Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Staff Statement No. 13 

Members of the Commission, with your help, your staff is prepared to report its 

preliminary findings regarding the emergency response in New York City on September 

11, 2001. These initial findings may help frame some of the issues for this hearing and 

the development of your judgments and recommendations. 

This report represents a summary of our work to date. We remain ready to revise our 

current understanding in light of new information as our work continues. We encourage 

those whose understanding differs from ours to come forward. Sam Caspersen, George 

Delgrosso, Jim Miller, Madeleine Blot, Cate Taylor, Joseph McBride, Emily Walker, and 

John Farmer conducted most of the investigative work reflected in this statement, and 

Allison Prince assisted with the audio-visual components. 

Much of this work was conducted in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST), which is studying the building performance issues. We are 

indebted to NIST for its cooperation. We have also received cooperation from the Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey and from the City of New York. 

We have spoken with hundreds of people about the most painful moments of their lives. 

We thank them for their willingness to help us. As we have relived their stories, and the 

records left by those who no longer can help us, we have joined in the mourning for all 

those who were lost that day. 

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the community of people 

working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not with national policymakers but 

with private firms and local public servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, 

and emergency medical service professionals. 

As we therefore focus on the choices they made on the morning of 9/11, we will not offer 

much commentary. We will offer more analysis and suggest some lessons that emerge 

for the future in Staff Statement No. 14, which we will present tomorrow. Today we 

concentrate just on presenting a reliable summary of what happened, to explain the day in 

its complexity without replicating its chaos. 

We wish to advise the public that the details we will be presenting may be painful for you 

to see and hear. Please consider whether you wish to continue viewing. 
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Building Preparedness on 9/11 

Emergency response is a product of preparedness. We begin with a brief discussion of 

measures taken to enhance safety and security at the World Trade Center after the 1993 

bombing. 

The World Trade Center (WTC) complex was built for the Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey. Construction began in 1967, and tenants began to occupy its space in 

1970. The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and symbolic place in the culture of 

New York City and America. 

The WTC actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16 

acres of land. The buildings were connected by an underground mall one level below the 

plaza area. The Twin Towers (“1 WTC” or the “North Tower,” and “2 WTC” or the 

“South Tower”) were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of 

office space. On any given work day up to 50,000 office workers occupied the towers, 

and 40,000 visitors passed through the complex. 

 

Both towers had 110 stories and were about 1,350 feet high. Both were square; each wall 

measured 208 feet in length. The outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-

inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel columns were 40 inches apart. These 

exterior walls bore the majority of the weight of the building. 

The interior core of the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which elevators and 

stairwells were grouped. Each tower contained three central stairwells, which ran 

essentially from top to bottom, and 99 elevators. Generally, elevators originating in the 

lobby ran to “sky lobbies” on upper floors, where further elevators carried passengers to 

the tops of the buildings. 

Stairwells A and C ran from the 110th floor to the mezzanine level and Stairwell B ran 

from the 107th floor to level B6. All three stairwells ran essentially straight up and down, 

except for two deviations in Stairwells A and C where the staircase jutted out toward the 

perimeter of the building. These deviations were necessary because of the placement of 

heavy elevators and machine rooms. These areas were located between the 42nd and 48th

floors and the 76th and 82nd floors in both towers. 

On the upper and lower boundaries of these deviations were “transfer” hallways 

contained within the stairwell proper. Each hallway contained “smoke doors” to prevent 

smoke from rising from lower to upper portions of the building. Smoke doors were kept 

closed but not locked. Other than these slight deviations in Stairwells A and C, the stairs 

ran straight up and down. 

Doors leading to the roof were kept locked. The Port Authority told us that this was 

because of structural and radiation hazards, and for security reasons. To access the roof 

in either towers required passing through three doors: one leading from the stairwell onto 
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the 110th floor, and two leading from the floor onto the roof itself. There was no rooftop 

evacuation plan. The roof was a cluttered surface that would be a challenging helipad 

even in good conditions and, in a fire, smoke from the building would travel upward. 

Unlike most of America, both New York City and the World Trade Center had been the 

target of terrorist attacks before 9/11. On February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb 

stashed in a rental van was detonated on a parking garage ramp beneath the Twin Towers. 

The explosion killed six people, injured 1,000 more, and exposed vulnerabilities in the 

World Trade Center’s and the City’s emergency preparedness. 

The towers lost power and communications capability. Generators had to be shut down 

to assure safety. Elevators stopped. The public address system and emergency lighting 

systems failed. The unlit stairwells filled with smoke and were so dark as to be 

impassable. Rescue efforts by the Fire Department of New York were hampered by the 

inability of its radios to function in buildings as large as the Twin Towers. The 9-1-1 

emergency call system was overwhelmed. The explosion occurred at 12:17 p.m.; the last 

person was evacuated nearly ten hours later in a helicopter rescue by the New York 

Police Department. 

To address the problems encountered during the response to the 1993 bombing, the Port 

Authority implemented $100 million in physical, structural, and technological changes to 

the WTC. In addition, the Port Authority enhanced its fire safety plan. 

The Port Authority added battery-powered emergency lighting to the stairwells and backup power to its alarm system. Other upgrades included glow-in-the-dark signs and 

markings. Upgrades to the elevator system included a redesign of each building’s lobby 

command board to enable it to monitor all of the elevators. 

To aid communications the Port Authority installed a “repeater system” for use by the 

Fire Department of New York. The “repeater” used an antenna on the top of 5 WTC to 

“repeat” and greatly amplify the wave strength of radio communications, so they could be 

heard more effectively by firefighters operating many floors apart. 

The Port Authority also sought to prepare civilians better for future emergencies. Deputy 

fire safety directors conducted biannual fire drills, with advance notice to tenants. During 

a fire drill, designated fire wardens were instructed to lead people in their respective areas 

to the center of the floor where they would use an emergency intercom phone to obtain 

specific information on how to proceed. 

Civilians were taught basic procedures such as to evacuate by the stairs and to check 

doors for heat before proceeding. Civilians who evacuated in both 1993 and 2001 have 

told us that they were better prepared in 2001. 

Civilians were not, however, directed into the stairwells during these drills. Civilians 

were not provided with information about the configuration of the stairwells and the 

existence of transfer hallways or smoke doors. Neither full nor partial evacuation drills 
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were held. Participation in the drills that were held, moreover, varied greatly from tenant 

to tenant. 

Civilians were never instructed not to evacuate up. The standard fire drill instructions 

advised participants that in the event of an actual emergency, they would be directed to 

descend to at least two floors below the fire. Most civilians recall simply being taught to 

await instructions which would be provided at the time of an emergency. 

Civilians were not informed that rooftop evacuations were not part of the Port 

Authority’s evacuation plan. They were not informed that access to the roof required a 

key. The Port Authority acknowledges that it had no protocol for rescuing people 

trapped above a fire in the towers. 

Preparedness of First Responders on 9/11 

On 9/11, the principal first responders were from the Fire Department of New York 

(FDNY), the New York Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police 

Department (PAPD), and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM). 

The 40,000-officer New York Police Department consisted of three primary divisions: 

operations, intelligence, and administration. The Special Operations Division supervised 

units critical in responding to a major event. This division included the aviation unit, 

which provided helicopters for the purpose of survey and/or rescue, and the Emergency 

Service Units (ESU), or rescue teams, which carried out specialized missions. 

The NYPD had standard operating procedures for the dispatch of officers to an incident. 

