______________ 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

County of Florence and Florence County Council, 

Respondents, 

v. 

West Florence Fire District, purported to have been 

created by S.C. Act No. 183 of 2014, the West Florence 

Fire District Commission, purported to have been created 

by S. C. Act. No. 183 of 2014, David Brown, Dustin 

Fails, Linda Lang Gipco, Richard Hewitt and C. Allen 

Matthews, each in his or her purported official capacity 

as a member of the West Florence Fire District 

Commission and the State of South Carolina, Defendants, 

of whom West Florence Fire District, purported to have 

been created by S.C. Act No. 183 of 2014, the West 

Florence Fire District Commission, purported to have 

been created by S. C. Act. No. 183 of 2014, David 

Brown, Dustin Fails, Linda Lang Gipco, Richard Hewitt 

and C. Allen Matthews, each in his or her purported

official capacity as a member of the West Florence Fire 

District Commission are Appellants. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-000693 

Appeal from Florence County 

J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27776 

Heard December 13, 2017 – Filed March 7, 2018 
AFFIRMED 

Blake A. Hewitt, of Bluestein Thompson Sullivan LLC, 

of Columbia and Wallace H. Jordan, Jr., of Florence, for 

Appellants. 

Steve A. Matthews, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., 

of Columbia and D. Malloy McEachin, Jr., of McEachin 

& McEachin, P.A., of Florence, for Respondents. 

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Deputy Solicitor 

General J. Emory Smith, Jr., for Defendant, State of 

South Carolina. 

JUSTICE HEARN: In this declaratory judgment action, Florence County 

challenges the validity of the West Florence Fire District, arguing that it violates this 

Court's decision in Wagener v. Smith, 221 S.C. 438, 71 S.E.2d 1 (1952) and conflicts

with the state's constitutional provisions concerning special legislation and home 

rule. See S.C. Const. art. III, § 34, and S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 7. The circuit court 

held in favor of Florence County on all three grounds, and the West Florence Fire 

District appealed. We affirm on Article VIII, section 7 grounds. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Prior to 2014, Florence County (the County) operated several special tax 

districts to fund fire protection services provided by not-for-profit fire departments. 

Each district implemented its own capital expense programs and bore responsibility 

for its own expenditures. To fund these services, the County assessed a millage rate 

based on ad valorem property taxes within each district, resulting in different millage 

rates between districts. For example, shortly before the County restructured the

districts, residents in West Florence were taxed at a rate of 8 mills while Johnsonville 

residents were taxed at a rate of 40 mills. 

In 2014, in an effort to reform the method for financing fire protection

services, the County hired a firm to analyze and recommend improvements to the 

existing scheme, one of which was to consolidate the districts into one district to 

achieve a more equitable millage rate scheme and to ensure adequate funding. Under 
 

 

the consolidated district, the County planned to assess a unified rate and provide

more administrative oversight in an effort to lower millage rates for many residents, 

cut the insurance premiums for the district, and enact a more equitable funding 

scheme. However, while the proposal expected to curtail the high millage rates for 

many residents, the rate in West Florence would nearly triple. 

The County conducted public hearings and, over the course of a few months, 

garnered enough public support for the consolidation proposal. However, residents 

of West Florence, upset about their increased millage rate, looked to their 

representatives in the General Assembly for help. In response, the General Assembly

passed Act No. 183 in the spring of 2014 (the Act), creating the West Florence Fire 

District which encompassed part of Florence County—mainly West Florence—and 

a negligible portion of Darlington County that consisted of the right-of-way along a 

one-mile stretch of Interstate 95 and three small parcels of land adjacent to the

interstate. 

The General Assembly explained the purpose of the Act, stating:

[T]hat a certain portion of Darlington County primarily consisting of 

Interstate 95 from the Florence County line northward to Exit 169 in

Darlington County is presently served by fire departments in Florence 

County because no fire department in Darlington County provides

service to this area. This therefore presents concerns for the safety and 

well-being of citizens residing and traveling in this area in addition to 

placing additional burdens on fire personnel in Florence County which 

are called on to provide fire service in this area. The General Assembly 

has therefore determined to create a joint county fire district in the same

manner other joint county fire districts have been established pursuant

to this chapter, consisting of areas in two counties, to solve this 

problem, and to provide fire service to all areas of the district on the 

most economically feasible basis possible. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 4-23-1000 (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). When the County 

challenged the constitutionality of the Act, the General Assembly reacted by passing 

an amendment (Amended Act) that: (1) clarified the precise boundary of the district; 

(2) added part of a neighborhood in Darlington County1 to the district; (3) transferred 

property from the prior district to the West Florence District; and (4) included a 

The neighborhood consists of about 100 lots and straddles the Darlington and 

Florence County lines.

1
 

 

sunset provision whereby the amendment would expire five years after its effective 

date. 

