|                                     | Combined Arms Research Library |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Command & General Staff College | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  |

----

|  | CGSC Home | CARL Home | Library Information | Resources | Internet Gateway | Library Catalog | Digital Library |  |
|--|-----------|-----------|---------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--|

----

|  |
|--|
|  |

| Busting the Bocage:American CombinedArms Operationsin France6 June--31 July 1944

byCaptain Michael D. Doubler

**FOREWORD**

	The hedgerow country of northwestern France-the Bocagepresented a trying challenge tothe U.S. Army in 1944. During the Normandy invasion, U.S. forces faced a stubborn GermanArmy defending from an extensive network of small fields surrounded by living banks of hedgesbordered by sunken dirt lanes. German forces fighting from these ready-made defensivepositions were, at first, able to curb most of the American advances and make the attempts verycostly. For the U.S. Army, busting through the difficult Bocage country required tactical,doctrinal, and organizational ingenuity.

	Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July1944 shows how the U.S. Army identified and overcame the problems of fighting in difficultterrain. The adoption of new tactics combined with technical innovations and good small-unitleadership enabled American forces to defeat a well-prepared and skillful enemy. In thehedgerow country, the U.S. Army eventually brought the separate components of the combinedarms team-infantry, armor, and artillery-to bear on the enemy simultaneously. The resultingsuccesses were costly but effective. Combat in the Bocage demonstrated the U.S. Army'scapability to fight and win in a new and hostile environment.
November 1988RICHARD M. SWAIN Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies InstituteCSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed herein arethose of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department ofDefense.
Busting the Bocage:American CombinedArms operationsin FranceJune--31 July 1944

byCaptain Michael D. Doubler
**U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900**

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data**

	Doubler, Michael D. (Michael Dale), 1955Busting the Bocage.

	Bibliography: p.1. World War, 1939-1945-Campaigns-France-Bocage normand. 2. Bocage normand (France)-History.I. Title.D756.5.N6D68 	1988 	940.54'21	88-23757CONTENTS**Illustrations**- **I. Normandy: The Context of the Battle**   **Introduction**   **U.S. Army Organization and Doctrine**   **Combat Experience before D-Day**   **The Operational Setting** 
- **II. The Battle**   **Tactical Problems**   **The Solution** 
- **III. Conclusions** 
**Notes****Bibliography**ContentsILLUSTRATIONS
**Figures**
**1. Triangular infantry division, 1943****2. German hedgerow defence****3. The 29th Infantry Division's hedgerow tatics****4. The 83d Infnatry Division's hedgerow tactics****5. The 3d Armored Division's hedgerow tatics**
**Maps**
**1. The advance inland, 6 June--1 July 1944****2. The 29th Division's attack, 11 July 1944****3. The attack on Hill 192, 11 July 1944****4. Breakthrough, 25--27 July 1944**ContentsI. NORMANDY: THE CONTEXT OF THEBATTLE
**Introduction**

	Over forty years have passed since Allied armies landed in Normandy with the purpose ofliberating western Europe and destroying Hitler's Third Reich. Despite this passage of time andextensive writings on the landings in France, officers and historians are still intensely interested inD-Day and the Normandy campaign. Indeed, a great deal remains to be learned about the U.S.Army's participation in the Normandy campaign, and a detailed examination of the fighting yields afruitful case study for America's professional officer corps concerning how American soldiersperformed in combat, how squads and platoons closed with and destroyed the enemy, and how theArmy adapted methods to overcome a whole host of problems that it encountered in combat.

	The broad conceptual framework for this study of the U.S. Army's efforts in France in 1944originated with an idea borrowed from the eminent British military historian Michael Howard. In aspeech to the Royal United Services Institute in October 1973, Howard examined the difficultiesmilitary establishments encounter in creating doctrine for the employment of their combat forces.Unlike other professionals, military leaders have no sure method of testing or verifying theirdoctrines and practices short of combat. Due to this drawback, Howard thought that peacetimemilitary doctrine is usually faulty. Such weaknesses in doctrine, however, are not irresoluble.Once in combat, the military can recognize flaws in its doctrine and combat techniques and remedythem as quickly as possible. Ultimately, the advantage will go to the army that learns quickly fromits mistakes and adapts promptly to a new and unfamiliar environment.1

	This study attempts to identify the problems that hampered the operations of the U.S. FirstArmy during the weeks immediately following the D-Day landings. In Normandy, inexperiencedAmerican combat units struggled with veteran German defenders on terrain specially suited for thedefense. The U.S. Army was faced with the problem of conducting offensive operations in theNormandy hedgerow country-known as the Bocage. Shortcomings in preinvasion training andpreparation resulted initially in uncoordinated efforts whenever American infantry, tanks, andartillery tried to combine forces during attacks. Technical deficiencies also hampered efforts.

	More important, this study shows the processes by which the Army identified andovercame its problems. Through flexibility and determination in battle, coupled with ingenuity andinnovativeness in the use of weaponry, the U.S. Army was able to push back a stubborn opponentand achieve victory. At all levels from squad leader to commanding general, the U.S. First Armysought to turn a bad situation to its advantage. Locked in combat with a formidable foe, Americanleaders relied on their previous training and experience, common sense, and knowledge of thecapabilities of their equipment to forge together the uncoordinated, separate elements of the Army'scombat arms into a unified, combined arms team.

	The American experience in Normandy supports Michael Howard's assertion that theability of armies to adapt in combat is a key ingredient in their success. In the seven weeksbetween D-Day and 31 July 1944, despite shortcomings in combat experience and the difficultNormandy terrain, the U.S. First Army defeated the Germans in a series of battles that placed apremium on leadership and ingenuity at the small-unit level. New tactics and technical innovationsallowed First Army units to close with and destroy a well-prepared defender. By early August, theAmericans had restored mobility to the battlefield, and the Allies began to push the Germans backin operations designed to carry the Allied armies to Paris and beyond.
Contents
**U.S. Army Organization and Doctrine**

	On 6 June 1944, Allied forces landed on the European continent with the mission ofoccupying Nazi Germany and destroying its armed forces. By the end of June, Allied commandersrealized that original estimates for their rate of advance into the interior of France were overlyoptimistic. In the British sector, units under the overall command of General Sir Bernard L.Montgomery were stalled in front of Caen, which had been a D-Day objective. Likewise, theAmericans of the U.S. First Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, foundthemselves behind schedule and engaged in a grueling war of attrition with the Germans on terrainspecially suited for the defense.

	Sallying forth from the D-Day beachheads, the American Army had plunged into Normandyhoping to destroy the German units that lay in its path. First Army soon found itself in veryinhospitable terrain facing a determined and capable enemy. Slow progress and prohibitive lossesmade it clear that normal methods of attacks were unworkable. German positions could not be outflanked or turned, so the only recourse was to plunge directly into the face of theirdefenses. But before the U.S. Army took the risk of shattering itself on the Germans' positions,soldiers of all ranks speculated on how to best rupture the enemy's defenses.

	The principal assets that American combat leaders in Normandy had to rely on to defeat theGermans were the firepower and capabilities of their equipment and their knowledge of tac ticaldoctrine. They also wielded the combat formations of the U.S. Army that had been equipped andorganized with the outbreak of war. A familiarity with the composition and capabilities of thesecombat units is essential in understanding the small-unit actions that took place in Normandy. Aknowledge of Army doctrine also facilitates a better comprehension of the operations thatcommanders designed and expected their units to execute.

	In 1940, the Army adopted a new divisional organization on the premise that infantrydivisions should be simple, mobile, and trimmed of all nonessential troops and equipment. Calledthe "triangular" division because of its use of three infantry regiments as the basis of the division,the new division became the Army's workhorse during World War II. The triangular division wasmeant to be lean, agile, and optimally suited for the attack. The new organization became theblueprint for Regular Army infantry divisions, and National Guard divisions adopted the newstructure after America's entry into the war.2

	The basic composition of the triangular division was three infantry regiments and a varietyof combat and combat support troops at the division level (see figure 1). Taken together, theweaponry within a triangular division gave commanders at all levels vast amounts of firepower.The division artillery was foremost in combat power among the assets found at division level. Thedivision artillery had four battalions-three 105-mm howitzer battalions with twelve guns each anda 155-mm howitzer battalion with twelve guns. The standard infantry regiment, the next majorcommand below division level, consisted of three infantry battalions, an antitank company, acannon company, a headquarters company, a service company, and a medical detachment. The nextlower organization was the infantry battalion. Three rifle companies, a heavy weapons company,and a headquarters company comprised an 871-man battalion. The rifle company consisted of 3rifle platoons, a weapons platoon, and a small headquarters section and had a total manpowerstrength of 6 officers and 187 enlisted men. The weapons platoon was armed with two .30-caliberand one .50-caliber machine guns, three 60-mm mortars, and three 2.36-inch bazookas. Three infantry squads comprised a rifleplatoon. Each rifle squad consisted of twelve men armed with ten M1 Garand rifles, one Browningautomatic rifle, and one M1903 bolt-action Springfield rifle. Despite the awesome, aggregatefirepower of the weapons within a triangular division, the lifeblood of the infantry division wasthe 5,211 officers and combat infantrymen who manned its 27 rifle companies.3

	Ironically, in emphasizing the leanness and toughness of the triangular division, Armyplanners denied the division the organic support of the weapon that would prove so important inground combat in World War II-the tank. Despite the impressive array of weaponry within thetriangular infantry division, the firepower and mobility of tanks was a necessary augmentation tothe infantry division's combat power. The need for effective combined arms operations was one ofthe principal tactical lessons of World War I and had been reaffirmed by the *Wehrmacht's*victories early in World War II. For this reason, Army planners had not neglected tanks, neither intheir role nor in their organizational composition.

	At the outbreak of World War II, American armor had two combat roles, infantry supportand exploitation. With the founding of the Armored Forces in July 1940, the groundwork was laidfor the creation of the American armored division. The intended, primary role of the armoreddivision was offensive operations against hostile rear areas. By 1943, the combat power of thearmored division was based on an equal number of tanks, infantry, and artillery battalions withinthe division. Thus, the armored division, unlike its counterpart the triangular infantry division, wasa true combined arms unit.4

	The Army realized, however, that the triangular division needed armored support. Adamantin preserving the lightness of the triangular division, Army planners refused to incorporate a tankbattalion into the standard organization of the infantry division. Instead, independent tank battalionswere formed and became known as general headquarters (GHQ) tank units. The theory ran thatGHQ tank battalions could be attached singly or in groups to infantry divisions for specificoperations or that commanders at the highest levels could mass GHQ tank units for exploitationmissions in much the same way as an armored division might be employed.5
Contents**Figure 1. Triangular infantry division (1943)**
	Regardless of whether a tank battalion served in an armored division or as a GHQ tankunit, the organization was the same. A standard tank battalion consisted of a headquarterscompany, a service company, three medium tank companies, and a light tank company. Each tankplatoon had five tanks-two tanks in a "light" section and three tanks in a "heavy" section. Everytank company had three platoons and a headquarters section of two tanks. The medium tankcompany had a total strength of 5 officers and 116 enlisted men and was equipped with 17 M-4Sherman tanks. The light tank company had five officers and ninety-one enlisted men and wasequipped with the M-5 Stuart light tank.6

	Single GHQ tank battalions were normally assigned to infantry divisions to providesupport during operations. In turn, the tank battalion was attached to one of the division's infantryregiments and then operated closely with the battalions of that regiment. In an infantry division, theseparate elements of the combined arms team came together at the regimental level. A GHQ tankunit, detachments from the division's engineer battalion, fire-support elements from the divisionartillery and supporting combat aviation, and the rifle battalions of the infantry regiment were theactive participants in the combined arms team of World War II. Supporting elements were oftennot held at the regimental level but were passed on to the rifle battalions. A single rifle battalion inthe attack might be augmented by tanks, combat engineers, artillery support, and the firepower offighter-bombers.

	American military leaders in Normandy were familiar with the body of knowledge thatwas the basis for the American methods of waging war. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field SeruiceRegulations, Operations*, served as the conceptual foundation for the Army's ideas on battledoctrine that were conceived and implemented prior to and during World War II. The manualdescribed the fundamental doctrines of combat operations, the basic concepts of battlefieldleadership, and the principles of employment for the combat arms. Additionally, FM 100-5 spreadits influence over the Army's school system and formed the common link between all training andinstruction carried out at the various service schools.

	The military subject matter covered by the 1941 edition of FM 100-5 was broad anddiverse. However, two root concepts occur again and again throughout the discussions on the rolesof the combat arms and the conduct of military operations. The first was the critical importance ofdynamic, competent leadership. Commanding troops in combat was a complex task that required leaders to possess "willpower, self confidence, initiative, and disregard of self," as well as superior knowledge abouttechnical and tactical matters. In the introduction to FM 100-5, Army Chief of Staff GeneralGeorge C. Marshall stressed that it was a function of competent leadership to combine doctrinalconcepts with battlefield experience to produce plans that would ensure success in battle.7

	Ironically, the coordination of the combat arms, which was deficient in the beginningphases of the Normandy battles, was the second theme that ran throughout FM 100-5. Officers ofthe expanding, modernizing U.S. Army of the early 1940s were aware of the importance ofcoordinated, concerted action by the combat arms. FM 100-5 stated that "no one arm wins battles."The "combined action of all arms and services" was the key to success. Unit commanders wereheld responsible for coordinating the "tactics and techniques of the various arms" and fordeveloping in their units the combined arms teamwork "essential to success."8

	A better comprehension of the Army's offensive doctrine contained in FM 100-5 enhancesan understanding of First Army's struggle in Normandy. According to FM 100-5, the sole purposeof offensive operations was the destruction of hostile armed forces. To achieve this purpose, acommander established a clearly defined physical objective toward which all efforts could bedirected. Attacks were grouped into two categories: envelopments and penetrations. Of these twoforms of attack, the envelopment was the more preferable. The design for an attack consisted of aplan of maneuver and a plan of fire. FM 100-5 stated that the best guarantee for success in anattack was the effective cooperation between the troops in the attacking echelon, the supportingartillery, and any supporting combat aviation. The "superior commander" was that battle leaderwho could coordinate his fire support with his plan of maneuver.9

	From the doctrinal framework provided by FM 100-5, the Army's various combat arms,working under the supervision of the War Department, generated more detailed offensive doctrinesfor their respective arms. The techniques and procedures developed by the combat armsspecifically described how each arm would perform in battle and interact with other combat armsduring operations. In turn, these doctrines served as the basis for combat training conducted in theArmy's service schools and maneuver units.