Gradations in response were called “mobilization” levels and went from 1 (lowest) to 4 

(highest). Level 3 and 4 mobilizations could not be ordered by someone below the rank 

of captain. 

 

The NYPD ran the City’s 9-1-1 emergency call center. 9-1-1 operators were civilians 

trained in the rudiments of emergency response. Fire emergencies were transferred to the 

FDNY dispatch center. 

The 11,000-member Fire Department of New York was headed by a Fire Commissioner, 

who, unlike the Police Commissioner, lacked operational authority. Operations were 

controlled by the Chief of Department. 

Basic operating units included ladder companies, to conduct standard rescue operations, 

and engine companies, to put out fires. The Department’s Specialized Operations 

Command contained specialized units, including five rescue companies, to perform 

specialized and highly risky rescue operations, and one HAZMAT team. 

The logistics of fire operations were coordinated by Fire Dispatch Operations division. 

9-1-1 calls concerning fire emergencies were transferred to this division. 
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Alarm levels escalated from first(lowest) to fifth (highest) with a pre-established number 

of units associated with each. Prior to 9/11, it was common FDNY practice for units to 

arrive with extra personnel, and for off-duty firefighters to respond to major incidents. 

The years leading up to 9/11 were successful ones for the FDNY. In 2000, fewer people 

died from fires in New York City—107—than in any year since 1946. Firefighter 

deaths—22 during the 1990s—compared favorably with the best periods in FDNY 

history. The FDNY had fought 153,000 fires in 1976; in 1999, that number had been 

reduced to 60,000. 

In July 2001, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani signed a directive entitled “Direction and Control 

of Emergencies in the City of New York.” Its purpose was “to ensure the optimum use of 

agency resources while ... eliminating potential conflict among responding agencies 

which may have areas of overlapping expertise and responsibility.” 

The directive designated, for different types of emergencies, an appropriate agency as 

“Incident Commander.” The Incident Commander would be “responsible for the 

management of the City’s response to the emergency.” The role of the Mayor’s Office of 

Emergency Management was supportive, to “coordinate the participation of all city 

agencies in resolving the event,” and to “assist the Incident Commander in his/her efforts 

in the development and implementation of the strategy for resolving the event.” 

The Mayor’s creation of the Office of Emergency Management and the issuance of his 

Incident Command Directive were attempts to address the long-standing rivalry between 

the NYPD and the FDNY. This rivalry has been acknowledged by every witness we 

have asked about it. Some characterized the more extreme manifestations of the 

rivalry—fistfights at the scenes of emergencies, for instance—as the actions of “a few 

knuckleheads.” Some described the rivalry as the result of healthy organizational pride 

and competition. Others told us that the problem has escalated over time and has 

hampered the ability of the City to respond well in emergency situations. 

The NYPD and the FDNY were two of the preeminent emergency response organizations 

in the United States. But each considered itself operationally autonomous. Each was 

accustomed to responding independently to emergencies. By September 11 neither had 

demonstrated the readiness to respond to an “Incident Commander” if that commander 

was an official outside of their Department. The Mayor’s Office of Emergency 

Management had not overcome this problem. 

As we turn to the events of September 11, we will try to describe what happened in the 

following one hundred minutes: 

-- The 17 minutes from the crash of hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 into World 

Trade Center 1 (the North Tower) at 8:46 a.m. until the South Tower was hit 

-- The 56 minutes from the crash of hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 into World 

Trade Center 2 (the South Tower) at 9:03 a.m. until the collapse of the South Tower 
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-- The 27 minutes from the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 a.m. until the collapse 

of the North Tower at 10:26 a.m. 

From 8:46 until 9:03 a.m. 

At 8:46:40 a.m. the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the upper portion of 

the North Tower.

Video: AA 11 hits North Tower.

The plane cut through floors 93/94 to 98/99 of the building. All three of the building’s 

stairwells became impassable from the 92nd floor up. Hundreds of civilians were killed 

instantly by the impact. Hundreds more remained alive but trapped. 

A jet fuel fireball erupted upon impact, and shot down at least one bank of elevators. The 

fireball exploded onto numerous lower floors, including the 77th, 50th, 22nd, West Street 

lobby level, and the B4 level, four stories below ground. The burning jet fuel 

immediately created thick, black smoke which enveloped the upper floors and roof of the 

North Tower. The roof of the South Tower was also engulfed in smoke because of 

prevailing light winds from the north. 

Within minutes, New York City’s 9-1-1 system was flooded with eyewitness accounts of 

the event. Most callers correctly identified the target of the attack. Some identified the 

plane as a commercial airliner. 

The first response came from private firms and individuals—the people and companies in 

the building. Everything that would happen to them during the next few minutes would 

turn on their circumstances and their preparedness, assisted by building personnel on site. 

Because all of the building’s stairwells were destroyed in the impact zone, the hundreds 

of survivors trapped on or above the 92nd floor gathered in large and small groups, 

primarily between the 103rd and 106th floors. A large group was reported on the 92nd

floor, technically below the impact but trapped by debris. Civilians were also reported 

trapped below the impact zone, mostly on floors in the eighties, though also on at least 

the 47th and 22nd floors, as well as in a number of elevators. 

Because of damage to the building’s systems, civilians did not receive instructions on 

how to proceed over the public address system. Many were unable to use the emergency 

intercom phones as instructed in fire drills. Many called 9-1-1. 

9-1-1 operators and FDNY dispatchers had no information about either the location or 

magnitude of the impact zone and were therefore unable to provide information as 

fundamental as whether callers were above or below the fire. 9-1-1 operators were also 

not given any information about the feasibility of rooftop rescues. In most instances, 9-1-

1 operators and FDNY dispatchers, to whom the 9-1-1 calls were transferred, therefore 
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relied on standard operating procedure for high-rise fires. Those procedures are to advise 

civilians to stay low, remain where they are, and wait for emergency personnel to reach 

them. This advice was given to callers from the North Tower for locations both above 

and below the impact. 

The protocol of advising against evacuation, of telling people to stay where they were, 

was one of the lessons learned from the 1993 bombing. Fire chiefs told us that the 

evacuation of tens of thousands of people from skyscrapers can create many new 

problems, especially for disabled individuals or those in poor health. Many of the 

injuries after the 1993 bombing occurred during the evacuation. Evacuees also may 

complicate the movements and work of firefighters and other emergency workers. 

Although the default guidance to stay in place may seem understandable in cases of 

conventional high rise fires, all the emergency officials that morning quickly judged that 

the North Tower should be evacuated. The acting fire safety director in the North Tower 

immediately ordered everyone to evacuate that building, but the public address system 

was damaged and no one apparently heard the announcement. 

Hence, one of the few ways to communicate to people in the building was through calls 

to the 9-1-1 or other emergency operators. We found no protocol for communicating 

updated evacuation guidance to the 9-1-1 operators who were receiving calls for help. 

Improvising as they learned information from callers, some operators advised callers that 

they could break windows. Some operators were advising callers to evacuate if they 

could. 

Below the impact zone in the North Tower, those civilians who could began evacuating 

down the stairs almost immediately. 

Claire McIntyre, Manager, Administration Services, American Bureau of 

Shipping: After going out into the hallway and yelling down that everyone get 

out, I went into my office to get my pocketbook and also I grabbed the flashlight 

and my whistle. The flashlight was useful for the first couple of flights going 

down because it was completely dark, and there was water flowing down so it was 

dangerous too, and there was some debris, even on the landings. The air quality 

wasn’t too bad, there was some smoke, light, it was never heavy smoke, where you 

couldn’t breathe. And the lights in the stairwells worked all the way down except 

for the first two or three flights. 

