HEARING ON MILITARY MODERNIZATION


AND CROSS-STRAIT BALANCE


HEARING


BEFORE THE 

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 

REVIEW COMMISSION

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 6, 2004 

Printed for the use of the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.uscc.gov 

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

ROGER W. ROBINSON, Jr., Chairman 

C. RICHARD D’AMATO, Vice Chairman 

CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, Commissioner PATRICK A. MULLOY, Commissioner 

GEORGE BECKER, Commissioner WILLIAM A. REINSCH, Commissioner 

STEPHEN D. BRYEN, Commissioner MICHAEL R. WESSEL, Commissioner 

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, Commissioner LARRY M. WORTZEL, Commissioner 

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH, Commissioner 

DAVID J. OHRENSTEIN, Executive Director 

ROBERT A. BEAN, Senior Advisor and Director Public and Governmental Affairs 

KATHLEEN J. MICHELS, Associate Director 

The Commission was created in October 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 sec. 1238, Public Law 106– 

398, 114 STAT. 1654A–334 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. sec. 7002 (2001)), 

as amended, and the ‘‘Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003,’’ 

Public Law 108–7, dated February 20, 2003. Public Law 108–7 changed 

the Commission’s title to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

The Commission’s full charter is available via the World Wide Web: http:// 

www.uscc.gov. 

The Commission’s Statutory Mandate begins on page 166. 

(II) 

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

MARCH 10, 2004 

The Honorable TED STEVENS, 

President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable J. DENNIS HASTERT, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515 

DEAR SENATOR STEVENS AND SPEAKER HASTERT: 

On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we are 

pleased to transmit the record of our hearing on February 6, 2004, on China’s ‘‘Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance.’’ U.S. cross-Strait policy and U.S.-

China relations are intertwined. Taiwan remains the key political and military flash 

point between the two countries, driving both China’s military modernization efforts 

and U.S. military assistance to Taiwan. 

The Commission is mandated by law (P.L. 108–7, Division P) to ‘‘review the triangular economic and security relationship among the United States, Taipei and 

Beijing, including Beijing’s military modernization and force deployments aimed at 

Taipei, and the adequacy of United States Executive Branch coordination and consultation with Congress on United States arms sales and defense relationship with 

Taipei.’’ 

The Commission’s hearing took place at a time of heightened tension in crossStrait relations. China’s ballistic missile build-up directed at Taiwan has been escalating in recent years. Such a build-up appears clearly designed to coerce Taiwan 

into accepting unification with China and/or to deter moves toward independence by 

Taiwan. In January, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian announced his decision to 

hold a national referendum as part of the Presidential election balloting on March 

20, 2004. The referendum would seek a national opinion on the question of whether 

Taiwan should deploy advanced anti-missile defenses to counter China’s missile deployment and whether Taiwan should be negotiating a cross-Strait framework for 

peace and stability with Beijing. The response from Beijing, which views the referendum as a further move toward independence by Taiwan, has been one of strong 

condemnation and rhetoric, including threats of a possible military response. President Bush has publicly reiterated U.S. opposition to actions by either side that seek 

to alter unilaterally the status quo. Notably, he made such a statement in the presence of visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December. 

During our hearing on February 6, the Commission heard from senior State and 

Defense Department officials on current developments in U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relations, from experts on the parameters of U.S. commitments to Taiwan 

under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the role of Congress laid out in the TRA, 

and from analysts of China’s military modernization programs and its military-industrial complex. 

China’s military modernization program. Between 1989 and 2002, as China’s 

economy has rapidly expanded, China’s official defense budget for weapons procurement grew more than 1,000 percent, significantly outpacing China’s GDP growth. 

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has become a major buyer of foreign military technologies, and is now the principal purchaser of Russian military weapons 

and technology. China’s increased military spending and acquisitions of foreign military technologies have greatly enhanced China’s military capabilities. 

During the late 1990s, the PLA began focusing its efforts toward developing military options and capabilities to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. The 

PLA has undertaken programs designed to improve its force options against Taiwan 

and to deter and counter potential U.S. military intervention during any cross-Strait 

conflict. China’s military modernization is focused on exploiting vulnerabilities in 

Taiwan’s national and operational-level command and control system, its integrated 

air defense system, and Taiwan’s reliance on Sea Lines of Communication for sustenance. At the same time, Taiwan’s relative military strength appears likely to deteriorate unless Taiwan makes substantial new investments in its own defense. 

The Commission also heard testimony that China’s defense firms have significantly improved their R&D techniques and their production processes. As the PLA 

shifts away from purchasing complete weapon systems from foreign suppliers to acquiring military-related technology, China’s defense production capabilities will become a critical factor in the PLA’s long-term effort to renovate its force structure. 

China has been able to serialize the production of destroyers based on stealthy designs with improved air defense and anti-submarine capability. China has also improved its ability to serial produce ballistic missiles with an increase in annual proiii 

Insert names.eps

duction of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) from 50% to 75%. However, despite

rapid improvements, China’s defense industry is not yet capable of producing global 

state of the art weapons systems on par with the United States. 

China’s continuing missile build-up opposite Taiwan is a serious challenge to Taiwan’s security. The Defense Department’s 2003 report to the Congress on China’s 

military indicates that China now has approximately 450 short range ballistic missiles that can strike Taiwan and forecasts that this number will grow substantially 

over the next few years.

Given these developments, the Commission is concerned by reports that the European Union (EU) nations are debating whether to lift the EU’s current arms embargo on China, imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, and 

begin selling military equipment to Beijing. The Commission believes such action 

would undermine legitimate security concerns, be destabilizing to the region, and 

is unjustified by any improvement in China’s human rights record, as documented

in the Department of State’s recently released Human Rights Report 2003. 

Recommendation: The Congress should urge the President and the Secretaries 

of State and Defense to strongly press their EU counterparts to maintain the EU 

arms embargo on China. Further, the Congress should request the Department

of Defense to provide a comprehensive report to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction on the nature and scope of Russian military sales to China. In addition, 

Congress should urge the Executive Branch to continue its positive working relationship with the Israeli government to limit Israeli military sales to China. 

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The Taiwan Relations Act gives Congress a joint role 

with the Executive Branch in the fashioning of U.S. cross-Strait policy, particularly 

with regard to how the U.S. should respond to cross-Strait conflicts and what arms 

the U.S. should sell to Taiwan to assist in its defense needs. Nonetheless, it appears 

that Congress has regularly been excluded from cross-Strait policy decisionmaking 

by a succession of Administrations. Congress has too often been notified only after

the Administration has, in effect, made a decision on the sale of specific weapons 

to Taiwan. There has been some improvement in recent years in the consultative 

process between the Congress and the Executive Branch, but certain important documents or reports the Executive Branch has prepared on this subject have never 

been shared with the Congress. Given the potential for military conflict in the region, Congress needs to take a more direct oversight role in the process. The type

of consultation that was envisioned by Congress at the time of passage of the TRA 

is going to be critical now in managing U.S. foreign policy towards China and Taiwan. 

Recommendation: Congress should enhance its oversight role in the implementation of the TRA. Executive Branch officials should be invited to consult on intentions and report on actions taken to implement the TRA through the regular committee hearing process of the Congress, thereby allowing for appropriate public 

debate on these important matters. This should include, at a minimum, an annual 

report on Taiwan’s request for any military aid and a review of U.S.-Taiwan policy 

in light of the growing importance of this issue in U.S.-China relations. 

Recommendation: The responsible committees of Congress should request that 

the Executive Branch make available to them a comprehensive catalogue and copies of all the principal formal understandings and other communications between 

the United States and both China and Taiwan on the parameters of the trilateral 

relationship, as well as other key historical documents clarifying U.S. policy in 

this area. 

The Commission will be closely following cross-Strait developments in the run-up 

and aftermath of the Taiwan Presidential election and referendum vote on March 

20. We may develop additional recommendations regarding Congressional-Executive 

Branch coordination on U.S. cross-Strait policy as part of our upcoming Report to 

Congress later this spring. 

Sincerely, 

Roger W. Robinson, Jr. C. Richard D’Amato 

Chairman Vice Chairman 

Note: 

Commissioner Bryen dissented from the Commission’s majority in submitting these 

recommendations. 

iv 

CONTENTS 

Page 

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2004

HEARING ON MILITARY MODERNIZATION 

AND CROSS-STRAIT BALANCE 

Opening remarks of Chairman Roger W. Robinson, Jr. ....................................... 1


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2


Opening remarks of Vice Chairman C. Richard D’Amato .................................... 3


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4


Opening remarks of Commissioner Larry M. Wortzel, Hearing Co-Chair ......... 4


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6


Opening remarks of Ambassador Robert F. Ellsworth, Hearing Co-Chair ......... 6


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7


PANEL I: ADMINISTRATION VIEWS—U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN TRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 

Statement of Richard P. Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 


Asian and Pacific Affairs ..................................................................................... 8


Statement of Randall G. Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East 


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10


Asian and Pacific Affairs ..................................................................................... 13


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15


Panel I Discussion, Questions and Answers .......................................................... 16


PANEL II: TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT—ADEQUACY OF CONSULTATION 

Statement of Harvey J. Feldman, U.S. Ambassador, Retired, Senior Fellow 


for Asian Studies, The Heritage Foundation ..................................................... 29


Statement of Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Professor, Political Science De-


Statement of John F. Copper, Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International 


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31


partment, Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri ......... 34


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36


Studies, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee .................................................. 41


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43


Panel II Discussion, Questions and Answers ........................................................ 45


LUNCHEON SESSION 

Statement of Jacques deLisle, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania ... 56


Luncheon Session Discussion, Questions and Answers ........................................ 66


PANEL III: CHINESE ARMS/WEAPONS PURCHASES AND SUPPORTING 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

Statement of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, 


Center for Security Policy ................................................................................... 72


Statement of David M. Finkelstein, Deputy Director of Project Asia, Center 


Statement of Evan S. Medeiros, Ph.D., Associate Political Scientist, The 


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 74


for Naval Analysis Corporation, Center for Strategic Studies ......................... 90


RAND Corporation ............................................................................................... 93


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96


Panel III Discussion, Questions and Answers ....................................................... 103


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VI 

Page 

PANEL IV: MILITARY TRENDS IN THE CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONSHIP 

Statement of Jason E. Bruzdzinski, Senior Professional Staff, The MITRE 


Corporation, McLean, Virginia ........................................................................... 113


Statement of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political 


Statement of Lyle J. Goldstein, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Naval Warfare 


Studies, U.S. Naval War College, and William Murray, Retired Commander 


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 116


Science, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia ...................................... 124


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 126


and Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War College .................................................. 129


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 135


Panel IV Discussion, Questions and Answers ....................................................... 156


HEARING ON MILITARY MODERNIZATION 

AND CROSS-STRAIT BALANCE 

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Commission met in Room 1310, Longworth House Office 

Building, Washington, D.C. at 10:30 a.m., Commissioners Robert F. 

Ellsworth and Larry M. Wortzel (Hearing Co-Chairs), presiding. 

OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN ROGER W. ROBINSON, JR. 

Chairman ROBINSON. All right. If we might begin. One of our 

witnesses for this morning, Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard 

Lawless, is on his way, and if we might, I’d like to begin with our 

opening statements. 

On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, I would like to welcome you to our public hearing. Our 

focus today is on the political and military relationship between the 

United States, China and Taiwan. My colleagues, Ambassador Robert Ellsworth and Larry Wortzel, will co-chair today’s hearing and 

guide us through this important topic. 

U.S. cross-Strait policy covers all aspects of our relationship with 

China. It remains the key political and military flash point between the two countries, driving both China’s military modernization efforts and U.S. military assistance to Taiwan. The Congress 

made clear the importance of these issues by directing the Commission to assess, and I quote, ‘‘the triangular economic and security 

relationship among the United States, Taipei, and Beijing, including Beijing’s military modernization and force deployments aimed 

at Taipei, and the adequacy of the United States’ Executive Branch 

coordination and consultation with Congress on the United States 

arms sales and defense relationship with Taipei.’’ 

Recent developments have heightened tension in this trilateral 

relationship. Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s decision to hold a 

national referendum on China’s military build-up during next 

month’s Presidential election has prompted strong rhetoric from 

Beijing concerning a possible military response. At a minimum, it 

appears likely to push Beijing to accelerate further its already substantial military modernization programs. 

The proper response to these developments by the United States 

is at the heart of our investigation today and, in fact, the broader 

mission of the Commission. 

Much of the debate about the rise of China since the early 1990s 

has centered on how fast China’s economic and military capabilities 

are increasing and how the United States should properly react to 

(1) 

2 

Beijing’s offensive build-up. This hearing will take this assessment 

to the next level by examining what China might actually do militarily and politically in different scenarios. We will also look at the 

historical underpinnings of U.S. cross-Strait policy—the Taiwan 

Relations Act and the three Communique ́s—and the parameters 

set out for U.S. commitments to Taiwan. 

At this juncture, it bears repeating a statement I made on this 

subject at our December 4 hearing on ‘‘China Growth as a Regional 

Economic Power: Impacts and Implications.’’ In response to Beijing’s threatening rhetoric concerning Taiwan’s proposed 

referenda—which has again been evidenced over the past week— 

I noted that given this environment, the United States would be 

well advised to maintain its long-standing unstated policy of not 

actively supporting but also not opposing democratic moves in a direction that Beijing perceives to be toward independence with a 

goal of a peaceful outcome. 

Moreover, it would be counterproductive and even perilous for 

our government to allow us to be perceived as, in effect, endorsing 

Beijing’s view of what constitutes a, quote, ‘‘provocation’’ in crossStrait relations. 

In sum, China’s military modernization and its cross-Strait political posture are central to the Commission’s mandate to assess the 

national security implications of the U.S.-China economic relationship. I look forward to our comprehensive discussion of these issues 

today, and with that, I’d like to turn to the Commission’s Vice 

Chairman Dick D’Amato for his opening statement. 

[The statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Chairman Roger W. Robinson, Jr. 

On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, I would 

like to welcome you to our public hearing. Our focus today is on the political and 

military relationship between the United States, China and Taiwan. My colleagues, 

Ambassador Robert Ellsworth and Larry Wortzel, will co-chair today’s hearing and 

guide us through this important topic. 

U.S. cross-Strait policy colors all other aspects of our relationship with China. It 

remains the key political and military flashpoint between the two countries, driving 

both China’s military modernization efforts and U.S. military assistance to Taiwan. 

The Congress made clear the importance of these issues by directing the Commission to assess ‘‘the triangular economic and security relationship among the United 

States, Taipei and Beijing, including Beijing’s military modernization and force deployments aimed at Taipei, and the adequacy of United States Executive Branch coordination and consultation with Congress on United States arms sales and defense 

relationship with Taipei.’’ 

Recent developments have heightened tension in this trilateral relationship. Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s decision to hold a national referendum on China’s 

military buildup during next month’s presidential election has prompted strong 

rhetoric from Beijing concerning a possible military response. At a minimum, it appears likely to push Beijing to accelerate further its already substantial military 

modernization programs. The proper response to these developments by the U.S. is 

at the heart of our investigation today, and in fact the broader mission of the Commission. 

Much of the debate about the rise of China since the early 1990s has centered 

on how fast China’s economic and military capabilities are increasing and how the 

United States should properly react to Beijing’s offensive buildup. This hearing will 

take this assessment to the next level—by examining what China might actually do 

militarily or politically in different scenarios. We will also look at the historical 

underpinnings of U.S. cross-Strait policy—the Taiwan Relations Act and the three 

Communique ́s—and the parameters they set out for U.S. commitments to Taiwan. 

At this juncture, it bears repeating of a statement I made on this subject at our 

December 4 hearing on ‘‘China Growth as a Regional Economic Power: Impacts and 

3


Implications.’’ In response to Beijing’s threatening rhetoric concerning Taiwan’s proposed referenda—which has again been in evidence over the past week—I noted 

that given this environment, the United States would be well-advised to maintain 

its long-standing unstated policy of not actively supporting, but also not opposing, democratic moves in a direction that Beijing perceives to be toward independence 

with the goal of a peaceful outcome. Moreover, it would be counterproductive, and 

even perilous, for our government to allow itself to be perceived as in effect endorsing Beijing’s view of what constitutes a ‘provocation’ in cross-Strait relations.

In sum, China’s military modernization and its cross-Strait political posture are 

central to the Commission’s mandate to assess the national security implications of 

the U.S.-China economic relationship. I look forward to our comprehensive discussion of these issues today. 

OPENING REMARKS OF VICE CHAIRMAN C. RICHARD D’AMATO 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join Chairman Robinson in welcoming everyone to what I 

believe is one of the critical areas this Commission has been asked 

by Congress to examine: the current cross-Strait military balance 

and the resulting political implications for the United States. 

The upcoming referendum vote in Taiwan and China’s rhetoric 

in response make these issues as timely as ever. It has become apparent that Washington rightly wants to avoid friction with Beijing 

over Taiwan in the midst of joint efforts on terrorism and North 

Korea with the Beijing regime. The U.S. is not keen on complicating factors, political or other confrontation with China over the 

cross-Straits relations. 

Nonetheless, the proposed Taiwan referendum—a device that is 

common among democracies, and I would note that Taiwan has become a democracy—over China’s military build-up across the Strait 

and China’s saber rattling make it necessary for the Executive 

Branch and Congress to be very clear on where the United States 

stands with regard to its commitments to Taiwan. 

The role of the Congress in the development of U.S.-Taiwan policy is central and has been central. The TRA, the major legal underpinning of our policy toward Taiwan over the years, of course, 

was written almost wholly in the Congress during the Carter Administration. We want to renew the adequacy of the consultative 

procedures that are called for in that Act. I would note that former 

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and other major political figures in the Executive Branch since his time have guarded Taiwan 

and China policy jealously as an exclusive domain of the Executive 

Branch and in some ways, played a game of keep-away with the 

Congress in terms of U.S.-China policy and U.S.-Taiwan policy, a 

game which really needs to end. 

We believe it is important for this hearing to look at the level 

of consultation, therefore, between the Executive Branch and the 

Congress envisioned by the Taiwan Relations Act—the governing 

document of U.S.-Taiwan policy. 

The TRA calls for Congress to exercise a unique role vis-a`-vis 

Taiwan. Congress is authorized to make specific determinations 

jointly under that Act with the President as to Taiwan’s defense 

needs and both the President and Congress are to determine appropriate action in the event there is any danger—I would emphasize 

‘‘jointly’’ determine appropriate action in the event there is any 

danger to U.S. interests arising from a threat to Taiwan. 

We want to know exactly how that joint decisionmaking process 

is going to play out, what procedures are in place, what committees 

4 

and how the leadership is consulted, and specifically in advance of 

an emergency. 

Today we’ll examine both the specifics of China’s military modernization programs, the implications for Taiwan and U.S. crossStrait policy and the role of the TRA as the foundation of this policy. The time is ripe for better Congressional-Executive coordination in an area of U.S. foreign policy where the stakes are so high 

and past communications have been rather inadequate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Vice Chairman C. Richard D’Amato 

Let me join Chairman Robinson in welcoming everyone to what I believe is one 

of the critical areas the Commission has been asked by Congress to examine—the 

current cross-Strait military balance and the resulting political implications for the 

United States. The upcoming referendum vote in Taiwan and China’s rhetoric in response makes these issues as timely as ever. 

It has become apparent that Washington wants to avoid friction with Beijing over 

Taiwan. In the midst of joint efforts on terrorism and the North Korean nuclear crisis, the U.S. is not keen on a political or other confrontation with China over crossStrait developments. Nonetheless, the proposed Taiwan referendum over China’s 

military buildup across the Strait and China’s vociferous threats of retaliation make 

it necessary for the Executive Branch and Congress to be clear on where the U.S. 

stands with regard to its commitments to Taiwan. 

The role of the Congress in the development of U.S.-Taiwan policy shouldn’t be 

underestimated. We believe it is important for this hearing to look at the level of 

consultation between the Executive Branch and Congress envisioned by the Taiwan 

Relations Act (TRA)—the governing document of U.S.-Taiwan policy—and how such 

consultation has played out in the twenty-five years since its enactment. 

The TRA calls for Congress to exercise a unique role vis-a`-vis Taiwan. Congress 

is authorized to make specific determinations jointly with the President as to Taiwan’s defense needs and both the President and Congress are to determine appropriate action in the event there is any danger to U.S. interests arising from a threat 

to Taiwan. 

Today we will examine both the specifics of China’s military modernization programs, the implications for Taiwan and U.S. cross-Strait policy, and the role of the 

TRA as the foundation for this policy. The time is ripe for better Congressional-Executive coordination in an area of U.S. foreign policy where the stakes are high and 

past communication has been low. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Co-Chairman Wortzel and then we’re going 

to turn it over to the Co-Chairman for this morning’s hearing, Ambassador Ellsworth. 

OPENING REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER LARRY M. WORTZEL 

HEARING CO-CHAIR 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today, we’ll explore the issue of China’s military modernization and what that 

means to the security of the United States and its relations with 

Taiwan. 

The Republic of China is a thriving democracy of more than 23 

million people with a market economy. It’s the seventh largest 

trading partner of the United States. The Taiwan Relations Act in 

1979 mandates that the President of the United States provide appropriate defensive services to Taiwan to meet the military threat 

from the PRC. 

As Section 3(a) of the Act states: ‘‘The United States will make 

available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in 

such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain 

5 

a sufficient self-defense capability,’’ and part of today’s hearing will 

allow us to judge just what Taiwan may need to defend against. 

Now, China represents a very different challenge for the United 

States than did the Soviet Union. Certainly no ideological challenge 

to Western liberal democracy and free enterprise from China. And 

China has not built thousands of nuclear warheads with which to 

attack the United States. 

China and the United States are not fighting proxy wars around 

the world. Nonetheless, China does present a strategic military 

threat and a regional threat because of its nuclear and missile programs and its ability to attack U.S. deployed forces and U.S. allies. 

Some systems acquired recently by China include advanced fighter aircraft, Kilo-class submarines equipped with CLIB-long range 

anti-ship missiles and electro-optical and radar satellites. 

Now, I think there’s encouraging evidence that the U.S. strategy 

of engagement and trade with China is working. A middle class is 

forming in the country, and as people begin to own homes and 

businesses and travel for pleasure, they’re increasingly less supportive of Beijing’s military policies including the Chinese Communist Party’s insistence that Taiwan be taken by force if necessary. 

Nonetheless, China remains a one-party state, dominated by a 

Communist Party that represses its own people and maintains the 

capacity to coerce its regional neighbors. I’d like to mention one 

major area of concern for us here in the Commission, and that’s the 

trade in sophisticated technologies. 

While many of these technologies are civilian in nature and have 

improved China’s standard of living, elements of these technologies 

can be used against the United States. 

Another important issue is weapons in space. For some time 

now, China has spearheaded an international movement to ban 

conventional weapons from space, and I refer here to space-based 

missile defenses, and has introduced a draft treaty at the United 

Nations to outlaw the deployment of such weapons. 

At the same time, Beijing quietly continues to develop its own 

space-based weapons and tactics to destroy American assets. Its 

strategy is to blunt American military superiority by limiting and 

ultimately neutralizing America’s existing defense assets and 

frankly to forestall the deployment of new technology that many 

experts believe would provide the best protection for the United 

States and its allies against ballistic missile attack. 

The PLA’s military planners are convinced that America’s 

strength can become its Achilles heel, and by strength I refer specifically to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the knowledge of what’s 

going on in the world and on the battlefield. 

And the PLA believes that if China can neutralize or destroy our 

space assets in particular, American forces will lose a critical advantage leaving them more vulnerable to China’s larger but far 

less advanced military. 

I thank all of you for being here, and I thank the Chairman for 

his time. 

[The statement follows:] 

6 

Prepared Statement of Commissioner Larry M. Wortzel 

Hearing Co-Chair 

Today we will explore the issue of China’s military modernization and what it 

means to the security of the United States and its relations with Taiwan. Taiwan 

is a thriving democracy of more than 23 million people with a market economy. It 

is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States. The Taiwan Relations 

Act of 1979 mandates, that the President of the United States provide appropriate 

defensive services to Taiwan to meet the military threat from the PRC. 

Fortunately, China is not, and is unlikely to be, a strategic military threat the 

way the Soviet Union once was. There is some encouraging evidence that the U.S. 

strategy of engagement and trade with China is working. A middle class is forming 

in the country and, as people begin to own homes and businesses and travel for 

pleasure, they increasingly are less supportive of Beijing’s military policies, including the Chinese Communist Party’s insistence that Taiwan be taken (by force, if 

necessary). 

I would, however, like to mention one area of concern—that is the trade in sophisticated technologies. While these technologies are civilian in nature and have improved China’s standard of living—elements of these technologies can be used 

against the United States. For example the issue of weapons in space—for some 

time now, China has spearheaded an international movement to ban conventional 

weapons from space and has introduced a draft treaty at the United Nations to outlaw the deployment of space-based weapons. At the same time, Beijing quietly continues to develop its own space-based weapons and tactics to destroy American military assets. Its strategy is to blunt American military superiority by limiting and 

ultimately neutralizing its existing space-based defense assets, and to forestall deployment of new technology that many experts believe would provide the best protection from ballistic missile attack. 

These lessons have convinced PLA military planners that America’s strength can 

become our Achilles heel. If they can neutralize or destroy our space assets, American forces will lose a critical advantage, leaving them far more vulnerable to China’s larger but less-advanced military. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you. Co-Chairman Ellsworth. 

OPENING REMARKS OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH 

HEARING CO-CHAIR 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’ve been 

asked by Congress to look into the impact of China’s military and 

modernization programs on U.S. national security. We’ve also been 

asked to delve into the current status of the Taiwan Relations Act. 

This one Act has guided U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations 

since 1979 and a review of its continuing validity to support U.S. 

national security is in order. So that’s a big part of what we’re 

about. 

There are many long-range issues that face both the United 

States and China. China is seen by many as an economic powerhouse that has the potential to translate its economic power into 

military power. We in the United States have the potential to 

translate our global military and economic power into cooperation. 

The eventual reunification of North and South Korea, the emergence of China as a regional power, its national policy concerning 

military unification if necessary—all these are issues that the 

United States must address. 

Specifically now is the time to do some hard thinking about Taiwan. The United States is faced with a number of difficult decisions. For example, what is the extent of U.S. willingness to militarily support Taiwan in the face of our military operations in the 

Middle East and in the face of Chinese acquisition of the types of 

weapons and systems that would permit it to conduct modern operations against U.S. military forces in East Asia? Specifically, weap­

7


ons necessary to conduct anti-carrier operations critical to any U.S. 

defense of our interest in the western Pacific. 

China’s continued ballistic missile and nuclear warhead development programs remain a concern. The approximately 500 missiles 

opposite Taiwan and the annual increase in numbers are vital strategic issues to the United States. 

Finally, President Chen Shui-bian’s continued pursuit of a security referendum and his recent comments about establishing a reported demilitarized zone with China all have increasingly stressed 

relations between Taiwan, China and the United States. 

Today, during the whole day, we will be hearing from a variety 

of experts, experts on the Taiwan Relations Act, its implication and 

development, as well as researchers of China’s military programs. 

[The statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Ambassador Robert F. Ellsworth

Hearing Co-Chair 

Today the Commission is holding a significant hearing on the Taiwan Relations 

Act and China’s military modernization programs. We have been asked by the Congress to look into the impact China’s military modernization programs will have on 

U.S. national security. Additionally, we have been asked to delve into the current 

status of the Taiwan Relations Act. This one Act has guided U.S.-China and U.S.-

Taiwan relations since 1979 and a review of its continuing validity to support U.S. 

national security is in order. 

There are many long-range issues that face both the United States and China. 

China is seen by many as an economic powerhouse that has the potential to translate its economic power into military power. The United States has the potential to 

translate global military and economic power into cooperation. The eventual reunification of North and South Korea, the emergence of China as a regional power, its 

national policy concerning military unification if it’s necessary, are all issues that 

the United States must address. 

Now is the time to do some hard thinking about Taiwan. The United States is 

faced with many difficult decisions, for example, what is the extent of U.S. willingness to militarily support Taiwan in the face of Chinese acquisition of the types of 

weapons and systems that would permit it to conduct modern operations against 

U.S. military forces. Specifically weapons necessary to conduct anti-carrier operations critical to any U.S. defense of our interests in East Asia. China’s continued 

ballistic missile and nuclear warhead development programs remain a concern. The 

approximately 500 missiles opposite Taiwan and the annual increase in numbers 

are vital strategic issues to the United States. Finally, President Chen Shui-bian’s 

continued pursuit of a security referendum and his recent comments about establishing a reported demilitarized zone with China all have increasingly stressed relations between Taiwan, China, and the United States. 

Today we will be hearing from a variety of experts, experts on the Taiwan Relations Act, its implementation and development as well as researchers of China’s 

military programs. 

PANEL I: ADMINISTRATION VIEWS—U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN 

TRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Our first panel this morning will examine 

the Administration’s current views of the trilateral relationship 

among the United States, China and Taiwan. We hope also to address this morning the Defense Department’s assessment of the 

qualitative military balance between China and Taiwan. We’ll discuss China’s focused military activities against Taiwan and if, in 

fact, the PLA has put together a strategic plan to accomplish military unity with Taiwan. 

This morning we are honored to have Mr. Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Lawless assumed his position October 2002. He received his 

8


B.S. in international relations from Bradley University School of 

International Studies and studied Korean at the Defense Language 

Institute in Monterey, California. 

And Mr. Randy Schriver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He’s responsible for the PRC, Taiwan, Mongolia and Hong Kong. Prior to his current position with 

the East Asia Bureau, Mr. Schriver served for nearly two years as 

Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor to Deputy Secretary of 

State Richard Armitage. 

Welcome, gentlemen. Let me explain the procedure. We are asking each of you to make a preliminary statement. We thank you 

for your texts, which we have. You should use about seven minutes 

for each of your original statements, and then five minutes for each 

Commissioner in turn to ask you questions and to have you answer. What I’m saying is five minutes for the question and the answers. I know that’s not entirely up to you, but the cutoff will be 

five minutes. But first we look forward to your statements, one 

after another, before we go to questions from up here. 

Mr. Lawless, would you like to go first, and Mr. Schriver, would 

you like to follow? Okay. Please. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD P. LAWLESS 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

Mr. LAWLESS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Commission. I’d like to begin my statement by apologizing for being 

somewhat tardy. I did miss the opening statement by the Chairman, and I apologize for that. My embarrassment is doubly important here because this is an issue, the subject to this panel, that 

we at the Department of Defense take extremely seriously, and we 

certainly look forward today to responding to the questions and indeed have taken very careful note of the letter that was sent to us 

inviting us here today. 

I will begin with a brief statement. I’ll attempt to limit it to the 

time required. However, I may run over a little bit in that we have 

attempted to incorporate in this statement specific responses to 

your letter, and you did pose a lot of very specific questions to us. 

So I’ll run right along with this if I might. 

First of all, again, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you 

regarding the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. It’s especially 

important to address these issues, we believe, as we enter a critical 

election period on Taiwan. In the interest of reserving time, again 

I will attempt to cover many of the questions that you raised in 

your letter to us. 

First of all, a general statement. The overarching U.S. goal, of 

course, is to preserve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The policy of the United States toward Taiwan and the PRC is integral to this goal. We maintain our obligations toward Taiwan as 

stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act, not only because it is the 

law of the land, but also because it’s good policy. 

We also seek to maintain fair and balanced relations with China 

and the Chinese defense establishment, also because it’s good policy to do so. These two approaches are complementary, and we 

work very hard to make sure that they are indeed complementary 

and support our often-stated interest that the PRC and Taiwan 

9 

should peacefully resolve their differences. A constructive and 

peaceful Taiwan-PRC dialogue serves the interests of all the parties and is a major element, we believe, in achieving long-term regional peace and stability. 

Turning to U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense, the United States 

Government has engaged with Taiwan in several ways to ensure 

that the United States is prepared appropriately to implement relevant sections of the Taiwan Relations Act. I should add here that 

this has been an absolute consuming interest of the team that we 

have at the Department of Defense today, and it is something that 

we address on an absolutely continuing basis. 

The United States actively monitors the security situation in the 

Taiwan Straits. We make available articles and services to Taiwan 

to ensure that it can maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

We work with Taiwan on a series of non-hardware related initiatives to address perceived shortcomings in Taiwan’s readiness, and 

we maintain capabilities to assist in the defense of Taiwan if so required. 

To maintain the peace in the Taiwan Strait, President Bush has 

made it clear that the United States opposes the unilateral transformation of Taiwan’s status whether through the use of force or 

a declaration of independence. The preservation of Taiwan’s democracy depends on effectively balancing these two goals while providing Taiwan with the support it needs to deter PRC coercion. 

The TRA stipulates that ‘‘the United States will make available 

to Taiwan such defense articles and services and in such quantity 

as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient selfdefense capability.’’ The TRA states that ‘‘the President and the 

Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense 

articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs 

of Taiwan in accordance with procedures established by law.’’ 

The TRA further asserts that ‘‘such determination of Taiwan’s 

defense needs shall include a review by the United States military 

authorities in connection with recommendations to the President 

and the Congress.’’ 

One of your parties has already referenced Section 2(b) of the 

TRA, and I will not read that to you because that’s a very well established piece of U.S. policy. 

The United States takes its obligations to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-defense capability very seriously. The Bush Administration’s national security strategy that calls for a, quote, ‘‘building 

a balance of power that favors freedom’’ identifies the spread and 

protection of freedom and democracy as a national security objective of the United States. 

Taiwan’s development into a true multi-party democracy over the 

past decade has strengthened America’s commitment to its defense. 

As long as Taiwan has a capable defense, the environment will be 

more conducive to peaceful dialogue, and thus the region as a 

whole will be more stable. 

Taiwan’s challenges. As it enters the 21st century, Taiwan faces 

significant challenges. First, the PRC’s ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over Beijing’s declared preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means. Taiwan 

faces an increasingly powerful PRC with an accelerated military 

10 

modernization program, which is designed to improve China’s force 

options versus Taiwan and it is designed to deter and counter U.S. 

military intervention. 

This modernization is focused on exploiting vulnerabilities in 

Taiwan’s national and operational-level command and control system, its integrated air defense system, and Taiwan’s reliance on 

sea lines of communication for sustenance. As the PRC rapidly 

modernizes its military in order to provide its leadership with credible options for the use of force, Taiwan’s relative military strength 

will deteriorate, unless—— 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Mr. Lawless. 

Mr. LAWLESS. Yes. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Under the seven-minute rule, you have a 

couple of more minutes, and you’re a long way from the end of your 

splendid statement. 

Mr. LAWLESS. I will encapsulate and move very quickly, if that’s 

all right. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you so much. 

Mr. LAWLESS. Okay. If I may repeat, as the PRC rapidly modernizes its military in order to provide its leadership with credible options for the use of force, Taiwan’s relative military will deteriorate 

unless Taiwan makes sufficient investments in its own defense. 

As the PRC accelerates its force modernization program, Taiwan 

remains isolated in the international community, especially in the 

area of security cooperation. Although several states quietly collaborate with Taipei on security matters, the United States is alone 

in its political courage, strategic imperative and sense of moral responsibility in assisting Taiwan. 

Taiwan is therefore challenged. These challenges are serious but 

not insurmountable. Our defense relationship with Taiwan seeks to 

reverse negative trends in its ability to defend itself, possibly obviating the need for massive U.S. intervention in a crisis scenario 

and allowing Taiwan’s political leaders to determine the island’s future from a position of strength. 

If deterrence fails, Taiwan, as supported by the U.S. and its allies, must be prepared to swiftly defeat the PRC’s use of force. 

It is important to reiterate our belief that any improvements in 

the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship as we look at our bilateral relationship with China is not a zero-sum game. Any improvement in 

our bilateral relationship should not and will not come at Taiwan’s 

expense, but rather serve to prevent possible misperceptions and 

promote restraint. 

Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and 

stability fostered by a positive U.S.-Beijing relationship. 

With that, I’ll conclude my statement. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Richard P. Lawless 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Affairs 

Introduction 

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. Thank you for 

this opportunity to speak to you about the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. 

It is especially important to address these issues as we enter a critical election period on Taiwan. In the interest of reserving time to answer any questions you may 

have, I have prepared a statement that specifically addresses your interest in the 

11 

views of the Department of Defense toward the U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship. 

The overarching U.S. goal is to preserve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 

region. The policy of the United States toward Taiwan and the PRC is integral to 

this goal. We maintain our obligations toward Taiwan as stipulated in the Taiwan 

Relations Act, not only because it is law but because it is good policy. We also seek 

to maintain fair and balanced relations with China’s defense establishment, also because it is good policy. These two approaches are complementary and support our 

often-stated interest that the PRC and Taiwan peacefully resolve their differences. 

A constructive and peaceful Taiwan-PRC dialogue serves the interest of all the parties and is a major element in achieving long-term regional peace and stability. 

U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense 

The United States Government is engaged with Taiwan in several ways to ensure 

the United States is prepared appropriately to implement relevant sections of the 

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The United States actively monitors the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, makes available articles and services to Taiwan to ensure 

it can maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, works with Taiwan on a series 

of non-hardware related initiatives to address shortcomings in Taiwan’s readiness, 

and maintains capabilities to assist in the defense of Taiwan if required. To maintain the peace in the Taiwan Strait, President Bush has made clear that the United 

States opposes the unilateral transformation of Taiwan’s status, whether through 

the use of force or a declaration of independence. The preservation of Taiwan’s democracy depends on effectively balancing these two goals, while providing Taipei the 

support it needs to deter PRC coercion. 

The TRA stipulates that ‘‘the United States will make available to Taiwan such 

defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 

to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.’’ The TRA states that ‘‘the President 

and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and 

services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance 

with procedures established by law.’’ The TRA further asserts that ‘‘such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.’’ 

Section 2(b) states: 

It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future 

of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a 

threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area and of grave concern 

to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 

to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 

forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. 

The United States takes its obligation to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-defense capability very seriously. The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy that calls for ‘‘building a balance of power that favors freedom’’ identifies the 

spread and protection of freedom and democracy as a national security objective of 

the United States. Taiwan’s development into a true multi-party democracy over the 

past decade has strengthened America’s commitment to its defense. As long as Taiwan has a capable defense, the environment will be more conducive to peaceful dialogue, and thus the whole region will be more stable. 

Taiwan’s Challenges 

As it enters the 21st century, Taiwan faces significant challenges. First, the PRC’s 

ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over Beijing’s declared preference for 

resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means. Taiwan faces an increasingly powerful PRC with an accelerated military modernization program aimed at 

improving its force options versus Taiwan, and deterring or countering United 

States military intervention. This modernization is focused on exploiting vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s national- and operational-level command and control system, its integrated air defense system; and reliance on sea lines of communication for sustenance. As the PRC rapidly modernizes its military in order to provide its leadership 

with credible options for the use of force, Taiwan’s relative military strength will 

deteriorate, unless it makes significant investments into its defense. 

As the PRC accelerates its force modernization program, Taiwan remains isolated 

in the international community, especially in the area of security cooperation. Although several states quietly collaborate with Taipei on security matters, the United 

States stands alone in its political courage, strategic imperative, and sense of moral 

responsibility in assisting the security of Taiwan’s democracy. Taipei’s isolation lim­

12 

its choices on procurement and force modernization. Taiwan’s isolation also constrains its ability to exploit technological, organizational, and doctrinal aspects of 

the ongoing global military transformation. Finally, its isolation creates uncertainties with regard to procurement of foreign weapon systems, which in turn complicates development of a long term, coherent force modernization strategy. 

Taiwan’s defense establishment faces a wide array of other challenges as it attempts to keep pace with developments across the Taiwan Strait. Economic trends, 

the domestic debate over defense strategy, national identity issues, service parochialism, all complicate Taiwan’s force modernization, training, and jointness. As 

opinion polls consistently indicate a lack of popular concern about attack from 

China, Taiwan is faced with an increasingly constrained defense budget. Over the 

last 10 years, Taiwan’s defense budget has shrunk in real terms and as a proportion 

of its gross domestic product (GDP). 

Overcoming Challenges 

These challenges are serious, but not insurmountable. Our defense relationship 

with Taiwan seeks to reverse negative trends in its ability to defend itself, possibly 

obviating the need for massive U.S. intervention in a crisis, and allowing Taiwan’s 

political leaders to determine the island’s future from a position of strength. If deterrence fails, Taiwan, supported by the U.S. and its allies, must be prepared to 

swiftly defeat the PRC’s use of force. 

The United States maintains an active dialogue with Taiwan’s defense authorities 

to better understand their current capabilities and future requirements, and to assist Taiwan in improving its defense. Since 1997, the Department of Defense has 

conducted more than a dozen studies, reports, assessments, and surveys that have 

evaluated Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs. 

Armed with a solid base of knowledge and consistent with our legal obligations 

under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. is assisting Taiwan to create a professional, civilian-controlled defense establishment that is modern, joint, and able to 

function effectively should it be required to defend itself. DoD is supporting Taiwan 

in developing an integrated national security strategy; joint doctrine; and integrated 

capabilities for training, employing, and sustaining joint forces. 

Taiwan has succeeded in focusing attention on critical steps that must be taken 

in order to enhance Taiwan’s defense in the next 3–5 years. For the first time in 

10 years, Taiwan has increased its defense budget as a proportion of its gross domestic product. It has taken positive steps to modernize its C4ISR system and undercut the political and military utility of the PRC’s most effective means of coercion—its growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballistic 

missiles and ever more capable submarine force. It has invested in passive defense 

systems, streamlined its military force, addressed pilot shortages, and drafted and 

implemented a detailed plan for the recruitment and retention of civilian personnel. 

While modernizing its force in a focused manner, there is still progress to be 

made. We believe that Taiwan should devote greater resources to readiness, including personnel management, logistics, maintenance, and training. Taiwan should further strengthen its strategy and force planning processes, and develop the means 

to identify and correct deficiencies. We also suggest that Taiwan enhance interoperability among its Services, and with the United States and other potential security 

partners. We also believe that it should better protect classified information and enforce strict discipline it its executive and legislative interaction with the media. 

China and U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations 

Our deepening defense cooperation with Taiwan is a direct result of Beijing’s increasingly threatening military posture. The PLA’s growing sophistication, including 

its efforts to complicate U.S. intervention, calls for more consistent strategic harmonization between the U.S. and Taiwan to improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself 

and reduce the danger to U.S. forces should intervention become necessary. The 

U.S. Government’s ability to use a wide range of security assistance tools consistent 

with the nature of the U.S.’ unofficial relations with Taiwan can help it improve its 

defenses, and, should U.S. intervention be necessary, reduce the risk to U.S. forces. 

In all our dialogues, we make clear to the PRC that we will continue to support 

Taiwan in its legitimate defense needs not only because it is required by U.S. law, 

but also because it serves the wider interests of peace and stability in the region. 

We also have made clear that we support only a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 

issue, and regard any attempt to resolve the issue by other than peaceful means, 

or any other action that threatens regional stability, to be of grave concern to the 

United States. Similarly, the U.S. Government believes that its commitment to a 

one-China policy and opposition to any moves by Taiwan unilaterally to change the 

status quo are keys to maintaining the peace. Nobody should mistake increasing 

13 

U.S. support for Taiwan’s security as an endorsement of Taiwan independence. We 

seek to preserve a stable, secure environment that helps the people on both sides 

of the Strait to resolve their differences peacefully. 

It is important to reiterate our belief that any improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum: they will not come at Taiwan’s expense, but 

rather serve to prevent possible misperceptions and promote restraint. Taiwan will 

be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and stability fostered by positive 

Washington-Beijing relations. 

Ultimately, the U.S. position is that the Taiwan issue is for people on both sides 

of the Strait to resolve. This remains the best approach and our policy must remain 

consistent in this regard. Indeed, this is the only long-term guarantee of a peaceful 

and durable solution across the Taiwan Strait. It is also a necessary element in 

guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. We want to be very lenient with you because of the importance of what you’re saying here, but we’ll now 

interrupt and see if we have some questions from the Commissioners. No, we’ll go to Mr. Schriver and then we’ll come back to 

you and we’ll invite you at that time to say whatever you want to 

in addition to what you’ve said because this statement is a very important statement. Thank you. 

Mr. Schriver. 

STATEMENT OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Good morning. Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, 

thank you again for the opportunity to be here with you today to 

talk about a very important topic. I’ll focus my remarks on the 

cross-Strait relationship and the Administration’s view of it and 

our approach to try to foster an environment conducive to peace 

and stability. 

As Mr. Lawless mentioned, our overriding objective, and, in fact, 

I think its fair to say the overriding objective of seven consecutive 

Administrations from both parties over the course of three decades 

has been and remains to be to preserve peace and stability in the 

Taiwan Strait. 

In this regard, we maintain our one China policy, our one China 

policy as defined by the three Joint Communique ́s and the Taiwan 

Relations Act. There are other elements that support this policy 

such as our strong opposition to the use of force, our non-support 

for Taiwan independence, and our support for the six assurances. 

This approach coupled with our forward-deployed forces in the 

region have helped to create a peaceful environment which has allowed the people on both sides to benefit from an economic relationship and people-to-people ties, and we’ve actually seen that increase over the last several years. 

Second, I’d note that there is a stated intent on both sides of the 

Strait to seek a peaceful resolution of this, and I think that remains important. This has been an element that has been, I think, 

under appreciated recently because of the absence of a cross-Strait 

dialogue, but we need to do what we can to help the two sides get 

back to a point where they can talk with one another directly because that is really the key to any hope for a peaceful solution is 

to have the two sides talk to one another. 

Third, it’s very important to note publicly and privately at every 

opportunity that we support Taiwan’s democracy. We admire, we’re 

14 

proud of what’s been accomplished there, and we applaud the 

democratic evolution in Taiwan, particularly noting the peaceful 

transfer of power for the first time from one party to another in 

the 2000 election. 

We expect this upcoming election—in fact, we’re well into the 

heat of it—to be a heated contest and a hard-fought campaign, and 

we look forward to working with whoever wins this campaign, either party, the President and the Vice President. 

Fourth, as Mr. Lawless stated, the military modernization program of the Chinese is of very high interest to the United States 

and of concern. We can say that some elements of this program you 

could describe as natural. Any country wants to take steps to defend itself and protect interests, but clearly there’s elements that 

exceed that normal expectation and trouble us in that it certainly 

gives the appearance there is a desire to have a capability for 

power projection, a capability to use the military as a means to intimidate, coerce Taiwan and potentially if asked to do so by political leaders, address that situation through use of the military. 

So there are many aspects of the Chinese military modernization 

that are troubling to us, and I’d leave the details for discussion, 

and I think Mr. Lawless has already mentioned some. I’ll just mention one. 

I think the missile deployment is of most significant concern. 

Just given the overwhelming size of the deployment and the rapid 

pace with which the Chinese have been proceeding with those deployments. We’ve made clear our position on the use of force. China 

should renounce the use of force to solve this issue. The military 

build-up contributes to tensions and it doesn’t lead us in the direction of a peaceful resolution. 

I do want to also mention the referenda as was mentioned in 

opening statements because I know it’s of great interest, and I do 

want to be clear. We support referenda in principle. As noted, this 

is a normal tool for democracies. It should be a tool available to 

Taiwan. It’s in Taiwan’s constitution—the word ‘‘referendum’’ and 

the ability to use it to settle certain questions. 

I think we have some questions about this particular proposal. 

Deputy Secretary Armitage most recently addressed this in public 

because we observe that normally democracies would turn to a referendum to settle difficult and divisive issues, and referendum normally have a bottom up sort of appearance. 

These two questions that we understand are under consideration 

don’t seem to fall into that category of difficult and divisive, and 

therefore I think does raise some legitimate questions about the 

motives involved. 

I think it’s also important to note that irrespective of a referendum, we have opinions on these two questions. We have opinions, and I think Mr. Lawless can go into detail about the first 

question on whether or not Taiwan should take steps to address 

the missile threat through increased defense spending. We think 

that’s an absolute yes, and of course, the second question, should 

there be a framework for peace and stability in the cross-Strait environment, absolutely. 

So whether or not these questions are turned over to the public 

for their opinion, we have opinions on this, and we think it re­

15 

quires leadership from both sides of the Strait to address these 

questions. 

In conclusion, I want to note what the President said on December 9. It had an important message, but it had an important message for both sides. To the Chinese, the message is very clear that 

we oppose the use of force to address and to attempt to resolve the 

cross-Strait situation. To the Taiwan side, of course, it also addresses our concerns that there may be interest in taking steps 

that unilaterally change the status quo in the political sense. 

So this was an important statement. It’s been supportive of our 

overall policy and it has been a consistent line that we’ve had and 

will continue to sustain. 

Thank you for your time and for having me here again this 

morning, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Randall G. Schriver 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address the Commission on the issue of Chinese military modernization and its relation to recent 

developments in cross-Strait relations. I am pleased to be here with Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Lawless who is particularly well qualified to address many 

of the concerns you might have about the issue of China’s military modernization. 

For my part, I will focus on the cross-Strait relationship and the Administration’s 

view of it, in light of the steadily increasing capability of the People’s Liberation 

Army. 

First, our objective has been consistent for more than three decades and through 

seven Administrations of both parties: to preserve peace and stability in the region. 

In this regard, we maintain our one China policy, based on the three Joint 

Communique ́s and the Taiwan Relations Act. This approach, coupled with our forward deployed forces in the region, has helped create a peaceful environment in 

which mutually beneficial economic and people-to-people ties have expanded dramatically across the Strait in recent years. 

Second, I would note that political leaders on both sides of the Strait have expressed their desire to seek a peaceful resolution of their differences. The problem 

has been that at the most important senior levels, they have not been talking with 

one another. The Administration has encouraged Beijing and Taipei to find some 

way to enter into direct communication, without the kinds of preconditions that 

have been discussed previously. 

Third, America stands firmly behind democracy in Taiwan. We applaud the evolution of Taiwan’s democratic experience and the presidential elections in 2000 

which led, for the first time, to the peaceful transfer of power from one party, the 

Nationalist Party or Kuomintang, to another, the Democratic Progressive Party or 

DPP. 

We expect a similarly hard fought, democratically contested election on March 20. 

We are committed to working with the democratically elected President and Vice 

President of the next government of Taiwan, whoever they may be. 

Fourth, military modernization has been high on China’s list of priorities since 

the start of its economic reform more than 25 years ago, but, for the most part, has 

been closely tied to China’s main domestic agenda, rapid economic development. 

Many of the efforts China has made at streamlining and professionalizing its military, upgrading its capabilities, improving command and control functions have 

been the natural and logical outgrowth of a nation that seeks to ensure its borders 

are safe from threat and that it can defend its interests in an uncertain world. 

However, there are some aspects of Chinese military modernization—command 

and control, naval and amphibious upgrades, missile placement, especially as it is 

and other deployments and investments directed at improving the PRC’s capability 

to target Taiwan. We do not take for granted that the PRC may ultimately elect 

to use force to settle cross-Strait differences, and we have made our position on the 

use of force clear to China, both publicly and privately. With regard to all of these 

capabilities, the State Department, along with other USG agencies, has pointed out 

that the military buildup contributes to tensions, which in turn lead to distrust on 

both sides. Let me note that we have been especially concerned about the PRC’s de­

16 

ployment of ballistic missiles along its Eastern seaboard. Such a deployment is inherently destabilizing. We have raised the issue of Taiwan-targeted missiles with 

the PRC at the highest levels and continue to do so regularly. I want to assure you 

that we are going to do our utmost to make sure that there isn’t any kind of conflict 

in the Taiwan Strait area. 

I know that you are also interested in our view of the recent referenda, which 

President Chen Shui-bian has offered for consideration by the voters concurrent 

with the March 20 election. We support referenda in principle; they are tools that 

all democratic countries use to gauge the sentiments of the people, though it’s usually the case that you have these referenda coming from the bottom rather than 

drawn up by the top. 

As the Deputy Secretary said in Beijing, referenda are generally reserved for very 

difficult and divisive issues, but the wording of these referenda is neither difficult 

nor particularly divisive. The Secretary of State has noted that we are still studying 

the text of President Chen’s proposed referenda. We do not endorse any particular 

referendum or phrasing, but we will wait to see the context, and how it is used domestically in Taiwan. 

In conclusion, both sides of the Strait need to reflect on the President’s December 

9 statement, during the visit of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao. The U.S. does not support 

Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral attempts, by either side, to change the 

cross-Strait status quo. We can’t get much clearer than that, no matter how many 

times we are asked to reiterate it, no matter how many requests we have for clarification. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks and I would be happy to take 

questions from you and your fellow Commissioners. 

Panel I: Discussion, Questions and Answers 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Schriver, and thank you 

again, Mr. Lawless. Commissioner D’Amato has a question. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for your testimony on this rather important matter. I have a 

question on the missile deployment and the referenda. I note in 

your testimony, Mr. Lawless, that you refer to the opinion polls in 

Taiwan as showing a lack of overall concern among the population 

as to the level of threat or the attack from China, that there is 

some level not a high level of concern. 

On the other hand, I think our evaluation of the missile deployment, as Mr. Schriver mentions, is that certainly it’s a threatening 

deployment; it’s overlarge. One wonders why. 

Let me ask you this. Does not it seem logical—it seems logical 

to me—does it not seem logical to you that a leadership looking— 

in a democracy, looking at the missile deployment, it certainly 

would be within the realm of understandability that they would 

want to call attention to that via some mechanism. Something like 

a referenda in a democracy is a well-known tool in order to engage 

its population as to the level of threat that you all have said this 

represents, that it seems to us it represents. That this is certainly 

a reasonable and appropriate mechanism, and that, as I understand the Administration, does not—and tell me if I’m wrong—interpret that referenda as an attempt at declaration of independence 

or an exercise of sovereignty, but does, in fact, address a very real 

issue confronting Taiwan. If I were a citizen of Taiwan, I would 

consider a very real issue confronting me to see this very large missile deployment. How would you react to that—my statement? 

Mr. Lawless. I’d like both of you to actually, if you would. 

Mr. LAWLESS. I’m going to leave a little bit of the interpretation 

of the politics to the State Department. However, I would like to 

note that the reason that we mentioned in the prepared statement 

our concerns about Taiwan’s ability to mobilize and indeed focus on 

17 

the threat is really a function of the participatory democracy that 

they have moved into this phase. 

We now, as we interact with the Taiwanese, find it a much more 

complex series of relationships that we have to deal with. We have 

a Legislative Yuan that’s highly involved now in the defense process including the appropriations and budgeting process, which has 

become a multi-year fairly complicated situation. 

We have a defense establishment which is essentially attempting 

to morph itself very quickly and perhaps on a faster timeline than 

our own defense establishment was able to morph itself into both 

a civilian bureaucracy and bring itself into a joint or a joint status, 

if you will. 

So there are activities going on within Taiwan that are, in fact, 

favored by us. Certainly the evolution of the defense establishment 

is favored by us just simply for pure decisionmaking issues as well 

as interacting with the Legislative Yuan and the Executive Yuan. 

These issues complicate, I believe, a national consensus so the 

issue that you raise and the issue that we raise here in focusing 

the government’s ability to focus the people on the necessity of a 

sufficient defense budget is extremely important, and it’s an issue 

that we have returned to again and again, and I think was alluded 

to in some of the Commissioner’s statements here earlier, and it’s 

perhaps an issue that we could talk later more about, but it’s a 

very important issue. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. We think the missile threat and the missile challenge is extremely serious, and we’ve been engaged with the Taiwan authorities and our interlocutors for some time on the serious 

nature of it and what we think needs to be done to address it. 

I think this calls for some leadership in Taiwan, not of any particular political party, not just the President but the legislature as 

well. It requires leadership to convince the public that it’s necessary to expend the resources to be properly prepared to deal with 

this challenge. I don’t know that a referendum necessarily helps or 

hurts, but I think it requires leadership to make these decisions. 

The questions about resources are always difficult in periods of 

economic challenge and budgetary challenge, but this is an issue 

that needs that kind of leadership and dedication. This is something we’ve worked with Taiwan on and we’re prepared to continue 

to work. So again whether a referendum helps the cause, hurts the 

cause, I don’t know. 

Our overriding interest is that Taiwan be prepared to deal with 

this challenge, and to the extent they want our help to do that, 

we’re standing by for that. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you. Your references to the complications that arise as a result of having a legislative body are 

well known here. I remember Secretary of State Baker once told 

Mr. Gorbachev—Gorbachev complained to him about the Duma. He 

said, well, anybody who wants a legislature certainly is welcome to 

have one. I think it was in jest, but I have some other questions 

later, but I’ll defer them. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, gentleman. Chairman Robinson has some questions. 

18 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you. I wanted to probe a little more 

into the nature of the missile threat and what an appropriate response might be. On the matter of leadership in Taiwan, I certainly 

take your point, Mr. Schriver, that one might have different interpretations of the motives and environment in which these statements have been made. Perhaps Taiwan’s President believes that 

a more informed and mobilized Taiwan public opinion could indeed 

support higher defense spending, something I think we’re all concurring is indicated via the so-called defense referendum. 

In my view, at least, a democratic-oriented approach to informing 

and mobilizing public opinion on the tough tradeoffs that inevitably 

need to take place between economic and military spending is appropriate. This may seem like an obvious question, but I’d like to 

ask you both whether you believe that the quantity and quality of 

the arms provided by the United States to Taiwan should be commensurate with the threat posed by the PRC? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think your question is embodied in the Taiwan 

Relations Act, and we’re absolutely committed to fulfilling the TRA, 

and as I understand it, that means we make weapons of a defensive character available to Taiwan in sufficient quantity to ensure 

their sufficient self-defense. 

Chairman ROBINSON. And I would assume, Mr. Lawless, that you 

have a similar view on that? 

Mr. LAWLESS. Indeed I do. I would add, however, that I think 

that it is also incumbent, and I think the Taiwan Relations Act addresses itself to this both in spirit and in verse, that it’s incumbent 

upon us to tell the Taiwanese our opinion on what would properly 

constitute a suitable defensive character, and I think both Mr. 

Schriver and myself and all of the departments involved in the U.S. 

Government have attempted to do that. That is indeed our suggestion and opinion. It is not something we can mandate, but that is 

an issue. 

As the missile threat has manifested itself I think in the last 

year or so, we’ve been especially attune to attempting to identify 

what we believe are the appropriate priorities to redress the issue. 

Chairman ROBINSON. And with over 500 missiles deployed by 

China against Taiwan now, by most estimates, and some 75 being 

added to that number per year, does it strike you as reasonable 

that beyond the defense spending increase that Taiwan may indeed 

need to acquire in rather short order an AEGIS-based missile defense system that could be inter-operable with our own to address 

the threat? 

I know that it’s not something that we’re seeking to do for a 

number of reasons, but then again trying to look at this issue of 

responding responsibly to the level of missile threat, how does that 

issue sit with you both today? 

Mr. LAWLESS. I believe that we’re, of course, well aware of this. 

This issue has been on the table for some time. I think that in due 

course it will be addressed by the Administration. At the present 

time, I think we’re more seized with the programs that we’re already discussing with them, particularly those programs that address the ballistic missile issue, both in terms of defeating any attack or in addressing shortcomings that perhaps the Chinese have 

identified in the Taiwan situation that makes them more vulner­

19 

able to a ballistic missile attack, for example, C4ISR, redundant 

command and control and other things. 

So there is an order of sequencing here if you will that we think 

is very important that they address what they can address today 

based on the approvals that are already in hand, and find a way 

to prioritize and pay for and introduce those systems as quickly as 

possible. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I understand. Thank you. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Yes, thank you very much. Commissioner 

Wortzel. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much for your testimony. In 

June 1989, in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, the European 

Council adopted a resolution that condemned the brutal repression 

taking place in China and interrupted by the member states of the 

European Community military cooperation and imposed an embargo on arms trade with China. 

Now, in the very recent past, France, Germany and the Netherlands have begun to question whether that arms embargo should 

be lifted. I think we all realize that not a single European nation 

is required, as the United States is, to maintain forces in the area 

of the western Pacific sufficient to deal with any resort to force or 

other forms of coercion by China against Taiwan. So should the Europeans do this? 

It’s certainly a direct threat to Taiwan. It certainly is a potential 

threat to United States forces and raises the ability of the People’s 

Republic of China to coerce Taiwan. 

I’m interested, I guess, Mr. Schriver, you’re sort of the guy to answer it, but I also recognize that the Department of Defense does 

run some fairly extensive international consultations in support of 

our security policy. What are you doing with the Europeans to 

make it clear that the United States opposes this? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you for the question. We are opposed to 

the EU lifting its embargo and its ban on arm sales. And we’re opposed for three reasons, just very briefly. One, the ban was originally imposed due to concerns over human rights. We don’t feel as 

though the human rights situation has improved to the point 

where it merits lifting the ban, and we have continuing problems. 

Two, we do have concerns about Chinese export control and the 

ability to protect sensitive technology from being transferred to a 

third country if the EU or anyone else was to transfer sensitive 

technology into China. So we’d like to see better export control policy and implementation of that policy. 

Third, which addresses directly the point you made, is that we 

do have obligations and interests in ensuring there’s a balance between Taiwan and China, and when I say balance, it means Taiwan having the ability to defend itself. We have other obligations, 

as you noted, that there are scenarios where we could actually be 

involved in this. 

So any contribution to the other side of the equation complicates 

our position, and that is why we’re opposed. We have been in contact with every member of the EU on this issue, stating clearly our 

position, and at the senior-most levels, my Secretary and below, 

have engaged European counterparts at almost every opportunity. 

I’m not in the room for each discussion or every phone call, but it 

20 

is certainly part of our standard talking points in our approach to 

European interlocutors right now because we understand this to be 

a sensitive time in their decisionmaking. 

Mr. LAWLESS. I’d like to add one postscript to that. In the 14 plus 

years since that embargo was put in place by the EU, I believe China’s ability to acquire, integrate and thereby multiply its force posture has really increased dramatically. In other words, what the 

EU may have to offer now may make a lot more sense in the context of where China needs to go than it ever has in the past. 

We have an increasingly sophisticated military establishment 

that’s shown itself capable of procuring, paying the price that’s necessary to pay, introducing systems, integrating those systems and 

getting the force multiplier and the additional menu of options that 

those things provide. So I think if anything the focus on what the 

EU does or doesn’t do with its arms embargo or limitation vis-a`-

vis China is much more important today than say it was even four 

or five years ago. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you very much. Commissioner 

Dreyer. 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank both of you for your very interesting and carefully written testimony. I would like to address the 

question that a referendum usually comes from the bottom up, and 

just bear with me here. The missile threat is a real one, as you 

both said, and I also see in your statements that you’re aware that 

Taiwan’s defense posture over the past couple of years has deteriorated vis-a`-vis the PRC. 

One of the reasons for this, as I read in articles written by several of the reporters here in the room today, is disagreement within 

the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China on Taiwan and 

among the population about what to buy and how to pay for it. Do 

we raise taxes they ask? Do we buy AEGIS? Do we postpone the 

purchase of Kidd-class ships, et cetera? 

And therefore it wouldn’t really seem to be out of line with the 

spirit behind a referendum to have the impetus come from the top 

since there’s a disagreement on the bottom. Would the U.S. Government’s attitude have been more positive toward the referendum 

if the impetus could have been arranged from the bottom? 

We all know about spin control. It’s really very easy for whoever 

is in power to mobilize supporters at the bottom. They’ll get people 

in Kaohsiung to get out for a parade and somebody to organize a 

referendum. Is that what really makes the difference? Or is it PRC 

lobbying? We read today in The New York Times about PRC delegations being in Washington to lobby you all. Could you address 

that question? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, it’s absolutely not about PRC lobbying, and, 

in fact, I think our support for missile defense and our encouragement of Taiwan to do more is probably the strongest evidence that 

we’re not bowing to the PRC lobbying effort. 

I think there’s a lot of context and a lot of other elements to how 

we got to where we are with this proposed referendum. This had 

the appearance—I said in the statement—normally bottom up. It’s 

normally where issues can’t be settled within the legislature, then 

21 

you turn to a referendum—normal matter how these things proceed. 

This had the appearance of a referendum looking for an issue, 

referendum looking for a topic. We heard WHO. We heard legislative reform. We heard a variety of things. It just looks different, 

and I think that does create some questions about motive and intention. You’ll notice we have not said we oppose because on the 

surface and on the text, that question does not alter the status quo 

as the President has expressed his concerns. 

But I think we do need to be mindful of the context and the activities associated with this. You know when we say we’re still 

studying the referendum. It doesn’t mean that everyday we pour 

over the words. What it means is we are watching in a mindful 

way how this is portrayed domestically, how it’s spun, if you will, 

and it’s important because it’s not just the text. 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank you for that clarification. Mr. 

Lawless. 

Mr. LAWLESS. I would like first to refer the Commissioners back 

to the prepared statement. Indeed, I don’t want to leave the impression here today that Taiwan is not doing anything to improve 

its defense. Indeed, it is making progress. The issues have to do 

with the rate of progress and the magnitude of the changes and the 

challenge its facing vis-a`-vis the Chinese threat. 

Commissioner DREYER. You actually were clear on that. 

Mr. LAWLESS. Okay. Having said that, and addressing myself to 

your question, the bottom up as opposed to the top down, irrespective of how we got here with this particular referendum issue, 

there clearly is a requirement for this nation to find a common will 

and to bring itself together. From the legislative side of the house 

you’ve noted the problems that they deal with. It is a free country. 

It’s a democracy. It’s a functioning democracy, and so however they 

manage to instill the national will to do what they have to do, that 

is the responsibility of the Taiwanese people and we don’t want to 

impose ourselves on that process, and clearly, there does need to 

be an improved national consensus about what they must do and 

how they need to spend their money and where they’re going to get 

those resources from, and that’s an issue that we’ve continued to 

come back to them on over the past year. 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank you. And I’m very happy to hear 

that we are not being intimidated by the PRC lobbying. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Commissioner Bryen. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Secretary Lawless and Secretary Schriver, for your testimony. I 

think I should start by saying that the work the Administration is 

doing or trying to do to provide sufficient defense for Taiwan is 

very much appreciated, certainly by me and I think by the American people. 

