GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Military Personnel, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

August 1999 MILITARY 

PERSONNEL

Actions Needed to 

Better Define Pilot 

Requirements and 

Promote Retention

GAO/NSIAD-99-211

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283075 Letter

August 20, 1999

The Honorable Steve Buyer

Chairman

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

This report responds to the request of the Chairman and former Ranking Minority Member that we 

review and identify reasons for the reported military pilot shortages and offer solutions to address the 

issue. Specifically, we determined (1) the services’ reported and projected estimates of their pilot 

shortages, (2) the basis for the services’ pilot requirements, (3) key factors that account for the 

reported pilot shortages, and (4) concerns that are causing pilots to consider leaving the military.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Wayne Allard, Chairman, and Senator Max Cleland, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed 

Services; Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and Representative Jerry Lewis, 

Chairman, and Representative John P. Murtha, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, 

House Committee on Appropriations. We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable 

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Lewis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the 

Honorable John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the 

Air Force; and General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be made 

available to others upon request.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact Brenda S. Farrell or me at (202) 512-5140. 

Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, National Security

Preparedness Issues
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Executive Summary

Purpose The Department of Defense (DOD) reported shortages of approximately 

2,000 pilots at the end of fiscal year 1998 and projected that shortages 

would continue for several years. Retaining qualified pilots is important not 

only to ensure that operational requirements can be met, but also to recoup 

the substantial investments the services make in training their pilots.

Concerned about reports of pilot shortages, the Chairman and former 

Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, 

House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to review and identify 

reasons for the reported pilot shortages and offer solutions to address the 

issue. Specifically, GAO determined (1) the services’ reported and 

projected estimates of their pilot shortages, (2) the basis for the services’ 

pilot requirements, (3) key factors that account for the reported pilot 

shortages, and (4) concerns that are causing pilots to consider leaving the 

military.1

Background At the end of fiscal year 1998, DOD had about 28,000 active duty 

commissioned and warrant officer pilots. These included approximately 

13,300 pilots in the Air Force; 6,600 pilots in the Navy; 4,800 warrant officer 

pilots in the Army; and 3,300 pilots in the Marine Corps. The Army is the 

only service that uses warrant officers as pilots. 

Generally, DOD pilots follow career paths that require them to serve in both 

cockpit and nonflying positions. These positions range from operational 

positions that have a direct combat mission to nonoperational positions 

that exist to carry out support activities, training functions, and other 

noncombat related activities. Pilot requirements are based on cockpit and 

operational positions needing aviation expertise as well as on a number of 

nonflying positions needed to develop pilots’ leadership skills for 

advancement purposes. Additional considerations in establishing 

requirements include the need to permit sufficient time between 

deployments and the fact that a certain percentage of pilots will not be 

available for assignment at any given point in time due to factors such as 

education and training, medical conditions, and transfers between 

assignments.

1

GAO has several additional, ongoing reviews requested by Congress related to military personnel 

issues, including an analysis of data from a broad military personnel survey to be implemented later this 

year, a GAO survey of servicemembers in retention critical specialties, and an historical examination of 

military retention rates. 
Executive Summary

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

All pilot candidates must complete basic flight training, lasting 1 to 2 years, 

to earn their initial qualifications, or wings. According to DOD, the cost to 

train each military pilot through basic flight training is about $1 million; the 

cost to fully train a pilot with the requisite operational experience can be 

more than $9 million. These costs will vary significantly depending on the 

type of aircraft.

Upon entering pilot training, pilots begin to receive aviation career 

incentive pay (ACIP), commonly referred to as flight pay, which was 

designed to attract and retain officers in a military aviation career. Once 

pilots complete their initial aviation commitment of 6 to 8 years, the 

services are further authorized to offer bonuses, called aviation 

continuation pay (ACP), to encourage pilots to continue in their military 

career beyond their initial obligation. Currently, the services are authorized 

to offer ACP to pilots through 14 years of aviation service. Pending 

legislation contains provisions that would authorize the services to 

continue these ACP payments through a pilot’s 25th year of aviation service. 

DOD’s pilots, whether assigned to flying or nonflying positions, are eligible 

to receive both ACIP and ACP, provided they meet the other eligibility 

criteria. ACIP can be as high as $840 a month. ACP is authorized up to 

$25,000 a year; the largest bonus currently offered is $22,000 a year.

Results in Brief The services currently report that no unit is deploying without 100 percent 

of its pilots, and they believe that they will continue to be able to meet their 

operational missions. The services are able to fill their operational cockpits 

by extending some pilots on deployments and by sending senior pilots to 

what have traditionally been junior cockpit positions. However, the Air 

Force and the Navy, and to a lesser extent the Army and the Marine Corps, 

are all reporting that they are unable to fill some nonflying positions that 

they have designated for pilots. The services project that these shortages 

will continue for several years but the extent of these shortages has not 

been specifically determined. While the services have procedures to review 

their requirements, they have not comprehensively assessed whether all of 

their required positions truly need to be filled with active duty military 

pilots. If other personnel could fill some of these nonflying positions, the 

services could reduce their pilot requirements and thereby reduce their 

reported shortages. DOD needs to clearly determine the magnitude of the 

shortages and understand the extent to which the shortages are temporary 

or longer lasting before the services implement wholesale and potentially 

costly changes to their current aviator management systems.
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

The significance of reported and projected pilot shortages is difficult to 

ascertain because the basis for current pilot requirements has not been 

firmly established or documented. For example, while the Air Force has 

examined its nonflying positions, established certain priorities, and made 

the decision to leave more than 1,000 positions reserved for pilots unfilled, 

it has not formally transferred the 1,000 empty positions to other 

communities and is still carrying them as pilot requirements. The services 

have not sufficiently explained which nonflying positions active duty pilots 

must fill nor have they classified positions according to their operational 

nature or designated which positions are needed for career advancement 

purposes. In addition, the Air Force was unable to break down its data on 

pilot requirements and inventories in a way that would allow this type of 

comprehensive assessment. Without such information, the services cannot 

easily evaluate which positions it must fill on a priority basis or assess 

whether other personnel such as retired military personnel, reservists, 

warrant officers, military personnel who are not pilots, DOD civilians, or 

contractors could fill some positions in times of shortages.

Although data on pilot requirements is incomplete, GAO identified three 

key factors that are contributing to the services’ reported and projected 

pilot shortfalls. First, the Air Force and the Navy reduced the number of 

pilots they recruited during the personnel reductions that occurred through 

most of the 1990s. This action has unintentionally contributed to an 

insufficient number of pilots to fill the overall current pilot requirements. 

Second, the Navy and the Marine Corps have experienced delays in their 

training pipelines due to problems in coordinating training phases, a lack of 

spare parts, and other factors. These delays have increased training times 

and reduced the number of pilots available for their first assignments. 

Third, many pilots are leaving the military before retirement since today’s 

economy provides many career opportunities for pilots in private industry. 

The first two factors have resulted in what may be temporary shortages 

since the number of pilots entering pilot training has increased and the 

Navy and the Marine Corps are addressing the training backlog.

Pilots are reporting a number of concerns that are leading them to consider 

leaving the military—the high pace of operations, inadequate spare parts 

and equipment to effectively do their jobs, and dissatisfaction with 

leadership that, in their view, too easily accepts unacceptable demands on 

service personnel. Although these concerns are not unique to pilots, GAO 

identified two concerns that have particular relevance to pilots. First, many 

pilots are now being asked to remain in cockpit positions, which means 

they are not being given the opportunity to serve in other types of 
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

career-enhancing positions. Some of these pilots have become concerned 

that they will not be competitive for promotion. In contrast, some pilots are 

pleased to be able to spend more time in the cockpit and have, in fact, 

expressed their dissatisfaction with assignments that take them away from 

flying. Both the Air Force and the Navy have considered fly-only career 

tracks in the past, but to date neither has adopted options that would 

match individuals who wish to fly additional duty with extra flying duty or 

instituted a fly-only career track that might deal more permanently with 

cyclical shortages.

A second concern is the ACP. A pilot’s decision to accept a bonus no longer 

provides assurance that the pilot will stay in the military until the pilot is 

eligible to retire. Chief complaints voiced by pilots are that the ACP 

eligibility dates are outdated and that the end of the bonus payment at year 

14 represents a cut in pay. Pending legislation, originally requested by DOD, 

would address this concern by giving the services the flexibility to offer 

bonus payments through a pilot’s 25th year of aviation service. 

GAO is making a number of recommendations to promote more accurate 

data on pilot requirements. These recommendations are intended to help 

the services identify opportunities to reduce their pilot requirements and, 

in doing so, reduce their reported shortages. GAO is also making 

recommendations to address pilot concerns that are causing pilots to 

consider leaving the military. 

Principal Findings

The Air Force and the 

Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot 

Shortages 

The services currently report that they are able to fill their operational 

positions and that no unit is deploying without 100 percent of its pilots. The 

services have been able to fill their operational cockpits by extending some 

pilots on deployments and by sending senior pilots to positions formerly 

filled by more junior servicemembers. As a result, the current reported 

shortages are occurring primarily in the nonoperational flying and support 

positions.

The Air Force and the Navy are reporting the greatest shortages; within 

these two services, the shortages are more apparent in some pilot 

specialties than in others. At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Air Force 

projected that its greatest shortages would occur during fiscal years 2002 to 
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

2007, primarily among its fighter, tactical airlift, and bomber pilots. The Air 

Force projected overall shortages of between 1,900 and 2,155 pilots, or 

between 14 and 16 percent of its pilot requirements. Fighter pilot shortages 

were projected to reach 820 pilots, or 17 percent of its fighter pilot 

requirements. Tactical airlift pilot shortages were projected to reach

311 pilots, or 15 percent of the tactical airlift pilot requirements. Likewise, 

the Air Force projected a shortage of 294 bomber pilots, or 28 percent of 

the bomber force pilot requirements. Despite these reported shortages, the 

Air Force believes that it will be able to continue to fill its operational 

cockpit positions and that shortages will occur in nonoperational positions. 

The Navy believes that it experienced its greatest shortage of 1,153 pilots in 

fiscal year 1998, though it projects that a shortage will continue indefinitely. 

The Navy’s shortage of 1,153 pilots, out of a requirement of 7,712 pilots, 

represented about 15 percent of its pilot requirements. In fiscal year 1998, 

the Navy was short 536 helicopter pilots, or 17 percent of its helicopter 

pilot requirements. In the case of propeller aircraft, the Navy was short

311 pilots, or 17 percent of its propeller aircraft pilot requirements. In the 

jet community, the Navy was short 216 pilots, representing about

10 percent of its jet pilot requirements. As in the Air Force, nonoperational 

positions will continue to be most affected by the shortages. 

Basis for Pilot 

Requirements Has Not 

Been Clearly 

Established or 

Documented

Although the Air Force and the Navy are reporting shortages and predicting 

a continuation of those shortages, the services have not comprehensively 

assessed whether all of their required positions need to be filled with active 

duty military pilots. Currently, the Air Force’s nonflying positions represent 

slightly more than 20 percent of its total pilot requirements and the Navy’s 

nonflying positions represent 22 percent of its pilot inventory. These figures 

lack precision, however, because this type of breakdown does not capture 

the extent to which the flying and nonflying positions carry an associated 

operational or combat-related function as opposed to a nonoperational or 

support function. Disparate databases do not permit these services to 

uniformly report data on their pilot requirements and inventories nor do 

they enable the services to identify any imbalances in the various types of 

positions. In addition, job descriptions do not clearly explain why positions 

require active duty military pilots. If some positions could be filled with 

other personnel—such as navigators, warrant officers, retired military 

personnel, DOD civilians, contractors or reservists with the required 

aviation expertise—active duty pilot requirements, and thereby shortages, 

could be reduced. It is also possible that aviation expertise, while desirable, 

might not be absolutely necessary for some positions. 
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Predictions about future shortages must also be viewed within the 

limitations under which such predictions are made. Historically, pilot 

shortages have been recurrent and difficult to predict. For example, the Air 

Force revised its projections in April 1999 and is now projecting 355 fewer 

shortages than were projected at the end of fiscal year 1998. 

Several Factors Are 

Contributing to 

Reported Shortages 

GAO has identified three factors that are contributing to the services’ 

reported shortages. First, the Air Force and the Navy reduced the number 

of pilots they recruited during the reductions in force during the 1990s to 

avoid the involuntary separation of pilots already in the force. This decision 

unintentionally contributed to an insufficient number of pilots to fill the 

overall current pilot requirements. Consequently, certain year groups are 

atypically small and current aviation personnel managers are challenged to 

find ways to fill requirements as this population matures through the 

workforce. The Air Force, for example, reduced active duty pilot 

accessions from more than 1,500 in fiscal year 1990 to approximately 500 

annually during fiscal years 1994 to 1996. Recognizing that it needed to 

increase accessions, the Air Force has steadily increased its pilot 

production since that time. In fiscal year 1990, the Navy accessed

1,039 pilots; in fiscal year 1994 the Navy accessed only 471 pilots but has 

increased accessions since then. 

Second, the Navy and the Marine Corps, which share the same pilot 

training facility, have experienced training delays due to problems in 

coordinating training phases, a lack of spare parts, and other factors. As a 

result, pilots have been delayed in reporting to their first operational 

assignments by as many as 40 weeks. The delays have left entry-level 

positions empty, and the requirement for new ensigns and lieutenants is 

going unmet. 

Finally, pilots state that factors, such as a good job market, are making a 

career in private industry more attractive. Civilian airlines are experiencing 

an increased demand for pilots, and projections show this demand for 

experienced military pilots will likely continue. The airlines can ultimately 

pay greater salaries with less stringent schedules than the services. 

