alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Professional Insurance Company of New York, Appellant, v. D. Guerrini-Maraldi, Respondent, et al., Defendants. Professional Insurance Company of New York, Appellant, v. Desmond T. Barry et al., Defendants. Robert Chaut, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. D. Guerrini-Maraldi, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent, et al., Third-Party Defendants.

Order, entered July 18, 1969, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. In affirming, we construe the order as effective merely as a direction for payment of the sum mentioned therein as interim allowance for legal fees and disbursements incurred by defendant D. Guerrini-Maraldi in connection with his defense and the order shall not be effective in any way to ■ obligate the plaintiff to pay expenses, including attorneys’ fees, thereafter incurred in the defense of the action. A subsequent application, if made, for a further allowance, shall be determined *de novo*on the basis of proceedings and facts then presented to the court. Furthermore, the determination here shall not have the effect in any way as a precedent for the granting of similar applications by other defendants but such applications, if made, shall also be determined on the basis of the proceedings and facts then presented to the court. Concur — Eager, J. P., Markewich, Tilzer and Bastow, JJ.
BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DISTRICT, AT TEXARKANA

No. 06-17-00091-CV

Kenneth Craig Miller

v.

Gregg County, Texas

(No. 2017-703-CCL2 IN COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF GREGG COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

MOTION FEE

MOTION FEE

MOTION FEE

SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD

REPORTER'S RECORD

SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD

CLERK'S RECORD

INDIGENT

STATEWIDE EFILING FEE

FILING

SUPREME COURT CHAPTER 51 FEE

$10.00

$10.00

$10.00

$15.00

$1,100.00

$15.00

$319.00

$25.00

$30.00

$100.00

$50.00

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

CAROL GOLEY

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW KORN

KENNETH MILLER

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW R KORN

ANDREW R KORN

Balance of costs owing to the Sixth Court of Appeals, Texarkana, Texas: 0.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, DEBRA AUTREY, CLERK OF THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct 

copy of the cost bill of THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF 

TEXAS, showing the charges and payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, 

as the same appears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, 

witness my hand and the Seal of 

the COURT OF APPEALS for 

the Sixth District of Texas, this 

June 5, 2018.

DEBRA AUTREY, CLERK

By ___________________________

Deputy
#### § 51.1821 Application of tolerances.

Individual samples are subject to the following limitations, unless otherwise specified in § 51.1820. Individual samples shall have not more than one and one-half times a specified tolerance of 10 percent or more, and not more than double a specified tolerance of less than 10 percent: *Provided,* that at least one decayed or wormy fruit may be permitted in any sample: *And provided further,* that the averages for the entire lot are within the tolerances specified for the grade.

[62 FR 2898, Jan. 21, 1997]
#### § 63.11 Under Secretary for Rural Development.

*Under Secretary for Rural Development* means the Under Secretary for Rural Development of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, or any other officer or employee of the Department designated by the Under Secretary to act in the Under Secretary's stead.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 99-10042

JOHN WESLEY FORD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(4:98-CV-241-A)

October 17, 2000

Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Texas prisoner John Wesley Ford, acting pro se, appeals from

the district court’s final judgment denying his first federal

habeas corpus petition. Ford’s conviction became final after the

April 1996 effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and his claims are, therefore,2

controlled by the provisions of that statute. Although Ford raised

numerous issues in the district court, this Court granted COA on a

single issue, which is whether F ord’s constitutional right to a

speedy trial was violated. Ford’s speedy trial issue is controlled

by the four-factor analysis applied in Barker v. Wingo , 92 S. Ct.

2182 (1972), and its progeny. Under that test, the Court

considers: (1) the length of the pretrial delay; (2) the reason for

the pretrial delay; (3) the defendant’s attempts to assert his

speedy trial ri ghts, if any; and (4) the prejudice caused by the

pretrial delay. S ee Hughes v. Booker

, 220 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir.

2000) (citing Lindh v. Murphy , 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997)).

Ford pressed his speedy trial claimbefore the state habeas

court, which received evidence and then entered finding s of fact

and conclusions of law in support of its decision denying relief.

Under the strictures of AEDPA, this Court may not grant relief

unless (1) the state court made an unreasonable deter mination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2), or (2) the state court’s legal conclusions were in

violation of clearly established Supreme Court precedent in

existence when Ford’s convict ion became final, i d. § 2254(d)(1).