I have one question actually about some of the language you 

used and how to apply it. Mr. Schriver, in your testimony you 

spoke about no unilateral steps to change the status quo, obviously 

referring to the referendums. Isn’t the build-up of missiles a unilateral step to change the status quo? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I actually didn’t mean to be specific to the referendum when I said that, and I don’t think that’s the President’s 

22 

intent or anyone else’s intent. And, in fact, it does address both 

sides of the equation and it would address the missile threat. 

When we talk about the status quo, we’re careful how we talk 

about it because to really define it, you’d have to give a very 

lengthy description and an arcane discussion of politics and economics, but when we, I think really the operative part and what 

we really mean is there’s a situation where there is fundamental 

disagreement and sustained disagreement over a period of time 

that is being managed peacefully, and we don’t want to see steps 

by either side that disrupts that part of the status quo, and I think 

the military posture is certainly a step not in the right direction. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Good. Well, let’s follow that up just a little 

bit. If that’s so, are we raising with the Chinese side on a consistent and strong basis complaints about the build-up of the missiles? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Absolutely. No question. Our most recent senior 

visitor to China was Deputy Secretary Armitage. He raised this at 

several points and raised it publicly. I think from our Department, 

probably the most high profile public statement on China was Secretary Powell’s speech at College Station, and he addressed the 

missile build-up very explicitly with a very senior Chinese audience 

there, and that I think got a lot of press. 

Commissioner BRYEN. To carry it one step further, is the buildup of missiles, in your opinion, the kind of extortion somewhat like 

what North Korea is trying to do? 

Mr. LAWLESS. Let me tackle that from more of a perhaps military 

perspective than a political perspective. I think one of the interesting elements of this very rapid build-up, both quantitatively and 

qualitatively in the missile force, not to mention all of the other 

areas where the build-up predominates vis-a`-vis Taiwan is that I 

think our idea is that it is clearly not just a question of quantitative or qualitative advantage or disadvantage. Clearly, with this 

rapid pace of build-up and with the build-up directed so forcefully 

and frontally against Taiwan, it’s clearly an attempt to change the 

dynamic. 

And by dynamic, I mean to an extent, China’s calculation on 

what the cost would be to China both in terms of resource and in 

terms of time that would have to be devoted to coerce or invade a 

Taiwan. So there is this issue that I think we are still wrestling 

with understanding, and how that dynamic is actually changing, 

and I think that’s one of the things that the leadership in Taiwan 

is wrestling with—how to explain this to its people. 

Taiwan has so long enjoyed this qualitative edge that it could 

rely on, to now be challenged and confronted in both a qualitative 

and quantitative aspect and then taking that back and explaining 

it to their populace may not be that simple. 

Commissioner BRYEN. I just want to offer one comment. There’s 

a much longer conversation here that’s required, but I was in Taiwan in 1996 during the missile exercise. I can assure you that you 

didn’t need to explain it to the Taiwanese people. You certainly 

didn’t need to explain it to me. It was pretty frightening. And so 

far as I could see, Taiwan had no response to it. 

23 

I think we’re still in the same situation, and I’m not sure that 

just providing some sort of missile defense is an adequate answer 

to the dilemma. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Commissioner. Commissioner 

Mulloy, please. 

Commissioner MULLOY. I’m not an expert on political and military issues. I do follow trade issues very carefully, but I want you 

to help me make sure I understand what’s going on in this area. 

My understanding is that after the revolution, Chiang Kai-shek 

went off to Taiwan and maintained himself as the legitimate government of all of China even though he was on the small island 

off the coast of about 23 million people. 

My understanding is that in 1972, President Nixon signed the 

Shanghai Communique ́ in which we acknowledged that there is but 

one China and Taiwan is a part of China. We acknowledged that 

both sides claimed that. 

My further understanding is that at that point, we had a defense 

agreement with Taiwan, and that when President Carter recognized China and we entered diplomatic relations with China in 

1979, that we ended that defense agreement with Taiwan. My further understanding is that Senator Goldwater and others sued 

President Carter to declare that that was unconstitutional what he 

did, that he didn’t have that authority, and that the Supreme 

Court upheld President Carter and so we did not have a defense 

arrangement with Taiwan. 

I further understand that in the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by 

the Congress, the Congress said that we would provide the Taiwanese what they need to defend themselves. We still have no obligation to defend Taiwan. That’s my understanding. 

So my further understanding is that there are about 500,000 Taiwanese now living and working in China and that Taiwan has invested enormous amounts of money to help the Chinese further 

build their industrial base and military capabilities. 

It’s my further understanding that the Taiwanese when we offered them additional weapons a couple of years ago after the 

President said that we would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan, when we offered them additional weapons, they did not want 

to purchase them, they did not tax themselves to pay for those 

weapons, and so they were never purchased. 

So I’m wondering if the Taiwanese don’t perceive the threat, 

what are we doing in pressing them to further buy new weapons 

if they don’t perceive it that way? They see this economic relation 

with China going quite dramatically. We have no formal obligation 

to defend Taiwan. It’s a situation that doesn’t quite jive, and so if 

you could comment on my understanding. Maybe I’m way off the 

mark on this. I’m not a political military expert. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, I think that was a very modest statement 

given the extensive history you just recited. I mean it was quite 

good. We don’t have a defense treaty, but the Taiwan Relations Act 

not only talks about providing weapons for sufficient self-defense. 

There are two other operative elements. 

One, as Mr. Lawless mentioned in his statement, we have an obligation to maintain the capacity to resist force if asked to do so. 

And number two, if there is a threat to the people on Taiwan, and 

24 

I don’t have the exact language in front of me, but the threat is 

defined explicitly to, and in a very comprehensive broad way, talks 

about economic threat, that the President would consult with Congress to determine appropriate action. 

That’s not a defense treaty, but there are some very important 

obligations there. To go just a bit further, when Premier Wen 

Jiabao was in Washington, one of the things that was said privately in a conversation that the President had with the Premier 

is that if there is a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, it’s very likely we’ll 

be involved, and so, no, there is no formal defense treaty, but questions about our involvement and questions about our obligations, I 

think, lead us in the direction that we do have to be very mindful 

of how we’re prepared and how Taiwan is prepared to deal with 

this contingency. 

So if your starting point is there’s a good chance we’d be involved, I think we do need to be mindful of how Taiwan is preparing itself and the steps that it’s taking. So we do have a role 

in providing not only our opinions and advice, but we have direct 

equities. If there are steps that they don’t take, there are scenarios 

under which we’ll be presented with filling that gap. 

So it’s important that we help shape the debate in Taiwan and 

that we make our views known because of our strong equities here. 

And I guess the last thing I’d say is I’d take issue a little bit with 

how you characterize it. I don’t think it’s that Taiwan doesn’t see 

a threat or they don’t agree with us on the threat. I think it’s a 

bit more complicated than that, but they are having some difficulties with how they make the resourcing decisions and how they 

make discrete decisions along the way to address the threat, but 

I think there is an appreciation of the threat among the military 

and among the leadership there. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Well, I would pursue this, but I guess 

my time is up, but these are issues I think we really have to probe 

a little bit. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Do you have anything quickly to add, Mr. 

Lawless? 

Mr. LAWLESS. Just a brief note. I do believe the operative language in that Section 2(b) of the TRA does address itself that obligates United States or the Administration to maintain the capability of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 

forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social 

or economic system of the people of Taiwan. 

That puts us in a situation where frankly it is incumbent upon 

us to encourage the Taiwanese to do what they need to do to dissuade China to the maximum extent possible from taking risks 

that they otherwise would not take in attempting to resolve the situation they had between these two entities through non-peaceful 

means or coercive means. 

So in the first instance our charge is to engage the Taiwanese 

fairly aggressively, point to this responsibility that is the law of the 

land that we have, and to ask them to do what is necessary or suggest to them that they do what is necessary to dissuade China from 

thinking perhaps they have an opportunity here that they 

shouldn’t have to have. 

25 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. It might be worthwhile, just recalling historically—Commissioner Bryen mentioned the 1996 missile exercises and isn’t it true that we sent a couple of carrier task groups 

into the Strait at that time in order to be helpful at restoring 

what—peace and security, tranquility. I mean we have gotten involved historically fairly recently. 

Commissioner Reinsch. 

Commissioner REINSCH. Mr. Schriver, can you assess current 

public opinion on Taiwan about the island’s status and how it’s 

evolved over the last few years? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I can provide my understanding of what polling 

data and what’s been conveyed by Taiwan authorities and others. 

I think it’s probably imprecise for some reasons, which I can also 

mention. It seems that if you want to look at the three categories, 

pro-reunification, pro-independence, and maintain the status quo, 

those favoring reunification near-term, very small, something like 

six to eight percent; those favoring independence would be higher 

but still generally under 20 percent, so high teens; and then the 

rest of that group falls into wanting to maintain the status quo. 

Again, this is just my reading of polls and things that I’ve seen. 

The reason I think it’s imprecise is because there is this threat of 

the use of force. Are some of those people that are in the status 

quo, might they be more inclined to want to be independent or different status? It’s hard to tell. They don’t want to get attacked. So 

it’s hard to tell where those numbers actually fall. 

But I think as we read the numbers now, there is an interest in 

sustaining the status quo for whatever reason, for fear of being attacked or interest in peace and stability for the purpose of growing 

economic ties, et cetera. So—— 

Commissioner REINSCH. Which I understand from your testimony 

is our interest as well, preserving the status quo. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Preserving peace and stability which I think our 

current view is that that’s best maintained through sustaining the 

status quo unless the two sides agree between themselves that they 

can alter the status quo. We’re opposed to unilateral change. I 

mean I think that’s an important distinction. 

Commissioner REINSCH. I understand. I think you’re just using 

more words. What do we do if over time in a democratic society, 

public opinion comes to favor a change in the status quo? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, I think that’s a challenge that we’ll have to 

address directly. I mean it’s a hypothetical that I can’t adequately 

address right now, but it’s something that I think we should be 

thinking about in the future because there are important trends 

underway in Taiwan and we need to be mindful of that. 

Commissioner REINSCH. That was really where I was going. It 

seems to me it is something that you would want to think about 

and anticipate. These situations, for better, for worse, don’t stay 

static forever. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Reinsch. Commissioner 

D’Amato, once again, please. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want 

to pursue something that Commissioner Mulloy mentioned. He’s 

right, of course, that there is no formal defense treaty, but when 

26 

you read the TRA, it is clear it is as close to being a de facto defense treaty given the serious and grave nature of the obligations 

that we have undertaken with regard to Taiwan. I don’t think 

there should be any misunderstanding of the nature of that. 

In fact, those obligations were written into the law by Congress 

and were at variance with the views of people in the Carter White 

House. That legislation was not submitted to Congress as written 

by the Carter White House. It was completely rewritten in the Congress to make it very clear what the nature of those obligations 

were, and I would also point out that President Reagan made it 

very clear consistently that the quality and quantity of arms that 

we were to provide the PRC pursuant to this Act were to be commensurate with the threat, and that we were to defend Taiwan, to 

provide the arms and defense capability relative to Taiwan that 

was equivalent or equal to the threat posed by the mainland. 

Let me ask you just two quick questions. First, would you agree 

with the statement that the rapid and extensive deployment of missiles is, in fact, a heavy-handed bullying effort to intimidate Taiwan and seriously, in effect, undermines efforts at peaceful resolution of the issues? Mr. Lawless, each one of you. 

Mr. LAWLESS. Well, this is important. To put it in context, there 

is a military modernization that is proceeding apace on a whole variety of fronts, but we are today I think somewhat focused on the 

missile challenge, in part perhaps because the referendum focused 

itself to that issue. 

I agree in general with your statement, but I think it’s important 

to understand that probably what is happening here is the more 

the missile build-up continues, particularly qualitatively in addition to quantitatively, what is happening here is China may be providing itself with an expanded range or a menu, if you will, of options that allow it to systematically coerce and does not necessarily 

involve automatic assumptions, say, for example, of an invasion 

scenario or something else. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Uh-huh. 

Mr. LAWLESS. So there is a degree of sophistication and subtlety 

to what is taking place that again, as I expressed earlier, we both 

have to understand and I believe the Taiwanese are slowing coming to grips and understanding. 

So I’m not disputing anything you say. I’m just trying to say that 

there is a level of sophistication here and a menu of options that 

may be available today—that menu may expand tomorrow—that 

certainly wasn’t there three or four years ago. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Bullying with a Chinese twist. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LAWLESS. And options in a sense. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Mr. Schriver, do you have anything to 

add to that? Then one last question I’d like to ask Mr. Schriver, 

and Mr. Lawless can chime in, we’re concerned about the adequacy 

of the consultation arrangements that are in place with the Congress in terms of making the kind of joint decisions that are called 

for by TRA with regard to Taiwan, Taiwan’s defense. 

Do you think there is room for improvement in these? I understand in the last couple of years, there’s been a dramatic improvement in the consultative arrangements that occur on a yearly basis 

27 

between particularly DOD and the Congress on this matter. Do you 

think there is room for improvement here and how would you rate 

the effectiveness of the consultative arrangements that are in place 

now? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I think there is always room for improvement. 

And we’d be available for either further or more in-depth consultations or a different kind of approach to consultations. I think we’ve 

been in very close touch with our relevant committees, with the 

caucuses. There’s, of course, the Taiwan Caucus and any interested 

members or staff I think we’re available to, and if there is interest 

in, again, more in-depth or different kinds of consultations, and if 

that would result in improved consultations, we’d be all for it. 

Mr. LAWLESS. I’d just add from the perspective of DOD and the 

relatively short time that I’ve been in my job, a little over a year, 

I find that in both the situation where we’re required to provide 

written reports, for example, a China military power report and 

other things, as well as the unofficial give and take with your staffers, Congressional staffers, the exchange has been fairly dynamic 

and we are queried on a regular basis, and therefore I believe that 

the exchange is robust and very useful. If something is late, we’re 

told it’s late the day before it’s late. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Yes. Certainly the Act does call for 

joint decisionmaking, which is a fairly direct kind of description of 

what’s needed here because successful foreign policy is always 

predicated on good communication and consensus-building between 

the two branches, and obviously to the extent we can build that, 

the better off we are in terms of a challenge that comes up in the 

future. Thank you very much. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Commissioners, we’re way behind, but I 

have promised Commissioner Mulloy, and would ask the responses 

to be very, very brief. 

Commissioner MULLOY. I’ll be brief. I’ve read that the Chinese 

claim their build-up is meant because of claims for independence 

that the President of Taiwan has been making. My understanding 

is we, and President Bush recently stated this, we do not support 

Taiwanese independence; is that correct? That’s correct, right? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. That’s correct. 

Commissioner MULLOY. So would that help defuse this situation 

with regard to the missiles? If we’re not supporting independence, 

and they were putting the missiles there to forestall independence, 

would that help alleviate the situation? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. This decision for the Chinese, I think the missiles 

are not helpful. I think the missiles are not helpful to Chinese interests. I think it’s not conducive to peace and stability and not 

conducive to a peaceful dialogue. Our policy is designed to promote 

an environment that is conducive to peace and stability. 

I think irrespective of our statements, the Chinese should renounce the use of force and remove the missiles or at least take 

a much less threatening posture. 

Mr. LAWLESS. Two quick points. I would note that the missiles 

that are being deployed today and that will be deployed tomorrow 

are not as a consequence, I don’t believe, necessarily of this Administration. Certainly decisions had to be made three, four, and five 

28 

years ago to allow them to build in the quantity and quality that 

they’re being built and deploy them today. 

And again, that build-up continues apace. The only other issue 

related here I believe is that indeed as the Taiwanese develop a 

consensus, to go back to your earlier question that you raised, our 

hope is that as that consensus is developed, they will more aggressively address the shortcomings that still exist on the Taiwanese 

side. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Gentlemen, thank you very much. You can 

tell by the interest of the questions of the Commissioners that 

you’ve been very, very helpful to us this morning, and we’re most 

grateful to you. Thank you so much. 

PANEL II: TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT—ADEQUACY OF 

CONSULTATION 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. We’ll move directly into panel two. The 

title the second panel this morning is ‘‘Taiwan Relations Act: Adequacy of Consultation.’’ 

This panel is designed to examine the historical and current context of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three Communique ́s and 

their continuing application to contemporary U.S. foreign policy development and implementation. 

The TRA is unique among foreign policy instruments since it is 

strictly speaking a domestic law of the United States. It was the 

result of collaboration between the White House and Capitol Hill 

in 1979 to work out a way for relations between the Republic of 

China and the United States of America to continue after the suspension of formal diplomatic ties. I’m going to pause while the witnesses come and take their seats at the table, and I’ll introduce 

them at that time. 

[Whereupon, a short break was taken.] 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. I’m told the cameras are running so it’s 

okay to start. We’re fortunate to have Ambassador Harvey Feldman with us today. He is a Senior Fellow for Asian Studies at the 

Heritage Foundation. Ambassador Feldman retired from the Foreign Service after a career spanning more than three decades and 

four continents. An East Asian specialist for most of his career, 

Ambassador Feldman also served with distinction in Eastern Europe and at the United Nations. 

As a member of the policy planning staff of the State Department, he helped plan President Richard Nixon’s epic-making first 

visit to China. He also was one of the drafters of the Taiwan Relations Act. 

We also have with us this morning Professor Dennis Van 

Vranken Hickey from Southwest Missouri State University. Professor Hickey has conducted extensive research into the issues concerning Taiwan, the implications for the United States. 

He has published three books. Their titles are: The Armies of 

East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan and the Koreas; Taiwan Security 

in the Changing International System; and U.S.-Taiwan Security 

Ties. 

We also have Professor John F. Copper from Rhodes College. 

Professor Copper is the author of more than 20 books on Asia and 

international affairs. Professor Copper has testified several times 

29 

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific 

Affairs. He is currently on the Board of Directors of the American 

Association for Chinese Studies and is a member of the editorial 

board of the journal Asian Affairs. 

Welcome, gentlemen, and let me just review the procedure. Each 

of you is invited to make a seven-minute statement and we’ll ask 

you to do it in sequence, and then Commissioners will be recognized for their questions and answers and for each Q&A including 

the ‘‘A’’ have only five minutes. Gentlemen, would you proceed in 

order? Ambassador Feldman, Professor Hickey and Professor Copper, please. 

STATEMENT OF HARVEY J. FELDMAN, U.S. AMBASSADOR, RETIRED 

SENIOR FELLOW FOR ASIAN STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you, Commissioner Ellsworth. I’ve tried to 

answer the several questions in some detail, and I shall not repeat 

them in my oral presentation. It seems to me that they fall into 

three categories. 

One, the role of Congress in the Taiwan Relations Act; two, the 

status of Taiwan; three, the question of the referendum. And I’ll 

run through these rather quickly. Let me just say that I co-chaired 

the State Department committee that prepared the initial draft of 

the Taiwan Relations Act. I then represented the Carter Administration in the negotiations with the Congress that resulted in the 

final law. 

Commissioner D’Amato is entirely correct when he refers to— 

what shall we call it—the struggle, the back and forth, where what 

we didn’t state was to draft a law that would take care of the commercial, economic, immigration, legal relationships and had nothing, said nothing about security. All of that was added by the Congress, and so what Congress did was essentially write a treaty, a 

unique Act, I think, in American foreign policy and one not normally appreciated by Administrations. 

Congress took to itself a number of oversight obligations. It became a partner. It made itself a partner with the Administration 

on deciding what arms to sell, deciding how to respond to threats 

in the region. 

Now, these things are not looked upon favorably by Administrations who don’t want somebody looking over their shoulder and so 

several times it seems to me Administrations have basically ignored their obligations under the TRA. 

For example, the Administration is supposed to inform the Congress of any threat to Taiwan security. As we know in 1995–1996, 

there were missile firings within a few kilometers of Taiwan’s 

major ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, and the Administration sent 

two carrier task forces to the vicinity but never made a report to 

Congress on the situation. 

There is another aspect that I think is quite glaring. It’s always 

bothered me particularly. Let me see if I can find it. This is Section 

4, subsection (d). Let me read it: 

Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting 

the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership 

30 

in any international financial institution or—and here I add emphasis—any other international organization. 

And if you look at this and you see the statements of, for example, the Clinton Administration, that we will not support Taiwan’s 

membership in any international organization that requires statehood for membership, there seems to me to be a direct contradiction. 

I’ll address this in more detail when I turn to the question of Taiwan status. Let me just say that Congress has a role. Congress has 

given itself a role. The role is very, very clearly defined in the Act, 

and I’m afraid that Congress has not been entirely forward in asserting the right and the role, which is given in the Act. 

Now let me turn to Taiwan status. I was asked to describe its 

status under international law. And here I’d like to clear up some 

misconceptions. We have something called the ‘‘one China policy.’’ 

The PRC has something called the ‘‘one China principle.’’ Taiwan 

from time to time has had a one China policy. It’s a little bit vague. 

These three are very, very different. They are not the same thing 

at all. 

Let me begin with the U.S. The U.S. one China policy is very, 

very simple. We recognize as the government of China and will 

have diplomatic relations only with the People’s Republic of China 

government in Beijing, period. We acknowledge that they claim 

that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. We state nothing on the subject. 

We make no statement at all as to the status of Taiwan. 

The last time the United States made a formal statement about 

Taiwan’s status was in the Truman Administration when we said 

that status remains to be determined by international agreement. 

Now, the PRC one China principle, of course, is very, very different. The PRC one China principle is that in its current version— 

it’s changed over time—the current version is both Taiwan and the 

Chinese mainland, the PRC, constitute one China. Taiwan and the 

mainland constitute one China of which the sole legal government 

and sole legitimate international representative is the People’s government in Beijing. That is their claim. That’s not what we agree 

to. We only said we’ll have diplomatic relations with you and we 

understand that this is what you claim. 

Taiwan has changed its view over time and is a little bit complicated, and so let me read it. Taiwan’s position goes something 

like this: 

The government on Taiwan is the direct legal successor to the 

Republic of China government that was established in 1911 and 

therefore it is a sovereign entity, but one which has governing authority only over Taiwan and associated islands. The PRC has 

never ruled on Taiwan. Taiwan is not a part of the PRC nor is it 

a part of any other state. 

Former President Lee Teng-hui once stated that Taiwan has a, 

quote, ‘‘special state-to-state’’ relationship with the PRC, more or 

less analogous to that which existed between East and West Germany prior to reunification when they actually had embassies in 

each other’s country or each other’s capital. 

The current President, Chen Shui-bian, has stated that there is 

a separate state on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Now if you look 

at the historical record of China over four millennia, you find there 

31


have been many, many occasions where the broad entity of China, 

in fact, was made up of several states, sometimes, in fact, several 

competing kingdoms. 

So asserting that there are separate states on each side of the 

Taiwan Strait could be taken to mean that Taiwan is not part of 

the People’s Republic of China, but it could be part of some broader 

entity. 

In international law, the Montevideo Convention provides the 

test for what is a state. A state is an entity that has defined borders, defined population and has the capability of entering into 

international agreements. Taiwan meets these three tests. It is a 

member of the World Trade Organization, the Asian Development 

Bank. It is a party to many international agreements. It has settled territory, settled population. It no longer claims to be the government of all of China. It claims to be the government of only Taiwan and associated islands. 

In the TRA, if you read it, you will find that we define Taiwan 

as a state. For all purposes of American law, Taiwan is a state. It 

is on this basis that we are able to sell weapons to Taiwan because 

U.S. law provides that you can sell weapons only to friendly governments. 

It is on this basis that we can sell enriched uranium fuel for Taiwan’s electric, nuclear electric reactors. We’re the only one that 

does this, and this can be done under U.S. law only to friendly 

states. So under U.S. law, Taiwan is a friendly state and its government is a friendly government. That is clear in the TRA. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Your time has expired. However, because 

of the importance of what you’re saying, would you please proceed 

briefly? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes. On the referendum, it’s been discussed at 

some length, and as you’ve heard, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Schriver has said that we consider both questions to be significant 

and, in fact, were the questions put to us, we would say yes to 

both. The contention is that this is altering the status quo. I don’t 

see how it alters the status quo. 

And as to the assertion that we oppose any claim to independent 

sovereignty on the part of Taiwan, let me point out that 27 other 

countries recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereignty. Should 

we then go to these 27 countries and say you shouldn’t do that? Or 

if another country was considering recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign entity, we should go to them and say no, no, you mustn’t do 

that; that will disturb the status quo. 

The point of all of this is that we don’t want to see a challenge 

to the PRC. We don’t want to see them stick their thumb in the 

PRC eye, but I don’t see how a referendum that says should we defend ourselves against missiles, should we have dialogue with the 

PRC in the interest of peace, I don’t see how these things constitute a thumb in the PRC eye. 

Thank you very much. 


[The statement follows:]


Statement of Harvey J. Feldman, U.S. Ambassador, Retired 

Senior Fellow for Asian Studies, The Heritage Foundation 

Dear Commissioners, I am quite pleased to comply with your request (dated January 14th, but which reached me only on January 23rd) to participate in a public 

32


hearing on February 6, 2004. I provide below answers to the six questions put to

me in your invitation letter. 

1. What role does the TRA establish for the Congress in U.S. policy toward Taiwan? 

The TRA is unique in foreign policy. In it, the Congress established firm parameters defining major aspects of U.S. relations with both the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) and with Taiwan. As examples, the law: 

• states that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC is tied firmly 

to the expectation that Taiwan’s future will be settled by peaceful means only; • invoking language taken from the United Nations Charter, states that any attempt to determine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means, including by

boycott or embargo, is to be considered a threat to the peace and security of 

the western Pacific area and a matter of grave concern to the United States; • directs that the U.S. shall provide Taiwan with arms sufficient for its defense 

needs, and that the U.S. shall maintain forces in the area sufficient to deal with 

‘‘any resort to force or other forms of coercion’’ against Taiwan; • states that ‘‘preservation and enhancement’’ of human rights on Taiwan are objectives of the United States. 

Having set forth these objectives with great specificity, the law gives the Congress

a clear oversight role vis-a`-vis Taiwan. Thus, ‘‘the President is directed to inform 

the Congress promptly of any threat to the security’’ of Taiwan. It is the Congress 

and the President who, jointly, are to determine the nature and quantity of defense 

articles and services for Taiwan. The Congress goes on to modify a number of American laws in order to provide for the continuation of a complex, international relationship with Taiwan. And, in establishing the American Institute in Taiwan to

carry out that relationship, it sets forth general Congressional oversight as well as 

requirements for reporting to the Congress as may be necessary. 

Having stated these things, it is necessary to point out that in 1995 and 1996, 

when the PRC fired missiles into the immediate vicinity of the island republic’s two 

major ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, the then President did not inform the Congress of the threat to Taiwan as required by law. That such a threat existed was

made plain by the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of 

Taiwan. 

2. Has the Congress been fully briefed on the complete historical record and arrangements regarding U.S. policy toward Taiwan (such as the historical records of the 

‘‘three Communique ́s’’ and the background papers supporting the TRA)? Are there 

important documents in the non-public historical record that would shed important light on U.S. commitments to Taiwan? 

Congress itself must be the best judge of whether it has been fully and appropriately briefed by successive Administrations since the passage of the TRA. The 

legislative record of the Act exists and makes plain the intent of the Congress in 

the continuing relationship with Taiwan under the TRA. See Lester L. Wolff and 

David L. Simon: Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, published by the

American Association for Chinese Studies and St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y., 

1982. Additionally, James Mann’s About Face (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998) 

provides excellent background information on the negotiations which led ultimately 

to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC, and the Shanghai, Recognition, and August 17 Communique ́s. My own article, ‘‘Taiwan, Arms Sales, and 

the Reagan Assurances’’ (American Asian Review, XIX, No. 3, Fall 2001) provides

background on the Six Assurances given Taiwan by President Reagan, and includes 

previously unpublished letters from President Reagan to Taiwan’s President Chiang 

Ching-kuo. One of these letters states that in the event it becomes clear that a 

peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status is no longer PRC policy, the Communique ́ of 

August 17, 1982 will be considered null and void. 

Are there other documents still unpublished, or kept secret by successive Administrations? Undoubtedly so. 

3. How would you describe the debate over Taiwan’s status under international law? 

Is its status finalized or does it remain an ‘‘undetermined question?’’ 

As is generally known, in the Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan abandoned all right 

and title to Taiwan but did not convey its rights, acquired under the Treaty of 

Shimonoseki in 1895, to any other state. Since that time during the Truman Administration, the formal position of the United States has been that Taiwan’s status remains undetermined—this despite informal statements by President Nixon in conversation with Mao Zedong agreeing that Taiwan is part of China. 

In fact, in the three Communique ́s signed with the PRC, the United States stated 

no position of its own with regard to Taiwan’s status, in effect remaining agnostic. 

33 

Thus among the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan, there are three completely 

different views. 

The PRC asserts what it calls ‘‘the One China Principle’’ which, in its latest 

iteration has it that both Taiwan and the mainland are part of one China, and that 

the only legitimate government and international representative of that one China 

is the PRC government in Beijing. 

Taiwan’s position has taken several different forms over the past dozen years. At 

present, it goes something like this. The government on Taiwan is the direct and 

legal successor to the Republic of China government established in 1911, and therefore is a sovereign entity, but one which has governing authority only over Taiwan 

and associated islands (Chinmen, Matsu, etc.). The PRC has never ruled on Taiwan, 

Taiwan is not a part of the PRC, nor is a part of any other state. Former President 

Lee Teng-hui once stated that Taiwan has a ‘‘special state-to-state’’ relationship 

with the PRC, more or less analagous to that between East and West Germany 

prior to reunification. The current President, Chen Shui-bian, has stated that there 

is a separate state on each side of the Taiwan Strait. In the historical record of more 

than four millenia, there have been many occasions where the broad entity ‘‘China’’ 

was made up of several states or, in fact, kingdoms. So asserting that there are separate ‘‘states’’ on each side of the Taiwan Strait could be taken to mean no more 

than that Taiwan is not part of the People’s Republic of China, though it could still 

be a part of some broader entity. 

In the Communique ́ of January 1, 1979, recognizing the People’s Republic of 

China as the sole legal government of China, the United States acknowledged (i.e. 

expressed its understanding) that the PRC claims there is but one China of which 

Taiwan is a part. But the United States stated no view or position as to Taiwan’s 

status. In the Six Assurances, President Reagan assured President Chiang Chingkuo that there had been no change in the American position. 

The United Nations regards Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic of 

China. Though it has seated non-stated such as the Palestinian Authority, under 

PRC pressure it refuses any recognition of Taiwan’s separate status, even asserting, 

from time to time, that Taiwan is represented internationally by the government in 

Beijing. This should demonstrate that such decisions are political and not legal. 

Some countries, in establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, agreed with the 

view that Taiwan is a part of China. Others refused to do so. Some twenty-seven 

countries, most of them quite small, accord diplomatic recognition to Taiwan as the 

Republic of China. 

In international practice, countries are free to make their own determination as 

to international legitimacy or statehood. In that connection, the most widely used 

test of statehood is given in the Montevideo Convention of 1931: an entity is a state 

within international law if it has defined territory, defined population, and has the 

ability to enter into international agreements. Clearly Taiwan, a member of the 

World Trade Organization, the Asian Development Bank, and other international 

bodies, meets the Montevideo test. 

Finally, please note that at one minute before midnight December 31, 1978 the 

United States recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan not only as a state but 

as the sole legitimate government of China. At one minute after midnight January 

1, 1979, it no longer did so. Yet no change took place on Taiwan. In every way except 

with regard to its diplomatic relationship with the United States, it remained exactly 

what it had been. Moreover, the fact that the United States does not recognize Cuba 

does not mean that Cuba is not a state, or lacks international personality. 

4. How does the proposed Taiwan referendum comport with U.S. commitments 

under the TRA? 

Whatever one may think of its salience or wisdom, the referendum now under discussion on Taiwan has no bearing upon those commitments, nor is it in conflict with 

them. 

5. Please discuss how U.S. military relations with Taiwan were intended to be conducted under the TRA, including the role of Congress in this process. Are they in 

fact being conducted in this manner? 

It is clear from the Senate and House reports on the bill that became the TRA 

that the Congress intended to be a full partner in carrying out military relations 

with Taiwan. A typical quote is that of Representative Broomfield, who at the time 

was the Ranking Republican Member of the House Committee on Foreign Relations: 

‘‘. . . it is the Committee’s intent that the President should inform the Congress of 

anticipated dangers (emphasis added), and not await their actual occurrence.’’ See 

Wolff and Simon, op. cit., p. 144. It should be clear from the events of 1996 that 

they are not being conducted in this manner. 

34 

6. Are there any examples known to you where the U.S. Congress has shared formally with the Executive Branch its assessment of Taiwan’s military needs as 

specified in the TRA, Section 3(b)? 

As far as I am aware, the Congress has done so only in the form of non-binding 

resolutions. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Ambassador Feldman. Professor Hickey, if you will, please. Seven minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DENNIS VAN VRANKEN HICKEY 

PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT 

SOUTHWEST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY, SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI 

Mr. HICKEY. I’ll try to keep it short. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

and Commissioners for this opportunity to talk a little bit today 

about the Bush Administration’s compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act and some of the changes during the Administration. 

On December 9, President Bush warned Taiwan about a referendum that many believed would irritate China and declared 

that the U.S. was opposed to any action to unilaterally changing 

the status quo. 

This statement, of course, angered some Members of Congress 

and others who support this island democracy. Some folks in the 

press accused them of appeasing a dictatorship, and one U.S. Presidential candidate—well, he was at that time— Mr. Lieberman, 

even went so far as to blast President Bush for, quote, ‘‘turning his 

back on Taiwan.’’ 

I believe it’s time for a reality check in this respect because this 

Administration has been the most pro-Taiwan Administration since 

1979. While abiding by the Taiwan Relations Act, it has carried out 

significant readjustments of U.S. policy at the same time that it’s 

been trying to maintain a constructive working dialogue with 

China. 

My written testimony goes into the terms of the TRA. I don’t 

think we need to rehash that here. But I want to hit some of the 

main points of the Bush Administration’s actions towards Taiwan. 

First of all, in the area of arms sales, the U.S., as you know, is the 

supplier of arms. Despite our pledge under the Reagan Administration in 1982 to reduce arms sales leading over a period of time to 

a final resolution, arms sales did increase markedly after that. But 

some systems were denied. 

Congress had pushed hard for an increase in arms sales, and 

under the Bush Administration, they got it. In April 2001, the Administration approved the sale of four Kidd-class destroyers, 12 P– 

3C Orion sub killer aircraft and eight diesel submarines. 

Tom DeLay boasted at the time that the Bush Administration 

had approved the most robust package of arms sales in over a decade. A report by the Congressional Research Service concurred 

with that. Most Members of Congress applauded it with the exception of Mr. Gephardt from my home State of Missouri who said it 

didn’t go far enough. 

Only days after that announcement, the President ended this annual review that we had on arms sales, which had degenerated into 

an annual quarrel with China so we could meet their needs as far 

as defensive weapons on a case-by-case basis. 

35 

Since 2001, the Administration has continued to offer weapons to 

Taiwan. Unfortunately, as we noted, not all of these weapon systems have been purchased. They did purchase the destroyers. They 

put a deposit down on the subs, but haven’t moved too far with 

that. And the P–3C aircraft has yet to get moving, that project. 

As for military cooperation, after 1979, cooperation between U.S. 

and Taiwan decreased markedly. After 1976, however, with the crisis, this resumed, and during—1996—I’m sorry—and during this 

Administration those contacts have escalated with Taiwan’s Defense Minister coming over here, military teams going to Taiwan 

to observe exercises, inspecting facilities, even, according to the 

Taiwanese press, boarding Taiwan’s midget subs and inspecting 

them. Also, offering suggestions as to how to engage their C4ISR 

capabilities. 

The President has signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act of 2003 to treat Taiwan as a non-NATO ally, although 

he emphasized at the time that this might impinge upon the President’s powers and that this did not in any way undermine our one 

China policy. He also worked with Congress to draft a law calling 

for the study of increased military ties with Taiwan. 

As far as the security commitment, Members of Congress had 

complained, particularly after ’96, when many learned that the 

TRA was not a treaty. It provides us only with an option to defend 

Taiwan. In 2001, the President, as we all know, said that he would 

do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself. 

This wasn’t a slip of the tongue. Since that time, this has been 

cited by Administration officials on numerous occasions. Most recently a couple of weeks ago in the wake of this referendum debate, 

a person in the State Department said, quote, ‘‘The President has 

made clear his commitment to Taiwan and will not compromise on 

it.’’ 

Political ties. Like a lot of other states, we have a curious relationship with Taiwan. We have often treated it as a third-class citizen. Presidential visits were discouraged. Again, the Bush Administration has changed this. We’ve had several Presidential visits. 

The President of Taiwan has come here, met with American lawmakers, gone down to Texas, had barbecue with Tom DeLay, generally been treated with the dignity and respect you would expect 

to have a foreign leader treated. 

Others have been here, the Vice President, the First Lady, Lien 

Chan, the candidate right now for President from the Kuomintang, 

had dinner at the White House. Other Ministry of National Defense officials have been here. So we’ve had these visits. As far as 

other political changes, U.S. diplomats can now accept assignments 

in Taiwan. The flag is flown occasionally at our unofficial embassy 

there, and the President has signed legislation to help Taiwan gain 

observer status in the World Health Organization. 

Something that is not in my written testimony that Mr. Feldman 

was mentioning about the international organizations, this Administration also reversed the policy of the Clinton Administration, 

which had actually spoken against Taiwan’s drive to rejoin the 

U.N. We’ve gone—this Administration has gone back to the original position of not saying anything. So if you don’t have anything 

nice to say, don’t say anything at all. 

36 

And for conclusion, to conclude this with 20 seconds to spare 

here, my discussion provides only the most dramatic examples of 

change. More complete discussion would include the President’s efforts to jettison the ‘‘three no’s,’’ and while at the same time embracing the Clinton Administration’s pledge that future of Taiwan 

must be acceptable to the Taiwanese people. 

As one lawmaker noticed, our relationship with Taiwan under 

this Administration has never been closer. I had more in the written testimony about the referendum, just a few words on that. But 

I think as Dr. Copper is going to address that issue, I’ll let it go 

there. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Dennis Van Vranken Hickey 

Professor, Political Science Department 

Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri 

The Bush Administration and Taiwan 

On December 9, 2003, President George W. Bush warned the Taiwanese government about a proposed referendum that is certain to irritate China. He declared 

that the U.S. is opposed to any action that ‘‘might unilaterally change the status 

quo’’ across the Taiwan Strait. The White House apparently feared that Taiwan was 

inching closer and closer to declaring itself independent of China—a move that could 

ignite a major conflict in East Asia at a time when U.S. forces are tied down in the 

Middle East. 

Not surprisingly, Bush’s statement angered some pro-Taiwan Members of Congress and others who support the island democracy. The President’s critics accused 

him of ‘‘appeasing a dictatorship’’ and having ‘‘lost his bearings.’’ On January 6, 

2004, a Democratic candidate for President, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D–CT), 

even went so far as to blast Bush for ‘‘turning his back on Taiwan.’’ It’s time for 

a reality check. 

Without question, the Bush Administration is the most ‘‘pro-Taiwan’’ administration since the United States broke relations with Taiwan and recognized the mainland Chinese regime in 1979. Indeed, the administration has carried out a significant readjustment of U.S. policy toward the island, while continuing to abide by the 

terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. Like previous administrations, however, the 

Bush Administration also recognizes the value of engaging the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC). 

I. U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan 

On December 15, 1978, the U.S. announced the establishment of full diplomatic 

relations with the PRC, to become effective January 1, 1979. In order to achieve normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijing’s three long-standing demands: (1) termination of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; (2) removal of all U.S. troops 

from Taiwan; and (3) abrogation of the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. 

Since 1979, American policy toward Taiwan has been guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and three U.S.-PRC Joint Communique ́s: (1) the 1972 Shanghai 

Communique ́; (2) the 1979 Normalization Communique ́; and (3) the August 17, 

1982, U.S.-China Joint Communique ́. The TRA provides a legal framework for 

America’s commercial and cultural relations with Taiwan. It also outlines the terms 

of Washington’s ‘‘unofficial’’ governmental relations with Taiwan and includes provisions for its defense. In the Communique ́s, the U.S. recognizes the PRC as the legitimate government of China and acknowledges Beijing’s position that there is only 

one China and Taiwan is a part of it.1 Washington also promises not to pursue a 

policy of ‘‘two Chinas’’ or ‘‘one China, one Taiwan’’ and stresses that the resolution 

of the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide peacefully. 

The U.S. security commitment to Taiwan is outlined principally in Sections 2 and 

3 of the TRA. Section 2(b) states: 

1 The word ‘‘acknowledge’’ was deliberately chosen as it indicates cognizance of, but not necessarily agreement with, the Chinese position. Interestingly, the Chinese version of the 

Communique ́ states that both sides ‘‘agree’’ that there is only one China and that Taiwan is 

a part of it. See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, ‘‘America’s Two-Point Policy and the Future of 

Taiwan,’’ Asian Survey, Volume XXVIII, Number 8, August 1988, pp. 881–896. 

37 

It is the policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort to determine the 

future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 

concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to 

force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social 

or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 

In terms of American arms sales to Taiwan, the most pertinent passages of the 

TRA are to be found in Section 3: 

(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United 

States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services 

in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 

self-defense capability. 

(b) The President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such 

defense articles and services based solely upon their judgement of the needs of 

Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of 

Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by the United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and Congress. 

Should the security or the social or economic system of Taiwan be threatened, 

Section 3 also states that ‘‘the President is directed to inform the Congress promptly 

. . . (and) the President and the Congress shall determine in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any 

such danger.’’ 

In addition to the TRA, critical elements of U.S. policy toward Taiwan may be 

found in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communique ́s. In the 1972 Shanghai 

Communique ́—a document that helped pave the way for eventual normalization of 

U.S.-PRC relations—Washington reaffirmed ‘‘its interest in a peaceful settlement of 

the Taiwan question.’’ In the 1979 Normalization Communique ́, Washington also 

stressed that ‘‘the United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.’’ In the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China Joint 

Communique ́, American authorities once again emphasized that Beijing must 

‘‘strive for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.’’ In the same agreement, 

however, the U.S. promised to eschew long-term arms sales to Taiwan and to keep 

sales from exceeding either the quality or quantity of arms sold to Taiwan after the 

U.S. established relations with the PRC. This document also apparently committed 

the U.S. to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan gradually. 

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is both ambiguous and contradictory. For example, the 

TRA warns that the U.S. would consider any hostile actions directed against Taiwan 

as ‘‘a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the U.S.’’ But Washington is not committed to Taiwan’s defense. Furthermore, in the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China Joint Communique ́, Washington promised 

to reduce its arms transfers to Taiwan. But since 1982, arms sales have escalated. 

Washington steadfastly refuses to accede to Beijing’s demands that these arms sales 

be curbed. 

II. U.S.-Taiwan Relations in the Bush Administration 

During the first months of the Bush Administration, there seemed to be little indication of a major shift in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Indeed, the administration 

appeared determined to maintain cordial relations with China. By mid-2001, however, it was clear that the administration was prepared to upgrade ties with Taiwan 

and increase arms sales to the island. 

Arms Sales 

As described, according to the TRA—the legislation that guides official American 

policy toward Taiwan—the U.S. will ‘‘make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 

to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.’’ During the late 1980s and 1990s, 

a variety of considerations—including the PRC military buildup, the end of the Cold 

War, Taiwanese lobbying and domestic political pressures—had contributed to an 

escalation in arms sales. Indeed, by the time George W. Bush assumed office, sales 

of American-built military equipment had included missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated anti-submarine helicopters, warships, transport planes, tanks, 

38 

long-range radar and the Patriot Anti-Missile System.2 But other weapons systems—including submarines and AEGIS equipped destroyers—were denied to Taipei. U.S. officials took the position that submarines were offensive weapons and 

therefore could not be sold to the island. Moreover, PRC threats that the AEGIS 

would be ‘‘the last straw that breaks the camel’s back’’ and Pentagon warnings that 

China’s military might launch a preemptive strike against the vessels contributed 

to the Clinton Administration’s decision to block the sale of the AEGIS to Taiwan. 

From the outset, Members of the U.S. Congress lobbied the Bush Administration

to sell additional arms to Taiwan. Especially high on Taipei’s 2001 shopping list 

were P–3C anti-submarine aircraft, diesel powered submarines and AEGIS equipped 

destroyers. Taiwanese officials expressed hopes that these requests would be approved. But many Taiwanese defense experts doubted that Washington would sell 

such weapons to Taiwan. As might be expected, Chinese authorities urged the Bush 

Administration to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. 

In April 2001, President Bush announced that he had decided upon an arms sales 

deal with Taiwan that was ‘‘the right package for the moment.’’ The President approved the sale of four Kidd-class destroyers and 12 P–3C Orion submarine-killer 

aircraft. He also agreed to help the island secure eight diesel submarines. The 

AEGIS decision was deferred, with the administration suggesting that a future decision might depend upon the deployment of PRC missiles opposite Taiwan (China

has deployed roughly 450 missiles opposite Taiwan). Following the President’s announcement, Representative Tom DeLay (R–Texas) proclaimed that ‘‘the Bush Administration has approved the most robust package of defensive weapons approved 

for Taiwan in over a decade.’’ A study conducted by the U.S. Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) concurred with this assessment. 

It is noteworthy that the arms sales package enjoyed widespread support among

the media and the U.S. Congress. There was little partisan bickering. Indeed, some 

leading Democrats argued that the sale didn’t go far enough. Probably referring to 

the April 1, 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S. spy plane and a PRC fighter jet, 

Representative Richard Gephardt (D–Missouri), declared that the President also 

should have approved the sale of the AEGIS in response to China’s ‘‘military buildup and other provocative acts.’’

Only days after approving the sale of the destroyers, aircraft and submarines, 

President Bush announced that he would end the practice of employing an annual 

review to determine Taiwan’s defensive needs—a policy that had been in place since 

1982. The annual review had degenerated into an annual quarrel between Washington and Beijing. 

Since 2001, the Bush Administration has continued to offer generous weapons 

packages to Taiwan. For example, in 2003, Taiwan’s air force took delivery of U.S.-

made AIM 120 medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMS) that will boost the 

firepower of its F–16s. Moreover, the administration has pushed the Taiwanese to 

enhance its C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and approved the sale of the Link-16 

C4ISR system to Taiwan. The Taiwanese finally agreed to purchase a scaled-down 

version of the system in late 2003 (unfortunately, Taiwan has yet to move forward 

with plans to purchase the submarines or P–3C Orion submarine-killer aircraft that 

the administration has offered to sell). In June 2003, Taiwan announced that it 

would move forward with plans to purchase three Lockheed-Martin PAC–3 units 

and upgrade its two PAC–2 Plus units to PAC–3 standards. 

Military Cooperation 

As a pre-condition for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 

1979, the U.S. agreed to remove its troops from Taiwan and abrogate the 1954 U.S.-

ROC Mutual Security Treaty. As a consequence, military cooperation between the 

two governments decreased markedly. The Bush Administration, however, has 

sought to reverse this trend. 

In March 2002, Tang Yiau-ming, Taiwan’s Defense Minister, journeyed to the 

United States to attend a ‘‘private’’ meeting in Florida. He was the first Taiwanese 

Defense Minister to be granted a visa to the U.S. for other than a transit stop since 

1979. During his visit, Tang met with Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, to discuss arms sales and defense issues. 

In another sharp departure from past policy, the Bush Administration approved 

sending military teams to Taiwan to observe military exercises. According to the 

Pentagon, U.S. military personnel are deployed to the island for the purpose of ‘‘ob2 In addition to arms, the U.S. has transferred critical technologies to Taiwan. This technological assistance has enabled Taipei to domestically manufacture a wide range of military hardware—including advanced warplanes, missiles, warships and tanks. 

39 

serving and assessing’’ Taiwan’s armed forces so arms sales may be tailored to meet

Taipei’s needs. According to Taiwanese press accounts, the U.S. defense experts 

have inspected Taiwan’s military equipment (including its midget submarines) and 

offered suggestions as to how the military might best improve its C4ISR capabilities. 

Finally, President Bush has signed legislation to enhance military ties between 

Taipei and Washington. In 2002, the President signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003. According to Section 1206 of the law,

‘‘for the purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense 

services, Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO 

ally.’’ 3 The President also signed into law an Act calling on the administration to 

study the feasibility of expanding U.S.-Taiwan military ties. 

Security Commitment 

As described, the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan is discussed in the TRA 

and three Joint Communique ́s with the PRC. Some argue that the TRA mandates 

an American military response to a PRC attack. But these individuals are mistaken. 

The TRA provides the U.S. only with an option to defend Taiwan, it does not necessarily commit the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense. On April 25, 2001, however, President 

Bush was asked whether the U.S. had an obligation to defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China. The President replied, ‘‘Yes, we do and the Chinese must understand that. Yes I would.’’ When asked if this meant protecting the island ‘‘with the 

full force of the American military,’’ Bush replied, ‘‘whatever it took to help Taiwan 

defend theirself (sic).’’ No other president has made such a sweeping commitment 

to Taiwan’s defense during the post-normalization era. 

Some initially dismissed the President’s statement as a ‘‘slip of the tongue.’’ It is 

noteworthy, however, that it continues to be cited by senior administration officials 

as official U.S. policy. Moreover, U.S. officials have continued to reassure the international community that, despite Taiwan’s controversial referendum plans, the 

American security commitment to the island remains strong. On January 14, 2004, 

Adam Ereli, Deputy U.S. Department of State spokesman, told a gathering of foreign correspondents that the President had made clear his commitment to Taiwan’s 

security and that he will not compromise on it. 

Political Ties 

Like many other countries, America maintains a curious relationship with Taiwan. For years, Taiwan was treated like a third-class country. For example, the 

President of this democratic state and other officials were strongly discouraged from 

visiting the U.S. 

The Bush Administration has expanded the range of acceptable contacts with Taiwan that had been curtailed following the recognition of the PRC in 1979. In May 

2001, President Chen Shui-bian was granted a transit visa to ‘‘rest’’ in New York 

City and Houston while en route to Central America. The administration also indicated that it would not oppose Chen’s plans to meet with American lawmakers during the visit—an abrupt change from the past treatment accorded to high-ranking 

Taiwanese officials. Consequently, President Chen met with Mayor Rudolph 

Giuliani and 20 legislators during a three-day stay in New York City and enjoyed 

a barbecue with Representative Tom DeLay during a visit to Texas. President Chen 

returned to the U.S. for another high-profile visit in 2003. 

In addition to President Chen, a steady stream of other high-ranking Taiwan officials have journeyed to the U.S. since Bush took office. These visitors have included 

Vice President Annette Lu (an independence activist once described as the ‘‘scum 

of the earth’’ by PRC authorities), Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming, Wu Shu-chen 

(the President’s wife) and a host of lawmakers and politicians. Indeed, Lien Chan, 

Kuomintang Party Chairman and the party’s 2000 and 2004 Presidential nominee, 

attended a dinner at the White House in June 2002. In some instances, the U.S. 

is the final destination for the visitors. In other cases, however, officials are granted 

transit visas. For example, Vice President Lu’s three-day visit to New York City was 

officially designated as a ‘‘stopover.’’ These leisurely transit stops have prompted 

members of the press to quip that the visits appear to be journeys to the U.S. followed by short stopovers in Central America. 

In addition to the escalation in high-level visits and exchanges, the political relationship between Washington and Taipei has changed in other subtle ways. As described, President Bush signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 

3 When signing the law, however, President Bush voiced objections to it on ‘‘Constitutional and 

procedural grounds’’ and warned that it ‘‘could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one 

China’ policy of the U.S. when that U.S. policy remains unchanged.’’ 

40 

Fiscal Year 2003. The new law permits incumbent diplomats to accept assignments 

in Taiwan and expresses the ‘‘sense of the Congress’’ that the U.S. flag should be 

displayed at the ‘‘unofficial’’ U.S. embassy in Taiwan (the American Institute in Taiwan or AIT) and at the residence of the AIT Director ‘‘in the same manner as U.S. 

embassies, consulates and official residences throughout the world.’’ On September 

11, 2002, the U.S. flag was flown at the AIT in Taipei for the first time since the 

U.S. broke diplomatic relations with the island. 

Finally, President Bush has signed legislation directing the Department of State 

to devise a plan whereby Taiwan will gain observer status at the World Health Organization. During a closed-door meeting of the World Health Assembly in 2003 during the SARS crisis, the U.S. delegation spoke in favor of Taipei’s admission to the 

WHO As Tommy Thompson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services, explained, ‘‘We know this is a controversial issue, but we do not 

shrink from taking a public stance on it. The people of Taiwan deserve the same 

level of public health as citizens of every nation on earth, and we support them in 

their efforts to achieve it.’’ 

Conclusion 

The discussion above provided only the most dramatic examples of changes in 

American policy toward Taiwan. A more complete description would include other 

developments as well. For example, the administration quietly jettisoned President 

Clinton’s ‘‘Three No’s Policy.’’ On the other hand, officials publicly embraced the 

former President’s pledge that any resolution of the Taiwan issue must be acceptable to the Taiwanese people. As Representative Robert Wexler (D–Florida) observed in January 2003, ‘‘the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan has never 

been stronger in terms of its totality.’’ 

To be sure, Washington has moved closer to Taipei. Arms sales have escalated, 

high-level military contacts have been reestablished, America’s security commitment 

to Taiwan has been bolstered and political ties have been strengthened. So why has 

President Bush criticized Taiwan’s proposed referendum? Having recently returned 

from Taiwan, perhaps I could shed some light on this issue. 

In March, Taiwanese voters will go to the polls to elect a President. The incumbent, President Chen Shui-bian, is in deep trouble. The economy remains stagnant 

and unemployment has hit record levels. Chen has seized upon the idea of a referendum as a desperate tactic to salvage his faltering re-election campaign. A negative reaction from China will only boost his popularity. Taiwanese voters have displayed a tendency to rally around any candidate who is criticized by Beijing. In 

other words, domestic political considerations are driving the referendum plan. 

Chen’s referendum gamble holds the potential to ignite a conflict between China 

and Taiwan. This is a very dangerous game for everyone involved—including the 

U.S. President Bush has now made it clear that he wants to preserve the status 

quo across the Taiwan Strait. Despite our long-standing friendship with democratic 

and free Taiwan, Bush realizes that the U.S. needs China. Beijing’s cooperation is 

essential if the U.S. hopes to address a wide range of pressing global problems, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental 

degradation, health issues, dwindling energy supplies and the nuclear crisis on the 

Korean Peninsula to name just a few. The President also realizes that an unnecessary military conflict with China over Taiwan will not serve anyone’s interests. It 

is for these reasons that President Bush called on President Chen to exercise restraint and call off his controversial referendum scheme. 

Fortunately, President Chen has toned down his controversial referendum plan in 

recent weeks. American officials have welcomed these moves and hopefully the ‘‘referendum crisis’’ is being defused. Differences over this thorny issue have not diminished America’s friendship with Taiwan or the Bush Administration’s commitment 

to abide by the terms of the TRA—support for the island’s security remains strong. 

And despite the angry accusations of a small group of politicians, academics and 

paid lobbyists, President Bush has not turned his back on Taiwan. Rather, the Bush 

Administration is the most ‘‘pro-Taiwan’’ administration in over three decades. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you so much, Professor Hickey. 

Thank you, very interesting, very much appreciated. 

Professor Copper, if you will, please. 

41 

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. COPPER 

STANLEY J. BUCKMAN PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

RHODES COLLEGE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 

Mr. COPPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the 

Commission. I want to address the issue of the Taiwan Relations 

Act in connection with the referendum issue in Taiwan. As you’ve 

heard already, the Taiwan Relations Act commits the United 

States to the defense of Taiwan. I agree with that very much. Provisions in it, particularly if you look at them together, make a firm 

pledge that the U.S. will protect Taiwan. I’d like to add a point 

that hasn’t been made: the promise aimed at China—Taiwan has 

no other threat, no other enemy. 

Second, even if you reject the legal argument in the Taiwan Relations Act that the United States will protect Taiwan, I think for all 

practical purposes, we will. It’s very obvious that public opinion in 

the United States favors Taiwan. It does not favor China. That’s 

been true for some time. 

Another point that needs to be made is that the provisions in the 

Taiwan Relations Act just referred to have been tested, in 1996 

when President Clinton ordered aircraft carriers into the region at 

a time when China was intimidating Taiwan influence its first direct Presidential election. 

There is another point I think is important for this Commission 

to know: That we will aid Taiwan, defend Taiwan under almost 

any circumstances is a view that you hear in Taiwan oftentimes 

stated by the President and the Chen Administration. The opposition sometimes takes issue with this. They do not always agree 

with it. 

Looking at the other side of the problem, and what I think constitutes a problem for us, China regards Taiwan as its territory. 

Prior to Japan taking the island in 1895, it was ruled by China for 

more than 200 years. 

The present government of China openly pledges that Taiwan 

must be returned to China. This issue is intimately connected to 

nationalism in China, which is on the rise. And it’s my opinion that 

any official in China that might want to say that we (meaning 

China) don’t want Taiwan back or we don’t care about Taiwan, 

won’t remain in power very long. 

It is not in the interest of the United States to provoke a conflict 

with China. We should realize that the Taiwan issue can cause instability in China. We don’t want that. We (meaning the United 

States therefore) don’t want to contradict China’s view on the subject of Taiwan. That’s why we have the one China policy. 

This brings me to the matter of the referendum, which I think 

in this context has to be seen as a very serious one, realizing the 

Taiwan Strait is a ‘‘flash point,’’ a place where the United States 

and China may come to loggerheads and war might result. 

Let me make a couple of points about the issue of referendums. 

First of all, the word ‘‘referendum’’ in Chinese, or gong tou, includes the notion of plebiscite. There’s no separate word for plebiscite in Chinese. So when you use the term ‘‘referendum,’’ you’re 

also talking about a plebiscite. 

Second, this issue came up in the context of holding an election 

in Taiwan, an election that’s going to be a bitterly contested one. 

42 

And the perception is that by bringing this up, it will help President Chen and his party. He denies this, but I think the timing 

suggests that it is connected. 

The questions to be answered by this referendum, I think, deserve our attention, too. Should Taiwan acquire more anti-missile 

weapons if China continues its build-up? And second, should the 

government in Taiwan engage in negotiations with China to establish peace and stability? 

On the matter of anti-missile weapons, this is an issue, which 

won’t be decided by public opinion. After all, whether Taiwan acquires weapons or not is largely dependent upon what the United 

States sells to Taiwan. Incidentally, we’ve already been doing this. 

So technically speaking it’s not a matter to decide. This way anyway. It’s already in process. 

The issue of negotiating with China to establish a peace and stability framework using the term ‘‘negotiation’’ won’t happen. The 

word ‘‘negotiation’’ suggests talks between two nation states. China 

is not going to negotiate. China regards Taiwan as its territory. 

So the referendums are about matters that aren’t normally what 

we would consider to be issues decided upon by referendums. In 

any case, the opposition agreed that there should be a referendum 

law. It’s in the constitution, but no law has ever been written to 

define what it is. 

Immediately after a referendum law was passed problems arose 

about a so-called ‘‘defensive referendum’’ or a referendum that 

would prevent conflict. Incidentally, in the Chinese version of the 

law, those terms aren’t there. Article 17 of the referendum refers 

to an emergency or a crisis. It does not talk about defending Taiwan. 

President Chen chose to interpret it as defending the island and 

that’s the way the press talked about it. Another issue has come 

up, and that is writing a new constitution. President Chen has also 

broached that possibility—— 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Professor Copper, you’re—— 

Mr. COPPER. —which presents a problem also. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Could you come to a termination? You’re 

testimony is very interesting and very important, but we are running out of time, and we have a lunch guest coming, and the Commissioners still need to have time to ask questions. 

Mr. COPPER. May I have one minute? 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Please, go ahead. 

Mr. COPPER. This has presented another very similar problem 

because the constitution states that Taiwan is part of China. This 

coincides with China policy: one China. 

Let me get to my conclusion then. The United States should 

make it clear when we support a referendum in Taiwan. We’re not 

supporting a plebiscite. Also, I think what we should make clear 

is that in supporting a referendum; we’re not trying to help one 

side in a coming election. We want to avoid that. Those are my 

major points. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement follows:] 

43 

Statement of John F. Copper 

Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies 

Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee 

The Taiwan Relations Act and the Referendum Issue in Taiwan: A 

Conundrum for the United States 

Provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed into law by Congress in 

1979 and President Chen Shui-bian calling for referendums in Taiwan, when juxtaposed together creates a dilemma for U.S. foreign policymakers. Furthermore, the 

situation is a serious one. 

It is my opinion, and one shared by many scholars in the field, that the TRA commits the United States to defend Taiwan against an external military threat. It 

states that enactment of this law was ‘‘necessary’’: (1) to make it clear that to try 

to determine Taiwan’s future by force is a threat to the security of the Western Pacific area and of ‘‘grave concern’’ to the United States; (2) to provide Taiwan with 

arms; (3) to maintain the (America’s) capacity to resist any effort to change Taiwan’s 

social or economic system. 

Reading these three provisions, especially together, and knowing Taiwan faces a 

threat from only one country (China), one must conclude that the TRA has committed the U.S. to defend Taiwan against any action the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China might take against the island, especially an armed attack, 

and for whatever reason. 

Even if one does not accept this ‘‘legal’’ argument or prefers a more pragmatic interpretation of U.S. Taiwan policy, the fact public opinion in the United States is 

very favorable toward Taiwan and not favorable toward China and that this is reflected in the view of Congress toward Taiwan, constitutes evidence that the U.S. 

will protect Taiwan. 

The United States, in fact, did so in 1996 when Taiwan held its first direct Presidential election and China conducted missile tests near Taiwan’s shore to intimidate 

and influence the electorate. President Clinton ordered two U.S. aircraft carrier 

groups to the area and a face-off between U.S. and Chinese forces followed. His decision was likely influenced by anticipated public and Congressional pressure if he did 

not act. 

The reasons stated for the U.S. to defend Taiwan at that time, were the previously cited provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act and the fact that Taiwan has 

long been a faithful ally of the United States. It was noted that Taiwan had become 

a democracy under U.S. aegis. 

Further, it was U.S. policy (iterated regularly since the 1950s), that the ‘‘Taiwan 

issue’’ must be resolved peacefully. That idea was written in the TRA. It was cited 

during the 1996 crisis. 

The United States, then, and probably under any circumstance, will defend Taiwan again in the event of a threat or military action by China against the island. 

It is critically important to note that most people in Taiwan believe this. Moreover, President Chen and his Administration say it often and base their policies, 

and their election strategy, on it. 

On the other side of the equation, China regards Taiwan as its territory. Taiwan 

was ruled by China in the past, for over 200 years prior to Japanese rule that began 

in 1895. Its government has pledged often and with serious words to bring about 

China’s reunification, meaning getting Taiwan back. 

The ‘‘Taiwan issue’’ connects intimately to the virulent nationalism and irredentism that has grown in China of late. Thus, even if Chinese government officials 

want to abandon China’s claim to Taiwan, they cannot and still remain in power. 

It is clearly not in the interest of the United States to provoke a conflict or war 

with China. Likewise Washington does not want to cause political instability in 

China or undermine its current leadership. Openly contradicting China’s stance on 

the Taiwan issue would do that. 

This is the reason for the U.S. policy of one China, even though there are two 

sovereign states one on each side of the Taiwan Strait. 

The gravity of President Chen Shui-bian several months ago proposing the use 

of a referendum must be seen in this context. Furthermore, the referendum issue 

amplified an already tense situation. 

Taiwan is a ‘‘nexus’’ state, or one that could trigger a war between two major powers, the U.S. and China. Thus, the Taiwan Strait is considered a flashpoint, or a 

place where two major powers may engage in a conflict and weapons of mass destruction may be used. 

In designing a U.S. response to the referendum matter, some other important 

facts that relate to President Chen’s decision need to be noted. 

44 

One, the word for referendum in Chinese, gong tou, includes the concept of plebiscite, or deciding the issue of (Taiwan’s) sovereignty. (There is no separate word for 

plebiscite in Chinese.) 

Two, President Chen broached the referendum issue in the context of an upcoming election and when opinion polls indicated that the opposition ‘‘blue team’’—the 

Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), and the People First Party (PFP)—would 

win the election over President Chen and his ‘‘green bloc’’—his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)—President Chen made the 

proposal to improve his prospects of winning the Presidential election in March. 

Three, the referendums are to be held the same day as the election. The two questions to be resolved are not matters of domestic policy but rather relate to the question of Taiwan’s relationship with China. 

The two questions are: (1) Should Taiwan acquire more advanced anti-missile 

weapons if China continues to increase the number of its missiles in the area of 

China adjacent to Taiwan, and (2) should the government engage in negotiations 

with China to establish a ‘‘peace and stability’’ framework for cross-Strait interactions? 

The matter of acquiring anti-missile weapons is an issue between the U.S. and 

Taiwan and probably will not be affected much, if at all, by public opinion. Furthermore, Taiwan has been and is currently in the process of acquiring anti-missile 

weapons. The second question likewise is not something that the electorate of Taiwan can resolve. China will not ‘‘negotiate’’ with Taiwan, as that term implies talks 

between two sovereign nations. To China the ‘‘Taiwan issue’’ is a domestic matter. 

Thus, these issues are not really matters to be resolved by a referendum and calling for a decision on them constitutes a challenge, if not an affront, to America’s 

one China policy. 

Notwithstanding this situation, the opposition parties subsequently agreed to 

write a referendum law, there being a provision for referendums in the Constitution 

(but there existed no law to define their use) and opinion polls showing the public 

wanted it. 

Indeed a referendum law was needed to bring about needed political reform, 

which had not been accomplished in the milieu of severe political gridlock following 

Chen Shui-bian winning the Presidential election in March 2000. 

However, problems arose immediately after the Referendum Law was passed. It 

contains a provision for what some call a ‘‘defensive referendum’’ or ‘‘peace referendum’’ (though the Referendum Law does not include such words). According to 

the law (a rather vague sentence) it can be invoked in the event of an emergency 

or crisis. 

President Chen declared forthwith that China’s buildup of missiles and other military forces across the Taiwan Strait constitutes such a situation and that he intended to put the issue to the voters coinciding with the March 20, 2004 Presidential election. Since, as noted above, the voters cannot decide this matter, it 

seems to be an effort to win votes. 

