Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures,

and Arms Control

September 1985

NTIS order #PB86-182953
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, A nti-.%]h~llih’ W(wp(m.s, ( ‘(wnhv--

metisures, and Arms Cmh-of, (WA- 1.S(;-281 (Wash inglx)n, 1 W: (J .S. ( ;f)vt’r-ntm’nt

I)rinting office, Sepkmher 1 985).

I.ibrary of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600587”

For sale by the Superintendent of l)ocumcnts

U.S. Government f’rinting office, Washington, 1)C 20402
Foreword

///
Advisory Panel on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologie ● s

Iv
OTA Project Staff on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson
Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

Glossary of Acronyms

Glossary of Terms
they are deployed from a booster or post-boost

vehicle until they are destroyed.

Bistatic Radar: A radar system which has transmitters and receivers stationed at two locations;

a special case of multistatic radar.

Boost Phase: The phase of a missile trajectory

from launch to burnout of the final stage. For

ICBMS, this phase typically lasts from 3 to 5

minutes, but studies indicate that reductions to

the order of 1 minute are possible.

Brightness: In this report, the amount of power

that can be delivered per unit solid angle by a

directed-energy weapon.

Capital Satellite: A highly valued or costly satellite, as distinct from an inexpensive decoy satellite. Some decoys might be so expensive as to

be considered capital satellites.

Chaff: Confetti-like metal foil ribbons which can

be ejected from spacecraft (or terrestrial vehicles) to reflect enemy radar signals, thereby creating false targets or screening actual targets

from the “view” of radar.

Coherence: The matching, in space (transverse) or

time (temporal coherence), of the wave structure

of different parallel rays of a single frequency

of electromagnetic radiation. This results in the

mutual reinforcing of the energy of these different components of a larger beam. Lasers and radar systems produce partially coherent radiation.

Command Guidance: The steering and control of

a missile by transmitting commands to it.

Counter-countermeasures: Measures taken to defeat countermeasures.

Countermeasures: In this report, measures taken

by the offense to overcome aspects of a BMD

system.

Dazzling: In this report, the temporary blinding

of a sensor by overloading it with an intense signal of electromagnetic radiation, e.g., from a laser or a nuclear explosion.

Decoy: An object that is designed to make an observer believe that the object is more valuable

than is actually the case. Usually, in this report,

a decoy refers to a Iight object designed to look

like a satellite.

Deep Space: The region of outer space at altitudes

greater than 3,000 nautical miles (about 5,600

kilometers) above the Earth’s surface.

Defensive Satellite (DSAT) Weapon: A spacebased ASAT weapon that is intended to defend

satellites by destroying attacking ASAT

weapons.

Defensive Technologies Study Team (DTST): A

committee, generally known as the “Fletcher

Panel, ” after its Chair, appointed by President

Reagan to investigate the technologies of potential BMD systems.

Delta-V: A numerical index of the maneuverability of a satellite or rocket, It is the maximum

change in velocity which a spacecraft could

achieve in the absence of a gravitational fieId.

Diffraction: The spreading out of electromagnetic

radiation as it leaves an aperture, such as a mirror. The degree of spread, which cannot be eliminated by focusing, is proportional to the ratio

of the wavelength of radiation to the diameter

of the aperture.

Digital Processing: The most familiar type of computing, in which problems are solved through

the mathematical manipulation of streams of

numbers.

Directed-Energy Weapon: A weapon that kills its

target by delivering energy to it at or near the

speed of light. Includes lasers and particle beam

weapons.

Discrimination: The ability of a surveillance system to distinguish decoys from intended targets, e.g., certain types of satellites.

Early Warning: In this report, early detection of

an enemy ballistic missile launch, usually by

means of surveillance satellites and long-range

radar.

Electromagnetic Radiation: A form of propagated

energy, arising from electric charges in motion,

that produces a simultaneous wavelike variation in electric and magnetic fields in space. The

highest frequencies (or shortest wavelengths) of

such radiation are possessed by gamma rays,

which originate from processes within atomic

nuclei. As one goes to lower frequencies, the

electromagnetic spectrum includes X-rays, ultraviolet light, visible light, infrared light,

microwave, and radio waves.

Electron-volt: The energy gained by an electron in

passing through a potential difference of 1 volt.

6.25 quintillion electron-volts equals 1 joule;

22.5 billion trillion electron-volts equals 1 kilowatt-hour.

Elliptical Orbit: A noncircular Keplerian orbit.

Endoatmospheric: Within the atmosphere; an endoatmospheric interceptor intercepts its target

within the atmosphere.

Ephemeris: A collection of data about the predicted positions (or apparent positions) of celestial objects, including artificial satellites, at various times in the future. A satellite ephemeris

might contain the orbital elements of satellites

and predicted changes in these.

Equatorial Orbit: An orbit above the Earth’s

Equator.

Excimer: A contraction for “excited dimer”; a type

of lasant. A dimer is a molecule consisting of

two atoms. Some dimers—e.g., xenon chloride

and krypton fluoride-are molecules which cannot exist under ordinary conditions of approxivii
mate thermal equilibrium but must be created

in an “excited’ ’-i.e., energized-condition by

special “pumping” processes in a laser.

Exoatmospheric: Outside the atmosphere; an exoatmospheric interceptor intercepts its target in

space.

Fission: The breaking apart of the nucleus of an

atom, usually by means of a neutron. For very

heavy elements, such as uranium, a significant

amount of energy is produced by this process.

When controlled, this process yields energy

which may be extracted for civilian uses, such

as commercial electric generation. When uncontrolled energy is liberated very rapidly: such fission is the energy source of uranium- and plutonium-based nuclear weapons; it also provides

the trigger for fusion weapons.

Fratricide: In this report, the unintended destruction of some of a nation’s weapons or other military systems (e. g., satellites) by others.

Free-electron Laser: A type of laser which does not

use ordinary matter as a lasant but instead generates radiation by the interaction of an electron

beam with a static magnetic or electric field.

Loosely speaking, free-electron laser technology

resembles and evolved from that used by particle accelerators (“atom smashers”). Lasers

which are not freeelectron lasers are boundelectron lasers.

Functional Kill: The destruction of a target by disabling vital components in a way not immediately detectable, but nevertheless able to prevent the target from functioning properly. An

example is the destruction of electronics in a

guidance system by a neutral particle beam.

Fusion: More specifically, nuclear fusion: The fusing of two atomic nuclei, usually of light elements, such as hydrogen. For light elements,

energy is liberated by this process. Hydrogen

bombs produce most of their energy through

the fusion of hydrogen into helium.

Graser: See Gamma-ray Laser.

Gamma-ray Laser: A laser which generates a beam

of gamma rays; also called a graser. A gammaray laser, if developed, would be a type of X-ray

laser; although it would employ nuclear reactions, it need not (but might) employ nuclear fission or fusion reactions or explosions.

Gamma Rays: X-rays emitted by the nuclei of

atoms.

Geostationary Orbit: An orbit at an altitude of

35,800 kilometers above the Earth’s Equator.

A satellite placed in such an orbit revolves

around the Earth once per day, maintaining the

same position relative to the surface of the

Earth. It then appears to be stationary, and can

be used as a communications relay or as a surveillance post.

Geosynchronous Orbit: An orbit about 35,800 km . . . Vlll

above the Equator. A satellite placed in such

an orbit revolves around the Earth once per day.

See Geostationary Orbit.

Gray: The Syst6me International unit of absorbed

dose of ionizing radiation. One gray (abbreviated 1 Gy) is 1 joule of absorbed energy per kilogram of matter.

Hard Kill: Destruction of a target in such a way

as to produce unambiguous visible evidence of

its neutralization.

Hardness: A property of a target; measured by the

power needed per unit area to destroy the target by means of a directed-energy weapon. A

hard target is more difficult to kill than a soft

target,

High-Earth Orbit: An orbit about the Earth at an

altitude greater than 3,000 nautical miles (about

5,600 kilometers).

Homing Device: A device, mounted on a missile,

that uses sensors to detect the position or to

help predict the future position of a target, and

then directs the missile to intercept the target.

It usually updates frequently during the flight

of the missile.

Impulse: A mechanical jolt delivered to an object.

Physically, impulse is a force applied for a period of time, and the Systi$me Internationale

unit of impulse is the newton-second (abbreviated N-s). See Impulse Intensity.

Impulse Intensity: Mechanical impulse per unit

area. The Systeme International unit of impulse intensity is the pascal-second (abbreviated

Pa-s) A conventionally used unit of impulse intensity is the “tap,” which is one dyne-second

per square centimeter; hence 1 tap = 0.1 Pa-s.

Impulse Kill: The destruction of a target, using

directed energy, by ablative shock. The intensity of directed energy maybe so great that that

the surface of the target violently and rapidly

boils off delivering a mechanical shock wave to

the rest of the target and causing structural

failure.

Inclination: The inclination of an orbit is the (dihedral) angle between the plane containing the

orbit and the plane containing the Earth’s

Equator. An equatorial orbit has an inclination

of 00 for a satellite traveling eastward or 1800

for a satellite traveling westward. An orbit having an inclination between 00 and 900 and in

which a satellite is traveling generally eastward

is called a prograde orbit. An orbit having an

inclination of 900 passes above the north and

south poles and is called a polar orbit. An orbit

having an inclination of more than 900 is called

a retrograde orbit.

Ionization: The removal or addition of one or more

electrons to a neutral atom, forming a charged

ion.

Isotropic: Independent of direction; referring to
the radiation of energy, it means “with equal

intensity in all directions, ” i.e., omnidirectional.

Isotropic Nuclear Weapon (INW): A nuclear explosive which radiates X-rays and other forms of

radiation with approximately equal intensity in

all directions. The term “isotropic” is used to

distinguish them from nuclear directed-energy

weapons.

Joule: The Systeme International unit of energy.

One kilowatt-hour is 3.6 million joules.

Keep-out Zone: A volume around a space asset, off

limits to parties not owners of the asset. Keepout zones could be negotiated or unilaterally

declared. The right to defend such a zone by

force and the legality of unilaterally declared

zones under the Outer Space Treaty remain to

be determined.

Kelvin Temperature: A scale of temperature on

which zero degrees Kelvin (abbreviated 00 K)

corresponds to “absolute zero. Temperature in

degrees Kelvin equals temperature in degrees

Celsius plus 273.16, thus ice melts at 273.16 G

K, and water boils at 373.16° K.

Keplerian Orbit: The orbit which a satellite would

follow if the Earth were a uniform sphere with

no atmosphere, and if other simplifying assumptions were valid. Such an orbit would be an ellipse having the center of the Earth as one focus. A special case of such an orbit is a circular

orbit about the center of the Earth.

Kill Assessment: The detection and assimilation

of information indicating the destruction of an

object under attack. Kill assessment is one of

the many functions to be performed by a battle management system.

Kinetic-Energy Weapon: A weapon that uses kinetic energy, or energy of motion, to kill an object. Weapons that use kinetic energy are a

rock, a bullet, a nonexplosively armed rocket,

and an electromagnetic radgun.

Lasant: A material that can be stimulated to produce laser light. Many materials can be used as

lasants; these can be in solid, liquid, or gaseous

form (consisting of molecules–including excimers— or atoms) or in the form of a plasma (consisting of ions and electrons). Lasant materials

useful in high-energy lasers include carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, deuterium fluoride,

hydrogen fluoride, iodine, xenon chloride, krypton fluoride, and selenium, to mention but a few.

Laser: A device that produces a narrow beam of

coherent radiation through a physical process

known as stimulated emission. Lasers are able

to focus large quantities of energy at great distances, and are among the leading candidates

for BMD weapons.

LIDAR: A technique analogous to radar, but

which uses laser light rather than radio or microwaves. The light is bounced off a target and

then detected, with the return beam providing

information on the distance and velocity of the

target.

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The multilateral Treaty

signed and ratified by the United States and the

U.S.S.R. in 1963 which prohibits nuclear tests

in all locations except underground.

Megawatt: One million watts; a unit of power. A

typical commercial electric plant generates

about 500 to 1,000 megawatts.

MeV: One million electron-volts. A unit of energy

usually used in reference to nuclear processes.

It is equivalent to the energy that & electron

gains in crossing a potential of 1 million volts.

Micron: One-millionth of a meter (equivalently,

one-thousandth of a millimeter). Roughly twice

the wavelength of visible light.

Midcourse Phase: The phase of a ballistic missile

trajectory in which the RVS travel through

space on a ballistic course towards their targets.

This phase lasts up to 20 minutes.

Military Satellite (MILSAT): A satellite used for

military purposes, such as navigation or intelligence gathering.

Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV)/Miniature Vehicle

(MV): An air-launched direct-ascent (“pop-up”)

kinetic-energy ASAT weapon currently being

developed and tested by the U.S. Air Force.

Monostatic Radar: A radar system in which the

receiver and transmitter are colocated.

Multistatic Radar: A radar system that has transmitters and receivers stationed at multiple locations; typically, a radar system with a transmitter

and several receivers, all of which are geographically separated. A special case is bistatic

radar. An advantage of multistatic radar over

monostatic radar is that even if transmitters—

which might be detected by the enemy when

operating-are attacked, receivers in other locations might not be noticed and might thereby

escape attack.

Obscur-&.nt: A material-e. g., smoke or chaff-used

to conceal an object from observation by a radio or optical sensor. Smoke maybe used to conceal an object from observation by an optical

sensor, and chaff may be used to conceal an object from observation by a radio sensor (e.g.,

radar).

On-line: Operating, as distinct from dormant.

Orbital Elements: Any set of several parameters

(e.g., apogee, perigee, inclination, etc.) used to

specify a Keplerian orbit and the position of a

satellite in such an orbit at a particular time.

Seven independent orbital elemets are required

to umambiuously specify the position of a satellite in a Keplerian orbit at a particular time.

Outer Space Treaty of 1967: A multilateral treaty

ix
signed and ratified by both the United States

and the Soviet Union. Article IV of the Outer

Space treaty forbids basing nuclear weapons or

other weapons of mass destruction in space.

Passive Sensor: One that detects naturally occurring emissions from a target for tracking and/or

identification purposes.

Perigee: The minimum altitude attained by an

Earth satellite.

Phased-Array Radar (PAR): A radar with elements

that are physically stationary, but with a beam

that is electronically steerable and can switch

rapidly from one target to another. Used for

tracking many objects, often at great distances.

Pointing: The aiming of sensors or defense weapons at a target with sufficient accuracy either

to track the target or to aim with sufficient accuracy to destroy it.

Polar Orbit: An orbit having an inclination of900.

Prograde Orbit: An orbit having an inclination of

between 0° and 90°. See Retrograde Orbit.

Pumping: In this report, the raising of the molecules or atoms of a lasant to an energy state

above the normal lowest state, in order to produce laser light. This results when they fall back

to a lower state. Pumping may be done using

electrical, chemical, or nuclear energy.

Rad: A unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation.

One rad is 0.001 gray.

Radar: A technique for detecting targets in the

atmosphere or in space by transmitting radio

waves (e.g., microwaves) and sensing the waves

reflected by objects. The reflected waves (called

“returns” or “echos”) provide information on

the distance to the target and the velocity of

the target and may also provide information

about the shape of the target. (Originally an

acronym for “RAdio Detection And Ranging.”)

Radian: A unit of angular measure. One radian is

about 57.30. One microradian (0.000001 radian)

is the angle subtended by an object 1 meter

across at a distance of 1,000 kilometers.

Reaction Decoy: A decoy deployed only upon

warning or suspicion of imminent attack.

Reentry: The return of objects, originally launched

from Earth, into the atmosphere.

Retrograde Orbit: An orbit having an inclination

of more than 900. See Prograde Orbit.

Robust: In this report, describing a system, indicating its ability to endure and perform its

mission against a reactive adversary. Also used

to indicate ability to survive under direct

attack.

Salvage-fused: Describing a warhead, that is set

to detonate when it is attacked. Usually refers

to a nuclear warhead.

Sensors: Electronic instruments that can detect radiation from objects at great distances. The information can be used for tracking, aiming, discrimination, attacking, kill assessment, or all of

the above. Sensors may detect any type of electromagnetic radiation or several types of nuclear particles.

Shoot-back In this report, the technique of defending a space asset by shooting at an attacker.

Signature: Distinctive type of radiation emitted

or reflected by a target, which can be used to

identify that target.

Simulation: The art of making a decoy look like

a more valuable strategic target See Anti-simulation.

Slew Time: The time needed for a weapon to reaim

at a new target after having just fired at a previous one.

Smoke: An obscurant which may be used in the

atmosphere or in space to conceal an object

from observation by an optical sensor.

Soft Kill: Same as functional kill.

Space Detection And Tracking System (SPADATS):

A network of space surveillance sensors operated by the U.S. Air Force.

Space Mines: Hypothetical devices that can track

and follow a target in orbit, with the capability

of exploding on command or by pre-program,

in order to destroy the target.

Stimulated Emission: Physical process by which

an excited molecule is induced by incident radiation to emit radiation at an identical frequency and in phase with the incident radiation.

Lasers operate by stimulated emission.

Superfluorescence: See Superradiance.

Superradiance: The process used by a superradiant

laser to generate or amplify a laser beam in a

single pass through a lasant material, or—in the

case of a free-electron laser—through an electric

or magnetic field in the presence of an electron

beam. Superradiance is actually a form of stimulated emission. Also known as superfluorescence, or amplified spontaneous emission.

Superradiant Laser: A laser in which the beam

passes through the lasant only once; mirrors are

not required for the operation of such a laser,

as they are with more conventional lasers which

are sometimes called “cavity lasers” to distinguish them from superradiant lasers. Free-electron lasers may also be superradiant; the laser

beam of a superradiant free-electron laser would

pass once through an electric or magnetic field

(instead of a lasant) in the presence of an electron beam.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): A radar system

which correlates the echoes of signals emitted

at different points along a satellite’s orbit or an

airplane’s flight path. The highest resolution

achievable by such a system is theoretically

equivalent to that of a single large antenna as

x
wide as the distance between the most widely

spaced points along the orbit that are used for

transmitting positions. In practice, resolution

will be limited and by the radar receiver’s signalprocessing capability or by the limited coherence of the radio signal emitted by the radar

transmitter.

Thermal Kill: The destruction of a target by heating it, using directed energy, to the degree that

structural components fail.

Threat: The anticipated inventory of enemy weapons and method of using them.

Tracking: The monitoring of the course of a moving target. Ballistic objects may have their

tracks predicted by the defensive system, using

several observations and physical laws.

Warhead: A weapon, usually a nuclear weapon,

contained in the payload of a missile.

World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS): A communications network

linking U.S. forces.

X-ray Laser: A laser which generates a beam or

beams of X-rays. Also called an “x-raser” or

“XRL.”

X-rays: Electromagnetic radiation having wavelengths shorter than 10 nanometers (10 billionths of a meter).

xl
Contents

Page

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . 25

3. MILSATs, ASATs, and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4. ASAT Capabilities and Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5. ASAT Arms Control: History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

6. ASAT Arms Control: Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....105

7. Comparative Evaluation of ASAT Policy Options . ..................125

Appendix A: Text of the 1983 Soviet Draft Treaty on

the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and

From Space Against the Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...145
Chapter 1

Executive Summary
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Principal Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Comparison of Potential ASAT and Arms Control Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. Existing Constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2. Comprehensive ASAT and Space-Based Weapon Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3. ASAT Weapon Test Ban and Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban 15

4. One Each/No New Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

5. “Rules of the Road” for Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

6. Space Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

7. Space-Based BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Treaties of Limited Duration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Tables

Table No. Page

l-1. Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development and Arms Control ., .. ....,13

l-2. Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Chapter 1

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTIO N

For over two decades the United States and

the Soviet Union have used satellites for military purposes. As a result of recent technological advances, military satellites will soon

be able to play a more significant role in terrestrial conflicts. These space assets will be

able to supply more types of information, more

rapidly, to more diverse locations. Some will

carry out target acquisition, tracking, and kill

assessment functions, thus operating more

directly than before as components of weapons systems.

This growing military utility also makes satellites attractive targets for opposing military

forces. Both the Soviet Union and the United

States have been developing anti-satellite

(ASAT) weapons. These weapons could weaken

the opponent’s military capabilities by depriving his forces of the services of some satellites.

The existing Soviet anti-satellite weapons—

and future, potentially more effective ASATS

–pose a growing defense problem for the

United States.

A variety of unilateral measures, passive

and active, may improve the survivability of

U.S. military satellites. At present, it is unclear whether such survivability measures will

be adequate to guard against the highly developed ASAT threats of the future. Another

possible contributor to satellite survivability

is mutually agreed arms control. A judicious

combination of certain arms control measures

and unilateral satellite survivability measures

might provide more security to U.S. military

satellites than either type of measure alone.

At the same time, however, arms control

measures which constrained the threat to U.S.

satellites would also constrain the ability of

the United States to weaken Soviet military

capabilities by attacking their satellites in

time of war. In addition, limits on ASATS

would severely limit the kinds of ballistic missile defense weapons that might be deployed

in the future. (The subject of ballistic missile

defense is dealt within a companion OTA report, Balistic Missile Defense Technologies.)

This report explains the dilemmas facing

U.S. policymakers and assesses the pros and

cons of some options for dealing with the challenge of anti-satellite weapons, particularly in

the light of projected future weapons technology.

PRINCIPAL FINDING S

Current Soviet military satellites pose

only a limited threat to U.S. military capabilities, but future space systems will

pose a greater threat.

The Soviet Union currently uses satellites

to perform a wide variety of tasks including

missile launch detection, communications,

navigation, meteorological surveillance, photographic and radar reconnaissance, and collection of electromagnetic intelligence (e.g.,

radar emissions). Many of these satellites, although not “weapons” themselves, support

and enhance the effectiveness of terrestrial Soviet forces that would engage in direct combat. For example, if navigation satellites improve munition delivery accuracies, then fewer

munitions are required to accomplish a given

objective. The growing military utility of satellites has rekindled U.S. interest in ASAT

weapons.

Some Soviet satellites already supply limited targeting information to other terrestrial

3
4

assets. The Administration has expressed its

concern about:

. . . present and projected Soviet space systems which, while not weapons themselves,

are designed to support directly the

U. S. S.R. ’S terrestrial forces in the event of

a conflict. These include ocean reconnaissance satellites which use radar and electronic intelligence in efforts to provide targeting data to Soviet weapon platforms

which can quickly attack U.S. and allied surface fleets. ’

At present Soviet radar (RORSAT) and electronic intelligence (EORSAT) ocean reconnaissance satellites pose only a limited threat to

U.S. and allied surface fleets. RORSATS and

EORSATS are typically deployed at altitudes

and inclinations which offer limited observation range. Although the observation “swath”

of these satellites will eventually cover most

of the Earth, if only one or two of these satellites are operational-as has been customary

in peacetime-then a ship would be exposed

to observation only intermittently and might

successfully evade the satellite. The Soviet

Union could increase the number of deployed

RORSATS and EORSATS, thereby making

evasion more difficult. Other countermeasures

exist which could further reduce the threat

posed by these satellites, but such measures

might not be available to merchant resupply

vessels operating during a protracted nonnuclear conflict.

In the future, sophisticated communication,

navigation, and surveillance satellites are

likely to play a greater role in all levels of terrestrial conflict. This will increase the incentive for both the United States and the Soviet

Union to develop and deploy ASAT weapons.

Possible responses to the threat posed

by Soviet military satellites are numerous and diverse.

A variety of options are available to mitigate the threat to U.S. and allied security

posed by Soviet military satellites (MILSATS).

‘President Ronald Reagan, Report to the Congress: U.S. Po]-

icy on ASAT Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984.

These options include nondestructive as well

as destructive measures; those presented below are not mutually exclusive.

● Possible nondestructive responses to Soviet MILSATs:

–Force Augmentation: U.S. combat or

support forces could be increased to

counter the increase in effectiveness

which Soviet forces could derive from

use of military satellites. Force augmentation is often, but not always, more

costly than other means of mitigating

the threat posed by Soviet military satellites.

–Passive Countermeasures: By using

passive measures to conceal or disguise

their identity and nature, U.S. forces

could reduce the utility of Soviet reconnaissance satellites. For example, assets now detectable by radar might be

redesigned to reflect radar signals only

weakly in order to evade detection by

radar satellites, or radio silence might

be practiced, or covert signaling techniques used to prevent detection by satellites that collect signals intelligence.

–Electronic Countermeasures and Electrooptical Countermeasures: Electronic countermeasures such as “jamming” (i.e.,

overloading enemy receivers with

strong signals) and “spoofing” (i.e.,

sending deceptive signals) could be used

to interfere with satellite functions.

Electro-optical countermeasures such

as “dazzling” (temporary “blinding”) or

spoofing optical sensors are also available. However, these countermeasures

—especially spoofing—require detailed

knowledge of the satellite systems (e.g.,

operational frequencies, receiver sensitivity, etc.) against which they are

directed.

● Possible Destructive Responses to Soviet

MILSATs:

–Inadvertent But Inherent ASAT Capabilities: The inherent ASAT capabilities

of nuclear weapons such as ICBMS and

SLBMS could be used to destroy lowaltitude Soviet satellites; with some

modifications, these weapons might
5

also be used to attack satellites at

higher altitudes. Some types of nonnuclear interceptors (e.g., that demonstrated in the U.S. Army’s 1984 Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)) which

might eventually be developed and deployed for BMD purposes, would have

some inherent ASAT capability. Finally, any highly maneuverable spacecraft capable of noncooperative rendezvous—e.g., the U.S. Space Shuttle—has

some ASAT potential.

—Planned ASAT Weapons: When operational, the current USAF MV ASAT

weapon will be able to destroy Soviet

military satellites in low-Earth orbit.

–Advanced ASAT Weapons: Space- or

ground-based directed-energy weapons

or advanced kinetic-energy weapons

could be developed that would be able

to destroy Soviet satellites beyond the

range of existing or planned U.S. ASAT

weapons.

The United States is now more dependent on satellites to perform important

military functions than is the Soviet

Union.

In choosing between ASAT weapon development and arms control, one wishes to pursue that course which makes the greater contribution to U.S. national security. This is

often characterized as a choice between developing a capability to destroy Soviet satellites

while assuming U.S. satellites will also be at

risk, or protecting U.S. satellites to some extent through arms control while forfeiting effective ASAT weapons. The better choice

could, in principle, be identified by comparing

the utility which the United States expects to

derive from its military satellites with the disutility which the United States would expect

to suffer from Soviet MI LSATS during a conflict. Such a comparison-although possible in

principle–is made exceedingly difficult by the

number of conflict scenarios which must be

considered and by the lack of consensus or official declaration about the relative likelihood

and undesirability of each scenario.

Although national utility for space system

support is difficult to assess precisely and

meaningless to compare between nations, it

is apparent that the United States is more dependent on MILSATS to perform important

military functions than is the Soviet Union.

The United States has global security commitments and force deployments, while the Soviet

Union has few forces committed or deployed

outside the borders and littoral waters of members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and

Cuba. The United States has corresponding

requirements for global and oceanic command

and control communications (C3) capabilities

and relies largely on space systems to provide

these requirements. The Soviet Union, on the

other hand, can rely on landline communications systems and over-the horizon radio links

for many of its C’ needs. Satellite communications links are used by the Soviet Union but

are not as essential as those of the United

States. In addition, the Soviet Union has

greater capability to reconstitute satellites

which are lost in action; hence even to the extent the Soviet Union is dependent on space

system support, it is less dependent on individual satellites for some functions. The

United States also has fewer alternative terrestrial means for collecting intelligence than

does the Soviet Union, which can exploit the

freedom and openness of U.S. society for this

purpose.

Soviet ASAT capabilities threaten U.S.

military capabilities to some extent now

and potentially to a much greater extent

in the future.

The Soviet Union tested a coorbital satellite interceptor system from 1968 until its selfimposed moratorium of August 1983. The

Reagan Administration considers this ASAT

system to be operational. The interceptors are

believed to be capable of attacking satellites

at altitudes of up to 5,000 kilometers, depending on their orbital inclination. At present

there appear to be only two launchpads for Soviet coorbital interceptors, both located at

Tyuratam.
6

The existing Soviet

effective for negating

tary satellites, such as

attractive targets. Both the United States and the Soviet Union

have been developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons

ASAT weapon may be

low-altitude U.S. miliare used for navigation

(Transit), meteorological surveillance (Defense

Meteorological Support Program satellites),

and other purposes. Assistant Secretary of De

fense Richard Perle has stated:

We believe that this Soviet anti-satellite capability is effective against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit, that in wartime

we would have to face the possibility, indeed

the likelihood, that critical assets of the

United States would be destroyed by Soviet

anti-satellite systems. . . . If, in wartime, the

Soviet Union were to attack critical satellites

on which our knowledge of the unfolding conventional war depended, . . . we would have

little choice but . . . to deter continuing attacks on our eyes and ears, without which we

could not hope to prosecute successfully a

conventional war. z

‘Statement of The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), in Hearings

before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear

Forces of the Senate Comm”ttee on Armed Services: Review

of the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Bill, Mar. 15, 1984

[S.Hrg. 98-724, Pt. 7., p. 3452].

The current Soviet interceptor and the

booster that it has been tested with cannot

reach critical U.S. early warning and communication satellites in high orbits. If the Soviet

ASAT weapon were mated with a larger booster—a procedure which has yet to be tested—

it might be able to reach these U.S. satellites.

In addition to the coorbital interceptor, the

Soviet Union is testing ground-based lasers

which the Reagan Administration believes

have ASAT capabilities. The U.S. Department

of Defense estimates that the U.S.S.R. could

test a space-based laser within the decade.3

Advanced directed-energy weapons such as

lasers and particle beam weapons–if developed and deployed—could give the Soviets an

“all altitude,“ “instantaneous kill” capability.

As the United States increases its reliance on

space systems to perform vital military functions (e.g., the MILSTAR communication satellite system), an increase in Soviet ASAT capabilities could create a significant threat to

U.S. national security.

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1985,

p. 44.
7

Aside from its intentional ASAT capabilities, the Soviet Union could currently attack

low-altitude satellites with its nuclear ABMs,

ICBMs, and SLBMS. With some modification,

these nuclear assets might also be used to attack satellites in higher orbits. Current Soviet

spacecraft (i.e., Soyuz, Salyut), because of their

limited maneuter and rendezvous capabilities,

do not hate a significant ASAT potential. Future Soviet spacecraft, such as the expected

Soviet “Shuttle” and space plane, will have

greater inherent ASAT capabilities. The Soviets also have the technological capability to

conduct electronic warfare against space

systems.

Several technologies on the horizon

could lead to a new generation of highly

capable ASATS.

‘1’he following advanced ASATS could be de-

\“eloped and deployed b~~ either the United

States or the Soviet Union:

● 5’pace Alines.a These would be deployed

within lethal range and would continuousl~’ trail their target. Using a conven-

.

tional or nuclear explosive charge, a space

mine would destroy its quarry almost instantly on command or (if salvage-fused)

when attacked or disturbed.

High-Power Radio-Frequency Weapons:

These would be devices capable of producing intense, damaging beams of electromagnetic radiation that could be used to

jam communication and radar systems at

low power levels or to overload and burn

out satellite electronics at higher power

levels;

High-Energy Laser Weapons: High-energy lasers may eventually be capable of

producing intense, damaging beams of

electromagnetic radiation that could jam

optical communication and sensor systems at low power levels or cause permanent damage at higher power levels.

Ground-based lasers would have infrequent opportunities to attack satellites

but, unless attacked themselves, could

shoot inexpensively and repeatedly.

Space-based reflectors could also be used

to relay laser beams from ground-based

lasers to their targets. Spacebased lasers

,/’

Artist’s conception of high-energy laser facility at the

Sary Shagan test facility in the Soviet Union,

H!gh-energy lasers may eventually be effective ASAT weapons, Ground-based lasers would have Infrequent opportunities

to attack satellites, but, unless attacked themselves. could shoot inexpensively and repeatedly,
8

●

●

might be able to attack several satellites

in quick succession; space-based X-ray

lasers might be able to attack several satellites instantly and simultaneously.

Neutral Particle Beam Weapons: Powerful particle accelerators, similar to those

now used in scientific research, might

eventually be developed which could destroy the hardened electronics of a

spacecraft.

Kinetic-Energy Weapons: Space- or

ground-based kinetic-energy weapons

(similar to the current U.S. MV ASAT)

would probably be small, homing vehicles

that destroy their target by colliding with

it at extremely high velocities.

Possible U.S. responses to the Soviet

ASAT threat are numerous and diverse.

The United States could respond to the

threat posed by the Soviet ASAT threat in

several ways; both unilateral and diplomatic

options are available.

● Possible unilateral responses to Soviet

ASATS:

–Reduce Dependence on Military Satellites: No matter what satellite survivability or arms control measures are

taken, there will always be some risk

that critical satellites can be destroyed

or rendered inoperable. The United

States must exercise caution in the extent of its reliance on space assets to

perform tasks essential to the national

security. Nonetheless, some space systems perform vital military functions

which cannot be duplicated—or can be

duplicated only imperfectly-by terrestrial systems.

–Passive Countermeasures: Passive

countermeasures such as hiding, deception (use of decoys), evasion (maneuvering), hardening (making satellites more

durable), and proliferation (adding more

satellites) all offer significant protection

from the current and perhaps future Soviet A SAT weapons. Decoys would

probably be effective against a wide variety of ASAT weapons and will be particularly economical for the protection

of small satellites capable of being imitated by small, cheap decoys. Combinations of these passive responses—e.g.,

decoys for “dark” spare satellites–

could offer even greater protection than

individual measures alone.

—Active Countermeasures: Active countermeasures may be destructive or nondestructive. Destructive countermeasures could include giving satellites a

self-defense capability or providing critical satellites with an escort defense.

Nondestructive countermeasures might

include electronic countermeasures and

electro-optical countermeasures such as

jamming. Attacking Soviet ASAT control facilities is also a potential-though

dangerous— active countermeasure.

–Deterrence: The Soviets might be deterred from attacking U.S. satellites if

the United States declared its willingness to retaliate for attacks on U.S.

space assets. Such retaliation could be

against Soviet space assets, in which

case the United States would need a capable ASAT weapon, or it could be

against Soviet terrestrial assets. The

former alternative assumes that the

Soviets value the preservation of their

satellites at least as highly as they

value the destruction of U.S. satellites.

The latter alternative, of course, carries

a greater risk of uncontrolled escalation

if deterrence should fail.

–Keep-Out Zones: The United States

could declare and defend protective

zones around critical satellites.

Defended keep-out zones could offer significant protection against current

ASAT weapons for some satellites. This

subject is discussed in detail below.

 Possible diplomatic responses to Soviet

ASATS:

–Arms Control; The United States, the

Soviet Union, and other spacefaring nations could negotiate limitations on the

testing, deployment, or hostile use of

anti-satellite systems.
9

. —

–Rules of the Road: The United States,

the Soviet Union, and other spacefaring nations could negotiate restrictions

on potentially provocative activities in

space, such as unexplained close approaches to foreign satellites or irradiation of foreign satellites with lowpower directed-energy beams. With

such agreed restrictions in force, these

activities would justify defensive or

retaliatory measures.

Of the future ASAT weapons now foreseeable, those which would be most effective if used in a preemptive or aggressive

surprise attack would be space-based and

therefore subject to attack by similar

weapons.

Preemptive attack would be an attractive

countermeasure to space-based ASAT weapons. If each side feared that only a preemptive attack could counter the risk of being

defeated by enemy preemption, then a crisis

situation could be extremely unstable. While

salvagefusing, if it proved practicable, would

diminish this risk, it would create a risk of

space war breaking out by accident. For example if a meteoroid destroyed a satellite, it

might set off a chain reaction of salvage fusing which would destroy all satellites. To the

extent that protection was sought through

“shoot-back” rather than “shoot-first” tactics,

a premium would be placed on having the biggest and best ASATS deployed, which could

lead to an intense arms race.

Foreseeable passive or active countermeasures may be inadequate to guarantee the survival of large inilitary satellites

attacked by advanced ASAT weapons.

Passive or active countermeasures might

have only limited effectiveness against very

advanced ASAT or BMD weapons. For example, it might be uneconomical to rely on passive measures to protect large and expensive

satellites from a powerful neutral particle

beam weapon. Shielding satellites against a

neutral particle beam weapon could cost more

than it would to scale up the weapon to penetrate the shielding, and such a weapon could

slew its beam quickly enough to make evasion

infeasible. With such a weapon it might be as

economical to damage spare satellites as they

are brought “on line’ as it would be to damage initially operational satellites.

Active measures, such as “shoot-back” with

a weapon of longer effective range, could provide protection against some A SAT weapons

but not against weapons such as space mines

or single-pulse lasers which could destroy satellites instantly and without warning. However, it might not be economical to attack satellite systems composed of many small, cheap

satellites—and possibly decoys as well—with

expensive advanced ASAT weapons. Such satellites could perform a number of important

functions (e.g., communication or navigation)

without encouraging a proliferation of advanced weapons to attack them. Therefore, although it would be difficult to protect individual satellites, satellite systems performing

some critical functions might retain a fair degree of survivability.

A commitment to satellite survivability is important whether or not ASAT development, or arms control, or both, are

pursued.

The United States should place more emphasis on means to ensure the survivability of critical military satellites and, particularly, their

associated ground stations and data links,

regardless of whether ASAT limitations are

agreed upon. The existence of non-ASAT

weapons (e.g., ICBMS, ABMs) and space systems (e.g., maneuverable spacecraft) with

some inherent ASAT capability makes it impossible to ban the ability to attack satellites.

Therefore, even under the most restrictive

ASAT arms control regime, programs for satellite survivability and countermeasures must

be pursued. In the absence of arms control

limitations on ASATS, ensuring satellite sur-
10

viability will be a more demanding task since

highly capable directed-energy ASAT weapons or space mines could be deployed.

In the absence of restrictions on the development or deployment of ASAT weapons, satellite survivability can be enhanced if the United States is willing to

negotiate or declare keep-out zones and

is able thereafter to defend such zones

against unauthorized penetration by foreign spacecraft.

Although passive or active countermeasures

alone may be insufficient to protect satellites,

if combined with keep-out zones they could offer a significant degree of protection from certain ASAT weapons. Without keep-out zones

space mines could be predeployed next to all

critical military space systems. A keep-out

zone of sufficient size would reduce the effectiveness of such weapons. However, advanced,

directed-energy or kinetic energy ASAT weapons may be able to function effectively even

outside very large keep-out zones.

Should ASAT development be pursued, the United States will need to formulate an employment policy.

At present, no clear consensus exists among

those Administration military space policy

analysts and executives interviewed by OTA

on the conditions under which the United

States would attack foreign satellites or on the

manner in which it would retaliate for an attack on U.S. satellites. If the United States

continues with its ASAT development and deployment plans, it will be necessary to formulate an employment policy.

If the United States wishes to enhance the

deterrent value of its ASAT weapons, it may

choose to publicize certain aspects of its employment policy. It might, for example, promise that the United States would not use its

ASAT capabilities in an aggressive or preemptive first strike but might use them in a defensive or retaliatory reaction to an attack

against the United States or its allies, even if

U.S. satellites were not attacked. That is, the

United States might announce a “no first

strike but possible first use’ policy for the employment of ASAT weapons as it has for the

employment of nuclear weapons.

If defensive satellites (DSATS) are deployed

by the United States to defend its satellites,

or if certain satellites are given self-defense capabilities, the United States would have to de

cide under what circumstances it would use

these assets and whether it wished to publicly

announce this employment policy. The United

States might declare in advance that it would

fire at satellites suspected of being ASATS if

they approached U.S. satellites within possibly lethal range. However, such a declaration

would have an uncertain legal status and

might generate considerable political opposition from both spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations.

Certain arms control provisions would

reduce the probability that advanced

ASATS will be developed or deployed.

However, arms control could not guarantee the survival of U.S. satellites attacked

by residual or covert Soviet ASAT

weapons.

Arms control provisions, such as a ban on

all testing of all systems “in an ASAT mode,”

would reduce the likelihood that the Soviet

Union could successfully develop and deploy

advanced, highly capable ASAT weapons. The

categories of weapons eliminated might include space mines capable of “shadowing” valuable military assets in any orbit, directedenergy weapons with kill radii of hundreds to

thousands of kilometers, and advanced kinetic-energy weapons. In the absence of an agreement limiting their development, each side

would have a strong incentive to seek continually more effective means to attack threatening satellites and to defend valuable assets.

In the absence of adequate countermeasures,

the “instantaneous kill” capability of some advanced ASATS might be destabilizing in a crisis, because they would give each side an incentive to “shoot first” or else risk the loss

of its space assets.
11

Photo cred(l Lockheed

Launch of U.S. Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) to

test nonnuclear anti-ballistic missile technology,

Photo cred{t U S Deparfment of Defense

Artist’s conception of the Soviet GALOSH ABM

interceptor currently deployed around Moscow.

ABM interceptors may have some inherent ASAT capabilIties, ABMs, as well as ICBMS and SLBMS, present a threat

which may not be easily resolved through arms control,

A ban on testing weapons in an A SAT mode

would be less effective at reducing the threat

posed by weapon systems with inherent

ASAT capability and by the existing Soviet

ASAT weapon. ICBMS, SLBMS, and ABM interceptors with nuclear payloads are examples

of systems with residual ASAT capability. Although these systems lack the kind of precision guidance necessary to actually collide

with a satellite, the long-range destructiveness

of their nuclear payloads makes them potentially effective ASATS. The Shuttle’s recent

success at retrieving satellites strongly suggests the ASAT potential of future maneuverable spacecraft, although costly vehicles like

the Shuttle would probably not risk approaching satellites which might be booby-trapped.

However, the range, effectiveness, and reaction time of even advanced maneuverable

spacecraft not designed as weapons would be

substantially less than those of intentional

ASAT weapons. Although the development of

maneuverable spacecraft would not be inhibited by most ASAT testing limitations,

some limits could be placed on operating them

“in an ASAT mode. ”

Arms control provisions might substitute for passive and active countermeasures in reducing the threat posed by

ASAT weapons, but arms control would

be more effective if combined with countermeasures.
12

U.S. satellites can be protected either by increasing their survivability or by reducing the

threat posed by Soviet ASAT weapons. Passive or active countermeasures are designed

to do the former while arms control provisions

would hopefully do the latter. In considering

the advantages and disadvantages of ASAT

arms control, ASAT development, and countermeasures, it is important to consider them

in packages. A combination of arms control

provisions and passive countermeasures, for

example, or of passive countermeasures and

active countermeasures, could provide greater

security than each component of such a package might provide alone.

The benefits of most ASAT limitations

conflict with the benefits of ASAT exploitation.

Although ASAT arms control might prevent the Soviet Union from developing advanced, highly capable ASAT weapons, it

would also place a similar restriction on the

United States. Therefore, although U.S. satellites might be less vulnerable to ASAT attack, the United States would have to give up

the ability to strike at Soviet satellites which

threaten U.S. and allied forces. Although arms

control might prevent an expensive and potentially destabilizing arms race in space, it would

also limit the ability of the United States to

use its comparative advantage in advanced

technology to protect U.S. satellites and place

threatening Soviet satellites at risk.

Not all arms control regimes are inconsistent with ASAT development or deployment.

“Rules of the road” for space–e.g., negotiated

keep-out zones—might be pursued simultaneously with ASAT research, testing, and deployment.

Effective ASAT arms control would

likely place significant restrictions on the

testing and deployment of future ballistic missile defense systems.

There is considerable overlap between BMD

and ASAT technologies. Since even a poor ballistic missile defense system would probably

have excellent ASAT capabilities, any ASAT

limitation or test ban would almost certainly

impede BMD development. Conversely, technology development ostensibly for advanced

ASAT systems might provide some limited

BMD capabilities, or, at minimum, information useful in BMD research.

Some available unilateral actions have clear

benefits:

●

●

●

c

Deployment of attack sensors on valuable

satellites in order to provide information

to support a retaliation decision;

Deployment of a space-based, space surveillance system in order to provide information to support verification of compliance with future arms control agreements;

to provide warning information required

for effective evasion or dispensing of de

coys; to support a decision to retaliate in

the event of an attack; and to provide information required for the targeting of

ASAT/DSAT weapons4

;

Hardening of military satellites against

nuclear effects to a modest degree in order to preclude “cheap kills” by nucleararmed ICBMS, SLBMS, or ABMs;

Development or maintenance of electronic .

countermeasures and electro-optical countermeasures, which would be relatively

cheap, useful at all conflict levels, and unlikely to be prohibited by arms control

agreements.

The ASAT weapon under development in the

United States is sufficient to meet the threat

posed by current, low-orbit Soviet military satellites.

Should the United States decide that it is

in our national security interest to deploy

ASAT weapons, the current MV program and,

potentially, interceptors based on the recently

tested HOE technology, are sufficient to respond to the threat posed by existing Soviet

military satellites in low orbit. The current

U.S. ASAT could be made even more effective

by the addition of a spac~based space surveil4Because of its usefulness, such a surveillance system would

bean attractive target for a Soviet ASAT attack. The ultimate

utility of such a system, therefore, hinges on its survivability.
13

lance system to aid the process of targeting

and/or additional basing facilities.

Many of the functions performed by Soviet

military satellites may eventually be performed by more capable satellites orbiting at

altitudes out of reach of the U.S. MV. Should

this happen, it would provide a strong incentive to extend the MV’S capabilities by adding a larger booster or to develop a newer,

more capable ASAT system.

COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL ASA T

AND ARMS CONTROL REGIME S

There are widely varying views about the

wisdom of deploying weapons which are to

operate in space or against space objects. This

fact, combined with more general concerns

about the Soviet military threat and the

dangers of the U.S./Soviet arms race, has

made it difficult to forge a national consensus

on the subject of ASAT weapons. Some people oppose A SAT weapons as a matter of principle because these weapons would operate in

space or because such developments would

contribute to the arms race. Others believe the

benefits of ASAT weapons are outweighed by

the risk they pose to current U.S. space systems, which are seen as essential for maintaining U.S./Soviet strategic stability. Still others

see the development of A SAT and BMD weapons as a means to exploit U.S. technological

advantages to enhance U.S. power, reduce the

threat of conflict and global nuclear war, and

reduce the damage done by such a war should

it ever occur.

In its analysis, OTA has attempted to take

into consideration this range of viewpoints

and, to the greatest extent possible, show how

it leads to a range of policy options. Many of

the choices that will be made over the next several years will require a delicate balancing of

strategic, economic, and political considerations. There is little doubt that reasonable persons can and will disagree as to the most

appropriate nature of this balance.

Seven international legal regimes and corresponding military postures are considered

critically below. Each of these regimes is intended to facilitate assessment of the effective

ness and desirability of different combinations

of A SAT and BMD technology development,

satellite survivability, and arms control. Each

regime is constructed so that it is different

from the other regimes and so that it contains

elements which might reasonably be expected

to co-exist in the same proposal.

1. Existing Constraints

The first regime is defined by treaties and

agreements presently in force; these are the

Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space

Treaty, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The existing international legal regime prohibits the use of A SAT capabilities except in

self-defense, the testing or deployment of

space-based weapons with BMD capability,

and the testing or deployment in space of nuclear space mines or ASATS that would require a nuclear detonation as a power source.

Table 1-1 .—Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development

and Arms Control

Restrict with Develop ASAT

arms control weapons

Existing constraints . . . . . No Yes

Comprehensive ASAT

and space-based

weapon ban . . . . . . . . . Yes No

Test ban and spacebased weapon ban . . . Yes Yes/Noa

One each/no new types . . Yes Yesb

Rules of the road . . . . . . . Yes Yesc

Space sanctuary . . . . . . . . Yes Yesc

Ballistic missile defense . No Yes

alrr thts regime ASAT weapons could be developed, tested, and deployed on Earth

but not In space The United States could pursue ASAT development with!n the

bounds of the treaty, or it could forego ASAT development entirely

bAll ASAT weapon5 other than “current types” could not be tested or cledoyed

In space

c Development and deployment optional but strongly supported by aciwcates Of

this regime
14

With these few exceptions, all other ASAT

weapon development and deployment activities would be allowed. It is, therefore, permissible for the United States and the Soviet

Union to develop and deploy coorbital interceptors (like the current Soviet system), directascent interceptors (like the current U.S. system), terrestrial or space-based lasers, spacebased neutral particle beam weapons, and

weapons based on maneuvering spacecraft.