	The Army's primary ground-gaining arm was the infantry. Because of its ability to seize orretain major objectives, the infantry battalion was the most basic combat unit of the U.S. Army.Infantry doctrine prescribed that battalions usually attacked in daylight to seize terrain objectives.While envelopments were preferred over penetrations, infantry doctrine admitted that thebattalion-size attacks were usually nothing more than frontal assaults against enemy defenses.Battalions attacked along a frontage of 500-1,000 yards in width, depending on terrain and enemydispositions. The rifle companies of the infantry battalion performed the actual tasks of seizingobjectives and closing with the enemy. Normally, a battalion attacked with two companies abreast,the third company acting as the battalion reserve. One of the attacking companies conducted themain attack, while the other supported the main effort with secondary attacks. A single riflecompany's zone of attack was usually 200-500 yards wide.10

	Army doctrine recognized that the infantry was capable of only "limited independentaction" through the employment of its organic weapons. The other combat arms had to augment theinfantry to increase its offensive power to overcome strong enemy defenses. Recognizing theinfantry's need, each of the Army's combat arms developed doctrine in support of the infantry'sattacks.11

	FM 17-36 outlined the techniques used by armored forces when operating in conjunctionwith the infantry. Like FM 100-5, this manual stressed the need for closer cooperation andcoordination between the ground forces. FM 17-36 insisted that since the role of tanks and infantry"are linked so closely" that it was essential that the "doctrine, powers and limitations of both" beunderstood by those involved.12

	Tanks operating with infantry during offensive operations assisted the infantry bydestroying the enemy with firepower and by keeping the attack moving using the tanks' inherentarmored protection and mobility. The combat capabilities of tanks and infantry werecomplementary. Prewar doctrine specified that infantry-armor attack formations consisted of twoseparate echelons. Armor led when the terrain was suitable and when antitank weapons andobstacles were absent or neutralized. Infantry led the attack over difficult terrain and when strongenemy minefields and antitank defenses were present. When armor led the attack, the first attackingechelon was composed solely of tanks, while the second echelon comprised infantry and tanks.Similarly, if infantry led the attack, the first wave was composed solely of infantry formations, while the second wave comprisedtank-infantry teams. Despite the firepower produced by small arms, machine guns, and tank mainguns in tank-infantry forces, tactical doctrine acknowledged that this firepower in no wayminimized the need for close support from the other combat arms.13

	Foremost among the support provided by the other combat arms was the firepower of thefield artillery. Commanders fully integrated supporting fires into the attack so that they wouldcoincide with the time of attack and the scheme of maneuver. Artillery's role in the combined armsattack was to neutralize enemy crew-served weapons, to destroy field fortifications, and to preventenemy infantry from manning their defenses as the U.S. assault approached its objective. When thetank-infantry forces were prepared to conduct the final assault, artillery fires were lifted uponrequest and then shifted onto other enemy targets beyond the objective.14

	Combat engineers formed another important adjunct to the tank-infantry team. Engineershad the overall mission of increasing combat effectiveness through acts of construction ordemolition designed to facilitate friendly movement or to hinder the enemy's mobility. Whenoperating with tank-infantry forces in offensive operations, engineers usually had a mobilityenhancement mission, which meant they were to remove or breach obstacles such as antitankditches, wire entanglements, and minefields.15
Contents
**Combat Experience Before D-Day**

	Knowledge of Army doctrine and weaponry were not the only assets available to FirstArmy leaders seeking to find new ways to win in the Bocage. Lessons learned during combatoperations prior to D-Day helped provide some basis for developing solutions to problemsencountered in Normandy. Combat experience among American commanders and their troops inFrance varied greatly. Unblooded units whose only firsthand knowledge of military operationswas training maneuvers in the United States and England joined divisions that had fought in NorthAfrica and Sicily. While only some American troops had actually been in combat, most wereaware of the major combat lessons learned in the North African and Mediterranean theaters.

	Despite successes in Tunisia and Sicily, the U.S. Army that assaulted the Normandybeaches was still far from being a well-oiled, coordinated fighting machine. Shortcomings in prebattle training and battlefieldcoordination during 1942 and 1943 prevented the U.S. Army from developing its full potential asan effective fighting force. One of the major problems discovered was the surprising lack ofaggressiveness displayed by infantry units. Instead of employing techniques of fire and maneuverto close with and destroy the enemy, infantry attacks often merely located and pinned down theenemy. Artillery fire was then called on to finish the infantry's job of destroying the defenders.Instead of relying on their organic weapons, infantrymen trusted in the big guns of the field artilleryto deliver the coups de grace.16

	Another problem compounded the infantry's reliance on artillery support. The purpose ofthe infantry division's mortars and assault guns was to support the attacks of the riflemen.Consequently, these weapons were usually employed close to the fighting front and becamefavorite targets for German artillery, tanks, and other heavy weapons. American mortar, antitank,and assault-gun crews often suffered heavy casualties. A tendency developed in which theseweapons remained hidden and silent until the salvos of the supporting artillery landed on thedefenders' positions. Artillery fires suppressed and neutralized the Germans, and only then wouldthe infantry's organic heavy weapons join in the battle.17

	Even more disturbing was the poor coordination that existed during tank-infantry attacks.Experience in combat painfully showed that stateside training lacked emphasis on the planning andexecution of combined arms attacks. Infantry commanders habitually failed to exploit the mobilityand firepower of the tanks attached to their units. Conversely, tankers operating with infantry wereoften reluctant to aggressively advance, taking the burden of the attack away from the riflemen.When the tankers did lead the attack, infantrymen had a tendency to lag behind and were slow infollowing the tanks to the objective. Tankers often found themselves in the predicament of being ontheir objectives and surrounded by pockets of German defenders while still awaiting the arrival oftheir accompanying infantry. On the other hand, riflemen who stayed with their tanks during theattack were often killed or wounded by stray enemy fire from heavy weaponry intended for theAmerican tanks. Inadequate communications at the lowest levels also hampered smoothly executedtank-infantry attacks. Often infantry platoons could not warn the tankers about antitank traps andweapons. Answers to the perplexing problems of tank-infantry coordination were still lacking prior to theNormandy battles.18

	Battles in the Mediterranean and North African theaters exposed numerous organizationalweaknesses in the Army. Perhaps the most significant was the existence of separate, independentGHQ tank battalions. These units, considered inferior in maintenance and training to theircounterparts in armored divisions, were usually quickly rotated between different infantry units,not only within a single division but among other divisions as well. At the small-unit level, thismade the development of the teamwork and esprit so important to the success of the tank-infantryteam almost impossible. Because of their independent existence, GHQ tank battalions lackedproper care and support. Outside of a regular division's personnel and supply channels, GHQ tankbattalions suffered from lack of crew replacements, supplies, and spare parts. Unfortunately, GHQtank battalions were often indifferently commanded, the best armor officers being chosen tocommand tank battalions within armored divisions. The problem of GHQ tank battalions was asore one and accompanied the U.S. Army to the French mainland.19
Contents
**The Operational Setting**

	Within a few days after the Allied invasion of Normandy, the U.S. Army found itself facinga stubborn opponent on terrain that favored the defender. Units fought desperately for hills, towns,and bridges that had become of strategic importance. At every turn, the Americans faced theseasoned veterans of the German Army. The effects of weather and especially terrain had a directinfluence on the conduct of operations, while the dispositions and defensive capabilities of theGerman Army crucially dictated American actions. A familiarity with these factors is essential to afull understanding of the Normandy campaign (see map 1).

The terrain features of the French countryside had a particularly strong influence on the conduct ofoperations. The terrain on the Allied left, held by the British Second Army, was an expanse ofgently rolling pastures and cultivated fields. The relatively dry and firm ground in the Britishsector facilitated armor operations and the construction of forward airfields. The boundary linebetween the British Second Army and the U.S. First Army began on the coast near Port-en-Bessinand extended inland for approximately twenty miles, ending a few miles east of the village of Caumont. The U.S.First Army was responsible for operations along a wide arc that stretched westward fromCaumont to the port of Cherbourg, a frontage of more than fifty miles.20
Contents**Map 1. The advance inland, 6 June--1 July 1944**
	Unlike the terrain in the British sector, the ground held by the U.S. First Army did not favormobile operations. The American left, the ground between the boundary line with the British andthe Vire River, was broken and uneven. The countryside in this sector was a patchwork of smallhills, low ridges, narrow rivers, and steep valleys that hampered long-range observation and impededcross-country movement. The center of the American sector was low ground that containedextensive marshlands. The whole area was drained by the Taute and Vire Rivers, which empty intothe English Channel near Carentan and Isigny, respectively. The marshlands are flat, and theground is soft and moist making travel by foot difficult, with vehicle traffic being almostimpossible. Heavy rains make the marshlands even less trafficable, restricting movement to thefew asphalt roads that traverse the bogs. On the American right, the terrain was more favorable.Between the marshes in the center of the sector and the coastline on the extreme right flank, a groupof hills rose up to dominate the northern end of the Cotentin Peninsula. The most important terrainfeature on the American right was the city of Cherbourg with its extensive port facilities.

	Several miles inland, the low terrain throughout the First Army sector rose into a plateauwith average heights of 200 meters above sea level. The plateau started along the lineCoutances-Saint-Lo-Bayeux and stretched southward into the French interior. As American unitsadvanced inland, they would have to conduct attacks to dislodge German units from the high terrainfeatures on the rim of the plateau. Some of the most bitter fighting of the Normandy campaign tookplace around Saint-Lo, as American units pushed back German troops entrenched on the highground around the village.

	The compartmentalized nature of the countryside was the most striking feature of the terrainin the U.S. First Army sector. The swamplands restricted all cross-country maneuver, making theuse and control of the road network a necessity for offensive operations. The natural, uneven lay ofthe land in the rest of the American sector made command and control of deployed combat forcesextremely difficult. Despite these natural obstacles, the most pervasive and formidable barrier inthe American sector was man-made.

	For centuries, Norman farmers had followed the practice of enclosing the plots of theirarable land, pastures as well as orchards, with thick hedgerows. The hedgerow country in the U.S.sector started about ten miles inland from the Normandy beaches and extended in a wide swathfrom Caumont on the American left to the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. The hedgerowsare sturdy embankments, half earth, half hedge. At their base, they resemble dirt parapets and varyin thickness from one to four feet, with heights that range from three to fifteen feet. Growing out of this earthen wall is a hedge that consists of small trees and tangles ofvines and brush. This vegetation has a thickness of between one to three feet and varies in heightfrom three to fifteen feet. Originally intended to serve as fences to mark land boundaries, to keep inlivestock, and to prevent the erosion of the the land by sea winds, the hedgerows surround eachfield, breaking the terrain into numerous walled enclosures. Because the fields are small, about200 by 400 yards in size, and usually irregular in shape, the hedgerows are numerous and set in nological pattern. Each field has an opening in the hedgerow that permits access for humans,livestock, and farm equipment. For passage to fields that are not adjacent to regular highways,numerous wagon trails run through the hedgerows.

	The military features of the Bocage are obvious. The hedgerows divide the country intotiny compartments. The hedgerows in each field provide excellent cover and concealment to thedefender and present a formidable obstacle to the attacker. Numerous adjoining fields can beorganized to form a natural defensive position echeloned in depth. The thick vegetation providesexcellent camouflage and limits the deployment of units. The hedgerows also restrict observation,making the effective use of heavy-caliber direct-fire weapons almost impossible and hamperingthe adjustment of artillery fire. Anyone occupying a high place that afforded good fields ofobservation and a clear view of the surrounding countryside would have a distinct advantage.

	The uneven and compartmentalized nature of the Bocage put increased emphasis on theimportance of the network of paved roads in the First Army sector. The main highways eitherparalleled the coast or stretched inland to the interior of Normandy. Carentan, in the center of theFirst Army's sector, was a vital road junction. From this village, good highways ran eastward toPériers and La Haye-du-Puits. East of Carentan, two parallel roads ran south to Saint-Lo, whichwas perhaps the most vital road junction in the First Army sector. Like spokes on a wheel, roadsran from Saint-Lo in almost every direction. The force that could hold Saint-Lo would retaincontrol over much of the road network in the Bocage.

	Like the terrain, the weather also influenced operations in Normandy. More than anythingelse, persistent rains during June and July hampered the efforts of the U.S. Army. The earlysummer of 1944 was the wettest since 1900.21 Extended periods of rainy weather turned themarshlands west of Carentan into a bottomless morass, making cross-country movement impossible. Rains also added immeasurablyto the daily miseries endured by the foot soldier. Low visibility and cloud ceilings often groundedall aircraft, denying the ground forces the support of fighter-bombers and aerial observers that wasso desperately needed. Additionally, a major channel storm ravaged the invasion beaches during19-23 June, severely restricting the movement of supplies onto the mainland. As a result, shortagesin key commodities hampered operations during the battles in the Bocage. The extent of daylightwas also important. Extremely long days put a premium on the hours of darkness. Nighttime wasused to rearm, resupply, rest, and plan for the next day's operations. Short nights limited the amountof time for these activities, and early dawns often found exhausted American units unprepared toconduct an attack or to defend against counterattacks.
**An aerial view of typical hedgerow terrain in Normandy. Note thw irregular-shapedpattern of the fields.**
	Of all the factors that influenced Allied operations in the summer of 1944, none was moresignificant than the German Army's determination and defensive abilities. Since 6 June, Germansoldiers had fought desperately to contain the expanding Allied beachheads. Most were unawareof heated controversies taking place in the German High Command over the best way to repel the Allied invasion. The German commander in chief in western Europe, FieldMarshal Gerd von Rundstedt, favored a mobile defense. Rundstedt disagreed with his most trustedsubordinate, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The "Desert Fox" commanded Army Group B andbore direct responsibility for the defense of the northern coastlines of France. Rommel favored astrong forward defense that would defeat the Allied invasion on the beaches. Adolf Hitler wasaware of the disagreement between his western commanders, but he failed to settle the dispute.Consequently, the Germans adopted neither the forward nor the mobile defense concepts as adistinct course of action.