President Chen has also called for writing a new Constitution. To be sure Taiwan’s Constitution is in many ways anachronistic, having been written when the 

Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek ruled China. It needs to be replaced or 

amended to fit Taiwan’s current political situation and to resolve systemic matters, 

such as whether Taiwan should have a Presidential system of government or not, 

which may be too fundamental to handle by referendums. 

But, the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty was again put to question because the Constitution states that Taiwan is a part of China. Since President Chen is on record 

saying he would like to change Taiwan’s national title, this seems to be his intent. 

Furthermore, his call for penning a new Constitution during the campaign period, 

like the proposing referendums, seems clearly politically motivated. 

A feud with China helped former President Lee win the election in 1996 and 

President Chen win in 2000. President Chen perceives that a China crisis will help 

him win the coming election. 

All of this creates a serious predicament for the United States. 

The United States has long favored democracies in the conduct of its foreign policy and has, especially Congress, been instrumental in the democratization of Taiwan, even threatening the government of Taiwan if it did not democratize. The 

TRA, in my opinion, when it demanded progress in human rights in Taiwan (since 

in the U.S. view the human rights condition of nations is improved by democratization) called for it. 

Democracy, in the U.S. view, also gives a nation the right to choose its future. 

That means Taiwan should possess the right to decide whether it unifies with China 

or become legally separate from China. 

45 

However, U.S. China/Taiwan policy is based on the principle of one China. ‘‘One 

China’’ has maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait in the past and still does. 

Thus the U.S. has good reason to oppose referendums in Taiwan if they attempt 

to decide the sovereignty issue. There are two special reasons for this. 

First, it is desirable that the United States avoids a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

This is even more so now given America’s problems and commitments elsewhere. 

In December, President Bush stated this emphatically in the context of the referendum imbroglio. 

Second, supporting President Chen’s referendum proposals, given their language 

and in the present situation (meaning in conjunction with an election), would be 

tantamount to helping one political party or bloc win. Taiwan’s national identity, 

or whether it is legally a part of China or not, is an issue that divides Taiwan along 

political party lines. 

In fact, the media in Taiwan has frequently reported that the U.S. favors the 

Chen Administration over the opposition. 

President Chen’s recent visit to the U.S. and others in his Administration coming 

to the United States as a product of a more liberal U.S. policy in this regard, has 

helped President Chen’s re-election chances as reflected by polls after the visits. 

The Chen government has been lauded in the United States for its many contributions to Taiwan’s democratization, in many respects deservedly so. When it was in 

opposition it promoted a two-party system, which helped the process of democratization. In power it has been responsible for the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy 

and it has made sincere efforts to get rid of corruption and much more. One can 

certainly argue that the KMT was in power too long and President Chen and his 

party were a good alternative and that the change of parties helped further democracy. 

But President Chen and his party also have their warts. The DPP, before the election in 2001, called on the youth to emulate individuals who have struggled in their 

lifetimes. One of the models suggested was Adolf Hitler. President Chen appointed 

an individual convicted of attempted murder in New York to be his human rights 

advisor. President Chen got his son a legal position in the military even though his 

test scores were not high enough. The Chen Administration and the DPP have blatantly practiced ethnic (or sub-ethnic) discrimination in government hiring and have 

fanned the flames of ethnic enmity during election campaigns and at other times. 

The United States has to formulate a China/Taiwan policy that balances protecting Taiwan and supporting its democracy with a one-China policy that keeps 

peace and tranquility in the Taiwan Strait. 

The U.S. should support referendums, but not a plebiscite. The United States 

should certainly avoid any change in policy or any public statement that would have 

an impact on the outcome of the election or that would result in further tension in 

relations between Taiwan and China. 

Panel II: Discussion, Questions and Answers 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Professor Copper, and again 

Professor Hickey and Ambassador Feldman. Commissioner Robinson has some questions or a question anyway. Again, this is a fiveminute deal. 

Chairman ROBINSON. You bet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Q&A both included. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Ambassador Feldman, I take your point on 

the fact that Congress may not have been as robust in asserting 

its obligations under the TRA and perhaps the relationship more 

generally in its dialogue with the Executive Branch. 

Many of us concur with that view, and as being a Commission 

established by the leadership of the Congress, we’re also anxious 

to determine specific recommendations that might redress any imbalance or any fall-off in that dialogue and see if it could be remedied. 

Would you share with us any specific ideas you might have about 

how that Congressional prerogative could be asserted more effectively and forcefully? 

46 

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you. It will depend upon the circumstances, 

which change over time. In connection, for example, with the statement by President Bush on no change in the status quo, which was 

received in Taiwan with something that was described as ‘‘shock 

and awe.’’ I think when something like that happens, Members of 

Congress, the appropriate committees of the leadership, commissions should seek immediately to gain an understanding of why the 

statement was made, what its parameters are, what it means, and 

when you say ‘‘no change in the status quo,’’ that’s awfully broad. 

Let’s get the Administration to define what they mean by 

‘‘change in the status quo,’’ and then, of course, the very fact that 

that statement was made standing side by side with the Premier 

of the People’s Republic of China added something to it, and I 

think it would be entirely appropriate for the Congress to say, hey, 

when you make such a statement standing next to the Premier of 

the People’s Republic of China, you yourself are changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait area. 

And when you will publicly say to Taiwan thou shalt not do this, 

but not publicly, but, only as Secretary Schriver has told us, privately say, hey, by the way we’re bothered by those 500 plus missiles, I think that should have been a public statement as well. And 

so that also becomes a question that the Congress can ask. So what 

I’m saying is you have to—it will go with whatever the circumstances are—and you have to be willing to seize the circumstances and say, hey, we’re a partner in this. We want to be 

consulted and we want to give advice. 

Chairman ROBINSON. In my view, that’s excellent counsel, and 

one that this Commission will take on board in its final report. 

Mr. Hickey, this is just a small matter, but I took note of your 

comment about President Reagan’s pledge to reduce arms sales in 

contrast a little bit to the Bush Administration, which has been 

more forward leaning. 

But you’d agree, wouldn’t you, that President Reagan himself believed that we needed to condition absolutely any kind of reduction 

in arms sales on China’s continued commitment to a peaceful resolution of differences, number one, but also the specific character of 

the threat that the PRC was going to pose against Taiwan. 

That is to say it sort of defies my imagination to think of a President more committed to ensuring that any kind of comment on the 

reduction of arms sales wasn’t more than offset, if you will, by 

making very plain that any deviation, any ramping up of the threat 

by the PRC on Taiwan, that is off the table. Any kind of move 

other than fully peaceful resolution-mindedness, if you will, again 

off the table. 

Would you concur with that? 

Mr. HICKEY. Certainly, yes. What had happened at that time was 

there was a division within the Administration with Secretary of 

State Haig and others saying there was a need to build up our relationship with the PRC against the Soviet Union, and that outweighed the President’s own personal opinions towards upgrading 

relations with Taiwan, which he had said he would do during the 

campaign. 

So they issued this Communique ́ in 1982 which said that we 

would reduce arms sales leading over time to a final resolution, but 

47 

at the same time in that Communique ́, they did stress that all of 

this was predicated upon a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, 

and a follow-up on something Ambassador Feldman said that I 

think was very important, the Congress at that time was really 

very concerned if not outraged by this Communique ́. 

And they called all of these Administration people in on the floor 

and held a series of hearings that if you go back and read them 

are really fascinating, where they’d say, well, what does this mean? 

When are you going to terminate these arm sales and does this 

mean next year? And the person would say, well, I don’t know. It 

goes 50 years from now? It goes 500 years from now? And then the 

Administration official’s response was your guess is as good as 

mine. 

And then they came up with, well, are these sales actually going 

to decrease, and they said, no, you look at it like a regression chart. 

They could actually go up for 30 or 40 years and then decrease, but 

the purpose—I think what was helpful from these hearings is that 

they showed that the Communique ́ was almost a dead letter from 

1982, that it really didn’t mean that much. 

I mean almost immediately the Administration went through all 

sorts of contortions explaining that it wasn’t what it appeared to 

be, and that I think maybe the Congress, you know, acted very responsibly then trying to get to the bottom of what this change in 

policy meant, whereas perhaps they ought to be doing the same 

about the referendum issue. 

Mr. FELDMAN. May I add one thing? 

Chairman ROBINSON. Please. 

Mr. FELDMAN. At the same time he signed the Communique ́, 

President Reagan sent a letter to then President of Taiwan, Chiang 

Ching-kuo, and said that this Communique ́ is entirely predicated 

upon the statement by the PRC that peaceful resolution is their 

fundamental policy. 

If at any time in the future, it appears that that has changed, 

I will regard this Communique ́ as null and void. Now, I think one 

can certainly say that post-’96, the missile firings, at that point if 

not before the Communique ́ became null and void. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I would agree with that. 

Mr. HICKEY. People were asking if it became null and void when 

President Bush, Sr. approved the sale of the F–16s. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I would just say in conclusion that I also 

don’t think that the public record has necessarily seen all of President Reagan’s reflections on this matter. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes. There are two letters from President Reagan 

to Chiang Ching-Kuo, which I have translated and included in an 

article that I mentioned in my written testimony. Jim Mann in his 

book About Face says that there is a highly secret memorandum 

from President Reagan in a drawer at the NSC. Undoubtedly, there 

are lots and lots of documents that have never been made public 

going back to ’79 right up to the present. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I’d just say I think that’s a fair statement. 

I’d like to turn to our Vice Chair of the Commission, Dick D’Amato, 

at this time. 

48 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much for your testimony. Do you happen to know what drawer 

that is in at the NSC? We’d like to—— 

Mr. FELDMAN. Ask Jim Mann. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. —get our hands on that memo. 

Commissioner DREYER. He said a safe. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Oh, a safe. That’s harder. Well, this is 

a matter of concern. Making foreign policy by periodic 

Communique ́s issued from somewhere in the Executive Branch 

without consultation with Congress and building any kind of consensus is dangerous, sort of like foreign policy by fortune cookie— 

you know, here it comes—and only lasts the life of the writer—of 

the President. Certainly there is no binding anything on the next 

President. 

So the only redeeming and permanent document and the sound 

policy foundation is the TRA from what I can see, and the rest of 

it is always sort of, you know, paragraph nine of the other letter. 

But it is of concern that it seems to me that the construction of 

this foreign policy is based upon not only these Communique ́s, but 

on other documents and agreements and assurances made by Executive Branch figures to powerful Chinese leadership members that 

we’re not aware of. I mean who knows what Kissinger told Chou 

En-Lai, you know. Kissinger told a lot of people a lot of things. We 

would be very interested—in fact, we have a project the Commission is engaging in in trying to build a historical record here to understand how this all evolved, so that we can help to recommend 

sounder mechanisms for formulating policy which is going to be obviously more and more important as we go along here given the importance of our relationship with both China and Taiwan. 

So I would just encourage you to, if you have any knowledge of 

some of these documents, that you would keep us in mind and we 

would like to confer with you, and your writings are very, very informative to us on these matters. 

The one thing I’d like to ask all of you—I don’t know if you have 

that much experience in the arms area—but we have a problem in 

that we have authorized the sale of a lot of arms to Taiwan which 

the Taiwanese legislature has not funded or at least the Executive 

Branch has not agreed to fund there. And so the question of maintaining a qualitative and quantitative equality or a commensurate 

capability on the part of the Taiwanese, you know, becomes somewhat theoretical. 

They’ve got so many destroyers and submarines and other kinds 

of weapon systems that have been approved, but they haven’t been 

bought, they haven’t been integrated in the defense system. There 

hasn’t been any training and there hasn’t been any joint development of doctrine, all the things that you need to build the kind of 

effective defense force. 

Do any of you have any thoughts on this, this problem, and what 

it is in Taiwan that is restraining the Taiwanese ability to build 

the kind of support domestically which they have gotten from the 

U.S. Congress and the U.S. Department of Defense in terms of 

their defense purchases? 

Mr. Hickey. 

49 

Mr. HICKEY. There are a number of reasons. If you’re talking 

about the hardware that they’ve been offered by the United States 

including the submarines and the submarine killing aircraft, in the 

old days the Taiwanese could, you know, under marshal law, you 

could just make these kind of orders and purchase these things. As 

you know, Taiwan is now a democracy, and when I was there in 

December, I asked these same kind of questions: why are you all 

stalling on these subs and what have you, and they said, well, the 

price is too high, we’re a democracy, all of this stuff has to go 

through our congress now. 

And when you have a major weapons system package offered to 

Singapore, it will take 22 months; United States could take 22 

months; we could take 24 months. These things are going to take 

time. We’re going to want to bargain. At the same time, you’ve got 

to remember that there’s a recession in Taiwan. The economy isn’t 

booming like it used to be, and an interesting point that one of my 

hosts made was that, you know, some of this actually was America’s fault. 

It’s funny how that always comes back to us, but they’ve wanted 

those submarines for a long time, and when they offered to buy 

them back in the 1980s when they had the money, we refused saying that they were offensive weapons. Now never mind the fact 

that, you know, Japan, which is not supposed to have any offensive 

weapons, had submarines, but the State Department—no offense to 

the State Department—but they were saying these are offensive 

weapons and you can’t purchase them. 

Now suddenly they say there’s just all of these weapon systems 

coming down the pike that the U.S. is offering, and they don’t have 

the money, plus they’ve got to go through the legislature, plus 

they’ve got the recession, plus they’ve got the accelerating cost and 

other social programs. These are some of the reasons that they’ve 

not moved forward. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Mr. Feldman. 

Mr. FELDMAN. If I may just add one or two things. There are no 

submarines. They don’t exist. They’d have to be built. They’d have 

to build it from scratch. We haven’t built a diesel submarine in 50 

years, something like that. There is no other country that’s going 

to sell them to them. Countries that make diesel submarines— 

Spain, Germany, Holland—they’re not going to sell them to the 

PRC—to Taiwan—sorry. 

So they have to be built from scratch. All right. Well, (a) it’s expensive; (b) you even have a fight here in the United States where 

there is a very influential Senator who wants to have it built in 

Mississippi and there is another influential Senator who wants to 

have it built up in Rhode Island. 

And then the Taiwanese, they want to have a piece of the action, 

too. They want to say, well, look, if we’re going to have submarines, 

let’s at least start our capability by letting us build part of one, 

more of the next, and so on and so forth. So this is not a simple 

kind of thing. And then you’ve got—as my colleague has said, 

you’ve got the whole democracy thing going there, too. 

It is not easy to get appropriation bills through our Congress. It 

is not easy to get appropriation bills through their congress. So 

they’ve gone ahead with some stuff. As Richard Lawless was say­

50 

ing, there’s a whole bunch of stuff that they can and should do that 

doesn’t really take very much money. 

They can harden their revetments for aircraft, for example. They 

can work out a whole bunch of procedures to protect your leadership against a decapitation strike. There are lots of things that 

they can do we’re telling them and they’re doing some of them. 

By the way, I was told when I was there—when I was there in 

November, this is I suppose part of Chen Shui-ban’s trying to get 

us on his side. He said that if he is elected, he will very shortly 

after his reelection submit a supplemental defense appropriation— 

I forget how many billion dollars—I think the number was six. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Yes, Mr. Copper, briefly if you don’t mind. 

Mr. COPPER. A couple of points. Since the election in 2000, Taiwan has experienced divided government and gridlock on almost 

every issue of any importance including defense spending. 

Second, in 2001, Taiwan experienced a recession, negative 

growth. Few in Taiwan had experienced this. I think things will 

get better. The inability to decide on purchasing weapons, I think 

this will gradually go away. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you very much. I’d like to turn to 

Co-Chairman for today’s hearing Commissioner Wortzel followed by 

Commissioner Bryen and Commissioner Mulloy and Commissioner 

Dreyer. So that’s our list. We need to stay within our limits here, 

but please Co-Chairman Wortzel. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Ambassador Feldman, you’ve had quite a bit 

of experience with the Taiwan Relations Act and I would appreciate clarification on one point that now, in my mind, needs to be 

clarified, and the rest of the panel, if the witnesses would care to 

comment, that would be great. 

But when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of 

China in 1979, did it also recognize or accept the proposition that 

Taiwan is part of China and a one China policy? 

Mr. FELDMAN. No, sir, it did not. The recognition Communique ́ 

says that the United States acknowledges the Chinese policy that 

there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. The word ‘‘acknowledge’’ is diplo-speak for we hear you; we know that’s what 

you say. The United States made no statement of its own as to 

what the status of Taiwan was nor have we since made any statement, any formal statement, of what we regard the status of Taiwan to be. 

I trust this answers the question. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Yes, thank you very much. Dr. Copper, Dr. 

Hickey. 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, I agree. I think there have been a few people 

somewhere along the line who have made a mistake, who make a 

slip of the tongue or something and say we—but Ambassador Feldman is absolutely correct. That the U.S. acknowledges that it’s the 

PRC’s position, and that Taiwan is part of China, and you could 

tell me, Commissioner Wortzel, that it’s a beautiful sunshiny day 

out there today, and I can say I acknowledge your position that it 

is. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. The fact is it’s raining. 

Mr. FELDMAN. The fact is it’s raining and it’s nasty. So, yes, basically that’s what it meant. 

51 

Mr. HICKEY. I agree with what’s said. I think some people, however, drew from the fact that we established diplomatic relations 

with Beijing that there is only one China, and therefore Taiwan 

has no sovereignty, but I want to add that the Taiwan Relations 

Act certainly contradicts that. 

It doesn’t say that Taiwan has sovereignty, but I think if you 

read into it, interpret it, it does say that. 

Mr. FELDMAN. May I add one more thing? One minute to midnight on December 31, 1978, we recognized the Republic of China 

as the sole legal government of all of China. One minute after midnight on January 1, 1979, we no longer did so. What changed was 

U.S. recognition. Nothing changed on Taiwan. It was exactly the 

same place it had been. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you. Commissioner Bryen. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the Commission’s benefit, first of all, there’s a law called P.L. 92–403, the 

Case Act. In ancient times, I worked on this proposition, which is 

part of the law today. It requires that all Executive agreements including secret ones be transmitted to the Congress on a prompt 

basis. 

If there are Executive agreements in someone’s drawer, they 

don’t belong there. And the Commission has every right, as an instrument of the Congress, to request whatever documents of this 

sort exist. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. I think, Mr. Chairman, we should do 

something like that. We should take that up for action. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Yes, I agree. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

It was very interesting. I have a broad question. It seems to me 

that we’ve fallen back into the language of considering Taiwan a 

burden, some sort of an obligation on the United States, some kind 

of liability, some sort of nuisance. 

I think you can make the opposite case, and so I could make it, 

but I think I would rather hear you make it. Some of the points 

that might be considered in that is what military importance Taiwan might have for the United States—what effects its presence 

along the Taiwan Straits has in terms of keeping the sea lines of 

communications open? How it might help contain military expansion of China, which I think is of global concern? And finally, one 

area to look at is the impact of democracy on the entire region. So 

with those sort of suggestions, I open it up to you for comment. 

Mr. HICKEY. I think that’s a good question, and I’ve heard that 

a couple times recently of people saying, well, why Taiwan and why 

is Taiwan important? I think we have to remember that beyond the 

strategic, you know, of people saying, well, if Taiwan is an old— 

President Reagan used to say it was an ally of ours going all the 

way back to World War II. Now that was a slip of the tongue, because they weren’t an ally after ’79, but in addition to the strategic 

elements that people talk about, there’s also the—— 

Commissioner BRYEN. He tended to get the principles right. 

Mr. HICKEY. I’m sorry? 

Commissioner BRYEN. President Reagan tended to get the fundamental principles right. 

Mr. HICKEY. He got the big picture. Right, the big picture. 

52 

Commissioner BRYEN. And that’s what was so impressive about 

him. 

Mr. HICKEY. But as far as politics, Taiwan has evolved into what 

the State Department now calls officially a multi-party democracy 

and they put the light of the argument that it is impossible for a 

Chinese state or an Asian state to ultimately democratize peacefully and metamorphasize as it did into a functioning lively democracy. And I think democratization in Taiwan, I mean it’s brought 

a lot of good things. People look at, well, you’ve got these divisive 

issues. It takes a long time to get laws through and what have you, 

but if—the first time I went to Taiwan, it was under marshal law 

and I thought it was a mess. 

And I know people who don’t like that because they liked it 

under marshal law, but the traffic was a mess, there weren’t any 

parks, there weren’t any green spaces, but since with democracy 

the island has been cleaned up. They’ve got the mass transit. 

They’ve got parks. The air pollution—they’ve got an environmental 

movement. So politically I think we have a lot of interests in Taiwan and economically as well people tend to forget that we have 

more invested in Taiwan than we do in the mainland, even to this 

day. So we have vested political, economic and strategic interests 

in Taiwan. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I’d add only that there are only five democracies 

in all of Asia—Taiwan is one of them—Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. That’s it. And this is very, very important as an example of what a Chinese society can in fact create. 

Let me also remind or recall a couple years ago, ten years ago 

or so, people were talking about Asian values. Remember? Asian 

values were a Pinochet-kind of regime. That was an Asian value. 

Well, Taiwan has given the lie. It has gone from a military dictatorship with all the apparatus of such a thing, the political prisoners, the controlled press, the inability to do damn near anything, 

into what it is today, and just as Professor Hickey has described, 

that’s got to be very important to us, plus all the strategic implications that Commissioner Bryen has pointed to. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Commissioner—sorry—— 

Mr. COPPER. Could I? Sorry. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I’m sorry. Mr. Copper. 

Mr. COPPER. A comment about Taiwan’s democratization. Taiwan, in my opinion, democratized faster and more successfully 

than any country on the earth. So it’s become a model for developing countries, not only in Asia but everywhere else. 

Also, as Ambassador Feldman mentioned when talking about 

Asian values, there are two models of democracy in Asia, Asian democracy and Western democracy. Taiwan is the latter. 

A third point being that Taiwan has democratized under influence of the United States. We pushed Taiwan to democratize. 

Therefore, in answer to your question, is Taiwan a nuisance, yes, 

it is. But if we abandon Taiwan, we have no credibility in Asia. We 

have to understand that, I think. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Commissioner Mulloy. 

53 

Commissioner MULLOY. Yes. Just a point of clarification, Mr. 

Feldman. When you talked about the Shanghai Communique ́, I 

think there was one important sentence that we didn’t read: 

United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 

Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China—in other words 

that we acknowledge—and that Taiwan is part of China. We acknowledge. 

But then the Communique ́ further states: The United States 

does not challenge that position, so it’s not just acknowledging, 

we’re not challenging it. Okay. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Different communique ́s. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Isn’t this the Shanghai Communique ́? 

Mr. FELDMAN. That’s the Shanghai Communique ́. I was quoting 

the Recognition Communique ́. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Well this is the Shanghai Communique ́ 

where we say that—— 

Mr. FELDMAN. I can talk about that, too, but I was quoting the 

Recognition Communique ́. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Now, the second point, in your testimony, you talk about the state and imply that Taiwan meets the 

test of a state because of the Montevideo Convention. And then you 

cite the membership in the WTO and the Asian Development Bank. 

Of course, China’s membership in the WTO is not as a state. Customs territories are permitted into the WTO, and I was at the negotiations in Bangkok, I think in 1985, when Taiwan was kept in 

and the PRC came into the Asian Development Bank and Taiwan’s 

title there, I think, is Taiwan China. So I don’t think we can cite 

that as these memberships as that they’re a state. 

I’m not making a big point. I want this record very clear so that 

people understand what is happening here. Now, the third point I 

want to make, Mr. Hickey, you say on page four of your testimony, 

Washington is not committed to Taiwan’s defense under the Taiwan Relations Act. I know that Mr. Copper disagrees with that. 

Now, in light of that statement, President Bush in April of 2001 

made that famous statement about what we would do if—do we 

have an obligation to defend Taiwan if it was attacked? 

This is on page eight of your testimony. The President replied, 

yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that, yes, I would. 

When asked if this meant protecting the island, quote, ‘‘with the 

full force of the American military,’’ President Bush replied, quote, 

‘‘whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself.’’ 

After that statement, Members of Congress went to the floor and 

said that they didn’t think the President had that authority because under the Taiwan Relations Act, you have to consult with 

Congress, that Congress, under our Constitution, is the body that 

declares whether we’re going to go to war or not, and this would 

imply we were going to go to war. 

So I would like your view. Under Taiwan Relations Act, who 

really has this? Can the President alone take us to war in this type 

of situation or do you think the Taiwan Relations Act requires consultation with the Congress and a decision by Congress about these 

sorts of matters? Mr. Hickey and then whoever else wants to comment because I think it’s an enormously important issue. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I’d like to answer the first two questions. 

54 

Commissioner MULLOY. Fine. 

Mr. FELDMAN. As regards the Shanghai Communique ́, I was 

speaking of—I was quoting the Recognition Communique ́, not the 

Shanghai Communique ́. Now, what the Shanghai Communique ́ 

says is that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait say there 

is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. The United States does 

not challenge that position. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Correct. 

Mr. FELDMAN. It doesn’t say the United States agrees with that 

position. 

Commissioner MULLOY. We don’t challenge it. 

Mr. FELDMAN. So once again, it’s an agnostic statement. By the 

way, Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait did not agree with 

that statement. On Taiwan, 85 percent of the people would have 

said something completely different. So it was a neat trick by Secretary Kissinger, by Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, because 

the formal declarative position of the Chiang Kai-shek government 

was indeed that there is but one China, of which Taiwan is a part. 

But that was not the position, in fact, taken by the Taiwanese 

people who constituted an overwhelming majority on the island— 

number one. 

Question number two: the Montevideo Convention to which I referred said a state has to have the ability to enter into international agreements. It doesn’t say under what quality or what 

name. Taiwan has entered into international agreements. It has 

settled population. It has defined territory. 

Therefore, I would make the argument that under the Montevideo Convention, which is the convention in international law, it 

has all the attributes of statehood. 

Commissioner MULLOY. But the real test under international law 

of a state is whether other states recognize it as a state. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes. 

Commissioner MULLOY. That’s customary international law. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Right. Twenty-seven other countries recognize it 

as a state. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Right. And how many states are there in 

the world? 

Mr. FELDMAN. There are, last I looked, 192 members of the 

United Nations including members like Nauru with a population of 

8,000 or Andorra with a population of 13,000, which is less than 

one city block in downtown Taipei. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I have to apologize here, but I think in 

order for Commissioner Dreyer to have her opportunity, we’ll need 

to move to her. I apologize to other speakers that might have had 

something on that. 

Commissioner Dreyer. 

Commissioner DREYER. First, a comment on Dr. Hickey’s comment that Taiwan has moved on these weapons. I think Ambassador Feldman is exactly correct when he says what he said about 

the submarines. In fact, we offered to sell submarines when we 

didn’t have submarines to sell. And this is also true of some of the 

other weapons. The production line for some of the other weapons 

that we announced we would sell was closed, and opening it up cost 

a huge amount of money, which raised the price prohibitively. So 

55 

it is not just the excuse that Taiwan had a recession that it 

couldn’t buy them. 

And in a third instance, there were weapons that they had asked 

to buy, and we offered to sell them something else. And you can 

imagine that if you go to your stockbroker and say I would like to 

buy IBM and he says, no, but here’s some Enron, that you would 

feel very differently about him. So I take issue with that statement. 

But my real question, and I guess you all get about ten seconds, 

each of you, to answer this, is on the issue of the status quo. And 

it seems to me that the status quo is very rarely static because 

things are always changing. The earth continues to spin around the 

sun, and the universe continues to expand, and if the Administration is making repeated statements about neither side shall be allowed to change the status quo, are we not then getting ourselves 

in a box, because I have never heard Taiwan object that the PRC 

is changing the status quo and we always seem to allow the PRC 

to complain that Taiwan is changing the status quo. 

Can any of you see or all of you seriatim see a way out of that? 

Mr. FELDMAN. I think just as you say the status quo changes all 

the time. The status quo changes with every additional missile emplaced opposite Taiwan. So this fetish that our government makes 

about the status quo is osaway [ph]. It’s without any foundation. 

Commissioner DREYER. Dr. Hickey. 

Mr. HICKEY. I think Thomas Gold wrote an article in Asian Survey a number of years ago about Taiwan and said that the status 

quo is not static. It does change all the time. At the same time, 

however, I think what people in the Administration mean is not 

adding a missile here or a tank here or reduction of force levels 

here. I think they’re sort of looking at the broad picture that if 

changing the status quo in a major way would be, you know, 

changing to a Republic of Taiwan or something like that, that they 

feel that this is moving too fast in that direction. That may not be 

my opinion. I’m just saying what I think that they’re—you asked 

what they might—— 

Commissioner DREYER. I asked something rather different and 

that is, with this attitude, are we not allowing the PRC to dictate 

the terms of the argument? 

Mr. HICKEY. I’d have to give that some more thought. 

Commissioner DREYER. Dr. Copper. 

Mr. COPPER. I interpret the term ‘‘status quo’’ to mean don’t rock 

the boat. The Taiwan Strait is a flash-point area, and we want to 

avoid conflict there. Certainly things are changing in Taiwan and 

its relationship with China. Taiwan is heading politically toward 

independence; economically it’s heading the other way. You’ve got 

major trends going on, but it’s difficult to interpret what the bottom line is. 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank you. 

Chairman ROBINSON. I’d like to thank the panelists very much 

for an illuminating discussion. I can tell you that we’ve absorbed 

your words carefully and they’ll be reflected in our work ahead, 

and we’d like to be in touch with probably all of you over time. 

Before concluding the morning session, however, as we’ve discussed President Reagan on several occasions this morning, I 

would like to take this opportunity to offer the Commission’s con­

56 

gratulations to President Reagan on this his 93rd birthday. This is 

a particularly meaningful event for a number of us here today, both 

on the dais and I’m sure in the audience as well. 

So, with that, we’d like to resume at one o’clock for our afternoon 

session. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing recessed for the luncheon 

speaker.] 

LUNCHEON SESSION, 12:40 P.M., FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 

Commissioner DREYER. Okay. Let’s get started. It gives me great 

pleasure to introduce Jacques deLisle, who is not only very eminent 

but happens to be a friend of mine, I hope. 

Jacques, you didn’t know this, but yesterday we had a French 

national who was the—was it the Secretary of the EU—— 

Mr. OHRENSTEIN. The Deputy Head of the EU Delegation. 

Commissioner DREYER. So this will dispel any notions that we 

are anti-Gallic, and Jacques is Professor of Law and a member of 

the faculty at the Center for East Asian Studies at the University 

of Pennsylvania, and he also directs Asian studies at the Foreign 

Policy Research Institute, which it is my pleasure to be a Senior 

Fellow of, and I could go on about Jacques. He received his undergraduate education at Princeton and has degrees in law and political science from Harvard, and more relevantly I think you are one 

of the few people I know who manages to be fantastically erudite 

and very amusing at the same time. 

So without further ado, go to it. 

STATEMENT OF JACQUES DELISLE 

PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. DELISLE. Hey, no pressure. Thank you, June, and thank you 

all for inviting me to speak to you at this lunch. My charge today, 

I gather, is to address the referendum and perhaps more broadly 

the ‘‘new constitution’’ issues in Taiwan in the context of international legal questions of Taiwan’s status. 

The referendum and the constitutional reform discussion can 

best be understood as the most recent twists in a very long-running 

story. President Chen Shui-bian, of course, insists that the referendum, which will be on the March 20 ballot, the broader legislation authorizing referenda, and the ‘‘new constitution’’ discussion 

have nothing to do with Taiwan’s status or, to put the point more 

provocatively, Taiwan independence. 

We are assured it will not violate the ‘‘five no’s,’’ or as it is usually rendered in Chinese, the ‘‘four no’s and one not.’’ That is: no 

declaration of independence, no change the national title, no incorporation of former President Lee Teng-hui’s state-to-state language 

in the constitution, no referendum on independence or unification— 

those are the four no’s, and the not is: not to dismantle the National Reunification Council and the Guidelines for National Unification. 

The way Chen Shui-bian has framed this is to say that he is 

seeking to maintain the status quo, and that this has no bearing 

on unification or independence issues. It is, we are told, purely a 

‘‘defensive’’ referendum. Now, as a narrow legal matter, that’s prob­

57 

ably right in ways that I will explain shortly, but the issues are 

a lot more complicated than that. 

There is, first of all, a Taiwanese domestic legal question about 

whether what Chen is doing conforms with the referendum law 

that was passed last fall, but it is now clear that those issues will 

not derail the referenda and they will be on the ballot March 20. 

So, if Chen has a good, or at least not-effectively-challenged, case 

that he stayed within Taiwanese law and a good case that he 

stayed within his highly public, internationally visible commitments about not changing Taiwan’s status, why all the fuss? Some 

of it, of course, is politics. You all know that at least as well as I 

do. Clearly there has been a big political flap surrounding the famous statement by President Bush during Chinese Premier Wen 

Jiabao’s visit to Washington, the various statement and signals 

sent by Messrs. Armitage, Powell, Moriarity, Paal, and, of course, 

Ms. Shaheen, and the familiar warnings from Beijing sources from 

Wen Jaibao down to a recent lengthy analysis of Taiwan politics 

and the referendum issue by the Propaganda Department of the 

Chinese Communist Party, which tends to be pretty thorough and 

profuse in spilling ink, both black and red. 

The political tumult has extended to the Taiwan side with the 

‘‘pan-blue’’ team (that is, the Kuomintang and People’s First Party) 

falling all over itself to figure out how to react to the ‘‘pan-green’’ 

team’s (that is, the Democratic Progressive Party-led group’s) referendum initiative. And, of course, perhaps most strikingly of all, 

that you all consider international law a fit talk for a lunch suggests that there is certainly some significant level of concern with 

the political and security implications of the referendum and related developments. 

What I want to suggest is that there is, in addition to that politics, an international legal aspect to the controversy that’s worth 

plumbing, in part because it reflects the same kind of entanglement of politics and international law that we’ve seen going on in 

the cross-Straits relationship for 15 or more years now, in some 

ways for probably 30 some years. 

By saying this, I do not want to suggest that international law 

is going to solve any of the problems. Indeed, quite the contrary. 

Nor do I mean to suggest that what everyone is worried about is 

resolving the legal implications of the referenda or related issues, 

or the legal niceties of Taiwan’s status. Rather, what we have here 

is a situation where the volatile politics of cross-Strait relations is 

entangled with legal categories. To talk in legal terms has some 

use here because diplomats and politicians like vagueness, while 

lawyers like precision. If you have to use legal terms, you have to 

be a little more precise, and that tends to help expose where the 

political land mines are buried. 

Beyond that, law tends to be a weapon of the weak. If you do not 

have anything more powerful on your side, you try the law. Taiwan 

is, of course, weak in its current international position. Also, arguments that invoke some legal principles may have unprecedented, 

if still limited, purchase with the PRC. China cares more about 

international law than it has historically, partly because it wants 

to be in the club. The WTO is the most recent example of that. 

More broadly international legal categories tend to do a pretty nice 

58 

job of reflecting and focusing some important features of political 

reality in the international realm. That may all sound a little abstract. Let me try to put it concretely with respect to one aspect: 

The world regarded very differently on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 

than it did Iraq’s treatment of Kurds and Shiites in Iraq who happened, like the Kuwatis, to be sitting on a lot of oil. The world 

looks rather differently on how the PRC behaves toward Tibet or 

Xinjiang than it did on how the PRC behaved toward Vietnam during its ill-fated invasion a quarter-century ago. 

As these contrasts indicate, it is very important for Taiwan to 

make the cross-Strait relationship look ‘‘international’’ and for 

China to make it look ‘‘intra-national.’’ 

So without further ado, let me turn to our principal topic: the referendum question. The text of the referenda do not raise squarely 

any question of Taiwan’s status. The first referendum is about the 

PRC missiles targeting Taiwan. It asks whether more defensive capabilities should be purchased by Taiwan. The question of withdrawing the missiles has been moved to a preamble condition rather than the focus of the referendum, which it was in an earlier contemplated form: 

If China does not withdraw its missiles and renounce the use of 

force, should Taiwan upgrade its capabilities? 

The second referendum question has to do with the establishment of a ‘‘peace and stability’’ framework for cross-Strait negotiations. There is nothing in these two referenda that mention ‘‘status’’ or ‘‘independence.’’ And both, again, are a climb down from an 

initial proposed referendum’s focus on withdrawing missiles. The 

two referenda have also emerged against the background of other 

referendum topics that were bandied about before the passage of 

the legislation that authorizes the referenda that will be on the 

ballot: 

This strange grab bag of possible referendum topics included: 

whether Taiwan should build a fourth nuclear power plant, whether Taiwan should enjoy World Health Organization representation, 

whether Taiwan should shrink the size of its legislature, and 

whether Taiwan should have a new constitution. The first three 

say nothing explicit about Taiwan’s status and do not seem obviously to implicate such questions. 

Constitutional change also does not necessarily say anything 

about Taiwan’s status or independence. The issues that are officially on the agenda for constitutional reform in Taiwan are fairly 

familiar domestic affairs: A constitution drafted across the Strait in 

1947 for a big underdeveloped country doesn’t fit so well for an industrialized country of 23 million in the current century. How do 

you deal with the cumbersome institutions that the old constitution 

established to represent a vast and far-flung people? How do you 

deal with the half-residential/half-parliamentary structure, which 

does not work so well in a system of multi-party democracy? 

So, why all the charges and worries that the referenda or constitutional reform are efforts to change the status quo with respect 

to Taiwan’s status? Looking at the international law questions 

starts to make things clearer. When you say ‘‘referendum’’ in the 

same breath as ‘‘Taiwan,’’ everybody thinks of the old platform of 

the DPP—of President Chen’s party, which called for referendum 

59 

on independence. It is hard to get away from the idea that the developments of the last several months can be characterized as a 

‘‘referendum in search of a topic.’’ For the very idea of a referendum in Taiwan evokes the notion that we are tossing around 

the familiar term that resonates in Taiwan’s recent political history 

with a referendum on the independence question. 

The other potential referendum topics that were being discussed 

in recent months also have implications for questions of Taiwan’s 

international legal status. Consider WHO representation for Taiwan. The quest for representation, which the referendum would 

have sought to advance or at least to spotlight is part of Taiwan’s 

relentless quest for as much international ‘‘status’’ as it can grab. 

A standard, established principle of international law makes it 

clear that Taiwan’s capacity to engage in international relations is 

one of the criteria of statehood. 

While the precise meaning and application of this principle is 

controversial, it at least counts for something to be a member of 

as many organizations as you can. The closer you can get to membership or some affiliation with UN-affiliated, state-members-only 

organizations like the WHO, the better. So, in this way, the potential WHO representation referendum implicated questions of Taiwan’s status. 

Constitutional reform does too. In the discussion of constitutional 

reform and the possible referendum to support it, Chen and other 

advocates of change have said much about how the people of Taiwan need a constitution that belongs to them. They should not 

have to live with need an ill-suited constitution that was crafted by 

and for a China with very different characteristics. 

This discussion of constitutional renovation comes against the 

background of a trajectory of past constitutional reforms on Taiwan 

that, step by step, severed or weakened links to the mainland. To 

adopt a wholly new constitution made on Taiwan would push that 

trend significantly farther, even if it did not formally change the 

name of the country to ‘‘Taiwan’’ or ‘‘Republic of Taiwan.’’ 

So while, of course, governments draft new constitutions and ongoing states change their constitutions, one of the things that new 

states routinely do is make new constitutions. This albeit loose correlation between newly acquired statehood and adoption of a new 

constitution resonates particularly strongly in the post-Cold War 

world in which the Soviet Union’s breakup created numerous new 

states that wrote new constitutions. Indeed, a few of my colleagues, 

not at my university, but in other law schools, made a tidy living 

providing form-book constitutions to new republics, many of which 

have since been revised. 

Let me take a step back and look at some of the broader contextual issues surrounding the two upcoming referenda and constitutional reform. If you probe the discussion of the referenda and their 

context a little more closely, you can see that, everywhere you turn, 

they resonate with international law questions that have been part 

of the politics of Taiwan’s international status. 

The biggest one here is, of course, whether Taiwan is a state or 

not. We used to play what I call ‘‘Montevideo games:’’ assessing 

how far Taiwan was going in playing the game of claiming to meet 

the standards of statehood of international law. 

60 

The basic rules of these games are set forth in the Montevideo 

Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which here does not 

bind as a treaty. Instead, it tracks and states customary international law. It sets forth four factors. One is territory; another is 

population. It is pretty obvious Taiwan has a lot of people (more 

than many states) and, as an island, it has a nicely stable territory, 

barring an occasional earthquake. 

The third criterion is a government, an effective government. 

This means a government that exercises power independently of 

the government of any other state. That is, the government does 

not answer to any larger or other entity. Effective government also 

means a government that provides governmental authority and 

order domestically. Taiwan does well on these criteria as well. 

The fourth factor, the capacity to engage in international relations, is more complex and controversial. There are some who lean 

toward the highly formalist notion that asks: are you recognized by 

other countries as a state? That view is largely passe ́. The proponents of this ‘‘constitutive’’ theory basically lost the argument. 

Most international law views accept the rival, ‘‘declaratory’’ theory. 

If we put the jargon aside, what this theory means is we do not 

care what states say (whether they formally recognize another entity as a state), we care what they do (whether they treat an entity 

in practice as if it were a state). If other states let you into their 

organizations, if they let you have something that looks like an embassy, that is pretty good evidence of satisfaction of the fourth criterion of statehood on the declaratory view. 

As a legal matter, it is plausible to say that no state recognizes 

Taiwan as a state. There are countries that maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC-on-Taiwan government, but they fudge the 

issue of what state that government represents. What the question 

of Taiwan’s status brings to the fore is that there is a fifth, 

unstated Montevideo factor. That is: you must say you are a state. 

The factors set forth in the Montevideo Convention were formulated in a world in which many entities claimed to be states that, 

in fact, probably did not satisfy the four listed substantive criteria. 

Taiwan is in many ways the opposite case. It scores high in 

terms of the enumerated criteria, but it has been oddly slippery or 

opaque in terms of making the requisite assertion that it is a state. 

If you parse the sacred texts of the Taiwan status issue over the 

last several years—Lee Teng-hui’s Deutche Welle interview, Chen 

Shui-bian’s various formulations, if you go through all the talk of 

‘‘state-to-state or at least special nation-to-nation relations,’’ and 

‘‘one side/one country,’’ and so on, if you line those up and examine 

them carefully in an almost Jesuitical way, you can find that they 

tend to do one of two things: 

They sometimes stop just short of the line. They do not quite 

cross the Rubicon of saying Taiwan is an independent separate 

state that we hereby declare ourselves to be now. Or, at other 

times, they try to imply that independent statehood is a fait 

accompli. They say, in effect, at some earlier point, Taiwan became 

a sovereign independent state. They say: we are either not going 

to tell you exactly when it happened, or, if we are going to tell you, 

we say it was 1911. Thus, moves away from independence—not toward it—would be changes to the status quo. 

61 

So, in sum, they say either, ‘‘We haven’t quite crossed the Rubicon,’’ or ‘‘We already got to the other side awhile ago, when you 

weren’t looking.’’ They are, in effect, saying, that there is no moment now when Taiwan is wading into the dangerous waters. So, 

there is no reason literally or figuratively for the PRC to go ballistic now. 

Either way, the foundation is laid for the Taiwanese claim that 

Taiwan enjoys state or fully state-like status and that nothing in 

that regard has changed recently. It is as it was. If you want to 

think that the way it was was ‘‘one country,’’ you are free to do 

that, but that is not how Taiwan officially sees it. 

These are very artful moves in addressing the big international 

legal issue concerning Taiwan’s status: statehood or its equivalent. 

There are important resonances of these broader arguments in the 

current referendum and new constitution issues. If you look at Article 17 of the Referendum Law, the legal basis for the referenda 

that will be on the March ballot, what does it say? It says that 

when the state is threatened by an outside force so that sovereignty is in danger of alteration, the president may propose a referendum on his own. In effect, it asserts that Taiwan is a sovereign 

state. It asks: Is this state in mortal peril? Such language implies 

that we have already crossed the Rubicon to which I have referred 

and are trying to protect the status quote of a separate sovereignty 

from erosion. 

As to the new constitution, again, adopting a new constitution is 

what new states tend to do. More specifically, if we do see a new 

constitution for Taiwan—and, while we will not know the details 

for some time, we do see hints—it likely will reaffirm the notion 

of the relevant territory, which is the geographic limitation to Taiwan and the offshore islands that Lee Teng-hui undertook in constitutional amendments more than a decade ago. It likely will reaffirm that this is a constitution of the people on Taiwan or the people of Taiwan. 

It will reaffirm that Taiwan has a government (with the structure specified in the constitution) because, after all, constitutions 

structure and create governments. And it will, I predict, make the 

same type of complex assertions about Taiwan’s status that we 

have seen during the last several years of official pronouncements, 

saying that the constitution does not change anything with respect 

to status and/or claiming that Taiwan already became a sovereign 

state some time ago. 

There is a still broader question here of status in international 

law: However you assess the statehood question, there is an assertion by Taiwan of equality with the PRC. Taiwan and the PRC 

should deal with one another as equals. That is the Taiwan position. You can see this in Lee Teng-hui’s ‘‘two essentially equal political entities’’ formulation and the various demands for level playing field party-to-party negotiations, as well as in the ‘‘sate-tostate’’ and ‘‘one side, one country’’ locutions. 

The second referendum question of the March 20 ballot raises 

the same issue quite explicitly. Its topic of the framework for crossStrait negotiation resonates with that whole discussion of crossStrait equality. 

62 

Another international law principle with deep implications for 

Taiwan’s status is at issue in the referendum controversy: the use 

of force. The use of force by states is often perfectly okay in international law if that use of force is domestic. You can use force to 

put down rebels. The U.S. did it in the 19th century. It is not, however, often okay under international law to use force internationally. That is a core principle of post-war, UN Charter-based international law. 

So, by saying the PRC should renounce the use of force in the 

first referendum question—saying that if the PRC does not renounce the use of force and withdraw the missiles, an upgrade in 

Taiwan’s defenses will follow—the referendum question implicates 

the international law governing the use of force. It invokes not only 

the ‘‘five no’s’’ which, remember, are all declared to be binding only 

on the condition of the PRC’s not threatening force and not intending to use force against Taiwan. Thus, the first referendum and, to 

a degree the second, and the context of the ‘‘five no’s’’ in which 

Chen placed the referenda essentially say to China: ‘‘Don’t use 

force. You must renounce the use of force against Taiwan.’’ That at 

least resonates and, in context, perhaps entails an assertion that 

Taiwan is a state because China could use force against Taiwan (to 

put down what China considers to be a rebellion, and subject only 

to human rights constraints) if Taiwan were not a state. 

The referenda also invoke the international legal principle of the 

obligation to resolve disputes peacefully. Customary international 

law says that states have obligations to resolve their disputes 

peacefully. What is key here is that this obligation attaches primarily, arguably exclusively, to relations among states. So, saying 

that there is an obligation for China and Taiwan to sit down peacefully or that Taiwan and China should agree to a peaceful framework is essentially putting in, through the back door, this notion 

of equality among the parties and, indeed, evoking the idea of 

equality among states. 

President Chen has also said that having a referendum is a basic 

universal human right. This is playing the human rights card, 

much the way that Taiwan has played the human rights card for 

more than a decade now. 

This move has two elements. One is to assert that, whatever you 

think of Taiwan’s state or non-state status, the people of Taiwan 

have human rights. People are visible to international law in a way 

they were not 60, 70 years ago. They directly hold international 

legal rights that states are bound to respect, and, therefore, whatever you think of Taiwan’s status in other respects, Taiwan as a 

political entity gets credit and standing for its role as the protector 

of the human rights of the people on Taiwan. One way to protect 

those human rights is to make sure those 23 million people have 

a place at the table at the UN or elsewhere, or that their bodily 

integrity is protected from flying missiles, or that their opportunity 

to shape their own government is not lost to foreign domination. 

Next, democracy is another international legal principle relevant 

here. Taiwan has pushed this card pretty hard, and, of course, the 

referendum issue is about democracy. Chen says the referenda represent the next stage of democratization and the deepening of Taiwan’s democracy. The referendum law itself says in its preamble 

63 

that it is rooted in the principle of sovereignty of the people. Thus, 

the referenda embody a democratic principle and an exercise of democracy which resonate with an argument that Taiwan has long 

made—one that says that Taiwan is a democracy and that being 

a democracy counts for something in terms of international status. 

As with human rights, here, with democracy, international law 

(and the politics it reflects) has left behind the old world of black 

box states. States that are more democratic or near-states that are 

more democratic get ‘‘leveled up’’ to enjoy a higher or more secure 

status than they otherwise would enjoy. Uncontested states that 

are not democratic get ‘‘leveled down’’ in status. This is another 

post-Cold War legacy. Democracy was a condition (or at least a factor) of recognition that Europe and the U.S. adopted in handling 

recognition of some of the post-Soviet states. 

As an aside to, there has been much discussion in the context of 

Taiwan’s impending referenda of whether the referendum is the 

appropriate democratic tool that Chen claims it to be for dealing 

with the questions that will be put to the Taiwanese electorate. 

Such criticisms have tended to come from a rather American perspective on referenda, one which sees referenda as a means for resolving contentious issues that seem incapable of solution through 

ordinarily legislative processes, and which therefore tends to regard Taiwan’s pair of referenda as inappropriate acts of political 

posturing or manipulation. 

Referenda, however, have deep roots in Chinese constitutional 

law. Sun Yat-sen included the right to referenda as one of the four 

powers of the people, and this still is reflected in the Republic of 

China Constitution today. Thus, it still exists in the constitution 

that is operative on Taiwan today, in a provision that provides the 

basis for the referendum law that in turn provides the basis for the 

upcoming referenda. 

I would suggest that if you parse those four powers of the people, 

actually the referendum lines up not so badly with the kind of 

Presidentially proposed initiatives Chen has proposed. The Sun 

Yat-sen type of referendum is a kind of thumbs up/thumbs down 

plebiscite, with no obvious restriction as to subject matter given the 

constraints that Chen faced under the referendum law as passed, 

which allows the President to propose a referendum on his own 

only in a narrow ‘‘national emergence’’ or ‘‘security’’ context, the 

topics chosen were perhaps the best he could do and do not collide 

with any constitutional notion of the type of issue that would be 

a proper topic. And the portion of the referendum law that Chen 

relied upon does not collide with any constitutional norm that 

referenda should come from below. But that is a minor point about 

the way that international legal norms concerning domestic democracy resonate in the referendum flap. 

Another more important matter related to principles of democracy is that democracy links us to the question of self-determination of peoples, and self-determination is, in turn, linked to 

referenda and is itself a major principle of post-war and, more 

broadly, the last century of international law. Self-determination is 

a principle that Taiwan has not pushed so hard in the debate over 

Taiwan’s status, partly because it is not clear under international 

law that self-determination gets you very much. It entitles a ‘‘peo­

64 

ple’’ to something, but it does not necessarily entitle them to their 

own state. It entitles them to a full state if they are an ex-colony 

being de-colonized. This idea had some currency with independence 

wing of the DPP’s argument from some years ago that said that 

when Japanese authorities left Taiwan at the end of World War II, 

Taiwan went into a post-colonial limbo, its status to be determined 

later. This is actually very close to what the U.S. says in its decades-old but still-most-recent official statement on Taiwan’s actual 

status. 

So-called ‘‘blue-water’’ decolonization—the dismantling of an 

overseas empire—tends to be seen as giving a right to separate 

statehood, and Japanese decolonization of Taiwan would seem to fit 

this model. On the other hand, where a people seeks to break away 

from a bigger, contiguous state, which is how the PRC and some 

others would characterize Taiwan’s ‘‘leaving’’ China, international 

law says that maybe some kind of autonomy regime within an undivided state will be enough satisfy the right to self-determination. 

So pushing the self-determination question is problematic as a 

strategy for Taiwan for that reason. 

It is also problematic because self-determination is a right of 

‘‘peoples’’ and it is not quite clear that the people of Taiwan are a 

‘‘people’’ in the relevant sense. On the one hand, they are arguably 

at least partly Chinese. On the other hand they are internally divided between ‘‘mainlanders’’ from families who arrived in 1949 

and Taiwan people whose ancestors came across the Strait much 

earlier. 

But the most intractable problem with respect to self-determination is that the preferred way for exercising any right to self-determination is a plebiscite—a referendum—on the issue of whether 

the people of a territory want to be their own state. 

As is well known, China will not stand for that, and the opinion 

polls on Taiwan (which show support for the ambiguous status quo) 

are obviously operating in the shadow of what China would do if 

the people of Taiwan said what they thought about self-determination issues. The point here that the current referendum issue politically resonates with the referendum as an international legal 

means for addressing questions of self-determination—questions 

that are highly volatile in the cross-Strait context and that obviously have implications for whether Taiwan is a part of China, a 

separate state or something else. 

In all of the ways that I have described, the referenda, along 

with the issue of constitutional reform, in Taiwan evokes and implicates myriad international legal questions and the volatile politics of Taiwan’s status. 

Lest you think that I am suggesting that Taiwan alone is responsible for making the trouble here, I want briefly to address the 

PRC half of the set of international law problems that help to create a context that has increasingly squeezed Taiwan’s international 

‘‘space’’ in recent years and against which Chen, and Lee Teng-hui 

before him, and others on Taiwan have reacted. 

Remember the PRC position on the question of sovereignty over 

Taiwan. Taiwan is part of China, full stop. It is just like Sichuan 

province. That is the PRC’s abundantly clear position on the international legal question of Taiwan’s status. The PRC’s position on 

65 

how Taiwan got to that status is interestingly murky. In first year 

torts, we teach students that when they become lawyers, they need 

to be prepared to argue simultaneously that my client never borrowed your now-broken kettle, that your kettle was fine when my 

client returned it, and that it was already broken when my client 

borrowed it. 

Well, China does something like that when it addresses the question of Taiwan’s status. It says Taiwan never left China, in effect 

that Taiwan never could have left China, that China is unbreakable, so the ‘‘unequal’’ treaty nominally ceding Taiwan to Japan 

1895 did not have and could not have had any effect. China also 

says that maybe Taiwan left in 1895, but that the treaty granting 

it to Japan became void when Japan invaded China in 1937, thereby breaching the terms of the 1895 peace treaty. Alternatively, Taiwan came back to China in 1945 when Japanese troops on Taiwan 

surrendered to the ROC regime, the rights of which the PRC later 

inherited, or Taiwan came back some time around the end of World 

War II, when the Potsdam and Cairo declarations, which declared 

the Allies’ intent to restore Taiwan and other stolen territories to 

China, somehow ripened into reality. 

But, in any event, the PRC’s claim is that Taiwan is part of 

China. There is no international legal act needed to return it. The 

PRC holds that the U.S. is obliged to accept that situation by the 

three Communique ́s, and the U.S. violates that obligation with the 

TRA, which continues to accord Taiwan state-like status and to underpin the sale of arms. That is the Chinese position, and it is very 

hard line. 

What is important for the purposes of understanding the implications of the referendum law and constitutional reform on Taiwan 

is that there is a Chinese domestic law corollary to this PRC position on the international legal issue. One of the implications of saying that Taiwan is and always has been, or is clearly now, part of 

China is that China can pretty much do what it wants in dealing 

with Taiwan. China could not bind itself, even if wanted to, under 

Chinese theories of sovereignty to anybody else about how it will 

exercise its sovereignty over Taiwan. 

The Joint Declaration with respect to Hong Kong illustrates the 

PRC perspective on this crucial question. Closely read, it is remarkably free of anything that China accepts as a clear, internationally binding legal obligation. The domestic Chinese law corollary of the lack of international legal obligation is that, as a matter of domestic Chinese notions of how to exercise sovereignty, the 

National People’s Congress, which we all know takes orders from 

the party, cannot do anything more than pass a law that says ‘‘one 

country, two systems,’’ and remain completely free to change that 

through subsequent legislation. Indeed, the NPC is free to change 

the constitution. 

So what you have here is a very intractable problem. The PRC 

position on sovereignty over Taiwan at international law and the 

exercise of sovereignty in domestic law does not give much room to 

provide anything that legally really promises Taiwan anything. 

This, of course, only exacerbates political suspicions on Taiwan and 

elsewhere about the promised guarantee of ‘‘one country, two systems.’’ 

66 

The question of Taiwan’s status, itself in significant part an 

international legal question, thus, remains inescapably at center 

stage, with the referendum and constitutional reform debates 

throwing the newest spotlights on old problems. Attempts to use 

international law to find a way around the status question have, 

like the referendum and constitutional reform questions, offered no 

way out and often raised the temperature. Models or proposals of 

different, blended, or half-way-house sovereignty arrangements— 

special autonomy region, federalism, confederation, divided states, 

the German or Korean or EU models—all of those ultimately provoke more disagreement than agreement, simply because they cannot get out of a simple trap: either they are talking about two countries that may be coming together, or one country that may be coming apart. And the PRC and Taiwan are on opposite sides of that 

fundamental divide. 

You all know the political and economic and military factors that 

have been squeezing Taiwan. I have tried to supplement those with 

a related legal dimension. Under these circumstances, it is hardly 

surprising that Taiwan’s first lawyer President is following the old 

lawyer’s adage that says when the facts are against you (in this 

context, facts such as a deteriorating security situation and an 

asymmetrical pattern of economic dependence), pound the law. 

When the law may not be with you (as it may not be, given international law’s permeability to international politics and the weakness of some of Taiwan’s legal claims), pound the table. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Luncheon Panel: Discussion, Questions and Answers 

Commissioner DREYER. Shall we give poor Jacques a few minutes 

to eat? 

Mr. DELISLE. No, no, go ahead. Ask away. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. I’ve gone one. 

Chairman ROBINSON. And we only have about seven minutes. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Why was it so easy for the People’s Republic 

of China to essentially cede its sovereignty over Mongolia? And 

when the Republic of China did that only a year ago, and if the 

NPC could somehow cede its sovereignty over Mongolia, why can’t 

it do that over Taiwan? 

Mr. DELISLE. It’s a great question, and there is a certain, shall 

we say, lack of thoroughgoing consistency in the PRC position on 

what is ‘‘China.’’ At its most expansive, the PRC has said anything 

that was under the Qing government, at the farthest reaches of the 

Qing Dynasty, is China, end of story. This notion is what you see 

with respect to Hong Kong and Taiwan: these areas were part of 

China and can never have left because they are really, really part 

of China. 

Yet, on China’s inland frontiers the PRC has accepted the loss 

of Mongolia; it settled territorial disputes with India and Burma 

and others. The PRC has in those areas managed to be a little 

more flexible. How does one explain it? 

Well, some of it is, of course, simply politics. Taiwan is the third 

rail of elite Chinese politics. Nobody can dare to give ground on the 

matter of Taiwan’s status. But beyond that, there is a sense that 

67 

the areas that are ethnically Chinese and geographically contiguous with the Chinese heartland are really, really China, in a way 

that overseas Chinese areas in southeast Asia are not and in a way 

that non-Han areas along the borders of Han China are not quite 

so thoroughly or clearly part of China, but obviously there’s a reluctance to say that too openly because it has some nasty implications 

for Xinjiang and for Tibet. BAs a matter of Chinese constitutional 

theory, the NPC could say we hereby give this up, but that would 

not fit with the most robust assertive notion of the ‘‘unbreakable 

China’’ that the PRC has often pushed with respect to the questions of Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s status. 

It would be consistent with the PRC arguments with respect to 

Taiwan’s status ones that say only that Taiwan left by treaty and 

it came back by treaty or by military surrender. But the usual line 

is that cession of a truly Chinese area can’t happen. 

Commissioner MULLOY. In the Shanghai Communique ́, a point 

that came up in the hearing, where you have the statement that 

U.S. acknowledges that both, and then something like U.S. does 

not challenge that. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Its not just saying like it’s a rainy day, 

it’s a sunny day. I mean there is more to it than that; isn’t there? 

Did you hear that exchange? 

Mr. DELISLE. I did, and I think, as a legal matter, the PRC position has always been that the Shanghai Communique ́ is a binding 

treaty and that what the U.S. said in the Communique ́ is something that the U.S. now bears as an international legal obligation 

to China to respect. China has read what the U.S. said as an acceptance that there is one China that includes Taiwan. The U.S. 

position also has never been to accept that any of the three 

Communique ́s are treaties. Those are bilateral statements that do 

not create a binding legal obligation, although they do state U.S. 

policy. If you want to define the parameters of U.S. legal obligation 

as the U.S. officially sees it, there is nothing there that’s legally 

binding, and as a matter of policy, it really is only an acceptance— 

more an acknowledgement than a recognition (there were translation issues about that)—that Chinese on both sides of the Strait 

share a view that there is one China that includes Taiwan, and we 

don’t challenge the position that they hold that the mainland and 

Taiwan are in, in effect, ultimately one place. 

Commissioner MULLOY. When you issue a communique ́ like that, 

is it President Nixon who is—— 

Mr. DELISLE. No, it’s—— 

Commissioner MULLOY. It wasn’t just Kissinger? 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. With Chou En-lai who was head of government. 

Commissioner MULLOY. It was Kissinger. It was President Nixon. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. Right. 

Mr. SCHLAIKJER. One other point that I think is useful, Jacques, 

is that in that as in many other such instruments, because there 

was no agreement—— 

Mr. DELISLE. It’s a pair of parallel statements; right. 

Mr. SCHLAIKJER. —or there is very little agreement, these are 

statements—the statement Pat quotes is a U.S. statement. It is not 

68 

a joint statement. It’s a U.S. statement only. Chinese say what 

they say. 

Commissioner MULLOY. The Shanghai Communique ́ that’s not a 

joint statement? 

Mr. DELISLE. What you got is—if you look at—— 

Mr. SCHLAIKJER. No, that paragraph is. 

Mr. DELISLE. If you look at it, much of it is parallel statement. 

Party A says this, Party B says this, and they both sign it. And 

the PRC understands that move in the context of the 

Communique ́s as creating a binding legal obligation for the U.S. 

Here’s another case where the PRC is not necessarily thoroughly 

consistent in its legal arguments. 

As I said, they have a different view of Taiwan and Mongolia on 

the territorial sovereignty issue, so too here with respect to joint 

or parallel statements by states. Look at the Joint Declaration on 

Hong Kong. It’s consciously structured as two parallel statements. 

The British say X. The Chinese say Y. The Brits say we are returning sovereignty over Hong Kong to you. The Chinese say we have 

decided to resume the exercise of that sovereignty which we always 

had. 

So, the outcome is that you can have a document that both parties can put their names to in both cases (the Hong Kong Declaration and the U.S.-PRC Communique ́s), but the parties proceed from 

different premises, and I think the Shanghai Communique ́ can be 

read essentially in that way, just as the Hong Kong Declaration 

can. The difference is that the PRC has been eager to embrace the 

Communique ́s as treaties and reluctant to accord the Joint Declaration fully equivalent status. 

Commissioner MULLOY. The communique ́s were not an executive 

agreement. 

Commissioner DREYER. East Timor. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Well, let me ask—— 

Commissioner DREYER. I wanted to ask about East Timor. You 

mentioned the idea of getting sovereignty, and if you been a colony, 

blah, blah, blah. 

Mr. DELISLE. Yes. 

Commissioner DREYER. And it would seem to me that what happened in East Timor is more like the norm and does not fit the 

PRC’s position. 

Mr. DELISLE. East Timor before or after? 

Commissioner DREYER. No, they had a plebiscite. They were part 

of Indonesia. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right, and then the separation. You’re talking 

about East Timor today. 

Commissioner DREYER. Yes, but only East Timor voted on that, 

and this would seem to contradict the PRC’s insistence, intransigence, that if there is a vote on Taiwan independence, that all the 

people on the mainland be asked to vote as well. Which is the 

norm? 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. Well, I mean it depends—this is what the 

argument is about—which box do you put Taiwan into; right? And 

East Timor is a delightful example because it has the same ambiguous quality. That is, if you think of East Timor as a Portuguese 

colonization next to an ex-Dutch colony, independent Indonesia, 

69 

then what you’ve got is essentially something which should have 

become independent when the Portuguese pulled out. True, Indonesia essentially moved in and took it over, but one can still think 

that what we’re really doing is completing the Portuguese de-colonization. It’s blue water de-colonization. It’s like the view one 

sometimes hears on Taiwan that Taiwan was given up by Japan; 

now it can decide its own destiny without having to take its proximity to, or pre-Japanese colonial era limited control by, China into 

account. 

If you think of it as a case of East Timor trying to secede from 

Indonesia after the takeover, well, then that’s a much more uphill 

struggle to claim a right to statehood. The analogy is to the PRC’s 

favored view that some on Taiwan are trying to ‘‘break away’’ from 

China. But, either way, any right to secede and to have your own 

state is premised on the notion that the people want it, and that 

there is a distinct people, and the claim is the East Timorese are 

different from Indonesians, just as the claim has to be that Taiwanese are different from the mainland Chinese. 

You’re right, the PRC position on self-determination is that we 

have got to have a plebescite of 1.3 billion plus 23 million. If we 

do, guess who wins? In contrast, the Taiwanese, or pro-Taiwan 

independence position, says it’s the 23 million here on Taiwan who 

are the self-determining group. And here again you see these issues 

having come up in the politics of Taiwan’s status. You see Lee 

Teng-hui’s discussion of the ‘‘new Taiwanese.’’ You see Chen Shuibian talking about the ‘‘people of Taiwan’’ as an attempt to make 

the Taiwanese people coherent and different from the mainland. 

Commissioner DREYER. Yes. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Let me ask you a question. What is the 

status? Even if the Shanghai Communique ́ was an Executive 

agreement, it wouldn’t last—there would be no effective status beyond the tenure of the President who signed it; correct? 

Mr. DELISLE. It depends on how you structured it. If it is a true 

executive agreement, then it stands essentially the way a treaty 

stands. If it’s a full-fledged—— 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. It’s binding on future Administrations? 

Mr. DELISLE. If it a formal Executive agreement, the constitutional law of foreign relations is pretty well settled: almost anything you can do by treaty, you can do by Executive agreement. 

There are problems if it would require certain types of changes in 

domestic legislation, but for something like this, where it was purely foreign affairs, an executive agreement is a full substitute for a 

treaty in almost all contexts. 

