### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00010-CR
Wesley Dean D eShon, Appel lant
v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RDJ UDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 9031, HO NORABLE FRANK J. MALONE Y, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING Appe llantWe sle y De an De Sh o n w as co nvic t ed in a j ury tri al of the f el ony of f en se of crim in al mi schi ef h avi ng caused a

pecuni ary l oss of property of the val

ue of f i f teen hun dred d oll ars ormore but less than

twen ty th ousan d doll ars. SeeTe x. P en. Co de Ann. § 28 .0 3( a) (1 ), (b) (4 )( A) (West Supp. 2002). The trial court assess ed

ap pe llant ’s pu nish men t at impr iso nme nt in a st at e ja il f ac i l i ty for one year. Impo sitio n of t he sent ence was sus pend ed a nd appe l l an t wa s g ra n ted com m un i ty
su pe rvi si on for a period o f f

iv e years; t he co nd it io ns o f pr o ba t io n inc lud e c o nfine men t in th e c oun ty jailfo rt hir t y da ys a nd a r eq uir eme nt t ha t ap pe llant make re sti tuti on to th e ow

n er s of th e p rop er

ty destroyed i n th e a moun t of twen ty th ous an d doll ar s to be

pai d over th

e p eri od of probation i

n equal monthl y i nstall men ts. Appe llantchal

le ngest he lega l and

fac t ua l su fficie nc y o f t he ev ide nc e; als o , he cla ims that the evi

dence is i nsuf fi ci ent becaus e the testim

ony of the accompl

ic e wi tness wasnot

su fficie nt ly
corro borated. In a ddit ion, app ellant co mplain s o f: (1 ) the tr i al cou rt’ s ref us al to quash th e i n di ctm en t, (2) t he adm

is si on of evi

dence rel ating to the me asure of pecun ia ry l oss, (3) t he r equ irement t hat he
make resti

tuti on , a n d ( 4) th e j ur

y ch arge . We wi l l

af f i rm th e j udgm

en t. The applic ation paragraph of the j ury

charge, tra

cki ng th e i ndi ctmen t, cha rged th e j ury th at:2 Now bear ing in mi

nd t he fo re go ing instr uct ions, if y ou believe fro m the evi dence beyond a reasonabl

e doubt, t hat the defe

ndan t, Wesl ey Dean De sh on, on or about the 7th day of Septem ber, 1999, in

the Count y of Burnet, and Stat e of Texas, as al l eg ed i n th e i n di ctm en t, e i th er ac ti ng alo ne or wi th an other, di d then a nd th ere i nten tion al l y or knowi ngl y des troy tan

gi bl e proper ty, to wi t: TREES by cut t ingand b

ull dozin g downtrees owned by

Ri chard Scha

rin ger, without t he effect ivecons en

t of Ri chard Scha

ri nge r, and di d thereby caus e a pe cun

i ary loss i n the am ount of $20,00 0 or m

ore bu t le ss th an $100,0 00; or, by directi ng that trees owned by

Ri ch a rd Schari

nger be c ut and bul

ldozed do wn , wit ho ut t he effe ct ive co nse nt o f Ric ha r d S ch ar ing er , an d d id t her eby cause a pecu ni ary l oss i n the am ount of $20,00 0 or m

ore bu t le ss th an $100,0 00; or, by in structing John

ny Brown to cut and b

ull doze down trees wi th out t he effect iveco nsent of Richa rd Scha ringe r, and d id t her eby cau se a pec uniar y loss in t he am ount of $20,00 0 or m

ore bu t le ss th an $100,0 00; or, by paying fo r t re es o wned by Ric hard Schari

nger to be cut and bul

ldozed down, without t he eff

ective consent of Ri

chard Scha

rin ger, and did thereby

cause a pe cu ni ary l oss i n th e a moun t of $20 ,00 0 or

more but le ss than $100,000; as al

le ged in t he indict ment, you w ill

find the defe ndan t guil ty of the of

fen se of cri mi nal mi schi ef as alleged in the indict ment, and so say by your verdi

ct, but if y ou do not so bel

ie ve, or if you ha ve a reasona

ble doubt thereof, you wi ll consider the followi

ng: If you find be yond a r eas ona ble do ubt t hat t he de fendant comm itted crim in al mi schi ef as a lleged in t he indict ment bu t you fa il to find beyond a r ea so na ble do ubt that t he pe cu nia ry lo ss , if a ny, caused was in the am ount of $20,000 or more but less than $10 0, 000 , bu t you find be yond a r eas ona ble do ubt t hat t he pecuni ary l oss was in th e a mo unt o f $ 150 0 o r mo re but less t han $2 0, 000 , t hen you will f ind t he defend ant gui

l ty of the of f ense of cr imi nal mischief i

n said a mou nt and so say

by your v erdi ct. The j ur y f oun d a pp el l an t gui l ty of the l es ser i nc l ude d of f en se of caus i ng a pecu ni ary loss of f if teen hundred do ll

ars or more but less than twenty thousand do ll ars. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. In his fir st po int o f er r o r , ap pe llant insis t s t ha t t he ev ide nc e is leg ally insufficientto supp ort the jury ’s verdict f or four reasons. Fi

