06-4216-cv

Arar v. Ashcroft 

### 1 UNI TED STATE S C OURT O F A PPE ALS 2 3 FOR TH E S ECOND CIRCUI T 4 5 Aug ust Te rm, 20 08 6 7 8 In Ban c R ehe ari ng: De cem ber 9, 20 08 Dec ide d: Nov emb er 2, 200 9 9 Doc ket No . 0 6-4 216 -cv 10 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 13 MAH ER ARA R, 14 15 16 Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t, 17 18 - v .- 19 20 JOH N A SHC ROF T, Att orn ey Gen era l o f t he 21 Uni tedSt ate s, LAR RY D. THO MPS ON, 22 for mer ly Act ing De put y A tto rne y G ene ral , 23 TOMRI DGE , S ecr eta ry of Hom ela nd Sec uri ty, 24 J. SCO TT BLA CKMAN, fo rme rly Re gio nal 25 Dir ect or of the Re gio nal Of fic e o f 26 Imm igr ati on andNa tur ali zat ion Se rvi ces , 27 PAU LA COR RIG AN, Re gio nal Di rec tor of 28 Imm igr ati on andCu sto ms Enf orc eme nt, 29 EDW ARD J. MC ELR OY, fo rme rly Di str ict 30 Dir ect or of Imm igr ati on andNa tur ali zat ion 31 Ser vic es for Ne w Y ork Di str ict , a nd now 32 Cus tom s E nfo rce men t, ROB ERT MU ELL ER, 33 Dir ect or of the Fe der al Bur eau of 34 Inv est iga tio n, Joh n D oe 1-1 0, Fed era l 35 Bur eau of In ves tig ati on and /or Immig rat ion 36 andNa tur ali zat ion Se rvi ce Age nts , a nd JAM ES 37 W. ZIG LAR , f orm erl y C omm iss ion er for 38 Imm igr ati on andNa tur ali zat ion Se rvi ces , 39 Uni tedSt ate s, 40 41 Def end ant s-A ppe lle es. 42 43 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

### Se nio r C irc uit Ju dge Mc Lau ghl in was a mem ber of th e * 

### ini tia l t hre e-j udg e p ane l t hat he ardth is app eal an d i s the ref ore el igi ble to pa rti cip ate in in ba nc reh ear ing . See 28 U.S .C. § 46( c)( 1). Se nio r C irc uit Ju dge s C ala bre si, Sa ck, an d P ark er, ** 

### who as sum ed sen ior st atu s d uri ng the co urs e o f i n b anc pro cee din gs, ar e e nti tle d t o p art ici pat e p urs uan t t o 2 8 U.S .C. § 46( c)( 2).

Th e H ono rab le Son ia Sot oma yor , w ho was or igi nal ly a *** 

### mem ber of th e i n b anc pa nel an d w ho par tic ipa tedin or al arg ume nt, wa s e lev ate d t o t he Sup rem e C our t o n A ugu st 8, 200 9. 2 

### Bef ore : JAC OBS , C hie f J udg e, McL AUG HLI N, CA LAB RES I, * * * 

### 1 2 CAB RAN ES, PO OLE R, SAC K, SO TOMAYO R, ** *** 

### 3 PAR KER , RAG GI, WE SLE Y, HAL L, andLI VIN GST ON, ** 

### 4 Cir cui t J udg es. K ATZ MAN N, Cir cui t J udg e, too k 5 no par t i n t he con sid era tio n o r d eci sio n o f 6 the ca se. 7 8 JAC OBS , C .J. , f ile d t he maj ori ty opi nio n i n w hic h 9 MCL AUG HLI N, CAB RAN ES, RA GGI , W ESL EY, HA LL, an d L IVI NGS TON , 10 JJ. , j oin ed. 11 12 CAL ABR ESI , J ., fil ed a d iss ent ing op ini on in whi ch POO LER , 13 SAC K, andPA RKE R, JJ. , j oin ed. 14 15 POO LER , J ., fil ed a d iss ent ing op ini on in whi ch CAL ABR ESI , 16 SAC K, andPA RKE R, JJ. , j oin ed. 17 18 SAC K, J., fi leda dis sen tin g o pin ion in wh ich CA LAB RES I, 19 POO LER , a nd PAR KER , J J., jo ine d. 20 21 PAR KER , J ., fil ed a d iss ent ing op ini on in whi ch CAL ABR ESI , 22 POO LER , a nd SAC K, JJ. , j oin ed. 23 24 25 App eal fr om a j udg men t o f t he Uni tedSt ate s D ist ric t 26 Cou rt for th e E ast ern Di str ict of Ne w Y ork (T rag er, J. )3 

### 1 dis mis sin g P lai nti ff- App ell ant Ma her Ar ar’ s c omp lai nt 2 aga ins t J ohn As hcr oft , t he Att orn ey Gen era l o f t he Uni ted 3 Sta tes ; T om Rid ge, th e S ecr eta ry of Hom ela nd Sec uri ty; 4 Rob ert Mu ell er, th e D ire cto r o f t he Fed era l B ure au of 5 Inv est iga tio n; andot her s. Ar ar v. Ash cro ft, 41 4 F . S upp . 6 2d 250 (E .D. N.Y . 2 006 ). Ar ar all ege s t hat he wa s d eta ine d 7 whi le cha ngi ng pla nes at Ke nne dy Air por t i n N ew Yor k ( bas ed 8 on a w arn ing fr om Can adi an aut hor iti es tha t h e w as a m emb er 9 of Al Qae da) , m ist rea tedfo r t wel ve day s w hil e i n U nit ed 10 Sta tes cu sto dy, an d t hen re mov ed to Syr ia via Jo rda n 11 pur sua nt to an int er- gov ern men tal un der sta ndi ng tha t h e 12 wou ld be det ain ed andin ter rog ate d u nde r t ort ure by Sy ria n 13 off ici als . 14 Ara r’s co mpl ain t a lle ges vi ola tio ns of the To rtu re 15 Vic timPr ote cti on Act (“ TVP A”) an d t he Fif th Ame ndm ent . The 16 Dis tri ct Cou rt dis mis sedth e c omp lai nt. I d. at 287 -88 . A 17 thr ee- jud ge pan el of thi s C our t u nan imo usl y h eldth at: (1 ) 18 the Di str ict Co urt ha d p ers ona l j uri sdi cti on ove r T hom pso n, 19 Ash cro ft, an d M uel ler ; ( 2) Ara r f ail ed to sta te a c lai m 20 und er the TV PA; an d ( 3) Ara r f ail ed to est abl ish su bje ct 21 mat ter ju ris dic tio n o ver hi s r equ est fo r a de cla rat ory 22 jud gme nt. A rar v. As hcr oft , 5 32 F.3 d 1 57 (2dCi r. 200 8). A4 

### 1 maj ori ty of the pa nel al so dis mis sedAr ar’ s B ive ns cla ims , 2 wit h o ne mem ber of th e p ane l d iss ent ing . Id. A fte r i n b anc 3 reh ear ing , t he pan el opi nio n i s v aca tedan d t he jud gme nt of 4 the di str ict co urt is af fir med . 5 DAV ID COL E ( Mar ia Cou ri LaH ood , 6 Jul es Lob el, Ka the rin e 7 Gal lag her , o n t he bri ef) , C ent er 8 for Co nst itu tio nal Ri ght s, New 9 Yor k, NY; Jo shu a S . S ohn (o n t he 10 bri ef) , D LA Pip er US LLP , N ew 11 Yor k, NY, fo r P lai nti ff12 App ell ant . 13 14 JON ATH AN F. COH N, Dep uty 15 Ass ist ant At tor ney Ge ner al 16 (Gr ego ry G. Kat sas , A ssi sta nt 17 Att orn ey Gen era l; Ben ton J. 18 Cam pbe ll, Un ite d S tat es 19 Att orn ey; La rry Le e G reg g, R. 20 Jos eph Sh er, De nni s C . B arg haa n, 21 Ass ist ant Un ite d S tat es 22 Att orn eys ; M ary Ha mpt on Mas on, 23 Jer emy S. Br umb elo w, U.S . 24 Dep art men t o f J ust ice , C ivi l 25 Div isi on, To rts Br anc h; Bar bar a 26 L. Her wig , R obe rt M. Loe b, 27 Mic hae l A bat e, U.S . D epa rtm ent 28 of Jus tic e, Civ il Div isi on, 29 App ell ate St aff , o n t he bri ef) , 30 for De fen dan t-A ppe lle e J ohn 31 Ash cro ft, th e o ffi cia l c apa cit y 32 Def end ant s-A ppe lle es, an d t he 33 Uni tedSt ate s. 34 35 JER EMY A. LAMKE N ( Joh n J . 36 Cas sid y, Jam ie S. Kil ber g, Pau l 37 J. Nat han son , o n t he bri ef) , 38 Bak er Bot ts L.L .P. , W ash ing ton 39 D.C .; Ste phe n L . B rag a ( on the 40 bri ef) , R ope s & Gr ay L.L .P. ,5 

### 1 Was hin gto n D .C. , 2 for De fen dan t-A ppe lle e L arr y D . 3 Tho mps on. 4 5 Rob in L. Gol dfa den , Amer ica n 6 Civ il Lib ert ies Un ion 7 Fou nda tio n, Imm igr ant s’ Rig hts 8 Pro jec t, San Fr anc isc o, CA, fo r 9 Ami ci Cur iae Am eri can Ci vil 10 Lib ert ies Un ion an d N ew Yor k 11 Civ il Lib ert ies Un ion in su ppo rt 12 of Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t. 13 14 Bur t N eub orn e, New Yo rk, NY , f or 15 Ami ci Cur iae No rma n D ors en, 16 Hel en Her shk off , F ran k 17 Mic hel man , B urt Ne ubo rne , a nd 18 Dav id L. Sha pir o, in sup por t o f 19 Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t. 20 21 Mic hae l B . D e L eeu w, Dal e E . H o, 22 Jon ath an J. Smi th, Fr ied , F ran k, 23 Har ris , S hri ver & Jac obs on LLP , 24 New Yo rk, NY , f or Ami cus Cu ria e 25 NAA CP Leg al Def ens e & 26 Edu cat ion al Fun d, Inc . i n 27 sup por t o f P lai nti ff- App ell ant . 28 29 Sid ney S. Ro sde itc her , P aul , 30 Wei ss, Ri fki nd, Wh art on & 31 Gar ris on LLP , N ew Yor k, NY, fo r 32 Ami ci Cur iae Re tir ed Fed era l 33 Jud ges in su ppo rt of Pla int iff

- 34 App ell ant . 35 36 Nan cy Mor awe tz, Ne w Y ork 37 Uni ver sit y S cho ol of Law , N ew 38 Yor k, NY, fo r Amic i C uri ae Law 39 Pro fes sor s i n s upp ort of 40 Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t. 41 42 Ale xan der Ya nos , F res hfi eld s 43 Bru ckh aus De rin ger US LL P, New 44 Yor k, NY, fo r Amic us Cur iae6 

### 1 Red res s T rus t i n s upp ort of 2 Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t. 3 4 5 6 DEN NIS JA COB S, Chi ef Jud ge: 7 8 Mah er Ara r a ppe als fr om a j udg men t o f t he Uni tedSt ate s 9 Dis tri ct Cou rt for th e E ast ern Di str ict of Ne w Y ork (T rag er, 10 J.) di smi ssi ng his co mpl ain t a gai nst th e A tto rne y G ene ral of 11 the Un ite d S tat es, th e S ecr eta ry of Hom ela nd Sec uri ty, th e 12 Dir ect or of the Fe der al Bur eau of In ves tig ati on, an d o the rs, 13 inc lud ing se nio r i mmi gra tio n o ffi cia ls. A rar al leg es tha t 14 he was de tai nedwh ile ch ang ing pl ane s a t K enn edy Ai rpo rt in 15 New Yo rk (ba sedon a war nin g f romCa nad ian au tho rit ies th at 16 he was a mem ber of Al Qa eda ), mis tre ate d f or twe lve da ys 17 whi le in Uni tedSt ate s c ust ody , a nd the n r emo vedto Sy ria 18 via Jo rda n p urs uan t t o a n i nte r-g ove rnm ent al und ers tan din g 19 tha t h e w oul d b e d eta ine d a nd int err oga tedun der to rtu re by 20 Syr ian of fic ial s. Th e c omp lai nt all ege s a vi ola tio n o f t he 21 Tor tur e V ict im Pro tec tio n A ct (“T VPA ”) andof hi s F ift h 22 Ame ndm ent su bst ant ive du e p roc ess ri ght s a ris ing fr om the 23 con dit ion s o f h is det ent ion in th e U nit ed Sta tes , t he den ial 24 of his ac ces s t o c oun sel an d t o t he cou rts wh ile in th e 25 Uni tedSt ate s, andhi s d ete nti on andto rtu re in Syr ia. 26 The di str ict co urt di smi sse d t he com pla int (w ith le ave7 

### 1 to re- ple ad onl y a s t o t he con dit ion s o f d ete nti on in the 2 Uni tedSt ate s a nd his ac ces s t o c oun sel an d t he cou rts 3 dur ing th at per iod ) a nd Ara r t ime ly app eal ed (wi tho ut 4 und ert aki ng to ame nd) . Ara r v . A shc rof t, 414 F. Su pp. 2d 5 250 (E .D. N.Y . 2 006 ). A thr ee- jud ge pan el of thi s C our t 6 una nim ous ly hel d t hat : ( 1) the Di str ict Co urt ha d p ers ona l 7 jur isd ict ion ov er Tho mps on, As hcr oft , a nd Mue lle r; (2) Ar ar 8 fai ledto st ate a cla im und er the TV PA; an d ( 3) Ara r f ail ed 9 to est abl ish su bje ct mat ter ju ris dic tio n o ver hi s r equ est 10 for a dec lar ato ry jud gme nt. A rar v. As hcr oft , 5 32 F.3 d 1 57 11 (2dCi r. 200 8). Ama jor ity of th e p ane l a lso di smi sse d 12 Ara r’s Bi ven s c lai ms, wi th one me mbe r o f t he pan el 13 dis sen tin g. Id . The Co urt vo tedto re hea r t he app eal in 14 ban c. We no w a ffi rm. 15 We hav e n o t rou ble af fir min g t he dis tri ct cou rt’ s 16 con clu sio ns tha t A rar su ffi cie ntl y a lle gedpe rso nal 17 jur isd ict ion ov er the de fen dan ts who ch all eng ed it, an d t hat 18 Ara r l ack s s tan din g t o s eek de cla rat ory re lie f. We do no t 19 rea ch iss ues of qu ali fie d i mmu nit y o r t he sta te sec ret s 20 pri vil ege . As to the TV PA, we ag ree wi th the un ani mou s 21 pos iti on of the pa nel th at Ara r i nsu ffi cie ntl y p lea dedth at 22 the al leg ed con duc t o f U nit ed Sta tes of fic ial s w as don e8 

### 1 und er col or of for eig n l aw. W e a gre e w ith th e d ist ric t 2 cou rt tha t A rar in suf fic ien tly pl ead ed his cl aimre gar din g 3 det ent ion in th e U nit ed Sta tes , a ru lin g t hat ha s b een 4 rei nfo rce d b y t he sub seq uen t a uth ori ty of Bel l A tla nti c 5 Cor p. v. Two mbl y, 550 U. S. 544 , 5 70 (20 07) . Our at ten tio n 6 is the ref ore fo cus ed on whe the r A rar ’s cla ims fo r d ete nti on 7 andto rtu re in Syr ia can be as ser tedun der Bi ven s v . S ix 8 Unk now n N ame d A gen ts of Fed era l B ure au of Nar cot ics , 4 03 9 U.S . 3 88 (19 71) (“ Biv ens ”). 10 To dec ide th e B ive ns iss ue, we mu st det erm ine wh eth er 11 Ara r’s cl aim s i nvo ke Biv ens in a new co nte xt; an d, if so, 12 whe the r a n a lte rna tiv e r eme dia l s che me was av ail abl e t o 13 Ara r, or whe the r ( in the ab sen ce of aff irm ati ve act ion by 14 Con gre ss) “‘ spe cia l f act ors co uns el[ ] h esi tat ion .’” S ee 15 Wil kie v. Ro bbi ns, 55 1 U .S. 53 7, 550 (2 007 ) ( quo tin g B ush v. 16 Luc as, 46 2 U .S. 36 7, 378 (1 983 )). T his op ini on hol ds tha t 17 “ex tra ord ina ry ren dit ion ” i s a co nte xt new to Bi ven s c lai ms, 18 but av oid s a ny cat ego ric al rul ing on al ter nat ive re med ies

-- 19 bec aus e t he dom ina nt hol din g o f t his op ini on is tha t, in the 20 con tex t o f e xtr aor din ary re ndi tio n, hes ita tio n i s w arr ant ed 21 by spe cia l f act ors . We the ref ore af fir m. (T he ter m 22 “re ndi tio n” andit s r ela tedus age s a re def ine d a nd dis cus sedThe term “rendition” refers to the transfer of a 1 fugitive from one state to another or from one country to another. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1410 (9th ed. 2004) (defining “rendition” as “[t]he return of a fugitive from one state to the state where the fugitive is accused or was convicted of a crime”); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.9(c) (“[I]nterstate rendition[ ] is specifically provided for in the United States Constitution. In order to implement the rendition clause, Congress enacted the Federal Rendition Act, which requires that the demanding state produce ‘a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor.’” (footnotes omitted)). In the international context, “extradition” is a “distinct form of rendition” in which “one [country] surrenders a person within its territorial jurisdiction to a requesting [country] via a formal legal process, typically established by treaty between the countries.” Cong. Research Serv., Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture 1 (2009); see also 1 Oppenheim’s International Law §§ 415-16 (9th ed. 1996). Although most international renditions occur under a formal extradition treaty, renditions also occur outside the scope of extradition treaties, often as a matter of international comity. See 1 Oppenheim, supra, § 416; Cong. Research Serv., supra, at 1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (permitting, “in the exercise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries without regard to the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government”). The terms “‘irregular rendition’ and ‘extraordinary rendition’ have been used to refer to the extrajudicial transfer of a person from one [country] to another.” Cong. Research Serv., supra, at 1; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1410 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “extraordinary rendition” as “[t]he transfer, without formal charges, trial, or court approval, of a person suspected of being a terrorist or supporter of a terrorist group to a

9 

### 1 in the ma rgi n. ) 1foreign nation for imprisonment and interrogation on behalf

of the transferring nation”). As we understand and use the term here, “extraordinary rendition” does not, by itself, imply that a subject of extraordinary rendition will be treated as Arar alleges he was treated during and after the rendition alleged in this action. The United States Department of State records that, between 1993 and 2001, “rendition” provided the means for obtaining custody of ten suspected terrorists and “extradition” applied to another four suspects. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, App. D: Extraditions and Renditions of Terrorists to the United States. Accordingly, the rendition of suspected terrorists outside the mechanisms established by extradition treaties-- so-called extraordinary rendition--had been employed as a means of combating terrorists for nearly a decade prior to the events giving rise to this litigation. See John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter to the Editor, Wall St. J., July 5, 2006, at A25 (discussing the renditions of suspected terrorists Ramzi Yousef and Mir Aimal Kansi to the United States and the rendition of Illich Ramirez Sanchez, also known as “Carlos the Jackal,” by French authorities from the Sudan to France, “which was subsequently upheld by the European Commission on Human Rights”), reprinted in Digest of United States Practice in International Law 162-63 (Sally J. Cummings ed., 2006); see also Remarks of Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State (Dec. 5, 2005) (“For decades, the United States and other countries have used ‘renditions’ to transport terrorist suspects from the country where they were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can be questioned, held, or brought to justice.”), in Digest of United States Practice in International Law 100, 102 (Sally J. Cummings ed., 2005). 10 

### 1 Our ru lin g d oes no t p rec lud e j udi cia l r evi ew and 2 ove rsi ght in th is con tex t. Bu t i f a ci vil re med y i n d ama ges 3 is to be cre ate d f or har ms suf fer ed in the co nte xt of 4 ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on, it mu st be cre ate d b y C ong res s,11 

### 1 whi ch alo ne has th e i nst itu tio nal co mpe ten ce to set 2 par ame ter s, del ine ate sa fe har bor s, andsp eci fy rel ief . If 3 Con gre ss cho ose s t o l egi sla te on thi s s ubj ect , t hen ju dic ial 4 rev iew of su ch leg isl ati on wou ld be ava ila ble . 5 6 7 8 [li nes 5- 13 int ent ion all y l eft bl ank ] 9 10 11 12 13 14 App lyi ng our un der sta ndi ng of Sup rem e C our t p rec ede nt, 15 we dec lin e t o c rea te, on ou r o wn, a new ca use of ac tio n 16 aga ins t o ffi cer s a nd emp loy ees of th e f ede ral go ver nme nt. 17 Rat her , w e c onc lud e t hat , w hen a cas e p res ent s t he 18 int rac tab le “sp eci al fac tor s” app are nt her e, see su pra at 19 36- 37, it is fo r t he Exe cut ive in th e f irs t i nst anc e t o 20 dec ide ho w t o i mpl eme nt ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on, an d f or the 21 ele cte d m emb ers of Co ngr ess --a nd not fo r u s a s j udg es- -to 22 dec ide wh eth er an ind ivi dua l m ay see k c omp ens ati on fro m12 

### 1 gov ern men t o ffi cer s a nd emp loy ees di rec tly , o r f romth e 2 gov ern men t, for a con sti tut ion al vio lat ion . Adm ini str ati ons 3 pas t a nd pre sen t h ave re ser vedth e r igh t t o e mpl oy 4 ren dit ion , s ee Dav id Joh nst on, U. S. Say s R end iti on to 5 Con tin ue, bu t w ith Mo re Ove rsi ght , N .Y. Ti mes , A ug. 24 , 6 200 9, andno t w ith sta ndi ng pro lon gedpu bli c d eba te, Co ngr ess 7 has no t p roh ibi tedth e p rac tic e, imp ose d l imi ts on its us e, 8 or cre ate d a ca use of ac tio n f or tho se who al leg e t hey ha ve 9 suf fer ed con sti tut ion al inj ury as a con seq uen ce. 10 11 I 12 Ara r’s co mpl ain t s ets fo rth th e f oll owi ng fac tua l 13 all ega tio ns. 14 Ara r i s a du al cit ize n o f S yri a, whe re he was bo rn and 15 rai sed , a nd of Can ada , t o w hic h h is fam ily immig rat ed whe n 16 he was 17 . 17 Whi le on vac ati on in Tun isi a i n S ept emb er 200 2, Ara r 18 was ca lle d b ack to wo rk in Mon tre al. H is iti ner ary ca lle d 19 for st ops in Zu ric h a nd New Yo rk. 20 Ara r l and ed at Ken ned y A irp ort ar oun d n oon on Se pte mbe r 21 26. B etw een pl ane s, Ara r p res ent ed his Ca nad ian pa ssp ort to 22 an imm igr ati on off ici al who , a fte r c hec kin g A rar ’s13 

### 1 cre den tia ls, as kedAr ar to wai t n ear by. A bou t t wo hou rs 2 lat er, Ar ar was fi nge rpr int ed andhi s b ags se arc hed . 3 Bet wee n 4 p. m. and9 p.m ., Ara r w as int erv iew ed by an age nt 4 fro m t he Fed era l B ure au of Inv est iga tio n ( “FB I”) , who as ked 5 (in ter al ia) abo ut his re lat ion shi ps wit h c ert ain 6 ind ivi dua ls who we re sus pec tedof te rro ris t t ies . Ara r 7 adm itt ed kno win g a t l eas t o ne of the m, but de nie d b ein g a 8 mem ber of a ter ror ist gr oup . Fol low ing th e F BI int erv iew , 9 Ara r w as que sti one d b y a n o ffi cia l f romth e I mmi gra tio n a nd 10 Nat ion ali zat ion Se rvi ce (“I NS” ) f or thr ee mor e h our s; he 11 con tin uedto de ny ter ror ist af fil iat ion s. 12 Ara r s pen t t he nig ht alo ne in a r oomat th e a irp ort . 13 The ne xt mor nin g ( Sep tem ber 27 ) h e w as que sti one d b y F BI 14 age nts fr om app rox ima tel y 9 a. m. unt il 2 p .m. ; t he age nts 15 ask ed himab out Os ama Bi n L ade n, Ira q, Pal est ine , a nd oth er 16 thi ngs . Tha t e ven ing , A rar wa s g ive n a n o ppo rtu nit y t o 17 ret urn vo lun tar ily to Sy ria . He ref use d, cit ing a fea r o f 18 tor tur e, andas kedin ste ad to go to Can ada or Sw itz erl and . 19 Lat er tha t e ven ing , h e w as tra nsf err ed to the Me tro pol ita n 20 Det ent ion Ce nte r ( “MD C”) in Br ook lyn , whe re he rem ain ed 21 unt il Oct obe r 8 . 22 On October 1, the INS initiated removal proceedings,14 

### 1 and served Arar with a document stating that he was 

### 2 inadmissible because he belonged to a terrorist 

### 3 organization. Later that day, he called his mother-in-law 

### 4 in Ottawa--his prior requests to place calls and speak to a 

### 5 lawyer having been denied or ignored. His family retained a 

### 6 lawyer to represent him and contacted the Canadian Consulate 

### 7 in New York. 

### 8 A Canadian consular official visited Arar on October 3. 

### 9 The next day, immigration officers asked Arar to designate 

### 10 in writing the country to which he would want to be removed. 

### 11 He designated Canada. On the evening of October 5, Arar met 

### 12 with his attorney. The following evening, a Sunday, Arar 

### 13 was again questioned by INS officials. The INS District 

### 14 Director in New York left a voicemail message on the office 

### 15 phone of Arar’s attorney that the interview would take 

### 16 place, but the attorney did not receive the message in time 

### 17 to attend. Arar was told that she chose not to attend. In 

### 18 days following, the attorney was given false information 

### 19 about Arar’s whereabouts. 

### 20 On October 8, 2002, Arar learned that the INS had: (1) 

### 21 ordered his removal to Syria, (2) made a (required) finding 

### 22 that such removal would be consistent with Article 3 of the

### Ar tic le 3 o f t he Con ven tio n A gai nst To rtu re 2 

### “pr ohi bit s a ny sta te par ty to the Co nve nti on fro m e xpe lli ng, ret urn ing or ex tra dit ing an y p ers on to ano the r S tat e w her e the re are su bst ant ial gr oun ds for be lie vin g t hat he wo uldbe in dan ger of be ing su bje cte d t o t ort ure , a nd pro vid es tha t the de ter min ati on of whe the r s uch gr oun ds exi st [mu st tak e] int o a cco unt al l r ele van t c ons ide rat ion s i ncl udi ng, wh ere app lic abl e, the ex ist enc e i n t he Sta te con cer nedof a con sis ten t p att ern of gr oss , f lag ran t o r m ass vi ola tio ns of hum an rig hts .” Tu n v . I NS, 44 5 F .3d55 4, 566 (2 d C ir. 20 06) (in ter nal qu ota tio n m ark s, bra cke ts, an d e lli psi s o mit ted ). 15 

### 1 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and (3) barred him from 2 

### 2 re-entering the United States for five years. He was found 

### 3 inadmissible to the United States on the basis of 8 U.S.C. 

### 4 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V), which provides that any alien who “is 

### 5 a member of a terrorist organization” is inadmissible to the 

### 6 United States. The finding was based on Arar’s association 

### 7 with a suspected terrorist and other (classified) 

### 8 information. Thereafter, Defendant J. Scott Blackman, 

### an 9 INS Re gio nal Di rec tor , m ade a det erm ina tio n t hat Ar ar was 10 cle arl y a nd une qui voc all y a me mbe r o f A l Q aed a a nd 11 ina dmi ssi ble to th e U nit ed Sta tes . A “ Fin al Not ice of 12 Ina dmi ssi bil ity ,” dat ed Oct obe r 8 , a nd sig nedby De fen dan t 13 Dep uty At tor ney Ge ner al Lar ry Tho mps on, st ate d t hat Ar ar’ s 14 rem ova l t o S yri a w oul d b e c ons ist ent wi th the CA T, 15 not wit hst and ing Ar ar’ s a rti cul ate d f ear of to rtu re. 16 Lat er tha t d ay, Ar ar was ta ken to Ne w J ers ey, wh enc e h e16 

### 1 fle w i n a sm all je t t o W ash ing ton , D .C. , a nd the n t o Amma n, 2 Jor dan . Whe n h e a rri vedin Amman on Oc tob er 9, he was 3 han dedov er to Jor dan ian au tho rit ies wh o t rea tedhi m r oug hly 4 andth en del ive redhi m t o t he cus tod y o f S yri an off ici als , 5 who de tai nedhi m a t a Sy ria n M ili tar y I nte lli gen ce fac ili ty. 6 Ara r w as in Syr ia for a yea r, the fi rst te n m ont hs in 7 an und erg rou nd cel l s ix fee t b y t hre e, andse ven fe et hig h. 8 He was in ter rog ate d f or twe lve da ys on his ar riv al in Syr ia, 9 andin th at per iodwa s b eat en on his pa lms , h ips , a nd low er 10 bac k w ith a two -in ch- thi ck ele ctr ic cab le andwi th bar e 11 han ds. A rar al leg es tha t U nit ed Sta tes of fic ial s c ons pir ed 12 to sen d h im to Syr ia for th e p urp ose of in ter rog ati on und er 13 tor tur e, anddi rec tedth e i nte rro gat ion s f romab roa d b y 14 pro vid ing Sy ria wi th Ara r’s do ssi er, di cta tin g q ues tio ns for 15 the Sy ria ns to ask hi m, andre cei vin g i nte lli gen ce lea rne d 16 fro m t he int erv iew s. 17 On Oct obe r 2 0, 200 2, Can adi an Emb ass y o ffi cia ls 18 inq uir ed of Syr ia as to Ara r’s wh ere abo uts . The ne xt day , 19 Syr ia con fir medto Ca nad a t hat Ar ar was in it s c ust ody ; t hat 20 sam e d ay, in ter rog ati on cea sed . Ara r r ema ine d i n S yri a, 21 how eve r, rec eiv ing vi sit s f romCa nad ian co nsu lar of fic ial s. 22 On Aug ust 14 , 2 003 , A rar de fie d h is cap tor s b y t ell ing17 

### 1 the Ca nad ian s t hat he ha d b een to rtu redan d w as con fin ed to 2 a s mal l u nde rgr oun d c ell . Fiv e d ays la ter , a fte r s ign ing a 3 con fes sio n t hat he ha d t rai nedas a ter ror ist in 4 Afg han ist an, Ar ar was mo vedto va rio us loc ati ons . On 5 Oct obe r 5 , 2 003 , A rar wa s r ele ase d t o t he cus tod y o f a 6 Can adi an emb ass y o ffi cia l i n D ama scu s, andwa s f low n t o 7 Ott awa th e n ext da y. 8 9 II 10 On Jan uar y 2 2, 200 4, Ara r f ile d a fo ur- cou nt com pla int 11 in the Ea ste rn Dis tri ct of New Yo rk see kin g d ama ges fr om 12 fed era l o ffi cia ls for ha rms su ffe redas a res ult of hi s 13 det ent ion an d c onf ine men t i n t he Uni tedSt ate s a nd his 14 det ent ion an d i nte rro gat ion in Sy ria . Cou nt One of Ar ar' s 15 com pla int se eks re lie f u nde r t he Tor tur e V ict im Pro tec tio n 16 Act (“ TVP A”) , 2 8 U .S. C. § 1 350 no te (a) (1) (t he “TV PA 17 cla im” ). Co unt s T wo andTh ree se ek rel ief un der th e F ift h 18 Ame ndm ent fo r A rar 's all ege d t ort ure in Sy ria (C oun t T wo) 19 andhi s d ete nti on the re (Co unt Th ree ). Co unt Fo ur see ks 20 rel ief un der th e F ift h Amen dme nt for Ar ar’ s d ete nti on in the 21 Uni tedSt ate s p rio r t o h is rem ova l t o S yri a. Ar ar als o 22 see ks a d ecl ara tor y j udg men t t hat de fen dan ts’ co ndu ct18 

### 1 vio lat ed his “c ons tit uti ona l, civ il, an d h uma n r igh ts. ” 2 Def end ant s-A ppe lle es mov ed to dis mis s t he com pla int 3 pur sua nt to Fed era l R ule of Ci vil Pr oce dur e 1 2(b ), 4 cha lle ngi ng per son al jur isd ict ion ov er Def end ant s A shc rof t, 5 Tho mps on, an d M uel ler an d c hal len gin g s ubj ect -ma tte r 6 jur isd ict ion as to th e c lai ms all egi ng con fin eme nt and 7 tor tur e i n S yri a o n t he gro undth at the y a ris e f roman or der 8 of rem ova l a nd are th ere for e s ubj ect to th e j uri sdi cti ona l 9 bar of th e I mmi gra tio n a nd Nat ion ali ty Act (s ee inf ra Par t 10 VI) . It was al so arg uedth at Ara r l ack ed sta ndi ng to see k a 11 dec lar ato ry jud gme nt. 12 On Feb rua ry 16, 20 06, th e d ist ric t c our t d ism iss ed 13 Cou nts On e, Two , a nd Thr ee wit h p rej udi ce, an d C oun t F our 14 wit hou t p rej udi ce. A rar v. As hcr oft , 4 14 F. Sup p. 2d 250 , 15 287 -88 (E .D. N.Y . 2 006 ). Th e d ist ric t c our t a lso co ncl ude d 16 tha t A rar la cke d s tan din g t o b rin g a cl aimfo r d ecl ara tor y 17 rel ief . Id. at 25 8-5 9. 18 Ara r e lec tedno t t o r e-p lea d C oun t F our , a nd on Aug ust 19 17, 20 06, th e d ist ric t c our t e nte redju dgm ent di smi ssi ng all 20 of Ara r’s cl aim s. Ar ar tim ely ap pea led . A d ivi dedth ree 21 jud ge pan el of thi s C our t a ffi rme d o n J une 30 , 2 008 . Ara r 22 v. Ash cro ft, 53 2 F .3d15 7 ( 2d Cir . 2 008 ). Th e C our t v ote d19 

### 1 to reh ear th e c ase in ba nc, an d o ral ar gum ent wa s h ear d o n 2 Dec emb er 9, 200 8. 3 4 III 5 We rev iew de no vo the di str ict co urt ’s dec isi on to 6 gra nt a m oti on to dis mis s. In re NY SE Spe cia lis ts Sec . 7 Lit ig. , 5 03 F.3 d 8 9, 95 (2dCi r. 200 7). I n s o d oin g, we 8 acc ept as tr ue the fa ctu al all ega tio ns of the co mpl ain t, and 9 con str ue all re aso nab le inf ere nce s t hat ca n b e d raw n f rom 10 the co mpl ain t i n t he lig ht mos t f avo rab le to the pl ain tif f. 11 Rot h v . J enn ing s, 489 F. 3d 499 , 5 01 (2dCi r. 200 7); se e a lso 12 Con yer s v . R oss ide s, 558 F. 3d 137 , 1 43 (2dCi r. 200 9). 13 At the ou tse t, we con clu de (as th e p ane l c onc lud ed 14 una nim ous ly) th at Ara r: (1) su ffi cie ntl y a lle gedpe rso nal 15 jur isd ict ion ov er the de fen dan ts, an d ( 2) has no st and ing to 16 see k d ecl ara tor y r eli ef; in ad dit ion , b eca use we di smi ss the 17 act ion fo r t he rea son s s et for th bel ow, we ne ed not (a nd do 18 not ) r eac h t he iss ues of qu ali fie d i mmu nit y o r t he sta te 19 sec ret s p riv ile ge. 20 Thi s o pin ion ow es a d ebt to th e p ane l o pin ion s. 21 2220 

### 1 IV 2 The TV PA cre ate s a ca use of ac tio n f or dam age s a gai nst 3 any “i ndi vid ual wh o, und er act ual or ap par ent au tho rit y, or 4 col or of law , o f a ny for eig n n ati on . . . sub jec ts an 5 ind ivi dua l t o t ort ure .” 28 U. S.C . § 13 50 not e ( a)( 1). 6 Cou nt One of Ar ar’ s c omp lai nt all ege s t hat th e d efe nda nts 7 con spi redwi th Jor dan ian an d S yri an off ici als to ha ve Ara r 8 tor tur ed in dir ect vi ola tio n o f t he TVP A. 9 Any al leg ati on ari sin g u nde r t he TVP A r equ ire s a 10 dem ons tra tio n t hat th e d efe nda nts ac tedun der co lor of 11 for eig n l aw, or un der it s a uth ori ty. K adi c v . K ara dzi c, 70 12 F.3 d 2 32, 24 5 ( 2d Cir . 1 995 ). “I n c ons tru ing th e t erm [] . . 13 . ‘ col or of law ,’ cou rts ar e i nst ruc tedto lo ok . . . to 14 jur isp rud enc e u nde r 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 983 . . . .” I d. (ci tin g 15 H.R . R ep. No . 3 67, 10 2d Con g., 2dSe ss. , a t 5 (1 991 ) 16 rep rin tedin 19 92 U.S .C. C.A .N. 84 , 8 7). U nde r s ect ion 19 83, 17 “[t ]he tr adi tio nal de fin iti on of act ing un der co lor of st ate 18 law re qui res th at the de fen dan t . . . h ave ex erc ise d p owe r 19 ‘po sse sse d b y v irt ue of sta te law an d m ade po ssi ble on ly 20 bec aus e t he wro ngd oer is cl oth ed wit h t he aut hor ity of st ate 21 law .’” W est v. At kin s, 487 U. S. 42, 49 (1 988 ) ( quo tin g 22 Uni tedSt ate s v . C las sic , 3 13 U.S . 2 99, 32 6 ( 194 1)) . The21 

### 1 det erm ina tio n a s t o w het her a non -st ate pa rty ac ts und er 2 col or of sta te law re qui res an in ten sel y f act -sp eci fic 3 jud gme nt una ide d b y r igi d c rit eri a a s t o w het her pa rti cul ar 4 con duc t m ay be fai rly at tri but ed to the st ate . See 5 Bre ntw oodAc ad. v. Te nn. Se con dar y S ch. At hle tic As s’n , 5 31 6 U.S . 2 88, 29 5 ( 200 1). Afe der al off ice r w ho con spi res wi th 7 a s tat e o ffi cer ma y a ct und er col or of sta te law , s ee 8 Bee chw oodRe sto rat ive Ca re Ctr . v . L eed s, 436 F. 3d 147 , 1 54 9 (2dCi r. 200 6); bu t s inc e “ fed era l o ffi cia ls typ ica lly ac t 10 und er col or of fed era l la w,” th ey are ra rel y d eem ed to hav e 11 act ed und er col or of sta te law . Str ick lan d e x r el. 12 Str ick lan d v . S hal ala , 1 23 F.3 d 8 63, 86 6 ( 6th Ci r. 199 7) 13 (em pha sis in or igi nal ). 14 Acc ord ing ly, to st ate a cla im und er the TV PA, Ar ar mus t 15 ade qua tel y a lle ge tha t t he def end ant s p oss ess ed pow er und er 16 Syr ian la w, andth at the of fen din g a cti ons (i .e. , A rar ’s 17 rem ova l t o S yri a a nd sub seq uen t t ort ure ) d eri vedfr om an 18 exe rci se of tha t p owe r, or tha t d efe nda nts co uldno t h ave 19 und ert ake n t hei r c ulp abl e a cti ons ab sen t s uch po wer . The 20 com pla int co nta ins no su ch all ega tio n. Ar ar has ar gue d t hat 21 his al leg ati on of con spi rac y c ure s a ny def ici enc y u nde r t he 22 TVP A. Bu t t he con spi rac y a lle gat ion is th at Uni tedSt ate sJudge P OOL ER relies on a line of section 1983 cases 3 explaining when and how private conduct can constitute state action, and then reasons by analogy to deem the defendants’ conduct in this case to have arisen under foreign (Syrian) law. See Dissent of Judge Pooler at 8-9 . Under this theory, Judge P OOL ER would allow a person tortured abroad to sue an official of the United States government, who in the performance of her official duties, “encourage[d],” “facilitat[ed],” or “solicit[ed]” the mistreatment. Id. at 22 

### 1 off ici als en cou rag ed andfa cil ita tedth e e xer cis e o f p owe r 2 by Syr ian s i n S yri a, not th at the Un ite d S tat es off ici als 3 hador ex erc ise d p owe r o r a uth ori ty und er Syr ian la w. Th e 4 def end ant s a re all ege d t o h ave ac tedun der co lor of fe der al, 5 not Sy ria n, law , a nd to hav e a cte d i n a cco rda nce wi th 6 all ege d f ede ral po lic ies an d i n p urs uit of th e a ims of th e 7 fed era l g ove rnm ent in th e i nte rna tio nal co nte xt. A t m ost , 8 it is all ege d t hat th e d efe nda nts en cou rag ed or sol ici ted 9 cer tai n c ond uct by fo rei gn off ici als . Suc h c ond uct is 10 ins uff ici ent to es tab lis h t hat th e d efe nda nts we re in som e 11 way cl oth ed wit h t he aut hor ity of Sy ria n l aw or tha t t hei r 12 con duc t m ay oth erw ise be fa irl y a ttr ibu tab le to Syr ia. S ee, 13 e.g ., Har bur y v . H ayd en, 44 4 F . S upp . 2 d 1 9, 42- 43 (D. D.C . 14 200 6), af f’don ot her gr oun ds, 52 2 F .3d41 3 ( D.C . C ir. 15 200 8). W e t her efo re agr ee wit h t he una nim ous ho ldi ng of the 16 pan el andaf fir m t he Dis tri ct Cou rt’ s d ism iss al of the TV PA 17 cla im. 310 . Notably, she cites no authority for this remarkable

proposition, which would render a U.S. official an official of a foreign government when she deals with that foreign state on matters involving intelligence, military, and diplomatic affairs. At least one commentator has proposed a legislative amendment to bring the law into line with what Judge P OOL ER thinks it is, or should be. See Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 Rutgers L.J. 715, 802, 804 (2006) (“Under current law, U.S. officials can seldom be held civilly liable for torture . . . . Congress could amend the TVPA to extend the cause of action to the victims of torture inflicted under color of federal law.”).