Commissioner BRYEN. That’s the biggest impact is the domestic 

legislation. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. Now you got the TRA. 

Commissioner BRYEN. The Shanghai Communique ́ caused there 

to be domestic legislation. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. And once you do that, you can clean up the 

contradiction or eviscerate one side of it. There is no doubt that 

whatever the status of an Executive agreement, or a treaty, of 

course, if Congress then passes something contrary, the treaty is 

dead as a matter of domestic law. 

Commissioner BRYEN. And it’s absolutely, in effect, as a treaty. 

70 

Commissioner MULLOY. Yes, the later in law—— 

Mr. DELISLE. Wins. 

Commissioner MULLOY. —wins. And so the treaty, the Taiwan 

Relations Act is the basis of our relation with Taiwan and—— 

Commissioner BRYEN. Taking into account the Communique ́. Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Well, wait a minute. That was 1979, 

wasn’t it? 

Commissioner DREYER. April ’79. The TRA is April ’79. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. And Shanghai was ’82; right? 

Mr. DELISLE. Well, no, the first Shanghai Communique ́, the 

Nixon Communique ́, Nixon-Chou, was 72. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Or Reagan. 

Mr. DELISLE. The Recognition Communique ́, the second 

Communique ́ was the end of ’78. And the Reagan arms sales 

Communique ́ is ’82. 

Commissioner DREYER. ’82. 

Mr. OHRENSTEIN. Well, the ’82 Communique ́ would not trump a 

legislative act. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Right. 

Commissioner DREYER. Well, it was caveated from the beginning. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. I mean there are two levels of problems with 

the three Communique ́s. As I understand it, it is still quite disputed what those do. Are those full-blown Executive agreements 

with the binding quality of treaty? Not clear they are. I don’t know 

of any formal acknowledgement that they are. They’re stated as enduring positions of U.S. policy, and nothing more. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Statements of policy. 

Mr. DELISLE. Right. Statements of—enduring statements of U.S. 

policy positions, but I don’t think we’ve done anything that could 

be construed as having accepted them as treaty-like Executive 

agreements. 

Commissioner MULLOY. I agree. 

Commissioner BRYEN. And each Administration has repeated 

them. 

Mr. DELISLE. Each Administration reaffirms that it’s still policy; 

right. 

Mr. OHRENSTEIN. If there were a contradiction between the TRA 

and the ’82 Communique ́, the TRA would still govern because it’s 

a domestic law and act. 

Mr. DELISLE. Alright. Let me try to answer that simply. One 

point is that these things are not Executive agreements in the treaty-like sense, in which case who cares? They can’t change legislation. 

Secondly, even if they are, what do they really say? It’s not clear 

they really say very much. What does the U.S. actually undertake 

to do in the three Communique ́s? It’s not clear it really undertakes 

to do anything that’s concrete and binding, and again they may be 

so vague, they wouldn’t pass the smell test as an Executive agreement, as having operational obligations. 

Thirdly, if they do, if contrary to what we just said, they are full 

treaty-like Executive agreements and they do have some operative 

content that could conflict with a statute, and you can’t find a way 

to reconcile the apparent contradiction, consistent with the preference always to avoid conflict in interpreting treaties and statutes; 

71 

right. If you find a square conflict, then you’re into one of the 

nastiest areas of U.S. foreign relations law. An Executive agreement can often gut preexisting legislation, but it is problematic as 

to how far. 

Mr. OHRENSTEIN. If it’s constitutionally in the presence—— 

Mr. DELISLE. It is easier if the issue concerns matters within the 

President’s foreign affairs power. Goldwater v. Carter was partly 

about that. 

Chairman ROBINSON. If I might intercede, regrettably, that’s 

going to have to be the last word for at least some of us. I was not 

involved in the planning here, let me say at the outset, but we 

have a panel starting at 1:15 that was originally scheduled for one, 

so some of us are going to have to push along. 

Mr. DELISLE. I’d just like to thank you for the opportunity and 

to tell you as part of ongoing research, I’m happy to give you a sort 

of short form of this in writing if you want it. 

Chairman ROBINSON. We very much appreciate your being with 

us. 

Commissioner MULLOY. That would be enormously helpful. 

Commissioner DREYER. Yes. 

Mr. DELISLE. I will get that to you when I get back. 

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the luncheon session concluded, the 

hearing to reconvene at 1:20 p.m., this same day.] 

AFTERNOON SESSION, 1:20 P.M., FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2004 

PANEL III: CHINESE ARMS/WEAPONS PURCHASES AND 

SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE 

Chairman ROBINSON. At this time, we’d like to commence our 

afternoon session, and I would like to turn the gavel over to the 

Co-Chairman for this hearing and who is going to preside over this 

afternoon’s proceedings, Commissioner Wortzel. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much and thank you all for 

being here. We’re going to move the focus this afternoon from policy implications for the Taiwan Relations Act to Chinese Military 

Doctrines, Strategy and Weapons Acquisitions. 

The first panel this afternoon, we’ve got three very distinguished 

students or experts on the People’s Liberation Army: 

Mr. Richard Fisher, a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. He edits the Foundation’s China Brief newsletter. He served 

as a senior analyst for the House Republican Policy Committee. 

Dr. David Finkelstein. Dr. Finkelstein is a member of the Center 

for Naval Analysis Corporation, Center for Strategic Studies. He’s 

the Deputy Director of Project Asia there. He’s got an M.A. and 

Ph.D. in Chinese history from Princeton University, and is a retired Army Foreign Area Officer Specialized on China. 

And finally, Dr. Evan Medeiros of the Rand Corporation. Dr. 

Medeiros joined Rand as a political scientist in 2002. He was the 

Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and he’s got 

some very deep research interests in Chinese foreign and defense 

policies and on defense industrial issues. 

Gentlemen, we have seven minutes for you to give you oral presentations. I know both for this panel and for the next, a number 

72


of you or some of you have chosen to use slides or PowerPoint. We 

would invite you to submit those PowerPoint presentations and 

slides as part of your testimony, and we will incorporate that in 

some form, perhaps even we could get it done in a CD-ROM form 

so it can be viewed. But seven minutes is seven minutes. Choose 

your slides wisely because that’s the time we have allotted, and I 

guess we’ll start with Mr. Fisher. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. FISHER, JR. 

SENIOR FELLOW, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION 

CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY 

Mr. FISHER. Okay. I’d like to begin by stating my three gratitudes to the Commission in Chinese fashion. The first for holding 

this hearing and playing such a vital role in our national debate 

on relations with the PRC. Second, to the Commission for supporting my research over the last year, which allowed me to write 

a very long report. And then third, for this opportunity to mercifully try to summarize it today. 

The next slide, please. The report that I have submitted to the 

Commission essentially has four major conclusions. In looking at 

how the PLA has tried to modernize, in particular by acquiring foreign weapons and technology, there has been a wide-ranging debate over the last decade, but looking at this effort over the last 

15 to 20 years, I think four conclusions are in order. 

First, that the PLA is today the world’s largest purchaser of foreign military weapons and technology. Second, the cumulative effect of these direct purchases is now enabling new capabilities. 

Third, these new capabilities are increasingly presenting specific 

challenges to American power in Asia, and are propelling what 

some officials in Taiwan fear will be a crossover in the military balance by 2005 and beyond. And then four, it is imperative that 

United States do whatever it can to impede the flow of foreign 

weapons and technology to the PLA. 

Next slide, please. These purchases that I describe in far greater 

detail in my submitted report include many that are having a real 

impact on near-term PLA capabilities. By 2006, in my estimation, 

the PLA will have 400 Sukhoi fighters and fighter-bombers. These 

will be armed with thousands of Russian made air-to-air and precision-guided air-to-ground munitions. PLA will have many hundreds 

of advanced track via missile S–300 SAMs. 

By 2007, thereabouts, at least 12 KILO submarines, eight of 

which will be armed with advanced long-range CLUB anti-ship 

missiles, and this goes on to include naval weapons technologies 

that’s enabling three new classes of stealthy warships. New onemeter electro-optical and radar satellites. Access now to Europe’s 

future navigation satellite network and new transport aircraft. 

Next slide, please. This cumulative technology is also allowing 

the PLA to become better at assembling new weapon systems, new 

warships, new fighter aircraft, and also to develop its own new onemeter capable reconnaissance and surveillance satellites. 

Next slide, please. In terms of missile threats, foreign technology 

has impacted on the PLA’s ability to build new small warheads, 

warheads, which have made possible a multiple warhead version of 

the DF–5 that is now entering service. U.S. technology, solid fuel 

rocket technology, in my opinion, has enabled three new solid fuel 

73 

ICBMs and the purchase of S–300s and related technology has allowed the PLA to advance its air defense capabilities and to build 

the beginning of a capability for its own missile defense capabilities 

while it criticizes American missile defense. 

Next slide, please. Foreign technology is also allowing the PLA 

to exploit and deny the use of outer space. Russian radar satellites. 

On the bottom left is the Shenzhou 5 orbital module armed with 

reconnaissance cameras. The first manned space flight by the PRC 

last year was nothing more in my opinion than a military reconnaissance mission. 

And then on the left, a small satellite, a nano-satellite technology 

sold by the United Kingdom is allowing the PLA to in the future 

develop direct assent anti-satellite weapons. 

Next slide, please. In terms of the air-to-air threat, I’ve touched 

on that briefly. I would just note that the Sukhoi is a very capable 

fighter. It is more maneuverable than the American F–15, more 

maneuverable than the American F–18 EF. The EF will have a 

slight advantage when its new phased array radar comes on board, 

but the main point I’d like to make is that the air balance for the 

remainder of this decade between the PLA Air Force and American 

Air Forces in Asia is simply too close for comfort. The capabilities 

conveyed by Russian weapons is simply too much for us to ignore. 

Next slide, please. In terms of a growing naval threat, in my 

opinion, the PLA could by the end of this decade put together close 

to 40 new conventional submarines. The Russian submarines, the 

KILOs, will be armed with long-range, 220 kilometer CLUB missiles. These will likely be combined in a coordinated fashion by 

Wieh Sukhois that will be launching Russian-made long-range 

anti-ship missiles such as the KH–59M on the bottom right. 

And foreign technology, perhaps Ukrainian technology, is allowing the PLA to make advanced air defense destroyers such as the 

170 class, also pictured here. 

Next slide, please. Foreign technology is also better enabling 

PLA power projection capabilities, specifically on the Taiwan 

Strait. Russian reports indicate that during his last visit to Moscow, Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan had discussions about buying another 30 or more Il–76 transports on top of the 20 that they 

already have. 

Airborne forces may already have the very advanced BMD Russian airborne tank. On the upper right is an Italian light truck 

that is being configured for airborne operations as well. It is being 

co-produced in the PRC now by the thousands. Also of significance 

is the growing amphibious capabilities and how these are being 

better enabled by foreign technology. 

According to my sources, on the bottom left, the new type 63–A 

amphibious tank, the most powerful amphibious tank now in production anywhere in the world is armed with the ‘‘Russian Bastion’’ 

gun launched, laser guided missile. As soon as this tank lands on 

the beaches on Taiwan, it has the ability with this missile to outrange all of Taiwan’s tanks. It can hit, it can shoot first before Taiwan tanks can shoot back. 

And follow-on forces will include most likely the T–98 or improved version main battle tank pictured on the bottom right. This 

tank also fires Russian designed laser guided gun-launched mis­

74 

siles. The armor and the guns both far exceed the capability of all 

Taiwan tanks, and because Taiwan’s leadership is so army-centric, 

they note, they understand this, and it vexes them greatly. 

Next slide, please. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. I wonder if I can ask you to sum up? I think 

you’ve kind of—— 

Mr. FISHER. Okay. This is the last slide, Mr. Chairman. In summation, it is imperative that the United States do what it can to 

stop the weapons flows to the PLA. Where we have engaged democracies, we have had success. Where we have engaged Israel, for example, we have had notable success in convincing our ally, Israel, 

to stop selling advanced weapons to the PLA. A lot have already 

gone through. 

The J–10 on the upper left is one example where Israel made a 

decisive contribution. In the future, however, we have to be very 

wary and very quick to come down hard on our friends and allies 

in Europe who are on the cusp of ending their arms embargo and 

could be very soon selling tremendous advanced technologies to the 

PLA. 

In all areas where we are trying to compete and stay ahead of 

the PLA, Europe is working on similar technologies, be it rail guns, 

lasers, Stealth. If European companies were to enter into alliances 

with PLA companies in developing all these advanced technologies, 

the great transformation that our Secretary of Defense hopes will 

keep and preserve American military superiority may not last more 

than a decade in my estimation. 

And with that note, I’ll stop there. Thank you very much. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Richard D. Fisher, Jr.


Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Center for Security Policy


Foreign Military Acquisitions and PLA Modernization 

I would like to begin by thanking the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission for this opportunity to present testimony on the modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army. In addition, I would like to note my gratitude to the 

Commission for supporting my research over the last year, which has allowed me 

to produce a much longer report for the Commission titled, ‘‘The Impact of Foreign 

Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of China’s People’s Liberation 

Army.’’ 1 This testimony draws from that much longer report. 

While the most recent phase of the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a vast undertaking spanning two decades, a critical element feeding its success has been consistent access 

to foreign weapons and military technologies. Successful PLA modernization is also 

dependent upon ongoing reform of its doctrine, strategies, military-industrial policies, and training and personnel policies. But all of these ongoing reforms would be 

for naught if the PLA did not have the most modern and capable weapons. 

Access to foreign military technology, especially Russian weaponry, has allowed 

the PLA to begin to fashion capabilities to wage war in the early 21st century and 

create the basis for an ongoing military-technical modernization that will place increasing pressure on the United States to sustain deterrence in Asia. For example, 

weapon systems the PLA is acquiring will allow it to greatly impede a future U.S. 

attempt to rescue democratic Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack. Foreign military 

systems are also propelling what Taiwanese officials predict will be a ‘‘crossover’’ in 

which the military balance on the Taiwan Strait will start to favor the PLA after 

1 This report has been submitted to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. It substantially updates an earlier work by the author, ‘‘Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA 

Modernization,’’ in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces The Fu­ ture, American Enterprise Institute and M.E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 85–191. 

75


2005. Foreign military technology may also allow the PLA to build new power projection capabilities by the early next decade. 

In assessing the degree to which foreign military technology is aiding PLA modernization, and the possible resultant dangers to U.S. national security, it is also 

possible to highlight the need for greater U.S. policy focus on the need to stem PLA 

access to more modern and dangerous technologies. While the United States has 

made clear its desire for peaceful relations with the Chinese people, the government 

of the PRC is actively preparing for a possible war with democratic Taiwan, as it

continues to proliferate dangerous nuclear weapon and missile technologies to rogue 

regimes. It remains necessary for the U.S. to sustain its embargo of military technologies put in place in response to the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. The 

U.S. should work with allies in Europe to explain the possible dangers if Europe 

ends it Tiananmen embargo in 2004. And as the U.S. was able to persuade Israel 

to end its sale of dangerous military technology to the PLA, it is necessary to make

curtailment of Russia’s substantial arms trade a higher bi-lateral issue with Moscow. 

PLA NOW THE WORLD’S LARGEST ARMS IMPORTER 

The impact of foreign technology on PLA modernization has been examined repeatedly during the 1990s and beyond.2 In the mid-1990s, one well-regarded study 

concluded that ‘‘. . . China can only expect limited success in its efforts to improve 

its military capabilities through the acquisition of foreign military weapons and 

technologies. . . . Quick breakthroughs in military capabilities are more likely to 

come about as a result of direct foreign purchases . . . but these are likely to be modest in quantity and quality. . . .’’ 3 During the mid-1990s, such a conclusion was warranted given that the PLA was experiencing some difficulty in absorbing new foreign weapons. 

Nearly a decade later, however, it is possible to begin to consider a different set 

of conclusions due primarily to the fact that the PRC has sustained and increased 

its foreign arms imports. Estimating the amounts of PRC arms imports is at best 

an imprecise task. PRC sources offer almost no accounting for foreign arms purchases, indeed, it is thought that most foreign arms purchases are paid for by government budgets not part of the PLA’s publicly stated budget figures. However, the 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) notes that, since 2000, 

the PRC has been the world’s largest importer of weapons.4 In 2001, its imports 

were calculated to exceed $3 billion, while in 2002, arms imports exceeded $2.3 billion. Total arms imports were calculated to exceed $11.8 billion from 1993 through 

2002.5 For illustration purposes, SIPRI’s figures are included in a chart below. 

SIPRI is the first to caution that its figures do represent actual totals. The U.S. 

Congressional Research Institute estimated that PRC arm imports were $3.6 billion 

in 2002 and ‘‘signed deals’’ to import $17.8 billion worth of weapons from 1995 to 

2002.6 

Instead of seeking marginal gains from foreign weapons purchases, it is now possible to conclude that the PLA is relying on very large foreign weapons purchases 

to achieve near-term growth in capabilities that it may determine are necessary, especially in relation to military-political requirements pertaining to Taiwan. The 

2002 order of eight new Russian KILO submarines is a case in point. With this 

order, the PLA sought to exceed the 2001 U.S. intention to sell Taiwan eight new 

2 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions From Abroad, A Quest for ‘Superb and 

Secret Weapons,’ SIPRI Research Report No. 11, London: Oxford University Press, 1995; Richard 

A. Bitzinger and Bates Gill, Gearing Up For Hi-Tech Warfare?: Chinese and Taiwanese Defense 

Modernization and Implications for Confrontation Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995–2005, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 1996; Bates Gill, ‘‘Chinese Military Hardware and Technology Acquisition of Concern to Taiwan,’’ in James R. Lilley 

and Chuck R. Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Washington, DC: National Defense University and the American Enterprise Institute, 1997, pp. 105–129; Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘‘Going 

Places or Running In Place?, China’s Efforts To Leverage Advanced Military Technologies for 

Military Use,’’ in Col. Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army After Next, Carlisle: U.S. 

Army War College and the American Enterprise Institute, 2000, pp. 9–54; Shirley A. Kan, 

Christopher Bolkcom and Ronald O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Conventional Foreign Arms Acquisitions: 

Background and Analysis,’’ CRS Report for Congress, October 10, 2000; David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, Progress, Problems and Prospects, Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 2002, Chapter 6. 3 Gill and Kim, p. 131. 


4 Also reported in David Lague, ‘‘In China’s Ambitions, a Mother Lode for Arms Dealers,’’ The 


Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2002. 5 SIPRI database, http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step3. 6 Ray Cheung, ‘‘China’s arms deals topped US$ 3.6b,’’ South China Morning Post, September 

27, 2003, p. 5. 

76 

submarines by actually making sure Russia delivered, whereas the U.S. prospects 

for delivery were and remain unclear. But this purchase increased by 200 percent 

the number of KILOs slated for the PLA Navy. Wholesale purchases that are being 

used to seek major advances in capability are listed in the following chart. 

Given PRC sustained economic growth rates, and the Pentagon’s estimation that 

annual PRC defense spending levels will increase beyond 2002 levels of $65 billion, 

it is possible that the PLA may be able to sustain its arms buying binge. The main 

recipient of the PLA’s spending has been Russia. During the December 2003 visit 

to Russia of PRC Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, it was revealed by Russian 

sources that PRC arms purchases from Russia would exceed $2 billion in 2004.7 

This figure included previous and new arms deals, meaning that subsequent years 

hold the prospect for high amounts of arm purchases from Russia. 

MAJOR ONGOING PLA WEAPONS PURCHASE PACKAGES 

400 Sukhoi fighters by 2006, many upgraded for multi-role missions 

Thousands of Russian anti-air and precision ground-attack weapons for

aircraft 

Many hundreds of Russian S–300 SAMs 

12 Russian KILO submarines, 8 with CLUB long-range anti-ship missiles 

4 Russian SOVREMENNIY class missile destroyers 

Russian weapons and electronics packages for three new classes of 

stealthy warships 

Russian 1-meter electro-optical and radar satellites 

Assuring access to Navsat signals by buying a partnership in the European GALILEO 

40 to 50 Russian Il–76 heavy transport aircraft 

Impact on PLA Arms Industries: Making Pieces Fit Better 

There has long been tension between those in the PLA who demand new weapons 

as soon as possible and prefer to buy select foreign systems, and those who follow 

the historic desire by the PRC to strengthen self reliance, which emphasizes the interests of PLA subordinate defense industries over foreign weapons purchases. The 

middle ground for the PLA has long been to try to graft various foreign components 

into largely indigenous weapon designs to increase their capability, or to in turn 

produce a new generation of weapons. From the 1970s to the mid/late-1990s, there 

were many attempts to do this, largely with marginal success. Prominent examples 

include the Nanchang A–5 attack fighter, a radically re-designed Shenyang J–6 

(MiG–19) turning a short-range, low-payload, clear-weather fighter into a shortrange, low-payload, clear weather attack aircraft. In the early 1990s, the PLA Navy 

acquired two LUHU class destroyers, which for the first time combined U.S. and 

Ukrainian gas turbine engines and French SAMs, defensive electronics and command and control systems, and an Italian CIWS. There were integration problems 

and the ship’s performance, while an improvement for the PLA, was obsolete compared to neighboring navies. In addition, the early 1990s saw the PLA Navy encounter serious problems trying to marry disparate technologies into its first Type 039 

SONG class conventional submarine. For most of the 1990s, indigenous fighter programs, be it the Shenyang J–8II, Chengdu J–10 or Chengdu Super-7/FC–1, encountered delays due to arms embargoes, funding issues and inability to decide on a foreign component or whether to make it themselves. 

As the mid-decade draws near, however, it is possible to assemble a different picture that appears to be one of improvement rather than stasis or decline. This conclusion follows from review of new PLA weapon systems in Part 2 of this study. The 

PLA has not lost its enthusiasm for seeking to graft foreign components onto new 

weapons systems in the absence of being able to design complete new weapon systems. The new twist is that, by early in this decade, the PLA is getting better at 

it. The solutions could be many and, while the individual stories of some weapon 

systems in the second part of this report will shed light on how weapons production 

has improved, there are reasons that can be listed here. 

7 ‘‘Russia, China to maintain arms trade level,’’ Itar-Tass, December 17, 2003. 

77 

One reason may be that the PLA has learned lessons on how to better use foreign 

expertise. A recent example of this is the seeming happy ending to the long-running 

saga of the Rolls Royce Spey turbofan engine co-production deal. This project started 

in 1975, but the PLA was not able to co-produce this engine in order to complete 

a much needed fighter-bomber, the Xian JH–7. In the late-1990s, when the PLA decided that it really wanted the JH–7 to succeed, it went back to Rolls Royce, and 

by 1999 cut a new deal. It purchased more used Spey engines to carry forward some 

JH–7 production, but also allowed Rolls Royce to make co-production work. The result is the new Qinling turbofan engine. 

GROWING SUCCESS FOR CO-DEVELOPMENT VENTURES 

Not So Successful Demonstrating More Success 

Luhu Destroyer: Early 1990s program to combine U.S. gas turbine engines, French and Italian weapons, 

French electronics, only to make a 

ship that was still obsolete. 

No. 168 Destroyer: Current program 

to combine Russian weapons and 

electronic systems, Ukrainian gas 

turbine engines in a new stealthy 

hull. Result appears to be a ship that 

in some respects is superior to Taiwan’s U.S. KIDD destroyers. 

Song Submarine: Early 1990s attempt to combine German engines, 

Russian weapons and possible Israeli 

advice. First submarine failed to 

meet performance expectations. 

Song A Submarine: After addressing 

mistakes the new SONG A incorporates design changes and appears 

to be successful; it is now in series 

production. 

PL–10 AAM: A 1980s program that 

tried to copy the Italian ASPIDE 

semi-active guided AAM. Apparently 

was not successful, little indication it 

is in widespread service. 

PL–12 AAM: Combines a Russian active seeker and data link with a PRC 

motor to create the PLA’s first activeguided AAM. Is apparently successful 

as it will enter production and be delivered to the PLAAF in 2004. 

Super 7 Fighter: A late-1980s attempt 

to employ the U.S. Grumman Company to redesign the Chengdu J–7. 

Failed due to Tiananmen sanctions. 

FC–1: Same concept continued by 

Chengdu but with Russian technical 

aid, achieved financial stability by 

late 1990s and was test-flown in August 2003. It is now viewed as a success for market incentive reform in 

the defense industry. 

J–10 Fighter: A long-running attempt 

to create a 4th generation fighter 

stemming from J–9 canard fighter 

but with Israeli and Russian technical help. Did not officially fly until 

1996 but technical difficulties lingered into the late 1990s. 

J–10 Fighter: By early this decade 

Chengdu was meeting with much 

greater success. Design issues appeared resolved, program somewhat 

declassified, push for foreign sales, 2­

seat model test flown, and late 2003 

reports of final production go-ahead. 

CBERS–1 optical imaging satellite: 

Co-development program with Brazil 

which only purchased 20 meter lowresolution imaging systems. 

KONDOR–E optical imaging satellite: In 2003 Russia is ready to sell 

a 1-meter capable camera for a future 

PLA imaging satellite. 

78


FOREIGN CONTENT OF FUTURE PLA WEAPONS 

Weapon System Foreign Content Domestic Content 

Anti-Satellite, Direct 

Assent 

British micro and nanosatellite technology PRC design and solid 

fueled mobile launch 

system 

Radar Satellite Russian antenna PRC satellite bus 

Synthetic Aperture 

Radar (SAR) Aircraft 

Russian Tu–154; U.S. 

SAR technology 

PRC designed SAR 

Y–8 Airborne Early

Warning (AEW) aircraft 

British Racal/Thales 

Skymaster AEW radar 

Xian Y–8 transport aircraft 

Chengdu J–10 MultiRole Fighter Russian engine; possible 

Russian radar; Israeli 

airframe and control 

system assistance 

PRC designed airframe; 

possible PRC Radar 

and defensive systems; 

PRC weapons 

Shenyang J–11 MultiRole Fighter Russian airframe, some 

avionic and electronic 

systems 

PRC multi-mode radar; 

PRC weapons, PRC engine 

SD–10 Active Air-to-Air 

Missile 

Russian radar and data 

link 

PRC motor; airframe 

HQ–9/FT–2000 Surfaceto-Air Missile Russian guidance systems; possible U.S. 

seeker technology; possible Israeli design assistance 

PRC motor; airframe 

Destroyer No. 168 Russian SAM, guidance 

and search radar; 

Ukrainian gas turbine 

engine 

PRC hull; anti-ship missile; defensive systems 

SONG–A SSK German engine; possible 

Russian weapons and 

design assistance; possible Israeli design assistance 

PRC hull; defensive systems 

Project 093 nuclear attack submarine Russian design assistance; possible Russian 

weapons 

PRC hull; nuclear reactor; defensive systems 

Medium Transport/Attack Helicopter French design assistance 

for rotor head; Italian 

design assistance; possible Canadian engine 

PRC airframe; engines; 

avionics; weapons 

Type–98 Main Battle

Tank 

Russian influenced hull 

and 125mm main gun; 

Russian gun-launched 

guided missile; British 

or German influenced 

engine 

PRC designed composite 

armor; tank design and 

integration 

79 

COUNTRIES THAT SELL WEAPONS TO THE PLA 

Russia 

In a reversal of the late Cold War antagonism, since the collapse of the Soviet 

Union, the new Russian Federation has emerged as the PRC’s principle source for 

advanced military hardware, military technology, military-technical training and advice. In mid-2002, the Pentagon reported that since 1990, figures for ‘‘signed agreements’’ could range from ‘‘$10 billion to $20 billion’’ with actual deliveries ranging 

from ‘‘$7 billion to $10 billion.’’ 8 In 1999, annual Russian arms sales to the PRC 

jumped from about $1 billion to $2 billion, a figure that will be sustained in 2004. 

The Pentagon concluded in 2002 that ‘‘Russian arms sales are expected to have a 

significant impact on China’s ability to use force against potential adversaries such 

as Taiwan.’’ 9 

Since the early 1990s access to Russian weapons and military technology has had

a profound impact on PLA modernization. All the PLA services to varying degrees 

rely on new Russian technology to help fulfill modernization goals. Russian technology enabled the PLA’s first manned spaceflight to perform military reconnaissance in October 2003, and will enable future PLA radar surveillance satellites. 

Russian Sukhoi Su–27s and Su–30 fighter-bombers, when combined with Russian 

PGMs, A–50 AWACS and reconnaissance satellites, are giving the PLA Air Force 

(PLAAF) its first all-weather strike capability. Russian technology and assistance 

enabled the PLA Navy (PLAN) to launch its first second-generation Type 093 SSN 

in 2002, which will form the basis for the PLAN’s second-generation Type-094 

SSBN. The purchase of 12 KILO conventional submarines, with the prospect for coproduction of 20 more, could give the PLA the largest fleet of modern SSKs in Asia. 

Russian weapons and advice have helped the PLA to build three new classes of 

stealthy warships. Russian weapons and technology purchased by the PLA has 

helped modernize PLA Army main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, amphibious tanks, airborne tanks and anti-tank missiles. 

There is an increasing emphasis on broader technology development cooperation, 

in which the PRC seeks to attract Russian technological investment in the PRC and 

the PRC also invests in high technology in Russia. In 1993, there were 300 Russian 

scientists on long-term defense-related programs, and by 2000, this number jumped 

to 1,500.10 High technology development contracts between Russia and the PRC 

jumped from 35 contracts, totaling $11.7 million in 2001, to $20.7 million for 30 contracts in the first six months of 2002.11 A 2002 PRC technology delegation visiting 

Moscow to advance these contracts included officials from ‘‘leading shipbuilding, nuclear energy, aerospace and defense industry companies.’’ 12 Long seeking to shift 

the balance of its military trade from hardware to technology, in December 2003, 

PRC Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan made a special push to change this balance 

to 70 percent technology and 30 percent hardware.13 

Of note, the PLA wants to participate with Russia in joint sales to third countries.14 This is significant in relation to a possible ending of Europe’s arms embargo. 

If this happens, the PLA will likely try to form new alliances with European arms 

makers as quickly as possible, thereby creating anxiety in Moscow. One way for Beijing to calm Moscow’s fears would be to craft more multi-lateral military programs. 

But to remain competitive with Europe, it is possible that Russia may become more 

eager to sell whatever it has that is new and more deadly. For example, the fear 

of European competition may drive Russia to allow the PLA to co-produce up to 20 

of its modern and effective conventional submarines. 

Ukraine 

While the Ukraine has probably only sold roughly $1–2 billion million in military 

products to the PLA over the last decade, it has been useful none the less. Since 

the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian and Ukrainian military concerns have become more competitive, and the PLA has sought to take advantage of this. The 

Ukraine has been a source for space and missile technologies, conducting training 

8 Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, ANNUAL 

REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. July 2002, 

p. 40. 

9 Ibid, p. 46. 

10 Ibid., p. 45. 11 ‘‘Chinese delegation brings over 100 high-tech projects to Russia,’’ ITAR–TASS, August 1, 

2002, in FBIS CEP20020801000209. 12 Ibid. 13 ‘‘Russia, China Sign Military Technology Cooperation Protocol for 2004,’’ Itar-Tass, December 17, 2003, in FBIS CEP20031217000230. 14 Ibid. 

80 

for PLA astronauts, and possibly selling the PLA advanced liquid fuel rocket engines. The Ukraine is a principle source for air-to-air missiles for PLA Sukhoi fighters. In terms of naval hardware, after much effort, the PLA was able to buy the 

rusting hulk of a carrier VARYAG and tow it to Dalian in 2002. There it will teach 

PLA Navy engineers about Soviet era aircraft carrier technology. The PLA may remain interested in the quite capable Ukrainian SLAVA class cruise. If reports are 

to be believed, it was PLA investment that allowed the Ukraine to create the feared 

KOLCHUGA passive radar.15 The PLA is reportedly paying Ukrainian companies 

to develop a new naval phased array radar, which may be the new radar for the 

PLAN’s No. 170 class air-defense destroyers.16 In such arrangements, the PLA likely owns the resulting new technology, as it most probably enables its engineers to 

absorb the knowledge of their Ukrainian mentors, strengthening their potential to 

produce a next generation product. 

Israel 

Even though Israel apparently has stopped its military exports to the PRC, it remains the second most important source of advanced military technology to the PRC 

due to its cumulative effect. Total estimates of the amount of Israel’s military exports to the PRC vary. SIPRI lists $162 million from 1993 to 2002, but in 1997, an 

Israeli official noted that Israel’s military sales to the PRC were approximately $10 

million annually.17 Another estimate for that same year notes Israeli arms sales to the PRC may have been as high as $30 million annually from 1979.18 Notably, this trade was poised to leap by $1 billion, but the U.S. convinced Israel to cancel the 

sale of its sophisticated PHALCON AWACS aircraft in 2000. 

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States encouraged Israel to develop military technical ties with the PRC in order to indirectly aid PRC military

modernization against the former Soviet Union. The formal go-ahead is reported to 

have come in 1979, when then-Defense Minister Ezer Weizman asked the late 

Israeli billionaire Shaul Isenberg to establish the Israeli-PRC arms trade.19 During 

the 1980s, Israel offered the PRC its technology in the areas of tank weapons, antitank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles, military electronics and aircraft design. But by the 1990s, the Israel-PLA relationship became a matter of increasing concern for Washington, not just because of the sophistication of technology 

sold, but because some of the technology was of U.S. origin or made possible by access to U.S. weapon systems, and was subsidized by U.S. taxpayers.20 

Israel’s principle motivation for pursuing its arms relationship with the PRC was 

to support its arms industries, whose independence and competitiveness Israel requires for its own national security. However, some Israelis have suggested another

motivation. Israeli officials claim that one benefit of its sale of LAVI fighter technology to China has been to prevent sales of surface-to-surface missiles to Israel’s 

neighbors.21 However, in mid-1996, the CIA reportedly disclosed that China may 

have shipped ‘‘missile-related components’’ to Syria.22 And there is the larger question of PRC nuclear and missile proliferation and the dangers that has created for 

Israel. For example, the PRC has sold Iran both nuclear technologies that would

contribute to its nuclear weapons program and missile technologies that have contributed to its long-range nuclear missile program. Iran then helped Libya’s missile 

program. Furthermore, PRC missile technologies have been sold to Iran through 

proxies like North Korea. This occurred during the 1990s when the Israeli-PLA relationship was at its height. 

The most famous PRC-Israel project has been the co-development of the Chengdu

Jian-10 (J–10) 4th generation multi-role fighter. This project drew heavily on 

Israel’s Israeli Aircraft Industries LAVI advanced fighter,23 which was terminated 

15 Narodna Armiya, Kiev, November 21, 2003, Global News Wire—Asia Africa Intelligence

Wire, BBC Monitoring International Reports, December 4, 2003. 16 ‘‘Ukrainian Radar Designer Interviewed on Current Projects,’’ Kiev Defense-Express, November 1, 2003. 17 Barbara Opall, ‘‘Israel Denies Charges On Tech Sales to China,’’ Defense News, July 21–

27, 1997, p. 56. 18 Ibid. 19 Judy Dempsey, ‘‘Israel considers arms dealings with China an acceptable risk,’’ Financial 

Times, April 23, 1999, p. 8. 20 Jim Krane, ‘‘U.S. aid to Israel subsidizes a potent weapons exporter,’’ The Associated Press, 

June 19, 2002. 21 Opall, op-cit. 22 Bill Gertz, ‘‘CIA suspects Chinese firm of Syria missile aid,’’ The Washington Times, July 

23, 1996, p. A1. 23 Douglas Barrie, ‘‘Chinese tonic, The Chinese air force is picking up the pieces of Israel’s 

Lavi fighter programme,’’ Flight International, November 9, 1994; Jim Mann, ‘‘U.S. Says Israel 

Gave Combat Jet Planes To China,’’ The Los Angeles Times, December 28, 1994, p. A1; Charles 

81


after the U.S. withdrew its financial and political support. In 2003, a Russian source

who visited Chengdu in the early 1990s remarked that it was possible to view Hebrew language placards on the walls where work was being done on the J–10.24 But 

the LAVI, in turn, drew heavily from U.S. technology, including some associated 

with the Lockheed-Martin F–16 fighter. U.S.-origin technology in the J–10 may include avionics, advanced composite materials and flight control specification.25 As 

more details about the J–10 have surfaced, it is increasingly apparent that Chengdu

pooled technology influences from Israel and Russia to make this new fighter. 

Though long in gestation, the J–10 may enter production in 2004, and could prove 

to be a capable multi-role fighter able to hold its own against many current U.S. 

fighters. 

But it was Israel’s attempt to sell its very advanced PHALCON phased array airborne radar to the PLA which finally mobilized a bipartisan U.S. effort in the late 

1990s to insist that Israel halt its exports of dangerous military technology to the

PRC. Concern had been building since the deal was formalized at the Paris Airshow 

in 1997 that Israel would combine PHALCON with a Russian-supplied Beriev A– 

50 AWACS aircraft. The deal would have involved up to four aircraft for $1 billion.26 

The advanced capabilities of the PHALCON exceeded that of the U.S. E–3 SENTRY 

and would have severely threatened Taiwan’s air defense capabilities. The Clinton

Administration began to press its concerns to Israel in November 1999.27 The issue 

soon united both Democrats and Republicans in opposition, both in the Administration and in the Congress, and even among strong supporters of Israel.28 Former 

Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced Israel’s cancellation of the deal during a 

U.S.-Israeli summit in July 2000. The PHALCON’s capabilities are still prized by 

the PLA and this perhaps is why, as recently as late 2001, China has persisted in 

trying to convince Washington to reverse its decision.29 

Since the cancellation of the PHALCON sale, the U.S. applied increasing pressure 

on Israel to curtail all sales of dangerous weapons to the PLA. In late 2000, a U.SIsraeli committee was reportedly created to review Israel’s sale of such technologies.30 Nevertheless, such sales have surfaced. In 2002, it was reported that 

Israel sold a large number of its HARPY anti-radar drone to the PLA.31 In early

2002, Israel was close to a sale for its AMOS small-bus communications satellite, 

originally designed for the Israeli military. But through 2002 and 2003, the U.S. apparently convinced Israel to stop its sales of advanced military technology to the 

PLA.32 In mid-2003, the AMOS sale fell through and Israeli Aircraft Industries reduced their Beijing office.33 A December 2003 report notes that Israel may be trying 

to revive some military-technical commercial ties that may focus primarily on

counterterrorism.34 Given that there is little distinction between counterterrorism 

capabilities and those required by Special Force units for assault missions, it is necessary for the U.S. to continue to monitor Israeli military commercial activities with 

the PRC. 

Europe 

In early 2004 Europe stands poised to end its 1989 arms embargo against the

PRC. In truth, adherence to this embargo has been progressively weakened by many 

European states. After the mid-1990s, Britain, France, Spain and Italy modified 

Bickers and Nick Cook, ‘‘Russia, Israel helping China build new fighter,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 25, 1995; Andy Chuter, ‘‘Israel/Russia Compete to Arm F–10 Fighter,’’ Flight International, October 15, 1997, p. 9; David Isenberg, ‘‘Israel’s role in China’s new warplane,’’ Asia 

Times, December 4, 2002. 24 Interview, Moscow Airshow, August 2003. 25 Mann, op-cit; Larry Wortzel, ‘‘U.S. Commits to Security of Its Allies,’’ Taipei Times, March 

15, 2001. 26 ‘‘Final RFP for Chinese AEW Follow-On Program Expected,’’ Journal of Electronic Defense 

Electronics, April 1, 2000. 27 Bill Gertz, ‘‘U.S. opposes Israel-China military deal,’’ The Washington Times, November 12, 

1999, p. A1. 28 William A. Orme, Jr., ‘‘Israeli Armorer in a Global Arena; Aircraft Maker Runs Afoul of 

U.S. With China Radar Contract,’’ The New York Times, June 30, 2000, p. 1; Dov S. Zakheim,

‘‘Get real on China,’’ The Jerusalem Post, November 22, 1999, p. 8; Hanan Sher, ‘‘The Plight 

of the Phalcon,’’ The Jerusalem Report, October 10, 2000. 29 ‘‘China seeks U.S. reversal,’’ Flight International, October 30, 2001, p. 21. 30 ‘‘U.S. And Israel Will Form Joint Technology Committee On Arms Exports,’’ Israel Business 

Today, September 1, 2000. 31 ‘‘IAI Sells Harpy Drones To China,’’ Flight International, November 5, 2002, p. 5. 32 Bill Gertz, ‘‘Israel asked to stop arms sales to China; U.S. seeks to curb threat to Taiwan,’’ 

The Washington Times, January 3, 2003, p. A01. 33 Ami Ettinger, ‘‘IAI Cuts Investment in Defense Exports to China, Will Focus on Civil Aviation,’’ Ma’ariv, October 9, 2003. 34 Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Israel, China To Revive Ties,’’ Defense News, December 15, 2003. 

82 

their interpretations of the 1989 sanctions to allow increasing ‘‘dual use’’ technology 

to be sold to the PRC. Under this flag, Europeans have sold defense electronics and 

helicopter technology to the PLA. By the late 1990s, Beijing was putting heavy pressure on many European countries to end these sanctions and resume military technology and weapons sales. During his August–September 2002 tour of Europe, 

former Premier Zhu Rongji explicitly called for Europe to resume military sales.35 

As U.S.-EU relations went from tepid to worse in 2002–2003, it appears that Beijing 

saw an opening to extract concessions from Europeans who were looking for stronger links to Beijing to take the place of those they were giving up with Washington. 

In June 2003, during a visit to Beijing, French Defense Minister Michele AlliotMarie said, ‘‘We are working hard to lift the ban.’’ 36 

An October 2003 PRC White Paper on PRC-EU relations stated ‘‘The EU should 

lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense industry and technologies.’’ 37 This White Paper 

was released weeks before a high-profile Summit of EU leaders in Beijing in November 2003. Then, in early December, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder called 

for the embargo to be lifted during a visit to the PRC.38 Barely two weeks later, 

at an EU summit in Brussels, French President Jacques Chriac’s called for the end 

of the embargo and a summit statement said that Foreign Ministers would ‘‘re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China.’’ 39 Days later, the 

European Union Assembly adopted a resolution against lifting the embargo, citing 

the PRC’s threats to Taiwan,40 but the advisory nature of this body means it cannot 

stop a lifting of the EU embargo on arms sales to the PLA in 2004. On January 

25 a gathering of EU Foreign Ministers rejected by a vote of 14 to 1 a French call 

to end the embargo. However, given France and Germany’s strong support, it appears that momentum is leaning toward its removal in 2004. 

Should Europe lift its embargo, its arms sales to the PLA will presumably be governed by a ‘‘Code of Conduct.’’ Unfortunately this Code of Conduct has not stopped 

Britain from selling microsatellite technology that is informing future PLA anti-satellite capabilities, or from selling Rolls Royce turbofan engine technology now being 

used on new JH–7A fighter-bombers. It also has not stopped French and Italian contributions to the PLA’s first modern attack helicopter or has it stopped German and 

French marine engines sales for PLA submarines and combat ships. A 2003 agreement to secure a PRC financial contribution to the future European GALILEO navigation satellite constellation marked a new high-point in space cooperation. By October, the PRC and the European Space Agency were reported close to completing a 

five-year space cooperation agreement that would cover ‘‘space science, Earth observation, environmental monitoring, meteorology, telecommunications and satellite 

navigation, microgravity research for biology and medicine, and human resource development and training.’’ 41 

In conjunction with the mid-December EU summit, major European defense and 

aerospace companies called for an end to the embargo.42 Their tone was set by 

EADS, which in early October signed a ‘‘strategic cooperation agreement’’ with 

AviChina, an investment arm of AVIC II, that would involve the ‘‘joint development, 

manufacturing and modernization of helicopters, regional aircraft and training aircraft.’’ Said an EADS spokesman, ‘‘We have been working with AVIC II for 30 years. 

It makes perfect sense for us to become a strategic partner in AviChina.’’ 43 Once 

the EU embargo is lifted, it can be expected that many European defense companies 

that now cooperate with U.S. defense companies will seek cooperative alliances with 

PLA-controlled companies. Such moves should be viewed with concern in Washington as these alliances could prove to be very useful avenues for future PLA espionage against U.S. defense technology. 

35 ‘‘EU should lift arms embargo, Chinese premier tells French president,’’ Agence France 

Press, September 2, 2002. 36 ‘‘Europe’s companies urges removal of ban on high-tech exports to China,’’ Xinhua, November 26, 2003. 37 ‘‘Xinhua Carries ‘Full Text’ of China’s EU Policy Paper,’’ Xinhua, October 13, 2003, in FBIS 

CPP20031013000072. 38 ‘‘China Urges EU To Lift Arms Embargo Amid Talks for Plutonium Plant,’’ Agence France 

Presse, December 4, 2003. 39 Ibid. 40 ‘‘EU parliament resists end to arms embargo against China,’’ Agence France Presse, December 18, 2003. 41 China Set for Closer Cooperation After Space Flight, Agence France Presse, October 15, 

2003. 42 ‘‘Europe’s companies . . .’’ op-cit. 43 Paul Betts and Justine Lau, ‘‘EADS moves to boost ties with China AEROSPACE,’’ Financial Times, October 21, 2003, p. 31. 

83 

HOW FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY IS ASSISTING PLA MODERNIZATION 

It is now possible to describe the manner in which access to foreign weapons and 

technology has accelerated the modernization of the PLA. This section is a summary 

of findings in ‘‘The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army.’’ 

PLA Missile and Space Modernization 

Deploy new small nuclear warheads. In 1999 an independent damage assessment commission led by the U.S. Intelligence Community and a special commission 

of the U.S. House of Representatives led by Congressmen Christopher Cox and 

Norm Dicks concluded that PLA access to information about modern small U.S. nuclear warheads informed and shortened the development of new PLA small nuclear 

warhead. While there are some who maintain that the PLA could have developed

these warheads from their own capabilities, these individuals are in the minority. 

These new small warheads were essential for the PLA to develop new classes of 

intercontinental nuclear missiles. 

Deploy new liquid fuel and solid fuel ICBMs capable of reaching the

United States. In 2002 the Pentagon reported that the PLA would deploy about 

20 new DF–5 Mod 2 ICBMs by 2005. The Pentagon implied that this new ICBM

might have multiple warheads. The DF–5 Mod 2 ICBM very likely benefited from 

U.S. knowledge and technology. Both U.S. agencies and the Cox Commission determined that PLA interaction with U.S. satellite and aerospace companies, including 

Loral and Hughes, allowed the PLA to improve the LONG MARCH space launch 

vehicle, which is based on the DF–5. In addition, some U.S. intelligence analysts 

contend that a two-satellite launch bus developed to loft U.S. IRIDIUM communication satellite provided a ‘‘technology bridge’’ for a multiple warhead bus, and a 

former PLA engineer has noted that U.S. companies provided advice regarding the 

IRIDIUM bus. The U.S. company Martin Marietta also provided information that 

allowed the PLA to improve the solid fuel rocket engines of the DF–21 IRBM, and 

very likely for the new DF–31, DF–31A ICBMs and JL–2 SLBM. The road-mobile 

DF–31 is now being deployed and is expected to be followed by the longer-range

DF–31A and JL–2 later in this decade. 

Develop new long-range cruise missiles expected to be deployed by mid-decade. Taiwanese sources expect the PLA to deploy new long-range land attack cruise 

missiles by mid-decade. Chinese sources indicate these may resemble the U.S. 

TOMOHAWK cruise missile and will have multiple guidance systems like terrainfollowing radar and satellite-navigation. Eventually this new cruise missile will be

launched from land, ship, submarine and aircraft platforms. This new cruise missile 

is also expected to have benefited from Russian, Israeli and captured U.S. cruise 

missile technology.

Achieve a manned space capability in about a decade, which is now being

used for military purposes. The October 2003 manned flight of the Shenzhou-5 

spaceship was made possible by PLA access to extensive Russian space technology. 

The Shenzhou is a slightly larger and improved version of the Russian Soyuz. The 

first five Shenzhou missions, including the first manned mission, were used to test 

electronic intelligence and imaging intelligence payloads. Based on this precedent, 

it is possible to project that future Shenzhou spaceflight missions and future PLA 

space stations may very likely also perform military missions. Should the PLA elect 

to perform military surveillance missions from a future space station, it may also 

arm its space stations for self defense, which also raises the prospect of it arming 

manned space stations for offensive military missions as well. Europe and Russia 

are interested in selling technology that will enable future PLA manned space stations. 

Develop a modern space reconnaissance and surveillance capability. The 

PLA’s first high-resolution radar satellite will be based on the Russian NPO 

Mashinostroyenia radarsatellite. NPO Mashinostroyenia officials also note they are 

selling the PLA their new 1-meter capable electro-optical imaging satellite. The PLA 

intends to loft four radar and 4 new electro-optical imaging satellites from 2006. 

These will allow the PLA to revisit any target on Earth twice a day. Such a space 

surveillance capability, when combined with airborne and fixed surveillance assets, 

will enable the PLA to conduct a dynamic offensive missile and air strike campaign 

against Taiwan. Radar satellites will also be useful in finding U.S. naval forces at 

sea. In addition, the ability to gather 1-meter or better imagery will give the PRC 

and PLA leadership new levels of political influence, by enabling them to assist favored factions in overseas conflicts. It will also enable the PRC to expose U.S. military moves in ways that may endanger U.S. military personnel.

Quickly upgraded the PLA’s air defense capabilities. According to Russian 

reports the PLA has purchased possibly several to many hundred S–300 SAMs. 

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These deadly missiles use very-hard-to-jam track-via-missile (TVM) technology reportedly stolen from the U.S. The U.S. has never had to fight an air battle against 

a foe armed with TVM missiles. The PLA’s possession of a large number of S–300s 

serves to deter the modern U.S. conventional precision strike air forces. The PLA 

has also obtained at least one U.S. Patriot SAM from which it may have also added 

to its knowledge of TVM technology. A new version of the PLA FT–2000 SAM may 

use TVM guidance. Passive KOLCHUGA radar purchased from the Ukraine and 

Russian KASTA low-altitude radar will enhance the PLA’s build-up of modern radar

systems that can cue new SAMs. 

PLA Air Force Modernization 

Amass a fleet of about 400 4th generation attack-capable Russian Sukhoi

fighters by about 2006. The PLA decided in the early 1990s to accelerate the modernization of the PLA Air Force by purchasing and co-producing large numbers of 

Russian Sukhoi fighters. By 2006 it will have significantly advanced this goal by

acquiring and building about 400 Su–27SK, Su–30MKK, Su–30MKK2 and co-produced J–11 fighters. This number could increase substantially if as some Russian 

sources predict, the PLA elect for a second co-production contract for more J–11 

fighters. The Sukhoi is the peer of the U.S. F–15C fighter and F–15E strike-fighter, 

and is in some respects superior. The PLA is now upgrading Su–27 and J–11 fighters to make them multi-role fighter and attack capable. With air-refueling the Su–

30MKK/MKK2 is cable of striking targets in Guam and Okinawa. 

Better implement evolving offensive joint-warfare doctrines. The PLA Navy 

is purchasing the Sukhoi Su–30MKK2 and Russian sources indicate that the PLA 

Air Force may upgrade its Su–30MKKs to MKK2 standards. This could give the 

PLA over 100 Su–30s capable of both land and naval attack missions. As such, this 

capability will allow the PLA to better implement joint tactics between the PLA Air 

Force and PLA Navy. 

Develop and produce its first 4th generation combat fighters and lay the 

groundwork for 5th generation combat aircraft programs. Foreign technologies have helped the PLA to upgrade its Shenyang J–8II and Chengdu J–7 

fighters. Israeli and Russian technologies were critical in enabling Chengdu to complete its new J–10 and FC–1 multi-role fighters. Chengdu’s J–10C 5th generation 

fighter concept bears a very close resemblance to the Russian Mikoyan Article 1.44 

5th generation fighter proposal. 

Arm both foreign-made and indigenous fighters and fighter-attack aircraft with new and capable air-to-air, ground-attack and long-range naval 

attack weapons. The PLA is importing thousands of new Russian air-to-air and 

air-to-ground munitions. These include very capable missiles like the helmet-sighted 

Vympel R–73 and the active-radar guided Vympel R–77 AAMs. Russian technology 

is also enabling the PLA to put into production in 2004 its first reliable mediumrange active-guided AAM, the Louyang PL–12/SD–10 missile. The PLA has also 

purchased large numbers of new Russian precision-guided munitions, including the 

Kh–29 short-range attack missile, the Kh–59ME medium range attack missile, the 

Kh–31 anti-radar and anti-ship missiles, and the Kh–59MK long-range anti-ship 

missile. In addition the PLA has purchased the very large KAB–1500 precision-guided bomb, a 3,000 lb bomb that can be equipped with deep-penetrating and 

thermobaric warheads. Russian-designed laser-guided bombs will also arm JH–7A 

fighter-bombers, and possibly, larger numbers of Xian A–5 attack fighters. 

Support combat missions around Taiwan with new space and airborne information platforms, aerial refueling aircraft and transport aircraft. PLA 

air strike missions against Taiwan will benefit from satellite surveillance and from 

Russian A–50 AWACS expected to be purchased. The PLA also intends to purchase 

Russian Ilyushin Il–78 aerial refueling aircraft, which will extend the range of Su– 

30MKK/MKK2 strike fighters. Russian sources indicate the PLA may now purchase 

30 more Ilyushin Il–76 heavy transport aircraft in addition to about 20 already in 

service. Depending on the version, these can airlift two–three BMD airborne tanks, 

which will give added power-projection capability to PLA Airborne units. The 

Ukraine is also assisting the PLA’s Shaanxi company to improve its Y–8 medium 

transport, develop a much more capable version of the Y–8, and is discussing the 

possibility of co-producing the Antonov An–124 mega-transport. 

Undertake all-weather counter-air, ground-attack and naval-attack missions on or around Taiwan, and against U.S. forces that may seek to repel

such an attack. By 2006 or shortly thereafter, the acquisition of foreign technologies will allow the PLA for the first time to conduct all-weather offensive strike 

missions against Taiwan and against U.S. forces that would seek to defend Taiwan 

from PLA attack. This is significant because PLA short-range, medium-range ballistic missiles, and new cruise missiles, while great in number, can only perform one 

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mission. Strike aircraft can perform multiple missions. By this time the PLA will

have large numbers of Russian-built Su–30s and will build up its new Britishengined Xian JH–7A fighter bombers so that it may have about 150 fighters capable 

of attacking U.S. Navy ships.

Significantly advance the PLA’s goal of creating a modern and innovating

combat aircraft industry sector. Over the last decade the PLA’s combat aircraft 

design and manufacturing sector has been improved by access to French computer 

design software and by modern machine tools from Russia, Europe, Japan and the

United States. In addition, it is apparent that interaction with European and U.S. 

aerospace firms is helping PLA controlled companies like Shenyang and Chengdu 

to become more innovative and to understand how to be driven by markets rather 

than state planning dictates. The Sukhoi-Shenyang partnership is leading to 

Shenyang’s eventual ability to indigenously produce its own variants of the J–11. 

Foreign assistance has enabled Chengdu to produce two fighters which may soon

be able to compete in two critical market segments. In addition, interaction with foreign firms is enabling PLA companies finally to produce modern turbofan fighter engines and modern fighter radar. 

PLA Navy Modernization 

Combine new information systems and new long-range strike platforms to

enable offensive and defensive missions at far greater distances. It is very

likely that the PLA Navy will also benefit from information derived from new surveillance satellites. The PLA Navy also has some Y–8 transports modified with British airborne search radar that have been used to assist long-range targeting for destroyers. The Ukraine apparently has co-developed with the PLA a new naval 

phased-array radar that will equip one and possibly two new classes of air defense 

destroyers. Such radar may be used in the same way as the U.S. AEGIS to manage 

long-range counter-air and counter-naval battles. 

Build new generations of modern and capable nuclear and conventional 

submarine and support them with an increasingly credible Naval Air Force

and Air Force strike combine. Russian technology was used to enable the PLA 

to launch its first second-generation SSN in 2002. It is expected to be equivalent 

in performance to the Russian VICTOR–III class SSN, which would constitute a 

very large leap in capability for the PLAN. It can be expected that Russia would 

have sold technology to make them even quieter than the VICTOR–III, enhancing 

their ability to counter U.S. SSNs, and will arm them with 220km range Russian 

CLUB anti-ship missiles. The PLA is now acquiring 12 very quiet KILO conventional submarines, 8 of which will be armed with CLUB missiles. Russia is now considering selling the PLA the rights to co-produce up to 20 conventional submarines. 

Russian, German and possibly French technology enabled the PLA to produce a 

working version of its new SONG conventional submarine, which is now in series 

production. It is possible that before the end of the decade the PLA will have the 

capability to coordinate mass missile attacks on U.S. Naval forces by submarines 

and Su–30s. 

Better enable future naval attack and blockade operations against Taiwan later in this decade, if the PRC chooses to do so. Foreign technology is 

better enabling the PLAN to undertake blockade missions around Taiwan. Foreign 

purchased or assisted all-weather fighter bombers will be able to attack Taiwan 

Navy ships in ports and at sea, degrading Taiwan’s ability to oppose larger numbers 

of Russian and foreign assisted PLAN submarines. Russian weapons and systems 

are enabling the PLA to produce three new classes of stealthy warships. Two of 

these are design for air defense missions, filling a long-standing PLAN requirement 

for better naval air defense. 

Gain increasing naval strength needed to enforce territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea. A combination of new information assets and longrange strike assets will soon enable increasingly distant PLA Navy operations, especially in its immediate region to enforce long-standing PRC territorial claims. New 

foreign build or assisted submarine, foreign assisted stealthy warships and Russianbuilt long-range strike fighters will allow the PLA to undertake shows of force near 

contested areas, and if necessary, fight naval battles in those same areas. While the 

PLAN has long been able to best inferior neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines, in the near future it may also be able to oppose Japanese naval forces near 

the Daiyoutai Islands or Malaysian naval forces in the Spratly Island Group.

Increase the PLA Navy’s ability to protect naval access in the Indian 

Ocean and begin to employ a limited naval power projection capability 

based on sub-launched LACMs. As Russian influenced SSNs enter PLAN service, 

the PLA will soon acquire a limited conventional power-projection capability in that 

they will likely soon carry new PLA-developed long-range land attack cruise mis­

86


siles. Global targeting for PLA cruise missiles will be made possible by Russian surveillance satellites, foreign-assisted PLA owned or controlled communication satellites, plus Russian and European navigation satellites. Even such a limited power 

projection capability will give the PRC leadership greater influence in that it can 

choose to directly intervene on the side of a favored faction by direct application of 

precision striking power.

Gain increasing understanding of aircraft carrier construction and operations to better prepare for eventual aircraft carrier construction. Since the 

mid-1980s the PLA has collected used aircraft carriers from Australia and Russia 

to gather knowledge needed in order to eventually build their own. In 2002 a PRC 

company linked to the PLA Navy took possession of the former Russian carrier 

Varyag, which is now in Dalian ostensibly to be refurbished as a casino. In August 

2003 the Harbin Technical University, which closely cooperates with the PLA, put 

on display a model of a PLA version of this Russian carrier. It is not known whether

the PLA has the financial resources to build carrier in the near future, but it does 

have a much greater level of technical proficiency to complete such a project. In addition, as the Shenyang Aircraft Company turns the J–11 into more of an indigenously built fighter, it also becomes a strong candidate for an initial carrier-based 

fighter-bomber, inasmuch as its Russian partner, KnAAPO, also builds a carrier 

version for the Russian Navy. While the Chengdu J–10 is often viewed as a potential carrier fighter, the J–11 is already a proven carrier-capable design. 

PLA Ground Force Modernization 

Turning information into a more effective weapon by greater use of UAVs,

radars and more profound fire and counter-fire capabilities that are being 

improved with foreign technologies. Like other modern armies, the PLA is investing in new targeting and precision strike systems. The PLA has been experimenting with unmanned reconnaissance vehicles (UAVs) since the late 1980s and 

has likely benefited from Israeli technology in this area. The PLA may also be investing in long-range synthetic aperture radar-based airborne ground surveillance 

and targeting systems. These will be used to direct new long-range artillery rockets 

based on the Russian SMERSH system. The SMERSH uses self-targeting sensorfused munitions that allow one long-range rocket to attack many armored vehicles. 

It is likely that Russian sensor-fused technology is aiding the PLA to make its own 

sensor-fused munitions. 

Using foreign technology to building world-class main battle tanks and

armored personnel carriers. With the benefit of British, Israeli and Russian technology, the PLA has developed two new main battle tanks, the Type-98 and less expensive Type-96. Both are armed with Russian-influenced 125mm main guns and 

both likely fire Russian designed gun-launched laser-guided anti-tank missiles. Both 

tanks also use modern composite-steel sandwich armor in removable segments that 

allow for upgrades. The T–98 uses a unique laser-based defensive system that can 

either blind opposing optical guidance systems or, upon detecting such systems, can 

automatically direct counter-fire. In early 2003 the PLA revealed a new armored infantry fighting vehicle that uses the gun-turret system from the Russian BMP–3 armored infantry fighting vehicle. 

Using Russian tank gun-launched laser-guided missiles to give several 

PLA tanks greater striking distance. The PLA now produces a version of the 

Russian BASTION gun-launched laser-guided anti-tank missile for its 105mm tank 

guns. With a 5km range, this missile out-ranges regular 105mm gun shells. Taiwanese sources believe this missile arms the PLA’s new Type-63A amphibious tank, 

enabling it to out-range Taiwan’s U.S.-built M–60 and M–48 tanks as soon as it 

lands ashore. These missiles are also being used by T–59D and possibly T–79 tanks. 

Using foreign aircraft, helicopters, light tanks and light trucks to give

greater power to PLA Airborne Forces. It is increasingly apparent that the PLA 

views its Airborne forces as a strategic striking force with special relevance to many 

possible Taiwan combat scenarios. If Airborne forces can rapidly secure airfields on 

Taiwan in conjunction with the capture of key ports by Amphibious forces, that may 

help force Taiwan’s political leadership to capitulate before a full-scale invasion. Or 

if necessary, these forces could in large part help to capture Taipei, forcing the same 

result. The power projection capability of PLA Airborne forces is being improved by 

the possible purchase of up to 50 Russian Il–76 heavy transport aircraft, modern 

and capable Russian BMD airborne tanks, and new Italian Iveco light trucks armed 

with HJ–9 anti-tank missiles, likely derived from the Israeli MAPATS missile. PLA 

Special Forces could also lead attacks on Taiwan military, infrastructure and political targets after having been transported by Russian Mi–17 or other European-designed helicopters. Airborne and Special Forces troops could be covered by new WZ– 

11 attack helicopters, a copy of a French design. 

87


Using foreign helicopter technology to enable improved indigenous helicopter development. In early 2003 the PLA is reported to have test flown a new 

attack helicopter, sometimes called the ‘‘Z–10.’’ This helicopter also forms the basis 

for a new 6-ton class medium utility helicopter. The dynamic system for this helicopter was assisted by Italy and France. Both helicopters may enter PLA service 

by the end of the decade. The new attack helicopter is expected to resemble the European TIGER attack helicopter, meaning it will be an all-weather platform armed 

with long-range attack weapons. Access to European helicopter technology is likely

to improve with the emerging EADS–AVIC–2 alliance, and may enable the PLA to 

better complete a planned 10-ton class utility helicopter. 

NEW THREATS TO TAIWAN EMERGING FROM PLA ACCESS TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 

Foreign weapons and technology are helping to propel an historic shift in the military balance on the Taiwan Strait. In January 2004 Taiwan Deputy Minister of Defense Chong Pin Lin offered a sober assessment of the evolving military balance on 

the Taiwan Strait. Lin said, ‘‘The PLA may start to surpass what we have in 2005 

or between 2005 and 2008,’’ Lin offered the caveat that a ‘‘crossover’’ in the military 

balance did not mean the PRC leadership would ‘‘feel 100 percent confident in winning a war,’’ and predicted by 2010 to 2015 the PLA may have ‘‘supremacy in both 

qualitative and quantitative comparison of forces that it may feel confident to

move.’’ 44 The assessment of 2005 as a ‘‘crossover’’ date is also shared by many high 

Taiwan military officers.45 Foreign military systems are helping fuel the PLA’s ability to lead this ‘‘crossover.’’

Missile Balance. If current growth rates are sustained by 2006 the PLA may be 

closing in on 750 SRBMs, to which one could add 100–200 new long-range land-attack cruise missiles, which have benefited from Russian, Israeli and U.S. technology. Russian imaging satellites will help make them more accurate and more 

flexibly retargetable. If the PLA does loft an 8-satellite constellation after 2006, then 

it will be able to revisit all targets on Taiwan twice-daily by both types of satellites, 

with radarsats able to penetrate cloud cover. Even though there is enthusiasm in 

Taiwan to build retaliatory ballistic missiles, it is not clear that Washington will 

allow this necessary defensive measure. If used with strategic surprise and immediate follow-up airstrikes, the PLA’s missile force could have a devastating effect. 

Their improving accuracy makes these missiles much more than a terror weapon.

Air Balance. Taiwan has about 330 4th generation fighters, a number expected 

to be static in 2006, when the PLA will have received about 400 Sukhoi fighters, 

most being multi-role fighter and attack capable. To this number there may be 30– 

50 British-engined JH–7 fighter bombers and 30–40 J–10 multi-role fighters. All 

PLA multi-role fighters will carry new active-guided AAMs, helmet-sighted shortrange AAMs, and be capable of delivering a range of PGMs. The PLA’s KAB–1500 

heavy PGMs could wreck havoc with Taiwan’s deep underground aircraft shelters. 

If surprise is achieved, PLA missile and air strikes could reduce the number of Taiwan fighters available for defensive missions. The PLA will also place a high priority on the destruction of Taiwan’s AWACS and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. 

Taiwan is reportedly developing its own GPS-guided PGM but its short range exposes the Taiwan fighter to PLA S–300 SAMs.

Naval Balance. Taiwan only has two aging conventional submarines and the 

U.S. is not expected to make good on any intended new submarine deliveries before 

the end of the decade. In contrast, by 2006 to 2007 the PLA could have the 8 Club 

ASM-armed KILOs ordered in 2002, and as many as 7 or 8 new SONG class submarines, in addition to about 20 older but still useful MING class submarines. 