In the current regime both the United

States and the Soviet Union could develop,

test, deploy, and use such passive countermeasures as hiding, deception, evasion,

hardening, and proliferation. Active, nondestructive defenses, such as electronic or

electreoptical countermeasures, would also be

allowed. Active, destructive defenses, such as

shoot-back or DSATS, would be allowed as

long as they did not violate any of the treaties enumerated above.

The primary advantage of the current regime is that it allows the almost unrestrained

application of U.S. technology to the twin

problems of protecting U.S. satellites and placing threatening Soviet satellites at risk. Under this regime, the United States would be

free to use its comparative advantage in advanced technology to keep pace with expected

developments in Soviet ASATS and other military satellites. Advanced U.S. ASATS might

discourage the development of more capable

Soviet space systems designed to place U.S.

terrestrial assets at risk. In addition, the

United States would be free to respond to Soviet A SAT weapons with increasingly sophisticated defensive weapons and countermeasures, thereby reducing the probability that the

Soviets would ever use their intentional or inherent ASAT capabilities.

In the existing regime, research and development on new ballistic missile defense technologies can also proceed without the constraints that might be imposed by certain

ASAT arms control regimes. Testing of advanced ASATS could provide valuable information that would contribute to the development of very capable BMD systems. Therefore, some types of generic space-weapon

research could be conducted without first having to modify or withdraw from the ABM

Treaty.

Some view advanced ASAT research as dangerous for this very reason. They argue that

such research will gradually erode the usefulness of the ABM Treaty, thereby precipitating a defensive and offensive arms competition on Earth and in space. Rather than

protecting satellites, a competition in space

weapons might severely reduce their military

utility. Under conditions of unrestrained competition, security might be purchased, if at all,

only at the price of a substantial and sustained

commitment to the development of increasingly sophisticated offensive and defensive

space weapons. In such an environment, ensuring the survivability of satellites would require more than simple hardening or evasion.

Costly measures might have to be taken such

as the deployment of precision decoys, predeployed spares, or acquiring the ability to

quickly reconstitute space assets. Satellites capable of defending themselves or a companion satellite might also have to be developed

and deployed.

Should space-based weapons such as space

mines or directed-energy weapons be deployed,

these might be capable of the almost instantaneous destruction of a large number of critical satellites and ASATS. This could force nations into a situation in which they must “use

or lose” their own pre-deployed space weapons. This might supply the incentive to escalate an otherwise manageable crisis.

2. Comprehensive ASAT and

Space-Based Weapon Ban

A comprehensive ASAT and spacebased

weapon ban would require the United States

and the Soviet Union to agree to forgo the possession of specialized ASAT weapons, the

testing—on Earth or in space—of specialized

ASAT capabilities, the testing in an “ASAT

mode ’ of systems (e.g., ICBMS or ABMs)

‘Testing in an “A SAT mode” would include tests of ground-

, air-, sea- or space-based systems against targets in space or

against points in space.
15

which have inherent ASAT capabilities, and

the deployment in space of any weapon. Such

a regime would require the U.S.S.R. to destroy

all of its coorbital interceptors and the United

States to destroy all of its direct-ascent interceptors. 6

Although this regime contains the most far-

-reaching arms control provisions, it would

have the disadvantage of being the most difficult to verify. Unlike an ASAT test ban and

space-based weapons ban regime, a comprehensive ban would prohibit possession and

testing of A SAT weapons on Earth.7 Because

the current Soviet coorbital interceptor is a

relatively small spacecraft launched on a much

larger, generaI-purpose booster, the Soviet

Union could maintain and perhaps even expand its ASAT force without the the United

States gaining unambiguous evidence of a violation.

Since the United States might agree to a

comprehensive ASAT ban only after considerable domestic political friction over questions of compliance and verification, it is important to consider how such a ban might

make a greater contribution to U.S. national

security than a ban on ASAT testing and

spacebased weapon deployment (discussed be

low). The purpose of both bans would be to pre

vent the use of ASATS, or, at minimum, to reduce the probability that an ASAT attack

would be effective. An ASAT test ban would

primarily affect weapons reliability, while an

ASAT possession ban, if observed, would affect both availability and reliability. It is conceivable that the risk posed by possible illegal Soviet use of ASAT weapons might be

somewhat lower in a regime in which the

Soviets could not lawfully possess ASAT

weapons. Presumably, the inability to overtly

possess ASAT weapons would diminish one’s

ability to use them effectively. Furthermore,

6Such an agreement might resemble the draft treaty proposed

to the United Nations by athe U.S.S.R. in August of 1983, except that draft also bans the testing or use of manned spacecraft for military purposes. See U.N. Document A138/194, Aug.

23, 1983.

7A comprehensive ban would not ban systems with inherent

ASAT capabilities, such as ICBMS, ABMs, and maneuverable spacecraft,

an absolute ban on possession might make it

less likely that the current generation of

ASAT weapons could be upgraded and held

in readiness in significant numbers.

However, if the United States can only be

confident that the Soviets are complying with

a treaty to the extent we can verify compliance, then the United States would not have

confidence that this regime offered any greater

protection to our satellites than would a test

ban and space deployment ban.

3. ASAT Weapon Test Ban and

Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban

In this regime, in addition to adhering to

treaties and agreements presently in force, the

Soviet Union and the United States would

agree to forgo all testing in an “A SAT mode”

and the deployment of any weapon in space.

Such a ban would not only prohibit the testing of both current and future ASAT systems

but would also place similar restrictions on

BMD systems with ASAT capabilities. This

regime would not ban terrestrial research on

ASAT or space-based weapons and would not

attempt to ban their possession. Therefore, if

it were judged to be desirable, ASAT and

BMD weapons could be developed (though not

tested in space) and held in readiness on Earth.

In a test ban regime, the passive countermeasures and nondestructive active countermeasures that were discussed in the “existing

regime” could still be developed and employed.

Destructive active countermeasures such as

“shoot-back” or DSATS could not be tested

or deployed but could be developed and held

in readiness.

Although a ban on testing in an “ASAT

mode” would not eliminate all threats to satellites, it would reduce the cost and complexity of ensuring a reasonable level of satellite

survivability. The United States would still

benefit from ‘hardening’ its satellites and deploying spares and decoys, but the more

elaborate, expensive, precaution of developing

and deploying DSATS would be prohibited

and, indeed, less attractive. In the absence of

reliable, effective ASATS, satellites would pre
16

-.

Table l-2.—Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring

Prohibitable action Observable .—

ASAT attack:

K E W

a impact . ... . . . . . . acceleration

Pulsed HELb irradiation . . . acceleration

Continuous H EL

irradiation . . . . . . . . heating

NPB C irradiation . . . . . . . . . . ionization

Keep-out zone penetration . . . position of thermal radiation source (ASAT)

Interception test . . . . . . . . . . . positions of thermal radiation sources

(ASAT and target)

NPB ASAT operation . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASAT

HEL ASAT operation . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASAT

Irradiation of target

with NPB . . . . . . . . ... . . gamma radiation from target

Irradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from target

Irradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from target

Irradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . . . position of thermal radiation source (target)

Irradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from target

Nuclear explosive aboard

satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gamma radiation from fissile or fusile

nuclei activated by cosmic radiation or by

particle beams — a/(ir-r@lC.0n0r9Y weapon

bHtgh.energy laser

cNeutral. Darticle beam

sensors

Attack sensors:

accelerometers

accelerometers

thermistors

ionization detectors

space-based LWIRd thermal image~ f

space-based LWIR thermal imageP r

space-based LWIR thermal imagere

space-based LWIR thermal image~ f

gamma-ray spectrometer

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multi spectral imager

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multi spectral imager

gamma-ray spectrometer (and optional

particle beam generator)

dl-ong.w~vel

ength Infrared

e The LWlR telescope on the Infrared A~trOnOnll~al satellite (lRAs) OXOMpliflOS demonstrated space-based tflerrnal IMager technology, this Instrument IS described

in .4strophys/ca/ Journal, 278 (1, Pt. 2), L1 -L85, Mar 1, 1984 (Spectal Issue on the Infrared Ast ronomlcal Satelllte)

fRadar and Passive radio direction.finding methods could also be useful for tracking, tf h!dlng measures are not employed b the Penetratln9 spacecraft LWIR tracking

IS emphasized here because it is difficult to counter by such measures

gA target irradiated by a high-energy neutral panicle beam will emit gamma rays, neutrons, and other observable particles, Just as It Will, at a slower rate, when bombarded

by natural cosmic rays These gamma rays could be detected by a gamma-ray spectrometer such as those which have been carried by Sowet Venusian and lunar

landers and by U S NASA Ranger and Apollo spacecraft (NASA report SP-387, pp 3.20 )

sumably be of greater utility since the United

States might have higher confidence that they

would be available when needed.

Relative to the existing regime, the primary

advantage of a regime banning testing of

ASAT capabilities and deployment of spacebased weapons would be that highly valued

U.S. satellites in higher orbits–e.g., the future

MILSTAR system–could be protected with

some confidence from advanced A SAT weapons, especially if protected as well by passive

countermeasures. The fact that advanced

ASATS could not be overtly tested would reduce the probability that they would be developed and deployed. If they were developed and

used without prior testing, a test ban would

reduce the probability that they would be successful.

As in the existing regime, the United States

could retain a capability to attempt to negate

low-altitude Soviet satellites with its MV

ASAT (or, possibly, with interceptors based

on the HOE technology) since a “no test” ban

would not prohibit ASAT possession. However, confidence in the operational capability

of both the U.S. and Soviet ASAT systems

would degrade over time without continued

operational testing.

There would be two important disadvantages to this regime. First a ban on testing in

an “A SAT mode” and deploying space-based

weapons would not offer absolute protection

for satellites; there would remain some possibility that an untested–or covertly tested–

advanced ASAT, if suddenly deployed and

used, might actually work well enough to overcome passive countermeasures. Second, without an ASAT weapon the United States would

lack a fully tested means to attack threatening satellites. The United States would, therefore, have to place greater reliance on countermeasures to protect its terrestrial assets.

It is unclear whether countermeasures alone

will be able to keep pace with the threat posed

by advances in military satellites.
17

Depending on one’s viewpoint, an additional

advantage or disadvantage of this regime is

that the testing of some types of advanced

BMD weapons would be prohibited. This prohibition might even include some groundbased BMD weapons such as the U.S. HOE

(Homing Overlay Experiment) ABM interceptor, which is currently allowed under the ABM

Treaty. Although such limitations would only

be slightly more restrictive than those of the

ABM Treaty, they would be very restrictive

when compared to a regime in which the ABM

Treaty was no longer in force.

4. One Each/No New Types

Regime four would include arms limitation

provisions which would restrict the United

States and the Soviet Union to their current

ASATS and prohibit the testing in an “A SAT

mode’ and deployment, in space, of more advanced systems. Existing treaties and agreements would remain in force. In addition to

banning the testing or deployment in space of

new types of ASATS, the “no new types”

agreement would prohibit making current systems more capable so they could attack targets at higher altitudes. BMD systems would

also be banned if they had ASAT capabilities.

In a “no new types” regime, the passive

countermeasures and nondestructive active

countermeasures that were discussed in the

“existing regime” could still be developed and

employed. Destructive active countermeasures such as “shoot-back” or DSATS could not

be tested or deployed but could be developed

and held in readiness. Current ASATs—should

they already possess the capability when the

treaty is signed-could be used to attack other

ASATS.

The primary advantage of a “no new types”

regime, relative to the existing regime, would

be that, by prohibiting the testing of advanced

A SAT weapons, highly valued U.S. satellites

in higher orbits could be protected with some

confidence. In addition, the United States

could retain a capability to negate low-altitude

Soviet satellites (e.g., RORSAT) in the event

of war and to respond in kind to a Soviet

ASAT attack.

A primary disadvantage of a “no new

types” regime would be that allowed (i.e.,

tested, nonnuclear) U.S. ASAT weapons would

be inadequate to negate threatening Soviet

satellites if such satellites were moved to

higher orbits–a feasible but technologically

difficult and costly Soviet countermeasure. An

additional disadvantage to this regime is that

attempts to define “new types” of ASATS

would be likely to result in the same ambiguity

and distrust that resulted from attempts to

define “new types” of ICBMS in the SALT II

negotiations. Finally, the degree of protection

afforded high-altitude satellites by a ban on

testing “new types” would be uncertain; there

would remain some probability that an untested advanced ASAT, if suddenly deployed

and used, might actually work. Systems with

inherent ASAT capabilities (ICBMS, ABMs,

maneuvering spacecraft) would also still exist.

As in the test ban and space-based weapon

ban regime, a “no new types’ regime would

limit the testing of some types of advanced

BMD weapons which are currently allowed under the ABM Treaty.

5. “Rules of the Road” for Space

Whether or not the United States and the

Soviet Union agree to restrict ASAT weapons,

they might negotiate a set of “rules of the

road” for space operations. These rules could

serve the general purpose of reducing suspicion and encouraging the orderly use of space,

or they could be designed specifically to aid

in the defense of space assets. Examples of

general rules might include agreed limits on

minimum separation distance between satellites or restrictions on very low-altitude overflight by manned or unmanned spacecraft.

These general rules might also be used to

establish new, stringent requirements for advance notice of launch activities. Specific rules

for space defense might include agreed and

possibly defended “keep-out zones, ” grants or

restrictions on the rights of inspection, and

limitations on high-velocity fly-bys or trailing

of foreign satellites. It might also be desirable to establish a means by which to obtain

timely information and consult concerning ambiguous or threatening activities.
18

The “rules of the road” discussed above–

if implemented in the absence of restrictions

on ASAT weapon development—would not remove the threat of ASAT attack. The primary

purpose of such a regime would not be to restrict substantially the activities of the parties, but rather, to make the intentions behind

these activities more transparent. Although

the degree of protection for U.S. space assets

to be gained from a “rules of the road” agreement would be less than from other arms limitation regimes, the costs would also be correspondingly less if other nations failed to

comply with such rules. One must assume that

in the absence of ASAT arms control, both

ASAT development and satellite survivability programs will be given high priority. This

being the case, offensive and defensive measures would be available to respond to violations of “rules of the road. ”

If they were defended, “keep-out zones”

would probably offer the closest thing to security in a “rules of the road” regime. Space

mines designed to shadow satellites and detonate on command would lose a great deal of

their utility if held at bay by a defended keepout zone. Nonetheless, there are a number of

difficulties with trying to implement this regime, not the least of which would be the reaction of other space-faring nations.

ASAT weapons such as nuclear interceptors

must be kept at a range of several hundred

kilometers from moderately hardened satellites in order to protect such satellites; advanced directed-energy ASAT weapons might

have to be kept much farther away. Given the

number of satellites currently in orbit, this

would present several problems. Satellites in

geostationary orbit are already so closely

spaced that a keep-out zone sufficiently large

to protect satellites from a nuclear weapon

would displace other satellites. It is possible

that critical strategic warning and communications satellites could function in supersynchronous orbits.8 If so, there would be adequate room to accommodate large keep-out

zones around satellites in such orbits.

‘I.e. higher than geosynchronous orbital altitude.

There are too many satellites in low-Earth

orbit to accommodate large keep-out zones.

However, it might be feasible to establish

smaller keep-out zones around such satellites

and, in addition, to specify a minimum angular separation between orbital planes to prevent continuous trailing.

6. Space Sanctuary

Regime six would establish altitude limits

above which military satellites could operate

but where the testing or deployment of weapons would be forbidden. A “space sanctuary”

regime would not constrain ASAT weapon development, testing, or deployment in space

but would attempt to enhance security by prohibiting these activities in deep space (i.e.,

above 3,000 nautical miles, or about 5,600

kilometers) where critical strategic satellites

are based. At present, the altitude of these

strategic satellites makes them invulnerable to

attack by the current Soviet and U.S. ASATS.

In a “space sanctuary” regime, the passive

countermeasures and nondestructive active

countermeasures that were discussed in the

“existing regime” could still be developed and

employed. Unlike the “test ban” or “no new

types” regime, destructive, active countermeasures such as DSATS could be tested and

deployed, but not in deep space. Deployment

in deep space of ‘‘shoot-back’ capabilities or

DSATS would probably be prohibited since it

might be impossible to differentiate these

weapons from offensive ASATS.

The primary advantage of this regime would

be that it could protect satellites in high orbits from the current generation of ASAT

weapons. In addition, a deep-space sanctuary

regime would constrain ASAT development

less than would a comprehensive test ban regime or a no-new-types regime. However,

should the United States and the Soviet Union choose to pursue advanced ASAT weapons, a space sanctuary might offer only limited

protection.

The greatest risks in a space sanctuary regime would be posed by advanced directedenergy weapons which could be tested and de-
19

.

ployed at low altitudes. Such testing and deployment would probably be adequate to guarantee effectiveness against targets at higher

altitudes. Satellites at very high, supersynchronous altitudes might still derive some protection from this regime, but violation of the

sanctuary by highly maneuverable kineticenergy weapons or by satellites covertly carrying powerful nuclear or directed-energy

weapons would remain a risk. For this reason,

sanctuaries might provide less security than

would keep-out zones (discussed above), because any foreign satellite entering an agreed

keep-out zone could be fired upon, while a satellite entering a sanctuary could be lawfully

fired upon only if it could be proven that it

was, or carried, a weapon.

7. Space-Based BMD

The seventh regime might result from U.S.

or Soviet withdrawal fro-m the ABM Treaty

followed by the deployment of space-based

BMD systems. Since even a modest BMD system would make a very capable A SAT weapon, in a “space-based BMD” regime there

could be no attempt to restrain ASAT development. Moreover, each side would probably

want the freedom to develop new A SAT weapons capable of destroying the opponent’s

space-based BMD systems.

The ASAT weapons allowable under the

“spacebased BMD” regime would include all

of those in the “existing regime, plus weapArtist’s conception of the Space Shuttle deploying a

neutral particle beam weapon.

Neither of the weapons I Illustrated here exwts today, but I n the absence of agreed limitations, both the United States

and the Soviet Union WI I I probably develop a wide range of advanced space weapons.
20

ons capable of countering ballistic missiles in

flight. Defensive measures would be less constrained and more essential than in the “existing regime. In particular, advanced spacebased weapons such as neutral particle beam

weapons could be deployed at low altitudes

and then used as ASAT or DSAT weapons.

Passive countermeasures and nondestructive

active countermeasures like those discussed

in the “existing regime” would be developed

and employed.

Depending on one’s viewpoint, the principal

advantage, or disadvantage, of a space-based

BMD regime would be that it would allow the

United States and the Soviet Union to deploy

highly capable weapons in space. On March

23, 1983, President Reagan called for a vigorous research program to determine the feasibility of advanced BMD systems, suggesting

that the deployment of such systems, if feasible, could offer an alternative to the current

stalemate in strategic nuclear weapons. Given

the inherent ASAT capabilities of advanced

BMD weapons, satellites would be most vulnerable in a space-based BMD regime. Before

the United States deployed space-based BMD

systems it would have to determine, first, that

the contribution that such systems made to

U.S. security was great enough to compensate

for the threat which similar opposing systems

would pose to U.S. satellites; and, second, that

space-based BMD components could be protected at competitive cost against advanced

ASAT weapons.

ASAT countermeasures must prove to be effective for spacebased BMD platforms if a decision to deploy them is to make sense. Perhaps large improvements in the effectiveness

or economy of passive countermeasures such

as combinations of hardening, deception, and

proliferation would provide the needed protection. Alternatively, the superior fire-power or

massive shielding of BMD weapons might

give them a degree of protection unattainable

by smaller, less capable satellites.

With respect to other military satellites, the

expense of equipping them with countermeasures to insure some level of survivability

against advanced BMD systems would be considerable. However if, as some argue, spacebased missile defenses could make us more secure and encourage the Soviets to make real

reductions in offensive missiles, this would reduce the threat of U.S./Soviet conflict. In a

world where conflict was less likely, satellite

vulnerability would be less important.

Others, of course, disagree strongly with

this argument. They claim that space-based

missile defenses will decrease our security by

encouraging greater competition in both offensive and defensive weapons. In a world of

space-based weapons and higher U.S./Soviet

tension, satellite vulnerability would be a critical and potentially destabilizing factor.

TREATIES OF LIMITED DURATIO N

Each of the regimes examined above could

be negotiated as a treaty of indefinite or

limited duration or, alternatively, as one which

remained in force as long as periodic reviews

were favorable. Each of these alternatives

would have its advantages and disadvantages.

Treaties of indefinite duration are more effective at discouraging the pursuit of banned

activities, yet require a greater degree of foresight regarding the long-term interests of the

signatories and can foreclose technological options for the indefinite future.g Treaties of

limited duration allow parties to take advantage of future technological options, yet can

Wheaties of unlimited duration usually contain a clause which

states that if a country’s “supreme national interests” are

threatened, then that country may withdraw from the treaty,

In addition to “supreme national interest clauses, ” treaties may

also contain specific unilateral or agreed statements regarding

specific understandings about related events. For example, The

1972 ABM Treaty contains a unilateral statement by the LJnited

States which links the continued viability of the treaty to “more

complete limitations on strategic arms. ”
21

encourage aggressive development programs

designed to reach fruition at the termination

of the designated period. Treaties which call

for a periodic reassessment of agreed limitations in theory have great flexibility, yet, in

practice, often result in a strong presumption

that they should be continued.

The United States might, for example, enter into a treaty limiting ASATS with the explicit and public reservation that we would

withdraw from this treaty if and when we were

ready to test and deploy a ballistic missile defense system in ways that the ASAT Treaty

would forbid. Alternatively, we might take the

public position that we intended to restrict our

BMD activities so as to remain within the

limits of an ASAT Treaty. While the former

position would suggest a treaty of limited duration and the latter a treaty of unlimited duration, this need not be the case. It would be

perfectly possible to sign a treaty of unlimited

duration, with the standard provision allowing for withdrawal, accompanied by a clear

statement of some of the conditions under

which we intended to withdraw.

From one point of view, the exact language

in a treaty regarding its duration would be less

important than the intentions of the parties.

After all, there have been numerous examples

of treaties of unlimited duration that were violated soon after they were signed and examples of treaties of limited duration that continued in force after they had expired (e.g., the

“Interim Offensive Agreement” signed at

SALT I). The real issue would be whether the

parties believe that adherence to the treaty in

question continued to be in their national security interest.

The Reagan Administration has recently indicated that it intends to conduct ASAT tests

to gather information useful in advanced

BMD research.l” Given the close connection

between these two technologies, an ASAT

treaty of even limited duration would require

modification of current SD I program plans.

Thus, to the extent that the United States

wished to maintain the most rapid pace of advanced BMD research within the bounds of

the ABM Treaty, such a treaty would not be

desirable. Conversely, to the extent that the

United States wished to slow the pace of Soviet BMD research and would be willing to de

fer decisions regarding the testing of spacebased or space-directed weapons, an ASAT

treaty of limited duration could contribute to

that result.

jOThe ~urpo9e of ~9t9 ‘ ‘in an ASAT mode’ would be to investigate advanced technologies without violating the ABM

Treaty. The Department of Defense recently told Congress that,

“To ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty the performance

of the demonstration hardware will be limited to the satellite

defense mission. Intercepts of certain orbital targets simulating anti-satellite weapons can cleady be compatible with this

criteria. ” [Report to the Congress on the Strate@”c Defense Im”-

tiative, Department of Defense, 1985, app. B, p. 8.]
Chapter 2

Introduction
Contents

Page

overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Space Weapons: Attitudes and Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

ASATs and BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Attitudes Toward the Military Uses of Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Organization of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter 2

Introduction

OVERVIE W

This report examines the issues raised by the

development of weapons capable of attacking

objects stationed in space. It analyzes the military utility of space systems, describes the technical characteristics and military value of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, and discusses the effectiveness of a number of satellite defenses and

technical countermeasures. Finally, the report

examines how various levels of ASAT arms control might contribute to U.S. national security

when combined with various survivability measures and various levels of ASAT development

and deployment.

Believing that the development of weapons capable of attacking missiles in flight or objects

in space would likely have a strong effect on “deterrence, crisis stability, arms control and. . . national security policy, ” the House Committee on

Armed Services’ and the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations’ asked the Office of Technology Assessment to prepare this report. The committees requested that the report should, among

other things, assess:

 the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of various space-based or space-directed

concepts; 3

 the relationship between capabilities that

can reasonably be expected and the impact

of the technology exploitation effort on the

overall strategic policy of the United

States; 4

‘Letter from Melvin Price, Chairman, William L. Dickinson,

Ranking Minority Member, and Les Aspin of the House Armed

Services Committee, to John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of

Technology Assessment, Mar. 5, 1984.

‘Letter from Charles H. Percy, Chairman, Claiborne Pen,

Ranking Member, Larry Pressler, and Paul E. Tsongas of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee to John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of Technology Assessment, Mar. 20, 1984.

‘Ibid.

4Supra, note 1.

●

●

the implications of anti-satellite weapons

and space-based or space-directed missile

defense concepts for standing arms control

agreements, particularly the Anti-Ballistic

Missile, Outer Space, and Limited Test Ban

Treaties;s and

the prospects for future space-related arms

control agreements, including an assessment of advantages, disadvantages, and

verifiability e

The subject of ballistic missile defense

(BMD)–particularly space-based BMD–was of

special interest to both the House Armed Services and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

This subject is dealt within a companion OTA

report, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies.

There is a strong relationship between ASAT

and BMD technologies and the technical, political, and diplomatic actions taken in one sphere

will almost certainly affect the other. For this

reason, OTA assessed the two subjects at the

same time, with a single staff, and with the advice of a single advisory panel. In each of these

reports, OTA has endeavored to make clear the

relationship between these two sets of technologies, and where appropriate has provided cross-

-references to further assist the reader.

In producing this unclassified report, OTA

was able to draw on a wide range of classified

material. Appendices of classified notes on this

report are available to individuals having appropriate security clearances and who require access to that material.

‘Supra, note 2.

‘Ibid.

25
—

26

SPACE WEAPONS: ATTITUDES AND CONTROVERS Y

Assuming that highly capable and militarily

useful ASAT weapons can be built at an acceptable cost, then why not proceed with development and deployment? Why should the U.S.

Congress give more attention to ASATS than

it gives to other new terrestrial weapon systems

(e.g., anti-ship or anti-aircraft weapons)?

ASATS and BMD

Going forward with ASAT weapon development or, alternatively, agreeing to restrict

such development through arms control measures, could have important consequences for

advanced, space-based BMD technologies.

Over the past several years a major debate on

strategic defense has been taking place in the

United States. Some believe that ballistic missile defenses can be developed that may eventually allow the United States to abandon the

current policy of deterrence through assured

retaliation. Others believe that even increased

research on BMD alternatives might precipitate an offensive arms race with each side

hastening to counter possible defenses with

more and better offensive arms. This debate

was intensified by President Reagan’s March

23, 1983, speech which outlined what was later

to become the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Since the debate over ballistic missile defense involves a fundamental reassessment of

this country’s strategic policy, decisionmakers

are reluctant to proceed with ASAT weapon

development, deployment, or arms control de

cisions that may tie their hands with respect

to future technologies or that may commit

them irrevocably to a course with unforeseen

consequences. Some people believe that ASAT

weapon development programs will be used to

accomplish BMD research, thereby avoiding

the strictures of the ABM Treaty and the scrutiny of Congress. Others believe that ASAT

arms control restrictions would impede future

BMD research and development programs.

Given these opposing viewpoints, the decision

to go forward with or, alternatively, to restrict

ASAT development must be made in the

broader context of this country’s reassessment

of its strategic posture and the military utility of space.

Attitudes Toward the

Military Uses of Space

In addition to understanding the complex

relationship between ASAT and BMD technologies, one must also recognize that people

think about the military use of space in radically different ways. There are a great many

views—both pro and con—regarding weapons

that would operate in or from space; it is useful to examine several of the more frequently

stated positions.7

Opposition to Space Weapons

Some people oppose the development of

weapons that would operate in or from space

because they feel such activities run counter

to the legal and political history of space. They

point to the many examples of successful international cooperation in space science,

commerce, law, and politics and see these

activities as reducing international tension

and contributing broadly to peace and development. Space weapons are seen as violating

the spirit and, in some cases, the letter of the

treaties and agreements to which the United

States is a party. They point to the language

of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states

that space activities should be conducted “in

the interest of maintainingg international peace

and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. ”8 Adherents of

this viewpoint emphasize that every American President since Eisenhower has stated

‘For a discussion of various “space doctrines, ” see: “Space

Doctrines, ” Lt. Col. D. Lupton, USAF (Ret.), Strt.ite~”c Rew”ew,

fall 1983, pp. 36-47; see also: Lt. Col. D. Lupton, USAF (Ret.),

On Space Warfare: A SpacePower Doctrine, U.S. Air Force, Air

University Command, center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research,

and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1985.

“’Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon

and Other Celestial Bodies, ” 18 U.S.T. 2410, T. I.A. S. 6347, Article III.
27

support for the idea that space should not be

an arena of conflict and that space exploration

should contribute to peace. The web of commitments that the United States has fashioned over the past 25 years through its agree

ments and unilateral declarations is seen as

imposing a positive burden on the United

States to support the broad ideals stated in

the Outer Space Treaty.

Others–although acknowledging the importance of the laws and the history of space—

base their opposition to space weapons on the

belief that the deployment of such weapons in

space, if not halted now, will be impossible to

reverse. Since neither the United States nor

the Soviet Union now has weapons that are

based in space, they feel that it is both possible and desirable to prevent the arms race

from extending to this new environment. This

view is widely held in countries other than the

United States and the Soviet Union. Over the

last several years, the Soviet Union has made

a strong effort to place the blame for the

militarization of space on the United States.

The American point of view is that the arms

race is a burden imposed on the United States

by the inordinate military preparations of the

Soviet Union. Nonetheless, many nonallied

governments, as well as important segments

of the populations of even our allies, view the

superpower arms race as a dangerous and destabilizing activity.g Those who see the superpower arms race as a dangerous process which

the protagonists are doing little to halt are

likely to see military development in space as

an integral part of that process.

Some opposition to space weapons derives

from the fact that such weapons would place

at risk critical communication and information-gathering satellites that contribute to the

stability of the U.S./Soviet relationship.l”

Space weapons are seen as destabilizing and

likely to increase the possibility that a nuclear

‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Um”space

’82: A Context for Cooperation and Competition-A Technical

Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-26 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1983).

‘“see: R. Garwin, K. Gottfried, and D. Hafner, “Anti-Satellite

Weapons, ” Scientific American, vol. 250, No. 6, June 1984, pp.

45 ff.

war might occur either through accident or intention. At present, nations can use space to

peer within the boundaries of other sovereign

states to obtain otherwise inaccessible information and early warning of attack. For

this reason, many believe that space is of

greater value to the United States than to the

Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union has other

means of gathering information in the open

U.S. society. Adherents to this position maintain that, though there are many potential military uses of space, the communication and

information-gathering activities are the most

important. They argue that these benefits will

be jeopardized by U.S./Soviet military space

activities such as ASAT weapons development or space-based BMD. Although these

latter activities also have military utility, they

are not seen as outweighing the risk that such

systems would create.

Support for Space Weapons

Those who support the development of

weapons that would operate in or from space

generally emphasize the importance of being

able to exert military power in space. Some

supporters view space as merely another

sphere of military activity; others feel that military space activities might offer a means by

which to fundamentally alter the U.S./Soviet

strategic balance. Advocates of the former

viewpoint emphasize that the increase in the

number of Soviet military space systems with

enhanced capabilities creates a threat to which

the the United States must be prepared to respond. In particular, supporters of this position stress the importance of being able to destroy satellites which assist the Soviets in

targeting U.S. terrestrial forces. They believe

that in order to deter or, alternatively, to prevail in terrestrial conflicts, the United States

must be able to operate in, and respond to

threats from, space just as it does on land, at

sea, or in the air.11

1lColin Gray, “Why an ASAT Treaty Is a Bad Idea, ” Aero

space Amen”ca, April 1984, pp. 70 ff.; and R. F. Futrell, ideas,

Concepts, and Doctrine: A Histoqy of Basic Thinking in the

United Stabs &r Force, 1907-1964, U.S. Air Force, Air University Command, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1974, pp.

279-282, summ arizing views of Gen. Thomaa D. White, USAF.
28

Some space weapons advocates see space as

more than just another theater of military

operation; they see it as a solution to the current stalemate in offensive nuclear weapons.

They argue that space-based ballistic missile

defenses can provide the opportunity for the

United States to abandon its current doctrine

of assured retaliation. Should both the United

States and the Soviet Union possess spacebased defensive forces, then more desirable

offensive-defensive or purely defensive strategies can be developed. Other space power advocates see space weapons as a means to capture the “high ground. ”12 The current U.S.

lead in military space technology is seen as

granting a military advantage over the Soviet

Union-an advantage which, if not seized, will

soon be lost.

Because views about the military uses of

space vary so widely, it has been difficult to

forge a national consensus on the subject of

ASAT weapons. Some people oppose ASAT

weapons as a matter of principle because these

‘

zLt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.), High Fronti”er: A

Strategy for IVational Survival (Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1983).

weapons would operate in space, others oppose

ASAT weapons because they believe the benefits of such weapons are outweighed by the

risk they pose to current U.S. space systems.

Some people support ASAT weapons simply

because they feel the United States must be

able to respond to Soviet threats from any the

ater. Other supporters see space as a means

to project U.S. power, reduce the threat of conflict and global nuclear war, and reduce the

damage done by such a war should it ever occur.

In its analysis, OTA has attempted to take

into consideration this range of viewpoints

and, to the greatest extent possible, show it

leads to a variety of policy options. As this re

port demonstrates, the opportunities and risks

that might result from developing or not developing ASAT weapons or from pursuing or

not pursuing ASAT arms control cannot be

simply stated. Many of the choices that will

be made over the next several years will require a delicate balancing of strategic, economic, and political interests. There is little

doubt that reasonable persons can and will disagree as to the most appropriate nature of this

balance.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPOR T

The main body of this report begins with the

discussion in chapter 3 of the military utility

of satellites and ASAT weapons. This chapter provides the conceptual framework necessary to understand how these various space

systems contribute to or threaten U.S. national security. Current and projected Soviet

and U.S. military satellite capabilities are examined, as are a variety of responses to such

capabilities.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed technical look

at the existing and projected ASAT capabilities of the United States and the Soviet

Union. This chapter discusses both existing

technologies and the possibilities for more advanced kinetic-energy, nuclear, and directedenergy ASAT weapons. It also considers the

wide range of technical and political responses

available to the United States to counter or

compensate for Soviet ASAT capabilities.

Chapter 5 reviews the history of arms control related to ASAT weapons. This chapter

describes the constraints imposed by treaties

and agreements in force and discusses the international political barriers to ASAT development. The 1978-79 ASAT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union

are examined, along with subsequent draft

treaties proposed by the Soviet Union. Recent

legislative and executive branch activities are

also summarized.

Chapter 6 describes a number of different

ASAT arms control provisions that might be

sought by the United States. Restrictions on

testing, possession, deployment, and use are
all ex amined to determine whether they might

contribute to U.S. national security. Provisions restricting spacecraft operation and

orbits—so-called “rules of the road’ ’—are also

examined.

Finally, chapter 7 provides a comparative

evaluation of seven hypothetical legal/technical regimes. Each regime combines examples

29

of technical measures and countermeasures

discussed in chapter 4 with examples of arms

control as discussed in chapter 6. Each of

these hypothetical regimes describes the advantages and disadvantages of different combinations of ASAT weapons development, employment policies, defensive countermeasures,

and arms control.
Chapter 3

MILSATS, ASATS, and

National Security
Contents

Page

The Role and Value of Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

The Role of Military Satellites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Current and Projected MILSAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Possible Advanced-Technology MILSAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

The Value of Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Vulnerability and Protection of Military Space Systems . . . . . . . . . . 43

The Role and Value of Anti-Satellite Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Military Space Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Military Space Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

ASAT Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Ballistic Missile Defense as an ASAT Policy Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 46

Tables

Table No. Page

3-l. Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet Space System Need and Use . . . . . . . 34

3-2. Orbits of Some Soviet Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . 37

3-3. Possible Responses to Enemy MILSAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Figures

Figure No, Page

3-1. Ground Track of Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite . . . . . . 37

3-2. Radar Imagery From Kosmos 1500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

3-3. Imagery Obtained by Synthetic-Aperture Satellite Radar . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Chapter 3

MILSATs, ASATs, and National Security

THE ROLE AND VALUE OF MILITARY SATELLITE S

The Role of Military Satellites

Force Support and Force Enhancement

Satellites are used for a variety of military

applications by the United states, the U. S. S. R.,

and-in smaller numbers—by several other nations. Most military satellites (MILSATs) perform nondestructive functions. For example,

Soviet military satellites are used for meteorological surveillance, surveillance of ballistic

missile launch areas to provide rapid warning

of possible missile attack, relaying of radio

communications to distant force elements, optical and radar reconnaissance of foreign force

dispositions on land and at sea, interception

of foreign radio communications and radar signals, transmission of radionavigation signals,

and logistic support for space systems.1 Even

though these functions are nondestructive and

the satellites which perform them are not considered weapons, they support force elements

which would engage in direct combat and enhance the combat effectiveness of those force

elements.

The value, or utility, of military satellites is

very real, but it is extremely difficult to quantify.2 The timeliness of information or the

‘E.g., maintenance and retrieval.

*The term utih”ty is used here in the sense defined by John

von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games

and Econom”c Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1953), pp. 26-27; i.e., as a numerical index of the relative preferability of an outcome [e.g., occurrence of nonnuclear

war and survival of all high-altitude satellites] which could result from a decision [e.g., an agreement to ban ASAT weapon

testing]. Of any two possible outcomes, the one having a higher

utility would be preferred over the other. Practical methods of

assessing the utilities of a decisionmaker for possible outcomes

have been described and reviewed by M.W. Merkhofer, Comparative Evaluation of Quantitative Decision-Making Approaches, National Science Foundation report NSF/PRA-83014,

April 1983.

Other notions of utility have been used in the classified literature on satellite utility. Some of these notions are vaguely defined, while others-e. g., force multiplication factors—are precisely defined and, in principle, objectively calculable, although

less clearly related to national interests than are Von NeumannMorgenstern utilities.

speed of communications may make the difference between winning a battle and losing

one—or it may greatly affect the number of

casualties suffered in a battle without deciding victory. In some cases satellites provide

capabilities that could not be obtained in any

other way —e.g., surveillance of areas which

would otherwise be closed to our observation,

or providing very early warning of enemy missile launches. In other cases, satellites provide

a cheaper and easier way of of doing something that could be accomplished by other

means-e. g., trans-Atlantic communications.

Then there are the navigation satellites, which

provide an added degree of precision which

may be critical in some applications and only

of marginal utility in others.

In a few special cases, satellites contribute

to a military mission the objectives or requirements of which can be quantified, as can,

therefore, the value of the support provided

by satellites. For example, the use of navigation satellites may improve the accuracy with

which certain munitions are delivered, thereby

reducing wastage of munitions. If so, then the

effectiveness of the munitions used would be

“multiplied” by satellite support—they would

be as effective as a larger number of munitions

delivered without the assistance of navigation

satellites. The effectiveness of munitions delivery systems would be similarly multiplied.

For missions such as this, it is reasonable to

think of satellites as “force multipliers, ” and

the factor by which the forces are multiplied

can in principle be used to assess the value of

the satellite. This has led some analysts to assess the significance of anti-satellite weapons

in terms of the additional forces which the

United States would have to procure to maintain military capability if it could not use

MILSATs–or could not rely on their availability—in a conflict severe enough to justify

Soviet ASAT use.

33
34

However, in assessing the importance of

ASATS, it maybe more important to consider

the dependence of military capabilities on

space systems. If space system support suddenly becomes unavailable to a force element

which has become accustomed to it, the combat effectiveness of that force element maybe

reduced to lower than it was before it began

using space system support. Its effectiveness

will be reduced to a fraction of what it was

with space system support; the smaller this

fraction, the greater the force element’s dependence on space support.

There is a trend in both the United States

and the U.S.S.R. to use increasingly sophisticated satellites to perform more functions and

to do so more capably. It is generally believed

that because of its sophisticated and still advancing space technology and because of the

global distribution of its interests, commitments, and forces, the United States derives

considerable utility from space system support: without satellites, performance of many

military missions would become impossible,

and performance of others would require large

increases in the unit strengths of various U.S.

force elements. Other force elements probably

derive negligible force multiplication from

space support. In general, however, the utility of military satellites to both the United

States and the Soviet Union is probably increasing. 3 It is also generally believed that because of the expense of other means of providing comparable support to these forces, the

United States has not vigorously developed

alternative means of support and has consequently become highly dependent on space

system support.4

Whether the United States derives more

military utility from space system support

than does the Soviet Union probably cannot

be answered in general terms,5 although force

3See, e.g., Stephen M. Meyer, “Soviet Military Programs and

the ‘New High Ground ’,” Sm”val, %pt./Oct. 1983, pp. 204-215.

‘Ibid.

‘According to accepted (e.g., Von Neumann-Morgernstern)

axioms of utility theory, utility cannot be assessed in absolute

terms but only to within an affine transformation; hence interpersonal or international comparisons of utility are not justifiable in general. See, e.g., Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of

Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 288n,

and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 90.

multiplication of particular types of force elements has been estimated in several studies.e

Insofar as such estimates are comparable,

judgments of comparative space support differ. Such differences may attributable, in part,

to exclusion from the scope of some studies,

for reasons of security classification, of consideration of some types of satellites which are

of great value to the United States but for

which the U.S.S.R. has no counterpart or from

which the U.S.S.R. might derive much less

utility. The utility of some functions of such

satellites may be unquantifiable in any case,

and this may lead to their neglect in quantitative assessments of utility.

It is easier to argue that the United States

is more dependent on space system support

for performing important military functions

than is the Soviet Union,7 because the Soviet

Union has less need for some types of space

system support and more alternative terrestrial means of providing similar support [see

table 3-l]. Moreover, the Soviet Union has

‘Force multiplication, in those cases where it is meaningful

and can be assessed, can be assessed in absoluti terms and compared between nations.

‘Just as international comparison of utility is unjustifiable

in principle, international comparison of dependence on space

systems is also unjustifiable, if dependence is defined as the

loss in utility which it would suffer if its satellites were suddenly incapacitated. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the United

States is more dependent on MI LSATS to perform important

military functions than is the Soviet Union, even though the

value of these functions cannot be easily quantified.

Table 3“1.—Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet

Space System Need and Use

Asymmetry United States Soviet Union

MILSAT reliability . . . . . (+) High (–) Lower

MILSAT endurance . . . . (+) Long (–) Shorter

Launch rate. . . . . . . . . . . (–) Low (+) High

Stockpile of spare

MI LSATS . . . . . . . . . . . (–) Low ( +

C

3 requirements . . . . . . . (–) Global and (+

oceanic

Terrestrial C3

alternatives (relative

to requirements) . . . . . (–) Few ( +

Terrestrial alternatives

for information

collection (relative to

Higher

Continental

and littoral

More

requirements) . . . . . . . (–) Few (+) More

Operational ASAT

capability . . . . . . . . . . . (–) No (+) Yes

ASAT altitude reach . . . (–) Low (+) Higher

ASAT responsiveness . . (+) High (–) Low
35

greater capability to reconstitute satellites

which provide such support in case they are

lost in action, hence even to the extent the Soviet Union is dependent on space system support, it is less dependent on individual satellites for some functions.

Force Application

Satellites have also been used to provide destructive capabilities. For example, since 1968

the U.S.S.R. has tested a coorbital interceptor—a satellite which could be used to intercept and destroy other satellites. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that the Soviet

Union attained an operational anti-satellite capability with this weapon in 1971.* Although

to date there has been little testing and apparently no long-term basing or actual use of

weapons in orbit, there is increasing technological potential to do so and, in the United

States, increasing overt interest in doing so.

In particular, there is strong interest in the

United States in using space-based (i.e., satellite) weapons for defensive missions, especially ballistic missile defense and air defense.

Satellites could also provide destructive capabilities in support of other missions. Public Soviet statements have indicated a decreasing interest—indeed, growing opposition—to

space-based weapons, although such statements have been interpreted by some in the

West as disingenuous and propagandistic, intended for political gain and strategic deception. g

Nonmilitary Functions Contributing to

National Security

Satellites are also used for nonmilitary applications which contribute to national secuY.J.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 4th cd.,

Apr. 1985, p. 55. According to analysts of the Congressional

Research Service, the U.S.S.R. has also tested a fractional-orbit

bombardment system (FOBS), and possibly also a multipk+orbit

bombgrdrnent system (MOBS), which could employ sateMtes

to bombard terrestrial targets with nuclear warheads W.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,

Science Policy Research Division, Soviet &ace Programs, 1971-

1975, Committee Print prepared for the U.S. Senate, C%mrnittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976].

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency,

Soviet Mih”tary Space Doctrine, report DDB-1400-16-84, Aug.

1, 1984 [UNCLASSIFIED].

rity, such as monitoring compliance with arms

control agreements 10 and collecting data ‘o r

scientific research which could improve future

military capabilities.

Current and Projected MILSAT

Capabilities

Important asymmetries exist between the

space systems of the United States and the

Soviet Union and between the ways in which

these systems would be employed [see table

3-l]. However, simple comparisons of U.S. and

Soviet space systems can be misleading. The

Soviet Union has an operational ASAT weapon, the United States does not. Yet, the U.S.

ASAT, if developed, will be more capable and

versatile than the Soviet ASAT. U.S. satellites

are more sophisticated, more reliable, and capable of performing more functions than their

Soviet counterparts. Yet, the Soviet’s rapid

launch capability and policy of maintaining

spares would allow them to reconstitute some

space assets during a conflict. *1

These factors are further modified by the

different roles that satellites or ASAT weapons would play in different theaters of war at

different levels of conflict. Soviet forces are de

ployed largely on the Eurasion land mass, and

would, in many scenarios, be able to rely on

terrestrial communication and information

links. In many’of the same scenarios, satellite

communications would be critical to globally

deployed U.S. forces which might lack the

same terrestrial communication links. Even in

peacetime, the United States relies heavily on

surveillance satellites to monitor Soviet compliance with arms control agreements by monitoring Soviet activities which could not be

monitored by other lawful means, although

similar activities in the United States would

be readily observable by Soviet personnel k+

gaily in the country.

‘OLes Aspiu “The Verification of the SALT II Agreement, ”

Scientific American, vol. 240, No. 2, February 1979, pp. 38-45.

“president Ronald Reagan, Report to the Congress: U.S. PoJ

icy on ASA T Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984 ~NCLASSIFIED].
36

Soviet MILSAT Capabilities

The Soviet Union currently uses satellites

to perform missile launch detection, communications relaying, radionavigation, meteorological surveillance, photographic and radar

reconnaissance, collection of electronic intelligence (ELINT: e.g., radar emissions), and

other functions.12 These functions support a

variety of military applications. Of particular

concern to the Administration and in Congressl$ are:

. . . present and projected Soviet space systems which, while not weapons themselves,

are designed to support directly the U. S. S.R. ’S

terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict.

These include ocean reconnaissance satellites

which use radar and electronic intelligence in

efforts to provide targeting data to Soviet

weapon14 platforms which can quickly attack

U.S. and allied surface fleets. In view of the

fundamental importance of U.S. and Allied

access to the seas in wartime, including for

Allied reinforcement by sea, the protection

of U.S. and allied navies against such targeting is critical.ls

Soviet ELINT ocean reconnaissance satellites (EORSATS) attempt to detect, localize,

and classify ships by detecting the radio signals emitted by their communications and radar systems, while Soviet radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATS) attempt to

detect, localize, and classify ships by detecting radar “echoes” reflected by the ships.