In response, the County filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing both the 

Act and the Amended Act were unconstitutional under Article VIII, section 7, 

Article III, section 34, and Wagener. The West Florence District countered that 

statutes are presumed constitutional and the County had failed to meet its burden in 

demonstrating otherwise. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County on all three 

grounds. First, the court held Wagener prohibited the General Assembly from 

establishing an entity that provided the same service in an area served by Florence 

County, noting that the rule was applied to a special tax district in North Carolina 

Electric Membership Corporation. v. White, 301 S.C. 274, 391 S.E.2d 571 (1990) 

(holding that a city council could not create a special tax district to perform water 

and sewage services in the same area where the General Assembly had previously 

created a special purpose district). Second, the circuit court found the Act violated 

the rule against special legislation under Article III, section 34. Lastly, the circuit

court held Article VIII, section 7's prohibition against laws for a specific county 

rendered the legislation unconstitutional, even though three parcels of Darlington 

County were included. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a high hurdle to 

overcome because all statutes are presumed constitutional. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C.

557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001). Furthermore, "[A] legislative enactment will 

be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave

no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the constitution." 

Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 321 S.C. 59, 62–63, 467 S.E.2d 739, 741 

(1995). 

DISCUSSION 

The West Florence District contends the Act does not violate Article VIII,

section 7 because the district encompasses more than one county. Moreover, it 

argues the circuit court improperly weighed the wisdom of the legislation, thereby 

encroaching on the prerogative of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the 

County asserts the negligible portion of Darlington County does not transform what 

is essentially a special purpose district for West Florence into a multicounty district. 

Additionally, the County claims the circuit court did not impermissibly weigh the 

wisdom of the legislation; instead, the court merely inquired into the territorial
 

 

 

 

 

composition of the West Florence District to determine whether there was sufficient

regional impact to constitutionally justify its creation. 

We begin by recognizing the General Assembly's plenary power to enact

legislation. Hampton v. Haley, 403 S.C. 395, 403, 743 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2013) (citing 

Clarke v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 438–39, 181 S.E. 481, 486 (1935) 

("[T]he General Assembly has plenary power over all legislative matters unless 

limited by some constitutional provision.")). One constitutional limitation is 

commonly referred to as "home rule," which this Court has recognized as a means 

to determine how power is allocated between the General Assembly and local 

governments. See Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 311 S.C. 417, 422, 429 

S.E.2d 802, 804–05 (1993) (citing Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company 

v. City of Aiken, 279 S.C. 269, 271, 306 S.E.2d 220, 221 (1983) ("Article VIII of the

South Carolina Constitution was completely revised for the purpose of

accomplishing home rule; thus granting renewed autonomy to local government.")). 

Prior to the 1970s, "Columbia [was] the seat of county government," as the General

Assembly had the power to control local functions. Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 

565, 571, 206 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1974). However, the state constitution was amended 

to reverse this allocation of power,2 and under Article VIII, section 7, the General 

Assembly cannot enact legislation "relating to a specific county which relates to 

those powers, duties, functions and responsibilities, which under the mandated 

2

 Addressing special purpose districts within a county, the Court in Knight warned: 

There is a sound reason for curtailing the power of the General

Assembly to create special purpose districts within a county. If, despite 

the prohibition of laws for a specific county, the General Assembly may

continue to carve a given county into special purpose districts, a 

frightful conflict would exist between the power of the General

Assembly and the power of the county government. Each county could 

be carved into enumerable special districts. Commission[s] or other 

agencies might be established for each, with each given the power to 

perform a function intended to have been vested in the county 

government. Such a result could well be chaotic and home rule intended 

by Section 7 would be frustrated in whole or in part since the result 

could well be that the governing body in each county contemplated by 

the draftsmen of Section 7 would have little or no power left. To point 

out the potential results of such a theory compels its rejection. 

Knight, 262 S.C. at 572–73, 206 S.E.2d at 878.
 

 

systems of government, are set aside for counties." Kleckley v. Pulliam, 265 S.C. 

177, 183, 217 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1975). This transfer of power "reflects a serious 

effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to restore local 

government to the county level." Knight, 262 S.C. at 569, 206 S.E.2d at 876. While 

Article VIII, section 7 did not dissolve pre-home rule special purpose districts, it 

does apply to legislation enacted post-home rule that concerns a special purpose 

district created prior to the rule. Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. City of 

Spartanburg, 283 S.C. 67, 80, 321 S.E.2d 258, 265 (1984). 

South Carolina jurisprudence is clear that a special purpose district limited to 

one county violates home rule. In Knight, the Court held that a special purpose 

district established by the General Assembly and limited to providing recreational 

facilities in a portion of Dorchester County was unconstitutional because it violated 

Article VIII, section 7. Knight, 262 S.C. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878. In discussing 

home rule, the Court noted, "It is clear that Section 7 sought to put an end to this 

practice, at least insofar as it relates to special purpose districts within a given

county." Id. However, the Court expressly left open the question of whether Article 

VIII, section 7 prevents multicounty special purpose districts. Id. at 573, 206 S.E.2d 

at 878. 