23 

### 1 V 2 Cou nt Fou r o f t he com pla int al leg es tha t t he con dit ion s 3 of con fin eme nt in the Un ite d S tat es (pr ior to Ar ar’ s r emo val 4 to Syr ia) , a nd the de nia l o f a cce ss to cou rts du rin g t hat 5 det ent ion , v iol ate d A rar ’s sub sta nti ve due pr oce ss rig hts 6 und er the Fi fth Am end men t. Th e D ist ric t C our t d ism iss ed 7 thi s c lai m-- wit hou t p rej udi ce- -as in suf fic ien tly pl ead ed, 8 andin vit ed Ara r t o r e-p lea d t he cla im in ord er to 9 “ar tic ula te mor e p rec ise ly the ju dic ial re lie f h e w as 10 den ied ” a nd to “na me tho se def end ant s t hat we re per son all y 11 inv olv ed in the al leg ed unc ons tit uti ona l t rea tme nt. ” Ara r, 12 414 F. Su pp. 2dat 28 6, 287 . Ara r e lec ted(i n h is cou nse l’s 13 wor ds) to “s tan d o n t he all ega tio ns of his or igi nal 14 com pla int .” 15 On a m oti on to dis mis s, cou rts re qui re “en oug h f act s t o24 

### 1 sta te a c lai m t o r eli ef tha t i s p lau sib le on its fa ce. ” 2 Two mbl y, 550 U. S. at 570 ; s ee als o A shc rof t v . I qba l, 129 S. 3 Ct. 19 37, 19 49- 50 (20 09) . “Fa ctu al all ega tio ns mus t b e 4 eno ugh to ra ise a rig ht to rel ief ab ove th e s pec ula tiv e 5 lev el . . . .” Tw omb ly, 55 0 U .S. at 55 5. Br oadal leg ati ons 6 of con spi rac y a re ins uff ici ent ; t he pla int iff “m ust pr ovi de 7 som e f act ual ba sis su ppo rti ng a m eet ing of th e m ind s, suc h 8 tha t d efe nda nts en ter ed int o a n a gre eme nt, ex pre ss or tac it, 9 to ach iev e t he unl awf ul end .” We bb v. Goo rd, 34 0 F .3d10 5, 10 110 (2 d C ir. 20 03) (i nte rna l q uot ati on mar ks omi tte d) 11 (ad dre ssi ng con spi rac y c lai ms und er 42 U.S .C. § 198 5). 12 Fur the rmo re, a pla int iff in a Biv ens ac tio n i s r equ ire d t o 13 all ege fa cts in dic ati ng tha t t he def end ant s w ere pe rso nal ly 14 inv olv ed in the cl aim ed con sti tut ion al vio lat ion . See El lis 15 v. Blu m, 643 F. 2d 68, 85 (2 d C ir. 19 81) ; s ee als o T hom as v. 16 Ash cro ft, 47 0 F .3d49 1, 496 (2 d C ir. 20 06) . 17 Ara r a lle ges th at “De fen dan ts” --u ndi ffe ren tia ted

-- 18 “de nie d M r. Ara r e ffe cti ve acc ess to co nsu lar as sis tan ce, 19 the co urt s, his la wye rs, an d f ami ly mem ber s” in ord er to 20 eff ect uat e h is rem ova l t o S yri a. Bu t h e f ail s t o s pec ify 21 any cu lpa ble ac tio n t ake n b y a ny sin gle de fen dan t, anddo es 22 not al leg e t he “me eti ng of the mi nds ” t hat a pla usi bleWe need not, therefore, consider the panel’s holding 4 that Arar failed “to establish that he possessed any entitlement to a pre-removal hearing” or “to the assistance of counsel.” Arar, 532 F.3d at 187-88. 25 

### 1 con spi rac y c lai m r equ ire s. He al leg es (in pa ssi ve voi ce) 2 tha t h is req ues ts to mak e p hon e c all s “ wer e i gno red ,” and 3 tha t “ he was to ld” th at he was no t e nti tle d t o a la wye r, but 4 he fai ls to lin k t hes e d eni als to an y d efe nda nt, na medor 5 unn ame d. Gi ven th is omi ssi on, an d i n v iew of Ar ar’ s 6 rej ect ion of an op por tun ity to re -pl ead , w e a gre e w ith th e 7 Dis tri ct Cou rt andth e p ane l m ajo rit y t hat th is Cou nt of the 8 com pla int mu st be dis mis sed . 9 We exp res s n o v iew as to th e s uff ici enc y o f t he 10 ple adi ng oth erw ise , t hat is , w het her th e c ond uct al leg ed (if 11 pla usi bly at tri but abl e t o d efe nda nts ) w oul d v iol ate a 12 con sti tut ion all y p rot ect ed int ere st. T o t he ext ent th at 4 

### 13 thi s c lai m m ay be dee medto be a Biv ens -ty pe act ion , i t m ay 14 rai se som e o f t he spe cia l f act ors co nsi der ed lat er in thi s 15 opi nio n. 16 17 VI 18 Ara r’s re mai nin g c lai ms see k r eli ef on the ba sis of 19 tor tur e a nd det ent ion in Sy ria , a nd are ca st as vio lat ion s

### 8 U.S .C. § 125 2(b )(9 ) p rov ide s t hat “[ j]u dic ial 5 

### rev iew of al l q ues tio ns of law an d f act , i ncl udi ng int erp ret ati on andap pli cat ion of co nst itu tio nal an d sta tut ory pr ovi sio ns, ar isi ng fro m a ny act ion ta ken or pro cee din g b rou ght to re mov e a n a lie n f romth e U nit ed Sta tes 26 

### 1 of sub sta nti ve due pr oce ss. A t t he out set , D efe nda nts ar gue 2 tha t t he jur isd ict ion al bar of th e I NA dep riv ed the Di str ict 3 Cou rt of sub jec t-m att er jur isd ict ion ov er the se cou nts 4 bec aus e A rar ’s rem ova l w as con duc tedpu rsu ant to a dec isi on 5 tha t w as “at th e d isc ret ion ” o f t he Att orn ey Gen era l. 6 “[A ]ny po lic y t owa rd ali ens is vi tal ly andin tri cat ely 7 int erw ove n w ith co nte mpo ran eou s p oli cie s i n r ega rd to the 8 con duc t o f f ore ign re lat ion s, the wa r p owe r, andth e 9 mai nte nan ce of a r epu bli can fo rm of gov ern men t. Su ch 10 mat ter s a re so exc lus ive ly ent rus tedto th e p oli tic al 11 bra nch es of gov ern men t a s t o b e l arg ely immun e f romju dic ial 12 inq uir y o r i nte rfe ren ce. ” Har isi ade s v . S hau ghn ess y, 342 13 U.S . 5 80, 58 8-8 9 ( 195 2). A cco rdi ngl y, the IN A r equ ire s a n 14 ali en to see k r eli ef onl y t hro ugh ju dic ial re vie w o f a 15 rem ova l o rde r i n t he app rop ria te cou rt of app eal s; it 16 ent ire ly for ecl ose s j udi cia l r evi ew of dec isi ons of th e 17 Att orn ey Gen era l o r t he Sec ret ary of Ho mel andSe cur ity 18 spe cif iedby th e I NA to be wit hin th e d isc ret ion of th ose 19 off ice rs. S ee 8 U .S. C. § 1 252 . 5

### . . . sha ll be ava ila ble on ly in jud ici al rev iew of a fin al

ord er. ” Sub sec tio n 1 252 (a) (5) , i n t urn , s tat es tha t “ a pet iti on for re vie w f ile d w ith an ap pro pri ate co urt of app eal s . . . sha ll be the so le andex clu siv e m ean s f or jud ici al rev iew of an or der of re mov al. ” Fin all y, pur sua nt to § 1 252 (a )(2 )(B ):

[N] o c our t s hal l h ave ju ris dic tio n t o r evi ew . . . (ii ) a ny . . . dec isi on or act ion of th e A tto rne y Gen era l o r t he Sec ret ary of Ho mel andSe cur ity th e aut hor ity fo r w hic h i s s pec ifi ed . . . to be in the di scr eti on of the At tor ney Ge ner al or the Sec ret ary of Ho mel andSe cur ity , o the r t han th e gra nti ng of [as ylu m].

27 

### 1 Ho wev er, th e a ppl ica tio n o f t he INA ’s jur isd ict ion al 2 bar is pr obl ema tic in th is cas e b eca use th e p roc eed ing s 3 und er the IN A a re all ege d t o h ave be en irr egu lar in se ver al 4 res pec ts. 5 Fir st, th e c omp lai nt all ege s t hat th e g ove rnm ent to ok 6 the fo llo win g a cti ons th at imp air ed Ara r’s ti mel y a bil ity to 7 see k t he jud ici al rev iew no rma lly af for dedun der th e I NA and 8 to rec eiv e a ny mea nin gfu l r eli ef: de nyi ng his re que sts to 9 con tac t a n a tto rne y o r h is fam ily ; m isl ead ing hi s l awy er 10 (af ter on e w as ret ain ed for hi m) as to his lo cat ion an d 11 sta tus , t her eby fr ust rat ing an y a dvo cac y o n h is beh alf ; a nd 12 ser vin g t he rem ova l o rde r o n A rar en ro ute to Amman , w hen he 13 no lon ger ha d a cce ss to his at tor ney an d c oul d n ot mak e u se28 

### 1 of the re vie w p roc ess . The co mpl ain t a lso al leg es tha t t he 2 gov ern men t u nde rto ok ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on in cle ar 3 vio lat ion of th e p rot ect ion s a ffo rde d a lie ns by the IN A, 4 sug ges tin g t hat th e g ove rnm ent it sel f m igh t n ot hav e v iew ed 5 the IN A a s t he rea l s our ce of its re mov al aut hor ity in th is 6 con tex t. Ho wev er, me re all ega tio ns of obs tru cti on gen era lly 7 do not ci rcu mve nt a c ong res sio nal ly man dat ed rem edi al 8 sch eme . Oth erw ise , l imi tat ion s o n t he jur isd ict ion of th e 9 dis tri ct cou rts co uldea sil y b e e vad ed andth war ted . 10 Sec ond , a lth oug h t he INAgo ver ns the st atu s o f a lie ns 11 in tra nsi t a t U nit ed Sta tes ai rpo rts , a nd cle arl y h as a r ole 12 in suc h c irc ums tan ces , s ee 8 U .S. C. § 1 182 (d) (4) (C) , t his is 13 not a typ ica l i mmi gra tio n c ase ac cor din g t o t he com pla int : 14 Ara r t ook no st ep to ent er or sta y i n t his co unt ry; he wa s 15 cha ngi ng pla nes to go el sew her e, rep eat edl y e xpr ess ed his 16 des ire to re tur n t o C ana da, an d w as tic ket ed to Mon tre al. 17 Eve n t hou gh thi s c ase do es not pr ese nt the fa mil iar fa ct 18 pat ter n o f a n a lie n t ryi ng to ent er or rem ain in th e U nit ed 19 Sta tes , o ur imm igr ati on law s a ppl y w ith eq ual fo rce to 20 ali ens wh o s eek ad mis sio n t o o ur cou ntr y a nd to ali ens wh om 21 the go ver nme nt see ks to kee p o ut of our co unt ry. 22 In sho rt, it is no t c lea r t hat th e I NA’ s j udi cia l29 

### 1 rev iew pr ovi sio ns gov ern ci rcu mst anc es of inv olu nta ry 2 ren dit ion su ch as tho se all ege d h ere . Ind eed , r end iti on may 3 tak e p lac e i n c irc ums tan ces th at in no way im pli cat e U nit ed 4 Sta tes immig rat ion la ws, su ch as whe n a pe rso n i s d eta ine d 5 abr oadan d r end ere d t o s ome th irdco unt ry. 6 Fin all y, eve n i f t he INA ’s jur isd ict ion al bar is 7 sur mou nte d a nd rev iew no t f ore clo sed , A rar ha s a lle ged 8 cir cum sta nce s t hat wo uldha ve pre ven tedhi m f romob tai nin g 9 rev iew . If, as he al leg es, he wa s s erv ed wit h t he rem ova l 10 ord er whi le he was al rea dy en rou te to Amm an, th e I NA cou ld 11 hav e a ffo rde d h im no rel ief th en (an d c an aff ordhi m n o 12 aff irm ati ve rel ief at th is tim e i n t his ca se) . 13 In any ev ent , w e n eedno t d eci de the ve xedqu est ion of 14 whe the r t he INAba r d efe ats ju ris dic tio n o f A rar ’s 15 sub sta nti ve due pr oce ss cla ims , b eca use we co ncl ude be low 16 tha t t he cas e m ust be di smi sse d a t t he thr esh oldfo r o the r 17 rea son s. 18 19 VII 20 In Biv ens v. Si x U nkn own Na medAg ent s o f F ede ral Bu rea u 21 of Nar cot ics , 4 03 U.S . 3 88 (19 71) , t he Sup rem e C our t 22 “re cog niz ed for th e f irs t t ime an im pli ed pri vat e a cti on for30 

### 1 dam age s a gai nst fe der al off ice rs all ege d t o h ave vi ola teda 2 cit ize n’s co nst itu tio nal ri ght s.” C orr . S erv s. Cor p. v. 3 Mal esk o, 534 U. S. 61, 66 (2 001 ). Th e p lai nti ff in Biv ens 4 hadbe en sub jec tedto an un law ful , w arr ant les s s ear ch whi ch 5 res ult ed in his ar res t. Bi ven s, 403 U. S. at 389 -90 . The 6 Sup rem e C our t a llo wedhi m t o s tat e a ca use of ac tio n f or 7 mon ey dam age s d ire ctl y u nde r t he Fou rth Am end men t, the reb y 8 giv ing ri se to a j udi cia lly -cr eat ed rem edy st emm ing di rec tly 9 fro m t he Con sti tut ion it sel f. Id . a t 3 97. 10 The pu rpo se of the Bi ven s r eme dy “is to de ter 11 ind ivi dua l f ede ral of fic ers fr om commit tin g c ons tit uti ona l 12 vio lat ion s.” M ale sko , 5 34 U.S . a t 7 0. So a Biv ens ac tio n 13 is bro ugh t a gai nst in div idu als , a nd any da mag es are pa yab le 14 by the of fen din g o ffi cer s. Ca rls on v. Gre en, 44 6 U .S. 14 , 15 21 (19 80) . Notwithstanding the potential breadth of claims 

### 16 that would serve that objective, the Supreme Court has 

### 17 warned that the Bivens remedy is an extraordinary thing that 

### 18 should rarely if ever be applied in “new contexts.” See 

### 19 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted); 

### 20 Sch wei ker v. Ch ili cky , 4 87 U.S . 4 12, 42 1 ( 198 8); se e a lso 21 Dot son v. Gr ies a, 398 F. 3d 156 , 1 66 (2dCi r. 200 5) (“B eca use 22 a B ive ns act ion is a jud ici all y c rea tedre med y . . . c our ts31 

### 1 pro cee d c aut iou sly in ex ten din g s uch im pli ed rel ief 2 . . . .”) . In the 38 ye ars si nce Bi ven s, the Su pre me Cou rt 3 has ex ten dedit tw ice on ly: in th e c ont ext of an em plo yme nt 4 dis cri min ati on cla im in vio lat ion of th e D ue Pro ces s C lau se, 5 Dav is v. Pas sma n, 442 U. S. 228 (1 979 ); andin th e c ont ext of 6 an Eig hth Am end men t v iol ati on by pri son of fic ial s, Car lso n, 7 446 U. S. 14; se e a lso Wi lki e v . R obb ins , 5 51 U.S . 5 37, 55 0 8 (20 07) (“ [I] n m ost in sta nce s w e h ave fo unda Biv ens re med y 9 unj ust ifi ed. ”); Ma les ko, 53 4 U .S. at 68 (“ [W] e h ave 10 con sis ten tly re fus ed to ext endBi ven s l iab ili ty to any ne w 11 con tex t o r n ew cat ego ry of def end ant s.” ). Si nce Ca rls on in 12 198 0, the Su pre me Cou rt has de cli nedto ex ten d t he 13 Biv ens re med y i n a ny new di rec tio n a t a ll. Amon g t he 14 rej ect ed con tex ts are : v iol ati ons of fe der al emp loy ees ’ 15 Fir st Ame ndm ent ri ght s b y t hei r e mpl oye rs, Bu sh v. Luc as, 16 462 U. S. 367 (1 983 ); har ms suf fer ed inc ide nt to mil ita ry 17 ser vic e, Uni tedSt ate s v . S tan ley , 4 83 U.S . 6 69 (19 87) ; 18 Cha ppe ll v. Wal lac e, 462 U. S. 296 (1 983 ); den ial s o f S oci al 19 Sec uri ty ben efi ts, Sc hwe ike r, 487 U. S. at 412 ; c lai ms 20 aga ins t f ede ral ag enc ies , F DIC v. Me yer , 5 10 U.S . 4 71 21 (19 94) ; c lai ms aga ins t p riv ate co rpo rat ion s o per ati ng und er 22 fed era l c ont rac ts, Ma les ko, 53 4 U .S. 61 (2 001 ); andcl aim s32 

### 1 of ret ali ati on by fed era l o ffi cia ls aga ins t p riv ate 2 lan dow ner s, Wil kie , 5 51 U.S . a t 5 62. 3 Thi s c ase re qui res us to ex ami ne whe the r a llo win g t his 4 Biv ens ac tio n t o p roc eedwo uldex ten d B ive ns to a n ew 5 “co nte xt, ” a nd if so, wh eth er suc h a n e xte nsi on is 6 adv isa ble . 7 “Co nte xt” is no t d efi nedin th e c ase la w. At a 

### 8 sufficiently high level of generality, any claim can be 

### 9 analogized to some other claim for which a Bivens action is 

### 10 afforded, just as at a sufficiently high level of 

### 11 particularity, every case has points of distinction. We 

### 12 construe the word “context” as it is commonly used in law: 

### 13 to reflect a potentially recurring scenario that has similar 

### 14 legal and factual components. 

### 15 The co nte xt of thi s c ase is in ter nat ion al ren dit ion , 16 spe cif ica lly , “ ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on. ” Ext rao rdi nar y 17 ren dit ion is tr eat ed as a d ist inc t p hen ome non in 18 int ern ati ona l l aw. S ee sup ra not e 1 . Indeed, law review 

### 19 articles that affirmatively advocate the creation of a 

### 20 remedy in cases like Arar’s recognize “extraordinary 

### 21 rendition” as the context. See, e.g., Peter Johnston, Note, 

### 22 Leaving the Invisible Universe: Why All Victims of33 

### 1 Extraordinary Rendition Need a Cause of Action Against the 

### 2 United States, 16 J.L. & Pol’y 357, 363 (2007). More 

### 3 particularly, the context of extraordinary rendition in 

### 4 Arar’s case is the complicity or cooperation of United 

### 5 States government officials in the delivery of a non-citizen 

### 6 to a foreign country for torture (or with the expectation 

### 7 that torture will take place). This is a “new context”: no 

### 8 court has previously afforded a Bivens remedy for 

### 9 extraordinary rendition. 

### 10 Once we have identified the context as “new,” we must 

### 11 decide whether to recognize a Bivens remedy in that 

### 12 environment of fact and law 

### . The Su pre me Cou rt tel ls us 13 tha t t his is a two -pa rt inq uir y. In order to determine 

### 14 whether to recognize a Bivens remedy in a new context, we 

### 15 must consider: whether there is an alternative remedial 

### 16 scheme available to the plaintiff; and whether “‘special 

### 17 factors counsel[] hesitation’” in creating a Bivens remedy. 

### 18 Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378). 

### 19 20 VII I 21 The re are se ver al pos sib le alt ern ati ve rem edi al sch eme s 22 her e. Co ngr ess ha s e sta bli she d a su bst ant ial ,34 

### 1 com pre hen siv e, andin tri cat e r eme dia l s che me in the co nte xt 2 of imm igr ati on. T he INApr ovi des fo r r evi ew of fin al ord ers 3 of rem ova l, inc lud ing re vie w o f t he gov ern men t’s de sig nat ion 4 of a p art icu lar de sti nat ion co unt ry andma ny (al bei t n ot 5 all ) d eci sio ns of the At tor ney Ge ner al andth e S ecr eta ry of 6 Hom ela nd Sec uri ty. S ee 8 U .S. C. § 1 252 ; M end is v. Fil ip , 7 554 F. 3d 335 , 3 38 (2dCi r. 200 9). C ong res s h as sup ple men ted 8 thi s g ene ral re med ial sc hem e w ith sp eci fic gu ida nce fo r 9 par tic ula r c ont ext s b y e nac tin g ( i) the Fo rei gn Aff air s 10 Ref orman d R est ruc tur ing Ac t o f 1 998 (“ FAR RA” ), 8 U .S. C. 11 § 1 231 no te; se e a lso 8 C.F .R. § 208 .16 (c) ; a nd (ii ) t he 12 TVP A, whi ch, as al rea dy dis cus sed , p rov ide s n o r eme dy to 13 Ara r. At th e s ame ti me, Co ngr ess ha s e xpr ess ly lim ite d 14 rev iew of th e r emo val of al ien s w ho (li ke Ara r) are 15 rem ova ble fo r r eas ons re lat ed to nat ion al sec uri ty. S ee 8 16 U.S .C. § 122 5(c ). Co ngr ess ha s a lso re gul arl y m odi fie d t he 17 var iou s r evi ew mec han ism s t o a cco unt fo r p erc eiv ed 18 dif fic ult ies an d c omp lic ati ons . See , e .g. , R EAL ID Ac t o f 19 200 5, Pub . L . N o. 109 -13 , d iv. B, 11 9 S tat . 3 02; Il leg al 20 Imm igr ati on Ref orman d I mmi gra nt Res pon sib ili ty Act of 19 96, 21 Pub . L . N o. 104 -20 8, div . C , 1 10 Sta t. 300 9-5 46. I n l igh t 22 of the co mpl exi ty of the re med ial sc hem e C ong res s h asAccordingly, we have no occasion to consider the 6 panel’s conclusion that the “review procedures set forth by the INA provide a convincing reason for us to resist recognizing a Bivens cause of action for Arar’s claims.” Arar, 532 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 35 

### 1 cre ate d ( andfr equ ent ly ame nde d), we wo uldor din ari ly dra w a 2 str ong in fer enc e t hat Co ngr ess in ten dedth e j udi cia ry to 3 sta y i ts han d a nd ref rai n f romcr eat ing a Biv ens ac tio n i n 4 thi s c ont ext . See Wi lki e, 551 U. S. at 554 ; S chw eik er, 48 7 5 U.S . a t 4 24- 29; Bu sh, 46 2 U .S. at 38 8. 6 We rec ogn ize , h owe ver , t hat an y r eli anc e o n t he INAas 7 an alt ern ati ve rem edi al sch eme pr ese nts di ffi cul tie s f or the 8 sam e r eas ons di scu sse d i n P art VI ab ove . Ara r h as all ege d 9 tha t h e w as act ive ly pre ven tedfr om see kin g a ny mea nin gfu l 10 rev iew an d r eli ef thr oug h t he INApr oce sse s. In th e e nd, we 11 nee d n ot dec ide wh eth er an alt ern ati ve rem edi al sch eme wa s 12 ava ila ble be cau se, “e ven in th e a bse nce of an al ter nat ive 13 [re med ial sc hem e], a Biv ens re med y i s a su bje ct of jud gme nt 14 . . . [in wh ich ] c our ts mus t . . . p ay par tic ula r h eed. . . 15 to any sp eci al fac tor s c oun sel lin g h esi tat ion be for e 16 aut hor izi ng a n ew kin d o f f ede ral li tig ati on. ” Wil kie , 5 51 17 U.S . a t 5 50 (in ter nal qu ota tio n m ark s o mit ted ). S uch 6 

### 18 spe cia l f act ors ar e c lea rly pr ese nt in the ne w c ont ext of36 

### 1 thi s c ase , a nd the y s ter nly co uns el hes ita tio n. 2 3 IX 4 Whe n t he Biv ens ca use of ac tio n w as cre ate d i n 1 971 , 5 the Su pre me Cou rt exp lai nedth at suc h a re med y c oul d b e 6 aff ord ed bec aus e t hat “c ase in vol ve[ d] no spe cia l f act ors 7 cou nse lli ng hes ita tio n i n t he abs enc e o f a ffi rma tiv e a cti on 8 by Con gre ss. ” Biv ens , 4 03 U.S . a t 3 96. T his pr ude nti al 9 lim ita tio n w as exp res sly we igh ed by the Co urt in Da vis , 4 42 10 U.S . a t 2 45- 46, an d C arl son , 4 46 U.S . a t 1 8-1 9, andsu ch 11 hes ita tio n h as def eat ed num ero us Biv ens in iti ati ves , s ee, 12 e.g ., Sta nle y, 483 U. S. at 683 -84 ; C hap pel l, 462 U. S. at 13 304 ; W ilk ie, 55 1 U .S. at 55 4-5 5; Dot son , 3 98 F.3 d a t 1 66- 67. 14 Amo ng the “s pec ial fa cto rs” th at hav e “ cou nse l[e d] 15 hes ita tio n” andth ere by for ecl ose d a Bi ven s r eme dy are : 16 mil ita ry con cer ns, St anl ey, 48 3 U .S. at 68 3-8 4; Cha ppe ll, 17 462 U. S. at 304 ; s epa rat ion of po wer s, Uni tedSt ate s v . C ity 18 of Phi lad elp hia , 6 44 F.2 d 1 87, 20 0 ( 3d Cir . 1 980 ); the 19 com pre hen siv ene ss of ava ila ble st atu tor y s che mes , D ots on, 20 398 F. 3d at 166 ; n ati ona l s ecu rit y c onc ern s, Bea tti e v . 21 Boe ing Co ., 43 F.3 d 5 59, 56 3 ( 10t h C ir. 19 94) ; a nd for eig n 22 pol icy co nsi der ati ons , U nit ed Sta tes v. Ve rdu go- Urq uid ez,Judge P OOL ER labels these two principles “dicta,” see 7 Dissent of Judge Pooler at 2 , but they are not. They are integral to the holding in this in banc case, because we do not take account of countervailing factors and because we apply the standard we announce. 37 

### 1 494 U. S. 259 , 2 74 (19 90) . 2 Two pr inc ipl es eme rge fr om thi s r evi ew of cas e l aw: 3 • “Sp eci al fac tor s” is an emb rac ing ca teg ory , 4 not ea sil y d efi ned ; b ut it is lim ite d i n t erm s 5 to fac tor s t hat pr ovo ke “he sit ati on. ” Whi le 6 spe cia l f act ors sh oul d b e s ubs tan tia l e nou gh 7 to jus tif y t he abs enc e o f a da mag es rem edy fo r 8 a w ron g, no acc oun t i s t ake n o f c oun ter vai lin g 9 fac tor s t hat mi ght co uns el ala cri ty or 10 act ivi sm, an d n one ha s e ver be en cit ed by the 11 Sup rem e C our t a s a re aso n f or aff ord ing a 12 Biv ens re med y w her e i t w oul d n ot oth erw ise 13 exi st. 14 15 • The on ly rel eva nt thr esh old --t hat a fac tor 16 “co uns els he sit ati on” --i s r ema rka bly lo w. It 17 is at the op pos ite en d o f t he con tin uumfr om 18 the un fla ggi ng dut y t o e xer cis e j uri sdi cti on. 19 Hes ita tio n i s a pa use , n ot a f ull st op, or an 20 abs ten tio n; andto co uns el is not to re qui re. 21 “He sit ati on” is “c oun sel ed” wh ene ver 22 tho ugh tfu l d isc ret ion wo uldpa use ev en to 23 con sid er. 7 

### 24 25 With these principles in mind, we adduce, one by one, 

### 26 special factors that bear upon the recognition of a Bivens 

### 27 remedy for rendition. 

### 28 29 X 30 Alt hou gh thi s a cti on is cas t i n t erm s o f a cl aimfo r38 

### 1 mon ey dam age s a gai nst th e d efe nda nts in th eir in div idu al 2 cap aci tie s, it ope rat es as a c ons tit uti ona l c hal len ge to 3 pol ici es pro mul gat ed by the ex ecu tiv e. Ou r f ede ral sy ste m 4 of che cks an d b ala nce s p rov ide s m ean s t o c ons ide r a lle ged ly 5 unc ons tit uti ona l e xec uti ve pol icy , b ut a p riv ate ac tio n f or 6 mon ey dam age s a gai nst in div idu al pol icy mak ers is no t o ne of 7 the m. A B ive ns act ion is so met ime s a nal ogi zedto an ac tio n 8 pur sua nt to 42 U.S .C. § 198 3, but it do es not re ach so fa r 9 as to cre ate th e f ede ral co unt erp art to an ac tio n u nde r 10 Mon ell v. De par tme nt of Soc ial Se rvi ces , 4 36 U.S . 6 58 11 (19 78) . Her e, we nee d n ot dec ide ca teg ori cal ly whe the r a 12 Biv ens ac tio n c an lie ag ain st pol icy mak ers be cau se in the 13 con tex t o f e xtr aor din ary re ndi tio n, suc h a n a cti on wou ld 14 hav e t he nat ura l t end enc y t o a ffe ct dip lom acy , f ore ign 15 pol icy , a nd the se cur ity of th e n ati on, an d t hat fa ct 16 cou nse ls hes ita tio n. Ou r h old ing ne ed be no bro ade r. 17 18 A. Security and Foreign Policy 

### 19 The Executive has practiced rendition since at least 

### 20 1995. See Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism 

### 21 Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic Relations: Joint Hearing 

### 22 Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human

### Se e P res s R ele ase an d A nno unc eme nt, St eph en Har per , 8 

### Pri me Min ist er of Can . ( Jan . 2 6, 200 7), htt p:/ /pm .gc .ca /en g/m edi a.a sp? id= 151 0; Ott awa Re ach es $10 M Set tle men t w ith Ar ar, CB C N ews , J an. 26 , 2 007 , htt p:/ /ww w.c bc. ca/ can ada /st ory /20 07/ 01/ 25/ ara r-h arp er. htm l. 39 

### 1 Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. 

### 2 Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) (statement 

### 3 of Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, CIA). 

### 4 Arar gives “the mid-1990s” as the date for the inception of 

### 5 the policy under which he was sent to Syria for torture. 

### 6 Pl. Maher Arar’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Invocation 

### 7 of the State Secrets Privilege, Mar. 14, 2005, at 6. A suit 

### 8 seeking a damages remedy against senior officials who 

### 9 implement such a policy is in critical respects a suit 

### 10 against the government as to which the government has not 

### 11 waived sovereign immunity. Such a suit unavoidably 

### 12 influences government policy, probes government secrets, 

### 13 invades government interests, enmeshes government lawyers, 

### 14 and thereby elicits government funds for settlement. 

### 15 (Canada has already paid Arar $10 million. ) 8 

### 16 It is a substantial understatement to say that one must 

### 17 hesitate before extending Bivens into such a context. A 

### 18 suit seeking a damages remedy against senior officials who 

### 19 implement an extraordinary rendition policy would enmesh the40 

### 1 courts ineluctably in an assessment of the validity and 

### 2 rationale of that policy and its implementation in this 

### 3 particular case, matters that directly affect significant 

### 4 diplomatic and national security concerns. It is clear from 

### 5 the face of the complaint that Arar explicitly targets the 

### 6 “policy” of extraordinary rendition; he cites the policy 

### 7 twice in his complaint, and submits documents and media 

### 8 reports concerning the practice. His claim cannot proceed 

### 9 without inquiry into the perceived need for the policy, the 

### 10 threats to which it responds, the substance and sources of 

### 11 the intelligence used to formulate it, and the propriety of 

### 12 adopting specific responses to particular threats in light 

### 13 of apparent geopolitical circumstances and our relations 

### 14 with foreign countries. 

### 15 The Supreme Court has expressly counseled that matters 

### 16 touching upon foreign policy and national security fall 

### 17 within “an area of executive action ‘in which courts have 

### 18 long been hesitant to intrude’” absent congressional 

### 19 authorization. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) 

### 20 (emphasis added) (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 

### 21 U.S. 788, 819 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 

### 22 concurring in the judgment)). It “has recognized ‘the41 

### 1 generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province 

### 2 and responsibility of the Executive. . . . Thus, unless 

### 3 Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts 

### 4 traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the 

### 5 authority of the Executive in military and national security 

### 6 affairs.” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 

### 7 (1988) 

### (e mph asi s a dde d) (qu oti ng Hai g v . A gee , 4 53 U.S . 2 80, 8 293 -94 (1 981 )). T his “h esi ta[ tio n]” an d “ rel uct an[ ce] ” i s 9 cou nse ledby : 10 • the co nst itu tio nal se par ati on of pow ers am ong 11 the br anc hes of go ver nme nt, se e U nit ed Sta tes 12 v. Cur tis s-W rig ht Exp . C o., 29 9 U .S. 30 4, 320

- 13 22 (19 36) (n oti ng the “p len ary an d e xcl usi ve 14 pow er of the Pr esi den t a s t he sol e o rga n o f 15 the fe der al gov ern men t i n t he fie ld of 16 int ern ati ona l r ela tio ns” an d d isc uss ing th e 17 dif fic ult ies pr ese nte d b y c ong res sio nal --l et 18 alo ne jud ici al- -in vol vem ent in su ch aff air s), 19 and 20 21 • the li mit ed ins tit uti ona l c omp ete nce of th e 22 jud ici ary , s ee Bou med ien e v . B ush , 1 28 S. Ct. 23 222 9, 227 6-7 7 ( 200 8) (“U nli ke the Pr esi den t 24 andso me des ign ate d M emb ers of Co ngr ess , 25 nei the r t he Mem ber s o f t his Co urt no r m ost 26 fed era l j udg es beg in the da y w ith br ief ing s 27 tha t m ay des cri be new an d s eri ous th rea ts to 28 our Na tio n a nd its pe opl e. The la w m ust ac cor d 29 the Ex ecu tiv e s ubs tan tia l a uth ori ty to 30 app reh endan d d eta in tho se who po se a r eal 31 dan ger to ou r s ecu rit y.” ); see al so Mun af v. 32 Ger en, 12 8 S . C t. 220 7, 222 6 ( 200 8) (“T he 33 Jud ici ary is no t s uit ed to [ma ke] 34 det erm ina tio ns [in th e a rea of fo rei gn 35 aff air s] tha t w oul d . . . u nde rmi ne the42 

### 1 Gov ern men t’s ab ili ty to spe ak wit h o ne voi ce 2 in thi s a rea . In con tra st, th e p oli tic al 3 bra nch es are we ll sit uat ed to con sid er 4 sen sit ive fo rei gn pol icy is sue s, suc h a s 5 whe the r t her e i s a se rio us pro spe ct of tor tur e 6 at the ha nds of an y a lly , a nd wha t t o d o a bou t 7 it if the re is. ” ( cit ati on omi tte d)) . 8 9 Tru e, cou rts ca n-- wit h d iff icu lty an d r eso urc efu lne ss- - 10 con sid er sta te sec ret s a nd eve n r eex ami ne jud gme nts ma de in 11 the fo rei gn aff air s c ont ext whe n t hey mu st , t hat is , w hen 12 the re is an unf lag gin g d uty to ex erc ise ou r j uri sdi cti on. 13 Oth erw ise : 14 [T] he spe cia l n eed s o f f ore ign af fai rs mus t s tay 15 our ha nd in the cr eat ion of da mag e r eme die s 16 aga ins t m ili tar y a nd for eig n p oli cy off ici als fo r 17 all ege dly un con sti tut ion al tre atm ent of fo rei gn 18 sub jec ts cau sin g i nju ry abr oad . The fo rei gn 19 aff air s i mpl ica tio ns of sui ts suc h a s t his ca nno t 20 be ign ore d-- the ir abi lit y t o p rod uce wh at the 21 Sup rem e C our t h as cal ledin an oth er con tex t 22 “em bar ras sme nt of our go ver nme nt abr oad ” t hro ugh 23 “mu lti far iou s p ron oun cem ent s b y v ari ous 24 dep art men ts on one qu est ion .” Wh eth er or not th e 25 pre sen t l iti gat ion is mo tiv ate d b y c ons ide rat ion s 26 of geo pol iti cs rat her th an per son al har m, we thi nk 27 tha t a s a ge ner al mat ter th e d ang er of for eig n 28 cit ize ns’ us ing th e c our ts in sit uat ion s s uch as 29 thi s t o o bst ruc t t he for eig n p oli cy of our 30 gov ern men t i s s uff ici ent ly acu te tha t w e m ust 31 lea ve to Con gre ss the ju dgm ent wh eth er a d ama ge 32 rem edy sh oul d e xis t. 33 San che z-E spi noz a v . R eag an, 77 0 F .2d20 2, 209 (D .C. Ci r. 34 198 5) (Sc ali a, J.) (q uot ing Ba ker v. Ca rr, 36 9 U .S. 18 6, 217 35 (19 62) ). Ab sen t c lea r c ong res sio nal au tho riz ati on, th e43 

### 1 jud ici al rev iew of ex tra ord ina ry ren dit ion wo uldof fen d t he 2 sep ara tio n o f p owe rs andin hib it thi s c oun try ’s for eig n 3 pol icy . It doe s n ot mat ter fo r o ur pur pos es whe the r s uch 4 con seq uen ces wo uldfl ow fro m i nno cen t i nte rfe ren ce or fro m 5 del ibe rat e m ani pul ati on. T hes e c onc ern s m ust co uns el 6 hes ita tio n i n c rea tin g a ne w d ama ges re med y t hat Co ngr ess 7 has no t s een fi t t o a uth ori ze. 8 9 B. Cla ssi fie d I nfo rma tio n 10 The ex tra ord ina ry ren dit ion co nte xt inv olv es exc han ges 11 amo ng the mi nis tri es andag enc ies of fo rei gn cou ntr ies on 12 dip lom ati c, sec uri ty, an d i nte lli gen ce iss ues . The 13 sen sit ivi tie s o f s uch cl ass ifi ed mat eri al are “t oo obv iou s 14 to cal l f or enl arg ed dis cus sio n.” D ep’ t o f N avy , 4 84 U.S . 15 at 529 (i nte rna l q uot ati on mar ks omi tte d). E ven th e p rob ing 16 of the se mat ter s e nta ils th e r isk th at oth er cou ntr ies wi ll 17 bec ome le ss wil lin g t o c oop era te wit h t he Uni tedSt ate s i n 18 sha rin g i nte lli gen ce res our ces to co unt er ter ror ism . “At 19 its co re, ” a s t he pan el opi nio n o bse rve d, “th is sui t a ris es 20 fro m t he Exe cut ive Br anc h’s al leg ed det erm ina tio n t hat (a ) 21 Ara r w as aff ili ate d w ith Al Qa eda , a nd the ref ore a thr eat to 22 nat ion al sec uri ty, an d ( b) his re mov al to Syr ia was