RORSATS and EORSATS are typically deployed at altitudes of about 250 and 425 kilometers, respectively, in nearly circular orbits inclined about 650 with respect to the equatorial

plane [see figure 3-1 and table 3-2] From these

altitudes, these satellites can observe shipping

IZ1bid., pp. T ~d 12; and U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of

Naval Operations, Understanding Sow”et Naval Developments,

4th cd., NAVSO P-3560 (Rev. 1/81), Jan. 1981 IUNCLASSIFIED], p. 46.

‘

sHearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Cou’ttee on Armed Serw”ces Um”ted

States Senate, Testimony on Space Defense Matters in Review

of the FY1985 Defense Authorization Bill, S. Hrg 98-724, Pt.

7, pp. 3568-3569.

“Specifically, anti-ship cruise missiles launched against U.S.

surface ships: see U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Mfi”tmy

Power, 3d cd., 1984; p. 41.

“Reagan, op. cit.

over a limited range. The observation “swath’

of each satellite will eventually cover the entire earth and ocean surface between latitudes

of about 650 north and south. If only one or

two RORSATS or EORSATS were operational

at one time—as has been customary in peacetime–then a ship in this latitude band would

be exposed to observation only intermittently.l g However, larger numbers of RORSATS or EORSATS could be operational during wartime.

Even if only intermittent, surveillance by

RORSATS or EORSATS could assist Soviet

forces in targeting Allied shipping to an extent dependent on details of satellite capabilities, such as resolution. For example, Soviet

oceanographic radar satellites of the Kosmos1500 class can obtain radar imagery with a

resolution of only 1.5 to 2 kilometers [see figure 3-2], which is inadequate to distinguish an

aircraft carrier from a tanker, for example.17

Various countermeasures could be used by

ships to evade observation by these satellites

or to reduce the value of their observations to

the enemy; la some of these are discussed below, in the section entitled “The Role and

Value of Anti-Satellite Capabilities. ”

U.S. MILSAT Capabilities

The United States uses MILSATS to perform most of the functions performed by Soviet satellites, as well as some other functions.

. —

W!ompare the discussion of radar search satellites in I14X lkfissile Basing, OTA report OTA-ISC-140, September 1981.

ITIn 1983 the ~viet Union launched a Cid Ocean-surveillance

satellite (Kosmos 1500) equipped with a side-looking radar and

in the same year placed two satellites (Venera 15 and Venera

16) equipped with similar radar systems into orbits around VE+

nus. The U.S.S.R, has exhibited radar imagery obtained by

these satellites. Although the resolution of this radar imagery

is poor compared to the 25-meter resolution imagery obtained

by NASA’s Seasat-A radar satellite in 1978 [see Figure 76B

of U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, hZX Missile Basing, OTA-ISG140, Sept. 1981], the 40-meter resolution

imagery obtained by NASA’s experimental Shuttle Imaging

Radar (SIR-A) device in 1982 [see figure 3-3], or the 25-meter

resolution imagery obtained by NASA’s experimental Shuttle

Imaging Radar (SIR-A) device in 1984, Soviet satellite radar

technology can be expected to improve, and synthetic aperture

radar could be used on future satellites.

“Reagan, op. cit., p. 13. See also testimony of VADM Gordon R. Nagler, USN, before the HAC Subcommittee on Defense,

Mar. 23, 1983.
37 ———— —

Figure 3.1 .—Ground Track of Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite

600 inclination

160-170 nmi altitude

1.5-1.6 hr period

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Table 3“2.—Orbits of Some Soviet Military Satellites U.S. satellites are designed to have longer

Per[gee-Apogee operational lifetimes in orbit than Soviet sat-

(km) (km) Inclination Apparent mission ●

ellites, hence fewer satellite launches per year

35,785-35,785 0 communications are required to perform similar functions. The

19,000-19,200 65 navigation complexity of a U.S. satellite may differ from

965-1,020 47 communications that of a Soviet satellite performing the same 940-960 83 meteorological

855-895 81 meteorologyical function, and the value of this function to the

790-810 74 communications United States may differ from its value to the

620-660 81 electronic lntelligence

(ELI NT)

U.S.S.R.

425-445 65 ELINT ocean reconnaissance

(RORSAT)

760-40,000 6 3 launch detection

400-40,000 6 3 communicatlons

356-415 73 photo- reconnaissancea

250-265 65 radar ocean reconnaissance

(RORSAT)

172-351 67 photo-reconnaissance b

———. . — aManeUVerab}e ]nltlaj parameters for Kosmos 1499 91ven

bManeuverab~e Inltlal parameters for Kosmos 1454 glve~

SOURCES NASA Sa/e///fe S~fuaf[on Report VOI 24 No 5 Dec 31 1984 and

“ Nicholas L Johnson The Sov/et Year In Space 7983 (Colorado

S~r!ngs CO Teledyne Brown Eng(neerlng 1984)

Attack Warning.-The United States uses infrared sensors aboard satellites in geostationary orbit to detect and promptly report ICBM

and SLBM launches; these reports would provide early warning of a missile attack. 19

“U.S. Dep~rtment of Defense, Report of the Secretar~ of Defense Caspar 1$”. W’ehberger to the Congress on the FY 1985

13udget, F}r 1986 Authorization Request, and FY 1985-89 Defense Programs, Feb. 1, 1984 IUNCI,ASSIFIEDL p. 196.
38

Figure 3-2.- Radar Imagery From Kosmos 1500

.

. ,

Left, imagery of Atlantic Ocean waves obtained by

the Soviet Kosmos 1500 Oceanographic Research

Satellite in 1983:

SOURCE: Photographs courtesy of Aviation Week and Space Technology (reprinted by permission)

Navigation and Detection of Nuclear Detonations.—U.S. NAVSTAR satellites carry radionavigation beacons for use by Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers on aircraft,

ships, and land vehicles. They also carry Integrated Operational Nuclear Detonation Detection System (IONDS) sensors designed to

detect nuclear detonations in order to monitor compliance with the Limited Test Ban

Treaty and other treaties in peacetime. In wartime they could be used to confirm a nuclear

attack on the United States or its allies in order to support a decision by the National Command Authorities to retaliate, and to assess

the success of a retaliatory strike.20

‘“Ibid.
39

Command and Control Communications.—The

United States also uses several different military and commercial communications satellites to provide command and control communications among its globally distributed forces.

An advanced satellite communications system

called MILSTAR has been designed to replace

these and is intended to provide survivable

and enduring command and control communications to all four services at all levels of conflict, including general nuclear war.”

Meteorological Surveillance.–Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) meteorological surveillance satellites provide timely

information about weather conditions worldwide. This information is of considerable value

in planning military operations, especially

flight operations.

Compliance Monitoring.–Photoreconnaissance satellites are used to monitor compliance

with arms control treaties and agreements;

this function could not be performed as well

by any alternative means which is politically

acceptable in peacetime, and this function

would be unnecessary during war with another

party to such treaties, which would be suspended during such a war. However, in wartime the United States would attempt to collect intelligence using satellites’z and other

means, such as aircraft overflight, which are

acceptable during wartime.

“The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense,

Annual Report to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY

1985 Authorization Request, and FY 1984-88 Defense Programs, Feb. 1, 1983 [UNCLASSIFIED].

“The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security PoIicy, has stated:

W’e believe that this Soviet anti-satellite capability is effective against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit, that

in wartime we would have to face the possibility, indeed the

likelihood, that critical assets of the United States would be destroyed by .Soviet antisatellite :~stems. If, in wartime, the

Soviet Union were to attack crltlcal satellites upon which our

knowledge of the unfolding conventional war depended, . . . we

would ha~’e little choice but . to deter continuing attacks on

our eyes and ears, without which we could not hope to prosecute successfully a conventional war,

[Hearings before the Subcomrm”ttee on Strategic and Theater NucJear Forces of the Com”ttee on Armed Services Um”ted

States Senate, Testimon-v on Space Defense Matters in Review

of the FYI 985 Defense A uthorizati’on Bill, S.Hrg. 98-724, Pt.

7., Mar. 15, 1984, p, 3452. ]

Possible Advanced-Technology

MILSAT Capabilities

Recent and prospective technological advances could be exploited by both the United

States and the U.S.S.R.–at different rates–to

develop MILSATS which could perform those

functions now performed by MILSATS more

effectively or economically. Such improvements are possible in the performance of each

of the functions mentioned. Of particular interest and concern are possible marked improvements in ocean surveillance, logistic

support of space systems, and anti-satellite capability which appear technologically feasible.

For example, radar ocean surveillance satellites using synthetic aperture radar techniques could provide radar imagery of sufficient resolution to permit classification of

ships. An example of the potential quality of

radar imagery is provided by the radar imagery obtained by the Shuttle Imaging Radar

system SIR-A in 1981 [see figure 3-3]. The synthetic aperture radar carried by SIR-A distinguished features as small as 40 meters across.

Earlier, in 1978, NASA’s Seasat-A demonstrated a resolution of 25 meters; more recently, in 1984, SIR-B demonstrated a comparable resolution. Even finer resolution is

possible, and several satellites could be deployed at once to provide frequent opportunities to observe each point on the ocean surface. [Deploying such satellites at higher

altitudes for greater coverage would greatly

increase the power required and hence also satellite cost.] Both the United States and the

U.S.S.R. could deploy radar ocean surveillance

satellites using high-resolution synthetic aperture radar technology in the future. Soviet deployment of radar ocean surveillance satellites

with improved performance would threaten

U.S. and allied shipping to a greater extent

than does the existing RORSAT and would

provide the United States with a greater incentive to maintain, or, if necessary, develop

an A SAT capability to destroy such satellites

or otherwise interfere with their performance.

Future EORSAT performance could also be

improved. With regard to the threat posed by
40

. —

such Soviet MILSATS to U.S. and allied shipping, the Administration has expressed concern

that “as Soviet military space technology improves, the capabilities of Soviet satellites that

can be used for targeting are likely to be enhanced and represent a greater threat to U.S.

and allied security. ”23

The logistic support and anti-satellite capabilities of space systems could also be enhanced greatly in the future. Potential future

‘ ‘Reagan, op. cit., p. ‘i. See also testimony of VAI)M Gordon

R. Nagler, USN, hefore the IIAC Subcommittee on Defense,

Nlar. 23, 1983.

ASAT capabilities are discussed in chapter 4

of this report.

Recent and prospective technological advances could also be exploited to enable future

MILSATS to perform functions not now performed by MILSATS. For example, the United

States could develop and deploy space surveillance satellites to detect and track foreign satellites. This capability could be used to detect

impending attacks on U.S. or allied satellites

in time to permit countermeasures to be used;

it could confirm success of such attacks in order to support a decision to retaliate (not necessarily in kind); it could monitor compliance

with possible future ASAT arms control or

“Rules of the Road in Space” agreements; and

it could provide targeting information for U.S.

anti-satellite weapons. Space surveillance satellites could provide continuous space object

detection and tracking capabilities which cannot be duplicated by ground-based radars

(which have limited search range) and photographic or electro-optical sensors (which cannot be used in daytime or through overcast).

The United States and the U.S.S.R. could

also develop satellite (i.e., space-based) weapons capable of attacking a variety of targets

other than satellites—e.g., ballistic missiles,

aircraft, ships, and fixed or mobile targets on

land.24 Assessment of the military capabilities

which such weapons might eventually be able

to provide requires an understanding of the

feasibility of making them survivable at affordable costs and is beyond the scope of this

report, which is limited to survivability issues.

The feasibility and value of space-based ballistic missile defense system components–

including weapons—is discussed in a companion OTA report, Ballistic Missile Defense

Technologies.

The Value of Military Satellites

Estimation of the force multiplication effects which satellites might provide under specific circumstances might be done objectively,

by means of combat modeling and simulation,

“LTC David I.upton, USAF (Ret.), op. cit., pp. 36-47.
and analysis of historical combat data. The

costs of the additional ‘‘equivalent forces’

which the satellite services would, in effect, replace might be used as an upper bound on the

value of the satellites under those circumstances. However, the expected utility, or

worth, of such force multiplication cannot determined by such an analysis without assuming probabilities that the forces supported will

be involved in various conflict situations, estimating the force multiplication expected in

each such situation and the additional costs

averted by such force multiplication, and

averaging these averted costs over all such

situations. This would be a demanding, and

probably infeasible, analytical task, because

assessment of such values and probabilities

is necessarily subjective and hence subject to

dispute. However, some judgments of value

are conventionally accepted and can be rationalized to a considerable extent.

For example, the missile attack warning

function performed by U.S. MII.SATs has

been described as being of “vital’ importance

to national security. ” The navigation and nuclear detonation detection functions performed

by the GPS and IONDS mission packages

aboard NAVSTAR satellites have been described as “critical,” as has the communications function to be performed by MILSTAR

and currently performed by a variety of satellites [see box entitled “The Dependence of

U.S. Command and Control Performance on

Satellite Communications Systems’’ ].” Surveillance satellites have been described as

“criticaI assets, “27 and the surveillance function which they perform has been called “vi- tal.‘ ’28

Other satellites are seldom judged to be of

importance comparable to those aforementioned, although some are of considerable

value. For example, after DMSP cloud imagery and DMSP-derived forecasts were made

available to aircraft carriers operating in

Southeast Asia, sorties of carrier-based aircraft scheduled for strike and reconnaissance

missions which required clear weather in the

target area were canceled when meteorological data from DMSP satellites showed overcast in the target area, and the aircraft which

had been assigned to the canceled sorties were

reassigned to other missions. This use of

DMSP data decreased the number of aircraft

required to perform a number of assigned missions in a given time, or, equivalently, increased the number of aircraft available to fly

such missions.

As another example, the navigational accuracy of missiles and aircraft which rely on

very accurate, unaided inertial navigation systems depends on geopotential anomaly data

collected by geophysical research satellites.

Some of the functions performed by satellites, and the satellites which perform them,

are most valuable in peacetime, while others

would be more important in crisis, conventional war, or nuclear war. However, determination of the nature of the dependence of

satellite value on the level of conflict is complicated by the fact that in many cases the

critical U. S, sat ellites in relat, ik’el~’ low orhit, that in wartime

we would ha~’e to face the possibility’, incfwxf the likelihood, that

critical assets of the on it ed States would he dest rolred b)’ So-

\’iet anti- sat[lllite sj’stems. ---Statement of l’he I lonor:ihl[

Richard f]erle, Assistant Secretary” of I)efensc ( 1 nternati{)nal

Securit~’ I)oliq), Hearings hefore the Suhcommit tfw on Str;Itegic and Theater Aiuclear Forces of the [’on]mit tet’ on .Armed

.Ser\riceL9 ( lnited States Senate. Testin]on.)r on .Space llefen.se

hfatters in fle~’ieu of the F>”] 985 L)efense .4u[horizatjon Bill,

Klar, 15, 1984, S, Ilrg. 98-724, Pt. i’, p. 3452.

2“The l+onorahle I lans hl ark, then SecretarJr of the .4ir Force,

in test imon}” in 1980 hearings before the U.S. Congress, 1+ ouse

( )f 1{ eprc,w~n t at i ~c~, (’ommittet’ on Science and “1’echnolo~~,

Stat f~d that ‘‘ two missions [strategic missile warning arrci surt’t’illan((~j al)oi(~ al] {)ther-s stand out as }~~in~ of \’i tal inlport :incf~ t () national sf’curit J. [ ( ‘nitd St at(Is (’i\’ iJian Spa(v I’olic’,~, 1 IOUS(J I )(KU rnf’nt 15;1, !Mt h (Tong., Yd s[~ss,, ,Jul I’ 2324,

I :W(}: pp. 9:)-WI\.
42

The Dependence of U.S. Command and Control Performance on

Satellite Communications Systems

It has been estimated that about 70 percent of all U.S. military electronic communications are

routed through communications satellites.1 In peacetime, much of such traffic consists of administrative messages which would be unessential to the conduct of war. Therefore, the dependence of

U.S. military capabilities on satellite communication systems, although undoubtedly substantial,

is not necessarily represented accurately by the fraction of message traffic routed through satellites during peacetime. The dependence of U.S. military capabilities in several theaters on satellite

communication systems is reflected qualitatively in the following views of military commanders

and staff analysts.

Command and Control in the Southwest Asian Theater.–The dependence of command and control within the Southwest Asian theater and between that theater and the continental United States

on satellite communications systems has been noted by Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston,

USA (Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force):

. . . the challenge is to establish and maintain strategic communications upward, necessary linkages laterally, and tactical communications downward. Strategic connectivity in the [Southwest Asian] region is

limited today. The backbone of the Defense Communications System cannot be accessed directly except

by satellite or HF over long distances. The FLTSAT and DSCS II systems support this need for all the

services. DSCS 111, the follow-on satellite, will soon be launched with a new booster. The HF programs,

however, especially in the anti-jamming arena, need better interoperability. At present, limited HF links

must transmit beyond optimum distances to reach DCA entry points and are subject to frequent atmospheric interruptions.2

Command and Control in the Pacific Theater.–Similar concern has been expressed by Lieutenant

General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA (Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Pacific) about the dependence

of command and control within the Pacific theater and between that theater and the continental

United States on satellite communications systems:

A critical problem is the Pacific area’s heavy reliance on satellite and undersea cable systems. The Soviet Union’s demonstrated ability to destroy satellites has made it urgent to implement countermeasures and modernize backup high frequency systems so we can deploy at least minimum essential communications. s

Command and Control in the European Theater.–Command and control between the European

theater and the continental United States depends on similar means which are similarly vulnerable. Command and control within the European theater depends less on satellite communications,

for reasons noted by Major General Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF (then Assistant Chief of Staff,

Studies and Analyses, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force):

It is interesting to watch a simulated war-game exercise in the central region of Europe when the

communications circuits are removed to simulate loss or destruction. The German Post Office telephone

system is used to contact another command center when the military primary lines are down.4

‘Colonel Robert B. Giffen, US Space System Survivabih”ty: Stretegic Alternatives for the 1990s, National Security Affairs Monograph

Series 82s4 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Fort Leslie J. McNsir, 1982), pp. 22-23.

*Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, USA, “C$I and the Rapid Deployment Force, ” Worldwide Deployment of Tactical Forces and

the OZ Connection, Pr oceedings of the National Security Issues 1982 Symposium, Oct. 4-5, 1982, MITRE Corp. document M82-64, 1982.

%ieutenant General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA, “Pacific Command Perspectives, ” Worldwide Deployment of Tactical Forces and the

01 Connection, Proceedings of the National Security Issues 1982 Symposium, Oct. 4-5, 1982, MITRE Corp. document M82-64, 1982.

‘Major General Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF, “Satisfying C’I Requirements for Deployed Air Forces, ” Worldwide Deployment of Tactical

Forces and the (Y1 Connection, Proceedings of the National Security Issues 1982 Symposium, Oct. 4-5, 1982, MITRE Corp. document M82-

64, 1982.
43

value of a function performed by a satellite

may be realized at a later time and at a different–probably higher-level of conflict than

that at which the function was performed.

For example, missile attack warning data

would be most valuable during a nonnuclear

war, when anticipation of such an attack

would be most intense and when it would be

most important to be reassured that the nation is not under attack when such is indeed

the case. Once the United States has confirmed that it has been so attacked, or is under attack, or decides to retaliate for a nonnuclear attack by Warsaw Pact forces against

NATO allies, further warning information

would be of value only if additional salvos were

expected, as in “nuclear war-fighting” scenarios.

As another example, the value of geopotential anomaly data collected by satellite might

be greatest during nuclear war, although to

be of value then such data must have been collected and analyzed-a lengthy process–

during peacetime.

The problem of assessing the values of MILSAT capabilities and ASAT capabilities will

be discussed in greater detail in appendix D

to this report.

The Vulnerability and Protection of

Military Space Systems

The value of MILSAT functions performed

during wartime can be realized only if MILSATS survive long enough to perform them.

Most current MILSATS are vulnerable to deliberate nuclear or nonnuclear attack, and

some are vulnerable to nondestructive electronic countermeasures and electro-optical

countermeasures. However, only a few U.S.

MILSATS are potentially vulnerable to current Soviet nonnuclear A SAT weapons, and

these could be made less so.

Satellites operate as components of space

systems, which include terrestrial components

such as satellite control facilities and user terminals (the “ground segment”) as well as the

satellites themselves (the “space segment”).

Attacks against either segment can disrupt

the functioning of a military space system and

negate or reverse the force enhancement it pro

vides. Hence both MILSATS and their associated ground equipment must be effectively

protected against attack if the value of their

wartime functions is to be realized. Technical

measures—i.e., active and passive countermeasures—can provide some protection by reducing the MILSAT vulnerability, and legal

measures—i.e., arms control treaties treaty or

customary law banning threatening activities

in space—can provide some protection by constraining ASAT capabilities which could be

used against MILSATS. Arms control measures could be used in combination with passive countermeasures to constrain potential

ASAT threats and reduce vulnerability to

those which would remain. However, some

arms control measures would be incompatible

with some active countermeasures, such as

shoot-back with ASAT weapons.

U.S. responses to current and future ASAT

threats need not be limited to legally constraining such threats and protecting and

defending satellites from those which remain.

Other possible responses include deterrence of

ASAT attack by maintaining a capability to

retaliate (not necessarily in kind), using nondestructive electronic countermeasures and

electro-optica.1 countermeasures against the

space and ground segments of A SAT systems,

attacking the ground segment of ASAT systems, augmenting other forces to compensate

for MILSAT vulnerability, and reducing dependence on MILSATS.

[Technical countermeasures are discussed in

greater detail in chapter 4 of this report, and

arms control and other legal measures are discussed in chapters 5 and 6. In practice, passive countermeasures, and probably active

countermeasures as well, would be used in conjunction with arms control; such combinations

of arms control and technical countermeasures

are discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 of

this report.]
44

THE ROLE AND VALUE OF ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIE S

To the extent that enemy MILSATS could

increase the effectiveness of enemy forces, capabilities to damage such MILSATS or to degrade their functioning would be valuable in

wartime. In addition to such destructive and

nondestructive ASAT capabilities, other options are available to reduce the utility of MILSATS to an enemy or to compensate for their

disutility to the United States.

Electronic and electro-optical countermeasures can be used to provide nondestructive

ASAT capabilities which could be used at any

level of conflict. They would be particularly

valuable during crises short of declared war,

in which satellite destruction would be escalator and hence in many cases undesirable.

“Active” electronic countermeasures such as

“jamming” (i.e., overloading enemy receivers

with strong signals) and “spoofing” (i.e., sending deceptive signals) could be used to interfere with satellite functioning, as could such

active electro-optical countermeasures as temporary blinding (or “dazzling”: the optical

counterpart to jamming ) and spoofing. Suc h

nondestructive ASAT measures are discussed

in chapter 4 of this report.

At higher levels of conflict, ASAT weapons

could be used to destroy enemy satellites. The

inherent ASAT capabilities of nuclear weapons such as ICBMS and SLBMS could be used

for negation of low-altitude MILSATS at nuclear levels of conflict, while at nonnuclear

levels of conflict the inherent ASAT capabilities of the experimental nonnuclear ABM

technologies demonstrated in Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) tests could be used for

low-altitude MILSAT negation, as could the

U.S. Air Force’s Miniature Vehicle ASAT

weapon, when operational. Negation of satellites at higher altitudes or more rapid negation of low-altitude satellites would require

more capable ASAT weapons such as are discussed in chapter 4 of this report.

Alternatively, or supplementally, various

passive measures could be used in peacetime,

crisis, and war not to interfere with the functioning of enemy MILSATS but rather to decrease the value of their functions to the

enemy and, more importantly, to mitigate or

compensate for the harm such satellites could

cause the United States. Intelligence-gathering satellites may be particularly susceptible

to such measures. For example, terrestrial

force elements might employ maneuver to

avoid observation by enemy imaging satellites, and they could use camouflage and concealment to prevent recognition if observed.

Decoys which would also be “recognized” erroneously could be used to thwart image interpretation by causing confusion as to the numbers and locations of the assets simulated by

the decoys. Ships, aircraft, and other assets

might be designed to reflect radar signals only

weakly in order to evade detection by radar

satellites, and radio silence might be practiced,

or covert signaling techniques used, in order

to prevent detection of radio emissions by satellites. Of course, these passive measures

would impose either operational constraints

or financial costs or both.

Still other options are available to compensate for, rather than mitigate, the harm which

foreign MILSATS could cause to U.S. and allied security. For example, to the extent that

foreign MILSATS provide a force multiplier

effect to foreign force elements which engage

in direct combat, U.S. or allied force elements

which might oppose these foreign force elements might be augmented in order to maintain relative combat strength. That is, force

augmentation could offset the force multiplication provided to enemy forces by space support. Force augmentation would be costly, but

not necessarily more costly than an ASAT capability of comparable security benefit.

These possible responses to threatening

MILSAT capabilities are summarized in table 3-3. These response options would be more

effective used in combination rather than individually.

Assessment of the value of ASAT capability is subject to the same methodological

difficulties which confound assessment of the

value of MILSAT capability .29 These prob- —. ————

*’The value of a U.S. ASAT capability to the United States

in a conflict could be assumed to be equal in magnitude to the
45

Table 3-3.—Possible Responses to

Enemy MILSAT Capabilities

●

●

●

●

Force augmentation

—offsets force multiplication by MILSATS

Passive measures against satellite reconnaissance and

targeting

— Evasion

—Concealment

—Camouflage

—Decoys

—Radio/radar silence

—Covert communications techniques

Nondestructive anti-satellite measures

—Electronic countermeasures

 Jamming

● Spoofing

—Electro-optical countermeasures

● Jammin g

● Spoofing

Destructive anti-satellite measures

—Use inherent ASAT capabilities of ICBMS, SLBMS,

and ABMs

—Develop deliberate ASAT weapons

lems, noted above, are discussed in greater detail in appendix D to this report. Although

quantification of the value of ASAT capability is necessarily subjective or complicated, or

both, it is clear that operational ASAT capabilities would have some value to the extent

that they would be inexpensive, stabilizing,

and compatible with other (e.g., diplomatic) options for enhancing security.

[negative] total value to the Um”ted States of those enemy MILSATS which it would be expected to destroy. No analytically

sophisticated studies known to OTA have attempted to systematically assess and compare the utility of U.S. MILSATS to

the United States with the disutility of Soviet MILSATS to

the United States but compare Stephen M. Meyer, op. cit., pp.

204-215]. It is these utilities which should be compared to determine whether the United States would fare better in a regime in which U.S. and Soviet MILSATS were mutually vulnerable to the other’s ASAT weapons or in a regime in which

U.S. and Soviet MILSATS were protected from A SAT threats

by active or passive countermeasures or arms control.

MILITARY SPACE POLIC Y

Military Space Policy Issues

The fundamental task of military space policy formulation is deciding how much proposed military space programs are worth, both

in terms of the resources for which they would

compete with other proposed national programs, and in terms of opportunity costs

which might be incurred by failing to take

other actions (e.g., arms control) with which

such programs are incompatible for nonbudge

tary (e.g., legal) reasons. Because the costs,

risks, and benefits differ in character, a political determination of levels at which military

space efforts should be pursued is required.30

Prerequisite for this is the task of deciding

the relative values of proposed military space

systems, anti-satellite systems, and arms control agreements; judgment of these values also

requires political choice.31

30 Representative of Such determinations are the annual

lwdgets prepared by the executive branch and funds authorized and appropriated by Congress.

“Representative of such determinations are President

Carter’s Presidential Directive 37 (PD-37) issued in June 1978,

President Reagan’s July 4, 1982, statement on National Space

Policy, and President Reagan’s Report to the Congress: U.S.

Policy on ASAT Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984,

ASAT Policy Issues

Particularly apparent is the incompatibility

between ASAT capabilities and ASAT arms

control agreements; these would have different kinds of benefits and risks, and a decision

to pursue one or the other must be based on

a political judgement of their respective expected net benefits. A national ASATpolicy

reflects such a judgement and should attempt

to establish goals for national efforts to enhance security by the chosen approach. In particular, a national ASAT policy should:

1.

2.

3.

describe military posture objectives; it

should attempt to answer the question:

“What ASAT capabilities do we need,

and why?”

indicate the extent to which pursuit of

security by the chosen approach would

probably benefit from increased spending

in various areas of research and technology development, so that national research and development policy might be

formulated cognizant of these potential

benefits.

establish ASA T arms contro]policy; i.e.,

it should indicate types of arms control
46

4.

provisions or agreed confidence-building

measures which are judged to be in the

national interest, in order to coordinate

formulation of negotiating postures, in

particular, and foreign policy in general;32

and

specify U.S. ASAT employment policy;

i.e., it should specify conditions under

which U.S. use of ASAT capabilities—

especially in conflicts short of declared

war-would be deemed justifiable and in

the national interest. In addition, if we de

sire to deter Soviet ASAT attacks, we

must arrive at and announce a public policy which we believe will make this deterrence as effective as possible. Whether

this policy should be explicit or instead

one of calculated ambiguity is a matter

of political judgment.

Ballistic Missile Defense as

an ASAT Policy Issue

The incompatibility between ballistic missile defense capabilities and ASAT arms control agreements is apparent. Ballistic missile

defense weapons which would be capable of attacking ballistic missile components in space

generally would have some inherent capability to attack satellites at altitudes or ranges

comparable to those at which ballistic missile

components would be engaged, depending on

satellite “hardness.” The inherent ASAT capabilities of some possible advanced-technology BMD weapons would be considerable,

and any arms control agreement which would

attempt to limit the threat of such weapons

to satellites must ban or limit such weapons.

Hence a restrictive ASAT arms control agree-

‘

zRepresentative of such a policy is President Reagan’s Report to the Congress: U.S. Poficy on ASATArms Control, delivered Mar. 31, 1984.

ment would also restrict BMD capabilities,

just as the ABM Treaty-which limits, by intent, weapons capable of attacking ballistic

missiles-also limits ASAT weapons with inherent BMD capability. Of all the opportunity

costs which might be imposed on the United

States by an agreement to limit ASAT capabilities, restrictions on the development and

deployment of BMD capabilities beyond those

already imposed by the ABM Treaty are considered most costly by those who believe that

exploitation of advanced technology may

make possible BMD weapons of great effectiveness.

A more fundamental incompatibility between ASAT and BMD capabilities is physical rather than legal: the most capable BMD

systems now envisioned would use spacebased sensors, and perhaps also space-based

weapons, which would be subject to attack by

deliberate ASAT weapons or by BMD or other

weapons with inherent ASAT capabilities.

Such BMD systems would be effective only

if their sensors and weapons could be protected from such ASAT threats at reasonable

cost by passive countermeasures, active countermeasures, arms control measures, or a combination of these. If so, perhaps such measures

could be used to protect other satellites, or else

the functions now performed by other satellites could be performed by secondary mission

payloads “piggybacking” on BMD satellites.

If not, such BMD capabilities would be of little value, if any, and the opportunity costs

which would be incurred by restricting them

would be small.

[Chapter 5 of this report contains a discussion of past arms control efforts which had the

intent or effect of constraining ASAT capabilities. Other ASAT arms control options are

described and evaluated on a provision-byprovision basis in chapter 6 and as packages

of provisions in chapter 7.]
Chapter 4

ASAT Capabilities

and Countermeasures
Contents

Page

Organization of This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Current and Projected ASAT Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Generic ASAT System Components , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Soviet ASAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

U.S. ASAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Possible Advanced-Technology ASAT Weapon Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Isotropic Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Kinetic-Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Directed-Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Possible U.S. Responses to Soviet ASAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Reduction of Dependence on Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Force Augmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Passive Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Active Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Diplomatic Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Summary of Findings Regarding ASAT Capabilities and

Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Tables

Table No. Page

4-l. Estimated Costs of the U.S. Air Force Space Defense and

Operations (ASAT) Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

4-2. Types of ASAT Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

4-3. A Comparison of Laser Weapons. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4-4. Passive Countermeasures Against ASAT Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4-5. Active Measures Against ASAT Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Figures

Figure No. Page

4-1. Generic Components of an ASAT System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4-2. Illustrative Components of the U.S. Space Defense System . . . . . . . . 51

4-3.The Soviet Coorbital Satellite Interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4-4. Soviet Anti-Satellite Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4-5. Space Detection and Tracking System ., ..., , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

4-6. Deep Space Surveillance Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4-7. ASAT Mission Operations Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4-8. Mission Control Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4-9. The USAF Miniature Vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4-10. ASAT Mission Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4-11. Artist’s Concept of a Neutral Particle Beam Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4-12. Artist’s Conception of the Space Shuttle Deploying a

Neutral Particle Beam Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4-13. Cost Comparison: Satellite and RPV Relays for Single-Channel

UHF Tactical Theater Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4-14. Low-Cost Packet-Switching Communications Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Chapter 4

ASAT Capabilities and Countermeasures

ORGANIZATION OF THIS CHAPTE R

A variety of technological options are available for space surveillance systems, stand-off

weapons, and weapon and sensor platforms for

anti-satellite uses. Current and projected U.S.

and Soviet ASAT capabilities, including space

surveillance capabilities, are described in the

first section of this chapter. More advanced

ASAT capabilities which could be deployed by

Some possible U.S. responses to Soviet development of such capabilities are described in

the third section of this chapter. The principal

conclusions about ASAT capabilities and

countermeasures are summarized in the final

section of this chapter. The actual military

utility of these capabilities will be discussed

in appendix D to this report, which is clasthe United States or the U. S. S. R-. are de- sified;

scribed in the second section of this chapter.

CURRENT AND PROJECTED ASAT CAPABILITIE S

Generic ASAT System Components

A space defense system could include both

passive countermeasures for protecting satellites and an ASAT system for interfering with

enemy satellites in time of war. An ASAT system, whether deliberate or expedient, must be

controlled by an associated command, control,

communications, and intelligence (CS

I) system,

which itself will have three types of subsystems, as illustrated abstractly in figure 4-1.

First is the intelligence collection part-the

space surveillance system—which would detect electromagnetic radiation emitted or

reflected by a satellite and, using these measurements, attempt to track the satellite and

determine its orbit. Careful interpretation of

this information may allow characterization

of the satellite-i. e., determination of its mass,

shape, and other features—and even determination of the function of the satellite. On the

basis of this interpretation, information would

be communicated over command, control, and

communications (C3) links to command and

control (C*) centers, where authorities would

consider the information in the context of

other relevant information and possibly issue

orders to negate the satellite or to interfere

with its functioning nondestructively (e.g.,

using electronic countermeasures). If so, other

C* elements would generate detailed

tions for an attack, and these would

municated by C3 links to an ASAT

system.

instrucbe comweapon

An A SAT system would have either nondestructive ASAT devices such as jammers or

other electronic or electro-optical countermeasures, or A SAT weapons capable of damaging

satellites (in which case it would be an A SAT

weapon system), or both. In general, each

weapon would consist of a stand-off weapon

capable of damaging a satellite at a distance

and either carried by a platform such as a satellite, rocket, airplane, or land vehicle, or else

based on the ground at a fixed site. The standoff weapon could be a kinetic-energy weapon

(KE W) such as a gun or a fragmentation warhead, a directed-energy weapon (DEW) such

as a laser or particle accelerator, or an ordinary “isotropic” nuclear warhead (so called because it would release roughly equal amounts

of energy in all directions).

The weapon platform (if any) would carry

the stand-off weapon to within lethal range of

a targeted satellite. A highly maneuverable

platform could pursue and collide with a targeted satellite; such a vehicle would be a “hitto-kill” kinetic-energy weapon which would

49
50

Figure 4-1 .—Generic Components of an ASAT System

LIDAR or RADAR

Sun

Solar

radiation

not need to carry a stand-off weapon. Alter- added, showing examples of its space surveilnatively, if the stand-off weapon had sufficient lance, command and control, and ASAT weaplethal range, it would not need to be maneu- on systems.

vered toward a targeted satellite but could instead be based on the ground or on a non- Soviet ASAT Capabilities maneuvering platform.

Figure 4-2 illustrates a portion of the U.S. Space Surveillance

Space Defense System as it will appear when The ASAT capabilities of the Soviet Union

the planned anti-satellite weapon system is depend on Soviet space surveillance systems.
51

Figure 4-2.— Illustrative Components of the U.S. Space Defense System

Key:

ASATCC:

CMC:

MV:

NSSC:

PMOC:

ROCC:

SPADATS:

SPADOC:

WWMCCS:

ASAT Control Center

(ASAT carrier aircraft base: prelaunch C2

)

Cheyenne Mountain Complex

Miniature Vehicle

(satellite interceptor warhead)

National Space Surveillance Center

Prototype Mission Operations Center

Regional Operations [military air traffic] Control Center

(post-launch C2

)

SPAce Detection and Tracking System

SPAce Defense Operations Center

World-Wide Military Command and Control System

The Soviet Union operates extensive military

and civil networks of radar, LIDAR1

, and pho

tographic space surveillance sensors linked together by satellite and terrestrial communications systems.2 Soviet missile early warning

radars and satellites can detect foreign satellite launches. Soviet radio/radar tracking

ground stations can presumably detect and

track satellites in low-Earth orbit and track

satellites in higher orbits. In addition, the ra-

‘ LI DAR is an acronym for L Ight Detection And Ranging;

it refers to a radar-like sensor system which transmits pulses

of light, typically produced by a laser, and looks for reflections

from objects. Ranges to objects can be inferred from the time

delay of pulses reflected from it.

‘Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Part 1, Committee Print,

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate,

97th Cong., 2d sess., December 1982. IUSGPO 98-515 O]

dars used by the Soviet ABM system and radio telescopes can be used to detect, track, and

characterize satellites. The U.S.S.R. also uses

ships for satellite tracking and communications and operates some tracking stations in

foreign territory.

Soviet deep-space detection capabilities necessarily rely upon passive sensors, primarily

telescopic cameras similar to the Baker-Nunn

cameras formerly used by the United States

and upon radio telescopes and ground-based

military signal intelligence collections systems.

Passive optical sensors, whether photographic

‘Such systems, which perform direction-finding or signal intercept functions, are called electronic support measure (ESM)

systems.
or electro-optical, can detect sunlight reflected

by a high-orbit satellite; the power of the

reflected sunlight received by a distant optical sensor decreases only as the square of the

range to the target, so passive optical ‘sensors

are more useful than radar for detecting highorbit satellites.4 Similar considerations make

passive radio systems—i.e., radio telescopes

or military electronic support measure systems—useful for detection and tracking at

long range, provided the target is emitting a

radio signal of some kind.

It is possible that the U.S.S.R. may develop

electro-optical tracking sensors in the future;

such sensors could provide surveillance information more quickly than can camera systems,

which require development of photographic

film or plates. Neither photographic nor electro-optical telescopes can detect or track satellites from the ground in daytime or through

overcast, as radar can.

Weapons

The Soviet Union has been conducting a series of tests of coorbital satellite interceptors

(“killer satellites”) since 1968.5 An artist’s

conception of such an interceptor is shown in

figure 4-3. The U.S. Department of Defense

estimates that these anti-satellite weapons became operational in 1971.6 These weapons are

- .— — —.— —.

‘This is because the energy of a radar return, or “echo,” from

a satellite decreases as the fourth power of range to the target.

Radar returns from satellites in high orbit are generally so weak

that they cannot be detected by a radar rapidly scanning the

sky; they can only be detected if the approximate position of

the satellite is already known so that the radar can scan slowly

for signals from that general direction, accumulating signal

energy for a prolonged period of time. Hence ground-based radar can measure small changes of a high-altitude satellite’s orbit but could not easily find a satellite which had maneuvered

energetically since its last observation. Similar considerations

limit the effective search range of LIDAR systems.

The energy of a radar echo also depends on the radar wavelength used. For example, at wavelengths much longer than

a satellite’s diameter, the echo energy decreases rapidly with

increasing wavelength-as the inverse fourth power, according

to Rayleigh’s law. However, the echo also becomes more omnidirectional (as a consequence of Babinet’s principle and—in

the special case of spherical satellites—the Mie effect) and less

dependent upon details of satellite shape and composition other

than the electric susceptibility of the satellite, in accordance

with Rayleigh’s law.

5U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 4th cd.,

April 1985.

‘Ibid., p. 55.

believed to be capable of attacking satellites

at altitudes up to 5,000 kilometers or even

higher, 7 depending on their orbital inclinations; presumably they would be unable to attack satellites in orbits with unfavorable inclinations, i.e., very different from the latitude

of the interceptor launch site. As of 1984 there

appeared to be only two launch pads for Soviet coorbital interceptors, both located at the

Tyuratam launch complex.8 Several interceptors could be launched per day from this

complex. g

In 1971 the testing of satellite interceptors

was apparently suspended, then resumed in

1976, then again suspended in 1978, just before the U.S.-U.S.S.R. A SAT negotiations began, then again resumed in 1980 after suspension of those talks, then again suspended in

August 1983 when Soviet President Yuri Andropov announced a unilateral moratorium on

ASAT testing, stating that the U.S.S.R.

would not test ASAT weapons if the United

States did not. The U.S.S.R. continues to observe this unilaterally declared moratorium.

The U.S.S.R. has never officially and publicly

admitted developing or testing weapons of

this type. However, on 29 May 1985, in an interview by a West German reporter in Geneva,

Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, a senior department head on the Soviet General Staff, claimed

that the U.S.S.R. had successfully developed

a direct-ascent satellite interceptor similar to

that tested by the United States in the early

1960s and operational until the mid-1970s.

— — —

‘Ibid., p. 56.

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 3rd cd.,

April 1984, p. 34.

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Mti’tary Power, 4th cd., “

April 1985, p. 56.
Figure 4-3.— The Soviet Coorbital Satellite

.

Launchpad and storage facility for satelllte Interceptors at

Tyuratam

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

The Soviet Union has also been testing

ground-based lasers which could have some

ASAT capability [see figure 4-4]. The Department of Defense has stated that the Soviets

“already have ground-based lasers that could

be used to interfere with U.S. satellites. ” As

of 1985, there are two experimental Soviet

ground-based lasers with some ASAT capability, ’O both at Sary Shagan. ”

based lasers for electro-optical countermeasures with some effectiveness.ls

Operational Capabilities

Existing Soviet ASAT capability could be

potentially effective for negating low-altitude

U.S. MILSATS, such as those used for navigation (Transit) and meteorological surveillance (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

satellites). Commenting on this capability, the

Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary

of Defense (International Security Policy), has

stated that:

In addition to weapons designed specifically

for A SAT use, the U.S.S.R. could attack lowaltitude satellites with its ABM interceptor

missiles [illustrated in figure 4-4], 12 and presumably with ICBMS and SLBMS, although

these might require some modification for

ASAT use. All of these weapons are presumably armed with nuclear warheads, and their

use in a nonnuclear conflict would be viewed

as escalator by the United States and presumably by the U.S.S.R. as well.

We believe that this Soviet anti-satellite capability is effective against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit, that in wartime

we would have to face the possibility, indeed

the likelihood, that critical assets of the

United States would be destroyed by Soviet

anti-satellite systems, ’4

In addition to these destructive ASAT capabilities, the U.S.S.R. has a technological capability to jam satellite uplinks or downlinks

with some effectiveness, and could use ground-

“’Ihici., p. 5 6 .

“ Ihid., p. 5/+.

121hid., p. 56,

—.

“Ibid., p. 56.

“Statement of The Honorable Richard Per]e, Assistant Secretar~. of Defense ( International Security Policy), in Hearings

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear

Forces of the (’ommjttee cm Armed Serl’ices United States Sen.

ate, Testimon?’ on Space Defense illatters in Re\’iew of the

F1’1 98,5 Defense Authorization Bill [S. Hrg. 98-724], March 15,

1984, Pt. 7, p. 3452.
54

Figure 4-4.—Soviet Anit.Sateltite Capabilities

Artist’s conception of a Soviet ABM interceptor missile, named

GALOSH by Western analysts GALOSH missiles might have

capab!litles to attack satellites at low altltudes.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

The utility of these U.S. satellites in various types of conflicts is discussed in Appendix D to this report, which is a separate, classified document.

Projected Capabilities

The Soviet Union could develop weapons capable of attacking U.S. satellites at higher altitudes than can be reached by the current

Soviet coorbital interceptor. Laser weapons,

among other types, could be be used for this

purpose. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that:

The Soviets are working on technologies or

have specific weapons-related programs underway for more advanced anti-satellite systems. These include space-based kineticenergy, ground- and space-based laser, particle beam, and radiofrequency weapons. The

Soviets apparently believe that these technol-

.,4- - “ -

. — -

+

.

-—

.

Soviet high-energy laser facility at Sary Shaaan Two lasers there may

be capable of d“amagl ng unprotected satellites at low altltudes

ogies offer greater promise for future antisatellite application than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors

equipped ‘with conventional warheads,

. . . In the late 1980s, they could have prototype space-based laser weapons for use

against satellites. In addition, ongoing Soviet

programs have progressed to the point where

they could include construction of groundbased laser anti-satellite (ASAT) facilities at

operational sites. These could be available by

the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase the Soviets’ laser ASAT capability beyond that currently at their test site at Sary

Shagan. They may deploy operational systems of space-based lasers for anti-satellite

purposes in the 1990s, if their technology developments prove successful. 15

The Soviet Union also has the basic technology required to build space-based neutral particle beam weapons. The U.S. Department of

Defense estimates that:

A prototype space-based particle beam

weapon intended only to disrupt satellite

electronic equipment could be tested in the

early 1990s, One designed to destroy the satellites could be tested in space in the mid1990s. 16 

‘

7

i~(j.s, ~epartment of Defense, .sot’iet ,tfi~itarJ power, qth ed.,

1985.

‘

G I bid.

17 However, as recently as 1984, while projecting this capability, the Administration noted that Itre have, as ~~et, no evidence of So}’iet programs based on particle-beam technology’

[President Ronald Reagan, “Report to the Congress: U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms C’ontrol, ” 31 March 1984 (u NC I, ASSIFIED~].
55

Future manned Soviet spacecraft, such as

the expected Soviet “space shuttle’ ’—and,

especially, the “space plane ’’-could have

greater maneuverability and possibly noncooperative rendezvous capability and, if so,

some inherent ASAT capability .18

U.S. ASAT Capabilities

The U.S. Space Defense System is a network

of systems used for space surveillance and for

command and control. An anti-satellite weapon system will be added to it in the near future. Figure 4-2 illustrates a portion of the prospective U.S. Space Defense System as it will

appear the planned anti-satellite weapon system is added. The figure shows examples of

the space surveillance, command and control,

and ASAT weapon systems which will be part

of the U.S. Space Defense System.

Space Surveillance

U.S. ASAT capabilities, like those of the SO

viet Union, depend on space surveillance capabilities. Like the U. S. S. R., the United States

can use its missile attack warning radars and

satellites to detect satellite launches and can

track satellites after launch using groundbased and shipboard radar, LIDAR, passive

optical, and passive radio sensors. The Space

Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS)

acquires, processes, stores, and transmits data

from such sensors, including Naval Space Surveillance (NAVSPASUR) radar interferometers and Air Force Spacetrack radars and

Ground-based Electr~Optical Deep-space Surveillance System (GEODSS) sensors [see figure 4-5]. The United States operates more

foreign-based space surveillance facilities than

does the U. S. S. R., and consequently relies less

on shipboard systems, although such systems

are used.

The effective search range of U.S. groundbased radar systems is limited to low-Earth

‘

aCurrent manned Soviet spacecraft (Soyuz, Salyut) do not

have a significant inherent ASAT capability: they have little

maneuver capability and have not demonstrated coorbital rendezvous with non-cooperative spacecraft. Rendezvous with cm

operative spacecraft is typically performed by an automatic system which relies on a transponder on the passive spacecraft.

orbit, although some radars can track a satellite out to geosynchronous altitude if the satellite’s approximate position is already known.”

The range at which a ground-based radar can

track low-altitude satellites is limited by the

requirement for an unobscured line of sight to

the satellite. For example, a satellite at an altitude of 185 kilometers (100 nautical miles)

would be below the horizon if farther away

than 1,590 kilometers slant range.20

For detection of satellites in deep space the

United States relies on a system of telescopic

electro-optical sensors called GEODSS, for

Ground-based ElectroOptical Deep-space Surveillance System [see figure 4-6].2

’ The GEODSS network, when completed, will provide

world-wide deep-space surveillance coverage

using sensors at five sites22:

 Socorro, New Mexico (Site I);

● Taegu, South Korea (Site II);

● Maui, Hawaii (Site III);

. Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean (Site

IV); and

● Portugal (Site V).