Should the PLA co-produce 20 more Russian submarines the naval balance would 

shift decidedly to the PLA. In terms of surface warships the PLA may have two or 

more new Russian-armed air defense destroyers, two or more new ‘‘Aegis’’ like air 

defense destroyers and 3–4 SOVREMENNIY destroyers. Taiwan may have taken 

delivery of 4 new respectable KIDD class air-defense destroyers. 

Ground Force Balance. While it will take considerable effort for the PLA to 

transport its new T–98 and T–96 tanks to Taiwan, their superiority over Taiwan’s 

U.S. tanks spurs considerable fear in the still Army-centric Taiwan military leadership. While Taiwan may have new AH–1 APACHE helicopters to deal with this 

threat, the PLA will also have increasingly sophisticated light-weight air-defense 

systems it can bring to Taiwan, and may have a good number of light-weight WZ– 

44 Benjamin Kang Lim and Tiffany Wu, ‘‘Taiwan sees military balance tipping to China,’’ Reu­ ters, January 10, 2004. 

45 This point was noted during the course of many meetings with military officials in Taiwan 

during 2002 and 2003. 

88 

11 attack helicopters armed with anti-air missiles. Russian Il–76s, Mi–17 helicopters and BMD Airborne light tanks are giving new mobility and firepower to 

PLA Airborne units. New T–63A amphibious tanks armed with BASTION gunlaunched missile can out-range the guns on Taiwan’s U.S. M–60 and M–48 tanks. 

If these units achieve surprise and manage to secure airfields and ports, then civilian foreign-made airliners and civilian ships and fast ferries can be expected to pour 

in tens of thousands of troops a day. 

NEW THREATS TO U.S. FORCES EMERGING FROM PLA ACCESS TO 

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 

New PLA offensive military capabilities made possible by access to foreign technology is also helping to create new threats to U.S. forces, especially those stationed 

in Asia. With new space surveillance capabilities the PLA will be able to better 

monitor U.S. forces in Japan, Okinawa and Guam, to better time and coordinate any 

potential military action against Taiwan. These assets can also help monitor any

U.S. forces that may be deployed to intervene on the Taiwan Strait, to better mount 

pre-emptive or counter-strikes. 

And at a time when U.S. forces may be diverted for many years with requirements to fight the War on Terror, or perhaps to defend against aggressive actions 

by North Korea, remaining U.S. forces may be hard pressed to deter PRC aggression 

on the Taiwan Strait. The closest U.S. forces to the Taiwan Strait are two squadrons of aging F–15C fighters at Kadena Airbase on Okinawa. The challenges of 

maintaining these aging fighters was recently explained by General William J. 

Begert, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, to include problems with airframe and 

wing fatigue.46 While the F–15C armed with modern helmet-display sighted AIM– 

9X and active radar guided AIM–120 missiles is formidable, it simply does not have

a decisive level of superiority when compared to emerging PLA Sukhois and their 

new missiles. The only future U.S. fighter that will be decisively superior to the 

Sukhois is the Lockheed-Martin F/A–22, but only 200–300 may be built. On top of 

this, as General Begert also explained, U.S. fighters like the F–15 may not be able 

to survive new PLA air defenses based on the S–300 SAM.47 

Again, considering that U.S. forces may be committed to other regions thus impeding their rapid assembly to respond to a Taiwan Strait crisis, the U.S. Navy may 

only have the ships of the Japan-based 7th Fleet to respond to such a crisis. One 

should expect that the PLA will take advantage of a U.S. inability to respond as 

part of its campaign planning. If all the U.S. Navy can mobilize is the 7th Fleet 

with its single carrier battle group, then U.S. will be severely challenged by the 

emerging PLA missile-air-submarine strike combine. The PLA may have the following anti-carrier assets by the end of the decade: 

Potential PLA Anti-Carrier Forces by 2010 * 

Submarines 

12 or more Russian KILO; 8 w/ CLUB anti-ship missile

10 or more SONG w/ Russian torpedoes

3 Type 093 SSNs; possibly with CLUB, Russian torpedoes

20 or so older MING 

Modern Ships defending submarine areas 

2+ No. 170 air defense destroyers

2+ No. 168 air defense destroyers

4 Sovremenniy destroyers

8+ Type 054 stealth frigates 

Strike Aircraft 

40+ Su–30MKK2; w/ Kh–31A anti-ship missile

70 or so Su–30MKK upgraded to MKK2 standard; w/ Kh–31A

50+ JH–7A; with Kh–31 and indigenous anti-ship missile

300+ J–11/Su–27SK w/ Kh–31A 

* In most cases numbers are author estimates. 

A single aircraft carrier has about 50 combat aircraft, which will progressively 

comprise the F/A–18E/F multi-role fighter plus a declining number of older F/A– 

46 Transcript, Defense Writers Group, Gen. William J. Begert, USAF, Commander, Pacific Air 

Forces, January 13, 2004. 47 Ibid. 

89 

18Cs, over the course of this decade. While the F/A–18E/F is a capable aircraft, especially when later modified with new phased array radar, like the F–15C, it does 

not have capabilities that are decisively superior to the PLA’s Sukhoi fighters. The 

Sukhoi has better maneuverability, slightly greater unrefueled range and the capabilities of their respective air-to-air missiles are too close for comfort. While the U.S. 

carrier fighters may benefit from better AWACS and information support, plus better training and tactical employment, the larger number of Sukhois is bound to 

overwhelm a single carrier air group. It is possible that as it gets within range, a 

single U.S. carrier will be more preoccupied with self-defense than much needed offensive missions to defend Taiwan. In addition, U.S. carrier air wings lost their S– 

3B VIKING long-range anti-submarine patrol aircraft in the late 1990s and will 

have to rely on more vulnerable land-based P–3 ORION ASW aircraft. In order to 

get close to the Taiwan Strait, the 7th Fleet will require long-range support from 

U.S. Air Force fighters in Okinawa, whose staying power is dependent upon AWACS 

and tankers which are vulnerable to attack. Support from Japanese F–15s could 

make a real difference, but it is not certain that Japan would commit it fighters 

to defending U.S. naval forces from the beginning of such a crisis. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The key conclusion of this testimony, and the larger report on which it is based, 

is that the PRC has been able to accelerate important components of military modernization though a sustained access to modern foreign military technology. This 

conclusion leads to another: for as long as the PRC threatens to use its military 

power to put key U.S. interests in danger, and proliferates nuclear and missile technologies, it is imperative for Washington to do its utmost to stem the flow of modern 

military technology to the PRC. Sustaining the 1989 Tiananmen embargoes forbidding the sale of U.S. weapons and dangerous military technologies is a first requirement. It is necessary for the U.S. to continue to look hard at dual-use items, like 

some helicopters, that the PLA could use to attack Taiwan. 

Sustaining this embargo is critical if only to demonstrate to Europe that its rapidly evolving policies that may soon lead the removal of its arms embargoes will create yet another serious conflict with Washington. Europe has already significantly 

relaxed its prohibitions against sales of militarily useful technologies and Beijing is 

pushing hard for a complete end to the 1989 European Union embargo. Should this 

embargo end it is likely that the PLA will be able to create new arms industry alliances that will further accelerate it access to and use of advanced military technologies. Europe could be a source for new military innovation that for the longterm Russia may not be able to afford to sustain. The U.S. should develop both 

broad and specific warnings that if Europe decides to become the PLA’s new military-technical supplier, that the U.S. will take appropriate measures to defend critical U.S. defense technologies, which may affect long-term European access to future 

U.S. technical innovation. 

In addition the United States should make stemming the supply of critical defense 

technologies to the PRC a higher strategic priority. One success story in this regard 

has been the long-term U.S. dialogue with Israel to convince its leadership to stop 

its sale of dangerous military technologies to the PLA. It took a near crisis in U.S.-

Israeli relations to make this point; the 1999–2000 confrontation over the sale of 

Israel’s PHALCON AWACS system. While the U.S. should be grateful for Israel’s 

eventual recognition and response to U.S. concerns, continued U.S. vigilance is warranted. Israel should also be reminded that its hope to use its arms trade with the 

PRC to seek to prevent its arms sales that might threaten Israel has not worked. 

While the PRC has not sold conventional weapons to direct confrontation states that 

now pose threats to Israel, the PRC’s proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan, and subsequent Pakistani proliferation, is creating new threats 

to Israel. 

Addressing the challenge posed by Russia also remains important. In 2002 the 

Department of Defense, in its annual report on PLA modernization, paid special attention to the PLA’s relationship with Russia. By simply continuing to highlight 

both the extent and breadth of the PLA-Russian military technical relationship, the 

U.S. gives greater intellectual ammunition to those in Russia who may share American concerns. Granted, there are not many in the current Russian government who 

do share U.S. concerns. It is clear that in Moscow the interests of Russian weapons 

makers predominate, and their priority is to sell their wares. Nevertheless Washington and Moscow do have a long-standing interest in bi-lateral arms control and 

on occasion Russia can be persuaded to curtail sales of dangerous weapons. It is the 

U.S. interest to make Russia’s weapons sales to the PRC a higher priority on Washington’s agenda with Moscow. While Russia’s democratic institutions remain fragile, 

90 

both U.S. officials and Members of Congress can reach out to convey an American 

concern. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much. Dr. Finkelstein. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. FINKELSTEIN 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PROJECT ASIA 

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS CORPORATION 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 

Dr. FINKELSTEIN. Many thanks to the Commission for the opportunity to be here today. In the short time that I have, I’d like to 

provide some contextual comments on where the PLA is going and 

why, and overall I would say that it’s a fascinating time to be a 

student of the Chinese military. Starting in earnest in the early 

1990s, the PLA put into motion an ambitious reform and modernization program that continues today. 

Over ten years ago, acting upon its own assessments of the rapidly changing nature of warfare and China’s changing security environment Beijing’s military leadership came to the conclusion that 

the armed forces of China were ill-suited to cope with its future defense-related challenges. 

The totality of what the PLA leadership hopes to achieve through 

its ongoing reform and modernization program is ambitious on two 

accounts: scope and scale. First, scope. The scope of reforms the 

Chinese defense establishment hopes to achieve cut across every 

conceivable facet of activity within that establishment, to wit, the 

development of new operational concepts and warfighting doctrines, 

the modernization of weapons as we just heard, the accrual and integration of state-of-the-art technologies, rethinking command and 

control relationships and their enabling architectures, the rectification of the armaments research and development system, and a 

host of institutional reforms, some of which I will touch on very 

briefly. 

But this reform program is also very impressive in terms of 

scale. And in terms of scale, I’m not talking merely about the 2.5 

million people who are in the PLA today. The scale of what China’s 

top military leadership hopes to achieve is measured as well in 

terms of the intellectual, corporate, professional, and conceptual 

leaps that this massive defense establishment is being asked to 

make. 

The officers and soldiers of the PLA are being told that business 

as usual will not suffice, that the old paradigms are bankrupt, and 

that entrenched local interests must and parochial equities be cast 

aside in order to bring the PLA into the 21st century. 

What’s driving all of this? Very simply two basic types of assessments that we do here in the U.S. as well, a capabilities-based assessment and a contingency-based assessment. 

Very briefly, the capabilities-based assessment is that after 

studying military operations by foreign militaries over the last 15 

and 20 years, the PLA leadership has simply decided that they are 

not capable of fighting the most likely type of war that they could 

face, which they refer to as ‘‘Local Wars Under Modern High-tech 

Conditions.’’ 

Now what is a local war under modern high-tech conditions? It 

has the following characteristics according to the PLA and it will 

91 

be very familiar to many of us. It’s fought for limited political objectives, limited in geographic scope. It’s short in duration but decisive 

in political strategic outcome. A single campaign may decide an entire war. It demands a high intensity OPs tempo based on mobility, 

speed and deep reach. It employs high lethality, high technology 

weapons causing high levels of instruction, it is logistics intensive, 

information and C4ISR intensive, and it will be fought in all of the 

battlespace dimensions and critically dependent upon high speed 

logistics and joint service operations. 

Even if there were no Taiwan issue for the PLA to have to plan 

about, I would argue that the PLA would still be on the same general reform and modernization vector that it is on today simply because of this capabilities-based assessment, although the pace 

might be different. 

But the reform and modernization program is also driven by 

their contingency-based assessments, and I won’t spend a lot of 

time except just to list them. Clearly Taiwan and all that implies 

for a potential confrontation with the U.S. but also concerns about 

Japan, India, the South China Sea, maritime resources, border contingencies, even with North Korea. 

Of note, all of these contingencies are maritime and maritime 

aerospace focused and intensive, and this is the battlespace dimension in which the PLA is currently and historically the weakest; 

hence, the emphasis that the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force is getting. 

But as I wrap up this little section on contingencies, I would 

point out something that the Members of this Commission know, 

but which is always worth pointing out. It’s simply this: After more 

than two decades of reform and opening up, China’s economic center of gravity has shifted from deep in the interior where it was 

protected from an anticipated Soviet invasion to its gold coast. 

From Dalian in the north to Hainan in the South, China’s economic 

center of gravity is on the coast, and China has not faced a littoral 

and maritime threat of this magnitude regardless of who they 

think the enemy is in many, many decades. 

So they almost certainly would have to be on the vector they are 

on today. So what are they doing about this? Well, there is simply 

no road map or precedent in the PLA’s past for what China’s military leaders are seeking to achieve for its future. 

And indeed the PLA itself used the term ‘‘transformation’’ quite 

a few years before we did here in Washington to talk about the end 

state. Almost nine years ago in order to begin to accrue over time 

the capability to fight the next possible war, Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, put forth the ‘‘Two Transformations’’ line for army building, which says that the Chinese 

armed forces will undergo a metamorphasis from an army preparing to fight local wars under ordinary conditions to an army 

preparing to fight local war under modern high tech conditions, 

and second, from an army based on quantity to an army based on 

quality. And a corollary that usually accompanies this formulation 

is that the PLA will metamorphasize from being personnel intensive to science and technology intensive. 

Now, if you were to find three words that you could use to analyze everything going on in the PLA today, it would be these. First 

92 

weapons, second doctrines and third institutions. Weapons, doctrines and institutions. 

Of these three pillars of PLA modernization, clearly it’s weapons 

that gets the lion’s share of attention among analysts, and in the 

domestic press and foreign media for various reasons. Without 

question, it’s critically important to understand where the PLA is 

going in terms of weapons. 

But at the same time, it’s not the whole story. Military professionals understand there is simply no straight line from the acquisition of a new weapons system to a fielded capability that can be 

employed effectively. So we have to take a look at doctrine. We 

have to take a look at institutional reform. 

And so in some concluding comments, let me just quickly go over 

some of the institutional reforms that the PLA is undergoing, 

which I find really impressive. 

I might add that of all of the pillars of the PLA modernization, 

it’s these institutional reforms that are very transparent. They are 

not secret. You spend enough time reading the Chinese newspapers, you’ll understand just about everything going on in the way 

of institutional reform, at least on paper. 

First, personnel reforms—the critical link. The PLA leadership 

understands that personnel reforms are the cornerstone of its 

transformation and it’s one of its greater challenges. Officer accession policies are changing. In order to fight the high tech war of 

the future, the PLA needs a new high tech officer and they’re trying to institute programs to get just such an officer. 

They are establishing on campus officer recruitment programs. 

They have a National Defense Education Scholarship program, and 

they’re aggressively trying to recruit into the officer corps high tech 

students with graduate degrees and even post-doctoral degrees. 

They are taking a very critical step in creating a new and professional non-commissioned officer corps, very critical for the capabilities of the PLA on the ground, and they are doing this in order to 

compensate for the recent decision a few years ago to reduce mandatory conscription down to 24 months and all that that entails for 

interrupting its training cycle. So a new NCO corps. 

A new officer personnel management system. The new officer 

personnel management system is giving much more professional 

military education to officers at every level, platoon leaders, company commanders, and regimental commanders are all getting precommand training. 

We now have stabilization of assignments. We have minimum 

terms of assignment, maximum terms of assignment, in order to 

make sure that critical units are filled with qualified—— 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. I’ve got to ask you to summarize it up, if you 

could. 

Dr. FINKELSTEIN. We could go through various other organizational reforms, the rectification of unit sizes, divisions down to brigades, flotillas being transformed into naval task forces, and military region air forces being re-looked now as to whether or not 

they’re actually effective. These things will change. 

At the end of the day, we’d also talk about doctrine where in 

1999 an entire generation of operational guidance was thrown 

away and a new series, a new large corpus of operational doctrine 

93 

was issued to the PLA, basically changing its footing from combined arms, static operations to joint operations and a more mobile 

stance. Sustainability and logistics, the critical key link of the PLA 

and a historical challenge for them is being given a tremendous 

amount of attention. 

So let me just say in conclusion that the PLA is demonstrating 

that it is a learning organization. They know what’s wrong with 

the PLA. They’re working to make the necessary adjustments. And 

it’s likely going to take many years for the PLA to turn its aspirations into reality. I always like to point out that it took the U.S. 

military from about 1974 to 1990 to transform itself into the fighting force that conducted operations in Desert Storm. It takes time. 

And those of us in the armed forces who lived through that 

metamorphasis understand all too well that it was a process that 

was slow, painful and dislocating for many. It would be a mistake 

to overestimate the ability of the PLA to enable all of its aspirations in the near term. At the same time, it would be equally mistaken to dismiss their ability to achieve their goals over the long 

haul. Steady, objective, empirical research by specialists is necessary more than ever to attempt to track the progress that’s being 

made in all of these three pillars of PLA modernization. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thanks a lot. Dr. Medeiros. 

STATEMENT OF EVAN S. MEDEIROS, PH.D.


ASSOCIATE POLITICAL SCIENTIST, THE RAND CORPORATION 


Mr. MEDEIROS. Thank you. I want to begin by thanking Chairman Robinson, Vice Chairman D’Amato, and the two Co-Chairmen 

for today’s session, Commissioners Ellsworth and Wortzel, for inviting me to speak today before the Commission. 

I’ve been asked to speak about the capabilities of China’s defense 

industries, the part of the Chinese economy that’s devoted to the 

production of weapon systems and related technologies, and in 

many ways, this issue of China’s defense industrial capabilities 

builds on the presentation of my colleague Richard Fisher. Both 

topics inform our assessments of the relative threat posed by Chinese military modernization. 

The capabilities of China’s defense industries have received far 

too little attention among the international community of China 

watchers in recent years. 

Important changes have occurred since the late 1990s and these 

clearly deserve closer scrutiny. So let me begin by giving you my 

provisional bottom line on China’s defense industries. In the last 

five years, China’s defense industry has become far more productive than in past decades. Gone are the days of widespread inefficiency and a paucity of innovation in defense production. 

Chinese defense firms have improved their R&D techniques, production processes and thus the quality of their output. These improvements have been gradual and incremental, but they can be 

expected to continue to accumulate in the future, assuming the 

Chinese economy continues growing. This is a critical assumption 

in any assessment of military modernization. 

Let me be crystal clear about my argument. China’s defense industry has not been completely renovated and is not now churning 

out global state-of-the-art weapons systems on par with major 

94 

Western nations. Progress has been mixed across the defense industry and numerous systematic weaknesses remain. 

These continued problems should not be discounted. Rather my 

argument to this Commission is that it’s high time to revisit the 

conventional wisdom about the capabilities of China’s defense industrial complex. The focus of current research needs to include the 

gradual improvements and the current progress within China’s defense industrial complex. 

Over the last 20 years, one of the most prominent themes and 

consistent conclusions among international research on China’s defense industrial complex has been the focus on the weaknesses and 

the limitations on China’s defense production capabilities. 

A new critical look at this issue is needed. The words of General 

Li Jinai, the Head of the China’s General Armaments Department, 

uniquely testify to the importance of revisiting this topic. Quote: 

‘‘There has been a marked improvement in national defense scientific research and in building of weapons and equipment. The 

past five years has been the best period of development in the 

country’s history.’’ Now let me outline some of the specific aspects 

of the overall trends. First of all, there have been some key policy 

changes implemented in recent years. In the late 1990s, for example, the government started to increase its funding for weapons 

procurement. From 1990 to 2002, the official defense budget allocation for weapons procurement grew from 5 billion RMB to 57.3 billion RMB. That’s about a 1,000 percent increase over a 12-year period. 

These increases are twice the rate of growth of the official overall 

defense budget. Also, the share of the budget devoted to weapons 

procurement increased from 16.3 percent in 1990 to 33.8 percent by 

2002. But increases in funding for weapons procurement are just 

one part of the story. 

An equally important aspect is the fact that the government finally adopted reforms, which indicate a recognition of the depth of 

the problems in China’s defense industrial system and the failures 

of past approaches. Beginning in the spring of 1998, China’s leadership initiated a new series of policies to reform the operation of the 

defense procurement system at the government level and, second, 

to restructure defense industries at the enterprise level of operations. 

These policies initiated institutional changes in the management 

of China’s defense industry in a way that outstrips past efforts in 

both scope and depth. These reforms also importantly began to influence incentive structures within the defense industry. 

In addition, in my testimony, I’ve highlighted other factors that 

have influenced the ability of China’s defense industries to improve 

their production capabilities. 

How have these policy changes manifested themselves? How do 

we know that any of these policy changes adopted in the late 1990s 

have been important? Well, I think there are a few important indicators to examine. 

Number one, the improvements are reflected in the improving financial situation of major defense enterprises within China and the 

deployment of new generation of weapons systems. In 2003, the 

overall revenue of China’s defense industry was reported as grow­

95 

ing by 18 percent while the total sales volume of manufactured 

goods and the added industrial output value grew by 25 percent 

and 20 percent respectively. 

In 2000, Chinese defense industry officials noted that during that 

year for the first time the entire defense industry as an aggregate 

broke even for the first time. In past years, they used to run massive deficits in the range of three to five billion dollars per year. 

But these changes in China’s defense industry are evident not 

only in the gradual improvement of the financial health of the defense industry but also in the production of a variety of new weapon systems. 

In particular, in the last three to four years, one of China’s key 

shipyards has built four new 7,000-ton destroyers based on stealthy 

designs and with improved air defense and anti-submarine capability. The serial production of these modern vessels is a first for 

China’s shipbuilding industry. The production of these four vessels 

also importantly utilized advanced modular production techniques 

that facilitated quick and efficient construction. 

Other shipyards in China are producing newly designed conventional and nuclear submarines as well as a variety of auxiliary vessels for China’s navy. China’s aerospace industry has improved its 

ability to serial produce ballistic missiles. According to the 2003 

U.S. Defense Department report on Chinese military capabilities, 

China now deploys around 450 SRBM short-range ballistic missiles 

opposite Taiwan. 

This estimate reflects an increase in annual production of those 

SRBMs from 50 percent a year to 75 percent a year. Changes within China’s defense electronics and IT sectors has also facilitated the 

modernization of China’s C4I systems. The Chinese military is in 

the midst of a C4I revolution characterized by the wholesale shift 

over the last 20 years from a relatively insecure communications 

to digital secure communications via fiber optic cable, satellite, 

microwave and enhanced high frequency radio. 

These successes are important and they deserve increased attention. However, it’s also important to keep in mind that these improvements in China’s defense industrial capabilities have not been 

universal. Many of the classic structural weaknesses persist in China’s defense industry. Much more consolidation and rationalization 

needs to occur to make the majority of China’s defense enterprises 

efficient, innovative and perhaps even profitable. 

As with economic reform, in China’s overall economy in the last 

20 years or so, the successes in China’s defense industry in the last 

few years have been gradual, uneven and mixed. 

So, in conclusion, I would argue that a new paradigm is needed 

to analyze China’s defense industrial capabilities. Much more research is needed to track these trends and most importantly to understand how fast and why these improvements have been occurring. 

Further research is needed to determine the relative impact of 

the recent organizational reforms that I outlined previously on the 

output and operations of China’s defense enterprises. Also, better 

metrics are needed to measure the relative benefit of civil military 

integration on the capabilities of China’s defense enterprises. 

96 

As the PLA shifts away from purchasing complete weapon systems from foreign suppliers to requesting technology transfers from 

them, China’s defense production capabilities will become a critical 

factor in the PLA’s long-term effort to renovate its force structure. 

Thus, the issue of China’s defense industry is a crucial and increasingly important variable in the complex and evolving equation 

of PLA modernization. Thank you, and I’m willing to answer any 

questions related to my testimony. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Evan S. Medeiros, Ph.D.


Associate Political Scientist, The RAND Corporation


Analyzing China’s Defense Industries 

and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization * 

I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Robinson, Vice-Chairman D’Amato 

and the two Co-Chairmen for today’s session, Commissioners Ellsworth and Wortzel, 

for inviting me to speak today to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. I commend the Commission for holding today’s hearing on trends in Chinese military modernization and the implications for cross-Strait political-military 

relations. These are issues that have a direct bearing on U.S. national security interests as well as those of U.S. friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s 

rise as an economic and military power in Asia raises numerous questions about the 

future prospects for stability in the region. These are questions well worth dedicating significant time and resources to answer. 

I have been asked to speak on the capabilities of China’s defense industry—the 

part of the Chinese economy involved in the production of weapons systems and related military technologies. This is an issue that The RAND Corporation has lately 

devoted effort to researching, especially in light of the organizational changes within 

the Chinese military and the continued growth of the Chinese economy in recent 

years. The capabilities of China’s defense industry has received far too little attention among the international community of China watchers. Important changes 

have occurred since the late 1990s, and these deserve closer scrutiny. 

Overall Trends 

In the last five years, China’s defense industry has become far more productive 

than in past decades. The defense industrial reforms implemented in the late 1990s, 

unlike the one adopted in previous years, were substantial and have positively influenced the quality of China’s defense industrial output. Gone are the days of widespread inefficiency and a paucity of innovation in defense production. Chinese defense firms have improved their R&D techniques, production processes and, thus, 

the quality of their output. These improvements have been gradual and incremental, 

but they can be expected to continue to accumulate in the future, assuming the Chinese economy continues growing. China’s defense firms produce a wide range of increasingly advanced weapons that, in the short-term, are relevant to a possible conflict over Taiwan as well as China’s long-term military presence in Asia. 

To be sure, my argument is not that China’s defense industry has been completely renovated and is now churning out global state-of-the-art weapons systems 

on par with major Western nations. Progress has been mixed across the defense industry and numerous systematic weaknesses remain. These continued problems 

should not be discounted. Rather, my argument to this Commission is that it is high 

time to revisit the conventional wisdom about China’s defense industrial complex; 

the focus of current research needs to include the gradual improvements and future 

progress of China’s defense industrial complex. Over the last 20 years, one of the 

most prominent and consistent conclusions drawn from research on China’s defense 

industrial complex has been the weaknesses and limitations of Chinese defense pro­

* This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record 

testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The 

RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective 

solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. 

RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 

97 

duction capabilities.1 A new look at this critical issue is needed. The words of General Li Jinai, the head of China’s General Armaments Department, testify to the 

salience of revisiting this topic, ‘‘there has been a marked improvement in national 

defense scientific research and in building of weapons and equipment. The past five 

years has been the best period of development in the country’s history.’’ 2 

What is China’s Defense Industry? 

China’s defense industry is comprised of 11 state-owned enterprises that, in one

form or another, have historically always been involved in production of military 

goods. These firms cover the general industrial areas of nuclear affairs, aerospace, 

aviation, shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics. The companies are: 

• China National Nuclear Group Corporation (www.cnnc.com.cn) • China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation 


(www.cnecc.com) 
 • China Aerospace Science and Technology Group Corporation 


(www.cascgroup.com.cn) 
 • China Aerospace Science and Industry Group Corporation (www.casic.com.cn) 

• China Aviation Industry Group Corporation I (www.avic1.com.cn) 

• China Aviation Industry Group Corporation II (www.avic2.com.cn) 

• China State Shipbuilding Group Corporation (www.cssc.net.cn) 

• China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (www.csic.com.cn) 

• China North Industries Group Corporation (www.norincogroup.com.cn) 

• China South Industries Group Corporation (www.chinasouth.com.cn) 

• China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (www.cetc.com.cn) 

Currently, these firms are not controlled by the Chinese military. Rather they are 

civilian entities under the authority of the State Council and its subordinate organ, 

the State Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense 

(COSTIND, Guofang Keji Gongye Weiyuanhui). These firms are contracted by the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to produce military items. China’s defense industrial firms are completely different entities from the PLA-owned companies and factories (known as jundui qiye or military enterprises). The latter were set up and 

run by PLA authorities in the 1980s and 1990s until Jiang Zemin forced the PLA 

to divest from commercial business activities in 1999.3 

Since the early 1980s, China defense industrial firms have diversified away from 

exclusive military production to producing civilian goods for domestic and international markets. This was an important part of Deng’s Xiaoping’s economic reform 

program which sought to lessen the defense industry’s heavy reliance on government support. Current estimates of the amount of civilian production in each of the 

eleven large defense corporation ranges from 65% to 90% depending on the particular firm. Thus, even though these enterprises are officially considered by the 

government as defense industrial firms, they are also primarily involved in producing civilian goods and services, and thus are intertwined with China’s huge civilian economy. In addition, there are a growing number of firms that do not belong 

to the eleven defense-industrial conglomerates (especially in the information technology (IT) sector) which produce goods under contract for the military. The line between defense industrial firms and civilian firms in China is increasingly blurred, 

which complicates analysis of the performance of China’s defense industrial base.4 

Salience of Examining China’s Defense Industry 

The salience of researching China’s defense industrial capability stems from several considerations which are directly relevant to today’s hearing. First, Chinese 

leaders are unlikely to have a long-term policy of relying primarily on imported 

weapons. The ability of China’s defense industries to produce modern weapons, 

therefore, will be an important determinant of China’s future military power. Second, understanding China’s defense industrial capabilities is critical to answering 

questions about whether China has the ability to translate its growing economic re1 Bates Gill, ‘‘Chinese Military Technical Developments: The Record From Western Assessments, 1979–1999,’’ as published in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, Seeing Truth 

from Facts, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2001.) 2 Wang Wenjie, ‘‘Delegate Li Jinai Emphasizes: Grasp Tightly the Important Strategic Opportunity, Accelerate the Development By Leaps of Our Army’s Weapons and Equipment,’’ 

Jiefangjun Bao, 8 March 2003, p. 1. 3 James Mulvenon, Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security, (Santa Monica, 

CA: The RAND Corporation, 1997). 4 For example, according to one Chinese report, military industrial enterprises produced 

780,000 automobiles in 2003, about 19 percent of China’s total motor vehicle production. ‘‘China’s Defense Sector Expands in 2003,’’ Xinhua (english), 5 January 2003. 

98 

sources into building a modern military.5 Third, China’s defense output serves as 

an indicator of national technological progress. China’s ability to overcome some of 

the perennial weakness of its defense industrial complex, such as systems integration and serial production of high-tech weapons platforms, may serve as a sign of 

a broader modernization in China’s science and technology base. 

Past Portrait of China’s Defense Industry 

For the past twenty years, the conventional wisdom has been that China’s defense 

industry was broken, decaying and unable to meet the needs of a military in desperate need of modernization. For much of that time period, that assessment was 

correct. China’s defense industry exhibited numerous weaknesses at all levels of the 

system, from government procurement to factory production. At the level of government procurement, decisions about which company would produce a particular item 

were made by administrative fiat or ministerial bargaining rather through competitive bidding based on the relative capabilities of various manufacturers. As a result, 

defense producers had little financial interest in improving the quality of the weapons systems or the efficiency with which they manufactured or designed them. In 

such a regime, the ability to produce a quality product had a minimal relationship 

to the orders received or the profits generated.6 

In addition to the lack of financial incentives for innovation, China’s Soviet-designed approach to industrial organization also inhibited the supply of innovation. 

Under the Soviet model, R&D institutes were organizationally separate from the actual manufacturers. This feature was common, though not universal, in China’s defense industry during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, a hierarchical organizational structure discouraged the horizontal knowledge flows that are critical to technological progress.7 This knowledge flow problem was undoubtedly exacerbated by 

the extreme secrecy associated with defense production in China. 

Other major problems exhibited by China’s defense enterprises included excessive 

capacity, redundant personnel, inflexibility in hiring and firing, loss of quality personnel to the non-state-owned sector, incorrectly priced inputs, poor management 

practices, and the inefficient geographic distribution of industry due to a 1960s and 

1970s policy of relocating defense firms to remote interior areas known as China’s 

‘‘Third Line’’ (disanxian). 

The Chinese government’s efforts in the 1980s and most of the 1990s to overcome 

these weaknesses was largely ineffective. Beijing relied on essentially two strategies: defense conversion and institutional reorganization. Both strategies, especially 

their poor implementation, failed to reform the operations of China’s defense firms 

to make them more innovative and efficient. Defense conversion was a largely troubled process for most Chinese firms which found it difficult to convert easily their 

production infrastructure to producing civilian, commercial goods. Defense enterprises were hampered by legal constraints and difficulties in attracting foreign partners who could provide new capital, know-how and technologies. These problems 

were further exacerbated by the weaknesses in technology absorption capabilities, 

project management, and the technical skills of the labor force. As a result, many 

civilian goods produced by defense firms were low quality, uncompetitive and thus 

generated few profits. 

Similar to China’s experience with defense conversion, institutional re-organization was largely a cosmetic and ineffective pathway to substantial and sustained reform of China’s decaying defense production capabilities. This approach involved a 

lot of changing of names and shuffling of organizational responsibilities but few of 

the systematic consolidation and rationalization measures needed to increase efficiency and bolster innovation. 

The weaknesses of China’s defense production capabilities over the last 20 years 

are reflected by two major indicators: (1) the technological backwardness of many 

5 China’s willingness to devote national resources to military modernization in light of pressing social and development burdens (e.g. unemployment, banking reform, SOE reform, etc.) is 

a separate but equally important question. 6 See John Frankenstein, ‘‘China’s Defense Industries: A New Course?’’ in James C. Mulvenon 

and Richard H. Yang (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa 

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1999.) Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein (eds.), 

Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, 1997; John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, ‘‘Current and Future Challenges Facing 

Chinese Defense Industries,’’ The China Quarterly, June 1996, p. 394–427. 7 Wendy Frieman, ‘‘China’s Defence Industries,’’ The Pacific Review, 1999; John Frankenstein 

and Bates Gill, ‘‘Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries,’’ op. cit.; 

Frieman, Wendy, ‘‘Arms Procurement in China: Poorly Understood Processes and Unclear Results,’’ in Eric Arnett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and 

Iran, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1997.) 

99 

of the systems produced in the 1980s and 1990s, and the long R&D and production 

timelines for most indigenously built weapons platforms; and (2) China’s extensive 

purchases of major weapons systems from foreign countries. The history of China’s 

defense industry is replete with examples of weapon systems with severe technological weaknesses and limitations. While many tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, surface ships, submarines, and air-to-air missiles 

entered service in the PLA since 1980, for the most part these new designs have 

been incremental improvements on earlier versions, which in many cases trace their 

lineage back to 1950s-era Soviet technology. 

The Changing Shape of China’s Defense Industry 

In the late 1990s, the situation began to change. The government started to increase weapons procurement funding. From 1990 to 2002, the official defense budget 

allocation for weapons procurement grew from RMB 5 billion to RMB 57.3 billion. 

These increases are twice the rate of growth of the official defense budget. Also the 

share of the budget devoted to weapons procurement increased from 16.3% to 33.8% 

in this time period.8 

Beyond increased funding for weapons procurement, the government finally 

adopted reforms which indicate a recognition of the depth of the problems in China’s 

defense industrial system and the failures of past approaches. Beginning in spring 

1998 during the 9th Meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s leadership 

initiated a new series of policies to reform the operation of the defense procurement 

system at the government-level and, second, to restructure the defense industries 

at the enterprise-level of operations. These policies initiated institutional changes in 

the management of China’s defense industry in ways that outstrip past efforts in 

both scope and depth. These reforms also importantly began to influence incentive 

structures in the defense industry. 

In March 1998, the government abolished the military-influenced Commission on 

Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), which had been 

created in 1982, and replaced it with a strictly civilian agency of the same name 

but under the control of the State Council. The old COSTIND, which reported to 

both the State Council and the military, had been very heavily involved in decisions 

on R&D and the purchase of military equipment. The restructured COSTIND’s responsibilities, resources and authority were substantially circumscribed. It no longer 

has a dominant role in decisions about PLA acquisitions of new military equipment 

or the direct management of defense industry enterprises. The restructured 

COSTIND, a shell of its former incarnation, is generally meant to function as the 

administrative and regulatory agency for China’s major defense enterprises. 

The second major organizational reform, following the ‘‘civilianization’’ of 

COSTIND, was the creation in April 1998 of a new general department of the PLA 

known as the General Armaments Department (GAD—Zong Zhuangbei Bu).9 GAD 

assumed the responsibilities for military procurement of the old COSTIND combined 

with the roles and missions of other parts of the General Staff and General Logistics 

Departments involved in weapons procurement. The responsibilities of GAD include 

the life cycle management of the PLA’s weapons systems (from R&D to retirement) 

and running China’s weapons testing, evaluation and training bases.10 

The significance of the ‘‘civilianization’’ of COSTIND and the creation of GAD is 

twofold. First, these policy changes centralized China’s military procurement system. Previously, responsibilities for PLA purchases were divided between numerous 

civilian and military organizations, each with distinct and conflicting interests. For 

example, COSTIND’s former predominant influence in this process produced numerous inefficiencies. Second, the 1998 reforms separated the builders from the buyers. 

This organizational change further rationalized the procurement system and aimed 

to reduce conflicts of interest and corruption. GAD represents the PLA interests 

whereas COSTIND, as a civilian agency, now mainly handles industrial planning 

and the administrative affairs of defense firms. 

In addition to these large organizational reforms, the government also adopted 

policies to streamline the weapons procurement process. In October 2002, Jiang 

Zemin signed an order promulgating and implementing a new set of regulations on 

military equipment procurement (Zhonghua Renmin Jiefangjun Zhuangbei Caigou 

8 ‘‘Chinese Defence Industry: Chinese Puzzle,’’ Jane’s Defence Review, 21 January 2004. 9 The name of this organization has also been translated as the ‘‘General Equipment Department’’; though the Chinese use the translation General Armaments Department. 10 For an analysis of the GAD see Harlan Jencks, ‘‘The General Armaments Department,’’ in 

James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, The PLA as an Organization v1.0, (Santa Monica, 

CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003.) 

100 

Tiaoli).11 These new regulations are meant to standardize, unify, and legalize the 

weapons procurement process.12 The new regulations are also meant to accelerate 

the establishment of a competitive bidding system for PLA contracts, which was discussed in 1998 when GAD was formed.13 The degree of their actual implementation 

in the procurement system is unclear, however. 

Enterprise-Level Reforms 

Beyond procurement reform at the government level of operations, Beijing in 1998

also adopted far-reaching policies to alter the relationship between the government 

and defense enterprises to bolster incentives for efficiency and innovation. The central government’s main goals were to separate the government from enterprise operations, to make them more market-oriented by exposing them to the pressure of 

competition, to provide harder budget constraints, to make them less reliant on 

state subsidies, and to lessen the classic social burdens associated with the workunit (danwei) system.

There are preliminary signs these policies have been effective. In some defense 

sectors (such as aerospace and shipbuilding), limited competition over entire systems, key sub-systems or parts has emerged or intensified. Competition in the sale 

of civilian goods produced by some defense firms has been most obvious and is likely 

improving the efficiency and modernization of their production processes. Defense 

enterprises have also benefited from the formation and exploitation of partnerships

with civilian universities and research institutes to improve educational training 

relevant to defense technology development. This is particularly true in the IT sector. A limited amount of defense industry rationalization has occurred in recent 

years as well, though much more is needed given the large inefficiencies and redundancy still prevalent in the defense sector. Factories have either been closed down 

or transferred to provincial authorities. According to one source, 20% of the entire

defense industry’s workforce (estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million) have been laid 

off.14 Furthermore, COSTIND and GAD have been effective at promoting R&D and 

production cooperation among defense enterprises located in various provinces. In 

the past, certain defense industrial sectors (such as the aviation industry) extensively relied on single source suppliers which contributed to inefficiency, redundancy, and high degree of insularity. 

Growing access by Chinese firms to foreign weapons technologies (i.e. know-how 

and production technologies) is an additional variable. It has facilitated improvements in Chinese defense production capabilities. Aviation co-production with the 

Russians have helped Chinese aviation enterprises expand their knowledge of manufacturing fourth generation aircraft. The Israelis have provided assistance with

avionics and air-to-air missiles; and the French have assisted with the development 

of air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles. 

Some defense industrial sectors (such as shipbuilding and aviation) have also benefited from the access to foreign investment and foreign commercial technologies facilitated by joint-venture business activities. They have leveraged this commercial 

cooperation with foreign firms to renovate their production infrastructure and to 

modernize their operations. Other reforms worth watching include the use of capital

markets in China and Hong Kong to generate funds which could conceivably be used 

for defense projects; 15 and reform of the ownership structures of the large 11 defense industrial enterprises to increase incentives for efficiency and innovation. 

Status Report on Defense Industry Output 

The above reforms combined with the sustained increase in procurement funding

has led to a leaner and more capable defense industry in China. These improvements are reflected in the improving financial situation of major defense enterprises 

as well as the deployment of new generations of weapons systems. In 2003, the over11 In 1990, the Central Military Commission issued ‘‘Work Regulations for the Management

of Weapons and Equipment.’’ Since then, additional regulations have proliferated. Chinese 

media announced the promulgation of the new rules but have not made them publicly available.

‘‘Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin Signs Order Promulgating and Implementing Chinese People’s Liberation Army Equipment Procurement Regulations,’’ Xinhua, 1 November 2002. 12 For research on China’s past procurement processes see Ravinder Pal Singh, (eds.), Arms 

Procurement Decision Making: China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea and Thailand, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 

1998.) 13 ‘‘Government Procurement Again Recommended at NPC,’’ Xinhua, 8 March 1999; 

Jiefangjun Bao, 9 February 1999, p. 6. 14 ‘‘Chinese Defence Industry: Chinese Puzzle,’’ Jane’s Defence Review, 21 January 2004. 15 Currently, over 30 Chinese firms linked to the defense industry are listed on Chinese stock 

exchanges. 

101 

all revenue of the defense industry was projected to grow by 18%; while ‘‘the total 

sales volume of manufactured goods and added industrial output value’’ were projected to grow by 25% and 20%, respectively.16 COSTIND officials declared last year 

that in 2002 the defense industry (as an aggregate) broke even for the first time. 

By contrast, in the 1990s, China’s defense industry annually ran deficits in excess 

of RMB 3–5 billion (US$375–$604 million).17 While these are official Chinese statistics of unclear reliability, they offer a general guide to the improving economic condition of China’s defense industry as a whole. However, the economic performance 

of the 11 enterprises in the defense industry vary considerably. Some generate significant profits while others accrue major losses. 

The changes in China’s defense industry are most apparent in the military output 

of key defense enterprises.18 In the last two years alone, Chinese defense factories 

have produced a variety of new weapons systems based on novel Chinese designs. 

Many are highly capable weapons platforms. The development of these weapons importantly reflects improvements in R&D techniques, design methods and production 

processes, especially compared to the 1980s and 1990s. Not only are the new systems more advanced, but China’s production of them is faster and possibly more efficient. 

China’s shipbuilding industry has been at the forefront of this trend. In the last 

3–4 years, the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai has built four new 7,000-ton destroyers based on stealthy designs and with improved air defense and anti-submarine capabilities. The serial production of these modern naval vessels is a first for China’s 

shipbuilding industry. The construction of these destroyers occurred at an unprecedented rate compared to the two Luhu destroyers China built during in the entire 

decade of the 1990s. The production of these four vessels has also importantly utilized advanced, modular production techniques that facilitate quick and efficient 

construction. Their designs may also facilitate easy modernization of their weapons 

capabilities in the future. According to news reports, an adjacent shipyard in Shanghai is also producing four new frigates based on a new design and with improved 

weapons capabilities.19 Other shipyards are producing newly designed conventional 

and nuclear submarines as well as a variety of auxiliary vessels for the Chinese 

Navy. According to the 2003 Department of Defense (DOD) report on Chinese military capabilities, China’s Song-class conventional submarine ‘‘has several features 

that point to a major shift in diesel submarine design philosophy’’ such as the use 

of a skewed propeller. 

China’s aerospace industry has improved its ability to serial produce short-range 

ballistic missiles (SRBMs). According to the 2003 DOD report, China has now deployed around 450 SRBMs opposite Taiwan. This estimate reflects an increase in 

the annual production rate of SRBMs from 50 per year to about 75 per year. The 

accuracy and lethality of these systems is improving as well. China is moving towards satellite-aided navigation for some SRBMs which would boost substantially 

their accuracy. Parallel research on new conventional warheads for these missile 

systems would increase their destructiveness. China is continuing to make progress 

on the development of a land attack cruise missile. The aerospace industry has also 

built anti-ship cruise missiles comparable to the U.S. Harpoon. The capability of 

China’s aerospace industry is further evident in the production of higher quality satellites. In recent years, the military started shifting from relying on state-owned civilian satellites to a constellation of military-dedicated satellites for navigation, communications and reconnaissance. 

The modern capabilities of China’s defense electronics and IT sectors has facilitated the modernization of PLA’s command, control, communications, computers and 

intelligence (C4I) systems. The Chinese military is in the midst of a C4I revolution, 

characterized by the wholesale shift over the last twenty years from relatively insecure analog communications to digital, secure communications via fiber optic cable, 

satellite, microwave, and enhanced high-frequency radio. Specifically, the PLA has: 

• laid thousands of kilometers of buried fiber optic cable connected by modern 

switches and routers, extending high-speed, secure communications to nearly 

every unit in the force; 

16 ‘‘China’s Defense Sector Expands in 2003,’’ Xinhua (english), 5 January 2003. 17 ‘‘Chinese Defence Industry: Chinese Puzzle,’’ Jane’s Defence Review, 21 January 2004. 18 For details on improvements in PLA capabilities see, Annual Report On The Military Power 

Of The People’s Republic Of China, U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant 

to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, 28 July 2003. 19 Yihong Chang, ‘‘China Launches Second Guided-Missile Destroyer,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 November 2003. 

102


• deployed large computer network intranets on this fiber backbone, dedicated to

operational command and control, training, logistics, finances, and education, 

among other subjects; 

In the future, the PLA will continue to build an infrastructure that is increasingly 

digital, automated, encrypted, faster, secure, and wider in terms of bandwidth.20 

The pace and depth of these advances cannot be explained by traditional Chinese 

defense-industrial dynamics, but instead spring from a paradigm known as the ‘‘digital triangle,’’ which resembles a classic techno-nationalist strategy, with high-level 

bureaucratic coordination and significant state funding. The three vertices of the

‘‘digital triangle’’ are (1) China’s booming commercial information technology companies, (2) the state R&D institute and funding infrastructure, and (3) the military. 

For the PLA, the ‘‘digital triangle’’ offers great gains in some crucial information 

technology areas, but the operational impact is uncertain. The introduction of secure 

communications, for instance, has likely improved communications and operational 

security, but the impact of these systems on actual warfighting performance cannot 

be known with absolute certainty prior to conflict.21 

Uneven Progress 

These improvements in China’s defense industrial capabilities have not been universal. Many of the classic structural weaknesses persist in parts of the defense industry. Much more consolidation and rationalization needs to occur to make the majority of China’s defense enterprises efficient, innovative and, perhaps, even profitable. As with the economic reform of much of China’s overall economy in the last

twenty years, the successes in the defense industry have been gradual, uneven, and 

mixed. 

Some of the best performers among defense enterprises have been the two aerospace conglomerates, the two shipbuilding conglomerates, and defense electronics 

firms. Nuclear industry and ordnance industry enterprises have long suffered losses. 

China’s aviation industry, for example, has experienced some successes in recent

years with the production and deployment of military platforms such as the JH– 

7 (FBC–1), the J–10 (F–10) multi-role aircraft and the Su–27 project with the Russians. Yet, the first two planes have been under development for 20 years. In addition, China aviation industry still can not produce a turbo-fan engine or advanced 

fire-control systems for its newest fighters. Many of the aviation platforms China 

is now building and deploying still utilize foreign imports for the most crucial subsystems such as propulsion, avionics and fire-control. In the aerospace industry, 

Chinese firms have been slow to produce a highly capable air-defense system, relying on imports form Russia. China’s most capable naval air-defense system under 

development, the HQ–9, is a Chinese version of a Russian system. As many scholars 

have noted before, systems integration remains a weaknesses for Chinese defense 

enterprises, though the advances noted above suggest that progress is being made

on this issue. 

Conclusions and Implications 

A new paradigm is needed to analyze China’s defense industrial capabilities. The 

PLA has increased funding for weapons procurement from domestic defense enterprises. At the same time, the government initiated a slate of unique reforms to renovate this long-moribund and decaying part of China’s economy. The newest defense 

industrial reforms, in contrast to the multiple failed efforts of the 1980s and 1990s, 

have brought about changes in institutions and incentives at both the governmentand the enterprise-levels of operation in China’s defense industrial system. These 

policy changes have produced successes as the financial health of defense firms improves. Certain defense industrial conglomerates are no longer operating at a net 

annual loss, according to official numbers. Chinese defense factories have begun producing a modicum of new weapons systems and platforms that represent qualitative 

improvements from past years. The truncated production cycles and use of more 

modern production processes are equally important advances in defense industrial 

capabilities. 

Much more research is needed to track these trends and, most importantly, to understand how fast and why these improvements are occurring. To be sure, some of 

these trends are a result of the fact the government is throwing more money at the 

problem. As procurement funding goes up, key problems, such as resources constraints and bottlenecks, get resolved. Similar phenomena have occurred in defense 

20 James Mulvenon, ‘‘The Digital Triangle: A New Defense Industrial Paradigm,’’ in Kent H. 

Butts and Edward L. Hughes, Economics and National Security: The Case of China, (Carlisle, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2002.) 21 James Mulvenon, ‘‘The Digital Triangle,’’ op. cit. 

103 

industries around the world. Yet, further research is needed to determine the relative influence of the recent organizational reforms on the output and operations of 

China’s defense enterprises. Also, better metrics are needed to measure the relative 

benefit of civil-military integration on the capabilities of defense enterprises. 

China’s defense industries will increasingly play a pivotal role in the future direction and military competence of the PLA. As the PLA shifts away from purchasing 

complete weapons systems from foreign suppliers to requesting technology transfers, 

China’s defense production capabilities will become a critical factor in the PLA’s 

long-term effort to renovate its force structure. Thus, the issue of China’s defense 

industry is a crucial and increasingly important variable in the complex and evolving equation of PLA modernization. 

Panel III: Discussion, Questions and Answers 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you. I really appreciate the three of 

you. We’ve had a great overview of weapons, of how you get the 

people to use them and the doctrines to fight with those weapons 

and how you develop an indigenous war production capacity for 

modern times, and I appreciate you all doing that. 

I’m just going to move from my right to my left and give each 

of the Commissioners an opportunity to ask some questions, and 

here again there’s going to be five minutes for question and answer 

and the red light there will let you know when that five minutes 

is up. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a small 

question and a big question. I’m not sure which is which, so I’ll 

start with the small question. It seems to me that in context of the 

modernization of the Chinese forces, it’s fairly evident the Chinese 

are modernizing their forces and they are to a certain extent reflecting on the kind of network centered warfare ideas and other 

ideas that the U.S. has developed. 

I think to a certain extent they’re awfully vulnerable as a nation, 

not just the gold coast, but the fact is, they are increasingly dependent for their survival on energy supplies that have to come 

from the Middle East. So I don’t see yet—and I wonder if you’d 

comment, and maybe I’m wrong—where China can be regarded as 

anything like a super power because without the ability to protect 

its flanks, particularly its energy supplies, I think they’re a mess. 

So I’d like to get your comments first on that. 

Dr. FINKELSTEIN. If you don’t mind, I think what you’ve put your 

finger on is the basic dichotomy that is China. If you work and play 

in the Chinese military and security realm, you cannot help but be 

struck by how proactive their foreign policy is, how much of a presence they have around the world and how much real progress 

they’re making in military modernization, and I think that’s a pretty legitimate assessment. 

At the same time, you have a China that is, as you said, dependent upon energy, a net oil importer for quite some years now, that 

is becoming more and more integrated into the world economic system, that requires a lot of FDI. But even more so I would say that 

there are a good number of internal issues inside China itself that 

most don’t pay enough attention to as well. 

After 20 years of reform and opening up, the social dislocations 

attendant to economic modernization are catching up with the 

party. All of the easy fixes have been made. There are all sorts of 

reports of unrest, attacks on the party out in the countryside, vil­

104 

lages refusing to pay taxes. We have a floating population some estimate in untold millions or more. 

So what you’re putting your finger on is the basic contradiction 

that we have when we look at China, externally putting out a very 

strong face, internally a lot of problems, and the party knows that. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Let me go to the second part of my question. This may seem unlinked, but they’re linked in my head anyway. It seems to me the approach that we’re taking to deal with 

China’s military modernization of trying to convince the Europeans 

not to sell technology, while we’re selling them tons of technology, 

has its natural limits. Let’s put it that way. 

And I think we’ve already reached those natural limits in many 

respects, and I think it’s a foregone conclusion. It’s only a matter 

of how many months on which side of the ledger that China is 

going to be able to modernize its weapons systems as it wants to. 

This sort of implies then what do you do about that? Where do 

you go? Do you just build up your own capabilities? I don’t think 

we’re going to do that. But the proposition I want to put on the 

table is, don’t you then build alliances and develop assets that can 

counter those kinds of developments? 

For example, we should sell to India, for example, lots of high 

technology and weapons systems. I happen to support that idea as 

a way of counterbalancing it. That we should convince the Japanese, for example, to spend more on their defense and to expand 

the circle of their defensive capabilities. This is kind of a containment approach to what is obviously going to become a challenge 

from China. I’d like to get your comments on that. 

Mr. FISHER. Well, Commissioner Bryen, I’d like to take a stab at 

that. I find some of your arguments compelling; others I would care 

to disagree. I think that it remains imperative that the United 

States try to stop the sale of advanced specific weapon systems. If 

the PLA had succeeded in purchasing the Falcon phased array 

radar intelligence jamming system, that would have constituted an 

enormous shift in physical capability. 

Once they’d absorbed it, put it into practice, it would have made 

a very big difference. It’s a system more advanced than our airborne radar systems. And stopping that was a good deed. 

Commissioner BRYEN. We all agree on that. I think the point I 

was making is a different one—that they’re going to get there sooner or later, so let’s worry about how we’re going to deal with them 

when they get there. 

Mr. FISHER. I would definitely like us to be out in front and 

transformed and ready to go, but if we allow alliances such as the 

insipid allowance between EADS and AVIC–II indicated by the 

EADS purchase of an IPO issued by AVIC–II last October, then we 

may not win the race, we may not be able to play enough. We may 

not be able to invest fast enough to stay far enough ahead in order 

to continue to deter. 

I think we still have to make the point that even these alliances 

as they develop pose harm and that we should state that. 

Commissioner BRYEN. Anybody else on this? I think we’re still 

talking past each other. The point that I’m trying to focus on is we 

can try to do it entirely by ourselves, which will not succeed. It 

won’t succeed. We’re too far away. We have lots of problems. If we 

105 

get tied up in Iraq or in the Middle East or in Afghanistan for a 

long time, we have very limited resources. So what we need are allies. And they have to be strong ones. So those that aren’t strong 

that could be made strong is a way of getting more deterrence. 

And the whole game here is deterrence. And I think we have 

kind of a tunnel vision, and we have to have—actually, I think the 

Administration is beginning to see this and particularly with respect to India and is improving its posture in that regard—and we 

have to improve it more. That’s the point I was trying to get at. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Dreyer and, by the way, if as 

you get ready to revise any of your testimony, you want to respond 

in writing to Commissioner Bryen, we would appreciate your 

thoughts, and I’ll give you some more time to digest that. 

Commissioner DREYER. A quick question for Dr. Medeiros and 

then a less quick question for all of you. Dr. Medeiros, you’ve done 

an excellent job of describing defense industries which have been 

improving incrementally and which can be expected to continue improving. And of course you very carefully linked that continued development to the caveat of the development of the economy in general. 

I am wondering, since we also see frequently references in the 

Chinese press to serious corruption that continues to worsen Hu 

Angang is estimating that corruption reduced the GDP by 16 percent of GDP every year and it’s getting worse. Is the defense industry exempt—of course it couldn’t be entirely exempt—but is it 

doing better in terms of efficiencies than Chinese industry in general? 

It’s also an industry which I imagine has some of the problems 

that state-owned industries in general have. Could you compare it 

to the other state-owned industries? Are they managing to do a better job with corruption? Are they managing to do a better job with 

efficiency? 

Mr. MEDEIROS. Thank you. It’s a very important question but 

also a very difficult one to have specific empirical data on. Most of 

what I know about corruption in the defense industry is anecdotal. 

My understanding is that the defense industry, in particular, had 

been rife with corruption for years. The long-standing secrecy surrounding defense procurement in China likely contributed to the 

high level of corruption; there was probably very little scrutiny of 

major deals outside the military. As a result, corruption was one 

of the reasons that the procurement system was so inefficient; the 

military was forced to buy weapons systems that it didn’t need and 

often didn’t work well. 

But ultimately the point of the reforms that were adopted in 

1998, the reforms I talked about in my testimony, were to eliminate the prevalence of corruption. The most important steps included a series of reforms including the civilization of the Commission on State Technology, Science and Industry for National Defense, and the creation of the General Armaments Department. 

The point was essentially to create a situation where there were 

far fewer incentives and opportunities for corruption. These reforms also sought to standardize, legalize and regularize the procurement process and take it out of the hands of corrupt officials. 

Such reforms will take much time given the resilience of the Chi­

106 

nese bureaucracy to change. These Chinese have started to move 

in the right direction. 

The Chinese government recognizes that the defense industry 

was rife with corruption that was partly to blame for why they’ve 

had so many difficulties producing high quality weapons systems 

and they’ve sought to change that, but like with much of the Chinese economy, it’s going to take time. 

Commissioner DREYER. But at least you see it going in the correct direction? 

Mr. MEDEIROS. Well, the policies that they’ve implemented reflect a recognition of the problem and an attempt to solve it, whether or not there’s real traction there, I don’t have any empirical data 

on that per se. 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank you. And then for anybody and all 

of you, this has been a really, really interesting presentation in 

terms of the hardware and the aspirations toward better training 

and a more science and technology oriented officer corps and so on. 

But there are a couple of questions hanging out there. 

One of them is that conscription term is now shorter, as the 

weaponry gets more technologically sophisticated, and the training 

methods get more sophisticated. To what extent might this constrict the PLA’s efforts to produce a better force? A second part of 

my concern is the matter of loyalty and morale, two separate questions but interrelated. 

We’ve seen tremendous efforts to train a more loyal force. To 

what extent is this succeeding? What about a force with high morale? We’ve noticed concerns about this within Jiefangjun Bao in 

the past. I haven’t seen any recently, but that doesn’t mean they’re 

not happening. It may just mean that the government has decided 

that the paper can’t talk about them anymore. So if you would 

please address those. 

Dr. FINKELSTEIN. Let me take at least part of that and then 

leave some time for Rick and Evan. You hit the nail on the head, 

Commissioner Dreyer. Conscription used to be, as you know, I 

know you know, four years for the Air Force, Second Artillery and 

Navy and three years for the ground forces. That was the old conscription system. 

The new conscription system is 24 months for all the forces. You 

can imagine the chaos this puts a unit training regimen through. 

As we know, conscription usually takes place at the same time 

every year. 

So in order to compensate for that problem at the grass-roots 

level, that’s why this NCO corps program was put into place, and 

this is a very arcane system, but for those of us who have been out 

on the ground, I mean the NCO corps is really the key to your 

technical proficiency, to your sustained knowledge, to your ability 

to work through the conscription cycle and have people who understand what’s going on continue to move through. 

And the regulations are very public. I know you’ve probably had 

a chance to look at them or if you haven’t, you know where to get 

them. They’ve got it right. They’ve got it right. They know at least 

on paper what they need to do to create an NCO corps to have full 

30-year military careers, to help them get through this current 

training/conscription dichotomy. 

107 

And by the way, anecdotally, a lot of people ask, well, why would 

the PLA want to go to a 24-month conscription system because it 

plays havoc on their training. Well, the fact of the matter is, and 

again this dichotomy of China, the PLA didn’t want that. This was 

imposed upon the PLA, one hears, by the National People’s Congress. Why? Because after all of these reforms in the economy, and 

the iron rice bowl being broken and the peasant farmers being told 

they’re no longer going to be subsidized by the state, there was an 

outcry at the grass-roots level that we, the farmers can’t afford to 

give up our only sons for three and four years. Do something about 

it. 

So there was pressure from below at the NPC level to change the 

national conscription laws. Again, on one hand, pressures building 

sociologically from the bottom. At the time, the PLA being able to 

adjust by putting into place this very nascent NCO program that’s 

only been around for a couple of years now. 

Mr. FISHER. I would only add, Commissioner Dreyer, that the 

challenge of the complexity of new weapons and technology is being 

met in part by new training technologies that are better and being 

made more widely available. One can just peruse the PLA press 

and see all kinds of references to online training systems, online 

this, that. Morale in part, I would say, is being at least bolstered 

in some areas by the increasing availability of online education, 

something that has certainly taken off here and is being made increasingly available in my opinion to members of the PLA as well. 

It’s something that has to help in terms of convincing a soldier to 

continue to invest in their PLA career. 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank you. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Robinson. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. I think all 

of you have succeeded in describing here a robust offensive military 

build-up underway by China. Its frontline systems, be they the 

KILOs, the Sukhois, the SOVREMENNIYs, others of these capable 

systems, pose an increasing and very real threat to our carriers or 

carrier battle groups. And also, of course, on the strategic side, 

China mobile ICBMs, the DF–41, others, and their submarinelaunched ballistic missiles pose a threat to the continental United 

States. 

So I think it’s been an eye-opening session. I’d like to change 

gears a bit and ask Mr. Fisher and Dr. Medeiros in particular if 

they think that it would be useful under these circumstances for 

the Commission to determine the identity of Chinese enterprises 

traded on the U.S. and Hong Kong stock exchanges that are part 

of, or linked to the Chinese military industrial complex? I’m thinking parent companies, affiliates, subs, whatever it may be. 

These entities may be in the process of being unwittingly underwritten by American investors. Do you think that these kind of corporate linkages, even though you’re not experts in the financial 

field, would nevertheless represent a potentially material risk to investors that should properly be disclosed so that at least investors 

are aware of these linkages? So I put that question to the two of 

you, if I might. 

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I would go even further and suggest 

that the Commission link the issues of material risks to physical 

108 

risks. I offer the example last October of the European aerospace 

consortium, EADS, purchasing a large chunk of an IPO issued by 

AVIC–II, the second large PLA controlled aviation missile consortium. 

EADS and other European companies, Agusta, already have a 

long-standing relationship with companies in AVIC–II. In April of 

last year, we’re led to believe that the first modern capable attack 

helicopter produced by the PLA was tested and now continues to 

be in testing. This attack helicopter was made possible by technology sold by Agusta in Italy and very likely Eurocopter in 

France. 

Such linkages not only need to be exposed, but they need to be 

exposed for what harm they can bring. An attack helicopter on the 

Taiwan Strait is a threatening thing. I blanch at the thought of a 

swarm of locusts of Z–10 attack helicopters raging up and down the 

Taiwan Strait like reusable cruise missiles, each firing very precision guided, European or Israeli assisted wire-guided or laser-guided missiles. 

It’s a very troubling thing. And we could be in receipt of those 

weapons. They could be attacking American forces coming to assist 

Taiwan at some point possibly in the not-too-distant future. We 

need to expose these linkages and we need to call them what they 

are. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Dr. Medeiros, do you have anything on 

that? 

Mr. MEDEIROS. I think I’d strike a little bit more of a cautious 

tone than my colleague Rick Fisher. Certainly it’s an issue worth 

looking into and it’s something I’ve explored a little bit, and I do 

know that there are a wide variety of defense industrial, what the 

Chinese call defense industrial enterprises, that trade on Chinese 

exchanges, on the Shenzhen Exchange and the Shanghai Exchange. But whether or not any of their shares are actively traded 

on U.S. or Hong Kong exchanges, I’m not aware of that. 

Chairman ROBINSON. They are. 

Mr. MEDEIROS. They are. Okay. I think it would be interesting 

to look into it to see if their use of Hong Kong or U.S. exchanges 

could actually be used to force a degree of transparency into the financial dealings and the operations of particular defense industry 

enterprises because they tend to be so opaque. 

The Chinese are very good at hiding the financial operations of 

these defense industrial enterprises and perhaps through IPO 

mechanisms or dealing with investment banks, it could be a tool 

for getting them to be a little bit more transparent. 

I would just encourage the Commission to keep a very important 

context in mind about Chinese defense industrial enterprises which 

is while the Chinese government calls them defense industrial enterprises, somewhere between 60 and 80 percent of their output is 

for commercial civilian purposes, and many of these companies 

such as AVIC–I or AVIC–II are companies that big American companies like Boeing regularly deal with, and so this raises major 

issues, major implications for big trade projects between the U.S. 

and China and then it’s just important to keep that context in 

mind when exploring this particular issue. 

109 

Chairman ROBINSON. Right, and that’s why we’re talking about 

it only in a risk- and disclosure-oriented context which I would assume you would support? 

Mr. MEDEIROS. Sure. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner D’Amato. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, 

I want to congratulate the panel on your testimony, and I particularly want to thank Mr. Fisher for the paper that you’ve done for 

us. I read it, and I think it’s very, very interesting. I would like 

to include that paper in the record of our hearing. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Absolutely, and I want to join the Vice 

Chairman in offering our collective gratitude to Mr. Fisher. That 

was a very fine piece of work. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. There was one area in there that I’ve 

had a particular interest in that the Commission mentioned in our 

report last year in passing, and that has to do with the Israeli relationship. Obviously, we encouraged the Israelis to get involved with 

the Chinese during the Cold War. They obliged us. Got involved 

with the Chinese and did very well, as the Israelis would, probably 

too well, and we then faced the problem of Israeli industries becoming dependent financially on the China market. The numbers apparently do not reflect the importance of the technologies that the 

Israelis have transferred. 