According to the Air Force, a pilot who currently leaves the military with

16 years of service is typically earning a regular military compensation of
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

about $78,000 a year, or more, depending on the location.2 Although it will 

take the pilot more than 5 years to earn a comparable salary, since newly 

hired pilots start at the bottom in private industry, that same pilot could 

potentially earn as much as $160,000 a year before retiring at age 60.

Pilots’ Concerns Are 

Contributing to Low 

Retention

The services have conducted studies of personnel matters during the past 

few years. While not all of the results are projectable to the entire pilot 

population, they did identify sources of frustration for military pilots. In 

addition, GAO administered questionnaires to more than 180 pilots in the 

Air Force and in the Navy from several different aviation career specialties. 

Although GAO also cannot project to the universe of pilots from this 

limited number, the responses were similar to the factors the services have 

identified in their studies. DOD surveys show that along with other military 

personnel, pilots are concerned about retirement and health care benefits, 

the high pace of operations, inadequate spare parts and equipment to 

effectively do their jobs, and dissatisfaction with leadership that, in their 

view, too easily accepts unacceptable demands on service personnel. 

However, certain concerns are specific to pilots. For example, a number of 

pilots raised concerns about the lack of opportunities for career 

development and promotions. While some pilots expressed concerns about 

the reduced opportunities for pilots to seek nonflying positions to broaden 

their experience and prepare for greater responsibilities, others expressed 

their desire to spend their careers exclusively in the cockpit.

Pilots also raised concerns about the ineffectiveness of the current 

retention bonus system that stops after 14 years of aviation service. Many 

pilots did not view the current bonus system as a viable retention tool. In 

fact, a pilot’s decision to accept a bonus no longer provides the services 

with the assurance that the pilot will stay in the military until the pilot is 

eligible to retire at 20 years of service. The Air Force, for example, has seen 

increasing numbers of pilots resign after 14 years of service during the past 

4 years. A chief complaint voiced by pilots is that the ACP eligibility dates 

are based on outdated assumptions. While it was previously assumed that 

pilots would stay until retirement once they reached 14 years of service, 

some pilots told us that they now see the end of the bonus payment at year 

14 as a cut in pay and are more likely to leave their military service rather 

2

In computing a pilot’s regular military compensation, the Air Force includes basic pay, basic allowance 

for subsistence (nontaxed), basic allowance for housing (also nontaxed), and the equivalent of the tax 

advantage that is derived from these last two categories.
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

than stay. DOD has developed a proposal that would authorize the services 

to continue bonus payments through a pilot’s 25th year of aviation service. 

Provisions substantially similar to the DOD proposal are contained in 

pending legislation. The proposed legislation, if approved, will give the 

services the flexibility to implement their new bonus programs in a manner 

that will address the pilots’ concerns. The Navy has already developed a 

model to offer bonuses to pilots at key career decision points throughout 

their careers in order to be a true bonus rather than an entitlement. 

However, GAO believes that the services might be able to phase out the 

bonus earlier than a pilot’s 25th year of aviation service since pilots are 

rarely in the cockpit at that point in their careers.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to take 

the following actions:

• Develop criteria and detailed job descriptions for designating positions 

to be filled with pilots, classify the positions according to their 

operational and flying status, and specify the types of duties that make 

pilots essential. Moreover, for jobs that are held for pilots based on 

reasons of career development and rotation, descriptions should 

contain a clear justification.

• Using the newly developed criteria, analyze each pilot position to 

identify those positions where active duty pilots are not required and 

take the necessary actions to fill those positions with other personnel 

possessing appropriate expertise, such as warrant officers, retired 

military, contractors, DOD civilians, reservists, or navigators.

• Revise their databases so that the services can (1) uniformly report data 

on future pilot requirements and inventories and (2) identify any 

imbalances in their operational and nonoperational flying and nonflying 

positions.

To the extent that shortages exist after these recommendations are 

implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

services to take the following actions:

• More fully evaluate the merits of a fly-only career path for a segment of 

the pilot community. In the short term, identify those pilots desiring 

additional flying duty and match them to this extra duty to the extent 

possible.

• If the pending legislation to extend the ACP is enacted, only offer the 

bonus to those pilots who make affirmative decisions to continue their 
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

career rather than to all pilots reaching specified gates. This would 

preclude the bonus program from being interpreted as an entitlement.

Agency Comments and 

GAO’s Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 

four of GAO’s five recommendations, but stated that GAO’s executive 

summary did not represent the sum and substance of the report as a whole 

in that it did not reflect the positive steps DOD had taken to address pilot 

issues. DOD also commented that GAO’s recommendations were actually 

refinements to DOD’s own initiatives. GAO added information to its 

executive summary to acknowledge DOD’s actions and to better explain 

how GAO’s recommended actions differ from ongoing efforts. 

In disagreeing with GAO’s fifth recommendation about the proposed bonus 

system DOD said that its current bonus systems are tied precisely to key 

career decision points and do not occur at arbitrary points in time, as GAO 

had originally suggested. GAO agrees that arbitrary is not a fair 

characterization of these points in time and has deleted this reference. 

GAO has revised its recommendation to better reflect its intent that the 

bonus system be offered to pilots as a reward for affirmative career 

decisions rather than being interpreted as an entitlement. In addition, GAO 

has clarified its report to emphasize that some assumptions about the 

success of bonuses in encouraging pilots to stay until retirement may be 

outdated and should be revisited.

In partially agreeing with GAO’s other recommendations, DOD outlined 

existing and ongoing activities that it believes satisfy the intent of GAO’s 

recommendations. Although DOD has taken positive steps to address pilot 

issues, GAO believes that DOD needs to build on these steps by 

establishing criteria for designating positions for pilots and identifying 

specific positions where active duty pilots are not needed. These actions 

would enable DOD to more systematically identify how positions could be 

filled with other personnel.

DOD also suggested several technical changes to the draft, which we have 

incorporated where appropriate. DOD’s comments are presented in their 

entirety in appendix II.
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Contents

Letter 1

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1

Introduction

Requirements Include Flying and Nonflying Positions 16

The Services Use Special Pays to Retain Their Pilots 18

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 20

Chapter 2

The Air Force and the 

Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot 

Shortages

The Services Report That They Can Fill Their Operational

Requirements 23

Current and Predicted Pilot Shortages 24

Pilot Shortages Are Recurrent and Difficult to Predict 29

Chapter 3

Opportunities May 

Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot 

Requirements

The Services Reserve Nonflying Positions for Pilots for a

Number of Reasons 31

Job Descriptions for Nonflying Positions Do Not Fully

Explain the Requirement for Pilots 32

Personnel Other Than Active Duty Pilots Might Be Able to

Fill Some Requirements 32

Current Reporting of Flying and Nonflying Positions Has

Limited Utility 34

Chapter 4

Several Factors Are 

Contributing to 

Reported Pilot 

Shortages

The Air Force and the Navy Reduced Pilot Accessions in the

1990s 39

The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Experienced Significant

Delays in Their Training Pipelines 42

Today’s Economy Provides Pilots With Civilian Job Opportunities 44

Chapter 5

Pilot Concerns Are 

Contributing to Low 

Retention

Indicators Show a Retention Problem 48

Surveys Show Consistent Areas of Dissatisfaction 49
Contents

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 6

Conclusions and 

Recommendations

Conclusions 57

Recommendations 60

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 61

Appendixes Appendix I: Pilot Retention Measurements 64

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 68

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 72

Tables Table 1.1: ACP by Service (fiscal year 1999) 20

Table 2.1: Key Projected Air Force Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 2007 26

Table 2.2: Key Navy Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 1998 26

Figures Figure 2.1: U.S. Air Force Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory, 

Fiscal Years 1992-2009 25

Figure 2.2: U.S. Navy Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory, 

Fiscal Years 1992-2009a 28

Figure 3.1: Distribution of Inventory of Navy Pilots by Category, 

as of April 1999 36

Figure 3.2: Navy Pilot Positions and Inventories 37

Figure 4.1: U.S. Air Force Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years

1988-2004 40

Figure 4.2: U.S. Navy Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years

1988-2005 41

Figure 4.3: Naval Undergraduate Pilot Training Pipeline 43

Figure I.1: Navy and Air Force Cumulative Continuation Rates,

Fiscal Years 1989-98 65

Figure I.2: Navy and Air Force Pilot ACP Take-Rates, Fiscal Years

1989-98 67
Contents

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Abbreviations

ACIP aviation career incentive pay

ACP aviation continuation pay

AIR, Inc. Aviation Information Resources, Incorporated

ALPA Air Line Pilots Association

DOD Department of Defense

UPAS Universal Pilot Application Service
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte1r

Military pilots serve in both flying and nonflying positions, and the services 

take several factors into account when they establish their pilot 

requirements. It takes several years and millions of dollars to produce 

pilots who are fully trained to serve in operational units. Due to the high 

costs associated with each loss of a pilot from the military, the services rely 

on incentive pays to retain their qualified pilots.

Requirements Include 

Flying and Nonflying 

Positions

At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported 

that it had about 28,000 active duty commissioned and warrant officer 

pilots.1 These included approximately 13,300 pilots in the Air Force,

6,600 pilots in the Navy, 4,800 warrant officer pilots in the Army, and

3,300 pilots in the Marine Corps. The Army is the only service that uses 

warrant officers.2

The services include cockpit and nonflying positions when they determine 

their pilot requirements and take several factors into account. To determine 

the number of pilots they need to fill their operational cockpits, the 

services follow Defense guidance that defines the missions upon which 

they are to establish their operational requirements. From this guidance, 

the services calculate the structure of their squadrons and the number of 

crews for each aircraft by considering such things as the frequency and 

duration of sorties, time to repair aircraft and conduct routine 

maintenance, and crew rest time. The services also consider the number of 

additional pilots they need to support the squadron missions. These latter 

pilot requirements include positions such as squadron commanders, 

operations officers, squadron instructors, and safety officers.

Requirements for a given combat aircraft are fairly consistent; however, 

cockpit requirements for support aircraft will vary for specific types of 

aircraft, depending on their mission. For example, an Air Force C-9 aircraft 

used for medical evacuations within the Atlantic Command has a crew-seat 

ratio of three pilots per seat, whereas the same aircraft used for 

transporting personnel within the same command has a crew-seat ratio of 

1

This figure does not include pilots beyond paygrade O-5. It also does not include student pilots who are 

in basic flight training and have not earned their wings.

2

Army warrant officers usually enter the service as enlisted personnel and are selected, based on their 

superior performance, to serve as specialists in the warrant officer community. In some cases, 

personnel will join the service and immediately enter the warrant officer program. Warrant and 

commissioned officers follow separate career paths and are subject to separate pay scales. Warrant 

officer pilots typically fly throughout their careers.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

two pilots per seat. Air Force officials indicated that the pilot requirement 

for the medical evacuation aircraft is greater to enable the aircraft to 

operate around the clock in a combat environment. The total number of 

pilots needed to fill the cockpits is determined by multiplying the crew-seat 

ratio by the number of seats in the cockpit (which in the case of the C-9 is 

two). Therefore, each aircraft used for medical evacuations requires six 

pilots, and each aircraft used to transport personnel requires four pilots. 

This figure is then multiplied by the number of aircraft required to carry out 

a particular mission. For example, if 10 C-9 aircraft are needed for medical 

evacuations, the Air Force will have a requirement for 60 pilots. If

10 aircraft are needed to transport personnel, the Air Force will have a 

requirement for 40 pilots to operate the same number of aircraft.

Air Force C-130 aircraft used for search and rescue or electronic jamming 

have a crew-seat ratio of two pilots per seat. The C-130 aircraft has two 

cockpit pilot positions. Therefore, the total pilot requirement is four. If

10 C-130 aircraft are required to carry out search and rescue missions, the 

Air Force will have a requirement for 40 pilots. Alternatively, C-130 aircraft 

used in special operations have crew-seat ratios of 1.5 pilots per seat, 

reducing the pilot requirement for each aircraft to three. According to Air 

Force officials, the primary reason for the difference in the crew-seat ratios 

for these C-130 aircraft is the expected lower number of hours that the 

aircraft will be used each day. If 10 C-130 aircraft are required to carry out 

special operations, the Air Force will have a requirement for 30 pilots.

In contrast, crew-seat ratios for Air Force fighter aircraft do not show this 

variance because their missions do not change. For example, Air Force 

data for fiscal years 1997 through 2004 show a constant crew-seat ratio of 

1.25 for F-15 and F-16 aircraft.

After the services determine their operational cockpit positions, they 

consider a number of other factors to determine their remaining 

requirements. These factors, which are not as quantitative as those that are 

used to determine operational cockpit requirements, include requirements 

to send pilots to operational staffs, joint duty assignments, assignments to 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, staff positions for career 

enhancement, and pilot instructor positions. These requirements are added 

to the number of pilots required to meet operational flying missions.

The services anticipate that a certain percentage of their pilots will not be 

available for assignment at any given point in time due to factors such as 

education and training, medical conditions, and transfers between 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

assignments, and adjust their total pilot requirements upward accordingly. 

Currently, the Air Force uses a factor of 12 percent and the Navy uses a 

factor of 10 percent.

The Services Use 

Special Pays to Retain 

Their Pilots

Under ideal conditions, it takes DOD approximately 11⁄2 to 21⁄2 years, 

depending on the type of aircraft, to produce a fully trained, operational 

pilot. All military pilots, whether they will fly fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft, 

receive about 1 to 2 years of undergraduate pilot training. After completing 

their undergraduate pilot training and receiving their wings, graduates in all 

of the services then receive additional advanced specialized aircraft 

training before they are assigned to an operational unit. 

The cost of a pilot’s training and flying experience varies depending on the 

type of aircraft. According to DOD, the cost to train each military pilot 

through basic flight training is about $1 million, and the cost to fully train a 

pilot with the requisite operational experience can be more than $9 million. 