### Se e O tta wa Try ing to Ho ld Bac k D ocu men ts fro m A rar 9 

### Inq uir y, CBC Ne ws, Ap r. 29, 20 04, htt p:/ /ww w.c bc. ca/ can ada /st ory /20 04/ 04/ 29/ ara r04 042 9.h tml . 44 

### 1 app rop ria te in lig ht of U.S . d ipl oma tic an d n ati ona l 2 sec uri ty int ere sts .” Ara r, 532 F. 3d at 181 . To det erm ine 3 the ba sis fo r A rar ’s all ege d d esi gna tio n a s a n A l Q aed a 4 mem ber an d h is sub seq uen t r emo val to Sy ria , t he dis tri ct 5 cou rt wou ld hav e t o c ons ide r w hat wa s d one by th e n ati ona l 6 sec uri ty app ara tus of at le ast th ree fo rei gn cou ntr ies , a s 7 wel l a s t hat of th e U nit ed Sta tes . Ind eed , t he Can adi an 8 gov ern men t-- whi ch app ear s t o h ave pr ovi dedth e i nte lli gen ce 9 tha t U nit ed Sta tes of fic ial s w ere ac tin g u pon wh en the y 10 det ain ed Ara r-- pai d A rar co mpe nsa tio n f or its ro le in the 11 eve nts su rro und ing th is law sui t, but ha s als o as ser tedth e 12 nee d f or Can ada it sel f t o m ain tai n t he con fid ent ial ity of 13 cer tai n c las sif iedma ter ial s r ela tedto Ar ar’ s c lai ms. 9 

### 14 15 C. Ope n C our ts 16 All ega tio ns of con spi rac y a mon g g ove rnm ent ag enc ies 17 tha t m ust of ten wo rk in sec ret in evi tab ly imp lic ate a lot of 18 cla ssi fie d m ate ria l t hat ca nno t b e i ntr odu cedin to the 19 pub lic re cor d. Al low ing Ar ar’ s c lai ms to pro cee d w oul d v ery 20 lik ely me an tha t s ome do cum ent s o r i nfo rma tio n s oug ht by45 

### 1 Ara r w oul d b e r eda cte d, rev iew ed in cam era , a nd oth erw ise 2 con cea ledfr om the pu bli c. Co nce alm ent do es not be spe ak 3 wro ngd oin g: in suc h m att ers , i t i s j ust as im por tan t t o 4 con cea l w hat ha s n ot bee n d one . Nev ert hel ess , t hes e 5 mea sur es wou ld exc ite su spi cio n a nd spe cul ati on as to the 6 tru e n atu re andde pth of th e s upp ose d c ons pir acy , a nd as to 7 the sc ope an d d ept h o f j udi cia l o ver sig ht. I nde ed, af ter an 8 inq uir y a t o ral ar gum ent as to wh eth er cla ssi fie d m ate ria ls 9 rel ati ng to Ara r’s cl aim s c oul d b e m ade av ail abl e f or rev iew 10 in cam era , A rar ob jec tedto th e s upp lem ent ati on of the 11 rec ordwi th mat eri al he cou ld not se e. Se e L ett er fro m 12 Dav id Col e, Cou nse l f or Mah er Ara r ( Dec . 2 3, 200 8). A fte r 13 poi nti ng out th at suc h m ate ria ls are un nec ess ary to th e 14 adj udi cat ion of a mot ion on th e p lea din gs (wh ere th e 15 all ega tio ns of the co mpl ain t m ust be ac cep tedas tr ue) , A rar 16 pro tes tedth at any ma ter ial s s ubm itt ed ex par te andin 17 cam era wo uldno t b e s ubj ect to ad ver sar ial te sti ng andth at 18 con sid era tio n o f s uch do cum ent s w oul d b e “ pre sum pti vel y 19 unc ons tit uti ona l” sin ce the y w oul d r esu lt in a d eci sio n “ on 20 the ba sis of se cre t i nfo rma tio n a vai lab le to onl y o ne sid e 21 of the di spu te. ” 22 The co urt ’s rel ian ce on inf orm ati on tha t c ann ot be46 

### 1 int rod uce d i nto th e p ubl ic rec ordis li kel y t o b e a co mmo n 2 fea tur e o f a ny Biv ens ac tio ns ari sin g i n t he con tex t o f 3 all ege d e xtr aor din ary re ndi tio n. Th is sho uldpr ovo ke 4 hes ita tio n, giv en the st ron g p ref ere nce in th e A ngl o5 Ame ric an leg al tra dit ion fo r o pen co urt pr oce edi ngs , a va lue 6 inc orp ora tedin to mod ern Fi rst an d S ixt h Amen dme nt law . See 7 U.S . C ons t. ame nd. VI (g uar ant eei ng the ri ght to a “ pub lic 8 tri al” (e mph asi s a dde d)) ; W est mor ela nd v. Col umb ia Bro ad. 9 Sys ., Inc ., 752 F. 2d 16, 23 (2 d C ir. 19 84) (n oti ng tha t t he 10 Fir st Ame ndm ent se cur es “a rig ht of acc ess to ci vil 11 pro cee din gs” ). Th e r isk of li mit ing ac ces s, of cou rse , i s 12 tha t w her e a pr oce edi ng “ha s b een co nce ale d f rompu bli c v iew 13 an une xpe cte d o utc ome ca n c aus e a re act ion th at the sy ste m 14 at bes t h as fai ledan d a t w ors t h as bee n c orr upt ed. ” 15 Ric hmo nd New spa per s, Inc . v . V irg ini a, 448 U. S. 555 , 5 71 16 (19 80) . “[T ]he ap pea ran ce of jus tic e c an bes t b e p rov ide d 17 by all owi ng peo ple to ob ser ve” pr oce edi ngs . Id. at 57 2. 18 “Pe opl e i n a n o pen so cie ty do not de man d i nfa lli bil ity fr om 19 the ir ins tit uti ons , b ut it is dif fic ult fo r t hemto ac cep t 20 wha t t hey ar e p roh ibi tedfr om obs erv ing .” Id . Thi s i s 21 esp eci all y t rue in th e c our ts, wh ere th e g uar ant ee of a 22 pub lic tr ial “h as alw ays be en rec ogn ize d a s a sa feg uar d47 

### 1 aga ins t a ny att emp t t o e mpl oy our co urt s a s i nst rum ent s o f 2 per sec uti on. T he kno wle dge th at eve ry cri min al tri al is 3 sub jec t t o c ont emp ora neo us rev iew in th e f oru m o f p ubl ic 4 opi nio n i s a n e ffe cti ve res tra int on po ssi ble ab use of 5 jud ici al pow er. ” In re Oli ver , 3 33 U.S . 2 57, 27 0 ( 194 8). 6 Gra nte d, the re are ci rcu mst anc es in whi ch a c our t m ay 7 clo se pro cee din gs to whi ch a p ubl ic rig ht of acc ess 8 pre sum pti vel y a tta che s. Se e W all er v. Geo rgi a, 467 U. S. 39, 9 45 (19 84) ; U nit ed Sta tes v. Al can tar a, 396 F. 3d 189 , 1 99- 200 10 (2dCi r. 200 5); Un ite d S tat es v. Doe , 6 3 F .3d12 1, 127 -28 11 (2dCi r. 199 5). A nd the pr obl ems po sedby th e n eedto 12 con sid er cla ssi fie d m ate ria l a re una voi dab le in som e 13 cri min al pro sec uti ons an d i n o the r c ase s w her e w e h ave a 14 dut y, imp ose d b y C ong res s, to exe rci se jur isd ict ion . But 15 thi s i s n ot suc h a ci rcu mst anc e o r s uch a cas e. Th e 16 pre fer enc e f or ope n r ath er tha n c lan des tin e c our t 17 pro cee din gs is a s pec ial fa cto r t hat co uns els he sit ati on in 18 ext end ing Bi ven s t o t he ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on con tex t. 19 20 XI 21 A g ove rnm ent re por t s tat es tha t t his ca se inv olv es 22 ass ura nce s r ece ive d f romot her go ver nme nts in co nne cti on

### We ta ke jud ici al not ice of th e e xis ten ce of thi s 10 

### unc las sif iedre por t a nd the sc ope of it s c ont ent s, inc lud ing the li mit ed dis cus sio n o f a ssu ran ces . Not ice is ta ken on ly tha t t he rep ort al leg es tha t a ssu ran ces we re rec eiv ed, no t as to the tr uth of th at all ega tio n o r t he rel iab ili ty of tho se ass ura nce s. 48 

### 1 wit h t he det erm ina tio n t hat Ar ar’ s r emo val to Sy ria wo uldbe 2 con sis ten t w ith Ar tic le 3 o f t he CAT . Off ice of In spe cto r 3 Gen era l, Dep ’t of Hom ela nd Sec ., (Un cla ssi fie d) The Re mov al 4 of a C ana dia n C iti zen to Sy ria 5, 22 , 2 6-2 7 ( 200 8). T his 10 

### 5 cas e i s n ot uni que in th at res pec t. Ca ses in th e c ont ext of 6 ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on are ve ry lik ely to pr ese nt ser iou s 7 que sti ons re lat ing to pr iva te dip lom ati c a ssu ran ces fr om 8 for eig n c oun tri es rec eiv ed by fed era l o ffi cia ls, an d t his 9 fea tur e o f s uch cl aim s o pen s t he doo r t o g ray mai l. 10 11 A. As sur anc es 12 The re gul ati ons pr omu lga tedpu rsu ant to th e F ARRA 13 exp lic itl y a uth ori ze the re mov al of an ali en to a f ore ign 14 cou ntr y f oll owi ng rec eip t f romth at cou ntr y o f s uff ici ent ly 15 rel iab le ass ura nce s t hat th e a lie n w ill no t b e t ort ure d. 16 See 8 C.F .R. § 208 .18 (c) . Sho uldwe de cid e t o e xte nd Biv ens 17 int o t he ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on con tex t, res olu tio n o f 18 the se act ion s w ill re qui re us to det erm ine wh eth er any su ch

### Th is ris k i s n ot nec ess ari ly aba tedby th e 11 

### und ert aki ngs of co uns el. S ee, e. g., Un ite d S tat es v. Sat tar , 3 95 F. Sup p. 2d 79 (S. D.N .Y. 20 05) (d eny ing at tor ney Lyn ne Ste war t’s mo tio n f or a j udg men t o f a cqu itt al fol low ing her co nvi cti on by a j ury of , i nte r a lia , c ons pir ing to def rau d t he Uni tedSt ate s, con spi rin g t o p rov ide ma ter ial sup por t t o c arr y o ut mur der an d k idn ap in a f ore ign co unt ry, andma kin g f als e s tat eme nts ). 49 

### 1 ass ura nce s w ere re cei vedfr om the co unt ry of ren dit ion an d 2 whe the r t he rel eva nt def end ant s r eli ed upo n t hemin go od 3 fai th in rem ovi ng the al ien at is sue . 4 Any an aly sis of th ese qu est ion s w oul d n ece ssa ril y 5 inv olv e u s i n a n i nqu iry in to the wo rk of for eig n 6 gov ern men ts andse ver al fed era l a gen cie s, the na tur e o f 7 cer tai n c las sif iedin for mat ion , a nd the ex ten t o f s ecr et 8 dip lom ati c r ela tio nsh ips . An inv est iga tio n i nto th e 9 exi ste nce an d c ont ent of su ch ass ura nce s w oul d p ote nti all y 10 emb arr ass ou r g ove rnm ent th rou gh ina dve rte nt or del ibe rat e 11 dis clo sur e o f i nfo rma tio n h arm ful to ou r o wn andot her 12 sta tes . G ive n t he gen era l a llo cat ion of au tho rit y o ver 11 

### 13 for eig n r ela tio ns to the po lit ica l b ran che s a nd the 14 dec ide dly li mit ed exp eri enc e a nd kno wle dge of th e f ede ral 15 jud ici ary re gar din g s uch ma tte rs, su ch an inv est iga tio n 16 wou ld als o i mpl ica te gra ve con cer ns abo ut the se par ati on of 17 pow ers an d o ur ins tit uti ona l c omp ete nce . See , e .g. , K iye mba50 

### 1 v. Oba ma, 56 1 F .3d50 9, 515 (D .C. Ci r. 200 9) (“[ S]e par ati on 2 of pow ers pr inc ipl es . . . pre clu de the co urt s f romse con d3 gue ssi ng the Ex ecu tiv e’s as ses sme nt of the li kel iho od a 4 det ain ee wil l b e t ort ure d b y a fo rei gn sov ere ign .”) . The se 5 con sid era tio ns str ong ly cou nse l h esi tat ion in ac kno wle dgi ng 6 a B ive ns rem edy in th is con tex t. 7 8 B. Gr aym ail 9 As emp has ize d a bov e, Ara r i nvo kes Bi ven s t o c hal len ge 10 pol ici es pro mul gat ed andpu rsu ed by the ex ecu tiv e b ran ch, 11 not si mpl y i sol ate d a cti ons of in div idu al fed era l e mpl oye es. 12 Suc h a n e xte nsi on of Biv ens is wi tho ut pre ced ent an d 13 imp lic ate s q ues tio ns of sep ara tio n o f p owe rs as wel l a s 14 sov ere ign immun ity . Thi s, by its elf , c oun sel s h esi tat ion ; 15 the re is fur the r r eas on to hes ita te whe re, as in th is cas e, 16 the ch all eng ed gov ern men t p oli cie s a re the su bje ct of 17 cla ssi fie d c omm uni cat ion s: a p oss ibi lit y t hat su ch sui ts 18 wil l m ake th e g ove rnm ent “v uln era ble to ‘g ray mai l,’ i. e., 19 ind ivi dua l l aws uit s b rou ght to in duc e t he [go ver nme nt] to 20 set tle a cas e ( or pre ven t i ts fil ing ) o ut of fea r t hat an y 21 eff ort to li tig ate th e a cti on wou ld rev eal cl ass ifi ed 22 inf orm ati on tha t m ay und erm ine on goi ng cov ert op era tio ns, ”51 

### 1 or oth erw ise co mpr omi se for eig n p oli cy eff ort s. Te net v. 2 Doe , 5 44 U.S . 1 , 1 1 ( 200 5) . 

### W e c ast no as per sio ns on Ara r, 3 or his la wye rs; th is dyn ami c i nhe res in an y c ase wh ere th ere 4 is a r isk th at a d efe nda nt mig ht “di scl ose cl ass ifi ed 5 inf orm ati on in the co urs e o f a tr ial .” Un ite d S tat es v. 6 Pap pas , 9 4 F .3d79 5, 799 (2 d C ir. 19 96) . Thi s i s a n e nde mic 7 ris k i n c ase s ( how eve r f ew) wh ich in vol ve a c lai m l ike 8 Ara r’s . 9 The ri sk of gra yma il is its elf a spe cia l f act or whi ch 10 cou nse ls hes ita tio n i n c rea tin g a Bi ven s r eme dy. T her e 11 wou ld be hes ita tio n e nou gh in an ord ina ry gra yma il cas e, 12 i.e ., whe re the ta cti c i s e mpl oye d a gai nst th e gov ern men t , 13 whi ch can tr ade se ttl eme nt cas h ( or the di smi ssa l o f 14 cri min al cha rge s) for se cre cy. S ee Ten et, 54 4 U .S. at 11 ; 15 Pap pas , 9 4 F .3dat 79 9. Bu t t he gra yma il ris k i n a Bi ven s 16 ren dit ion ca se is uni que ly tro ubl eso me. T he int ere st in 17 pro tec tin g m ili tar y, dip lom ati c, andin tel lig enc e s ecr ets is 18 loc ate d ( as alw ays ) i n t he gov ern men t ; y et a B ive ns cla im, 19 by def ini tio n, is nev er ple ade d a gai nst th e g ove rnm ent . 20 See , e .g. , M ale sko , 5 34 U.S . a t 7 0. So in a Biv ens ca se, 21 the re is a d iss oci ati on bet wee n t he hol der of th e n on22 dis clo sur e i nte res t ( the go ver nme nt, wh ich ca nno t b e s ued52 

### 1 dir ect ly und er Biv ens ) a nd the pe rso n w ith th e i nce nti ve to 2 dis clo se (th e d efe nda nt, wh o c ann ot wai ve, bu t w ill be 3 lia ble fo r a ny dam age s a sse sse d). I n a re ndi tio n c ase , t he 4 Biv ens pl ain tif f c oul d i n e ffe ct pre ssu re the in div idu al 5 def end ant s u nti l t he gov ern men t cr ies un cle . Thu s a ny 6 Biv ens ac tio n i nvo lvi ng ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on wou ld 7 ine vit abl y s uck th e g ove rnm ent in to the ca se to pro tec t i ts 8 con sid era ble in ter est s, and --i f d isc los ure is or der ed- -to 9 app eal , o r t o s uff er the di scl osu re, or to pa y. 10 Thi s p res sur e o n t he gov ern men t t o p ay a s ett lem ent ha s 11 (at le ast ) t wo fur the r p erv ers e e ffe cts . Fir st, a pay men t 12 fro m t he Tre asu ry ten ds to obv iat e a ny pay men t o r 13 con tri but ion by th e i ndi vid ual de fen dan ts. Y et, “[ Biv ens ] 14 is con cer nedso lel y w ith de ter rin g t he unc ons tit uti ona l a cts 15 of ind ivi dua l o ffi cer s” by extracting payment from 

### 16 individual wrongdoers. 

### Ma les ko, 53 4 U .S. at 71 . Whe n t he 17 gov ern men t e lec ts to set tle a Biv ens ca se whi ch is 18 sus cep tib le to gra yma il, th e i ndi vid ual wr ong doe r p ays 19 not hin g a nd the de ter ren t e ffe ct is los t. Se con d, the 20 ind ivi dua l d efe nda nt in suc h a ca se has no in cen tiv e t o 21 res ist di sco ver y t hat im per ils go ver nme nt int ere sts ; r ath er, 22 dis cov ery in duc es the go ver nme nt to set tle . So in theJudge C ALA BRE SI does not discount the risk of 12 graymail; he just minimizes the harm, equating it with settlement pressures that routinely inhere in section 1983 litigation. However, “graymail” is a term of art, signifying the use of military or intelligence information as hostage for payment of money or a plea bargain. The prospect of graymail does not induce Judge C ALA BRE SI to pause because he sees graymail as part of the “judicial structures that facilitate the giving of compensation, at least to innocent victims . . . .” See Dissent of Judge Calabresi at 15 . 

### It is te lli ng tha t, acc ord ing to th e D epu ty

13 

### Ass ist ant At tor ney Ge ner al, Mr . A rar an d h is att orn ey wen t to the Un ite d S tat es Con gre ss andre que ste d-- wit hou t suc ces s-- tha t i t “ cla rif y t he amb igu ity [i n t his ar ea] wi th leg isl ati on and. . . gi ve [Mr . A rar ] r epa rat ion s.” Tra nsc rip t o f A rar In ba nc Ora l A rgu men t a t 4 9. Cf . 1 53 Con g. Rec . D 138 4-0 2 ( Oct . 1 8, 200 7); Ma tth ew Jaf fe, Co ngr ess Hea rs Tes tim ony in Ar ar Tor tur e C ase , A BC New s, Oct . 1 8, 200 7, htt p:/ /ab cne ws. go. com /Po lit ics /st ory ?id =37 463 71& pag e=1 . 53 

### 1 ext rao rdi nar y r end iti on con tex t, the re is a r isk (o r 2 lik eli hoo d) tha t t he gov ern men t e ffe cti vel y b eco mes th e r eal 3 def end ant in in ter est , a nd the na medde fen dan ts bec ome 4 pro xie s t hat th e g ove rnm ent ca nno t c ont rol . Pre cis ely 5 bec aus e B ive ns has ne ver be en app rov ed as a M one ll- lik e 6 veh icl e f or cha lle ngi ng gov ern men t p oli cie s, thi s f act or 7 als o c oun sel s h esi tat ion in ex ten din g a pr iva te dam age s 8 act ion in th is con tex t. 12 

### 9 In the en d, a B ive ns act ion ba sedon re ndi tio n i s-- in 10 all bu t n ame --a cl aimag ain st the go ver nme nt. I t i s n ot 13 

### 11 for no thi ng tha t C ana da (th e g ove rnm ent , n ot an ind ivi dua l54 

### 1 off ice r o f i t) pai d A rar $1 0 m ill ion do lla rs. 2 3 XII 4 In the sm all nu mbe r o f c ont ext s i n w hic h c our ts hav e 5 imp lie d a Bi ven s r eme dy, it ha s o fte n b een ea sy to ide nti fy 6 bot h t he lin e b etw een co nst itu tio nal an d u nco nst itu tio nal 7 con duc t, andth e a lte rna tiv e c our se whi ch off ice rs sho uld 8 hav e p urs ued . The gu ardwh o b eat a pri son er sho uldno t h ave 9 bea ten hi m; the ag ent wh o s ear che d w ith out a war ran t s hou ld 10 hav e g ott en one ; a nd the immig rat ion of fic er who su bje cte d 11 an ali en to mul tip le str ip sea rch es wit hou t c aus e s hou ld 12 hav e l eft th e a lie n i n h is clo the s. Th is dis tin cti on may or 13 may no t a mou nt to a s pec ial fa cto r c oun sel ing he sit ati on in 14 the im pli cat ion of a Biv ens re med y. Bu t i t i s s ure ly 15 rem ark abl e t hat th e c ont ext of ex tra ord ina ry ren dit ion is so 16 dif fer ent , i nvo lvi ng as it doe s a co mpl ex andra pid ly 17 cha ngi ng leg al fra mew ork be set wi th cri tic al leg al jud gme nts 18 tha t h ave no t y et bee n m ade , a s w ell as po lic y c hoi ces th at 19 are by no me ans ea sil y r eac hed . 20 Con sid er: sh oul d t he off ice rs her e h ave le t A rar go on 21 his wa y a nd boa rd his fl igh t t o M ont rea l? Ca nad a w as 22 evi den tly un wil lin g t o r ece ive hi m; it was , a fte r a ll,55 

### 1 Can adi an aut hor iti es who id ent ifi ed Ara r a s a te rro ris t ( or 2 didso met hin g t hat le d t hei r g ove rnm ent to ap olo giz e 3 pub lic ly to Ara r a nd pay hi m $ 10 mil lio n). 4 Sho ulda per son id ent ifi ed as a t err ori st by his ow n 5 cou ntr y b e a llo wedto bo ardhi s p lan e a nd go on to his 6 des tin ati on? S ure ly, th at wou ld rai se que sti ons as to wh at 7 dut y i s o wedto th e o the r p ass eng ers an d t he cre w. 8 Or sho ulda sus pec tedte rro ris t e n r out e t o C ana da hav e 9 bee n r ele ase d o n t he Can adi an bor der --o ver wh ich he co uld 10 re- ent er the Un ite d S tat es vir tua lly at wi ll? O r s hou ld he 11 hav e b een se nt bac k w hen ce his pl ane ca me, or to so me thi rd 12 cou ntr y? Sh oul d t hos e g ove rnm ent s b e t oldth at Can ada 13 thi nks he is a ter ror ist ? If so, wh at cou ntr y w oul d t ake 14 him ? 15 Or sho uldth e s usp ect ed ter ror ist ha ve bee n s ent to 16 Gua nta nam o B ay or- -if no ot her co unt ry wou ld tak e h im- -ke pt 17 in the Un ite d S tat es wit h t he pro spe ct of rel eas e i nto th e 18 gen era l p opu lat ion ? See Za dvy das v. Da vis , 5 33 U.S . 6 78, 19 699 -70 0 ( 200 1). 20 Non e o f t his is to sa y t hat ex tra ord ina ry ren dit ion is 21 or sho uldbe a fav ore d p oli cy cho ice . At the sa me tim e, the 22 off ici als re qui redto de cid e t hes e v exe d i ssu es are “s ubj ect56 

### 1 to the pu ll of com pet ing ob lig ati ons .” Lo mba rdi v. Wh itm an, 2 485 F. 3d 73, 83 (2 d C ir. 20 07) . Man y v iab le act ion s t hey 3 mig ht con sid er “cl ash wi th oth er equ all y i mpo rta nt 4 gov ern men tal re spo nsi bil iti es. ” Pen a v . D ePr isc o, 432 F. 3d 5 98, 11 4 ( 2d Cir . 2 005 ) ( int ern al quo tat ion ma rks om itt ed) . 6 Giv en the am ple re aso ns for pa use al rea dy dis cus sed , w e n eed 7 not an d d o n ot rel y o n t his co nsi der ati on in con clu din g t hat 8 it is ina ppr opr iat e t o e xte nd Biv ens to th is con tex t. 9 Sti ll, Co ngr ess is th e a ppr opr iat e b ran ch of gov ern men t t o 10 dec ide un der wh at cir cum sta nce s ( if any ) t hes e k ind s o f 11 pol icy de cis ion s-- whi ch are di rec tly re lat ed to the se cur ity 12 of the po pul ati on andth e f ore ign af fai rs of the co unt ry- - 13 sho uldbe su bje cte d t o t he inf lue nce of li tig ati on bro ugh t 14 by ali ens . 15 16 XII I 17 All of th ese sp eci al fac tor s n otw ith sta ndi ng, we ca nno t 18 ign ore th at, as th e p ane l d iss ent pu t i t, “th ere is a lon g 19 his tor y o f j udi cia l r evi ew of Exe cut ive an d L egi sla tiv e 20 dec isi ons re lat ed to the co ndu ct of for eig n r ela tio ns and 21 nat ion al sec uri ty. ” Ara r, 532 F. 3d at 213 (S ack , J ., 22 con cur rin g i n p art an d d iss ent ing in pa rt) . Whe re doe s t hatDissents by their nature express views that are not 14 the law. 

### The se dis sen tin g o pin ion s c ont ain wo rds an d pas sag es tha t a re emo tio nal an d ( in our re spe ctf ul vie w) ove rwr oug ht . Accordingly, there is no need for extended engagement. A brief survey will suffice. Judge S ACK ’s dissent deems “artificial” our characterization of the new Bivens context in this case as “entirely one of ‘international rendition, specifically extraordinary rendition.’” See Dissent of Judge Sack at 34 . We would have thought it would be common ground that the context of this appeal is extraordinary rendition. Judge S ACK , however, reconceives the context, at some points characterizing the constitutional tort as encompassing only 57 

### 1 lea ve us? W e r eco gni ze our li mit ed com pet enc e, aut hor ity , 2 andju ris dic tio n t o m ake ru les or se t p ara met ers to go ver n 3 the pr act ice ca lle d r end iti on. B y t he sam e t oke n, we can 4 eas ily lo cat e t hat co mpe ten ce, ex per tis e, andre spo nsi bil ity 5 els ewh ere : i n C ong res s. Co ngr ess ma y b e c ont ent fo r t he 6 Exe cut ive Br anc h t o e xer cis e t hes e p owe rs wit hou t j udi cia l 7 che ck. B ut if Con gre ss wis hes to cr eat e a re med y f or 8 ind ivi dua ls lik e A rar , i t c an ena ct leg isl ati on tha t 9 inc lud es enu mer ate d e lig ibi lit y p ara met ers , d eli nea tedsa fe 10 har bor s, def ine d r evi ew pro ces ses , a nd spe cif ic rel ief to be 11 aff ord ed. O nce Co ngr ess ha s p erf orm ed thi s t ask , the n th e 12 cou rts in a pro per ca se wil l b e a ble to re vie w t he sta tut e 13 andpr ovi de jud ici al ove rsi ght to th e “ Exe cut ive an d 14 Leg isl ati ve dec isi ons [w hic h h ave be en mad e w ith re gar d] to 15 the co ndu ct of for eig n r ela tio ns andna tio nal se cur ity .” 14those events that occurred within the United States while at

other points requiring that the entire narrative be considered as a seamless whole, JFK to Syria. Compare id. at 34 with id. at 36-37 . But this case is emphatically and obviously about extraordinary rendition (and its alleged abuse), as is elsewhere acknowledged in the opinions of Judge C ALA BRE SI and Judge P ARK ER . See Dissent of Judge Calabresi at 15 ; Dissent of Judge Parker at 2 . As to the extraordinary rendition context, Judge S ACK (joined by all dissenters) makes the following constructive (and telling) concessions: “It is difficult to deny the existence of ‘special factors counseling hesitation’ in this case[,]” Dissent of Judge Sack at 47 ; “It . . . may be that to the extent actions against ‘policymakers’ can be equated with lawsuits against policies, they may not survive Iqbal[,]” id. at 49 ; and, “We share what we think to be the majority’s intuition that this case would likely turn largely, if not entirely, on decisions of national security and diplomacy . . . [,]” id. at 56 . Judge C ALA BRE SI ’s dissent urges that we forgo considering whether specific factors counsel hesitation under Bivens so that we could instead remand to see whether the case might eventually be dismissed as unmanageable under the state secrets privilege--which Judge C ALA BRE SI seems equally to disapprove. See Dissent of Judge Calabresi at 13 (state secrets privilege is the subject of “significant criticism, much of it warranted”). Thus Judge C ALA BRE SI professes hesitance to “hesitate” with respect to Bivens, as well as skepticism of the state secrets privilege. In doing so, he avoids fully endorsing either of the primary potential resolutions of this appeal, and hardly makes a choice at all. Even so, the authority cited by Judge C ALA BRE SI , which suggests deciding whether a claim is stated before doing Bivens analysis, is inapposite. Judge C ALA BRE SI fails to consider that application of the state secretsprivilege is often performed witness-by-witness; questionby-question; page-by-page; paragraph-by-paragraph--and can take years. It is not judicial activism to hesitate before requiring such an exercise in circumstances in which a Bivens claim may not lie. In any event, the state secrets doctrine has roots in separation of powers principles, and 58 

### 1is not itself devoid of constitutional implications. See

Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“The authority to protect [information related to national security] falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief.”); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Although the state secrets privilege was developed at common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities.”).

59 

### 1 Id. 2 3 CON CLU SION 4 For th e r eas ons st ate d a bov e, the ju dgm ent of th e 5 Dis tri ct Cou rt is aff irm ed. T he pan el opi nio n i s h ere by 6 vac ate d.1 CA LAB RES I , PO OLER, SAC K, and PARKE R, C ir c uit

Judg e s, dis se nt. Ea c h jo ins fu lly in all 2 thedis se nti ngop ini on s, but e a c h wri te s sepa ra te ly to e mph a sizepa

rt ic ula r a sp e c ts o f t

he se 3 dis se nts

.Judges Straub and Sotomayor voted in the en banc poll but 1 do not participate in deciding the case en banc because Judge Straub took senior status prior to the en banc hearing and Judge Sotomayor has been elevated to the Supreme Court. Judge Katzmann recused himself from both the poll and the en banc hearing. Senior Judge McLaughlin, as a member of the original panel, has participated in the en banc consideration. Judge Calabresi participated in the en banc hearing, but has taken senior status since the argument. The author of this opinion has also taken senior status since the hearing, but was a member of the panel that heard the appeal and therefore , like Judge McLaughlin, would have been able to have participated in the en banc hearing in any event. Judge Lynch, who joined the Court since the argument, has not participated in these proceedings. 1 Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 06-4216 2 Sack, Circuit Judge, joined by Judges Calabresi, Pooler, and 3 Parker, concurring in part and dissenting in part . 4 ------------------------------------------------------------- 5 The opinion of the en banc majority departs from the 1 6 opinion of the panel majority in two important and salutary 7 respects. 8 First, the Court now explicitly acknowledges that "this 9 is not a typical immigration case." Supra at [24] . We would 10 prefer that the Court concede that this is not an immigration 11 case at all -- it is about the alleged unconstitutional treatment 12 of an alien suspected of terrorism -- but we welcome the 13 resulting decision not to dismiss Arar's claims as 14 jurisdictionally barred by the Immigration and Nationality Act 15 ("INA"), see supra at [23] , and not to rely, in the Court's 16 Bivens analysis, upon the INA's remedial scheme and the well nigh 17 unlimited executive power that the INA bestows, see supra at-2- 1 [31] . Compare Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 169-71 & n.10, 2 179-81 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Arar Panel Op."). 3 In its second departure from the panel decision, the 4 Court declines to hold that if, as Arar alleges, government 5 conduct "denied [him] effective access to consular assistance, 6 the courts, his lawyers, and family members in order to 7 effectuate his removal to Syria," Arar's constitutional rights 8 would not have thereby been violated. Supra at [20] (internal 9 quotation marks omitted); compare Arar Panel Op., 532 F.3d at 10 184-89. We agree with this approach too. Indeed, we think both 11 of these departures are significant enough in themselves to have 12 rendered the unwieldy and often wasteful en banc process 13 worthwhile here. 14 We disagree, however, with the majority's continued 15 insistence that Arar cannot employ a Bivens remedy to seek 16 compensation for his injuries at the hands of government agents. 17 The majority reaches that conclusion by artificially dividing the 18 complaint into a domestic claim that does not involve torture -- 19 viz., "[Arar's] claim regarding detention in the United States," 20 supra at [6] -- and a foreign claim that does -- viz., "[Arar's] 21 claims for detention and torture in Syria," id. The majority 22 then dismisses the domestic claim as inadequately pleaded and the-3- 1 foreign claim as one that cannot "be asserted under Bivens" in 2 light of the opinion's "dominant holding" that "in the context of 3 involuntary rendition, hesitation is warranted by special 4 factors." Supra at [6-7]. 5 In our view, even treating Arar's claim for 6 mistreatment while in United States custody and denial of access 7 to United States counsel and United States courts as, arguendo, a 8 claim that is entirely isolated from the remainder of Arar's 9 allegations, it was adequately pleaded in his highly detailed 10 complaint. 11 As we will explain, however, the complaint's 12 allegations cannot properly be divided into claims for 13 mistreatment in the United States and "claims for detention and 14 torture in Syria." Arar's complaint of mistreatment sweeps more 15 broadly than that, encompassing a chain of events that began with 16 his interception and detention at New York's John F. Kennedy 17 Airport ("JFK") and continued with his being sent abroad in 18 shackles by government agents with the knowledge that he would 19 likely be tortured as a result. Viewed in this light, we 20 conclude that Arar's allegations do not present a "new context" 21 for a Bivens action.-4- 1 And even were it a new context, we disagree with what 2 appears to be the en banc majority's test for whether a new 3 Bivens action should be made available: the existence vel non of 4 "special factors counselling hesitation." First, we think 5 heeding "special factors" relating to secrecy and security is a 6 form of double counting inasmuch as those interests are fully 7 protected by the state-secrets privilege. Second, in our view 8 the applicable test is not whether "special factors" exist, but 9 whether after "paying particular heed to" them, a Bivens remedy 10 should be recognized with respect to at least some allegations in 11 the complaint. Applying that test, we think a Bivens remedy is 12 available. 13 We hasten to add that under the proper formulation of 14 the test, we might well agree with the en banc majority that a 15 Bivens action is not available in the context of an alien's 16 "claims for detention and torture in Syria." But, as we will 17 explain, Arar's allegations are not so limited. 18 Our overriding concern, however, is with the majority's 19 apparent determination to go to whatever length necessary to 20 reach what it calls its "dominant holding": that a Bivens remedy 21 is unavailable. Such a holding is unnecessary inasmuch as the 22 government assures us that this case could likely be resolvedSee, e.g., Arar Panel Op., 532 F.3d at 193 et seq. (Sack, 2 J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Arar partial panel dissent"). We do not dissent from the majority's conclusions as to 3 personal jurisdiction. The author of this opinion, as a member of the panel that originally heard this appeal, concurred in the panel opinion's conclusion that relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act is unavailable to Arar. Having reviewed the arguments to the contrary stated in Judge Pooler's partial dissent, infra, for the reasons stated in it, he now agrees that the relief under the Act is available to Arar. Inasmuch as the en banc Court now holds that it is not available, however, this opinion accepts its unavailability as a matter of law for the purposes of the Bivens analysis that follows. -5- 1 quickly and expeditiously in the district court by application of 2 the state-secrets privilege. 3 What is at stake on this appeal is not whether Arar 4 will, through this litigation, obtain compensation for the injury 5 he suffered as a result of the malfeasance of employees of the 6 United States. In light of the many hurdles he would have to 7 surmount, he would be extremely unlikely to do so. Rather, the 2 8 question for the Court is, and has from the outset been, the 9 manner by which that likely result will (or will not) be reached. 10 We fear that the majority is so bound and determined to declare 11 categorically that there is no Bivens action in the present 12 "context," that it unnecessarily makes dubious law. 13 For those reasons, we respectfully dissent. 3 14 I. Arar's AllegationsCitations to the district court opinion appear in 4 parentheses. The footnotes and subheadings are ours. -6- 1 The majority's recitation of the facts, see supra [8- 2 13], is generally accurate, but anodyne. A complete assessment 3 of the majority opinion and the implications of the Court's 4 decision is not possible without a fuller account of the 5 troubling allegations contained in Arar's complaint. 6 "Because this is an appeal from a dismissal of a 7 complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we view the allegations 8 of the complaint in the light most favorable to appellant." 9 Paycom Billing Servs. v. MasterCard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 10 285 (2d Cir. 2006). The district court's opinion carefully and 11 fully sets forth Arar's allegations. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 12 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). We adhere to that 13 account nearly verbatim. 4 14 A. Arar's Apprehension, Detention, and Forcible 15 Transportation to Syria 16 17 Arar, who is in his thirties, is a native of Syria. He 18 immigrated to Canada with his family when he was a teenager. He 19 is a dual citizen of Syria and Canada. He resides in Ottawa. 20 (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 252.)Arar was employed by a privately held Massachusetts-based 5 developer and supplier of software for technical computing. See Compl. ¶ 12. That is, changes of plane. 6 According to the complaint, on that day, Arar was 7 questioned first by an FBI agent for five hours, Compl. ¶ 29, then by an immigration officer for three hours, id. ¶ 31. -7- 1 In September 2002, while vacationing with his family in 2 Tunisia, he was called back to work by his employer to consult 5 3 with a prospective client. He purchased a return ticket to 4 Montreal with stops in Zurich and New York. He left Tunisia on 6 5 September 25, 2002. (Id.) 6 On September 26, 2002, Arar arrived from Switzerland at 7 JFK to catch a connecting flight to Montreal. Upon presenting 8 his passport to an immigration inspector, he was identified as 9 "the subject of a . . . lookout as being a member of a known 10 terrorist organization." Compl. Ex. D (Decision of J. Scott 11 Blackman, Regional Director) at 2. He was interrogated by 12 various officials for approximately eight hours. The officials 7 13 asked Arar if he had contacts with terrorist groups, which he 14 categorically denied. Arar was then transported to another site 15 at JFK, where he was placed in solitary confinement. He alleges 16 that he was transported in chains and shackles and was left in aThis is the same federal prison in which, less than a 8 year earlier, Javaid Iqbal was allegedly mistreated. Iqbal, a Muslim inmate accused of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud with identification and held post-9/11 in the MDC, allegedly suffered "unconstitutional actions against him in -8- 1 room with no bed and with lights on throughout the night. (Arar, 2 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.) 3 The following day, starting at approximately 9:00 a.m., 4 two FBI agents interrogated Arar for about five hours, asking him 5 questions about Osama bin Laden, Iraq, and Palestine. Arar 6 alleges that the agents yelled and swore at him throughout the 7 interrogation. They ignored his repeated requests to make a 8 telephone call and see a lawyer. At 2:00 p.m. that day, Arar was 9 taken back to his cell, chained and shackled, and provided a cold 10 McDonald's meal -- his first food in nearly two days. (Id.) 11 That evening, Arar was given an opportunity to 12 voluntarily return to Syria, but refused, citing a fear of being 13 tortured if returned there and insisting that he be sent to 14 Canada or returned to Switzerland. An immigration officer told 15 Arar that the United States had a "special interest" in his case 16 and then asked him to sign a form, the contents of which he was 17 not allowed to read. That evening, Arar was transferred, in 18 chains and shackles, to the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") 19 in Brooklyn, New York, where he was strip-searched and placed in 8connection with his confinement under harsh conditions . . .