There are large numbers with regard to the Russians, but in 

many cases that technology isn’t in the same ballpark as what the 

Israelis are providing. And in a sense, the Israeli practice is to provide technology that looks suspiciously like U.S. technology. We 

face modified forms of U.S. technology in a threat environment. 

I think the F–10 can be easily described as the Lavi, but prior 

to that suspiciously looks a lot like the F–16. So for us, for our 

American forces in the Far East to face F–16 like equipment, you 

know, is an irony that we would rather avoid. 

You say that Israel apparently has stopped its military exports 

to the PRC. I understand that we intercepted the AWACs like Falcon system, which of course is technology that should never have 

even been contemplated being sold to the Chinese. Is this true also 

in terms of the other two systems that you mentioned, the Lavi and 

the Harpy? Has that relationship terminated? 

Mr. FISHER. To my knowledge, Commissioner, the technology 

transfer that was underway to support the Lavi program has 

reached a point where the Chinese have what they want and 

they’ve built a fighter. They’re modifying it, making a twin-seat 

version. And they’ve had this Israeli source technology for over a 

decade now and they’ve combined it with inputs from Russia and 

areas that they’ve made on their own, and they’ve created this 

mishmash called the J–10. 

Whether there is continuing support for whatever Israeli content 

exists of the J–10, I don’t know for sure. But as regards the Harpy, 

it’s my understanding that they bought a large number and that 

was that. There is the sale. One could imagine that there might be 

continuing logistical training, whatever sorts of support for that, 

and it’s my hope that as part of the commission that was formed 

between the United States and Israel, I believe in 2000, late 2000– 

110 

2001, to examine these issues that we are pursuing these kinds of 

questions with Israel. 

I completely agree with the thrust of your comments that continued vigilance is necessary. Just in late December Barbara Opel 

with Defense News produced a very interesting report that to the 

effect that Israel was considering refashioning its military technical 

sales relationship with China to focus on more acceptable areas, 

such as counterterrorism. I read that and thought, well, you know, 

a counterterrorist one day can be a special operator repelling down 

the side of Taiwan’s Presidential palace the next day. 

So a continued vigilance is necessary, but I am impressed with 

the degree to which both the Clinton Administrations followed on 

by the Bush Administration has addressed this issue with Israel, 

engaged in a dialogue, made requests of our Israeli allies, and increasingly or largely they have responded to our requests in a fashion that is far and above whatever dialogue I know of with Russia, 

which is not much, and the Russians never listened to us to begin 

with. I’ll stop there. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Right. Well, of course, we don’t have a 

technology transfer program with the Russians the way we have 

had with the Israelis either. Of course, I think to the extent that 

it is credible that we are turning off the Israeli relationship, it 

makes it easier for us to restrain the European Union states from 

going forward with their dialogue for renewed sales after the 

Tiananmen sanctions. 

Mr. FISHER. It certainly creates a precedent within the policy 

community here in Washington for doing so. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. FISHER. And I would strongly support very high vigilance in 

regards to European weapon sales intentions in the near future 

and identification and high level dialogue with the European capitals to prevent their lifting of their embargo. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Ellsworth, we’ve been just 

going down the line, so we’ll go to you. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Well, it just occurs to me to ask whoever 

knows when somebody—let’s say France, just for example—sells 

some high tech militarily useful thing or system to China, is there 

a high financial reward for doing that beyond what the normal 

arms transaction price would be, or is it just a regular transaction 

designed mainly to keep the production line going, if anybody 

knows? 

Mr. MEDEIROS. Could you specify a little bit more what you 

mean? 

Mr. FISHER. Are you referring to corruption? 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. No, no, I’m not referring to corruption. I’m 

just referring to, okay, sell a destroyer or a PT boat or a helicopter 

to China. Is there a premium that you get from China for making 

your high technology available to them now rather than forcing 

them to develop it over a period of ten or 12 years? Or do you just 

get the same price as you would if you sold it to Peru? 

Mr. FISHER. Well, a sale, the Chinese usually insist on a transfer 

of as much technology knowledge. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. And do they pay extra for that? 

111 

Mr. FISHER. They certainly do, and the real payoff for the seller, 

Commissioner, in my opinion, is the ability to take profits across— 

whatever profit they can get and then reinvest it into their own defense industry to help them make the next weapons. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Well, I’m not worried about what profits 

they get. I’m not worried about what they do with the profit. You 

can do a lot of things. But I am interested to know if there is an 

extra incentive in today’s arms market for selling to China, if you 

know? 

Mr. FISHER. The incentive is to try to get—for Europeans, the incentive is to try to get into that market and corner it as much as 

they can, as early as they can, because they believe that there is 

a large future in sales of military technologies and military systems. 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. Are you suggesting that a European arms 

merchant might give the Chinese a discount just so that he can get 

his foot in the door? 

Mr. FISHER. Well, from what I know of this world, it’s a shady, 

slimy—— 

Co-Chair ELLSWORTH. In other words, we don’t know. Thank you. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Mulloy. 

Commissioner MULLOY. I don’t know whether you folks were 

here this morning when we had the panel on Taiwan. I think I got 

the impression that the concern you raise about what the Chinese 

are getting militarily to enhance their capabilities is somewhat tied 

to the fact that we have this defense obligation to Taiwan in particular, and that that makes this a proximate thing that may not, 

if we didn’t have that, would not be quite as worrying. Is that correct? 

Mr. FISHER. I was not here for that session, Commissioner. 

Commissioner MULLOY. But that premise that I just put out to 

you, is that—— 

Mr. FISHER. If you take the United States out of the Taiwan 

Strait equation, I would still posit that there is a cause for significant American concern from PLA modernization in and of itself in 

relation to our other interests in Asia as well. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Let me just walk this through and see. 

It seems a little schizophrenic on U.S. policy then. Because the 

President has said that if the Chinese attack Taiwan, we’ll do 

whatever it takes, as the Chinese get increasingly stronger militarily, and some of it I think is tied to the fact that they’re in the 

WTO, and there are huge investment flows going to China. They’re 

now the largest foreign investment recipient in the world; at least 

they were last year. 

And from what you read, Motorola is putting billions of dollars 

of R&D and a lot of other companies are, their industrial base is 

strengthening quite rapidly, and I think Mr. Medeiros, you point 

out that these industrial companies, a big part of what they’re selling is civilian production, not just military goods. So as all of that 

strengthens China’s capabilities, both industrial, technological and 

others, whatever it takes in terms of President Bush’s statement 

could go up quite dramatically. 

So I’m just wondering, do you think that the United States ought 

to pay closer attention to what American companies are investing 

112 

in China in terms of R&D and technology transfer? We pay a lot 

of attention to export controls, but I think the investment flows are 

quite dramatic. 

And secondly, my understanding is that because China is running such a large trade surplus with the United States, they have 

a lot of dollars and now they can come over here and buy companies that may be making things that they would want to have. So 

I’m just wondering, do you make all those connections that I’m 

making or is this a figment of my imagination that this would be 

a concern? 

Start with Dr. Finkelstein and then the other two. 

Dr. FINKELSTEIN. Yes, briefly, to get back to one of your more 

fundamental points, Commissioner Mulloy. At the end of the day, 

there is really only one scenario which holds the potential—God 

forbid—for military conflict between the U.S. and China and that’s 

Taiwan in my opinion. Frankly, I’d be more interested in understanding how much Taiwan is investing on the mainland since they 

are the object of a lot of angst. 

It’s just interesting to note how much Taiwan investment is on 

the mainland. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Yes, my understanding is they’re one of 

the larger investors in China, and a lot of it is very high investment going into China, which increases Chinese capability then to 

come back after them. So they don’t seem to be as worried about 

these issues as maybe we are. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Do either of the other panelists have a comment on this? 

Mr. FISHER. Well, Commissioner, I would like to see a greater 

appreciation here in Washington of the degree to which the United 

States has economic leverage over China. I think that as you’ve 

stated your question and concerns, the concern is more about their 

leverage over us and the degree to which they are able to mobilize 

businessmen and other supporters to have an impact on our deliberations and even on our policy. 

I would like to see the United States state more clearly and specifically the costs that China will face should it decide to undertake 

a near term military exercise to complete its goal of unification. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Again, it 

was an excellent panel. It’s a panel that covered the near-term 

weapons systems that we need to worry about or that Taiwan does, 

the doctrine to implement them and the long-term ability to put a 

war production machine afoot in China. Great job. Thanks. 

[Whereupon, a short break was taken.] 

PANEL IV: MILITARY TRENDS IN THE CROSS-STRAIT 

RELATIONSHIP 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. For this last panel, we have four panelists. 

Mr. Jason Bruzdzinski of the Mitre Corporation, who is a specialist 

on defense policy, military strategy and intelligence matters. He’s 

also served on professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee. He’s a Navy Reserve officer, and has served in intelligence 

positions with the Navy. He has an M.A. from Georgetown University and Bachelor’s degree from St. Lawrence University in New 

York. 

113 

Professor Vincent Wei-cheng Wang. Professor Wang is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Richmond. He has a Ph.D. in political science from the 

University of Chicago, and a M.A. from Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He has 

written extensively on Taiwan and on security matters. 

We have Professor Lyle Goldstein from the Navy War College, an 

Associate Professor in Naval Warfare Studies. He has worked extensively on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Chinese 

foreign and defense policy and Russian foreign and defense policy. 

He received his B.A. from Harvard and an M.A. from Johns Hopkins and a Ph.D. from Princeton. So I guess we’ve been pretty 

heavy on Princeton people today. And again a really solid group of 

writings and especially on this submarine issue. 

And Mr. William Murray, a retired Navy Commander and Research Fellow at the Navy War College, and I understand you two 

gentlemen are going to sort of dog and pony it. We will accommodate that with the timing. 

Once more, each of you will—Mr. Bruzdzinski and Dr. Wang will 

have seven minutes each. The little colored lights, when it goes orange, you got a couple minutes left, and when it goes red, hopefully 

you are summing up and done, and we’ll adjust. I think our timer 

here has the ability to compute in his head so that we’re not going 

to run you out in seven minutes. We’ll add time there. 

Mr. Bruzdzinski. 

STATEMENT OF JASON E. BRUZDZINSKI 

SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

THE MITRE CORPORATION, MCLEAN, VIRGINIA 

Mr. BRUZDZINSKI. Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I want to 

thank you for the invitation to be here today. I do appreciate the 

opportunity to present my views before the U.S.-China Commission. China is what I would characterize as an enduring challenge 

for U.S. defense policy and planning. I hope the discoveries from 

my research on China’s ‘‘Assassin’s Mace’’ concept, or shashoujian, 

which I will summarize today, will be helpful to the Commission’s 

important work. 

Shashoujian is a commonly used idiom in Chinese society. Indeed, it would be hard for any of us to find a Chinese citizen who 

wasn’t familiar with the concept. In Chinese military vernacular, 

according to PLA officers, shashoujian connotes a secret weapon, a 

platform or system for deterrence, or a tool to achieve political, psychological and military victory through a single decisive blow in 

combat. 

From my research, I also believe it to be a code word for a secret 

Chinese military research, development and acquisition effort, 

aimed at deterring, countering or defeating the United States in a 

military conflict should that come to pass. 

The concept emerged within the PLA during the early 1990s 

when considerable debate and publication on strategy and force 

modernization was taking place within China’s Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University. 

Within the PLA, three dominant schools of thought were influenced by a changing world and observed effectiveness of U.S. 

armed forces in post-Cold War military operations. The three 

114 

schools are commonly referred to as the ‘‘People’s War’’ School, the 

‘‘Local War’’ School and of course the Revolution and Military Affairs or ‘‘RMA’’ School. 

Shashoujian surfaced from these debates as common ground, a 

concept that each of the different schools of thought could embrace, 

relate to and respect. 

Open discussion about shashoujian and the PLA appeared in the 

1995–1996 timeframe, but through the late 1990s, PLA officers of 

increasing rank and political stature advocated shashoujian. And 

there is a traceable chronology of public statements and writings 

from these individuals. Images of some of the individuals appear 

up on the two screens that we have today. They range from senior 

Chinese Communist Party officials to Central Military Commissioner leaders to PLA scholars and warfighters. There are several 

other significant individuals that visibly participated in public discussions about shashoujian in China during this period. 

It is clear that by 1998 advocacy for the concept had reached the 

highest levels of the PLA and the PRC leadership. China’s leaders 

recognized that the PLA has lagged behind foreign militaries in its 

ability to integrate science and technology with weapons and equipment, and in this context, that the PLA is relatively inferior to advanced foreign militaries. 

Traditional emphasis on superior strategy and tactics is an important characteristic of China’s strategic culture. This emphasis 

profoundly influences Chinese military thinking today, despite the 

recent focus placed on introducing advanced military hardware into 

the PLA. 

This is precisely why shashoujian can hold appeal for such a 

wide range of PLA scholars and PRC leaders. Shashoujian, as a 

concept, effectively blends the old with the new. Specifically, 

shashoujian blends traditional Chinese warfighting strategies with 

modern systems, platforms and weapons that benefit from technology of the information age. 

Returning to 1998, in that year, China initiated an unprecedented wave of military acquisition reforms, including the reform 

of COSTIND and the creation of the General Armaments Department—as we heard from Dr. Medeiros earlier. At that time, China’s leaders also outlined the 998 State Security Project, a secret 

initiative to develop shashoujian concepts and weapons. The plan 

was adopted by the CPC Central Committee in August 1999 at 

Beidaihe and publicly revealed in 2000 by a CPC Central Committee official. 

The 998 Project mandates the acceleration of programs for research, development and the deployment of new weapons to ‘‘resist 

hegemonism.’’ Elements of the program include missiles, energy 

weapons and nuclear weapons. The program also calls for changes 

in PLA operational art and nuclear weapons policy. 

The 998 Project is directed by a powerful leading group and conducts work conferences managed by the PLA’s four General Staff 

Departments. Chinese open source references to shashoujian indicate that preliminary work on the 998 Project may have started as 

early as 1995, and if that is the case, then China could be a decade 

into a shashoujian weapons acquisition effort. 

115 

Let me turn to address some of the implications of shashoujian 

for PLA strategy, methods and also in the context of the effects of 

attacks. In the context of strategy, China seeks to leverage 

shashoujian weapons and methods to enable ‘‘the inferior’’ to defeat 

‘‘the superior,’’ and this is a concept that my colleague, Dr. Wang, 

will elaborate on. 

To attack superior adversaries, China is attempting to develop 

new equipment while carrying forward traditional war-fighting 

strategies. In the context of methods, there have been considerable 

discussion in PLA literature about how and when these weapons 

and tactics should be optimally employed against superior adversaries. 

Key PLA employment concepts emphasize (1) acquiring good intelligence to identify and exploit enemy weakness, (2) seizing initiative and advantage through surprise, and (3) the use of unorthodox 

means to attack enemy vulnerabilities and finally ensuring the survivability and counter-strike capability of shashoujian forces. 

PLA scholars also frequently discuss the intended effects of 

shashoujian strikes, and I elaborate on each one of these in my 

paper. They are deterrence, decapitation, and blinding paralysis 

and disintegration. 

Although an ancient concept, shashoujian is compatible with and 

potentially catalytic for current and emerging strategy and military 

capabilities. Shashoujian serves to help the PLA prioritize select 

military programs for special funding, rapid development and the 

formulation of new combat methods. 

The PLA’s warfighting capabilities will likely increase incrementally as China continues its research and development in this regard. PLA’s focus, dedication, and experimentation will likely enable some breakthroughs in military capability to be achieved in 

time. Invariably, there may also be some surprises for American 

watchers. 

China’s focus on shashoujian and effects-based warfare (with an 

emphasis on combining ancient military strategies with new 

warfighting concepts and operational arts) poses a danger. The 

U.S. Congress should concern itself with and watch out for the following elements or combination of elements in order to counter 

shashoujian and China’s stratagem of the inferior overcoming the 

superior. 

And I’ll outline them. First, the possibility of China presenting 

a military operational concept that takes the United States by surprise; two, weapons systems and infrastructure that can enable the 

PLA to implement the operational concept; and/or three, a strategic 

or tactical context in which the successful use of this concept is decisive. 

To avoid potential military disaster precipitated by misunderstanding, miscalculation or strategic surprise, the Congress should 

acknowledge the importance of China’s history and traditions for 

the PLA, continue to pay careful attention to developments in Chinese military strategy and programs, conduct senior level dialogue 

with China’s leaders, and finally, carefully monitor their statements and writings concerning military affairs, and more and more 

are visible today in open sources. 

116 

At the same time, the U.S. Government should continue to be upfront and clear about its policies vis-a`-vis China and Taiwan, 

present a compelling deterrent against Chinese military adventurism, and maintain a degree of tactical unpredictability to prevent the PLA from anticipating U.S. military actions. 

Thank you for your attention today. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Jason E. Bruzdzinski 

Senior Professional Staff, The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia 

Good Afternoon. 

I appreciate the opportunity to present my views before the U.S.-China Commission. 

Efforts to better understand the PLA’s modernization and its implications are 

very important because China is an enduring challenge for U.S. defense policy and 

planning. 

I hope that discoveries from my research on China’s ‘‘Assassin’s Mace’’ concept or 

shashoujian, which I will summarize today, will be helpful to the Commission’s important work. 

For the record, I submit my recent paper, Demystifying Shashoujian. This comprehensive analysis will be published later this year by the U.S. Army War College, 

The American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation, in an edited compilation of academic papers on the PLA. 

My remarks today express my own views and do not necessarily represent those 

of the U.S. Government or my employer, The MITRE Corporation. 

I would like to offer a working definition for shashoujian. Then, identify its origins and discuss its emergence as a warfighting concept for the PLA. I will conclude 

with a few statements about the implications of China’s shashoujian concept. 

Definitions 

Shashoujian is a widely understood and commonly used idiom in Chinese society. 

Indeed, it would be hard to find Chinese who do not understand the concept. 

Simply, it is the means or ways by which one overcomes a seemingly insurmountable obstacle. In this context, it implies an action or quality that offers strategic advantage when employed in a particular way, at a key moment of opportunity for the 

accomplishment of a specific goal. 

In Chinese military vernacular, according to senior PLA officers, shashoujian connotes a secret weapon, a platform or system for deterrence, or a tool to achieve political, psychological and military victory through a single, decisive blow in combat. 

Shashoujian, in a military context, should be considered in two ways. 

First, as a weapon or weapon system. 

Second, as a warfighting concept, a stratagem (or combination of stratagems), or 

a method or tactic that enables the PLA to seize advantage and assure victory 

against a superior adversary. 

From my research, I also believe it to be a codeword for a secret Chinese military 

research, development and acquisition effort. This effort, which I will discuss, appears responsive to China’s military strategy and is aimed at deterring, countering 

or defeating the United States in a military conflict, should that come to pass. 

Origin 

Shashoujian is an ancient term finding its origin in the Tang period (618–907 

A.D.).i I raise this point to emphasize the resilience of shashoujian in China’s culture. It is significant that the concept has endured China’s long and turbulent history. 

Emergence in the People’s Liberation Army 

The concept of shashoujian emerged within the PLA during the early 1990s, when 

considerable debate and publication on strategy and force modernization requirements took place within China’s Academy of Military Science and National Defense 

University. Three dominant schools of thought were influenced by a changing world 

and the observed effectiveness of U.S. armed forces in post-Cold War military operi Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center Online: http://edu.ocac.gov.tw/taiwan/kungfu/ 

e/5123-3.htm. 

117


ations. The three schools are commonly referred to as ‘‘the People’s War’’ school, the

more contemporary ‘‘Local War’’ school, and the ‘‘RMA’’ school. 

Shashoujian surfaced from the PLA debates as ‘common ground’—a concept that 

each school could relate to and respect. 

Open discussion about shashoujian in the PLA appeared in the 1995–96 timeframe. But, through the late 1990s, PLA officers of increasing rank and political 

stature advocated shashoujian and there is a traceable chronology of public statements and writings from these individuals.

From my research, it is clear that by 1998, advocacy for shashoujian had reached 

the highest levels of the PLA and PRC leadership. 

PLA Research, Development and Acquisition Possibilities 

In 1998, China initiated a wave of military acquisition reforms. At the same time, 

China’s leaders outlined the 998 State Security Project—a secret initiative to develop shashoujian concepts and weapons.

The plan was adopted by the CPC Central Committee in August 1999 at Beidaihe 

and publicly revealed in 2000 by a CPC Central Committee official in a Jiefangjun 

Bao article.ii 

The 998 Project mandates the acceleration of programs for research, development 

and deployment of new weapons to resist ‘‘hegemonism.’’

Elements of the program include missiles, energy weapons and nuclear weapons. 

The program also calls for changes in PLA operational art and nuclear weapons policy. 

The 998 Program is directed by a powerful Project Leading Group and conducts 

work conferences managed by the PLA’s four General Staff Departments. 

Open source references to shashoujian indicate that preliminary work on the 998

Project could have started as early as 1995. 

If so, China may be nine years into a shashoujian weapons acquisition effort. 

I would like to briefly mention two additional efforts that were initiated in 2000 

and could be related to China’s shashoujian concept. 

The first is the 122 Project. The objectives of the project are to improve PLA combat effectiveness, counter-attack capability and develop a new generation of hightech weapons, nuclear weapons, and improve the readiness of PLA strategic forces.

The second initiative is the 126 Program. The 126 Program was approved by 

President Jiang Zemin as the PRC’s second national level program established for 

development of military equipment. 

China’s first such program, the well known 863 Program, was established by 

Deng Xiaoping in 1986. Under the 126 Program, China will initially develop six 

major projects within 12–15 years.

These projects reportedly include the development of an aerospace technology system, electronic/information technology system, a strategic defense system, a deeplevel counter-attack system, an optical laser system, and a special materials development program. 

Under these six projects, 36 ‘‘theme projects’’ have reportedly been developed to 

support the 126 Program.

While neither the 122 or 126 efforts have been explicitly linked to shashoujian 

and the 998 Project, the members of the respective leading groups are very similar, 

as are the thrust areas of their identified initiatives. 

Additional research will be necessary to determine whether these initiatives are 

associated with shashoujian. 

Implications 

Let me turn to address the implications of shashoujian. 

PLA scholars have dedicated great effort to study the change in the requirements 

of warfare from the mechanization era to the information age. 

As an example, General Wang Baocun, of the AMS, concluded in 1997 that ten 

defining features will characterize warfare in the information age. His ten defining 

features are: 

limited goals in conflicts 

wars of short duration 

less damage 

larger battlefields and less density of troops 

transparency on the battlefield 

ii Wen Jen, ‘‘Revealing Secrets of Beijing’s 998 State Security Project,’’ Tai Yang Pao, June 

13, 2000 and Cary Huang, Hong Kong iMail (Internet Version), August 5, 2000, p. A3. Also see: 

Wang Congbiao, ‘‘Studying Jiang Zemin’s ‘On Science and Technology,’ ’’ Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001. FBIS Document ID: CCP20010221000077. 

118 

intense struggle for information superiority 

unprecedented force integration 

increased demands for command and control 

strategic objectives achieved through precision, not mass, and 

attacks on weaknesses, not strengths, of the enemy’s ‘‘combat system.’’ iii 

These features represent strategic and operational objectives, centers of gravity, 

and opportunities for the PLA to seize the initiative in conflict. 

General Wang advocates the consideration of these features for the development 

of military strategy, warfighting methods and to guide the PLA’s transformation 

process. 

I believe that General Wang’s assessments carry weight with the PRC’s leadership and are a major force driving China’s military modernization and its focus. 

China’s leaders recognize that the PLA has lagged behind foreign militaries in its 

ability to integrate science and technology with weapons and equipment—and, in 

this context, that the PLA is relatively inferior to advanced foreign militaries. 

For much of China’s pre-revolutionary history, the same was true of China’s armies. Historically, China depended upon superior strategies and tactics to cope with 

the inferiority of its weapons and equipment. This trend continues today in the 

PLA. 

Traditional emphasis on superior strategy and tactics is an important characteristic of China’s strategic culture. This emphasis profoundly influences Chinese 

military thinking today, despite the recent focus placed on introducing advanced 

military hardware into the PLA. 

This is how shashoujian can hold appeal for a wide range of PLA scholars and 

PRC leaders. 

It effectively blends the old with the new. 

Specifically, traditional Chinese warfighting strategies with modern platforms and 

weapons benefiting from the technology of the information age. 

PLA Strategy (Using the Inferior to Defeat the Superior) 

China seeks to leverage shashoujian weapons and methods to enable the inferior 

to defeat the superior. To defeat superior adversaries, China is attempting to develop new equipment while carrying forward traditional warfighting strategies. 

PLA strategists pay great attention to the study of methods to reverse the balance 

of combat strength with superior strategy, and to identify key operational conditions 

where the weak can defeat the strong through the use of weapons against which 

there is no defense.iv 

Operational Art (Methods) 

There has also been much discussion in PLA literature about how and when 

shashoujian weapons and tactics should be optimally employed against superior adversaries. Key employment concepts emphasize: (1) acquiring good intelligence to 

identify and exploit enemy weaknesses, (2) seizing initiative and advantage through 

surprise, (3) the use of unorthodox means to attack enemy vulnerabilities, and (4) 

ensuring the survivability and counter-strike capability of shashoujian forces. 

Effects of Strikes 

PLA scholars also frequently discuss the key intended effects of shashoujian 

strikes. They are: (1) deterrence, (2) decapitation and (3) blinding, paralysis and disintegration. 

Deterrence. Sunzi’s maxim on ‘winning without fighting’ endures and is consistent 

with the PLA’s requirement for a compelling deterrent value from shashoujian 

weapons. PLA scholars commonly refer to ballistic missile and submarine forces as 

‘‘shashoujian forces’’ serving as a basis for psychological warfare.v 

iii Wang Baocun, ‘‘A Preliminary Analysis of Information Warfare,’’ Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 

November 20, 1997, pp. 102–111. Also see: Peng Guangqian, ‘‘Meeting the Challenge of the New 

Military Transformation,’’ and Li Zhangrui and Liu Chunjun, ‘‘Firepower Cannot Be Excluded 

from Information Warfare,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, September 19, 2000, p. 6. FBIS Document ID: 

CPP20000919000045. iv Zian Ruyi, Command Decision-making and Strategems, Beijing: Kunlun Publishing House, 

1999, pp. 4–5. FBIS Document ID: CPP20030424000250. v Lt Gen Zhao Xijun, ‘‘Victory Without War and Modern Deterrence Strategy,’’ Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue, October 31, 2001, pp. 55–60. FBIS Document ID: CPP20011228000132. Also see: 

Liu Xiaodu and Kang Fashun, ‘‘A Certain Brigade Builds Itself into an All-round, Perfectly Masterful ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Unit,’’ Huojianbing Bao, May 25, 2002, p. 1, FBIS Document ID: 

CPP20020612000143, and Liu Xiaodu and Wang Xuezhong, ‘‘Charging to Control the High 

Ground of Training,’’ Huojianbing Bao, October 6, 2001. FBIS Document ID: 

CPP20011219000162. 

119 

Decapitation. Traditionally, the defeat of an adversary by a single fatal strike or

‘‘death blow’’ is the intended outcome of a shashoujian strike. Ideally executed with 

foreknowledge of the enemy’s disposition, it comes deceptively and swiftly—without 

perceptible indication or warning. 

If employed correctly, a shashoujian strike kills the adversary instantly. The grim 

result is final and irreversible.vi 

Blinding, Paralysis and Disintegration. As in the martial arts (and the medicinal

practice of acupuncture), pressure point warfare (dianxue zhan) is intended to have 

systemic effects on an enemy’s military structure or organization. 

PLA strategists often discuss the importance of conducting shashoujian strikes on 

critical infrastructure. Some targets frequently identified include command and control centers and networks, early warning and intelligence systems, remote sensing 

platforms, and military logistics systems. 

PLA scholars view these systems as dependencies (the relative weaknesses of a

superior enemy) and as more vulnerable to attack than the relative strengths of a 

superior adversary. They contend that shashoujian strikes on the key nodes of a superior adversary can cause paralysis and initiate the disintegration of a superior 

force.vii 

Conclusions 

China’s ancient history and traditions profoundly influence the thinking of its 

leaders and senior military officers. However, China’s PLA scholars and senior leaders are reexamining, even critiquing, the viability of Mao Zedong’s ‘‘People’s War’’ 

doctrine for warfare in the 21st century. 

Chinese think dialectically and assess military power holistically with emphasis on relative strengths and weaknesses. This approach to military assessment differs

significantly from American approaches. 

Contrasting conclusions and dangerous miscalculations can result from these different approaches. 

Reacting to significant changes in the global security situation, China’s military 

research and development efforts have been oriented toward the development of advanced systems, platforms and weapons for the prosecution of ‘‘Local War Under 

High Technology Conditions.’’

It is apparent that China’s leaders and senior military officers are uncomfortable 

with American defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Particularly, as it concerns 

the future of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. 

China’s leaders are also troubled by advances in U.S. military capabilities that 

they have observed since 1991. 

These concerns have prompted China to initiate military research and development programs tailored toward the prosecution of asymmetric warfare against superior forces. 

Chinese military strategy will guide PLA forces to minimize the relative superiority of enemies while employing effective stratagems and tactics. 

China will attempt to leverage the relative strengths and capabilities of the PLA 

at key moments—to be targeted against the relative weaknesses and vulnerabilities 

of a superior force. 

Shashoujian and other uniquely Chinese warfighting concepts will be key elements of this approach. 

Although an ancient concept, shashoujian is compatible and also potentially catalytic for current and emerging strategy and military capabilities. Shashoujian serves 

vi Tien Ping, ‘‘Space for Readjustment in Nuclear Policy,’’ Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, June 23, 

2003, p. A2. vii Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (eds.), Zhanyi Xue (The Science of Campaigns), Beijing: 

National Defense University Publishing House, May 2000, pp. 168–182. Also see: Liu Jun and 

Zhou Ruhong, ‘‘How to Concentrate Capability in Joint Operations,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, June 12, 

2001, p. 6, FBIS Document ID: CPP20010612000063, Huang Xing and Zuo, pp. 49–56, Shen 

Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, ‘‘A Rudemintary Exploration of 21st Century 

Naval Warfare,’’ Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20, 1995, No. 1, pp. 28–32; Major General 

Dai Qingmin, ‘‘Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations,’’ Zhongguo Junshi 

Kexue, August 20, 2000, pp. 72–77; and an untitled article by Lin Zheng published in Huoli Yu 

Zhihui Kongzhi, Beijing: Ministry of Electronic Industries, October 1996, pp. 16–21, Dai 

Qingmin, ‘‘On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare,’’ Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 

February 1, 2002, pp. 112–117. FBIS Document ID: CPP20020624000214. Niu, Li and Xu, pp. 

115–122, Bao Guojun, ‘‘Military Expert Urges China to Promptly Eliminate ‘Era Gap’ in Military Technology—An Interview with Major General Wang Baocun, Renowned Military Expert 

of the Academy of Military Science,’’ Tzu Ching, No. 153, June 1, 2003, pp. 57–60, FBIS Document ID: CPP20030611000077, Sun Zian, ‘‘Strategies to Minimize the High-Technology Edge of 

the Enemy,’’ Xiandai Bingqi, August 8, 1995, No. 8, pp. 10–11. FBIS Document ID: 

FTS19950808000009. 

120 

to help the PLA prioritize select military programs for special funding, rapid development and development of new combat methods. 

PLA capabilities will likely increase incrementally as China continues its research 

and development in this regard. 

Long-term challenges associated with hardware integration, force professionalization, training and education efforts, as well as military logistics, will complicate China’s RMA goals. 

However, the PLA’s focus, dedication, and experimentation will likely enable some 

breakthroughs in military capability to be achieved in time. 

China’s focus on shashoujian and effects-based warfare (with emphasis on combining ancient military strategies with new warfighting concepts and operational 

art) poses a danger for the United States. 

The U.S. Government should be concerned with and watch out for the following 

elements or combinations of elements in order to counter shashoujian and the stratagem of ‘‘the inferior overcoming the superior’’: 

(1) the possibility of China presenting a military operational concept that takes 

the United States by surprise, 

(2) weapons systems and infrastructure that can enable the PLA to implement 

the operational concept, and/or 

(3) a strategic or tactical context in which the successful use of this operational 

concept is decisive. 

To avoid potential military disaster precipitated by misunderstanding, miscalculation or strategic surprise, the U.S. Government should acknowledge the importance 

of China’s history and traditions for the PLA, continue to pay careful attention to 

developments in Chinese military strategy and programs, conduct senior-level dialogue with China’s leaders, and carefully monitor their statements and writings concerning military affairs. 

At the same time, the United States should continue to be up-front and clear 

about its policies vis-a`-vis China and Taiwan, present a compelling deterrent 

against Chinese military adventurism and maintain a degree of tactical unpredictability to prevent the PLA from anticipating U.S. military actions. 

Insert Bruz1.eps

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Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much. Dr. Wang. 

STATEMENT OF VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG, PH.D. 

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 

Mr. WANG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Commission. My remarks focus on one aspect of China’s military modernization: information warfare, or IW, which has considerable implications for security in the Taiwan Strait and relations with the 

United States. 

My comments are drawn from two of my published articles, one 

of which is included as a written statement for the Commission, so 

I hope you have a chance to read it. My key points are as follows: 

First, the PRC’s interest in IW reflect an increasingly prevalent 

view among well-versed strategic thinkers in China that IW is a 

key catalyst for the People’s Liberation Army’s Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA, and a vital impetus for China’s military modernization. 

Second, China’s IW strategy is distinctive in applying traditional 

stratagems, such as Sun Tzu’s ‘‘overcoming the superior with the 

inferior’’ and Mao Zedong’s ‘‘people’s war,’’ to modern warfare in an 

attempt to overcome a technologically superior adversary by attacking its strategic ‘‘Achilles’ heel.’’ China’s IW strategy thus epitomizes asymmetric war, defined as the use of surprise force by a 

weaker party against a stronger but vulnerable adversary. 

Third, China seems keen on developing its IW capability into a 

credible military option that can be used to absorb Taiwan on Beijing’s terms of unification and deter the United States from intervening in any cross-Strait conflict. These trends introduce new 

sources of instability into the cross-Strait relationship. 

Fourth, despite the PLA’s keen interest in IW, there still exists 

a doctrinal-capability gap in China’s IW development. An incipient 

digital ‘‘mutual assured destruction’’ is emerging across the Taiwan 

Strait as a result of the double-edged nature of technology, the low 

connectivity of the Chinese society and Taiwan’s responses. 

As an earlier panel has said, until the late 1980s China’s military doctrine was primarily aimed at defending China’s homeland 

and land borders and relied primarily on large Army units. By the 

1990s, however, China’s military doctrine had evolved into what 

PLA theoreticians called Local War Under Modern High-Technology Conditions. Some PLA strategists expanded their study of 

other concepts of future high-tech warfare, including IW, which became known under the rubric of RMA. The major focus of PLA 

operational planning in the late 1990s had become preparation of 

military options and capabilities to ensure that Taiwan does not 

seek independence. The possibility that the U.S. military may become involved in the defense of Taiwan is a worst-case factor that 

PLA planners also must consider. The Taiwan scenario became a 

prime case for this new doctrine. 

In this regard, IW holds special appeal to top PLA brass, which 

sees it as a way of bypassing many deficiencies that most PLA commanders and researchers recognize. IW weapons are seen as ‘‘killer’’ weapons, ‘‘trump cards’’ or ‘‘magic weapons,’’ (shashoujian), as 

Jason has mentioned, that can overcome inherent weaknesses in 

the PLA to inflict surprise attack. 

125 

In recent years, well-versed military theorists in the PLA have 

been exploring new concepts of war, especially asymmetric warfare 

strategies that make offense a more appealing option to the weaker 

party. One important publication is ‘‘Unrestricted Warfare.’’ The authors, reflecting upon the war in the age of technological integration and globalization call a new type of war that transcends all 

boundaries and limits, ‘‘chaoxian zhan,’’ or unrestricted warfare, 

which expands the combat beyond the traditional battleground. IW 

exemplifies unrestricted warfare and lends credence to the concept 

of asymmetric war. 

It lures the initiators into thinking that they can achieve their 

political objectives without much sacrifice. The Chinese view IW as 

a superior choice for attaining classic strategist Sun Tzu’s adage: 

‘‘To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’’ 

It also gives developing countries like China an allure to compensate for their military inferiority vis-a`-vis the United States 

with superior strategies—the notion of overcoming the superior 

with the inferior. The Chinese also hope to exploit the apparent 

paradox that the strong American ‘‘information society’’ also poses 

a potentially weak side to a determined adversary. They hope to 

achieve Sun Tzu’s highest stage of ‘‘winning the war without fighting.’’ 

The Chinese approach to IW, therefore, fits a pattern that is emblematic of many of its previous reform efforts, Zhongxue Weiti, 

Xixue weiyong (to retain Chinese teaching as the root and only use 

the Western teaching selectively). 

The July 2002 Pentagon report to Congress states that China 

views information warfare operations as a strategic weapon and is 

particularly sensitive to the potential asymmetric application IO/ 

IW can have in any future conflict with a technologically superior 

adversary. 

It points out that China’s military is developing strategies and 

tactics to use surprise, deception, and shock in any opening military campaign while exploring coercive strategies designed to bring 

Taiwan to terms quickly. 

Since the end of the Cold War, China’s double-digit growth rates 

have allowed China to substantially increase its military spending 

and to acquire advanced weapons and technologies. The PLA is 

keen on developing selective ‘‘pockets of excellence.’’ IW plays a 

very important role in this strategic view of military modernization. 

As an example of retooling, China now has given its vast 1.5 million strong reserve force a task in IW/IO application of digital ‘‘people’s war.’’ PLA officers have also begun discussing how IW can be 

waged in a combined amphibious battle. 

The Chinese military has also begun to put these ideas into practice. In the summer of 2001, the PLA for the first time began the 

war game exercises in the Taiwan Strait with information warfare 

aimed at electronically paralyzing enemy communications and command systems. Also for the first time, a new electronic warfare unit 

was deployed over the Strait. In exercises the following year the 

PLA incorporated even more sophisticated items of IO/IW. 

In sum, the PLA seeks to gain information domination in any 

conflict with Taiwan by attacking Taiwan’s information networks 

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and command and control centers as well as by conducting propaganda and political warfare. The goal is to incorporate Taiwan by 

‘‘subduing the enemy without actually fighting’’ a la Sun Tzu, and 

by denying possible American military intervention. 

This trend presents a new challenge to Taiwan and U.S. defense 

officials. 

From the Chinese standpoint, IW seems to have lowered the 

threshold for a likely successful military campaign against Taiwan 

and increase the utility of offensive strategy. Properly executed IW 

may—along with such other coercive weapons as missile strikes 

and a naval blockade—help bring Taiwan to its knees and deny 

American intervention. 

How seriously should American decisionmakers take the PRC’s 

IW endeavors? There is no question that the Chinese military is 

keenly interested in studying IW. At the present moment the PLA’s 

interest is primarily academic; its IW capabilities are far from 

operational (weaponized). The modernization of the Chinese armed 

forces has so far lagged behind doctrinal development. 

Yet, the Chinese seem to have history on their back. Historically, 

they have defeated stronger opponents and have many times surprised Western analysts by indigenously developing weapon systems that the West tried hard to deny them. Therefore, I caution 

against missing the possibility of China developing IW with Chinese characteristics. 

I believe that China’s development ultimately depends on its economic ascendancy in general and its rise as a global IT player in 

particular. Although China is merging as the world’s third largest 

IT hardware producer, and its online population is increasing exponentially (from 200,000 in 1997 to 45.8 million in mid-2002), its 

overall connectivity is still very low (as of mid-2002, only 3.58 percent of its population was online, up from 0.0001 percent in 1997). 

How can we have a society with a first-rate IW capability but a 

third rate information system? 

China’s mixed record as an IT society in an increasingly 

globalized economy—a giant in absolute terms with immense upside potential but a dwarf in relative terms—will affect the degree 

of success of China’s further inroads in IW. The PLA’s immersion 

in both IW and RMA, notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine a superb IW fighting force detached from a society characterized by relatively low technology and connectivity. A strong IT base gives rise 

to a strong IW capability. 

Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 

Statement of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Political Science 

University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia 

Winning the War Without Fighting and

Overcoming the Superior With the Inferior?

China’s Information Warfare Strategies and

Implications for Asymmetric Conflict in the Taiwan Strait 

My remarks will focus on one aspect of China’s military modernization—information warfare (IW). China’s development on IW entails considerable implications for 

security in the Taiwan Strait and relations with the United States. My comments 

are drawn from two of my published articles, one of which is included as a written 

statement for the Commission. 

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My key points are highlighted at the outset. First, the PRC’s interests in IW reflect an increasingly prevalent view among well-versed strategic thinkers in China 

that IW is a key catalyst for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Revolution in 

Military Affairs (RMA) and a vital impetus for China’s military modernization. Second, China’s IW strategy is distinctive in applying traditional stratagems (e.g., 

Sun Tzu’s ‘‘overcoming the superior with the inferior’’ and Mao Zedong’s ‘‘people’s 

war’’) to modern warfare in an attempt to overcome a technologically superior adversary (i.e., the United States) by attacking its strategic ‘‘Achilles’ heel.’’ China’s IW

strategy thus epitomizes asymmetric war, defined as the use of surprise force by a 

weaker party against a stronger but vulnerable adversary. 

Third, China seems keen on developing its IW capability into a credible military 

option that can be used to (1) absorb Taiwan on Beijing’s terms of unification at 

some point in the future, and (2) deter the United States from intervening in any 

cross-Strait conflict. These trends increase the prospects for misperception and miscalculation and introduce new sources of instability into the cross-Strait relationship. 

Fourth, despite the PLA’s keen interests in IW, there exists a doctrinal-capability 

gap in China’s IW development. My remarks will end on a cautionary note on an 

incipient digital ‘‘mutual assured destruction’’ (MAD) emerging across the Taiwan 

Strait as a result of the double-edged nature of technology, the low connectivity of

Chinese society, and Taiwan’s responses. 

For the most part of China’s post-reform era (1978–), military modernization had 

received the lowest priority among the Four Modernizations, mainly due to budgetary constraints, technological deficiencies, and an army-dominated force structure 

with a continental orientation. As China’s security environment changed and its 

economy expanded, China’s military doctrine also evolved. China’s military doctrines

from the late 1970s to the late 1980s were termed People’s War and People’s War 

Under Modern Conditions, which aimed at defending China’s homeland and borders 

(mainly from the Soviet Union) and relied upon large army units. With the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, China shifted its attention to potential regional skirmishes 

along its maritime frontiers in the southeast—a strategy known as Local War. The 

Gulf War had tremendous impact on PLA doctrinal development. By the mid-1990s

the PLA’s dominant doctrine had evolved into what PLA theoreticians called Local 

War Under Modern High-Technology Conditions. Meanwhile, some PLA strategists 

expanded their study of other concepts of future high-technology warfare, including 

IW, which became known under the rubric of RMA. The major focus of PLA operational planning in the late 1990s had become preparation of military options and 

capabilities to ensure that Taiwan does not seek independence. The possibility that

the U.S. military may become involved in the defense of Taiwan is a worst-case factor that PLA planners also must consider. The Taiwan scenario became a prime 

case for this new doctrine. 

In this regard, IW holds special appeal to top PLA brass, which sees it as a way 

of bypassing many deficiencies most PLA commanders and researchers recognize. 

IW weapons are seen as ‘‘killer’’ weapons, ‘‘trump cards’’ or ‘‘magic weapons’’ 

(shashoujian) that can overcome inherent weaknesses in the PLA to inflict surprise 

attacks. 

Until now, two aphorisms have been widely (and uncritically) accepted by most 

scholars and analysts: (1) In a conflict, the party with preponderant force prevails— 

either by coercing the weaker party to take an action desired by the former 

(compellence) or by dissuading the weaker party from taking an action detested by 

the former (deterrence). (2) Although the PRC has refused to renounce the use of 

force against Taiwan, it currently has few credible military options. However, certain recent developmental trends in the PLA could upset the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 

In recent years some well-versed military theorists and writers in the PLA have 

been exploring new concepts of war that call into question, if not invalidate, these 

two dictums. Of particular note is their fascination with asymmetric warfare strategies that make offense a more attractive option to the weaker party. One publication 

that has attracted considerable attention inside and outside China is Unrestricted 

Warfare. Reflecting upon war in the age of technological integration and globalization, the authors discuss a new type of war—unrestricted warfare (chaoxian zhan)— 

that transcends all boundaries and limits, and promote expanding combat beyond 

the battlefield to include such other facets as computer warfare, international terrorism, biological and chemical warfare, and economic and financial warfare (caveat: 

some of their recommendations, such as state-sponsored terrorism, are fundamentally at odds with China’s stated policy). 

IW exemplifies unrestricted warfare and lends credence to the concept of asymmetric war. It challenges the conventional Clausewitzian view that ‘‘violence is the 

128


essence of war’’ by luring the initiators of IW into thinking that they can achieve

their political objectives without much sacrifice. The Chinese view IW as a superior 

choice for attaining classic strategist Sun Tzu’s adage: ‘‘To subdue the enemy without 

fighting is the acme of skill.’’ It also gives developing nations like China an allure 

to compensate for their military inferiority vis-a`-vis the United States, because they 

can make up technological backwardness with superior strategies—the notion of 

overcoming the superior with the inferior. The Chinese also hope to exploit the apparent paradox that the strong American ‘‘information society’’ also poses a potentially weak side to a determined adversary to achieve Sun Tzu’s highest stage of 

‘‘winning the war without fighting.’’ China’s approach toward IW thus fits a pattern 

that is emblematic of many of its previous reform endeavors—‘‘to retain Chinese 

teaching as the root and only use Western teaching selectively’’ (Zhongxue weiti, 

Xixue weiyong). China is developing ‘‘information warfare with Chinese characteristics’’ by integrating traditional Chinese stratagems into modern IW. This strategy

poses a challenge to the Western-dominated IW paradigm. 

The July 2002 Pentagon report to Congress states that China ‘‘views information 

operations/information warfare (IO/IW) as a strategic weapon . . .’’ and ‘‘is particularly sensitive to the potential asymmetric applications IO/IW can have in any future conflict with a technologically superior adversary.’’ It points out that China’s 

military is developing strategies and tactics to use ‘‘surprise, deception, and shock’’ 

in any opening military campaign, while ‘‘exploring coercive strategies’’ designed to 

bring Taiwan to terms quickly. 

The strategic considerations of China’s interest in unconventional forms of warfare (and devotion to IW in particular) could introduce instability into the Taiwan 

Strait. Since the end of the Cold War, China’s double-digit growth rate in the 1990s 

have allowed China to substantially increase its military spending and to use its

new wealth to acquire advanced weapons and technologies. The PLA is following 

Deng’s advice to develop ‘‘selective pockets of excellence.’’ Consequently, IW is playing a very important role in this strategic view of military modernization. 

As an example of retooling, China has now given its vast 1.5 million-strong reserve force, which in the past was charged with supporting PLA forces in defense 

against any foreign intervention, with an IW/IO mission. To answer Jiang Zemin’s

1991 call for building common telecom systems for both military and civilian use, 

China has attempted to implement a ‘‘people’s war’’ with IW reserve force. 

The advent of IW has introduced a new element into the cross-Strait military situation by presenting China with a potentially credible military option vis-a`-vis Tai­ wan. The Pentagon report states that despite Beijing’s professed commitment to a

peaceful unification with Taiwan, the Chinese leadership has shown an increasing 

willingness to consider the use of force to achieve unification. The report argues 

‘‘Beijing’s primary political objective in any Taiwan-related crisis . . . likely would be 

to compel Taiwan authorities to enter into negotiations on Beijing’s terms and to 

undertake operations with enough rapidity to preclude third-party intervention.’’ It 

also seems to concur with the view of some analysts that the PLA’s offensive capabilities improve as each year passes, providing Beijing with an increasing number 

of credible options to intimidate or actually attack Taiwan. With the exception of 

ballistic missiles, IW seems the most promising option for achieving Beijing’s political objectives. Indeed, the PRC has made considerable efforts toward making IW 

a real option. 

Certain PLA officers have promoted IW as an effective weapon to subdue Taiwan 

and to deter possible American intervention. Military publications study the various 

forms IW can be waged in a combined amphibious battle (e.g., command and control 

war, intelligence war, network war, communication war, and electronic war). 

Further, the Chinese military has begun to put these ideas into practice. In the 

summer of 2001, the PLA for first time began the war game exercises in the Taiwan 

Strait with information warfare aimed at electronically paralyzing enemy communications and command systems. Also for the first time, a new electronic warfare 

unit was deployed over the Strait. In exercises the following year, the PLA incorporated even more sophisticated items of IO/IW. 

In sum, the PLA seeks to gain information domination in any conflict with Taiwan by attacking Taiwan’s information networks and command and control centers, 

as well as by conducting propaganda and political warfare. The purpose is to incorporate Taiwan by ‘‘subduing the enemy without actually fighting’’ a` la Sun Tzu, and 

by denying possible American military intervention. 

This trend presents a new challenge to Taiwan and U.S. defense officials. Most 

analysts have hitherto: (1) dismissed Chinese invasion threat due to the high 

threshold for success (due to logistical difficulties, Taiwanese resistance, and international intervention); (2) argued that Taiwan’s smaller military can maintain a 

129


qualitative edge until at least 2005; (3) questioned whether Beijing has realistic

military options vis-a`-vis Taiwan despite both the PRC’s consistent refusal to renounce the use of force and occasional saber-rattling against Taiwan; and (4) held 

that a probable, albeit not guaranteed, U.S. military intervention (in the case of an 

unprovoked attack on Taiwan) serves to deter Beijing—i.e., the so-called policy of 

strategic ambiguity. 

From the Chinese standpoint, IW seems to have lowered the threshold for a likely 

successful military campaign against Taiwan and increased the utility of an offensive 

strategy. IW seems to hold promise for ‘‘winning the battle without fighting’’ (Sun 

Tzu’s adage) and ‘‘overcoming the superior with the inferior’’ (Mao’s guerrilla strategy). Properly executed IW may—along with such other coercive weapons as missile 

strikes and a naval blockade—help bring Taiwan to its knees and deny American 

intervention. Such perceptions may cloud decision-making and make China more 

likely to use force. The application of information technology in international conflicts such as cross-Strait tensions may thus result in more instability. 

How seriously should American decision-makers take the PRC’s IW endeavors? 

There is no question that the Chinese military is keenly interested in studying IW. 

At the present moment the PLA’s interest is primarily academic; its IW capabilities 

are far from operational (weaponized). The modernization of the Chinese armed 

forces has so far lagged behind doctrinal development.

Nevertheless, China’s IW forays will benefit from two factors—one old and one 

new. Historically, China has more than once surprised Western analysts by indigenously developing weapons systems that the West tried hard to deny to China (e.g., 

atomic bombs in 1964 and nuclear warhead miniaturization technology in 1999). 

Prudence thus cautions against dismissing the possibility that China may succeed 

in developing ‘‘IW with Chinese characteristics.’’ Whether a modern IW doctrine

guided by proven historical stratagems will surpass the Western model remains to 

be seen, however. 

Most importantly, the future of China’s IW development hinges on the country’s 

economic ascendancy in general and its rise as a major global IT player in particular. Thanks in large measure to investments by Taiwanese IT firms on the 

mainland, the PRC has recently overtaken Taiwan as the world’s third largest IT 

hardware producer and is poised to overtake Japan in the next decade if current 

growth trends continue. In addition, China’s online population is experiencing exponential growth: from 200,000 in 1997, to 16.9 million in July 2000, and to 45.8 million in July 2002, making China one of the largest and fastest-growing Internet 

markets. However, viewed from another indicator—Internet penetration rate (i.e., online population as a percentage of total population), China remains sparsely wired. 

As of July 2002, only 3.58 percent of its population was online, up from 0.001 percent six years ago. Compared to the United States, Japan, and even Taiwan, China 

clearly has a long way to go before it can claim to be a true information power. 

China’s mixed record as an IT society in an increasingly globalized economy—i.e., 

being a giant in absolute terms and with tremendous upside potential, while also 

being a dwarf in relative terms—will affect the degree of success of China’s further 

inroads in IW. The PLA’s immersion in both IW and RMA, notwithstanding, it is 

hard to imagine a superb IW fighting force detached from a society characterized 

by relatively low technology and connectivity. A strong IT base gives rise to a strong 

IW capability. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much. Dr. Goldstein and Mr. 

Murray, I’ll let you go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN, PH.D. 

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, AND WILLIAM MURRAY 

RETIRED COMMANDER AND RESEARCH FELLOW 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. If you can call up the presentation there. I want 

to thank the Commission for including us in these very interesting 

and important deliberations. One quick caveat: The research that 

we’re presenting today, these are our own opinions, not the opinions of the United States Navy. 

One other quick note. This research will appear in the spring 

issue of International Security, and we’ve submitted it for the 

record. 

130 

Our bottom line, what our studies show, is that China is making 

a very significant investment in undersea warfare and that submarines are emerging as the centerpiece of their ongoing naval 

modernization. 

Next slide, please. If you could click a few ahead. I don’t have 

a clicker here. One more. All right. Just to note in our sources, 

we’re using what we think are rather unique sources. First of all, 

quite a bit of Russian material is available because the Russians, 

of course, are marketing these, but also a host of Chinese unclassified materials that we’re following—Dangdai Haijun, Guoji 

Zhangwang—one more, Jianchuan Zhishi, please—Renmin Haijun. 

Unfortunately, these resources I think are not well exploited by 

our intelligence community, nor even by academia. We’re trying at 

Naval War College to develop sort of a center of unclassified research as well as classified on China’s naval modernization. 

Mr. MURRAY. Okay. Could we go to the next slide, thank you. I’d 

like to echo Dr. Goldstein’s thank you to the Commissioners. Thank 

you very much for inviting us. 

In May 2002, Russia announced a contract to sell eight of these 

KILO submarines to People’s Republic of China. They’re getting 

eight of these for $1.6 billion and depending on the source, they’ll 

either take delivery by 2005 or 2007. It’s important to note that as 

a former submarine officer and somebody who qualified to command Los Angeles class attack submarines, these submarines are 

spoken of in the open press as being more quiet at times than our 

improved Los Angeles class submarines. 

They’re extremely difficult to find and they’ll be operated in some 

of the most challenging anti-submarine warfare environment on 

the face of the earth. This is a huge problem. 

Now in addition to getting these submarines, China is also buying, as Mr. Fisher and somebody else mentioned earlier—a click, 

please—this SS–N–27 or 3M54 Echo or the Club cruise missile. A 

quick review of this thing. It’s got 120 nautical mile range and it 

homes, it terminal homes at supersonic speeds, something in excess 

of Mach 2 and it carries a tremendous warhead. It’s extremely difficult to shoot down and it is a severe threat to any surface ship 

that it is shot at. 

Now, in addition to this, China is also buying from Russia the 

Test 71 anti-surface warfare torpedo. It’s a wire guided or wake 

homing torpedo. It can shoot either surface ships and it can shoot 

submarines equally well. And it’s a relatively brainless torpedo. It 

has all the brains for it that you need. You shoot it. It gets the hit. 

Now, in addition to this, we see tremendous interest in all of the 

journals that Dr. Goldstein just mentioned in air independent propulsion, and let me emphasize we don’t see China having this this 

year, but we see a tremendous interest in issue after issue after 

issue of their journals in acquiring this or exploring it. And the reason is a relatively modest investment in air independent propulsion, which, by the way, all the major European manufacturers 

offer as an option, gives a diesel submarine the option of not snorkeling in order to recharge its batteries. 

They can operate for weeks at a time. We’ve interviewed the 

Swedish officers who have commanded these, and they said it is a 

broad blossoming of capabilities for diesel submarine. 

131 

It’s a tremendous thing that they’re interested in and of course 

Pakistan has the French system, and we know that the Pakistanis 

and the Chinese cooperate very closely on a number of issues. 

The next slide, please. Now hand in hand with the KILO sale is, 

of course, the Song program. This is an indigenous submarine that 

China is building out by themselves, but that’s a little bit misleading. It’s got German diesel engines. It’s got French digital 

sonar system, and it’s a modern capable submarine. This is a very 

capable 1980s, mid-’80s, late ’80s, type submarine. It was originally 

thought to be a real—I’m going to use a flippant term—a dog, but 

China is still making these things. They’ve improved it successfully 

and it’s now entered serial production. Most unclassified sources 

will tell you that there are at least five of them in the water and 

we expect to see quite a few more of them. 

Now, there are a number of parallels. One more, thank you. 

China is in a hurry. They’re building a very capable Navy in general, a military even more broadly, but specifically a submarine 

force. 

They’re buying the KILOs. They’re building the Song. As people 

have mentioned earlier, they’re buying the SU–27s and 30s, and 

they’re building the F–10, the J–10. They’re buying the 

SOVREMENNIYs and they’re building these Type 52s or 107 class 

ships. 

China is in a hurry. They’re very interested in getting a capable 

Navy, and from our point of view, they seem to be succeeding. 

One more, please. Now complementing this effort at diesel submarines, China is undergoing an extensive program of nuclear 

powered submarine modification. The type 93 SSN, the first of this 

was launched in December of 2002. Generally, this was a surprise 

to many people. If you look through the old Jane’s issues you’ll find 

that that was a shock. 

And one more click. They’re also building the Type 094 SSBN, 

and we have a Jane’s source that tells us that one of these has already started construction. This will carry the JL–2 missile an 

8,000-kilometer, perhaps multiple independent reentry vehicle nuclear missile, and we’re not sure how many that will be built. 

We see references to six and we also have a Chinese reference 

that says, kind of a little bit of breast beating, we’d like to have 

30 of each, 30 of the fast attack submarines and six or more of the 

ballistic missile subs. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Next slide, please. Bill has told you some about 

the platforms, but what about the people behind the platforms? We 

see what we think is really a revolution in Chinese training activity moving to what they call confrontational training. What this 

amounts to is red versus blue exercises where they’re not, in other 

words, rote and scripted exercises. They force the commanders to 

make decisions on the spot. 

We see this in the Navy and in the submarine force. Next slide, 

please. 

Lots of activity in logistics, but let me give you an idea, an example from this logistics activity to the idea of the kind of—I’ll give 

you an idea of the kind of innovative exercise that we’ve taken note 

of. 

132 

China now in most of its training explicitly identifies the United 

States as a possible adversary which is a major step in itself, and 

in one of their recent submarine exercises, they did a remote torpedo loadout from a very isolated civilian port, and what this tells 

us is keeping this idea of confronting the United States in mind, 

that they may lose access to these ports in the early phase of a war 

to their major facilities and have to work out of these remote bases. 

So this shows us a leap in sophistication in their exercises. 

Next please. More broadly speaking, though, they’re engaged in 

the objective study of history, naval history and submarine history 

in particular. We see a huge amount of material looking at old— 

this is a discussion of Gunter Prien in the Second World War, but 

a huge amount of material devoted to this, and may not seem significant. After all, Naval War College, this is our bread and butter, 

but it is significant in a Chinese context because you know this is 

a force that’s spent a lot of time discussing Maoism and Marxism 

and how it would be applied to naval warfare. 

This is a real change to a much more objective study of the lessons of history and we expect to see progress accordingly. 

Next, please. They’re also shooting torpedoes and Navy’s don’t always do this. It’s expensive. It’s hard and China is doing so. 

Okay. Next, please. Make a mention. This has been covered 

widely and Rick—Mr. Fisher has done a great job in his paper on 

this showing the great influence of Russian technology. We see 

them not only buying technology but getting deep access to Russia’s 

expertise, their ship design bureaus are said to be full of Chinese 

students, and they’re getting great access to the shipyards as we 

can see from these photographs. 

They’re even resorting, and this is curious, I think, in the Russian context to espionage. The director of the acoustics noise laboratory in Vladivostok is actually on trial. In Congress, we’re, of 

course, very familiar with the Nunn-Lugar legislation that tried to 

stem this tide of Russian nuclear expertise, but clearly we’ve been 

quite unable to stem the tide of expertise on conventional weaponry 

and undersea warfare in particular. 

Next please. But one also has to consider the impact of European 

influence. The Europeans publish a huge amount of material and 

if these export restrictions change, we think that some of the cutting edge European technology, for example, on AIP, will be filtering even more directly into China. 

Next, please. To speak concretely of the scenario that’s already 

been discussed a lot today, of course, we have to be concerned with 

missiles, but submarines could also factor into a variety of scenarios and even be the pointy tip of the spear in a blockade scenario, of course. 

Next, please. Next, if you could click one or two more, please, 

again, please. All right. This is an article, just a quick note, an article from Michael O’Hanlon in the year 2000 where he looked carefully, and he’s very dismissive of Chinese capabilities in general 

and particularly of the blockade scenario, and in his evaluation, he 

said in an extreme case, a U.S. ship or two could be lost. We feel 

that is off by a fair margin. That it’s an exceedingly optimistic estimate based on badly flawed assumptions which we can go more 

133 

into in the Q&A. But generally, underestimating Chinese capabilities. 

Go ahead, Bill. 

Mr. MURRAY. Click, please. Well, China has a number of capabilities that most people just won’t even—don’t seem to want to consider. As I mentioned earlier, they’re buying the test 71 torpedo, 

which gives their newest submarines an anti-submarine warfare 

capability. So this raises the prospect of one of their submarines 

shooting and sinking another submarine, perhaps ours. 

Another slide, please. China also has a tremendous number of 

submarines. Now one submarine that is unlocated is going to cause 

a battle group commander to take a real hard look at what he 

wants to do and why. And China can easily muster 40 or 50 submarines without much trouble whatsoever. Another click. 

They also have a large inventory of mines. And we see a tremendous interest in some of the most modern deadly mines going. 

These deep water rising mines can be purchased from Russia. They 

have tremendous ability to mine deeper waters where we would 

prefer to operate. So what we would consider to have been a haven 

may no longer be a haven. 

Another click. Thank you. China is also exhibiting a great interest in using anti-air capability from a submarine. Some of the Russian submarines—this is a Cold War era tactic—the French are 

also designing this. You can go to the DCA web site to see more. 

China is following it very closely. 

One more click. And China has something we have a hard time 

getting over there and that’s local knowledge. When they operate 

in these waters day after day, day after day, hour after hour, they 

acquire a level of expertise on where it’s quiet, where it’s noise, 

where are the fishing vessels and so on and so forth, that we just 

don’t have yet. 

And another click. Now the other thing that China recognizes 

clearly is that, and they pay a tremendous amount of attention to 

this, is that our large ships, our aircraft carriers, our LPHs and 

even our large logistics resupply ships, are all prime targets, and 

the sinking or even the damaging and making dead in the water 

one of our large deck ships would be a calamity for the United 

States if we were to intervene or get involved in a Taiwan scenario. 

And we see the great focus of their effort is towards acquiring 

this capability, whether it’s cruise missiles that can be launched 

from submerged submarines from 120 nautical miles away that 

they’re buying from Russia or their indigenously built ones that 

have somewhat shorter ranges, but still aren’t something that you 

could just dismissively ignore. 

China is clearly oriented towards this goal. This begs the question. Could Taiwan defend itself from a concerted Chinese submarine campaign and our answer is unequivocally no. They have 

26 of these S–2 trackers in the upper left corner; six of them according to the most recent article we can find are air-worthy. We’ve 

already gone over the sad story of the $4.1 billion offer for 12 P– 

3Cs. 12 P–3Cs will not win an anti-submarine war campaign. It 

won’t do it, and at $4.1 billion, the Taiwan government is balking. 

They’re buying the Kidd destroyers. Of course, that’s relatively 

cheap and they have two submarines, and they’re interested and 

134 

we’re interested in selling them eight more submarines, but at a 

cost of $10.1 billion by some estimates and perhaps 2019 final delivery date, that’s too little, too late, at too much money frankly. 

They don’t have enough platforms to conduct an anti-submarine 

warfare campaign, which requires a tremendous number of ships, 

all acting in an intricately choreographed manner in order to be 

successful. 

Could I have another slide? Thank you. Now, can the United 

States Navy come to the rescue in this? The cavalry? Well, that’s 

a tough question. The S–3 aircraft that the aircraft carriers carry 

are no longer funded for anti-submarine warfare and don’t conduct 

it, though they do carry the APS–137 radar. The Spruance class destroyer on the upper left, that was a wonderful anti-submarine 

warfare ship. We have five of those left in the Pacific Fleet. By the 

end of fiscal year 2005, we’ll have one left. 

The T–AGOS ships that would carry the towed-arrays and could 

listen very carefully for quiet submarines and were excellent at 

finding them, we had a Cold War high of 23. We’re down to four 

or five of those now. And of course, the P–3s have gone down by 

half of what we had in the Cold War, and a third of the ones that 

we have remaining were recently announced for early decommissioning due to some maintenance problems. 

Oh, and of course, something near and dear to my heart are the 

number of fast attack submarines. We had 100 or more in the Cold 

War. We’re down to 58. One of our admirals was recently quoted 

as saying it wouldn’t surprise him if we were down in the 30s before the end of the very short time period, end of the decade. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Okay. Let me just summarize here then. It 

seems to us that the PLA Navy modernization is gathering steam 

and that submarines are at the center of this. What do we see? We 

see an unprecedented scale in the sale of KILOs that happened in 

2002. We see them despite that sale going ahead with the Song 

class. Many had said they would shut down the Song class because 

of the KILO sale, but they’re going in tandem now. 

We see them fielding the second generation of nuclear boats, 

which we think will be a leap in capability. And we also see this 

great improvement in the areas of recruiting, training, logistics, 

R&D. 

One final note that I didn’t get to mention is the new CNO, the 

Chief of Naval Operations equivalent for the PLA Navy, is a submariner. Last one was an aviator. That happened last year. So it 

seems to us rather clear that China is following the path, well-trod 

path of other continental powers, Germany, and the USSR after 

them, in relying on subs to challenge the superior maritime opponent. 

Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 

135 

Statement of Lyle J. Goldstein, Ph.D.*

Associate Professor of Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, and 

William Murray, Retired Commander and Research Fellow 

U.S. Naval War College 

Undersea Dragons—China’s Maturing Submarine Force † 

Despite new tensions surrounding the March 2004 Presidential elections on Taiwan, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have witnessed 

over the last two years an impressive and unexpected warming of relations.1 Since 

the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there have been a series of high-level 

meetings between the countries’ leaders. China backed United States military intervention in Afghanistan and actively supports the new regime of Hamid Karzai in 

Kabul.2 The past year has seen substantial United States-Chinese cooperation in 

the sphere of counterterrorism, including the sharing of intelligence and the arrest 

of several suspected terrorists.3 Surprising many, Beijing has supported the United 

States on all major United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the recent Iraq war. Even more significant, American observers have been profoundly impressed with China’s quiet efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula.4 

Many are convinced that a major corner has been turned in United States-China 

relations, with Beijing embracing a much more pro-American foreign policy. An alternative explanation however, holds that Chinese leaders have instead opted for a 

pause in the evolving Sino-American strategic rivalry. Diplomatic gestures support 

the optimistic view of United States-China relations, but close inspection of Chinese 

military development provides ample evidence for both caution and concern. 

Indeed, while the United States military remains focused on the Middle East, the 

Korean Peninsula, and Central Asia, China continues its rapid military modernization. As part of an increasing maritime focus, significant aircraft and destroyer purchases indicate a broad effort to improve combat capabilities. There is little evidence 

however, that China will endeavor to field carrier battle groups.5 Moreover, Chinese 

airpower is constrained by weak aerial refueling capabilities, and its surface fleet 

lacks adequate air defense.6 Alternatively, preliminary indications suggest that submarines will lead China’s new maritime strategic orientation.7 

† This article will appear in the Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004) issue of International Security. * Note: The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent 

the official viewpoints of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government. 1 This turnaround in relations was all the more surprising given the strains that accompanied 

the Bush Administration’s early labeling of China as a ‘‘strategic competitor.’’ These strains 

came to head in the so-called ‘‘EP–3 incident’’ of April 2001, in which an American reconnaissance plane was damaged in a mid-air collision with an aggressive Chinese interceptor, and subsequently detained on Hainan Island after an emergency landing. 2 See ‘‘Jiang Zemin Announces PRC Aid to Afghanistan,’’ Xinhua News Agency, December 20, 

2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document No. CPP20011220000178. 3 Keith Bradsher, ‘‘3 in Hong Kong Agree to Face Charges in U.S.,’’ New York Times, January 

7, 2003, pg. A11. 4 See, for example, Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘‘China’s New Diplomacy,’’ Foreign 

Affairs Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 22–35. 5 Despite the 2001 purchase of the aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine, most naval analysts 

are skeptical regarding China’s intentions to use this platform to develop carrier aviation, because of the tremendous cost that would be necessary to make the vessel combat ready. This 

viewpoint is not universal, however. For example, one Japanese estimate notes, ‘‘It is clear that 

the Chinese navy has a ‘blue water navy’ orientation and intends to have aircraft carriers.’’ See 

[editorial], ‘‘Technical Level and Future Trends of Chinese Warships,’’ Sekai no Kansen, July 

01, 2002, pp. 96–103, FBIS Document No. JPP20020809000036. For insight into the Chinese 

debate on aircraft carriers, see ‘‘Zhongguo Xuyao Hangkong Mujian? Haishi Qianting?’’ [Does 

China need aircraft carriers? Or submarines?], Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and Merchant Ships], 

No. 247 (April 2000), p. 9. 6 Concerning Chinese aerial refueling, see Liu Jiafeng and Sha Zhiliang, ‘‘Haitian Duijie: 

Haijun Kongjun Bing Kongzhong Jiashouyou Shuenlian Jishi’’ [Connecting over the ocean: A 

record of the naval air force’s aerial refueling exercise], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 258 (March 

2001), p. 5. This narrative reveals the exercise to be one of the first of its kind, that it was 

limited in scope, and that many unanticipated problems developed during the course of the maneuvers. On weak air defenses of the People’s Liberation Army Navy for surface combatants, 

see, for example, David Isenberg, ‘‘China Buys Russian Vessels to Mount Naval Challenge to 

U.S.,’’ Navy News & Undersea Technology, November 18, 2002, p. 3. 7 Certainly, land-based aircraft and surface vessels can be an effective complement to the submarine force. On China’s new maritime strategic orientation, see, for example, Tang Fuquan, 

Huang Jinsheng and Zhang Yonggang, ‘‘Shin Shiji Haiyang Zhanlue Xingshi Zhanwang’’ [Prospects for a maritime strategy in the 21st century], Junshi Kexue [Military Science], Vol. 15, No. 

Continued 

136


This development is demonstrated most clearly by China’s unprecedented signing

of a contract with Russia for eight new Kilo-class diesel submarines in May 2002. 

Contrary to Western forecasts, China’s confidence in imported Kilos has not halted 

domestic production of the new Song-class diesel submarine.8 In addition, China’s 

nuclear propulsion program will soon field the first of its second-generation vessels, 

which will include both attack submarines and strategic missile boats. Finally, the 

PLA Navy (PLAN) is undertaking an overhaul of the submarine force’s weaponry,

training, recruitment, and doctrine. A Chinese appraisal of future naval warfare 

concludes, ‘‘The prospect for using submarines is good, because of their covertness 

and power. . . . Submarines are menaces existing anywhere at any time.’’ 9 According 

to another Chinese analyst, ‘‘Submarines are the maritime weapons posing the 

greatest threat to an aircraft carrier formation. Submarines are also our Navy’s core 

force.’’ 10 

Recognizing this priority, the 2002 Department of Defense (DoD) report to the 

United States Congress on Chinese military capabilities concludes, ‘‘The PLA Navy 

likely intends to maintain a large submarine force.’’ 11 Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt 

(U.S. Navy, ret.), a close observer of the Chinese navy, similarly contends, ‘‘Submarines are an essential ingredient in the . . . maritime strategy of China,’’ and calls 

for focused research on China’s submarine force.12 

Unclassified studies of Beijing’s ability to conduct undersea warfare are rare. Unfortunately, the analyses that have been available to the wider academic community 

are also misleading, built on highly problematic assumptions. In particular, Michael 

O’Hanlon’s article in International Security, although relatively accurate concerning 

the prospects for an amphibious invasion, perilously simplifies the challenge posed 

by China’s submarine force.13 This sanguine approach reflects a broader inclination

within the American strategic studies community. Indeed, few in the United States 

national security establishment view Chinese military modernization as a potential 

menace,14 especially given the immediate nature of other threats such as terrorism 

and proliferation. Many analysts make the all-too-frequent mistake of extrapolating 

from decades of peace in the Taiwan Strait. A deeper understanding of Chinese security policy, however, suggests that peace in the Strait during most of the Cold 

War (since the 1960s) was the consequence of the virulent Sino-Soviet conflict that 

focused Beijing’s attention elsewhere, rather than the product of a stable political 

reality. With Soviet tanks poised to drive on Beijing, Taiwan was not an primary 

consideration for China’s leaders. Since the end of the Cold War, the East Asian 

strategic landscape has fundamentally changed, and growing Chinese power and nationalism make the status quo in the Taiwan Strait especially precarious. 

Given the persistence of this troubling scenario, together with China’s increasing 

maritime strategic focus, this article seeks to assess China’s evolving submarine 

force and its likely impact on international security. The first section describes the 

1 (2002), pp. 88–97; and Hou Songling and Chi Diantang, ‘‘Zhongguo Zhoubian Haiyu de 

Zhanlue Diwei he Dilu Zhanlue Jiazhi Chutan, ‘‘China’s Near Seas: Strategic Position and GeoStrategic Importance,’’ Dangdai Yazhou [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], No. 10 (2003), pp. 

47–52. 8 An example of a forecast that recently predicted the demise of the Song submarine program 

is Nikolai Novichkov, ‘‘China’s Russian Kilo Buy May Put Song Submarine Future In Doubt,’’ 

Jane’s Defense Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 24, June 12, 2002, p. 3. 9 Capt. Shen Zhongchang, Lcdr. Zhang Haiyin, and Lt Zhou Xinsheng, ‘‘The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare,’’ in Michael Pillsbury, (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 277–278. 10 Wang Jiasuo, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers: Suggest You Keep Out of the Taiwan Strait,’’ Junshi 

Wenzhai, [Military Digest], April 1, 2001, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20020326000218. 11 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, http://www.defenselink.mil/ 

news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf, p. 21. 12 Michael McDevitt, ‘‘Ruminations About How Little We Know About the PLA Navy,’’ paper 

presented to the Conference on Chinese Military Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2000, 

pp. 8–9, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ChinalCenter/CMAlConflOct00/paper14.htm. 13 See Michael O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ International Security, Vol. 

25, No. 2, (Fall 2000), pp. 51–86. 14 See, for example, the discussion of China’s maritime potential in Robert S. Ross, ‘‘Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,’’ International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 67, 80. Other examples include Bates Gill and 

Michael O’Hanlon, ‘‘China’s Hollow Military,’’ National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55– 

62; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘‘China’s Search for a Modern Air Force,’’ International 

Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 64–94; and Avery Goldstein, ‘‘Great Expectations: 

Interpreting China’s Arrival,’’ International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36– 

73. An important corrective to these analyses is Thomas J. Christensen, ‘‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,’’ International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5–40. 

137 

PLAN submarine force’s emerging order of battle, consisting of both conventionallypowered, and nuclear-powered vessels. The second section focuses on the all-important human and institutional dimensions that will support the major undersea platforms. The third section places the analysis into a political context: the crucial Taiwan scenario. The final section develops a sketch of emerging PLAN submarine doctrine for warfare against the United States Navy. We come to the preliminary conclusion that a dramatic shift in Chinese underwater aspirations and capabilities is 

under way, and that submarines are emerging as the centerpiece of an evolving Chinese quest to control the East Asian littoral. 

An Asymmetric Solution for the Littoral 

The PRC has long pursued a potent submarine force. Indeed, submarines were 

highlighted in the founding doctrine of the PLAN, as outlined by the very first commander-in-chief, Xiao Jingguang.15 Though China succeeded in amassing a rather 

large force over the decades of the Cold War, these efforts were constrained by 

Maoist excesses, which tended to retard the technical and organizational progress 

so critical to building, maintaining and operating a first class undersea fleet. Today’s China is vastly altered since the era of Mao. Now, China is poised to make 

a broad effort toward creating a submarine fleet that is both large, and modern. 

CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINES 

On 2 May 2003, China revealed that 70 PLAN submariners had perished in an 

undersea accident. Details of the tragedy, hardly China’s first submarine accident,16 

have gradually emerged. Preliminary examination showed that the submarine had 

not suffered any damage and all victims were confirmed to have ‘‘died of acute suffocation.’’ 17 Most likely, the accident resulted from the failure of a critical air intake 

valve to open.18 Regardless of the exact cause of this accident, the event raises troubling questions about safety procedures and the fundamental state of crew training 

on board PLAN submarines. The Financial Times reported that the recent incident 

‘‘cast a spotlight on China’s aging and ill-equipped submarine fleet.’’ 19 But it would 

be a mistake to extrapolate from this incident and assume that the PLAN submarine force is incompetent and obsolete. Such a perspective fails to recognize that 

submarine accidents have afflicted all of the major submarine powers. Indeed, as 

the Kursk disaster and also the U.S. Navy’s near loss of the USS Dolphin in May 

2002 illustrate, even the most mature submarine forces are not immune to serious 

accidents. 

Beijing responded to the accident with an unprecedented degree of candor. In a 

high profile visit carried on national television shortly after the initial announcement, new President Hu Jintao and ex-President Jiang Zemin traveled to the sub15 Wang Youqi, ‘‘Mao Zedong Zhuxi Shichaguo de Qianting’’ [The submarine inspected by Mao 

Zedong], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 287 (August 2003), p. 6. The doctrine was encapsulated in a 

three character phrase to guide the PRC’s new navy ‘‘Qian, Kong, Kuai’’—or simply ‘‘Submarines, [Land-Based] Aircraft, and Fast [Attack Patrol Boats].’’ 16 There is a report of a potentially devastating loss of a large group of skipper trainees when 

a Romeo-class submarine was lost in 1993. See Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., et al., ‘‘China and 

Northeast Asia, Navy,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, November 19, 2002, 

www.janes.com. There is more clarity concerning an accident in the 1980s, which killed 10, and 

an even more serious incident in the 1960s in which there was only one survivor. See Ma Ling 

and, Li Ming, ‘‘Why Did China Make Public the Submarine Accident?’’ Ming Pao, May 9, 2003, 

FBIS Document No. CPP20030509000043. The Chinese may have lost an additional Ming to a 

fire. See ‘‘Ming Type 035,’’ http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/plan/ming.htm. On early 

submarine accidents, see Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of Chinese 

Seapower (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 214. There is also some speculation 

regarding a second Xia-class ballistic missile submarine that might have been ‘‘lost in a fire before it went to sea.’’ See Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st 

Century, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 196, n. 46. 17 ‘‘Valve Problem Blamed for Submarine Accident,’’ Wen Wei Po, May 8, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030508000029. 18 Although the PLAN has not released the results of its investigation, a number of scenarios 

have been suggested. One possible sequence of events is that a crucial valve stuck shut and 

failed to allow exterior air to enter the submarine while the ship’s diesel engines were operating. 

The engines consumed all the oxygen from the ship’s atmosphere and rapidly asphyxiated the 

crew. An alternative explanation is that the diesel engines failed to shut off as intended when 

the submarine submerged. See ‘‘Valve Problem Blamed for Submarine Accident.’’ A third scenario offered by Rear Adm. Lloyd Vasey (U.S. Navy, Ret.) suggests that seawater entered the 

ship’s massive batteries, generating toxic clouds of chlorine gas that killed the crew. See Indira 

A.R. Lakshmanan, ‘‘Cause of Submarine Disaster Is Mystery,’’ Boston Globe, May 4, 2003, p. 

18. 19 James Kynge, ‘‘Hu Seeks More Modern Military,’’ Financial Times, May 5, 2003, p. 4. 

138


marine’s Lushun base to console the families and inspect the vessel.20 In a subsequent political development, the PLAN’s leader since 1996, Adm. Shi Yunsheng, was 

relieved and replaced by Adm. Zhang Dingfa.21 This shakeup at the top may or may 

not herald a new accountability in Chinese governance, but it is already certain that 

the submarine incident is having a profound effect on China’s navy. In particular, 

ADM Zhang’s background as a submariner—his predecessor was an aviator—is one 

of many signs that the PLAN is accelerating its efforts in the realm of undersea

warfare.22 

The scale of China’s $1.6 billion Kilo purchase from Russia suggests that PLAN 

strategists continue to view diesel submarines as a vital asset. The eight new Kilos, 

all project 636s, Russia’s top-of-the-line conventionally powered submarines, will 

augment the two 636s and the two somewhat more limited project 877s that China 

already possesses. Combined, these twelve impressive submarines will over the next

few years supplement China’s nearly thirty aging Romeos, approximately twenty 

Mings (an indigenously produced modified Romeo), and its five or more of the newer 

Song-class submarines to become a formidable prospective undersea opponent. 

Of all China’s submarines, the Kilo is the most formidable. It is well respected 

in the West, and is very quiet, employing a variety of advanced noise reduction 

measures including sound-dampening tiles, a raft-like shock absorbing base, and a 

seven-blade propeller to achieve its noteworthy stealth. The Kilo is as quiet as the 

improved version of the United States Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine.23 Double-hulled, it can dive to three hundred meters, has a maximum underwater speed of seventeen knots, and a crew of fifty two. China’s Kilos can launch 

Russia’s heavyweight wire-guided Test-71 ME, as well as 53–65KE wake-homing 

torpedoes.24 

The eight new Kilos, for which China has asked for ‘‘expedited’’ delivery within 

five years, will incorporate a number of significant upgrades.25 They will likely possess superior batteries (correcting a long-standing problem with exported Kilos), an 

enhanced digital sonar system, slower turning screws, and quieter main engines.26 

Moreover, their weaponry will be state of the art. They will be equipped with the 

versatile and potent Klub weapon control system that will allow them to fire the 

3M–54E antiship cruise missiles (ASCM). This fearsome missile feature supersonic 

20 Wang Chien-min ‘‘Story Behind the Truth of Submarine No. 361 Accident,’’ Hong Kong 

Yazhou Zhoukan, No. 20, May 12, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030513000079. 21 John Pomfret, ‘‘China Replaces Top Naval Officers Over Sub Disaster,’’ Washington Post, 

June 12, 2003, p. 19. 22 Significantly, ADM Zhang Lianzhong, who was PLAN commander from 1988 through 1996, 

was also a submariner. On ADM Zhang Lianzhong, see Srikanth Kondapalli, ‘‘Chinese Navy’s 

Political Work and Personnel,’’ Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 10 (January 2000), http:// 

www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sal00kos01.html. 23 Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional 

Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis,’’ CRS Reports for Congress, October 10, 2000, p. 

61, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30700.pdf. 24 ‘‘Kilo Class (Type 877/636) Diesel Electric Submarine,’’ http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/sub/ 

kilo.asp. Wire-guided torpedoes allow the shooting ship to guide the torpedo toward updated target positions, which can increase the probability of obtaining a hit. For a description of other 

advantages of wire-guided torpedoes, see Owen R. Cote ́ Jr., The Future of the Trident Force: Enabling Access in Access-Constrained Environment, May 2002, p. 19, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/TridentlForceWEB.PDF. Wake-homing torpedoes greatly simplify the problem 

of sinking surface ships by submarines. These are ‘‘fire-and-forget’’ torpedoes that detect and 

follow a ship’s wake until they reach the ship itself. Unlike most World War II-era torpedoes, 

and like wire guided torpedoes, wake-homing torpedoes can follow and pursue evading targets. 

Increasing their lethality, they attack ships from the rear, where the target ship’s propulsion 

machinery masks the torpedo’s sound. Additionally, they are immune to towed acoustic decoys. 

See Kan, Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 66. 25 Charles Hutzler, ‘‘Deficiencies of Chinese Weapons Makers Underlined By Arms Accord 

with Russia,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2002, p. A11. Chinese sources report that the sale 

is to be completed by 2007. See ‘‘Zhongguo Haijun Jiang Goumai Ba Sou Jiluo Ji Qianting’’ [China’s navy will purchase 8 Kilo-type submarines], Bingqi Zhishi [Ordnance Knowledge], (September 2002), p. 5; and ‘‘Zhongguo Zai Goumai Jiluo Qianting’’ [China again buys Kilo submarines] Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 275 (August 2002), p. 2. The latter Chinese article noted that 

the submarine being built at Krasnoye Sormovo was already two thirds completed. Various Russian sources have said, however, that the submarines are to be completed by 2005. See, ‘‘Russian Shipyard Begins Building Submarines for Chinese Navy,’’ Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey 

[Military News Agency], January 15, 2003, FBIS Document No. CEP20030115000216. 26 Regarding slower turning screws: It is essential to understand that the faster a ship’s propeller rotates, the more likely it is to cavitate or produce other types of detectable noises. Since 

a submarine’s stealth is inversely proportional to the amount of sound it generates, the ability 

to achieve the same submarine speeds with a slower turning screw produces a significant tactical advantage. On battery problems in Kilos, see, for example, See Kan, Bolckom, and 

O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 63. 

139 

terminal homing and a 120 nautical mile range. Additional Klub weapons the Russians will likely offer for sale include ballistic trajectory antisubmarine and 

antisurface rocket thrown torpedoes.27 The new Kilos may very well deploy Russia’s 

supercavitating Shkval torpedo. A recent Chinese discussion of these weapons offers 

the following characteristics for the Shkval: it weighs 2.7 tons, is 8.2 meters long 

and 533 mm wide, and has a range of 6–12 km with a maximum depth of 400 meters. The speed is given as in excess of 200 knots, which is roughly three times faster than any torpedo carried by Western submarines. Disturbingly, this article claims 

the Shkval system may already be operational within the PLAN submarine force.28 

Another source suggests that China may be fabricating its own supercavitating torpedo.29 Chinese periodicals also evince a great interest in defensive armaments for 

submarines, including noisemakers and other antitorpedo systems, as well as surface-to-air missiles for use against antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft.30 

Air independent propulsion (AIP) technology promises to revolutionize the combat 

potential of future diesel submarines.31 When submerged and operating on batteries, modern diesel submarines are notoriously difficult to detect—and in many 

cases are even quieter than their modern nuclear counterparts. This stealthiness is 

the single most valuable tactical feature of conventional submarines, enabling them, 

much like a sniper on land, to lie quietly in wait for enemy ships. Diesel submarine 

batteries require recharging every few days, however, which forces the submarine 

to sacrifice stealth by running its noisy diesel engines to generate electricity to 

charge the batteries. When running its diesel engines, the submarine must raise its 

snorkel mast to take in outside air to satisfy the engine’s enormous appetite for oxygen. This protrusion provides a significant radar and infrared target for opposing 

forces to find. Air independent propulsion, on the other hand, provides the means 

for diesel submarines to forgo these vulnerable snorkeling periods through continuous and quiet charging of the submarine’s batteries by generating electricity using 

large stores of liquid oxygen.32 

Although AIP-equipped diesel submarines cannot match the endurance or speed 

characteristics of nuclear submarines, AIP does permit diesel submarines to remain 

quietly submerged for weeks at a time. The tactical advantages that this near independence from snorkeling brings has led all the European submarine manufacturers 

to offer AIP as an option on their newest export classes. The Pakistani navy recently 

accepted a French AIP system for its most modern imported submarine.33 There is 

little reason to believe that the Chinese will settle for less. In fact, Chinese naval 

periodicals indicate a very significant Chinese interest in AIP.34 Even Chinese-built 

diesel submarines may soon appear with AIP. Analysts noted in 2001 that China’s 

twentieth Ming-class submarine was 2 meters longer than its predecessor, leading 

27 ‘‘Club Anti-ship Missile and Chinese Navy,’’ http://www.kanwa.com/free/2003/06/e0609a.htm. 

According to this source, China will obtain fifty of these missiles as part of the deal in which 

it is acquiring the eight project 636 Kilo submarines from Russia. 28 Zi Xuan, ‘‘Qiaoji Konghua Wuqi’’ [Super cavitation weapons], Bingqi Zhishi, (January 2002), 

p. 51. 

29 See ‘‘Navy Systems’’ in Richard D. Fisher, ‘‘The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology 

on the Modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army,’’ p. 18, forthcoming. 30 See, for example Yu Yongtao and Qian Jin, ‘‘Fuwu: Yulei Duikang Xitong’’ [The Fuwu antitorpedo system], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 277 (October 2002), pp. 37–38. This is an appraisal of 

a European system. 31 It is possible, but unlikely that the eight new Kilo submarines will be delivered with AIP. 

The Russian Rubin submarine design bureau advertises AIP as an option on Russia’s newest 

Amur-class diesel submarines. The premier of this class is now being built in St. Petersburg, 

http://www.ckb-rubin.com/. No country is publicly known to have purchased the AIP option from 

Russia. It is conceivable, however, that the technology for the Amur AIP system could be backfitted into China’s Kilo fleet. Chinese sources mention this possibility, but are noncommittal. 

See ‘‘Songji Zhihou de Zhongguo Qianting Jihua’’ [After the Song: Future Chinese submarine 

development], Jianchuan Zhishi No. 241 (October 1999), p. 2. 32 For a description of air-independent propulsion systems, as well as their history, strengths 

and limitations, see Edward C. Whitman, ‘‘Air-Independent Propulsion,’’ Undersea Warfare, Vol. 

4, No. 1 (Fall 2001), http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issuel13/propulsion.htm. 33 Joris Janssen Lok, ‘‘French Submarine Export Efforts are Gathering Speed,’’ Jane’s International Defense Review, Vol. 25, April 1, 2002, pp. 52–53. Given China’s close military ties with 

Pakistan, it is likely that Chinese engineers will get a thorough look at this new Pakistani acquisition from France. On Sino-Pakistani maritime cooperation, see, for example, ‘‘Navy Chief, 

Chinese Envoy Talk Defense Ties,’’ Statesman, February 7, 2003, FBIS Document No. 

SAP20030207000038. 34 See, for example, a series of articles in the January 1997 (No. 208) and August 1997 (No. 

215) issues of Jianchuan Zhishi. 

140 

to speculation that it was a test bed for an AIP system.35 A major center for AIP 

research in China is the Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics. Illustrating the high 

priority of this research in China, the institute was visited by Jiang Zemin in 1999. 

The Dalian institute has apparently engaged in a substantive scientific exchange on 

fuel cell technology with German institutes, the world’s leaders in fuel cells for submarines.36 

The 2002 DoD report to Congress on Chinese military modernization supports the 

idea that the Chinese are pursuing AIP, stating, ‘‘A new advanced version of the 

Song-class conventional submarine is expected to incorporate advanced AIP.’’ The 

same report details other Song innovations: a skewed seven-blade propeller, submerged ASCM launch capability, flank array sonar of French design, and German 

diesel engines.37 The PLAN intends the Song to be a modern replacement for its 

Mings and Romeos as well as a capable peer to its imported Kilos. Some disagree. 

Preliminary reports on the May 2002 Kilo sale projected that the purchase might 

signify the death knell for the Song program.38 Indeed, the five years that marked 

the interval between launches of the first two Songs did suggest profound engineering and design troubles. But the completion of the second Song in 2001, and a third 

Song in 2002, with continued design improvements from their predecessors, the 

most obvious of which is the removal of the notch in the leading edge of the sail, 

suggest instead that the program is going forward in tandem with the Kilo purchase. 

The new sail on the Song is a matter of some misunderstanding. One analyst 

wrote in Jane’s International Defense Review, ‘‘Starting with the third vessel, the 

Song (Type 039) submarine is very close to the French Agosta 90B in external 

shape. The height of the sail has been lowered in order to increase stability underwater.’’ 39 It is apparent, however that the sail was not lowered. Instead, the notch 

on the forward half of the sail was covered up by extending the top edge of the sail 

forward. This becomes obvious after a close examination of photos of the Song before 

and after the correction. Fortunately, several unclassified photos include human figures enabling relatively accurate (if unsophisticated) calculations regarding the 

height of the sail. Design considerations bolster the argument that the Song’s sail 

height was not lowered.40 The ‘‘smoothing’’ of the sail would doubtless make the 

flow of water around it much quieter. Thus, the speculation that the Song was unstable underwater—the supposed rationale for ‘‘lowering’’ the sail—is also suspect. 

To be sure, the five year gap in between hulls one and two is indicative of some 

serious problems. But these problems may well be less significant than early Western appraisals suggested.41 

If this submarine is better than originally estimated, then it should not be surprising that multiple sources report that several more of these vessels are being 

built.42 According to Rear Adm. Eric P. McVadon, (U.S. Navy, ret.), an authority on 

the Chinese navy, the Song has entered serial production.43 Another analyst even 

states that as many as ten Songs may be under construction, in two different ship35 Robert Sae-Liu, ‘‘China ‘Stretches’ Latest Ming Submarine,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly, Vol. 35, 

No. 1, January 3, 2001, p. 15. Since most European submarine manufacturers AIP hull sections 

are five to six meters long, Sae-Liu’s conclusion is probably mistaken. On the other hand, there 

is some speculation that an AIP test-bed malfunction caused the accident aboard Ming 361 in 

April 2003. See, for example, ‘‘Mystery Surrounding No. 361 Submarine Accident Remains Unsolved, Outdated Equipment Become Potential Danger for National Defense,’’ Nanfang Ribao 

[Southern Daily] May 6, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030506000139. 36 Fisher, ‘‘The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology,’’ p. 7, forthcoming. According to 

Fisher, the Dalian Institute has produced a Polymer Electrolyte Membrane (PEM) fuel cell that 

exceeds the PEM performance that Germany has developed for the Type 212 submarines. 37 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 21. 38 Nikolai Novichkov, ‘‘China’s Russian Kilo Buy,’’ p. 3. This is also implied in Kan, Bolckom, 

and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 59. 39 Yihong Zhang, ‘‘China’s Rising Forces,’’ Jane’s International Defense Review, Vol. 35, No. 8 

(August 2002), p. 39. 40 Submarine sails house retractable antennas, periscopes, and air induction masts. When retracted, these devices can extend from the top of the sail down to the bottom of the hull of the 

submarine. A full redesign of these internal elements would have been extremely time-consuming and costly, especially when compared to the relatively simple task of filling in the notch. 41 Robert Sae-Liu, ‘‘Second Song Submarine Vital to China’s Huge Defense Program,’’ Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 7, August 18, 1999, p. 17. 42 See, for example, ‘‘Type 039 (Song Class) Diesel-Electric Submarine,’’ at China Defense 

Today, http://www.sinoDefense.com/navy/sub/039.asp, and Anthony Watts, ‘‘Janes Underwater 

Warfare Systems, Submarine Forces, China,’’ June 16, 2003, www.janes.com. 43 Comment made at Harvard/MIT Conference ‘‘The Strategic Outlook in the Taiwan Strait,’’ 

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., April 21, 2002. 

141 

yards.44 Considerable sunk costs in the Song program will certainly also propel this

program forward. China’s continuing acquisition of Songs, while simultaneously purchasing Kilos, does suggest that the PLA submarine force is in the midst of a major 

near-term buildup. 

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION 

Even PRC sources concede that China’s Han nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and 

Xia nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) were not only noisy but also 

posed serious hazards to their crews.45 Such early problems were doubtlessly exacerbated because both first-generation nuclear submarines were designed and built 

during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, 1966–69. Indeed, the chief designer of 

these vessels Huang Xuhua, at one point, was sentenced to raising pigs. Subsequently, a group of Red Guards even condemned him to death, a sentence that was 

only commuted with the direct intervention of Premier Zhou Enlai.46 Nuclear submarine design is sufficiently challenging without such blatantly deleterious political 

intrusions on the process and PLAN nuclear propulsion paid a heavy price. 

Despite these deficiencies, the PLAN continues to operate both classes of vessels. 

The problem-plagued Xia SSBN has just emerged from a major overhaul,47 and the 

Chinese press continues to extol sorties by China’s Han nuclear attack submarines—even claiming that they played a role in the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis.48 

Exemplifying the importance that the PLAN attaches to its nuclear submarines, a 

recent Chinese article claims that Beijing’s nuclear submarines are first among several factors (ranked ahead of nuclear weapons) that would stay Washington’s hand 

in a future Taiwan crisis.49 

The PLAN is actively pursuing successors to its problem plagued first-generation 

nuclear submarines. The new Type 093 SSN will soon succeed the Han, the last of

which was commissioned in 1990. Western sources suggest that the Type 093 will 

be technologically similar to the Russian Victor III, possessing enhanced sonar capabilities and advanced quieting.50 A recent PRC article claims that the powerful indigenous reactor will propel the Type 093 to speeds exceeding 40 knots. The same 

report suggests that the 093 will be comparable in combat performance to the U.S. 

Los Angeles class SSN.51 Other Chinese media reports boast that the new Chinese

nuclear attack submarine will not be left behind by the latest U.S. Sea Wolf class.52 

American submariners may well scoff at such claims, but Western analysts underestimated the technical capabilities of late Soviet era submarines too.53 A bow-on 

44 Jurrien Noot, ‘‘Introduction,’’ Jane’s Naval Construction and Retrofit Markets, Vol. 18, August 11, 2003, www.janes.com. 45 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 109. 46 Ibid., p. 59. 47 Zhang, ‘‘China’s Rising Forces,’’ p. 37. One source claims that the Xia was modified during 

this refit to accept China’s newest submarine launched ballistic missile, the JL–2. See David

Miller, Illustrated Directory of Submarines of the World, (St. Paul, Minn. MBI Publishing, 2002), 

p. 407. If true, this would be of enormous significance since it would allow the Xia to strike

the continental United States from the East Asian littoral. 48 Liu Gen, ‘‘Ruguo Dalu Bude Buyong Wuli Jiefang Taiwan—Meiguo Hui Shizhuang Ganshe

Ma?’’ [If the mainland has no choice but to use force to liberate Taiwan, will the United States 

forcefully intervene?], Junshi Zhanwang [Military Prospect], (September 2002), pp. 41–42. The 

last three hulls of the Han series seem to have been lengthened by 8 meters each to accommodate a special antiship missile system. Ching Tung, ‘‘Beijing’s Submarine Forces and Taiwan’s 

Antisubmarine Capabilities,’’ Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle] August 16, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020816000067. The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis witnessed China’s test firing of 

several missiles into the vicinity of Taiwan, large and menacing PLA maneuvers in the Strait 

and also the dispatch by President Bill Clinton of two United States carrier battle groups to 

the region for deterrent purposes. The main catalysts for that crisis were a visit by Taiwan 

President Lee Teng-hui to the United States together with the Taiwan Presidential elections of 

March 1996. 49 Office of Naval Intelligence Liu Gen, ‘‘Ruguo Dalu Bude Buyong Wuli Jiefang,’’ pp. 41–42. 50 United States Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997, United 

States Government Printing Office, February 1997, p. 21. This assessment of Victor III equivalence is repeated in many other sources. There is currently insufficient unclassified data to validate or contest this ONI projection. 51 Jian Jie, ‘‘Shenhou Zhong de Xuangzi Zuo’’ [Myth of the twins], Guoji Zhanwang [World 

Outlook], Vol. 450, (August 2002), p. 22. 52 Hou Xiaomeng, ‘‘Juesheng Shenhai: Shijie He Qianting Fazhan Shianzhuang Ji Qianjing’’ 

[Decisive conquest of the deep sea: World nuclear submarine development at present and in the 

future], Guoji Zhanwang Vol. 449, (August 2002), p. 61. 53 Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins testified in the mid-1980s: 

‘‘We had misjudged the absolute sound and pressure levels of the Soviet Victor III. We had made 

an estimating error, and found that they were quieter than we had thought . . . we learned that 

Continued 

142 

photograph of the vessel in dry dock suggests that the ship has both upper and 

lower bow sonar assemblies, as well as flank arrays. A Chinese report claims the 

093 will have 65 cm torpedo tubes, which suggests it will be able to carry Russia’s 

largest wake-homing torpedo—one developed specifically to destroy aircraft carriers.54 The premier 093 was launched in 2002.55 

Production of the 2nd generation SSBN, known as the Type 094, appears to be 

well underway. Chinese sources assess that the Xia’s successor aims to have a comparable acoustic signature with that of the very quiet Russian Typhoon.56 The first 

of the Type 094 SSBNs may have been launched in 2003, on schedule to become 

operational in 2005. A second Type 094 by 2008 is a distinct possibility. A larger 

displacement SSBN, Type 095, which would carry a more capable set of ballistic 

missiles may also be planned.57 The ample space devoted to discussing SSBN operations in China’s journal of naval warfare, Jianchuan Zhishi, implies that the 

PLAN’s determination to develop a functional SSBN force remains strong.58 Regarding SLBM development, a Japanese source suggests that the PLAN’s old Golf-class 

submarine has been engaged in tests of the new JL–2 Submarine launched Ballistic 

Missile (SLBM) since 1995.59 

The JL–2 promises to be a formidable SLBM. Solid fueled, with a projected range 

of 8,000 km, it is 13 m long, 2 m wide, and weighs 42,000 kg. Physically it is roughly comparable to the United States’ Trident D–5.60 The JL–2 will reportedly carry 

either a solitary one megaton warhead or alternatively three to eight multiple independent reentry vehicles with nuclear yields of up to 150 kilotons, in addition to 

penetration aids. It is expected to maneuver in flight using stellar and GPS navigational inputs, and may have a circular error probability accuracy of between 150 

and 300 m.61 This weapon and its successors, so it seems, are being built with an 

eye on developments in United States national missile defense. 

Taken as a whole, Chinese efforts in developing nuclear submarines suggest a 

measured commitment to the establishment of a blue water capability over the 

longer term, which complements strong efforts made in the near term to secure the 

littoral. Evidently, not all PLAN thinkers are satisfied with incremental development of the nuclear force. One Chinese naval strategist, for example, recently called 

for a future force of twelve SSBNs and thirty SSNs to augment a fleet of sixty-six 

conventional submarines.62 

they are very hard to find.’’ Quoted in Owen R. Cote ́ Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the 

U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), p. 66. It is widely believed that many Russian designers and technicians have 

been involved in building the type 093. Indeed, assistance from the Rubin submarine design bureau may date as far back as 1995. It is also perhaps worth noting that the Russian Victor III 

submarine was built in the Russian Far East at Komsomolsk. Thus, Russian expertise on SSN 

construction has most certainly been proximate and convenient to access by the PLAN. Fisher, 

‘‘The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology,’’ p. 1. On the other hand, U.S. Navy intelligence forecasts also overestimated Soviet submarine capabilities during the early Cold War. 

See Cote ́, The Third Battle, p. 18. 54 Jian Jie, ‘‘Shenhou Zhong de Xuangzi Zuo,’’ p. 23. 55 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, July 28, 2003, http:// 

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf, p. 27. This report predicts the 093 will become 

operational in 2004 or 2005. The 093 was probably launched on December 22, 2002. See Jurrien 

Noot, ‘‘Introduction,’’ Jane’s Naval Construction and Retrofit Markets. 56 See ‘‘Zhongwai He Qianting Bijiao’’ [A comparison of Chinese and foreign nuclear submarines], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 228 (September 1998), p. 30. 57 Jurrien Noot, ‘‘Introduction,’’ Jane’s Naval Construction and Retrofit Markets. 58 See, for example, the articles in the December 1998 (No. 231), August 1999 (No. 239), June 

(No. 249) and August 2000 (No. 251) issues of Jianchuan Zhishi. 59 See ‘‘Chinese Navy Releases New Photos of Its Strategic Submarines,’’ Sekai no Kansen 

[Ships of the World] November 1, 2002, FBIS Document No. JPP20021107000162. 60 The D–5, currently deployed aboard the United States Ohio-class SSBNs, is 13.4 m in 

length, 1.85 m in diameter, and weighs 58,500 kg. The U.S. weapon has a published range of 

at least 7,360 km. Federation of American Scientists, Trident II D–5 Fleet Ballistic Missile, http:/ 

/www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm. The significantly higher weight of the D–5, and comparable range, as compared to the JL–2, does suggest that the longer range estimates of 12,000 

and even 14,000 km for the JL–2, are exaggerations. For these longer range estimates see, for 

example, Tian Ping ‘‘ ‘Julang-2’ Will Be Deployed’’ Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, [Hong Kong Morning Paper], Jun 23, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030623000083. 61 This entire paragraph draws from Duncan Lennox, JL–2 (CSS–NX–5), Jane’s Strategic 

Weapon Systems, Vol. 40, June 3, 2003, www.janes.com. 62 Han Tang, ‘‘Ige Wangmi de Zhongguo Haijun Meng’’ [A total vision for China’s fleet], 

Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 232 (January 1999), p. 13. A recent Russian estimate suggests that the 

PLAN intends to acquire ten to twelve SSBNs. The same estimate envisions a force of twelve 

SSNs by the end of the decade and 100 conventional submarines. Dmitriy Permyakov, ‘‘Dual 

143 

Human Resources and Institutional Dimensions 

A central precept of Maoist strategy, and therefore of PLA doctrine during most 

of the Cold War, held that force of will trumps technology in warfare. Deng Xiaoping 

led a technocratic revolution against Maoist doctrines, sparking China’s spectacular 

economic growth of the last two decades. ‘‘High-tech’’ also became a buzzword in the 

PLA during that era as China started to replace obsolete weapons systems. Recently, however, study of the United States military and the wars that the United 

States fought through the 1990s has led the PLA to rediscover the human factor. 

Beijing clearly recognizes the extraordinary emphasis that the United States military places on education and training. The PLAN, in particular, is making serious 

efforts to redress recognized deficiencies in recruitment, training, logistics, and underwater technology research. 

RECRUITMENT AND EDUCATION 

While reducing personnel levels overall, the PLAN is also building communities 

of intellectual excellence, including the submarine force. Recognizing that pay incentives are needed to attract qualified specialists in China’s competitive labor market, 

the PLAN has initiated generous pay increases in recent years. For example, some 

ranks saw a salary increase of 100 percent in 1999–2000.63 In screening applicants, 

the PLAN gives priority to ‘‘outstanding student cadres whom are willing to volunteer for submarine service.’’ 64 Chinese military leaders, having identified a severe 

deficiency in developing competent noncommissioned officers, created a policy to redress this problem that is apparently producing an entirely new corps of specialists 

for undersea warfare.65 The PLA is also putting the finishing touches on a rigorous 

system of professional military education, including an initiative that replicates the 

United States ROTC program. Using the United States military as a benchmark, 

the new Chinese system of military education is such that one Chinese submarine 

force admiral’s resume ́ reads similarly to a United States counterpart’s: Adm. Zhang 

Xizhao completed two tours at the Qingdao Submarine Academy and one each at 

the Nanjing Naval Command and Staff College and at the PLA’s National Defense 

University in Beijing.66 

The Qingdao Submarine Academy has recently undertaken a sweeping program 

of reform. In a rigorous process of self-criticism, the academy’s leadership concluded 

that ‘‘basic theories have often been stressed at the expense of operating skills.’’ Focusing on its core mission, the leadership has concluded that the only appropriate 

‘‘yardstick’’ for evaluating ‘‘without mercy . . . existing teaching materials, including 

personnel and facilities’’ was ‘‘whether or not the relevant units are able to fight 

under hi-tech conditions.’’ New courses have been added, student exchange is now 

encouraged, and ‘‘teaching modes marked by theory-to-theory ‘indoctrination’ were 

smashed.’’ In addition, the reforms have introduced interdisciplinary research and 

a new focus on applying theory to command decisions, ‘‘flexibly dealing with sudden 

incidents, as well as upgrading the students’ psychological quality for fighting in a 

complicated environment.’’ 67 

Another segment of the PLAN’s education reform program concerns strategic research. There is an increasingly discernible trend in Chinese military periodicals toward the objective and methodical study of lessons learned from the study of relevant campaign histories. Although detailed discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic 

during World War II is discernible in these periodicals as early as the 1980s,68 the 

pace of publication and the sophistication of the analyses has increased considerably. Undersea warfare figures prominently in these analyses. Hitler’s U-boat camObjective of China’s Defense Industry,’’ January 31, 2003, Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] FBIS 

Document No. 20030131000351. 63 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 115. 64 Ibid, p. 117. For a much more skeptical view of the PLAN submarine force’s human resources, see Kan, Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ 

p. 60. 

65 Su Yingcheng, Chen Wanjun, Yu Zifu, and Liu Ronghua, ‘‘The Ocean Applauds You—Getting Close to the High Quality Group of Soldiers and Officers of a Certain Submarine Unit of 

the Navy’’ Xinhua News Agency, April 7, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020407000031. 66 Zhang Zhennan, ‘‘ ‘Longguan’ Li Zou de Jiangjun’’ [The tiger admiral], Jianchuan Zhishi, 

No. 227 (August 1998), p. 5. 67 Fan Ping, Liu Ping, and Wang Youngsheng, ‘‘Blue Whales Dive Deep to Train Skills of 

Fighting, Winning—True Account of In-Depth Teaching Reform Under Way at the PLA Naval 

Submarine Academy,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, October 21, 2002, FBIS Document No. 

CPP20021021000066. 68 See, for example, Yu Keliang, ‘‘Huwei Jian Hukang Fanqianting Zhan Ili’’ [Escorting convoys against submarine warfare: An example], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 47 (August 1983), p. 13. 

144 

paign is of great interest to Chinese strategists,69 as is Germany’s broader evolution 

as a maritime power.70 There is also extensive coverage of United States submarine 

exploits against Japan in the Pacific War.71 As highlighted elsewhere in this article, 

PLAN specialists continue to study Soviet tactics and strategy, in addition to other 

more contemporary submarine campaigns, such as the 1982 Falklands War.72 Thus, 

debates on strategy within the PLAN are now informed by an increasingly solid 

base of military historical research rather than ideological conformity.73 

TRAINING REVOLUTION 

Paralleling these intellectual innovations, the PLAN appears to be implementing 

a training revolution. As good students of United States military operations, Chinese planners have become increasingly conscious of the imperative for joint planning and operations.74 Indeed the PLAN may have even exceeded the United States 

in selected areas of joint training. For example, the PLAN has developed an innovative program of cross-training surface and submarine commanders.75 Beyond 

coursework and simulations, this program incorporates a system of cross-posting. A 

striking facet of the PLA’s effort to upgrade training is a distinct shift from rote, 

repetitive drills to what is described as ‘‘confrontational training,’’ which allows for 

more free-play elements. As is the case of joint operations, this notion appears to 

be an effort to imitate successful United States military practices. In fact, a recent 

Chinese article describes China’s ‘‘Fort Irwin,’’ where ‘‘red teams’’ compete against 

an elite ‘‘blue team,’’ with the goal of forcing the red team commanders to depart 

from prearranged plans and make on-the-spot adjustments.76 Thus, ‘‘confrontational 

training’’ or competitive, realistic war games are becoming increasingly common in 

the Chinese fleet, and, in particular, within the submarine force.77 Rounding out 

this trend toward interoperability, the Chinese armed forces, including the navy, 

have also recently executed a number of intertheater exercises.78 

Analysts generally agree that after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis the PLA focused 

on the United States as its most likely future adversary. Training with United 

States capabilities in mind has driven China’s submarine force to incorporate substantial innovation into its exercises. For example, fighting the United States would 

likely mean that PLAN bases might be heavily damaged by air and cruise missile 

strikes at an early point in hostilities. Working under this assumption, the submarine force has recently conducted a drill in which torpedoes were loaded onto a 

submarine at a small civilian port employing mobile cranes and other special equip69 See, for example, Zhou Ming, ‘‘Qixi Sicapa Wan,’’ [The daring raid on Scapa Gulf], Guoji 

Zhanwan, Vol. 456, (December 2002), pp. 74–81; and A Yu, ‘‘Weiri Diansha’’ [The electric shark 

that almost was], Bingqi [Weaponry], (April 2002), pp. 36–40. 70 See the series of articles on German sea power by Song Yichang in the April (No. 223), May 

(No. 224) and June (No. 225) 1998 volumes of Jianchuan Zhishi. 71 See, for example, Hu Qidao, ‘‘Huangsha Chuji’’ [The yellow shark goes on the attack], 

Bingqi (March 2002), pp. 28–30; Tian Shichen, ‘‘Jingang de Fumie’’ [The destruction of the 

Jingang], Guoji Zhanwang, Vol. 439, (October 2002), pp. 71–73; and Tian Shichen, ‘‘Anye 

Liesha’’ [Night of the hunting shark], Guoji Zhanwang, Vol. 457, (December 2002), pp. 74–77. 72 See the articles on Soviet naval power by Song Yichang in the 1999 volume of Jianchuan 

Zhishi. For discussion of the Falklands campaign, see Chen Juan, ‘‘Weishenme Shueisheng 

Duikang’’ [Why sonar countermeasures], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 255 (December 2000), p. 30. 73 This is obvious in, for example, ‘‘Zhongguo Xuyao Hangkong Mujian?’’ p. 9. 74 See, for example, Yuan Wenxian, ‘‘Strengthening Command Training in Joint Operations,’’ 

Jiefangjun Bao, April 9, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020409000117. An example of a recent 

joint exercise is Yao Yan, ‘‘Certain Destroyer Detachment Explores New Road for Joint Sea, Air 

Training with Certain Airman Unit,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, January 13, 2003, FBIS Document No. 

CPP20030107000053. 75 ‘‘Cutting Through the Waves as Well as Riding the Whale into the Sea,’’ Keji Ribao [Science 

and Technology Daily], February 2, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020201000184. 76 Zhang Kunping, ‘‘China’s ‘Fort Irwin’: The Fires of War Burn from Spring Until Winter,’’ 

Junshi Wenzhai, July 7, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020719000182. See also, for example, 

Zhang Linlin, ‘‘Never Set Up a Weak Opponent in Combat Drills,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, September 

6, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020906000027. 77 Zhang Luocan and Sun Shiwei, ‘‘Submarines of a Submarine Detachment Brave the Winds 

and Storms—Sinking Into the Sea for Confrontational Exercise,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, January 21, 

2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020122000030; and Liu Xinmin, ‘‘East Sea Fleet Submarine 

Detachment Takes New Tactics to the Training Area,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, January 3, 2003, FBIS 

Document No. CPP20030103000018. 78 Zhang Zhihui and Wang Jinyuan, ‘‘Air Force Division Successfully Organizes Exercise with 

Large Formations Making Tactical Inter-Airfield Transfer,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, November 21, 2002, 

FBIS Document No. CPP20021121000026; and Wu Ming-chieh, ‘‘Other Side Will Launch Exercise of Three Armed Services in South China Sea after 16th CPC National Congress,’’ Tzu-Yu 

Shih-Pao [Liberty Times], November 15, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20021115000106. 

145


ment.79 Another recent drill focused on clearing disabled ships from a vital navigation channel.80 

INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS 

The PLAN leadership also appears to understand that building and maintaining 

a world-class fleet of submarines entails a huge investment in infrastructure. Chinese sources suggest greater attention to logistics throughout the PLA. Planning 

has shifted from ‘‘charts, sand tables, and individual micro-computers,’’ to the development of a ‘‘theater and campaign logistics command training operations system.’’ 81 There have also been efforts at standardization to increase the maintenance 

efficiency of the fleet. For example, a recent initiative sought to reduce the number 

of high-grade lubricating oils used by the submarine force by increasing individual 

oils’ quality and versatility.82 

PLA logistics training scenarios are also based on a hypothetical confrontation

with the United States. A 2001 logistics exercise focused on disguising important 

targets and conducting rush repairs.83 In the PLAN, similar exercises have focused 

on air defense; port security; the evacuation of people and equipment; in addition 

to the emergency provisioning of warships with oil, food, water, and medical supplies.84 In addition, seaborne supply operations have been conducted with the newest Chinese submarines.85 Finally, the PLA leadership recently highlighted the vital

importance of naval construction units.86 Such units could conceivably allow the 

PLAN submarine force to build submarine pens for its vessels—‘‘dragon palaces 

under the sea’’—which would not only offer the submarine fleet enhanced protection 

but might also allow for undetected egress from port.87 Extensive shelters already 

protect the nuclear submarine fleet at Qingdao.88 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

Beijing’s commitment to undersea warfare over the long term depends on developing an outstanding science and technology research system to sustain the fleet’s 

development. The outlines of such a system are beginning to appear. The PLAN 

leadership has selected Wuhan and Harbin Universities as sites of maritime engineering excellence. The former, which opened officially in 1999, combines the Navy 

Engineering Academy and the Navy Electronics Engineering Academy. The curriculum focuses on ‘‘tackling the key problem of fusing and joining electronic information to weapons systems.’’ 89 The latter has colleges of nuclear propulsion and of 

underwater engineering. Recent research achievements of Harbin University for the 

PLAN include technology for ocean bottom topographic mapping and a dual-use sub79 Liu Xinmin and Xu Feng, ‘‘Chinese Submarine Unit Succeeds for First Time in Making Use 

of Civilian Port to Load Torpedos,’’ Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China Youth Daily] January 6, 

2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020603000058. 80 Wang Guangxin, Yu Zifu, and Wang Yong, ‘‘Vessels’ Protector and Savior—A Report on Exercises of Emergency and Rescue Operations of the Emergency and Rescue Contingent of the 

East China Sea Fleet,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, January 23, 2002, FBIS Document No. 20020123000063. 

Another especially challenging recent exercise was an undersea rescue drill conducted ‘‘under 

severe winter conditions.’’ See Yang Yue and Qiao Fei, ‘‘A Certain Rescue Regiment under the 

North Sea Fleet Conducts Winter Training in Sea Rescue,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, February 7, 2003, 

FBIS Document No. CPP20030207000046. Since the Russian Kursk tragedy, PLAN submarine 

rescue drills appear to have increased in intensity and frequency. See also Lu Wenxing and Cai 

Yifeng, ‘‘Chinese Submarine Successfully Conducts Lifesaving Escape in the Sea: An Interview 

with Chinese Navy Submarine Captain Sun Weidong,’’ Haixia Zhizheng Wang [Cross-Strait Outlook], November 22, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20021125000173. 81 Yin Rutao and Jiang Jianke, ‘‘Operations Automation, Networked Training, Equipping Our 

Military’s Logistics Command Training with High Technology,’’ Renmin Ribao, January 31, 

2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020131000068. 82 Chen Heying, Yuan Huazhi, and Xu Feng, ‘‘Wholehearted Attention to the Blood of Battlefields—A Research Report from the Navy’s Applied Oil Research Institute,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, January 22, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030122000090. 83 Liu Fazhong, Chen Duan, and Wang Shanhe, ‘‘Confrontation Drills Close to Actual Combat 

Situations—A Factual Record of Air Force’s Logistical Units Strengthening War Support,’’ 

Renmin Ribao, July 23, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020723000084. 84 See ‘‘North China Sea Fleet Conducts Emergency Logistical Support Exercises,’’ Jiefangjun 

Bao, November 6, 2001, FBIS Document No. CPP20011106000077. 85 Wang Guangxin, ‘‘Certain Service Vessel Group Strives to Raise Contingency Support Capabilities at Sea,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, August 27, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020827000067. 86 Jia Junfeng, Zhang Jinming, and Xu Feng, ‘‘The Wonderful Survey Troops—A Report From 

the Survey Party of Engineering Design Bureau of Navy,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, July 17, 2002, FBIS 

Document No. CPP20020717000062. 87 Glenn Schloss, ‘‘PLA Submarine Fleet Making Quiet Advances,’’ Sunday Morning Post, August 4, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020805000034. 88 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 123. 89 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 123–24. 

146


mersible for mine detection and deep-ocean salvage.90 Undersea mapping, in particular, appears to be a significant PLAN priority. Naval survey units have recently 

produced a three-dimensional digital chart of China’s coastal waters. This software 

not only conveys images for mariners but also sounds an audio alarm to warn of 

potential obstacles.91 On an even more sophisticated level, Chinese naval cartographers are mapping regional deviations in the ocean’s gravity, because of this 

force’s influence on the accuracy of long-range weapons fired from submarines.92 

Among other topics that Chinese researchers are exploring are lasers for submarine 

detection and sophisticated remote seabed hydrophone systems.93 

These research efforts are complemented by espionage. Chinese hydrological research vessels maintain an increasing presence in the waters of Taiwan and Japan, 

prompting the suggestion that they are busy ‘‘collecting information for the (PLAN) 

submarine force.’’ 94 The director of the acoustic noise laboratory at Russia’s Pacific

Oceanography Institute stood trial in Vladivostok for trying to smuggle secrets to 

the Chinese.95 Of related interest, one might note the somewhat curious fact that 

Harbin has been selected as a premier maritime research institution, despite the 

city’s considerable distance from the sea. On the other hand, the university, just a 

few hours drive from the Russian border, is conveniently located for tapping underemployed former Soviet scientists. Naturally, the United States is also a major target for Chinese submarine-related espionage. The most notorious example concerns 

allegations against Wen Ho Lee with regard to the fate of plans for the W–88 warhead, a design optimized for SLBMs. Less well known is another case involving alleged attempts by a Chinese graduate student at Iowa State University to illegally 

obtain detailed knowledge on the fabrication of Terfenol-D, a substance that promises to be crucial to future sonar system development.96 

It would be a major mistake, however, to assume that China’s future science and 

technology defense prospects are wholly dependent on Russian expertise. Indeed, 

many United States analysts fall into the trap of extrapolating from the PLAN’s historical development, gravely underestimating the impact of ‘‘systemic shocks’’ to 

that development, above all: the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Cultural Revolution. It would be an error, therefore, to predict future developments

within the Chinese submarine force based on the very slow development of the Han 

class SSN, for example, which was begun in 1958, but only went to sea in 1974. 

Given the PRC’s extraordinary efforts in education and especially basic science research, the ascendance of a generation of scientific personnel trained in the West, 

and market incentives that have vastly enhanced the technological sophistication of 

contemporary China, it is not surprising that one of the United States’ foremost Sinologists warns that the next generation of Chinese-made weaponry will represent

a marked departure from the past.97 

The Taiwan Scenario 

The PLAN’s near-term focus on diesel submarines is one of several indicators that 

suggest that Beijing’s immediate focus is on the Taiwan problem. Observers of the 

military balance across the Strait generally agree that an invasion of Taiwan will 

90 Zhang Shimin, ‘‘Harbin Engineering University for Ships, Sea and Defense,’’ Jianchuan 

Zhishi, No. 274 (July 2002), FBIS Document No. CPP20020723000222. 91 Han Fanzhou, Chen Xianjie, and Xu Feng, ‘‘Record of Surveying of China’s Marine Territory 

by Marine Surveying and Mapping Forces,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, December 11, 2002, FBIS Document 

No. CPP20021211000077. 92 Ibid. The force of gravity is not uniform. It varies due to local topographic features such 

as undersea mountains and trenches. Although these variations in gravitational fields are small, 

they have a significant effect on the accuracy of gyroscopically-aided navigation systems, such 

as those used by submarines and long range missiles. 93 Guo Yan and Wang Jiangan, ‘‘PRC S&T: Detecting Thermal Track of Submarines by Infrared Image,’’ Haijun Gongcheng Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 

June 1, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020812000168; and He Zuoyang and Wang Wenzhi, 

‘‘PRC S&T: Design of Acoustic Holography Measuring Array,’’ Harbin Gongcheng Daxue Xuebao 

[Journal of Harbin Engineering University] April 1, 2002, FBIS Document No. 

CPP20020627000203; Sun Guiqing, Yang Desen, Zhang Lanyue, and Shi Shenguo, ‘‘Maximum 

Likelihood Ratio Detection and Maximum Likelihood DOA Estimation Based on the Vector Hydrophone,’’ Shengxue Xuebao [Journal of Acoustics] January 1, 2003, FBIS Document No. 

CPP20030123000416. 94 See Stratfor, ‘‘Spy Incident Highlights Taiwan’s Submarine Concerns,’’ Stratfor.com, April 

16, 2002. 95 Oleg Zhunusov, ‘‘Eavesdropping in the Ocean Deemed Illegal,’’ Izvestiya, July 4, 2002, FBIS 

Document No. CEP20020705000214. 96 Scott L. Wheeler, ‘‘PRC Espionage Leads to ‘Terf’ War,’’ Insight Magazine, October 29, 2002, 

p. 26. 

97 Comments of Ambassador Chas Freeman, Asia-Pacific Forum, September 31, 2001, U.S. 

Naval War College. 

147 

continue to elude the PLA for at least the next decade. Despite the steady upgrading 

of the PLA Air Force, the revamping of Chinese special forces, and particularly the 

fielding of a vast array of short-range missiles, the paucity of modern amphibious 

landing craft among other factors makes a full-scale invasion an unlikely, if still 

conceivable possibility.98 

A BLOCKADE WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 

Enhanced submarine capabilities and numbers increasingly give credence to an 

alternative strategy for coercing Taiwan: the naval blockade.99 As an island with 

few resources, Taiwan may be uniquely vulnerable to this form of coercion. The volatility of Taipei’s stock market during the 1996 crisis indicates that Taiwan’s entire 

economy could face a meltdown if confronted with determined mainland efforts to 

subvert it. Moreover, the former ruling and now opposition party in Taipei, the Kuomintang, has been critical of the current Democratic Progressive Party government’s 

tendency toward pro-independence rhetoric. This suggests a strong possibility that 

the mainland could succeed in exploiting Taiwan’s internal political fissures in a crisis. In other words, Washington cannot count on a united front within Taiwan— 

speedy capitulation is conceivable if Beijing confronts Taipei with a sophisticated 

strategy of sticks and carrots. 

A recent Chinese article strongly suggests that PLA strategists are closely examining options for blockading Taiwan. Reflecting on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, 

for example, the author concludes, ‘‘The United States achieved its objective of a deterrent blockade, forcing the Soviet Union to give in.’’ According to this analysis, ‘‘A 

maritime blockade should be imposed suddenly, after thorough preparations, so as 

to have the effect of taking the enemy by surprise.’’ It is noted, moreover, that ‘‘a 

maritime blockade in a civil war . . . does not come within the scope of application 

of international maritime law.’’ 100 As another Chinese author explains: ‘‘Once China 

blockades Taiwan, sea transportation would be cut, Taiwan’s economy would be paralyzed and its political situation would become unstable.’’ 101 

Chinese diesel submarines would be the decisive force in this troubling scenario. 

Employing its older submarines as mine-layers and decoys would allow China to 

rely on its more modern submarines to patrol north, south, and east of the island. 

Even a few ship sinkings would prompt insurance brokers to revoke their coverage 

of merchant shipping, and commerce at Taiwan’s two biggest ports, Taipei and 

Kaoshiung, would swiftly grind to a halt.102 

TAIWAN’S ASW POTENTIAL 

While the United States considered its options, Taiwan’s navy might try to break 

the blockade on its own. Its chances of success, however, would be relatively low. 

Taiwan’s otherwise formidable air force might well fall victim to PRC missile impacts. Even without such strikes, Taiwan’s aircraft are not well suited for ASW operations. Indeed, a recent report suggests that out of Taiwan’s twenty-six S–2T 

Trackers, only six are operational.103 This is not surprising given that the aircraft 

have been in Taiwan’s service since 1976, and were considered obsolete by the 

United States before that. Taiwan’s budget crunch, moreover, has cast doubt on the 

expected purchase of twelve P–3C Orions from the United States, so that the Taiwan navy may seek a life-extension on the S–2Ts through 2008. The imminent delivery of the four Kidd-class destroyers from the United States will not significantly 

help the Taiwan navy in its ASW efforts either, even though the Kidd is potentially 

a capable ASW platform. 

The root cause of Taiwan’s ASW woes is an inadequate number of ASW platforms 

overall.104 Finding and destroying submarines requires enormous resources. As 

98 See O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ pp. 54–73. 99 Of course, Beijing would very possibly integrate missiles and other aerial operations into 

a naval blockade. Thus, it has been suggested that ‘‘China’s warplanes and missiles . . . can effectively break up Taiwan’s antisubmarine troops.’’ See Ching Tung, ‘‘Beijing’s Submarine Forces 

and Taiwan’s Antisubmarine Capabilities,’’ Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP2002082000067. See also Christensen’s discussion of a ‘‘missile blockade’’ in his 

‘‘Posing Problems without Catching Up,’’ p. 29. 100 Gao Hongyan, ‘‘A Chat on Naval Blockade Warfare,’’ Xiandai Junshi [Modern Military], 

January 5, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030127000191. 101 Ching Tung, ‘‘Beijing’s Submarine Forces and Taiwan’s Antisubmarine Capabilities,’’ 

Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020816000067. 102 Christensen, ‘‘Posing Problems without Catching Up,’’ p. 29. 103 Brian Hsu, ‘‘Taiwan Hopes to Extend Life of Submarine Aircraft,’’ Taipei Times, August 

12, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020812000122. 104 The authors wish to thank Rear Adm. (ret.) Michael McDevitt for this insight and many 

that follow. 

148 

Owen Cote ́ observes concerning the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, ‘‘the 

price of sea control was . . . substantially . . . [higher] than the price of contesting it. 

. . .’’ 105 

The problem is exacerbated both by the large number of submarines that China 

can deploy and by the nature of the area in which China’s submarines will operate, 

much of which is characterized by shallow, noisy waters that make ASW exceedingly difficult. Also affecting this calculus are the rapidly improving effectiveness 

and ease of operation of the weapons that China’s submarines will carry. Modern 

wake-homing torpedoes form a particularly cogent threat against surface ships. 

They also have the benefit of requiring only rudimentary submarine skills to fire, 

in contrast to previous torpedo-homing schemes. 

Many regard submarines as the best ASW platform, and there has been much 

talk of expanding Taiwan’s small fleet of four diesel submarines, two of which date 

from World War II. Superficially, Taiwan’s prospective purchase of eight modern 

diesel submarines from the United States would help to restore some measure of 

equity to the increasingly lopsided undersea balance in the Taiwan Strait. The purchase is plagued by numerous obstacles, however, and even if it does go forward, 

these submarines would do little to redress China’s fundamental undersea superiority. Unlike nuclear fast attack submarines, their diesel counterparts are not well 

suited to searching for other submarines. Taiwan’s diesel submarines might do well 

in chance encounters against their mainland adversaries, but they could not conduct 

the wide-area sanitizing operations required to lift a blockade. Instead, additional 

modern submarines for the Taiwan navy would give Taipei some offensive undersea 

capability, but they would probably have little effect on PRC submarine operations 

against Taiwan.106 

The timing and rate of submarine acquisition also mitigates against the notion 

that eight new submarines will help Taiwan’s ASW prospects. As noted previously, 

the PLAN expects to take delivery of eight Kilos between 2005 and 2007.107 These 

ships are being simultaneously built in three different Russian shipyards, which 

may suggest that Beijing is in a hurry.108 In addition, the PLAN may well have a 

system for accelerating crew training given that it maintains a large force of submarines and that it already has Kilos in its arsenal.109 A United States Navy delegation told Taiwan officials in November 2003 that Taiwan was unlikely to get its 

eight new diesel submarines before 2019.110 Moreover, Taiwan’s crew training 

would likely be a major bottleneck, suggesting some additional years before the vessels are truly operational. This time lag, even under assumptions that favor Taiwan, 

will still significantly widen the already substantial capability gap later in the 

present decade. The aforementioned Taiwan budget crunch that affects the P–3 

Orion sale also casts doubt on the proposed submarine purchase. With the Taiwan 

defense budget reaching an eight-year low in 2002,111 the $4–5 billion commitment 

seems unlikely. Also complicating Taipei’s calculations regarding this purchase is 

the ominous challenge of water space management. To avoid the problem of fratricide, Taiwan’s submarine force would have to be shielded from potential United 

States ASW operations. Making this point, former Taiwan Vice Defense Minister Ku 

105 Cote ́, The Third Battle, p. 12. 106 For an alternative view, see Capt. Bo Rask, Royal Swedish Navy, ‘‘Submarine Operations 

in Taiwan Waters,’’ The Submarine Review, January 2003, pp. 47–49. Rask views Taiwan submarine mining operations as a potentially major obstacle to PRC offensive operations. But given 

that the PRC is free to choose the timing of the campaign, we have little confidence that these 

mines could halt the successful egress of Chinese submarines. Moreover, Taiwan’s submarine 

fleet is likely to suffer attrition in the initial Chinese attack. 107 ‘‘Zhongguo Haijun Jiang Goumai Ba Sou Jiluo Ji Qianting,’’ p. 5 108 Nikolai Novichkov, p. 3. The three shipyards are in St. Petersburg, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, 

and Nizhny Novgorod. 109 On ‘‘explor[ing] a new way of training on one new submarine and storing up multiple 

groups of personnel for the new armament,’’ see ‘‘PLA Submarine Detachment Implements Advanced Training for New Armament Personnel,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, June 23, 2002, FBIS Document 

No. CPP20020624000065. A recent report also describes how two separate crews use one submarine to train. This raises the troubling possibility that China’s submarine force could quickly 

undertake a major expansion at some point in the future. See Liu Xinmin and He Desheng, 

‘‘Submarine Detachment Conducts ‘Vessel Exchange System’ Training—Going to Sea ‘on Other’s 

Vessel’ to Train Reserve Personnel,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, November 29, 2000, FBIS Document No. 