	After D-Day, Rundstedt and Rommel cooperated in concentrating forces to eliminate theAllied beachheads. They proposed to Hitler that the Germans fight a series of defensive battleswhile assembling forces for a massive counterattack. However, on 25 June, a major British attacknear Caen forced the Germans to commit all of their reserves. The Germans now found themselvesdefending along a static line with few forces left to mount any large-scale counterattacks. BothRundstedt and Rommel's previous operational concepts for the defense of Normandy were nowirrelevant.

	On 29 June, Hitler himself intervened and announced a new plan for the defense of France.The Fuhrer believed that German forces had to prevent the Allies from gaining an opportunity toconduct mobile warfare in the west. Before they could conduct a blitz campaign, the Allies neededsufficient space to deploy their formations and favorable terrain on which to maneuver. Hitlerbelieved the best way to prevent an Allied blitzkrieg was to contain the expansion of the Britishand American beachheads. Thus, the Fuhrer ordered German forces to engage the Allies in asavage battle of static warfare along a strong line that would capitalize on the defensivecharacteristics of the Bocage. Hitler knew his units occupied extremely favorable defensivepositions, so he ordered the German Army to stay and fight to the last in Normandy.

	The German Seventh Army, under the command of General Paul Hausser, opposed the U.S.First Army. Seventh Army consisted of three fresh infantry divisions, the remnants of four moreinfantry divisions that had suffered heavy casualties during the early fighting in Normandy, aparachute regiment, and three regimental-size combat teams known in the German Army as*kampfgruppen*. These troops were organized into two corps, the LXXXIV Corps and the IIParachute Corps. The LXXXIV Corps was responsible for operations west of the Vire River, while the II Parachute Corpsdefended the sector between Saint-Lo and Caumont. The aggregate strength of Seventh Army was30,000 combat troops, with all of their organic weaponry supported by approximately 80 tanks.

	In carrying out Hitler's orders for the stubborn defense of Normandy, General Hausserdeployed his troops along a fixed front and intended to make the Americans fight and die for eachinch of ground. The Germans lightly manned their forward defense line, keeping the bulk of theircombat troops in reserve. These reserves were grouped into counterattack units and weresupported by tanks and assault guns. Once the German forward lines identified the main Americanassault, reserves would counterattack the flanks and rear of the Americans. Well aware of thehedgerows that favored their defensive efforts, the Germans coined their tactics "bush warfare."

	Compared with the German High Command, Allied leadership was in much wideragreement about the overall strategy for the invasion campaign. The Allied plan for the invasion ofwestern Europe consisted of two phases. The first was the seizure and establishment of securebeachheads large enough to permit the landing of substantial combat forces with adequate supplylevels. The second phase of the Allied strategy called for expanding the coastal enclaves into asubstantial lodgment area. Such an area would provide for the deployment of enough combatforces, both ground and air along with support units and sufficient supplies, to ensure the successof a mass offensive into central France and toward Germany.

	Landing in France on 6 June, the U.S. First Army under General Bradley quicklyconsolidated its foothold on the Normandy beaches. Elements of Major General J. Lawton Collins'VII Corps seized Utah Beach, while units of Major General Leonard T. Gerow's V Corpsassaulted Omaha Beach. Moving to complete the first phase of Allied strategy by securing andexpanding their beachheads, the U.S. V and VII Corps began to push inland. By 12 June, theAmericans had captured Carentan and effected a linkup between the heretofore separatebeachheads. Meanwhile, combat units of Major General Charles H. Corlett's XIX Corps arrived inFrance to reinforce the U.S. effort.22

	Confident that First Army had sufficient forces in France to prevent the Germans fromeliminating the beachheads, General Bradley moved to implement the second phase of Allied strategy. On 14 June, VII Corps launched an offensive to seize the badly needed portfacilities at Cherbourg. Collins' offensive enjoyed good success, and Cherbourg fell on 26 June.While Collins moved against Cherbourg, consuming the majority of available supplies, theremainder of First Army stood on the defensive warding off German attacks and preparing forfuture operations.23

	By 1 July, with the American beachheads secure, First Army prepared to resume theoffensive. The U.S. Army was deployed along a wide are that stretched from Caumont to the westcoast of the Cotentin Peninsula near La Haye-du-Puits. General Bradley's mission was to continuethe expansion of the lodgment area and to relieve German pressure against the British byconducting a full offensive against the German Seventh Army. Scheduled for 1 July, the attack wasdesigned to push the Germans out of Normandy and to open the way for American operations intoBrittany.

	For the attack, Bradley had available the equivalent of thirteen divisions organized intofour separate corps. On the American right was Major General Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps,consisting of the 82d Airborne and 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions. The newly arrived 8thDivision was also assigned to VIII Corps to replace the 82d Airborne, which was scheduled toreturn to England for rest and refit. To the left of VIII Corps, in the vicinity of Carentan, wasCollins' VII Corps. Three infantry divisions, the 83d, 4th, and 9th, were under VII Corps control.On Collins' left stood Corlett's XIX Corps, which consisted of the 29th, 30th, and 35th InfantryDivisions and newly arrived elements of the 3d Armored Division. Major General Gerow's VCorps held the American left flank and was anchored on the village of Caumont. The V Corps hadunder its command the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division. Out of the totalnumber of divisions in Normandy, less than half (the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, the82d Airborne, and the 2d Armored) had any combat experience. For the other units in First Army,their initial experience in combat would be among the Normandy hedgerows.24
ContentsII. THE BATTLE
**Tactical Problems**

	By early July, First Army was painfully aware of its slow progress, as it fell far behindpreinvasion estimates of advance. Planners within Supreme Headquarters, Allied ExpeditionaryForce (SHAEF), thought that by 20 June (D+14) First Army would be far inland occupying the lineLessay-Saint-Lô-Caumont. But not for another month would First Army occupy the entire areawithin the D+14 sector. American commanders said their progress was slowed by the inhospitablehedgerow country, the tenacity and organization of the German defense, and various inadequacieswithin the American combined arms team.1

	The formidable barriers presented by the hedgerows and the military characteristics of theBocage seem to have taken First Army by complete surprise. Despite Allied planners' awarenessof the nature of the Bocage, American commanders had done little to prepare their units for fightingamong the hedgerows. Preoccupied with the myriad problems of the D-Day landings, Americanleaders had failed to see the battlefield in depth and had paid little attention to the potentialproblems of hedgerow combat. As early as 8 June, General Bradley called the Bocage the"damndest country I've seen." General Collins of VII Corps was equally surprised by the nature ofthe hedgerow terrain and told General Bradley on 9 June that the Bocage was as bad as anything hehad encountered on Guadalcanal. Brigadier General James M. Gavin, the assistant divisioncommander of the 82d Airborne, best summarized the surprise of the senior American leadership:"Although there had been some talk in the U.K. before D-Day about the hedgerows, none of us hadreally appreciated how difficult they would turn out to be."2

	The junior leadership within First Army shared their seniors' surprise. In a surveyconducted after the Normandy battles, not 1 out of 100 officers questioned stated that they hadprior knowl edge of the nature of the hedgerows. A summary of these interviews stated that theofficers as a whole were "greatly surprised" by the Bocage. Captain Charles D. Folsom, acompany commander in the 329th Infantry of VII Corps' 83d Infantry Division, admitted that thehedgerows presented a problem his unit "had never before encountered" and that preinvasiontraining had "not taken the hedgerows into consideration."3
**An American fighting position in the Bocage. Note the heavy vegetation.**
	Even though the hedgerows were serious impediments to offensive operations, the primaryobstacle holding up the American advance was the German defense. As First Army fought its wayinland, it discovered that the German Army was well prepared and adept at defending thehedgerow country. The German defense was organized in depth and designed to destroy thecoordination and momentum of American attacks while exploiting the defensive advantages of thehedgerows. The forward German defensive line was a series of interconnected,compartmentalized fields. Small detachments defended each field and its surrounding hedgerows.Behind these forward positions, the Germans organized a defensive zone consisting of echelonedbelts of prepared battle positions. Available tanks and assault guns were distributed throughout thebattle zone to blunt American attacks and to support German counterattacks.4

	In addition, the Germans organized each field as a defensive strongpoint and confronted theattacking Americans with a deadly mixture of direct and indirect fires (see figure 2). The Germansemployed their direct-fire weapons to trap American infantrymen in a deadly hail of cross fire andgrazing fires coming from all sides. Machine guns were the primary weapons of the German defense. At theopposite corners of each field, the Germans emplaced heavy machine guns in positions dug into theearthen embankments of the hedgerows. The purpose of the heavy machine guns was to pin downattacking infantrymen in the open, making them easy targets for small arms and preplanned indirectfires. Light machine guns and machine pistols supplemented the fire of the heavy machine guns andwere emplaced in other firing positions to the front and flanks of the attackers. The Germans alsoused their light machine guns to place bands of grazing fire along the bases of hedgerowsparalleling the American attack. The purpose of the grazing fire was to inflict casualties onAmerican infantrymen seeking cover and concealment during their advance. Indirect fire was a keycomponent of the German defense. Once pinned down in the open, preplanned artillery and mortarfire punished American units. German mortar fire was particularly effective, causing as much as75 percent of all U.S. casualties during the Normandy campaign.5

	The Germans also implemented other measures to improve their scheme of hedgerowdefenses. They habitually dug slit trenches into the hedgerow embankments to protect themselvesduring American artillery and mortar barrages. Furthermore, German commanders linked togethertheir defensive positions with wire communications that allowed them to coordinate the defense oftheir sector. Snipers also were an important part of the German defense. They were used to protectmachine-gun positions against infiltrating Americans and to deliver harassing fire during lulls inthe action. Booby traps and mines abounded within the thick vegetation of the hedgerows.Trip-wire explosives were a German favorite. To combat American armor at close range, Germaninfantry used the *panzerfaust* (a light, portable weapon, fired by one man, that launched an armor-piercing rocket). At longer ranges, Germans engaged American armor with tank main guns,self-propelled guns, and used the legendary 88-mm antiaircraft gun in a ground-defense mode.6

	The early fighting in Normandy demonstrated the effectiveness of the German defensivesystem. American infantry commanders soon realized that normal tactical maneuvers wereimpossible in the Bocage. Company commanders initially used conventional methods of attack,with two rifle platoons abreast followed in turn by the third rifle platoon and the weapons platoon.However, companies could not deploy and maneuver because of thick vegetation and thecompartmentalized nature of the terrain. Platoons were forced to hack their way through the dense vegetation becauseGerman defensive fires covered all natural breaks in the hedgerows. As leading attack elementsemerged from the hedgerows, they found themselves exposed to almost point-blank German.machine-gun fire. Pinned down in the open in the middle of a well-prepared kill zone, infantrymenwere unable to maneuver and continue the attack. Squads returned fire with their own rifles andautomatic weapons, but their firepower was not enough to suppress the defenders. Americancommanders quickly discovered that four or five German defensive positions could pin down anentire infantry battalion and hold up an attack for long periods.7
Contents**Figure 2. German hedgerow defense**
	Unable to use normal techniques of fire and maneuver, American commanders were alsopowerless to influence the battle with increased firepower. Heavy vegetation and the closeproximity of the German defenders made it impossible to bring forward and set up heavy machineguns. Company commanders used their organic 60-mm mortars in an attempt to knock out Germanmachine-gun positions. However, the hedgerows and the close combat conditions made theobservation and adjustment of mortar and artillery fire almost impossible. American and Germanunits often fought one another at ranges of less than 300 yards. Short distances made calling forartillery fire risky, since unadjusted rounds could easily land on friendly troops. Manyengagements were fought at such close range that even if friendly rounds landed on Germanpositions, the effects of shrapnel and concussion would endanger American lives. Unable toobserve the enemy and to call fire on him from a safe distance, infantrymen were deprived of fieldartillery and mortar support.8

	The Bocage also adversely affected command and control of small units. Companies andbattalions did not attack along fixed frontages as prescribed in standard doctrine. Instead ofattacking along a frontage of between 200 and 500 yards, company-size attacks were canalizedinto single fields. Likewise, battalions attacked on fronts as narrow as 300 yards in order to seizea group of adjacent hedgerow fields. Standard control measures and boundary lines between unitswere almost meaningless in the compartmentalized terrain. Commanders learned to orient theirattacks along roads and paths running through the Bocage. At the company level, maintainingproper orientation during an attack proved difficult. Hemmed in on all sides by the hedgerows,platoons lost their sense of direction and without a fixed reference point often became disorientedand could not pinpoint their own location on their maps. These orientation problems aggravated normaldifficulties in getting platoons and companies to advance under fire.9

	Bad terrain and the Germans' tactical proficiency were not the only conditions hamperingoperations. American commanders observed many defects in the training and effectiveness of theirtroops. As experience in other theaters had shown, lack of aggressiveness was a major problem inmost infantry units. Infantrymen failed to maneuver in order to place more effective direct fire onthe enemy. Instead, units maneuvered to locate the Germans and then called for heavy weapons andindirect fire to neutralize the defenders. Even after the artillery had pounded enemy positions,many infantry units were slow in seizing their objectives. General Bradley acknowledged that amajor problem in First Army was the infantry's slowness in following their close supportingartillery barrages.10

	Interrogation of German prisoners during the hedgerow battles revealed that even theGermans detected a lack of aggressive drive among the American infantry units. Prisoners

stated that the American infantry moved too cautiously and consequently failed to take weakly heldpositions. They were surprised that artillery barrages were not followed up by determined infantryassaults. An experienced corporal in the German 275th Infantry Division summed up Germanattitudes: "Americans use infantry cautiously. If they used it the way Russians do, they would be inParis now."11

	American infantrymen were not convinced of the potency and effectiveness of their ownrifle and machine-gun fires. Their failure to maintain the proper distribution and volume ofsmallarms fire during assaults was a major problem. infantry training stressed covering the entireobjective with small-arms fire during an attack to suppress enemy defensive fires. In Normandy,many riflemen failed to keep up a steady rate of fire during the attack. Instead, they tended not tofire at suspected enemy positions but to wait for a definite target before opening fire.Consequently, many concealed German positions were not fired on during the attack.12
**Infantrymen crouching behind bushes atop a hedgerow**
	Inexperience in combat also hampered infantry units. In battle for the first time, infantrymenhad to rely on their training and leaders to get them through the initial trauma of combat. Many hadto learn how to survive through their own experiences and from the misfortunes of others. Greentroops of all ranks had a tendency not to move under fire, preferring the protection of the closest cover or simply hugging the open ground. German snipers were aparticular source of fear."13The experience of a platoon leader in the 9th Division illustrates howuntried troops can react under fire:

**One of the fatal mistakes made by infantry replacements is to hit the ground and freezewhen fired upon. Once I ordered a squad to advance from one hedgerow to another. During themovement one man was shot by a sniper firing one round. The entire squad hit the ground andthey were picked off, one by one, by the same sniper**.14

	For normal infantrymen, becoming "battle wise" was a terrible, if not fatal, experience.