In exchange for their expensive training, each pilot incurs a commitment to 

serve an additional 6 to 8 years of aviation service following pilot training.3

 

For example, the Air Force estimates a training cost of slightly more than 

$1 million to get an F-15 pilot through initial training and another $2 million 

through flight lead/aircraft commander qualifications. For an F-15 pilot 

separating at the end of the 8-year service obligation, the Air Force 

estimates that it will forfeit an investment of about $8 million. These figures 

include those costs associated with operating and maintaining the pilot 

training commands as well as those costs associated with operating and 

maintaining the aircraft used for training purposes in the operational 

squadrons. The figures also include the pay and allowances for command, 

staff, and support personnel at the training commands, but do not include 

the pay and allowances of the pilots in training. The Army estimates that it 

has invested about $2 million by the time an Apache helicopter pilot 

completes the service obligation. 

In view of the investment in training its pilots, the services currently rely on 

a system of special pays to promote retention and avoid the cost of 

replacing pilots who leave. Upon entering basic flight training, each new 

pilot currently begins to receive aviation career incentive pay (ACIP), 

3

The Air Force will raise the commitment to 10 years beginning in fiscal year 2000. Pilots can also incur 

other obligations to serve in the military at various points in their military careers, usually for shorter 

periods of time, for such things as accepting orders to new assignments or attending particular schools.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

commonly referred to as flight pay. The ACIP, which was designed to 

attract and retain officers in a military aviation career, starts at $125 a 

month for up to 2 years of service and rises over the years to $840 a month 

for a pilot with 15 to 23 years of aviation service. For the period of service 

after 22 years, the amount gradually decreases until it reaches $250 a 

month after 25 years of service. 

Once pilots complete their initial aviation commitment, the services are 

authorized to offer bonuses, called aviation continuation pay (ACP), to 

encourage them to continue in their military career beyond the initial 

aviation obligation. The services have offered this incentive even in those 

cases where pilots have already incurred an additional obligation to serve 

the military for a few more years.4

 Current law5 authorizes the services to 

pay ACP bonuses of up to $25,000 per year to aviators for each additional 

year of commitment if they have completed between 6 and 13 years of 

aviation service and agree to remain on active duty to complete 14 years of 

aviation service. Currently, the Air Force offers $22,000 per year to all pilots 

with the required years of aviation service who sign a commitment to stay 

in the service 5 additional years and smaller dollar amounts to those who 

sign a commitment for 1, 2, or 3 years. The Marine Corps offers $12,000 a 

year to pilots in targeted aircraft specialties where the shortages are 

critical. The Navy targeted its ACP bonuses to critically short pilot 

communities in the past but is now offering a flat 2-year bonus of

$12,000 per year to all eligible pilots. The Army began offering aviation 

continuation pay for the first time in fiscal year 1999. Currently, the Army is 

offering $12,000 a year to Apache helicopter pilots. Table 1.1 presents the 

fiscal year 1999 ACP program by service. 

4

We previously reported on the ACP bonus in our report entitled Aviation Continuation Pay: Some 

Bonuses Are Inappropriate Because of Prior Service Obligations (GAO/NSIAD-95-30, Oct. 14, 1994).

5

37 U.S.C. 301b.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Table 1.1: ACP by Service (fiscal year 1999)

a

Long term is defined as an agreement to stay through 14 years of aviation service.

Source: GAO from service data.

Military pilots, whether assigned to flying or nonflying positions, are 

eligible to receive both ACIP and ACP, provided they meet the other 

eligibility criteria.

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

In response to concerns of the Chairman and former Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on Armed 

Services, about the potential impact of pilot shortages, we reviewed and 

identified reasons for the pilot shortages and solutions to alleviate the 

shortages. Specifically, we determined (1) the services’ reported and 

projected estimates of their pilot shortages, (2) the basis for the services’ 

pilot requirements, (3) key factors that account for the reported pilot 

shortages, and (4) concerns that are causing pilots to consider leaving the 

military.

To determine the extent of projected pilot shortages, we gathered data on 

pilot shortages from each of the services. We also gathered data on past 

shortages so that we could identify trends and place an historical 

perspective on the projected shortages. We concentrated on Air Force and 

Navy data when we conducted our analyses because these two services are 

reporting the greatest number of pilot shortages. Furthermore, we limited 

our scope to active duty pilots.

To determine the basis for pilot requirements, we documented the 

procedures used in determining requirements and what process the 

services follow to validate these requirements. In pursuing this objective, 

Service

Annual

payment Duration Eligibility

Air Force $22,000 Long terma All eligible pilots

$12,000 3 years

$9,000 2 years

$6,000 1 year

Navy $12,000 2 years All eligible pilots and naval flight officers

Marine 

Corps $12,000

Long term Pilots and naval flight officers in critically 

short aircraft specialties

Army $12,000 Long term Apache pilots
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

we discussed methodologies with officials from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and the military services. We gathered data on Air Force and 

Navy flying and nonflying pilot requirements and worked closely with 

service officials to resolve discrepancies that appeared in different data 

sets that the services provided to us. In addition, we conducted our own 

analysis to categorize the flying and nonflying pilot positions according to 

whether they were operational or nonoperational. Our definition of 

operational positions, whether flying or nonflying, included those positions 

that exist primarily for conducting and supporting combat activity. Our 

definition of nonoperational positions included those positions that exist 

primarily to carry out support activities, training functions, and other 

noncombat related activities. We also reviewed 275 Air Force justifications 

for positions to be filled by active duty military pilots.

To identify factors contributing to reported shortages, we met with officials 

in each of the services to gain their perspectives on factors contributing to 

pilot shortages. In addition, we reviewed past retention studies conducted 

by the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, 

and private research organizations including the Commonwealth Institute 

and RAND. 

To analyze the reasons why pilots are leaving the service, we reviewed 

quality-of-life surveys conducted by the Air Force and the Navy. In addition, 

to corroborate the results of these surveys, we administered our own 

questionnaire to more than 180 pilots in the Air Force and the Navy at

5 installations and conducted follow-on discussions with more than 120 of 

the pilots who responded to our questionnaire.6

 We selected the 

installations in order to talk to pilots in a number of different specialties. 

These included Air Force fighter and tactical airlift pilots and Navy 

helicopter pilots, jet pilots, and propeller aircraft pilots. While we cannot 

project our results to the universe of pilots from our limited number of 

questionnaires, the responses we received were consistent with existing 

studies, and the comments from the participants were instructive.

To determine the extent to which job opportunities exist for military pilots 

with the commercial airlines, we met with representatives from private 

industry, including the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Universal 

Pilot Application Service (UPAS) and gathered data from Aviation 

Information Resources, Inc. (AIR, Inc.). 

6

Some navigators were included in these discussions.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

To help us identify any lessons learned and possibilities for solutions from 

foreign militaries, we conducted interviews with defense officials from the 

German, British, and Australian embassies in Washington, D.C., and the 

Canadian National Defense Forces in Ottawa, Ontario. We also consulted 

the government auditing agencies of Germany, Australia, Canada, and 

Britain.

We performed our work at the following locations:

Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, Office of the

 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.; 

Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas;

Naval Bureau of Personnel, Arlington, Virginia;

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Arlington, Virginia;

Headquarters, Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia; 

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona;

Langley AFB, Norfolk, Virginia;

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida; 

Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and

Naval Station, Mayport, Florida.

We conducted our review between July 1998 and June 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages Chapte2r

The services currently report that no unit is deploying without 100 percent 

of its pilots, and they believe that they will continue to be able to meet their 

operational missions. The services have been able to meet their operational 

commitments by sending senior pilots back to junior positions and having 

pilots spend more time on deployments. In all communities, therefore, the 

shortages are occurring almost exclusively in nonoperational positions.

Currently, the Air Force and the Navy are reporting the greatest number of 

pilot shortages, and within these two services, the shortages are more 

apparent in some pilot specialties than in others. The two services project 

that their pilot shortages in nonflying positions will continue for the next 

several years, but that they will continue to be able to fill their operational 

cockpits. It is important to note, however, that shortages are historically 

recurrent and the services are limited in their ability to accurately project 

future pilot inventories. 

The Services Report 

That They Can Fill 

Their Operational 

Requirements

The services currently report that they are able to fill their operational 

flying positions and that no unit is deploying without 100 percent of its 

pilots. The services report that this is at some cost, however, as they are 

only able to fill their flying positions by sending pilots back into the cockpit 

at higher ranks and having pilots spend more time on deployments. As a 

result of these actions, the shortages are occurring primarily in nonflying 

positions, and the services believe that they will continue to be able to fill 

their operational flying positions.

Air Force officials have made cockpit positions a staffing priority, and they 

are making a concerted effort to fill these positions before they fill their 

nonflying positions. The Air Force is filling its cockpit positions by sending 

senior-graded pilots back into the cockpit. Currently, approximately 3,100 

pilots, or 54 percent of majors and lieutenant colonels, are filling junior 

cockpit positions normally filled by lieutenants and captains. Under ideal 

conditions, these pilots would be assigned to career development 

assignments to prepare them for future leadership positions. Generally, 

when a pilot reaches the major and lieutenant colonel level, the pilot would 

serve in positions such as squadron commander or operations officer. 

The Chief of Naval Operations has set a goal that no unit will deploy 

without 100 percent of its required pilots—and the Navy has reported that 

no operational cockpit is going empty. The Navy has worked to fill its 

cockpits by extending the length of time that first tour operational pilots 

spend on sea tours from 36 to 42 months and by reducing the length of time 
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

a pilot spends in shore tours from 36 months to 30 months. To accomplish 

this, the Navy is leaving some nonflying billets empty.

Current and Predicted 

Pilot Shortages

Despite being able to fill their operational positions, each of the services is 

reporting pilot shortages, but to varying degrees. At the end of fiscal

year 1998, the Air Force anticipated that its greatest shortages would occur 

in fiscal year 2007, while the Navy reported that its greatest shortages 

already occurred in fiscal year 1998. The Army is only experiencing 

significant shortages within its Apache helicopter pilot community and 

believes it can address the shortages with management tools already 

available to it. The Marine Corps anticipates increasing shortages of 

fixed-wing pilots until fiscal year 2005. As noted, all services have given 

priority to filling their operational flying positions, and as a result, 

shortages are occurring almost exclusively in nonoperational positions.

Air Force Shortages Will 

Peak in Fiscal Year 2007

At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Air Force reported that it had a shortage 

of 648 pilots, or 5 percent of its 13,986 pilot requirement. The shortages 

were in the fighter and tactical airlift pilot communities. The fighter pilot 

specialty had a requirement of 4,876 pilots, with a shortage of 499, or

10 percent of fighter pilot requirements. Tactical airlift pilot requirements 

were 2,054, with a shortage of 113 pilots, or 6 percent of the tactical airlift 

pilot requirements. 

At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Air Force anticipated that its most critical 

shortages would occur during fiscal years 2002 through 2007, when it 

projected shortages of between 1,900 and 2,155 pilots, or between 14 and 

16 percent of its overall pilot requirements. Figure 2.1 displays the actual 

Air Force’s stated pilot requirements and its inventory for fiscal years 1992 

through 1998 and projected requirements and inventory for fiscal

years 1999 through 2009. The divergence between requirements and the 

supply of pilots that begins in 1997 can be attributed in part to the affects of 

reduced pilot accessions in the early 1990s. This will be discussed in more 

detail in chapter 4.
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Figure 2.1: U.S. Air Force Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory, Fiscal Years 1992-2009

Note: Air Force data include both flying and nonflying positions.

Source: GAO from fiscal year 1998 U.S. Air Force data.

The Air Force projected that its greatest shortage would occur in fiscal

year 2007, and would continue in the fighter and tactical airlift 

communities; the Air Force also projected that shortages will begin to 

emerge in bomber pilot communities, peaking in 2007. The Air Force 

projected shortages of 15 percent of its tactical airlift pilots, 17 percent of 

11,500

12,000

12,500

13,000

13,500

14,000

14,500

15,000

15,500

16,000

16,500

17,000

17,500

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Requirements Inventory
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

its fighter pilots, and 28 percent of its bomber force pilot requirements. 

Table 2.1 displays the key projected shortages for Air Force pilots in fiscal 

year 2007.

Table 2.1: Key Projected Air Force Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 2007

a Includes both flying and nonflying requirements. All aircraft types are not included.

Source: U.S. Air Force data from end of fiscal year 1998.

Navy Shortages Peaked in 

Fiscal Year 1998

Navy data shows that its greatest shortage of pilots was in fiscal year 1998. 

The Navy’s shortage of 1,153 pilots, out of a requirement of 7,712 pilots, 

represented about 15 percent of its pilot requirements. Navy data also 

show that the greatest number of shortages occurred among those pilots 

who fly helicopters, followed by those who fly propeller aircraft, and, 

finally, jets. As shown in table 2.2, in fiscal year 1998, the Navy was short

10 percent of its requirements for jet pilots, 17 percent of its helicopter 

pilot requirements, and 17 percent of its propeller aircraft pilot 

requirements.

Table 2.2: Key Navy Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 1998

a Includes both flying and nonflying requirements. All aircraft types are not included.

Source: U.S. Navy data.

Over the next 5 years, the Navy projected that, if actions it is currently 

taking are successful, its pilot shortages will dissipate, but not disappear. 