rst, t here i s no evi

dence that any

thin g, ot her than two dead t rees, were d estr oyed o ut side of appellant’s land and ease me nt. Second, there is n

o evi dence that appe l l an

t i ns tructed the de stru cti on of anything ot her t han two dead t rees, out side of appellant’s3

land an d e as em en t. Th i rd, the re i s n o evi den ce t hat t he pe cuniar y loss, if any, suffer ed by t he Schari ngers was fi fteen hundred dollars or more but less t han t went y tho usa nd do llars. Finally , t he Sta te f ai l ed to prov e p ecun i ary l oss base d on f ai r m ark et val ueorthat fair mark et value c ou ld no t be establ is hed. In rev ie w i ng th e legal suf f i ciency of th e ev i den ce, the rel ev an t questi on i s wh ethe r, aftervi ewing the evi

dence i n the l igh t most favorabl

e to t he prosecution, an

y rational trier of f ac t
co uld have f

ound th e es sen tia l elem en ts of th e cri me b ey ond a reas onab l e doubt. Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S . 30 7, 3 19 ( 197 9); Patric k v. State , 906 S.W .2d 481 , 486 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1995 ); Aiken v. State , 36 S.W.3d 131, 132 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 2 00 0, pe t
. r ef’ d)
. T he st an da r d o f r ev iew is t he sa me whether the e vi den ce is di rect or ci rcum stan tia l , or both. SeeKutzne

r v. State , 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (T ex. Crim. App. 199 9); Banda v. Stat e , 890 S .W. 2d 4 2, 50 ( Te x. C rim. App . 1 994 ). All of the evi dence t ha t t he jury wa s p er mit t ed , pr o pe r ly o rimp r o pe r ly, to consider must be t ake n into acc ou nt in determ i ni ng th e legal suf f i ciency of the ev i den ce. Garcia

v. Sta te , 9 19 S .W. 2d 3 70, 378 (T ex. Cr im. App. 199 4); see also, Johnso n v. State , 871 S.W .2 d 183, 1 86 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1993 ); Rodrigue z v. State , 939 S.W .2d 211 , 218 (Tex. A pp.—A usti n 19 97, n o pet.). Richar d and Patricia Schari nger owned

a 9
. 62

- ac r e t r ac t o f lan d in t he La ke Ma r ble Fa lls S u bdivision in Bur net Co unt y. App ellant o wned a 4. 96- acr e t ra ct of land t hat adjo ined t he Scharingers’ propert y. Between the two tracts of

l an d w asa f i f ty-f oot road easemen

t. An unsurf

aced di rt road l es s th an twe l ve f ee t wi dewa s l oca ted wi thi n th e h al f of t he easement adjacent to appellant’s pr o pe r t y. Ex ce

pt f orth e n ar row road, both

pi ec es of pr ope rty an d th e e as em en t we recov ered wi th nat ivetrees and brush . The Schari ngers’ property was

between appellant’s pr o pe r t y and La ke Ma r ble Falls. On Lab or Day 1999, when they ca me t o insp ec t t he ir

propert y, the Sch

arin gers observed pi

le s of t re es a nd br ush a nd

di sc ove red tha t an are a of approx i mate l y 30, 000 sq ua re f ee t of their l and h ad been c leare d wit hou t t heir p er mission.

Appe llantem

ploy ed Johnn y B rownto cl

ea r h i s trac t of l an d a n d al l owe d B row

n to
em pl oy his t hir t een- year- old so n Timmy , R .V . T ur ney, a nd Jo hn Wilcox t o a ssist him. Appe llant1 Appell ant and hi s wif

e Melan ie were i n the proce ss of g et t ing a divo rc e at t he t ime o f t r ial. 4 rented heavy eq uipment —a t ra ck lo ade r— for Bro wn t o u se in bu lldozing and p ili ng t he t re es a nd brush t o be bur ned. The re wer e inco nsist encies in Jo hnny Bro wn’ s testim ony. He testi fi

ed that app ellant tol d

hi m to take down two trees that were o n the Scharin gers’ property so that app ellant and his w ife c o uld “see the la ke real good. ” Brown vaci

ll ated i n h i s testi mony wh ethe r the tree s we

re de ad or al i ve . Br own also te sti f i ed tha t, “ Be f ore y oucouldn’t see the wat er, just th e v er y ti p of i t. Wh en I got done, y

ou could se e the

l ake re al good. . . . He [a ppe llant] didn’t re ally say to do t his and do that. He

sai d he wan ted to see th

e water.” T immy Brown testif

ie d that appell

ant showed John

ny Brownwh

ere h e w as goi n g to bu ild hi s house. Further, Tim

my testifi ed that appell

an t to ld J o hnn y Br o wn t ha t “me [ sic ] an d my wife ca n ’t s ee th e l ake a n d s o cou l d y ou g o ov er

th ere a n d c l ea r s om e p rop er ty so Ican ha ve a vi ew.” Appellant’s wif

e, Me la nie DeShon testif

ie d 1 that she was a “Texas Certi fi ed Nurserym an Professi onal ,” and thatshe was