	Tankers also found the hedgerow country forbidding. They discovered that vegetation andthe compartmentalized nature of the terrain negated their best assets, mobility and firepower. Thehedgerows kept the tanks from maneuvering freely, and poor observation prevented the tankersfrom using their longrange main guns and machine guns. Tanks unaccompanied by friendly infantrywere easy targets for German infantry armed with explosives and *panzerfausts*. Reluctant tooperate within the confined spaces and tangles of the hedgerows, tank commanders kept theirvehicles road bound. Staying on main roads and paths, however, made the tanks easy targets for theGermans' preplanned antitank defense. Panzers and 88-mm antitank guns were sited to takeadvantage of long fields of fire and covered highways, bridges, and road junctions. Indirect fires were preplanned to strikeAmerican armor moving along highways. Early in the campaign, tankers attempted to executemassed attacks in columns down the Normandy highways-blitz actions that were ineffective andcostly. The Germans stopped a typical American tank attack on 15 June, as an armored unitsupported the U.S. 120th Infantry of the 30th Infantry Division during an attack southward fromOmaha Beach. The American tanks never left the road, while the accompanying infantry operatedon the flanks. Within moments, the Germans destroyed the three lead tanks, one immobilized by amine and two others hit by an 88-mm antitank gun, and the attack ground to a confused halt. Armorleaders soon realized that tanks had to stay off highways to survive. Their only alternative was tooperate within the cover and concealment of the hedgerows.15

	Army doctrine for the coordinated use of tanks and infantry. was ineffective in the Bocage.The hedgerows' earthen embankments and heavy vegetation were almost impassable obstacles forthe M-4 Shermans. Tanks could not lead the attack through the hedgerows nor support leadinginfantry attacks with maingun and machine-gun fire. Unable to operate through the hedgerows withattacking infantrymen, tanks had to take a passive role and merely followed the main infantryattack, while awaiting suitable opportunities for employment.

	Another serious problem that became evident during the early Normandy battles was thattank-infantry coordination was poor. Insufficient combined arms training had been conductedbefore D-Day. Primarily concerned with the problems of amphibious warfare, infantry divisionsfailed to train adequately with their assigned tank units. Another difficulty was that supportingGHQ tank battalions were not assigned to their respective infantry divisions until a few weeksprior to D-Day. For example, the 745th Tank Battalion was not assigned to the 1st InfantryDivision until 21 April, and tank companies were not attached to individual infantry regimentsuntil they were already in combat after D-Day.16

	Another cause for poor tank-infantry coordination was that many infantry commanders hadnot worked with tanks before and lacked sufficient experience concerning how tanks should beused in conjunction with infantry. The exact details of how tanks and infantry should work togetherwere largely neglected until infantrymen and tankers found themselves thrown together among thehedgerows. Many commanders at the battalion level and above were inexperienced in integrating the components of the combined arms team. Theoperations officer of Collins' VII Corps elaborated on this problem: "More combined training forinfantry battalion commanders is needed. They should know how to use all of their tools.... Wehave had to teach this in battle the hard way. The same also applies to regimental commanders."17

	A bright spot in the American combined arms teams was the field artillery. Infantrycommanders understood artillery doctrine and knew how to best employ their supporting fires.Infantry-artillery coordination was consistently good throughout First Army. When conditionspermitted, artillery wreaked havoc on the enemy. German prisoners consistently stated that U.S.artillery fire was extremely effective. Captured officers with experience in Russia believed thatAmerican artillery was more powerful and devastating than Soviet artillery.18

	Despite the outstanding performance of the infantry-artillery team, several conditionsinhibited artillery operations. Ammunition shortages, for one, plagued First Army artillery unitsthroughout the Normandy campaign. Lack of positions from which to observe targets alsocompelled artillery batteries to fire on unobserved targets and unconfirmed locations of Germanunits. Inadequate observation also restricted counterbattery fires against German artillery andharassing and interdiction fires against targets in the German rear.19

	The central challenge facing U.S. commanders in Normandy, however, was how to rupturethe hedgerow defenses and get their own units moving quickly forward in of systematicallygrinding their way through the Germans' prepared positions. Since the hedgerows and the confinedspaces within the beachhead precluded outflanking maneuvers, the only available alternative wasthe least desirable one: frontal assaults straight into the enemy's kill zones. American commandersat all levels understood that answers to tactical problems had to be found before a stalemateensued. Methods and techniques had to be devised that would overcome the hedgerow barriers,degrade the German defense, and restore the initiative to the attacker. First Army realized it couldnot afford the luxury of suspending operations to repair deficiencies in the combined arms team orto determine the very best way of busting the German defenses. Solutions to these problems wouldhave to be found and implemented in the midst of battle.
Contents
**The Solution**

	By late June, most commanders throughout First Army realized the peculiar nature of thefighting taking place in the hedgerows. From a tactical standpoint, hedgerow combat was unlikeanything the Americans had ever before encountered. Combat consisted of small-unit actionsaimed at reducing the German positions in each field rather than sweeping maneuvers to seizemajor objectives. Veterans with experience in North Africa and Sicily had not encounteredanything comparable to the Normandy hedgerows. Similarly, combat training did not prepareunblooded soldiers for the tactical problems unique to hedgerow fighting. Battle in Normandy puta higher premium on leadership and initiative at the small-unit level rather than on generalship.Some commanders compared the hedgerow fighting to combat in jungles or forests. Others said itwas more akin to Indian fighting.20

	The leaders within First Army realized they had to find ways to smash through the Germandefenses. Unable to outflank enemy positions, American soldiers had to find ways to restoretactical mobility and to bring more heavy-caliber weapons to bear against the Germans. As theytried to develop techniques that would succeed within the confined spaces of the Bocage,commanders gleaned little help from Army doctrine or standard tactical procedures. Nonetheless,as early as 9 June, First Army headquarters began to grapple with the problem of how to getthrough the hedgerows. In a conversation with an armor officer on First Army's staff, GeneralBradley wondered whether tanks could blow their way through the hedgerows with main-gun andmachine-gun fires. Throughout First Army during June and July, officers, noncommissionedofficers, and enlisted men contemplated methods to overcome the German defense.21

	The most obvious solution to the problems of hedgerow combat was for Americancommanders to find ways to maximize the advantages of the tools most readily available to them:the mobility and firepower of the combined arms team. The key challenge to the U.S. Army was tofinds ways to bring the separate components of the combined arms teams together in a concertedattack against the German hedgerow defenses. Infantry, armor, and artillery had to be knittedtogether into an effective fighting team.

	Early in the campaign, infantry commanders realized that before their units could maneuverto close with the enemy, they had to find a way to deliver heavy suppressive fires against the Germans. The most obvious solution at hand was to better integrate armor into the attack so asto capitalize on their tanks' armored protection and firepower. Instead of attacking in separateechelons as prescribed in doctrinal manuals, infantry and armor had to be able to advancesimultaneously in the face of German defenses, while mutually supporting one another. If tanks andinfantry worked closely together, infantrymen might be able to assault the Germans whileShermans delivered heavy suppressive fire with their machine guns and cannon.22

	However, before infantrymen and tankers could operate together in the hedgerows, severaltechnical problems had to be solved. The most pressing and difficult problem was to find ways forthe First Army's M-4 Shermans to overcome the physical barrier presented by the hedgerows.Another obstacle to tank-infantry coordination was inadequate communications. If ways could befound for the Shermans to bash through the hedgerows and communicate with their accompanyinginfantry, tanks would be able to deliver suppressive firepower and help the infantry move forward.

	The search for a solution to the armored mobility problem typifies the problem-solvingprocesses that took place throughout First Army. Tank units discovered that Shermans could driveover the top of smaller hedgerows. Negotiating larger hedgerows was a hazardous, if notimpossible, task and exposed the tanks' thin underbellies to antitank fire. The first attempts atpenetrating the hedgerows involved the use of specially equipped "dozer" tanks. These tanks werea relatively new invention in 1944 and consisted of M-4 Shermans equipped with a blade similarto those on commercial bulldozers. Dozer tanks normally removed obstacles or improveddefensive positions. Early experience in Normandy showed that a dozer tank could push its waythrough the most formidable hedgerow. Dozer tanks could also widen natural gaps in hedgerowsthat were too narrow for Shermans to drive through.23

	However, there were too few dozer tanks in First Army to support large-scale operationson wide frontages. A tank battalion was usually equipped with only four dozer tanks. These tankswere too few in number to support divisional attacks effectively where each infantry regimentmight encounter dozens of hedgerows. To alleviate the situation, armor leaders recommended thatone tank in each armor platoon be equipped with a blade device. First Army made frantic efforts toincrease the number of its dozer tanks. In July 1944, First Army requisitioned 278 dozer blades. However, units could not sit idly by while waiting for supply channels toproduce the badly needed dozer blades. Weeks might pass before enough dozer tanks becameavailable to allow widespread armor operations through the hedgerows.24

	The urgency of the situation resulted in the development of improvised methods thatallowed tanks to maneuver in the Bocage. The first field-expedient solution to the mobilityproblem came from the 747th Tank Battalion assigned to Major General Charles H. Gerhardt's29th Infantry Division. The 747th was not equipped with dozer tanks, so instead of trying to drivedirectly over the hedgerows, someone suggested that demolitions be used to blow gaps in thehedgerows. After experimentation, the tankers discovered that demolitions could indeed breach thehedgerows. Two 24-pound explosive charges placed eight feet apart and eighteen inches aboveground level blew a sizable hole in a hedgerow. On 24 June, engineer squads from the 29thDivision's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion emplaced demolition charges on hedgerows during alimited attack by elements of the 747th Tank Battalion and the 115th Infantry. The attackersdiscovered that the 24-pound charges did not always create a hole large enough for the Shermans.After the attack, the engineers decided to increase the size of the explosive charges fromtwenty-four to fifty pounds. They hoped the increased charges would consistently blow breacheslarge enough to accommodate the attacking tanks.25

	However, several problems resulted from increasing the size and weight of the explosivecharges. The commander of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R.Ploger, conducted an informal study of the logistics involved in supporting a tank attack withfifty-pound explosive charges. Ploger assumed that in a typical attack, a tank company moving adistance of one and one-half miles through the Bocage would encounter thirty-four separatehedgerows. As a result, each tank company needed seventeen tons of explosives. Demolitionswere not readily available in such quantities, and the problems involved in the transport andemplacement of enough explosives seemed insurmountable. Apparently, other techniques wereneeded to breach the hedgerows.26

	The engineers then suggested that the explosives be buried within the hedgerowembankments. Burying the charges would greatly increase the efficiency of the demolitions, allowthe use of smaller charges, and alleviate problems associated with availability, transport, andemplacement. Unfortunately, other conditions prevented the burying of explosive charges. Digging holes large and deep enough forthe explosives in earthen embankments covered with vines and filled with roots proved toolaborious. During an attack, digging holes and emplacing charges would simply take too long.Since an attack could proceed only as fast as charges were emplaced and detonated, slowmovingAmerican attacks would allow the Germans to coordinate their hedgerow defense better.Engineers and infantrymen would also be dangerously exposed to German mortar fire whileplanting demolitions. Though technically feasible, burying explosives by hand was a procedureboth too difficult and tactically unwise.27

	Determined to find a way to get through the hedgerows, the tankers and engineers finallydeveloped an effective technique for using explosives. In a conference between officers of the747th Tank Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Ploger, someone suggested that the tanks be equippedwith a mechanical device to gouge holes in the hedgerows for the explosives. After someexperimentation, the tankers finally equipped an M-4 Sherman with two pieces of commercialpipe, each four feet long and six and one-half inches in diameter. The tankers welded the pipesonto the front side of the Sherman's final drive assemblies and reinforced the weld with angleirons. Shermans so equipped simply rammed into a hedgerow embankment and then backed awayleaving two sizable holes for the explosives. Ploger's engineers also learned to pack thedemolitions into expended 105-mm artillery shell casings, thereby greatly increasing the efficiencyof the charges. The engineers found that two charges of only fifteen pounds each could blow a gaplarge enough for a Sherman tank. Placing explosives in shell casings also made the transport andhandling of charges much easier. The method proved so successful that the 747th outfittednumerous tanks with the pipe devices.28

	Several factors soon led to an even better method of breaching the hedgerows. The tankersdiscovered that demolitions took away the element of surprise during attacks. An explosion alertedthe Germans that a tank would soon appear through the hedgerows. The detonation clearly markedwhere the tank would appear, thus forming an aiming point for German machine-gun and antitankfires. A method that did not use explosives would increase the effectiveness of American attacksby restoring the element of surprise.29

During experiments to test the feasibility of the pipe devices, the tankers of the 747th discoveredthat a Sherman equipped with pipes could sometimes plough its own way through smaller hedgerows. Unfortunately, themaneuver frequently bent the pipes or tore them loose from the tank. After observing that tankswith pipes could penetrate some hedgerows on their own, First Lieutenant Charles B. Green of the747th designed a strong bumper device for use in plowing through the hedgerows. Made fromsalvaged railroad tracks, the new tank bumper proved strong enough to tear through almost anyhedgerow. After proving successful in combat, maintenance teams welded the bumper onto manyof the 747th's Shermans.30