after separation from the general prison population." Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147, 148 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007). We held, with respect to Iqbal's subsequent Bivens action, that such treatment was not protected, as a matter of law, by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 177-78. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed that judgment and remanded, holding that the complaint was insufficiently pleaded as to two high-ranking official defendants. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009). On September 29, 2009, the remaining parties in Iqbal filed a document in this Court stipulating that the appeal was to be "withdrawn from active consideration before the Court . . . because a settlement has been reached in principle between Javaid Iqbal and defendant United States." Iqbal v. Hasty, No. 05-5768-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2009), "Stipulation Withdrawing Appeal from Active Consideration" dated September 29, 2009. I.e., five days after Arar's arrival in the United

9 States. -9- 1 solitary confinement. During his initial three days at MDC, 2 Arar's continued requests to meet with a lawyer and make 3 telephone calls were refused. (Id.) 4 On October 1, 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization 9 5 Service ("INS") initiated removal proceedings against Arar, who 6 was charged with being temporarily inadmissible because of his 7 membership in al-Qaeda, a group designated by the Secretary of 8 State as a foreign terrorist organization. Upon being given 9 permission to make one telephone call, Arar called his mother-in10 law in Ottawa, Canada. (Id.) 11 Upon learning of Arar's whereabouts, his family 12 contacted the Office for Consular Affairs ("CanadianThe consulate is in New York City. 10 -10- 1 Consulate") and retained an attorney, Amal Oummih, to represent 10 2 him. The Canadian Consulate had not been notified of Arar's 3 detention. On October 3, 2002, Arar received a visit from 4 Maureen Girvan from the Canadian Consulate, who, when presented 5 with the document noting Arar's inadmissibility to the United 6 States, assured Arar that removal to Syria was not an option. On 7 October 4, 2002, Arar designated Canada as the country to which 8 he wished to be removed. (Id.) 9 On October 5, 2002, Arar had his only meeting with 10 counsel. The following day, he was taken in chains and shackles 11 to a room where approximately seven INS officials questioned him 12 about his reasons for opposing removal to Syria. His attorney 13 was not provided advance notice of the interrogation, and Arar 14 further alleges that U.S. officials misled him into thinking his 15 attorney had chosen not to attend. During the interrogation, 16 Arar continued to express his fear of being tortured if returned 17 to Syria. At the conclusion of the six-hour interrogation, Arar 18 was informed that the officials were discussing his case with 19 "Washington, D.C." Arar was asked to sign a document that-11- 1 appeared to be a transcript. He refused to sign the form. (Id. 2 at 253-54.) 3 The following day, October 7, 2002, attorney Oummih 4 received two telephone calls informing her that Arar had been 5 taken for processing to an INS office at Varick Street in 6 Manhattan, that he would eventually be placed in a detention 7 facility in New Jersey, and that she should call back the 8 following morning for Arar's exact whereabouts. However, Arar 9 alleges that he never left the MDC and that the contents of both 10 of these phone calls to his counsel were false and misleading. 11 (Id. at 254.) 12 That same day, October 7, 2002, the INS Regional 13 Director, J. Scott Blackman, determined from classified and 14 unclassified information that Arar is "clearly and unequivocally" 15 a member of al-Qaeda and, therefore, "clearly and unequivocally 16 inadmissible to the United States" under 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V). See Compl. Ex. D. at 1, 3, 5. Based on 18 that finding, Blackman concluded "that there are reasonable 19 grounds to believe that [Arar] is a danger to the security of the 20 United States." Id. at 6 (brackets in original). (Arar, 414 F. 21 Supp. 2d at 254.)-12- 1 At approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 8, 2002, Arar 2 learned that, based on classified information, INS regional 3 director Blackman had ordered that Arar be sent to Syria and that 4 his removal there was consistent with Article Three of the United 5 Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 6 Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"). Arar pleaded for 7 reconsideration but was told by INS officials that the agency was 8 not governed by the "Geneva Conventions" and that Arar was barred 9 from reentering the country for a period of five years and would 10 be admissible only with the permission of the Attorney General. 11 (Id.) 12 Later that day, Arar was taken in chains and shackles 13 to a New Jersey airfield, where he boarded a small jet airplane 14 bound for Washington, D.C. From there, he was flown to Amman, 15 Jordan, arriving there on October 9, 2002. He was then handed 16 over to Jordanian authorities, who delivered him to the Syrians 17 later that day. At this time, U.S. officials had not informed 18 either Canadian Consulate official Girvan or attorney Oummih that 19 Arar had been removed to Syria. Arar alleges that Syrian 20 officials refused to accept Arar directly from the United States. 21 (Id.)-13- 1 Arar's Final Notice of Inadmissability ("Final Notice") 2 ordered him removed without further inquiry before an immigration 3 judge. See Compl. Ex. D. According to the Final Notice: "The 4 Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has 5 determined that your removal to Syria would be consistent with 6 [CAT]." Id. (brackets in original). The Final Notice was dated 7 October 8, 2002, and was signed by Deputy Attorney General Larry 8 Thompson. After oral argument in the district court on the 9 defendants' motions to dismiss, in a letter dated August 18, 10 2005, counsel for Arar said that Arar had received the Final 11 Notice within hours of boarding the aircraft taking him to 12 Jordan. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 254.) 13 B. Arar's Detention in Syria 14 During his ten-month period of detention in Syria, Arar 15 alleges, he was placed in a "grave" cell measuring six feet long, 16 seven feet high, and three feet wide. The cell was located 17 within the Palestine Branch of the Syrian Military Intelligence 18 ("Palestine Branch"). The cell was damp and cold, contained very 19 little light, and was infested with rats, which would enter the 20 cell through a small aperture in the ceiling. Cats would urinate 21 on Arar through the aperture, and sanitary facilities were 22 nonexistent. Arar was allowed to bathe himself in cold water-14- 1 once per week. He was prohibited from exercising and was 2 provided barely edible food. Arar lost forty pounds during his 3 ten-month period of detention in Syria. (Id.) 4 During his first twelve days in Syrian detention, Arar 5 was interrogated for eighteen hours per day and was physically 6 and psychologically tortured. He was beaten on his palms, hips, 7 and lower back with a two-inch-thick electric cable. His captors 8 also used their fists to beat him on his stomach, his face, and 9 the back of his neck. He was subjected to excruciating pain and 10 pleaded with his captors to stop, but they would not. He was 11 placed in a room where he could hear the screams of other 12 detainees being tortured and was told that he, too, would be 13 placed in a spine-breaking "chair," hung upside down in a "tire" 14 for beatings, and subjected to electric shocks. To lessen his 15 exposure to the torture, Arar falsely confessed, among other 16 things, to having trained with terrorists in Afghanistan, even 17 though he had never been to Afghanistan and had never been 18 involved in terrorist activity. (Id. at 255.) 19 Arar alleges that his interrogation in Syria was 20 coordinated and planned by U.S. officials, who sent the Syrians a 21 dossier containing specific questions. As support for this 22 allegation, Arar notes that the interrogations in the United-15- 1 States and Syria contained identical questions, including a 2 specific question about his relationship with a particular 3 individual wanted for terrorism. In return, Arar alleges, the 4 Syrian officials supplied U.S. officials with all information 5 extracted from Arar; Arar cites a statement by one Syrian 6 official who has publicly stated that the Syrian government 7 shared information with the United States that it extracted from 8 him. See Compl. Ex. E (January 21, 2004 transcript of CBS's 9 Sixty Minutes II: "His Year In Hell"). (Id.) 10 C. Arar's Contact with the Canadian Government 11 While Detained in Syria 12 The Canadian Embassy contacted the Syrian government 13 about Arar on October 20, 2002, and the following day, Syrian 14 officials confirmed that they were detaining him. At this point, 15 the Syrian officials ceased interrogating and torturing Arar. 16 (Id.) 17 Canadian officials visited Arar at the Palestine Branch 18 five times during his ten-month detention. Prior to each visit, 19 Arar was warned not to disclose that he was being mistreated. He 20 complied but eventually broke down during the fifth visit, 21 telling the Canadian consular official that he was being tortured 22 and kept in a grave. (Id.)-16- 1 Five days later, Arar was brought to a Syrian 2 investigation branch, where he was forced to sign a confession 3 stating that he had participated in terrorist training in 4 Afghanistan even though, Arar states, he has never been to 5 Afghanistan or participated in any terrorist activity. Arar was 6 then taken to an overcrowded Syrian prison, where he remained for 7 six weeks. (Id.) 8 On September 28, 2003, Arar was transferred back to the 9 Palestine Branch, where he was held for one week. During this 10 week, he heard other detainees screaming in pain and begging for 11 their torture to end. (Id.) 12 On October 5, 2003, Syria, without filing any charges 13 against Arar, released him into the custody of Canadian Embassy 14 officials in Damascus. He was flown to Ottawa the following day 15 and reunited with his family. (Id.) 16 Arar contends that he is not a member of any terrorist 17 organization, including al-Qaeda, and has never knowingly 18 associated himself with terrorists, terrorist organizations, or 19 terrorist activity. Arar claims that the individual about whom 20 he was questioned was a casual acquaintance whom Arar had last 21 seen in October 2001. He believes that he was removed to Syria 22 for interrogation under torture because of his casual-17- 1 acquaintance with this individual and others believed to be 2 involved in terrorist activity. But Arar contends "on 3 information and belief" that there has never been, nor is there 4 now, any reasonable suspicion that he was involved in such 5 activity. Compl. ¶ 2. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255-56 6 (footnote omitted).) 7 Arar alleges that he continues to suffer adverse 8 effects from his ordeal in Syria. He claims that he has trouble 9 relating to his wife and children, suffers from nightmares, is 10 frequently branded a terrorist, and is having trouble finding 11 employment due to his reputation and inability to travel in the 12 United States. (Id. at 256.) 13 D. U.S. Policy Relating to Interrogation 14 of Detainees by Foreign Governments 15 The complaint alleges on information and belief that 16 Arar was removed to Syria under a covert U.S. policy of 17 "extraordinary rendition," according to which individuals are 18 sent to foreign countries to undergo methods of interrogation not 19 permitted in the United States. The extraordinary rendition 20 policy involves the removal of "non-U.S. citizens detained in 21 this country and elsewhere and suspected -- reasonably or 22 unreasonably -- of terrorist activity to countries, including-18- 1 Syria, where interrogations under torture are routine." Compl. 2 ¶ 24. Arar alleges on information and belief that the United 3 States sends individuals "to countries like Syria precisely 4 because those countries can and do use methods of interrogation 5 to obtain information from detainees that would not be morally 6 acceptable or legal in the United States and other democracies." 7 Id. The complaint further alleges that federal officials 8 involved with extraordinary rendition "have facilitated such 9 human rights abuses, exchanging dossiers with intelligence 10 officials in the countries to which non-U.S. citizens are 11 removed." Id. The complaint also alleges that the United States 12 involves Syria in its extraordinary rendition program to extract 13 counter-terrorism information. (Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 256.) 14 This extraordinary rendition program is, Arar alleges, 15 not part of any official or declared U.S. public policy; 16 nevertheless, it has received extensive attention in the press, 17 where unnamed U.S. officials and certain foreign officials have 18 admitted to the existence of such a policy. Arar details a 19 number of articles in the mainstream press recounting both the 20 incidents of this particular case and the extraordinary rendition 21 program more broadly. These articles are attached as Exhibit C 22 of his complaint. (Id. at 256-57.)-19- 1 Arar alleges that the defendants directed the 2 interrogations in Syria by providing information about Arar to 3 Syrian officials and receiving reports on Arar's responses. 4 Consequently, the defendants conspired with, and/or aided and 5 abetted, Syrian officials in arbitrarily detaining, 6 interrogating, and torturing Arar. Arar argues in the 7 alternative that, at a minimum, the defendants knew or at least 8 should have known that there was a substantial likelihood that he 9 would be tortured upon his removal to Syria. (Id. at 257.) 10 E. Syria's Human Rights Record 11 Arar's claim that he faced a likelihood of torture in 12 Syria is supported by U.S. State Department reports on Syria's 13 human rights practices. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human 14 Rights, and Labor, United States Department of State, 2004 15 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Released February 28, 16 2005) ("2004 Report"). According to the State Department, 17 Syria's "human rights record remained poor, and the Government 18 continued to commit numerous, serious abuses . . . includ[ing] 19 the use of torture in detention, which at times resulted in 20 death." Id. at 1. Although the Syrian constitution officially 21 prohibits such practices, "there was credible evidence that 22 security forces continued to use torture frequently." Id. at 2.The district court's description of the facts as alleged 11 in the complaint ends here. On October 23, 2007, this Court granted Arar's motion to 12 take judicial notice of the Report insofar as its existence and the scope of its contents were concerned, but denied the motion insofar as it may have sought judicial notice of the facts asserted in the report. But cf. supra at [4-5] (employing the report as the source for facts relating to Canadian involvement in the Arar incident). -20- 1 The 2004 Report cites "numerous cases of security forces using 2 torture on prisoners in custody." Id. Similar references 3 throughout the 2004 Report, as well as State Department reports 4 from prior years, are legion. See, e.g., Compl. Ex. A (2002 5 State Department Human Rights Report on Syria). (Arar, 414 F. 6 Supp. 2d at 257.) 11 7 F. The Canadian Government Inquiry 8 On September 18, 2006, a Commission of Inquiry into the 9 Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar ("Arar 10 Commission"), established by the government of Canada to 11 investigate the Arar affair, issued a three-volume report. See 12 Arar Commission, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar 13 (2006) ("Commission Report"). A press release issued by the 12 14 Commission summarized: "On Maher Arar the Commissioner [Dennis 15 O'Connor] comes to one important conclusion: 'I am able to say 16 categorically that there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Arar-21- 1 has committed any offence or that his activities constitute a 2 threat to the security of Canada.'" Arar Commission, Press 3 Release, Arar Commission Releases Its Findings on the Handling of 4 the Maher Arar Case (Sept. 18, 2006) (boldface in original), 5 available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Release Final_Sept 6 18.pdf (copy on file with the Clerk of Court). On January 26, 7 2007, the Office of the Prime Minister of Canada issued the 8 following announcement: 9 Prime Minister Stephen Harper today released 10 the letter of apology he has sent to Maher 11 Arar and his family for any role Canadian 12 officials may have played in what happened to 13 Mr. Arar, Monia Mazigh and their family in 14 2002 and 2003. 15 "Although the events leading up to this 16 terrible ordeal happened under the previous 17 government, our Government will do everything 18 in its power to ensure that the issues raised 19 by Commissioner O'Connor are addressed," said 20 the Prime Minister. "I sincerely hope that 21 these actions will help Mr. Arar and his 22 family begin a new and hopeful chapter in 23 their lives." 24 Canada's New Government has accepted all 23 25 recommendations made in Commissioner 26 O'Connor's first report, and has already 27 begun acting upon them. The Government has 28 sent letters to both the Syrian and the U.S. 29 governments formally objecting to the 30 treatment of Mr. Arar. Ministers Day and 31 MacKay have also expressed Canada’s concerns 32 on this important issue to their American 33 counterparts. Finally, Canada has removed-22- 1 Mr. Arar from Canadian lookout lists, and 2 requested that the United States amend its 3 own records accordingly. 4 The Prime Minister also announced that 5 Canada's New Government has successfully 6 completed the mediation process with Mr. 7 Arar, fulfilling another one of Commissioner 8 O'Connor's recommendations. This settlement, 9 mutually agreed upon by all parties, ensures 10 that Mr. Arar and his family will obtain fair 11 compensation, in the amount of $10.5 million, 12 plus legal costs, for the ordeal they have 13 suffered. 14 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, Prime Minister 15 Releases Letter of Apology to Maher Arar and His Family and 16 Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26, 2007), 17 available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ 18 media.asp?id=1509 (last visited July 15, 2009); see also Margaret 19 L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition 20 and the Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333, 1339-40 (2007). 21 II. The Dismissal of the Fourth Claim for Relief 22 The fulcrum of the en banc majority's analysis is its 23 conclusion that this appeal requires us to decide whether "to 24 devise a new Bivens damages action" under Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 25 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007). See supra at [6] . But the majority 26 can characterize Arar's action as "new" only by isolating and 27 eliminating the domestic aspects of the case. It does so in part-23- 1 by affirming the district court's dismissal of Arar's "Fourth 2 Claim for Relief, (Fifth Amendment: Substantive Due Process -- 3 Domestic Detention)" on the ground that the claim was 4 insufficiently pleaded. See supra at [19-21] . We think that 5 ruling to be incorrect. 6 With respect to the conditions of confinement aspect of 7 this claim, the district court concluded that Arar was entitled 8 to Fifth Amendment substantive due process protection and that 9 his rights in that respect could have been violated by "the 10 deprivations Arar alleges with respect to his treatment while in 11 U.S. custody." Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 286. We agree, and the 12 majority does not decide otherwise. Supra at [21] . With respect 13 to the access to counsel and the courts aspect of the claim, the 14 district court concluded that Arar would be able to state a claim 15 for interference "with his access to courts in part by 16 [government officials] lying to his counsel," if he could 17 "identify 'a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief 18 for some wrong.'" Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (quoting 19 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002)). We agree 20 here, too, and the majority does not decide otherwise. 21 But the district court nonetheless dismissed the Fourth 22 Claim for Relief without prejudice. On pain of forfeiture of theFollowing the district court's dismissal of the fourth 13 claim without prejudice and dismissal of the first three claims with prejudice, Arar moved for certification of a final judgment on the first three claims to enable him to appeal them immediately. See Arar v. Ashcroft, No. CV-04-0249 (DGT), 2006 WL 1875375, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45550 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2006). The district court denied the motion. See id. Arar then declined to replead the fourth claim, apparently in order to obtain this Court's early review of the dismissal of the first three claims, cf. id. The majority affirms the dismissal of the fourth claimpartly "in view of Arar's rejection of an opportunity to replead." Supra at [21] . While we do not read that as a suggestion that this claim has been waived on appeal, we note that any such suggestion would be incorrect. We may review the entire judgment. See, e.g., Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 n.8 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] disclaimer of intent to amend the complaint renders the District Court's judgment final and allows review of the dismissal in this Court."); Festa v. Local 3 Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 905 F.2d 35, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, -24- 1 claims, it required Arar (1) with respect to the mistreatment 2 claim, to "name those defendants that were personally involved in 3 the alleged unconstitutional treatment," and, (2) with respect to 4 the denial of access claim, to replead "without regard to any 5 [underlying] rendition claim," in light of the court's conclusion 6 that no Bivens action was available with respect to such a claim, 7 and, because it was unclear to what underlying relief Arar was 8 denied access, "identify[ing] the specific injury he was 9 prevented from grieving." Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287-88. Arar 10 declined to replead, rendering the dismissal final. 13960-61 (2d Cir. 1987). -25- 1 A. Specification of Defendants' Acts and Conspiracy Allegations 2 The majority affirms the dismissal of the Fourth Claim 3 for Relief on the ground that Arar's complaint does not "specify 4 any culpable action taken by any single defendant" and fails to 5 allege a conspiracy. Supra at [21] . We disagree with each of 6 these rationales. 7 Arar should not have been required to "name those 8 defendants [who] were personally involved in the alleged 9 unconstitutional treatment." Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287. In 10 actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are "analog[s]" of 11 the less-common Bivens action, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 12 1937, 1948 (2009) (citation omitted), we allow plaintiffs to 13 "maintain[] supervisory personnel as defendants . . . until [they 14 have] been afforded an opportunity through at least brief 15 discovery to identify the subordinate officials who have personal 16 liability." Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1998) 17 (citing Second Circuit authority). 18 Similarly, courts have rejected the dismissal 19 of suits against unnamed defendants described 20 by roles . . . until the plaintiff has had 21 some opportunity for discovery to learn the 22 identities of responsible officials. Once 23 the supervisory officer has inquired withinThe Supreme Court explained: "The agents were not named 14 in petitioner's complaint, and the District Court ordered that the complaint be served upon "those federal agents who it is indicated by the records of the United States Attorney participated in the November 25, 1965, arrest of the [petitioner]." App. 3. Five agents were ultimately served." Id. at 390 n.2; see also Bivens, Brief for Respondent at *2 n.1, 1970 WL 116900 ("The apparent contradiction in the title of this case -- "Unknown Named" -- arises from the fact that after petitioner filed his complaint, the United States Attorney supplied the clerk of the court with the agents' names. However, as the summonses and their returns indicate, only five agents are apparently involved (App. 5-24), rather than six as stated in the case title.")

-26- 1 the institution and identified the actual 2 decision-makers of the challenged action, 3 those officials may then submit affidavits 4 based on their personal knowledge of the 5 circumstances. 6 Id. (citations omitted). It should not be forgotten that the 7 full name of the Bivens case itself is Bivens v. Six Unknown 8 Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 9 (emphasis added). 14 10 To be sure, the Supreme Court has recently set a strict 11 pleading standard for supervisory liability claims under Bivens 12 against a former Attorney General of the United States and the 13 Director of the FBI." See Iqbal, supra. We do not think, 14 however, that the Court has thereby permitted governmental actors 15 who are unnamed in a complaint automatically to escape personal 16 civil rights liability. A plaintiff must, after all, have someThe complaint alleges, inter alia: 15 Early on October 8, 2002, at about 4 a.m., Mr. Arar was taken in chains and shackles to a room where two INS officials told him that, based on Mr. Arar's casual acquaintance with certain named individuals, including Mr. Almalki as well as classified information, Defendant Blackman, Regional Director for the Eastern Region of Immigration and Naturalization Services, had decided to -27- 1 way to identify a defendant who anonymously violates his civil 2 rights. We doubt that Iqbal requires a plaintiff to obtain his 3 abusers' business cards in order to state a civil rights claim. 4 Put conversely, we do not think that Iqbal implies that federal 5 government miscreants may avoid Bivens liability altogether 6 through the simple expedient of wearing hoods while inflicting 7 injury. Some manner of proceeding must be made available for the 8 reasons we recognized in Davis. 9 Whether or not there is a mechanism available to 10 identify the "Doe" defendants, moreover, Arar's complaint does 11 sufficiently name some individual defendants who personally took 12 part in the alleged violation of his civil rights. The role of 13 defendant J. Scott Blackman, formerly Director of the Regional 14 Office of INS, for example, is, as reflected in the district 15 court's explication of the facts, see Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 16 252-54, set forth in reasonable detail in the complaint. So are 15remove Mr. Arar to Syria. Without elaboration, Defendant Blackman also stipulated that Mr. Arar's removal would be consistent with Article 3 of CAT. . . . (A copy of Defendant Blackman's decision is attached as Exhibit D [to the complaint]). Compl. ¶ 47. The complaint alleges, inter alia: 16 The only notice given [Arar's counsel prior to his interrogation late on the evening of Sunday, October 6, 2002] was a message left by Defendant McElroy, District Director for Immigration and Naturalization Services for New York City, on [counsel's] voice mail at work that same [Sunday] evening. [She] did not retrieve the message until she arrived at work the next day, Monday morning, October 7, 2002 -- long after Mr. Arar's interrogation had ended. Compl. ¶ 43. -28- 1 at least some of the acts of the defendant Edward J. McElroy, 2 District Director of the INS. 16 3 The majority also asserts that Arar does no more than 4 "allege[] (in passive voice) that his requests to make phone 5 calls 'were ignored,' and that 'he was told' that he was not 6 entitled to a lawyer." Supra at [21] . But as indicated above, 7 such an identification of the unnamed defendants by their "roles" 8 should be sufficient to enable a plaintiff to survive a motion to 9 dismiss, and subsequently to use discovery to identify them. And 10 while the majority is correct that the complaint does not utterThat rule provides: 17 Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a -29- 1 the talismanic words "meeting of the minds" to invoke an 2 agreement among the defendants, see supra at [21] , it is plain 3 that the logistically complex concerted action allegedly taken to 4 detain Arar and then transport him abroad implies an alleged 5 agreement by government actors within the United States to act in 6 concert. 7 B. Dismissal of Claims of Denial of Access to Courts and 8 Counsel 9 10 With respect to the dismissal of Arar's claim for 11 "interfere[nce] with his access to lawyers and the courts" while 12 he was incarcerated by United States officials, Compl. ¶ 93, we 13 think the district court erred here, too. An access to courts 14 claim requires the pleading of (1) a "nonfrivolous, arguable 15 underlying claim" that has been frustrated by the defendants' 16 actions, and (2) a continued inability to obtain the relief 17 sought by the underlying claim. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415-16 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court decided 19 that Arar failed to plead with sufficient "precis[ion]" the 20 existence of a sought-for underlying claim for relief, Arar, 414 21 F. Supp. 2d at 286, which means it decided that, for purposes of 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the defendants were not put 17claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). -30- 1 on notice of the existence of such a claim. See Christopher, 536 2 U.S. at 416 ("Like any other element of an access claim, the 3 underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed 4 by allegations . . . sufficient to give fair notice to a 5 defendant."). 6 But taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as 7 we must, the complaint clearly implies the existence of an 8 underlying claim for relief under CAT. The defendants can hardly 9 argue that under Arar's assertions, which we take to be true, 10 they lacked notice of such a claim, since the complaint says that 11 it was they who first notified Arar about it: Arar alleges that 12 on October 8, 2002, "two INS officials told him that . . . 13 Defendant Blackman . . . had decided to remove [him] to Syria," 14 and "Defendant Blackman also stipulated that [such action] would 15 be consistent with Article 3 of CAT." Compl. ¶ 47. Indeed, the-31- 1 complaint alleges that Arar asked defendants for reconsideration 2 of that decision -- i.e., relief from it -- in light of the 3 prospect of torture in Syria, but the officials said that "the 4 INS is not governed by the 'Geneva Conventions.'" Id. 5 Insofar as the district court's requirement that Arar 6 "articulate more precisely the judicial relief he was denied," 7 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 286, related to its holding that "Bivens 8 did not extend a remedy to Arar for his deportation to Syria," 9 id., we disagree for the reasons set forth below. Insofar as the 10 district court thought Arar's underlying CAT claim would have 11 been frivolous, it was mistaken. Cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 12 357 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (pursuant to the CAT, the United 13 States may not remove an alien to a country if "'it is more 14 likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to 15 [that country]'" (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2))). 16 Nor was CAT the only relief Arar was denied. As the 17 government pointed out at oral argument, "th[e] decision [in 18 Michael v. INS, 48 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 1995),] shows that in 19 extraordinary cases, and no one can dispute that this is an 20 extraordinary case, the plaintiff could have filed a habeasIn response to a question by the Chief Judge as to what 18 cognizable allegations might be made in such a habeas petition, the government said, "Your Honor, I'm not going to speak for what a judge might or might not have said, but in his habeas position and his petition for a stay he could say, look, things are moving quickly, I'm afraid they're going to send me to Syria, don't let that happen." Tr. 84; see also id. at 85.