The main telescopes at each GEODSS facility are designed to detect objects as dim as

a star of visual magnitude 16.5, or a reflective

sphere about the size of a soccer ball in geosynchronous orbit.

Command and Control

Under present policy, the U.S. National

Command Authorities (NCA) would have to

authorize satellite negation. Actual operational control of a negation mission would be

exercised by the USAF Space Command

‘eSee note 4, supra.

201 e 1 ’560 kilometer as projected on the Earth’s surface.

. .! ,

A closer satellite at this altitude might be below the horizon,

if mountains or other terrain features obscured the view. In addition, the azimuthal coverage of some radars is limited.

2’D.D. Otten, E.I. Bailis, and J.G. Klayman, “GEODSS:

Heavenly Chronicler, ” Quest (Redondo Beach, CA: TRW, Inc.,

August 1980), pp. 3-23.

‘

zSites I, II, and 111 are presently operational, and site IV

should become operational this year. Sites I, II, and III each

have two main 40-inch telescopes and one 15-inch auxiliary telescope, while sites IV and V will have three main telescopes

each. Site equipment is designed to be relocatable within 2

weeks.
56

Figure 4-5.—Space Detection and Tracking System

60

0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360

■ Radar .Electro-optical (GEODSS)

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC)

in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex using

other assets of the Space Defense Command

and Control System [see Figures 4.7 and 4.8].29

On October 1, 1985, satellite negation will

become the responsibility of a new unified

space command which will also exercise operational command over U.S. military space systems which provide support to the combatant

forces of other unified and specified commands. Creation of a unified space command

was proposed in order to increase the effective

ness and responsiveness of U.S. space systems

and to ensure a clear chain of command from

the NCA to combatant forces.24 Creation of the

U.S. Space Command was authorized by the

President on November 30, 1984.

2SR.S. Cooper, Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency, The U.S. Anti-sate fi”te (ASAT) Program, statement

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 25 April 1984.

Z4Hon. Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, USAF FY85

Report to the 98th Congress of the United States of America,

8 February 1984; reprinted in S. Hrg 98-724.

Weapons

In 1959 the United States successfully intercepted the Explorer VI satellite using an

air-launched ballistic missile developed for

other purposes and, the following year, began

to develop—but abandoned before testing—a

coorbital SAtellite Interceptor system (SAINT)

designed specifically for the purpose of inspecting and destroying satellites. The United

States also maintained an operational directascent satellite interceptor capability from

1963 until 1975, using nuclear-armed NikeZeus missiles (Project Mudflap, 1963-1964)

and Thor missiles (Project 437, 1964-1975).25

The United States has no deliberate operational ASAT capability at the present time,

although its nuclear-armed ICBMS and SLBMS

have some inherent ASAT capabilities, as was

demonstrated by the nonnuclear exoatmospheric ABM Homing Overlay Experiment

“M. Smith, “Anti-satellites (Killer Satellites), ” CRS Issue

Brief 1B81123, 22 August 1983.
57

Figure 4-6.—Deep Space Surveillance Systems

Left: Today, surveillance of deep space IS performed by

ground-based electro-optical surveillance systems such as the

Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance

(GEODSS) system, which IS operated by the U.S. Air Force

Space Command as part of the Space Detect Ion and Tracking

System (SPADATS) Here, an operator at a GEODSS control

and display console studies a 21 field of view of deep space.

On a clear night, a GEODSS main telescope can automatically survey over 500 such fields per hour and detect reflective

satellites as small as soccer balls at geosynchronous

altltudes

SOURCE U S AIr Force

I
58

Figure 4-7.—ASAT Mission Operations Concept

ASAT Control

Center

Tyndall AFB

SE ROCC

This illustration shows communication links which would be used for a satellite negation operation.

SOURCE: The Aerospace Corp

(HOE) test of 10 June 1984. However, the U.S.

Air Force is flight-testing an air-launched,

direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon called the

Miniature Vehicle (’(MV”). This infraredguided nonnuclear kinetic-energy weapon [see

figure 4-9] is mounted on a two-stage SRAM/

ALTAIR booster which is carried aloft and

launched from an F-15 aircraft. F-15 carrier

aircraft are to be deployed at Langley Air

Force Base in Virginia and at McChord Air

Force Base in Washington state [see figure 4-

10]. When operational, it will be able to attack

low-altitude Soviet satellites which perform

reconnaissance and targeting functions; these

are viewed as most threatening by the United

States. 28 If based as planned, these weapons

will not be able to attack Soviet satellites

‘“President Ronald Reagan, l?epmt to the Congress: U.S. Policy on ASATArms Control, 31 March 1984 ~NCLASSIFIED].

which provide missile attack warning, navigation, and advanced communications functions.27

The Air Force plans to hold 12 flight tests

of the ASAT system. Two of the twelve tests

have been held–the first in January 1984 and

the second in November 1984. In the January

test, the ASAT missile was targeted at a point

in space to determine whether the two-stage

SRAM/ALTAIR booster could deliver the

miniature homing vehicle to the vicinity of the

target point. The Air Force considered the test

a success: the proper functioning of the first

and second stage propulsion systems and the

2’R.S. Cooper, Director, Defense Advanced Reeearch Projects

Agency, The U.S. Anti-satelh”te (ASAT) program, statement

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 25 April 1984.
 59

Figure 4-8.— Mission Control Events

—kxecution of a satellite negation mission using the USAF MV ASAT weapon would begin with an alerting order. The target would then be tracked

by SPADATS and its ephemeris would be updated by the National Space Surveillance Center (NSSC) for use in generating mission tapes to be

loaded on the carrier aircraft for targeting of the ASAT weapon. After an execution order is issued from the Prototype Mission Operations Center

(PMOC) in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC), the carrier aircraft would take off and the missile would have to be launched before sensor

coolant exhaustion. Before missile launch, the carrier aircraft would receive updated information and instructions by high-frequency radio data

link from a Regional Operations Control Center (ROCC), which is an element of the current military air traffic control center.

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

missile guidance system was successfully dem- The Air Force considered the test a partial suconstrated. 28 cess. zg

The objective of the November 1984 test Successful completion of U.S. ASAT tests

was to reaffirm the performance of the mis- would provide confidence that the weapon

sile and to demonstrate the capability of a min- could perform as specified if actually used.

iature homing vehicle to acquire and track an Funds for completion of the planned flight test

infrared-emitting body (in this test, a star) program have been appropriated by Congress

against the radiant background of deep space. subject to certain limitations, partly because

of concern that once the weapons are proven

— effective, the Soviet Union would cease to ob2

’U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Report to the serve its self-imposed moratorium on the test- Honorable George E. Brown, Jr., House of Representatives: Sta- ing of ASAT weapons and might be reluc- tus of the U.S. Antisatellite Program, ” report GAO/NsIAl)-

85-104, June 14, 1985. “Ibid.
60

USAF

.

ASAT missile carried by F-15 fighter during refueling operation

SOURCE U.S Alr Force
61

———. —— ——— —— . —

Figure 4-.10. —ASAT Mission Profile

Target

satelIite

}

vehicle

homing

intercept

}

Upper stage

pointing and

target

acquisition

Missile guidance

to intercept

point in space

\

Targeting data

loaded by ground

support equipment

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

tant to agree to arms control measures which States retained a capability to use hidden

would ban them. Because the small weapons ASAT weapons.

could be easily concealed, if they are proven

effective and then banned by agreement, So- The estimated costs of the U.S. ASAT proviet authorities might suspect that the United gram are listed in table 4-I.
62

Table 4.1 .—Estimated Costs of the U.S. Air Force Space Defense and

Operations (ASAT) Program

POSSIBLE ADVANCED-TECHNOLOGY ASAT WEAPO N

SYSTEM S

It will be possible in a few years to build

space surveillance systems, ASAT weapon

systems, and ASAT countermeasure systems

much more capable than those used by the

United States or expected to become operational soon. These advanced systems could use

technologies expected to be available eventually in both the United States and the Soviet

Union. The variety of possible systems is so

great that this report will discuss only those

which seem most promising or threatening

with respect to criteria of responsiveness, survivability, altitude reach, economy, early availability, controllable lethality (for destructive

applications), and usefulness at nonnuclear

levels of conflict. The most promising ASAT

technologies will be discussed in this section

as possible U.S. options. Space surveillance

systems, although essential components of

space defense systems, will not be discussed

in this section, because the most promising

space surveillance technologies would be used

to best advantage in space-based space surveillance systems; these were discussed in

chapter 3 as possible advanced-technology

MILSAT capabilities.

Table 4-2 lists the major categories of ASAT

weapons, organized, according to physical

means of causing damage, into three categories: isotropic (nondirectional) nuclear weapons, kinetic-energy weapons (projectiles), and

directed-energy weapons (particle beam weapons, radio-frequency weapons, and laser weapons). Because the boundary between destructive directed-energy devices (weapons) and

nondestructive directed-energy devices (e.g.,

radio jammers, lasers used to overload optical sensors, or particle-beam generators used

to upset the functioning of electronic systems)

is blurred, being one of power or mode of use

rather than kind, nondestructive directedenergy devices will not be distinguished from

directed-energy weapons except where necessary.

Isotropic Nuclear Weapons

Ordinary nuclear weapons, when detonated

in space, radiate energy and disperse debris

more or less uniformly in all directions. Hence

they will be called isotropic nuclear weapons

(INW) to distinguish them from nuclear explo-
63

Table 4-2.—Types of ASAT Weapons

Isotropic nuclear weapons (/NW):

Ground-based

—Coorbital interceptor

—Direct-ascent (“pop-up”) interceptor

Space-based

—Coorbital interceptor (nuclear ‘{space mines”)’ b

Kinetic-energy weapons (KEW):

Ground-based

—Coorbital interceptor

—Direct-ascent (“pop-up”) interceptor

Space-based

—Coorbital interceptor (“space mines”)’

—Noncoorbital interceptor

Directed-energy weapons (DEW):

Ground-based

—High-power radio-frequency (HPRF) and active

electronic countermeasures (ECM)

—High-energy laser (H EL) and active electro-optical

countermeasures (E-OCM)

Space-based

—High-power radio-frequency (HPRF) and active

electronic countermeasures (ECM)

—High-energy laser (HEL)d and active electro-optical

countermeasures (E-OCM)

—Neutral-particle beam (NPB)

aA “space mine” Is an expendable ASAT weapon predeployed In space so as

to be capable of destfoy!ng enemy satellites almost Instantly They could be

armed wtth INW, KEW, or DEW I f armed with a short-range weapon, a space

mine must be coorbital

bprohibited by the 1967 Outer space Treaty

Clntercepis targets at high velocity from parking orbit

dlnc[udlng nuclear explosive powered X.ray lasers (X RLS), Which are nuclear

directed-energy weapons (NDEW)

sive-powered directed-energy weapons (NDEW)

which will be discussed subsequently. INW

could be carried to within lethal range of a satellite or satellites by a rocket and detonated.

Early U.S. ASAT weapons were of this type,

and the United States or the U.S.S.R. could

use nuclear-armed ICBMS, SLBMS, and ABM

interceptors in this manner. Alternatively,

INW could be used as nuclear space mines:

they could be concealed aboard satellites

which are continuously or occasionally within

lethal range of enemy satellites and detonated

on command.

As ASAT weapons, nuclear weapons have

several legal, political, and strategic disadvantages: they can only be used at the nuclear

level of conflict-or in any case their use would

escalate a conflict to the nuclear level—and

when used they may upset or damage unhardened friendly and neutral satellites at

ranges which depend on weapon yield but

which can be very large. In addition, they cannot legally be based in orbit, this being prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

Moreover, existing U.S. procedures for safeguarding nuclear weapons and for preventing

their unauthorized use are expensive and timeconsuming, and the Soviet Union may have

similar safeguards now and incentives to retain them in the future. On the other hand, the

advantages of isotropic nuclear weapons are

their present availability, their economy (relative to other weapons of comparable range),

their concealability (from present surveillance

systems), their great lethal range (as compared

to kinetic-energy weapons) against unhardened satellites, the difficulty of hardening

satellites against nuclear detonations at close

range, and their adaptability for delivery by

a variety of launch vehicles and orbital platforms, including those with poor guidance accuracy and no pointing capability.

By comparison, nuclear directed-energy

weapons are not now available and, if developed, would require platforms with moderately accurate pointing capability. However,

it is possible in principle to build nuclear

directed-energy weapons, such as X-ray lasers,

which could have far greater lethal range than

the nuclear explosive devices which power

them and which could be feasibly and economically delivered by platforms with adequate

pointing capability. The theoretical potential

of such weapons,34 if realized in practice, would

make them superior to isotropic nuclear weapons for ASAT applications. The potential

ASAT capabilities of NDEW, therefore, deserve greater concern than do those of isotropic nuclear weapons which are, however, of

more immediate concern because of their existence and demonstrated capability.

Existing nuclear-armed Soviet ABM missiles could be used against low-altitude satellies. Prior testing of such weapons against satellites would not be required to demonstrate

the reliability of subsystem operation.

“See, e.g., F.V. Bunkin, V.I. Derzhiev and S.1. Yakovlenko,

‘‘Specification for pumping X-ray laser with ionizing radiation, ”

Soviet Jourmd of QuantxJrn Electronics, vol. 11, No. 7, July

1981, pp. 971-972, and note that many such lasers could be powered by one “exotic” source of pulsed x-radiation.
64

Isotropic nuclear weapons concealed aboard

satellites used as ‘‘space mines” could attack

without warning and would pose a greater

threat+ because reactive countermeasures could

not be used for protection. Nuclear space

mines could be lethal against satellites as hard

as any now operational at such range that the

testing of their trailing capability -e.g., in geostationary orbit—although observable, might

not be interpreted as such. Protection against

such weapons would require evading them

during placement (which would be relatively

economical only for a small, cheap satellite),

opposing their placement by defending an

agreed or unilaterally declared “keep-out

zone” around satellites from penetration by

any spacecraft which might contain a nuclear

weapon, or possibly, after penetration and

trailing by such a spacecraft, evading (e.g., under cover of smoke and chaff) it until out of

its probable lethal range, at which time it could

be attacked by ASAT weapons of greater

range, if available.

Development and, when necessary, operation of closelook inspection satellites equipped

with gamma-ray spectrometers or other instruments capable of detecting materials used

in nuclear explosives would afford additional

protection: if inspection by such satellites were

anticipated, the designer of a nuclear space

mine would have to shield its nuclear explosive device with tons of materialg5 in order to

prevent collection of prima facie evidence of

having placed a nuclear weapon in orbit in violation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Placing so massive a space mine into orbit would

be more costly, and it could be evaded at less

relative cost than a smaller, unshielded space

mine could be.

“U.S. and Soviet scientific spacecraft, landers as well as orbiters, have carried gamrn a-ray spectrometers capable of detecting low concentrations of fissionable materials as deep as

half a meter below lunar and planetary surfaces [U.S. National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, A Forecast of Space

Technology 1980-2000, NASA Special Report SP-387, 1976; and

cf. the recent Soviet “VEGA” Venus/Halley’s Comet probe.].

The United States could develop such sensors for use on satellites for purposes of monitoring compliance with the Outer

Space Treaty.

The risk which such weapons may pose to

U.S. spacecraft now or in the future is mitigated to some extent by the fact that they

would be useful only in a nuclear war, in which

the ground segments of space systems would

also be significantly vulnerable and might be

attacked by preference, and more rapidly. This

and the other aforementioned disadvantages

of ASAT INW pose disincentives against developing them, attempting to base them in orbit covertly, and using them at nonnuclear

levels of conflict

Several conclusions follow from these considerations:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

It is feasible to build direct-ascent and

coorbital isotropic nuclear weapons.

Weapons of this type could be as small

and inexpensive as many existing satellites.

Such weapons could be developed and

tested covertly.

Soviet nuclear weapons could threaten

U.S. satellites at low and high altitudes

now and in the future but only at nuclear

levels of conflict.

Protection of U.S. satellites from coorbital INW may require defense of a keepout zone around low-altitude satellites or

designing future low-altitude satellites to

beat least as small and inexpensive as the

nuclear space mines which threaten them.

Many more options are available for defending high-altitude satellites from direct-ascent nuclear interceptors.

Kinetic-Energy Weapons

Anti-satellite kinetic-energy weapons pursue

satellites and destroy them by direct impact

or at close range using a gun or a fragmentation warhead. One example of an ASAT KE W

is a coorbital interceptor which approaches its

target at a low closing velocity before destroying it. Another example is a direct-ascent

(“pop-up”) interceptor which is launched from

the Earth’s surface or from an airplane and

which approaches its target at a high closing

velocity. Such an interceptor could also be
65

based in space in a parking orbit, from which

it could enter a transfer orbit in which it would

close with its target at high velocity, just as

a pop-up interceptor would. “Pop-up” interception requires less energy per unit interceptor payload than does coorbital interception,

particularly at low altitudes. A coorbital interceptor, on the other hand, could be used as

a “space mine, continuously observing and

trailing its target, prepared to destroy it

almost instantly on command or (if salvagefused) when attacked or disturbed in specified

ways. Used in this way, a coorbital ASAT

KEW could take advantage of the element of

surprise in an attack, leaving an enemy no

time to react with active defenses or reactive

passive countermeasures such as evasion or

deployment of decoys or smoke.

A coorbital interceptor could pursue a target (its ‘quarry”) indefinitely if it had as much

velocity change capability (“delta-V”) as its

quarry. If it also had as much acceleration capability as its quarry, it could, with tracking

capability, pursue its quarry continuously,

otherwise its quarry would be able to maneuver out of lethal range temporarily. Under

some conditions, an interceptor may be able

to trail its quarry using less delta-V than its

target uses for evasion; however, calculation

of required velocity change is complicated,3G

particularly in the case of many-against-one

interception. In any case, if comparable propulsive technologies are available to both pursuer and evader, pursuit can be successful if

the interceptor’s mission payload—its armament (if any) and guidance and fuzing systems—is lighter than that of its quarry.

It should be possible to build space mines

with very lightweight armament. For example, a directional fragmentation warhead similar to that of a Claymore mine could project

100,000 one-gram pellets in a pattern which

would cover a 100 x 100 meter area with 10

pellets per square meter at a range of 1 kilometer. This would be adequate to destroy un-

‘G.M. Anderson, “Differential Dynamic Progr amming Feedback Control for a Pursuing Spacecraft with Limited Fuel, ’’(New

York, NY: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, AIAA Paper A78-31925, 1978).

armored satellites as small as about a meter

in diameter with high probability. The pellets

for such a warhead would weigh 100 kilograms, and its explosive charge could weigh

less than that. Even lighter warheads of this

type may be possible, possibly having dispersion angles as small as those of shotguns or

even high-power rifles (e.g., 10 centimeters dispersion at a range of 1 kilometer).

Guns and rockets could also be used as armament by a KEW space mine. For example,

a single unguided rocket which deploys a 10

x 10 meter net weighing about 1 kilogram and

having a l-gram weight at each of its 100

nodes (knots) could achieve the same kill probability as the Claymore-type warhead if its

aiming error were less than 5 milliradians (5

meters at 1 kilometer) after rocket burnout

and net deployment. A space mine using such

a rocket as armament might weigh as little as

50 kilograms but could destroy much heavier

unhardened satellites.

It would not be relatively economical to use

such mines to attack smaller, cheaper satellites, which could be useful for some military

applications, such as communications.37 However, it would be economical to use space

mines to attack larger satellites. If such satellites are armored as a countermeasure, the

space mine could also be made more lethal, and

this would probably require less mass than

would be required for armor against it at the

assumed lethal range38. There appears to be

no relatively economical means of protecting

large satellites against a surprise attack by

such mines, once they are emplaced. Safety

from such attacks would require opposing

their placement by defending an agreed or unilaterally declared “keep-out zone” around satellites, or else, once they are emplaced, evading them (e.g., under cover of smoke and chaff)

until out of their range, at which time they

could be attacked by ASAT weapons of greater

range.

s~For example, the U.S.S.R. operates a constellation of Mhtweight satellites in low orbit, and as early as 1961 the United

States operated SYNCOM communications satellites weighing

only 31 kilograms in geosynchronous orbit. 98s= the di~Cu99iOn Of har&ning in the discussion Of Countermeasures, below.
Space mines the size of those assumed (2

meters in diameter) could be detected by

ground-based radars if at low altitude or, if at

high altitude, by electro-optical sensors (e.g.,

GEODSS) if they do not employ measures

(e.g., black paint) to evade detection or by

space-based long-wavelength infrared space

surveillance sensors even if they do employ

such measures. In order to demonstrate reliability, they would have to be tested in space

by trailing satellites or space debris. This

activity could be observed and would be noticeable.

The U.S. Department of Defense has estimated that the U.S.S.R. views development

of directed-energy weapons as a more promising approach for improving future antisatellite capabilities than further development of

ground-based kinetic-energy ASAT weapons.39

However, Soviet development and testing of

interceptors of the type which is currently

operational have demonstrated an interest,

and some capability, in coorbital, nonnuclear

kinetic-kill approaches to ASAT capability.

Given sufficient incentive, the U.S.S.R. might

choose to continue these efforts and, if so,

could eventually produce smaller, cheaper

weapons of longer endurance. Once testing of

such weapons in space is observed, there

might be insufficient time for the United

States to react by developing new generations

of small, inexpensive satellites against which

use of small space mines would be uneconomical. 40

It can be concluded from these considerations that it is feasible to build coorbital

kinetic-energy ASAT weapons. Weapons of

this type could be smaller and cheaper than

most satellites as presently designed. If such

weapons are deployed by the U. S. S. R., protecting future U.S. satellites from them may

require defense of a keep-out zone around U.S.

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Sow”et Military Power, 4th cd.,

Apd 1985, p. 44.

● OFor exmple, ~viet testing of interceptors Of the tYPe now

operational was first observed in 1968, and the U.S. Department of Defense has judged, in retrospect, that an operational

capability with these interceptors was achieved three years

later, in 1971. [Ibid,, p. 55.]

satellites or designing future satellites to be

at least as small and inexpensive as the space

mines which threaten them.

Directed-Energy Weapons

Several types of directed-energy weapons

could be used for ASAT purposes, including

ground- and space-based systems powered by

nuclear explosives, nuclear reactors, or nonnuclear energy sources. They include highpower radio-frequency (HPRF) generators,

high-energy laser (HEL) weapons, and neutral

particle beam (NPB) weapons. They could also

include non-laser sources of short-wavelength

radiation.

High-Power Radio-Frequency Weapons and

Electronic Countermeasures

HPRF weapons–which include high-power

microwave (HPM) weapons—are devices capable of producing intense, damaging beams of

radio-frequency radiation.41 HPRF generators

could be used to overload and damage satellite electronic equipment at high power levels

or, at lower power levels, merely to temporarily overload satellite electronic systems (i.e.,

for “jamming“).” Radidrequency (RF) generators could therefore be useful at all levels of

conflict.

HPRF weapons could be ground-based or

based in space. Ground-based HPRF weapons,

unlike ground-based laser weapons, could operate through cloud cover. However, the maximum pulse energy per unit area which can be

beamed through the atmosphere is limited.4s

Space-based HPRF weapons would not be so

limited, but, like ground-based HPRF weap4’I.e., electromagnetic radiation at wavelengths of 1 rnillim~tir

or longer,

‘This continuum of HPRF effects makes distinction between

“weapons” and “j ammers ” diffimk.. For arms control purposes,

however, a distinction could be made based on power-aperture

product, as is done in the ABM IYeaty. Wavelengthdependence

should be considered as well, because at a given power-aperture

product, shorter wavelengths can be radiated with greater

brightness and deliver more power per unit area at long range.

4The maximurn p~se energy per unit area which can be

beamed through the atmosphere is limited to about 1 jo~e per

square meter by the phenomenon of dielectric breakdown of the

atmosphere, which occurs at higher energy fluence levels.
67

ens, would have to be very large in order to

concentrate their HPRF energy into a narrow

beam. Even a relatively wide beam might be

able to damage satellites of existing designs

at considerable range, but this is uncertain,

and hardening satellites against HPRF radiation is possible.

The lethality of HPRF weapons would be

less certain than the lethality of other DEW

because of uncertainties about target vulnerability, i.e., about the beam energy per unit

area required to damage a particular enemy

satellite, This will depend on details of the design of the satellite and would be difficult to

predict with accuracy even if those details

were known. Moreover, even though it is possible in principle to harden satellites to withstand intense HPRF radiation, it is difficult

to verify by modeling and simulation, and exorbitantly expensive to verify by testing, the

actual degree of hardness achieved. Hence, although many concepts for HPRF weapons

have been studied, none of them are as resistant to countermeasures as are some HEL and

neutral particle beam concepts.

Radio-frequency generators of lower power

will continue to be valuable for providing capabilities to jam and spoof (i.e., deceive) satellite radio systems.44 The vulnerability of satellites to jamming and, especially, spoofing,

is also uncertain and probably varies greatly

among satellites. However, low-power RF

generators useful for jamming and spoofing

would be much cheaper than HPRF generators;

indeed, some existing electronic countermeasure systems could be used against satellite

links. Because of the prevalence and ambiguity of these capabilities, it would be difficult

or impossible to eliminate the non-destructive

A SAT capabilities of ECM systems by means

of arms control agreements. Use of passive

.

‘Jh;t’en at ~er~’ low power le~rels radio-frequency genera~ors

might be able to confuse (’‘spoof’ satellites b~ beaming decepti;”e signals at them. Some possible spoofing techniques ha~’e

been described b~’ CO1, Robert B. Giffin, (JS~\ F. in [JS Space

,$~,sten] SurIiLabilitjr: Strategic .A)ternacil’es for the 1990s, National Securit~ Affairs Nlonograph Series 82-$, National 1)efense [[ni\ersit?’ Press, F’ort I,eslie ,J. LlcNair, W’mhington, DC,

19X2: p. 26. E;lectrwnic counter-counterlmeasures can be used

to reduce the ~usceptibilit~ of hl I I,SATS to spoofing.

electronic counter-countermeasures, when necessary, would be preferred.

High-Energy Laser Weapons and ElectroOptical Countermeasures (Ground-Based)

High-energy laser weapons are devices capable of producing intense, damaging beams

of optical radiation45 by means of the phenome

non of stimulated emission of radiation. Highenergy lasers could be used to permanently

damage satellites, or, at lower power levels,

to jam optical communication systems and to

“dazzle” optical sensor systems (i.e., to overload them, temporarily blinding them). This

continuum of effects makes the distinction be

tween “laser weapons” and “active electrooptical countermeasures” one of degree rather

than kind and therefore difficult.46 Lasers of

several types, employing different materials

and physical processes and operating at different wavelengths, might be suitable for use as

weapons; some of these types are described in

the box entitled “Types of Lasers. ”

HEL weapons could be space-, ground-, air-,

or sea-based. Of the many possible types of

lasers useful as ground-based A SAT weapons,

continuous-wave deuterium-fluoride chemical

lasers have been of particular interest because

of their simplicity, the maturity of their technology, and the possibility of focusing their

infrared beams using mirrors of relatively

rough surface quality (compared to that which

would be required at shorter visible and ultraviolet wavelengths).

Repetitively-pulsed free-electron lasers and

electric-discharge excimer lasers have also

been of interest because they would operate

at short wavelengths at which small beam

divergence angles could be achieved using

smaller mirrors than would be required for infrared beams, although they would have to be

—

“I. e., electromagnetic radiation at ~a~’elengths shorter than

1 millimeter,

‘fi For arms control purposes, howe~er, a distinction could be

made based on power-aperture product, as is done in the ABM

Treat~’. \$’a\elength-dependence should be considered as well,

because at a git’en power-aperture product, shorter wa~’elengths

can he radiated with greater brightness and delit’er more power

per unit area at long range.
68 —

Types of Lasers

A laser is described by the lasant material it

uses as a source of coherent optical radiation

(e.g., deuterium fluoride), the characteristic

wavelength or wavelengths at which the lasant

emits such radiation, the method of pumping

(i.e., energizing) the lasant (e.g., chemical lasers,

electric-discharge lasers, optically pumped

lasers, gasdynamic lasers, etc.), the source of

energy used for pumping (e.g., chemical electrical, nuclear reactor, nuclear explosive, etc.), and

its pulse waveform (e.g., single-pulse, repetitively pulsed, or continuous-wave).

Many materials can be used as lasants; these

can be in solid, liquid, or gaseous form (consisting of molecules or atoms) or in the form of a

plasma (consisting of ions and electrons).

Lasant materials useful in highnergy lasers include carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, deuterium fluoride, hydrogen fluoride, iodine, xenon

chloride, krypton fluoride and selenium, to mention but a few, Some of these-e.g., xenon chloride and krypton fluoride-are molecules which

cannot exist under ordinary conditions of approximate thermal equilibrium but must be created by special “pumping” processes in a laser.

of higher optical quality. Free-electron lasers

can probably be ‘made more efficient than

other short-wavelength lasers and could be

ground- or space-based. Electric-discharge excimer lasers might be available sooner, but

probably cannotbe made as efficient as freeelectron”lasers can be, nor can they be tuned,

as free-electron lasers can be, to wavelengths

which would minimize beam degradation by

atmospheric effects (in the case of groundbased ‘lasers) and optimize target damage.47

“Soviet laser development has emphasized other technologies

than these; the “best” laser technologies for near-term Soviet

weapons may differ from those which would be ‘‘best” for nearterm U.S. weapons. Cf. N.N. Sobolev and V.V. Sokivikov, “The

Carbon Monoxide Laser: Review of Experimental Results, ” So

vie.t Jourmd of Quantum l?~ectronics, vol. 2, Jan. -Feb. 1973, p.

305 ff.; M.M. Mann, “CO Electric Discharge Lasers, ” AIAA

Journal, vol. 14, No. 5, May 1976, pp. 549-567; A.A. Stepanov

and V.A. Schlegov, “Continuous-Wave Reaction-Product Chemical Lasers (Review), Soviet Journal of Quantum Electronics,

vol. 12, No. 6, June 1982, pp. 681-707; and S. Kassel, Soviet

Free-Electron ~J~ser Research {Santa Monica, CA: The Rand

Corporation, report R-3259-ARPA, May 1985);

Such molecules are called excimers, a contraction for “excited dimer” (a dimer is a molecule

consisting of two atoms).

Free-electron lasers do not use lasants but instead generate radiation by the interaction of

an electron beam with a static magnetic or electric field. Loosely speaking, free-electron laser

technology resembles and evolved from that

used by particle accelerators (“atom smashers”), while other (i.e., bound+lectron) lasers use

Iasants heated by electrical current or chemical

combustion and resemble fluorescent lamps or

rocket engines in some respects. Some lasers

use mirrors, lenses, diffraction gratings, or

other optical elements to recirculate the laser

beam through the lasant in order to achieve adequate amplification; such lasers are called

cavity lasers, and the arrangement of optical

elements used to recirculate the beam is called

the laser cavity or resonator. In other lasers, the

beam passes through the lasant only once; such

cavity-less lasers are called superradiant lasers,

and the process of singk+pass beam generation

they use is called superradiance, superfluorescence, or amplified spontaneous emission.

Beams from ground-based HEL weapons

would be subject to a variety of phenomena

which would disturb their propagation through

the atmosphere. These phenomena include absorption, scattering, thermal blooming, dielectric breakdown, and the refractive effects of

atmospheric turbulence. Most serious is beam

absorption and scattering by clouds: groundbased HEL weapons, unlike ground-based

HPRF weapons, could not operate through

cloud cover.48

—.——

‘*Dielectric breakdown is not as serious at optical wavelengths

as it is at radio wavelengths. Scattering causes beam degradation, especially at short wavelengths, but is not insurmountably problematic in clear weather. Thermal blooming of a beam

focused on a distant satellite can be controlled by phase compensation techniques, or by using a laser which operates at a

wavelength at which atmospheric absorption is not severe. A

deuterium fluoride laser, for example, operates at such a wavelength and future freeelectron lasers could also operate at such

wavelengths.
69

The effects of atmospheric turbulence also

pose a serious problem for ground-based lasers:

without compensation, the beam of a groundbased laser would diverge at so great an angle that it would be unable to damage anything other than the most sensitive earthpointed optical sensors on satellites at geostationary altitude. Such compensation appears

possible, in principle.

Another serious problem for ground-based

lasers is the infrequency with which a lowaltitude satellite would pass within view of a

ground-based laser site. The interval between

such passes might be days or weeks, and, until

it exhausted its maneuver fuel, a maneuvering satellite could completely avoid coming

within range. Deployment of a large number

of ground-based lasers would provide more fre

quent opportunities to engage satellites and

would increase the difficulty and expense of

evasive maneuver and of attempts to attack

the laser sites. It would also increase the probability that a number of the lasers would not

be overcast by impenetrable cloud cover. Of

course, such proliferation would be expensive.

An alternative approach would be to base

ASAT lasers on ships, which would have some

flexibility to remain in clear weather near the

ground tracks of high-priority targets and distant from most anti-shipping threats. Another

solution to the coverage problem would be to

deploy steerable reflectors on satellites to relay the beams from ground-based lasers to targets or to other relay satellites. The operational capabilities provided by such a system

would be similar to those provided by spacebased laser weapons with an unlimited power

supply, except that beam availability would

be contingent on the absence of overcast at

at least one ground-based laser site and on the

survival of both a ground-based laser and an

orbital reflector.

High-Energy Laser Weapons and ElectroOptical Countermeasures (Space-Based)

The beams of space-based laser weapons

would not have to pass through the atmosphere and could damage unhardened satellites

at great range. A much smaller force of such

lasers than would be required for effective ballistic missile defense could pose a threat to a

nation’s most critical satellites. However,

space-based laser weapons, like other satellites, would be subject to attack by ASAT

weapons.

Several types of lasers could be used as

space-based laser weapons, each having some

particuhu- advantage. For example, of those

lasers which could damage satellites by overheating them, hydrogen-fluoride chemical

lasers are particularly attractive because of

their simplicity, while carbon-monoxide electric-discharge lasers are attractive because of

their potentially high electrical efficiency.

Free-electron lasers are attractive because

they can operate at short wavelengths at

which small beam divergence angles can be

achieved using small mirrors. Excimer lasers

would be bulky and less suitable for space

basing.

Space-based lasers of very low power, if of

an appropriate wavelength, could dazzle or

permanently blind optical sensors used by

other weapons for homing guidance or for

beam pointing. More powerful lasers could be

used to attack and damage a satellite by overheating it and possibly melting its “skin,” or

tearing its “skin’ as a result of the hammerlike mechanical impulse which pulsed laser radiation can generate on a target surface.4g

-————. --——

igThe amount of mechanical impulse which a Aven amOUnt

of beam energy can generate can be estimated on the basis of

published impulse-coupling models, such as that of P.E. Nielson, “High-Energy Laser-Matter Coupling in a Vacuum, ” Journal of Applied Ph~wics, vol. 50, No, 6, June 1979, pp. 3938-3943,

modified to account for the depth to which the beam radiation

A high-altitude satellite, on the other hand, will penetrate before surface ~aporization begins. In Directed

would be within view of a ground-based laser Energy hfissile Defense in Space IOTA Background Paper OTABP-l SC-26, April 1984], Dr. Ashton Carter estimated that a lasite for a prolonged or indefinite period. For ser beam fluence of 20 kilojoules per square centimeter would

example, a ground-based laser could irradiate produce an impulse intensity of 10 kilotaps [10,000 dyrwseconds

a satellite in geostationary orbit continuously, per square centimeter], i.e., an impulse coupling of 0.5 dyneseconds per joule. This estimate assumes that the laser pulse

weather permitting. is so brief that little heat is conducted to a depth greater than
70

Spacebased reflectors could relay beams from

ground-based lasers to a target, or another

reflector, beyond the horizon. These could be

used in much the same manner as space-based

lasers and would be, in effect, space-based

lasers with an unlimited fuel supply.

All of these weapons have certain disadvantages, however. They would use large, expensive, power-handling mirrors; they would engage targets sequentially, thus giving other

enemy satellites time to use reactive passive

countermeasures (e.g., smoke); and they would

be subject to attack by expendable, singleshot

weapons (INW, KEW, or DEW) against which

reactive countermeasures and shoot-back would

be ineffective. Hence space-based lasers which

can damage one or several targets instantly,

without warning, using a single pulse and

which are cheap enough to be considered expendable, if feasible, would be most attractive.

Because they would exhaust their fuel or destroy themselves as soon as they were used,

they would be invulnerable to shoot-back although subject, and possibly vulnerable, to

preemptive attack.

One type of laser which might be useful as

an expendable, single-shot, space-based weapon is the X-ray laser. X-ray lasers are presently

only in the earliest stages of development.50

X-ray lasers (also called “x-rasers” or XRLS)

could be very simple in design; they might

be thin fibers of lasing material powered

(“pumped”) by intense, pulsed radiation from

—.. —

the depth to which the beam radiation will penetrate before surface vaporization begins. Longer pulses can produce a much

greater impulse coupling. For example, an impulse coupling of

20 dyne-seconds per joule has been measured in experiments

using infrared lasers [P. Bournot, et al., “Mesure de la Pression Induite sur une Cible Metallique par une Laser C02 Impulsionnel, ” Journal de Physique, Tome 41, Suppl. au No. 11,

Colloque C9, Novembre 1980, pp. 81-86].

‘“Successful operation of an X-ray laser was claimed by a

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories group headed by

Dennis Matthews at the meeting of the Division of Plasma

Physics of the American Physical Society in Boston on October

29, 1984. Their laser operated at two wavelengths near 20

nanometers. The design of the laser is described by D.L. Matthews, et al., in “ Demonstration of a Soft X-Ray Amplifier, ”

Physical Review Letters, 54:110-113, 1985. More recently, the

U.S. Department of Energy has stated that the nation’s nuclearweapons laboratories conducted an underground test of a nuclear explosive powered X-ray laser at the Nevada Test Site

laser and achieved lasing [see note 52, infra].

— —

another laser, a nuclear explosion, or some

other source. The beam from such a device

would diverge at an angle roughly equal to the

square root of its wavelength divided by the

square root of the length of the fiber.5]

The U.S. Department of Energy is investigating the feasibility of developing nuclearpumped X-ray laser weapons. Nuclear explosive pumping is of interest because even if only

a small fraction of the energy of a nuclear explosion could be converted into X-ray laser

beams, it could still be lethal at great range.

Most details of this research, except for the

fact of its existence, are classified. However,

the U.S. Department of Energy has stated

that:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

———

The U.S. Department of Energy is interested in and is conducting research on certain types of nuclear explosive powered

directed-energy weapons (NDEW)–viz.,

X-ray lasers, visible-light weapons, microwave weapons, and charged-particle beam

weapons—as well as on nuclear explosive

powered kinetic-energy weapons (NKE W).

Underground nuclear tests at the Nevada

Test Site have been and continue to be a

part of this research.

NDEW could engage multiple targets

using multiple beams, providing high

leverage.

NDEW could damage targets at ranges

of thousands of kilometers.

Nuclear explosive powered X-ray laser

weapons would damage targets by means

of ablative shock.

51 Provided the square of this angle is greater than twice the

cross-sectional area of the fiber divided by the square of its

length. For example, a thin, one meter long XRL operating at

a wavelength of 20 nanometers would produce a beam with a

divergence angle of 100 microradians. This divergence angle

is large compared to those achievable by lasers operating at

longer wavelengths at which mirrors can be used, and only a

small fraction of the energy in a beam diverging at such an angle would would be intercepted by a satellite-sized target, at a

range of thousands of kilometers. X-rays cannot be focussed

using conventional lenses and mirrors, but they can be focussed

using diffraction gratings and other special optical elements

[R. W. Waynant and R.C. Elton, Proceedings of the IEEE, vol.

64, No. 7, July 1976, pp. 1059-1092]. Such techniques may be

useful for generating X-ray laser beams of very high brightness.
71

6. Lasing by a nuclear explosive powered Xray laser has been demonstrated in an underground nuclear test at the Nevada

Test Site.52

Weapons powered by nuclear explosions

would have several disadvantages compared to

nonnuclear weapons: nuclear explosives are

banned from orbit by the Outer Space Treaty 53,

they would require elaborate, costly, and

time-consuming command and control arrangements under present U.S. policy, they would

be useful only at the nuclear level of conflict

or would signal escalation to that level, and

they might disrupt radio propagation and damage allied and neutral satellites when used, depending on burst times, locations, and details

of weapon design. For these reasons there is

also interest in developing expendable, singlepulse non-nuclear laser weapons, if these should

prove feasible and economical. Such lasers

might operate at short X-ray and gamma-ray

wavelengths 54 or at longer wavelengths (e.g.,

‘*On January 14, 1983, in the first official public discussion

of U.S. research on nuclear explosive pumped X-ray lasers, the

Presidential Science Advisor, Dr. George Keyworth, suggested

that such lasers might eventually be of great military significance, and he called the “bomb-pumped X-ray laser’ program

“one of the most important programs that may seriously influence the nation’s defense posture in the next decades. ”

[Quoted by William J. Broad, in “Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Bid:

Many Ideas Converging, ” New York Times, Mar. 4, 1985, p.

Al ff.]. Subsequently, Major General William W. Hoover,

USAF (Ret.), Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs, elaborated on the U.S. nuclear directed-energy research,

saying that the nation’s nuclear-weapons laboratories conducted

an underground test at the Nevada Test Site of an X-ray laser

and achieved lasing. More recently, the Department of Energy

has released the other statements quoted here.

53Some have, however, questioned this interpretation, arguing that the intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to ban weapons of mass destruction from orbit, not ASAT or BMD weapons which would cause minor collateral damage, if any.

“One concept for a short-wavelength X-ray laser envisions

using a very brief and intense laser pulse to stimulate coherent, collective radioactive decay of nuclei which have been energized by exposure to neutrons in a reactor [C.B. Collins, et al.,

“The Coherent and Incoherent Pumping of a Gamrn a Ray Laser with Intense Optical Radiation, Journal of Apph”ed Physics,

vol. 53, No. 7, July 1982, pp. 4645-4651]. Recent experimental

results [B. D. DePaola and C.B. Collins, ;’Tunability of Radiation Generated at Wavelengths Below 1 A by Anti-Stokes Scattering from Nuclear Levels, ” Journal of the Optical Society of

America B, vol. 1 December 1984, pp. 812-817,; C.B. Collins

and B.D. Paoli, “Observation of Coherent Multiphoton Processes in Nuclear States, ” Optics Letters, vol. 10, January 1985,

pp. 25-27] have verified that some of the problems of developing such a laser can be solved. However, it is not yet known

whether nuclei suitable for use in such a laser exist.

iodine lasers). Non-laser sources of singlepulse

directional radiation may also be useful as

weapons.

Neutral Particle Beam Weapons

Powerful particle accelerators similar to

those used for scientific research, isotope production, and fusion power applications could

be used as particle-beam weapons to attack

satellites. Because electrically charged particles would travel along spiraling paths within

the Earth’s magnetic field, electrically neutral

particles such as atoms of hydrogen, deuterium, tritium, or heavier elements would be

used by such weapons. Because such atoms

would become ionized and hence charged if

they passed through matter as dense as the

upper atmosphere, such weapons must be

based in space and are useful only against targets in space, although relatively small weapons of this type could be kept on the ground

ready for launch into orbit and, after some onorbit testing and calibration, for use.

A neutral particle beam (NPB) weapon

might consist of a negative ion source, a particle accelerator, beam focusing and pointing

magnets, and a “stripping” device-e. g., a gas

ce1156—which strips the negative ions of their

extra electrons, thereby neutralizing them, as

well as a power source and other ancillary

equipment, s8 as shown in figure 4-11. These

components could resemble those presently in

use for other purposes and need not be much

larger to provide a modest ASAT capability.

For example, the hydrogen atoms produced by

an accelerator at the Los Alamos Meson

Physics Facility (LAMPF) have energies of

800 million electron volts” (MeV) and could

6’T.D. Hayward, et al., Negative Ion Beam Processes, Los

Alamos National Laboratory, report UC-34C, January 1976,

UNCLASSIFIED; J. H. Fink, “Photodetachment Tech.nolo~,”

American Institute of Physics, Conference Pmceedm“ gs No. 111,

pp. 547-560, 1984; V. Vanek, et al., “Technology for a Laser

Resonator for the Photodetachment Neutralizer,’ American Institute of Physics, Conference Proceedings No. 111, pp. 568-

584, 1984.

“K. Boyer, ‘iDirected-Energy Beam Weapons, ” l?roceeo!ings

of the Society of Photo-Optical knhmentation Engineers, Volume 474, 1984, pp. 79-86.

“The electron volt (eV) is a unit of energy; about 6.25 quintillion electron volts equals one joule, the Systeme Intemationale unit of energy.
72

Table 4-3.—A Comparison of Laser Weapons

Space-based laser

(repetitive pulse Ground-based

Space-based laser or continuous Ground-based laser and space-

(single-pulse) wave) laser based reflectors
73

penetrate aluminum shielding 1 meter thick.

The hydrogen atom beam produced by this accelerator has a current of 1 milliampere; irradiation of an unhardened satellite at a range of

40,000 kilometers for several minutes by a

beam of this current and particle energy could

upset the functioning of its electronic circuits.

A turboalternator-powered NPB weapon

might require about 25 tons of liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, tankage, and other “overhead, ”68 to deliver an absorbed dose of 10

kilograyssg through shielding at a range of

40,000 kilometers, regardless of the thickness

of the shielding, provided that maximum

shield thickness is known or assumed in advance and that the weapon is designed to penetrate a shield of such thickness.BO An absorbed

radiation dose of about 10 kilograys would permanently damage most radiation-resistant

high-density silicon integrated circuits. Many

existing and planned spacecraft use, or will use,

high-density integrated circuitry with a radiation hardness three or four orders of magnitude

1ower.’l Ten times this mass–250 tons–would

be required to damage circuits hardened to

withstand 100 kilograys, at this range.B2 On

‘*Such as fiel for propulsion of the extra weapon fuel, oxidizer,

coolant, and tankage.

59A gray (Gy) is the Systeme Intemationale unit for absorbed

energy dose. One gray is one joule per kilogram, or 100 rads.

One kilogray is a tenth of a megarad.

‘“A hydrogen atom having a kinetic energy of 50 MeV could

penetrate about a centimeter of aluminum shielding. If the

thickness of the shield were increased, particle energy, and hence

also weapon size, would have to be increased in order to penetrate the shielding, but the amount of beam energy and weapon

fuel required need not increase. The reason for this is that as

particle energy is increasti, beam divergence can be decreased,

and the same number of particles per unit area per second could

be delivered (over a smaller area) with a lower total beam current (particles per second). Hence a high-energy, low-current

weapon could penetrate thicker shielding and deliver the same

radiation dose in the same time over a smaller cross-sectional

area of a target than could a lower-energy, higher-current

weapon of equal beam power ( which equals particle energy

times beam current).

alDo9e9 of 100 ways would probably upset electronic circuits

on most satellites. It would be possible to shield such circuits,

but the shield mass required would increase more rapidly than

would the mass of a weapon which could penetrate it. On the

other hand, it is possible to fabricate integrated circuits capable of withstanding radiation doses as high as 100 kilograys.

6ZLow-density g~lium arsenide circuits which cm withstand

100 kilograys have been fabricated, as have higher-density silithe other hand, only 1.6 tons would be required

to damage such circuits at a range of 1,000

kilometers, and perhaps as little as a kilogram

would suffice to upset or damage integrated

circuits of existing hardness levels at a range

of 1,000 kilometers.