	By late June, many units throughout First Army had developed a variety of means to breachthe hedgerows. The 83d Infantry Division in VII Corps used two 25-pound explosive charges.Engineers packed the explosives in a sandbag, buried them by hand two feet into the hedgerowembankment, and then tamped the hole full of dirt to increase the effectiveness of the charge. Otherunits copied the techniques developed in the 29th Division. The 703d Tank Battalion, attached tothe 4th Infantry Division in VII Corps, adopted the 747th's hedgerowbusting techniques and foundthem "highly successful." In VIII Corps, the 79th Infantry Division also developed another type ofhedgerow cutter for use on its Sherman tanks.31

	Soldiers of the 2d Armored Division's 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron inventedthe hedgerow device that gained the widest publicity. During a discussion between some of the102d's officers and enlisted men, someone suggested that they get "saw teeth," put them on theirtanks, and cut through the hedgerows. Many of the troops laughed at the suggestion, but SergeantCurtis G. Culin took the idea to heart. Culin designed and supervised the construction of ahedgerow cutting device made from scrap iron pulled from a German roadblock. Testing showedthat the device allowed a Sherman to cut easily through the hedgerows. Because the hedgerowcutter's blades made a tank resemble a large pachyderm with tusks, troops called the device a"rhinoceros," and Shermans equipped with Culin's invention became known as "rhino" tanks.Though the most famous of the hedgerow-reducing devices, Culin's "rhinoceros" was only one ofmany such contrivances invented and employed throughout First Army.32
**A close-up of a typical hedgerow-cutter device**
	Culin's device soon got the attention of the chain of command within 2d Armored Divisionand V Corps. On 14 July, General Bradley attended a demonstration of Culin's hedgerow cutter.Bradley watched as Shermans mounting the hedgerow device plowed through the hedgerows "asthough they were pasteboard, throwing the bushes and brush into the air." Very impressed by the demonstration,Bradley ordered the chief of First Army's Ordnance Section to supervise the construction andinstallation of as many of the hedgerow cutters as possible.33

	First Army Ordnance assembled welders and welding equipment within the beachhead andfrom the rear areas in England to assist with the project. Welding teams used scrap metal fromGerman beach obstacles to construct most of the hedgerow cutters. In a prodigious effort between14-25 July, the First Army Ordnance Section produced over 500 hedgerow cutters and distributedthem to subordinate commands for installation. By late July, 60 percent of First Army's Shermansmounted the hedgerow-cutting devices.34

	Another problem besetting the U.S. Army in the early stages of the campaign wasinadequate communications, which prevented close coordination between tankers and infantrymen.The din of battle and roar of tank engines drowned out voice communications between tankcommanders and troops on the ground. Infantrymen could not get the attention of tankers who were busy inside their vehicles. The most significant problem was that the majority of tank andinfantry radios operated on different wavelengths. Such incompatible equipment made direct radiocommunications between tanks and infantry platoons impossible. Out of the seven radiosauthorized in an infantry company, only the company commander's radio transmitted and receivedwith tank radios. Conversely, in a tank platoon only the platoon leader and the platoon sergeanthad radios capable of communicating with an infantry company commander's radio. Unable tocommunicate during combat, infantry squads and tankers failed to coordinate their fires against theGermans.35

	Eventually, soldiers devised several field-expedient solutions to communicationsproblems. One technique involved the attachment of two infantry field telephones to each tank.Infantrymen strapped one phone onto the rear of a Sherman's back deck and then connected it bywire to a second phone located inside the tank's turret. By using such back-deck telephones,soldiers could direct tankers against concealed German positions. However, infantrymen wereforced to expose themselves to enemy fire while talking on the back-deck telephones. Some unitstried to solve the problem by letting a long strand of communications wire trail behind the tanks.Infantrymen then connected a field telephone to the end of the trailing wires and talked with thetank's crews from a safer position. However, dangling wires often accidentally broke, pulled loosefrom the tanks, or got entangled in the tanks' treads. Infantrymen and tank crews discovered the bestway to communicate was through the tanks' interphone boxes, which were connected directly intothe tanks' intercom systems, and were then mounted on each Sherman's back deck in emptyammunition containers. To talk with the tankers, infantrymen simply plugged a radio handset intothe interphone boxes. The handsets' long cords permitted soldiers to lie down behind or underneaththe tanks to protect themselves while talking to the tank crews. By mid-July, many divisions inFirst Army used field-expedient methods for communications between tanks and supportinginfantrymen.36

	Units also found ways to facilitate better radio communications. Both tank and infantryunits tried to increase the span of control by procuring additional radios. Tank platoon leaders insome units acquired extra, manpack armor radios for use by the infantry. Other tank units tried toinstall infantry radios in their vehicles but with poor results. A popular method of increasingcommand and control by radio was for infantry commanders to ride in the command vehicle of theattached armor unit. By riding in a command tank and using a manpack infantry radio, a rifle company commandercould simultaneously control the movement of his platoons and attached tanks.37

	Troops developed a wide variety of visual signals and standing operating procedures tocoordinate actions during battle. Because tankers and infantrymen used different standard hand andarm signals, soldiers had to develop new signals for various functions. Tank-infantry teamsinvented signals for "commence fire," "cease fire," and to indicate the location of enemy positions.Leaders also used smoke grenades and flares to control their subordinates. Many infantry squadand platoon leaders carried rifles that fired tracer bullets used to mark targets. Infantrycommanders learned to assign the same squads to work with supporting tanks and found thatfamiliarity between tank crews and infantry squads greatly increased the soldiers' confidence andproficiency.38

	Inadequate observation of artillery targets was also a problem that hampered combinedarms operations. Operating in the flat hedgerow thickets, forward observers lacked adequate fieldsof observation to adjust fire onto German forward positions or targets in the enemy's rear. Ashortage of forward observers also hampered operations. Artillery battalions normally assignedone forward observer to each rifle platoon in an infantry company, while tank companies receivedonly one forward observer for use by the company commander. Because tank companies rarelyoperated as a single unit, tank platoons did not have their own means of calling for fire. Normallytankers sent their requests for fire to the forward observer of their accompanying infantryunit-usually without results. Tank platoon leaders sometimes called for fire by communicatingdirectly with the fire-direction center of their supporting artillery. Unfortunately, armor officerswere often incapable of sending correct calls for fire or could not adjust rounds onto targets.39

	Aerial forward observers were the best. solution to the problems of observing enemytargets. In First Army, each division had ten light aircraft assigned for liaison missions, and eachcorps headquarters had from fifty to seventy aircraft. The airplanes were either L-4 Piper Cubs orthe larger L-5 Stinson Sentinels. Besides the pilot, the aircraft carried a skilled forward observerequipped with radios linked to the fire-direction centers of supporting artillery units. Loiteringover a designated sector, aerial forward observers called fire on forward enemy positions andvaluable targets in the German rear area and adjusted barrages in support of American ground attacks. During the Normandy battles, aerial forwardobservers conducted the majority of target-fire missions with "universally excellent" results.40

	Aerial observers also performed numerous other functions. On several occasions,observers adjusted artillery fire to neutralize German gun positions firing on Americanfighter-bombers engaged in close air support missions. During VII Corps' attack on Cherbourg, airobservers adjusted naval gunfire for ground units. Whenever observer aircraft were in the area,German artillery batteries were reluctant to fire for fear of revealing their location and exposingthemselves to American counterbattery fire. Air observers also collected tactical intelligence bytaking photographs that ground units used in preparing for attacks. The small aircraft were reliable,highly maneuverable, and surprisingly survivable; only nine Piper Cubs were lost duringoperations in Normandy.41

	Technical innovations in mobility, communications, and artillery observation were notenough to ensure a coordinated combined arms effort. Small-unit tactics also had to be developedso that indirect fire pounded the enemy while closely coordinated teams of tanks and infantryassaulted German defensive positions. With the problems of armored mobility and tacticalcommunications largely solved, infantry commanders finally realized that firepower from theirsupporting M-4 Shermans could place heavy suppressive fires on the Germans, thus allowing theirunits a chance to maneuver. Properly employed, the machine guns of an M-4 Sherman delivered thedirect fire needed to suppress German machine guns, while a Sherman's main gun, used atpoint-blank range, substituted for indirect artillery fire. As tanks suppressed the German defenders,infantry units could clear out the hedgerows and maneuver to assault the main German defensivepositions. Infantry could also provide tanks with protection against German close assaults.Throughout First Army, units worked to develop new combined arms tactics. Commanders at alllevels began to experiment with methods that permitted infantry and tanks to work closely together.Units trained and conducted rehearsals in rear areas before trying new tactics in combat. The resultwas the implementation by First Army units of several methods that allowed the combined armsteam to overcome the enemy.

	Events within the 29th Infantry Division best illustrate how the U.S. Army developed andexecuted new tactical methods. In an attempt to expand the Normandy beachhead, First Army ordered Corlett's 's XIX Corps to attack the Germans on 16 June and seize prominent  terrain northand east of Saint-Lo. The XIX Corps ordered Gerhardt's 29th Division to conduct the main attackand to take key terrain near the villages of Saint-Andréde-l'Epine and Villiers-Fossard (see map2). The attack jumped off early on the morning of 16 June and failed to make any substantialprogress against the Germans. By late afternoon, it was obvious that the 29th Division's regimentswould not reach their initial objectives before nightfall. Major General Corlett issued orders forthe forward troops to dig in for the night and to prepare to resume the attack the next day. The 29thDivision continued to attack for two more days but with few beneficial results. By nightfall on 18June, the division was exhausted, bloodied, and unable to continue the attack. In this instance, theGerman hedgerow defense had successfully stopped the best American efforts to smash through theBocage.42

	Other operations in the 29th Division's sector also exhibited deficiencies in tank-infantrycoordination. An attack on 20 June by the 175th Infantry and Company B, 747th Tank Battalion,against German positions near Villiers-Fossard demonstrated the problems of operating among thehedgerows. Using standard tank-infantry tactics, the tankers led the attack, and the infantryfollowed. Tankers and infantrymen, however, failed to support one another during the attack andsoon became separated, as the tankers blew the hedgerows with explosives and plunged forwardalone. German machine guns pinned down the infantry, while the unescorted American tanks soonfell prey to German antitank fires. Company B lost four tanks in the attack, and finally both tankersand infantrymen had to withdraw to their initial positions.43

	Frustrated by their failures in the hedgerows, leaders within the 29th Division realized theyhad to find ways to defeat the Germans. General Gerhardt directed the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, to supervise the development and implementation oftactics to overcome the German method of hedgerow defense. The tactics developed by the 29thDivision were a departure from normal Army doctrine in that neither the tanks nor the infantry ledthe attack but fought closely together and protected one another while closing with the enemy.44

	The 29th Division's solution relied on the firepower and maneuver of small, closelycoordinated combat teams. Each team consisted of a single tank, an engineer team, and a squad ofinfantry reinforced by a light machine gun and a 60-mm mortar from an infantry company's weapons platoon. Before the attack, the infantry and engineersoccupied the hedgerow that served as the jump-off position for the assault (see figure 3). Theattack began when a Sherman equipped with pipe devices nosed into the hedgerow and opened fireon the Germans with main gun and machine guns. The Sherman first fired a white phosphorousround into the corners of the opposite hedgerow to eliminate German heavy machine-gun positions.The tankers then systematically sprayed machine-gun fire along the entire base of the enemyhedgerow. The 60-mm mortar supported the attack by lobbing shells into the fields directly behindthe German positions. The infantry attacked when the Sherman opened fire with its machine guns.The squad moved through the hedgerow deployed on line and advanced across the open field usingstandard methods of fire and movement. The infantry stayed away from the hedgerows on theirflanks to avoid enemy grazing fire. The Sherman continued to support the attack until the infantry'sadvance masked the tank's machine-gun fire. As they closed on the German positions, Americaninfantrymen threw hand grenades over the hedgerow to kill or confuse German defenders on theopposite side. Simultaneously, the Sherman backed away from its firing position, and the engineerseinplaced demolitions in the holes left by the Sherman's pipe devices. After the explosives blew ahole in the hedgerow, the Sherman moved forward to provide close support to the infantry squad.The tankers and infantrymen then flushed the hedgerow of any remaining defenders and prepared tocontinue the attack. The engineer team and machine-gun and mortar crews then displaced forwardto support the next assault.45

	On 24 June, elements of the 29th Division conducted a full rehearsal in the division reararea to test the validity of the new close-assault tactics. An infantry platoon, a tank platoon, andthree engineer teams rehearsed the new tactics during several simulated attacks. Lessons learnedduring the exercise helped improve the effectiveness of the hedgerow tactics. The infantrydiscovered a light machine gun could not be moved quickly enough to keep up with their advance.Instead, the infantry preferred to use Browning automatic rifles to provide suppressive fire.Infantrymen also learned to coordinate their attack with tankers by using rear-deck telephonesmounted on the backs of the Shermans. Mortar observers discovered that by standing on theSherman's rear deck, they could see the next hedgerow and adjust rounds onto the Germanpositions. Mortar crews also learned they could help protect the assaulting infantry squad by obscuring German observation with smoke shells. The tankers found out thatcrew members had to dismount and cut away vegetation to clear adequate fields of fire andobservation. The rehearsals made tank commanders realize they had to control their machine-gunfire closely to avoid hitting friendly infantrymen.46
Contents**Figure 3. The 29th Infantry    Division's hedgerow tactics****A Sherman tank crew practices using a hedgerow-cutter device prior to a battle**
	After the rehearsal on 24 June, the 29th Division's operations staff prepared diagrams andexplanatory notes outlining the new hedgerow tactics in detail. The operations section thendistributed the information as a training memorandum to all regiments within the division. Units inthe 29th Division practiced and rehearsed the new tactics in preparation for their next bout withthe Germans.47 On 1 July, General Cota summed up the 29th Division's tactical experience inFrance:

**What held us up at first was that we originally were organized to assault the beach,suffered a lot of casualties among key men, then hit another kind of warfare for which we were notorganized. We had to assemble replacements and reorganize. Now we have had time to reorganizeand give this warfare some thought. I think we will go next time.48**

The 29th Division did not have to wait long for an opportunity to use its new combined armstactics.

