: North 

Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack,” USA Today, January 5, 2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2014/12/18/sony-hack-timeline-interview-north-korea/20601645/.

2 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Update on Sony Investigation, December 19, 2014. 

http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation.

3 Associated Press, “Obama Says North Korea Hacked Sony, Vows Response,” New York Times, December 19, 

2014. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/12/19/arts/ap-us-sony-hack.html.

4 Carol E. Lee and Jay Solomon, “U.S. Targets North Korea in Retaliation for Sony Hack: New Sanctions Target 

Individuals Working for Arms Industry,” Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-spenalizes-north-korea-in-retaliation-for-sony-hack-1420225942. 

5 David Rothkopf, “Obama Is Wrong: The Sony Hack Is Not ‘Cybervandalism’: Why the United States Needs a 

Broad, New Strategy to Prepare for – and Defend against – the Next Generation of Online Warfare,” Foreign Policy, 

December 22, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/22/cyber-attack-sony-hack-north-korea-obamaresponse/?wp_login_redirect=0; David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Asks China to Help 

Rein in Korean Hackers,” New York Times, December 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/usasks-china-to-help-rein-in-korean-hackers.html; Jonathan Cheng and Jeyup S. Kwaak, “North Korea: How Can the 

U.S. Respond to Sony Hack Attack?: Experts Say Possible Responses Range from Financial Sanctions to Targeting 

North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/northkorea-how-can-the-u-s-respond-to-sony-hack-attack-1419063801; Anna Yukhananov and James Pearson, 

“Washington Is Limited in its Response to North Korea over Sony Hack,” Reuters, December 19, 2014. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-sony-cybersecurity-sanctionsidUSKBN0JX1UW20141219?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter; and Joseph Marks, “What 

Does a Cyber Counterattack Look Like?” Politico, December 19, 2014. 

http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/what-does-a-cyber-counterattack-look-like-113715.html. 

6

Jonathan Cheng and Jeyup S. Kwaak, “North Korea: How Can the U.S. Respond to Sony Hack Attack?: Experts 

Say Possible Responses Range from Financial Sanctions to Targeting North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities,” Wall 

Street Journal, December 20, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-how-can-the-u-s-respond-to-sonyhack-attack-1419063801. 

7 Ralph Ellis, Holly Yan, and Kyung Lah, “U.S. Seeks China's Help against North Korean Cyberattacks,” CNN, 

December 20, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/20/world/asia/north-korea-sony-response/.

8 David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Asks China to Help Rein in Korean Hackers,” New York 

Times, December 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/us-asks-china-to-help-rein-in-koreanhackers.html.

9 Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Loses its Link to the Internet,” New York Times, December 22, 

2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/asia/attack-is-suspected-as-north-korean-internet-collapses.html; 

David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Asks China to Help Rein in Korean Hackers,” New York 

Times, December 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/us-asks-china-to-help-rein-in-koreanhackers.html; and Carol E. Lee, “U.S. Approaches China in Effort to Respond to North Korean Hacking 

Communications with Chinese Officials Seek Beijing’s Intervention,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2014. 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-approaches-china-in-effort-to-respond-to-north-korean-hacking1419122637?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories.

10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's 

Regular Press Conference on December 22, 2014, December 22, 2014; Xinhua (English edition), “China against All 

Forms of Cyber Attacks, Cyber Terrorism,” December 22, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-

12/22/c_133870914.htm; and Zhang Yunbi and Chen Weihua, “Awaiting Word from China on Sony Hack,” China 

Daily, December 23, 2014. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-12/23/content_19143627.htm.

11 Ralph Ellis, Holly Yan, and Kyung Lah, “U.S. Seeks China's Help against North Korean Cyberattacks,” CNN, 

December 20, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/20/world/asia/north-korea-sony-response/. 

12 Jeremy Diamond, “Graham Suspects China Involved in Sony Attack,” CNN, December 29, 2014. 

http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/28/politics/lindsey-graham-north-korea-guantanamo/.

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's 

Regular Press Conference on December 29, 2014, December 29, 2014. 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1224045.shtml.