CPP20001129000037. 110 David Eisenberg, ‘‘Taiwans’s Ssubmarine Saga Continues,’’ Asia times, November 21, 2003, 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinaEK21Ad03.html, cited in Fisher, ‘‘The Impact of Foreign 

Weapons and Technology,’’ p. 6. 111 Brian Hsu, ‘‘Taiwan Defense Spending Hits Eight-Year Low,’’ Taipei Times, September 4, 

2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020904000138. 

149 

Ch’ung-lien recently warned, ‘‘Taiwan submarines [may] be mistakenly attacked.’’ 

He concluded, ‘‘[Submarines] may not necessarily meet Taiwan’s actual needs.112 

Simply stated, Taipei is unwilling or unable to devote the necessary resources to 

mount a credible defense against a sustained submarine campaign. It is therefore 

unlikely that Taiwan will be able to cope with such a scenario at present or for the 

foreseeable future. The more salient question is: Could the United States break the 

blockade? Certainly yes, but the growing capability of the PLAN submarine force 

will increase the risk to United States naval forces operating in the vicinity of Taiwan. 

ASW IS HARD, AND GETTING HARDER 

The United States ability to wage ASW has withered significantly since the end 

of the Cold War. O’Hanlon estimates that ‘‘in an extreme case, a United States ship 

or two could even be sunk’’ in breaking a PRC blockade of Taiwan.113 Our analysis 

shows this estimate to be too optimistic—off by an order of magnitude. The discussion below reveals the flaws in O’Hanlon’s estimate. 

As one PLAN strategist correctly explains, ‘‘Attempting to track submarines in 

the tremendous expanse of the ocean is extremely difficult.’’ 114 This assessment 

fully corresponds to U.S. Navy experience. Cote ́, for example, cites one participant 

in the increasingly difficult hunt for quiet Soviet submarines in the late Cold War: 

‘‘[There were] several incidents in which the entire navy had to deploy in order to 

find and maintain contact on one submarine.’’ 115 Finding and neutralizing quiet 

submarines requires an intricate choreography and the integration of the specialized 

characteristics of multiple aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and remote cueing 

systems. The more physical assets that can be devoted to the problem of finding 

submarines, the more likely that adversary submarines can be found and destroyed, 

or at least driven off. Similarly, the more highly skilled and trained the hunters are, 

the more likely their success. Unfortunately, the United States Navy’s ability to 

field large numbers of skilled submarine hunters and ASW platforms has fallen precipitously. 

During the Cold War, United States carrier-borne S–3 Viking aircraft were effective submarine stalkers, capable of finding periscopes at long ranges with their potent radar. But the S–3s have been taken off of their ASW mission, and have become full-time aerial refueling aircraft. Land-based P–3 Orion ASW aircraft, have 

suffered a 50 percent overall force reduction, and in most regions they no longer 

focus on ASW as their principal mission. A third of the remaining P–3s are scheduled to be removed from service by 2005 due to corrosion problems.116 The U.S. 

Navy has effectively mothballed its Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), and it has 

scaled back on the number and ASW prowess of its Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)-equipped T–AGOS ships, especially by failing to build beyond the first prototype of the Impeccable-class. The navy has been unable to adequately test that ship’s Low Frequency Active (LFA) sonar system due to lawsuits 

stemming from environmental concerns about possible harm to marine mammals. 

This is a severe blow to the navy’s shallow water ASW efforts given that the LFA 

system can provide particularly good long-range detection probabilities against modern diesel submarines in shallow waters.117 Significantly, only 5 of the navy’s 22 

112 Quoted in Chieh Yang, ‘‘Taiwan Needs Key Weapons,’’ Taiwan News, October 17, 2002, 

FBIS Document No. CPP20021023000197. Ku asserts, ‘‘The sale of submarines to Taiwan by 

the United States is fundamentally a political issue.’’ He goes on to suggest that only ‘‘key weapons’’ (i.e. nuclear weapons) can maintain Taiwan’s security and avoid ‘‘the quagmire of [an] arms 

race.’’ Ibid. 113 O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ pp. 78–79. 114 Anonymous quoted in ‘‘Zhongguo Xuyao Hangkong Mujian?’’ p. 9. 115See Cote ́, The Third Battle, p. 70. 116 The U.S. Navy intends to purchase 108 Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), but this 

platform is not supposed to reach initial operating capability until 2013. There are also plans 

to purchase fifty Broad Area Maritime Surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles to augment the 

MMAs. See Mark Selinger, ‘‘Navy Plans Early Retirement For A Third Of P–3 Fleet,’’ Aerospace 

Daily, November 19, 2003. These timelines suggest the possibility of a rather wide window of 

vulnerability with respect to U.S. airborne ASW capability. Moreover, using these aircraft to 

find and destroy submarines requires an uncontested aerial maritime environment. Robert 

Rubel, a professor at the Naval War College, observes that some aircraft in China’s inventory, 

including especially the Su–27, would be highly effective against U.S. maritime surveillance aircraft because of the Su–27’s speed and impressive range. 117 Fred Engle, ‘‘Sharing the Seas with Marine Mammals,’’ Currents: The Navy’s Environmental Magazine (Winter 2003), p. 19. 

150 

Cold War-era T–AGOS ships continue to perform ASW missions.118 The navy’s fleet 

of surface combatants is also much reduced. Such capable ASW ships as the remaining nineteen Spruance class destroyers are slated for accelerated decommissioning 

as a cost-saving measure.119 In fiscal year 2004, five Spruance destroyers are scheduled for decommissioning, as are four T–AGOS ships.120 

During any United States attempt to break a Chinese submarine blockade, American nuclear submarines are certain to form the leading strike force. The United 

States, however, now has only fifty-four fast attack submarines, barely more than 

half of the 100 SSNs operational in 1985.121 Nor are current building rates particularly reassuring.122 The remaining United States SSNs are individually more capable than they were eighteen years ago, but whereas during the Cold War SSNs focused primarily on their blue water ASW mission, today’s SSN force must divide 

time between ASW, surveillance operations, and most prominently, the attack of 

targets ashore with cruise missiles. Added to this reduction in force and shift in 

mission is the irreducible difficulty of finding the modern, quiet diesel submarines 

in China’s shallow and noisy littoral waters. 

American SSNs could conduct a methodical search-and-destroy campaign against 

Chinese submarines, especially in the deep waters to the east of Taiwan where they 

can make full use of their superior technology, weapons, and training. But as one 

analyst notes ‘‘shallow water is ideally suited for [Chinese] submarine operations. 

. . . [They] can hide between the layers of the underwater thermals and maneuver 

among the rocks and shoals, where acoustics are clouded.’’ 123 In the vicinity of Taiwan, even the United States submarine force will be strongly tested, given the difficult environment, the large number of interfering merchant and fishing vessels 

that mask the quiet adversary, improvements in the PLAN submarine force’s ASW 

weaponry, and the sheer weight of Chinese numbers. This fundamental difficulty is 

exacerbated if United States SSNs are expected to operate in the Taiwan Strait, 

which is so shallow as to nearly preclude United States SSN operations there.124 

Much of the East Asian littoral is comprised of shallow water, defined here as less 

than two hundred meters in depth. (See Figure 1.) This area, which encompasses 

nearly the entire Yellow and East China seas, provides severely disadvantageous 

conditions for United States SSN employment, weapons, and sensors. Such conditions constitute nearly all of the waters to the west and north of Taiwan. 

Taking into account the forgoing analysis, the problems with O’Hanlon’s analysis 

become readily apparent. First, he claims that the ‘‘overall outcome of [the blockade 

campaign] is hard to predict, given the rough parity in numbers between Chinese 

submarines and Taiwanese escorts.’’ 125 This appraisal gives short shrift to the history of ASW warfare, which has repeatedly shown that ASW campaigns are extraordinarily resource intensive. Thousands of United States and British escorts and aircraft were required to curtail the threat from several hundred Nazi submarines, and 

despite this great numerical advantage, this campaign was ‘‘a damned near run 

118 Only one of the original eighteen Stalwart-class ships still conducts ASW missions. See 

‘‘Counter-Drug Operations/Ocean Surveillance Ships–T–AGOS,’’ http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/ 

navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-tagos3.html. All four of the Victorious class T–AGOS ships still perform ASW. See ‘‘Victorious Class Ocean Surveillance Ships,’’ http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/ 

. The Navy also uses the Cory Chouest Ocean Surveillance ship as a test platform for the Low 

Frequency Active Towed Sonar array, bringing the number of active T–AGOS ships to six. See 

Cory Chouest Ocean Surveillance ship, http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/. 119 Hunter Keeter, ‘‘Mullen: Navy to Back Further Program Cuts, More Business Efficiencies,’’ 

Defense Daily, January 17, 2003, p. 1. 120 Rear Adm. A.T. Church, FY 2004 President’s Budget Overview, January 31, 2003, slide 

presentation http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/04pres/highbook/ 

31JanlBudgetlRolloutlbrief.pdf. 121 ‘‘U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–’’ http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-

4.htm. 122 In 2003, according to the former United States Submarine Force commander Vice Adm. 

Grossenbacher, ‘‘The problem we have today is just numbers, . . . We don’t have enough. . . . In 

my opinion, we’re about as thin as we can be. . . .’’ Robert A. Hamilton, ‘‘Lack Of Subs Could 

Slow Pace Of Technology, Admiral Warns,’’ New London Day, September 30, 2003, p. A3. This 

same article observes, ‘‘The Navy is [currently] building one submarine a year, which will eventually result in a force of 30 boats.’’ A looming budget shortfall later this decade endangers longrange plans to boost this low building rate. 123 Frank C. Borik, ‘‘Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare,’’ in Mary A. Sommerville 

ed., Essays on Strategy XIII (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 16. 124 One informed observer states that a ‘‘Modern nuclear submarine, as presently configured, 

can [only] operate safely on a routine basis in waters that exceed 120–140 feet in depth.’’ Richard M. Rosenblatt, ‘‘Submarine Air Independent Propulsion and the U.S. Navy,’’ Submarine Review, (July 1997), p. 122. 125 O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ p. 78. 

151 

thing.’’ 126 Similarly, during the Falklands War, the British navy expended nearly 

all of their ASW ordinance without sinking or disabling the two modern Argentine 

submarines that were active in the theater.127 

In assessing the United States Navy’s overall present and future effectiveness 

against China’s submarine force, O’Hanlon’s analysis is again flawed. He attempts 

to extrapolate from certain estimates regarding United States Navy effectiveness 

versus Soviet submarines. Yet he ignores numerous problems with the comparison: 

Diesel submarines are quieter than nuclear submarines; acoustic conditions in the 

littoral are much more complicated and difficult than in deep blue water; and there 

is no reason to believe that United States forces could rely on SOSUS hydrophones 

in the vicinity of Taiwan, as O’Hanlon assumes. As demonstrated above, United 

States ASW is not what it was during the Cold War, nor is the likely future operating environment. O’Hanlon’s quantitative assumptions regarding a United States 

ASW campaign against Chinese submarines are also not sustainable. Thus, his notion that each Chinese submarine would only have a 20 percent chance of detecting 

an adversary ship before being detected is, again, far off the mark.128 Our estimate 

is that this number could be at least 50–60 percent if not higher.129 Similarly, he 

estimates that 75 percent of Chinese submarines would be destroyed after one 

‘‘round’’ of combat, a rather optimistic appraisal of United States ASW capabilities 

(and Chinese incompetence).130 Such changes in assumptions have major consequences in calculating possible United States losses. 

O’Hanlon’s mistaken estimates may stem from a misreading of Cold War submarine operations. He extrapolates from a source claiming that in the late 1980s, 

forty United States SSNs could destroy all Soviet SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk 

within fourteen hours.131 He neglects, however, the original author’s caveat that 

this measure assumed no reaction by the Soviet armed forces, a truly bizarre assumption.132 The suggestion, moreover, that a few dozen Taiwan and United States 

ships and aircraft could adequately patrol his suggested 300,000-square-mile safe 

‘‘corridor’’ is also highly questionable.133 Finally, O’Hanlon’s analysis is based on 

faulty estimates of Chinese submarine capabilities. The analysis suggests that only 

10 percent of China’s armed forces will have ‘‘late Cold War equivalent hardware’’ 

by 2010. If the Song proves to be a capable platform, the Chinese submarine force 

in 2003 is already over that modest hurdle. Given recent developments, including 

especially the large new Kilo purchase and the imminent appearance of China’s new 

SSN, there is no possibility that O’Hanlon’s estimate on PLAN capabilities will hold 

to 2010. Thus, O’Hanlon’s conclusion that ‘‘in an extreme case, a United States ship 

or two could be sunk’’ does not meet the test of closer scrutiny. 

PLAN Submarine Doctrine 

Since at least 1996, the PLAN has been preparing to do battle with the United 

States Navy. Consequently, PLAN submarine doctrine is developing with a distinct 

understanding of the asymmetric nature of its rivalry with the United States Navy. 

ASYMMETRIC TACTICS 

In such an environment, PLAN submariners realize they must overcome the technological gap with innovative tactics that will allow them to confront a technically 

superior military.134 Of course, this is a condition that has prevailed in almost all 

of modern China’s military conflicts and has therefore become deeply embedded in 

Chinese strategic culture. Contemporary Chinese military journals frequently dis126 Cote ́ writes: ‘‘In World War II, the peak number of U-boats operational was 240 in March 

1943, and this force faced in the Royal Navy alone approximately 875 ASDIC-equipped escorts, 

41 escort carriers, and 300 Coastal Command patrol aircraft.’’ Cote ́, The Third Battle, p. 12. 

Modern technology may reduce this ratio, but the needle-in-the-haystack nature of the ASW 

problem will likely always demand large numbers of platforms. 127 Adm. Harry D. Train, commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command and also NATO 

Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic during the Falklands War, writes that Argentina’s two 

German Type 209 diesel submarines ‘‘created enormous concern for the British. It dictated, at 

least as much as did the air threat, the conduct of British naval operations and caused the expenditure of a vast supply of antisubmarine warfare weapons. Virtually every antisubmarine 

weapon in the task force was expended on false submarine contacts.’’ Train, ‘‘An Analysis of the 

Falkland/Malvinas Islands Campaign,’’ Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1988), 

p. 40. 

128 O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ p. 82, n. 115. 129 This estimate is based on the professional experience at sea of one of the authors. 130 O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ p. 82, n. 115. 131 Ibid., p. 79, n. 104. 132 Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: 

Lexington Books, 1987), p. 36. Stefanick himself calls this assumption ‘‘highly unrealistic.’’ 133 O’Hanlon, ‘‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,’’ p. 78. 

152 

er.

cuss the option of striking first as a key means of coping with inferiority.135 This 

finding is consistent with that of the 2002 DoD Annual Report to Congress on the 

Chinese military.136 Strategic timing is vital, but so is tactical timing. One Chinese 

military author, for example, envisages the sortie of Chinese submarines from port 

during bad weather so that adversary ASW aircraft are temporarily grounded.137 

Speaking to reporters after a recent patrol, a PLAN submarine captain explained, 

‘‘When we penetrated the first island chain, we took advantage of bad weather as 

cover, which did well in ensuring the concealment of our submarine.’’ 138 Similarly, 

another Chinese strategist suggests that the Luzon Strait (between Taiwan and the 

Philippines) is ideal for submarine operations, because of the notoriously bad weath­ 139 In this and like manners PLAN submariners intend to exploit the fact that 

hostilities are likely to take place in and around China’s home waters.140 Thus, 

PLAN submarine commanders are working toward an intimate acquaintance with 

the topography, thermoclines, currents, and other hydrographic peculiarities of China’s coast and particularly in close proximity to Taiwan. One Chinese source says 

of the waters east of Taiwan: ‘‘Owing to the enormously strong and warm western 

Pacific current in these waters, submarines operating there can submerge to a certain depth of water and antisubmarine sonar above the water finds it very difficult 

to detect them directly.’’ 141 

A recent description of PLAN submarine exercises details operations in which the 

submarines stop their engines and rest either on the seabed or drift silently on a 

thermal layer as if ‘‘perched on the clouds.’’ 142 Another notes repeated practice in 

cloaking as a ‘‘submerged reef’’ and riding the rapid local currents.143 These peculiar 

phrases suggest that Chinese submariners clearly recognize the importance of having comprehensive local environmental knowledge and exploiting that knowledge to 

maintain stealth and other tactical advantages. 

Chinese sources also note that PLAN submarines will work in conjunction with 

mining operations.144 They observe that submarines played a role in the United 

States’ campaign to mine Japanese waters during World War II, which led to the 

sinking of 670 Japanese ships.145 Indeed, there is great interest in mines, and particularly deep-water rising mines.146 Submarines and mines are not the only underwater weapon systems receiving close scrutiny by PLAN strategists. Minisubmarines, special operations, and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) also appear to 

be of great interest.147 

Previous discussions of PLAN doctrine have noted the potentially significant fact 

that China’s submarine force has not been officially tasked with an ASW role.148 

This aspect of doctrine is in transition, however, and the development of submarine 

ASW tactics now appears to be a priority.149 Indeed, the latest model diesel sub134 For PLA discussions of asymmetric warfare, see Christensen, ‘‘Posing Problems without 

Catching Up,’’ p. 9. 135 See, for example, Wang Jiasuo, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers: Suggest You Keep Out of the Taiwan 

Strait,’’ Junshi Wenzhai, April 1, 2001, FBIS Document No. CPP20020326000218; and Dong 

Ping, ‘‘Qianting de Yinbi he Yinbi de Gongji’’ [Submarine concealment and concealed attack], 

Bingqi Zhishi (May 2002), p. 52. 136 See the 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China, p. 13– 

14. The United States would also face strong incentives to preempt before China’s submarine 

fleet had effectively dispersed. On this point, see Kan, Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign 

Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 69. 137 Yi Wen, ‘‘Wo Bangjiale Yi Sou Hangkong Mujian’’ [I kidnapped an aircraft carrier], Guoji 

Zhanwang, Vol. 440, (April 2002), p. 78. 138 Lu and Cai, ‘‘Chinese Submarine Successfully Conducts Lifesaving Escape in the Sea.’’ 139 Su Sen, ‘‘Batu Haixia: Chouliang de Qianting Youji Qu’’ [The Bashi Channel: A favorable 

environment for submarine attack operations], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 241 (October 1999), p. 13. 140 See, for example, Christensen, ‘‘Posing Problems without Catching Up,’’ p. 11. 141 Ching Tung, ‘‘Beijing’s Submarine Forces and Taiwan’s Antisubmarine Capabilities,’’ 

Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020816000067. 142 Wang Xinsen, ‘‘A Close Look as a Submarine Puts to Sea,’’ Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 272 (May 

1), 2002, FBIS Document No. 200205300000157. 143 Zhang, ‘‘ ‘Longguan’ Li Zou de Jiangjun,’’ p. 5. 144 Wang, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers.’’ 145 Ying Nan, ‘‘Gongshi Bulei de Bingli Yunyong he Tedien’’ [Tendencies in offensive mine 

warfare delivery systems], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 240 (September 1999), p. 10. 146 See, for example, Li Kefeng, ‘‘Eluosi Shin Huoquian Shang Fu Shuilei’’ [Russia’s new rocket-propelled rising mines], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 277 (October 2002), pp. 34–35; and Zhou Yi, 

‘‘Aircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins,’’ Junshi Wenzhai, March 1, 2002, FBIS Document 

No. CPP20020315000200. 147 On UUVs, see, for example, the series of articles in September 2001 issue (No. 264) of 

Jianchuan Zhishi. On mini-subs and special operations, see, for example, a series of articles in 

the April 2001 (No. 259) issue of Jianchuan Zhishi. 148 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 139. 

153


marines are apparently training for this mission.150 Against the formidable passive

sonar systems of the United States submarine force, Chinese submarine captains 

recognize that frequent resort to active pinging is tantamount to suicide.151 The emphasis is therefore on improving the performance of passive Chinese sonar and the 

incorporation of towed arrays.152 Another improvement is that Chinese submarines 

are increasingly equipped with digital (versus less capable analog) sonar systems 

that make extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf computer processing technology.153 Western diesel-electric submarines have been successful during exercises 

in conducting mock attacks against American nuclear submarines.154 

Conceivably, a future Chinese submarine force could be guided to ASW engagements, cued by acoustic information obtained from remote seabed hydrophone arrays, by a form of Chinese SOSUS, which has elicited considerable PLAN interest, 

as noted above.155 Chinese military analysts are also interested in sonar countermeasures,156 including the use of acoustic signal masking with China’s extensive 

merchant and fishing fleets. A United States naval strategist speculates, ‘‘[Chinese] 

fishing vessels would seed periscope decoys, transponder buoys, and floating radar 

reflectors. Merchant ships would transmit false radar signals and would tow acoustic jammers.’’ 157 Describing a recent incident involving the USS Bowditch surveillance ship, one Chinese commentator observes, ‘‘Only after a Chinese fishing boat

rammed and damaged its sonar equipment did the ship resentfully go away. China 

used civilian to resist military, and outwitted the United States ship.’’ 158 This behavior may well indicate broader Chinese intentions to extensively employ civilian 

assets to confound the enemy in the midst of military operations. 

NUMBERS MATTER 

In addition, PLAN submarines will attempt to make use of their superior numbers to offset the qualitatively superior United States submarine fleet. Thus, older

and less sophisticated submarines will likely be employed to screen the higher-value 

assets. Chinese sources openly describe using certain submarines as ‘‘bait.’’ 159 Employing this tactic, it is conceivable that United States submarines could reveal their 

own presence to lurking Kilos by executing attacks against nuisance Mings and Romeos. No wonder China continues to operate the vessels, which are widely derided

as obsolete by Western observers. The threat from these older submarines cannot 

be dismissed out of hand. Informal United States Navy testimony suggests that the 

PLAN can operate the older classes of diesel submarines with surprising tactical efficiency. 

Despite increasing attention to ASW, PLAN writings leave little doubt that destruction of United States aircraft carrier battle groups is the focal point of doctrinal

development. As one PLA general recently observed: ‘‘We have the ability to deal 

with an aircraft carrier that dares to get into our range of fire. . . . The U.S. likes 

vain glory; if one of its aircraft carriers could be attacked and destroyed, people in 

the U.S. would begin to complain and quarrel loudly, and the U.S. President would 

find the going harder and harder.’’ 160 The singular PLAN focus on targeting United 

149 Lin Zailian and Lu Yongzheng, ‘‘Certain Submarine Detachment under North Sea Fleet 

Conducts Drills and Develops 12 New Combat Methods,’’ Jiefangjun Bao, March 22, 2002, FBIS 

Document No. CPP20020325000052; Kan, Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 60; and 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 

Republic of China, Report to Congress, p. 22. 150 See, for example, Jiang Guangxin, Liu Ronghua and Yu Zifu, ‘‘Yong Shin Ban Xiang

Dayang: Ji Mou Qianting Tingzhang Wang Zaizhu’’ [A courageous new crew sets sail: Recollections of a certain submarine captain Wang Zaizhu], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 269 (February 2002), 

p. 8. 

151 Dong Ping, ‘‘Qianting de Yinbi he Yinbi de Gongji,’’ p. 51. 152 Ibid. By incorporating towed arrays on its submarines, the PLAN would be indicating a 

clear intent to operate in deeper water. Towed arrays are generally heavier than the water they

displace, and would drag along the bottom in shallow water, making them useless. 153 See the 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China, p. 23. 154 Most recently, Nathan Hodge ‘‘Australian ‘Hit’ On U.S. Sub Gets Attention,’’ Defense Week 

Daily Update, October 1, 2003. Also see Kan, Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 67. 155 China may have developed passive acoustic sensors, possibly for coastal surveillance. See 

the 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress, p. 33. 156 Wang, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers.’’ 157 Borik, ‘‘Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare,’’ p. 11. 158 Huang Tung, ‘‘The Inside Story on How a Chinese Fishing Boat Outwitted U.S. Spy Ship,’’ 

Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly], October 7, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20021008000063. 159 Wang, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers.’’ 160 Maj. Gen. Huang Bin, quoted in Richard D. Fisher, ‘‘To Take Taiwan, First Kill a Carrier,’’ 

Continued 

154


States carriers is likely related to the very high profile of carrier battle groups in

the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (and in virtually every other significant crisis over the 

past five decades). The strike potential of a carrier’s embarked air wing represents 

significant power projection, just as the carrier itself is symbolic of United States 

military might. China clearly recognizes this significance, and has developed its submarine force to the extent that it is now the greatest Chinese threat to United 

States carriers. Interestingly, Chinese sources suggest that lurking PLAN submarines inhibited the movement of United States carrier battle groups during the

1996 crisis.161 

STALKING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 

China will rely on a new generation of air and space assets to track United States 

carrier battle groups. Indeed, Beijing recently launched the second of its latest generation photo-reconnaissance satellites.162 Also, it will soon receive Russian built A– 

50E early warning aircraft for surveillance of ships at sea.163 These new capabilities 

will be supplemented by merchant vessels, high-frequency direction finding, and a 

formidable network of spies. Chinese planners estimate, ‘‘There is no way [for 

United States carriers] to evade . . . reconnaissance and tracking.’’ 164 Not surprisingly, the PLAN appears to be especially interested in developing the technology 

and doctrine for communicating effectively with its submarine fleet, so that its submarine captains get the most up-to-date targeting information from these remote 

sources.165 Without a doubt, achieving this capability is no easy task, but Beijing 

recognizes the magnitude of the problem. 

Chinese strategists do not underestimate the formidable defenses of American carrier battle groups, but they hold that success against United States capital ships 

is possible. One author, for example, writes, ‘‘Although aircraft carriers have powerful submarine killer aircraft on board, and despite the fact that there are antisubmarine vessels in the formation and their magnetic and infrared detectors are very 

advanced, antisubmarine warfare is by no means easy to implement.’’ 166 China’s 

current strategy may even be a calculated response to ‘‘vulnerabilities that the PLA 

has identified in the United States Navy’s high-tech armory.’’ Thus, a Hong Kongbased military analysts suggests, ‘‘The development of the Chinese submarine force

is very much based on Beijing’s assessment that they have found gaps in United 

States capabilities. The U.S. has a lot of trouble tracking submarines when they are 

under way.’’ 167 A top American submarine admiral’s assessment does not contradict 

this Chinese appraisal. In a speech before a select group of defense contractors Vice 

Adm. John Grossenbacher observed, ‘‘Our ASW capabilities can best be described as 

poor or weak.’’ 168 

Chinese planners, in the Russian tradition, believe that a carrier battle group can 

be destroyed with multiwave and multivector saturation attacks with cruise missiles. One recent analysis calculates, ‘‘In order to paralyze a carrier, there must be 

8 to 10 direct hits [by] cruise missiles . . . and nearly half of the escort vessels have 

to be destroyed. This . . . requires the launch of 70 to 100 anti-ship cruise missiles 

from all launch platforms in a single attack.’’ 169 The same analysis describes Russia’s Cold War-era ‘‘anti-carrier forces’’ in great detail and concludes, ‘‘This is Russia’s asymmetrical and economical answer to the threat of United States aircraft 

carriers. In the Russian armed forces, no other force could surely fight this threat 

sia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/cwel002l014l004.htm. On the widespread conviction among 

Chinese strategists that American society is casualty averse, see Christensen, ‘‘Posing Problems

without Catching Up,’’ pp. 17–20. 

161 Xin Benjian, ‘‘United States Concerned Over China’s Anticarrier Strategy for Fear of Exposing Its Own Weakness and Plays Up ‘Threat’ of Other countries,’’ Huanqiu Shibao [Global 

Times], February 7, 2003, FBIS Document No. CPP20030212000035. According to this article,

‘‘Once the carriers are threatened, the Americans will run away.’’ 162 Philip S. Clark, ‘‘China Launches New photo-Reconnaissance Satellite,’’ Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 19, November 6, 2002, p. 14. 163 Xin, ‘‘United States Concerned Over China’s Anticarrier Strategy.’’ 164 Zhou, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins.’’ 165 Wang Gong and Tong Shaosi, ‘‘Qianting Zhiming Shang: Tongxin Maoduen Luohou Dui

Qianting de Shengcun Weixian’’ [A submarine’s fatal flaw: The danger of communications backwardness for submarine survivability], Junshi Zhanwang (March 2002), pp. 57–59. 166 Xin, ‘‘United States Concerned Over China’s Anticarrier Strategy.’’ 167 Schloss, ‘‘PLA Submarine Fleet Making Quiet Advances,’’ Some PLAN authors may respect

Japanese ASW capabilities more than those of the United States. See Wang Xiaoxuan, ‘‘Riben 

Hangkong Fanting Liliang de Zuozhan Tedian’’ [Trends in Japan’s aerial anti-submarine warfare capabilities], Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 208 (January 1997), p. 32. 168 Vice Adm. John Grossenbacker, ‘‘Remarks at 2002 NDIA Clambake,’’ Submarine Review, (January 2002), p. 12. 169 Dong Hua, ‘‘An Aircraft Carrier’s Natural Enemy: The Anti-Ship Missile,’’ Junshi Wenzhai, July 1, 2002, FBIS Document No. CPP20020710000185. 

155 

except submarines.’’ 170 Chinese fascination with the Russian Oscar-class ‘‘carrierkiller’’ SSGN (nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine) is evident in PLAN publications.171 Another article highlights the importance of saturating the carrier battle 

group’s anti-cruise missile defenses with ‘‘numerous cruise missile salvos forming up 

dense waves of attacks, and with the interval between the launch of each wave 

being several seconds or several minutes, so that the enemy aircraft carrier formation is subjected to multiple waves of continuous, concentrated attacks. . . . [It will 

be] unable to react effectively to the follow-on waves of attack, and ultimately [will] 

take hits.’’ On this problem, Owen Cote ́ explains, ‘‘Flying low and fast, antiship missiles are extremely difficult to defend against in the endgame of their engagements, 

which is why the United States Navy’s traditional approach . . . [was] to kill the archer rather than his arrow.’’ 172 The serious shortfall in contemporary United States 

ASW limits reliance on this Cold War-era tactic. 

Other strategies outlined for attacking carrier battle groups include attempts to 

‘‘scatter [the] formation,’’ allowing for defeat in detail 173 and also targeting the vulnerable ships that resupply the carrier battle group with fuel and other necessities.174 Chinese authors have duly noted that during World War II, seventeen aircraft carriers were sunk by submarines.175 PLAN strategists also draw confidence 

from reports of success by rather primitive diesel submarines in penetrating carrier 

battle group ASW screens during exercises with allied navies.176 According to the 

Chinese press, PLAN exercises in 2001 and 2002 off China’s south coast were conducted ‘‘with the intervention of United States aircraft carriers in mind.’’ 177 Finally, 

aircraft carriers are seen as carrying ‘‘huge quantities of ammunition, aircraft fuel, 

and ship fuel,’’ and therefore are vulnerable to ‘‘heavy losses if hit.’’ 178 

More than simple chest-thumping, the potential Chinese submarine threat has 

been noted in the wider Asia-Pacific region. An author writing in the Far Eastern 

Economic Review recently observed, ‘‘Defense analysts are already questioning 

whether the United States . . . would risk sending aircraft carrier battle groups to 

intervene in any clash across the Taiwan Strait if China is successful in deploying 

an effective fleet of submarines by the end of this decade.’’ 180 O’Hanlon’s vision of 

‘‘the tide of [the sea] battle would be strongly against the PRC,’’ along with Robert 

Ross’s recent assertion that ‘‘United States maritime forces enjoy overwhelming advantages’’ would each seem to rest on questionable assumptions.181 

Conclusion 

Evidence suggests that China is seeking to become a first-class submarine power. 

While the PLAN modernization shows impressive breadth with major new purchases of naval aircraft and surface combatants, submarines appear to be the centerpiece of China’s strategic reorientation toward the sea. The May 2002 contract 

for eight additional Kilos, the likely continuation of the Song program, and nuclear 

force modernization, taken together with the evident new priority on training, technological research and doctrinal development all suggest that Beijing recognizes the 

value of submarines as a potent, asymmetric answer to United States maritime superiority. The recent ascendance of a submariner, Adm. Zhang Dingfa, to the position of commanding officer of the PLAN underlines these tendencies. Further investments in diesel submarines, particularly when enhanced by air independent propulsion, will afford Beijing increasing near-term leverage in the East Asian littoral, 

170 Ibid. 171 See, for example, the many Oscar-related articles in the December 2002 issue (No. 279) 

of Jianchuan Zhishi. The Oscar, a true behemoth, carries 24 300-mile-range mach 2.5, 750 kg 

warhead SS–N–19 cruise missiles, and can launch 65 cm wake-homing torpedoes. A recent Russian article states ‘‘The PRC also has an interest in the procurement of an Oscar class submarines,’’ Oleg Odnokolenko, ‘‘Watch Out, Market Closing. . . ,’’ Itogi, February 4, 2003, FBIS 

Document No. CEP20030204000434. Rumors also persist regarding a possible sale of an Akulaclass SSN to China. See, for example, Isenberg, ‘‘China Buys Russian Vessels to Mount Naval 

Challenge to U.S.,’’ p. 3. 172 Cote ́, The Future of the Trident Force, p. 11. 173 Wang, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers.’’ 174 Schloss, ‘‘PLA Submarine Fleet Making Quiet Advances.’’ 175 Zhou, ‘‘Aircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins.’’ 176 See ‘‘Zhongguo Xuyao Hangkong Mujian?’’ For a United States Government report detailing such incidents, see Kan, Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 65, n. 234. 177 Xin, ‘‘United States Concerned Over China’s Anticarrier Strategy.’’ 178 Ibid. 180 David League, ‘‘We All Live for Another Submarine,’’ Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15, 2002. 181 O’Hanlon, ‘‘Can China Conquer Taiwan?’’ p. 79; and Ross, ‘‘Navigating the Taiwan Strait,’’ 

p. 80. 

156 

while methodical nuclear modernization signifies a long-term commitment to global 

power projection. As one Chinese strategist recently observed, ‘‘The scale [of recent 

purchases] indicates that in the coming years, China will build an offshore defense 

system with submarines as the key point.’’ 182 

In considering China’s maritime modernization, Western defense analysts commonly downplay the threat, expressing deep skepticism at PLAN aptitude for employing high technology and integrating it successfully. Given China’s poor record 

at projecting seapower in the modern era, such skepticism is reasonable, and by no 

means should the PLAN submarine force be considered ten feet tall. China’s submarine force has some significant weaknesses: a reliance on diesel submarines that 

have to approach the surface to snorkel; especially in the wake of the Ming 361 accident, it is evident that crew training and professionalism remain a fundamental 

problem; finally, there is little evidence of a robust, remote cueing capability, and 

probable weakness in the sphere of command and control.183 Moreover, the data 

presented in this study must be viewed as both preliminary and limited, rendering 

the conclusions necessarily tentative. For example, detailed information regarding 

the sophistication of Chinese submarine exercises, if it exists, is highly classified. 

On the other hand, the trap of projecting from the past and underestimating an 

opponent is timeworn folly. Here, it is useful to reflect briefly on the Israeli experience in 1973. Just a few years earlier in the Six Day War, the Israelis had shown 

themselves masters of high-technology air and armored warfare, while the Egyptian 

armed forces had demonstrated gross incompetence. Given that experience, Israeli 

analysts were not concerned by the threat from new antitank and air defense weapons imported by Egypt before 1973. Egypt’s forces put these new weapons to such 

deadly effect during the first days of the Yom Kippur War, however, that Israel’s 

survival was very much in question. 

Far from inevitable, the possibility of war between the United States and China 

is reduced by numerous factors: the enormous volume of trade and investment between the two powers chief among them. The same economic mechanisms are also 

drawing Taiwan and the PRC ever closer. Close examination of Beijing’s current 

terms for unification, in particular Jiang Zemin’s ‘‘eight points,’’ yield the conclusion 

that a political settlement of the Taiwan issue is not beyond the realm of possibility.184 Such an outcome would do much to forestall the tendencies toward rivalry 

that characterized United States-China relations during most of the 1990s. On the 

other hand, the United States must hedge against the worst case and face China’s 

rise with eyes wide open. 

China is not the first land power to go to sea by investing disproportionately in 

submarines. Though both Germany and the Soviet Union ultimately failed, their 

submarine-centric strategies were qualified successes. Germany almost defeated 

Britain twice in this manner, and by the 1970s the Soviet submarine force successfully challenged United States sea control, even in such core regions as the Mediterranean.185 Whether the PRC will succeed where Germany and the Soviet Union 

struggled is one of the greatest questions of maritime strategy for the twenty first 

century. 

Panel IV: Discussion, Questions and Answers 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Thank you very much. That was a great 

briefing by both of you. Commissioner Mulloy, if I start with you, 

I’ll just run down this way. Do you have anything? 

Commissioner MULLOY. Yes, I do. This is for Dr. Goldstein and 

Mr. Murray. I was reading on page 38 of your prepared testimony. 

182 T’ang Sheng, ‘‘Mainland Strengthens Prowess of Submarines to Deter Taiwan Independence,’’ Ching Pao [The Mirror], September 1, 2001, FBIS Document No. CPP20020905000021. 183 For a useful discussion of possible weak points in China’s submarine force, see Kan, 

Bolckom, and O’Rourke, ‘‘China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions,’’ p. 70. 184 In his famous ‘‘eight points’’ speech on January 30, 1995, former PRC President Jiang 

Zemin stated, ‘‘[Taiwan] may . . . retain its armed forces and administer its party, governmental, 

and military systems by itself. The central government will not station troops or send administrative personnel there. What is more, a number of posts in the central government will be made 

available to Taiwan.’’ It is additionally worth noting that this is the opening PRC position for 

negotiations—suggesting that the final terms of a settlement might be even more lenient. For 

the complete text of Jiang’s speech, see ‘‘Continue to Promote the Reunification of Taiwan,’’ in 

Orville Shell and David Shambaugh (eds.), The China Reader: The Reform Era (New York: Vintage, 1999), pp. 498–501. 185 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990, (Stanford, 

Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 398–402. 

157 

You paint a very sobering scenario, but I’m encouraged by what 

you say there. You said far from inevitable, the possibility of war 

between the United States and China is reduced by numerous factors. 

And then you talk about the enormous volume of trade and investment between the two powers. You believe that that is a positive in terms of this relationship. And then you say the same economic mechanisms are also drawing Taiwan and the PRC ever 

closer, and then you go on further and you talk that close examination of Beijing’s current terms for unification, in particular, Jiang 

Zemin’s eight points, yield the conclusion that a political settlement 

of the Taiwan issue is not beyond the realm of possibility. 

In terms of U.S. policy, do you think we should be encouraging 

that type of political settlement between Taiwan and China? Some 

people say no, no, we’re going to have a problem with China, we 

ought to be encouraging Taiwan as some kind of a permanent, you 

know, offshore carrier, and I’m just wondering where do you—I’d 

be interested in the whole panel. What do you think? We should 

be encouraging the settlement? Or do you think that’s an impossibility and we ought to be going in the other direction? 

And I’ll start, and I’d like a quick view of each of you on that 

issue. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Okay. Yes, sir. Well, you know, addressing the 

wider political context is a bit outside of the thrust of our paper. 

Commissioner MULLOY. It’s in your testimony. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. But let me elaborate somewhat. My own view is 

that one of the major implications of our work is that whereas 

O’Hanlon would argue that a war with China would be relatively 

cheap, just one or two ships lost in an extreme case, that our analysis suggests that a U.S.-China war would be much more costly, 

and one implication of that is especially given the considerable 

commitment of the United States to the global war on terrorism, 

that we should consider how diplomatic tools might be used to push 

some kind of settlement of the Taiwan issue. 

When one considers how much diplomatic energy has been expended on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and yet there is no comparable 

efforts in this potentially explosive situation. Washington’s attitude 

is extremely passive—limited to expressing the hope that a settlement can be found. Given the considerable military risks involved, 

which our study underlines, it seems that a more pro-active diplomatic approach is in order. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Commander Murray, do you agree with 

that? 

Mr. MURRAY. I don’t want to contradict anything that either of 

the Deputy Assistant Secretaries said earlier, but I think if we 

could find our way to a negotiated agreement that suited all parties, that’s certainly preferable to a war. 

Commissioner MULLOY. The other two? You agree with their 

analysis on that point? 

Mr. BRUZDZINSKI. I’ll just say that I agree unequivocally with 

Mr. Murray. I think that a war in the Taiwan Strait would be potentially catastrophic for the parties involved and damaging for the 

interests of the entire region. A war between China and Taiwan 

would be incredibly costly and it would be very destabilizing to 

158 

peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. So, if a peaceful 

means can be discovered to resolve differences between the Mainland and Taiwan to achieve an outcome that is compatible with 

U.S. strategic interests as well as the desires of the free people of 

Taiwan, then, a peaceful settlement is, by far, the preferred course. 

However, I do believe that it is imperative that the United States 

honor its lawful security commitments as embodied in the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act. 

Mr. WANG. I have a slightly different take on this issue. I think 

the stated U.S. policy is to encourage a peaceful settlement of disputes between the two sides, but be careful what you’re wishing 

for. If I were to favor a settlement, it can only happen under one 

condition, namely, that the two sides are relatively on equal footing 

parity rather than Taiwan negotiating under duress. 

Other than that, I would actually favor including Taiwanese in 

the negotiation regarding its status and relationship with the PRC, 

which we did not do in the past. The Shanghai Communique ́ was 

basically a deal brokered between the U.S. and China over the fate 

of Taiwan, without any input from Taiwan, and the President 

wants to impose a status quo that is inherently unstable, Taiwan 

is now a democracy, so I think the key is to involve the Taiwanese. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Thank you very much. That was very 

helpful. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Ellsworth. No. Okay. Commissioner D’Amato. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much for your testimony. It takes a lot of thought to think 

through the implications of what you’re telling us. As I understand 

it, you were talking about submarine procurement at the rate of 

something like over $8 billion. Was that the figure I heard you 

mention in terms of procurement of submarines, the KILOs? 

Mr. MURRAY. Well, no, sir. The KILOs are eight KILOs for 

roughly, according to the open press, $1.6 billion total at $200 million a piece. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. $1.6 billion? 

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Yes. That sounds like a lot of money, 

you know. 

Mr. MURRAY. It is to me. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. It is to me, too. 

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. But when you consider the fact that 

the Chinese pick up a billion dollars in trade surplus about every 

48 hours, I figure they can probably afford a few of these KILO 

submarines. 

The question is, and—the question is whether or not we have 

thought through a more complicated battle group strategy for the 

Strait’s defense given the possibility of the deployment of numerous 

KILO submarines to challenge the battle groups? Have you been 

looking at that? 

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir. We’re giving that a great deal of thought. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. We may not have as many dimensions 

to our Strait defense strategy, which in the absence of a Chinese 

blue water Navy having a couple of battle groups around would be 

159 

sufficient. But in the face of this kind of a possible future submarine deployment, then a rethinking is needed. We’d be interested in seeing any kind of papers that you all are doing in that 

area. 

Mr. MURRAY. We’d have to talk to you separately in some other 

venue. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. We would like to do that. Yes. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, I might comment that we painted a rather 

bleak picture of American ASW, but there are some bright spots. 

One is I think recognition by the Navy this year that ASW needs 

to be identified as a priority. We’ve actually set up a separate command within OP NAV under the CNO that will address ASW 

issues, specifically. 

And there is, I think, at least a recognition on the set of programs that the U.S. Navy needs to regain proficiency in this area. 

I can walk through them for you, but the Navy will be looking to 

Congressional support for a variety of programs to regain the capability that has withered in the last decade. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Well, I also was very interested in your 

presentation on this so-called Assassin’s Mace program, something 

that we’ve been looking at for several years. I don’t know if you 

saw our first report where we went over—we’d be interested in 

your analysis of what was said in that report on what you know 

now about Assassin’s Mace weapons. 

Mr. BRUZDZINSKI. I will be happy to review the report and comment on it for the Commission. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. Thank you. All right. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Okay. I’m going to break the order I have 

been following and turn to Commissioner Dreyer. 

Commissioner DREYER. I wanted to say thank you before I have 

to leave. This has really been fascinating. And with regard to Dr. 

Wang’s testimony, I was thinking, as you were talking about the 

Zhongxue Weiti, Xixue Weiyong, that in the 19th century for those 

of you who don’t speak Chinese, this means Chinese learning for 

the essence and Western learning for practical use—there was a 

gentleman named Yan Fu, who in the 19th century worked in a 

naval shipyard and also translated the works of Western political 

philosophers like Bentham and Rousseau. He made a startling discovery which is that Western learning had an essence of its own, 

and if you don’t adopt that essence, you can never actually fully 

utilize the things for practical use. 

On my good days, I think I can adopt your statement there about 

the relative lack of interconnectivity in China and say that this is 

a two-edged sword because as connectivity increases and people are 

able to bounce ideas off each other, that the society may pluralize, 

and therefore the PRC will be less of a danger. 

And then, of course, I listened to Drs. Goldstein and Murray and 

I got very, very depressed about the possibility of what they were 

describing happening. So I hope that since we do all have security 

clearances, we can talk to you at some point about what the U.S. 

Navy is doing and how that might play out in a cross-Strait confrontation. Would that be agreeable to you, gentlemen? 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Of course. 

160 

Commissioner DREYER. Thank you. And now I have to go. Thank 

you very much. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Robinson. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. It strikes 

me that it’s a high tempo, intensely violent event if things go 

wrong in the cross-Strait context and there could be a lot of damage as you go out of area, IW being just one example of many. This 

is obviously a scenario best avoided given the attrition of our own 

capabilities and the non-replacement of same. 

It’s not the most upbeat briefing I’ve heard, but then again very 

realistic and very well presented. I want to talk about miscalculation for a moment. We’ve been evaluating Chinese for some time 

now, both from a military, strategic perspective as well as, of 

course, the economic trade, financial, and energy side of the equation because of the broad scope of our mandate. 

And in our evaluation of Chinese perceptions, particularly on the 

military and strategic front, we find, a troubling propensity on 

their part to believe their own propaganda or doctrine, in effect too 

much. China possesses a number of modern, world-class weapon 

systems. You’re dealing with asymmetric warfare. The Chinese are 

enamored with magic or Assassin’s Mace weaponry, IW, a big emphasis here, and they’re acquiring the kind of capabilities that 

could take down, or disable a major surface ship like a carrier, 

which by their own admission they regard as a ‘‘prize.’’ China is 

not in my humble judgment, really appreciating the political implications of what they’re talking about or preparing for here. 

When you fire a supersonic cruise missile at a carrier, it’s important to recall that there are 4,000 to 5,000 Americans on board, 

and if that CLUB missile or supersonic Sunburn cruise missile, 

whatever, hits its target, you could have thousands of casualties. 

I mean there are a far greater number of people than perished 

on 9/11 on that carrier. The Congress would of course react 

robustly to any incident of this kind, putting it mildly. I don’t understand why the Chinese have a better appreciation for the stakes 

involved. If you want to talk about things going wrong in a hurry 

and an escalation that could turn into an uncontrollable spiral— 

driven by the reaction of the American people, the media and an 

outraged Congress—the Executive Branch would likely not be able 

to contain the political fall-out from such an attack. 

So I’d be interested in your trying to get into their heads a bit 

for me and explain to me whether or not I’ve got it right that the 

Chinese tend to be prone to miscalculation here, as evidenced by 

their publications? Are you seeing this as well? 

Mr. WANG. I think your point is absolutely right. The Chinese 

have a problem in terms of their inability to comprehend the political implications. Sometimes I think that they are probably too fascinated by the offensive advantage, for example IW will give them. 

In several cases of my research, I found that they very quickly 

discover that they are equally vulnerable. They hope that they can 

inflict harm on their opponent, but in fact they are equally vulnerable. So the second generation of the scholarship of these strategic 

thinkers have become more sober. 

I want to provide a little bit of perspective. Some of these publications like the ones that have been shown and the ones I’ve read 

161 

are actually results of China’s economic development, namely now 

there is greater market competition. So some publications are trying to sensationalize and I think that if you ask the real people 

who have the real decisionmaking powers whether they are ready 

to take on the United States, that the answer would be probably 

different. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Please. 

Mr. MURRAY. Regarding the quality of these publications, they 

are wholly comparable to U.S. military publications. That does not 

mean they are immune from exaggeration, and speculation. We 

find these sources are generally credible, as have other scholars in 

this field. Of course, buying the platform doesn’t necessarily give 

you the full capability, as Dr. Finkelstein mentioned earlier, but 

China definitely recognizes where they want to go and they have 

a clear understanding of the path they have to tread in order to 

get there, in our opinion. 

But the actual state of their expertise or their underwater professionalism, their ability to take these aspirations and make it work, 

that’s something we don’t have a firm grip on yet, but this is something we’re following as closely as we possibly can, so we’d like to 

say they’re five feet tall and growing. They’re not ten feet tall, but 

they know where they want to go. 

Chairman ROBINSON. Tempted in the direction of miscalculation? 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, sir, I think it’s a very interesting question, 

and I think on the point of miscalculation, I’ve actually taken to 

counting how many citations one can see references to the so-called 

‘‘Somalia syndrome,’’ and this dubious notion, I have to say, shows 

up very frequently in the literature, and one can ask, well, do you 

see the opposite? Do you see any reference to the ‘‘Pearl Harbor 

syndrome,’’ maybe the ‘‘9/11 syndrome,’’ if you will, and we don’t 

see that at all, as near as I can tell, which is most disturbing. 

This may suggest on the one hand, just a complete vast 

misperception. On the other hand, it could plausibly suggest a determined effort on their part to suggest that they don’t accept, they 

don’t recognize the Pearl Harbor syndrome, they’re not afraid of us. 

So that could be a propaganda effort on their part. 

However, in your broader question, though, of whether they appreciate the true consequences of striking a carrier, I might just 

say that when we consider the military balance in this situation, 

it’s most important to understand the tyranny of geography and 

how much that gives China or how that begins to level the playing 

field when we actually look directly into military scenarios. That 

may give them the kind of confidence combined with their political 

will which is evident from their increasing nationalism, to consider 

even some of the most violent scenarios. 

I think there’s a large tendency in the military defense analytical 

community to assume that this war is going to be over in 48 hours 

and hopefully we’ll be there, we’ll have the forces in place. But I 

do not think we can rule out a war in the East Asian littoral that 

lasts for years and that more closely approximates a tremendous 

battle of attrition, where again they leverage this advantage of geography. 

And so this could well become a question of political will. I think 

Americans frequently underestimate Chinese will on this question. 

162 

Chairman ROBINSON. Yes. 

Mr. BRUZDZINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I share your concerns. I think 

you have made a very realistic, sober, judgment. I observe that, 

historically, the Chinese display a propensity for misperception and 

miscalculation. I would like to acknowledge the work in this regard 

by Dr. Michael Pillsbury, who is present here today. Dr. Pillsbury 

has assembled some excellent research on this for the Office of Net 

Assessment at the Department of Defense. In fact, I believe that 

Dr. Pillsbury prepared a specific study a few years ago called ‘‘Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions.’’ 

I refer to this study over and over again because it’s so insightful, and also because I have become very concerned about the statements that I’m reading in translation from authoritative Chinese 

military journals published by the PLA National Defense University, from the PRC Academy of Military Science and other Chinese 

military institutions. It is clear to me that the Chinese really do 

believe that by using their own unique methodologies, that the 

United States can be deterred or defeated in combat by the PLA. 

While this may sound almost bizarre to us, I think it is easier for 

Americans to understand how the Chinese reach some of these 

misperceptions when one carefully examines the logic and the 

methodologies that the Chinese employ for their assessments. I 

view that both the methodologies and the logic appear to be fundamentally flawed. 

To their detriment, the Chinese have been indoctrinated to draw 

upon the Marxist dialectic and what I will call a ‘‘relativist’’ perspective for their military assessments. PLA scholars (operations 

analysts) are trained to look at military matters from a very relativist perspective. If we take the time to understand the perspective, logic and the methodology that the Chinese use for their assessments, it becomes easier for us to understand how the Chinese 

reach their conclusions. However, our ability to understand this 

process does not necessarily make the judgments of the Chinese 

correct. Indeed, I view that often, the contrary is true. I believe, 

like Dr. Pillsbury does, that the Chinese tend to draw dangerously 

incorrect conclusions about the United States Armed Forces and 

the PLA’s ability to cope with American military power. I fear that 

if the Chinese believe they can deter the United States or prevail 

in a military conflict with the United States, then China’s leaders 

and generals might be more apt to attempt such actions. 

Chairman ROBINSON. No. Thank you for that. I would just conclude by sending a message to China with regard to this kind of 

scenario—don’t do it. It would be a huge mistake. Thank you. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. I have a couple of questions if I may before 

we close. Dr. Wang, you talked about in your paper digital mutually assured destruction. Now, that is a deterrence term. And what 

I get from that is you’re suggesting that because each side is so 

good at digital warfare, they deter each other and there is no war. 

Mr. WANG. Or they are so bad at this moment. I’m talking about 

China and Taiwan. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Yes. So they would not—in other words, 

there’s no danger. They’re going to deter each other; is that what 

you’re trying to tell us? 

163 

Mr. WANG. I’m not saying that there is no danger because either 

side can get a technological breakthrough. But based on the available evidence, I see that there is some kind of mutual assured destruction. 

Let me give you two examples. In 1999, after Taiwan President 

Lee Teng-hui made the ‘‘two states theory’’ remarks, the Chinese 

hackers, called honkers (or ‘‘red hackers’’ in Chinese, meaning they 

are ideologically committed hackers), attacked the Taiwanese web 

sites, and planted Chinese flag and all that, and the Taiwanese 

hackers retaliated. So we saw a virtual war, a cyber war if you 

will, short of a shooting war, so the Chinese became more sober, 

and they know they have weaknesses as well. 

Another example is the Taiwanese youth today may be a bit too 

sedentary in terms of lifestyle: They spend too much time in front 

of a computer playing games so they may not be playing basketball 

very well, but they know computers very well. Since Taiwan still 

has a conscription system, so many of them will be drafted into the 

military, they can become the so-called cyber warriors if you will. 

The Chinese have their cyber warriors. The Taiwanese military established its own electronic warfare unit in 2001. 

So I think that Taiwan is responding to what the Chinese are 

doing, and this should give the Chinese a little bit of caution as 

well, but I still would not rule out the possibility of either side 

gaining some technological breakthrough. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Okay. Dr. Goldstein and Mr. Murray, you’re 

concerned about U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities. And because of that, I mean what I sense in your responses to more political questions is you’re just ready to sort of get in the middle, sort 

of bargain away whatever sort of little bit of sovereignty Taiwan 

has in order to avoid that war because we’re not as good in antisubmarine warfare as you think we should be. 

So let’s assume we do that. Let’s assume we get in the middle 

and broker a deal, as you suggest, both of you, between Taiwan 

and the mainland. Does that China have any other goals in the 

western Pacific that might interfere with American and Japanese 

interests, assuming that Taiwan was not an issue between China 

and the United States? 

Do they have any maritime goals that have to do with the ability 

to have freedom of operation and freedom of movement through the 

air space of the western Pacific? 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. It’s quite clear to me that China does seek to be 

a serious maritime power. As evidence for that, you may look at 

the development of nuclear propulsion. If those programs are successful and as they develop, that will enable China to project maritime power well beyond the confines of the Taiwan scenario. 

Certainly, we would not argue that Taiwan is the sole focus of 

China’s naval modernization, but I think we have to recognize that 

China is like any other country, it goes through its guns and butter 

debate. The Taiwan issue focuses and supports those favoring a 

more aggressive pace for military modernization, and particularly 

the submarine and naval lobby. 

And I do believe China will gradually emerge as a ‘‘natural’’ 

naval power. It’s my own personal view that China’s larger geopolitical goals are not akin to the expansionist aims of the Soviet 

164 

Union. They are not I think as you yourself said earlier today, that 

they are not seeking global hegemony, although it is clear they 

would like to control the East Asian littoral. 

Beijing appears much more interested in commercial expansion 

than in military expansion. But we cannot rule out a more aggressive China in the future. Certainly, we must hedge by strengthening our military forces and various relationships. However, I 

question whether Taiwan is the most appropriate place to draw the 

defense line. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. And you both seem to have left Japanese 

anti-submarine warfare capabilities completely out of your equation. Are there any Japanese capabilities here? 

Mr. MURRAY. Certainly there are. Japan has a very capable 

Navy. They have an extensive P–3 force. They have 15 submarines, 

not that that gives you much of an anti-submarine warfare capability or wide area search and sanitization capability. And their 

surface ships are excellent. 

Could Taiwan count on them to assist in a situation—— 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. We’ve already given Taiwan away. Remember, you guys just gave Taiwan away and solved that one. 

Mr. MURRAY. A diplomatic solution does not equate to ‘‘giving 

Taiwan away.’’ 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. We haven’t. You have. 

Mr. MURRAY. Certainly Japan is a strong ally and they have a 

very capable navy. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. I think Commissioner D’Amato has one and 

then I think we’re going to close it out. 

Vice Chairman D’AMATO. I’d just like to follow up on that. I’ve 

got a couple of thoughts on that. The defense line has already been 

drawn for us. It’s too late to draw a new defense line. It’s there. 

The problem is, as we see it, as I see it anyway, that brokering a 

deal between Taiwan and the mainland, that sounds very nice, but 

what you’re talking about is a robust new democracy, how it brokers a deal with what is essentially a highly controlled and brutal 

and corrupt dictatorship, which is the reality of what’s going on in 

Beijing. 

I don’t know where the political deal arises from that kind of a 

dialogue in terms of the long run. So our problem is that given the 

strong probability that no deal will be brokered as long as you have 

this political dysfunctionality because Taiwan presents a tremendous embarrassment to the Beijing regime. It’s a threat because it 

exists in terms of an alternative political model to their own. 

The problem there is that when you get to the mind-set of asymmetrical warfare and magic weapons and all this baloney, that we 

look for ways to make sure that miscalculation is reduced to an absolute minimum. How do we reduce miscalculation to an absolute 

minimum? That’s the issue. I think it’s a tough question because 

projecting our way of thinking on their regime is very, very dangerous. They think differently. 

And the question of how to communicate what the extreme costs 

would be for miscalculation, I think, is the task that our leadership 

needs to address, make sure that there is not a miscalculation. As 

long as this dysfunctionality exists and there’s a potential miscalculation, how to communicate in ways that indicate that the cost 

165 

of miscalculation are going to be too high to risk. And I think that 

is what we need to assure ourselves that we are able to put in 

place that kind of capability. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Commissioner Mulloy, you’re going to wrap 

it up for us. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Yes. I just wanted the point that the two 

authors make—Dr. Goldstein, I think you point out in footnote 184 

of what you put in here of what the famous eight points are, and 

not exactly asking for Taiwan to surrender. But the other point by 

Commissioner Wortzel, Japan has no, they’ve not indicated that 

they’re in on defending Taiwan from my understanding. We’re pretty much alone in that endeavor, aren’t we? 

But further afield, there would be quite different calculation 

worldwide, I think, in terms of other adventures that may happen 

at some point. Is that your impression? 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. As far as Japan, I think it’s very much left ambiguous. I do not believe that we can count on Japanese support 

in a conflict over Taiwan. If we’re going to have a robust deterrence 

ability that the Commissioner just spoke of, then we would want 

to be sure that Japan is on board for these scenarios, but I don’t 

think we can be, especially given China’s clear ability to threaten 

Japan and in Kadena in particular, so that I do think is a grave 

concern. 

As far as Jiang’s eight points, what I find particularly interesting 

there is China’s apparent willingness—and this is reiterated over 

and over again—to allow Taiwan to keep its defense forces and also 

to say that they will not station any PRC representatives on Taiwan. To me that suggests there’s at least some room for negotiations. I leave the political details to the diplomats, but what I say 

is let our diplomats be creative. Let them put the energy that they 

put into the Arab-Israeli conflict into this. Give them a chance. 

Of course, our research focuses more narrowly on the military 

balance and what I say to you on that question of the military balance is if you want robust deterrence, you had better invest heavily 

in ASW in the future. 

Commissioner MULLOY. Thank you, both. Commander Murray. 

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, please, I’d like to make one point. You may 

take the impression away that our Navy doesn’t recognize the ASW 

problem China represents or isn’t doing enough to improve antisubmarine warfare. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our 

Chief of Naval Operations has tasked the fleet to come up with a 

game plan, a way to regain the undersea supremacy that we would 

like to have. We’re devoting what assets are available to accomplish this, but we are severely resource constrained, because of the 

demands of the global war on terrorism. To accomplish all of our 

mission effectively, the Navy will undoubtedly require more support. 

Co-Chair WORTZEL. Well, to close it out, thank God that we’re 

only dropping down to 1,800 strategic nuclear warheads. Thanks a 

lot for your time. 

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

STATUTORY MANDATE OF THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 

REVIEW COMMISSION 

Pursuant to Public Law 108–7, Division P, enacted February 20, 

2003 

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMISSION.—The United 

States-China Commission shall focus, in lieu of any other areas of 

work or study, on the following: 

PROLIFERATION PRACTICES.—The Commission shall analyze and assess the Chinese role in the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction and other weapons (including dual use technologies) to terrorist-sponsoring states, and suggest possible steps 

which the United States might take, including economic sanctions, 

to encourage the Chinese to stop such practices. 

ECONOMIC REFORMS AND UNITED STATES ECONOMIC TRANSFERS.—The Commission shall analyze and assess 

the qualitative and quantitative nature of the shift of United 

States production activities to China, including the relocation of 

high-technology, manufacturing, and R&D facilities; the impact of 

these transfers on United States national security, including political influence by the Chinese Government over American firms, dependence of the United States national security industrial base on 

Chinese imports, the adequacy of United States export control 

laws, and the effect of these transfers on United States economic 

security, employment, and the standard of living of the American 

people; analyze China’s national budget and assess China’s fiscal 

strength to address internal instability problems and assess the 

likelihood of externalization of such problems. 

ENERGY.—The Commission shall evaluate and assess how China’s large and growing economy will impact upon world energy 

supplies and the role the United States can play, including joint 

R&D efforts and technological assistance, in influencing China’s energy policy. 

UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.—The Commission 

shall evaluate the extent of Chinese access to, and use of United 

States capital markets, and whether the existing disclosure and 

transparency rules are adequate to identify Chinese companies 

which are active in United States markets and are also engaged in 

proliferation activities or other activities harmful to United States 

security interests. 

CORPORATE REPORTING.—The Commission shall assess 

United States trade and investment relationship with China, including the need for corporate reporting on United States investments in China and incentives that China may be offering to 

United States corporations to relocate production and R&D to 

China. 

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167 

REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPACTS.—The 

Commission shall assess the extent of China’s ‘‘hollowing-out’’ of 

Asian manufacturing economies, and the impact on United States 

economic and security interests in the region; review the triangular 

economic and security relationship among the United States, Taipei and Beijing, including Beijing’s military modernization and 

force deployments aimed at Taipei, and the adequacy of United 

States executive branch coordination and consultation with Congress on United States arms sales and defense relationship with 

Taipei. 

UNITED STATES-CHINA BILATERAL PROGRAMS.—The 

Commission shall assess science and technology programs to evaluate if the United States is developing an adequate coordinating 

mechanism with appropriate review by the intelligence community 

with Congress; assess the degree of non-compliance by China and 

[with] United States-China agreements on prison labor imports and 

intellectual property rights; evaluate United States enforcement 

policies; and recommend what new measures the United States 

Government might take to strengthen our laws and enforcement 

activities and to encourage compliance by the Chinese. 

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION COMPLIANCE.—The 

Commission shall review China’s record of compliance to date with 

its accession agreement to the WTO, and explore what incentives 

and policy initiatives should be pursued to promote further compliance by China. 

MEDIA CONTROL.—The Commission shall evaluate Chinese 

government efforts to influence and control perceptions of the 

United States and its policies through the internet, the Chinese 

print and electronic media, and Chinese internal propaganda. 

LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 

PREPARED STATEMENTS 

Page 


Bruzdzinski, Jason E., Senior Professional Staff, The MITRE Corporation, 


McLean, Virginia .................................................................................................. 113


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 116


Copper, John F., Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies, 


Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee ................................................................ 41


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43


D’Amato, Vice Chairman C. Richard 


Opening remarks of .......................................................................................... 3


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4


deLisle, Jacques, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania ......................... 56


Ellsworth, Ambassador Robert F., Hearing Co-Chair 


Opening remarks of .......................................................................................... 6


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7


Feldman, Harvey J., U.S. Ambassador, Retired, Senior Fellow for Asian Stud­


ies, The Heritage Foundation .............................................................................. 29


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31


Finkelstein, David M., Deputy Director of Project Asia, Center for Naval 


Analysis Corporation, Center for Strategic Studies .......................................... 90


Fisher, Richard D., Jr., Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Center for 


Security Policy ...................................................................................................... 72


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 74


Goldstein, Lyle J., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. 


Naval War College ............................................................................................... 129


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 135


Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken, Professor, Political Science Department, South­


west Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri ..................................... 34


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36


Lawless, Richard P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific 


Affairs .................................................................................................................... 8


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10


Medeiros, Evan S., Ph.D., Associate Political Scientist, The RAND Corpora­


tion ........................................................................................................................ 93


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96


Murray, William, Retired Commander and Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War 


College ................................................................................................................... 129


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 135


Robinson, Chairman Roger W., Jr. 


Opening remarks of .......................................................................................... 1


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2


Schriver, Randall G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and 


Pacific Affairs ....................................................................................................... 13


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15


Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science, 


University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia .................................................... 124


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 126


Wortzel, Larry M., Hearing Co-Chair 


Opening remarks of .......................................................................................... 4


Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6


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