Having considered Ford’s claims in light of the record and those

standards, we are persuaded that there is no material error in the

state court’s disposition. We, therefore, affirm the district3

court’s denial of relief for essentially the same reasons given by

that court.

The district court is in all respects AFFIRMED.
#### Mohn Supply Company, Inc., Appellant, v Sisters of St. Joseph of Rochester, Inc., Respondent.

(Appeal No. 1.)

Order unanimously modified, and, as modified, affirmed, without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: In this action for the delivery of goods and services covering a period from 1965 to 1977, defendant interposed an affirmative defense asserting that plaintiff is guilty of laches in that its conduct led defendant to believe that the goods and services delivered “were in the nature of gifts and benevolences made by the plaintiff to the defendant. ” The suit is for supplies and maintenance provided for the operation of a swimming pool on defendant’s property. Plaintiff sought to take the deposition of Sister Mary Magdalene, who had the responsibility for pool maintenance and of Mother Agnes Cecelia, a superior of defendant corporation, with respect to a meeting she had with representatives of plaintiff concerning statements previously submitted for goods and services. Plaintiff claims that this meeting is critical on the issue of the affirmative defense. Defendant has already had discovery of plaintiff with regard to its affirmative defense. CPLR 3101 (subd [a]) requires full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. “Disclosure is required as to all evidence relevant to the case and as to all information reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence” (Siegel, New York Practice, § 344, p 422; see, *also, Allen v Crowell-CollierPub. Co.,*21 NY2d 403). Where the information sought in good faith will have a possible use as evidence in chief or in rebuttal, or for cross-examination, it falls within the scope of the statute as “material and necessary” and discovery should be permitted (see *Maloney vBuffalo Sav. Bank,*41 AD2d 591; 3A Weinstein-Kom-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3101.07). Special *1013Term properly granted the application to examine Sister Mary Magdalene but erred in denying the application to depose Mother Agnes Cecelia. (Appeal from order of Monroe Supreme Court — discovery.) Present — Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Doerr and Witmer, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Matthew T. Hogan, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee of the Seventh Judicial District, Petitioner.

Fourth Department,

July 10, 1980

*396APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*David E. Brennan (Gerard M. LaRusso*of counsel), for petitioner.

*James M. White*for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

*Per Curiam.*

Respondent, an attorney at law, was admitted to practice in this Department on December 5, 1960.

Charge 1 of the petition alleges that sometime during the month of October, 1975 respondent was retained to transfer 948 shares of Eastman Kodak stock jointly owned by two *clients into*three separate *inter vivos*trusts. In handling this matter, he caused his clients to sell 70 shares of the stock worth approximately $7,000 representing to them that the sale was necessary to raise funds for the payment of gift taxes. Respondent obtained the draft from the stock sale and deposited the same in an account at Marine Midland Bank, permitting his clients’ funds to be commingled with other funds. Thereafter he neglected to preserve and identify his clients’ funds and failed to maintain adequate records. The records of the bank indicate that during this period of time respondent’s trust account contained a balance well below the $7,000 belonging to his clients.

The second and third charges involve estate matters in which respondent was retained as attorney. Respondent neglected both estates, failed to file United States and New York State fiduciary and estate tax returns, and failed to refund a portion of his legal fees paid in advance and not earned.

Respondent admitted the material allegations of the petition and has settled each complaint to the satisfaction of the clients together with restitution where required.

Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct which constituted violations of the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110, DR 6-101, DR 9-102 (subd [B], par [3]) and this Department’s rules relating to attorneys 22 NYCRR 1022.5 (a), (b), 1022.8. In mitigation, we note that respondent was suffering from acute and chronic alcoholism which he has acknowledged and for which he has continued to receive rehabilitative treatment and has been under suspension for a period of approximately two years (22 NYCRR 1022.23).

*397In view of respondent’s rehabilitation and his satisfactory conduct during his period of suspension, we find that an appropriate sanction is a suspension, the time period of which shall be considered to have commenced on July 7, 1978 and ending on May 23, 1980.

Dillon, P. J., Card amone, Simons, Hancock, Jr., and Callahan, JJ., concur.

Order of suspension ordered.
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. 4:94cr4021-WS

ARTHUR JEROME MARTIN, 4:05cv277-WS

Defendant.