-32- 1 [petition] and sought a stay pursuant to the All Writs Act." Tr. 2 at 82 (Cohn). 18 3 Contrary to the district court's ruling, then, Arar's 4 complaint put the defendants on notice of claims seeking relief 5 to bar his removal that were frustrated by the defendants' 6 actions. Whatever the ultimate merits of those claims, they 7 would not have been "frivolous." And absent a remedy for the 8 rendition and torture themselves -- the district court, and the 9 majority, of course, conclude there is none -- no contemporaneous 10 legal relief is now possible except through the access to courts 11 and counsel claim. See generally Br. of Amici Norman Dorsen et 12 al. at 12-14. The Fourth Claim for Relief therefore states a 13 sufficient due process access claim. 14 C. Sufficient Pleading under Iqbal 15 More generally, we think the district court's extended 16 recitation of the allegations in the complaint makes clear that 17 the facts of Arar's mistreatment while within the United States-33- 1 -- including the alleged denial of his access to courts and 2 counsel and his alleged mistreatment while in federal detention 3 in the United States -- were pleaded meticulously and in copious 4 detail. The assertion of relevant places, times, and events -- 5 and names when known -- is lengthy and specific. Even measured 6 in light of Supreme Court case law post-dating the district 7 court's dismissal of the fourth claim, which instituted a more 8 stringent standard of review for pleadings, the complaint here 9 passes muster. It does not "offer[] 'labels and conclusions' or 10 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" 11 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 12 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Nor does it "tender[] 'naked 13 assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. 14 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Its allegations of a 15 constitutional violation are "'plausible on [their] face.'" Id. 16 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And, as we have explained, 17 Arar has pled "factual content that allows the court to draw the 18 reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the 19 misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). We 20 would therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of the 21 Fourth Claim for Relief.-34- 1 III. The Majority's Interpretation of the Second and 2 Third Claims for Relief 3 Having thus decided, mistakenly we think, that Arar's 4 Fourth Claim for Relief has failed, our colleagues leap to the 5 conclusion that what remains -- the allegations contained in what 6 Arar's complaint styles as the Second and Third Claims for Relief 7 -- relates only to the legal implications of the international 8 and foreign elements of the defendants' behavior. See supra at 9 [21] ("Arar's remaining claims seek relief on the basis of 10 torture and detention in Syria . . . ."). Even were we to agree 11 with the majority's view that the Fourth Claim for Relief 12 warranted dismissal, we would still not concur in its crabbed 13 interpretation of Arar's complaint in light of the facts alleged 14 in it. 15 "[W]e may not affirm the dismissal of [a] complaint 16 because [it has] proceeded under the wrong theory 'so long as [it 17 has] alleged facts sufficient to support a meritorious legal 18 claim.'" Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 19 89 (2d Cir. 2000) (plurality opinion of Pooler, J.) (quoting 20 Northrop v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., 134 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 21 1997)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888 (2001). "'Factual allegations 22 alone are what matter[].'" Northrop, 134 F.3d at 46 (quoting 23 Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988) (enThe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct that 19 "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Wright and Miller's treatise counsels that "[t]his provision is not simply a precatory statement but reflects one of the basic philosophies of practice under the federal rules." 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (3d ed. 2004). "One of the most important objectives of the federal rules is that lawsuits should be determined on their merits and according to the dictates of justice, rather than in terms of whether or not the averments in the paper pleadings have been artfully drawn." Id. -35- 1 banc)); see also Newman v. Silver, 713 F.2d 14, 15 n.1 (2d Cir. 2 1983) ("[T]he nature of federal pleading . . . is by statement of 3 claim, not by legal theories."). And we are required to read 19 4 those factual allegations as a whole. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 5 F.3d 717, 721 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh 6 Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 2005) 7 (per curiam), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 596 (2006); Goldwasser v. 8 Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2000). 9 Although Arar pled in his Fourth Claim for Relief what 10 he denominated as a separate "Claim" on the subject of "Domestic 11 Detention," including allegations about unconstitutional 12 conditions of confinement and denial of access to courts and 13 counsel, the complaint as a whole makes broader allegations of 14 mistreatment while within the borders of the United States. 15 According to the complaint: (1) Arar was apprehended by 16 government agents as he sought to change planes at JFK; (2) he 17 was not seeking to enter the United States; (3) his detention was-36- 1 for the purpose of obtaining information from him about terrorism 2 and his alleged links with terrorists and terrorist 3 organizations; (4) he was interrogated harshly on that topic -- 4 mostly by FBI agents –- for many hours over a period of two days; 5 (5) during that period, he was held incommunicado and was 6 mistreated by, among other things, being deprived of food and 7 water for a substantial portion of his time in custody; (6) he 8 was then taken from JFK to the MDC in Brooklyn, where he 9 continued to be held incommunicado and in solitary confinement 10 for another three days; (7) while at the MDC, INS agents sought 11 unsuccessfully to have him agree to be removed to Syria because 12 they and other U.S. government agents intended that he would be 13 questioned there along similar lines, but under torture; (8) U.S. 14 officials thwarted his ability to consult with counsel or access 15 the courts; and (9) thirteen days after Arar had been intercepted 16 and incarcerated at the airport, defendants sent him against his 17 will to Syria, where they allegedly intended that he be 18 questioned under torture and while enduring brutal and inhumane 19 conditions of captivity. This was, as alleged, all part of a 20 single course of action conceived of and executed by the 21 defendants in the United States in order to try to make Arar 22 "talk."-37- 1 It may not have been best for Arar to file a complaint 2 that structures his claims for relief so as to charge knowing or 3 reckless subjection to torture, coercive interrogation, and 4 arbitrary detention in Syria (the second and third claims) 5 separately from charges of cruel and inhuman conditions of 6 confinement and "interfere[nce] with access to lawyers and the 7 courts" while in the United States (the fourth claim). But such 8 division of theories is of no legal consequence. "'Factual 9 allegations alone are what matter[].'" Northrop, 134 F.3d at 46 10 (quoting Albert, 851 F.2d at 571 n.3). The assessment of Arar's 11 complaint must, then, take into account the entire arc of factual 12 allegations that it contains –- his interception and arrest; his 13 interrogation, principally by FBI agents, about his putative ties 14 to terrorists; his detention and mistreatment at JFK in Queens 15 and the MDC in Brooklyn; the deliberate misleading of both his 16 lawyer and the Canadian Consulate; and his transport to 17 Washington, D.C. and forced transfer to Syrian authorities for 18 further detention and questioning under torture. Such attention 19 to the complaint's factual allegations, rather than its legal 20 theories, makes perfectly clear that the remaining claims upon 21 which Arar seeks relief are not limited to his "detention or 22 torture in Syria," supra at [6] , but include allegations of-38- 1 violations of his due process rights in the United States. The 2 scope of those claims is relevant in analyzing whether a Bivens 3 remedy is available. 4 IV. The "Context" in Which a Bivens Remedy Is Sought 5 The majority's artificial interpretation of the 6 complaint permits it to characterize the "context" of Arar's 7 Bivens action as entirely one of "international rendition, 8 specifically, 'extraordinary rendition.'" Supra at [32] ; see 9 also id. ("Extraordinary rendition is treated as a distinct 10 phenomenon in international law."). This permits the majority to 11 focus on the part of the complaint that presents a "new context" 12 for Bivens purposes. But when the complaint is considered in 13 light of all of Arar's allegations, his due process claim for 14 relief from his apprehension, detention, interrogation, and 15 denial of access to counsel and courts in the United States, as 16 well as his expulsion to Syria for further interrogation likely 17 under torture, is not at all "new." 18 A. Bivens and Its Progeny 19 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 20 Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court "recognized for 21 the first time an implied private action for damages against 22 federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's-39- 1 constitutional rights." Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 2 61, 66 (2001). Bivens permitted "a victim of a Fourth Amendment 3 violation by federal officers [to] bring suit for money damages 4 against the officers in federal court." Id. The Supreme Court 5 has been reluctant, as the majority correctly observes, to 6 "extend" Bivens liability further. See, e.g., Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. 7 at 2597. The Court has done so only twice –- in the contexts of 8 "an implied damages remedy under the Due Process Clause of the 9 Fifth Amendment" in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and 10 under "the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 11 Amendment" in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Malesko, 534 12 U.S. at 67; see also Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597-98. But we must 13 ask whether we should "devise a new Bivens damages action," 14 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597, only if the asserted action is, 15 indeed, new. And a new Bivens action is not being sought unless 16 the plaintiff is asking the court to "extend Bivens liability to 17 a[] new context or new category of defendants." Malesko, 534 18 U.S. at 68. 19 B. The New Category of Defendants Test 20 The majority does not suggest that Arar's Bivens claim 21 fails because it is against a new category of defendants. The 22 Bivens remedy was devised to supply relief for constitutional-40- 1 torts by federal agents and officials. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 2 70. 3 C. The New Context Test 4 The questions, then, are whether we are facing a "new 5 context," or considering recognizing "a new Bivens damages 6 action," questions that are complicated by the fact that the 7 meaning that the Supreme Court has ascribed to those terms is 8 less than clear. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 (noting that 9 Bivens was extended to "a new right of action" in Davis v. 10 Passman, in which the Court "recognized an implied damages remedy 11 under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment" (emphasis 12 added)), with id. at 68 (describing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 13 U.S. 412 (1988), as presenting a "new context[]" in which the 14 plaintiffs sought damages under the Due Process Clause for errors 15 made by federal officials "in the[] handling of [their] Social 16 Security applications" (emphasis added)). 17 If the alleged facts of Arar's complaint were limited 18 to his claim of "extraordinary rendition" to, and torture in, 19 Syria -- that is, limited to his allegations that he was 20 transported by the United States government to Syria via Jordan 21 pursuant to a conspiracy or other arrangement among the countries 22 or their agents and mistreated in Syria as a result -- as theIn one sense, every case presents a new context, in that 20 it presents a new set of facts to which we are expected to apply established law. But a new set of facts is not ipso facto a "new context." We do not decide, based on the difference in factual setting alone, whether or not it is a good idea to allow a plaintiff to avail him or herself of a well-established remedy such as that afforded by Bivens. This is illustrated by cases involving legal contexts where Bivens is well-established, in which courts do not conduct a fresh assessment as to whether a Bivens action is available based on the facts of each case. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (Bivens action for Fourth Amendment violation); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (Bivens action for Eighth Amendment violation), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994) (Fourth Amendment); Armstrong v. Sears, 33 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); see also Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (same), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006). -41- 1 majority would have it, then we might well agree that we are 2 dealing with a "new context." But, as we have explained, the 3 complaint is not so limited. Incarceration in the United States 4 without cause, mistreatment while so incarcerated, denial of 5 access to counsel and the courts while so incarcerated, and the 6 facilitation of torture by others, considered as possible 7 violations of a plaintiff's procedural and substantive due 8 process rights, are hardly novel claims, nor do they present us 9 with a "new context" in any legally significant sense. 20 10 We have recognized implied Bivens rights of action 11 pursuant to the Due Process Clause, so Arar's claims for relief 12 are not new actions under Bivens in that sense. A deprivation of-42- 1 procedural due process rights can give rise to a Bivens claim 2 under our case law. See, e.g., Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 3 80-83 (2d Cir. 2000). And while we do not appear to have 4 squarely considered whether a Bivens action may lie for alleged 5 violations of substantive due process rights, our cases imply 6 that it can be. In Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), 7 rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 8 Ct. 1937 (2009), for example, we considered a Bivens action 9 brought on, inter alia, a Fifth Amendment substantive due process 10 theory. The plaintiff alleged physical mistreatment and 11 humiliation, as a Muslim prisoner, by federal prison officials, 12 while he was detained at the MDC. After concluding, on 13 interlocutory appeal, that the defendants were not entitled to 14 qualified immunity, we returned the matter to the district court 15 for further proceedings. We did not so much as hint either that 16 a Bivens remedy was unavailable or that its availability wouldShortly after we decided Iqbal, the Supreme Court made 21 clear that by appealing from the district court's denial of qualified immunity, the defendants placed within our jurisdiction the question of "the recognition of the entire cause of action." Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597 n.4. The district court in Iqbal had specifically rejected the defendants' argument that a Bivens action was unavailable. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *14, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *44-*45 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). Thus, had we thought that no Bivens action was available, we had the power to resolve Iqbal's claims on that basis. -43- 1 constitute an unwarranted extension of the Bivens doctrine. 21 2 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177-78. 3 In other cases we have apparently assumed Bivens 4 remedies were available for substantive due process claims. See 5 Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing 6 district court's dismissal of Bivens action for violation of 7 plaintiff's Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights while 8 detained at the MDC); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 9 2000) (dismissing, on qualified immunity grounds, plaintiff's 10 Bivens claim for, inter alia, substantive due process violations, 11 without questioning whether a cause of action was available); Li 12 v. Canarozzi, 142 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming judgment 13 following jury verdict for defendants in Bivens action based on 14 allegations of physical assault by guards at the federal 15 Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City, although not 16 explicitly on substantive due process grounds); Ayeni v. Mottola, 17 35 F.3d 680, 691 (2d Cir. 1994) (apparently assuming that Bivens 18 remedy was available for substantive due process claim, but-44- 1 deciding that it could not be pursued because the claim in issue 2 was covered by the more particular provisions of the Fourth 3 Amendment, for which a Bivens action was permitted), abrogated on 4 qualified immunity grounds, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 5 Indeed, even the most "international" of Arar's 6 domestic allegations -- that the defendants, acting within the 7 United States, sent Arar to Syria with the intent that he be 8 tortured -- present no new context for Bivens purposes. 9 Principles of substantive due process apply to a narrow band of 10 extreme misbehavior by government agents acting under color of 11 law: mistreatment that is "so egregious, so outrageous, that it 12 may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." 13 Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal 14 quotation marks omitted). Sending Arar from the United States 15 with the intent or understanding that he will be tortured in 16 Syria easily exceeds the level of outrageousness needed to make 17 out a substantive due process claim. 18 Although the "shocks the conscience" test is undeniably 19 "vague," see Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 156 (3d 20 Cir. 2005); Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1998), 21 "[n]o one doubts that under Supreme Court precedent, 22 interrogation by torture" meets that test, Harbury v. Deutch, 233The D.C. Circuit in Harbury concluded that the 22 interrogation in question did not violate the Constitution because it occurred entirely abroad. See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 602-04 (relying upon United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)). The full quotation is: 23 [T]he freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. Because a State may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand. Because a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and -45- 1 F.3d 596, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom 2 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002); see also Rochin v. 22 3 California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the forcible 4 pumping of a suspect's stomach to obtain evidence to be used 5 against him was "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of 6 constitutional differentiation"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 7 319, 326 (1937) (noting that the Due Process Clause must at least 8 "give protection against torture, physical or mental"), overruled 9 on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Brown 10 v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) ("Because a state may 11 dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may 12 substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not 13 be substituted for the witness stand."). 23torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86. "[R]endition -- the market approach -- outsources our 24 crimes, which puts us at the mercy of anyone who can expose us, makes us dependent on some of the world's most unsavory actors, and abandons accountability. It is an approach we associate with crime families, not with great nations." Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century 388 (2008). "[O]ne could get the worst of both worlds: national responsibility for acts as to which the agents we have empowered are unaccountable." Id. at 387. "I do not think that whether the defendants violated 25 Arar's Fifth Amendment rights turns on whom they selected to do the torturing: themselves, a Syrian Intelligence officer, a warlord in Somalia, a drug cartel in Colombia, a military contractor in Baghdad or Boston, a Mafia family in New Jersey, or a Crip set in South Los Angeles." Arar partial panel dissent at 205. -46- 1 To be sure, Arar alleges not that the defendants 2 themselves tortured him; he says that they "outsourced" it. But 24 3 we do not think that the question whether the defendants violated 4 Arar's substantive due process rights turns on whom they selected 5 to do the torturing, or that such "outsourcing" somehow changes 25 6 the essential character of the acts within the United States to 7 which Arar seeks to hold the defendants accountable. 8 We think that Arar states a substantive due process 9 claim under either of two theories of substantive due process 10 liability: "special relationship liability" or 11 "state-created-danger liability," Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 12 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).-47- 1 Under the latter doctrine, the defendants can be held liable for 2 "tak[ing] an affirmative act that creates an opportunity for a 3 third party to harm a victim (or increases the risk of such 4 harm)." Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 80. Under the former, Arar was 5 owed "an affirmative duty" by the defendants to protect him from 6 harm by Syrian agents in light of the fact that the government 7 took him "into its custody and h[eld] him there against his 8 will." Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155-56 (2d 9 Cir.) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnotes 10 omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 636 (2008). 11 In sum, we do not view the current action as presenting 12 a "new context" in any relevant sense. We therefore do not think 13 we must decide whether "to devise a new Bivens damages action." 14 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597, here. 15 V. Devising a New Bivens Damages Action 16 Even apart from our disagreement with the majority that 17 Arar's claims present a new context in which to extend Bivens 18 liability, we are puzzled by the majority's analysis as to 19 whether to do so. Having decided that the issue for our 20 consideration is whether a Bivens action should be permitted in 21 what it has concluded is a new context, the majority engages in a 22 two-part inquiry: "whether there is an alternative remedial-48- 1 scheme available to the plaintiff; and whether 'special factors 2 counsel[] hesitation' in creating a Bivens remedy." Supra at 3 [33] (quoting Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598). 4 Our colleagues wisely decline to decide the first 5 issue, whether an alternative remedial scheme is available, 6 partly because they conclude that this is not an immigration case 7 (or, at least, not a "typical" one), see supra at [28] , and 8 partly because "Arar has alleged that he was actively prevented 9 from seeking any meaningful review and relief through the INA 10 processes," supra at [35]; see also supra at [27] . This is 11 significant inasmuch as the Supreme Court has observed that it 12 has recognized "new" Bivens actions precisely, inter alia, "to 13 provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any 14 alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's 15 unconstitutional conduct." Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 (emphasis 16 omitted). 17 The majority moves on to the second prong of the test, 18 concluding that "special factors are clearly present in the new 19 context of this case, and they sternly counsel hesitation." 20 Supra at [35-36] . We think it unfortunate that the majority 21 concludes that Arar should be afforded no Bivens right of action 22 in light of such "special factors." We quarrel not only with-49- 1 their conclusion, but also the majority's apparent treatment of 2 the existence vel non of "special factors counseling hesitation" 3 as the determinative legal standard for whether an extension of 4 Bivens is warranted. Setting aside for the moment our view that 5 many of the "special factors" cited by the majority are not 6 properly considered to be such, we think it mistaken to preclude 7 Bivens relief solely in light of a citation or compilation of one 8 or more purported examples of such "special factors." 9 A. "Special Factors" As a Standard 10 The majority is not altogether clear in conveying its 11 understanding of the legal significance of a finding that 12 "special factors counseling hesitation," "sternly" or otherwise, 13 are present. The majority acknowledges that "[h]esitation is a 14 pause, not a full stop, or an abstention; and to counsel is not 15 to require," supra at [37] , but it also states that 16 countervailing factors are not considered, and that no such 17 factors have "ever been cited by the Supreme Court as a reason 18 for affording a Bivens remedy where it would not otherwise 19 exist," id. What we are left with is an implication that the 20 presence of "special factors counseling hesitation" in fact does 21 require a "full stop, or an abstention." We disagree. It seemsThe Court referred by way of example to its previous 26 decisions in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947), in which it had concluded that the government had no implied right of action against a company that had allegedly injured a soldier because it trenched upon "federal fiscal policy" particularly delegated to Congress, and Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), in which the Court found no private right of action under federal law where the defendant's acts were not asserted to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights and were governed by state law. -50- 1 to us that the existence of such "special factors" alone does not 2 compel a conclusion that a Bivens action is unavailable. 3 When the words "special factors counseling hesitation" 4 were first uttered by the Supreme Court, in Bivens itself, the 5 Court asserted that there is a general rule "that where legal 6 rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a 7 general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use 8 any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bivens, 403 9 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then 10 said: "The present case involves no special factors counseling 11 hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," 12 citing cases in which the general rule had not been applied. 26 13 Id. The Bivens Court's observation that there was no cause for 14 hesitation, and its simultaneous recognition in the case before 15 it of a private right of action did not imply, however -- as the 16 majority seems to -- that if there had been reason to hesitate,This appears to reflect a classic logical fallacy, 27 "denial of the antecedent," which mistakes a necessary condition for a sufficient one. E.M. Adams, The Fundamentals of General Logic 164 ("The truth of the premises does not require the truth of the conclusion. This means that denying the antecedent is an invalid form of the simple conditional argument."). -51- 1 then the Court, ipso facto, would not have recognized a right of 2 action. 27 3 The Supreme Court has not told us that "special factors 4 counseling hesitation" are to be understood to prohibit a private 5 right of action. In Wilkie, for example, the Court noted that 6 deciding "whether to recognize a Bivens remedy may require two 7 steps," the second of which asks that the court "pay[] particular 8 heed . . . to any special factors counselling hesitation," id., 9 127 S. Ct. at 2598 (emphasis added). And the Court, in Bush v. 10 Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), relied upon by the Wilkie Court in 11 this regard, similarly observed that "[i]n the absence of . . . a 12 congressional directive [that a right of action lies], the 13 federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that 14 is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, 15 however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before 16 authorizing a new kind of federal litigation." Id. at 378 17 (emphasis added).Such a test would be reminiscent of Leo Tolstoy's 28 brother's perhaps apocryphal challenge to Tolstoy to stand in a corner and not think of a white bear. See, e.g., Aylmer Maude, The Life of Tolstoy: First Fifty Years (Dodd, Mead and Co. 1910) 19 ("[T]here was also a certain Fanfarónof Hill, up which [my brother] said he could lead us, if only we would fulfil all the appointed conditions. These were: first, to stand in a corner and not think of a white bear. I remember how I used to get into a corner and try (but could not possibly manage) not to think of -52- 1 "[H]eed" means "[c]lose attention" or "notice." 2 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 813 (4th ed. 3 2000). To "pay heed," then, means "to notice," it does not mean 4 "to be governed by." The majority tells us that "'[h]esitation' 5 is 'counseled' whenever thoughtful discretion would pause even to 6 consider." Supra at [37] . If the existence of "special factors 7 counseling hesitation" were determinative of the existence of a 8 right of action, the bar to declining to allow a new Bivens claim 9 would be less than "remarkably low." Id. It would be 10 chimerical. 11 It is difficult to deny the existence of "special 12 factors counseling hesitation" in this case. We have been 13 "hesitating" -- in order to deliberate in light of those factors 14 -- for nearly two years. While the time we have taken to 15 consider "special factors" strongly indicates that they counsel 16 hesitation, it cannot follow that having hesitated, we must 17 therefore halt, and dismiss the Bivens complaint. 28a white bear."). -53- 1 B. The Special Factors Identified by the Majority 2 The "special factors" cited by the majority fall into 3 one of two general categories: those involving security, secrecy, 4 and confidentiality, and those involving other policy 5 considerations. We turn to the latter category first, briefly 6 summarizing each factor as the majority describes it and then 7 setting forth our view of the factor's weight. 8 1. Factors not involving secrecy or security. 9 ! This action asks for damages, but it 10 functionally "operates as a constitutional 11 challenge to the policies promulgated by the 12 executive." Supra at [38] . We should 13 hesitate to allow such an action to proceed 14 because to do so would tacitly "decide," id., 15 that Bivens can subject federal officers to 16 the kind of enterprise liability that was 17 established for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983 by Monell v. Department of Social 19 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but has not 20 been established for Bivens actions. 21 This paraphrase sets forth the strongest argument 22 ("factor"), we think, for denying a Bivens remedy to Arar. After 23 Iqbal, it would be difficult to argue that Arar's complaint can 24 survive as against defendants who are alleged to have been 25 supervisors with, at most, "knowledge" of Arar's mistreatment. 26 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also id. at 1955 (Souter, J.,-54- 1 dissenting). And to the extent that the United States remains a 2 defendant, perhaps it should be dismissed for want of possible 3 liability under Bivens too. But that does not dispose of the 4 case against the lower-level defendants, such as Blackman, 5 McElroy, and the Doe defendants, who are alleged to have 6 personally undertaken purposeful unconstitutional actions against 7 Arar. 8 It also may be that to the extent actions against 9 "policymakers" can be equated with lawsuits against policies, 10 they may not survive Iqbal either. But while those championing 11 Arar's case may in fact wish to challenge extraordinary rendition 12 policy writ large, the relief Arar himself seeks is principally 13 compensation for an unconstitutional implementation of that 14 policy. That is what Bivens actions are for. 15 ! Actions for damages against federal officers 16 "who implement" rendition "policy" implicate 17 sovereign immunity concerns, by 18 "influenc[ing] government policy, prob[ing] 19 government secrets, invad[ing] government 20 interests, enmesh[ing] government lawyers, 21 and . . . elicit[ing] government funds for 22 settlement." Supra at [39]. 23 ! Recognizing a Bivens action for Arar would 24 entail a judicial "assessment of the validity 25 and rationale" of rendition, which "directly 26 affect[s] significant diplomatic and national 27 security concerns." Supra at [40] . The 28 concern here is in part one of separation of 29 powers, see supra at [41] , and in part one of-55- 1 institutional incompetence, see supra at 2 [41] . 3 Aside from diplomatic and national security 4 considerations, which we address below, this consideration 5 applies to all civil rights actions. Bivens by its nature 6 implicates "government interests," enmeshes government lawyers, 7 and elicits government funds for settlement. Bivens by its 8 nature authorizes courts to invalidate exercises in executive 9 power. A Bivens action, like any other civil rights action, is 10 an attempt to hold members of the executive accountable for their 11 allegedly unconstitutional acts, through the courts. If these 12 "special factors" were persuasive grounds on which to deny Bivens 13 actions, they would not only not be permitted in new contexts, 14 they would not be permitted at all. 15 Similarly, insofar as this Bivens action may influence 16 executive policy, we doubt that that should be a factor 17 "counseling hesitation" either. Civil rights actions influence 18 policy: They make it more costly for executive officers to 19 violate the Constitution. That is their point. See Wyatt v. 20 Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) ("The purpose of § 1983 is to 21 deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to 22 deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to 23 provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.").-56- 1 Finally, the majority suggests that "[i]n the small 2 number of contexts in which courts have implied a Bivens remedy, 3 it has often been easy to identify both the line between 4 constitutional and unconstitutional conduct, and the alternative 5 course which officers should have pursued," a "distinction [the 6 majority says] may or may not amount to a special factor 7 counseling hesitation in the implication of a Bivens remedy." 8 Supra at [54] . It should be noted to the contrary that in the two 9 Supreme Court decisions that did "extend" a Bivens remedy in a 10 "new context," such identification was anything but "easy." 11 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), involved the line between 12 constitutional and unconstitutional medical treatment and medical 13 facilities in prisons, whose management the Supreme Court has 14 found "peculiarly within the province and professional expertise 15 of corrections officials" -- and thus outside of the competence 16 of judges -- and instructed courts to "ordinarily defer to 17 [prison officials'] expert judgment," Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 18 817, 827 (1974). And Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), 19 addressed the line between constitutional and unconstitutional 20 discrimination in public employment, which the Court later 21 observed raises issues requiring "decisions [that] are quite 22 often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of 23 factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify," Engquist 24 v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008).-57- 1 The factors relied upon by the majority that do not 2 relate to secrecy or security therefore do not appear to us to 3 counsel strongly against recognition of a Bivens remedy here. 4 2. Factors involving secrecy or security. The other 5 "special factors" cited by the majority focus our attention on 6 the ability of the executive to conduct the business of diplomacy 7 and government in secret as necessary and to protect public and 8 private security. It is beyond dispute that the judiciary must 9 protect that concern. See, e.g., Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95 (2d 10 Cir. 2009). But inasmuch as there are established procedures for 11 doing just that, we think treating that need as giving rise to 12 "special factors counseling hesitation" is an unfortunate form of 13 double counting. The problem can be, should be, and customarily 14 is, dealt with case by case by employing the established 15 procedures of the state-secrets doctrine, see id. ; see also 16 section VI, below, rather than by barring all such plaintiffs at 17 the courtroom door without further inquiry. 18 C. Factors Weighing in Favor of a Bivens Action 19 At least some factors weigh in favor of permitting a 20 Bivens action in this case. We assume, as we are required to, 21 that Arar suffered a grievous infringement of his constitutional 22 rights by one or more of the defendants, from his interception-58- 1 and detention while changing planes at an international airport 2 to the time two weeks later when he was sent off in the 3 expectation -- perhaps the intent and expectation -- that he 4 would be tortured, all in order to obtain information from him. 5 Breach of a constitutional or legal duty would appear to counsel 6 in favor of some sort of opportunity for the victim to obtain a 7 remedy for it. Justice Harlan's landmark concurrence in Bivens 8 explains: 9 The[ government's] arguments for a more 10 stringent test to govern the grant of damages 11 in constitutional cases [than that governing 12 a grant of equitable relief] seem to be 13 adequately answered by the point that the 14 judiciary has a particular responsibility to 15 assure the vindication of constitutional 16 interests . . . . To be sure, "it must be 17 remembered that legislatures are ultimate 18 guardians of the liberties and welfare of the 19 people in quite as great a degree as the 20 courts." But it must also be recognized that 21 the Bill of Rights is particularly intended 22 to vindicate the interests of the individual 23 in the face of the popular will as expressed 24 in legislative majorities; at the very least, 25 it strikes me as no more appropriate to await 26 express congressional authorization of 27 traditional judicial relief with regard to 28 [the plaintiff's constitutional] legal 29 interests than with respect to interests 30 protected by federal statutes. 31 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation and 32 footnote omitted).Although there is some disagreement in the Circuits 29 regarding precisely when, following arrest, abuse of detained persons is to be analyzed under principles of substantive due process, we think Judge Posner's comment as to why those principles must apply at some point is insightful and remains valid. -59- 1 And more generally, Bivens should be available to 2 vindicate Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights such as 3 those asserted here. As Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh 4 Circuit with respect to a Bivens action: 5 [I]f ever there were a strong case for 6 "substantive due process," it would be a case 7 in which a person who had been arrested but 8 not charged or convicted was brutalized while 9 in custody. If the wanton or malicious 10 infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a 11 person being arrested violates the Fourth 12 Amendment –- as no one doubts –- and if the 13 wanton or malicious infliction of severe pain 14 or suffering upon a prison inmate violates 15 the Eighth Amendment –- as no one doubts –- 16 it would be surprising if the wanton or 17 malicious infliction of severe pain or 18 suffering upon a person confined following 19 his arrest but not yet charged or convicted 20 were thought consistent with due process. 21 Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 22 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); accord Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 29 23 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court's dismissal of 24 pretrial detainee's Bivens action alleging unconstitutional 25 conditions of confinement at federal penitentiary in violation of 26 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Cale v. Johnson, 27 861 F.2d 943, 946-47 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that "federalWhile cases permitting pretrial detainees to bring 30 Bivens actions for violations of their substantive due process rights support the availability of a Bivens action here, Arar's substantive due process claim should not be evaluated under the standard for assessing the claims of persons who, unlike Arar, were detained pretrial rather than for the purpose of interrogation. We have not been asked by the parties to examine the 31 possibility that Arar has pled facts sufficient to raise a claim under theories other than substantive due process -- such as under the Fourth Amendment, the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, or even the Eighth Amendment. Because this is an appeal from a dismissal on the facts pleaded in the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we think that even if this Court were to consider such an alternate theory and conclude that it was valid, the case would be subject to remand to the district court for -60- 1 courts have the jurisdictional authority to entertain a Bivens 2 action brought by a federal prisoner, alleging violations of his 3 right to substantive due process"), abrogated on other grounds, 4 Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 387-88 (6th Cir. 1999); see 5 also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 193 (2003) (Scalia, J., 6 dissenting) (observing that "a [Bivens] action . . . is available 7 to federal pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their 8 confinement" (citing Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202 (3d 9 Cir. 1988)). 30 10 A federal inmate serving a prison sentence can employ 11 Bivens to seek damages resulting from mistreatment by prison 12 officials. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). It would be 13 odd if a federal detainee not charged with or convicted of any 14 offense could not bring an analogous claim. 31further proceedings on that theory. -61- 1 Finally, a factor counseling recognition of a Bivens 2 action is that Arar has no other remedy for the alleged harms the 3 defendant officers inflicted on him. Cf. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 4 ("In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its 5 holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of 6 action against individual officers alleged to have acted 7 unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a 8 plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by 9 an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct."). 10 VI. The State-Secrets Privilege 11 A. Resolution on State-Secrets Grounds 12 If we have not been fully persuasive in arguing that a 13 Bivens remedy should not be denied in this case, we hope we have 14 made it abundantly clear that the question is a complex and 15 difficult one. And that underlies our principal cause for 16 dissent. We think it improper for the Court to take the twisting 17 road to a categorical conclusion that no plaintiff has a private 18 right of action in these circumstances and circumstances like 19 them, when, by a brief order, we could take steps that would 20 likely permit the case to be resolved on its particular facts 21 without new and strained declarations of law.-62- 1 The majority makes a thinly veiled reference to the 2 recognition of a Bivens action as "alacrity or activism." Supra, 3 at [37] . The irony of its making that assertion while reaching 4 out unnecessarily to decide a difficult issue related to 5 separation of powers principles should not be lost. Activism in 6 the defense of "liberty," we gather, is no vice. 7 "The state secrets privilege is a common law 8 evidentiary rule that allows the government to withhold 9 information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to 10 national security." Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 11 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991). "In some cases, the effect of an 12 invocation of the privilege may be so drastic as to require 13 dismissal," as when a "proper assertion of the privilege 14 precludes access to evidence necessary for the plaintiff to state 15 a prima facie claim." Id. at 547. We share what we think to be 16 the majority's intuition that this case would likely turn 17 largely, if not entirely, on decisions of national security and 18 diplomacy that the executive branch has already assured us it has 19 good reason to keep out of public view. 20 Indeed, the government, while arguing before us en banc 21 seeking affirmance on the Bivens issue, could hardly have been 22 clearer:-63- 1 [I]t seems like at the core of your concerns 2 and perhaps your colleagues' concerns is you 3 don't have more information. And that might 4 be the result of the fact that the district 5 court did not rule on the state secrets 6 issue, so all the classified declarations are 7 not in the record, and if this court felt it 8 could not address our Bivens special factors 9 argument at this stage, and I think it 10 can . . . then I respectfully suggest this 11 court do a limited remand for the district 12 court to review the state secrets issue. The 13 government would have to update the 14 declarations, because much time has passed, 15 but allow the government to do that, have the 16 district court rule on the state secrets 17 issues and then this Court could have this 18 declaration before it if it thought it needed 19 to do that. 20 Tr. 58-59 (Cohn). And: 21 Your Honor, if this Court is talking simply 22 about a limited remand, to send this case 23 back simply for the limited purpose of the 24 district court examining the state secrets 25 issue first [if the court won't address 26 Bivens otherwise], I think there's a lot of 27 sense to that, your Honor. 28 Id. at 62-63 (Cohn). 29 Recognizing that the government, like Arar and his 30 counsel, would prefer a ruling on the merits, we nonetheless 31 think we should be taking the government up on its alternate 32 suggestion. Doing so would likely allow us to avoid giving 33 sweeping answers to difficult questions of law that we are not 34 required to ask. And it would, by well-established procedure, 35 address what the majority cites as additional "special factorsOur discussion is limited to the government's invocation 32 of the state-secrets privilege in the context of civil litigation. The protection of state secrets in the course of a criminal prosecution would likely raise many different and difficult issues in light of, among other things, the defendant's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. -64- 1 counseling hesitation" in recognizing a Bivens right of action. 2 In particular, the majority notes these "factors": 3 ! Judicial consideration of the issues relating 4 to rendition involves particular 5 "sensitivities" because of the need to 6 discover much "classified material," supra at 7 [43] , including those relating to "the 8 national security apparatus of at least three 9 foreign countries, as well as that of the 10 United States," supra at [44] . 11 ! "Cases in the context of extraordinary 12 rendition are very likely to present serious 13 questions relating to private diplomatic 14 assurances from foreign countries . . . , and 15 this feature of such claims opens the door to 16 graymail." Supra at [48] ; see also supra at 17 [51] ("The risk of graymail is itself a 18 special factor which counsels hesitation in 19 creating a Bivens remedy."). 20 These are "factors" that the state-secrets privilege was designed 21 to address. 32 22 We are not without precedent here -- similar both 23 factually and procedurally. In El-Masri v. United States, 479 24 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007), the 25 issue was an alleged "special rendition" by U.S. agents of a 26 German citizen from Macedonia to a U.S.-controlled prison inThe district court's full statement bears repeating: 33 It is important to emphasize that the result reached here is required by settled, controlling law. It is in no way an adjudication of, or comment on, the merit or lack of merit of El-Masri's complaint. Nor does this ruling comment or rule in any way on the truth or falsity of his factual allegations; they may be true or false, in whole or in part. Further, it is also important that nothing in this ruling should be taken as a sign of judicial approval or disapproval of rendition programs; it is not intended to do either. In times of war, our country, chiefly through the Executive Branch, must often take exceptional steps to thwart the enemy. Of course, reasonable and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the propriety and efficacy of those exceptional steps. But what this decision holds is that these steps are not proper grist for the judicial mill where, as here, state secrets are at the center of the suit and the privilege is validly invoked. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41. -65- 1 Afghanistan for the purpose of abusive interrogation. The 2 plaintiff had brought suit, inter alia, pursuant to Bivens, for 3 violation of his due process rights against former CIA director 4 George Tenet, among others. The Fourth Circuit explained: 5 The United States intervened as a defendant 6 in the district court, asserting that El7 Masri's civil action could not proceed 8 because it posed an unreasonable risk that 9 privileged state secrets would be disclosed. 10 By its Order of May 12, 2006, the district 11 court agreed with the position of the United 12 States and dismissed El-Masri's Complaint. 13 Id. at 299-300. The district court, in summarizing its order, 14 had said, "It is important to emphasize that the result reached 15 here is required by settled, controlling law." El-Masri v. 33We cite El-Masri not to endorse its conclusions, but as 34 evidence that the procedures to be applied here are not in any sense novel. Cf. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I 35 simply cannot agree with my Brother BLACK that the possibility of 'frivolous' claims -- if defined simply as claims with no legal merit -- warrants closing the courthouse doors to people in Bivens' situation. There are other ways, short of that, of coping with frivolous lawsuits."). -66- 1 Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (E.D. Va. 2006). The Fourth 2 Circuit agreed and affirmed. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300. 34 3 The majority cites the possibility of "graymail" as a 4 "special factor counseling hesitation." But as another decision 5 of the Fourth Circuit points out, the state-secrets privilege 6 protects this interest too, by "provid[ing] a necessary safeguard 7 against litigants presenting the government with a Hobson's 8 choice between settling for inflated sums or jeopardizing 9 national security." Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th 10 Cir. 2005). 35 11 In Arar's case, the government followed essentially the 12 same procedure as it had in El-Masri. The district court here 13 (prior to the district court and court of appeals decisions in 14 El-Masri) decided the case on Bivens grounds instead. We think 15 that to have been mistaken. 16 B. Shortcomings of a State-Secrets ResolutionThere have been assertions that the state-secrets 36 invocation in Reynolds, in which the modern form of doctrine was first set forth, was a cover-up of government misfeasance, not an attempt to protect legitimate state secrets. See, e.g., Barry Siegel, Claim of Privilege at 205-10; Herring v. United States, No. A 03 Civ. 5500 (LDD), 2004 WL 2040272, at *2, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *6-*7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004); but see Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005) (deciding, after review of the report, that the government's "assertion of military secrets privilege for [the] accident report [in Reynolds] . . . was [not a] fraud upon the court"), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1123 (2006). -67- 1 We discussed the state secrets doctrine in some detail 2 in Doe, 576 F.3d at 101-05 (describing, inter alia, the emergence 3 of the doctrine in and after United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 4 1 (1953)). We are not oblivious to the criticism to which it has 5 been subject. There has been considerable debate about it, see, 6 e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. 7 Rumsfeld: State Secrets and the Limits of National Security 8 Litigation, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1249, 1263-1308 (2007) ("Enemy 9 Combatants"); Carrie Johnson, "Handling of 'State Secrets' At 10 Issue," Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2009, at A1, which has been 11 stoked by the recent surfacing of the now-declassified Air Force 12 accident report that was the subject of Reynolds, see Barry 13 Siegel, Claim of Privilege 205-10 (2008). 36 14 But this controversy has centered on the extent of the 15 judiciary's role in making the determination of the legitimacy ofQuestions that have been raised include: Did the 37 Reynolds dissenters, and the Third Circuit and Eastern District of Pennsylvania before them, see Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), have the better of the argument when concluding that the judicial role is not fully exercised in any case without an in-chambers, ex parte review of the allegedly privileged material? Cf. State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. § 5(a) ("Once the Government has asserted the privilege . . . the court shall undertake a preliminary review of the information the Government asserts is protected by the privilege . . . ."); State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (providing that, absent certain exceptions "the United States shall make all evidence the United States claims is subject to the state secrets privilege available for the court to review, consistent with [specified requirements], before any hearing conducted under this section"). Should the monetary loss occasioned as the result of the invocation of the privilege fall invariably and exclusively on plaintiffs? See Enemy Combatants, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1312-13. How finely grained a showing should be required before an action is dismissed in light of a successful state-secrets invocation? See Editorial, The State-Secrets Privilege, Tamed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2009, at A26 (opining on what it characterized as "the affront to civil liberties and the constitutional separation of powers in the Justice Department's argument that the executive branch is entitled to have lawsuits shut down whenever an official makes a blanket claim of national security"); see also msnbc.com, "Full transcript of President Barack Obama's news conference, Apr. 29, 2009," http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 30488052// (The President: "I actually think that the state secret doctrine should be modified. I think right now it's overbroad.").

-68- 1 the claim of privilege and the consequences of the government's 2 refusal to produce subpoenaed material necessary to the 3 prosecution of the plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Enemy 4 Combatants, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1288. No one can seriously 37 5 doubt the need for a mechanism by which the government can 6 effectively protect its legitimate military and diplomatic 7 secrets. The question is whether those procedures now in place-69- 1 best balance the need for secrecy with competing values and 2 interests. The critics do not, we think, seek to avoid at all 3 cost and in all circumstances the ability of the government to 4 protect state-secrets in civil litigation or the possibility that 5 some such litigation will ultimately be resolved as a result. 6 C. The Majority's Objections 7 The majority has two objections to a state-secrets 8 resolution. 9 First, it hints that we have an "unflagging" obligation 10 to address the Bivens issue before turning to the question of 11 state secrets. See supra at [39] ("True, courts can -- with 12 difficulty and resourcefulness -- consider state secrets and even 13 reexamine judgments made in the foreign affairs context when we 14 must, that is, when there is an unflagging duty to exercise our 15 jurisdiction." (emphasis in original)). We highly doubt the 16 jurisprudential necessity of addressing a broader, more difficult 17 Bivens question when this case might be resolved on its facts by 18 application of well-established state-secrets procedures. As the 19 panel majority pointed out, non-merits dispositions do not 20 require a predicate decision on subject-matter jurisdiction: 21 The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, 22 recognized that a federal court has leeway to 23 choose among threshold grounds for denying 24 audience to a case on the merits. . . . [A]-70- 1 federal court that dismisses on non-merits 2 grounds before finding subject-matter 3 jurisdiction makes no assumption of 4 law-declaring power that violates separation 5 of powers principles. 6 See Arar, 532 F.3d at 172 (internal quotation marks, citations, 7 and ellipses omitted). The Supreme Court acted similarly in 8 Iqbal, assuming the viability of a Bivens action in order to 9 decide the case on the basis of pleading and supervisory 10 liability. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 11 Second, the majority professes concern about the "[t]he 12 court's reliance on information that cannot be introduced into 13 the public record," which the Court says "is likely to be a 14 common feature of any Bivens actions arising in the context of 15 alleged extraordinary rendition." Supra at [42] . The majority 16 thinks that this concern "should provoke hesitation, given the 17 strong preference in the Anglo-American legal tradition for open 18 court proceedings." Supra at [42-43]. 19 "'A trial is a public event. What transpires in the 20 court room is public property.'" Richmond Newspapers v. 21 Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574 n.9 (1980) (plurality opinion) 22 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). We applaud 23 the majority's recognition of the fundamental importance of the 24 principle that the courts are presumed to be open. See supra at 25 [44] ; and see, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457This is "access to courts" in a sense quite different 38 from the "access to courts" argument made by Arar referring to the frustration of his ability to seek relief from the judiciary. Cf. Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 145 n.30 (2d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between a litigant's due process right of access and the press and public's right of access under the First Amendment). -71- 1 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). It respects this Circuit's history of 2 meticulously guarding constitutional protection for "access to 3 the courts" in the sense of the ability of a citizen to see and 4 hear, and in that way to participate in, the workings of the 5 justice system. See, e.g., Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 56 38 6 (2d Cir. 2005); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 7 (2d Cir. 2004); ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2004); 8 United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2001); 9 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 10 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 11 880 (2d Cir. 1982). But it follows not at all, we think, from 12 the presumption of openness however gauged that the open nature 13 of the federal courts is properly weighed as a factor in the 14 Bivens analysis. 15 The presumption of openness is just that, a 16 presumption. In can be, and routinely is, overcome. We 17 regularly hear, on the basis of partially or totally sealed 18 records, not only cases implicating national security or-72- 1 diplomatic concerns, see, e.g., Doe, 576 F.3d 95; In re Terrorist 2 Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 93 (2d 3 Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2778 (2009), but those 4 involving criminal defendants' cooperation with prosecutors, see, 5 e.g., United States v. Doe, 314 F. App'x 350 (2d Cir. 2008) 6 (summary order), other criminal matters, see, e.g., U.S. v. 7 Silleg, 311 F.3d 557, 560 (2d Cir. 2002), probation department 8 reports, upon which federal criminal sentences are to a 9 significant extent typically based, see, e.g., United States v. 10 Parnell, 524 F.3d 166, 168 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); 11 United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 275 (2d Cir. 2004), child 12 welfare, see, e.g., Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003), 13 trade secrets, see, e.g., In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24 14 (2d Cir. 1994), and any manner of other criminal and civil 15 matters. Hardly a week goes by, in our collective experience, in 16 which some document or fact is not considered by a panel of this 17 Court out of the public eye. 18 We accommodate the public interest in proceedings 19 before federal courts by rigorously adhering to the presumption 20 of openness, but the presumption is often overcome. The 21 majority's notion that because the presumption is likely to be 22 overcome in a particular species of case we should therefore-73- 1 foreclose a remedy or otherwise limit our jurisdiction in order 2 to accommodate the public suspicion of secrecy, is misconceived. 3 Denying relief to an entire class of persons with presumably 4 legitimate claims in part because some of their number may lose 5 in proceedings that are held in secret or because secrets may 6 cause some such claims to fail, makes little sense to us. It 7 could work endless mischief were courts to turn their backs on 8 such cases, their litigants, and the litigants' asserted rights. 9 We are not aware of any other area of our jurisprudence where the 10 ability to overcome the presumption of openness has been relied 11 upon to deny a remedy to a litigant. We do not think it should 12 be here. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons and to the extent indicated, 15 we respectfully dissent.- 1- 1 BARRI

NGTOND. PARKER, Circuit Judg e, joined by Judg es CALAB RESI , POOL ER, and 2 SAC K, dis se nti ng : 3 Ijoin J udg e Sack’ s, Judg e Pooler’s, a nd Judg e Calabr esi’s opinions in full. My point of 4 depar

ture from the majority

is the tex t of the Convention Ag ainst Torture, which provides that 5 “[n] o exceptional circ umstances wha tsoever, whether

a state of war or a thre at of wa

r, interna l 6 political instabili ty or any other public e merg ency , may be invoked a s a justification of torture .” 7 United Nations Convention Ag ainst Torture a nd Other Crue l, Inhuman, or De gradingTreatment 8 or Punishment, Art. 2, cl. 2, Dec ember 10, 1984, S. Treaty

Doc. No. 100- 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 9 (“Convention Ag ainst Torture” ). B eca use the majority

has neg lected this basic c ommitm ent and 10 a g oo d d e a l mo re , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. 11 Maher

Ara r cr edibly alleg es that United States off icials conspire d to ship himfrom 12 Americ an soil, wherethe Constitut ion and our law s apply , to Sy ria, whe re the y

do not, so that 13 Sy

rian a g ents could torturehim at fede ral off icials’ dire ction and behe st. He also credibly alleg es 14 that, t o a c c omp lis h th is unla wf ul o bje c tiv e , a g e nts of

our g ov e rnme nt a c tiv e ly

ob str uc te d h is 15 acc ess to this very Court and the prote ctions established by Congr ess. See8 U.S.C. § 16 1252(a) (2)( D) (providing f or judicial re view of c onstitut ional claims or questions of lawraised 17 by

an orde r of r emoval). 18 Whil e I

broadly concur with my colleagues who dissent, I write sepa

rate ly to underscore 19 themis c arria g e of jus tic e that le ave s Ara

r w ith out a

re me dy in o ur c ourt s. Th e ma

jority wo uld 20 immuniz e off

icial misconduct by

invoking the separation of powers a nd the executive’s 21 responsibility

for f oreign aff airs and national security . Its approac h distorts the sy stem of che cks- 2- 1 and bala

nces e ssential to the rule of la w, and it trivializes the judiciary ’s role in theseare nas. To 2 my m i n d , th e m o s td e p r e s s i n ga s p e c to f th e m a j o ri ty’ s o p i n i o ni s i t s s i n c e ri ty. 3 A primary

theme of themajority ’s approach is de fer enceto executive authority , 4 espec ially

in a time of national unre st, turmoil, or dang er. Theconduct of fore ign policy

and the 5 maintenanc e of national security aresurely

executive and leg islative powers. Y et those powe rs 6 arenot limi tless. The bounds in both wartime a nd peac etime ar e fixed by the same Constitution. 7 See E

x parte Milligan , 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866). Whereappropriate, def ere nce to the 8 coordinate bra

nches is an e ssential element of our work. B ut there is, in my view, an e normous 9 differencebetwee n beingdefe rential a nd beingsupine in the fac e of g overnmental misconduct. 10 The for

mer is often ne cessa

ry , the latter ne ver is. At the e nd of the da y , it is notthe role of

the 11 judic iary

to s e rv e a s a

he lp- mate to t

hee xec uti vebr anc h, and

it i s n ot i ts roleto a

vo id dif fi c ult 12 de c isi on s f

or fe ar o f c omp lic atin glif

e fo r f e de ral of fi c ia ls. Al wa

y s mi nd fu l of

thefa c t th at in 13 times of national stress and tur moil the rule of law is e very thing, our role is to defe nd the 14 Constitution. W e do this by aff ordingredr ess when g overnme nt officials violate thelaw, eve n 15 when national security is invoked as the justification. SeeU.S. Const., Art. I , § 9, cl. 2; 16 Y oungstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 17 Notably , the majority opinion does not appea

r to dispute the notion that Arar has stated a

n 18 injury

under theFifth Ame ndment of the Constituti on. That is hear tening , beca

use, by any 19 measure , the notion that fede ral off icials conspire d to send a man to Sy ria to be tortur ed “shoc ks 20 the consc ience .” Ro c hin v . Ca lif or nia , 3 4 2 U. S

. 1 6 5 , 1 7 2 (1 9 5 2 ). Wh ati s p ro fo un d l y d i s turb i n g, 21 howeve r, is the Court’s pronounc ement that it can of fer Ara r no opportunity

to prove his ca se and 22 no possibili ty

of re lief. This conc lusion is at odds with the Court’s re sponsibili ty to enforc e theSee United State s Written Resp onse to Q uestion s A sk ed b y the United

N ations Com

m ittee 1 Ag ainst Torture, ¶

5 (bullet-point 5) (Apr. 28, 20 06), availab le at http://www. state.g ov/g/drl/rls/6855 4.htm ; United States Rep ort to the United Nation s C om m ittee A g ainst Torture, ¶ ¶ 51 (bu llet- point 5), 274, U .N . D oc. CA T/C/28/Ad d/5 (F eb. 9, 2000 ), availab le at http ://www . st at e. g ov

/d oc uments /o rg an iz at io n/ 10 02 96

. pd f.