Civilians who called the Port Authority police desk at 5 WTC were advised to leave if 

they could. Most civilians began evacuating without waiting to obtain instructions over 

the intercom system. Some had trouble reaching the exits because of damage caused by 

the impact. While evacuating, they were confused by deviations in the increasingly 

crowded stairwells, and impeded by doors which were locked or jammed as a result of 

the impact. Despite these obstacles, the evacuation was relatively calm and orderly.
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Ms. McIntyre: We never really heard any announcements or received any 

information all the way down. It got more and more congested as we went further 

down. For some reason we had to go down a long hallway and then when we got 

to the end of it, it was a locked door. So, we couldn’t go any further; so we went 

back and went back up to 78 because we knew that that was a sky lobby. 

Within ten minutes of impact, smoke was beginning to rise to the upper floors in 

debilitating volumes and isolated fires were reported, although there were some pockets 

of refuge. Faced with insufferable heat, smoke, and fire, and no prospect for relief, some 

jumped or fell from the building. 

Many civilians in the South Tower were unaware initially of what happened in the other 

tower.

Brian Clark, President, Euro Brokers Relief Fund: I heard a loud boom. The 

lights in my office buzzed and I glanced up at them and then my peripheral vision, 

behind me, caught something and I spun in my chair, and just two yards from me 

outside the glass, 84 floors in the air, was swirling flames. I assumed that there 

had been an explosion upstairs. 

Richard Fern, Vice President, Facilities, Euro Brokers: When I was entering the 

trading floor, I noticed all of the brokers clamoring on the building side where 

One World Trade Center is. And they were just screaming that a bomb went off. 

Many people decided to leave. Some were advised to do so by fire wardens. In addition, 

some entire companies, including Morgan Stanley, which occupied over 20 floors of the 

South Tower, were evacuated by company security officials.

 

The evacuation standard operating procedures did not provide a specific protocol for 

when to evacuate one tower in the event of a major explosion in the other. At 8:49 a.m. 

the deputy fire safety director in the North Tower spoke with his counterpart in the South 

Tower. They agreed to wait for the FDNY to arrive before determining whether to 

evacuate the South Tower. According to one fire chief, it was unimaginable, “beyond 

our consciousness,” that another plane might hit the the adjacent tower. 

In the meantime, an announcement came over the public address system in the South 

Tower urging people to stay in place. 

Mr. Clark: Strobe lights flashed, the siren gave its little “whoop whoop.” And I 

heard a familiar voice say: “Your attention please, ladies and gentlemen, 

Building 2 is secure. There is no need to evacuate Building 2. If you are in the 

midst of evacuation, you may use the re-entry doors and the elevators to return to 

your office. Repeat, Building 2 is secure.” And then the announcement was 

repeated. 
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Indeed, evacuees in the sky lobbies and the main lobby were advised by building 

personnel to return to their offices. The Port Authority told us that the advice may have 

been prompted by the safety hazard posed by falling debris and victims outside the 

building. Similar advice was given by security officials in the sky lobby of the South 

Tower. We do not know the reason for this advice, in part because the on-duty deputy 

fire safety director in charge of the South Tower perished in the tower’s collapse. 

As a result of the announcement, many civilians in the South Tower remained on their 

floors. Others reversed their evacuation and went back up.

Mr. Fern: After the first announcement, for the Port Authority or the PA system 

not evacuate the floor, I guess I kinda felt comfortable to stay on the floor. 

Mr. Clark: At three minutes after 9:00, at the time of impact, I was talking to a 

gentleman who said he had gone down half a dozen or ten floors and had come 

back up because of that announcement. 

Stanley Praimnath, Assistant Vice President, Administration, Mizvho Corp. 

Bank: As we were about to exit the building through the turnstile first, the 

security guard looks at me and says, “Where are you going?” I said, “Well, I am 

going home.” “Why?” “I saw fireballs coming down.” “No, your building is 

safe and secure. Go back to your office.” 

 

The Port Authority Police desk in 5 WTC gave conflicting advice to people in the South 

Tower about whether to evacuate. 

We have been fortunate, in learning about the FDNY’s emergency response, to have had 

the cooperation of two of the principal commanders in the North Tower on 9/11, Joseph 

Pfeifer and Peter Hayden. The chiefs were filmed throughout the morning by Jules 

Naudet, a French filmmaker preparing a documentary about firefighters. We have 

reviewed Naudet’s unedited footage and also filmed Chiefs Pfeifer and Hayden as they 

viewed the footage, commenting on events as they relived them. 

The FDNY response began immediately after the crash.

Joseph Pfeifer, Deputy Assistant Chief, FDNY: Right from the beginning, before 

we even arrived at the Trade Center, what you see is the beginning of an Incident 

Command System, where things are placed in order, and command is taken 

immediately. 

Mr. Pfeifer (on 9/11): “We have a number of floors on fire, it looks like the plane 

was aiming towards the building. Transmit a Third Alarm. We will have a 

staging area. Vesey and West Street—have the Third Alarm assignment go into 

that area—Second Alarm assignment report to the building.” 
10

Mr. Pfeifer: So from the bullet point when the plane hit the building, we started 

our Incident Command System. 

 

Chief Pfeifer and four companies arrived at about 8:52 a.m. As they entered the lobby, 

they immediately encountered badly burned civilians who had been caught in the path of 

the fireball. 

The initial FDNY incident commanders were briefed on building systems by building 

personnel. 

Peter Hayden, Assistant Chief, FDNY: When I entered the lobby here, Joe had 

already assumed command and I came in. I was receiving a briefing from Chief 

Pfeifer here, and he was giving me a status of the—what was the building systems. 

He was informing me that the elevators were not working at the time and that they 

had a report from the Fire Safety Director that the plane had crashed in around 

the 78th floor and Joe had started units up and had then report to the 78th floor. 

Here we’re convening with the Fire Safety Director and the Port Authority 

personnel. Our main concern at this time was evacuation of the building. And we 

wanted to get everyone out of the building. 

Units began mobilizing in the increasingly crowded lobby.

Mr. Pfeifer: You have to understand that in the Trade Center that we had ninetynine elevators in each of the towers, and those had to be checked to see if they 

were operating. Without elevators, it meant that the firefighters carrying a 

hundred pounds of equipment would have to climb some ninety floors just to get 

to where we could start a rescue operation for people trapped above the damaged 

area. 

Mr. Hayden: These are units coming in and they’re awaiting assignment and, as I 

said, we’re trying to get elevators working. We are conferring with the Port 

Authority personnel there—and this took a period of time for them to come back 

to and confirm to us that we had no elevators operating. Once we realized that 

we didn’t have elevators operating, we began giving instruction to members to 

start ascending the stairs by way of the B Stairwell. 

 

It was challenging for the chiefs to keep track of arriving units. They were frustrated by 

the absence of working building systems and elevators.

Mr. Hayden: My aide had arrived and he was setting up the Command Board. 

As you can see him in on the background, he was setting up the Board, which 

accounts for the units as they come in. Once they are given an assignment they 

are entered in on the Command Board. That’s the way we keep track of the 

individuals. 
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Mr. Hayden: I am walking down off to the right here—left now— waiving my 

radio trying to get the Port Authority personnel and the chief fire to come with me 

off a little bit to have a private discussion regarding the building systems and 

particularly the elevators. That was a primary concern of ours at the time. That 

we didn’t have the elevators available to us. You can see the damage that the 

planes caused. You can see the tiles on the floor there. Right now we are seeing 

more units come in. 