	On 11 July, XIX Corps attacked southward toward Saint-Lo as part of a First Armyoffensive to push the German Seventh Army out of Normandy. The XIX Corps ordered the 29thDivi sion to attack and seize key terrain east of Saint-Lo. As part of the division's attack plan,General Gerhardt ordered the 116th Infantry to conduct the main attack and captureSaint-Andréde-l'Epine, then swing westward and attack along a major ridgeline to take the villageof Martinville (see map 2). The regimental commander then ordered the 2d Battalion, 116thInfantry, to lead the attack with the other battalions following in column. Company B of the 121stEngineer Combat Battalion and Company A of the 747th Tank Battalion supported the 2dBattalion. The lead battalion planned to execute the attack with two rifle companies that had beentrained and organized to execute the 29th Division's new hedgerow tactics.49

	The attack started at 0600 on 11 July after a furious twenty-minute preparatorybombardment by five battalions of artillery. Initial progress was slow and discouraging. The 2dBattalion advanced with two companies abreast and encountered determined resistance fromenemy positions in the first hedgerows. The tank-infantry-engineer teams, however, continued topush forward, and by 1100 they finally broke through the organized German defense, which easedand then collapsed. The 2d Battalion then made rapid progress, seized the ridgeline to its front,wheeled to the right, and continued to move. Before nightfall, the 2d Battalion advanced anothermile toward Martinville and was in an excellent position to continue the attack toward Saint-Lô.50

	The 116th Infantry's attack demonstrated the effectiveness of the 29th Division's hedgerowtactics. Compared to other operations in the Bocage, the 2d Battalion's advance made spectacularprogress. The battalion achieved a major penetration of the enemy line and completely ruptured themain line of German resistance. General Gerhardt attributed the success to tank-infantry-engineerteamwork. Mortars delivered fire on the German positions, tanks provided suppressive fire,engineers breached the hedgerows, and infantry assaulted the Germans while protecting theShermans against antitank fires. Infantry casualties were relatively light during the attack, and notone Sherman was lost.51
Contents**Map 2. The 29th Division's attack, 11 July 1944**
	Major General Walter M. Robertson's 2d Infantry Division in V Corps had a similarexperience with hedgerow combat. During 12-16 June, the 2d Division battered itself against Hill 192, the highest terrain feature inthe Saint-Lo area, which allowed the Germans to observe all major activities within the entire Vand XIX Corps sectors. Hill 192 was also one of the most heavily defended German strongpointsin the entire First Army sector. After repeated assaults over a four-day period, the division failedto take Hill 192 and suffered 1,253 casualties.52

	In the aftermath of the June attacks, the 2d Division began to look for successful ways toattack through the hedgerows. The tactics they developed and employed varied slightly from theprocedures used in the 29th Division. In small-unit actions, engineer teams accompanied eachSherman tank as well as each infantry squad. Once the infantry squad attacked and secured anenemy hedgerow, the accompanying engineers immediately began to prepare the hedgerow fordemolition. Engineers with the Sherman gapped the hedgerow holding up the tank and then swept apath for the tank through the open field with mine detectors. Two infantrymen provided constantlocal security for the Sherman. Follow-on infantry platoons actively probed the hedgerows to lookfor concealed Germans and to eliminate snipers.53

	As part of the major offensive of 11 July, First Army ordered V Corps to attack and seizethe dominating terrain east of Saint-L6. General Gerow ordered the 2d Division to once againattack and seize Hill 192. General Robertson ordered the 38th Infantry to conduct the main attack.This time, the regimental commander decided to conduct a powerful frontal assault with twobattalions abreast.54

	The attack started at 0630 on 11 July after a devastating twenty-minute artillerybombardment (see map 3). The 1st and 2d Battalions led the attack, supported by two tankcompanies from the 741st Tank Battalion and an engineer company from the 2d Engineer CombatBattalion. The Germans put up stiff resistance from the beginning. One tank company lost sixShermans to German *panzerfausts*. Fanatical Germans defending a position near "Kraut Corner"refused to surrender and were run over and buried alive by one of the 741st's dozer tanks.However, the 38th Infantry began to make good progress by using its new hedgerow tactics.Devastating artillery fire closely supported the infantry advance by maintaining heavy barrages infront of the attacking units. Around noon, the 38th Infantry finally reached the top of Hill 192 as theGermans disengaged and withdrew to the south. By nightfall, the 38th Infantry had cleared Hill 192 of all German defenders and was well entrenched in positions on the hill'ssouthern slopes.55
Contents**Map 3. The attack on Hill 192, 11 July 1944**
	Like the 29th Division's attack against the Martinville ridge, the 2d Division's attack wasan outstanding success. The principal reason was the proper use of tank-infantry-engineer teams.The infantry found that the tank's rear-deck telephones helped greatly in coordinating the attack.One battalion commander reported that because of the new hedgerow tactics, his battalion lost notroops to sniper fire, while in previous operations snipers had caused over 50 percent of allcasualties. A second reason for the success on 11 July was the awesome firepower of Americanartillery. The 2d Division's own artillery units fired 20,000 rounds in support of the attack. Alltogether, American artillery battalions dumped forty-five tons of high explosives on the Germansdefending Hill 192.56

	The 83d Infantry Division in Collins' VII Corps also devised other techniques for attackingthrough the hedgerows. Arriving in Normandy in late June, the 83d Division, commanded by MajorGeneral Robert C. Macon, relieved the battle-weary 101st Airborne Division and then occupiedstatic defensive positions near Carentan. While awaiting commitment to offensive operations, the83d Division drew from the 101st Airborne's battle experiences to develop small-unit tactics foruse in the hedgerows.57
Contents**Figure 4. The 83d Infantry Division's hedgerow tactics**
	As in other divisions, the 83d Division's combined arms tactics capitalized on thecomplementary fire and maneuver of tank-infantry-engineer teams supported by mortars andartillery. The attacking elements consisted of an infantry squad, an engineer team, and a tanksection (see figure 4). The attack opened when the lead Sherman, positioned along a hedgerowwith the infantry and the engineers, opened fire with its main gun against the German heavymachine-gun positions in the corners of the opposite hedgerow. Simultaneously, the infantry firedfrom their positions with their own small arms. In addition, supporting mortars lobbed rounds onthe first defensive position, while artillery shelled German defensive positions in depth. After thelead Sherman thoroughly covered the opposite hedgerow with main-gun and machine-gun fire, theassault began. The engineers gapped the hedgerow with buried explosive charges, as the infantrysquad pushed forward through the hedgerow. As soon as the hedgerow was breached, the secondSherman moved forward through the gap and attacked across the open field with the infantry, whilethe support tank continued to fire from its initial position. At the height of the attack, maximum firepower from mortars, a riflesquad, and two Sherman tanks simultaneously assailed the Germans. After the assaulting tank andinfantry squad secured the enemy hedgerow, the supporting Sherman, the engineer team, and themortar crews displaced forward to prepare for the next operation. The assault tank then becamethe support tank for the next attack.58
**The combined arms team in action. By the end of the Normandy campaign, close-knitteams of tanks and infantry were common throughout First Army**
	During the last days of June, units in the 830. Division underwent rigorous training toprepare for combat in the hedgerows. The division was untested in battle and had almost noexperience in working with tanks. Each unit received training in hedgerow tactics from small,combined arms instruction teams formed at division level. Troops from the 101st Airborne and 2dArmored Divisions with experience in hedgerow warfare helped train the 83d Division'stank-infantry-engineer teams.59

	Despite rigorous training and preparation, the 83d Division's introduction into combat wasa bloody failure and illustrates what occurred when American units failed to coordinate theirefforts. On 4 July, the 83d Division, supported by the 746th Tank Battalion, attacked southward from Carentan, with the mission of seizing a vital road junctionat the village of Périers (see map 3). Due to low, wet ground in the sector, the 83d Division had toattack with two regiments abreast along a narrow strip of high ground on both sides of the mainCarentanPériers highway. The restricted avenue of advance greatly assisted German units indefending the sector. From the beginning, bad luck and weather plagued the attack. Despite theirintensive prebattle training, inexperienced units disintegrated as they tried to execute theirhedgerow assault tactics. Tankinfantry coordination was particularly poor and resulted in violentoutbursts between tankers and infantrymen. At least one infantry commander threatened to shoot anarmor officer for failing to support an attack, and one tank commander threatened to gun downinfantrymen who provided inadequate local security for his vehicle. Unable to root out theGermans with uncoordinated attacks, the division's offensive came to a complete, bloody halt. The83d Division paid a heavy price for its clumsy and confused attack. By nightfall on 5 July, thedivision had advanced only 1,600 yards while suffering 2,100 casualties.60

	Armored divisions also studied how best to attack through the Bocage. The lead elementsof 3d Armored Division arrived in Normandy in late June and were assigned to XIX Corps. By 29June, 3d Armored Division's Combat Command A (CCA), commanded by Brigadier GeneralDoyle O. Hickey and consisting of the 32d Armored Regiment and the 36th Armored InfantryRegiment, was ready for combat. As troops arrived in France, Hickey's staff and some of his unitcommanders talked to Corlett's XIX Corps staff about operations in the Bocage. Based on theprevious combat experiences of XIX Corps' units, the tankers decided to develop their ownspecial tactics for combat in the hedgerows.61

	In late June, 3d Armored Division devised hedgerow tactics that emphasized coordinated,combined efforts by tanks and infantry. Again, mobility and firepower were the key elements in thetactical formula. Like other units in First Army, 3d Armored Division discovered that dozer tanksand engineer teams with demolitions could breach the most formidable hedgerows. Tank platoonsoperating with infantry squads and supported by artillery and mortar fire were expected to deliverenough direct firepower to root out the most determined defenders.62

	Unlike infantry divisions that developed hedgerow tactics for single tanks and infantrysquads, 3d Armored Division devised a method of assault based on the coordinated action of a tank company and an infantrycompany (see figure 5). Units attacked on a front usually three fields wide and always assaultedthe center field last. The attack began as engineer teams or dozer tanks gapped the first hedgerowand indirect fire fell on and behind the forward German positions. An entire tank platoon thenattacked with one section moving forward along each hedgerow paralleling the axis of advance.The Shermans put main-gun fire into the hedgerow to their front and sprayed the side hedgerowswith heavy machine-gun fire. During the early phase of the assault, the tanks moved slowly enoughso that supporting infantry could move with them and provide local security. The tanks also tried toprotect themselves against German close infantry assaults by always staying at least twenty yardsaway from the nearest hedgerow. After reaching the main German defensive position, the tanksturned inward and worked their way toward the center of the field, covering the hedgerows withheavy machine-gun fire. Together, the tanks and infantry cleared the German defensive positionand then prepared to continue the attack.63

	The second phase of the assault began when engineers or dozer tanks gapped thehedgerows bordering the center field. Assault teams of infantry and tanks from each of the originalattacking platoons then attacked the flanks of the center German position. During the second phaseof the attack, follow-on forces moved forward to occupy the hedgerow delineating the original lineof departure and provided suppressive fire with tank cannon and machine guns. The attackingsections moved toward the center of the German position, spraying the hedgerow withmachine-gun fire and rooting out any remaining defenders. Once the final objective was secure, thecompanies reorganized and prepared to continue the attack by repeating the same sequence ofevents.64

	The 3d Armored Division's hedgerow tactics had several merits. By not directly attackingeach field with frontal assaults, the tankers hoped to secure a maximum amount of terrain whileminimizing exposure to enemy fire. Commanders believed that by initially attacking and securingthe outside fields that the Germans defending the center would withdraw to maintain the overallcontinuity of the German defense.65
Contents**Figure 5. The 3d Armored Division's hedgerow tactics**
	On 29 June, Combat Command A (CCA) of 3d Armored Division entered battle in supportof the 29th Infantry Division. General Hickey's mission was to reduce a German salient thatprotruded into the American lines near the hamlet of Villiers-Fossard. The position was heavily defended and at its furthest point jutted 2,000 yards intoAmerican lines. The XIX Corps ordered CCA to conduct a forward passage of lines through the29th Division, attack and reduce the salient, and then defend until relieved by follow-on units ofthe 29th Division.66
**A U.S. infantry squad deployed along a small hedgerow**
	CCA's attack against Villiers-Fossard moved forward at 0900 on 29 June after a punishingfifty-minute preparatory bombardment by fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air Command andseventeen battalions of artillery. The attacking battalions initially met fierce resistance, butcoordinated tankinfantry-engineer teams successfully pushed the Germans back. The command'stwelve dozer tanks played a major role in breaching the hedgerows. By the evening of 30 June,CCA successfully reduced the German salient and was relieved by the 29th Division.67

	CCA's attack proved that coordinated combined arms actions could overcome the Germanhedgerow defense, but it also revealed the Germans were a determined and resourceful enemy.During the attack, the lead American infantry elements noticed that extensive wire communications ran between all German positions. The communicationsnetwork enabled forward observers in trees to bring down accurate mortar and artillery fire onCCA. In the two-day attack, German indirect fire caused 351 out of the total of 401 Americancasualties. Not one Sherman was lost while moving through the hedgerows with infantryprotection. However, an uncoordinated armor assault in the last phase of the operation againshowed the necessity for combined arms action. In an unsupported blitz attack across the openspaces of an abandoned airfield south of Villiers-Fossard, elements of CCA lost twenty-sevenShermans. Long-range antitank fires hit thirteen tanks, while German *panzerfausts* destroyedanother fourteen Shermans. Even with the loss of 27 of its 116 tanks, the use of effective combinedarms tactics permitted CCA to reduce the Villiers-Fossard salient with a relatively low cost inmen and equipment.68