famil iar w ith t he pr op er t y she and app ellant o wned and t he pr op er t y the S char inger s’ o wned . S he testi f i ed th at “ori

gi na l l y , be f ore it was cl

eared, there was
a v er y sm al l por ti on of th e l ake” th at c oul d b e s een f rom th e p rop er

ty she an d her husb and owned. “We had to cl i

m b up i nto the truc

k an d on top of

a tool b ox to get a very

good vi ew of the l ake.” Howev er, “[a] fte r it was clear ed, it w as just dr amat ic. Y ou co uld se e a w ide exp ansio n, a very la rge area . . . of the la ke.” She also test if

ie d that the clearin

g extended at least 250 feet into Scharingers’ pr operty —a pp rox i mate l y se v en ti mes th e wi dth of th e e as em

en t. Don Gar dner , a co nsult ing ar bor ist a nd a member of t he I nt er national Soci ety of Arb oric ul ture and the A

me rican Society of

Consul ting A rborists, was qual

if ie d and testif

ie d as an
expert witne ss. Gardner testif

ie d that when h

e i nspected the Scha

rin gers’ property, he saw thre e “siz ea ble piles” o f nat ivetrees and observe d a “cl eared swath . . . right through very ni cel y wooded
area s.”By

usi ng a “sa mple pl

ot” m eth od of com pa ri ng the cl ea red are a to the u

nd i stu rb ed stri psof pr operty on ei ther si de of t he cl eared area, Gardner determi ned the n umb er, size s, and ki

nds of trees5

that had b een cl

eared. Gardner testif

ie d that t he trees destroyed di d not have a f ai r market val

ue, but the replacemen

t value of the trees dest royed was between thirty-fi ve and f ort y thousand doll ars. Richard Schari nge r t e stif ie d that over o ne h

undred trees on hi s propert y h ad been destroyed. The di

rect and ci

rcumstantial

evidenc e whe n viewed in the light most favo ra ble to t he pros ecution

supports a rat iona

l f in din g that the es se nti al el em en ts of the charged off

ense we re proved beyond a r ea so nab le d o ubt . T he v er dic t o f t he ju ry, t he fi nde r o f fac t , is s up po r t ed by leg ally suf fi ci ent evi dence. A ppella nt’s f irst poin t o f error is

overruled.
B. In his second poin

t o f error, appell

ant asserts that t he evide nce is fac t ually insuffi cient to sup po rt t he jur y’s verd ict. In a fact ual su ffi ciency re view, we a re re quir ed t o g ive defer ence t o t he jury ’s verdict and e

xam in e all of the evi dence i mpa rtially , setting asi

de t he jur y ver dic t “o nly if it is
so con tra ry to t he o ver whelming weight of t he evi dence as to be cl early wrong and unjust.” Cain v. State , 9 58 S. W.2d 404 , 41 0 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 97) ; Clew is v. State , 9 22 S .W. 2d 1 26, 129 (T ex. Cri m . A pp. 199 6). Th e c om

pletean d c orre ct s tan

da rd a rev i ew i ng cou rt m us t f ol l owto co n du ct a Clew is factual suf f i ci en cy re v i ew i s to deter

m i n e w h eth er a n eu tral re v i ew of al l of th e ev i den ce , b oth f orand a gainst t he finding, d emons t ra t es t hat t he pr oo f of gu ilt is so obvio usly wea k as t o u nder mine confi dence in t he ju ry’ s d et er minat io n, o r t he p ro o f o f gu ilt, alt ho ug h ad eq ua t e if t ak en alo ne , is gr ea t ly outweighe d by

contrar y proof. Johnson v. State , 2 3 S .W. 3d 1 , 1 1 ( Te x. Cri m . App. 2000 ). The only evi dence o ffer ed by t he de fen se wa s d o cu men t ar y evid en ce an d p ho t o gr ap hic
ex h i b i ts of appell

ant’s and the Scharingers’ propert y. Here, as h e di d in arguin g the le gal in suf fi ci ency of the evi dence, appel

la nt argu es t he St at e failed t o s how t hat t re es w er e de st ro yed o n t he Scharingers’ pr op er t y. App ellant r elies in par t on t he t est imony of Jo hnny Brownand R.V. Turney and contends that, ot her than two dead t r ee s, no t r ee s w er e d es t r o yed o n t he S ch ar ing er s’ pr o pe r t y. In o ur dis cu ss io n o f leg al s uffic ien cy, we ha ve alr ea dy c o nsid er ed t he ac co mplic e w it ne ss Joh nny6

Bro wn’s t es t imo ny, wh

i ch may b e c on str ue d to show he bul

ldozed down more t han two dead t rees. We wil l no w c o ns id er T ur ne y’s t es t imo ny.