 

ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc. 352)

docketed July 7, 2005. The magistrate judge recommends that the defendant's petition

for modification of sentence (doc. 349) be summarily denied. The defendant has filed

objections (doc. 353) to the report and recommendation as well as a petition (doc. 354)

for leave to supplement his petition for modification with supplemental authority.

Upon review of the record in light of the defendant’s objections, the court has

determined that the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be adopted.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc. 352) is adopted and 

incorporated by reference in this order of the court.

Case 4:94-cr-04021-WS-WCS Document 355 Filed 07/29/05 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Case No. 4:94cr4021-WS

2. The defendant’s petition (doc. 354) presenting supplemental authority is

GRANTED. The supplemental authority presented by the defendant has been

considered.

3. The defendant's petition for modification of sentence (doc. 349) IS hereby

summarily DENIED.

4. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall close Case No.

4:05cv277-WS.

DONE AND ORDERED this July 29, 2005.

 /s William Stafford 

WILLIAM STAFFORD

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:94-cr-04021-WS-WCS Document 355 Filed 07/29/05 Page 2 of 2
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 224 (Monday, November 22, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71080-71081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-29336]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary


Closed Meeting of the Department of Defense Wage Committee

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice of closed meetings.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of section 10 of Public Law 92-463, 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act, notice is hereby given of closed 
meetings of the Department of Defense Wage Committee.

DATES: Tuesday, December 14, 2010; at 10 a.m. and Tuesday, December 28, 
2010; at 10 a.m.

ADDRESSES: 1400 Key Boulevard, Level A, Room A101, Rosslyn, Virginia, 
22209

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Additional information concerning the 
meetings may be obtained by writing to the Chairman, Department of 
Defense Wage Committee, 4000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-
4000.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the provisions of section 10(d) of 
Public Law 92-463, the Department of Defense has determined that the 
meetings meet the criteria to close meetings to the public because the 
matters to be considered are related to internal rules and practices of 
the Department of Defense and the detailed wage data to be considered 
were obtained from officials of private establishments with a guarantee 
that the data will be held in confidence.
    However, members of the public who may wish to do so are invited to 
submit material in writing to the chairman concerning matters believed 
to be deserving of the Committee's attention.


[[Page 71081]]


    Dated: November 16, 2010.
Morgan F. Park,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2010-29336 Filed 11-19-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) 2:06-CR-169-WKW

)

DEMETRIA MILLS )

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE

AND CERTIFICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE

PURSUANT TO § 5K1.1, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES

COMES NOW the United States of America, by and through Leura G. Canary,

United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama, and files the above-captioned

motion, and as reasons therefore, submits the following:

1. Defendant entered a plea of guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) to an indictment

charging violations of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 843(b), pursuant to

a plea agreement.

2. Defendant agreed to cooperate with the Government in the instant cause and

in subsequent investigations as necessary, and to waive his rights to appeal or collaterally

attack the guilty plea or sentence.

3. The United States submits the defendant has cooperated with the United States

and has abided by the terms of his plea agreement. The assistance provided by

Defendant should be considered substantial.

4. The Government is satisfied that Defendant is entitled to be considered for a

reduction of sentence under § 5K1.1 U.S.S.G., and moves this Court to reduce the

applicable offense level of Defendant by three levels. 

Respectfully submitted, this the 28th day of January, 2008.

LEURA G. CANARY

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

Case 2:06-cr-00169-WKW-SRW Document 529 Filed 01/28/2008 Page 1 of 3
s/A. Clark Morris

A. CLARK MORRIS

Assistant United States Attorney

131 Clayton Street

Montgomery, AL 36104

Phone: (334)223-7280

Fax: (334)223-7135

E-mail: clark. morris@usdoj.gov

ASB-1613-N77A

Case 2:06-cr-00169-WKW-SRW Document 529 Filed 01/28/2008 Page 2 of 3
3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) 2:06-CR-169-WKW

)

DEMETRIA MILLS )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 28, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing with the

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to

the following: Everett Urech.