	The 2d Armored Division also developed special tactics for use in the hedgerows, but itstechniques differed radically from those developed by other divisions within First Army. In midJuly, 2d Armored Division began to prepare for its role in Operation Cobra, First Army'soffensive designed to rupture the defenses of the German Seventh Army and precipitate a majorbreakout into the Brittany peninsula and the interior of France. In the Cobra plan, First Armyassigned a rapid exploitation mission to Major General Edward H. Brooks of the 2d ArmoredDivision. The tactical challenge facing the 2d Armored was to develop techniques that allowedinfantry and armor to work closely together during high-speed maneuvers through the Bocage.
**Infantrymen ride on the back of an M-4 Sherman "rhino" tank as it bashes through a hedgerow**
	By 25 July, CCA of the 2d Armored and the 22d Infantry had developed a novel way fortanks and infantry to cooperate during fast-moving operations: the infantry rode on the back decksof tanks and only dismounted when the attack met stiff enemy resistance. The overall tactical plandeveloped by Brigadier General Maurice A. Rose's CCA and the 22d Infantry called for units toattack in three assault waves. The first echelon consisted solely of tanks and relied on its ownmobility and firepower, along with supporting artillery, to eliminate enemy positions. A secondwave of tanks and infantry closely followed the lead elements. Eight infantrymen rode on the backdeck of each Sherman in the second wave. The infantry had two main purposes. They providedtanks in the second wave with local security, and whenever the tanks in the first wave encounteredstiff resistance, the infantry dismounted and worked with the lead tanks to conduct a coordinated combined arms attack. The third echelon alsoconsisted of tanks and infantry and had the mission of eliminating positions bypassed or notdetected by the leading elements.69

	Between 19-25 July, the 22d Infantry and CCA's 66th Armored Regiment conducted mockattacks and rehearsals in preparation for Cobra. Tankers conducted classes on the proper distribution of main-gun and machine-gun fire and the correct way to use the "rhinoceros" hedgecutters mounted on 75 percent of the 66th's tanks. Platoons from the 22d Infantry- constantlypracticed tank-infantry coordination with the 66th Armored.
Contents**Map 4. Breakthrough, 25--27 July 1944**
Infantry units learned how best to mount, dismount, and ride on tanks and taught their soldiers howto use the new external telephones mounted on most of CCA's tanks. Infantrymen also found waysto camouflage themselves with vegetation while riding on Shermans. Leaders generally found that infantrymen easily adapted to the new tasksinvolved in working with armor.70

	On the morning of 26 July, the day after the saturation bombing that marked the opening ofthe Cobra offensive, CCA, applying some of its new techniques, conducted a forward passage oflines through the 30th Infantry Division and attacked southward (see map 4). General Rose'smission was to seize high ground in the vicinity of Hill 193 and le Mesnil-Herman and thenestablish defensive positions to repel German counterattacks aimed at American follow-on forces.CCA's attack was the type of action most preferred by American commanders, a highly fluidsituation in which mobile forces overran or bypassed enemy resistance.71

	As a result of their new tactics and the intensive prebattle training period, CCA and the22d Infantry made spectacular gains during the attack. The combined arms team worked closelytogether. Artillery observers rode in the lead tanks and brought accurate, indirect fire down on theenemy. Infantry battalion commanders with manpack radios rode in command tanks to bettercoordinate tankers and riflemen. The commander of the 22d Infantry reported that his soldierswere enthusiastic about riding the Shermans "Russian style." The infantry found that riding on tanksgave them several advantages. The height of the tanks put the riflemen above grazing fire and gavethem better observation. Riding on tanks that moved at irregular speeds also made the infantrymore difficult targets. In two days, CCA penetrated more than six miles into the German SeventhArmy's sector. Cobra's preparatory bombardment, sporadic German resistance, and thecoordination and swift execution of CCA's attack resulted in light casualties for the Americans. Bynightfall of 27 July, General Rose was on his objective, having lost only 3 tanks and less than 200men.72

	For First Army, 6 June-31 July was a period of great adaptability, as unit commanders andtheir soldiers came to grips with the problems of fighting in the hedgerow country. For the mostpart, solutions to the problems confronting American units were both technical and tactical innature. The greatest changes took place in combat units where tankers, infantrymen, engineers, andartillery forward observers became close-knit partners in a coordinated effort to root the Germansout of their defensive positions. With the opening of the Cobra offensive on 25 July, First Army began to leave the Bocage behind and to impose on the German Army a new war ofmobility and firepower.
ContentsIII. CONCLUSIONS
	The U.S. Army's first major fight in the European Theater of Operations in World War IIwas one of its hardest. Not until the Huertgen Forest or the German Ardennes offensive wouldAmerican units be so challenged in battle. In Normandy, First Army gained institutional experienceconcerning how to conduct large-scale maneuvers, and inexperienced troops became eithercasualties or seasoned veterans. The fighting produced several operational and tactical lessons.Some were obvious to the participants at the time, others were lost or became blurred by theturbulence of battle.

	Even when First Army failed to seize terrain and make large advances during the fighting inthe hedgerows, it achieved, in considerable degree, the principal objective of combat operations:the destruction of enemy forces. The terrible carnage of the hedgerow fighting cannot help butimpress anyone studying the Normandy campaign. By 17 July, the Germans had suffered almost100,000 casualties but were unable to replace many of their losses. Only enough fresh troopsarrived in Normandy to replace 12 percent of the losses. First Army had fared little better but wascapable of replacing more of its casualties. Before D-Day, SHAEF planners expected over 70percent casualties among infantrymen. By 31 July, First Army had suffered 100,000 casualties and85 percent of these were among infantry units. The 29th Infantry Division alone, which was incontinuous combat longer than any other division in First Army, suffered 9,939 casualties. Riflecompanies throughout the U.S. Army often numbered about 100 men-or less than half strength. Bythe middle of July, infantry losses were so serious that First Army put in an immediate request foran additional 25,000 infantry replacements.1

	In the Normandy campaign, the U.S. Army demonstrated its capability to adapt to a newand hostile environment. Confronting an experienced enemy in the Bocage-terrain that distinctlyfavored the defender-First Army devised tactics and combat procedures to meet unanticipatedchallenges. Furthermore, American troops showed a remarkable capacity to learn from theirmistakes and experiences. Leaders learned in combat how best to use their organic weapons andequipment. At the small-unit level, junior officers, sergeants, and enlisted men invented ways to solve tactical problems peculiar to close combat in the hedgerows.

	Not only did the Army adapt, but it did so quickly and in a great number of ways. The U.S.forces that crossed the Normandy beaches in June had changed a great deal by late July. BetweenD-Day and the Normandy breakout, First Army had devised numerous technical and tacticalsolutions for the conduct of battles against the German Army. The greatest transformation tookplace in combat units where tankers, infantrymen, engineers, and artillery forward observersbecame closeknit partners in a coordinated effort. In the preinvasion period, tankers probablycould not have visualized the hedge cutters and back-deck telephones that were to be on most oftheir tanks by the opening of the Cobra offensive. Nor could commanders have imagined thetactical combinations that had to be developed for combat in the Bocage. By the end of July, FirstArmy routinely used a large number of combat techniques and procedures that were unheard of inthe preinvasion period.

	Ideas on how to achieve better results against the Germans came from a wide variety ofsources. In general, ideas flowed upward from the men actually engaged in battle and were theneither approved or rejected by higher commanders. Within the bottom ranks of the Army,individual soldiers suggested ways that enabled their units to move against the enemy. SergeantCulin's hedgerow cutter is the best example of a single soldier's idea that influenced all of FirstArmy. At the top end of the chain of command, general officers also produced ideas on how todefeat the Germans. General Cota's supervision of the development of hedgerow tactics in the 29thDivision typifies the contributions made by general officers.

	The effort to gather ideas on how to beat the Germans was decentralized. There was almostno effort to work out an Armywide solution to the tactical problems of combat in the Bocage. TheFirst Army staff made no distinct attempt to devise tactical solutions for. the whole command touse in overcoming the German defenses. First Army did publish and distribute to all units a seriesof "Battle Experiences," reports that contained information and lessons learned in battle. Thebulletins were not directive in nature, but subordinate commanders were expected to use theinformation to assist them in finding ways to defeat the Germans. In fact, in only one area did FirstArmy headquarters take an active role in dealing with tactical problems: the production anddistribution of Sergeant Culin's hedgerow cutter.

What explains the decentralized, collective method of tactical problem solving exhibited withinFirst Army? First, the U.S. Army was not in a position to analyze the German defensesystematically and produce one best solution for attacking through the hedgerows. First Armysimply did not have the time to slow the pace of combat operations while seeking a uniform,coordinated solution to tactical problems. The U.S. Army had to push inland and expand itsbeachhead as a prelude to larger operations. Corps and division commanders received orders andwere expected to execute them as quickly as possible while overcoming all difficulties.Commanders who did not perform well were relieved; several division commanders lost theirposts during the Normandy campaign.

	Combat in the hedgerows emphasized the need for competent, assertive leadership incommanders at all levels. Army doctrine insisted that the coordination of the tactics and techniquesof the combined arms team was a command function. In Normandy, commanders were heldresponsible for developing and implementing solutions to tactical problems and were often givenwide latitude in finding answers to difficulties. Senior American leaders expected theirsubordinate commanders to develop and execute solutions to overcome obstacles instead ofwaiting for staffs from higher headquarters to devise the most workable answers to tacticalproblems. Commanders within each division listened to ideas from their units, learned from theexperiences of other divisions, and then developed their own tactics for overcoming the Germanhedgerow defenses. While commanders throughout First Army developed new tactical methodsthat capitalized on the firepower and mobility of the combined arms team, the tactics used withineach division were somewhat different. The variations in technique reflected the individual ideasand experiences of commanders at all levels within each division concerning how to best attackthrough the hedgerows.

	The newly developed tactical methods played a significant role in the defeat of theGermans. Though perhaps not in themselves decisive, new tactical and technical innovationsallowed American units to move forward against the Germans while suffering significantly fewercasualties, The attacks against the Villiers-Fossard salient, the Martinville ridge, and Hill 192 bythe 3d Armored, 29th, and 2d Infantry Divisions, respectively, are the best examples of combinedarms attacks that made good progress with few casualties. Without the development and use ofspecial hedgerow tactics, the U.S. Army might have become bogged down in a brutal war of attrition with the Germans-a situation that would have morally andmaterially disrupted the Allied war effort.

	The Normandy campaign illustrates the importance of precombat training in preparingsoldiers for battle. Serious training deficiencies led to ineffective cooperation between the combatarms in the early hedgerow fighting. A First Army report warned that the "development ofoperational procedures and techniques between the infantry and close-support tanks must not beleft until arrival in the combat zone."2 Yet this is exactly what happened. Standard tank-infantrytraining was poor in the Army. Surprisingly, after two years of actual combat in other theaters, theU.S. Army still placed too little emphasis on the thorough training of tank-infantry teams.Moreover, the lack of an organic tank battalion within each infantry division prevented armor andinfantry units from training together on a regular basis. Training weaknesses also existed in each ofthe combat arms. Infantrymen lacked aggressiveness and failed to use their organic weapons.Tankers initially showed a great reluctance to leave roads and thus avoid enemy antitank fire.Combined arms teams did demonstrate effective coordination between infantry and artillery units-abright spot in their record. While inadequate training hampers any unit in combat, the peculiarnature of the Bocage particularly magnified the effects of training weaknesses among the combatarms.

	Deprived of combined arms training opportunities prior to D-Day, combat trainingconducted just behind the front lines played a key role in the success of American operations.During such training, tankers and infantrymen familiarized themselves with each other'scapabilities and methods and conducted remedial training on how to work together under fire.Finding technical and tactical solutions to overcome the German defenses would not ensuresuccess; soldiers still had to be trained and drilled on how to use new mechanical devices andexecute novel hedgerow tactics. Training conducted in rear areas by the 29th, 2d, and 83d InfantryDivisions and the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions typified the combat zone training experiences thattook place throughout First Army.

	One of the U.S. Army's greatest shortcomings in the campaign was its ignorance of thecharacteristics of the Bocage. Prior to D-Day, senior leaders had no proper appreciation of thehostile nature of the hedgerow country. Despite accurate, detailed analyses by SHAEF and FirstArmy staffs about the military characteristics of the hedgerow country, commands at the highest level did nothing to prepare for combat in the hedgerows. Even though U.S. forces wereproperly concerned about preparing for the amphibious landings, they failed to see beyond thebeaches and to plan and prepare for the battle in the Normandy countryside. With some training,units might have been more prepared for combat in the hedgerows.

	The American tendency to rely on the lavish use of firepower is another striking feature ofFirst Army's conduct of the Normandy campaign. To expend munitions rather than human lives iscertainly a sound practice, but combat in the Bocage proved that firepower alone cannot defeat theenemy. Despite awesome preparatory bombardments, the Germans still stood and fought and hadto be killed or captured by American infantrymen and tankers. An important battlefield lesson ofthe Normandy campaign is that aggressive tactical maneuver must be combined with the proper useof offensive fires in order to defeat a well-prepared defender.

	A study of combat in the hedgerows also sheds some light on the fighting abilities of theopposing forces. Several recent works in military history have analyzed the relative combatperformance of German and American units in World War II. In general, these studies argue thatthe German Army is the paradigm of operational and tactical success, while the American Armymuddles through to victory by the application of overwhelming resources and thunderingfirepower. In *Fighting Power*, Martin van Creveld argues that the U.S. Army put more emphasison technical and administrative matters than on the psychological needs of the fighting soldier andthe training of small-unit leaders. Knowledgeable employment of weapons and machines did playa key role in the American victory, but not to the extent where other considerations weredisregarded. Max Hastings, in *Overlord*, praises German fighting ability while criticizing the U.S.Army for weaknesses in its combat performance. However, Hastings fails to extend his analysisand does not examine how First Army did overcome problems in the Bocage. Even a classic worklike S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire* does not give a complete picture of the fighting in thehedgerows. Marshall observed that in Normandy only 15 to 25 percent of infantry soldiers firedtheir weapons in combat. While such a low fire ratio may be correct, Marshall does not adequatelyexplain why the volume of small-arms fire was so meager nor how the U.S. Army overcameprepared German defenses despite alleged deficiencies in American infantry units. Undoubtedly,First Army experienced problems in its combat units, but this study attempts to portray a more complete and even-handed appraisal of Americanfighting prowess than that depicted in recent analyses of American soldiers' combat performance.While the U.S. Army contained a number of officers and soldiers who proved weak andincompetent in combat, many others displayed the ability to perform under pressure, to getmaximum results from available resources, and to lead their comrades in battle.