- 3- 1 Constitution’s protections and c annot, in my view, be reconc iled with Bi v e ns v . S ix Un k no wn 2 Named Agents of Fed. B ur. of Narc. , 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which remains g ood law to this day

. 3 See also Dav is v. Passman , 4 4 2 U. S

. 2 2 8 , 2 4 3 (1 9 7 9 ) ( d ec l ar i n g Bi v e ns re me dy fo r alle g e d F if

th 4 Amendment violations). The ma jority is at odds, too, with our own State Depa rtment, which ha s 5 repe ate dly

take n th e po sit ion

be fo rethewo rl d c omm

un ity that th is e xac t r e me dy

is a va ila bleto 6 tor ture vic tim s li keArar. I f t heCon sti tut ion

e ve r i mpl ie d a

dama g e s r e me dy , th is i s su c h a c a se 1 7 – wher e executive of ficials alleg edly

blocked a cce ss to the remedie s chosen by Congr ess in order 8 to deliver a

man to known torturer s. 9 Th e Court ’s he sit atio n to da y immun ize s o ff

ic ia l c on du c t di re c tly

at od ds wi th t

hee xpre ss 10 will of Congr ess and the most basic guara ntees of liber

ty contained in the Constitution. By doing 11 so, the majority

risks a g overnme nt that can inter pret the la w to suits it s own ends, without 12 scrutiny

. See M e m o r an d umf r o mJ o hnY o o , D e p uty A s s i s t antAtt ' y G e n . , & R o b e rtJ

. D e l ahunty, 13 Special Counsel, to Wil liam J . Hay nes I I , Gen. Counsel, Dep' t of Def ense, Jan. 9, 2002, in The 14 TorturePapers: TheRoad to Abu Ghra ib 38 (Kar en J. Greenbe rg& Joshua L . Dra tel eds., 2005); 15 The Fede ralist N o. 48 , at 313 (James Madison) (Clinton Ross iter ed., 1961) (wa rningag ainst the 16 “ty

rannic al conc entration of all the power s of g overnme nt in the same hands” ). Contrary to the 17 majority , Ibelieve that the Constitution affords Arar a re medy should he prove his sobering 18 alleg ations, and that his caseshould be permitted to proc eed. 19 I- 4- 1 The majority discovers my

riad re asons to “hesitate ” in the fa ce of Ara r’s c omplaint that 2 fe de ral of

fi c ia ls c on sp ir e d to se nd

him to S y ri a to b e tor tur e d. Its p ri nc ipal r e a so n, ho we ve r, is 3 th atp erm i tt i n g s u chanac t i o n“w o u l d h av e th e n atura l t en d en cy t o af fe ctd i p l o m ac y , fo re i gn 4 policy

and the se curity

of the nation.” Maj. Op. at 38 . T his vie w o f t hesepa ra tio n o f p ow e rs , 5 which conf

ines the cour

ts to the sidelines, is, in m y view, deeply

mistaken; it dim inishes and 6 dis tor

ts thero le of

thejudic iary

e sp e c ia lly

duri ngtim e s o f t

ur moi l. 7 When presente d with an appropriate c ase or controve rsy , courts are entitled – indee d 8 oblige d – to act, eve n in instances whe re g overnme nt officials see k to shield their conduct be hind 9 invocations of “na tional security” and “ fore ign policy .” Se e, e .g., Ha md an v . R um sfe ld, 5 48 U. S. 10 55 7 ( 20 06 ); Re id v . Co v e rt , 3 54 U. S. 1 , 2 3- 30 (1 95 7) ; Y ou ng sto wn , 343 U.S. 579. Compare Ex 11 pa rteQu irin , 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (obse rvingthe “duty which re sts on the courts, in time of war 12 as we ll as in tim e of pe ace , to preser ve unimpaire d the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty”), 13 with Maj. Op. at 42 (sug g estingthat Ara r’s a lleg ations do not trigg er theCourt’s “unfla g g ing 14 duty

to exercise [its] jurisdiction”). This authority derive s directly

from the Constitution and 15 g oes hand in ha

nd with the responsibility of the c ourts to adjudicate all manner of c ases put 16 befor e them. 17 The a ctive mana g ement of f oreign policy

and national se curity

is entrusted to the 18 executive and leg islative branc hes. SeeU.S. Const., Art. I , § 8; Art. II , § 2. But this does not 19 mean that e x ecutive a nd leg islative officia ls are le ft to adher e to constitutional boundaries of 20 their own a ccord, without ex terna l restra int. That is the job of the courts. As Ma dison declar ed 21 wh e n h e int

ro du c e d th e B illof

Rights to C on gre ss:- 5- 1 I f [these amendme nts] areincorporated into the Constitution, independent 2 tribunals of justice will consider the mselves in a pec uliar manne r the guardia ns of 3 those rights; they will be an impenetr able bulwa rk ag ainst ever

y assumption of 4 power

in the L eg islative or Executive; they will be natura lly

led to resist eve ry 5 encroachme nt upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constituti on by the 6 de c laratio n o f rights

. 7 8 1 Annals of Cong. 439 (Jos eph Ga les ed., 1834). T he Constituti on established thre e co- equal 9 branc hes of g overnme nt, eac h operating a s a che ck upon the other s. In this way , the sepa ration of 10 power s was designed as a limit ing principle of g overnme nt – not to si lenceany one bra nch, as the 11 majority

implies here, but to enlist eac h as “a sentinel over thepublic rights.” The Fede ralist N o. 12 51 , at 323-24 (James Madison) (G .P. Putnam' s Sons ed., 1908). 13 Th e ma

jority tr e ats thesepa

ratio n o f p ow e rs a s a

re a so n f or theCourt to a bs ta in i n th is 1 4 ca s e –

i nre al i ty , i ti s p re ci s el y

th e o p p o s i t e. T h e e x ec ut i v e’ s co re re s p o n s i b i l i ty fo r f o re i gn 15 policy

does not neg ate the judicia ry ’s duty to interpret a

nd enforce c onstitut ional limit s. “[E] ven 16 the war

power does not removeconstitutional li mitations safeguardingessential liberties.”Home 17 Bl

dg. &Loa n A ss'n v . B lai

sd e ll , 2 90 U. S. 3 98 , 4 26 (1 93 4) ; Bo um e die nev . B us h , 128 S. Ct . 2229, 18 2246 (2008). Onebranc h impermissibly intrudes upon another

not when it fulfills its prescribed 19 ro le but whe n it

se e ks to e xer c isea

uth ority a ssi gne d to its c oo rdinate br anc he s. Se eY ou ng sto wn , 20 343 U.S. at 587-89 (holdingthat the President had e x cee ded his executive powe rs when he 21 assumed the “ law makingpower” entr usted to “Congress a lone in both good a nd bad times”); 22 Bowsher v. Synar , 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holdingthat Congr ess may not remove e x ecutive 23 of

fi c e rs e xcept b y

imp e a c hme nt) ; The Fede ralist N o. 47 , at 325-326 (James Madison) (J. Cooke 24 ed. 1961) ( “[W ]here the wholepower of one department is exercised by the same ha

nds which 25 possess the whole powe r of a nother department, the f

undamental principles of a f reeconstitution,- 6- 1 aresu

bv e rt e d. ” ). Th e de fe nd ants be fo reus c ou ld, of c ours e , b e fu lly

e xone ra te d in thee nd , b ut i t 2 is the Court’s role to deter mine the leg ality

of their a ctions for itself. 3 In this case, Arar doe s not ask the Court to assume any executive func tions – to di spatch 4 dip lom atic repr e se ntativ e s, ne g oti ate tr e atie s, or ov e rs e e battl e fi e ld d e c isi on s. L ike wi se , th e su it 5 do e s n ot i mpl ic ate his re le a seor re sc uefrom S y

ri an c us tod

y . Rathe r, Ar ar a sk s th e Court to 6 perf

orm a c ore judicia l function: To interpre t the laws and Constitution as they apply to detailed 7 alleg ations of offic ial misconduct on Americ an soil. And he pe titions for a familiar judicial 8 reme dy : money

damag es. See B ivens , 403 U.S. at 395. Such a suit does not repr esent judicial 9 interfe renc e in executive func tions, as the majority would have it, but rather a n eff ort to keep 10 executive power

within constitut ional limit s. See B uckle y v. V aleo , 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) 11 (re cognizi ngthat eac h branc h nece ssarily participates in the aff

airs of theothers); Mistretta v. 12 United States , 488 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1989). Respe ctfully , Ibelieve themajority' s defe renc e 13 dis so lve s th e ve ry prote c tio ns and

lib e rt ie s th at th e sepa

ratio n o f p ow e rs wa s inte nd e d to 14 guara

ntee. 15 II 16 The SupremeCourt has repe atedly made c lear

that the sepa

ration of powe rs does not 17 preve nt the judiciary from rulingon matters af fec ting national security , and that the c ourts are 18 competent to under take this task. Se e, e .g., Ha md i v . R um sfe ld, 5 4 2 U

. S. 5 0 7 , 5 3 5 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ( “ [W] e 19 nece ssarily

reje ct the Gove rnment' s assertion that sepa ration of powe rs principles mandate a 20 he avil y

c ir c ums c ribe d rolefo r t

hec ourt s”in e sta

bli sh ingproc e dure s f

or de signatin ge ne my 21 c omb atants ); New Y ork Times Co. v. United States , 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holdingthat asser tedIn Lit tl e v. Barreme , 6 U

. S

. ( 2 C ranc h) 1 70 , 1 79 ( 18 04 ), f or e xam pl e, th e S up re m e C ourt 2 found a nav al cap tain "ans werab le in dam ag es" for his unlaw ful seizure o f a Dan ish trad ingship , e v en whe re aP re si de nt ia l o rd er a pp eare d to autho ri z e th e se izur e. Th e C ourtd id n ot h es it at e, a s he re , to address the leg ality

of the P resident' s ord er or the se izure itself. “ A com m ander of a ship of w ar of the Un i t e d St at e s , i no b e yi n g h i s i n s tru c t i o n s f r o m th e Pr e s i d e nto f

th e Un i t e d

St at e s , a c t s ath i s p e r i l

. I f those instruction s are not s trictly w arranted by

lawhe is ans werab le in dam ag es to any perso n injured b y their ex ecution .” Id. at 1 70 ; see a lso T albot v. Seem an , 5 U .S. (1 Cran ch) 1 (18 01) (determiningthe le g al ity o f th e navy ' s ca

pt ur e of f or ei gn m er ch ant v es se l d

ur in gund ec lare d co nf

li ct w ith F ranc e) ; Th e Prize Cas es , 6 7 U .S. (2 Black) 63 5 (1 862). Ex parte Milligan , 7 1 U .S. (4 Wall.) 2 (18 66), rejected the go ve rnme nt ’ s c l a i m th atc i vi l war auth o r i ze d

th e e x e c ut i ve b r an c ht o a c ta s “ s up r e me l e gi s l at o r , s up r e me j u d ge , an d

s up r e me e x e c ut i ve . ” W i l l i am H. Re hn qu i s t , Al l th e Law s Bu tOn e : Ci vi l Li b e rt i e s i nW art i me 121 (1998 ) (quo tingthe g ov ernm ent’s b rief in Milligan ). “The Co nstitution of the United States is a law for rule rs and

peo ple, equally

in war and in pe ace, and cov ers w ith the shield of its protection all c lasses of m en, at all tim es, and unde r all c ircum stances. ” Ex parte Milligan , 7 1 U .S. at 1 20- 21.

- 7- 1 milit ary

interests could not justify prior re straint of the pre ss); Y ou ng sto wn , 3 43 U. S. 5 79 ; Ex 2 pa rteQu irin , 317 U.S. at 19. 2 3 Courts routinely handle c lassified materials and exercisejudgment about both the 4 cre dibility

and leg al significanc e of thesecurity interests asse rted by

the g overnme nt. See 5 For eign Intellige nce Surve illance Ac t of 1978 (F I SA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-29, 1841- 6 46, 1861-62 (2006) ; Fre edom of Information Ac t (FO IA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)( B) & (b)(1) 7 (2 00 2) ; Cla ssi fi e d Inf or matio n Proc e dure s A c t ( CIPA) , 1 8 U .S. C. A pp . I I I§§ 1- 16 ; Boumedie ne 8 v . B us h , 128 S. Ct . 2229, 2261 (2008) ( “TheGover nment prese nts no credible a rguments that the 9 milit ary

mission at Guantanamo would be c ompromised if habe as cor pus courts had jurisdiction 10 to h e ar t

hede ta ine e s' c la ims .” ); United States v. United States District Court ( Keith) , 4 07 U. S. 11 297, 320 (1972) ( “We ca nnot acc ept the Gove rnment' s argument that internal security matters are 12 too subtle and complex for judicial eva luation.”). The se ca ses belie the ma jority ’s notion that the 13 courts lac k authority or compe tency

to assess Ara

r’s c laims. “What are theallowable limits of 14 milit ary

discretion, and whether

or not they

have be en over stepped in a pa rticular c ase, a

re 15 judicial questions.” Ste rling v . Co ns tan tin , 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932)).- 8- 1 Th e c ourt s h avea duty to s c rutin ize un ilate ral a sse rt ion s o f s e c urity and se c re c y be c a us e 2 the g overnme nt’s acc ount has, in many of these c ases, be en over blown. Rece nt disclosures 3 sug g est that the military secr ets so fierc ely

guarde d in United States v. Re ynolds , 345 U.S. 1 4 (1 95 3) – th e Sup re me Court ’s se min a l st ate se c re ts c a se– ma y we ll h avepo se d n o thre at to 5 national sec urity

. See H erring v. United States , 2004 WL2040272, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 6 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 ( 3d Cir. 2004) (findingno deliberate fra ud upon the cour

t, but noting 7 “ thea

pp are nt d e art

h o f s e ns iti veinf

or matio n in thea c c ide nt i nv e sti g atio n r e po rt and wi tne ss 8 statements”) ; L ouis Fisher, In the Nameof National Security : Unchec ked Presidential Power and 9 the Reynolds Case 166-69 ( 2006). 10 A similar truth has emerg ed from the Pentag on Papers c ase, New Y ork Times Co. v. 11 United States , 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Although the g overnme nt argued to the SupremeCourt that 12 publication posed a “ graveand immediate da ng er to the se curity

of the United States,”former 13 Solicitor General Griswold has since a cknowledg ed that the e x ecutive' s primary conce rn wa s 14 “not with national sec urity , but rather with gove rnmental e mbarra ssment.” Erwin N. Griswold, 15 Se c re ts N ot Wo rt h K e e pin g , Wa sh . Po st, F e b. 15 , 1 98 9, at A 25 ; c f. Offic e of theAttorney 16 Gene ral, Mem. on Policies and Proc edure s GoverningInvocation of theState Secre ts Privil eg e 2 17 (S e pt. 23 , 2 00 9) (i ssu ingre vis e d guid e lin e s a nd c lari fy ingtha t th e Depa

rtme nt o f Jus tic e “ wi ll 18 no t de fe nd

an invo c atio n o f t

he[state se c re ts] p ri vil e g e in o rd e r t o . . . pr e ve nt e mba rra ssm e nt t o 19 a per son, org anization, or ag ency of the United States g overnme nt”). Theappropriate tools for 20 e va luatin gnatio nal se c urity c on c e rn s area lr e a dy

fi rm ly e sta bli sh e d in our l aw –

name ly , th e state 21 se c re ts p ri vil e g e and CIPA. Th e y

do no t r e qu ir e wh ole sa le a bs te nti on by thec ourt s.- 9- 1 Ind e e d, a

numbe r o f c a se s in

wh ic h c ourt s h avea c c e de d in thi s w ay , r e lyingon

ba ld 2 appeals to national security , have proven deeply troubling in re trospect. TheSupreme Court’s 3 de c isi on s u

ph oldingc onvic tio ns un de r t heSe dit ion

Ac t of 19 18 arere g ard e d a s in de fe ns ibl e 4 today

. See Sc henck v. United States , 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Debs v . United States , 249 U.S. 211 5 (1 91 9) ; Abrams v. United States , 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Morse v . Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 442 6 (2007) ( Stevens, J ., dissenting) (obser ving that Justice Holmes’ dissent in Ab ra ms has 7 “emphatically

car ried the da

y”)

. Mo rere c e ntl y , th e dir e wa rn ing s is su e d to jus tif

y theind e fi nit e 8 detention of e nemy combatants a

nd fore stall further c ourt revie w havealso drawn stern rebuke. 9 In Pa dilla v . H

an ft , 432 F.3d 582, 584- 587 (4th Cir. 2005), the F ourth Circuit observe d that the 10 g overnme nt had “stea dfastly maintain[ed] that it was imperative in the inter est of national 11 se c urity” to h old

Pa dil la in m ili tary

c us tod y fo r t hr e e and a ha lf ye ars . Y e t of

fi c ia ls a br up tly 12 chang ed cour se on the doorstep of Supreme Court r eview, se ekingto move Padilla into criminal 13 custody , at a “ substantial cost to the g overnme nt’s cre dibility befor e the c ourts.” Id. at 584. See 14 also Brief for

Respondents, Ha md

i v . R um sfe ld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (N o. 03-6696) ( arguing that 15 milit ary

nece ssity require d Hamdi’s indef

inite detention, yet re leasinghim to S audi Ara bia seve n 16 months later). 17 Finally , contra ry to the majority ’s sug g estion, the courts re quire no invitation from 18 Congr ess bef

ore c onsideringclaims that touch upon for eign policy or national sec urity

. See Maj. 19 Op. at 10-11, 42-43, 57 . In fac t, the Supreme Court has de monstrated its willingness to ente r 20 this arena

ag ainst the express wishes of Congress. In Bo um e die nev . B us h , 128 S. Ct . 2229 21 (2008), the Supre me Court rebuf fed le g islative eff

orts to strip the courts of jurisdiction over 22 detainee s held at Gua ntanamo B ay . It held that the writ of ha beas c orpus extended to the nava lThe m aj ority identifies extrao rdinary

rend ition as the context for Arar’s Biven s claim s, a 3 label th at redu ces th e co m plaint to the fact of his tran sfer to Sy ria. See Maj. Op. a t 8, 32 -33

. In d oing so, the maj ority

larg ely disreg ards th e ev ents b oth b efore and after Arar' s trans fer that are p art and parc el of h is claim

for relief. Arar does not merely alleg e that he w as ren dered to S yria w ithout process , b ut that h e w as first detained in the United States for tw elv e day s, duringwhich tim e he w as h eld in harsh and punitiv e co nditions , c oerciv ely interrog ated, and deliberately den ied ac cess to counsel, his co nsulate, and the co urts b y

Am erican officials. See Com pl. ¶ ¶ 2, 4, 32

- 49, 91

- 93. Mo reov er, the p urpose and cu lmin at io n of

th is mis tr eatm ent w as n ot s im pl y Arar' s re m ov al f

ro m th e Uni te d S tate s. Rathe r, Am er ic an o ff ic ia ls a ll eg ed ly

s et o ut to r en de r hi m

to S yri a ei th er

inte nd in go r k

no w in gth at

Arar w ou ld be to rtured there, and aided this ab use by pro v idinginformation to his cap tors. See id. ¶ ¶ 55

- 57. O ne hope s that all extrao rdinary rend ition is not fo r the purpo se o f torture; certainly , th is abu se is not o ne o f the attrib utes th at the m aj ority attach es to that lab el. See Maj. Op. a t 9-10 n. 1

. A ll to ld , e xtra or di nary rendition is th e m ethod by

which Arar was transferred to S yria, b ut it h ardly cap tures th e co nstitutiona l

- 10- 1 base, a

nd that neither Congress nor theexecutive bra nch could displac e the c ourts without 2 formally

suspendingthe writ. Importantly , it did so despite the fac t that this ex erc ise of judicial 3 power

plainly aff ecte d the executive’s de tention of hundreds of enemy combatants a

nd a 4 cente rpiec e of thewar on terror . The Court re cognized that habeas procee dings “ may divert the 5 attention of military personne l from other pr essingtasks” but re fused to find theseconce rns 6 “dispositive.” Id. at 2261. Score s of dec isions have since f ollowed this lead. See, e .g. , Al 7 Rabiah v. United States , 2 00 9 WL 30 48 43 4 ( D. D. C. Sept. 17 , 2 00 9) ; Ahmed v . Obama , 6 13 F. 8 Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009). Courts cannot blithely acc ept eve ry

asser tion of national security

at 9 fac e-va lue, and they areentitled to enforc e constitutional limi ts by scrutinizing such c laims. 10 III 11 Although Arar cre dibly alleg es mistreatment in both the United States and Sy ria, the 12 circ umstances of his detention on America n soil are summarily

excluded from the majority ’s 13 Bi v e ns analysis. Instead, the Court c oncludes that Ar ar ha s not pleaded the se alleg ations with the 14 fac tual detail re quired by Be ll A tla nti cCor

p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Maj. Op. at 15 23-24 . Co ns e qu e ntl y , it dis mis se s Cl a im F our a

nd proc e e ds a s th ou gh th e c ha lle ng e d c on du c t is 16 stric tly

e xtrate rrito ri a l. Th is c on c lus ion g oe s f ar b e yon d a

ny ple a din gru le wearebo un d to 3in

juri es d es cr ib ed

in h is c om pl ai nt

. At the tim e of Arar' s de tention, D efendant A shcroft was Attorn ey G eneral of the United States; 4 Defen dant Thom

psonw as D eputy

United States Attorn ey

G eneral; Defen dant Rob ert Mueller was the Directo r of the F ederal Bure au o f Inv estig ation (FB I ); D efendant Z ig lar w as C om m issioner of the Im m igrat ionand Natura li zati on Service (INS); Def end antBlac kman was Regional Dire ct or of the INS fo r th e E as te rnD is tr ic t; D ef en dant Mc E lr oy w as D is tr ic t D ir ec to r fo r th e I N S f or th e N ewY or

k C ity District; and J ohn Doe s 1- 10 were federal law enforcement ag ents e m ploy ed b y the FB Ior I

NS

. See Com pl. ¶ ¶ 14

- 22.

- 11- 1 apply , and it is inconsistent with both Rule 8 of the F ederal Rules of Civil P roce dure a nd rec ent 2 Sup re me Court

de c isi on s. 3 Even a fter Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009), whic h dismiss ed 4 discrimination claims ag ainst policy maker s on acc ount of inadequate pleading , Claim Four 5 rea dily

exceeds a

ny measureof “pla

usibili ty .” Claim Four se eks to hold Defe ndants J ohn 6 A s h c r o f

t , L ar r y T h o mp s o n , R o b e rtM u e l l e r , J am e s Z i g l ar , J

. S c o ttB l a c km an , E dw ar d M c E l r o y, 7 and John Does 1-10 responsible f or the e x treme c onditions under which Ar ar w as held in the 8 United States. Whil e the majority finds that Ara

r fa iled to alleg e the r equisite “mee ting of the 4 9 minds” nece ssary

to support a conspira cy , see Maj. Op. 24 , it ignore s the fac t that Arar pleade d 10 mul tip le the orie s o f l ia bil ity . F or

ma l c on sp ir a c ie s a sid e , h e a lso a lle g e s th at th e de fe nd ants 11 commonly

aided a nd abetted his de tention and re moval – that is, that the defe ndants wer e 12 persona lly

involved in his mi streatment both in the United States a nd abroa d. Se eHa

y ut v . S tate 13 Un iv . o

f Ne w York, 3 52 F .3 d 7 33 , 7 53 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) (A s up e rv iso ry of fi c ia l pe rs on a lly 14 participates in challeng ed conduc t not only by direc t participation, but by (1) f ailing to take 15 corr ective a ction; (2) creation of a policy or custom fostering theconduct; (3) grossly neg lige nt 16 su

pe rv isi on , o r ( 4) de lib e rate indif fe re nc e to t

heri ghts of

oth e rs ); Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged 17 Sc h. Di

st. , 239 F.3d 246, 254 ( 2d Cir. 2001).- 12- 1 In support of his claim for mistreatment and due process violations while in Americ an 2 custody , Ara

r includes f

actua l alleg ations that areany thing but conc lusory . Indeed, heprovides 3 as much fa ctual support as a man held incommunicado c ould rea sonably be expected to of

fer a 4 c ourt

at th is s ta g e . T hec omp la int a lle g e s th at D e fe nd ant M c El ro y wa s p e rs on a lly

inv olv e d in 5 Ara

r' s failureto rec eive the a ssistance of c ounsel. See Com pl. ¶ 4 3. It a lle g e s th at D e fe nd ants 6 B la c kma

n a nd Th omp so n p e rs on a lly

a pp ro ve d Ara

r' s e xpe dit e d trans fe r f

ro m th e Un ite d St ate s to 7 Sy ria, implicatingthese off

icials in his inability

to acc ess the cour

ts. Id. ¶¶ 15 , 4 7- 48 . And

it 8 re c ounts state me nts by Ar ar' s Ame ri c an inte rrog ator s th at th e y we redis c us sin ghis sit

uatio n w ith 9 “Washington D.C.” Id. ¶ 4 5; see also Dep' t of Homeland Sec urity , Offic e of theInspector 10 Gene ral, TheRemoval of a Ca nadian Citiz en to Sy

ria (“ OI G Report”) at 11 (reportingthat DOJ 11 and I

NS officials in Washington, D.C. lea rned of Ara r' s apprehension on the eve ning of 12 Thursday , September 26, 2002, 12 da y s befor e he w as re ndere d to Sy ria via Jordan). More 13 broa dly , Ara

r d e ta ils theha

rs h c on dit ion s und e r whic h h e wa s h e ld, inc ludingsh a c kli ng , s trip 14 searches, a dministrative se greg ation, prolong ed interrog ation, and a ne ar c ommunications 15 blackout. See id. ¶¶ 29- 47. Notably , these a re not “ [t ]hreadbare re citals of the e lements of a 16 causeof ac tion, supported by mereconclusory

statements.” Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949. They 17 easily

satisfy the re quirements of both Iq ba l and a lso Rul e 8, wh os e “ sh or t and plain s tate me nt” 18 rema ins the baseline f or notice- pleading

. See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 8(a) (1). 19 Mo re ov e r, a s Iq ba l made c lear , plausibility is “context-specific,”requiringthe re viewing 20 court “ to draw on its experienc e and c ommon sense.” Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1950. Ther e, the 21 Sup re me Court

re je c te d I qb a l' s d isc ri min atio n c laims a g a ins t hi gh- ra nkingfe de ral of

fi c ia ls 22 beca

use his complaint lacke d sufficie nt fac tual alleg ations supporting theinfere nce of- 13- 1 discriminatory

intent. Id. at 19 52 . Ce ntra l to thema jority' s d e c isi on

wa s th e fa c t th at th e se 2 officia ls face d a deva stating te rrorist attack “pe rpetrated by 19 Ara b Muslim hi

jacke rs.” Id. at 3 1951. Ag ainst this backdrop, the ma jority found I qbal' s claim overwhelmed by the “obvious 4 a lte rn ativ e e xplanatio n”– th at hi s arre st s te mme d f ro m a “ no nd isc ri min ator

y int e nt t o d e ta in 5 aliens . . . who ha d potential connec tions to those who c ommitt ed ter rorist ac ts.” Id. at 1951 6 (qu o t i n g Twom bly , 5 50 U. S. at 56 7) . App are ntl y havin gthe ir

own v ie ws a

bo ut t hede fe nd ants ’ 7 state of mind, the majority simply found I qbal' s discrimination claim incredible. 8 P l a

u s i b i l i ty, i nth i s an a l ys i s , i s a r e l at i v e m e a s ur e . A l l e g at i o n s ar e d e e m e d “ c o n c l u s o r

y” 9 wher e they

rec ite only

the eleme nts of the claim. The y becomeimplausible when the c ourt’s 10 commonsense c redits fa r more likely

infere nces f

rom the available fa cts. Se eHa rri s v . M ill s , 572 11 F .3 d 6 6, 71 -7 2 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 9) . Pl a

us ibi lity thu s d e pe nd s o n a

ho st o f c on sid e ratio ns : T hefu ll 12 fac tual picture pr esente d by the complaint, the par

ticular c ause of

action and its ele ments, and the 13 availablealternative explanations. See I qbal , 1 29 S. Ct . at 19 47 -5 2. As Rul e 8 im pli e s, a c la im 14 should only

be dismissed at the plea ding sta g e whe re thealleg ations areso g eneral, and the 15 alternative explanations so compelling, that the c laim no longe r appe ars plausible. See F e d. R. 16 Civ . P. 8( a ); Twom bly , 5 50 U. S. at 55 6 (re qu iringsim ply “ e no ugh f

a c t to raisea

re a so na ble 17 expectation that discovery will revea l evidence ” supportingthe claims). 18 Arar' s c la im r e a dil y surv ive s th is t e st, pa

rt ic ula rl y in l ight o f t

heCourt ' s o bli g atio n to 19 “ dr aw[] a ll r e a so na bleinf e re nc e s in theplaint if

f' s f avo r”on a mot ion to dism iss

. Se eCha mb e rs 20 v. Time W

arner, Inc

. , 282 F.3d 147, 152 ( 2d Cir. 2002). The notion that high-ra nking 21 g overnme nt officials like De fenda nts Ashcroft a

nd Mueller we re pe rsonally involved in setting or 22 approvingthe conditions under whic h suspected te rrorists would be held on Americ an soil – andLikewise , th e m aj ority finds these v ery

sam e alleg ations sufficient for purposes of 5 person al jurisdiction, as d id the pan el. See Maj. Op. a t 19 ; A ra r v. A sh crof t , 5 32 F.3 d 1 57, 17 3- 75 (2d Cir. 2008 ) (pan el op .) (ap ply ingidentical pers onal inv olv em ent standard in consid eringperso nal juri sd ic ti on

and f in di ngit m et ).

- 14- 1 even ove rsaw Arar ' s detention and re moval – is hardly far -fe tched. Arar' s arrival at J FK airport 2 was a

signific ant eve nt in September 2002, trig g eringall manner of sec urity

response s. See, e .g. , 3 Com

pl. ¶ 4 5; O I G R e po rt

at 11 , 1 5 ( c iti ng“ high- le ve l inte re st i n Ara r i n Wa sh ington , D C” ); id. 4 at 30 n.31 (de scribingthe four- vehicle c onvoy in which Ara

r wa s transported, inc luding nine I NS 5 office rs equipped w ith their servicewea pons, Remington 870 shotguns, M-4 rifles, he lmets, and 6 ballistic vests). The fa ct that Ara r wa s cover

tly transfe rre d to Sy

ria, by itself, indicates 7 involvement at the highest levels of g overnme nt. 8 In contra st to Iqbal , it is the alter native here that is difficult to fathom. To think that low9 level ag ents had c omplete discre tion in setti ngthe conditions for holdinga suspec ted member of 10 a l Q a e da

de fi e s c omm on se ns e . It r e qu ir e s th e Court to b e lie vethat, whil e high- le ve l of fi c ia ls 11 wer e involved in ar rang ing Arar ' s removal to Sy ria – a premise the ma

jority does not question – 5 12 the y

we reob liv iou s to thepa

rt ic ula rs of his de te nti on . T hema

jority wa s, of c ours e , b ound

to 13 c re dit

a ll r e a so na

bleinf e re nc e s f ro m th e a lle g atio ns in t

hec omp la int , und e rs tand ingthat th e ir 14 fac tual basis would be thoroughly tested in discover

y . Se eTwom bly , 550 U.S. at 555 (a c ourt 15 mus t proc e e d “ on thea ssumpt ion

that a ll thea lle g atio ns in t hec omp la int

aretr ue(e ve n if 16 doubtful in fact) ”). Theinfere nce that, in 2002, high-le vel offic ials had a role in the detention of 17 a suspec ted member of al Qa eda require s litt le imag ination. 18 Fur

ther, unlike Iqbal , Ara

r’s dueproce ss claims do not ask the Court to speculateabout 19 the mental state of g overnme nt officials. Rather , Claim Four re sts on objective fa ctors – theIn Iqbal , th e S up re m e C ourtl oo k ed b ey on d th e co m

pl ai nt to aw id er

f ac tu al c onte xt

in 6 assessingplau sibility

. See12 9 S . C t. at 1951

- 52.

- 15- 1 conditions of confine ment and his ac cess to the c ourts – that areindepende nt of motive. 2 Compare Iqbal , 1 29 S. Ct . at 19 48 (c la im o f i nv idi ou s d isc ri min atio n r e qu ir e s th e plaint if f t o 3 “plea d and provethat the def endant a cted with discriminatory purpose” ), with K

aluczky v. City of 4 W hite Plains , 57 F.3d 202, 211 ( 2d Cir.1995) (g overnment conduct that is “a rbitrar y , conscie nce5 shocking , or oppre ssive in a constitutional sense” violate s substantive due proc ess). The 6 complaint contains more tha n sufficie nt fac tual alleg ations detailingthese deprivations. See 7 Compl. ¶¶ 27-49. 8 Finally , it should notbe lost on us that the Depa rtment of Homela

nd Security ’s Off

ice of 9 In s p ec t o r G en er al h as i t s el f c o n fi rm edth e b ro adco nt o urs o f A rar's m i s tre atm ent , p ro d u ci n g a 10 lengthy

repor t on the conditions of his detention in America n custody

. SeeOI G R e po rt . T his 11 repor

t provides a powe rful indication of thereliability of Ara r’s fa ctual alleg ations at this stage

. 6 12 Plainly , the majority has re ad the OI G report, eve n citing it for limit ed purpose s in its opi nion. 13 See Maj. Op. at 48 . It is difficult, then, to comprehe nd how the majority can ignore therepor

t’s 14 finding s and conc lusions in assessing the ba sic plausibility of Ara r’s four th claim. 15 Ultimately , it is unclear what ty pe of a lleg ations to overcomea motion to dism iss by 16 high- level off

icials could eve r satisfy

the majority . In ref

using to c redit Ara

r' s alleg ations, the 17 majority

cites the c omplaint’s use of the “passive voice ” in desc ribingsome of the unde rlying 18 events. See Maj. Op. at 25 . This criticism is odd becausethe occ asional use of the passive 19 voice ha s not previously rende red ple ading s defe ctive, par ticularly wher e the de fenda

nts’ roles 20 can beeasily

asce rtained f

rom the over all complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 14-22; Y oder v.- 16- 1 Orthomolecular Nutrition Insti tute, Inc. , 7 51 F .2 d 5 55 , 5 61 (2 d Cir. 19 85 ) ( “ It is e le me nta ry that, 2 on a mot ion to dism iss , a

c omp la int

mus t bere a d a s a

wh ole , d ra wi nga ll i nf

e re nc e s f avo ra bleto 3 the pleade r.”) (citations omitted). Specifically , the majority faults Ara

r for not pinpointi ngthe 4 in d iv id

u a ls r e s p o n s ib lef

o r e a c he v e nt s e t o ut i nth e c o mp laint a n d f o r f a il in gto p arti c u la

riz e 5 more fully

when a nd with whom they

conspired. T he irony

involved in imposi ngon a plaintiff – 6 wh o w a s h e ld i n s oli tary c on fi ne me nt a

nd the n im priso ne d f

or te n mo nth s in

an und e rgro un d c e ll 7

– a s t an d ar d s o s e l f

- e v i d e nt l y i mp o s s i b l e t o m e e ta p p e ar s t o h av e b e e nl o s to nth e m a j o ri ty. 8 Th e fl aws in t hema jority' s a pp ro a c h a reno t un iqu e to Ara

r, but e nd ang e r a

broa d s wath 9 of c ivi l rights plaint if

fs . Ra re ly , if e ve r, wi ll a

plaint if f b e in t hero om whe n o ff

ic ia ls f or mul ate 10 an unconstitutional policy later implemente d by

their subordinate s. Yet these c loseted dec isions 11 repr esent pre cisely the ty pe of misconduc t that civil rights cla ims are de signe d to addre ss and 12 deter

. See Carlson v. Gre en , 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980). Indeed, it is this kind of ex ecutive 13 overr eac hing that the Bill of Rights sought to guard a g ainst, not simpl y the frolic a

nd detour of a 14 few

“bad a pples.” Theproper

way to protect e x ecutive of

ficials from unwarr anted se cond15 guessingis not an impossi ble pleadingstandard inc onsistent with Rule 8, but the familiar 16 doctrine of

qualified immunity

. 17 Even if the ma jority finds that Ara

r’s fa ctual alleg ations fall short of e stablishing the 18 pe rs on a l invo lve me nt o f D e fe nd ants As hc ro ft and Mu e lle r, the y

plainl y state a c la im a g a ins t 19 defe ndants such as Thompson, B lackman, Mc Elroy , and John Doe FB Iand I CE ag ents. See 20 Compl. ¶¶ 43, 47-48, 55. The dire ct involvement of thesedefe ndants is bare ly contested by

the 21 appellee s and bar ely mentioned by

the majority . For

this reason a lone, thereis no leg al 22 jus tif

ic atio n f or thema jority to dism iss Cla im F our o utright.R espon dingto the C om m ittee’s qu estion, “What guarantee s an d co ntrols d oes [the United 7 States] hav e to ensure the monitoringof the ac tiv ities of law enforcement o fficials in prisons and othe r detention centres .

. . under its jurisdiction o r de facto c ontrol, ” the State Dep artm ent ac k now ledg ed am ongothe r rem edies: “Suin gfede ral officials for dam ag es under prov isions of the U .S. C onstitution for ‘c on st itut io na l t orts , ’ se e B iv en s v. S ixU nk no w n N am ed A ge nt s , 4 03 U. S. 388 (1971 ), and Dav is v. Pass man , 4 42 U

. S

. 2 28 ( 19 79 ). ”

- 17- 1 IV 2 Whe n th e fu ll r ang e of a lle g e d mi str e atme nt i s c on sid e re d, Ar ar’ s in jurie s h ardly 3 constitute a “ne w” c ontextfor Bi v e ns cl ai m s , an d Iagr ee wi thb o thJu d ge S ac k 's an d Ju d ge 4 Poo le r' s c are fu l ana ly se s. Th is C ourt ha s r e pe ate dly

a ssume d th at Bi v e ns extends to subs tantive 5 due proc ess claims and provides a damag es re medy to other deta inees illeg ally injured by 6 executive offic ials or their a g ents. See Carlson v. Gre en , 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Thomas v. 7 As hc ro

ft , 4 70 F .3 d 4 91 , 4 97 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ); Cuoco v. Moritsugu , 222 F.3d 99 ( 2d Cir. 2000). 8 Our State Department is of the sa me view, having a ssured the United Nations’ Committ ee 9 Ag ainst Torture that a Bivensreme dy is available to torturevictims. See United States Written 10 Response to Questions Asked by the United Nations Com mittee Ag ainst Torture, ¶ 5 11 (bullet-point 5) (Apr . 28, 2006), avail ab leat htt

p:/ /www .s tate .g ov/g/drl/rls/ 68 55 4. htm

. 7 12 Even if Arar’ s casewer e viewe d as a ne w context, the “spec ial fac tors” cited by the 13 ma

jority do no t ju sti fy

de nyinghim

re lie f b e c a

us e the y areno t “ sp e c ia l.”Th e y

larg e ly du pli c ate 14 conce rns – like state sec rets, sover eign immunity , and qualifie d immunity – amply addre ssed by 15 other doc trines at the Court’s disposal. See D avis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979) 16 (re fusingto hesitate whe re spe cial fa ctors we re “ coextensive with the protec tions afforde d by the 17 Speech or

Debate Clause”) . My

colleagues makethese a

rguments in gr eate r deta il, catalog ing 18 thefl aws in t

hema jority ’s Bi v e ns analysis. Iwrite to empha siz e the he ighte ned nee d for a Bivens 19 reme dy

in case s such as this wher e executive of ficials havedeliberately

thwarte d the re medies- 18- 1 provided by

Congr ess and obstruc ted ac cess to the c ourts. Ara r' s claims in this reg ard supply an 2 exceptionally

compellingjustification for af fordinga Bi v e ns reme dy , g oing w ell beyond the 3 alleg ations that g ave rise to Bi v e ns in the first place

. 4 The judicial rolerec ognized in Bi v e ns ref lects an important institutional balance– one 5 closely

aligned with sepa

ration of powe rs. Bi v e ns offe rs Congress the f irst opportunity

to fashion 6 a re medy

for invasions of individual rights protected by the Constitut ion. Howeve r, whe n a 7 leg islative judgme nt is lacking , Bivenspe rm its thec ourt s to us e the ir c omm on -l aw p ow e rs to f ill 8 cruc ial g aps and provide re dress in appropriate instanc es. This line of ca ses thus instructs the 9 courts to trea d lightly wher e Congress ha s spoken, pre suming that in those instance s 10 constitutional int ere sts have bee n adequately addre ssed by

the leg islative branc h. See Sc hweiker 11 v. Chilicky , 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (“ When the design of a G overnme nt program sug g ests that 12 Congr ess has provide d what it considers a dequatereme dial mecha nisms for constitutional 13 violations that may occur in the courseof its administration, we havenot cre ated a dditional 14 Bi v e ns reme dies.”). 15 On the other hand, whe re no le g islative remedy exis ts, Bi v e ns rea ffirms the c ourts’ powe r 16 to e ns ur e that in div idu a ls c an o btain re lie f f or c on sti tut ion a l in

jurie s. Th e c ourt s, wi thi n th is 17 framework, provide a f orum of last re sort; through Bivens , they stand behind constitutional 18 guara

ntees ne g lected by

the political branc hes. Compare Bive ns , 403 U.S. at 410 (Ha rlan, J., 19 concur

ring ) (implying a

reme dy wher e constitutional injury would otherwise g o unredr essed) , 20 with Bush v. Lucas , 4 6 2 U. S

. 3 6 7 , 3 8 8 (1 9 8 3 ) ( d enyi n g Bi v e ns re me dy in l ight o f t

he“ e la bo rate 21 reme dial sy stem” established by Congr ess).While the maj ority po intedly

no tes that the Sup rem e C ourt h as o nly agreed to extend a 8 Biv ens rem edy

three tim es sin ce 1 971, it h as o nly rejected such

claim s ba sed on special factors on three occasio ns o v er that sam e pe riod. See W ilkie v. Ro bbins , 5 51 U

. S

. 5 37 , 5 54 ( 20 07 ); U nited States v. Stanley , 4 83 U

. S

. 6 69 ( 19 87 ); Cha ppell v. W

allace , 4 62 U

. S

. 2 96 ( 19 83 ). In ev er y o th er c as e, th e C ourt has determined that the rem edial s chem e estab lished by C ongress d isplaces a judicial rem edy – a find ing that the m aj ority

do es n ot purport to m ak e he re. Moreov er, ev en in C ha pp ell , th e S uprem e C ourt re lied in part on the altern ativ e rem edial s chem e pro v ided in the Uniform C ode of Military

Justice. The sp ecial fac tors an aly sis co nsiders the w isdom and effectiv eness of o ne p articular 9 re m ed y – th e re co v er

y o f m on ey

d am ag es f

ro m in di v id ua l f ed er al o ff ic er s. Th is d et erm in at io n is se parate and

d is ti nc t f ro m ( 1) ac ourt ' s ca

pa ci ty to a ss es s th e ri ght

in q ue st io n; and

( 2) it s po w er

to a ff or d

- 19- 1 Ev e n s o, thi s r e me dy is c on stra ine d b y

“ sp e c ia l f

a c tor s”that c ouns e l he sit atio n e ve n in 2 the “a

bsenceof af

firmative a ction by

Congr ess.” Bivens , 403 U.S. at 396. The SupremeCourt 3 has neve r provided a n exhaustive definition of these spec ial fac tors, and existi ngprec edent of fer s 4 o n ly

a f e wd ata - p o ints

. B ut i t h a s n o n e th e le s s in d ic ate d th at t h is an a lys is s h o u ld

“ w e igh [] 8 5 rea sons for and ag ainst the cre ation of a ne w ca use of a ction, the way

common law judg es have 6 always done.” W

ilkie v. Robbins , 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007). In W ilk ie , for e x ample, the f

actor 7 that ultimately

counsele d hesitation was the diff iculty of distinguishingunconstitutional conduct 8 from lawf

ul gove rnment ac tivity

. Id. at 555-61. In earlier ca ses, involving c laims by milit ary 9 personne l, the Supreme Court cited Congress’ ple nary authority “To makeRules for the 10 Gover

nment and Regulation of the land a nd naval F orce s,” and its adoption of the Uniform Code 11 of Military

Justice. See Chappe ll v. W allace , 462 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1983) ( citing U .S. Const ., 12 Ar

t. I , § 8, c l. 1 2- 14 ; 10 U. S.C. § 9 38 ); see also United States v . Stanley , 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 13 (1987). WhereCongr ess, pursuant to this authority , had esta blished a par allel sy stem of military 14 dis c ipl ine , th e Court de c lin e d to int e rf

e rein t here latio ns hip be tw e e n e nli ste d p e rs onne l and the ir 15 commandingoffice rs. Se eCha pp e ll , 462 U.S. at 304. “Specia l fac tors,” then, must be re g arde d 16 as a pr

udential limitation: One that c onsiders the suitability of money

damag es for

the par ticular 17 constitutional inj uries alleg ed, tog ether with the availability

of other relief. See Da v is , 4 42 U. S. 9relief of any kind. In p articular, if a c ourt w ould be e ntitled to pro v ide in j unctiv e or habea s relief for the sam e or similar claim s, it cann ot treat the sp ecial fac tors an aly sis as a pro xy for j usticiability , th e political q

uestiondo ctrine, or the sep aration of p owe rs. Indeed , if other form s of relief w ould be av ailable, these potential obstacle s to the co urt' s jurisdiction h av e alread y bee n d ispatche d an d the y m ay not b e sm ug g led in a secon d tim e thro ugh the bac k do or. Y et the m aj ority

do es p recisely

this, rely ingon a ho st of “special factors” that sim ply repe at con cerns accounted for else whe re in our law. See Maj. Op. at 3 8-50 (treatingas special factors separation of pow ers, sov ereign im

m unity , s tate sec rets an d clas sified inform ation, and

diplo m atic assurances). In rea lity , it is a m uch m ore modest inquiry

. The special fa ct or s an al y si s m

us t f oc us o n why

m on ey d am ag es –

a s op po se d to o th er

f or m s of av ai la bl e re li ef – m ight be inap propriate or undesirab le.