Aircraft type Requirementa

Projected

force size Shortage

Shortage as a

percentage of

requirement

Tactical airlift 2,015 1,704 311 15

Fighters 4,715 3,895 820 17

Bombers 1,049 755 294 28

Aircraft type Requirementa Force size Shortage

Shortage as a

percentage of

requirement

Jets 2,221 2,005 216 10

Helicopters 3,195 2,659 536 17

Propeller aircraft 1,845 1,534 311 17
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

The overall shortage of Navy pilots is projected to improve from 15 percent 

to 8 percent by fiscal year 2004. The Navy projected that its propeller pilot 

community will be slightly healthier, with a shortage of 213 pilots out of a 

requirement of 1,845 pilots. This shortage represents 12 percent of the 

Navy’s propeller pilot requirements, and shows an improvement from the 

shortage of 17 percent that the Navy experienced in fiscal year 1998. The 

jet pilot community is projected to improve slightly, from a shortage of

10 percent in fiscal year 1998 to 9 percent in fiscal year 2004, representing a 

shortage of 189 pilots out of a fiscal year 2004 jet pilot requirement of

2,211 pilots. Finally, the helicopter community is projected to see the most 

improvement, with its shortage declining from 17 percent in fiscal 

year 1998 to 5 percent in fiscal year 2004, when the Navy projects it will be 

short 161 pilots out of a requirement for 3,307 helicopter pilots. Figure 2.2 

displays the Navy’s pilot requirements and inventory for fiscal years 1992 

through 1998 and projected requirements and inventory for fiscal

years 1999 through 2009. 
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Figure 2.2: U.S. Navy Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory, Fiscal Years 1992-2009a

a

The Navy’s data from fiscal year 1994 was incomplete and is not included. 

Note: Navy data include both flying and nonflying positions. 

Source: GAO from U.S. Navy data and projections as of February 1999.

Army Shortages Are Limited 

to Apache Helicopter Pilots

According to Army data, in fiscal year 1998, the Army had an overall 

requirement of 4,745 warrant officer pilots and an inventory of

4,799 warrant officer pilots, for a surplus of 54 warrant officer pilots, or

1 percent. At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Army reported a shortage of 

106 pilots out of a requirement of 1,059 pilots in its Apache helicopter pilot 

5,000

5,500

6,000

6,500

7,000

7,500

8,000

8,500

9,000

9,500

1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Requirements Inventory
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

force, or 10 percent. The Army projected that it would be able to meet its 

future Apache helicopter pilot requirements by (1) offering the ACP 

beginning in fiscal year 1999, (2) allowing certain pilots who were not 

promoted to stay on active duty, and (3) allowing others who left the 

service to return to active duty. The Army did not foresee a shortage for the 

rest of its helicopter fleet.1

Marine Corps Fixed-wing 

Pilot Shortages Will Peak in 

Fiscal Year 2005

The Marine Corps reported an overall shortage of 406 pilots at the end of 

fiscal year 1998, representing a shortage of about 11 percent of its overall 

requirement of 3,676 pilots. The Marine Corps reported shortages in its 

fixed-wing community–with a shortage of 311 pilots out of a requirement of 

1,452 pilots, or 21 percent of requirements at the end of fiscal year 1998. 

The rotary-wing community reported a shortage of 95 pilots out of a 

requirement of 2,224 pilots, or about 4 percent of requirements. 

The Marine Corps projected an increasing shortfall in the fixed-wing 

community culminating in a shortage of 402 pilots, or 29 percent of its 

requirement for 1,411 fixed-wing pilots in fiscal year 2005. Meanwhile, the 

rotary-wing community is predicted to experience a surplus of 145 pilots, 

or 7 percent above the 2,033 helicopter pilot requirements, in fiscal

year 2005. 

Pilot Shortages Are 

Recurrent and Difficult 

to Predict

It is important to note that pilot shortages in general tend to be recurrent. 

While the services undertake efforts to control the cycles of gains and 

losses in the pilot communities, the difficulties inherent in predicting the 

behavior of individuals make these efforts particularly challenging for 

personnel planners.

A previous GAO study shows that pilot shortages are not a new 

phenomenon. In 1982, for example, we reported that the Navy experienced 

or projected pilot shortages of between 10 and nearly 26 percent between 

fiscal years 1977 and 1983.2

 In that same report, we also found that the 

Marine Corps experienced or projected a pilot shortage of between 3 and 

14 percent during the same time frame. In addition, the Air Force 

1

Unlike the other services, the Army has relatively few fixed-wing aircraft. The Army currently has 

5,005 rotary-wing aircraft and 276 fixed-wing aircraft.

2

Millions Spent Needlessly in Navy and Marine Corps’ Aviation Bonus Program (GAO/FPCD-82-56,

Aug. 9, 1982).
Chapter 2

The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the 

Greatest Pilot Shortages

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

experienced pilot shortages in 7 of the fiscal years between fiscal year 1988 

and fiscal year 1997, ranging from a high of 9 percent in fiscal year 1989 to a 

low of slightly less than 1 percent in fiscal year 1992. 

Because of the difficulties inherent in making predictions, DOD’s ability to 

predict future inventories is also limited. For example, in 1988, DOD 

reported to Congress that the Air Force had a shortage of about 1,300 

mid-grade pilots. DOD further predicted that by fiscal year 1994, the Air 

Force would be short 2,900 pilots. Instead of experiencing this shortage, 

the Air Force had a surplus of 413 pilots, or about 3 percent of its 

requirements, in fiscal year 1994. Finally, mid-fiscal year 1999 figures 

demonstrate these points. For example, the Air Force now projects, as of 

April 1999, that its shortages will not reach their nadir until fiscal year 2008 

and at that point will be about 1,800 rather than the 2,155 that the Air Force 

projected just 6 months before.
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements Chapte3r

The current and projected shortages reported by the services must be 

viewed within the context of how they determine and document their pilot 

requirements. Pilot requirements are based on many other factors in 

addition to the number of cockpits that must be filled. For example, the 

services must reserve additional nonflying positions to provide pilots with 

opportunities for career development and relief from tours of duty where 

pilots are likely to be away from home. However, we found that the 

services have not comprehensively assessed all of the positions reserved 

for pilots to determine whether they truly need to be filled with active duty 

military pilots. If other military and civilian personnel who cost less and 

take less time to train could fill some positions, the services may be able to 

reduce their pilot requirements and thereby their reported shortages. 

Moreover, improved classification of pilot positions by their operational or 

nonoperational nature would help the services decide which positions 

should be filled on a priority basis in times of shortages and to better 

evaluate which positions might be filled by personnel other than active 

duty pilots. 

The Services Reserve 

Nonflying Positions for 

Pilots for a Number of 

Reasons 

As noted in chapter 1, the services consider a number of factors in 

establishing their pilot requirements. As a result of their requirements 

determination processes, a substantial number of nonflying positions are 

included in their requirements. Accordingly, a number of nonflying 

positions for pilots are needed to permit them to advance in their careers 

and avoid excessive deployments away from home. Pilots in the Air Force, 

the Navy, and the Marine Corps are commissioned officers and, as such, 

they are required to fill duties in addition to their flying responsibilities. 

The usual career progression for pilots includes rotations through flying 

and nonflying positions because the services view staff assignments as 

essential to the development of officers who will assume greater leadership 

responsibilities. In addition, other opportunities for pilots to receive 

graduate school education or training require them to be assigned to 

nonflying billets at certain times in their careers. Nonflying positions also 

permit pilots respites from deployment cycles and offer opportunities for 

pilots to participate in community and family activities and engage in 

academic pursuits. Such assignments allow pilots intervals at home 

between deployments, which some officials believe favorably affects 

retention. 

The Air Force’s nonflying positions currently represent slightly more than 

20 percent of its total pilot requirements, and the Air Force expects this to 
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

remain relatively constant over the next several years. The Navy’s nonflying 

positions currently represent 22 percent of its pilot inventory.

Job Descriptions for 

Nonflying Positions Do 

Not Fully Explain the 

Requirement for Pilots

Job descriptions for nonflying positions do not explain why the positions 

have to be filled by active duty pilots. For example, the Air Force prepares 

job descriptions to demonstrate why active duty pilots should fill nonflying 

positions and provided us with a sample of pilot justifications for 275 Air 

Force Headquarters staff positions. Pilots in these nonflying positions 

perform a range of duties, including planning deployments, providing 

guidance for developing cockpit avionics and displays, and evaluating 

modernization proposals to existing and future aircraft. In these job 

descriptions the Air Force demonstrated that particular work centers 

require a mix of pilots and other personnel. However, the justification for a 

specific number of pilots was not clear because the job descriptions did not 

explain how these designations or skill mixes were established. For 

example, one job description called for a pilot with the rank of major to 

serve in a policy and programs division within a test and evaluation 

directorate. However, the job description also stated that the work center 

consists of six aviators, six officers who are not aviators, and two civilians. 

It did not demonstrate how the mix of personnel was determined. While the 

Navy maintains brief descriptions for its different positions, these 

descriptions also do not clearly explain why these positions need to be 

filled with active duty pilots. 

Personnel Other Than 

Active Duty Pilots 

Might Be Able to Fill 

Some Requirements

Several opportunities exist to reduce current active duty pilot requirements 

and fill those positions with other personnel. In 1997, we recommended 

that the services develop criteria and review the duties of each nonflying 

position to identify those that could be filled by personnel other than 

pilots.1

 We noted that such an assessment could allow the services to 

reduce their pilot requirements. These other personnel could include 

warrant officers, retired military, contractors, DOD civilians, reservists, or 

navigators and naval flight officers. During our current review, we found 

that the Air Force has converted more than 500 positions formerly reserved 

for aviators and is filling them with other Air Force officers. The Air Force 

has also examined its nonflying positions, established certain priorities, 

1

DOD Aviator Positions: Training Requirements and Incentive Pay Could Be Reduced

(GAO/NSIAD-97-60, Feb. 19, 1997).
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

and made the decision to leave more than 1,000 positions reserved for 

pilots unfilled. However, the Air Force has not formally transferred the 

1,000 empty positions to other communities and is still carrying them as 

pilot requirements. We also found that the Navy has left certain nonflying 

positions unfilled and has not formally transferred its nonflying positions to 

other communities. 

The Navy is currently predicting an excess of naval flight officers beginning 

in fiscal year 2001, increasing to a surplus of 344 naval flight officers by 

fiscal year 2004. The Navy also reports that most of its nonflying positions 

are interchangeable and can be filled by either pilots or naval flight officers 

and that it takes less time and money to train a naval flight officer than a 

pilot. This extra pool of aviators created by the surplus of naval flight 

officers could be used during pilot shortages to fill some of the nonflying 

positions currently reserved for pilots. The Air Force also has a surplus of 

navigators that could be used to fill nonflying positions.

In addition, the Navy is exploring the possibility of filling a few positions, 

such as hangar deck officers and fuels officers, with limited duty officers2

and chief warrant officers. The Navy recently explored this issue in June 

1999. The Navy has also prioritized its general and unrestricted officer 

positions that do not require flying or combat operations to determine how 

many should be filled by air, surface, and submarine warfare officers. 

However, since retention challenges exist in all warfare communities, the 

Navy is reluctant to pass the aviator share of these positions on to other 

communities. This continuing problem reflects the importance of 

thoroughly reviewing whether civilians or others could fill some positions.

The Air Force addressed the issue of how to best fill its nonflying positions 

at a conference on April 13, 1999. One of the recommendations coming out 

of this conference was to examine the Air Force nonflying positions and 

identify alternatives to filling them with pilots. Alternatives being 

considered include using civilian contractors, reserve officers, and 

nonpilots and allowing former active duty pilots to return to military 

service. Returning former active duty military pilots to the cockpit is not 

entirely new. Since 1995, the Air Force’s recall program has resulted in

114 pilots being returned to active duty. The Army has instituted a recall 

2

Limited duty officers are former enlisted personnel who, on the basis of their outstanding 

performance, compete to become commissioned officers. They enjoy the same precedence and 

exercise the same authority as unrestricted commissioned officers. However, their promotion potential 

is limited to the Navy rank of captain. 
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

program for former active duty Army pilots. This voluntary recall program 

has resulted in 111 pilots accepting, with nearly all now on active duty. 

Similarly, the Navy has an active duty recall program focusing on 

intermediate strike instructor pilots associated with Naval reserve units. 

Through our work, we found that the British Royal Air Force provides an 

example of aviator requirements being reduced successfully. The Royal Air 

Force, which has 3,714 pilots and navigators (of the equivalent of major 

rank and below), is experiencing pilot shortages. After analyzing

1,230 ground-based aviator positions, the Royal Air Force determined that 

465 or 38 percent could either be transferred to other branches or 

eliminated. This reduction in requirements was the second major round of 

cuts for the Royal Air Force in recent years. In the last round, more than 

250 positions were removed or transferred. In addition, the Royal Air 

Force reviewed nonoperational flying positions and identified an additional 

61 positions for removal or transfer. Each squadron was asked to rate its 

aviator positions for aviator essentiality. Headquarters personnel reviewed 

these justifications and returned questionable justifications to the 

squadrons for confirmation. This difficult process resulted in a dramatic 

cut in requirements. Royal Air Force officials also told us, however, that 

their actions increased the number of ground-based personnel needed to 

fill the positions previously designated for aviators, and that it would take

5 to 8 years to fully staff these positions with ground-based personnel.

We acknowledge that converting pilot positions will be a long-term process 

and that it will take time for other communities to absorb pilot 

requirements that may be transferred to them. However, given the high 

costs and length of time associated with training pilots, we continue to 

believe that converting pilot requirements has merit. 

Current Reporting of 

Flying and Nonflying 

Positions Has Limited 

Utility 

The services’ reporting of data on flying and nonflying positions lack 

precision because this type of breakdown does not capture the extent to 

which these positions carry an associated operational or primary military 

function as opposed to a nonoperational or support function. Without this 

information, it is difficult to evaluate which positions the services should 

fill on a priority basis and whether some positions could be filled by other 

personnel during times of shortages.

Operational positions, whether flying or nonflying, include those positions 

that exist primarily for conducting combat activity. Positions that are 

operational and flying would include cockpit positions that have a combat 
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

mission. Positions that are operational but nonflying require a pilot 

because of the pilot’s aviation background, experience, or warfare 

expertise; however, these positions do not require a pilot to operate an 

aircraft in support of specific military operations. Examples of positions 

that are operational and nonflying would include catapult and arresting 

gear officers on an aircraft carrier and joint staff officers who develop 

operations plans. 