R.V. Turney

testifi ed he onl y s aw Johnn

y B rownkno ck d ow n t wo dea d t re es o n t he Schari nge rs’ property . Howev

er, Tur ne y also te sti f i ed tha t on on e oc ca si on he saw J ohnny Brown “go 200 feet or more” across the ri ght-of-way from appe lla nt ’s pr op er t y. Also, “[a] fte r [ Jo hnny Bro wn] went ba ck an d g o t o n t he t r ac k lo ad er , he we nt we ll i n si de of th e, wh at I wou l d c al l th e ri ghtof-way, wel

l i nto the a dj oin i ng property .” The t es t imo ny of J

i m m y Brown , Mel

an i e DeS hon , Don G ardn

er, an d Ri chard Schari nger was summarize d in o ur discu ssio n of t he legal su ffi ciency; t heir t est imony is sufficient to sh o w t ha t nu mer o us t r ee s o ut sid e o f t he ea se men t we r e d es t r o yed o n t he S ch ar ing er s’ pr o pe r t y.

A l so, appe l l an

t atta ck s th

e Sta te’ s p roof of pecuniary

loss and insists t hat t he St ate ’s proof i s woef ul l y de f i ci en t. A pp el l an t con ten dsth at th e S tate f ai l ed to sh owthe f ai r m ark et val ueof the trees destro ye d or t hat they had no mar ket value be for e pr oving re place ment va lue. Appe llant argues that t he pecuniary l oss sho uld be de t er mined by the d iff er ence in the fa ir mark et value o f the land bef ore and after the trees were destroyed. At trial , the judge disagreed wi th this argumen t; we al so di sag ree. It wasal l eged that the growi ng tre es w ere de stroyed. Do n Gar dner , t he co nsult ing
ar b ori st, t est ifi

ed t hat t he t re es d est ro yed had no mar ket value a nd t est ifi ed a bou t t heir r eplac ement val ue. Af

ter exami nin g all of the evidence i

mpartially and givi ng deference t o t he jury’s verdi ct, we concl

ude that the jury ’s verdict i s not so cont rary to the overwhel mi ng wei gh t of th e evi dence asto be cl ea rl y wron g a nd un j us t. Moreov

er, f rom our neutral rev

ie w of al l of the evi dence b oth f or a n d agai n st th e j ur y ’s v erdi ct, we f i n d i t f ai l s to sho w t hat t he pro of of appell ant’s guil t is so
o bvio us ly we ak asto un de rm i ne con f i de nc e i n th e j ury ’s de term i na ti on , o r t hat t he pr oof

of gui l t, al thoughadeq

uate i f taken alone, is gre atl

y outweighe d by

contrar y proof. T he ev ide nc e is fac t ua lly suf fi ci ent to suppo rt t he j ury’ s verdi ct. Appell

ant’s second poi

nt of error is overruled.7 C. In his four t h po int o f err or , a ppe llant u rg es t hat t he evide nce is no t “legally sufficient to sustain the convi ction when appl

yi ng the accom

pli ce wi tness rule.” A

co nvictio n canno t be had upon the testim

ony of an accom

pli ce wi tness unl ess corroborat ed by

ot her evi

dence tendi

ng t o connect t he de f en da nt w i th th e of f ense com m i tted;an d the c orrob orati

on i s n ot su fficie nt if it mer ely shows the comm

is si on of the off

ense. SeeTex. Cod e Crim . Pro c. Ann. art. 3 8.14 ( West 197 9) . T he trial court charged the j ury that John ny Brown was an a

ccompl ic e wi tness as a m

atter of law. The t est for sufficient co rr obo ra t ion is t o e lim inate fro m cons ider at ion t he t est imony of the accom

pli ce wi tness an d then to exam

in e the other inc

ulpa to ry ev ide nce to ascertain w

hether t he rem ai ni ng e vi den ce ten ds to conn

ect the def endan t wi th the off en se. Burks v

. State , 876 S.W.2d 877, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The non-accom pli ce evide nce does not have t o d irect ly l ink app ellant t o t he cr ime nor does i t al on e h av e to e sta b l i sh appe l l an t’s gui l t b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t; rathe r, th e n on -a cc om pl i ce ev i den ce merel y h as to co n n ec t appe l l an

t to the offense
. Id. ; Reed v. State , 744 S.W.2d

112, 126 (Tex. Crim . App. 1988). Eli mi natin g Johnn y B rown’s testim

ony, we m ay co nsider t he t est imony of Melanie D eSho n and T imm y Bro wn. On cr os s-e xaminatio n, Melani e DeShon testif

ie d t hat she a nd ap pellant discu ssed who sho uld be em

ploy ed to clear thei

r propert y b

ut appe l l an

t did the h i ri ng an d pa i d f ort he clea ring o f the property by check. A

ppe l l an t proudl y sh owe d M el

an i e h ow the c l ea

ri ng done on the Scharingers’ pr o pe r t y gr ea t ly en ha nc ed t he vie w o f t he lak e f r o m t he irpr o pe r t y. Tim my Brown testif

ie d: Q: Did you ever hear

Mr . De Shon

discu ssing w or king ac ro ss t he side , t he ot her si de of the Rocky

Road in order t o eff

ect a vi ew of the l

ake. A: Yes , si

r. Q: Wha t , wh at di d yo u h ea rhim s ay? A: Wel l, h e said -- showed my

dad where h

e was goin

g to bui ld the h ouse.8 And he sa i d, m e a nd m y wif e c an ’t s eethe

l ake a nd so c oul d y ougo over th

ere and cl ear some property so I can h ave a v ie w. * * * * * Q: W h ere w ere y