- 20- 1 at 245 (finding“spec ial conce rns” ove rcomeby impossibi lity

of equitablerelief

and 2 appropriateness of damag es re medy

). 3 So lim ited, Bi v e ns is an infre quent re medy , but it is a vitally nece ssary

one. In laying out 4 the Bi v e ns re me dy , th e Sup re me Court re c ognize d th at “ [t]heve ry e sse nc e of

c ivi l libe rt

y 5 cer

tainly consists in the right of

ever y individual to claim the protection of the la ws.” Butz v. 6 Economou , 4 3 8 U. S

. 4 7 8 , 4 8 5 (1 9 7 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Bivens , 4 03 U. S. at 39 5, 39 7) ; se eals o D av is , 442 7 U. S. at 24 1 ( “ [T]hejudic iary is c le arl y dis c e rn ibl e a s th e prima

ry me ans throu gh whic h th e se 8 rights may

be enf orce d.”). It was this principle, in the fa ce of “the most flagrant a

buses of 9 officia l power,”that prompted the Court to aff ord a da mag es re medy

. Bivens , 403 U.S. at 410 10 (Ha

rlan, J., concurring ). Bi v e ns thus refle cts the cour ts’ role a s an indepe ndent sourceof 11 protec tion, applying thedamag es re medy as a f orm of individual relief

and off icial 12 acc ountability

. 13 Th is p re ro g ativ e is c on sis te nt w iththec on sti tut ion a l pl an. Withits bu ilt -i n li mit atio ns , 14 Bi v e ns has neve r represe nted a f ormidable e xpansion of judicial powe r. The doc trine, it must be 15 reme mbere d, does not cre ate a ny new rights; it provides a me chanism for enforcingexis ting 16 constitutional rights whe n no other avenue e x ists. “[ W] hereleg al rights have be en invade d, and 17 a fe dera l statute provides for a g eneral right to sue for such inva sion, federal cour ts may use any- 21- 1 availablereme dy

to make g ood the wrongdone.” Bell v. Hood, 3 27 U. S. 6 78 , 6 84 (1 94 6) ; see 2 also Bivens , 403 U.S. at 395 (“H istorically , damag es havebeen reg arde d as the ordina ry reme dy 3 for a

n invasion of per sonal interests in liberty .”). 4 Ag ainst this backdrop, the ma jority sets out to narrow Bi v e ns to the point of vanishing. 5 The majority' s test would not justeliminate a Bi v e ns re me dy in Ara r' s c a se , b ut i n a lmo st a ll 6 case s. Acc ordingto the majority , “‘[h]esitation’ is ‘counseled’ wheneve r thoughtful discretion 7 would pause e ven to consider ,” and “ no acc ount is taken of counte rvailingfac tors.” See Maj. 8 Op. at 37 . B ut b e c a us e “ tho ughtf

ul”pe op le , b y

de fi nit ion , a lw ay s “pa

us e to c on sid e r, ” thi s 9 approa ch would for eclosea dama g es re medy on acc ount of the most fleetingand super ficial of 10 c on c e rn s. An d it wo uld pe rm it c ourt s to igno rec omp le te ly , a s th e ma jority op ini on its e lf do e s, 11 the gravity

of the c onstitut ional injuries alleg ed. As the Court a dmits, this dramatic r eca sting of 12 Bi v e ns is unnece ssary to support its hol ding. Id. at 38 (expressingthe view that Arar' s action 13 “would havethe natura l tendency to affe ct diplomacy , fore ign policy and the se curity

of the 14 nation,” and the ref ore theCourt's holding“nee d be no broa der” ). The sta ndard de scribed by

the 15 ma

jority mis state s th e law a

nd , f or there a so ns surv e ye d h e re , s ignif ic antl y we ake ns thec ourt s’ 16 ability

to redre ss constituti onal injuries. 17 V 18 Ara

r’s c laims, in fact, g o beyond the usual imperatives for a Bi v e ns re me dy . H is 19 c omp la int

of fe rs an e xcepti on a lly

c omp e lli ngba sis fo r r e lie f, on e tha t th e ma jority repe ate dly 20 sid e steps : T hec ha rg e that g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls a c tiv e ly

ob str uc te d Ara r’ s a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s, 21 violating c ore procedural due process rights. See Tellier v . Fields , 280 F.3d 69 ( 2d Cir. 2000) 22 (assumingthat a Bi v e ns action exists for proce dural dueproce ss claim by detainee ). Any

court- 22- 1 sh ou ld b e de e ply

dis tur be d b y su c h a lle g atio ns , e sp e c ia lly tho seba c ke d b y

thefa c tual de ta il 2 prese nted her e. Cf. Valverde v . Stinson , 2 24 F .3 d 1 29 , 1 33 -3 4 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 0) (f

indingAE DPA 3 statute of limitations equitably tolled whereprison officia ls intentionally obstructed ha

beas 4 petitioner’s a

bility to file his petition by

confiscating his leg al pape rs). Ye t the majority ’s 5 wholesaledismiss al of c laims relatingto Arar ’s detention in the United States – for insufficient 6 ple a din g , a s d e sc ribe d a bo ve– a llo ws it t o avo id a ny me anin g fu l e ng a g e me nt w iththe se 7 a lle g atio ns . 8 Normally , as wehave se en, whe n Congr ess leg islates in a par ticular a rea , a Bi v e ns action 9 is not appropriate . In particula r, the division of labor outlined in Bi v e ns contemplated two 10 sc e na

ri os : ( 1) Whe reCon gre ss h a s se le c te d a re me dy fo r c on sti tut ion a l in

jurie s, thec ourt s sh ou ld 11 defe r to its legislative w isdom; (2) Where Congress ha s not considere d a re medy , howeve r, a 12 court must use its “judgment about the best wa y to implement a constitutional gua rante e.” 13 W

ilk ie , 5 51 U. S. at 55 0; see Biv ens , 403 U.S. at 496. Howeve r, Ara r’s c ase f its neither situation. 14 Instead, the a lleg ations arethat any reme dy provided by

Congr ess and the Constitution was 15 purposef

ully fore closed by

executive offic ials. 16 When it comes to torture, Congress ha s spoken loudly and cle arly . Title 18, Section 2441 17 makes it a fe lony punishable by

life imprisonment to commit, or conspire to commit, “an a ct 18 specific ally

intended to inflict severe phy sical or menta l pain or suffe ring. . . upon another 19 person within his custody or phy sical control f

or the purposeof obtaininginformation or a 20 confe ssion.” See also 18 U. S.C. § 2 34 0A . Ara r’ s tr ans fe r t o Sy

ri a wa s a lle g e dly

de signe d to 21 skirt the congressional prohibition on torture by outsourcingthis form of interrog ation. 22 Moreove r, in order to seamlessly

acc omplish this transfer , officia ls had to ignor e or e vade a- 23- 1 number of othe r congressional dictates: An immigration policy that bars the removal of a ny 2 person to a c ountry wher e he w ill li kely

be torture d, and the I

NA' s judicial review

provision. See 3 Convention Ag ainst Torture, D ece mber 10, 1984, S. Tre aty Doc. No. 100- 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 4 implemente d by For eign Affairs Reform a nd RestructuringAct of 1998, Pub. L . No. 105-277, 5 Div. G., Tit. XXI I , § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codifie d at 8 U.S.C. § 1231); 8 U.S.C. § 6 12 52 (a)( 2) (D ); se eals o Tu n v . I NS, 445 F.3d 554, 566 ( 2d Cir. 2006). Fina lly , officia ls’ actions 7 also fore closed Arar’ s opportunity to seek ha

beas r elief unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the 8 Constitution, a reme dy that the g overnme nt itself conce des should have be en available to Ara r. 9 In bareterms, the complaint alleg es that executive off icials set out to circumve nt and 10 underc ut the power s of both the leg islative and judicial bra nches. Under the se circ umstances, the 1 1 u s u al j u s t i fi cat i o n s fo r h es i t at i o ni nap p l yi n g Bi v e ns aresimply not present. When, as he re, the 12 e xec uti vebr anc h ta ke s me a sure s in c omp atib le wi th t hee xpre ss o r i mpl ie d w illof Con gre ss, its 13 “powe r is at its lowest ebb.” Y ou ng sto wn , 343 U.S. at 637 (1952) ( J ackson, J., concurring)

. 14 Fa ctors that might otherwise c ounsel hesitation disappea r whe re e x ecutive of

ficials havesought 15 to n

ull if y there me die s c ho se n b y

Con gre ss. In th e sec a se s, c ourt s o wethee xec uti vebr anc h li ttl e 16 de fe re nc e . Ins te a d, thec ourt s’ prov isi on of a su bs tit utere me dy

is a n und e rt akin gno t si mpl y 17 “appropriate f

or a c ommon-law tribunal” but e ssential for the r ule of law

. Bush v. Lucas , 462 18 U. S. 3 67 , 3 78 (1 98 3) . Si nc e thema jority fails in t he sere sp on sib ili tie s, Irepe c tf ull y dis se nt. 19Ido not agreewith the majority ’s conc lusion that Arar’ s caseprese nts a new c ontextfor 1 a B ive ns a c tio n f

or there a so ns state d in

Judg e Sa c k’ s d iss e nt. 1 P OO L E R , C i rc u i tJu d ge, j o i n edb y Ju d ges C al ab re s i , S ac k , an d P ark er , d i s s ent i n g. Iagreewith the well-re asoned dissents of my colleagues and join their opinions in full. I write sepa

rate ly to note that the majority ’s opinion in this troubling a nd unusual ca se should not bemis re a d a s a do pti nga

ne w f ra me wo rk fo r d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t o r e c ognizea B ive ns c la im, and to explain why

Ido not agreethat Ara

r’s TVPA c laim should be dismis sed. I. Biv e ns At first g lance , it might seem that the ma jority ’s re asoningwith respec t to Arar’ s Bivens claim proc eeds in two simple steps: (1) Arar’ s claim presents a new c ontextfor a Bive ns action, 1 and (2) specia l fac tors counsel he sitation beforerec ognizi nga B ivens reme dy . But a closer

rea ding of

the majority

opinion revea ls far morethan a mere hesitation to extend Bivens to a ne w context in l ight of

specia l fac tors. Be causethe majority ’s holdings be ar no r elation to its new state me nts of

B ive ns princ ipl e s, tho sere mark s a redic ta . M or e ov e r, any

su c h s imp lis tic frame wo rk

wo uld bec ontr ary

to t heSup re me Court ’s B ive ns de c isi on s, wh ic h r e qu ir e tha t c ourt s consider reasons both for and ag ainst rec ognizi ngthe re medy

. The SupremeCourt has held that wemust eng ag e in the followinganalysis in considering whether to rec ognize Bivens ac tion: In the first plac e, ther e is the question whethe r any alternative, exis ting process f or prote c tin gtheint e re st a

mou nts to a c onvin c ingre a so n f

or theJudic ia l B ra

nc h to re fra in f ro m prov idi nga

ne w a nd fr e e sta nd ingre me dy

in d ama g e s. B ut e ve n in the abse nce of

an alter native, a B ivens reme dy

is a subject of judgment: “the fe de ral c ourt s mu st m akethekin d o f r e me dial de te rm inatio n th at is a pp ro priate for a common-law tribuna l, paying pa rticular he ed, howe ver, to a ny specia l fac tors counsellinghesitation befor e authorizi nga new kind of fede ral litigation.”Rece ntly , in dicta, the SupremeCourt expl ained that its “re luctan[ce]” to extend Bivens 2 ste ms f ro m th e fa c t th at “ imp lie d c a us e s o f a c tio n a

redis fa vo re d. ” As hc ro ft

v. I qb a l, 1 29 S. Ct

. 1937, 1948 (2009). 2 Wil kie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (quotingBush v. L ucas, 462 U .S. 367, 378 (1983)). Af te r s ide stepp ingthequ e sti on of e xistin gre me die s, Ma

j. O p. at 33-36 , the majority states that there ma ind e r o f i nq

uir y c an b e re du c e d to thequ e sti on of wh e the r t he reany sp e c ia l f a c tor s to

c on sid e r. I d. at 35-36 The majority

beg ins by

observingthat the Supreme Court ha s ext ended B ivens twice but

re fu se d to e xten d B ive ns se ve n ti me s, a s if thi s e mpi ri c a l di sf

avo r c ou ld s avec ourt s th e tr ou ble of eng ag ing in “ the kind of re medial deter mination that is appropriate f or a c ommon-law tribunal.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. Notwithstanding theSupreme Court’s re luctanceto ext end 2 Bive ns in rece nt year s, it has not overruled B ivens, nor has it over ruled the de cisions ext ending Bive ns to new conte x ts in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) and Carlson v. Gree n, 446 U. S. 1 4 ( 19 80 ), no r h a s it e ve r h e ld t

hat “ B ive ns and

its prog e ny

sh ou ld b e lim ite d to thepr e c ise circ umstances that they

involved.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J ., concur ring ) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the majority must dist inguish B ivens, Davis, and Gree n’s ca ses from Arar’ s. To do so , th e ma

jority po int s to “ sp e c ia l f

a c tor s”tha

t c ouns e l he sit atio n. Th e ma jority observe s, in dicta, two “princ iples” eme rg ing f rom the ca se law on B ivens. First, whe re spe cial fac tors counselinghesitation exi st, “no ac count is taken of c ounterva iling fa ctors.” Ma j. Op. at 37. Notwithstanding this new principle, the majority conclude s that it “cannot ignore that, as the panel dissent put it, ‘thereis a longhistory of judicial re view of Executive a nd L eg islative de c isi on s r e late d to thec on du c t of fo re ign r e latio ns and

natio na l se c urity .’ ” I d. at 56-57 (quoting3

Ara r v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 213 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (Sack, J., dissenting in part) ). And the majority rec ognizes that prudential considerations play into the Bivens a

naly sis, considering , for

e xamp le , whe the r a

B ive ns a c tio n in

Arar’ s c onte xt wo uld

havea de te rr e nt e ff

e c t. I d. at 52

. Ultimately , there fore , the majority has not adopted a

ny new principle of disre g arding

c ounte rv a ili ngfa c tor s. Second, the majority

procla ims that the threshold for de terminingwhether a fa ctor

“ ‘c ouns e ls h e sit atio n’ is r e mark a bly low .’ ” Ma

j. O p. at 37 . The majority explains that “‘[h]esitation’ is ‘counseled’ wheneve r thoughtful discretion would pauseeven to c onsider.” I d. Ifind this statement somewhat inscruta ble, but Ido not take the majority to mean that B ivens should not be ext ended a

ny time a spec ial fac tor deser ves any degreeof consideration. Insofar as the majority

intends to lower the ba

r for specia l fac tors, its remarks a re dic ta. Theserema

rks bear no relation to the majority ’s holding that ext ension of B ivens to Arar ’s context is not

“ a dv isa ble ,”id. at 32 , beca

use sepa ration of powe rs, institut ional competenc e, and othe r fa ctors

“ ste rn ly” c ouns e l he sit atio n. I d. at 36 . Ind e e d, thema jority ’s op ini on

de vo te s tw e nty

pa g e s to its ste rn a sse ssm e nt o f s pe c ia l f

a c tor s, id. at 36-56 , in c ludingthefe ar t hat “ a c tual te rrorist s”c ou ld wi n d ama g e s awa

rd s, pla c ingc ourt s in

thepo sit ion

of fu nd ingte rrorism , id . at 53 n.12 ; that the g overnme nt will be “gray mail[ ed]” into settling ca ses to preve nt disclosure of c lassified inf or matio n, id. at 51-54 ; and that other c ountries will be “less willingto cooper ate with the Un ite d St ate s in

sh ari ngint e lli g e nc e re so urc e s to c ounte r t e rrorism ,”id. at 43

. Apar t from beingdicta, theserema rks represe nt a misreadingof Supreme Court pr e c e de nt. Wilkie e xhor

ts that w e pa

y he e d to sp e c ia l f

a c tor s c ouns e lin ghe sit atio n whil e exercisingthe ty

pe of r emedial judgment appropriate for a common law tribunal – “we ighing4

rea sons for and ag ainst the cre ation of a ne w ca use of a ction, the way

common law judg es have always done.” 551 U .S. at 554 (citingBush, 462 U.S. at 378) . In the exercise of reme dial judgme nt, we should not consider only those fac tors that milit ate in fa vor of oneside of the argument. We must be mindful of a wide ra ng e of pr udential conc erns. See , e.g , id. at 550 (h oldingthat “ any

fre e sta nd ingda ma g e s r e me dy

fo r a c la ime d c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n h a s to

repr e se nt a

judgme nt a

bo ut t hebe st w ay

to i mpl e me nt a

c on sti tut ion a l gua

ra nte e ” ); Cor

r. Se rv s. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) ( consideringwhether extension of Bivens would “de ter individual federal offic ers . . . f rom committing constitutional violations”). The majority cannot

ov e rr uleWilkie ’s ho ldi ngthat w e mus t make“ thekin d o f r e me dial de te rm inatio n th at is appropriate for

a common-la

w tribunal,” 551 U .S. at 550, by repla cingthat phrasewith ellipses wh e n q uo tin gthec a se , s e e Ma

j. O p. at 35

. Were the ma

jority ’s dicta the r

ule, therewould be no explanation for the Supre me Court’s decision in Bive ns in the first place . Surely therewer e spec ial fac tors that would have c ounseled hesitation – the drain on the public f isc, the strain on judicial re source s, the hindranc e to law enforceme nt personnel whoseeff orts had to be diver

ted to defe nding la

wsuits for damag es. Without pausingto consider thesefac tors, the B ivens Court held that a damag es re medy was

ne c e ssa ry to e nf orc e theF ourt

h Ame ndme nt. B ive ns v. Six Unkn own N ame d A g e nts , 4 03 U. S. 388, 397-98 (1971) . Moreove r, we re themajority ’s dicta c orre ct, it would be impossible to make heads or tails of Davis v. Passman, supra . In that case , the Court extended Bive ns to a claim for

e mpl oy me nt disc ri min atio n in

vio latio n o f t

hee qu a l prote c tio n c omp on e nt o f t heF if th Amendment’s DueProcess Clause a g ainst a member of Congress. TheCourt rec ognized a Bive ns remedy

despite pausingto givethoughtf ul consideration to the argument that Passman’sBy abandoningthe pane l majority ’s holding that the I NA is an a lternative e x isting 3 reme dy that prec ludes Bive ns relief , the majority

has avoide d any

implication that well-e stablished Bive ns actions for immigrants alleg ing F ourth and Eighth amendment violations 5 status as a membe r of Congress, “ counsel[ed] hesitation.” 442 U.S. at 246. The Court also noted the risk of “ delug ing f

ederal cour

ts with claims” and the sc arc ity of judicial re source s, but did not find these spe cial fa ctors suff iciently persua sive to overwhe lm Davis’s nee d for a reme dial mecha nism. I d. at 248 (quotation marks omitted). The a bsenceof other remedies f or a c onstitut ional violation may be a reason f

or cr eating

a ne w c a us e of a c tio n. Wilkie , 5 51 U. S. at 55 4 ( c on sid e ri ng , at th e se c on d s tep o f t heana ly sis , the inadequa cy

of existi ngreme dies). Thus, the Supre me Court has re cognized a Bive ns remedy wh e re , f or theplaint if

f, it w a s “ dama g e s o r n oth ing .”Da vis , 4 42 U. S. at 24 5 ( qu oti ngB ive ns , 40 2 U .S. at 41 0 ( Ha

rl an, J., c on c ur

ri ngin j ud gme nt) ). “ ‘T heve ry e sse nc e of

c ivi l libe rt

y

cer tainly consists in the right of

ever y individual to claim the protection of the la ws, whene ver he

rec eives a n injury .’” B ivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quotingMarbur y v. Madison, 1 Cranch ( 5 U.S.) 137 (1803)) . “[W ]here fe dera lly protec ted rights have be en invade d, it has been therule from the beg inning that c ourts will be aler t to adjust their remedie s so as to grant the ne cessa ry relief .” I d. at 392 (quotingBe ll v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). In Davis, the Court held, “unless such rights are to be come merely prec atory , the class of

those litigants who a lleg e that their own constitutional rights havebeen violate d, and who at the same time haveno eff ective me ans other than the judiciar

y to enforc e theserights, must be able to invoke the existi ngjurisdiction of the courts for the protec tion of their justiciable constitutional rights.” 442 U.S. at 242. Th e ma jority “ avo ids any

c ate g oric a l r

uli ngon a lte rn ativ e re me die s, ” in f avo r o f i ts

“ do min ant h olding ” on

sp e c ia l f a c tor s. Ma

j. O p. at 8

. Ihave se arc hed the majority ’s opinion for

3arewithout basis. And, by abandoningthe holding that it could not take as true Arar ’s “unverified” a lleg ations of offic ial obstruction of his right to challeng e the CAT de termination, the opinion avoids the implication that Bivens c laimants fac e a he ightened plea ding sta ndard. 6 a su bo rdinate and

no n- c ate g oric a l r

uli ngon a ltern ativ e re me die s, and Ihavefo un d n on e . T his is for g ood rea son. The majority rec ognizes that “Arar

has alleg ed that he w as ac tively preve nted from s e e kin gany

me anin g fu l r e vie w a

nd re lie f t hrou gh th e I

NAproc e sse s. ” I d. at 35 . T his makes Arar’ s caseunlike those in which the Court re fused to imply a B ivens reme dy

upon concludingthat Congr ess had a lrea dy established a remedial sc heme c overingthe field. See , e.g ., Schweiker

v. Chili cky , 487 U.S. 412 (1988); B ush v. Lucas, 462 U .S. 367 (1983). Where d ef en d ant s b l o ck eda p l ai nt i ff ’s ac ce s s t o th e r em ed i es es t ab l i s h edb y C o n gre s s , fo re cl o s i n g a Bive ns remedy

eliminates any

judicial revie w. See Rauc cio v. Frank, 750 F . Supp. 566, 571 (D. Conn. 19 90 ); Gric he nk o v . U .S. Pos ta l Se rv ., 52 4 F . Su pp . 6 72 , 6 76 -7 7 ( E. D. N. Y. 19 81 ). Th is result thwar

ts Congre ss’s will and abdicates the judicial role. T he majority err s in failing to take

a c c ount o f t

his c on sid e ratio n in

its a sse ssm e nt o f spe c ia l f a c tor s. In c a se s in

wh ic h th e Court

de c lin e d to e xten d B ive ns , it did no t r e so lvetheiss uesim ply by observingthat it had to pause to consider specia l fac tors. Rather, the Court de clined to extend B ive ns be c a

us e fa c tor s r e late d to ins tit uti on a l c omp e te nc e and

sepa ratio n o f p ow e rs stron g ly counsele d hesitation. For e x ample, in Chappell v. Wallace , 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the Court de c lin e d to c re ate a

dama g e s r e me dy

fo r alle g e d r a c ia l di sc ri min atio n b y mil ita ry of fi c e rs be c a

us e “[t] he nee d for . . . a

specia l and exclusive sy stem of military justice[] is too obvious t o require extensive discussion; no m ilitary org anization can func tion without s trict discipline and regulation that would be unac cepta ble in a civilian setting ,” id. at 300, and thecre ation of a B ive ns re me dy

by thefe de ral c ourt s “ wo uld beplainl y

inc on sis te nt w ithCon gre ss’ a uth ority in7

this field” under

Article 1of

the Constitut ion, id. at 304. Ul tim ate ly , th e ma

jority c on c lud e s th at th e Con sti tut ion prov ide s Ara

r n o r e me dy

fo r t his wrong , that the judiciary

must stay

its hand in enforc ing theConstitution becauseuntested national sec urity

conce rns havebeen a sserted by the Executive branc h. For the re asons stated here in and in Judg e Sack’ s dissenting opinion, Iwould hold the Ara r should have a

Bive ns

re me dy – to re inf orc e our s y ste m of

c he c ks and

ba lanc e s, to p ro vid e a

de te rr e nt, and

to r e dr e ss

c on du c t th at sh oc ks thec on sc ie nc e . I un de rs tand

thema jority ’s op ini on

tod ay to b e a re su lt o f i ts hy perbolic a nd speculative assessment of thenational sec urity implications of rec ognizi ngAra r’s B ive ns a c tio n, its un de re sti matio n o f t heins tit uti on a l c omp e te nc e of

thejudic iary , a

nd its implicit failure to acc ept as trueAra r’s a lleg ations that defe ndants blocked his ac cess to judicial proce sses so that they

could render him to Sy

ria to be tortur ed, conduc t that shocks the conscie nce a

nd disfigures funda

mental constitutional principles. This is a hard c ase w ith unique circ umstances. Themajority ’s disappointing opinion should not be interpre ted to chang e B ivens law. I I . T VPA Ic ann ot j oin

theCourt

in c on c ludingthat th e fa c ts o f Ara r’ s c omp la int

areins uf fi c ie nt t o state a c la im und e r t

heTV PA. Se c tio n 2 (a) o f t heTV PA p ro vid e s th at a

de fe nd ant i s li a

bleon ly if he a cted unde r “a ctual or a ppare nt authority , or color of law, of a ny fore ign na

tion . . .” 28 U. S.C. 13 50 (n ote ). In c on str uin gthi s r e qu ir e me nt, weloo k “ to p ri nc ipl e s o f ag e nc y law a nd to jurisprudenc e under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Kadic v. Kara dzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). Under Section 1983, “[t] he tra ditional definition of actingunder c olor of state la w re quires that thede fe nd ant .

. . havee xer c ise d p ow e r p os se sse d b y vir tueof state law a

nd ma depo ssibleon ly8

beca use the wrong doer is clothed w ith the authority of state law .” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) ( quotation marks omitted). Iagreewith the majority

that thereis no litmus test for deter mining whe ther a

Section 19 83 de fe nd ant i s a c tin gun de r c olo r o f s tate law. Ma j. O p. at 21 (“ Th e de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r a no n- state pa

rt y a c ts und e r c olo r o f s tate law r e qu ir e s a n inte ns e ly

fa c t- sp e c if

ic judgme nt unaided by

rig id criteria

as to whethe r par

ticular c onduct may

be fairly attributed to the state.” ( citing B rentwood A cad. v. T enn. Seconda ry Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001))

. This is a wise depa

rture f rom the test set for

th by the pane l opinion, which interprete d Section 1983 caselaw to re quire that whe n the def endant is a f

ederal offic ial, he must be under the “control or influence ” of thestate ac tor to act unde r color of state law. Arar , 532 F.3d at 175-76. Our Circuit has c onsistently rec ognized severa l bases for liability under Sec tion 1983, “control or influence ” beingjust one: For the purposes of

section 1983, the a ctions of a nominally private e ntity

are attributable to the state when: (1) theentity acts pursua

nt to the “coe rcivepower” of the state or

is “controlled”by

the state (“ the compulsion test”); (2) when the state provides “ signific ant enc ourag ement” to the e ntity , the entity is a “willful participa nt in jointactivity

with the [s] tate,” or

the entity ’s func tions are “entwine d” with state policies ( “the joint action test” or “closenexus t est”); or

(3) wh e n th e e nti ty

“ ha s b e e n d e le g ate d a

pu bli c fu nc tio n b y the[s]tate ,”(“ thepu

bli c function test”)

. Sy balski v. Indep. Group Home L iving Program, Inc., 546 F .3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008) (pe r curiam) (quotingBr entwood Ac ad., 531 U.S. at 296). A s the majority now re cognizes, “[a] fede ral off

icer who conspire s with a state off icer may act unde r color of

state law.”Maj. Op. at 21 (citingBe echw ood Restorative Car e Ctr. v. L eeds, 436 F .3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2006)). The majority

conclude s that Arar ’s pleadingwas de ficient be causehe alleg ed only that9

“United States off

icials enc ourag ed and f

acilitated the e x erc ise of powe r by Sy rians in Sy

ria,”not that defe ndants possessed powe r under Sy rian lawwhich they

used to removehim to S y ria to be tor ture d. Ma

j. O p. at 21-22 . I

dis a gre e . In th e Se c tio n 1 98 3 c onte xt, th e Sup re me Court ha s h e ld that private indivi du a ls m ay belia blefo r j oint a c tiv iti e s w ithstate a c tor s e ve n whe retho se private individuals had no of ficial powe r under

state law. D ennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). In Sparks, the private individuals conspired with a statejudgeto enjoin the plaintiff’s mining operation. The Court held: [T] o act ‘ under c olor of’ statelaw for § 1983 purposes doe s not requirethat the de fe nd ant b e an o ff

ic e r o f t heState . It is e no ugh th at heis a wi llf ul p art ic ipa

nt i n joi nt a c tio n w iththeState or its a g e nts . Private pe rs on s, joi ntl y e ng a g e d w ithstate officia ls in the challeng ed ac tion, are a cting‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 19 83 a c tio ns . I d.; see a lso Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. B ank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 315 (2d Cir. 2007) ( Korman, J.,

concur ringin part). Arar a lleg es that U.S. offic ials, rec ognizi ngthat Sy rian lawwas more permissive of torturethat U.S. law, contac ted an a g ent in Sy ria to ar rang e to haveAra

r torture d

un de r t hea uth ority of Sy ri an la w. Spe c if

ic a lly , Ara

r alle g e s th at U .S. of

fi c ia ls s e nt t

heSy ri ans a dossier conta ining que stions, identical to those questions he was aske d while detaine d in the U.S., including oneabout his relationship with a par ticular individual wante d for ter rorism. He

a lso a lle g e s th e Sy

ri an o ff ic ia ls s up pli e d U .S. of

fi c ia ls w ithinf

or matio n th e y

e xtra c te d f

ro m hi m,

c iti nga pu bli c state me nt b y

a Sy ri an o ff ic ia l. A ssumin gthetr

uth of the sea lle g atio ns , defe ndants’ wrong doing w as only possible due to the latitude per mitted under Sy

rian lawand their joint action with Sy

rian a uthorities. The torturemay fairly be attributed to Sy

ria. Be causethe majority ’s holding in this ca se is not require d by controllinglaw from theBe causethe majority ’s holding tur ns on the unique aspe cts of Ar ar’ s claim under the 4 TVPA, it does not limi t the rang e of c onduct for which non-state a ctors ca n be held liable unde r Section 1983. 10 Section 1983 context, the dec ision mustturn on the unique fe ature s of this case – brought under 4 the TVPA alleg ing joint ac tion by fede ral a g ents with Sy

rian off icials. The majority

cites Har bury v. Hayden, 444 F . Supp. 2d 19, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2006), a ff’ d on other grounds, 522 F.3d 41 3 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 8) . In th at c a se , a s w e ll a s o neoth e r, dis tric t ju dg e s c on c lud e d th at U .S. officia ls pursuing f

ederal policy

under f ederal statutes ac t under c olor of U.S., not fore ign, la w. I d. (h oldingthat CIA o ff

ic e rs c oo pe ratin gwi th t

heGu ate ma lan mi lit ary

a c te d und e r c olo r o f U .S. law bec ause the y

wer e “w ithin the scope of their employ ment servingthe United States” a nd “ca rry ing out the policie s and direc tives of the CIA”) ; Schneider v. Kissinger , 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004) ( “Dr . Kissinge r wa s most assuredly actingpursuant to U.S. law . . . despite the fa ct that his alleg ed for eign co-c onspirators may have be en ac ting unde r color of Chilean law.” ), af

f’d on other

grounds, 412 F.3d 190 ( D.C. Cir. 2005). But the ma jority does not adopt this questionable re asoning– that a fe dera l official c an ac t under c olor of only one

so ve re ign’ s a

uth ority at a tim e . T hema

jority sim ply ob se rv e s th at be c a

us e “ fe de ral of

fi c ia ls ty pic a lly a c t un de r c olo r o f f

e de ral la w, the y arera re ly de e me d to havea c te d und e r c olo r o f s tate law. ” Ma j. O p. at 21 (quotation marks omitted). Rather, whe re thealleg ed torturewas c arried out by fore igne rs in a for eign land, the majority draw s a line betwe en the a ctual exerc ise of powe r under fore ign la

w and the

e nc ourag e me nt, fa c ili tatio n, or so lic itatio n o f t

hat e xer c iseof

po we r. I d. at 21-22 . T his dis tin c tio n is un

princ ipl e d. Un de r ag e nc y law, “ wh e n tw o p e rs on s e ng a g e joi ntl y in a pa rt ne rs hip for some c riminal objective, the la w dee ms them ag ents for oneanother . Eac h is deemed to haveThe majority ’s per plexi ngstatement that if a f ederal offic ial wer e found to beacting 5 under c olor of for eign law, it “would re nder a U.S. official a

n officia l of a foreign g overnme nt,” Ma j. O p. at 22-23 n.3 , is simpl y incorre ct. A private ac tor is not transformed into a state offic ial mere ly beca use he a cted unde r color of state law, se e De nnis, 449 U.S. at 27-28 (1980), a nd the reis n o r e a so n th at th is w ou ld b e thec a sein t heana log ou s T VPAc onte xt. Although thequestion in Aldana wa s whether violence by

a private sec urity

forc e 6 involved “state a ction,” and not whe ther the U .S. corporation was ac ting in Guatemala unde r color of U .S. or Guatema lan law, in the Sec tion 1983 context , the two inquiries ar e intercha ng eable . See, e.g ., Lug ar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982); see also Sinaltrainal v. Coca- Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). 11 authorized the ac ts and dec larations of the other unde rtake n to car ry out their joint objective.” United States v. Russo, 302 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2002). It is of no matter that only one member of the c onspiracy

car ried out the torture . I f wecar ry the majority ’s log ic to its ex treme, f ederal ag ents “c ould never

be re sponsible for tortureinflicted under color of f oreign law, eve n if they

wer e in the room with the foreign torturer s orche stratingthe technique s.” Ara r Reply Br . at 36. 5 Un de r S e c tio n 1 98 3, no n- state a c tor s who wi llf ull y pa rt ic ipate in j oint a c tio n w ithstate officia ls, actingunder statelaw, themselve s act unde r color of state law. B y

analogy , under the TVPA, non-Sy

rian a ctors who willfully

participate in joint action with Sy rian off icials, ac ting

un de r S y ri an la w, the mse lve s a c t un de r c olo r o f S y ri an la w. In A lda

na v. De l Mo nteF re sh Pr od uc e , 4 16 F .3 d 1 24 2, 12 49 , 1 26 5 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 5) , th e El e ve nth Cir c uit su staine d a

TV PA claim where plaintiffs a lleg ed that a U .S. corporation “hir[ed] and dire ct[ed] i ts employees a nd/or ag ents,” includinga Guatemalan mayor, “to torturethe Plaintiffs and threa ten them with death.” 416 F.3d at 1265. The alleg ation that the cor poration par

ticipated in joint action with the Guatema lan offic ial was suff icient. Isee no principled re ason to apply different rules to the 6 TV PA c onte xt tha

n th e Se c tio n 1 98 3 c onte xt, to fe de ral a g e nt d e fe nd ants tha n c or po rateB e c a us e plaint if

fs mus t me e t a

pla us ibi lity sta nd ard fo r c la ims a g a ins t f

e de ral of fi c ia ls 7 un de r A sh c ro ft

v. I qb a l, s up ra , I

am no t c on c e rn e d th at su bje c tin gfe de ral of

fi c ia ls t o li a

bil ity under theTVPA would open the f loodgates to a wave of meritless liti g ation. But seeHayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 12 defe ndants, or to ac tors in the United States than ac tors on fore ign soil. Ara r alleg es that 7 defe ndants, ac ting in conc ert with Sy rian off icials, interrog ated him through torture unde r color of Sy rian law , which they

could not have a ccomplished unde r color of U.S. law alone. Thus, Icannot a greethat the pane l corre ctly deter mined the TVPA question on the “c olor of law”question. Imus t th e re fo rere sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.Iuse this much abused phrase “ judicial activism,” in its lit era l sense, to mean the 1 unnece ssary

rea chingout to decide issues that ne ed not be r esolved, the violation of wha t Chief Justice Roberts called “the c ardina l principle of judicial r estraint—if it is not necessa ry to decide more, it is nece ssary

not to decide more .” PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. D EA , 3 62 F .3 d 7 86 , 7 99 (D .C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring ). 1 1 C ALABR E S I , C i rc u i tJu d ge, j o i n edb y Ju d ges P o o l er , S ac k , an d P ark er , d i s s ent i n g. 2 Irespe ctfully dissent. Ijoin J udg e Sack’ s, Judg e Parke r’s, a nd Judg e Pooler’s dissenting 3 op ini on s in

fu ll. B ut, be c a

us e Ibe lie vethat whe n th e his tor y of thi s d ist inguis he d c ourt

is 4 written, today ’s majority decision will be viewe d with dismay , Iadd a f ew words of my

own, “. . 5 . more in sorrow

than in ang er.” Hamlet , act 1, sc . 2. 6 My

colleagues havealre ady

provided ample rea son to regret the path the majority has 7 chosen. In its utt er subse rvienc e to the executive br anch, its distortion of Bivens do c trine , it s 8 unre a lis tic ple a din gsta nd ard s, its mis un de rs tand ingof theTV PA a

nd of § 1 98 3, a s w e ll a s in

its 9 persistent choic e of broad dicta wherenarrow ana ly sis would have suff iced, the ma

jority opinion 10 g oe s se ri ou sly

a stray . It do e s so , mo re ov e r, wi th t here su lt that a

pe rs on —who m w e mus t a ssume 11 (a) was totally

innocent and (b) wa s made to suffe r excruciatingly (c) through the misguide d 12 deeds of

individuals actingunder c olor of fe dera l law—is eff ectively left without a U.S. reme dy