Pilots in nonoperational positions carry out support activities, training 

functions, and other noncombat related activities. Nonoperational 

positions that have a flying aspect are designated for pilots who fly 

frequently in the performance of their duties but do not have a direct 

combat mission, such as flight instructors and test pilots. Nonoperational 

positions that do not have a flying requirement are designated for pilots 

based on the needs of the service to fill officer billets. These positions may 

draw on the pilot’s expertise or they may be general enough for any officer 

to perform. These positions would include positions such as accident 

investigators, advisors to foreign militaries, military academy teachers, and 

recruiters. 

We attempted to analyze the extent to which Air Force and Navy pilots are 

serving in positions that are flying, nonflying, operational, and 

nonoperational. We concentrated on these two services when we 

conducted our analyses because they are reporting the greatest number of 

shortages. The Navy provided us with figures to demonstrate its pilot 

distribution according to these categories. According to mid-fiscal

year 1999 data provided by the Navy, its total pilot inventory was 5,575.

3

About 3,200 of these pilots were in operational positions. Of these, 

approximately 2,600 pilots were in operational positions that are flying and 

600 pilots were in operational positions that are nonflying. The Navy also 

had 2,375 pilots in nonoperational positions. Of these, 1,750 pilots were in 

flying positions and 624 pilots were serving in nonoperational billets that 

are nonflying. Figure 3.1 displays the percentages of Navy pilots that fill 

these different types of positions.

3

These figures exclude about 745 pilots who were categorized as unavailable for duty because they 

were in transit between duty stations, in training, on medical leave, or imprisoned.
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Figure 3.1: Distribution of Inventory of Navy Pilots by Category, as of April 1999

Source: GAO from U.S. Navy data.

Certainly, the justification is greatest for military pilots to fill flying 

operational positions since this is what they have been trained to do. The 

possibility exists that personnel other than active duty military pilots could 

fill some of the flying nonoperational and nonflying positions. Especially 

during a period of critical pilot shortages, it is not clear why the Navy is 

filling 624 positions that are both nonflying and nonoperational with pilots. 

These 624 positions represent 55 percent of the Navy’s mid-fiscal year 1999 

shortage of 1,130 pilots and provide the Navy with several possibilities to 

fill some of these positions with personnel other than active duty military 

pilots.

This type of analysis is also useful in that it can identify for the services the 

extent to which they are filling their positions on a priority basis. For 

example, Navy data show that the Navy is currently experiencing a

15-percent shortage in its flying operational positions, a 30-percent 

shortage in its flying nonoperational positions, a 34-percent shortage in its 

nonflying operational positions, and 16-percent shortage in its nonflying 

nonoperational positions. As previously noted, the Navy has been able to 

fill its operational cockpits by extending some pilots on deployments and 

Nonflying/ 

operational

10%

Flying/ 

operational

47%

Flying/

nonoperational

32%

Nonflying/ 

nonoperational

11%
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

by sending senior pilots to positions formerly filled by more junior service 

members. The Navy is meeting the nonflying levels by using both pilots and 

naval flight officers. Figure 3.2 shows the number of positions, by category, 

and the extent to which each category is filled.

Figure 3.2: Navy Pilot Positions and Inventories

a

Nonflying/operational and nonflying/nonoperational inventories include both naval flight officers and 

pilots.

Source: GAO from U.S. Navy data.

The Air Force provided us with a breakdown of its flying and nonflying 

positions but was unable to identify which of the nonflying positions were 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

Positions 3,067 2,512 1,659 973

Inventorya 2,602 1,751 1,097 820

Shortage -465 -761 -562 -153

Shortage as a percent

 of requirement

15% 30% 34% 16%

Flying/

operational

Flying/

nonoperational

Nonflying/

operational

Nonflying/

nonoperational
Chapter 3

Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and 

Better Document Pilot Requirements

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

nonoperational. Currently, approximately 1,000, or 36 percent of the Air 

Force’s nonflying positions are vacant. These positions are equivalent to

47 percent of the 2,155 pilot shortages that the Air Force projects will occur 

in fiscal year 2007. Although it may not be realistic to assume that the Air 

Force could convert all 1,000 positions, they do provide the Air Force with 

several opportunities to reevaluate its requirements and fill some of these 

positions with personnel other than active duty military pilots.
Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to Reported 

Pilot Shortages Chapte4r

Several factors have contributed to the services reported current and 

projected pilot shortages. First, the Air Force and the Navy reduced their 

new pilot entries (accessions) during the military downsizing that began in 

the early 1990s. Because fewer pilots entered the force, the services are 

now reporting shortages in relation to their pilot requirements. In addition, 

the Navy and the Marine Corps have experienced training delays that have 

resulted in pilots reporting to the final phase of their training as many as

40 weeks late. Furthermore, the current economy is providing military 

pilots with job opportunities in private industry and pilots are finding the 

pay and benefits associated with those job opportunities attractive.

The Air Force and the 

Navy Reduced Pilot 

Accessions in the 1990s

During the military force reductions that took place during this decade, the 

Air Force and the Navy significantly reduced their pilot recruiting goals and 

actual new pilot accessions. One of the intended purposes behind these 

decisions was the desire to arrive at a smaller force by taking in fewer new 

pilots instead of forcing highly experienced and highly trained pilots 

already in the force to leave the military. Although the decisions to reduce 

accessions may have helped the services avoid involuntary personnel 

separations, they have produced the unintended consequences that the 

services are facing today. The services did not foresee today’s operating 

environment, which includes a high level of military operations, a much 

smaller force, a sustained good economy, and an expanding private airline 

industry that provides military pilots with ample civilian job opportunities. 

Consequently, these actions have produced insufficient numbers of pilots 

to support current requirements, which has contributed to the services’ 

need to retain more pilots. Certain year groups are atypically small, and 

current aviation personnel managers are challenged to find ways to fill 

requirements as this smaller pilot population matures through the 

workforce.

The Air Force, for example, reduced active duty pilot accessions from more 

than 1,500 new pilots in fiscal year 1990 to approximately 500 new pilots 

each year during fiscal years 1994 through1996. Recognizing that it needed 

to increase accessions, the Air Force has steadily increased its pilot 

production since that time. The service accessed approximately 900 new 

pilots in fiscal year 1998 and expects to meet its capacity of 1,100 new pilot 

accessions by fiscal year 2000. The capacity to access pilots beyond 1,100 is 

limited by the current number of training facilities and training slots for 

new, inexperienced pilots. Figure 4.1 shows Air Force pilot actual 

accessions and goals for fiscal years 1988 through 1998 and projected goals 

for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. The lack of a gap between accessions 
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

and goals during these fiscal years reflects the decision to lower the 

accession goals during this time. 

Figure 4.1: U.S. Air Force Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years 1988-2004

Source: GAO from U.S. Air Force data.

The Navy experienced a similar pattern. In fiscal year 1990, the Navy 

accessed 1,039 student pilots; in fiscal year 1994, the Navy accessed just 

471 student pilots. In fiscal year 2000, the Navy will access 728 new pilots 

and thereafter will access 878 student pilots each year for the foreseeable 

future. Figure 4.2 shows Navy pilot actual accessions and goals for fiscal 

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Actual Goal
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

years 1988 through 1999 and projected goals for fiscal years 2000 through 

2005.

Figure 4.2: U.S. Navy Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years 1988-2005

Source: GAO from U.S. Navy data.

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1998 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Actual Goal
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

The Navy and the 

Marine Corps Have 

Experienced 

Significant Delays in 

Their Training 

Pipelines

In addition to problems with pilot accessions, the Navy and the Marine 

Corps have experienced significant delays in moving new trainees through 

their new pilot training pipelines. In some cases, it has taken 40 weeks 

longer than expected to produce trained pilots. These delays have further 

contributed to the pilot shortages. Fiscal year 1998 data show that there 

were about 600 new Navy student pilots still in training who should have 

already reported to their first operational assignments. This increase in 

training time, coupled with the smaller numbers of new pilots created by 

reduced accessions, has exacerbated the shortfalls in both the Navy and 

the Marine Corps. However, the Navy now has a working group to better 

integrate the different phases of training to minimize delays and to identify 

choke points.

For the most part, Navy and Marine Corps student pilots train side-by-side, 

and all pilots must first complete naval undergraduate pilot training, which 

is divided into several segments, before they receive their initial 

qualifications, or wings. These segments include aviation preflight 

indoctrination, primary fixed-wing training, intermediate flight training, 

and advanced flight training. Preflight indoctrination takes place in a 

classroom setting. Primary fixed-wing training takes place in fixed-wing 

trainer aircraft, regardless of the type of aircraft the Navy or the Marine 

Corps aviator will ultimately fly. Following the preflight indoctrination and 

the primary fixed-wing training, the services decide what aircraft the pilot 

will fly depending on the pilot’s grades, the desires of the pilot, and the 

needs of the service. The pilot in training begins to specialize at this point 

in time and is assigned to one of four tracks to receive the intermediate and 

advanced flight training. These tracks are (1) jet aircraft, (2) carrier 

propeller aircraft, (3) propeller aircraft, and (4) helicopters. Upon 

successful completion of the advanced flight training, pilots receive their 

wings. New pilots then proceed to a fleet replacement squadron, at which 

point they receive specialized training in a specific type of operational 

aircraft. Depending on the type of aircraft, this specialized training will take 

an additional 6 to 9 months. It is at this point in time that a pilot is prepared 

to report to his or her first operational squadron. At the completion of this 

3-year operational tour, the Navy and the Marine Corps consider the pilot to 

be “seasoned.” Figure 4.3 displays the planned training pipeline from 

commissioning through the completion of the first operational assignment.
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Figure 4.3: Naval Undergraduate Pilot Training Pipeline

Note: The Navy also adds in travel times of roughly 2 weeks between each training segment.

Source: GAO from U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps information.

Marine Corps pilots follow the same training track, with the exception that 

they, like all other new Marine Corps officers, are required to attend the 

Basic School at Marine Corps Base Quantico, which lasts 26 weeks, prior to 

reporting to pilot training.

Data provided by the Navy in June 1999 illustrating current training times—

from the beginning of pilot training through the assignment to a fleet 

replacement squadron—demonstrate the magnitude of the training delays. 

For example, the planned time to train for a jet pilot through the fleet 

replacement squadron is 30 months, but the actual time to train was

45 months, representing a delay of 15 months or approximately 65 weeks. 

In the case of propeller aircraft, the planned time to train is 24 months, but 

the actual time to train was 30 months, representing a delay of 6 months or 

approximately 26 weeks. In the case of helicopters, the planned time to 

train is 24 months, but the actual time to train was 28 months, representing 

a delay of 4 months or approximately 16 weeks. 

Data provided to us by the Marine Corps, as of February 1999, demonstrate 

the delays pilots in training have been experiencing even before they 

reported to the fleet replacement squadron. For example, the planned time 

to train a jet pilot through wings—including the 26 weeks for Marine Corps 

Basic School and 4 weeks for travel—is 105 to 119 weeks, depending on the 

 Aviation

preflight

 indoctrination

Primary

fixedwing 

training

Intermediate

 and

 advanced

flight training

Fixed-wing

 trainers

Fleet 

replacement

squadron

1st tour

Classroom

 Pilot assigned

 to aircraft Wings

Jet

Helo

Carrier

 prop

Prop

Specialized

 aircraft

Jet, prop, carrier prop

 or helicopter trainers Squadron

6 weeks 5 months 6-13 months 6-9 months About 36 months

=

“Seasoned”

pilot
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

training aircraft used. However, the actual time to train was 145 to

153 weeks, or a delay of 32 to 41 weeks, depending on the type of jet trainer 

used. In the case of propeller aircraft and helicopters, the planned time to 

train to earn wings is 90 weeks, and the actual time to train was 120 to

129 weeks, or a delay of 30 to 39 weeks.

Navy officials attributed these delays to several factors. For example, while 

the services may have emphasized getting a student pilot through a 

particular phase of the pilot training, these phases were not properly 

coordinated, and backlogs occurred while student pilots waited to report 

to the next segment. Additional problems have occurred at the fleet 

replacement squadrons. Officials attributed many of the delays during this 

phase of training to a lack of spare parts, available aircraft for training, 

mechanical problems with some trainer aircraft, and shortages in enlisted 

air crew. They explained that the fleet replacement squadrons find 

themselves competing with the operational squadrons for parts and 

aircraft, and they have often been given lower priority.

The Navy has contracted with a private firm to help the Navy and the 

Marine Corps to better align the different phases of training in order to 

decrease the delays between segments and better coordinate all areas of 

training. As a result, delays have come down between 6 and 26 percent, 

depending on the community. 

Today’s Economy 

Provides Pilots With 

Civilian Job 

Opportunities

The potential for job prospects in private industry, the allure of potentially 

large salaries, and the appeal of private airline retirement packages are 

currently providing military pilots with attractive options. Commercial 

airline hiring projections made by private industry suggest that the current 

demand for experienced military pilots will likely continue. Projections of 

airline hiring factor in an increased requirement for pilots caused by 

growth in the regional and major airline industries and mandatory airline 

pilot retirement at age 60. Any increases that result from airline industry 

expansion or continuing favorable economic conditions will further fuel 

the commercial airlines’ need for pilots. Military pilots possess skills that 

are readily transferable to the airlines industry. They have received 

extensive formal training in areas such as aircraft systems, aerodynamics, 

air traffic control procedures, and meteorology. Further, military pilots can 

be easily trained on the jet and/or heavy aircraft qualifications required by 

the airlines. 
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

DOD closely monitors data produced by Aviation Information Resources, 

Incorporated (AIR, Inc.), which studies various trends within the 

commercial airline industry. Currently, this company is projecting 

significant growth among the private airlines. In a 1998 job market analysis, 

AIR, Inc., reported that 57,019 pilots were employed by the 14 major U.S. 

airlines in 1998 and projected that 40,000 new job openings to fly large jets 

would occur due to industry growth, pilot attrition, and retirement by 2007. 