ou a l l sta n di n g w h en you h ea rd h i m sa y th at? A: I thin k it was l ike in between the dri

veway of Mr. Dean

DeSho n’s pr op er t y and where he was goin

g to bui ld the h ouse. Q: W ere y

ou a l l l ooki n g down towa rd th e l ake a t th at p oi n t? A: Yes, si

r. We were looking toward t he property and towards the l ake. Q: Did you e ver hear him say anything else, instr uct ing you r d ad t o bu ll do ze a cr os s t he road? A: No. He j ust tol d hi

m go back ov er the

re, cl ear s ome more property
. I don’t remem ber if it wa s t he sa me d ay o rt he fo llo win g d ay bu t he t o ld h im he s t ill co uldn’t , d idn’t have a cl ear view, go do some m ore. Q: Mr . D eS h on

sa i d th at? A: Yes , si

r. Q: To wh

o? A: My dad. The testi mon y of Me l an i e D eS h on

an d Ti m m y Brown sh ows appe l l an t w as on t he
sce ne bef ore t he Sch

arin gers’ proper ty was clea r ed an d t ha t he inst ruc t ed Jo hnn y Br o wn , his
em ploy ee, t o impr ove t he view o f the l ake f rom hi s p rope rty . A f ter tree s h

ad be en cl ea red f rom Scha ringe rs’ pr op er t y, ap pellant t o o k M ela nie t o t he ir pr o pe r t y and ex pr es se d h is p lea su r e t ha t his vi ew of t he lake had be en significant ly i mpro ved a fte r S char inger s’ pr op er t y had bee n clear ed. The direct and c ircu msta nt ial evidence furnishe d by the non-accom

pli ce wi tnesses tend to connect app ellant to th e c om

m i ss i on of th e of f ense an d s atisf i es th e te st f or corro borating the ac compl ic e witne ss testim

ony of Johnn y B rown. Appella

nt’s f ourt h poin

t o f error is

overruled.9 The Indic

tment In his t hir d p o int o f er r o r , ap pe llant as se r t s t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in d en ying his
m oti on s to qu ash

th e i n di ctm en t. In th e i n di ctm en t, i t i s a l l eg ed th at: WESL EY DEAN DESHON , herei n af ter re f er re d to as Defe

ndan t, o n or about t he 7th day of Septemb er, 1999 , an d b efo r e t he pr es en t men t o f t his In di ctm en t, i n th e C oun ty of BUR NET , a nd t he St at e o f T ex as , did t he n a nd t he r e in t en t io na lly an d k no win gly dam age an d destroy tangi bl e property, to wi

t: TREES, PARA GRAPH A by cutting an

d bul ldozi ng down sai

d trees, without t he ef

fective consen

t of RICHARD SCHARINGER, the owner, and d i d th ereb y caus e a pe cun

i ary loss i n the am ount o f $20,000 or more but l ess than $100,000, PARA GRAPH B by di re cting that t he sa id t re es be cut and bu lldoze d do wn, wit hou t t he effect iveconsent o f RICHARDSCH ARIN GE R, t he o wner , a nd did t her eby cause a p ec unia ry lo ss in t he a mo unt o f $ 20,000 or m ore but less than $100,000, PARA GRAPH C by in structing John

ny Brownt o cu t an d b ulld o ze do wn sa id t re es, wit hou t t he effect iveconsent of

RI CH ARD SC HA RI NG E R, t he o wn er , an d d id t her eby cause a pecuni

ary l oss in the am ount o f $20,00 0 or more b ut less than $100,000, PARA GRAPH D by paying for said t re es t o be cut and bulldo zed do wn, wit hou t t he effect ive co nsent of R

ICHA RD SC HA

RINGER, th e owner, and did thereby cause a pecuni ary l oss in the am ount o f $20,000 or more but l ess than $100,000. S pe cif ica lly, appe l l an

t com pl ai n s th at h e w as n ot ac corde d h

i s S i xth A men dm en t ri gh t to noticeof what property he al le gedl y da ma ged or des t ro yed, beca use t he St at e failed t o a llege t he number , t ype, size, and lo cat ion o f the t re es bu lldoze d o r c ut do wn.

If kno wn, per so nal pr op er t y alleged in an indict ment s hall be ident ifi ed by nam e, ki nd, n um ber an d ownersh

i p. Wh en such is unknown , that fact shal

l b e stated, and a ge ner al classificat ion, descri bi ng an d ide ntif yi ng the property as n

ear as ma y b e, sha ll suf fi ce. If the property be real estate, its general

loca lity in the c ou nt y, and t he10

na me of the own er, oc cup ant or claimant t her eo f, sha ll be a suf f i ci en t de scri ption of the sam e. Tex . Code Cri

m . Proc. A

nn . art. 21.09(We st 1989 ). Real pr o pe r t y has be en de fine d a s “la nd an d a nyt hin g growi ng on . . . the l