	More than anything else, the Normandy campaign is an excellent example of how a militaryorganization can adapt itself to unforeseen circumstances and a hostile environment. Americanoperations in the Bocage prove that Michael Howard's assertion is largely correct: a successfularmy must have the ability to change and adapt under fire in order to develop correct methods forovercoming the enemy. In this respect, First Army performed well in Normandy and laid thefoundation for operations that eventually carried U.S. armies beyond the Rhine and to victory.
ContentsNOTES
***Chapter 1*****
**Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," 
Journal of the Royal United ServicesInstitute for Defence Studies
, 119 (March 1974):3-9.
Russell Frank Weigley, 
Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany,1944-1945
 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 22-23.
Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 14-19.
Ibid., 23; and U.S. War Department, Field Manual 100-5, 
Field Service Regulations: Operations
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1941), 278-80.
U.S. War Department, Field Manual 17-36. 
Employment of Tanks with Infantry
 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 3-10.
FM 100-5, ii-19.
Ibid.
Ibid., 97-103, 109-19.
U.S. War Department, Field Manual 7-20, 
Rifle Battalion
 (Washington. DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1942), 80-87.
FM 100-5, 5.
FM 17-36, 1.
Ibid., 25-65.
U.S. War Department, Field Manual 6-20, 
Field Artillery Tactics and Technique
 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 97-103, 128-31.
FM 100-5, 14-15.
Weigley, 
Eisenhower's Lieutenants
, 24-28; and Major General Ernest N. Harmon, U.S. Army,"Notes on Combat Experience During the Tunisian and African Campaigns," n.d., 15-17, availableat the manuscript collection, U.S. Army Armor School Library, Fort Knox, Kentucky.
Harmon, "Notes," 3.
Ibid., 6-9.
Ibid., 11-13.
Martin Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), chaps. 1-3 passim. All factualmaterial in this section is from the cited reference unless otherwise noted.
Ibid., 178.
Omar Nelson Bradley and Clay Blair, 
A General's Life
 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983),247-59.
Ibid., 262-64.
Ibid., 266-71.**

***Chapter 2***
**"Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgment Area: OperationOVERLORD," a terrain analysis study of the Cotentin Peninsula, 3 May 1942, 7, BrigadierGeneral Arthur S. Nevins, U.S. Army, Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, CarlisleBarracks, Pennsylvania; and Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 177. The U.S. Army MilitaryHistory Institute is hereafter cited as USAMHI.
"Operations to Secure a Lodgment Area," Nevins Papers, 5; Lieutenant Colonel Chester B.Hansen, U.S. Army, Diaries, 8-9 June 1944, USAMHI; and James Maurice Gavin, 
On to Berlin:Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943-1946
 (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 121.
Captain Charles D. Folsom, U.S. Army, "Hedgerow Fighting Near Carentan," Army SchoolLibrary Report 41-53 (Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox,Kentucky, 1948), 1; and U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board, European Theater ofOperations,
 Reports of the Army Ground Forces Board, European Theater of Operations
, Report no.171, "Normandy Hedgerows," 1-2, hereafter cited as AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no, and theindividual report title. There were AGF Observer Boards for each World War II theater ofoperations, and at one point observers were operating for both the War Department and the AGFand filed their reports under the aegis of the War Department while intending them for the AGF.The six-volume collection at USAMHI contains reports bearing both headings but is consideredrepresentative of AGF reports.
Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 48-50.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 138, "Notes on Hedgerow Warfare in the Normandy Beachhead,"1-2; AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 141, "German Defense in Hedgerow Terrain," Exhibit A; AGFObs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 195, "Lessons from Present Campaign," 1-4; U.S. Army, XIX Corps, "TheTank-Infantry Team," 24 June 1944, 2-3, available at USAMHI; and U.S. Army, 1st U.S. ArmyGroup, "Battle Experiences," no. 1, 1, available at USAMHI, hereafter cited as FUSAG, "BattleExperiences." During the Normandy fighting, 1st Army Group published and distributed a seriesof "Battle Experiences," reports that contained technical information and a synopsis of keylessons learned in combat by subordinate units.
Ibid.; FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 1, 3; and FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 12, 2.
FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 1, 2; AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 195, 1-4; and U.S. Army, 1stArmy, 
First United States Army: Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944
, 14 vols.(Washington, DC: U.S. War Department, 1945?), 1:122-23, hereafter cited as "First ArmyReport."
Ibid.
Ibid.
First Army Report, 1:117; AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 157, "Notes on Interviews with VariousInfantry Commanders in Normandy," 1; and FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 14, 1-2.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 187, "Training Memoranda, VII U.S. Army Corps," Exhibit B, 1.
First Army Report, 1:117; FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 1, 3; and FUSAG, "BattleExperiences," no. 14, 1-2.
FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 10, 1.
Ibid., no. 19, 1.
AGF, Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 157, 1, 4, 10.
Major William R. Campbell, U.S. Army, "Tanks with Infantry," Armor School Library Report42-9 (Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1947), 1.
First Army Report, 1:121-22; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 157, 5.
First Army Report, 1:121; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 187, Exhibit B, 1.
Omar Nelson Bradley, 
A Soldier's Story
 (1951; reprint, New York: Rand McNally, 1978), 306-7;and Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 42-43.
First Army Report, 1:122; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept, no. 195, 1-3.
Hansen, Diaries, 9 June 1944.
First Army Report, 1:122; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 195, 1-3.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 201, "Use of Dozer Tanks and Landing of Tanks in AmphibiousOperations," 1.
U.S. Forces, European Theater, 
Reports of the General Board
, Study no. 52, "Armored SpecialEquipment," 14-17, available at USAMHI, hereafter cited as USFET, Reports.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, "Notes on Interviews with Various Commanders inNormandy," 2-3, and Exhibits A, B, and C.
Ibid.
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
bid. 
Ibid.
Folsom, "Hedgerow Fighting," 5; AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, 5; and Blumenson, 
Breakoutand Pursuit
, 206.
Max Hastings, 
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy
 (London: Michael Joseph, 1984), 252;and Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 206-7.
Major William C. Sylvan, U.S. Army, Diaries, 14 July 1944, USAMHI; and Bradley, 
A Soldier'sStory
, 342.
Ibid.; and First Army Report, 5:200-201.
James J. Butler, "Individual Tank-Infantry Communications," 
Armored _ Cavalry Journal
 56(July-August 1947):43-45; FM 17-36, 93-100; and Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 43.
Butler, "Communications," 43-45; and First Army Report, 1:122.
Folsom, "Hedgerow Fighting," 7; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 120, "Employment of Tankswith Infantry," 4-5.
Butler, "Communications," 44-45; AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 120, 4-5; and FUSAG, "BattleExperiences," no. 13, 12.
USFET, 
Reports
, Study no. 50, "Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of SeparateTank Battalions," 6-7.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. Misc.-19, "Information Regarding AirGround Joint Operations,"8; and U.S. Army, G-3 Staff, Historical Branch, Programs Division, "Historical Survey of ArmyFire Support" (Washington, DC, 1963), I-B-2, loaned to the author by Dr. Allan R. Millett.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. Misc.-19, 8; First Army Report, 1:123; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO,Rept. no. 192, "Corps Artillery," 5.
Gordon A. Harrison, 
Cross-Channel Attack
, United States Army in World War II (Washington,DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1950), 381-84.
Ibid.
Major Forrest W. Creamer, U.S. Army, "Operations of the XIX U.S. Army Corps in Normandy,"Armor School Library Report 42-8 (Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School,Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1947), 31; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, Exhibit A.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 138, Exhibit A.
Ibid.
Ibid.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 157, 2.
Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 153-57; and U.S. War Department, General Staff, 
St. Lo, 7July-19 July 1944
, American Forces in Action Series (1947; reprint, Washington, DC: U.S. ArmyCenter of Military History, 1984), 54-58, hereafter cited as WDGS, St. Lo.
Ibid.
Ibid.; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, 1.
Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 149-53; and WDGS, 
St. Lo
, 58-69.
FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 8, 1-2.
Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 149-53; and WDGS, 
St. Lo
, 58-69.
Ibid.
Ibid.; and FUSAG, "Battle Experiences," no. 8, 2.
Folsom, "Hedgerow Fighting," 1-10.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 78-86.
Creamer, "Operations," 18-22.
Ibid.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 141, Exhibit A.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Creamer, "Operations," 20-28.
Ibid.
Ibid.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, 6-7.
Ibid.; and Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, Committee 3, "Employment of 2d Armored Division inOperation COBRA," Armor School Library Report 45.23 (U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox,Kentucky, 1950), 8-16.
Blumenson, 
Breakout and Pursuit
, 254-57.
Ibid.; and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, 6-7.**

***Chapter 3***
**Hastings, 
Overlord
, 210; AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Rept. no. 191, 2; and Blumenson, 
Breakout andPursuit
, 175-79.
First Army Report, 1:117.**
ContentsBIBLIOGRAPHY
**PRIMARY SOURCES**

***Personal Papers and Interviews*****

	Hansen, Chester B., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army. Diaries, U.S. Army Military HistoryInstitute, Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania. Lieutenant Colonel Hansen served as General Bradley'spersonal aide throughout World War II.

	Nevins, Arthur S., Brigadier General, U.S. Army. Papers. U.S. Army Military HistoryInstitute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Brigadier General Nevins served on the SHAEF staff asassistant operations officer throughout World War II and was intimately involved in the planningfor Operation Overlord.

	Sylvan, William C., Major. U.S. Army. Diaries. U.S. Army Military History Institute,Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Major Sylvan served as General Courtney H. Hodges' aidethroughout World War II.

***Reports*****

	Campbell, William R., Major, U.S. Army, Tanks with Infantry." Advanced Officers' Classno. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1947. Armor School Library Report 42-9.Major Campbell served with the 1st Infantry Division during the Normandy campaign.

	Creamer, Forrest W., Major, U.S. Army, "Operations of the XIX U.S. Army Corps inNormandy." Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky.1947. Armor School Library Report 42-6. Major Creamer served as assistant operations officeron the XIX Corps staff during the Normandy campaign.

	Folsom. Charles D., Captain, U.S. Army. "Hedgerow Fighting Near Carentan." AdvancedOfficers' Class no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1948. Armor SchoolLibrary Report 41-53. Captain Folsom was a rifle company commander in the 329th Infantry. 83dInfantry Division, during the Normandy campaign.

	Harmon, Ernest N., Major General, U.S. Army. "Notes on Combat Experience During theTunisian and African Campaigns." N.d. Available at the manuscript collection, U.S. Army ArmorSchool Library. Fort Knox, Kentucky.

	U.S. Army. 1st Army. *Report of Operations, 20 October 1941-1 August 1944.* 14 vols.Washington. DC?: U.S. War Department, 1945?

	U.S. Army. Ist Army Group. "Battle Experiences." 1944. Available at the U.S. ArmyMilitary History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

	U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board, European Theater of Operations. *Reports ofthe Army Ground Forces Observer Board, European Theater of Operations*. 6 vols. 1944-1945.Available at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

	U.S. Forces, European Theater. *Reports of the General Board*. 36 vols. November 1945.Available at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

***Books*****

	Bradley, Omar Nelson. *A Soldier's Story*. 1951. Reprint. New York: Rand McNally, 1978.

	Bradley, Omar Nelson, and Clay Blair. *A General's Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster,1983.

	Gavin, James Maurice. *On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943-1946.*New York: Viking Press, 1978.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

***Special Reports and Studies*****

	Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, Committee 3. "Employment of 2d Armored Division inOperation COBRA." U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1950.

	Greenfield. Kent Roberts. *Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle TeamIncluding Organic Light Aviation*. Study no. 35. Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Section, ArmyGround Forces, 1948.

	Ney, Virgil. *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968.* Fort Belvoir, VA: CombatOperations Research Group, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. 1969.

	Tannler, Thomas K., et al. "A Critical Analysis of the History of Armor in World War 11."Advanced Officers' Class no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1953.

	U.S. Army. G-3 Staff. Historical Branch. Programs Division. "Historical Survey of ArmyFire Support." Washington, DC, 1963. Loaned to the author by Dr. Allan R. Millett.

	U.S. War Department. Field Manual 6-20. *Field Artillery Tactics and Technique*.Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.

 ______ . Field Manual 7-20. *Rifle Battalion*. Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1942.

______ . Field Manual 17-36. *Employment of Tanks with Infantry*. Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1944.

______ . Field Manual 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington. DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1941.

***Books*****

	Blumenson, Martin. *Breakout and Pursuit*. U.S. Army in World War I1. Washington, DC:Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the Army. 1961.

	Harrison, Gordon A. *Cross-Channel Attack*. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, DC:Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1950.

Hastings, Max. *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*. London: Michael Joseph, 1984.

	Marshall, S. L. A. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*.1947. Reprint. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978.

	U.S. Department of the Army, Historical Division. *Utah Beach to Cherbourg (6 June-27June 1944)*. American Forces in Action Series. 1948. Reprint. Washing ton, DC: U.S. ArmyCenter of Military History, 1984.

	U.S. War Department. General Staff. *St. Lo, 7 July-19 July 1944.* American Forces inAction Series. 1947. Reprint. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1984.

	Van Creveld, Martin. *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Military Performance,1914-1945*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983; Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

	Weigley, Russell Frank. *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France andGermany, 1944-1945*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

***Articles*****

	Butler, James J. "Individual Tank-Infantry Communications." *Armored Cavalry Journal* 56(July-August 1947):43-45.

	Howard, Michael. "Military Science in an Age of Peace." *Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute for Defence Studies* 119 (March 1974}:3-9.
**Captain Michael D. Doubler**
Captain Michael D. Doubler wascommissioned in armor upon his graduation fromthe United States Military Academy in 1977. Hehas served in both armor and infantry battalionswith the 24th and 3d Infantry Divisions(Mechanized). In 1985, Captain Doublerreceived a master's degree in military historyfrom The Ohio State University. His lastassignment was as an instructor and assistantprofessor of military history at West Point. He iscurrently serving on the Army staff at thePentagon.

**COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE**

***Missions*****

	The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-levelactivity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.CSI has the following missions:
- Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the Army andpublish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components.
- Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist otherUSACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.
- Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for thedevelopment and coordination of an integrated. progressive program of military historyinstruction in the TRADOC service school system.

**U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas
Return          to CGSC/CSI Publications page   Contact the Combined Arms Research Library Updated:  11 May 2004  ** |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|