The AIR, Inc., analysis also projected that the number of U.S. commercial 

aircraft would grow from 7,334 aircraft in 1997 to 9,218 aircraft by the year 

2005. In terms of retirement, the analysis reported that many pilots hired 

during a big hiring surge in the mid-1960s are now retiring. The analysis 

showed that there were more than 1,150 major airline pilot retirements in 

1997 and projected that there would be an additional 16,400 pilot 

retirements by 2007. For one major airline alone, AIR, Inc., projected that

54 percent of that company’s pilots would retire between 1998 and 2008. 

Military pilots find the potential for large salaries and lucrative retirements 

attractive. Although initial private airline salaries are low, they can grow 

significantly. AIR, Inc., reported in 1998 that the average annual pay for 

pilots in the first year of employment in the 14 major airlines was $30,144. 

However, AIR, Inc., also reported that this average salary could rise to 

$161,052 for an airline captain who has more than 10 years of employment 

in 1 of the 14 major airlines. (Of the 14 major airlines, AIR, Inc., reported 

that the salary range for pilots in the highest bracket is between

$92,424 and $195,480.) In addition, the airlines offer generous retirement 

packages. AIR, Inc., estimated that the value of a 30-year career with one of 

the three largest major airlines for a pilot, hired at age 30, who flies until 

age 60 and enjoys a normal retirement, is between $6.7 to $8.0 million. (It is 

very unlikely that a military pilot could fulfill a minimum military service 

obligation and a 30-year career with a commercial airline. However, a 

military pilot may be able to complete a 29-year career.) 

Military pilots also consider the fact that airline salaries are driven totally 

by seniority within a particular airline. Although increased experience 

within the military, a private regional airline, or another major airline might 

make a pilot more competitive for employment, this additional experience 

will have no bearing on the pilot’s salary with the particular airline. One 

consequence of this structure is that military pilots experience a reduction 

in their pay before they start receiving the larger salaries.

The following scenario illustrates this. According to the Air Force, a 

typical military pilot with 10 years of experience who is promoted at 
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

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Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

normal rates currently receives an annual regular military compensation1

of about $57,000. When flight pay is added, the salary grows to 

approximately $65,000. (This figure assumes that a pilot has not accepted a 

retention bonus and also does not include any local cost of living 

adjustments, which vary depending on where a pilot is assigned.) In 

addition, a pilot with 10 years experience is likely to be assigned to a 

nonflying position in the military that will reduce his or her competitive 

status in the airline industry. If that pilot decides to leave the military and 

finds employment with 1 of the 14 major airlines, that pilot will receive an 

average starting salary of about $30,000, representing a salary reduction of 

about half of the military compensation. However, this pilot is facing the 

potential for greater pay and benefits. By the 6th year, that same pilot will 

receive a private industry average salary of about $88,000 and will have

6 years of contributions into a retirement plan, increased retirement 

benefits, and increased seniority in the airline. The pay alone will be 

approximately equivalent to the salary the pilot would receive had he or 

she stayed in the military. A typical salary for a military pilot with 16 years 

of service is about $78,000. When flight pay is added in, the pay is 

equivalent to approximately $88,000. 

The Air Force has calculated that military pilots who ultimately leave the 

military to go to a private airline lose a percentage of their lifetime earnings 

in each additional year that they stay in the military. Several factors 

account for this. First, the initial pay differential increases as the military 

salary rises. Second, the number of years in which a pilot can participate in 

a commercial airline retirement plan decreases. Finally, military pilots will 

attain seniority in the commercial airlines, and the associated larger 

salaries, later in their careers. According to Air Force calculations, the total 

career earnings of a pilot who enters the military at age 22, leaves the 

military after 9 years, is hired by a private airline, and then retires at age

60 is $4,368,460. Conversely, the total career earnings of a pilot who enters 

the military at age 22, accepts a retention bonus, retires at 20 years of 

service, receives military retirement pay, is hired by private industry, and 

then retires at the mandatory age of 60, is $4,063,472. According to Air 

Force calculations, it will cost the military member almost $305,000 to 

remain in the service until retirement.

1

In computing a pilot’s regular military compensation, the Air Force includes basic pay, basic allowance 

for subsistence (nontaxed), basic allowance for housing (also nontaxed), and the equivalent of the tax 

advantage that is derived from these last two categories.
Chapter 4

Several Factors Are Contributing to 

Reported Pilot Shortages

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

In addition to job opportunities and potentially more lucrative pay and 

benefits packages, many pilots are attracted to private industry by the 

promise of a better quality of life and a chance to spend more time with 

their families. Military members often work long hours and spend extended 

periods of time away from their homes. Conversely, private industry 

officials told us that many commercial pilots work no more than 15 days a 

month. Although these pilots may spend many of these nights away, they 

will also spend the remainder of the month at home. Private industry 

officials described a commercial pilot’s job as the best “part-time” job an 

individual could find.

There is, of course, a down side to joining private industry, and one of the 

biggest problems is a lack of job security. In the early 1990s, for example, 

the airline industry laid off approximately 2,000 pilots. Because the airlines 

operate exclusively under a seniority-based system that is company 

specific, a commercial pilot with years of experience who leaves one 

airline to join another will be hired at a entry-level salary. Commercial 

pilots in mid-career can expect to experience significant salary reductions 

should the airline industry face future downturns.
Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 5

Pilot Concerns Are Contributing to Low 

Retention Chapte5r

Air Force and Navy actions to reduce pilot accessions during DOD’s 

reductions in force and the training delays in the Navy and the Marine 

Corps have produced reported pilot shortages and are driving the need to 

retain more pilots in the service. Furthermore, this need to retain additional 

pilots is exacerbated by an increase in pilot resignations. The services have 

conducted several studies over the past several years and have identified 

frustrations that pilots state they are experiencing in their military careers. 

We administered our own questionnaire to more than 180 Air Force and 

Navy pilots at several different installations and held small group 

discussions with over 100 of these individuals. While we cannot project the 

results of our own questionnaires to the pilot community as a whole, our 

results were consistent with the findings that the services have identified in 

their own surveys. The services have taken certain actions to respond to 

these concerns. However, opportunities exist for additional action. 

Indicators Show a 

Retention Problem

In general, the services are currently experiencing retention problems in 

their pilot communities. DOD uses several indicators to measure retention, 

including the cumulative continuation rate, the ACP take-rate, and number 

of pilot resignations. A full description of the cumulative continuation rate 

and the ACP take-rate is in appendix I. Although the indicators used by the 

services are limited in their predictive value, these three indicators show 

that retention is currently an issue in the Air Force and the Navy. For 

example, between fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the Air Force’s pilot 

cumulative continuation rate declined from 71 percent to 46 percent. The 

Air Force bonus take-rate for all of its contracts declined from a high of 

81 percent in fiscal year 1994 to 42 percent in fiscal year 1998. The number 

of Air Force pilot resignations increased from 498 in fiscal year 1996 to 

1,052 in the first 10 months of fiscal year 1998. 

Based on the same indicators, the Navy is also experiencing a retention 

problem. The Navy’s cumulative continuation rate declined from 39 percent 

in fiscal year 1997 to 32 percent in fiscal year 1998. The Navy’s bonus 

take-rate for pilots declined from 50 percent in fiscal year 1994 to

21 percent in fiscal year 1998. The number of pilot resignations in the Navy 

actually decreased from 316 resignations in fiscal year 1996 to

299 resignations in fiscal year 1997, but then increased to 347 resignations 

in fiscal year 1998. 
Chapter 5

Pilot Concerns Are Contributing to Low 

Retention

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Surveys Show 

Consistent Areas of 

Dissatisfaction

The Air Force and the Navy have conducted different studies in recent 

years that have identified reasons why pilots are leaving or are considering 

leaving the service. While all of the results are not projectable to the entire 

pilot population, the results of these surveys show that along with other 

military specialties, pilots are concerned about retirement and health care 

benefits and other quality of life issues. In addition, there are areas of 

concern that are particularly relevant to pilots, including the pace of 

operations, limited spare parts and equipment, senior military and civilian 

leadership, aviator retention bonuses, and promotion opportunities and 

assignments. 

We administered our own questionnaire to more than 180 pilots in the Air 

Force and the Navy and conducted small group discussions with more than 

120 pilots who responded to our questionnaire at several different Air 

Force and Navy bases.1

 Our questionnaire results and discussions 

identified the same primary reasons for pilot separations as disclosed by 

the Air Force and the Navy studies. 

Examples of some DOD surveys we reviewed include an Air 

Force-administered “Careers and New Directions” survey in 1996 of 

random groups of personnel who intended to remain in the service and of 

other groups of personnel who had established a date of separation. Pilots 

were included in this survey. In 1997, the Air Force also administered a 

quality of life survey to more than 200,000 personnel. Again, this survey 

included pilots. In 1998, the Air Force conducted phone interviews with 

pilots who did not take a retention bonus. The Navy has also administered 

different studies in recent years. These include an aviator retention study 

conducted by a Navy aviator retention team in 1997, a retention study 

conducted by the Navy’s Atlantic Command in 1997, a retention study 

conducted by the Pacific Command in 1998, and a second 1998 retention 

study that was conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School.

Concern About High Pace of 

Operations

According to the 1997 Air Force quality of life survey administered to more 

than 200,000 personnel, one of the critical issues facing the Air Force 

during the past several years has been the high level of operations. 

Additionally, other studies have shown that Air Force pilots who declined 

1

Some navigators were included in these discussions.
Chapter 5

Pilot Concerns Are Contributing to Low 

Retention

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

the retention bonus in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 cited the pace of 

operations, additional duties, and family issues as primary concerns.

The Air Force reported that since 1995, there has been a slow, but steady 

increase in the number of reported temporary duty days and the number of 

hours worked by military personnel. Other work that we have done 

supports this observation.2

 For example, the Air Force reported that since 

about 1989, the average number of personnel deployed for operations other 

than war has more than quadrupled, from about 3,400 personnel in 1989 to 

about 14,600 personnel in 1997. We found that deployments are 

concentrated in a small percentage of career fields and that 5 percent of Air 

Force active duty personnel accounted for 27 percent of the temporary 

duty assignments in fiscal year 1998. Pilots, for example, comprised

4 percent of total active duty personnel, but accounted for 9 percent of 

total temporary duty assignments. 

In response to our questionnaire and small group discussions, Air Force 

pilots identified the frequency and length of deployments and lack of clear 

mission objectives as their primary concerns. The Air Force pilots we met 

expressed concerns specifically about the frequency of deployments to 

Southwest Asia, the austere living conditions, and the inability to train 

during those deployments. They questioned the need for a sizeable, 

constant presence in that area, and suggested that they would be better off 

training in U.S. air space and deploying on an as-needed basis. They also 

expressed concerns about the Air Force expeditionary force initiative that, 

though intended to add more predictability to pilot deployments, would 

result in an increase in the length of Air Force deployments from 45 to

90 days. Navy pilots had a different expectation about the length of 

deployments since naval deployments are typically 6 months in length. 

However, Air Force and Navy pilots alike raised concerns about the pace of 

operations between deployments. Several Navy pilots told us that the 

schedule between deployments is often more demanding than the 

deployments themselves. One pilot said that he often gets more sleep and 

communicates with his wife more often via e-mail while on deployment 

than he does when he is working 10- to 12-hour days between deployments.

The services have taken several actions to address these concerns. For 

example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been working to 

2

Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies (GAO/NSIAD-99-69, 

May 24, 1999).
Chapter 5

Pilot Concerns Are Contributing to Low 

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Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

reduce the number of deployments and exercises. This includes a 

15-percent reduction in joint exercises in fiscal year 1998 and plans for an 

additional 5-percent reduction in service exercises in fiscal years 1999 and 

2000. The Navy has mandated a 25-percent reduction in operational duties 

associated with the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle. The Air Force 

recently reduced Southwest Asia unit rotations from 90 to 45 days. The Air 

Force is currently reorganizing itself into an expeditionary force with the 

explicit intent of providing greater stability and predictability in 

deployments and will increase the length of deployments back to 90 days. 

Under this reorganization, air crews and support teams will be assigned to 

1 of 10 expeditionary forces, 2 of which would be on call for 1 90-day 

deployment every 15 months. This reorganization is still in development 

and is to be implemented on January 1, 2000.

Concerns About 

Constrained Resources

Pilots further expressed their concerns about conducting their missions 

with inadequate resources. Navy pilots surveyed by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet 

in 1997 reported low job satisfaction due to a lack of flight time and poor 

parts support. They complained about additional nonflying demands and 

other exercise requirements and “doing more with less.” The pilots in our 

survey cited aging fleets, a lack of spare parts, and increased demands on 

aircraft maintainers as sources of concern. Pilots in both services told us 

that they only learn on a day-to-day basis whether or not they will be able 

to fly on training missions due to the limited number of operating aircraft in 

their squadrons. These pilots expressed concerns that they are not 

maintaining their requisite combat skills under these conditions. Other 

work we have done in the Air Force has shown that this perceived shortage 

of spare parts may be due more to deficiencies in forecasting requirements, 

inventory management, repair problems, and budgeting problems.3

Nevertheless, the perception of the pilots we interviewed was that spare 

parts are not available to them and that aircraft mechanics spend an 

inordinate amount of time inefficiently removing working parts from one 

aircraft to repair another. In fact, when we asked pilots to provide us with 

the single change that would encourage them to stay in the military, one of 

the Navy pilots’ top answers was a fix for spare parts shortages. The pilots 

also expressed their concerns for their enlisted mechanics, adding that it is 

difficult for them to motivate their enlisted personnel in such a difficult 

work environment. 