and.” Black ’s Law Dictionary123 4 ( 7t h ed) 199 9; and see Chastain v. Koonce , 7 00 S .W. 2d 5 79, 584 (T ex. 1985)(Gonz ales, J ., conc urri ng)
. The trees alle gedl

y b ull dozed and cut down were not personal property but were part of the real propert y on w

hich they were growing. The i

ndictmen t gave appel

la nt notice that the trees destroyed were on propert y own

ed by Ri chard Scha

rin ger in Burnet County h

avi ng an alle ged val ue in ex ce ss o f t we nt y t ho us an d d o llar s. We ho ld t ha t t he alle ga t io ns o f t he ind ict men t su fficie nt ly descri bed the prope r t y de st r o ye d. Appel la nt was accorded hi s Si

xth Am endm ent righ t t o not ic e. Moreover, appe l l an

t ha d a ddi ti ona l noti ceof the de scri ption of the propert y de stroyed at a pretr ia l hearing cond

ucted a l most one m

onth b ef ore tri al . Al

though the j udge he ari ng th e pretri al mo t io n ruled the witness was not q uali fi ed as an expert witness, the witness testifi ed to facts giv

in g notice of the locati on, size , ki

nds , and the

num ber of tree s de stroyed. See Erlan dson v. Sta te , 763 S.W.2d 845, 84 9-50 (Tex. A

pp.—H ouston [14th Dist.] 1988 , pet. ref ’d). A l so, for t he first t ime on ap pea l, ap pellant ar gue s t he in suf fi ci ency of t he indict ment
wo uld n ot al

l ow a con v i cti on un der th i s i n di ctm en t to b e raise d i

n b ar to another

charge wi th iden tical all egations. J eopar dy de

termi nations are ma de by referen ce to t he en

tire record of the previous pr oc eed ingan

d n ot s i m pl y b y re f eren ce to th e a l l eg ati on s i n th e i ndi ctmen t. Stahle v. St

ate , 970 S.W.2d 682 , 6 93 ( Te x. Ap p. —Da llas 199 8, pet . r e’fd) . Whe n one ca nn ot det ermin

e from the S tat e’s ple adi ngswhether th

e of f ense s p ros ecute d a

re th e s am e, th e c ourt m us t l ook to the proo f of

fered at t r ial. Ex parte Goodbread , 96 7 S
. W. 2d 85 9, 86 0 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 19 98). Appella nt’s del ay ed
con ten ti on t ha t t he ple ad ing is ins uffic ien t t o pr o t ec t him f rom f uture p ros ecution

for the same off

ense is withoutmeri

t. See41 Ge orge E. Di

x & Robe rt O. Daws on, Texas Practice: Cr iminal Practice11

and Procedure § 2 0. 21 3 ( 2d ed . 2 00 1) . T he t ria l co ur t did no t er r in r efu sin g to quash t he in dictment. Appel

la nt’s thi rd point of error is overrul ed. Measure of Pecuniary Loss In his fif t h po int o f err or , a ppe llantclai m s tha t the tri al courter re d “in allowing t he wi tnes s Don Gardn er to testi f

y as to a ‘ cost of

cure’ meas

ure of dam ages .” (a) The am

ount of pecu ni ary lo ss un de rt his c ha pt er , if t he pr o pe r t y is destro yed, i s: (1) t he fair mark et value o f the pr op er t y at t he t ime and plac e o f the des t ru ct ion; or (2) if t he fair mar ket value o f the pr op er t y canno t be as cer t aine d , th e c ost of re placing p ro per t y within a r eas ona ble time aft er t he de st ru ct ion.
Te x. Pen . Code A

nn . § 28.06 (a) (W

es t 1994). Do n Gardne

r testifi ed that there is “

no fai r market val ue in tree appraisal .” As ex

pla in ed by Gardner, the “cost of cure” m ethod of determi

ni ng the val ue of de st r o yed t r ee s is essential ly the cost of replacem

ent. Simpl

if ied, “cost of c ur e” o r r eplac ement val ue of destroyed trees i s the am ount o f m oney required to buy trees of the sam

e si ze an d k i n d, t o plant them

i n pl ace of the des

troye d tre es , an d to care for the trees until they can, wi thout special care, su st ain t he ir

ow n gr ow t h. H er e, in Gar dner ’s o pinion, t he r eplac ement cost o f the des tro ye d trees was b etween th

i rty- f i ve and f orty thousan

d doll ars. G ardner’s t est imony was no t admit t ed be for e t he jur y unt il the t rial co ur t , a t t he in si stenceo f de fen se co un se l, conducted a “Ke ll y” heari ng out o f the prese

nceof the j ury . See Ke lly
v. State , 824 S.W .2d 568 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1992 ). The “K

elly ” heari ng ha d several pu rp ose s. Fi

rs t, t he trial cou rt nee de d to de t er mine w he t he rt ec hnic al o rsp ec ializ ed kn o wle dg e w o uld aid t he jur y in unde rst anding the eviden

ce and in assessi ng the amount of pecuniary damages, a

fact issue fo r t he jury. SeeT ex . R. E vid
. 70 2. Se co nd , t he t r ia lcou rt n eeded to det ermi