Although it may prove possible to harden

high-density electronics to withstand 10 kilograys without suffering permanent damage,

it is unrealistic to expect that all satellites will

be hardened to that extent; transient upset of

electronics, possibly causing memory loss in

computers, could occur at doses several orders

of magnitude lower. Hence a neutral particle

beam weapon could attack not only satellites,

but decoys for satellites presumed subject to

upset, using very little fuel and overhead—

e.g., 250 kilograms to deliver a dose of 10

grays at a range of 40,000 kilometers (the distance from low orbit to geosynchronous orbit).

According to some estimates, a NPB weapon with sufficient fuel to operate for 1,000 seconds must weigh about 4 tons per megawatt

of beam powerB3 The U.S. Space Shuttle, or its

expected Soviet counterpart, could deploy into

low orbit a NPB weapon weighing as much as

30 tons [see figure 4-12] .64 A heavier weapon

could be launched into low orbit by the anticipated Soviet heavy-lift launch vehicle, which

is expected to carry payloads as large as 150

tons. Even heavier weapons could be assembled in space by the United States or the Soviet Union.

A neutral-particle beam could be made to diverge at a small angle and would therefore

con circuits. For example, the Sandia National Laboratories of

the U.S. Department of Energy has fabricated a pin-for-pin

equivalent of the Intel Corporation’s 8085 8-bit microprocessor chip which can function after absorbing a 100-kilogray dose

of garnm a radiation and can withstand singleevent upsets

caused by 140 MeV particles. Sandia plans to fabricate a 32-

bit silicon microprocessor chip hardened to withstand 10

kilograys.

“E. g., see K. Boyer, “Directed-Energy Beam Weapons, ”

Proceedings of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers, Volume 474, 1984, pp. 79-86.

“U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet IUfi”tary Power, 3d cd.,

1984, p. 44.
74

Figure 4-12.—Artist’s Conception of the Space Shuttle

Deploying a Neutral Particle Beam Weapon

SOURCE U S. Department of Energy, Los Alamos National Laboratory

have a relatively small diameter even at great

distances-e. g., 40 meters diameter at a range

of 40,000 kilometers. A beam this small must

be pointed at a target with an accuracy of

about 1 microradian, and this presents a more

difficult problem in the case of a neutral particle beam than in the case of a continuouswave or repetitively pulsed laser. The tracking and pointing systems of such lasers can

quickly sense reflected beam energy from targets and thereby determine whether their

beams are actually on target. However, a target would emit very little radiation when irradiated by a neutral particle beam. Sensors

within several hundred kilometers of a target

might be able, during NPB irradiation, to detect enough x-radiation or garoma or other radiation from the target to determine that the

target had been hit, but it could not detect

such radiation fast enough to correct beam

pointing errors based on its presence or absence.

A neutral particle beam weapon could acquire (i.e., detect) a target using a passive longwavelength infrared (LWIR) sensor; it could

then track the target using an active optical

tracker (LIDAR) and use this tracking information to determine the angle at which its

beam must be pointed at the target. However,

this approach only guarantees that the optical tracker is pointed at the target and cannot directly sense whether the beam itself is

pointed at the target. That is, open-loop pointing must be used for neutral particle beams,

while more accurate closed-loop pointing can

be used by lasers. Determining whether openloop pointing of a neutral particle beam can

be done with an accuracy comparable to beam

divergence angles may require testing of neutral particle beam generators in space against

instrumented targets.

Aside from these difficulties of pointing and

kill assessment, neutral particle beam weapons are among the most promising near-term

options for nonnuclear ASAT weapons because of the maturity and demonstrated performance of their component technologies and

the relative diseconomy of hardening targets

against neutral particle beams. However, neutral particle beam weapons, like other spacebased sequential-fire weapons, would be subject to attack by single-shot weapons against

which shoot-back and other reactive countermeasures would be ineffective. They would

have little operational effectiveness unless

their survivability can be assured.

It appears, then, that if accurate open-loop

beam pointing can be demonstrated, it will be

feasible to build neutral particle beam weapons which, if deployed in low orbit, would pose

a serious threat to satellites in low and high

orbit. Against this threat only shoot-back

would be economical for protecting low satellites, while hardening and deception might pro

tect high-altitude satellites at low relative cost.

At close range (1,000 kilometers), neutral particle beam weapons could damage satellite

electronics of current hardness levels and upset harder future satellite electronics using
75

relatively little fuel and tankage (etc. )—probably about 1 kilogram per shot. The cost per

shot at a satellite hardened to this level, or at

a decoy simulating such a satellite, would be

very cheap relative to the cost per satellite or

decoy. Hardening satellite electronics would

increase the cost per shot, although probably

not to the cost of the smallest satellites or precision decoys: damaging high-density electronics hardened to the greatest extent now

foreseeable would require about 160 kilograms

per shot.

Such weapons, if encountered, could place

low-altitude satellites at risk at relatively low

cost. They could also upset or damage unhardened electronics on satellites in synchronous orbit, from low orbit, using

per shot (e.g., 25 kilograms for a

little mass

dose of 10

grays); however, hardening high-density electronics on such satellites to 10 kilograys and

using upset-tolerant circuit design could increase the mass requirement for damage to

perhaps 25 tons per shot and would increase

required irradiation time enough to permit use

of reactive passive countermeasures such as

generation of smoke or deployment of reaction

decoys. Shielding satellites-as distinct from

hardening their electronics-would be economically unfavorable against larger weapons: a

disproportionately small increase in weapon

mass, with no increase in mass per shot, could

compensate for an increase in shield mass.

POSSIBLE U.S. RESPONSES TO SOVIET ASAT CAPABILITIE S

How might the United States respond to increasingly threatening Soviet A SAT capabilities? Several options are available. For example, an increase in U.S. ASAT capabilities

might—but would not necessarily-be an appropriate response. Although useful for attacking Soviet MILSATS, they might be unable to protect U.S. MILSATS. Other possible

responses include reduction of dependence on

military satellites, augmenting U.S. combat

forces (to offset possible loss of force enhancement as a result of an ASAT attack), use of

passive or active countermeasures for defense

or retaliation, and arms control efforts or other

diplomatic initiatives intended to constrain

foreign ASAT capabilities or reduce incentives

to use them.

Reduction of Dependence on

Military satellites

The United States routinely uses satellites

to support its forces deployed worldwide to

reinforce allies, protect sea lines of communication, and pursue other national interests.

Routine use of satellites for such purposes has

engendered a considerable degree of dependence on them. In the past, when satellites

were less expensive and less vulnerable than

other means to these ends, dependence on satellites was not risky. In the future, satellites

may become so vulnerable that use, if possible, of more expensive but less vulnerable

means of performing functions now performed

by space systems may be required for adequate security.

Most functions now performed by space systems could be performed by alternative terrestrial systems, although terrestrial systems

providing comparable performance of some

functions would be unaffordable or politically

unacceptable. Missile launch detection and

space surveillance could be performed by airborne optical sensors; navigation by advanced

inertial navigation systems which can recognize local gravity gradient patterns, nuclear

detonation detection by ground-based overthehorizon electromagnetic pulse (OTH EMP)

sensors, and radio communications relaying

by MF ground-wave, HF ground-wave and

sky-wave, VHF meteor-burst, UHF tropospheric scatter, and UHF/SHF/EHF and lightwave airborne repeaters. Reconnaissance

could be performed in wartime by aircraft

overflight at great expense and risk.
76

— —

On the other hand, the kind of information

presently collected by satellites in peacetime

to monitor compliance with arms control

agreements cannot be obtained by other

means which are acceptable in peacetime. Unauthorized aircraft overflight, for example,

would be unacceptable. However, arms control treaties—like other treaties except those

defining “laws of war’ ’-are suspended during

war between parties, so a survivable spacebased means of performing this function is not

required.

Although alternative terrestrial systems for

performing some functions may be infeasible

or very expensive, alternative terrestrial systems for performing other functions may be

only slightly more expensive than space systems. For example, providing intra-theater

single-channel UHF communications to mobile ground elements in the 1980s by means

of satellite communications transponders

would be less expensive than use of remotely

piloted vehicles (aircraft) carrying transponders, but only slightly so [see figure 4-13]; a

slight increase in satellite vulnerability would

make the costs favor use of RPVS. Whether

alternative terrestrial systems are worth their

cost depends on the function to be performed

and is a matter of judgment deserving periodic reconsideration.

Force Augmentation

As satellites have been acquired and integrated into military systems, they have presumably increased the effectiveness of force

elements which would engage in direct combat, so that each such force element can now

fight as well as, say, one and a half could without MILSAT support. Having become dependent on satellite support, if suddenly deprived

of that support the effectiveness of a force element would be reduced, not just to that of a

force element unaccustomed to such support

but probably more so because of the disorganizing effect of losing sources of information

it had come to count on. Nevertheless, it is possible, in principle, to augment current forces

so that in the event of sudden loss of MILSAT

Figure 4-13.—Cost Comparison: Satellite and RPV

R-clays for Single-Channel UHF Tactical Theater

- Communications

Satellite Satellite with

null-stewing

antenna

RPV

support, larger future forces, although impaired in effectiveness, would fight as well as

or better than would current forces using satellite support. The force augmentation required by this criterion might, under some circumstances, be modest.

Passive Countermeasures

“Passive” countermeasures against ASAT

capabilities include hiding, deception, maneuver, hardening, electronic countermeasures

and electro-optical countermeasures, and

proliferation, as well as combinations of these

measures [see table 4-4]. Some of these countermeasures—e.g., hardening-are truly passive, requiring no satellite activity for their effectiveness, while others—e.g., evasion—require satellite activity–and hence attack

warning-and are not truly passive, although

they are nondestructive.

For expository purposes it is convenient to

discuss each type of countermeasure in isola-
77

Table 4-4.— Passive Countermeasures

Against ASAT Attacks

Hiding

e.g., satellite miniaturization and orbit selection

Deception

e.g., deploying lightweight decoys

Maneuver

e.g., evasion

Hardening

e.g., use of shielding

Electronic countermeasures and electro-optical

countermeasures

e.g., use of shorter wavelengths and more highly

directional antennas

Proliferate ion

e.g., of on-orbit spare satellites

-— —. —

tion from the others in the context of a oneagainst-one ASAT attack, as will be done here.

However, it is anticipated that such countermeasures, if used, might be used in combination in the context of a many-against-many

(i.e., force-against-force) space battle. It is in

such a context that the potential effectiveness

of a countermeasure should be assessed. However, the number and complexity of possible

contexts precludes any attempt at assessment

of countermeasure effectiveness from being exhaustive or conclusive.

Hiding

“Hiding” measures are measures taken to

evade detection by surveillance systems. In

some sense the effective use of hiding, if feasible, would be most desirable, because it

would eliminate the need for other countermeasures, all of which require increases in onorbit mass in the form of decoys for deception,

fuel for evasion, shielding for hardening, or

spares for proliferation.

Different hiding measures are required

against different types of surveillance sensors.

Space surveillance systems may be of two

types: active and passive. Active sensors irradiate a target with electromagnetic radiation

in order to “see” it, while passive sensors look

for electromagnetic radiation emitted by the

target or reflected by the target from natural

sources, e.g., the Sun. At optical wavelengths

(infrared, visible, and ultraviolet), both active

sensors (LIDAR) and passive sensors may be

usedGb In general, passive optical sensors on

satellites in low Earth orbit maybe able to de

tect satellites as small as a meter in diameter

at altitudes between a few hundred kilometers

and geosynchronous altitude.

Passive LWIR and visible light sensors can

work better in combination than either can

alone. For example, painting a satellite black

would prevent it from reflecting sunlight and

thereby make it invisible to passive visible

light sensors. However, painting a satellite

black would cause it to absorb more solar radiation and become hotter. In thermal equilibrium it would emit more LWIR radiation,

making it detectable at greater range by a passive LWIR sensor [see box entitled “Longwave Infrared (LWIR) Space Surveillance

Sensors”].

Operating a satellite at very low altitude can

make it difficult to detect using space-based

infrared sensors which must view it against

the radiant Earth or Earth limb background.

More satellites would be required to perform

a given function at lower altitude, and user

equipment might also have to be more complex and expensive.

Deception

The use of decoys to induce an enemy to

waste firepower on false targets-or to withhold fire for fear of doing so–can always be

made effective, if the decoys are sufficiently

realistic, i.e., “credible” to enemy space surveillance systems. A decoy can always be

made credib~e at a cost less than or equal to

that of the satellite it mimics, because a spare

satellite could be used as a decoy, and it would

be preferable to do so rather than spend as

much on a nonfunctional decoy. The critical

question is whether a decoy can be made credible at a much lower cost than that of the satel-

’51n most cases passive sensors are preferable to active sensors because they do not require a high-power radiation source

for irradiating targets, they are themselves consequently more

difficult to detect, and their effective range can be increased

more economically, because a twofold increase in range to a target decreases the irradiance received by a passive sensor only

fourfold as compared to sixteenfold in the case of an active

sensor.
78

.—— —

Long-Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) Space Surveillance Sensors

The following discussion describes the physical basis for the estimated detection capabilities of passive LWIR sensors and for the ineffectiveness of hiding measures against them.

Every object emits electromagnetic radiation

as a result of thermal processes; the amount of

power emitted by an object increasesin proportion to its surface area and would increase sixteanfold if its temperature were doubled. A satellite at a typical operating temperature-about

300° K—emits most of its thermal radiation at

a wavelength of about 10 microns [10 millionths

of a meter], which is in the LWIR portion of the

electromagnetic spectrum. The wavelength at

which thermal radiation is most intense varies

in inverse proportion to the temperature of its

source; thus the surface of the Sun-which has

a temperature of about 6,000° K-emits thermal radiation (sunlight) which is most intense

at a wavelength of 0.5 microns, a wavelength

in the visible portion of the electromagnetic

spectrum Passive optical sensors which can detact LWIR radiation can detect the thermal radiation emitted by satellites, while those sensitive to visible radiation are best suited for

detecting sunlight reflected by satellites. Visible light sensors are preferred for ground-based

space surveillance systems because LWIR thermal radiation is absorbed strongly by the lower

atmosphere, although LWIR telescopes have

been operated on mountain peaks and on

aircraft.

Passive LWIR and visible light sensors can

work better in combination than either can

alone. For example, painting a satellite black

would prevent it from reflecting sunlight and

thereby make it invisible to passive visible light

sensors. However, painting a satellite black

would cause it to absorb more solar radiation

and become hotter.x In thermal equilibrium it

would emit more LWIR radiation, making it detectable at greater range by a passive LWIR

sensor. Conversely, making the satellite surface

highly reflective would reduce its absorptivity

and hence also its emissivity, which equals the

absorptivity at each wavelength; this would

‘s. Stetnberg and V.P. 141am %@,elwesyatam” @h. 17), R.E.

Mtil{ed}, 8wmE z@neer@Hantilnmk (New York: McGraww 1965).

make the satellite less visible to passive LWIR

sensors.

Passive optical sensors may be designed to

detect targets within view above the horizon

(ATH) or below the horizon (BTH). BTH detection is more difficult than ATH detection, and

the image processing required by BTH sensors

is more complicated than that required by ATH

sensors. ATH sensors are therefore preferred

for passive optical space-based surveillance

systems.

Space-based LWIR ATH sensors could not

eady detect satellites which orbit at altitudes

so low that they are actually within the upper

atmosphere. Satellites at such low altitudes

would be in the “Earth limb” as viewed by a

space-based LWIR ATH sensor, which would

have to view the satellite just above the horizon through a thick layer of air which would absorb much LWIR radiation and which would

emit, reflect, and scatter LWIR background radiation against which the satellite would have

to be viewed. Satellites at such low altitudes

would experience considerable atmospheric

drag and would slow down and reenter the

atmosphere sooner unless they amid maneuver

and carried enough fuel to compensate for the

drag. Operating in such an altitude regime to

evade detection by space-based LWIR ATH

sensors would also impose operational penalties

in some cases. For example, surveillance satellites could not “see” as far from lower altitudes.

Required image processing sophistication

would be more difficult for general surveillance

than for warning of interception of the satelllite

carrying the sensor. This is because the spot of

focused radiation from an interceptor approach

ing a satellite-borne sensor “staring” at the

celestial background in the direction of the approaching interceptor would not move on the

sensor’s focal plane, and a single detector element of the sensor could accumulate thermal radiation from the interceptor until sufficient

energy for detection has been accumulated. By

contrast, the spot of focused radiation from an

interceptor traveling in some arbitrary direction

would move on the sensor’s focal plane, limiting the time available to a detector element for

accumulating image energy.
79

If the target’s angular position and velocity

is approximately known by other means, the

number of photons received by each detector

element over which the target’s image is expected to move could be added in order to accumulate image photons and average out the

noise photons. However, if the target’s angular position and velocity is not known accurately by other means, the number of possi

ble averages which must be calculated in this

way to detect the target reliably increases very

‘ rapidly with increasing uncertainty about target position and velocity, and the required mass

of image-processing hardware required will increase correspondingly.

A low-orbit LWIR space surveillance satellite

‘ with a 1 meter nonemissive primary mirror and

a focal plane detector army cooled to 77° K could

lite it mimics, as well as cheaper than an enemy’s

cost to identify it (e.g., by dispatching a coorbital interceptor to observe it at close range)

or to attack it in a manner which would negate

the satellite it simulates. This critical question

remains unanswered.

Before any of these costs can be estimated,

the designs of decoys and enemy surveillance

and weapon systems must be specified. Many

design choices are available. For example, for

the same amount of money, a few highly realistic decoys (called “precision decoys” or

“replica decoys”) could be built, or a much

larger number of less realistic but less expensive decoys could be built. A “precision” decoy designed to simulate an on-line satellite

would probably have to simulate attitude control, stationkeeping, signal transmission,

power generation and heat dissipation, and

other observable functions and properties. The

subsystems required to do this would be relatively expensive. If such decoys could not be

distinguished from actual satellites, all such

decoys would have to be attacked in a manner which would damage the satellites they

simulate.

detect a black-painted satellite 1.5 meters in diameter at a range of 35,000 kilometers using a

l millisecond integration (energy accumulation)

time. In one millisecond the image of a small

satellite at geosynchronous altitude would

move across the face of a detector element the

size of the telescope’s “spot size,” if the teb

scope were on a satellite at 1,000 kilometers altitude and “Stared” Continuosly toward the zenith. It would be feasible and affordable, but

costly (several billion dollars), to deploy a constellation of satdlites of this performance which

stare continuously in all directions above the

horizon. Even smaller objects could be detected

at greater range using a larger primary mirror,

or-less economically in the limit-more imageprocessing hardware.

Alternatively, inexpensive “traffic” decoys

could be made to simulate only those features

of a capital satellite which might be measurable cheaply, quickly, and remotely. Reflective

balloons or clouds of smoke and chaff could

be used as “reaction decoy s,” i.e., they could

be deployed in reaction to warning of an impending attack.” Even if such decoys could

deceive an enemy for only a limited period of

time, they could be effective in some situations. However, reaction decoys offer no protection against single-shot ASAT weapons

(e.g., “space mines”) which can destroy satellites almost instantly before reaction decoys

can be dispensed. Ingeniously designed lightweight decoys might be both inexpensive and

highly credible to passive remote sensors;

whether they will be is uncertain.

———...—

‘aFor example, a satellite under attack by a pop-up infraredhoming interceptor could dispense several lightweight decoys

which resemble it, from a distance, in infrared brightness temperature and color temperature. If the interceptor cannot distinguish such decoys from the capital satellite until it has flown

past, then the decoys would be adequately “credibIe.” Because

satellite mass cannot be measured both quickly and inexpensively, cheap, lightweight decoys could be effective as reaction

decoys.
80

Even if lightweight decoys cannot be recognized as such after prolonged remote passive

observation, it might be possible to recognize

them using directed-energy devices.87 However, use of directed-energy devices in such a

manner might be provocative in peacetime and

possibly more expensive than the cost of lightweight decoys.

If lightweight decoys cannot be distinguished from actual satellites, all such decoys

would have to be attacked, although not necessarily in a manner which would damage the

satellites they simulate, because the cost of attacking and observably damaging a lightweight decoy with some types of A SAT weapons could be comparable to, or smaller than,

the cost of attacking a decoy in a manner

which would damage a satellite which it simulates. For example, ground-based lasers might

be able to attack lightweight decoys inexpensively. Neutral-particle beam weapons could

also be used to attack decoys at long range,

as could singlepulse lasers, although less economically.

The large number of possible designs for decoys and enemy surveillance and weapon systems renders assessment of the cost-exchange

ratiosW of future systems infeasible at this time.

Furthermore, even if the decoy design were specified, it would be difficult to estimate decoy costs

accurately. Rough preliminary estimates of

satellite cost and of uncertainty in satellite

6TRefernng t. the possibility of active discrimination of decoys from ballistic missile reentry vehicles, Dr. Gerold Yonas,

Chief Scientist of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization,

has written that “directed energy, even in a very early period,

could be used in an interactive mode to assist in midcourse discrimination IGerold Yonas, “Strategic Defense Initiative: The

Politics and Science of Weapons in Space,” Physics Today, June

1985, pp. 24-32; cf. remarks attributed to Dr. Yonas in E.J.

Lemer, “Star Wars: Part II–Survivability and Stability, ”

Aerospace America, vol. 23, No, 9, Sept. 1985, pp. 80-84].

s8The relevat Cost-exchmge ratio is the minimax c05t-exchange ratio, i.e., the ratio of decoy costs to Soviet ASAT sensor and weapon costs which would be incurred if decoys were

designed to minhniz e the maximum cost-exchange ratio which

the U.S.S.R. could subsequently force on the United States by

judicious choice of ASAT sensor and weapon designs. The costexchange ratio of a specific future system is of questionable

relevance, unless the system can be shown to have a costexchange ratio close to the minimax cost-exchange ratio.

cost are sometimes derived from estimates of

satellite subsystem mass and complexity.

However, analysis of historical cost data reveals considerable variation in satellite cost

for satellites of comparable small mass.og

Deception is more advantageous when used

in combination with other passive measures such

as hardening and proliferation. For example,

dormant spare satellites can be hardened and

made to resemble cheaper decoys.

These considerations lead OTA to conclude

that the question of whether decoys can be made

credible at a much lower cost than that of the

satellites they mimic or than an enemy’s cost

to identify them or to attack them in a manner

which would negate the satellites they simulate

remains unanswered, and that answering this

question is essential in any attempt to assess

prospects for making future satellites adequately survivable. An affirmative answer will

probably require detailed designs for decoys

which are inexpensive and lightweight as well

as credible to possible future Soviet surveillance systems.

Maneuver

Satellites may maneuver in order to complicate enemy surveillance and targeting and to

evade enemy fire. Satellites which do not maneuver are nevertheless unavoidably mobile,

although in fixed orbits. Because of this property, the relation of maneuver to attrition is

different in space than on land or at sea, and

proximity in terms of orbital elements (e.g.,

apogee, perigee, inclination, etc.) has as much

tactical significance as does momentary proximity in space. A maneuver, loosely speaking,

is an action which changes a satellite’s Keplerian orbital elements. Pursuit of another satellite and evasion of an interceptor are examples of maneuvers.

In order to continuously evade an interceptor—whether pop-up or coorbital-a satellite

must have an acceleration capability and a ve

locity change (“delta-V”) capability about as

‘There has been less variation in cost per kilogram among

satellites of large mass.
81

great as those of the interceptor, but somewhat more or less, depending on initial positions and velocities.’” Acceleration and deltaV can be maximized by minimizing the mission payload, so that a large fraction of the

spacecraft initial mass is contributed by its

engines (for acceleration) and fuel (for deltaV). Because an interceptor’s payload can be

quite small-perhaps comparable to that of a

shoulder-fired anti-tank missile—an interceptor might have acceleration and delta-V capabilities which would be much more costly to

provide to satellites with large mission payloads such as long-range directed-energy weapons. If so, it would be difficult for such satellites to evade small but sophisticated

interceptors.

Hardening

For each type of ASAT weapon, there exist

hardening techniques which can reduce the

range at which the weapon would be effective.

For example, satellites may be hardened to

withstand the effects of ordinary, isotropic

nuclear weapons by avoiding reliance on photovoltaic cells—which are vulnerable to weapon X-rays—for power, by using massive shielding to block gamma radiation, and by using

Faraday shielding, magnetic shielding, and

fault-tolerant electronic design to reduce vulnerability to system-generated electromagnetic pulse. Of course, such practices cannot

protect a satellite from a nearby nuclear explosion, but they can force an attacker to expend at least one nuclear warhead per satellite and credible decoy to destroy them with

confidence.

Shielding, or armor, of different types can

offer protection against some types of projectiles, pulsed or continuous lasers, and neutral

particle beams. Different types of shields

would be required for protection against different types of ASAT threats. For example,

shields could be used against projectiles,

pulsed lasers, and neutral particle beams, respectively. For example, NASA developed

shields to protect a Halley’s Comet probe craft

from 0.1 g meteoroids impacting at 70 kilometers per second. ’l Such shields could be allaspect shields which completely surround a

satellite, or they could be “shadow shields”

deployed between the defended satellite and

a weapon which poses a threat to it. Shadow

shields could be deployed on a boom or they

could be independent, ‘‘free-flying” satellites.

Shadow shields could be lighter than allaspect shields, but a separate shadow shield

might be required for each known or suspected

threatening weapon. All-aspect shields would

be superior to shadow shields in that they

could defend a satellite from multiple sequential or simultaneous attack from any direction

or all directions and from covert weapons and

they would require no power or warning information for their operation.

Massive shields could also protect satellites

from laser radiation and from neutral particle

beams. Relatively little shield mass would be

required to protect a satellite from beam of

low-energy particles (i.e., those having energies of less than 50 to 100 MeV), but the shield

mass required would increase sharply if particles of higher energy, produced by larger

NPB weapons, were used.

Semiconductor microelectronic circuits inside satellites could also be made more resistant to ionizing radiation such as would be

produced by a neutral particle beam. For example, the Sandia National Laboratories of the

U.S. Department of Energy have fabricated

a pin-for-pin equivalent of the Intel Corp. ’s

8085 8-bit microprocessor chip which can function after absorbing a 100-kilogray dose of

gamma radiation and can withstand singleevent upsets caused by particles with energies

as great as 140 MeV.

The use of asteroidal materials such as

nickel for large, massive, all-aspect shields has

been proposed. Possible advances in space

mining, manufacturing, and transportation—

which would require large investments-might

‘IJ. P.D. Wilkinson, “A Penetration Criterion for DoubIeWalled Structures Subject to Meteoroid Impact, ” AIAA Jour-

‘“G. M. Anderson, op. cit. nal, vol. 7, No. 10, October 1969, pp. 1937-1943.
82

someday make use of asteroidal material for

such purposes cheaper than use of terrestrial

material.72

These considerations suggest that, in general, shielding against weapons of relatively

low capability is feasible and in many cases

may be less expensive than the weapons

against which it can offer protection. However,

as weapons are made larger, more capable, and

more numerous, the cost of protection against

such weapons generally increases more rapidly

than the cost of the weapons and and begins

to exceed the cost of the weapons at some

point.

Electronic Countermeasures and

Electro-Optical Countermeasures

Passive electronic and electro-optical countermeasures can provide protection-analogous to “hardening”—against nondestructive

ASAT measures. For example, communication links can be made increasingly resistant

to jamming by using more transmitter power

(which ultimately becomes uneconomical) or

signal bandwidth (which is limited except at

extremely high radio frequencies and optical

frequencies), or–in some applications-by

using larger antennas or shorter wavelengths

for greater directionality of transmission and

reception, or by transmitting at a lower data

rate. Command encryption can prevent spoofing, and use of spread-spectrum modulation

and time-division multiplexing techniques can

provide significant resistance against uplink

and downlink jamming and against downlink

exploitation (e.g., by anti-radiation missiles).

Proliferation-Replenishment

Another countermeasure against ASAT attack is proliferation of satellites, so that even

if a large fraction of the satellites were damaged by hostile action, enough undamaged satellites would remain to perform their assigned

functions. The number of additional satellites

needed to assure survivability of a required

72C. Meinel, “Near-Earth Asteroids: Potential Bonanza for

Ambitious Military Space Projects, ” Defense Sa”ence 2003 +,

February-March 1985, p. 40 ff.

number of them would depend on enemy

ASAT capabilities. The extra satellites could

be placed in orbit or else kept on Earth to be

launched into orbit after an ASAT attack to

replenish those satellites destroyed by the

attack.

Unless on-orbit spare satellites are also deployed, replenishment could not be relied on

to maintain uninterrupted performance of satellite function, which is essential for such applications as early warning of missile attack

and other strategic command and control functions. If it is cost-effective for an enemy to negate an operational satellite, it would probably

be cost-effective for the enemy to negate

replacements, if enemy ASAT capability survives. It would also be cost-effective for an

enemy to maintain enough ASAT weapons or

fuel to avoid exhaustion of ASAT capability

before replenished satellites can be negated.

Hence replenishment appears unattractive as

a countermeasure unless enemy ASAT capability can be destroyed before replenishment

is attempted, and unless the satellites to be

replaced need not function without interruption.

Proliferation-On-orbit Spares

Spare satellites could also be pre-deployed

in orbit, where they could remain dormant until needed or else be used routinely to provide

redundant capability in peacetime. Dormant

satellites would need to listen for radio commands to activate and might need to report

their status occasionally but in general would

require little power generation, cooling, attitude control, or exposure of antennas or other

sensors while dormant and could be made

harder than operational satellites. Their armor

could have a simple shape easily mimicked by

inexpensive decoys; hence proliferation of onorbit spares would work more effectively in

conjunction with hiding, deception, and hardening measures. However, an enemy which can

negate an operating satellite might be able, by

the same means, to negate an on-orbit spare

once it became operational. Proliferating and

simulating dormant spare satellites will not

preserve the functioning of a constellation of
83

satellites if the spares can be identified and

negated quickly and cheaply after being

brought “on-line.” Hence the use of on-orbit

spares would be most attractive if enemy

A SAT weapons could be themselves negated

soon after space combat begins.

Proliferation—Modularization and Segregation

Another form of proliferation is the partitioning of satellite subsystems into modules

which can be segregated and deployed on

different satellites. For example, the function

of a high-capacity comsat could be performed

by several small comsats which pass message

“packets” to one another over radio or laser

crosslinks.7s Functions such as stationkeeping

might be performed by maneuverable satellite

‘‘tenders, each of which could visit one satellite after another, adjusting their positions

and velocities as needed. Segregation of subsystems would require forgoing economies of

scale in peacetime in order to reduce vulnerability.

Combined Passive Countermeasures

Passive countermeasures work better in

combination than individually. For example,

use of decoys for deception would confer little protection against some (e.g., nuclear)

A SAT weapons unless maneuver were used to

disperse the decoys. It is therefore important

to consider the effectiveness of “packages” of

passive countermeasures against various

ASAT capabilities, which can also supplement

and complement one another and which should

also be considered packages, or postures,

Active countermeasures could, and probably

would, be used to complement passive countermeasures unless prohibited by a comprehensive ban on possession of ASAT weapons.

Hence in hypothesizing ASAT threats to be

countered by passive measures alone, it is

appropriate to consider as threats only those

capabilities which are unlikely to be banned

or those which might be developed and deployed (or retained) covertly. The former in-

‘-’The L~efense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPAI

is investigating the feasibility of a packet-switched network of

transponders on low-altitude satellites, or on Earth,

Figure 4-14.— Low-Cost Packet-Switching

Communications Satellite

The Global Low-Orbiting Message Relay Satellite (GLOMR), shown

here, is designed to receive messages sent to It, store them, and relay

them to ground facilities. The GLOMR program of the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAR PA) is intended to

demonstrate that communications satellites operating in this manner

can be produced at relatively low cost. If sufficiently Inexpensive,

such satellites could be deployed at lower cost than the cost of

attacking them with some types of ASAT weapons, and so many could

be deployed that other weapons might require a long t!me to destroy

most of them

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

elude nondestructive ASAT capabilities (e.g.,

ECM and E-OCM), and inherent ASAT capabilities of allowed weapons (e.g., ICBMS); the

latter include the existing Soviet coorbital interceptor, direct-ascent and coorbital nuclear

interceptors, space-based or pop-up X-ray laser

weapons, and possibly ground-based lasers. Of

these, the nuclear weapons might be based in

space disguised as, or aboard, a different type

o; satellite, the presence of which would be-ob-
84

servable but the nature of which might be impossible to ascertain except by prolonged close

observation or invasive sensing techniques.74

In general, nonnuclear space-based weapons

could not be expected, with confidence, to perform well, unless they had been previously–

and observably—tested in space.

Active Measures

Passive countermeasures against ASAT attacks may be supplemented by active measures intended to deter ASAT attack or to defend satellites if deterrence should fail. Active

measures can therefore be used for either

defensive or retaliatory purposes. Defensive

active measures are active countermeasures

against ASAT attacks. Retaliatory active

measures do not counter ASAT attacks but

instead fulfill explicit or implied threats of

retaliation which were intended to deter ASAT

attacks. Active measures used for either purpose can be either nondestructive (e.g., electronic countermeasures and electro-optical

countermeasures) or destructive (e.g., shootback), as shown in table 4-5.

Defensive Countermeasures

Shoot-Back.–” Shoot-back” usually refers

to counter-attacking spacebased ASAT weapons, but can also denote counter-attacks

against the ground segment of A SAT weapon

systems (e.g., satellite control facilities). Many

weapons capable of shoot-back would themselves be subject to shoot-back, making the

“E. g., see U.S. Patent 4,320,298.

Table 4.5.—Active Measures Against ASAT Attack

Defensive measures:

Nondestructive

e.g., jamming

Destructive

shoot-back

attack on ground-based ASAT command and

control facilities

Retaliatory measures:

ASAT counterattack

(retaliation in kind)

Horizontal escalation

(to terrestrial theaters) ———

effectiveness of shoot-back highly dependent

on the types and numbers of ASAT and other

weapons deployed and on the incentives for

preemptive attack which ASAT weapon vulnerabilities, if any, could create. Analysis of

the effectiveness of shoot-back is therefore

very complicated in general, although simple

in certain important cases.

For example, shoot-back would be ineffective

against expendable, single-shot space mines employing kinetic-energy, directed-energy, or nuclear destructive mechanisms. Such weapons

would damage their targets almost instantly,

if at all, and destroy themselves in the process, leaving nothing of value to shoot back at.

Moreover, shoot-back using sequential-fire

weapons which are vulnerable to attack by expendable, single-shot weapons would be ineffective, because they could be damaged by single

shot weapons after attacking only one target.

However, space-based single-shot ASAT weapons would themselves be subject to preemptive attack—i.e., “shoot-first” instead of

“shoot-back.” If such weapons were mutually

deployed in space, if each such weapon could

instantly destroy several similar weapons and

if such weapons were not salvage-fused to fire

if disturbed, the resulting preemptive advantage could cause a condition of “crisis instability, ” in which each nation, desiring peace

but fearing (perhaps mistakenly) an imminent

attack by the other, would have reason to initiate hostilities.7s

However, it is conceivable that even if such

incentives should induce escalation from peace

or low-level conflict to war in space, the preemptive ASAT attack which would begin such

a war might reduce incentives for further escalation, either “vertically” (to higher levels

of conflict) or horizontally (to other theaters

of conflict, e.g., Earth). For example, if the

United States and the U.S.S.R. continue to

possess strategic offensive missile forces of

considerable counterforce capability, and if

each were to deploy a large BMD system

‘

5 See M.B. Callaham and F.M. Scibilia, Proceedings of the

Society of Phot~Optical Instrumentation Engineers, vol. 474,

1984, pp. 107-114.
85

which relied on vulnerable space-based components, then each nation might fear that the

other nation (also fearing a preemptive attack)

might attack these BMD components preemptively with some confidence that its BMD system could limit damage from a retaliatory missile attack, if any. Each nation would therefore

have an incentive to attack the other’s space

based BMD components preemptively. However, after having done so, the attacker would

have no motive to launch a preemptive, damage-limiting missile attack, because it could

assume that the other nation—now highly vulnerable to retaliation-would not seriously

consider such an option. Hence, under these

assumptions, escalation instability would exist during crises in peacetime (thus “crisis instability’ but not at the level of war confined

to space.

It might be supposed that the crisis instability which would accompany mutual deployment of such weapons could be eliminated by

salvage-fusing them to fire if disturbed in certain ways (presumably indicative of an attack).

If salvage-fusing were feasible and actually

used (or believed to be used), there might be

little incentive to fire first even if an attack

were expected. However, salvage-fusing some

types of weapons against some other types

may be inordinately difficult or infeasible.

Moreover, even though an “intelligent”

salvage-fusing system might be able to distinguish among different types of disturbances,

it could not be made completely reliable or infallible in discrimination, so there would be a

risk that some natural disturbance (e.g., a meteoroid impact) might trigger such a weapon

to fire, possibly at several similar enemy weapons, possibly triggering them to fire, etc. Similar consequences could follow an accidental

attack or a “catalytic” attack by a third party.

Moreover, if salvage-fused spacebased weapons only held an enemy’s spacebased assets

at risk, the prospect of losing such assets in

retaliation for an attack might be considered

an acceptable or favorable trade by a nation

less dependent on space assets.

Regardless of whether salvage-fusing were

employed, mutual deployment of singlepulse

weapons would not be expected to create

strong proliferation incentives: with mutual

salvage-fusing each side could plausibly lose

all its important space assets in such an exchange regardless of whether it had many such

weapons or only a few deployed; it would

therefore have no incentive to deploy more

weapons than would be required to negate all

threatening satellites except single-pulse

ASAT weapons, against which neither

preemptive attack nor shoot-back would be effective. Without salvage-fusing, the side which

failed to preempt could plausibly lose all its

important space assets in such an exchange

regardless of whether it had many such weapons or only a few deployed, and would therefore gain nothing by deploying many weapons.

Electronic Countermeasures and Electro-Optical

Countermeasures.–Active electronic and

electro-optical countermeasures (jamming,

blinding, and spoofing) could be used against

some near-term ASAT command uplink systems, KEW homing systems, and DEW acquisition, tracking, and pointing systems which

have inadequate counter-countermeasures.

Attack on Ground-Based ASAT Weapons or

Support Systems.—At present there appear to

be only two launch pads for Soviet coorbital

interceptors, both at Tyuratam, and only two

Soviet ground-based lasers of significant

ASAT capability, both at Sary Shagan. Hence

attacking such ground-based facilities with

conventional or nuclear weapons could be very

effective, especially if preemptive, but would

be viewed by some in the United States as escalator with respect to attacking or defending satellites using nonnuclear weapons.

Retaliatory Measures

The ability to respond to ASAT attack by

active measures could be maintained and publicized in an attempt to deter such an attack

in the first place. Postures and policies intended to enhance deterrence could act as adjuncts to or substitutes for active and passive

countermeasures. Even in the event of deployment of advanced ASAT weapons such as expendable single-pulse lasers against which
86

“shoot-back’ and passive measures might be

ineffective, postures and policies intended to

enhance deterrence could enhance security, although they cannot guarantee security.

In pursuing security through deterrence, it

is appropriate to develop retaliatory capabilities which place at risk targets of sufficient

value to deter attack and which do not exacerbate crisis instability. The first of these considerations implies that to deter ASAT attack,

retaliation need not necessarily be “in kind”—

i.e., against satellites. In fact, an ability to retaliate in kind, however thoroughly or swiftly,

would be inadequate to deter an ASAT attack

if the attacking nation valued destruction of

enemy satellites more than survival of its own.

For example, if the U.S.S.R. developed a capability to quickly destroy all on-orbit U.S.

satellites, then even if the United States could

destroy all on-orbit Soviet satellites in retaliation, the U.S. capability to mount such a

retaliatory response —although valuable in the

event—might not deter a Soviet first use of

ASAT weapons. Soviet leaders might judge

the continued deployment of U.S. MILSATS

to be more detrimental to Soviet interests than

survival of Soviet MILSATS is valuable to Soviet interests. If this were the case, an ability

to retaliate against [more valuable] terrestrial

assets would be required to successfully deter an ASAT attack. Such retaliatory capabilities might be provided by terrestrial or space

based weapons. [A separate, classified appendix to this report (Appendix D) contains a

more detailed discussion of the utility of military satellites to the United States and to the

U. S. S. R.]

The second consideration—avoidance of crisis instability—precludes reliance on destabilizing weapons to provide retaliatory capabilities. Space-based ASAT weapons capable

of instantly destroying several satellites, including similar ASAT weapons, would be most

destabilizing unless salvage-fused but would

be prone to accidental firing if salvage-fused.

By comparison, an ideal weapon for deterring

ASAT attack would be nonnuclear and hence

usable at all levels of conflict without escalating the level of conflict. It could survive a

preemptive attack and destroy enemy assets

of sufficient value to deter an attack while

causing little collateral damage.

Diplomatic Measures

In addition to the military measures discussed above, diplomatic measures such as

arms control initiatives and negotiation of

“rules of the road” for space operations could

be useful responses to foreign development of

threatening ASAT capabilities. The variety of

possible measures is great, and assessment of

their advantages is complicated; this topic is

discussed in detail in chapter 6.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS REGARDING ASAT CAPABILITIE S

AND COUNTERMEASURE S

The most important conclusions which may 2.

be drawn from the preceding discussion of

ASAT capabilities and countermeasures are:

1. Nonnuclear ASAT weapons which are

now deployed or being tested by the

United States and the U.S.S.R. are limited in altitude capability and responsiveness and can attack only a subset of 3.

currently deployed opposing MILSATS,

although this subset includes important

MILSATS.

The inherent A SAT capabilities of existing nuclear weapons such as U.S. and Soviet ICBMS and Soviet ABM interceptor

missiles are substantial. Such weapons

could pose a threat even to satellites in

synchronous orbit, but are useful only at

the highest levels of conflict.

Technologies applicable to future ASAT

weapons are so varied, and many so promising, that future ASAT weapons, if developed, would be able to attack and dis-
87 — --

able virtually all MILSATS of current

types as currently deployed. Hence to

maintain the survivability of constellations of future MILSATS, it will be necessary that the development and deployment of such weapons be constrained by

arms control or that future satellites be

protected from them by passive or active

countermeasures, or that a combination

of these approaches be pursued.

4. Of individual passive countermeasures

5

6.

which might be used against advanced

ASAT weapons, only deception (use of de

coys) is likely to be effective against all

types of ASAT weapons, and deception

is likely to be economical (relative to the

offense) only if the decoys, and the satellites they mimic, are lightweight and inexpensive. Use of deception in combination with maneuver, hardening, and

proliferation might offer economical protection for lightweight satellites.

Active countermeasures—electronic countermeasures, electro-optical countermeasures, and shoot-back—would be ineffective against an aggressive or preemptive

surprise attack using expendable, singleshot ASAT weapons (e.g., kinetic-energy,

directed-energy, and nuclear “space

mines”). Actively defending keep-out

zones around critical satellites might be

able to protect such satellites against emplacement of short-range space mines but

not against advanced, long-range space

mines.

Of future ASAT weapons now foreseeable, those which would be most effective

if used in a preemptive or aggressive surprise attack—i.e., expendable, single-shot

ASAT weapons–would be space-based

and therefore subject to such attacks by

similar weapons. The cost of protecting

them from such attacks—which must necessarily be by passive means—would exceed the cost of attacking them. Such

weapons, if mutually deployed, would pro

vide or increase incentives to attack

preemptively in crises in which similar attacks are anticipated. Salvage-fusing such

weapons to fire if disturbed would reduce .

7.

8.

but not necessarily eliminate incentives

to preempt but would increase risks of accidental attack.

A capability to confirm the occurrence

and identify the perpetrator of an A SAT

attack and to retaliate in proportion, but

not necessarily in kind, might deter

ASAT attacks. A capability to retaliate

in kind—i.e., against the attacker’s satellites-could contribute to deterrence, if

this capability were survivable, but if this

capability were vulnerable to ASAT attack, it could undermine deterrence by

posing an opponent an incentive to attack

preemptively. However, a capability to

retaliate in kind would be inadequate to

deter an ASAT attack by an adversary

nation which values destruction of U.S.

satellites more highly than survival of its

own.

Strict arms control measures could not be

expected to eliminate the inherent ASAT

capabilities of weapons such as ICBMS

nor provide complete confidence that no

ASAT weapons have been developed and

deployed covertly. In an arms control regime which bans ASAT weapons, use of

passive countermeasures would be required to reduce the residual risk posed

by weapons such as ICBMS. However,

prohibiting the testing of A SAT capabilities of weapons would preclude the attainment of confidence that certain types

of advanced, nonnuclear ASAT weapons

would perform reliably if used and would

therefore also reduce incentives to develop such weapons or to attempt to deploy them covertly. A ban on testing

would also render more difficult, costly,

and risky any attempt to attain confidence, by covert testing, that other types

of advanced, nonnuclear ASAT weapons

(e.g., ground-based lasers) would perform

reliably if used and would therefore also

reduce incentives to develop such weapons or to attempt to deploy them covertly.

Prohibiting the basing in space of weapons

with ASAT capabilities, to the extent that

compliance with such a ban could be verified,
88

would forestall the creation of strong incen- spacecraft could reduce the ambiguity of such

tives to attack such weapons preemptively provocative acts and thereby reduce the risk

when a similar attack is feared. Even in the of ASAT attack resulting from misunderabsence of such strict restraints, if ASAT standing, while providing a legal basis for anweapons are based in space, an agreement ban- ticipatory self-defense against ASAT weapons

ning unauthorized close approach to foreign of short effective range.
Chapter 5

ASAT Arms Control: History
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Constraints Imposed by Treaties and Agreements en force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Charter of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Limited Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

The 1967 0uter Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I&II)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

International Political Barriers to ASAT Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

ASAT Negotiations—Past and Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

1978-79 Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ., ., 96

Soviet Draft Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Congressional Interest in ASAT Arms Control and

Executive Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Current Activities in ASAT Arms Control . ...............,........101
Chapter 5

ASAT Arms Control: History

This

ASAT

INTRODUCTIO N

chapter discusses the constraints on

development imposed by the treaties

and agreements currently in force. It also

briefly examines the history of ASAT weapons development and deployment, and describes the previous attempt by the United

States and the Soviet Union to conclude a

treaty further restricting such weapons. The

issue of ASAT weapons and ASAT arms control, a politically volatile topic, has stimulated

considerable interest in the U.S. Congress over

the last several years; this chapter also discusses the history of the major pieces of legislation in the 97th, 98th, and 99th Congresses

(1981-85) which concerned ASAT negotiations

and weapons development.

Chapter 4 examined how certain passive and

active ASAT countermeasures might contribute to U.S. national security and provide protection for critical space assets. Building on

the historical background presented in this

chapter, chapter 6 will examine the contribution that ASAT arms control might make to

these same goals, analyzing a number of potential ASAT arms control regimes and identifying those which might be appropriate for

the United States to pursue. The interaction

between technical countermeasures and arms

control is examined in chapter 7.

CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY TREATIES AN D

AGREEMENTS IN FORC E

To evaluate future space arms control measures it is first necessary to understand the constraints that existing treaties and other international agreements place on military space

activities. No single treaty fully specifies

which space activities are allowed and which

prohibited, and existing agreements do not apply uniformly to all countries. All nations are

presumably bound by the provisions of the

Charter of the United Nations,’ customary international law, and the “general principles of

law recognized by civilized nations.’” States

party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’ and the

Limited Test Ban Treaty4 accept additional re

striations on their space activities. The United

States and the Soviet Union agreed bilaterally

in the context of SALT I (the ABM Treaty5

and the Interim Agreement to limit offensive

arms) not to disturb the function of satellites

used to verify compliance with those treaties

and to forgo the development of space weapons to counter ballistic missiles. The relevant

provisions of these instruments are discussed

below.

1 As a general rule, only states party to a treaty are bound

by its terms. An exception to this rule appears in Article 2 (6)

of the U.N. Charter which provides: “The Organization shall

insure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance the Principles (of the Charter) so far as

may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace

and security. ” Charter of the United Nations, 1970 Yearbook

of the United Nations, p. 1001. See also: Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (3d cd., 1979).

‘Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38, 1970

Yearbook of the United Nations, p. 1013.