 

Shortly before 9:00 a.m., FDNY chiefs advised building personnel and a Port Authority 

Police Department officer to evacuate the adjacent South Tower. Impressed by the 

magnitude of the catastrophe, fire chiefs had decided to clear the whole WTC complex, 

including the South Tower. 

 

By 9:00 a.m., many senior FDNY leaders, including seven of the eleven most highly 

ranked chiefs in the department, had begun responding from headquarters in Brooklyn. 

The Chief of Department and the Chief of Operations called a 5th alarm, which would 

bring additional engine and ladder companies; they also called two more FDNY Rescue 

teams. The Chief of Department arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. He established an 

overall Incident Command Post on the median of the West Side Highway.

Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel were directed to one of four triage areas

around the perimeter of the WTC. In addition, many private hospital ambulances were 

rushing to the WTC complex. 

In the North Tower lobby, the chiefs quickly made the decision that the fire in the North 

Tower could not be fought. 

Mr. Hayden: Well, we realized that because of the impact of the plane that there 

was some structural damage to the building, and most likely that the fire 

suppression systems within the building were most likely damaged and possibly 

inoperable. We made that conclusion. We knew that at the height of the day 

there was as many as fifty thousand people in this building. We had a large 

volume of fire on the upper floors. Each floor was approximately an acre in size. 

Several floors of fire would have been beyond the fire extinguishing capability of 

the forces that we had on hand. So we determined very early on that this was 

going to be strictly a rescue mission. We were going to evacuate the building, get 

everybody out, and then we were going to get out. 

The chiefs decided to concentrate on evacuating civilians from the North Tower, 

although they held various views about whether anyone at or above the impact zone 

could be saved. 

As of 9:00 a.m., if only those units dispatched had responded, and if those dispatched 

units were not “riding heavy” with extra men, 235 firefighters would be at the scene or en 

route. The vast majority of these would be expected to enter the North Tower.
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Mr. Hayden: This is Rescue One entering the lobby now. And at this time we 

were starting to get a number of distress calls coming in, particularly from the 9-

1-1 and from Port Authority personnel of people in distress on various floors. As 

we got the information coming in, we would give the assignments out to the 

companies. If we had a report of people trapped in elevators we would send a 

company up to that specific floor. We had reports at one point in time of people 

in wheelchairs and we gave out assignments to go up and get the people out from 

on whatever particular floor they were calling from. These were difficult 

assignments. I had a strong inner sense throughout this entire operation that we 

were going to lose people this day. 

Mr. Pfeifer: What we did know was that thousands of people, tens of thousands of 

people, were in their greatest moment of need and the firefighters came in and 

they received orders from our Command staff, and they turned around and they 

picked up their hose, and they picked up their tools, and they went upstairs. What 

you see here is, this footage, is actually my brother going upstairs. As so many 

other firefighters, this was the last time we saw them. 

 

The NYPD response also began seconds after the crash. At 8:47 a.m. the NYPD ordered 

a Level 3 Mobilization. An initial mobilization point for patrol officers was established 

on the west side of the intersection of West and Liberty Streets. NYPD rescue teams

were directed to mobilize at the intersection of Church and Vesey Streets. The first of 

these officers arrived at Church and Vesey at 8:56 a.m. At 8:50 a.m., the aviation unit of 

the NYPD dispatched two helicopters to the WTC to report on conditions and assess the 

feasibility of a rooftop landing or special rescue operations. 

 

Within ten minutes of the crash, NYPD and Port Authority Police personnel were 

assisting with the evacuation of civilians. 

At 8:58 a.m., a helicopter pilot reported on rooftop conditions.

James Ciccone, Police Officer, NYPD Aviation Unit: On the morning of 

September 11th, as I arrived at World Trade Tower 1, I was accessing the damage 

on the north side of the building, and the rooftop area for the possibility of 

rooftop extraction from one of our heavier lift helicopters. And at that point, a 

few passes, and slow passes, we made a determination that we didn’t see anybody 

up on the roof, but more so we had problems with the heat and the smoke from the 

building. The heat actually made it difficult for us to hold the helicopters because 

it would interfere with the rotor system. 

At 8:58 a.m., while en route, the Chief of the NYPD raised the department’s mobilization 

to Level 4—its highest level—which would result in the dispatch of approximately 30 

lieutenants, 100 sergeants, and 800 police officers, in addition to rescue teams, which 

were already at the scene. The Chief of Department arrived at Church and Vesey at 9:00 

a.m. 
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At 9:01 a.m., the NYPD patrol mobilization point at West and Liberty was moved to 

West and Vesey, in order to handle the greater number of patrol officers who would be 

responding to the Level 4 mobilization. These officers would be stationed around the 

perimeter of the complex to assist with evacuation and crowd control. 

Around the city, the NYPD cleared routes along major thoroughfares for emergency 

vehicles responding to the WTC. The NYPD and Port Authority police coordinated the 

closing of bridges, subways, PATH trains, and tunnels into Manhattan. 

 

The Port Authority’s on-site commanding police officer was standing in the concourse 

when a fireball exploded out of the North Tower lobby, causing him to dive for cover. 

Within minutes of impact Port Authority police from bridge, tunnel, and airport 

commands began responding to the WTC. Officers from the WTC command began 

assisting in evacuating civilians. The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear 

standard operating procedures to guide personnel responding from one command to 

another during a major incident. 

The fire safety director in charge of the complex arrived in the North Tower lobby at 

approximately 8:52 a.m. and was informed by the deputy fire safety director there that 

evacuation instructions had been announced over the public address system within one 

minute of impact. As mentioned earlier, to our knowledge, because the public address 

system had been damaged upon impact, no civilians heard that announcement. 

At 9:00 a.m., the Port Authority Police commanding officer ordered an evacuation of 

civilians in the World Trade Center complex because of the danger posed by highly 

flammable jet fuel from Flight 11. The order was issued, however, over a radio channel 

which could be heard only by officers on the Port Authority WTC command channel. 

There is no evidence that this order was communicated to officers in other Port Authority 

Police commands or to members of other responding agencies. At 9:00 a.m., the Port 

Authority Police Superintendent and Chief of Department arrived together at the WTC 

complex, and made their way to the North Tower lobby. Some Port Authority officers 

immediately began climbing the stairs and assisting civilians.

David Lim, Port Authority Police Department: I went up the B Staircase now, 

and so I proceeded up on that one. While people were coming down on that 

staircase, there were some people that were burnt and injured—required 

assistance. So, I could have taken one person and brought that person down I 

guess, but I thought the greater good would be to get to the 44th floor and assist 

more people. So I assigned the people that were uninjured to help carry this 

person down. There is a triage area downstairs, and that seemed to work out. 

People were more than happy to help each other out. 

Officials in the Office of Emergency Management’s headquarters at 7 WTC began to 

activate its emergency operation center immediately after the North Tower was hit. At 

approximately 8:50 a.m. a senior representative from that office arrived in the lobby of 

the North Tower and began to act as its field responder. 
14

Summary 

In the 17-minute period between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. on September 11, New York 

City and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had mobilized the largest 

rescue operation in the City’s history. Well over one thousand first responders had been 

deployed, evacuations had begun, and the critical decision that the fire could not be 

fought had been made. 

The decision was made to evacuate the South Tower as well. At 9:02 a.m., a further 

announcement in the South Tower advised civilians to begin an orderly evacuation if 

conditions warranted. 