ne wh ether Gardner was qua lif ied by edu cat ion, t ra ining, exp er ience, and kno wledg e t o g ive his op inion as a n expe rt on t he is sue of p ecun

i ary dam ages . Id . T hird, t he t rial co ur t ne ed ed to d ete rmin

e whet her Gar dner’s2 Sometim es asin the repair of

automobil

es, the sum

of the cost of parts is m

uch greater than the enti re cost o f a n

ew veh ic le
. 12 proffe redtestim ony was rel

i ab l e an d rel ev an t on the i ssue of pecu ni ary dam age. See id
. Rul e 401, 402. Fo ur t h, t he t r ial c o ur t ne ed ed t o de t er mine w he t he rt he ad miss io n o f Ga r dn er ’s t es t imo ny w o uld
crea te a dan ger of unf ai r pre j udice , confuse the i ssues, mi slead the j ury, be cum ulativ e, or cause und ue de l ay . See id. Rul e 403.

In the “Kel ly ” hearin g, Gardner w as in

terr ogat ed by

the St ate, extensiv

elycrossexam in ed b y de f ense cou n se l , a n d c aref ul l y qu esti on ed

b y th e t rial court . There was sub stantial evi dence to support t he trial

court ’s f in din g that Gardner

was an ex

pert consulti

ng arbori st quali

fi ed to testify about the pecuni ary l

oss res ul t ing fr o m t he lo ss o f t he de st r o yed t r ee s. Ga r dn er fully expl ai ned the ge ne ral l y ac ce pte d m eth od ology he use d i

n f ormi ng h i s opi ni on of the p ecun

i ary dam ages re sult ingf

rom th e des tructi on of

trees on the Sc ha ri nge rs’ property
. The ev i den ce su pp orts t he t r ial c o ur t ’s de cis io n t o ad mit Ga r dn er ’s t es t imo ny. On appeal, the trial court’s ru li ng m ust be up he ld unl ess th e tr

i al cou rt a b us ed i ts di scre tion
. Kelly , 824 S.W .2d at 57 4. W e hold the tri al court did not abu se its di screti on i n a l l owi ng Ga rdn er to te sti

f y ab out the “ cos t of

cu re” mea su re of dam ages that is

essen tial ly the replac em

ent cost o f the trees destroyed. Appe llantar gue d du ring tri al an d n owon appe al argu es th at G ardn

er ’s opi n i on as to t he pecu ni ary dam ages i s abs

urd because the a

mount of pecun

ia ry dam ages Gardner f

ound was about t he sa me a moun t astha t wh i ch the Sch ari ng ers ha d pa i d f ort he ent ire p ro per t y on which t he trees
were de st r o yed
. T his c o mpla int is ab out th e w ei gh t of th e ev i den ce

n ot ab out i

ts ad miss ibilit y. A ll of t he evide nce w as be for e t he jur y for it s co nsider at ion. 2 A pp el l an t’s f i f th po intof error is overruled. Restitution I n his si xth poi nt of error, app el

l an t urgesthat the

tria l courtab us ed it s d isc r et io n in
or der ingt he payment of r est itu t ion in t he su m of t went y tho usa nd do llars. The cr iter ia for or der ing
r es t it ut io n in

crim in al casesi s statutory
. SeeTex. Code Crim. Proc. An n. art. 42.037 ( West Supp.13

2002)
. In summ

ary, article 42.037 as appli ed to this case provides that when a crim in al off ense re su l ts in destruction of a vi

ctim ’s proper ty, a

jud ge se nt en cin g t he de fen da nt an d g r an t ing him
com m un i ty su pe rvi si on may, as a condi

tion of com

mun ity supervisi on, order t hat the defe ndan t make
res ti tuti on t o t he vic t im in

an amo unt equal

to the val ue of the destroyed property at the tim e i t was destroyed. The court may allow the def

endan t t o make r est itu t ion in install men ts, with t he last insta llm ent due at the e

nd of the p eriod of c omm

uni ty s uperv i sion. The court in determ in in g whether to order rest itution an

d the am ount o f resti

tut ion s hal l c onsi der: (1) the amount of the l oss sustain

ed by t he vic t im

as a re sult of t he off

ense, (2) the f

in anci al resources of the def

endan t, (3) the fi

nan ci al needs and e ar ning ability of t he de fendant and t he de fendant ’s de pend ent s, a nd (4) other f

actors t he courtde em

s a pp rop riate . Th

e c our t sh al l i m pos e a n ord er of re sti tuti on th at is a s f

ai r a s p oss i b l e to t he vic t im. The re cord r ef l ec ts th at t he t r ia l co ur t ca r efu lly fo llo we d t he st at ut o ry cr it er ia in orderi ng r esti tution . The

re wa s ev i den ce of pecu ni ary loss that vari

ed fro m one hu ndr ed t hou sand dol l arsto less t han five h un dr ed dol l ar s. The S tate

aske d th e c our t to order re sti tuti on of n i n ety t hou sand do llars. The victims as ked for bet wee n sixty t hou sand and o ne hundr ed t hou sand dollars. Appe llantin