“’Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon

and Other Celestial Bodies, ” 18 U.S,T. 2410; T. I.A.S. 6347.

“’Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,

in Outer Space and Under Water, “14 U. S.T. 1313, T. I.A. S.

5433.

“’Treaty Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the

Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, ” Oct. 3, 1972, 23

U.S.T. 3435, T. I.A.S. 7503.

91
92

Charter of the United Nations6

Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter directs nations to “settle their international disputes by

peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are

not endangered.” Article 2(4) requires that nations “refrain . . . from the threat or use of

force . . . in any . . . manner inconsistent with

the purposes of the United Nations. ” It could

be argued that these statements and other

general principles of customary international

law in some ways inhibit the use of ASATS.

7

It is important to note that the responsibilities imposed by Article 2 of the U.N. Charter are modified by Article 51, which states,

“Nothing in the present charter shall impair

the inherent right of individual or collective

self-defense. ” Taken together, Articles 2 and

51 do indicate general international censure

of the use of force, but do not limit specific

weapon systems.

Limited Test Ban Treaty8

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits nuclear weapons tests “or any other nuclear explosion “ in outer space, as well as in

the atmosphere or under water. The treaty

therefore prohibits the testing, in space, of exotic ASAT weapons that would derive their

power from a nuclear explosiong—a consequence probably not anticipated by the treaty’s

drafters. The Limited Test Ban Treaty would

not limit the development or testing, on Earth

%upra, note 1.

‘Terrestrial international law is explicitly extended to space

by Article III of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states

that the exploration and use of outer space shall be conducted

“in accordance with international law, including the Charter

of the United Nations. ”

‘Supra, note 4.

‘An additional limitation on nuclear-pumped space weapons

can be found in the “Threshold Test Ban Treaty” of 1974. Article 1 prohibits tests of nuclear weapons greater than 150 kilotons in yield, bannin g even underground testing of any nucleardriven weapon requiring an explosion larger than that. The

Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed by the United States

but has yet to be ratified. “Treaty Between the United States

of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, ” reprinted

in, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency (1982 cd.), p. 167.

or in space, of other nonnuclear components

for such weapon systems. The power source

could be tested underground on Earth,1° as are

other nuclear weapons, and the nonnuclear

components could be tested separately in

space.

The 1967 Outer Space Treatyll

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty states

that space activities shall be carried out in

accordance with international law “in the interest of maintaining international peace and

security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. ” This Article expresses the sentiment of the drafters that

space be used to benefit mankind and contribute to peace.

In contrast to the general language of Article III, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty

establishes a clear prohibition against placing

“in orbit around Earth any objects carrying

nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. ”12 Orbiting weapons

using nuclear explosions for power would presumably be included. This provision does not

limit ground-based ASATS or ASATS which

use conventional explosives or other means to

destroy a target. Neither does it ban nucleararmed “pop up” ASAT interceptors that

ascend directly to their targets without entering into orbit.13

. —

IOSubject to other treaty limitations-see previous note.

“Supra, note 3.

“According to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, chief U.S.

negotiator of the Outer Space Treaty, weapons of mass destruction include “any type of weapon which could lead to the same

type of catastrophe that a nuclear weapon could lead to” (Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Executive D, 90th Cong., 1st sess., p. 23. ) In 1948, the U.N, Commission for Conventional Armaments advised the Security

Council that the term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ would include, “atomic weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal

chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed

in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above. ” (Resolution adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments at its 13th meeting, Aug. 12, 1948. U.N.

Security Council, S/C.3/32/Rev. 1, Aug. 18, 1948.)

‘~esting of such weapons which involved detonating nuclear

warheads in space would be banned by the Limited Test Ban

Treaty.
93

Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty directs

nations to “undertake appropriate international consultations” before proceeding with

any activity that might cause “potentially

harmful interference with the activities of

other states in the peaceful exploration and

use of outer space. ” It is possible to argue that

states developing ASATS (weapons intended

to cause “harmful interference”) should do so

only after ‘‘appropriate international consultations. ” Nonetheless, the vague wording of

Article IX and the forced nature of such an

interpretation reduce the Article’s value as an

arms control provision.14

Taken together, the provisions of the Outer

Space Treaty afford satellites some measure

of legal protection against attack. The precise

nature of this protection is unclear since the

treaty was not drafted for the specific purpose

of limiting deliberate hostile activities. The

treaty clearly does not limit the development,

testing, or deployment of nonnuclear weapons

capable of interfering with satellites of other

nations; moreover, the U.N. Charter provision

for self-defense might be taken to permit such

interference in some cases.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT I & 11)’5

The verification provisions of SALT I and

II state that the parties shall use “national

technical means” (NTM) of verification to

liThe ‘‘Accident~ Measures’ Agreement of 1971 IW@IWS the

United States and the Soviet Union to “notify each other immediately in the event of . . . signs of interference with [missile

warning systems] or with reiated communication facilities. ”

However, this agreement places no limitations on the development or use of ASAT capabilities. “Agreement on Measures

to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the

United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, ” reprinted in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 159.

“’’Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive

Arms” (SALT 1) reprinted in, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agreements, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

(1982 cd.), p. 139.; “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (SALT 11), reprinted in U.S.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Arms Control and Dismonitor adherence to the Agreements. NTM

is understood, though not explicitly specified,

to include certain reconnaissance satellite systems. The SALT Agreements further state

that “Each Party undertakes not to interfere

with the [NTM] of the other Party” as long

as these assets are operated “in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of

international law. ” The SALT Agreements implicitly sanction the use of satellites for verification of treaty compliance and provide some

measure of protection against peacetime attack

on these assets. These Agreements do not, however, restrict the development, testing, or

deployment of ASAT systems capable of attacking NTM. In addition, whatever legal pro

tection these Agreements provide is limited

to systems used to verify the SALT Agreements. Other space systems used for combat

support during hostilities would not be protected under the SALT provisions.

Article IX of SALT II prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of “systems

for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons

or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. ”

This provision was included to limit the development of Fractional Orbital Bombardment

Systems (FOBS), in which missiles enter partial Earth orbit and fly the long way around

the Earth rather than taking the much more

direct trajectory of normal ICBMS. However,

this provision could also be read as expanding the prohibition of Article IV of the Outer

Space Treaty. Whereas Article IV prohibits

only the act of orbiting nuclear weapons, Article IX of SALT 11 would seem to prohibit

in addition the development, testing and deployment of systems (e.g., launchers) to accomplish the orbiting of these weapons. So

interpreted, Article IX could create an additional legal barrier to the development of

—.—— —

armament Agreements (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1982), p. 246.

The completed SALT 11 agreement was signed by President

Carter and GeneraI Secretary Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. Although Senate consent to ratification has not been given, Presidents Carter and Reagan both declared that they would do nothing to jeopardize the treaty as long as the Soviet Union abided

by it.
94

orbital, nuclear-pumped, directed-energy

weapons.

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty’B

In the ABM Treaty, the United States and

the Soviet Union agreed not to deploy anti-ballistic missiles except under the very limited

conditions set forth in the treaty .17 Each party

also undertook not to “develop, test, or deploy

ABM systems or components which are seabased, air-based, space-based, or mobile

land-based. ”

The distinction between advanced ASAT

and BMD technologies is not always clear. As

noted by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in

a report to Congress, Ia directed-energy weap16’’ Treaty Between the United States of America and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems, ” supra, note 5.

“Article III limits each side to two fixed, ground-based ABM

deployment areas (later reduced to one), each of which has limitations on radar facilities and interceptors and launchers.

Agreed Statement D provides that should ABM systems based

on other physical principles than missile interceptors be developed in the future, these would be subject to discussion and

agreement. Unless such systems were explicitly permitted by

future agreement, they would continue to be banned.

‘UC. Weinberger, Fiscal Year 1985 Annual Report to Congress

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February

1984), p. 263.

ons “could perform a variety of missions, such

as antisatellite or ballistic missile defense. ”

For the purposes of the ABM Treaty, “an

ABM system is a system to counter strategic

ballistic missiles or their elements in flight

trajectory. “ Therefore, ASAT weapons would

be prohibited by the ABM Treaty if they were

capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles. * Such systems are banned unless they

are fixed, land-based and deployed at permitted sites. The testing of ASAT weapons

of lesser capability would not be inhibited by

the treaty. If an ASAT weapon became capable of intercepting missiles, it would fall within

the terms of the ABM treaty. This capability

test includes future systems having components “based on other physical principles”

than those of the ABM system components

(interceptors, launchers, and radars) described

in Article 11 of the treaty. However, the ABM

Treaty does not control highly capable ASAT

systems lacking ABM capability, and it does

not clearly indicate how such capability is to

be inferred.

*The ABM Treaty is discussed in grater detail in OTA’S report, Ballistic Missi/e Defense Technolo~”es, OTA-ISC-281,

app. A.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL BARRIERS T O

ASAT DEVELOPMEN T

Although there are few clear international

legal barriers to ASAT development, the desire of the United States to remain in some

way responsive to international opinion creates certain inhibitions to the unrestrained

pursuit of weapons that are based or operate

in space. In the United Nations and other international fora, the United States and, to a

lesser extent the Soviet Union, have been criticized for their military activities in space.

Some view the “militarization” or “weaponization” of space as breaking a de facto political taboo; others see it as a violation of customary international law. Some of our allies,

responding to strong domestic political pressures to limit the arms race, see U.S. and Soviet cooperation in controlling space weapons

as one means to reduce international tension.

It is important to note, therefore, that there

may be a significant political or diplomatic

cost to developing space weapons.

Opposition to “space weapons” derives, in

part, from the belief that space is a unique

environment which must be preserved for

“peaceful” activities and should be responsive

to international controls. The “uniqueness” of

space is seen as deriving from the fact that

some space activities, such as remote sensing

and satellite communications are inherently
95

global in effect; i.e., they pass over the territory of other countries and may require international coordination, such as frequency allocation. These characteristics have resulted in

the development of a number of successful international institutions such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the

International Telecommunication Satellite

Organization (INTELSAT), and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT).

The fact that certain space activities have

been the subject of international controls has

fostered a belief among some that all space

activities should somehow require international consent. In this view, an unrestrained

arms race between the United States and the

Soviet Union in space is seen as threatening

the interests of nations not having strong

space programs as well as being a threat to

peace.

The United Nations, and in particular its

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space (COPUOS), has been responsible for five

international treaties dealing with space. Each

of these treaties emphasizes to some degree

the necessity that the exploration and use of

space be for “peaceful purposes. In addition,

many world leaders (including every President

of the United States since Eisenhower), scholars, and jurists have, since the beginning of

the space age, emphasized the unique nature

of space and its ability to contribute to peace

and the common good.

Having been nurtured for over 25 years, the

idea that space is a unique environment which

should be used for peaceful purposes has come

to be considered by some to be a principle of

customary international law. As a result, the

development of weapons which would operate

in or through space has met with strong opposition in international fora.

The 1982 General Assembly Resolution on

the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer

Space” reflects this international concern. ’g

The Resolution reaffirms the belief of the General Assembly that “space [activities] should

be for peaceful purposes and carried on for the

benefit of all peoples, ” and notes “the important and growing contribution of satellites

for . . . the verification of disarmament agreements and . . . their use to promote peace, stability and international cooperation. ” Pointing out the “threat posed by anti-satellite

systems and their destabilizing effect for international peace and security, ” the Resolution urges all states “to contribute actively to

the goal of preventing an arms race in outer

space and to refrain from any action contrary

to that aim. ” Finally, it requests the U.N.

Committee on Disarmament to consider “the

question of negotiating effective and verifiable

agreements aimed at preventing an arms race

in space.

“’U. N.G.A. Dec. A 36192, .4ug. 11. 1982.

ASAT NEGOTIATIONS–PAST AND PRESEN T

Background

The first test of a weapon against a satellite was conducted by the United States in

1959 when a Bold Orion missile launched from

a B-47 aircraft successfully passed within 20

miles of the U.S. Explorer VI satellite as it

passed over Cape Canaveral. In 1963 and

1964, the U.S. Army operated a system of

nuclear-armed direct-ascent ASAT interceptors on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

From 1964 until 1970, another such system

was maintained on Johnston Island by the Air

Force; this system was formally decommissioned in 1975. z0

‘(’Marcia Smith, “ ‘Star W’ars’: Antisatellites and Space-Based

BMD” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional

Research Service, Issue Brief 11381123, Nov. 26, 1984); Paul

Stares, “Deja Vu: The ASAT Debate in Historical Context, ”

,4rms Control Toda)’, December 1983, p. 2.
96 — — — — —

The Soviet Union initiated a series of ASAT

tests in 1968 which continued through 1971.2

’

Although the United States suspected that

the Soviets were developing an “inspect and

destroy” capability, this system was not seen

as posing so significant a threat to U.S. assets

that a response was necessary. However, when

the Soviets conducted another series of ASAT

tests between 1976 and 1978, U.S. officials began to express concern.

The Carter Administration adopted a “twotrack” policy. In March 1977, President Carter

announced that he had suggested to the Soviets that “we forgo the opportunity to arm

satellite bodies and also to forgo the opportunity to destroy observation satellites. ’22 Also

in that month, the Department of Defense announced that U.S. military space programs

were being accelerated.23

1978-79 Negotiations

The Soviets responded positively to Carter’s

proposal for ASAT negotiations and in March

1978, agreement was reached on an exploratory meeting. Three rounds of the ASAT limitation talks were held: June 8-16, 1978, in Helsinki; January 23-February 16, 1979, in Bern;

and April 23-June 15, 1979, in Vienna. The

third round of talks ended when the two sides

felt they had gone as far as they could without further consultation and study in their

respective countries.24 According to Ambassador Robert W. Buchheim, head of the U.S.

delegation for most of the 1978-79 ASAT

talks, the two delegations agreed that when

either decided that it was ready to resume active negotiations, the other party would be so

notified through diplomatic channels.25 Al-

—21 Soviet S~ace Programs: 1976-$0, Committee Print, Senate

Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation, 97th

Cong., 2d sess., December 1982, p. 184.

Z~The ~~ash~n~on Post, Mar. 10, 1977, p. A4.

231 bid.

“Lynn F. Rusten, “Soviet Policy on Antisatellite (ASAT)

Arms Control” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 84-670-S, June 22, 1984), p. 1.

25’’Arms Control and the Militarization of Space, ” Hearings

Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S.J. Res. 129, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2d

sess., Sept. 20, 1982, pp. 54-55.

though neither side formally withdrew from

the negotiations, after the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, the U.S. refusal to ratify the

SALT II Treaty, and a general deterioration

of U.S.-Soviet relations, discussions never

resumed.

The 1978-79 talks did not result in an ASAT

arms control agreement; however, they did

clarify some of the concerns of the two parties. The talks focused on two main topics:

limits on ASAT use, and limits on the development of ASAT capabilities.2G

During the 1978-79 negotiations, as now, the

different status of the U.S. and Soviet ASAT

programs was a substantial impediment to

progress. The Soviet ASAT system was considered by the United States to be “operational, ” whereas the potentially more capable

American system had yet to be tested. A

limited moratorium or treaty would have

given the United States time to conduct

ground-based research and development while

inhibiting Soviet ASAT weapons tests in

space. An indefinite test ban, on the other

hand, might have locked the United States

into a position of ASAT inferiority.

Soviet Draft Treaties

In 1981 and again in 1983, the Soviets submitted draft space weapon treaties to the

United Nations.27 U.S. experts disagree as to

why the Soviets have continued to advocate

space weapon arms control. One theory holds

that the Soviet interest is not in arms control,

but rather in propaganda. Since the Reagan

Administration was not actively seeking limitations on space weapons, the Soviets could

portray the United States as being responsible for the escalation of the arms race and the

“For a more detailed discussion of the 1978-79 talks, see:

Walter Slocombe, “Approaches to an ASAT Treaty, ” Space

Weapon~-The Arms Contro] Dilemma. 13hupendra .Jasani (cd.)

(I,ondon: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p. 149; and Lynn F. Rusten,

op. cit.

“’’Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space, U.N. General Assembly, Dec.

A/36/192, August 1981; “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use

of Force in Outer Space and From Space Against the Earth,

U.N. ~OC. A138/194, Aug. 26, 1983.
97

“militarization” of space. Another hypothesis

is that the Soviets have a genuine interest in

limiting ASAT technology because this is an

area where the United States would be able

to excel. Since the Soviets have clearly stated

their opposition to the Reagan Administration’s plans to develop spacebased BMD technologies, their interest in arms control in

space—especially after March 1983—could be

intended to inhibit the progress of this program.

The United States refused to participate in

multilateral negotiation with the Soviets on

either the 1981 or 1983 draft treaties. Whatever the true reason or combination of reasons

for Soviet interest in ASAT arms control, the

Soviets have used this issue–and the U.S. refusal to negotiate–effectively in their political propaganda. The Soviet position has been,

until recently, that their space program has

been purely peaceful in nature. Since 1958,

according to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,

the Soviet Union “invariably stated and continues to state that space should be a sphere

of exclusively peaceful cooperation. “28

From an American point of view, the Soviet

propaganda seems absurd since the Soviet

Union has an “operational” ASAT and a very

active military space program. From the point

of view of many nonaligned governments, as

well as important segments of the populations

of our allies, the fact that the Soviet Union was

as responsible for the “militarization of space”

as the United States, or more so, did not lessen

the culpability of the United States for refusing to negotiate. As a result, the Soviet propaganda on the “militarization’ of space was

initially successful in enhancing the international image of the Soviets while fostering criticism of the United States. More recently, the

inability of the United States and the Soviet

Union, in the summer of 1984, to come to an

agreement regarding ASAT weapon and other

arms control negotiations (discussed in detail

.

Z81bid. However, m May 29, 1985, in an interview b a west

German reporter in Geneva, Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, a senior department head on the Soviet General Staff, claimed that

the U.S.S.R. had successfully developed a direct-ascent satellite interceptor similar to that tested by the United States in

the early 1960s and operational until the mid-1970s.

below) served to shift some of the burden of

the “militarization” issue back to the Soviets.

Since their introduction at the United Nations, a good deal of attention has been given

to the language of the two Soviet draft treaties. It is useful to examine these drafts since

they provide valuable insights into how the

Soviets have been thinking about arms control in space.

1981 Soviet Draft Treaty

The provisions of the 1981 and 1983 Soviet

draft treaties reflect the major issues raised

in the 1978-79 negotiations. Articles I and III,

the operative provisions of the 1981 Soviet

draft -

I.

III.

treaty, state:

The member states undertake not to put

into orbit . . . objects with weapons of

any kind, . . . and not to deploy such

weapons in outer space in any other way,

including also on piloted space vessels of

multiple use . . .

Each member shall . . . not destroy, damage, or disturb the normal functioning

and not to alter the flight trajectory of

space vehicles of other member states

where the latter have . . . been put into

orbit in strict accordance with . . . Article I.

Because it prohibited only weapons stationed in orbit, the 1981 draft would not have

restricted the testing, development, and deployment of ground-based or air-launched

ASATS. Accordingly, the United States and

the Soviet Union could have kept their current

ASAT systems and also pursued future technologies such as ground-based or air-borne

directed-energy weapons. The 1981 draft

treaty would, however, have prohibited the de

velopment of space-based BMD systems.

According to Article III of the 1981 draft,

parties would agree not to “destroy, damage,

or disturb the normal functioning and not to

alter the flight trajectory of space vehicles. ”

Presumably, signatories to such a treaty could

agree as to the meaning of the words “destroy, ” “damage,” and “alter the flight trajectory. ” It is less clear that a quick consensus
98

— —.

could be reached on what would be inhibited

under the injunction against “disturbing the

normal functioning. ” Would this prohibit interference with ground stations or the use of

electronic countermeasures such as jamming

or spoofing? Had the treaty been negotiated,

these issues would have certainly been the

subject of great attention and possible compromise.

Article II of the 1981 proposed treaty states

that space vehicles shall be used in “strict accordance with international law. This language seems to reflect the often stated Soviet

belief that certain space activities—e.g., the

operation of direct-broadcast satellites-are a

violation of national sovereignty. However,

under the terms of Article III, the only satellites that would be denied the treaty’s protection would be objects carrying “weapons of

any kind. ”

1983 Soviet Draft Treaty

In August 1983, when then Soviet Chairman

Andropov met with several U.S. Senators he

made the following statement:

. . . (T)he Soviet Union considers it necessary

to come to an agreement on a complete ban

of tests and of deployment of any spacebased weapons for striking targets on Earth,

in the air and in space.

Furthermore, we are ready, in the most radical way, to resolve the issue of anti-satellite

weapons—to agree to eliminate anti-satellite

systems already in existence and to ban creation of new ones.

At the forthcoming session of the General

Assembly of the United Nations, we will introduce proposals developed in detail on all

these issues.zg

As indicated by Chairman Andropov, on

August 22, 1983, Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko submitted a new draft treaty to the

U.N. General Assembly .’” The new draft was

more comprehensive than the 1981 draft, and

.

“’’Dangerous Stalemate: Superpower Relations in Autumn

1983, A Report of a Delegation of Eight Senators to the Soviet Union, ” Senate Dec. 98-16, Sept. 22, 1983, p. 28.

‘“’’Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer

Space and From Space Against the Earth, ” U.N. Doc, A/38/194,

Aug. 22, 1983.

in particular went beyond it in calling for a ban

on all testing of ASAT systems and the elimination of all existing ASAT systems (see appendix A). However, it also repeats many of

the themes of the 1981 draft and of the 1978-

79 negotiations.

Article 1 prohibits the “use or threat of force

in outer space and the atmosphere and on the

Earth through the utilization of . . . space objects” and the “use or threat of force against

space objects. ” The “use or threat of force”

language echoes the language of Article 2 of

the U.N. Charter. Since by the terms of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, the U.N.

Charter already applies to space, it is unclear

what this provision would add to existing international law. Article I does make it clear

that: 1) space objects are not to be used to

threaten objects in “outer space and the atmosphere and on the Earth”; and 2) space objects themselves are not to be threatened. This

article would prohibit threats from spacebased assets—e.g., ASAT or BMD weapons–

and threats to space-based assets, whether

from ground-, air-, sea-, or space-based

systems.

Article 2 has five sections. Section 1 prohibits testing and deploying space-based weapons; this goes well beyond the simple “no-use’

provision of the 1981 draft, which is repeated

in section 2. Section 3 repeats the prohibition

of the 1981 draft against destroying, damaging, disturbing the normal function or changing the flight trajectory of space objects of

other states.

Under section 4 of Article 2, parties agree

not to “test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems

that they may already have. ” There is no attempt in the treaty to define what constitutes

an “anti-satellite system. ” Presumably, it

would include both the proposed U.S. and current Soviet orbital interceptors. It is unclear

how systems, such as the Soviet GALOSH

ABM, which might have some ASAT capability, would be dealt with under the draft treaty.

Section 5 of Article 2 prohibits the “test or

use of manned spacecraft for military, includ-
ing antisatellite, purposes. ” Because of the

limitations that this would place on the U.S.

Space Shuttle, it is unlikely that the United

States would agree to such a provision. In any

case, since the SALT agreements allow verification by “national technical means” (NTM)

and the Shuttle is the launch vehicle for Government payloads—including satellites used

for NTM—this provision would seem to conflict with current Soviet and U.S. agreements.

Congressional Interest in ASAT Arms

Control and Executive Response

Following the introduction of the two Soviet

draft treaties, the Reagan Administration expressed no interest in negotiating these or any

other limitations on ASAT weapons. As time

passed, Members of Congress in both Houses

began to apply pressure on the Administration to halt ASAT testing and to begin negotiations with the Soviets. This pressure was

applied most effectively in amendments to the

Department of Defense authorization and appropriations bills.

The following resolutions concerning space

weapons were introduced in the 97th Congress

(1981 -82).” None of them were reported out of

committee or passed by either House:

Senate Resolution 129 (introduced by

Pressler, R-S. Dak.) calling for resumption

of ASAT limitations talks.

Senate Executive Resolution 7 (Pressler),

calling for negotiation of a protocol to the

1967 Outer Space Treaty that would provide a complete and verifiable ban on

ASAT development, testing, deployment,

and use.

Senate Resolution 488 (Matsunaga, DHawaii)j calling for talks with the Soviet

Union concerning the possibility of establishing a weapons-free international space

station.

31 For a more detailed historv of congressional activity during the 97th and 98th Congres~es, see Marcia S, Smith, “ ‘Star

Mrars’: Antisatellites and SpaceBased BhlD” (J$’ashington, DC:

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Issue

Brief IB81 123, No\’. 26, 1984).

●

99

—

House Joint Resolution 607 (Moakley, DMass. and 29 cosponsors), calling for the

immediate negotiations for a ban on space

weapons of any kind.

The number of bills and resolutions on space

weapons introduced in the 98th Congress

(1983-84) rose dramatically, with all but one

dying in committee.” The exception was

S. J.Res. 129 (Pressler and 28 others), which

was reported favorably out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and significantly

modified before being introduced, and later

withdrawn, as an amendment to the fiscal year

1985 DOD authorization bill. A resolution suggesting that international cooperation in space

be pursued as an alternative to the arms race

was passed by Congress and signed into law

(S. J.Res. 236; Public Law 98-562), but only after most of the language concerning the arms

race had been deleted. The most important actions of the 98th Congress resulted from

amendments to the DOD authorization and

appropriation bills.

The Fiscal Year 1984 DOD Authorization Bill

While the House of Representatives was debating the fiscal year 1984 DOD authorization

bill (H.R. 2969), two amendments concerning

ASAT weapons were introduced. The first, introduced by Representative George Brown (DCalif.), would have denied procurement funding for the ASAT weapon; the second, introduced by Representative Seiberling (D-Ohio),

would have prohibited the flight testing of the

ASAT until authorized by Congress. Both

amendments were defeated.

In the Senate, an amendment introduced by

Senator Tsongas and unanimously passed prohibited the expenditure of funds for tests of

“1.egislati~n not reported from committee in either House

or Senate:

I,egislation Opposed to Space Wreapons: H.J. Res. 87 (Kastenmeier, D-W’is. ); H.J. Res. 120 (Moakley, D-Mass. and 130 others);

S J.Res. 28 (Tsongas, D-Mass. and 8 others); H. J.Res. 523

(I)icks, D-W’ash. and 58 othersl and 524 (Dicks and 55 others);

1l..J. Res. 53 I (Brown, D-Calif. and 96 othersj.

Z,egislation in F’a\or of Space J{’capons: S.Res. 100 {W’allop,

lt-W’jo. and 14 othersl: S, 2021 (.Armstrong, R-CO1O.I: H.Res. 215

(t\’hitehurst, R-\”a. }, H. Res. 259 [Rennett, D-Fla. and 17 others:l:

1{, R. 3073 ( Kramer, R-CO1O. and 13 others)

Source; Sm]th, op. cit.; and Iiibrary of Congress SCORPIO database
100

explosive or inert ASAT weapons (i.e., exempting directed-energy weapons) against objects

in space, unless the President determined and

certified to Congress that: 1) the United States

was endeavoring in good faith to negotiate a

treaty with the Soviet Union for a mutual, verifiable, and comprehensive ban on ASATS; and

2) that pending such an agreement, such tests

were necessary for the national security.

The Fiscal Year 1984 DOD Appropriation Bill

Following a proposal by Representative

McHugh, the House Appropriations Committee deleted the fiscal year 1984 ASAT procure

ment funds pending a report from the President on his policies regarding arms control in

space. The Senate Appropriations Committee

took no similar action, but during floor debate,

the Senate adopted an amendment introduced

by Senator Tsongas requiring the President

to submit a report on the national security implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In the course of the House and Senate conference on the appropriations bill, the conferees agree to provide $19.4 million for advance procurement for the ASAT program as

proposed by the Senate, instead of no funds

as proposed by the House. However, the conferees direct that these funds not be obligated

or expended until 45 days following submission to Congress of a comprehensive report on

U.S. policy on arms control. The appropriations bill, as amended, was passed by both

Houses and signed into law (Public Law 98-

212).

President Reagan’s March 1984 Report on

ASAT Arms Control

On March 31, 1984, the Reagan Administration issued its “Report to the Congress on U.S.

Policy on ASAT Arms Control,” thus satisfying the requirements of the fiscal year 1984

DOD appropriation bill. The report stated that

the Administration was “studying a range of

possible options for space arms control with

a view to possible negotiations with the Soviets. ” However, it concluded that “no arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military activities in outer

space have been found to date that are judged

to be in the overall interest of the United

States and its Allies.” The report stated that

the search for effective ASAT arms control

was impeded by the “difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats to U.S. and Allied satellites and threats posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites which

undermine conventional and nuclear deterrence, ” and it emphasized the necessity for the

development of a U.S. ASAT weapon.

The Fiscal Year 1985 DOD Authorization Bill

When considering the fiscal year 1985 DOD

authorization bill, the House approved an

amendment introduced by Representative

George Brown. The amendment prohibited the

use of funds for ASAT testing against objects

in space until the President certified to Congress that the Soviet Union had conducted an

ASAT test after the enactment of the bill. The

House later accepted an amendment (offered

by Representative Gore) to the Brown amendment which limited testing until the President

certified that either the Soviet Union or another

foreign power had conducted such a test.

The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended that the fiscal year 1984 authorization language restricting ASAT tests be

relaxed to permit ASAT tests against objects

in space provided only that the President certified such tests to be essential for pursuing

arms control arrangements. During floor

debate, the Senate adopted a compromise

amendment offered by Senators Warner and

Tsongas that prohibited spending funds for

testing ASAT weapons against objects in

space until the President certified to Congress:

●

●

that the United States was endeavoring

in good faith to negotiate a mutual and

verifiable agreement with the strictest

possible limitations on ASATS consistent

with the national security interests of the

United States;

that pending agreement on such a ban,

tests against objects in space were necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm

to the national security;
101

● that such testing will not constitute an

irreversible step which will gravely impair

prospects for negotiations; and

 that testing is fully consistent with U.S.

obligations under the ABM Treaty.

With some minor changes, the WarnerTsongas amendment was adopted in the

House and Senate conference report.

The Fiscal Year 1985 DOD Appropriation Bill

Fiscal year 1985 appropriations for the Department of Defense were included in the Continuing Appropriation Bill (Public Law 98-

473). The appropriation bill, as enacted, reflects the compromise reached on the DOD authorization bill. The only differences are that

no tests against an object in space are permitted before March 1, 1985, or 15 days after

the President submits the required certifications, whichever is later, and no more than

three tests against objects in space are permitted in fiscal year 1985.

Current Activities in

ASAT Arms Control

On June 29, 1984, about 3 months after the

President’s March 31 report had been released,

the official Soviet news agency Tass announced

that the Soviet Government had offered to

start talks “to prevent the militarization of

outer space.“33 “To provide favorable conditions for the achievement of agreement, ” Tass

reported that the Soviet Union was prepared,

“to impose on a reciprocal basis a moratorium

on the tests and deployment of these weapons,

starting with the date of the opening of the

talks. 34 The Soviets suggested that such

meetings should take place in Vienna in September 1984.

In response, the Reagan Administration

stated that it was now ready to “discuss and

seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on antisatellite weapons. 35

The Administration also announced that in

addition to discussing space weapons it intended “to discuss and define mutually agree

able arrangements under which negotiations

on the reduction of strategic and intermediate

range nuclear weapons can be resumed. 36

However, the Administration stressed that

there were “no preconditions on the U.S. willingness” to discuss the entire range of arms

control issues.

The Soviets objected to discussing strategic and intermediate-range missiles at the

same time as space weapons. The Soviets proposed that the parties publish a joint public

announcement that would define the purposes

of the talks as being limited to the subject of

space weapons and would endorse the concept

of a moratorium on testing. The United States

responded that it was prepared to talk about

space weapons but that it was not prepared

to agree to a moratorium.37 The Soviets rejected the U.S. position and declared that it

made the talks “impossible. “38 Although the

U.S. Administration sent new messages modifying and “clarifying’ its initial stand, these

too were spurned by the Kremlin.

In the weeks following the initial exchanges

there was little communication between the

parties. The real argument seemed to be over

which side would take the blame for refusing

to negotiate. No meeting was held in September although both Washington and Moscow

continued to express interest in arms control

in space.

Six months later, on January 8, 1985, U.S.

Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko concluded

2 days of talks concerning the structure of future arms control negotiations. They jointly

released a communique indicating that planning would commence on “the forthcoming

U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space

arms” on “a complex of questions concerning

space and nuclear arms, both strategic and in-

“’’Soviet and U.S. Statements on Space Weapons Negotiations, ’ New York Times, June 30, 1984, p. 4.

“Ibid.

‘

b

Ibid.

“Ibid.

“’’Soviets Say U.S. Makes Talks on Space ‘Impossible’, ” The

Washington Post, July 28, 1984, p. Al.

“Ibid.
102

termediate range . . . The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in

space” along with constraining terrestrial

arms and increasing strategic stability.3g

Negotiations between the United States and

the Soviet Union began in Geneva in March

1985. Throughout these negotiations, the Soviet delegation has insisted that the termination of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense

Initiative is a necessary first step to any reduction in offensive arms. U.S. negotiators

have, for their part, argued that advanced ballistic missile defense systems could provide a

means by which both parties could safely negotiate deep reductions in their nuclear arsenals. As a result of this deadlock, both sides

appear to remain far from agreement on antisatellite limitations.

On August 20, 1985, pursuant to the Fiscal Year 1985 DOD Authorization Act (discussed above), the President certified that the

four requirements set out by Congress had

‘“Statement text from The Washington Post, Jam 9, 1985,

p. A14.

been fulfilled.40 President Reagan’s decision to

test the U.S. MV ASAT weapon against an

object in space has reinvigorated congressional debate on the ASAT issue.

The Soviet response to the U.S. ASAT program has fluctuated. In 1983, President Andropov implied that the U.S.S.R. would rescind its self-imposed moratorium on ASAT

testing if the United States began its ASAT

test program. Then, in May 1985, in an interview with a West German reporter, Col. Gen.

Nikolai Chervov, a senior department head of

the Soviet General Staff, stated that the

U.S.S.R. would rescind its moratorium if the

United States completed testing the F-15

launched ASAT weapon. Most recently, the

official Soviet news agency Tass, said that if

the United States “holds tests of antisatellite

weapons against a target in outer space, ” the

Soviet Union “will consider itself free of its

unilateral commitment not to place antisatellite weapons in space. ’

‘“Presidential Determination No, 85-19 of August 20, 1985,

Federal Reg”ster, vol. 50, No. 165, Aug. 26, 1985, pp.

34441-34443.

4’Wtishington Post, Sept. 5, 1985, p. A-17.
Chapter 6

ASAT Arms Control: Options
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

Provisions Restricting ASAT Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106

Monitoring Compliance With a Test Ban. . .........................106

Utility of an ASAT Test Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....109

Provisions Restricting ASAT Possession or Deployment . ...........,..112

Monitoring Compliance With Limitations on

Possession and Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....112

Utility of Limitations on Possession and Deployment . ...............113

Provisions Restricting ASAT Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..114

Monitoring Compliance With a ’’No Use” Agreement . ...............115

Utility of a”No Use’’ Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..115

Provisions Restricting Spacecraft Operation and Orbits. . ..............116

Monitoring Compliance With a ’’Rules of the Road” Agreement . . . . . . .118

Utility of a ’’Rules of the Road’’ Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118

BMD and ASAT Treaties of Limited Duration . ......................119

Compliance Monitoring, Verification, and Recourse . ...................120

Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................120

Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................121

Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......121

Recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....122

Table

Table No. Page

6-1. Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring . ...................110
Chapter 6

ASAT Arms Control: Options

INTRODUCTIO N

This chapter explores how various ASAT

arms control provisions might affect the longterm national security interests of the United

States. The interaction between these arms

control provisions and the unilateral satellite

survivability measures that the United States

might pursue is discussed in greater detail in

chapter 7. Four types of arms control are presented below: restrictions on ASAT testing,

possession, use, and “rules of the road’ for

space. Each of these provisions is described

and an assessment is given of its ability to protect U.S. space assets and contribute to other

long-term U.S. goals. Potential conflicts between ASAT arms control and the development of military capabilities (e.g., the U.S. MV

ASAT program and the Strategic Defense Initiative) are also examined.

The development of anti-satellite weapons

poses a significant threat to the military satellites of both the United States and the Soviet Union. These military satellites, in turn,

provide information and services which can be

threatening to either side. Here lies the inherent difficulty in arriving at acceptable A SAT

arms control agreements-given the choice,

the United States would like to protect its own

satellites while eliminating any military threat

posed by Soviet satellites. ] Since such a onesided advantage is not possible, it is reasonable to examine whether there are mutual restraints that would contribute to national

security and protect U.S. satellites, yet allow

an adequate response to the threat posed by

Soviet satellites.

The debate over ASAT arms control contains many familiar themes: To what extent

‘ Not all So~riet military satellites threaten the United States,

Presumabljr, the L)nited States would like the So\iet IJnion to

retain some reconnaissance and earl?’ warning satellites since

these satellites contribute to stability b~ allowing verification

of arms control agreements and by assuring the So\,iets that

the} are not under nuclear attack,

can the the United States monitor Soviet compliance? Do the Soviets intend to cheat, and

if so, can they? What recourse would the

United States have if faced with either clear

or ambiguous Soviet violations? Is the United

States better off pursuing arms control, technological superiority, or some combination of

both? What will be the response of our allies

to new development programs or arms control

proposals? These issues are discussed below,

both in the context of specific arms control

provisions and in a more general discussion

of monitoring treaty compliance.

Most of the provisions discussed in this

chapter would require the United States and

the Soviet Union to enter into a bilateral agreement to limit A SAT weapons development. As

a result of the technologies involved, their theater of operation, and the closed nature of Soviet society, it is unlikely that the United

States could monitor Soviet compliance with

complete certainty. The United States can

know only part of what the Soviet Union does

and little or nothing about what it intends;

therefore, any arms control agreement involves some degree of risk. For the purposes

of this discussion, the value or danger of a particular arms control provision is measured by

its likely impact on U.S. national security after

allowance is made for possible covert Soviet

violations. In other words, given the risks of entering into an agreement with the Soviets, are

we better off with or without a particular provision?z

This chapter focuses primarily on bilateral

treaties of unlimited duration. Other arrangements for ASAT constraints, such as multi-

—

z 1 t is important to note that ‘‘risk, as it is used here, does

not imply merely the probability that the Soviets can or would

\.iolate a particular provision of an A SAT agreement. Rather,

risk signifies both the probabilit~’ that the Soviets would violate the agreement and the threat to U.S. national security that

would likel~ result from such a Soviet violation.

105
lateral agreements, joint declarations, executive ity and primarily to formal treaties of unagreements or even unilateral declarations, limited duration because they are the hardest

might also be in the national interest. How- to obtain and have the most lasting effect on

ever, this report is limited exclusively t o national policy and programs.

bilateral agreements for the sake of simplicPROVISIONS RESTRICTING ASAT TESTIN G

An agreement that established limits on

testing could be a useful means by which to

prevent the development of reliable, dedicated

ASAT systems. The effectiveness of test restrictions is assumed to derive from the naturally conservative nature of military planners. Many informed observers believe that,

except when forced by necessity, Soviet military planners would be reluctant to rely on

systems that have not been tested near their

full capabilities, particularly in situations

where the stakes are high, second chances may

not come, and the penalties for failure could

be severe.

A test ban would prevent the testing which

would increase confidence in new ASAT weapons or, at minimum, would force testing to be

done covertly, under less than optimal conditions. In either case, the result would be to

erode the confidence that an ASAT system

would work as planned, when needed.

There are several ways to frame a test ban.

The most comprehensive would be a ban on

all “testing in an ASAT mode. ” For the purposes of this discussion, “testing in the ASAT

mode” would include tests of ground-, sea-,

air-, or space-based systems against targets

in space or against points in space. Testing of

ASAT systems or components on the ground

would not be prohibited. Such an approach

would avoid both the necessity of defining an

ASAT weapon and of restricting systems that,

although not designed as ASATS, might have

some inherent ASAT capability. For example,

it is possible that the Soviet GALOSH ABM

system might have some ASAT capability. An

agreement that banned all “testing in an

ASAT mode” would not require the United

States and the Soviet Union to agree whether

GALOSH was an ASAT or if it could function

as an ASAT, but would simply ban the testing of this system as an ASAT.

More limited “no-test” agreements could

also be used to inhibit the development of specific types of ASATS or to place restrictions

on certain types of testing. Such a treaty

might be used to ban the testing of only ASAT

weapons that would be based in space. Alternatively, it might be used to ban the testing

of specific space-based ASAT weapons (e.g.,

directed-energy weapons or space mines)

thought to be particularly destabilizing. Such

a ban might also limit ASAT testing to low

altitudes to protect critical early warning and

communication satellites that are in higher

orbits.

All of these examples of limited test bans

could be further modified by agreed limitations on allowable numbers of tests. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union might agree to limit themselves to only 10

tests over the next 5 years, or to a set number (either constant or declining) of tests per

year for the duration of the agreement.

Monitoring Compliance With

a Test Ban

In past bilateral agreements between the

United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has tended to take advantage of

treaty ambiguities and to engaged in activities that—although sometimes difficult to

characterize-bordered on treaty violation.3 It

is prudent, therefore, to assume that should

‘There is reason to believe that the Krasnoyarsk radar, when

complete and ready for o~ration, will violate the ABM Treaty.
an ASAT test ban be negotiated, the Soviets

would comply only to the extent that the

United States was able to verify its compliance. This being the case, it is important to

examine some of the problems associated with

monitoring the wide range of Soviet activities

that might be related to A SAT weapon development.

Scope of Monitoring Task

One barrier to verifying compliance with a

test ban is the enormous volume of space

where illicit activities might be conducted.

Verification of compliance with a SALT or

START arms control agreement involves inspection of a number of areas in the Soviet Union or its immediate airspace. This area, although large, is relatively well determined and

is amenable to close inspection by spacebased

photographic reconnaissance satellites. The region where space activities must be monitored

starts at altitudes of about 100 km and can

range well past geosynchronous orbit at 36,000

km. In addition, advanced ground-based ASATS

could be located anywhere in the Soviet Union and air-based ASATS might even operate

from non-Soviet airfields.

Although the volume of space is indeed

large, spacebased ASAT activities must start

on the ground. Relevant ground sites, including launch facilities, can be observed by an extensive array of U.S. monitoring facilities;

launches of ICBMS and similar vehicles from

Soviet territory can be detected. To some ex-
108

tent, the problems created by the large volume

of space are offset by the fact that space is

transparent and accessible to monitoring. Current weaknesses in ground-based surveillance

systems can be mitigated by putting surveillance systems into space.

If the Soviets were to develop air-based,

ground-based, or ‘“pop-up” directed-energy

weapons, these would require extensive testing. It is likely that some portion of this testing could be conducted out of the sight of (e.g.,

indoors or underground) U.S. monitoring assets. However, full development would probably require some in-space testing against targets. Possible targets could, in principle, be

monitored to see if they are being illuminated

by strong lasers, are giving off gases, are being unexpectedly accelerated, or are emitting

unusual signals. Air- and ground-based systems might be detectable by national technical means. Nonnuclear, spacebased systems

would be quite large and might emit detectable amounts of hydrogen fluoride or other

gases.

Problems of Discrimination

Verifying treaty compliance is complicated

by the growing number and variety of Soviet

space launches. Although the launch rate may

decrease in the future as the Soviets develop

longer lived satellites, space surveillance requires a body of experience with each additional type of satellite in order to classify its

function and discriminate between unusual

activity and routine behavior. The functional

characteristics distinguishing ASAT weapons,

such as space mines, from other satellites may

not be readily observable. Some occurrences

might have multiple interpretations. For example, a satellite fragmenting in orbit could

be accidental, the test of a self-destruct mechanism (either to avoid capture or to prevent

large components from falling back to Earth),

or the test of a space mine.4 All national technical means have imperfect discrimination,

@ne could, of course, ban all deliberate explosions in space.

If such a ban were made part of a more general test ban, there

would be less ambiguity to resolve.

and the physical differences between permitted and prohibited satellites may be small.

Although the annual number of Soviet

launches is large, the number of new satellites

or satellites engaged in “unusual activities”

is relatively small. Even if U.S. national technical means of verification could not by direct

observation distinguish between space mines

and normal satellites, other indicators, such

as orbital parameters, proximity to other—

particularly U.S.—satellites, and other sources

of intelligence might supply the needed information. If in addition to a test ban the treaty

also included some mechanism for resolving

ambiguities —e.g., the Standing Consultative

Committee established in SALT I–the problem might be further resolved.

Assuming that the difficulties associated

with deliberate ASAT systems were resolved,

it would still be necessary to reach some agree

ment concerning tests of advanced, groundbased, BMD systems. Should conventional

ground-launched BMD systems be developed

—similar to the system recently demonstrated

in the U.S. Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)

—they may have some limited ASAT capability.

Covert Development

There are numerous ways for the Soviets to

engage in covert ASAT development. It is possible that space mine or orbital interceptor

tests could be masked as legitimate rendezvous operations or satellite repair missions.

ASAT weapons might be directed against

points in space or space debris, thereby obviating the need for recognizable target satellites.

ASAT vehicles or their targets could be instrumented to store test data for broadcast

over the Soviet Union or for deorbit in a reentry capsule, thereby preventing the United

States from intercepting test information.

Nuclear-armed ICBMS or ABM launchers

such as the Soviet GALOSH might also be

tested (though not detonated) in a manner

which would be difficult to characterize. Relatively low-powered lasers capable of blinding

satellite sensors are already available and
109

Photo credft U S Department of Defense

Artist’s conception of the nonnuclear ABM interceptor

recently tested i n the Homing Overlay Experiment

(HOE). The current Soviet GALOSH nuclear ABM

interceptor or future, nonnuclear systems based on

HOE technology could complicate the process of

monitoring an ASAT weapon test ban.

might be tested without being clearly identified as being ASATS.

It is, on the other hand, possible to exaggerate the threat posed by covert development.

The United States is sufficiently familiar with

the operational characteristics of the current

generation of Soviet ASAT interceptors to

make its covert testing unlikely. The development of a new system would require an extensive testing program, some portion of which

we would almost certainly identify. New or unusual orbiting vehicles would be noticed, especially maneuvering ones. Monitoring equipment could be developed that would detect the

laser illumination of Soviet satellites, and

which could aid in monitoring Soviet directedenergy facilities. (See table 6-1, below). Soviet

efforts to hide covert testing might serve to

narrow down the regions where the United

States needs to concentrate its verification efforts. In any case, it is likely that an ASAT

test limitation agreement would provide the

means by which parties could inquire about

suspicious activities.

Utility of an ASAT Test Ban

Considering both the limitations of U.S.

monitoring capabilities and the possible illintentions of the Soviet Union, what then is

the value of an ASAT test ban? To answer this

question completely, one must examine the

specific test bans being considered in combination with possible technical countermeasures (this is done in chapter 7). However, some

preliminary generalizations can be helpful.

Some of the satellites that the United States

relies on for critical information are now vulnerable and few in number. With respect to

these specific systems, a small degree of Soviet cheating under a test ban agreement

might have a significant effect on U.S. security. On the other hand, the United States has

been quite successful at monitoring past Soviet space activities and the deployment of

more capable monitoring assets—e.g., spacebased surveillance systems–could substantially aid the process of treaty monitoring.

It is important to note that modest satellite survivability measures would reduce the

risk posed by current ASAT weapons and

could do much to reduce the risk posed by cvert weapons development. In the absence of

an agreement limiting ASAT weapon development, the United States must still monitor

Soviet activities but modest survivability

measures might not be effective. Without limitations, advanced ASATS would pose a greater

risk to a larger number of satellites and failure to effectively monitor these advanced

ASATS could create a significant danger to

U.S. national security.