One minute later, a plane hit the South Tower. 

From 9:03 until 9:59 a.m. 

At 9:03 a.m., the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 hit 2 WTC (the South Tower) from 

the south, crashing through the 78th to 84th floors.

Video: UA 175 hits South Tower. 

What had been the largest and most complicated rescue operation in city history instantly 

doubled in magnitude. 

The plane banked as it hit the building, leaving portions of the building undamaged on 

impact floors. As a consequence—and in contrast to the situation in the North Tower—

one of the stairwells (Stairwell A) initially remained passable from top to bottom.

Mr. Praimnath: I am looking to the direction of the Statue of Liberty, and I am 

looking at an airplane coming, eye level, eye contact, towards me—giant gray 

airplane. I am still seeing the letter “U” on its tail, and the plane is bearing 

down on me. I dropped the phone and I screamed and I dove under my desk. It 

was the most ear-shattering sound ever. The plane just crashed into the building. 

The bottom wing sliced right through the office and it stuck in my office door 

twenty feet from where I am huddled under my desk. 

At the lowest point of impact, the 78th floor sky lobby, hundreds had been waiting to 

evacuate when the plane hit. Many were killed or injured severely; others were relatively 

unaffected. We know of at least one civilian who seized the initiative and shouted that 

anyone who could walk should walk to the stairs, and anyone who could help should help 

others in need of assistance. At least two small groups of civilians descended from that 

floor. 

Others remained alive in the impact zone above the 78th floor, though conditions on these 

floors began to deteriorate within ten minutes.
15

Mr. Praimnath: Upon impact, the ceiling caved in, part of the 82nd floor 

collapsed. I am trapped under a steel desk. The only desk that stood firm, 

everything else is broken up. It looked like a demolition crew came and just 

knocked everything. Every wall was broken up. Computers were broken up—

everything. 

As in the North Tower, civilians became first responders.

Mr. Clark: We went down the hallway on the 84th floor, and I happened to turn 

left to Stairway A. We descended only three floors, to the 81st floor—the group of 

seven of us—when we met a very heavy-set woman and she just emphatically told 

our group, “Stop, stop! We have just come off a floor in flames and we’ve got to 

get above the flames and smoke.” That’s about all I heard of her conversation 

because I heard somebody inside the 81st floor banging on the wall and 

screaming, “Help, help! I am buried. Is anyone there? Help, I can’t breathe!” 

And, I noticed that my workmates, the heavy-set woman and her traveling 

companion were starting to go up the stairs. And that day they all perished 

unfortunately. But they were dealing with the information they had. None of us 

really had known what had happened or what was about to happen. 

Mr. Praimnath: I am watching the plane, I am watching the floor, and somebody 

heard me scream on the other end. The person had a flashlight. 

Mr. Clark: This person was directing me. This person who was trapped, saying, 

“You turn left, right,” and I kept moving with my flashlight. 

Mr. Praimnath: The man says,“Knock on the wall and I will know exactly where 

you are.” 

Mr. Clark: Somehow I grabbed him under the arms, or around the neck, pulled 

him up and over this, and what, as I say later, I learned was a wall. I didn’t know 

what it was at the time. And we fell in a heap on the floor. 

Mr. Praimnath: And Brian put his hand around my neck and said, “Come on, 

let’s go home.” 

Some civilians ascended the stairs and others remained on affected floors to assist 

colleagues. 

Although Stairwell A in the South Tower remained passable from above the impact zone 

to the lobby, conditions were difficult and deteriorating.

Mr. Fern: Upon entering Stairway A, I started to run down the stairs. The 

conditions in the stairs were smoky. There were no lights in the stairway, there 

was a glow strip on the floor in the center of the stairs. There was also a glow 

strip on the handrail. 
16

Mr. Praimnath: Brian knew we had to take the Stairwell A, but there was so 

much rubble. I don’t remember much. I think we just slid right from the 81st floor 

to the 80th floor. Because of all that sheet rock and ceiling tiles that was on there. 

We actually tried to walk, and we slid right down. 

Mr. Clark: There was smoke, there was a lot of water flowing under foot. And in 

a couple of places, I’m guessing around the 78th, 77th floor, there was only one 

layer of dry wall left that was cracked, and the flames were licking up the other 

side of the wall. 

 

Many ascended in search of clearer air or to attempt to reach the roof. Those attempting 

to reach the roof were thwarted by locked doors. Others attempting to descend were 

frustrated by jammed or locked doors in stairwells or confused by the structure of the 

stairwell deviations.

Mr. Clark: As we descended the stairways, one strange thing that I recalled 

happening is that the Stairway A at least, and I learned later that Stairway C is 

the same, the stairway just doesn’t go back and forth all the way down. As you 

descend a few floors, you come to a situation where you must traverse down a 

hallway. You go down a hallway, you make a turn, the stairway continues, 

there’s another transfer later. A bit of confusion, especially in the darkness. And 

especially when that was the distress area. 

 

By 9:35 a.m., the West Street lobby level of the South Tower was becoming 

overwhelmed by injured who had descended to the lobby but were having difficulty 

continuing. 

Within 15 minutes after the impact, debilitating smoke had reached at least one location 

on the 100th floor, and severe smoke conditions were reported throughout floors in the 

nineties and hundreds over the course of the following half hour. By 9:30 a.m. a number 

of civilians who had failed to reach the roof and could not descend because of 

intensifying smoke became trapped on the 105th floor. There were reports of tremendous 

smoke in most areas of that floor, but at least one area remained less affected until shortly 

before the building collapsed. 

Still, there were several areas between the impact zone and the uppermost floors where 

conditions were better. At least a hundred people remained alive on the 88th and 89th

floors, in some cases calling 9-1-1 for direction. The 9-1-1 system remained plagued by 

the operators’ lack of awareness of what was occurring and by the sheer volume of 

emergency calls.

Mr. Clark: I had a very frustrating experience calling 9-1-1. It was, I am sure, 

over three minutes in duration my conversation with them. Not five minutes, but 

certainly over three minutes where I told them when they answered the phone, 

where I was, that I had passed somebody on the 44th floor, injured—they need to 

get a medic and a stretcher to this floor, and described the situation in brief, and 
17

the person then asked for my phone number, or something, and they said—they 

put me on hold. “You gotta talk to one of my supervisors”—and suddenly I was 

on hold. And so I waited a considerable amount of time. Somebody else came 

back on the phone, I repeated the story. And then it happened again. I was on 

hold a second time, and needed to repeat the story for a third time. But I told the 

third person that I am only telling you once. I am getting out of the building, here 

are the details, write it down, and do what you should do, and put the phone 

down. Stanley and I went back to the stairs, we continued all the way down to the 

plaza level. 

 

No one in the first responder community knew that Stairwell A remained potentially 

passable. No callers were advised that helicopter rescues were not feasible. Civilians 

below the impact were also generally advised to remain where they were by 9-1-1 or 

FDNY dispatch operators. 

 

Back in the North Tower, evacuation generally continued. Thousands of civilians 

continued to descend in an orderly manner. On the 91st floor, the highest floor with 

stairway access, all but one were uninjured and able to descend. 

At 9:11 a.m., Port Authority workers at the 64th floor of the North Tower were told by the 

Port Authority Police desk in Jersey City to stay near the stairwells and wait for 

assistance. These workers eventually began to descend anyway, but most of them died in 

the collapse of the North Tower. 