si sted that rest itution sh

ould not exceed two thousand doll ars. The court co nsi

dered t he evi dence o f p ec un iar y lo ss sh o wn by the re cord, c on si dere d a pp el l an t’s f i n an ci al sta tem en t, app ellant’ s ea rning a bili

t y, and his and his d epe ndent s’ nee ds in ass essing t he amo unt of r est itu t ion. The cou rt’ s orde r f

or re sti tution i n th e a moun t of t went y tho usa nd do llars is su ppo rt ed by t he record; abuse of dis cretion i s not shown. Appel la nt’s si xth poin t o f error is

overruled. Court’s Jury Char

ge Appe llantpre sents

f i ve poi nts of err orco mplaining abou t t he jur y charg e. Appe llant asserts that t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed “in appl y i n g th e l aw of pa rties to th e l aw of pa rties i n i ts c h arge to t he jury.” Appel

la nt argues that the court “i

n i ts charge, charged b ot h the l aw of parties

and then by t ra cking the in

dictment charged the la

w of parties

agai n.” Also, he ar gue s “suc h char ge a llowed t he14

j ury to appl y the la w of parties to the la

w of parties a

nd al lowed the def

endan t t o be convi

cted twice removed f rom t he o ffense. ” T he t rial co ur t defined t he law o f par t ies and t hen ap plied t he law t o t he fact s. We find no mer it in ap pellant ’s co mplaint and ove rr ule po int o f err or eleven.

Appe llantcompl

ai ns that t he t rial co ur t er re d “in ove rr uling app ellant’ s o bject ions to the chargefor not in

cl udin g a requirem

ent that the appella

nt acted with a requi

red culpa ble m ental state.”Th e t r ial co ur t char ged t he jur y that it must find beyond a r eas ona ble do ubt t hat app ellant “ei ther actin g al one or with another, di d then and there int en t io na lly and kn o win gly d es t r o y t an gib le pr o pe r t y, to wit: TR

EES.” The

court’s charge p roperl y i nstructed the j ury

on th e l aw of cul pa b i l i ty required to convict appell ant of the cha

rged off ense. A ppella nt’s tenth poin

t o f error is

overruled. A l so, app ellant co mplains the tri al cou rt er red i n d en y i ng hi m “ a re que ste d i

ns tructi on defining‘f

ai r market val

ue’ of tangi

ble propert y s evered

from real e state.” T he fac t s in t his c as e d id not re quir e t he su bmission o f the re que st ed c harge, and t he r efusa l of t he t rial co ur t t o g ive the requested charge was n

ot error. Appel

la nt’s ni nth poin t o f error is

overruled. In his eight h po int o f err or , a ppe llant co nt ends t hat t he courter r ed in o ve rrulin g h is obj ection an

d i n f ail i ng to su bm i t hi s req ues ted ch arge d ef i ni ng “ pecu ni ary l oss.” Appe llantagrees th at the trial

court ’s j ury ch

arge on the defi

ni tion of pecun

ia ry l oss “tracked the statut e. Articl e 28.06(a)(1) and ( 2) .” The instr uct ion su bmitt ed byt he co ur t was t he st at ut or y definition. The cha rge was proper and adequate. Appel la nt’s ei ghth poin t o f error is

overruled. Appe llant co mplains tha t t he t rial co ur t er re d in o ver ru ling hi s req ue ste d i ns tructi on de f i n i n g “ ea se men t.”The tr i al cou rt i n str uc ted th e j ur y th at: By the term “e asem

ent” i s m eant that an owner of l

and adj oini

ng a roadway descri bed i n a n i ns tru men t dedicating that r oad in a subdi vided tr act o f l

and as a priv ate way for t he ex clu sive us e, be ne fit , an d c o nve nie nc e o f t he o wn er s o f lan d in such tra ct, h as th e ri gh t to grade , cut out and use the e nti re dedi cated width of s

uch easem ent provided that he doesnot destro y the use and b enef

it and c onven

ie nceof su ch ea se men t by t he o t he ro wn er s o f su ch ea se men t , if a ny.15 Appe llantarg

ue s th i s i ns tructi on did n ot go far enough. He contends tha t i n a ddi ti on to “ the righ t to grade , cu

tout an d us e the enti

re d edi ca ted wi dth of the e ase men t” the c ourt sho uld have added “the right to cut and remove t rees, bru sh o r o t her obs t acles lo cat ed w ithin t he eas em en t.” Appe llanti s h

y percr i tical of the c ourt ’s ch

arge whi ch, i n def in in g the righ ts in the easem

ent, was perhapsmo r e fa vo r ab le t o ap pe llant t ha n he wa s e nt it le d. Ap pe llant ’s se ve nt h p o int o f er r o ris overruled. The j udgme nt is aff irm ed.

Carl

E. F. Dall

y, Jus tice Be fo r e J us t ice s Kid d, Pu ryea ran d D ally * Af fi rmed File d: February

14, 2002 Do No t Publis

h16 * Bef ore Ca r l E
. F. Da lly, Judg e (reti red), Court of C

ri m i na l Appeal s, si ttin g by ass i gnm en t. See Tex . Gov’ t Code A

nn . § 74.00 3(b ) (We st 1998 ).