The Court again addressed the limits of home rule in Kleckley, which involved 

a pre-home rule special purpose district funded in part by legislation enacted after

home rule. In that case, the Court denied an Article VIII, section 7 challenge to 

legislation that funded improvements to airport facilities within the RichlandLexington Airport District. Kleckley, 265 S.C. at 180, 217 S.E.2d at 218. In order to

fund the improvements, the General Assembly imposed an annual ad valorem tax on 

property within the district. Id. In response to a taxpayer lawsuit claiming the 

legislation violated Article VIII, section 7, the Court upheld the provision because it

concerned two counties, and more significantly, because the district's purpose 

triggered a state-wide interest rather than a purely local concern limited to one

county. Id. at 185, 217 S.E.2d at 221. Emphasizing the importance of the airport 

district as a state interest, the Court ultimately held the legislation was "not a county 

function within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 7, but one of state concern." Id. 

at 187, 217 S.E.2d at 222 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court weighed the function 

of the district more heavily than the territorial boundary. 

Just one year after Kleckley, the Court reached a different conclusion in 

Torgerson v. Craver, 267 S.C. 558, 563, 230 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1976), which also 

involved funding for facilities within an airport district. This time the Court relied 

heavily on the fact that the Charleston County Airport District was solely within 

Charleston County. Id. at 563, 230 S.E.2d at 230. Additionally, the Court stated that
 

 

 

although the airport served travelers from across the region, the county was capable 

of solving any problems within the district, unlike in Kleckley, where neither 

Richland nor Lexington County alone could regulate the district. Id. While the

physical boundary of the district was important, the Court clarified its holding in 

Kleckley, noting that the bond legislation in Kleckley was not for a specific county 

but rather for a region. 

Kleckley and Torgerson demonstrate the conjunctive nature of the analysis—

in determining whether legislation violates home rule, a district's physical 

boundaries and function must be taken into account. In this case, the West Florence 

District relies in part on a 2011 South Carolina Attorney General's opinion that 

focuses almost entirely on the district's physical boundary. S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. dated 

Apr. 25, 2011 (2011 WL 1740746). Addressing the South Lynches Fire District, the 

2011 opinion reversed an earlier opinion which concluded that district was probably 

unconstitutional. Id. (reversing S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. dated June 16, 1983 (1983 WL 

181917)). 

The 2011 opinion acknowledged earlier attorney general opinions that 

suggested the Court's decisions in Kleckley and Torgerson stood for the proposition 

that the nature of the service—whether regional in scope or purely local—and 

physical territory are both important in the analysis. Id. However, the 2011 opinion 

articulated the principle that only physical territory is relevant in determining

whether Article VIII, section 7 is violated. Nevertheless, the 2011 opinion addressed 

a fire district split approximately 60% in Florence County and 40% in Williamsburg 

County. We find that scenario readily distinguishable from the instant case, where

the vast majority of the challenged district is located in one county and only a 

comparatively small portion is located in an adjacent county.3

Moreover, the Court noted in Kleckley that since the General Assembly could 

not legally pass a special act to curtail the governing body's county-wide powers, it 

was likewise impermissible for the General Assembly to achieve the same result 

indirectly. Kleckley, 265 S.C. at 184, 217 S.E.2d at 220. Here, home rule precludes 

legislation of fire protection services specific to West Florence. See S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 4-9-30(5) (1986 & Supp. 2017) (stating fire protection services are part of a county 

government's enumerated powers); S.C. Code Ann. § 4-19-10 (1986 & Supp. 2017) 

(enacting the Fire Protection Services Act). Therefore, it follows the General 

Assembly cannot indirectly accomplish the same goal merely by adding a small 

3 It appears from the record that the three parcels in Darlington County total onetenth of a square mile and represent less than 1% of the district. 
 

amount of acreage of another county; to do so would render Article VIII, section 7

meaningless. Kleckley and Torgerson demonstrate that where the legislation's 

function is local and within a county, home rule mandates the County is the proper 

body to address the matter rather than the General Assembly. 

Accordingly, we find the Act creating the West Florence District violates 

home rule. Because our analysis of Article VIII, section 7 is dispositive, we decline 

to reach the district's remaining two grounds for reversal. Young v. Charleston Cty. 

Sch. Dist., 397 S.C. 311, 310, 725 S.E.2d 107, 111 (2012) (declining to address 

additional grounds after reaching a dispositive issue). 

CONCLUSION 

In summary, we affirm the circuit court and hold the creation of the West 

Florence District violates Article VIII, section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution 

because the district is not truly a multicounty district. To hold that including three

parcels—totaling one-tenth of a square mile—is sufficient to remove the legislation 

from the purview of section 7 would eviscerate home rule. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM and REMAND the matter to the circuit court for 

its approval of a plan to transition the district to county control. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.