14 Simon Denyer, “China Reluctant to Join U.S. in Punishing North Korea over Cyberattacks,” CNN, December 23, 

2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-reluctant-to-join-us-in-punishing-north-korea-over-
5

 

cyberattacks/2014/12/23/911c5418-1bac-4307-9119-32adac212568_story.html; Gordon G. Chang, “Did China Help 

North Korea Hack Sony?” Forbes, December 21, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/12/21/didchina-help-north-korea-hack-sony/. 

15 Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Loses its Link to the Internet,” New York Times, December 

22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/asia/attack-is-suspected-as-north-korean-internetcollapses.html; Huanqiu (China), “South Korea Says North Korea Has Built a Network of About 1000 People in 

China,” December 22, 2014. http://www.wokeji.com/military/jsyw/201412/t20141222_904313.shtml. [Staff 

translation]; and Gordon G. Chang, “Did China Help North Korea Hack Sony?” Forbes, December 21, 2014. 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/12/21/did-china-help-north-korea-hack-sony/. 

16 Will Ripley, “North Korean Defector: ‘Bureau 121’ Hackers Operating in China,” CNN, January 7, 2015. 

http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/06/asia/north-korea-hackers-shenyang/; HP Security Research, HP Security Briefing

Episode 16, August 2014: Profiling an Enigma: The Mystery of North Korea’s Cyber Threat Landscape, August 

2014, 22. http://h30499.www3.hp.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-securityblog/388/2/HPSR%20SecurityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf.

17 Jose Pagliery, “What Caused Sony Hack: What We Know Now,” CNN Money, December 29, 2014. 

http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/24/technology/security/sony-hack-facts/; Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, 

“North Korea Loses its Link to the Internet,” New York Times, December 22, 2014. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/asia/attack-is-suspected-as-north-korean-internet-collapses.html; and

Drew Harwell and Ellen Nakashima, “Hackers’ Threats Prompt Sony Pictures to Shelve Christmas Release of ‘The 

Interview,’” Washington Post, December 17, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/top-movietheater-chains-cancel-premiere-showings-of-the-interview/2014/12/17/dd1bdb2a-8608-11e4-9534-

f79a23c40e6c_story.html. 

18 Yonhap (ROK), “DPRK Cyber War Capabilities Surge under Kim Jong Un,” December 20, 2014. Open Source 

Center Transcription ID: KPO2014122044582812; Ju-Min Park and James Pearson, “In North Korea, Hackers Are a 

Handpicked, Pampered Elite,” Reuters, December 5, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/05/us-sonycybersecurity-northkorea-idUSKCN0JJ08B20141205; HP Security Research, HP Security Briefing

Episode 16, August 2014: Profiling an Enigma: The Mystery of North Korea’s Cyber Threat Landscape, August 

2014, 60. http://h30499.www3.hp.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-securityblog/388/2/HPSR%20SecurityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf. 

19 Mike Levine, Pierre Thomas, and Jack Cloherty, “Sony Hacking: FBI Blames North Korea,” ABC News,

December 19, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/International/interview-fbi-links-north-korea-sonyhacking/story?id=27694178; Chosun Ilbo (ROK), “Evidence in Hacker Attack Points to North Korea,” April 11, 

2013. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/11/2013041100648.html; and U.S. Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Update on Sony Investigation, December 19, 2014. http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/pressreleases/update-on-sony-investigation.

20 Robert Hackett, “FBI Director: Sony Hackers 'Got Sloppy'”, Fortune, January 7, 2015, 

http://fortune.com/2015/01/07/fbi-director-sony/.

21 Mu Xueyuan, “China Suspends Cyber Working Group Activities with U.S. to Protest Cyber Theft Indictment,” 

Xinhua (English edition), May 20, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/20/c_126520553.htm; 

Doug Drinkwater, “China Denies New FBI Hacking Claims,” SC Magazine, October 20, 2014.

http://www.scmagazineuk.com/china-denies-new-fbi-hacking-claims/article/378095/. 

22 Zhang Yunbi and Chen Weihua, “Awaiting Word from China on Sony Hack,” China Daily, December 23, 2014. 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-12/23/content_19143627.htm; Cory Bennett, “US, China See Little 

Progress on Cybersecurity,” The Hill, November 12, 2014. http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/223865-us-chinasee-little-progress-on-cybersecurity; Adam Segal, “Axiom and the Deepening Divide in U.S.-China Cyber 

Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations Net Politics Blog, October 29, 2014.

http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2014/10/29/axiom-and-the-deepening-divide-in-u-s-china-cyber-relations/; and

Benjamin Kang Lim, “China Says It’s Hard to Resume Security Talks with U.S.,” Reuters, October 19, 2014.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/19/us-china-usa-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0I80GU20141019. 