3

Air Force Supply: Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and Operational Problems

(GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-99-77, Apr. 29, 1999).
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Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

In response to these concerns, the Navy has added $4.2 billion to spare 

parts and flying hour funding over 4 years to fully fund flight hour 

programs, spare parts, and maintenance. In our work on the Air Force 

flying hour program, we found that programmed hours were not flown for a 

number of reasons, but that lack of funding was not a cause for underflying 

the program.4

Concerns About Leadership On another theme related to these issues, many pilots also expressed 

through discussions and in responses to questionnaires their frustration 

with military and civilian leadership above their immediate chain of 

command. They perceived reluctance on the part of leadership to stand up 

and say no to expanded work under decreasing budgets and reduced 

manpower. They added that DOD needs to cut back on its commitments to 

match the personnel reductions in the force, suggesting that military and 

civilian leaders are holding pilots to new missions within old structures. 

Concerns About the Bonus 

System

Pilots also have voiced concern about compensation, including retirement 

and health care issues and—particularly for pilots—the effectiveness of the 

bonus system. The Navy’s Retention Group found that pilots were 

frustrated by the erosion of compensation and benefits. The Air Force’s 

1997 Quality of Life survey indicated that pilots believe their pay and 

benefits were not as good as those offered in the private sector. In a survey 

of pilots conducted by the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet Command in 1997, pilots 

said that, while the bonus “sweetens the pot for fence sitters,” it did not 

affect the decision of many polled to stay in the service. Of the 80 bonus 

takers we interviewed, only 32, or 40 percent, told us that they were very 

likely or definitely planning to stay in the military after they completed 

their current obligation. All others were undecided, somewhat unlikely, or 

very likely to leave the military. 

The pilots we met with also raised concerns about the inequities in the 

current bonus system and stated that it is not working effectively for a 

number of reasons. The bonus was developed in order to encourage 

aviators to stay through their 14th year of service. Until very recently, most 

bonus recipients continued their military service—after their bonus 

payments terminated—to retirement. Prior to fiscal year 1995, the Air 

4

Defense Budget: Observations on the Air Force Flying Hour Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-165, July 8, 

1999)
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Force expected 93 percent of pilots who accepted a bonus obligating them 

to stay in the military through their 14th year of aviation service to then go 

on and stay until they were eligible to retire at 20 years. However, in fiscal 

year 1998, the Air Force projected that only 25 percent of pilots who 

accepted a bonus will stay until they are eligible to retire. In addition, some 

pilots we talked to complained about the perceived “cut in pay” that occurs 

when a pilot reaches 14 years of aviation service and is no longer eligible to 

receive bonus money. Air Force data confirms this concern.

DOD has reviewed the shortcomings in the current bonus system—

including the fact that the 14-year cutoff date for the ACP is no longer 

effective at retaining pilots—and Congress is considering legislation that 

would expand the authority of the services to provide bonuses. DOD has 

developed a proposal that addresses the concern about the 14-year cutoff 

date by allowing the services to offer up to $25,000 a year to aviators 

through their 25th year of aviation service. It requires that the pilot must 

have completed the minimum service requirement and signed an 

agreement to serve at least 1 additional year in order to receive the ACP. 

The DOD proposal does not, however, require the services to identify a 

critical shortage in an aviation specialty in order to offer the ACP. 

Moreover, although the proposal would authorize the services to pay the 

bonus through a pilot’s 25th year of aviation service, we believe that paying 

the bonuses up to that point may be unnecessary since pilots are rarely in 

the cockpit at that point in their careers. Provisions substantially similar to 

DOD’s proposal are included in pending defense authorization legislation. 

The Navy has already developed a model, called Aviation Career 

Continuation Pay, to implement this new system. If the proposal becomes 

law, the Navy plans to offer bonuses to individuals at major career decision 

points rather than focusing on gates based on specific years of service. The 

bonus would be offered to those, for example, who are beginning a 

department-head tour or those who agree to take on an additional tour of 

sea duty, and they would allow the Navy to reward aviators who decide to 

make the Navy a career. This would also make the ACP a true bonus, rather 

than an entitlement. We believe that the outline of the Navy’s model 

addresses some of the pilot concerns about the current system. 

Concerns About Career 

Progression

Pilots are also concerned about career progression and promotion 

opportunities. Military pilots are normally required to serve in a variety of 

positions in order to be promoted and to develop the necessary leadership 

skills. In the ideal career path within the Air Force, for example, lieutenants 
Chapter 5

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Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

fill cockpit positions to develop pilot proficiency and become mission 

ready during their first tour assignments. Upon completing this tour, pilots 

are normally promoted to the rank of captain and report to their second 

assignment. The focus of this tour is to increase the depth of their cockpit 

experience and to enable the pilots to assume greater squadron 

responsibilities. Senior captains report to a third assignment and begin 

performing duties aimed at broadening their experience and preparing 

them for increased leadership responsibilities. These pilots will serve in 

positions such as weapons school instructors, test pilots, and staff 

assignments. These pilots also focus on professional and educational 

development activities, which could include work on a master’s degree. 

Successful pilots can expect to be promoted to the rank of major during 

this assignment. Subsequent assignments at the major and lieutenant 

colonel level emphasize leadership enhancement and career broadening 

assignments to include positions as squadron commanders, operations 

officers, and joint duty assignments. 

However, many pilots are now being asked to remain in cockpit positions, 

rather than serving in career-enhancing positions, and pilots we met raised 

concerns about the lack of opportunity for career development and 

promotions. These pilots have “grown up” in a military environment in 

which they have seen separation incentives, 15-year retirements, and 

forced early retirements after 20 years of service. They do not see the 

military as a guaranteed job. Some Air Force pilots raised concerns to us 

about being sent back to junior flying positions and not getting assignments 

to the traditional military leadership positions. These pilots believe that the 

personnel assignment and promotion systems are no longer synchronized 

since they believe they will be penalized for their nontraditional career 

paths. For example, pilots in the Air Force perceive that promotion boards 

still expect them to gain staff and education experiences to be competitive 

for promotion. In addition, Navy officials are concerned about pilots being 

promoted without the requisite career developing experiences. 

While some pilots expressed their concerns about the reduced 

opportunities for pilots to seek nonflying opportunities to broaden their 

experience and prepare for greater responsibilities, others expressed a 

desire to spend their careers exclusively in the cockpit. Some of the pilots 

we spoke with said that, in essence, the Air Force is creating a fly-only 

path, and they suggested that the services do this formally. The Navy pilots 

surveyed by the Atlantic Command specifically expressed the desire to fly 

more, stating that they joined the Navy to fly military aircraft. Similarly, 

over 60 percent of the pilots we questioned stated that the number one 
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Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

reason they joined the service was for excitement and love of flying. The 

Navy’s Retention Team reported that two of the primary comments from 

pilots concerned the increased workload and collateral duties and the 

pilots’ desire to eliminate the current focus on secondary duties. Pilots told 

us that they lose their edge in the cockpit when they go to staff positions. 

They said these nonflying duties are an incentive to leave the service as 

soon as they complete their service obligation in order to join the airline 

industry while they were still current in their flying skills. 

The Army’s warrant officer community offers an example of a fly-only 

career path that works well. The warrant officers are brought from the 

enlisted corps and are given helicopter flight training, but they do not take 

on leadership positions. The aviation leadership positions are reserved for 

a small corps of commissioned officer pilots in the Army. The warrant 

officer pilots have a higher retention rate than their commissioned officer 

counterparts in other services. 

While the Air Force does not have a fly-only career path, it is implementing 

a program that allows senior pilots to volunteer to return to the cockpit. 

The purpose of this program, called Phoenix Aviator 20, is to make it more 

attractive for pilots to stay in the Air Force until they can retire at 20 years 

of service. It is designed to ease the transition at retirement from a military 

to a commercial airline career. Among the provisions, pilots who enroll in 

the program will, during their last 3 years of service, be assigned a tour of 

duty that guarantees them flying experience in order to keep their flight 

credentials current. During this time, the Air Force will provide financial 

assistance for the military pilot to obtain his or her certifications. In 

addition, the military pilot will be guaranteed a job interview with private 

industry. The program is relatively new, and slightly fewer than 400 military 

pilots have enrolled during its first year.

In addition, we met with officials from the British Royal Air Force who 

described their fly-only career path option called the Specialist Aircrew. 

The Specialist Aircrew, which was introduced in the early 1970s, is 

designed to be a retention measure. This option is reserved for pilots who 

have been asked to remain in the service, but reach the age of 38 without 

having been promoted to the rank of major. At that point, a pilot can choose 

to become part of the Specialist Aircrew and remain in the cockpit. The 

Royal Air Force limits the size of the Specialist Aircrew, which currently 

comprises nearly 25 percent of the Royal Air Force pilot population. By 

becoming a member of the Specialist Aircrew, a pilot agrees to stay in the 

Royal Air Force until age 55, is given an enhanced rate of flying pay and is 
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Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

promised a flying position for the duration of his or her career. However, if 

a pilot is promoted to major before the age of 45, that pilot has the option of 

going back into the traditional career path. The Royal Air Force considers 

its Specialist Aircrew pilots to be expert pilots.

The Navy does not support the concept of a fly-only career path because it 

views this option as inconsistent with its current promotion and 

assignment systems. The Air Force does not support this track because it 

believes that the existence of this type of career path would take flying 

opportunities away from pilots who remain on the leadership track. 

Nevertheless, we found that the services are, at least on a temporary basis, 

creating a fly-only career track by returning many pilots to flying duties. As 

we previously stated, the Air Force is currently sending 54 percent of its 

majors and lieutenant colonels to fill junior cockpit positions normally 

filled by lieutenants and captains, and the Navy has extended the time that 

first tour operational pilots spend at sea from 36 to 42 months. If the 

services were to implement a fly-only career path, we believe that they 

should put controls on it similar to the British model—such as limiting the 

number of personnel who go into this system to an elite corps, limiting the 

promotion potential, and requiring an extended obligation. 

In order to gain a better understanding of why pilots are leaving the 

military, DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive survey of more than 

60,000 active duty military members that will examine the reasons 

servicemembers are leaving the military. DOD anticipates that the results of 

this survey, which we plan to analyze, will be available in calendar year 

2000.5

5

 In addition, we have other ongoing reviews requested by Congress related to military personnel issues. 

These include a survey of servicemembers in retention-critical specialties and an historical examination 

of military retention rates.
Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations Chapte6r

Conclusions The services currently report that no unit is deploying without 100 percent 

of its pilots, and they believe that they will continue to be able to meet their 

operational missions. Nevertheless, the Air Force and the Navy, and to a 

lesser extent the Army and the Marine Corps, are reporting pilot shortfalls, 

and they project that these shortages will continue for several years. 

However, the full extent of these reported shortages has not been identified 

because neither the Air Force nor the Navy have comprehensively assessed 

their nonflying positions to determine whether they truly need to be filled 

with active duty military pilots. Opportunities may exist to reduce pilot 

requirements and thereby reduce the reported shortages. Shortages can 

pose significant challenges because each pilot replacement costs DOD 

millions of dollars in training costs and years of investment in training time 

and experience. We believe that DOD needs to clearly determine the 

magnitude of the shortages and understand the extent to which the 

shortages are temporary or longer lasting before the services implement 

wholesale and potentially costly changes to their current aviator 

management systems.

An important first step is to determine whether or not pilot requirements 

are valid. If an assessment determines that not all positions now designated 

for pilots are needed to (1) meet operational flying and support positions; 

(2) provide career advancement opportunities; or (3) enable the pace of 

operations for pilots to remain within acceptable limits, then pilot 

requirements could be reduced. Exploring how some positions might be 

filled by personnel other than active duty military pilots offers the biggest 

payoff because this would make available more active duty pilots to fill 

requirements in the cockpit. Moreover, filling positions with personnel 

other than pilots can provide the services with increased flexibility because 

these other populations do not require as much time and money to train as 

pilots require.

Both the Air Force and the Navy maintain requirements for pilots to fill 

flying and nonflying positions and, to a certain degree, have developed job 

descriptions for these positions. However, the job descriptions do not 

clearly state why the positions have been reserved for active duty pilots. 

Thus, we believe it is difficult for anyone in the chain of command to 

validate the established requirements. We further believe it would be 

beneficial for the services to classify their pilot positions according to their 

operational nature and include specific statements in the job descriptions 

to show whether the positions are operational flying, operational nonflying, 

nonoperational flying, or nonoperational nonflying. Where positions are 
Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

designated to provide pilots with opportunities for career development and 

relief from tours of duty where pilots are likely to be away from home, this 

should be clearly noted. By revising their databases to account for pilot 

positions according to their flying and operational status, service officials 

could more uniformly report shortages, more easily evaluate which 

positions they must fill on a priority basis, and better assess whether some 

positions could be filled by other personnel in times of shortages. These 

personnel could include retired military personnel, reservists, active duty 

military officers who are not pilots, DOD civilians, and contractors. We also 

believe that it would be beneficial for the services to reconstruct their 

databases to reflect this type of analysis and capture the extent to which 

their pilot requirements have an operational and flying aspect. Doing so 

would enable all of the services to report future pilot requirements and 

inventories in a uniform manner and identify any future imbalances in their 

operational and nonoperational flying and nonflying positions.

An important second step to clarifying the extent of shortages is to 

separate out those contributing factors that are temporary in nature and 

are not attributable to retention. Doing so will more accurately identify the 

degree and type of corrective action that is required. Some of the reported 

shortages, for example, can be attributed to the fact that the Air Force and 

the Navy reduced their accessions during the reductions in force in the 

mid-1990s to avoid the involuntary separation of pilots already in the force. 