. 13 Se eesp e c ially

dissenting opinion of Judge Par ker. 14 All this, as the other dissenters ha ve powe rfully

demonstrated, is sure ly

bad enough. I 15 write to discuss one last failing, an unsoundne ss that, although it may not be the most signific ant 16 to Maher Arar

himself, is of signa l importance to us as f ederal judg es: the majority ’s unwave ring 17 wi llf

uln e ss. It ha s e ng a g e d in

wh at prop e rl y

c an b e de sc ribe d a s e xtra ordin ary judic ia l a c tiv ism

. 1 18 It has violated long -standingcanons of restraint that properly

must guide c ourts when they fac e 19 complex and searingquestions that involve potentially fundame ntal constitutional rights. It has2 1 rea ched out to dec ide an issue that should not havebeen resolved at this st ag e of Arar ’s ca se. 2 Moreove r, in doingthis, the court has justified its holding with side comments (a s to other fields 3 of law suc h as torts) that are both sweeping a nd wrong . That the majority —made up of 4 c oll e a gue s I

gre atly re sp e c t—h a s d on e a ll this wi th t hebe st o f i nte nti on s, and in t hebe lie f t hat it s 5 holding is nec essar y in a time of crisis, Ido not doubt. But this does not alter my conviction that 6 in calmer

times, wise people will ask themselve s: how could such ableand wor thy judge s have 7 do nethat? 8 I 9 Ifocus f

irst on the willful reac hing out to dec ide a ha rd constitutional question. “I f there 10 is o nedo c trinemore de e ply ro ote d th an a

ny oth e r i n th e proc e ss o f c on sti tut ion a l a dju dic atio n, it 11 is that w e ou ght n ot t o p a ss o n q ue sti on s o f c on sti tut ion a lity . . . unle ss s uc h a dju dic atio n is 12 unavoidable.” Sp e c tor Mo tor Se rv ., In c . v . M

c Lau gh lin , 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). The 13 Supreme Court longag o made c lear that it would not—and that we should not—“pass upon a 14 c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on a lth ou gh p ro pe rl y

pr e se nte d b y

there c ord, if

the reis a lso pr e se nt s ome 15 other ground upon which thecasemay be disposed of.” Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U.S. 288, 347 16 (1 93 6) (B ra

nd e is, J., c on c ur

ri ng ); see also, e.g. , Alexande r v. Louisiana , 405 U.S. 625, 633 17 (1972) ( “[W ]e follow our usual custom of avoidingdecision of c onstitut ional issues unnece ssary 18 to t

hede c isi on

of thec a sebe fo reus .” ); Burton v. United States , 1 96 U. S. 2 83 , 2 95 (1 90 5) (“ It is 19 no t th e ha

bit of thec ourt to d e c idequ e sti on s o f a

c on sti tut ion a l natur e un le ss a bs olute ly 20 nece ssary

to a dec ision of the case .”). We ourse lves havedescribed this canon of c onstitut ional 21 avoidanc e as “ axiom atic,” Allst ateIn s. Co. v . S

e rio , 261 F.3d 143, 149 ( 2d Cir. 2001), and have 22 long allowed it to “dictate[]” our decisions in appropriate circumstance s. Fine v. City of NewThereis also a ca non that courts should not lightly find leg islation to be 2 unconstitutional. See, e .g. , Clark v. Suarez Martinez , 543 U.S. 371, 381-82 (2005). That canon is of great importance, a

nd is related to but sepa

ratefrom the c anon to which I am re fer ring

. See id. at 381. It derives f

rom the so-c alled “ma

joritarian diff

iculty ,” the f

act that c ourts are , g enerally , not repre sentative bodies. See Alexander M. B ickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16- 17 (2d ed. 1986) (“[W] hen the Supre me Court decla res unc onstitut ional a leg islative act or the action of a

n elec ted executive, it thwarts the will of represe ntatives of the a ctual people. . . .”) The c anon at issue in this caseis differe nt, however , and dema nds, more broa dly , that unnece ssary

constitutional decisions not be made, whicheve r way they would comeout . It is expressed in a larg e variety of rules, a

fewof which a

re listed in one Supre me Court decision: constitutional iss ues af

fec ting leg islation will not be deter mined in friendly , nonadver sary proc e e din g s; in advanceof the nece ssity of deciding them ; in broader terms than are re qu ir e d b y

thepr e c isefa c ts t o whic h th e ru lin gis t o b e a pp lie d; if t

here c or d p re se nts some other ground upon which the c ase may be disposed of

; at the instanceof one who fails to s ho w that heis i nju re d b y thestatut e ' s o pe ratio n, or wh o h a s ava ile d h ims e lf

of its benef its; or if a construc tion of the statute is fairly possible by

which the que stion may

be avoided. RescueArmy v . Mun. Court of L os Angeles , 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947) (e mphasis added)

. 3 1 Y or k, 529 F.2d 70, 76 ( 2d Cir. 1975). 2 2 The que stion that today ’s majority elec ts to decide implicates this fundame ntal principle. 3 This is becausethe exist ence vel non of a c laim meriting a Bi v e ns reme dy , in the absenc e of a ny 4 c on gre ssi on a lly

mand ate d r e lie f, is a

matte r o f c on sti tut ion a l inte rp re tatio n. As e arl y a s Bivens 5 itself, the Supreme Court madeclea r that the c ause of

action it rec ognized arose “under”the 6 Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unk nown Named Agents of the Fed. Bure au of Narcotics , 4 03 U. S. 7 388, 397 (1971). As Justi ce H arla n said in his influential concurrencein Bivens , “the sourc e of 8 th e l e g a l i nt e r e s t ”p r o t e c t e d b y any Bi v e ns action is “the F ederal Constitut ion itself”; “the 9 Constitution is i n the re levant sensea sourc e of le g al protec tion for the ‘rights’ e numerated 10 there in.” Id. at 40 2 n .3 (H arl an, J., c on c ur ri ng ). An d e ve n th e ma

jority he rede sc ribe s Bivensas 1 1 “ a

j u d i c i a l l y- c r e at e d

r e m e dy stemm ing

dire c tly fro m t heCon sti tution its e lf

.”Ma j. O p. at 30Cf. Fine , 529 F.2d at 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1975) (de clining to de cide the “ difficult and 3 troublesome constitutional questions” in a Bivens -like cla im ag ainst a municipality “founde d dire c tly up on theF ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt” ); Brault v. Town of Milton , 527 F.2d 730, 738 ( 2d Cir. 1975) (e n banc) (assuming , without deciding , that a cla im ag ainst a municipality “ca n be founde d direc tly on the Four

teenth Amendme nt,” but finding“discussion of other possible barrie rs on [the plaintiff’s] road to re lief . . . super fluous” bec ause thealleg ations in the complaint were insufficient). For this reason, we re the re a

majority findingthat Ara

r could bringa TVPA a ction, as 4 Judg e Poo le r, in h e r diss e nti ngop ini on , p ow e rf ull y argue s h e sh ou ld b e a

bleto d o, the n o f c ours e theremight we ll be an “alternative, e x isting proc ess,” W ilk ie , 551 U.S. at 550, in which ca se a Bivensaction might not lie under the we ll-established rule that such a re medial sche me may obviate the ne ed for

a Bivensaction. B eca

use of the ma

jority ’s holding that the TVPA does not apply , howeve r, I

need not r eac h this question. A more complicate d issue, which I also don’t need to r eac h, is whether c ompensation by a foreign g overnme nt can c onstitut e an alternative redr ess, bec ause of

which, on the ve ry

particula r fa cts of this case , a Bivens action might not lie. But no onehas discussed or argued that in any

way , and sinceit is notan ea sy issue, Isee no need to de lve into it further. The fir st step of the two-pa rt ana ly sis laid out in W

ilkie is itself an instance of 5 c on sti tut ion a l avo ida

nc e . Wh e rea

c on gre ssi on a lly

c re ate d p ro c e ss a de qu ate ly prote c ts a 4 1 (empha sis added). 3 2 Irec ognize that this question—the constitutional status of Bivensactions—is one that has 3 vexed some in aca demia. B ut as is often the c ase, what ca n be layere d with my stery in the pag es 4 of a la

w re view is, in prac tice, fa irly simple. W hen a c ourt conc ludes that a Bivens a c tio n is 5 appropriate, it is holding that, on the then- prese nt state of the law , the Constitut ion require s the 6 court to cr eatea re medy . As eve n the staunche st critics of Bivens re c ognize , a ho ldi ngtha

t a 7 particula

r constitutional right impli es a r emedy “ca n presumably

not even berepudiated by 8 Congr ess.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesk o , 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Sca lia, J ., concur ring ). 9 Whil e Congress c an vitiate the ne ed for a judicially

cre ated Bivens reme dy

by providingan 10 “alter

native . . . proc ess for protectingthe [constitut ional] i ntere st,” W ilkie v. Robbins , 5 51 U. S. 11 53 7, 55 0 ( 20 07 ), it c ann ot o ve rt ur n a ho ldi ngtha

t somereme dy

is nece ssary . This is the 4 5constitutional right, ther e is no nee d to determine whether the Constitut ion require s a re medy

. See B ush v. Lucas , 462 U.S. 367, 378 n.14 (1983) (“ We need not re ach thequestion whether the Constitution its elf re quires a judicia lly fashioned da

mag es re medy

in the absenc e of a

ny other reme dy to vindicate the unde rlying right, unless ther e is an e xpress textual command to the contra ry . The e x isting civil servic e re medies for a demotion in reta liation for protec ted spee ch areclea rly constitutionally

adequa te.” ( citation omitted)). By contra st, the Supreme Court, ac ting pr udentially , has denie d Bi v e ns c la ims du e to “spec ial fac tors” only

in quite particular

circ umstances implicatingsubstantial constituti onal qu e sti on s. F ir st, it h a s d on e so in re sp on seto a n e xclu siv e te xtua l c omm itm e nt o f a uth ority to another branc h. See United States v. Stanley , 483 U.S. 669, 681-82 (1987) (holding that no Bivensaction lay

beca use of “ expli cit constitutional authorization for Congress ‘to make Rules fo r t heGo ve rnme nt a

nd Re gulatio n o f t

heland and nava l F orc e s’ ” and

“ theins ist e nc e . . . w ith which the Constitution confers a uthority over theArmy , Navy , and militia upon the politi cal br anc he s”(q

uo tin gU. S. Co ns t. Art . I , § 8, c l. 1 4) ); Chappell v. W allace , 462 U.S. 296, 300-02 (1 98 3) (s ame ); cf. Davis v . Passman , 4 42 U. S. 2 28 , 2 46 (1 97 9) (“ [A]ltho ugh a su it a g a ins t a Congr essman for

putatively

unconstitutional actions taken in the cour se of his off icial conduc t does ra ise specia l conce rns counse ling he sitation, we hold that these conc erns a re c oextensive with the protec tions afforde d by the Speec h or Debate Clause.” ). Second, it has doneso where the Constitut ion did not provide a worka ble standard for distinguishing c onstitut ional conduct from unconstitutional conduct. Se eW ilk ie , 551 U.S. at 555-61. Whil e the methodology

that courts apply

in determiningwhether

or not a c onstitut ional 6 right presupposes some implied re medy is that of “a c ommon-law tribunal,” Bush , 462 U.S. at 37 8, that f

a c t in no wa y dim ini sh e s th e status of

theultimate ho ldi ng , u

p o r d own, a s a constitutional int erpr etation. And while ther e are, of c ourse, situations in which a c ourt must or should put aside the pr a c tic e of

avo idi ngc on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s, a s whe n it s juri sd ic tio n und e r Art ic le I I Iis i n d ou bt, see Ste el Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998), noneof them apply here

. The e x istence vel non of a Bivensaction is not a jurisdictional prer equisite that must be resolved f i r s t

. If th i s w a s e v e r

i nd o u b t , i th a s b e e nr e s o l v e d

b y Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1948 (2 00 9) , whic h ma

ke s c le ar t

hat a c ourt c an “ a ssume , w ith out de c idi ng , th at [a ] cl a im i s a c tio na ble under Bivens ” and the n dismiss a ca se on non-jurisdictional grounds. 5 1 essenc e of a

constitutional holdi ng , and henc e one dir ectly subject to the avoida

nce c anon. 6 2 Th at avo idingdif fi c ult c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s li ketho sebe fo reus is t heprop e r c ours e 3 was madeclea

r by the Supreme Court in Chr istop he r v . H arbu ry , 536 U.S. 403 (2002). In that 4 c a se , th e on ly

iss uebe fo retheSup re me Court wa s whe the r H arb ur

y ’s Bi v e ns action for

denial of 5 acc ess to courts could procee d. Id. at 41 2. Justi c e Soute r ( fo r e ight m e mbe rs of theCourt) wro teTo be sure , the Supreme Court noted that the defe ndants in Harbury “d i d n o tch al l en ge 7 below the e x istence of

a ca use of a ction under Bi v e ns, ” and a ccordingly it did not ex press a

n opinion on the question or use the “ specia l fac tors” ter minology

. Ha rb ur

y , 536 U.S. at 412 n.6. But the c onstitut ional question befor e us, of the balancingof two constitutional interests, one a n individual right a

nd one a matter of national security and sepa ration of powe rs, is the same oneas was avoided in Ha rb ur

y . 6 1 that whe the r t

his Bi v e ns action lies would re quire a n inquiry that raises 2 3 conce rns for theseparation of powe rs in trenc hing on matters committed to the other 4 branc hes. Sin c ethene e d to re so lv esu c h c on sti tution al i ssu es o ug ht to b eav oid

e d wh e re 5 possible, the [courts] should . . . as soon as possi ble in the litigati on [determine] whether 6 a p ote nti al c on sti tution al ruling ma ybeob v iate d b e c ausethealle ga tio ns of d

e nie d a c c ess 7 fail to s tate a claim on which relief could be grante d. 8 9 Id. at 417 (e mphasis added) . The Court, in other words, said we must first dec ide if thereare 10 non-Bi v e ns grounds for resolvingthe dispute, and only then addr ess the constitutional issues 1 1 r a i s e d

b y Bivensactions. This prac tice, the Court stated, c omports with “the obligation of the 7 12 Judicial B ranc h to avoid decidingconstitutional iss ues nee dlessly .” Id. The Court then 13 proce eded to e x amine close ly the ca use of a ction that Har

bury claimed to havelost through the 14 defe ndants’ beha vior, deter

mined that it was insufficient to justify relief, and, on that non15 constitutional basis, dism issed Har bury ’s claim. Id. at 418. 16 Th e imp lic atio ns fo r Ara r’ s c a sec ou ld h ardly

bemor e manif

e st. Th e natio na l se c urity 17 conce rns that the majority relies upon in its special f actor s analysis are pr ecise ly those that the 18 Supreme Court said must be avoide d in Ha rb ur y . And in such circ umstances, it is our job to putAt footnote 7, the majority disputes Judg e Pooler’s state ment that the propositions in the 8 acc ompanying te x t aredicta. See Ma j. O p. at 37 . T hema

jority the n s e e ks to c ha

ra c te ri ze t ho se propositions as holdings. B ut whether something is holdingor dicta is an obje ctive fa ct and doe s no t depe nd

on ho w i t is c ha

ra c te ri zed e ith e r b y a ma jority or by a dis se nt. It is wh at it

is re g ardle ss o f what on e c a lls it. To pa ra phra semy

prof e sso r F le min gJame s, “ Yo u c an c a ll i t Thucydides or you can c all it must ard pla ster, but it is [ dicta or holding ] j ust the same.” T h e f a c tth atth e m a

j o r i ty wishes to call the propositions holding is instructive, howe ver. I f the propositions are holding the n th e y wo uld e lim inate vir

tually a ll Bivens a c tio ns in t

his circ uit. And they

would do so despite the asse rtions, elsewhe re in the ma jority opinion, that rec ognizi nga Bivensaction in this ex traordina ry casewould be uniquely

dang erous. The majority ’s desireto make a “ holding”of such br eadth, a s to a question entailingconstitutional int e rp re tatio n, in a

c a sewh ic h, a s I

argue , c ou ld l ike ly

bere so lve d o n o the r gro un ds , d isp lay s a tr uly e xtra ordin ary

de gre e of wi llf uln e ss a nd a c tiv ism

. 7 1 “the tria l court . . . in a position as soon as possible in the litigation to know whe ther a potential 2 constitutional ruling may be obviated.” Id. at 41 7. F or re a so ns tha

t w illbec le ar s oo n e no ugh, it 3 may

we ll b e that, o n r e mand , th is c a sewo uld , f or no n- c on sti tut ion a l r e a so ns , “ fail t o s tate a c la im 4 on which re lief could begrante d.” Id. at 417. That be ing so, theSupreme Court has told us, we 5 mus t avo id c on sti tut ion a l pron ounc e me nts

. 6 For

this Court t o g o out of its way to decide on Bivens gro un ds wh e n it is n ot n e c e ssa

ry is, 7 there fore , a re achingout of a pa rticularly dang erous sort, r eg ardle ss of what c onclusion the Court 8 comes to on the Bivensqu e sti on . I f—a s I wo uld if I ha d to fa c e thequ e sti on

—w e we reto 8 9 de c idethat Bivensapplies, then some r emedy would be nec essar

y reg ardle ss of Congr ess’s 10 pr e fe re nc e . I f, a s th e ma jority c ho os e s to do , w e ru le tha t Bivens do e s n ot a

pp ly , w e havesa id 11 that, in a wide va riety of ca ses, the Constituti on fails to g ive protec tion. Both positions require a 12 parsingof the Gr eat Char ter. When such a

decision ca

nnot be avoided, so beit: we do our job. 13 But whe re it ca

n be avoide d, it should be. 14 II 15 So, how might the Bivensiss uehavebe e n avo ide d? As Jud g e Sa c k e xpla ins in h isAt footnote 14, the majority states that the state se cre ts privilege , despite its common 9 law orig in, is not devoid of constituti onal implications. See Ma j. O p. at 58-59 . T hat ma

y we ll be. B ut that fac t in no way means that de cisions as to the applica bility of a pa rticular c laim of the privileg e enta il constitut ional interpre tations. The exist ing c ommon law privileg e morethan cover s whateve r the Constituti on require s. The prope r ana logy is quite simpl e. I f Congress we re to p a ss a statut e , akin

to § 19 83 , g ivi ngbroa d c a us e of a c tio n to tho seinj ur e d b y fe de ral of

fi c ia ls, de c isi on s und e r t

hat st atut e wo uld

no t no rm a lly

inv olv e c on sti tut ion a l inte rp re tatio ns . And thi s would be so eve n though, in the a bsenceof such a

statute, a Bivens , constitutional claim, might lie. The sameis so with respect to applications of the common law state se cre ts privilege . As an excuse for themajority ’s violation of the ca non of constitutional avoidancethis argument does not make it to first base. 8 1 e loq

ue nt diss e nt, thi s mi ght b e do nethrou gh f ir st e xami nin gthesignif

ic anc e of thestate se c re ts 2 privileg e to this case. That privileg e has longrequire d dismiss al in those rare ca ses where 9 3 national sec urity

interests so dra stically

limitthe evidenc e that ca n be introduce d as to deprive 4 either a

plaintiff or a

defe ndant of a

n opportunity

to make its case

. See, e .g. , Zuckerbraun v . Gen. 5 Dynamics Corp. , 9 32 F .2 d 5 44 , 5 47 (2 d Ci r. 19 91 ); see also United States v . Reynolds , 3 45 U. S. 6 1 (1953); El-Masri v. United States , 479 F.3d 296, 308 ( 4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] procee ding in whic h 7 the state sec rets privileg e is succe ssfully interposed must be dismissed if the circ umstances make 8 clea

r that privileg ed information will be so central to the litigation that any attempt to proce ed 9 will threaten that information’s disclosure.” ). In a ca se such a s this, where theGover nment 10 asser

ts that the plaintiff’s cla im impl icates vital national secre ts, we must, beforewe move to the 11 merits, examine the conseque nces of our duty to gua rd ag ainst any

potentially

harmful 12 dis c los ur e s. 13 The majority obviously

share s our conc erns a

bout the protec tion of state sec rets, as 14 virtually

ever y “spec ial fac tor” identified in the ma jority opinion concer

ns classified mate rial. 15 B ut, a s Judg e Sa c k s ay s, thi s amou nts to d ou ble -c ounti ngof

theGo ve rnme nt’ s inte re st i n 16 prese rvingstate sec rets. See dis se nti ngop ini on of Judg e Sa c k at 52 . We alreadypo sse ss a we ll-Indeed, if any thing, e x isting doctrinemay be too so lic ito us of

thene e d f

or se c re c y , if 10 the many critics of the Reynolds line arecorr ect. See infra Part IV. B ut whil e the reis widespre ad conc ern that the doctrine ma y be over used, it is hard to find any commentators who think that state secr ets areinadequately protec ted under

curr ent law. 9 1 established method for protec ting se cre ts, one that is more than a dequateto meet the majority ’s 2 conce rn. Deny

ing a Bivensreme dy

beca use state se cre ts might be re veale d is a bit like denying 10 3 a criminal trial for fe ar that a juror might be intimidated: it allows a risk, that the law is alre ady at 4 gre at pains to e lim inate , to ne g ate e nti re ly su bs tanti a l rights and

proc e dure s. 5 Even moremy stifying is the ma jority ’s insistence that it is respe cting“[t] he pre fer ence 6 fo r o pe n r athe r t

ha n c land e sti nec ourt

proc e e din g s. ” Ma

j. O p. at 47 . How, exactly , does the 7 ma

jority promo te op e nn e ss b y

sh a pin ga c on sti tut ion a l de c isi on

aro un d th e fa c t th at st ate se c re ts 8 might be involved in a claim? The state se cre ts doctrine is undoubtedly in tension with the 9 pu bli c ri ght o f a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s, but th e ma jority ’s a pp ro a c h is mor e op a qu e tha n a ny state 10 se c re ts r e so lut ion . Wh e n a c ourt prop e rl y a pp lie s th e state se c re ts d oc trine , th e c a seat ba r w ill 11 proce ed only

if the alleg ed state se cre ts are not vital to a c laim or defe nse, so thereshould be 12 littl e fe ar that a substantive holding w ill ult imately turn on secret material. By contra st, consider 13 the har

m done to the openne ss of the cour t sy stem by

what the majority

does her e. It bars any 14 action in the fa ce of what wearerequire d to assume ar e outra g eous constitutional violations, and 15 it d oe s so sim

ply be c a us e state se c re ts mi

gh t po ssi bly

be involved, without havinga cour t look 16 into that very

question. As a re sult, even if the Gove rnment’s c laimed nee d for se cre cy turned 17 out to be wholly

illusory , therewould be no re course ! Indeed, e ven if the G overnme nt 18 decla ssified eve ry document re lating to this ca se, eve n if all four c ountries involved announc ed 19 that they

had nothingto hide and that Ar ar’ s claim should proce ed so that they could beThat is, except to the extent “state secrets” a re involved. And to the extent they are , as 11 alre ady discussed, the state se cre ts privilegeis more than suff icient to prec lude gray

mail. 10 1 exonerated, the re w ould be no open judicial testingof Ara r’s a lleg ations. Whi ch approach 2 should giveus more ca use to hesitate? 3 The majority further err s in its us e and a

buse of other

fields of law . In trying to f ind 4 “spec ial fac tors” that could justify barring a Bivens claim (but do not depe nd on “state se cre ts”) 5 the majority

points to two issues that arisein e v e ry tort suit against a g overnme nt official. I f they 6 ar e v al i d

h er e th ey wo u l d ap p ear t o co un s el “h es i t at i o n ” i n(an d , un d er th e m aj o ri ty ’s re as o n i n g, 7 s e e m i n g l y p r e c l u d e ) e v e r y Bivensaction. F irst, the majority war ns that “[t] he risk of gray mail . . 8 . counsels hesitation in cre atinga Bivens re me dy .”Ma j. O p. at 51 . Be causethe risk of 9 unwar

rante d and dang erous disclosureis so high, the Gove rnment will be pre ssured into settling 10 meritless ca ses. Second, a s a conse quenceof such gray mail, the Gover

nment, rathe r than 11 individual defenda nts, would wind up paying of f cla ims. See Ma

j. O p. at 52 . B e c a

us e the se 12 possibili ties are“an e ndemic risk in ca ses (howe ver f ew) which involve a c laim like Arar ’s,” the 13 majority

conclude s, they

make Bi v e ns a c tio ns pa

rt ic ula rl y ina pp ro priate . M a

j. O p. at 51

. 14 But both of theseissues—the risk of gray mail and the disjunction betwee n individual 15 defe ndants and a

n indemnifying g overnme nt—areprese nt in e v e ry tort suit against a g overnme nt 16 ag ent, not just the relatively “fe w” c ases involvingextraordinary rendition for thepurposes of 17 tor

ture . Takin gthelatte r p oint f ir st, bo th s tate and

fe de ral of

fi c e rs area lmo st univ e rs a lly 11 18 indemnified by

the State if they

lose tort suits. In Bi v e ns case s, the fede ral g overnme nt 19 “indemnifies its employees a g ainst constitutional tort j udgments or settlements (in the ra re 20 instances in which a Bivensclaim re sults in a monetary liability) and takes re sponsibili ty for11 1 litigatingsuch suits.” Cornelia T.L . Pill ard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of 2 Public Officials’ Individual Liabil ity Under Bive ns , 8 8 G e o. L .J. 6 5, 76 (1 99 9) . Ind e e d, “ [a]s a 3 prac tical matter . . . inde mnification is a virtual ce rtainty .” Id. at 77 . Si mil arl y , a s is wi de ly 4 un de rs too d, “ a

su it a g a ins t a

state of fi c e r i s f un c tio na lly

a su it a g a ins t th e state , f

or thestate 5 defe nds the ac tion and pay s any adver se judgment. So far a s can beassessed, this is true not 6 occa sionally

and haphazardly

but perva sively

and depe ndably .” John C . J eff ries, Jr., In Praise of 7 the Elev enth Ame ndment and Sec tion 1983 , 8 4 V a . L . Re v. 47 , 5 0 ( 19 98 ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) . So 8 the majority ’s point proves fa r too much: if a Bivens action is inappropriate whe re theindividual 9 defe ndants’ pocke tbooks are not ultimately at risk, then Bivens actions ar e always inappropriate. 10 An d whil e thema jority c ou ld b e ri ght t

hat, a s a po lic y matte r, tor

t su its a g a ins t f

ina nc ia lly 11 indif

fe re nt d e fe nd ants areunwi se , who arewea s f e de ral a pp e llate judg e s to sa

y tha t wha t is 12 standard tort

law in every state in the nation , and what has bee n repe atedly approve d by

the 13 Supreme Court and e very fede ral c ircuit, is fatal ly unacc eptable? 14 As to gra

y ma il, de fe nd ants in c ivi l su its area lw ay s su bje c t to pr e ssu

re s to se ttl e , ye t th is 15 has neve r bee n considere d a re ason to bar c ateg orica lly a ty pe of suit ag ainst g overnme nt 16 of

fi c ia ls. I s th e de sir e to a

vo id t here ve latio n o f s tate se c re ts ( a de sir e tha

t is a lr e a dy

fu lly 17 acc ommodated by the state sec rets doctrine) so diffe rent from the desire to avoid, for example, 18 devastating r eputational injury , which will often drivea state or fede ral e ntity ’s re sponse to a 19 suit? How is the hassle attendant on a c laim like Arar ’s—the “e nmesh[ing of] gove rnment 20 lawyers”and the “ elicit[i ngof] gove rnment funds for settlement,” Ma

j. O p. at 39 —so much 21 worse he re tha

n it is i n the ty

pes of suits that ever

y state has c hosen to permit and that a ll three 22 branc hes of the f ederal Gover

nment have a ccepted since Bivens was issued a lmost 40 year sOn the subjec t of gray mail, something must be said in re sponse to the majority ’s 12 rema rkableinsinuation that Canada has be en the victim of gray mail at Ara

r’s ha nds. Maj. Op. at 53-54 . ( “ It is no t f

or no thi ngthat Ca

na da (t heg ov e rnme nt, no t an in div idu a l of fi c e r o f i t) pa id Ara r $10 million dol lars.”) . The Cana dian g overnme nt decided on its own a ccord to initi ate a n inquiry into its role in Ara

r’s tre atment, an investig ation that operated independe ntly of Ara r’s su its . T ha

t in qu ir y wa s “ sp e c if

ic a lly pr e c lud e d f

ro m makin gany

fi nd ing s ( or

e ve n a sse ssm e nts ) as to whethe r the Gove rnment of Cana da would be c ivilly liable to Mr. Ara

r.” Report of the Eve nts Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis &Rec ommendations , Commi ssion of Inquiry into the Actions of Cana dian Off

icials in Relation to Maher Arar 362 ( Sept. 18, 2006). It had no power to re c omm e nd

pa y me nt, but in ste a d ju st e xpre sse d th e fa c ts s ur ro un din gAr ar’ s tr e atme nt, spelling out Cana da’s c onduct vis-à- vis Arar in hundreds of pa g es of de tail. The Canadia n g overnme nt considere d that repor t and dec ided to compensate and a pologize to Ara

r. In other wo rd s, Cana da

vo luntari ly

e sta bli sh e d a c omm iss ion

thee nti repurp os e of

wh ic h w a s to de te rm ineand

dis c us s p ub lic ly

wh at th e Cana dia

n g ov e rnme nt did t o Ara

r; it the n a sse sse d th os e fac ts and conc luded that it should neg otiate a se ttlement with him and formally apolog ize for the role of Ca nadian of ficials. Many

lessons could be dra

wn from this proce ss for the Ame rica n responseto alleg ations like Arar ’s, but one thingquite clea rly cannot besaid: that what happe ned in C a na da is t anta mou nt t o gra y ma il. My fellow dissenter s have sa id all that needs to be sa id about the majority ’s insistence 13 that Ara r’s a ction is “a c onstitut ional challeng e to policies promulg ated by the executive” a

nd that Bivensa c tio ns c ann ot p ro c e e d whe rethe y “ a ff e c t diplo ma c y , f

or e ign p oli c y

and these c urity of thenatio n. ” Ma

j. O p. at 38 . And

a s to theomi no us -s ound ingwa rn ingtha t “ [s]uc h a

su it un avo ida bly inf lue nc e s g ov e rnme nt p oli c y” and “ inv a de s g ov e rnme nt i nte re sts ,”Ma j. O p. at 39 , I would not think that an unconstituti onal cour se of g overnme nt action is shielded from sc rutiny mere ly beca use it can bedescribed as a “policy” or “ interest.” I f the DEAhad a “policy” of c o n d u c t i n gw ar

r ant l e s s h o m e s e ar c h e s , w o u l d w e h e s i t at e t o i n f

l u e n c e i t ? See B ivens , 4 03 U. S. at 389-90. I f cor

rec tions officials ac ted on an “ interest” in de nying the ir inmates medica l car e, w o u l d w e h e s i t at e t o i nv a d e i t ? See Carlson v. Gre en , 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980). 12 1 ag o? 12 2 These, the n, arethe majority ’s deter minative “spec ial fac tors”: a mix of risks that are 3 ampl y

a dd re sse d b y thestate se c re ts d oc trineand po lic y c on c e rn s th at inhe rein all Bivens actions 4 and in innumera

ble eve ry-day

tort actions as we ll. This maladaptation of a Bivens analysis, as 13 5 far as I can te ll, is m otivated by

a belief that the majority ’s holding is ne cessa ry to protect our 6 nation’s sec urity . But, a s Ihave alrea dy said, that worthy

conce rn both ca

n be and should be 7 protec ted by

alre ady exis ting ordinary

law and not by

rea chingout and potentially war ping theThe fa ct that a c laim involves an open a nd plausible constitutional question should be 14 no bar to a

state sec rets ruling . As in Iqbal , a cour t can simply

“assume, w ithout deciding, that [pla int if f’ s Bivens ] claim is actionable” a nd deter mine whether

a ca se must be dismissed even on the leg al theory

most favora

ble to the plaintiff. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1948.

13 1 Constitution. 2 III 3 Th e state se c re ts d oc trineha s r e c e ntl y c omein f

or signif ic ant c ri tic ism , mu c h o f i t 4 war

rante d. In particula

r, many commentators—not to mention the Obama administration and a 5 Ninth Circuit panel—havesug g ested that outright dismi ssal of a c ase on statesecr ets grounds 6 should be disfavore d. See, e .g. , Mohame d v. Je ppesen D ataplan, Inc. , 5 63 F .3 d 9 92 , 1 00 6 ( 9th 7 Cir. 2009), amende d at 579 F.3d 942, reh’g e n banc granted byNo. 08-15693, 2009 U.S. App. 8 L EX I S 23 59 5; Policies and Proce dures Gove rning Invocation of the State Sec rets Privilege , 9 Memorandum f

rom the Attorney

Gen. to He ads of Exec. Dep’ts and Ag encie s (Sept. 23, 2009), 10 avail

ab leat htt

p:/ /www .u sd oj. g ov/op a/do c ume nts /st ate -s e c re t- privi lig e s. pd f. Th e reis muc h to 11 these c oncer

ns. But I would note threerea sons that a threshold dismissal for wa nt of evidenc e 12 due to the existence of state sec rets (if that wereeventua lly deter mined nece ssary

) would be 13 pref

era ble to the constitutional holding madetoday . And this would be so, Isug g est, quite apa rt 14 from the importanc e of a dheringto the canon of constitutional avoidance

. 15 First, a dismissal bec ause a party simply cannot ( for reasons of

state sec rets) proffe r 16 nece ssary

evidenc e says nothing a

bout the merits of the unde rlying c laim. Whil e this may be 14 17 deeply

unfair to a

party who has be en grievously injured (a s we must assume Ar ar w as), it, at 18 least, does no da

mag e to the leg al standards by which other

parties’ claims arejudge d. 19 Second, a routine prac tice of f irst consideringstate sec rets avoids the risk of a ce rtain ty peAt oral a rgument, howeve r, the Gove rnment did indicate that it could accept such a 15 rema nd. 14 1 of Go ve rnme nt g ame sma

ns hip . I f t

heGo ve rnme nt h a s th e op tio n o f s e e kin ga state se c re ts 2 dismiss al both befor e and afte r a de cision on some open question, then it has the a bility to moot 3 unfavorable r

ulings. Consider the strategy in this case. TheGover

nment’s initial filing bef

ore 4 theDi stric t Co ur

t so ught a state se c re ts dism iss a l. I n it s b ri e f f

or thi s en banchearing, how ever , 5 afte r it had won a f avora ble substantive rulingfrom the District Court and thepanel, the 6 Go ve rnme nt did n ot m e nti on any int e re st i n a

re mand fo r a state se c re ts dism iss a l. It se e ms 15 7 more than likely

that, had the District Court or thepanel f ound ag ain st the Gover

nment on the 8 Bi v e ns question, the Gover nment would be arguing to us that the opinion below should be 9 vacated pendinga state se cre ts determination. To be sur e, a pa rty has no oblig ation to fire a ll of 10 its gun s at on c e wh e n a sin g le argume nt c an s ho ot a c la im d own. An d I

do no t me an to imp ly 11 any

devious motive on the part of the Gover

nment in this case in par

ticular. B ut there is no 12 re a so n to str

uc ture our l aw t o f

a c ili tate su c h c on du c t. 13 Third, and most important, a holdingthat Ara r, eve n if all of

his allegations ar e true , has 14 su ff

e re d n o r e me dia

blec on sti tut ion a l ha

rm le gitim ate s theGo ve rnme nt’ s a c tio ns in a wa y that a 15 state se c re ts dism iss a l w ou ld n ot. Th e c on du c t th at Ara r alle g e s is repu gna

nt, but th e ma

jority 16 signa ls—

wh e the r i t inte nd s to or

no t—t hat it is n ot constitutional ly repugnant. Indeed, the 17 majority

expressly

states that the leg al significanc e of theconduct Arar a lleg es is a matter that 18 should be left entire ly to congressional whim. See Ma j. O p. at 56-57 . Wh ilea

state se c re ts 19 dismiss al would similarly move the locus of redre ss to the politi cal br anche s, it would do so not 2 0 b y

h o l d i n gth atth e h ar

md o n e t o Ar ar

i s o f n o c o n c e r

nt o th e j u d i c i ar

y o r t o th e C o n s t i tut i o n . ItCon sid e r t hec los ingre mark s o f Judg e El lis in h is s tate se c re ts dism iss a l of Kh a le d E l- 16 Ma sri’ s si mil ar alle g atio ns : It is important to emphasize that the re sult reac hed here is requir ed by settled, controlling law. It is in n o w ay

an a dju dic atio n o f, or

c omm e nt o n, theme ri t or la c k o f m e ri t of

El

Masri’s c omplaint. . . . [ P] utting asideall the leg al issues, if El-Masri’s alleg ations are tr ueor e sse nti a lly

tr ue , th e n a ll f

a ir -m ind e d p e op le , in c ludingtho sewh o b e lie vethat st ate secr ets must be protec ted, that this lawsuit cannot proc eed, a nd that renditions area ne c e ssa ry step to takein t

his wa r, mus t a lso a gre e tha

t E l- Ma sri ha s su ff

e re d in jurie s a s a re su lt o f o ur

c ountr y ’s mis takeand

de se rv e s a

re me dy . Y e t, i t is a lso c le ar f ro m th e re su lt rea ched he re that the only source s of that re medy

must be the Executive Branch or the L eg islative Br anch, not the Judicial Branch. El-Masri v. Tene t , 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540-41 (E .D. Va. 2006)

. 15 1 wo uld

do so , in ste a d, by

a c kn ow le dg ingan in sti tut ion a l li mit atio n—du e to t hepr e se nc e of

state 2 secr ets—that is independent of the merits of Ar ar’ s claim and would, ther eby , invite other 3 branc hes to look into those possibl e merits. 4 Th is l e a ds to my fi na l po int . Wh e the r e xtra ordin a ry re nd iti on is c on sti tut ion a lly 5 permissible is a question that seems to divide our c ountry . It seems to me obvious, howeve r, that 6 re g ardle ss o f t

heprop ri e ty

of su c h r e nd iti on s, an is su e on wh ic h I wo n’ t hi demy

stron gfe e lin g s, 7 mis take s will be madein its operation. And mo reob vio us sti ll i s th at a c ivi lize d p oli ty , whe n it 8 err s, admits it and seeks to g ive re dress. In some countries, this occ urs through a royal 9 commission. In the United States, for better or worse, c ourts are , almost universally , involved. 10 This beingso, and re g ardle ss of whethe r the Constituti on itself require s that there besuch 11 re dr e ss, theob

je c t mu st b e to c re ate and us e judic ial st

ru c tur e s th at fac ili tatethe g iving of 12 compensation, at least to innocent victims, while protec ting f rom disclosure those f

acts that 1 3 cann o tb e r ev ea l edwi th o uten d an ger i n g n at i o n al s ec uri ty . T h atm i ghtwe l l o cc ur h er e thro u gh 14 thea

pp lic atio n o f a

so ph ist ic ate d s tate se c re ts d oc trine

. It do e s n ot o c c ur wh e n, at th e outse t, 1616 1 Ara

r’s c laims—though a ssumed true a nd constitutionally

signific ant—ar e tre ated a s lackingany 2 reme dy . And this is jus t what today ’s unfortunate holding doe s. It hampers a n admission of 3 e rror , if

e rror oc c ur re d; i t de c ide s c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s th at sh ou ld b e avo ide d; i t is , I su bmi t, 4 on a ll c ounts , utte rl y

wron g . I

the re fo remus t r e gre tf

ull y , b ut e mph atic a lly , d iss e nt.