Those who descended Stairwell B of the North Tower exited between the elevator banks 

in the lobby. Those who descended the Stairwells A and C exited at the raised mezzanine 

level, where the smoky air was causing respiratory problems. All civilians were directed 

into the concourse at lobby level. Officers from the Port Authority and New York Police 

Departments continued to assist with the evacuation of civilians, for example, guiding 

them through the concourse in order to shelter the evacuees from falling debris and 

victims.

Ms. McIntyre: When we went down into the concourse, it was just people trying 

to get out. The security or rescue people just still directing us to keep moving and 

go out towards Borders and then go out. 

 

By 9:55 a.m., those few civilians who were still evacuating consisted primarily of 

injured, handicapped, elderly, or severely overweight individuals. 

Calls to 9-1-1 reflect that others remained alive above and below the impact zone, 

reporting increasingly desperate conditions. 

 

Immediately after the second plane hit, the FDNY Chief of Department called a second 

5th alarm. While nine Brooklyn units had been staged on the Brooklyn side of the 

Brooklyn Battery tunnel at 8:53 a.m., these units were not dispatched to the scene at this 

time. Instead, units from further away were dispatched. 
18

Just after the South Tower impact, chiefs in the North Tower lobby huddled to discuss 

strategy for the operations and communication in the two towers. 

At 9:05 a.m., two FDNY chiefs tested the WTC complex’s repeater system. This was the 

system installed after the 1993 bombing in order to enable firefighters operating on upper 

floors to maintain consistent radio communication with the lobby command. The system 

had been activated for use on portable radios at 8:54 a.m., but a second button which 

would have enabled the master hand-set was not activated at that time. The chief testing 

the master handset at 9:05 a.m. did not realize that the master handset had not been 

activated. When he could not communicate, he concluded that the system was down. 

The system was working, however, and was used subsequently by firefighters in the 

South Tower. 

The FDNY Chief of Safety agreed with the consensus that the only choice was to let the 

fires “burn up and out.” The chiefs in the North Tower were forced to make decisions 

based on little or no information.

Mr. Pfeifer: One of the most critical things in a major operation like this is to 

have information. We didn’t have a lot of information coming in. We didn’t 

receive any reports of what was seen from the helicopters. It was impossible to 

know how much damage was done on the upper floors, whether the stairwells 

were intact or not. A matter of fact, what you saw on TV, we didn’t have that 

information. 

Mr. Hayden: People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what was 

happening a hundred floors above us than we did in the lobby. Certainly without 

any information, without critical information coming in, the cumulative effect of 

the information coming in, it’s very difficult to make informed critical decisions 

without that information. And it didn’t exist that day. Our communication 

systems were down. Our building suppression systems were down, the elevators. 

We had no video capability throughout the entire operation. 

 

Climbing up the stairwells carrying heavy equipment was a laborious task even for 

physically fit firefighters. Though the lobby command post did not know it, one battalion 

chief in the North Tower found a working elevator, which he took to the 16th floor before 

beginning to climb. Just prior to 10:00 a.m., about an hour after firefighters first began 

streaming into the North Tower, at least two companies of firefighters had climbed to the 

sky lobby on the 44th floor of the North Tower. Numerous units were located between 

the 5th and 37th floors in the North Tower. 

At approximately 9:07 a.m., two chiefs commenced operations in the South Tower lobby. 

Almost immediately they were joined by an Office of Emergency Management field 

responder. They were not immediately joined by a sizable number of fire companies, as 

most, if not all units which had been in the North Tower lobby remained there. One chief 

and a ladder company found a working elevator to the 40th floor. From there they 
19

proceeded to climb Stairwell B. One member of the ladder company stayed behind to 

operate the elevator. 

Unlike the commanders in the North Tower lobby, these chiefs in the South Tower kept 

their radios on the repeater channel. For the first 15 minutes of the operations in the 

South Tower, communications among them and the ladder company which ascended with 

the chief worked well. Upon learning from a company security official that the impact 

zone began at the 78th floor, a ladder company transmitted this information, and the chief 

directed an engine company on the 40th floor to attempt to find an elevator to reach that 

upper level. 

Unfortunately, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that the repeater 

channel was functioning and being used by units in the South Tower. Chiefs in the North 

Tower lobby and outside were unable to reach the South Tower lobby command post 

initially. 

Communications also began to break down within the South Tower. Those units 

responding to the South Tower were advised to use tactical channel 3. From 

approximately 9:21 a.m. on, the ascending chief was unable to reach the South Tower 

lobby command post. The lobby chief ceased to transmit on repeater channel 7 at that 

time. 

The first FDNY fatality of the day occurred at approximately 9:25 a.m. when a civilian 

landed on a fireman on West Street. 

By 9:30 a.m., few of the units dispatched to the South Tower had arrived at their staging 

area. Many units were unfamiliar with the complex and could not enter the South Tower 

because of the danger of victims and debris falling on Liberty Street. Some units entered 

the Marriott Hotel and were given assignments there; others mistakenly responded to the 

North Tower. An additional 2nd alarm was requested at 9:37 a.m. because so few units 

had reported. At this time, units which had been staged on the Brooklyn side of the 

Brooklyn Battery Tunnel were sent, and many of them arrived at the WTC by 9:55 a.m. 

 

At 9:50 a.m., a ladder company had made its way up to the 70th floor of the South 

Tower. There they encountered many seriously injured people. At 9:53 a.m. a group of 

civilians were found trapped in an elevator on the 78th floor sky lobby. By 9:58 a.m., the 

ascending chief had reached the 78th floor on Stairwell A, and reported that it looked open 

to the 79th floor. He reported numerous civilian fatalities in the area. A ladder company 

on the 78th floor was preparing to use hoses to fight the fire when the South Tower 

collapsed. 

So far we have concentrated on the Fire Department’s command set-up in the North and 

South Towers. The overall incident command was just outside the WTC complex. At 

approximately 9:10 a.m., because of the danger of falling debris, this command post was 

moved from the middle of West Street to its western edge by the parking garage in front 
20

of 2 World Financial Center. The overall command post’s ability to track all FDNY units 

was extremely limited. 

 

At approximately 9:20 a.m., the Mayor and the NYPD Commissioner reached the FDNY 

overall command post. The FDNY Chief of Department briefed the Mayor on operations 

and stated that this was a rescue mission of civilians. He stated that he believed they 

could save everyone below the impact zones. He also advised that, in his opinion, 

rooftop rescue operations would be impossible. None of the chiefs present believed a 

total collapse of either tower was possible. Later, after the Mayor had left, one senior 

chief present did articulate his concern that upper floors could begin to collapse in a few 

hours, and so he said that firefighters thus should not ascend above floors in the sixties. 

By 9:20 a.m., significantly more firemen than were dispatched were at the WTC complex 

or en route. Many off-duty firemen were given permission by company officers to “ride 

heavy.” Others found alternative transportation and responded. In one case an entire 

company of off-duty firefighters managed to congregate and come to the WTC as a 

complete team, in addition to the on-duty team which already had been dispatched to the 

scene. Numerous fire marshals also reported to the WTC. 

At 9:46 a.m., the Chief of Department called a third 5th alarm. This meant that over onethird of all of the FDNY units in New York City were at or en route to the WTC. 

The Police Department was also responding massively after the attack on the South 

Tower. Almost 2,000 officers had been called to the scene. In addition, the Chief of the 

Department called for Operation Omega, to evacuate and secure sensitive locations 

around the city. At 9:06 a.m. the NYPD Chief of Department instructed that no units 

were to land on the roof of either tower. 