23 Amy Chang, Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy (Center for a New American Security, December 

2014), 30. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_WarringState_Chang.pdf. 

24 Zhang Yunbi and Chen Weihua, “Awaiting Word from China on Sony Hack,” China Daily, December 23, 2014. 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-12/23/content_19143627.htm.

25 Will Ripley, “North Korean Defector: ‘Bureau 121’ Hackers Operating in China,” CNN, January 7, 2015. 

http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/06/asia/north-korea-hackers-shenyang/.
6

 

26 Victor Cha, “China’s Choice,” Chosun Ilbo (ROK), May 25, 2010. 

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/25/2010052501422.html; University of Southern California 

US-China Institute, Hong Lei, China's Response to the Yeonpyeong Island Incident, November 25, 2010, November 

25, 2010. http://china.usc.edu/(S(mb5cldyotnlbux55ol3cruu0)A(BAFo5-

g9zQEkAAAAMDhhMGYzZDgtNzc0My00OGIxLWI4MGYtYWU3NjA3ZTg4MDVl7HxHeG9AZ48yTd4qediIP7XNSx

81))/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2316&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. 

27 Will Ripley, “North Korean Defector: ‘Bureau 121’ Hackers Operating in China,” CNN, January 7, 2015. 

http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/06/asia/north-korea-hackers-shenyang/.

28 Blake Sobczak, “China and U.S. Grapple over Red Lines for Cyberattacks,” Environment & Energy Publishing, 

December 22, 2014. http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060010888; Cory Bennett, “US, China See Little Progress on 

Cybersecurity,” The Hill, November 12, 2014. http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/223865-us-china-see-littleprogress-on-cybersecurity.

29 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, 

September 20, 2013, pp. 7-8. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS.pdf. 

30 Yu Xiaoqu, “US Playing Dangerous Game with ‘Cyber Deterrence,’” People’s Daily (China), July 26, 2011, 

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7452284.html. 

31 Ellen Nakashima, “Researchers Identify Sophisticated Chinese Cyberespionage Group,” Washington Post, 

October 28, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/researchers-identify-sophisticatedchinese-cyberespionage-group/2014/10/27/de30bc9a-5e00-11e4-8b9e2ccdac31a031_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop; Yu Xiaoqu, “US Playing Dangerous Game with ‘Cyber 

Deterrence’,” People’s Daily (China), July 26, 2011. 

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7452284.html. 

32 BBC News, “China’s Xinhua News Agency Condemns US ‘Cyber-Attacks,’” June 23, 2013. 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23018938. 

33 Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Cyber Combat: Act of War: Pentagon Sets Stage for U.S. to Respond to 

Computer Sabotage with Military Force,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2011. 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718; James A. Lewis, The ‘Korean’ 

Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber Conflict (Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 

2009). 

http://csis.org/files/publication/091023_Korean_Cyber_Attacks_and_Their_Implications_for_Cyber_Conflict.pdf. 

34 “Sony Saga Blends Foreign Intrigue, Star Wattage,” New York Times, December 20, 2014. 

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/12/20/us/politics/ap-us-sony-hack.html.

35 Lucas Kello, “Correspondence: A Cyber Disagreement,” International Security 39(2) (Fall 2014), p. 181.

36 Rob Lever, “US Eyes Cyber ‘Deterrence’ to Stop Hackers,” Agence France-Presse, October 28, 2014.

http://news.yahoo.com/us-eyes-cyber-deterrence-stop-hackers-202710016.html; National Research Council, 

Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. 

Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010), p. 57. 

http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12997&page=57; Maj. Gen. Brett Williams, USAF (Retd.), MSNBC,

Television, December 22, 2014. http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/watch/what-s-behind-north-korean-internetoutage--376176707647.

37 Blake Sobczak, “China and U.S. Grapple over Red Lines for Cyberattacks,” Environment & Energy Publishing, 

December 22, 2014. http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060010888.