The unintended consequence of the reduced accessions is that aviation 

personnel managers are now challenged to find ways to fill current 

requirements from year groups of pilots that are insufficient in size to fill 

those requirements. However, this condition will resolve itself as this 

population matures through the workforce. Other shortages can be 

attributed to the fact that two of the services have experienced significant 

delays in their pilot training pipelines that have left entry-level positions 

empty. Although these delays create the illusion that additional shortages 

exist, this condition will be resolved as the services reduce their training 

delays. 

Finally, we believe that some of the reported shortages can be defined in 

terms of retention, and DOD needs to understand what pilots consider 

when they make their decisions to stay in or leave the service. Although 

many of the pilots’ concerns may be shared by military members in other 

specialties and are not unique, we identified two concerns that have 

particular relevance to pilots. 
Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

One factor that clearly needs to be addressed is the pilot assignment 

system. Currently, the Air Force is sending approximately 3,100 majors and 

lieutenant colonels back to the cockpit to fill positions normally filled by 

lieutenants and captains, and the Navy has increased the length of time that 

first tour operational pilots spend on sea tours from 36 months to

42 months. By increasing the time pilots serve in cockpit positions, the 

services have taken pilots away from traditional career tracks, which has 

led pilots to become concerned that they will not be competitive for 

promotion within the military in the future. Such concerns, if unaddressed, 

could fuel retention problems. In contrast, other pilots are pleased to be 

able to spend more time in the cockpit and have, in fact, expressed their 

dissatisfaction with assignments that take them away from flying. These 

disparate views about the merits of flying more suggest that no single 

solution will address the concerns of all pilots and that a variety of 

approaches may be needed. In light of these disparate views and the 

current stresses that are being placed on the personnel management 

systems, it would be beneficial if the services could identify pilots desiring 

additional flying duty and assign them according to their preferences. In 

the longer term, the services might wish to make this process more formal 

by establishing a fly-only career path for a segment of their pilot 

communities. 

A second factor that needs attention is the bonus system. Many pilots do 

not view the current bonus system as a viable retention tool, and a pilot’s 

decision to accept a bonus no longer provides assurance that the pilot will 

stay in the military until the pilot is eligible to retire. The Air Force, for 

example, has seen increasing numbers of pilots resign after 14 years of 

service during the past 4 years. Chief complaints voiced by pilots are that 

the ACP eligibility dates are based on outdated assumptions and pilots see 

the end of the bonus payment—at year 14—as a cut in pay. These 

complaints are occurring at the same time that pilots see potentially 

lucrative career opportunities in private industry. 

DOD has reviewed the current bonus system and developed a proposal to 

address the shortcomings. Congress is considering legislation with 

provisions substantially similar to DOD’s proposal that would expand the 

current bonus authority by allowing the services to offer up to $25,000 per 

year to aviators through their 25th year of aviation service. Pilots could 

perceive this new program as an entitlement if the program is not properly 

implemented. On the other hand, the Navy has developed a model to 

implement the pending legislative changes that we believe has merit. Under 

this plan, the Navy would offer bonuses to individuals at major career 
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Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

decision points and provide the Navy with the capability to reward pilots 

who make an affirmative decision to make the Navy a career. Doing so 

would make the ACP a true bonus rather than an entitlement. 

DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive survey of more than

60,000 active duty military members that will examine the reasons 

servicemembers are leaving the military. DOD anticipates that the results of 

this survey, which will be shared with us, will be available sometime next 

year.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to take the 

following actions:

• Develop criteria and detailed job descriptions for designating positions 

to be filled with pilots, classify the positions according to their 

operational and flying status, and specify the types of duties that make 

pilots essential. Moreover, for jobs that are held for pilots based on 

reasons of career development and rotation, descriptions should 

contain a clear justification.

• Using the newly developed criteria, analyze each pilot position to 

identify those positions where active duty pilots are not required and 

take the necessary actions to fill those positions with other personnel 

possessing appropriate expertise, such as warrant officers, retired 

military, contractors, DOD civilians, reservists, or navigators.

• Revise their databases so that the services can (1) uniformly report data 

on future pilot requirements and inventories and (2) identify any 

imbalances in their operational and nonoperational flying and nonflying 

positions.

To the extent that shortages exist after these recommendations are 

implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

services to take the following actions:

• More fully evaluate the merits of a fly-only career path for a segment of 

the pilot community. In the short term, identify those pilots desiring 

additional flying duty and match them to this extra duty to the extent 

possible.

• If the pending legislation to extend the ACP is enacted, only offer 

bonuses to those pilots who make affirmative decisions to continue 

their career rather than to all pilots reaching specified gates. This would 

preclude the bonus program from being interpreted as an entitlement.
Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 

four of our five recommendations, disagreed with one recommendation, 

and stated that our executive summary did not represent the sum and 

substance of the report as a whole in that it did not reflect the positive 

steps DOD had taken to address pilot issues. DOD also commented that our 

recommendations were actually refinements to the DOD’s own initiatives. 

We have added information to our executive summary to acknowledge 

DOD’s actions and to better explain how our recommendations differ from 

ongoing efforts. 

With respect to developing criteria and detailed justifications for pilot 

positions, DOD said that, while it partially agreed with our 

recommendation, it had long-standing procedures to review billet 

requirements against operational mission requirements, including pilot 

requirements. DOD further stated that these procedures provide data 

sufficiently detailed and accurate to support legislative language 

addressing a broad spectrum of pilot initiatives. DOD noted that the 

services have procedures for reviews of rated officer requirements. We 

note, however, that despite these procedures the Air Force and the Navy 

found it necessary to conduct special meetings in April and June 1999, 

respectively, to review their own requirements for pilots in nonflying 

positions. In addition, while we agree that DOD has procedures to review 

pilot requirements, the procedures do not provide the criteria used to 

justify a pilot filling a particular position. Our recommendation would have 

DOD establish criteria and detailed job descriptions, classify the positions 

according to their operational and flying status, and specify the types of 

duties that make pilots essential. This would enable the services to possibly 

reduce their pilot requirements and enable them to better decide which 

positions should be filled on a priority basis in times of shortages.

DOD also partially agreed with the intent of our recommendation to 

identify those active duty pilot positions that could be filled with other 

personnel. It noted that it has filled pilot positions with recalled active duty 

pilots, warrant officers, reserve officers, and limited duty officers. Although 

it is true that the services have filled some positions with personnel other 

than pilots, there has been no systematic means of analyzing pilot positions 

to determine what other types of personnel might be used to fill the 

positions. Our recommendation is intended to encourage systematic 

consideration of all possible alternative means of filling pilot positions 

during periods of shortages.
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Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

While DOD partially concurred with the intent of our recommendation on 

uniformly reporting data, it believed that its current databases were 

sufficient to respond to DOD’s requirements. DOD saw no advantage to a 

single cross-service database that would track pilots given each service’s 

unique culture and mission. We did not, however, recommend a single 

database, but rather that the services revise their databases so that they 

can uniformly report data. During our review, we encountered several 

instances of inconsistent reporting. For example, in March 1999 hearings 

before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on 

Armed Services, the Air Force reported shortages of 648 pilots at the end of 

fiscal year 1998, and the Navy reported shortages of approximately 500 

pilots as of March 1999. These reported shortages were not comparable 

since the as-of dates were different, and the Navy’s data did not include 

those pilots whose training had been delayed. Comparable data that we 

obtained showed that, as of the end of fiscal year 1998, the Navy had a 

shortage (including those pilots whose training had been delayed) of

1,153 pilots. Consistent data presentations, as our recommendation 

suggests, would assist DOD and Congress in deciding how best to address 

pilot shortages.

DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation that the services 

consider the merits of a fly-only career path, but said that such a track has 

been studied by each service, and in some cases tested. It further 

commented that these tests have found that instituting a fly-only career 

track created a different set of problems for the services. In addition, DOD 

noted that the challenge currently facing the services is a staff shortage, not 

a cockpit shortage. DOD also acknowledged that a percentage of pilots just 

want to fly and have little desire for nonflying assignments. DOD agreed 

that a fly-only career path could be considered at a later date, when it 

would be addressed within a broad context that considers areas such as 

compensation, retirement, and advancement of individuals in this type of 

career progression path. We agree with DOD that this option would need to 

be considered within the broad context outlined by DOD. 

In disagreeing with our fifth recommendation about the proposed bonus 

system, DOD said that its current bonus systems are tied precisely to key 

career decision points and do not occur at arbitrary points in time, as we 

had originally suggested. We agree that arbitrary is not a fair 

characterization of these points in time and have deleted this reference. We 

have also revised our recommendation to better reflect our intent that the 

bonus system be offered to pilots as a reward for affirmative career 

decisions rather than being interpreted as an entitlement. In addition, we 
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Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

have clarified our report to emphasize that some assumptions about the 

success of bonuses in encouraging pilots to stay until retirement may be 

outdated and should be revisited.
Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Appendix I

Pilot Retention Measurements ApendxIi

The services use two statistical measures to monitor pilot retention.

Cumulative 

Continuation Rate

The cumulative continuation rate, commonly referred to as a “retention 

rate,” measures the tendency of pilots who start pilot training together to 

remain on active duty beyond their minimum service commitment. The 

services measure the propensity of a cohort of pilots in a particular year 

group to stay in the military for a specified additional number of years. The 

Air Force measures the propensity of an aviator in the 6th year of service to 

stay through the 11th year of service while the Navy measures the 

propensity of an aviator in the 7th year of service to stay through the

12th year of service. For example, the Navy uses two data points to monitor 

pilots who entered pilot training in 1986. The first measure would be

7 years after their accession, in 1993, while the second would be 12 years 

after their accession, in 1998. In this case, for every hundred pilots who 

were still on active duty in 1993 (7 years after accession), 32 remained on 

active duty in 1998 (12 years after accession). This represents a pilot 

cumulative continuation rate for fiscal year 1998 of 32 percent. 

The cumulative continuation rate varies depending on the years selected, 

and anomalies may not carry into the future. For example, several times in 

the late 1980s and early 1990s, the services (except for the Army) changed 

the minimum service obligation—which created artificially high cumulative 

continuation rates since not all individuals in the cohort were eligible to 

leave active duty when it was measured. These variations make it difficult 

to identify a normal loss rate. Other factors, such as differences in the 

populations in specific cohorts, further stress its limitations. When the 

services quote changes in the retention rates of pilots, they are not quoting 

the actual number of pilot losses, but rather an estimate based on an entire 

cohort’s behavior. Figure I.1 shows the Navy and the Air Force’s cumulative 

continuation rates from 1989 to 1998. 
Appendix I

Pilot Retention Measurements

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Figure I.1: Navy and Air Force Cumulative Continuation Rates, Fiscal Years 1989-98

Note: The Air Force spike between fiscal year 1993 and 1995 and the Navy spike in fiscal year 1996 

are due to multiple minimum service obligation extensions that reduced the number of pilots eligible to 

leave active duty during those years. 

Source: GAO from DOD data.

Aviator Continuation 

Pay Take-Rates

The ACP take-rate measures the percentage of aviators, of those who are 

eligible in a particular year, who take a bonus in exchange for an agreement 

to extend their service commitment through 14 years of service. By law, 

ACP is only offered to those aviators in critical aviation specialties who 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100 Percent

Navy CCR 38 41 33 33 42 40 35 52 39 32

Air Force CCR 36 37 35 34 62 82 87 77 71 46

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Appendix I

Pilot Retention Measurements

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

have completed their minimum service obligation, but have completed less 

than 13 years of aviation service. With the exception of the Army, the 

services have offered the bonuses for time frames as short as 1, 2, or

3 years. The bonus take-rate is considered the leading indicator of 

near-term aviator retention because service experience has shown that

90 percent of pilots separate within a year of declining a bonus.

It is important to note that not all pilots are eligible for the bonus at any 

given point in time and that the bonus take-rate only measures the 

percentage of pilots who take the ACP out of those who are eligible in a 

given year. Because the services simply measure the number of aviators out 

of the number eligible, a high bonus take-rate could signal that a service 

has given bonuses to too many aviators. For example, if a service had a 

community of 100 pilots, and 30 pilots took the bonus, this would represent 

a 30-percent take-rate. Since the take-rate represents the number of pilots 

who accepted a bonus, rather than the number of pilots that the service 

wanted or needed to take it, the take-rate could be 30-percent and still 

fulfill the needs of the service. The services could fill 100 percent of their 

goals and still report a 30-percent take-rate. The Navy and the Marine Corps 

currently do not tie their goals or desired take-rates to requirements. 

Instead, they base their take-rate projections on historical patterns and 

educated guesses of how many pilots are likely to take the bonus in the 

future. Additionally, since the ACP is offered to different aviation 

specialties in different years, for differing periods of time, and the take-rate 

for communities that have not been offered the ACP in the past is usually 

higher, the variations in take-rates can stem from many different causes. 

Figure I.2 shows the ACP take-rates for the Navy and the Air Force for 

fiscal years 1989 to 1998.
Appendix I

Pilot Retention Measurements

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Figure I.2: Navy and Air Force Pilot ACP Take-Rates, Fiscal Years 1989-98

Source: GAO from U.S. Navy and Air Force data.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90 Percent

Navy 33 54 22 22 28 50 39 28 21 21

Air Force 67 38 40 69 79 81 77 59 46 42

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxIi

See pp. 10 and 61.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Now on pp. 9 and 60.

Now on pp. 9 and 60.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

New on pp. 33-34.

Now on pp. 9 and 60.

Now on pp. 9 and 60.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

See pp. 10 and 62.

Now on pp. 9 and 60.
Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxIi

GAO Contacts Mark E. Gebicke, (202) 512-5140

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-5140

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Carol R. Schuster, David E. Moser,

Harry E. Taylor, Jane D. Trahan, and Tracy A. McCaffery made key 

contributions to this report.

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