An NYPD rescue team in the North Tower lobby prepared to climb at approximately 9:15 

a.m. They attempted to check in with the FDNY chiefs present, but were rebuffed. 

Office of Emergency Management personnel present did not intercede. The team went to 

work anyway, climbing Stairwell B in order to set up a triage center on upper floors for 

victims who could not walk. Later, a second rescue team arrived in the North Tower and 

did not attempt to check-in with the FDNY command post. 

NYPD rescue teams also entered the South Tower. The Office of Emergency 

Management field responder present ensured that they check-in with the lobby chief. In 

this case, both agreed that the rescue team would ascend in support of FDNY personnel. 

By 9:15 a.m., two more of these teams were preparing to leave the Church and Vesey 

mobilization point in order to enter the towers. 

At approximately 9:30 a.m. one of the helicopters present advised that a rooftop 

evacuation still would not be possible.

Mr. Ciccone: After the Second Tower was hit, we tried to make our way towards 

that area, but the smoke from the first building, Tower 1, obscured the rooftop of 
21

Tower 2. It was the first hour-and-a-half that was critical for these 

observations—for rooftop rescue. We flew a horseshoe pattern—in that horseshoe 

pattern—for over a pattern of about an hour-and-a-half before the buildings 

collapsed. That, the same observations were made. There was no one on the 

roof. Our ability to get in that type position was still factored in by the heat, and 

made it difficult to even, to make it plausible, to get on the roof. 

At 9:37 a.m., a civilian on the 106th floor of the South Tower reported to a 

9-1-1 operator that a lower floor—“90-something floor”—was collapsing. This 

information was conveyed incorrectly by the 9-1-1 operator to an NYPD dispatcher. The 

NYPD dispatcher further confused the substance of the 9-1-1 call in conveying at 9:52 

a.m. to NYPD officers that “the 106th floor is crumbling.” 

By 9:58 a.m., there were two NYPD rescue teams in each of the two towers, another 

approaching the North Tower, and approximately ten other NYPD officers climbing in 

the towers.

David Norman, Police Officer, NYPD Emergency Service Unit: We went up to 

the 31st floor where we triaged probably, somewhere around six to a half dozen to 

a dozen firefighters for a random number of things, chest pains, difficulty 

breathing, things like that. Prior to that, we would notice that the amount of 

civilians had dwindled down to almost none. At that point, while we were 

continuing, or conducting this triage, the South Tower collapsed. 

In addition, there were numerous NYPD officers on the ground floors throughout the 

complex, assisting with evacuation, and patrolling and securing the WTC perimeter. A 

greater number of NYPD officers were staged throughout lower Manhattan, assisting in 

civilian evacuation, keeping roads clear, and conducting other operations in response to 

the attacks. 

Prior to 9:59 a.m., no NYPD helicopter transmission predicted that either tower would 

collapse. 

Initial responders from outside Port Authority Police commands proceeded to the police 

desk in 5 WTC or to the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. Officers were 

assigned to assist in stairwell evacuations and to expedite evacuation in the plaza, 

concourse, and PATH station. As reports of trapped civilians were received, Port 

Authority Police officers also started climbing stairs for rescue efforts. Others, including 

the Port Authority Police Superintendent, began climbing toward the impact zone in the 

North Tower. The Port Authority Police Chief and other senior officers began climbing 

in the North Tower with the purpose of reaching the Windows of the World restaurant on 

the 106th floor, where there were at least 100 people trapped. 

The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear standard operating procedures for 

coordinating a multi-command response to the same incident. It also lacked a radio 

channel that all commands could access. Many officers remained on their local 
22

command channels, which did not work once they were outside the immediate 

geographic area of their respective commands. 

Many Port Authority Police officers from different commands responded on their own 

initiative. By 9:30 a.m. the Port Authority’s central police desk requested that responding 

officers meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the absence of predetermined leadership roles for an incident of this magnitude, a number of Port Authority 

inspectors, captains, and lieutenants stepped forward at West and Vesey to formulate an 

on-site response plan. They were hampered by not knowing how many officers were 

responding to the site and where those officers were operating. Many of the officers who 

responded to this command post lacked suitable protective equipment to enter the 

complex. 

By 9:58 a.m., one Port Authority Police officer had reached the sky lobby on the 44th

floor of the North Tower. Also in the North Tower, two Port Authority teams had 

reached floors in the upper and lower twenties. Numerous officers also were climbing in 

the South Tower, including the Port Authority rescue team. Many also were on the 

ground floors of the complex assisting with evacuation, manning the Port Authority 

Police desk in 5 WTC, or supporting lobby command posts.

Sue Keane, Port Authority Police Department: When I got up to Stairwell C in 

the Mezzanine area, I was the only Port Authority police officer there at the time. 

There were two civilians there, one Port Authority employee, and there was a 

Secret Service Agent there. Afterwards, some NYPD officers showed up, and at 

that time everybody just basically worked together. There was no standard 

operating procedure. We just did whatever we had to do to guide people out of 

the stairwell. 

 

Summary 

The emergency response effort escalated with the crash of United 175 into the South 

Tower. With that escalation, communications and command-and-control became 

increasingly critical and increasingly difficult. First responders assisted thousands of 

civilians in evacuating the towers, even as incident commanders from responding 

agencies lacked knowledge of what other agencies and, in some cases, their own 

responders were doing. 

Then the South Tower collapsed. 

From 9:59 until 10:26 a.m. 

At 9:59 a.m., the South Tower collapsed in ten seconds.

Video: South Tower collapses. 
23

We believe that all of the people still inside the tower were killed, as well as a number of 

individuals—both first responders and civilians—in the concourse, the Marriott, and on 

neighboring streets. 

The next emergency issue was to decide what to do in the North Tower, once the South 

Tower had collapsed. In the North Tower, 9-1-1 calls placed from above the impact zone 

grew increasingly desperate. The only civilians still evacuating above the 10th floor were 

those who were injured or handicapped. First responders were assisting those people in 

evacuating. 

Every FDNY command post ceased to operate upon the collapse of the South Tower.

Mr. Pfeifer: We were in the North Tower communicating with some of our 

people, and all of a sudden we hear this load roar. And, we were able to go into a 

small alcove. Immediately to our left, just adjacent to the passageway to 6 World 

Trade Center. And as you see, everything goes black. And what we thought at 

this point is that we were the ones in trouble, that something happened, something 

fell off of the building and crashed into the lobby—that we in the lobby—or maybe 

the elevators had blown out. But we thought we were the guys in trouble. And 

when we couldn’t maintain our command post in the lobby, we made a decision 

that we needed to regroup and pull people out of the building. 

Mr. Hayden: We were completely unaware that the South Tower had collapsed. I 

don’t ever think it was in our realm of thought. We knew some significant event 

had occurred, whether it was another plane or a bomb, or one of the elevators 

crashing into the lobby. But certainly it was not in our thought process that the 

South Tower had collapsed. 

 

Lacking awareness of the South Tower’s collapse, the chiefs in the North Tower 

nonetheless ordered an evacuation of the building.

Mr. Pfeifer: I got on the radio and I said, “Command to all units in Tower 1, 

evacuate the building.” And I heard that message relayed up. And then a little 

later I repeated it: “Evacuate the building.” At that point, we had firefighters 

many floors above, and it takes some time to come down. What we didn’t know at 

that point was that we were running out of time. 

 

An FDNY marine unit radioed immediately that the South Tower had collapsed. To our 

knowledge, this information did not reach the chiefs at the scene. 