Respectfully submitted,

s/A. Clark Morris

A. CLARK MORRIS

Assistant United States Attorney 

131 Clayton Street 

Montgomery, AL 36104

Phone: (334)223-7280

Fax: (334)223-7135

E-mail: clark. morris@usdoj.gov

ASB-1613-N77A

Case 2:06-cr-00169-WKW-SRW Document 529 Filed 01/28/2008 Page 3 of 3
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASE NO. 5:99cr15-SPM

FELIPE JAIMES,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on two letters filed by Defendant

Felipe Jaimes, which have been treated as a motion to obtain copies of the

judgment and commitment order and to prohibit interference with mail (doc.

1652) and a motion to prohibit the Federal Bureau of Prisons from moving

Defendant to another facility (doc. 1656). For the following reasons the motions

will be denied.

1. Defendant should have access to his judgment and commitment

order in accordance with the procedures set out in Bureau of Prisons Program

Statement No. 1351.05. 

2. Defendant has stated no valid grounds that would allow the Court 
Page 2 of 2

to prohibit his transfer. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: Defendant’s motions (docs. 1652 and

1656) are denied. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of September, 2009.

s/ Stephan P. Mickle

Stephan P. Mickle

Chief United States District Judge

 CASE NO. 5:99cr15-SPM
DENY; and Opinion Filed August 22, 2019.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-00804-CV

IN RE BLAKE BRANSON, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 417th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 417-56453-2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Osborne, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Osborne

Before the Court is relator’s petition for writ of mandamus in which he challenges the trial 

court’s order awarding real party in interest interim attorney fees for a modification proceeding in 

a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. To be entitled to mandamus relief, relator must show

that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate 

remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). 

After reviewing the petition and mandamus record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused 

its discretion because there was some evidence to support a finding that the interim fees were 

necessary for the safety and welfare of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001.

Accordingly, relator has not shown he is entitled to the relief requested.
–2–

We deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a) (court must 

deny petition if it determines relator not entitled to relief sought).

190804F.P05

/Leslie Osborne/

LESLIE OSBORNE

JUSTICE
#### § 503.14 Nondiscrimination.

There shall be no discrimination by segregation or otherwise against any person or persons because of race, religion, sex, color, or national origin in furnishing or refusing to furnish to such person or persons the use of any facility of a public nature, including all services, privileges, accommodations and activities provided by the PIADC.
§ 756.14 Misrepresentation, scheme, or device. ( a ) A producer will be ineligible to receive assistance under the OFF Program if the producer is determined by the FSA State committee or FSA county committee to have knowingly: ( 1 ) Adopted any scheme or device that tends to defeat the purpose of the OFF Program;
( 2 ) Made any fraudulent representation; or
( 3 ) Misrepresented any fact affecting a determination under the OFF Program, then FSA will notify the appropriate investigating agencies of the United States and take steps deemed necessary to protect the interests of the Government.
( b ) Any funds disbursed pursuant to this part to any person or operation engaged in a misrepresentation, scheme, or device, will be refunded to FSA. The remedies provided in this part are in addition to other civil, criminal, or administrative remedies that may apply.
#### In the Matter of Eugenia Jordan, Respondent, v Estate of Jennie Newman, Deceased, Respondent, and Uninsured Employers’ Fund, Appellant. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed April 5, 1979. The board awarded benefits to claimant for injuries she sustained on June 28, 1974 as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. It was held that claimant was an employee of Jennie Newman, who died on October 16, 1974. No legal representative has been appointed for her estate. The term "Employer” is defined in subdivision 3 of section 2 of the Workérs’ Compensation Law as including "the legal representatives of a deceased employer”. All proceedings in an action against a deceased party after his death and before substitution of his personal representative are null and void *(Lord v Sherman,*18 AD2d 1029). In this case, therefore, no party existed over which the board could exercise jurisdiction following the death of Jennie Newman. The board lacked the power to make an award against the estate of Jennie Newman since the entity was never created. Therefore, the matter must be remitted to the board. A representative of the deceased’s estate must be appointed to succeed to the rights and obligations of the decedent. As for respondent’s contention that the Uninsured Employers’ Fund waived its right to raise the question of personal jurisdiction, the record provides no factual support for this position. Furthermore, personal jurisdiction over the estate of Jennie Newman could only be waived by its legally appointed representative. Since none existed, waiver was impossible. *757Decision reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the board for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over the estate of Jennie Newman and for further proceedings not inconsistent- herewith. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Main and Mikoll, JJ., concur; Staley, Jr., J., not taking part.