Comprehensive Test Ban

A ban which prohibited all testing “in the

ASAT mode” would severely reduce the likelihood that the Soviet Union could successfully

develop advanced, highly capable ASAT weap-
110

Table 6-1 .—Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring

Prohibitable action Observable Sensors

ASAT attack:

KEWa impact ., . . . . . . . . . . . acceleration

Pulsed HELb irradiation . . . . acceleration

Continuous HEL

irradiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . heating

NPB C irradiation . . . . . . . . . . ionization

Keep-out zone penetration . . . position of thermal radiation source (ASAT)

Interception test . . . . . . . . . . . . positions of thermal radiation sources

(ASAT and target)

NPB ASAT operation . . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASAT

HEL ASAT operation . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASAT

Irradiation of target

with NPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gamma radiation from target

Irradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from target

Irradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from target

Irradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . . . position of thermal radiation source (target)

Irradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from target

Nuclear explosive aboard

satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . gamma radiation from fissile or fusile

nuclei activated by cosmic radiation or by

particle beams

Attack sensors:

accelerometers

accelerometers

thermistors

ionization detectors

space-based LWIRd thermal image~ f

space-based LWIR thermal image~ f

space-based LWIR thermal imagere f

space-based LWIR thermal image~ f

gamma-ray spectrometer

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multispectral imager

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multi spectral imager

gamma-ray spectrometer (and optional

particle beam generator)

aKlnetlc.energy weapon

bHigh-energy laser

cNeutral particle beam.

dLong.wavelength infrared

f?The LWlR telescope on the Infrared AStrOnOnll~al satelllte (lRAs) e~ernpllfles demonstrated space-based ttleunal Irnager technology, this Instrument iS described

in Astrophys/ca/ Journa/, 278 (1, Pt 2), L1 .L85, Mar 1, 198-4 (Spectai Issue on the Infrared Astronomical Satelllte)

fRadar and passive radio direc tion .findi ng methods could also be useful for tracking, If hiding measures are not employed by the penetrating Spacecraft LWIR tracking

is emphasized here because it is difficult to counter by such measures.

gA target Irradiated by a high-energy neutral particle beam will emit gamma rays, neutrons, and other observable part! cles, Just as !t WI II, at a slower rate, when bombarded

by natural cosmic rays These gamma rays could be detected by a gamma-ray spectrometer such as those which have been earned by Soviet Venus Ian and lunar

landers and by US NASA Ranger and Apollo spacecraft (NASA report SP.387, pp 3.20)

ens. The categories of weapons eliminated

might included space mines capable of “shadowing” valuable military assets in any orbit, or

directed-energy weapons with kill radii of hundreds to thousands of kilometers. In the absence of an agreement limiting the development of these weapons, each side might seek

continually more effective means to attack

threatening satellites and to defend valuable

assets. This could result in a potentially

destabilizing arms race in space. The “instantaneous kill” ability of the most advanced

ASATS would be destabilizing in a crisis, since

each side would have the incentive to “shoot

first” or else risk the loss of its space assets.

A comprehensive test ban would require

both the United States and the Soviet Union

to cease testing their current generation of

ASAT weapons. The Soviet ASAT is already

considered operational. Assuming the United

States also had an operational ASAT when the

agreement entered into force, each side’s existing system would pose some threat to the

other side. Over time, a comprehensive test

ban would gradually erode each side’s confidence in its respective weapons, thereby reducing the possibility of their use. If a test ban

were combined with additional restrictions on

possession or deployment, this might result

in somewhat greater security.

A comprehensive test ban would be less effective at reducing the threat posed by weapon

systems with “inherent” ASAT capability.

ICBMS, SLBMS, and ABM interceptors with

nuclear payloads are examples of systems with

inherent ASAT capability. Although these

systems lack the kind of guidance necessary

to intercept a satellite with great precision, the

long-range destructiveness of their nuclear

payloads makes them potentially effective

ASATS. However, some of the ASAT threat

posed by nuclear weapons is offset by their

very nature. The collateral physical, political,

and military consequences of using nuclear
171

ICBMS or ABMs as ASATS could well deter

their use in most conflicts short of a terrestrial nuclear war.

The Shuttle’s recent success at retrieving

and refurbishing satellites strongly suggests

the ASAT potential of future maneuverable

spacecraft. However, the range, effectiveness

and reaction time of even advanced maneuverable systems would be substantially less than

that of future dedicated ASATS. Although the

development of maneuverable spacecraft would

not be inhibited by most ASAT testing limitations, some limits could be placed on operating them in an ASAT mode.

The Soviet draft treaties and the 1983 unilateral Soviet moratorium on ASAT testing

suggest that the Soviets would be willing to

negotiate about a comprehensive ASAT test

ban. To date, the U.S. response to Soviet suggestions has been to point out that since the

Soviets have an “operational” ASAT and the

U.S. testing program has just begun, a comprehensive test ban would prevent the United

States from ever having a reliable interceptor

ASAT and would increase the threat posed by

a Soviet “breakout.” Nonetheless, the United

States has continued to express interest in

ASAT negotiations and has not ruled out the

possibility that it would agree to some kind

of test limitations.

Limited Test Bans

Should a comprehensive test ban be considered undesirable or nonnegotiable, it might

still be worthwhile to limit testing to the current generation of ASATS or to ASATS only

capable of attacking satellites in low-Earth orbit. A ban which limited each side to testing

its current ASAT would have three advantages: 1) a ban on testing new types of ASATS

would reduce the likelihood that advanced

ASATS, such as space mines or space-based

directed-energy weapons, would be developed;

2) the threat to critical early warning and communication satellites would be diminished; and

3) the United States would retain the ability

to negate Soviet low-orbiting, targeting, and

data collection satellites judged to pose a

threat to U.S. surface forces.

.

Photo credft U S Department of Defense

Ocean recovery of what is believed to be an unmanned

scale model of a new Soviet space plane. The development

of maneuverable spacecraft would not be inhibited by

most ASAT testing limitations, but some restrictions

might be placed on operating such spacecraft

“in an ASAT mode. ”

If a limited test ban could restrict each side

to its current, low-orbit, ASAT capability, it

would, in effect, create high-altitude “no attack zones. This might encourage adversaries to move some Earth monitoring space

assets into those zones. The development of

high-altitude data collection systems would re

‘If advanced directed-energy weapons with kill radii of thousands of kilometers are developed, such “no attack zones” might

be meaningless.
112 —

quire considerable time and expense. For the

next decade and perhaps beyond nations

would probably be forced to operate their current low-altitude systems.

Although it is possible that some reconnaissance satellites might be able to function from

higher orbits with some degradation of performance, radar satellites-useful in tracking

surface ships-would have substantially greater

difficulty. Current systems employ active radar, which means that the strength of the return signal decreases as the fourth power of

the range to the target. The substantial increase in range necessary to take advantage

of a high-altitude “no-attack’ zone would severely degrade the performance of current systems. It is possible that, over time, improvements in technology could solve the problems

created by the increase in range. Nonetheless,

by the time this occurred new ECM and EOCM

capabilities might also be developed that could

help to negate systems taking advantage of

high-altitude “sanctuaries.”

PROVISIONS RESTRICTING ASAT POSSESSIO N

OR DEPLOYMEN T

An agreement which sought to restrict the

possession or deployment of ASAT weapons

could be either comprehensive or limited. A

comprehensive ban might prohibit the possession or deployment of any deliberate “antisatellite system. A limited ban, on the other

hand, might allow the possession of some

ASAT weapons but not others, or establish

limitations on allowable ASAT capabilities or

on the number and kind of deployments.

In order to establish a comprehensive ban

on the possession or deployment of ASAT

weapons, it would first be necessary to come

to an agreement as to what exactly was being banned. As explained above, the existence

of systems that have an inherent ability to attack satellites complicates the process of eliminating all ASAT capability. A ban on all systems with ASAT capabilities would be so

broad as to be unworkable since it would include ICBMS, SLBMS, ABMs, and maneuverable spacecraft such as the Shuttle. On the

other hand, a ban on deliberate ASAT systems

alone might allow the development of nonASAT systems having sophisticated ASAT

capabilities. For this reason, the most effective comprehensive ban on possession and deployment would probably be one which was

also accompanied by a prohibition on testing

non-ASAT systems in an ASAT mode.

Many types of limited-possession regimes

can be imagined. The United States and the

Soviet Union might decide to keep the ASATS

they are currently testing, but prohibit the

possession or deployment of more advanced

systems. Alternatively, each side might be allowed to have one designated system in addition to the one they are currently testing; the

capabilities of this additional system might or

might not be limited (e.g., low-Earth orbit capability only). Still another regime might limit

the parties to ground-based ASAT weapons

and ban possession of weapons that would be

based in space.

In all of these limited-possession regimes additional restrictions on the number and location of allowable ASAT deployments could be

added.

Monitoring Compliance With

Limitations on Possession and

Deployment

A comprehensive ban on the possession or

deployment of the existing Soviet ASAT

weapon would raise some important monitoring problems. The launch vehicle for the Soviet ASAT is used in several other non-ASAT

roles. These launchers will remain available

even if the Soviet ASAT weapon is banned.
113

Since the ASAT weapon itself is small, it

would be difficult for the United States to verify with high confidence that the Soviets had

not clandestinely retained a stockpile. 

A limited possession ban that granted either

side the right to possess and deploy the ASAT

weapon it was currently testing would raise

fewer verification problems. Significant Soviet

cheating would involve covertly testing and

developing a new and unproven advanced

ASAT weapon, rather than simply hiding an

existing system. As discussed above, it is

likely that such a development program would

include some testing requirements that were

observable.

Given the small size of the current Soviet

A SAT weapon, restrictions on the number of

A SAT weapons that could be deplcyed at each

launch site would be difficult to monitor in the

absence of onsite inspection. Even onsite inspection would not provide complete security,

since ASATS could be covertly stored and easily transferred to the launch area when needed.

The United States would have higher confidence at monitoring restrictions on the allowable number of launch sites. Restriction on

launch facilities would increase the time between A SAT launches and decrease the probability of sudden, multiple kills. A combination of restrictions on both the allowable

number of launch sites and on the number of

ASAT weapons that could be stored at each

site could reduce the likelihood of a surprise

attack or, at minimum, reduce the effect of

such an attack.

Utility of Limitations on Possession

and Deployment

A comprehensive ban on ASAT possession

and deployment is complicated by: 1 ) the existence of the Soviet, and, in the near future,

The U.S. ASAT weapon currentl~ under dmrelopment is quite

small, I~owe~.er, the %y’iet monitoring task is easier becau S[J

the U.S. AS.AT weapon requires large and ciistincti~e support

equipment and becaus(~ significant expenditures for milit ar~r

facilities, personnel. and weapons procurement would be revealed in the annual authorization and appropriate ion proces<

of Congress or by the popular press.

the U.S. ASAT weapons; 2) the fact that the

lack of possession or deployment could not be

monitored with high confidence; and 3) the fear

that a ban on possession and deployment—

even if monitored with high confidence—would

not eliminate the knowledge of how to build

these systems, and that the forces might be

reconstituted at some time in the future.

Balancing these three concerns is the understanding that for the Soviets to retain some

A SAT weapons in violation of a possession or

deployment ban would not in itself be threatening—they must also be able to use these

A SAT weapons in a way that is militarily significant. Differences of opinion exist as to the

military significance of minor violations of a

ban on possession and deployment. Some argue that the Soviets must be able to launch

a sufficient number of A SAT weapons with

sufficient rapidity to gain an important military advantage. To do this, the ASAT weapons and launch vehicles would have to be premated and held in readiness, activities that

would probably be observable. Others believe

that the Soviets would not have to launch a

mass A SAT attack in order to gain important

military advantages. They point out that in

some limited war scenarios, destroying a very

small number of critical satellites could have

grave consequences. Therefore, there might

not be a need for a large number of observable, pre-mated A SAT weapons and launchers.

Assuming the United States did have advance notice of Soviet A SAT activities, it

could respond through diplomatic channels or

through a Standing Consultative Committee,

if established. Even short-term notice of intent

to use A SAT weapons would allow the United

States time to maneuver its satellites or take

other appropriate action.

The fact that every element of an agreement

cannot be monitored with high confidence does

not necessarily mean it has no value. It is extremely difficult to monitor the “no nuclear

weapons in space’ provision of the Outer

Space Treaty and yet the United States continues to adhere to it. Presumably, this is because the benefits of the treaty outweigh the

risk posed by potential Soviet cheating.
114

Even if a ban on possession and deployment

could not be monitored with high confidence

it would, at minimum, oblige the Soviets to

conduct future A SAT weapons tests covertly.

This would complicate maintenance of the

current system, make upgrades difficult and

advanced ASAT development less likely. The

combination of these effects would make U.S.

satellite survivability programs more effective

and might discourage the use of ASAT

weapons.

Space systems with inherent rather than intentional ASAT capabilities would be difficult

to restrict by a comprehensive ban on possession or deployment. Nonetheless, such systems pose only a modest threat to critical U.S.

assets. Those systems which employ nuclear

warheads (e.g., ICBMS, SLBMS, ABMs) might

only be used in a terrestrial nuclear war or at

the risk of precipitating one. They would also

risk damage to the attacker’s own satellites.

Future maneuverable spacecraft, although capable of some limited ASAT activity, would

not be able to provide the rapid, multiple-kill

capability likely to be obtained from future

dedicated ASAT systems, and are therefore

a considerably lesser threat.

A regime which banned only deliberate

ASAT systems and disregarded systems with

—

some inherent ASAT capability would still be

useful in as much as it would reduce the threat

of the most highly capable and destabilizing

future ASATS systems. Nonetheless, a ban on

the possession and deployment of ASAT systems would probably be most valuable if accompanied by a prohibition against the testing of non-ASAT systems in an A SAT mode.

The 1983 Soviet draft treaty contained an

example of a comprehensive ban on possession. Article 2(4) of the draft treaty would have

required that parties undertake, “Not to test

or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may

already have. ” Given the past statements of

Soviet officials and the draft treaties proposed

by the Soviet Union, it is likely that the

Soviets would be willing to negotiate a comprehensive ban on possession. It is less clear

whether they would be willing to negotiate

some form of limited ban. If their primary concern is protecting all of their space assets, then

a limited ban might not be acceptable. If, on

the other hand, their purpose in negotiating

any ban is to limit the development of more

effective ASATS or spacebased BMD technologies, then there might be some partial bans

that they would find acceptable.

PROVISIONS RESTRICTING ASAT US E

Perhaps the least complicated ASAT agreement would be one that prohibited hostile acts

against satellites. Such an agreement would

probably not attempt to limit specific ASAT

systems, but would instead prohibit the use

of all ASAT capabilities. Although a “no use’

agreement could not strictly be considered

“arms control, ” in as much as both parties

would be free to develop and deploy any number and kind of advanced ASAT system, it

might usefully define what constituted a “hostile act” against a satellite. This agreed definition of “hostile act” might serve to avoid

some future conflict brought about by a confusion of intentions. It would also establish a

satellite attack as an unambiguous warning

of further aggressive intent.

Although a “no use” agreement might not

substantially reduce the threat of ASAT attack, it could serve as a useful component of

other, broader arms control agreements. The

definition of prohibited acts that might reasonably result from the negotiation of a “no

use’ agreement could lead to a clearer understanding of the systems capable of performing those acts. This, in turn, might assist in

the negotiation of agreements that prohibited

the testing, possession, or deployment of

ASAT weapons.
115

Monitoring Compliance With

a “No Use” Agreement

Compliance with a “no-use” agreement

would be relatively easy to monitor. This is

particularly true for the current generation of

ASAT weapons. The monitoring task would

become slightly more difficult if the Soviets

were to follow the U.S. example and develop

an air-launched interceptor. This would allow

them to launch an ASAT attack outside of the

Soviet Union-perhaps even from the western

hemisphere if the appropriate facilities were

installed in Cuba.

If it were possible to covertly develop

ground-based directed-energy facilities or

more flexible air-based facilities, these might

be used to damage the sensors of a U.S. satellite in such a manner as to mimic an equipment

malfunction. This is particularly true when the

object of an attack is not to destroy the satellite, but rather to “blind” or “dazzle” delicate

sensors.

On the other hand, the effective use of onboard monitoring equipment could substantially reduce this threat. To a limited degree,

satellites now have some on-board “state-ofhealth” monitoring equipment. It is possible

to augment these sensors to determine whether

a failure is due to an internal flaw or whether

it has been externally induced. These sensors

might, for example, measure incident laser

light, rises in temperature, or sudden accelerations. The inclusion of “stateof-health’ monitoring equipment on satellites combined with

a future spacebased surveillance system could

provide the necessary ingredients to verify a

“no use” treaty with high confidence.

Utility of a “No Use” Agreement

In order to judge the utility of a “no use”

agreement it is first necessary to understand

what such an agreement could and could not

accomplish. Even if a “no use” agreement

could be monitored with very high confidence,

in an environment of unconstrained ASAT de

velopment, a “no use” treaty might make only

a small contribution to protecting U.S. space

assets. Should nations eventually possess

directed-energy weapons or space mines with

an instantaneous and multiple kill capability,

there will be significant advantages to being

a first user of these weapons. Nations may find

themselves in the position of having to use or

lose their offensive space-based assets. If the

measure of effectiveness of a “no use” agreement is how well it protects U.S. satellites in

an otherwise unconstrained environment, then

one would have to conclude such an agreement

was of limited value.

Although the U.N. Charter and the Outer

Space Treaty both implicitly prohibit hostile

acts against the satellites of other countries,

there may be some value to obtaining a formal agreement that such hostile interference

is a violation of international law and potentially a cause of war. A “no use” ASAT treaty

would, like the Geneva protocol on use of poisonous gases, establish more clearly the “law

of civilized nations. ” Codifying what is already

implicit in international law might serve to inhibit the willingness of nations to attack satellites in a crisis before hostilities have broken out on Earth and perhaps even for some

period of low intensity conflict.

Although a “no use” agreement would not, in

itself, substantially reduce the risk or the effect

of an ASAT attack, it would serve as a useful

addition to other, more comprehensive, ASAT

limitations. For example, an agreement that

restricted ASAT testing would benefit from

the clear statement that hostile acts against

satellites were forbidden. Such an agreement

would assist in developing the principle that

the goal of ASAT limitations was to protect

space assets and to keep space from becoming an area of unrestrained conflict and not

simply to control the development of one or

another class of offensive weapons.

It is likely that some type of “no use” agree

ment would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. It would, of course, be necessary to clearly

define what constituted “use” under the agree

ment. In their 1983 draft treaty, the Soviets

defined “use” as meaning “to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change
116

the flight trajectory. ” Although the United

States might agree in principle with the intent

of such a provision, it is unlikely that it would

accept this exact language. The Soviet phrase

“disturb the normal functioning” might be

interpreted as prohibiting the use of electronic

countermeasures, and this interpretation

would probably be unacceptable to the United

States.

viet draft except the phrase “disturb the

normal functioning” is replaced by “render inoperable. ” The UCS language is, from a U.S.

perspective, probably more acceptable, since

it would seem to cover only actions that harm

the satellite and not those that make its job

harder. In the absence of formal negotiations,

it is impossible to assess Soviet intentions or

willingness to compromise on this point.

The 1983 draft treaty of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is similar to the SoPROVISIONS RESTRICTING SPACECRAFT OPERATIO N

AND ORBIT S

Whether or not the United States and the

Soviet Union agree to restrict ASAT weapons

or capabilities it might be useful to negotiate

a set of “rules of the road” for military space

operations. These rules could serve the general purpose of reducing confusion and encouraging the orderly use of space, or they

could be designed specifically to aid in the defense of space assets. Examples of general

rules might include agreed limits on minimum

separation distance between satellites or restrictions on very low-orbit overflight by

manned or unmanned spacecraft. These general rules might also be used to establish new,

stringent requirements for advance notice of

launch activities. Specific rules for space defense might include declared and possibly

defended “keep-out zones, ” grants or restrictions on the rights of inspection, and limitations on high-velocity fly-bys or trailing. It

might also be desirable to establish a means

by which to obtain timely information and consult concerning ambiguous or threatening

activities.

Precedents can be found for each of the general rules suggested above. The clearest example of international acceptance of “rules of the

road” is the 1960 multilateral agreement on

“International Regulations for Preventing

Collisions at Sea. ”7 This agreement estab7

33 U.S.C. 1051: T. I.A.S. 5813

lished the rule of international conduct on the

high seas and provided the basis for the 1972

Soviet-U.S. treaty on the “Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas.”8 In this

latter agreement, the United States and the

Soviet Union established more specific rules

for the operation of their respective warships.

In the civilian communications field, nations

have agreed to work with the International

Telecommunication Union (ITU) to develop

rules to insure orderly use of the geostationary orbit and the radiofrequency spectrum.

Those nations possessing military satellites

might wish to establish an organization, or

more limited working groups, to develop similar technical rules of conduct for military

space activities.

The Chicago Convention of 1945 established

the fundamental principle of state sovereignty

over territorial airspace. g The 1967 Outer

Space Treaty established the equally important principle that space should be freely available for the use and exploitation of all nations.’” Since the beginning of the space age,

nations have wrestled with, but failed to re6

23 U.S.T. 1168; T. I.A.S. 7379.

“’Convention on International Civil Aviation” (Chicago 1947),

61 Stat. 1180, 15 U. N.T.S. 295, T. I.A.S. 1591

‘“’’ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States “

in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon

and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967 (Article I) 18 U.S.T.

2410, T. I.A.S. 6347.
117—

solve the question of how to characterize the

boundary between airspace and outer space. ”

As one author has observed, the very important difference between these two regimes is

that “states shoot at aircraft not authorized

to be in their airspace; they do not shoot at

satellites passing over that airspace. “12 This

distinction will become increasingly harder to

make as maneuverable space vehicles become

more capable. Will nations continue to allow

overflight of their territory by military spacecraft which are also capable of aerodynamic

flight? Practical and internationally consistent “rules of the road’ may be necessary to

resolve this problem.

Article IV of the “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space”

currently requires signatories to supply the

Secretary-General of the U.N. with information concerning its space objects and launches.

However, since the Convention requires only

that the signatories supply this information

“as soon as practicable, ” it is of little use in

clarifying ambiguous activities in a timely

manner. Article 4 of the “Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”

also requires that “each Party . . . notify the

other Party in advance of any planned missile

launches if such launches will extend beyond

its national territory in the direction of the

other Party. ” Unfortunately, since this article does not apply to space launch vehicles it

is of little use as a means to protect space assets. As space launches become more numerous and varied, an agreement providing for

timely notification of launch and information

on the characteristics of the vehicle may be

essential to avoid crisis through confusion.

“This question has been considered almost annually in the

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space but has

yet to be resolved. The position of the United States has been

that such a delimitation has not been necessary and, indeed,

might impede beneficial space activities.

‘

z

’’ Anti-Satellite Weapons, Arms Control Options, and the

Military Use of Space, ” William J. Durch, U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, contract No. AC3PC103, July 1984,

p. 3.

International law recognizes that the concept of sovereignty extends to more than a nation’s land mass. For example, a country’s territorial waters and contiguous airspace are

considered to be sovereign and defendable elements of that country. Extrapolating from

this concept, one method for protecting satellites would be to negotiate or declare “keepout zones” around the most critical space assets. The agreement or declaration of these

“keep-out zones” might also include the right

to defend these zones once declared. Precedent

for the concept of “keep-out zones” can be

found in the history of the SALT negotiations

pertaining to submarines. During the course

of these negotiations a number of proposals

were discussed such as, ‘‘nesubmarine zones’

which would have prohibited missile-carrying

submarines from operating in certain parts of

the ocean, and “no-ASW zones” (anti-submarine warfare) that would have allowed the

unhindered operation of submarines in select

areas to ensure that reliable retaliatory forces

would exist to deter a possible first strike.

Photo credit Nat/onal Aeronautics and Space Adm/n/strat/on

Artist’s conception of the U.S. Space Shuttle servicing

a Space Station. As commercial and scientific space

activities increase, internationally accepted “rules of

the road” may be necessary to ensure that both military

and nonmiIitary space activities are conducted i n a safe

and orderly manner.
118

—

Negotiated or declared “keep-out zones”

would have to be reconciled with Article II of

the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which states,

“outer Space . . . is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means

of use or occupation, or by any other means.

“Keep-out zones” might be considered by

some nations to be contrary to the Outer

Space Treaty’s ban on “national appropriation. ” A counter argument might hold that

current international practice with respect to

communication satellites in geosynchronous

orbit already incorporates a variation of the

“keep-out zone” principle. Current geosynchronous orbit must be space several degrees

apart in order to avoid frequency interference.

Therefore, such a satellite precludes the placement of other satellites near its position in the

orbital arc.

In order to reduce uncertainty regarding the

purpose of certain satellites and the tension

likely to result from unauthorized close approach, it might be useful to establish rules

regarding inspection, high-velocity fly-by and

trailing. Such agreements might allow closeapproach and inspection under certain circumstances (e.g., prior consent) but might otherwise ban high-velocity fly-by and trailing—

either of which could be a prelude to satellite

attack.

One of the functions of a regime of rules in

space would be to reduce instances where

provocative or threatening activities are observed but not explained. To resolve this problem, a forum or a “hot line” might be established through which questionable space

activities could be discussed in a timely manner. Precedent exists for this in the 1971

“Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk

of Outbreak of Nuclear War, which requires

the United States and the Soviet Union to

notify each other “in the event of signs of interference with [early warning systems] or

with related communication facilities, if such

occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of

nuclear war. ” The 1971 agreement might be

strengthened to require consultation regarding activities that might threaten satellites

and not just activities which create a risk of

nuclear war.

Monitoring Compliance With

a “Rules of the Road” Agreement

The ability to monitor individual “rules of

the road” with high confidence would vary

directly with the specific measures adopted.

As a general rule, however, monitoring “rules

of the road” would be easier than monitoring

other “arms control” regimes. The primary

purpose of such rules would not be to restrict

substantially the activities of the parties, but

rather, to make the intentions behind these

activities more transparent. Although the degree of protection for U.S. space assets to be

gained from a “rules of the road” agreement

would be less than from other arms limitation

regimes, the costs are also correspondingly

less for failure to completely verify compliance. One must assume that in the absence of

ASAT arms control, both ASAT development

and satellite survivability programs will be

given high priority. This being the case, offensive and defensive measures would be available to respond to violations of “rules of the

road.

Utility of a “Rules of the Road”

Agreement

The “rules of the road” discussed above–

if implemented in the absence of restrictions

on ASAT weapon development—would not remove the threat of ASAT attack. If they were

defended, “keep-out zones” would probably offer the closest thing to security in such a regime. Space mines designed to shadow satellites and detonate on command would lose a

great deal of their utility if held at bay by a

defended keep-out zone. If these zones were

sufficiently large, or if satellites were appropriately shielded, they might even be effective

against nuclear space mines. Keep-out zones

would be less effective against advanced

directed-energy weapons with kill radii of

thousands of kilometers. However, these

might be controlled by other arms control

measures.
. — —

‘‘Keep-out zones” combined with defensive

satellites (DSATS) would offer substantial—

though still incomplete–protection but would

likely be extremely expensive. As an alternative to defended “keep-out” zones, the United

States might wish to develop redundant systems and an ability to rapidly reconstitute lost

assets.

“Rules of the road” would be substantially

more effective at encouraging the orderly use

of space by the military and at reducing the

chances of escalation or misunderstanding in a

crisis. Even in the absence of controls on

ASAT weapons it would be valuable to have

a multinational consensus concerning ambiguous activities such as close-approach, very

low-orbit overpass, and high-velocity fly-by.

If the “rules of the road” were part of other

limitations on ASAT weapons and capabilities

they would likely contribute to the effectiveness of these agreements and make their implementation more manageable.

Whether “rules of the road” were negotiable would depend on the specific provisions

chosen. The negotiations pertaining to such

rules might require the United States, the Soviet Union, and perhaps others, to sit down

and discuss secret and extraordinarily sensitive issues relating to the operation of military

119

—

space assets. Some rules, such as very loworbit overflight by manned, reusable vehicles,

may be so politically sensitive as to not be

amenable to discussion. Other rules, such as

“keep-out zones” and minimum separation

distance for satellites, may not be desirable be

cause they are not technically possible at altitudes where the majority of current U.S. and

Soviet satellites are located. On the other

hand, some rules, such as high-velocity fly-by,

or close inspection might lend themselves to

discussion and agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union

may wish to adopt “rules of the road” as a

result of their increased use of space for military-including ASAT—purposes, or because

they are engaged in negotiations designed to

limit the arms race in space. “Rules of the

road” might be an attractive companion agree

ment to far-reaching limits on A SAT weapon

development. On the other hand, in the total

absence of ASAT weapon limitations, there

would be a need to clarify ambiguous activities before it became necessary to “use or lose’

offensive space weapons. The negotiability-or

lack thereof–of “rules of the road” can only

be discovered as a result of serious negotiation between interested parties.

BMD AND ASAT TREATIES OF LIMITED DURATIO N

Each of the regimes examined above could

be negotiated as a treaty of indefinite or

limited duration or, alternatively, as one which

remains in force as long as periodic reviews

are favorable. Each of these alternatives has

its advantages and disadvantages. Treaties of

indefinite duration are more effective at discouraging the pursuit of banned activities, yet

require a greater degree of foresight regarding the long-term interests of the signatories

and can foreclose technological options for the

indefinite future. 13 Treaties of limited duration

.

‘Treaties of unlimited duration usually contain a clause which

allows the signatories to withdraw from the treaty if their “supreme national interests” are threatened. In addition to ‘‘suallow parties to take advantage of future technological options, yet can encourage aggressive development programs designed to reach

fruition at the termination of the designated

period. Treaties which call for a periodic reassessment of agreed limitations in theory have

great flexibility, yet, in practice, often result

in a strong presumption that they should be

continued.

preme national interest clauses, ” treaties may also contain specific unilateral or agreed statements regarding specific

understandings about related events. For example, The 1972

ABM Treaty contains a unilateral statement by the United

States which links the continued viability of the treaty to “more

complete limitations on strategic arms. ”
120

The United States might, for example, enter into a treaty limiting ASATS with the explicit and public reservation that we would

withdraw from this treaty if and when we were

ready to test and deploy a ballistic missile defense system in ways that the ASAT Treaty

would forbid. Alternatively, we might take the

public position that we intended to restrict our

BMD activities so as to remain within the

limits of an ASAT Treaty. While the former

position would suggest a treaty of limited duration and the latter a treaty of unlimited duration, this need not be the case. It would be

perfectly possible to sign a treaty of unlimited

duration, with the standard provision allowing for withdrawal, accompanied by a clear

statement of some of the conditions under

which we intended to withdraw.

From one point of view, the exact language

in a treaty regarding its duration is less important than the intentions of the parties. After all, there have been numerous examples of

treaties of unlimited duration that were violated soon after they were signed and examples of treaties of limited duration that continued in force after they had expired (e.g., the

“Interim Offensive Agreement” signed at

SALT I). The real issue is whether the parties

believe that adherence to the treaty in question continues to be in their national security

interest.

The Reagan Administration has recently indicated that it intends to conduct ASAT tests

to gather information useful in advanced

BMD research. ” Given the close connection

between these two technologies, an ASAT

treaty of even limited duration would require

modification of current SD I program plans.

Thus, to the extent that the United States

wishes to maintain the most rapid pace of advanced BMD research within the bounds of

the ABM Treaty, such a treaty would not be

desirable. Conversely, to the extent that the

United States wishes to slow the pace of Soviet BMD research and is willing to defer decisions regarding the testing of space-based

or space-directed weapons, an ASAT treaty of

limited duration could contribute to that

result.

—.

“The purpose of tests “in an ASAT mode” would be to investigate advanced technologies without violating the ABM

Treaty. The Department of Defense recently told Congress that,

‘{To ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty the performance

of the demonstration hardware will be limited to the satellite

defense mission. Intercepts of certain orbital targets simulating anti-satellite weapons can clearly be compatible with this

criteria. “ “Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Department of Defense, 1985, app. B, p. 8.

COMPLIANCE MONITORING, VERIFICATION, AND RECOURS E

Verification of compliance with an arms control treaty provision involves three distinct

processes: monitoring the activities of other

parties to the treaty, interpretation of the

information obtained by monitoring, and,

assessment of the risk which such activities

pose to U.S. security. Each of these processes

presents a different set of problems and opportunities to the intelligence community.

Should violations or potential violations of

treaty obligations be discovered during the

verification process, then it becomes necessary

to decide what, if any, action is to be taken

in response. Verification of compliance and recourse are discussed in greater detail below.

Monitoring

When discussing the ability of the United

States to monitor Soviet treaty compliance,

it is important to distinguish existing and

planned-capabilities from potential capabilities. Existing and planned monitoring capabilities are described in chapter 4. Some of the

existing systems used to monitor compliance

with SALT and other arms control agreements

would be useful for monitoring compliance

with possible ASAT arms control provisions.16

—

“Some of these capabilities have been described in general

terms by Congressman Les Aspin in “The Verification of the

SALT II Agreement,” Scientifi-c Amen”can, vol. 240, No. 3, Feb

ruary 1979, pp. 38-45.
121

For example, capabilities to monitor the construction and dismantling of ICBM launchers

–the number of which is constrained by the

SALT II agreement-could also be used to

monitor the construction and dismantling of

launchers for boosters used for ASAT weapons.

By investing in new monitoring systems and

personnel, future monitoring capabilities can

be made more comprehensive than existing capabilities. To a limited extent, one can actually ‘‘buy’ more monitoring capability. (See

table 6-l). However, such additional capabilities would, in most cases, require years of

work and substantial expenditures of funds.

As in weapon system procurement, it will be

necessary to judge “how much is enough”-

i.e., to determine the level of investment above

which the value of monitoring capability improvement obtainable per dollar ceases to be

worth a dollar.

The fact that future monitoring systems

could be more capable than current systems

does not mean that all monitoring problems

can be solved by spending more money on

advanced technologies. Some activities will

always be unmonitorable (e.g., some forms of

underground testing), other dual-purpose activities (e.g., manned spaceflight) will often be

difficult to characterize. Although future technologies will increase our ability to monitor the

activities of other countries, similar technologies may make the job of treaty verification

more difficult. Specific examples of these problems are presented above in the discussions

of specific treaty provisions.

Interpretation

Once indications of a potentially prohibited

activity have been detected by monitoring systems, the data must be further interpreted to

determine the intent of the activity and how

the activity affects specific treaty agreements.

For example, suppose that while a spaceweapon ban is in effect, the deployment or construction of a large mirror is observed in space.

In this case, the monitoring data might be

scrutinized to determine whether the mirror

was capable of reflecting intense laser beams

and changing its pointing direction quickly—

as a prohibited weapon system might—or

whether, instead, it was only capable of reflecting low-intensity radiation and changing its

pointing direction slowly, as communication

system or telescope components might. 16 The

ability to make such a determination would

depend both on the sophistication of the monitoring system employed and prior knowledge

regarding similar activities.

Even if the monitoring system provides data

sufficient to clearly identify the nature of a

questioned activity, it still remains to be determined whether that activity is prohibited

by the language of the relevant treaty. In the

example of a mirror deployed in space, there

would remain the question of whether deployment in space of any large mirror capable of

reflecting intense laser beams would be a violation. Since similar mirrors have been proposed for peaceful purposes (e.g., propulsion

of laser-powered rockets17), even if the relevant

agreement defined weapons in terms of their

capabilities rather than intended uses, there

could be ambiguity as to the legality of deploying such mirrors.

When ambiguities are foreseen, treaty language can be worded to avoid them. However,

history has demonstrated that it is extremely

difficult to foresee all the significant ambiguities that could arise in an arms control

agreement.

Assessment

If monitoring data are interpreted to indicate that an activity prohibited by a treaty (or

possibly inadvertently allowed by ambiguity

of the treaty) is taking place (or about to take

place), the risk which the activity poses to U.S.

security must be assessed. This assessment

must take into consideration at least three factors: 1) the threat to U.S. national security

posed by the specific violation; 2) assuming the

loThe lmge deployable reflector (LDR) under development by

NASA is an example of such a component.

l~R.R. Berggren and G.E. Lenertz, ‘‘Feasibility of a 3@ Meter

Space Based Laser Transmitter, ” NASA-CR-134903, 1975

[NTIS accession number N-761 1421].
122

violation, the extent to which the relevant

treaty still contributes to U.S. national security; and 3) the ability of the United States to

take actions which will prevent, mitigate, or

compensate for damage that might be caused

by the violation. The result of such an assessment will often imply the appropriate nature

of the recourse to be pursued.

Recourse

Given the many different activities that

ASAT arms control could restrict and the numerous ways that such agreements could be

violated, it is difficult to make generalizations

about how the United States might or should

respond. Faced with a clear violation of a major treaty provision that seriously jeopardized

U.S. national security, the United States

would be wise to withdraw from the treaty in

question. If, on the other hand, the existence

of a violation was uncertain and it pertained

only to a subsidiary portion of an otherwise

valuable treaty, then it might be appropriate

to seek consultation to resolve this particular

activity while leaving the treaty otherwise intact.18 Alternatively, unilateral defensive countermeasures or R&D on treaty compliant

Wthers have argued that the mere fact that a treaty has been

violated is as important as the national security impact of the

violation. For example, Colin Gray writes:

The Soviet noncompliance issue is not important as a matter

of ethics or because the sanctity of international legal norms

must be upheld . . Nor is Soviet cheating primarily important

in terms of military advantage and disadvantage . . (Tlhe greatest danger . . . results from the loss of U.S. credibility. . . (W~ar

is more likely to explode out of a mutual diplomatic miscalculation (than a military imbalance), That miscalculation could be

rooted . in a Soviet lack of respect for the quality of determination in U.S. policy.

Cohn Gray, “Moscow is Cheating, $’ Fore&n Poficy, No. 56, fall

1984, pp. 141-152.

offensive measures might be pursued to hedge

against breakout. The hardest questions are

those that arise somewhere between these two

examples.

ASAT arms control raises a number of questions common to all high-technology treaty restrictions. For example, if one party violates

a test ban on advanced directed-energy

ASATS and then, when confronted with the

violation, declares its intent not to repeat this

violation, what is the appropriate response?

Some would argue that the damage has been

done. One side has had the opportunity to verify a technology which it may have been developing covertly over a period of years. The

side which remained in compliance has lost not

only the information it could have gotten from

similar tests, but potentially, years of research

experience. Others might argue that limited

testing or minor ambiguities offer no real and

enduring military advantage.

Other responses to clear or uncertain treaty

violations include negotiating modifications to

the agreement or matching cheating with identical or equivalent conduct. Negotiating modifications can be a long and contentious process, particularly if the negotiations require one

party to admit to treaty violations or ambiguous conduct. Given the differences between

Soviet and U.S. force structure and technology base, matching cheating with identical

conduct is often not a useful alternative. For

example, the United States may not desire to

build a Krasnoyarsk-style radar. On the other

hand, matching cheating with equivalent conduct (the so-called “parallel interpretation”

alternative) runs counter to notion that a

treaty should have one common understanding which is accepted by both parties.
Chapter 7

Comparative Evaluation

of ASAT Policy Options
Contents

Page

Policy Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................125

ASAT Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................125

Alternative Legal/Technical Regimes . .............................125

Regime I: Existing Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....127

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............127

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............128

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..128

Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............129

Regime 2: A Comprehensive Anti-Satellite and

Space-Based Weapon Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......130

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........,.....130

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............131

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............,131

Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........................131

Regime 3: An ASAT Weapon Test Ban and

Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban . ..........................132

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................132

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........132

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................133

Net Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............133

Regime4: “OneEach/NoNew Types’’ Regime.. . .....................134

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............134

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............134

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..135

Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................135

Regime 5: Rules of the Road . . . . . . . . ...............................136

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............136

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............138

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................138

Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . ......138

Regime6: Space Sanctuaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............138

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............138

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....4... . ...............139

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................139

Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................139

Regime 7: A Space-Based BMD Regime . ............................140

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................140

Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................140

Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................140

Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................141

Table

Table No. Page

7-1. Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development and Arms Control. . ......126
.

Chapter 7

Comparative Evaluation

of ASAT Policy Options

POLICY OVERVIEW

ASAT Policy Choices

Over the next 5 years, the United States will

have to make key decisions regarding research

and development programs for anti-satellite

weapons and countermeasures and for ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. In addition, the United States must also consider

whether it wishes to seek agreement with the

Soviet Union to halt or limit the development

of certain weapons that would operate from

space or against space objects. This chapter

analyzes the relationships between offensive

and defensive weapons programs and arms

control. In so doing, it utilizes the technology

discussions contained in chapters 3 and 4 and

the discussions of arms control found in chapters 5 and 6.

As discussed in chapter 6, those regimes

which require negotiated arms control agreements could be either of limited or unlimited

duration. Opponents of developing BMD systems might prefer an agreement of unlimited

duration. Agreements of limited duration–

perhaps 5-10 years—might be attractive to

proponents of advanced BMD research if they

could be fashioned so as not to interfere with

plans to develop and test prototype BMD

weapons. Such agreements would have the added benefit of temporarily constraining the development or testing of advanced .ASAT weapons which could attack space-based BMD

system components.

Alternative Legal/Technical Regimes

This chapter considers possible arms control

provisions, ASAT postures, and counter-measures together as packages in order to exan~-

ine their interaction. Since there are many conceivable packages, it is necessary to select a

limited number for analysis. These packages

have been constructed so that each will have

at least one advantage over the others considered and so that each contains elements which

might reasonably be expected to coexist in the

same proposal. Consideration of these regimes

is intended to facilitate assessment of the effectiveness and desirability of different combinations of ASAT and BMD technology development, satellite survivability, and arms

control.

The seven regimes considered in the remaining

1

2.

<. ?

sections of this chapter are]:

Existing Constraints. The first regime is

defined by treaties and agreements presently in force. The ways in which this legal

regime would affect technology developments designed to protect U.S. satellites

or to place Soviet satellites at risk will be

examined.

A Comprehensive Anti-Satellite and SpaceBased Weapon Ban. Regime two could be

established by adhering to treaties and

agreements presently in force and, in

addition, agreeing to forgo the possession

of deliberate anti-satellite weapons, the

testing—on Earth or in space—of any

deliberate ASAT capability, the testing

in an ‘‘ A SAT mode’ of systems with inherent ASAT capabilities, and deployment—on Earth or in space—of any

ASAT weapon.

An ASA’T Weapon Test Ban and a SpaceBased Weapon Deployment Ban. The third

‘These reginles might usefully include elements not discusswi

h(rc, ~70J” ex:jmp]t, r~~~jn]t,s ~, ,?, 4, and 5 might also include a

“no-use” pro~ l~ion w hi(h would prohihit the parties from dest ro~ri ng or ‘‘ rend(’rirrg inoperah]e each others satellites.

“resting in an “AS. A’I’ mode” would include tests of land-,

vea , air-, or spacf~-has(wi s~’st(~nls agairlst targets in space or

a~rai ns t points in spa(YI

125
126

4.

5.

6,

‘7.

regime could be created by adhering to

treaties and agreements presently in force

and, in addition, agreeing to forgo testing in an “A SAT mode” and the deployment of any weapon in space. This regime

differs from regime 2 most importantly

in that it would not ban possession or

testing–on Earth-of deliberate ASAT

weapons.

A “One Each/No New Types” Regime. Regime 4 includes arms limitation provisions which would permit the United

States and the Soviet Union to test and

deploy their current ASATS but would

prohibit testing of more advanced systems. Advanced systems prohibited

would include those capable of operating

or attacking targets at higher altitudes

and those that would be deployed in

space. For the purposes of this assessment, the U.S. MV will be considered to

be the only deliberate “current” U.S.

ASAT.

Rules of the Road. The fifth regime illustrates the advantages and disadvantages

of establishing ‘‘keep-out zones’ around

individual, high-value satellites.

Space Sanctuaries. Regime 6 would provide high-altitude sanctuaries where satellites could operate but where the testing or deployment of weapons would be

forbidden.

A Space-Based BMD Regime. The seventh

regime might result from U.S. or Soviet

withdrawal from the ABM Treaty followed by the deployment of space-based

BMD systems.

As table 7-1 demonstrates, the regimes discussed here can be characterized both by the

extent to which they rely on negotiated arms

controls and by the extent to which they allow or encourage ASAT development. With

the exception of the “Existing Constraints”

and the “Space-Based BMD” regimes, all

other regimes involve some type of arms control. With the exception of the “Comprehensive Anti-satellite and Space-Based Weapon

Ban, ” and perhaps, the “A SAT Weapon Test

—

Table 7-1 .—Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development

and Arms Control

—.————

Restrict with Develop ASAT

arms control weapons

Existing constraints ... No Yes

Comprehensive ASAT

and space-based

weapon ban . . . . Yes No

Test ban and spacebased weapon ban . . . . Yes Yes/No a

One each/no new types ., Yes Yes b

Rules of the road . . . . Yes Yesc

Space sanctuary ... . . . Yes YesC

Ballistic missile defense . No Yes

ain this regime ASAT weapons could be developed, tested, and dePloyed on Eaflh

but not In space The United States could pursue ASAT development wlthln the

bounds of the treaty, or (t could forego ASAT development entirely

bAll ASAT weapons other than “current types” could not be tested or deployed

In space

c Development and deployment opt !onal but strongly SU pported by advocates of

this regime

Ban and Space-Based Weapon Deployment

Ban, ” all other regimes assume some level of

ASAT development. These regimes demonstrate that although anti-ASAT arms control

arguments and pro-ASAT weapon arguments

are related, there are many distinguishing features. ASAT arms control proponents believe

that an ASAT treaty is in the national interest; those who support ASAT weapon development believe that this also is in the national

interest. However, ASAT arms control proponents do not necessarily oppose all types of

ASAT development and ASAT weapon prop~

nents do not necessarily oppose all types of

ASAT arms control.

Although the individual regimes vary considerably, all of them should be assessed with

two important considerations in mind:

1. First, if we wish to continue to use space

for military purposes, a commitment to satellite survivability is essential whether or

not any arms limitation agreements are in

force. The existence of space systems with

some inherent A SAT capability makes it

impossible to ban the ability to attack satellites. Therefore, even under the most restrictive ASAT arms control regime, programs for satellite survivability and

countermeasures must be pursued. In the

absence of arms control limitations on
127

2.

ASATS, ensuring satellite survivability there will always be some risk that critiwill be a more demanding task. cal satellites can be destroyed or rendered

Second, the United States should exercise inoperable. The value of continued and fucaution in its reliance on space assets to !per- ture reliance on space systems must be

form tasks essential to the national secu- balanced against the probability that

rity. No matter what arms control or sat- such assets may not be available in a conellite survivability measures are taken, flict situation.

REGIME 1: EXISTING CONSTRAINTS

Legal Regime

The United States could decide that there

are no additional arms control limitations relating to space weapons that are in its national

security interest. If so, development of antisatellite and space-based weapons by the

United States and the U.S.S.R. could continue

unrestrained except by the Limited Test Ban

Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the ABM

Treaty.’

Even in the absence of new arms control

limitations there are restrictions on what the

United States and the Soviet Union can do in

space. As discussed in chapter 5, under existing international law and the treaties to which

the United States is a party, the following

activities are already banned:

●

——.

Unprovoked Attack on Another Country’s

Satellite: Subject to the right of individual or collective self-defense, Article 2 of

the U.N. Charter prohibits the use or

threat of force. A similar sentiment is to

be found in Article III of the 1967 Outer

.

‘The unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the unratified SAI,T 11 Treaty, if adhered to, would supply additional

restrictions. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which was signed

in 1974, prohibits testing orI Earth of nuclear weapons with a

yield greater than 150 kilotons. Should a nuclear ASAT weapon

require a nuclear explosive of greater yield than this, it could

not be fully tested without violating the Threshold Test Ban

Treaty. Under Article IX of the Salt II Treaty, the parties

agreed not to develop, test, or deploy “systems for placing into

Earth orbit nuclear weapons. ” This might be interpreted to include nuclear A SAT weapons.

Space Treaty. The SALT and ABM Treaties also prohibit interference by either

state with space assets used by the other

to monitor those treaties.

Placement of Nuclear Weapons in Orbit:

Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty

(OST) prohibits orbiting nuclear weapons.

This would include nuclear “space mines’

and, presumably, ASATS that used a nuclear explosion as a power source.