Within minutes some firefighters began to hear evacuation orders over tactical 1, the 

channel being used in the North Tower. Some FDNY personnel also gave the evacuation 

instruction on command channel 2, which was much less crowded, as only chiefs were 

using it. Two battalion chiefs on upper floors heard the instruction on Command 2 and 

repeated it to everyone they encountered. At least one of them also repeated the 

evacuation order on tactical 1. 
24

 

Other firefighters did not receive the transmissions. The reasons varied. Some FDNY 

radios may not have picked up the transmission in the difficult high-rise environment. 

The difficulty of that environment was compounded by the numerous communications all 

attempted on tactical 1 after the South Tower collapsed; the channel was overwhelmed, 

and evacuation orders may have been lost. Some of the firefighters in the North Tower 

were among those who had responded even though they were off-duty, and they did not 

have their radios. Finally, some of the firefighters in the North Tower were supposed to 

have gone to the South Tower and were using the tactical channel assigned to that Tower. 

Many firefighters who did receive the evacuation order delayed their evacuation in order 

to assist victims who could not move on their own. Many perished. 

Many chiefs on the scene were unaware that the South Tower collapsed. To our 

knowledge, none of the evacuation orders given to units in the North Tower followed the 

specific protocols—which would include stating “mayday, mayday, mayday”—to be 

given for the most urgent building evacuation. To our knowledge none of the evacuation 

orders mentioned that the South Tower had collapsed. Firefighters who received these 

orders lacked a uniform sense of urgency in their evacuation.

Mr. Hayden: Even with the order to evacuate, the firefighters themselves on the 

upper floors were not aware that the building had collapsed. They didn’t realize 

the tremendous amount of danger they were in at that time. 

Mr. Pfeifer: I didn’t know, even at this point, that the entire South Tower 

collapsed. What we were doing here was regrouping, and the firefighters were 

coming down, and they were coming down with people. And they were helping 

more people to get out of the building. Like us, they didn’t know the building fell 

down. 

 

The Police Department had a better understanding of the situation. The South Tower’s 

collapse disrupted the NYPD rescue team command post at Church and Vesey. 

Nonetheless, the NYPD command structure gave vital help to its units.

Kenneth Winkler, Detective, NYPD Emergency Service Unit: There was this 

tremendous roar—tremendous. I looked up and the South Tower was imploding. 

I got behind a vehicle and it went from white to gray to black, and then back 

again. As this was happening, I was calling units out of the North Tower. The 

units in the North Tower did not know that the South Tower had collapsed. 

Mr. Norman: We at that point—because we were in an area where there were no 

windows—didn’t exactly know what was going on. Our building obviously 

violently shook. The noise from the collapse was heard by us, but we didn’t know 

exactly what we were going through. 
25

Mr. Winkler: The building was shaking, the ceiling tiles were falling, but we did 

not know why—this was the result of the South Tower collapsing. 

Mr. Norman: As soon as that subsided somewhat, we were communicated from 

Officer Winkler, who was our command post operator, that the South Tower had 

completely collapsed and we were being called out of the building. At first, we 

kinda didn’t understand it, that transmission. We clearly understood it, but to 

think that a building of one hundred and some stories was like, you know, almost, 

not believable at that moment. So we asked for him to confirm that and to repeat 

his message. He then explained that there was no South Tower, that it was 

absolutely gone, and our building was in imminent danger of collapse, and that 

we should come out of the building immediately. 

Mr. Winkler: They descended down in a controlled manner, still checking the 

floors on the way down. They didn’t rush out. As they got down and they got 

across West Street, the North Tower collapsed. 

Many NYPD radio frequencies became overwhelmed with transmissions relating to 

injured, trapped, or missing officers. By 10:10 a.m., the NYPD rescue team advised that 

they were moving their command post north and began moving vehicles in that direction. 

NYPD Aviation radioed in immediately that the South Tower had collapsed. At 10:08 

a.m., an aviation helicopter pilot advised that he did not believe the North Tower would 

last much longer. There was no ready way to relay this information to the fire chiefs in 

the North Tower. 

Both NYPD rescue teams in the North Tower knew that the South Tower had collapsed 

and evacuated the building. One remained in the complex near 5 and 6 WTC in order to 

keep searching for people who needed help. A majority of these officers died. 

At the time of the South Tower’s collapse, a number of NYPD and Port Authority Police 

officers, as well as some FDNY personnel, were operating in different groups in the 

North Tower mezzanine, the WTC plaza, and the concourse, as well as on the 

neighboring streets. Many of these officers were thrown into the air and were enveloped 

in the total darkness of the debris cloud. Within minutes of the South Tower collapse, 

these officers began to regroup in the darkness and to lead the remaining civilians and 

injured officers out of the complex. Many of these officers continued rescue operations 

in the immediate vicinity of the North Tower and remained there until the North Tower 

collapsed. Many lost their lives. 

The collapse of the South Tower also forced the evacuation of the Port Authority Police 

command post on West and Vesey, forcing its officers to move north. There is no 

evidence that Port Authority Police officers from outside the WTC command ever heard 

an evacuation order on their radios. Some of these officers in the North Tower 

determined to evacuate, either on their own, or in consultation with other first responders 

they came across. One Port Authority Police officer from the WTC command reported 
26

that he heard an urgent evacuation instruction on his radio soon after the South Tower 

collapsed.

Mr. Lim: I remember stopping on the floors now, from forty-four down, to check 

the floors to see if there was anybody left behind. There were some people that 

were, I guess, elderly, or that required assistance, that were just starting to come 

down now, so I just gathered them. There was no time to wait for anyone. I felt 

that time was of essence. And I collected them, and with my party, we started 

going down. 

 

Other Port Authority police stayed in the WTC complex, assisting with the evacuation.

Ms. Keane: You can see into the plaza, but it’s almost like an alley way between 

Tower One and I believe it was 6 the Immigrations Department, because I could 

see the Immigrations sign still. So I knew at that point where I was and that we 

could actually follow that wall down and go into 5. I had a clear view to look up 

and I would look up to see whether or not things were falling. You couldn’t see 

too high up. It wasn’t like I could—you could hear things. It was strange. You 

could hear whistling. You could almost tell when things were coming down. And 

if things were kinda quiet then I would holler, “send two over,” and they would 

come across. And we probably got another ten or so people out. I honestly don’t 

know what the count was. 

 

The North Tower collapsed at 10:26 a.m. 

The FDNY Chief of Department and the Port Authority Police Department 

Superintendent and many of their senior staff were killed. The Fire Department of New 

York suffered the largest loss of life of any emergency response agency in U.S. history. 

The Port Authority Police Department suffered the largest loss of life of any American 

police force in history. The New York Police Department suffered the second largest 

loss of life of any police force in U.S. history, exceeded only by the loss of Port Authority 

police the same day. 

The nation suffered the largest loss of civilian life on its soil as a result of a domestic 

attack in its history.

Mr. Pfeifer: At this point, we heard a load roar again and someone yelled that 

the building was collapsing. And, we started to run. With bunker gear, you can’t 

run too far, especially when a building is a quarter mile high. And what 

happened inside the building now happened outside. This beautiful sunny day 

now turned completely black. We were unable to see the hand in front of our 

face. And there was an eerie sound of silence. That day we lost 2,752 people at 

the World Trade Center; 343 were firefighters. But we also saved 25,000 people. 

And that’s what people should remember because firefighters and rescuers went 

in and they knew it was dangerous, but they went in to save people. And they 

saved many.