Detonation of Nuclear Weapons in Space:

The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)

prohibits nuclear weapons tests or other

nuclear explosions in space. This would

prohibit the full testing of ASATS that

use nuclear explosions for destruction or

as a power source.

Development, Testing, or Deployment of

Weapons Capable of Countering Strategic

Ballistic Missiles, or Their Elements in

Flight: Space-based weapons sophisticated enough to “counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in fLight” are

banned under the terms of the 1972 ABM

Treaty. This establishes a somewhat

vague upper limit on the capabilities of

advanced ASAT weapons.

To summarize, the existing international legal regime prohibits the use of ASAT capability except in national or collective selfdefense, the testing or deployment of spacebased weapons with strategic BMD capability, and the testing in space or deployment in

orbit of nuclear space mines or ASATS that
128

would require a nuclear detonation as a power

source. The existing regime places few restrictions on the current ASAT research and development programs of either the United

States or the Soviet Union.

Offensive Posture

In the absence of further restrictions, the following weapons could be developed, tested,

and deployed as deliberate ASAT weapons by

either the United States or the Soviet Union,

if deployed in compliance with the ABM

Treaty (i.e., so as not to be capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight)4

:

●

●

●

✍

Coorbital Interceptors: Ground-launched,

nonnuclear coorbital interceptors—e.g.,

the current Soviet ASAT–are allowable

under the existing regime. Ground-based

nuclear systems could be developed and

deployed but not tested in space. There

are no restrictions on nonnuclear coorbital interceptors predeployed as space

mines.

Direct-Ascent Interceptors: Groundlaunched or air-launched direct-ascent interceptors–e.g., the U.S. ASAT being

developed–are allowable. Direct-ascent

interceptors carrying nuclear weapons

could be developed and deployed but not

tested in space.

Ground-Based or Airborne Lasers: There

are no restrictions on nuclear or nonnuclear ground based lasers, or on airborne

lasers that would not require a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere.

———

‘The constraint that ASAT weapons not be deployed so as

to be capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles or their

elements in fight is restrictive, but several deployment schemes

can be conceived which would be both lawful and useful. For

example, a neutral particle beam weapon of relatively low power

might be deployed in geosynchronous orbit for ASAT or DSAT

purposes. It might be capable of damaging an enemy satellite

or ASAT several hundred kilometers away within several

seconds, but incapable of darnaging a distant ballistic missile

during its flight time of a few minutes. Deployment of such

weapons might also be allowed in low orbit, if the U.S.-Soviet

Standing Consultative Commission-which was established by

the ABM Treaty to consider allegations of treaty violations—

should agree that such weapons, if never tested as BMD systems, could not reasonably be expected to have a significant

BMD capability.

●

●

●

Space-Based Lasers: Nonnuclear, spacebased lasers are allowable.

Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam Weapons: There are no restrictions on spacebased neutral particle beam weapons.

Maneuverable Spacecraft: Although not

necessarily “deliberate” ASAT systems,

maneuverable spacecraft could be given

substantial A SAT capabilities under the

existing regime.

In addition to these deliberate ASAT systems, other weapon systems such as ICBMS

or ABMs that have some ASAT capability

could be developed and deployed, but could

not be completely tested as ASAT weapons.

Such systems could be tested in space as long

as they were not detonated. The SALT agreements and the ABM Treaty do place other restrictions on ICBMS and ABMs.

Defensive Posture

The United States and the Soviet Union

could develop, test, deploy, and use defensive

measures such as hiding, deception, evasion,

hardening, and proliferation without legal restraint in the existing regime. In addition to

such passive countermeasures, nondestructive

active countermeasures such as electronic

countermeasures (ECM) and electro-optical

countermeasures (E-OCM) could also be used.

ECM and E-OCM are likely to be available and

inexpensive and are unlikely to by restricted

by arms control agreements; however, these

countermeasures could be defeated at a reasonable cost.

Many destructive active countermeasures

would also be allowed under the present regime. Satellites could be given a self-defense

capability (shoot-back) or provided with an escort defense (DSAT). The current ASAT interceptors being developed by the United

States and the Soviet Union (respectively, the

U.S. Air Force Miniature Vehicle and Soviet

coorbital interceptor) are not capable of attacking each other. However, many advanced

ASAT weapons that could be built in the current regime would have some effectiveness

against some types of ASATS. For example,
129

a space-based neutral particle beam weapon,

in addition to its ASAT role, could also be used

as a DSAT to provide ‘enclave defense’ ‘—i.e.,

to defend a number of distant satellites from

other weapons such as coorbital or directascent interceptors or continuous-wave lasers.

However, neutral particle beam weapons deployed as DSATS could not shoot back effectively at larger neutral particle beam ASATS,

nor could they shoot back effectively at expendable single-pulse weapons such as predeployed nuclear “space mines” or some nuclear or nonnuclear directed-energy weapons.

Moreover, if shoot-back is to be effective,

space objects with known or suspected A SAT

capabilities would have to be fired upon while

still some distance from U.S. satellites believed to be in danger. As discussed above, attacking an approaching spacecraft is prohibited by international law except in selfdefense and one could not be certain that the

approaching spacecraft had a hostile intent

until it was too late. Hence, active defense

against suspected “space mines” might be

considered to be unlawful in the existing regime, although deployment of means for such

defense may not be.

Neither passive nor active countermeasures

could guarantee the survival of satellites attacked by some advanced directed-energy

weapons. Although, as discussed in chapter

4, the cost of destroying small, inexpensive

satellites and decoys with advanced directedenergy weapons might exceed the cost of

building such satellites and decoys. Security

for large and expensive satellites might ultimately have to rely on an attempt to deter

A SAT attacks by credibly threatening retaliation against enemy space-based or terrestrial

assets. A credible retaliatory capability would

require a means of discovering that U.S. satellites had been attacked and identifying the

attacker. This would probably require attack

sensors mounted on satellites and a spacebased surveillance system to track and distinguish ASATS from meteorites or space debris.

The latter could also be used to verify compliance with future A SAT arms control agreements, if any, or for targeting future ASAT

(or DSAT) weapons, if any.

Net Assessment

Treaties and agreements presently in force

create no significant barrier to the development, testing, and deployment of very capable, nonnuclear ASAT weapons. 5 The current

regime also allows a wide range of active and

passive countermeasures, including the development of satellites capable of defending

themselves by striking at attacking ASAT

weapons.

The primary advantage of the current regime is that it allows the almost unrestrained

application of U.S. technology to the related

problems of protecting U.S. satellites and placing threatening Soviet satellites at risk. Under this regime, the United States would be

free to use its comparative advantage in advancecl technology to keep pace with expected

developments in Soviet ASATS and other military satellites. Advanced U.S. ASATS might

discourage the development of more capable

Soviet military satellites designed to place

U.S. terrestrial assets at risk. In addition, the

United States would be free to respond to Soviet ASAT weapons with increasingly sophisticated defensive weapons and countermeasures, thereby reducing the probability tl-iat the

Soviets could successfully use their intentional

or inherent A SAT capabilities. Effective A SAT

capability could also give the United States

a powerful countermeasure against potential

Soviet space-based BMD systems.

In addition, research and development on

new balfistic missile defense technologies can

also proceed without the constraints that

might be imposed by certain ASAT arms control regimes. Testing of advanced ASATS

could provide valuable information that would

contribute to the development of very capable BMD systems. Such testing in the “ASAT

5ASAT weapons capable of operating in an “ABM mode’ are,

or course, limited by the ABM treaty. See discussion, supra,

p. 127.
mode” could allow some research to go forward that, if designated as BMD research,

might be considered to be inhibited by the

ABM Treaty.

The primary disadvantage of the current regime is that it might lead to an expensive and

potentially destabilizing arms race in space.

Rather than protecting satellites, a competition in space weapons might severely reduce

their military utility. Under conditions of unrestrained competition, security might be purchased only at the price of a substantial and

sustained commitment to the development of

increasingly sophisticated offensive and defensive space weapons. In such an environment,

ensuring the survivability of satellites would

require more than simple hardening or evasion. Costly measures might have to be taken

such as the deployment of precision decoys,

pre-deployed spares, or the ability to quickly

reconstitute ones space assets. Satellites capable of defending themselves or a companion satellite might ~so have to be developed

and deployed.

Should space mines or directed-energy weapons be deployed, they might be capable of the

almost instantaneous destruction of a large

number of critical satellites and ASATS. This

could force nations into a situation in which

they must “use or lose” their own pre-deployed space weapons. This might supply the

incentive to escalate an otherwise manageable

crisis. If missile early warning and communication satellites were highly vulnerable, crisis

stability might be lessened. The malfunction

of such satellites could be misinterpreted as

a sign of imminent attack, since potential nuclear aggressors would find such satellites to

be attractive targets.

Another potentially destabilizing factor is

that some satellites (particularly communication satellites) play a dual role—they are intended to be force multipliers in a conventional

war, yet they are to play a key role in managing a conflict so as to avoid unwarranted escalation. In the event of a conventional war,

the possessor of a capable ASAT system

would have a strong incentive to attack satellites that were providing support to conventional enemy forces. Destruction of these satellites, however, might contribute to escalation

from conventional to nuclear war.

An unrestrained competition in ASAT

weapons would also increase the risk posed to

space-based ballistic missile defense systems.

Such systems are likely to have many critical

assets based in low-Earth orbit. So situated,

extensive precautions would have to be taken

to protect them from even modest ASAT

weapons.

It is possible that an ASAT weapon competition could also inhibit the use of space for

commercial and scientific purposes. Manned

space stations would be quite vulnerable to

ASAT attack. Should considerable ASAT

testing take place, the resulting debris could

prove harmful to scientific and commercial

satellites.

REGIME 2: A COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-SATELLITE AND SPACEBASED WEAPON BAN

Legal Regime

This regime could be established by adhering to treaties and agreements presently in

force and, in addition, agreeing to forego the

possession of deliberate anti-satellite weapons,

the testing—on Earth or in space—of any deliberate ASAT weapon, the testing in an “ASAT

mode” of systems with inherent ASAT capabilities, and the deployment–on Earth or in

space—of any ASAT weapon.6 In addition, the

U.S.S.R. would be required to destroy all its

. — —

‘iSuch an agreement might resemble the draft treaty proposed

to the United Nations by the U.S.S.R. in August of 1983, except the testing or use of manned spacecraft for military purposes would not, in general, be banned as proposed in Article

2 of the 1983 Soviet draft treaty. (U.N. Document A/38/194,

Aug. 23, 1983). The fifth provision of Article 2 of this proposed
731

coorbital interceptors and the United States

would be required to destroy the direct-ascent

interceptor it is currently developing.

Offensive Posture

In this regime, the United States could not

maintain any deliberate ASAT weapons,

whether dedicated or multi-role, nor would the

U.S.S.R. be allowed to do so. Space systems

with inherent ASAT capabilities such as

ICBMS, ABMs, and maneuverable spacecraft

would still be allowed, but they could not be

tested in an “A SAT mode. ”

Defensive Posture

Under a comprehensive ASAT ban the United

States would retain the right to deploy and use

passive countermeasures such as hiding, deception, evasion, hardening, and proliferation.

The United States would not be allowed to develop, possess, test, or deploy weapons for satellite self-defense, defensive satellites (DSATS),

or other systems intended to have anti-satellite capabilities, even for defensive purposes.

If the U.S.S.R. complied fully with the letter of such a comprehensive ASAT ban, the

risk posed to U.S. satellites would be limited

to the risk posed by possible Soviet use of

ICBMS, SLBMS, ABM interceptors, and possible future highly maneuverable spacecraft.

If U.S. satellites were hardened against the effects of nuclear explosions to a modest degree,

only low-altitude U.S. satellites would be at

significant risk of damage by such inherent

ASAT capabilities, and then primarily at the

nuclear level of conflict. Assuming Soviet compliance, U.S. warning and communications

——

treaty would obligate parties “not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes. ” If this provision were stricken or changed to read “not to test or use

manned spacecraft for anti- satellite purposes, the resulting

draft treaty, if acceded to by the United States and the U. S. S. R.,

would establish a regime of the type considered in this section.

The fifth provision of Article 2 of the proposed Soviet draft

treaty would obligate parties *’Not to test or create new antisatellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems the~

may already have.

satellites in high-altitude orbits would enjoy

a high degree of security in this regime.

Net Assessment

Although this regime would contain the

most far-reaching arms control provisions and

therefore might be most effective at preventing the development of new and more threatening ASAT weapons, it would have the disadvantage of being the most difficult to verify.

Unlike an ASAT Test/Space-based Weapon

Deployment Ban (regime 3), a comprehensive

ban would prohibit possession of ASAT weapons on Earth. Because it is difficult to obtain

information about Soviet military affairs, the

United States would have to assume that the

Soviet Union could possess some number of

their current ASAT weapon.

The current Soviet coorbital interceptor is

a relatively small spacecraft launched on much

larger, general-purpose boosters. Maintaining

such boosters and their launchpads would be

allowed, and it would have to be assumed that

the U.S.S.R. would continue such activities.

Construction of additional boosters and launchpads would also be allowed by an ASAT ban

of the type considered here. Hence the U.S.S.R.

could maintain and even expand its ASAT

force with some confidence that the United

States could not gain unambiguous evidence

of a violation of an A SAT possession ban.

However, even if the U.S.S.R. maintained

some coorbital interceptors, it could not test

them without risking almost certain detection,

and in time the confidence of Soviets in a longuntested and never perfected A SAT weapon

might erode.

There would always be the possibility that

the Soviets might develop a new type of A SAT

weapon with the intention of using it, without prior testing, in extremis (e.g., if anticipating an imminent attack). For example, the

U.S.S.R. might equip an existing booster or

satellite vehicle with a nuclear explosive—

either an isotropic nuclear weapon or possibly

a nuclear directed-energy weapon—and maintain it in readiness for launch or actually

launch it into space. The military utility of
132

such untested systems would be questionable,

particularly if the United States aggressively

pursued available satellites survivability

measures.

Since the United States might agree to a

comprehensive ASAT ban only after considerable political friction over question of compliance and verification, it would be important

to consider how such a ban might make a

greater contribution to U.S. national security

than a ban on ASAT testing and space-based

weapon deployment (regime 3). The purpose

of both bans would be to prevent the use of

ASATS, or, at minimum, to reduce the probability that an ASAT attack would be effective. An ASAT test ban would primarily affect

weapons reliability, while an ASAT possession

ban, if observed, would affect both availability and reliability. It is conceivable that the

risk posed by possible illegal Soviet use of

ASAT weapons might be somewhat lower in

a regime in which the Soviets could not lawfully possess ASAT weapons. Presumably, the

inability to overtly possess ASAT weapons

would diminish one’s ability to use them effectively. Furthermore, an absolute ban on

possession might make it less likely that the

current generation of ASAT weapons could be

upgraded and held in readiness in significant

numbers.

However, if the United States could only be

confident that the Soviets were complying

with a treaty to the extent we could verify

compliance, then the United States would not

have confidence that this regime offered any

greater protection to our satellites than does

regime 3 (test ban and space-based weapons

ban).

REGIME 3: AN ASAT WEAPON TEST BAN AND SPACE-BASED

WEAPON DEPLOYMENT BAN

Legal Regime

This regime would ban what can be monitored with greater confidence—testing in an

“ASAT mode”7 and ASAT deployment in

space. Everything that is prohibited under the

current regime would continue to be prohibited. In addition, further testing—in space—

of the current Soviet coorbital interceptor and

the U.S. direct-ascent interceptor would be

prohibited, as would the placement of any

weapons in space. Unlike regime 2, this regime

would not attempt to ban testing, possession,

or deployment of ASAT weapons on Earth.

Offensive Posture

Although they could not be tested overtly

in an “ASAT mode, ” a number of weapons

which have some limited A SAT capability already exist or could be developed. ICBMS,

ABMs, and maneuverable spacecraft already

———— .———

‘Testing in an “A SAT mode” would include tests of ground-,

air-, sea-, or space-based systems against targets in space or

against points in space. Testing on the ground of ASAT systems or components would not be prohibited.

exist and have inherent ASAT capabilities

which pose some threat to satellites. It might

be possible to increase the ASAT potential of

these systems without violating a ban on the

testing of ASAT weapons. In addition, upon

entry into force of a ban on ASAT testing, the

United States and the U.S.S.R. would possess

deliberate ASAT weapons which would have

undergone some developmental testing, although possibly not enough to perfect their

designs. Such weapons could be maintained

in partial readiness. However, without operational testing for reliability evaluation and

training purposes, confidence in the effective

ness of such weapons would probably degrade

in time.

Advanced ASAT weapons such as neutral

particle beam weapons or x-ray lasers could

be developed and maintained in partial readiness, but could not be completely tested. Confidence that such weapons would perform ade

quately if used might be so low that one would

not rely on them in an aggressive first strike

nor find it cost-effective to develop them for

that purpose. On the other hand, one might
133

use them, if attacked, to degrade enemy capabilities supported by satellites, and might

find it cost-effective to develop them for that

purpose. That is, the discrepancy between offense conservatism and defense conservatism

might decrease the risk which untested weapons could pose if possessed by an aggressive

nation.

Defensive Posture

In this regime, testing and deployment in

space of advanced ASAT weapons would be

prohibited but might be attempted by the

U.S.S.R. covertly or after a breakout.8 Hence

the choice of passive countermeasures in this

regime would be influenced by the same considerations which favor deception and modest

nuclear hardening in the existing regime. Such

measures would be more effective, however,

in a test-ban regime because it could be assumed that the ASAT threat would be reduced

to some degree by the arms control provision.

Passive countermeasures would also be more

important in this regime, because destructive

active security measures—e.g., shoot-back

with reliable, tested DSAT weapons—would

not be an option. Deep-space surveillance

would be even more desirable in this regime

than in the existing regime, because of the

need to monitor compliance as well as for its

role in providing attack assessment information. Hence, in a test-ban regime, attack sensors, space-based LWIR sensors, satellite decoys, and modest nuclear hardening would be

at least as desirable, as in the existing regime,

if not more so.

Nondestructive active countermeasures such

as ECM and E-OCM would be desirable, if not

‘Although deployment of an NPB in space—a prerequisite

for testing-would probably be observable, maintaining an untested NPB weapon on Earth in readiness for quick launch

might not be, and would be allowed. Maintaining an untested

XRL weapon on Earth in readiness for quick launch might also

be difficult to dekt and would also be allowed under the terms

of an ASAT test and SBW deployment ban. Illegal deployment

of an untested XRL in space would be difficult and costly to

observe. However, an enemy could have little confidence in the

reliability and performance of untested NPB or XRL weapons,

so such weapons would not be as threatening as in the existing regime in which NPB weapons could be legally tested in

space.

inherent, in a test-ban regime, just as in the

existing regime. Destructive active countermeasures, on the other hand, would be severely constrained: new ASAT weapons useful as DSATS could be developed but could not

be tested nor deployed in space. An untested

NPB or XRL built and readied for quick

launch and use as a DSAT could not be responsive enough to use for defensive shoot-back

against expedient ASAT weapons such as

ICBMS but might have value if maintained for

retaliatory shoot-back.

Net Assessment

A negotiated ban on the testing of weapons

in space or against space objects would limit

the nature and extent of U.S. and Soviet arms

competition in space. Advanced ASAT directed-energy weapons which could threaten

high-altitude satellites with prompt destruction could not be lawfully tested and attempts

to extensively test such weapons covertly

would probably be detectable. Although such

a ban could not eliminate all threats to satellites, it would substantially reduce the cost

and complexity of ensuring a reasonable level

of satellite survivability. The United States

would still benefit from hardening its satellites

to some extent and deploying spares and decoys, but the more elaborate, expensive, and

possibly ineffective precaution of developing

and deploying DSATS would be prohibited

and, indeed, less attractive. In the absence of

reliable, effective ASATS, satellites would be

of greater utility since the United States

might have higher confidence that they would

be available when needed.

Relative to the existing regime, the primary

advantage of a regime banning testing of

ASAT capabilities and deployment of spacebased weapons would be that highly valued

U.S. satellites in higher orbits–e.g., the future

MILSTAR system–could be protected with

some confidence from advanced A SAT weapons, especially if protected as well by passive

countermeasures. The fact that advanced

ASATS could not be overtly tested would reduce the probability that they would be devel-
134

oped and deployed. If they were developed and

used without prior or complete testing, the improbability of their success compounded with

the improbability of their attacking an operational satellite rather than a decoy (if such

are deployed) would afford such satellites considerable protection and would, at least, disproportionately increase an enemy’s cost for

an effective ASAT capability. In addition, a

ban on testing advanced ASAT weapons and

deploying them in space would plausibly inhibit future competition in developing spacebased weapons and would discourage development and covert testing and deployment of

ASAT weapons of types which would pose the

strongest incentives for preemptive ASAT attack. These benefits might be deemed advantageous by both the United States and the

U.S.S.R.

As in the existing regime, the United States

could retain a capability to attempt to negate

low-altitude Soviet satellites (e.g., RORSAT)

with its MV ASAT in the event of war and to

respond in kind to a Soviet ASAT attack.

However, confidence in the operational capability of this system might degrade over time

without continued operational testing.

From the point of view of those interested

in preserving the present agreement beween

the United States and the Soviet Union limiting ballistic missile defenses, another advantage of an ASAT test ban would be its prevention of tests of ASAT technologies with

potential BMD applications.

On the other hand, from the point of view

of those favoring intensive BMD research, a

primary disadvantage of this regime, relative

to the existing regime, is that the testing of

some types of advanced BMD weapons might

be prohibited. Such limitations could be

slightly more restrictive than those of the

ABM Treaty, and would be very restrictive

compared to a regime in which the ABM

Treaty was no longer in force [regime 7]. Finally, it must be recognized that a ban on testing ASAT capabilities and deploying spacebased weapons would not offer absolute protection for satellites; there would remain some

possibility that an untested or partially tested

ASAT, if suddenly deployed and used, might

actually work well enough to overcome passive countermeasures.

REGIME 4: A “ONE EACH/NO NEW TYPES” REGIME

Legal Regime

A “one each/no new types” regime might be

established by adhering to agreements currently in force and further agreeing to ban the

deployment in orbit of any weapon and the

testing in space, “in an ASAT mode” of any

system except the currently operational type

of Soviet coorbital interceptor and the U.S.

MV direct-ascent interceptor.g Research on advanced systems and testing of these systems

on Earth would not be prohibited.

‘Although the U.S. Department of Defense has stated its belief that the Soviets have two ground-based lasers which could

be used against satellites [U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet

Mfi”hry Power, 1984, p. 35], testing of such lasers as ASAT

weapons would be prohibited. If these lasers had already been

tested as ASATS by the time a “no new types agreement” could

enter into force then this regime might have to be appropriately modified.

Offensive Posture

Offensive postures in a “no new types” regime would be as in an ASAT test ban and

space-based weapon deployment ban regime

(regime 3), except ASAT weapons of the single allowed type would almost surely be maintained for offensive ASAT missions in wartime.’” It is possible that each side would be

satisfied with the capabilities such fully tested

weapons could provide and would be less

tempted than it would be in a test ban regime

to covertly develop advanced ASAT weapons.

loIt is po9sible, of course, that one or both nations would

decide–as the United States did after ratifying the ABM

Treaty–that its allowed system was not worth maintaining.
135

——

Defensive Posture

Passive countermeasures appropriate in a

test-ban regime would also be appropriate in

this regime, and for the same reasons. In addition, the unambiguous, if limited, threat posed

by the one allowed ASAT weapon would provide an additional incentive to deploy passive

countermeasures tailored to that weapon. For

example, evasion might effectively counter

coorbital interceptors such as those tested by

the U. S. S. R., and maneuver-although not literally “evasion”- could complicate targeting

of the U.S. MV. These countermeasures would

probably be developed and employed even

though they would not be effective against

more capable weapons which might be developed but not tested nor deployed in space.

ECM and E-OCM would be allowed in this

regime as in a test-ban/space-based weapon

ban regime. Current U.S. and Soviet ASAT

weapons would be insufficiently responsive to

be effective for defensive shoot-back; however,

they could be used in retaliation.

Net Assessment

The primary advantage of a “no new types”

regime, relative to the existing regime, would

be that critical U.S. satellites in higher orbits

could be protected with some confidence from

advanced ASAT weapons. If developed and

used without prior testing, it is possible that

such advanced A SAT weapons would not work

properly. If they did work, it would not be

clear that they could overcome the survivability measures that could be given satellites in

this regime. More generally, a ban on testing

advanced ASAT weapons would inhibit to

some extent future arms competition in space.

Assuming the United States had successfully developed its MV ASAT, a “no new

types” regime might be particularly desirable.

Such an agreement could prohibit the testing

of Soviet ground-based lasers or MV-type

ASAT weapons and limit them to their current, unsophisticated A SAT weapon. Of course,

this would make such an agreement less acceptable to the Soviet Union. Should the Soviets test advanced ASAT weapons before

such an agreement can enter into force, such

an agreement would be less advantageous to

the United States. However, since such an

agreement might avert the risks posed by even

more advanced-particularly directed-energy

ASATs–a “no new types” agreement might

still be considered valuable and negotiable by

both the United States and the Soveit Union.

As in the existing regime, the United States

could retain a capability to negate low-altitude

Soviet satellites (e.g., RORSAT) in the event

of war and to respond in kind to a Soviet

ASAT attack. A primary disadvantage of a

“no new types” regime, relative to the existing regime, would be that allowed U.S. ASAT

capabilities would be inadequate to negate

threatening Soviet satellites if such satellites

were moved to higher orbits—a feasible but

difficult and costly Soviet countermeasure. As

in the test ban and space-based weapon ban

regime, the testing of some types of advanced

BMD weapons which would be allowed in the

existing regime would be limited in this regime. Such limitations could be slightly more

restrictive than those of the ABM Treaty and

would be very restrictive compared to a regime

in which the ABM Treaty was no longer in force.

Finally, it must be recognized that the reliability of protection afforded high-altitude satellites by a ban on testing “new types” would

be uncertain; there would remain some probability that an untested advanced ASAT, if

suddenly deployed and used, might actually

work.
136 —— — —

REGIME 5: RULES OF THE ROAD

Legal Regime

A legal regime providing for “keep-out

zones” around satellites could be established

by a “rules of the road” agreement similar to

the “Rules of the Road at Sea” Treaty. ” As

discussed in chapter 6, such an agreement

would not prohibit development, testing, or deployment in space of advanced ASAT weapons but would, instead, attempt to enhance

security by establishing rules regarding space

activities such as close approach of foreign satellites, advance notice of launch activities,

high-velocity fly-bys, minimum separation distance between satellites, low-altitude overflight, and “keep-out zones. ”12

‘‘Keep-out zones’ would probably offer the

closest thing to security in a “rules of the

road” regime. The following “rules of the

road” are illustrative of those which might be

agreed should it be decided that “keep-out

zones’ are in the U.S. national security interest:

9

●

●

●

●

●

Keep 100 kilometers and three degrees

out-of-plane from foreign satellites below

5,OOO km.

Keep 500 km from foreign satellites above

5,000 km except those within 500 km of

geosynchronous altitude.

One pre-announced close approach at a

time is allowed.

In the event of a violation of the rules

above, the nation of registry of the satellite which most recently initiated a maneuver “burn” is at fault and guilty of

trespass.

Satellites trespassing upon keep-out zones —

‘116 UST 794, TIAS 5813.

’21n addition to agreeing to such “rules of the road, ” the

United States and the Soviet Union might have to modify their

commitment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (18 U.S.T. 2410;

T. I.A.S. 6347). Since Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty states

that “outer space . . . is not subject to national appropriation

by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by

any other means, ” this could be interpreted as prohibiting establishment of such keep-out zones. A contrary argument maintains that a precedent for “keep-out zones” can be found in the

international acceptance of the principle that a satellite should

not be placed in geostationary orbit if it will interfere with a

satellite already in that orbit,

may be forcibly prevented from continued

trespass.

The rationale for these rules is as follows:

ASAT weapons such as nuclear interceptors would have to be kept at a range of

several hundred kilometers from moderately hardened satellites in order to protect such satellites; advanced ASAT directed-energy weapons might have to be

kept much farther away. ’3

Satellites in geostationary orbit are already so closely spaced that a keep-out

zone sufficiently large to protect satellites

from nuclear attack could not be established around such satellites without displacing satellites already there and reducing the number of geostationary orbital

slots available to other nations in the

future.

There are now very few satellites in supersynchronous orbits,” but critical strategic warning and communications functions could be performed by satellites in

such orbits. Should space systems be developed to operate in this region, there

would be adequate room to accommodate

large keep-out zones.

There are presently few satellite orbits in

deep space’s

but below geosynchronous

orbital altitude. The most notable exceptions are the orbits of various Soviet satellites in highly elliptical, semi-synchronous “Molniya-type” orbits, U.S. Air

Force Satellite Data System (SDS) satellites in similar highly elliptical orbits, and

U.S. (NAVSTAR) and Soviet (GLONASS)

navigation satellites in semi-synchronous

circular orbits. Although there are, or

soon will be, many such satellites de-

“In re: NDEW, see, e.g., L.A. Wojcik, “Separation Requirements for Protection of High-Altitude Satellites from Coorbital Anti-Satellite Weapons, ” (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie-Mellon

University, Department of Engineering and Public Policy, dissertation, March 1985); in re: NPB weapons, see ch. 4 of this

report.

“I. e., higher than geosynchronous orbitaJ altitude.

“I. e., higher than 3,000 nautical miles, or about 5,600

kilometers.
137

ployed, several satellites will (or could) occupy the same orbit. For example, 24

NAVSTAR satellites will occupy only

three orbits, with eight satellites following one another around each of the three

orbits. Hence there would be enough room

in this region of space to accommodate

keep-out zones of several hundred kilometers radius around the satellites presently deployed there.

● There are too many satellites in 1ow-Earth

orbit—particularly below the inner Van

Allen radiation belt which extends from

about 1,800 km (1,000 nmi) to about 5,600

km (3,000 nmi)–to accommodate keepout zones of several hundred kilometers

radius around the satellites presently deployed there. Indeed, many satellites have

perigees within several hundred kilometers of the Earth’s surface. Requiring

keep-out zones of several hundred kilometers radius around low-altitude satellites

would therefore be impractical.

s However, it would be feasible to establish

smaller keep-out zones around satellites

in low orbit and, in addition, to prohibit

satellites from entering an orbital plane

inclined less than, say, three degrees from

the orbital plane of a foreign satellite at

such altitudes. Specifying a minimum angular separation between orbital planes

would prevent continuous trailing; for example, two satellites in 1,000 km circular

orbits with orbital planes separated by

three degrees would approach each other

closely every 53 minutes, if properly

“phased,” but would separate by as much

as about 400 km at intermediate times

and would be separated by at least 200

km about half the time. If, in addition,

such satellites were phased so as to not

approach one another more closely than

100 km at any time, their separation

would vary between 100 km and more

than 400 km, at minimum. Under such

rules, although satellites would occasionally approach one another so closely as to

be mutually vulnerable to, for example,

covert on-board nuclear weapons, such approaches would not all occur simultaneously. Therefore, adequately hardened,

low-altitude satellites could not be instantly and simultaneously destroyed by

relatively primitive ASAT weapons.

● There would be some value in allowing

one pre-announced close approach at a

time as an exception to the rules above.

Such an exception would, for example,

permit an inspection satellite carrying a

gamma-ray spectrometer to trail a foreign

satellite while trying to determine whether

the foreign satellite carried fissionable

material, possibly in violation of Article

IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. A disadvantage of such an exception would be

that a trailing “inspection” satellite could

carry a weapon and destroy the trailed

satellite at close range. However, deployment of one on-orbit spare for any truly

essential satellite would eliminate this

risk.

 Although, given adequate space surveillance, it could be verified that two foreign

satellites approached one another more

closely than would be allowed by these

rules, there could be a problem in determining which nation or other party would

be guilty of a violation. It is difficult to

predict, to within an accuracy of 100 km,

where a satellite will be in several months

as the result of an orbital transfer or

stationkeeping maneuver. This is particularly true if the satellite is at very low altitude where it would be subject to atmospheric drag or at very high altitude where

it would be subject to the lunar gravitational field. Hence, inadvertent close approach might be possible. legal allocation

of responsibilities in such a regime might

follow precedents established in maritime

and, especially, aeronautical law, which

specifies minimum separation distances

between aircraft and gives right-of-way to

relatively unmaneuverable aircraft such

as aerostats (balloons) and gliders. One

possibility would be to give right-of-way

to satellites already in orbit and, by implication, to assign fault to whichever

spacecraft most recently initiated or continued a maneuver “burn.”
138

The rules suggested above are intended to

be illustrative rather than precise. Careful

framing of an agreement would be required in

order to prohibit unintended abuses such as

establishment of a de facto barrier to deep

space by deploying many small satellites in

low orbit in order to fill an altitude band with

keep-out zones. Rationing keep-out zones—

e.g., 10 per nation—could solve this problem,

but careful study may be required to foresee

other possible abuses. In addition to its technical problems, this regime is likely to have

a significant political dimensions inasmuch as

it will affect the rights of all present and future spacefaring nations.

Offensive Posture

A “keep-out zone” agreement would not

constrain offensive postures, and these could

be as in the existing regime. The protection

afforded by defended keep-out zones would

diminish the effectiveness of some types of

weapons such as coorbital interceptors and

thereby diminish incentives to include them

in a space order of battle. However, the effectiveness of advanced ASAT weapons—e.g.,

directed-energy weapons–would not be significantly reduced by keep-out zones of the size

considered here.

Defensive Posture

A “keep-out zone” agreement would not

constrain defensive postures, and these could

be as in the existing regime. Decoys might be

an attractive defensive measure in this regime,

because “keep-out zones” would inhibit or pre

elude certain types of close inspection which

might otherwise be able to distinguish decoys

from valuable satellites (see discussion in

chapter 4). The deployment of DSATS or selfdefense weapons would also be attractive, because such weapons could be used to enforce

agreed keep-out zones. In the existing regime,

attempts to enforce a declared keep-out zone

by firing upon a “violating” suspected (but not

proven) A SAT would probably be considered

unlawful unless lethal capability and hostile

intent of such spacecraft could be established.

Net Assessment

An agreement establishing minimum satellite separation rules could establish important

legal rights to actively defend satellites, and

would be an improvement over the existing re

gime if an active defense posture were desired.

Enforcing agreed keep-out zones using DSATS

would provide protection against relatively

primitive ASAT weapons such as the current

Soviet coorbital interceptor. However, keepout zones large enough to protect satellites

from advanced directed-energy weapons could

be accommodated only beyond geosynchronous altitude.

A “keep-out zone” regime would have the

advantage of not limiting research, development, and deployment of ASAT, DSAT, and

BMD technologies. On the other hand, since

a defended “keep-out zone” would provide significant protection against current ASAT

weapons, it would encourage the development

of more advanced systems. Such systems

would likely increase in sophistication until the

more advanced directed-energy technologies re

duced the effectiveness of “keep-out zones. ”

REGIME 6: SPACE SANCTUARIES

Legal Regime Such an agreement would be similar in some

A legal regime prohibiting the deployment

respects to the Antarctic Treaty,lG the Outer

Space Treaty,” the Treaty for the Prohibition

of weapons in deep space (i.e., at altitudes

greater than 3,000 nmi (5600 km)) or the test- -

“The text of the Antarctic Treaty is reprinted in U.S. Arms

ing of any weapons against instrumented tar- Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disargets or other objects in deep space could be mament Agreements (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1982), pp. 22-26.

established by a “Deep-Space Sanctuary. ” “ibid., pp. 51-55.
139

of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,18 the

so-called Seabed Arms Control Treaty,lg and

other treaties and agreements which establish

demilitarized or deweaponized zones. Such an

agreement would not prohibit development,

testing, or deployment in space of ASAT

weapons but would attempt to enhance security by banning the testing and deployment

of weapons in deep space where critical strategic satellites are presently based. At present,

such systems are invulnerable to currently

operational tested ASAT weapons.

In addition to such an agreement, other rele

vant agreements currently in force (Limited

Test Ban Treay, Outer Space Treaty, ABM

Treaty) could remain in force in a “deep-space

sanctuary’ regime. Amendment of the Outer

Space Treaty would not bean issue, since, unlike the “keep-out zone” regime, the “space

sanctuary” regime could not be considered as

a national appropriation of space.

Offensive Posture

Offensive postures appropriate in a “keepout zones” regime [regime 5] would also be

appropriate in a deep-space sanctuary regime,

and for the same reasons. However, nuclear

or kinetic-energy weapons—which would require more time to reach a satellite in deep

space than to reach a satellite inside a small

keep-out zone—would be less attractive as

ASAT weapons than in a “keep-out zones’ re

gime. Advanced directed-energy weapons,

when feasible, would be the most capable

ASAT weapons allowed in this regime, as in

a “keep-out zones” regime.

Defensive Posture

Passive countermeasures appropriate in a

“keep-out zone” regime would also be appropriate in this regime, and for the same reasons.

‘

a

Ibid., pp. 64-75; the texts of Protocols I and 11 thereto are

reprinted in ibid., pp. 76 and 77, respectively.

‘

g

Formally titled “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil

Thereof, ” the text of which is reprinted in ibid., pp. 103-105.

However, as in a “keep-out zone” regime, passive countermeasures could not economically

protect large and expensive satellites as high

as in geosynchronous orbit from advanced

directed-energy weapons, which would be allowed in low orbit and which could be adequately tested against instrumented target

satellites in low orbit. As in the existing regime, small, inexpensive satellites might be

protected from such advanced weapons because they might cost more to attack than to

build.

Active countermeasures appropriate in the

existing regime would also be appropriate in

this regime, and for the same reasons. As in

the existing regime, attacking suspicious approaching ASAT weapons would be unlawful

at low altitudes where such objects would have

rights of innocent passage. Deployment in

deep space of “shoot-back” capabilities or

DSATS would probably be prohibited since it

might be impossible to differentiate these

weapons from offensive weapons.

Net Assessment

The primary advantage of this regime would

be that it could protect satellites in high orbits from the current generation of ASAT

weapons. In addition, a deep-space sanctuary

regime would constrain ASAT development

less than would a comprehensive test ban regime or a nonew-types regime. However, should

the United States and the Soviet Union choose

to pursue advanced ASAT weapons, a space

sanctuary might offer only limited protection.

The greatest risks in a space sanctuary regime would be posed by advanced directedenergy weapons which could be tested and deployed at low altitudes. Such testing and deployment would probably be adequate to guarantee effectiveness against targets at higher

altitudes. Satellites at very high, supersynchronous altitudes might still derive some pre

tection from this regime, but violation of the

sanctuary by highly maneuverable kineticenergy weapons or by satellites covertly carrying powerful nuclear or directed-energy

weapons would remain a risk.
140 — — —

REGIME 7: A SPACE-BASED BMD REGIME

Legal Regime

If the United States or the Soviet Union

withdrew from the ABM Treaty, this would,

in addition to allowing ballistic missile defense, eliminate constraints on ASAT capabilities now imposed by that Treaty. The resulting regime would allow both advanced ASAT

and space-based BMD weapons. Withdrawal

from the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the

Outer Space Treaty would also be necessary

if the United States or the Soviet Union

desired to test and deploy space weapons that

used nuclear explosives as a power source.

Offensive Posture

In a space-based BMD regime, ASAT options would be less constrained than in the existing regime and advanced ASAT weapons

would be more essential for defeating spacebased enemy BMD system. In such a regime,

advanced space-based weapons could be deployed at low altitudes and used as ASAT or

DSAT weapons as well as for BMD. Some

spacebased weapons which would be useful—

but not preferred-for satellite negation might

be deployed in this regime because of their use

fulness as BMD weapons. For example, kinetic-energy weapons and continuous-wave

lasers which could destroy fast-burn boosters

deep within the atmosphere might be preferred

as BMD weapons over neutral particle beam

or X-ray laser directed-energy weapons. The

latter, although more useful in an ASAT role,

could not readily penetrate the atmosphere

and therefore may have more limited value as

BMD weapons.

Defensive Posture

In a space-based BMD regime, defensive

measures would be less constrained and more

essential than in the existing regime. Advanced space-based weapons could be deployed at low altitudes and then used as

ASAT or DSAT weapons. In a DSAT role,

these weapons could offer some protection to

low-altitude satellites. However, such satellites would probably remain vulnerable to attack by larger weapons or by expendable

single-shot weapons (e.g., single-pulse lasers)

which could attack from great range unless

held at bay by large “keep-out zones. ” As discussed in chapter 4, it is possible that future

technological advances might allow decoys to

be developed that were cost-effective when

compared to future offensive weapons and discrimination capabilities.

In evaluating offensive and defensive postures in a space-based BMD regime, it is necessary to assume that future technology will

confer an advantage to ASAT countermeasures vis-a-vis ASAT capabilities. Although

such an assumption may be unjustified at

present, if the United States is to deploy advanced space-based BMD weapons then it

must also have developed highly effective

countermeasures to ASAT weapons. It would

be irrational for the United States to seek to

establish a “spac~based BMD” regime unless

it judged that adequate numbers of the spacebased BMD components would survive or unless it judged that non-space-based BMD components could provide an adequate defense

without spacebased components. Scenarios illustrating each of these conditions are imaginable; for example:

1. The United States may judge that BMD

systems with space-based components

could not be destroyed by the U. S. S. R.:

For example, the United States might deploy, in addition to ground-based BMD

components, spacebased electromagnetic

launchers for kinetic-energy weapons and

defend them by hardening, deception, and

shoot-back. Deceptive measures employed

might include massive decoys made from

asteroidal material such as nickel.zo While

— .

20It is speculated that the cost of transporting such material

to low Earth orbit and refining and fabricating finished products with it there may eventually be several orders of magnitude lower than the cost of refining and forming such materials on Earth and transporting the products to space. Should

this forecast prove accurate, deception may have a favorable

cost-exchange ratio even against ASAT systems which can discriminate decoys on the basis of mass density.
141 — .—

2.

3.

the Soviets might be able to destroy some

BMD components, the system as a whole

would survive.

The United States may judge that spacebased BMD components would not be destroyed by the U. S. S. R.: Even if future

technology does not favor A SAT countermeasures to the extent assumed in (l),

A SAT countermeasure technology could

be so effective that the Soviet leadership

would be unwilling to pay the costs of

defeating the countermeasures.

The United States may desire an extensive BMD system without space-based

components: For example, U.S. aspiration

might be limited to defense of hardened

facilities which house strategic retaliatory

forces or command and control systems;

this might be accomplished using groundbased radars and interceptors but would

require deployment of more of these over

larger areas than is allowed by the ABM

Treaty. Alternatively, the United States

might desire an extensive BMD system

capable of defending industry and population using only ground-based weapons.

Net Assessment

Depending on one’s viewpoint, the principal

advantage, or disadvantage, of a space-based

BMD regime would be that it would allow the

United States and the Soviet Union to deploy

highly capable weapons in space. Since even

a limited BMD system would probably make

a very good A SAT system decision to proceed

with BMD deployment necessarily includes a

decision not to proceed with certain types of

ASAT arms control.”

On March 23, 1983, the President called for

a vigorous research program to determine the

“lt is p~ssiblc that in a space-based BMD regime one might

also wish to negotiate ‘ ‘rules of the road’ such as “keep-out

zones, or perhaps ex’en a deep-space sanctuary.

feasibility of highly effective, advanced-technology BMD systems, suggesting that the de

ployment of such systems, if feasible, would

be desirable. Before the United States deployed space-based BMD systems it would

have to determine, first, that the contribution

that such systems made to U.S. security was

great enough to compensate for the threat

which similar opposing systems would pose to

U.S. satellites, and second, that space-based

BMD components could be protected at competitive cost against advanced ASAT

weapons.

The threat to satellites would be greater in

a space-based BMD regime than in any other

regime because the BMD weapons would

likely have extensive ASAT capabilities. The

expense of equipping all military satellites

with countermeasures against such capabilities would be considerable, particularly if, as

some fear, deployment of space-based BMD

systems will lead to a major arms race in both

offensive and defensive weapons. However, if,

as some argue, space-based missile defenses

can make us more secure and encourage the

Soviets to make real reductions in offensive

missiles, this would reduce the threat of

U.S./Soviet conflict and to contribute to a

mutual desire to protect space assets. In a

world where conflict was less likely, satellite

vulnerability would be less important.

A SAT countermeasures must prove to be effective for spacebased BMD platforms if a de

cision to deploy them is to make sense. It is

possible that large improvements in the effectiveness or economy of passive countermeasures such as combinations of hardening, deception, and proliferation might provide the

needed protection. If such improvements occur, they might also be used effectively for satellites in the other regimes discussed above.

Alternatively, the superior fire-power or massive shielding of BMD weapons might give

them a degree of protection unattainable by

smaller, less capable satellites.
Appendix A

Soviet Draft Treaty on the

Prohibition of the Use of Force

in Outer Space and From Space

Against the Earth
—

Appendix A

Soviet Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of

the Use of Force in Outer Space and

From Space Against the Earth

U.N. General Assembly document A/38/194, Aug. 22, 1983

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the principle whereby Members of the

United Nations shall refrain in their international

relations from the threat or use of force in any

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the

United Nations,

Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space and

thus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threat

of nuclear war,

Desiring to contribute towards attainment of

the goal whereby the exploration and utilization

of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for

peaceful purposes,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

It is prohibited to resort to the use or threat of

force in outer space and the atmosphere and on the

Earth through the utilization, as instruments of

destruction, of space objects in orbit around the

Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in

any other manner.

It is further prohibited to resort to the use or

threat of force against space objects in orbit

around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed

in outer space in any other manner.

Article 2

In accordance with the provisions of article 1,

States Parties to this Treaty undertake:

1.

2.

Not to test or deploy “by placing in orbit

around the Earth or stationing on celestial

bodies or in any other manner any spacebased weapons for the destruction of objects

on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer

space.

Not to utilize space objects in orbit around the

Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer

space in any other manner as means to de3.

4.

5.

stroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

Not to destroy, darnage, disturb the normal

functioning or change the flight trajectory of

space objects of other States.

Not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems

that they may already have.

Not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Article 3

The State Parties to this Treaty agree not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of

States, international organization or natural or legal person to engage in activities prohibited by

this Treaty.

Article 4

1.

2.

For the purposes of providing assurance of

compliance with the provisions of this Treaty,

each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in

a manner consistent with generally recognized

principles of international law.

Each State Party undertakes not to interfere

with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 5

1.

.

The States Parties to this Treaty undertake

to consult and co-operate with each other in

solving any problems that may arise in connection with the objectives of the Treaty or

its implementation,

Consultations and co-operation as provided in

paragraph 1 of this article may also be undertaken by having recourse to appropriate in145
146

3.

temational procedures within the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Such

recourse may include utilization of the services of the Consultative Committee of States

Parties to the Treaty.

The Consultative Committee of States Parties

to the Treaty shall be convened by the depositary within one month after the receipt of a

request from any State Party to this Treaty.

Any State Party may nominate a representative to serve on the Committee.

Article 6

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to

adopt such internal measures as it may deem necessary to fulfil its constitutional requirements in

order to prohibit or prevent the carrying out of any

activity contrary to the provisions of this Treaty

in any place whatever under its jurisdiction or

control.

Article 7

Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights and

obligations of States under the Charter of the

United Nations.

Article 8

Any dispute which may arise in connection with

the implementation of this Treaty shall be settled

exclusively by peaceful means through recourse to

the procedures provided for in the Charter of the

United Nations.

Article 9

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 10

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature at United Nations Headquarters in

New York. Any State which does not sign this

treaty before its entry into force in accordance

with paragraph 3 of this article may accede

to it at any time.

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by

signatory States. Instruments of ratification

and accession shall be deposited with the

Secretary-General of the United Nations.

This Treaty shall enter into force between the

States which have deposited instruments of

ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth

instrument of ratification, provided that such

instruments have been deposited by the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the

United States of America.

For States whose instruments of ratification

or accession are deposited after the entry into

force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force

on the date of the deposit of their instruments

of ratification or accession.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations