**Black Soldier, White Army**
**The 24th Infantry in Korea**
> Executive Summary
This study analyzes the history of the 24th Infantry regiment in the KoreanWar to determine the quality of its performance during that conflict and thecauses of any deficiencies that occurred.
Background
In late September 1950, two months after the beginning of the Korean War,the commander of the 25th Infantry Division, Major General William B. Kean,requested that the Eighth Army disband the all-black 24th Infantry regimentbecause it had demonstrated that it was "untrustworthy and incapable ofcarrying out missions expected of an infantry regiment."

Thus began a controversy that has continued to this day. Critics of theregiment have charged that the 24th was a dismal failure in combat. TheAfrican-American veterans of the organization and others, meanwhile, havecontended that the unit did far better than its critics would concede and thatits main problem was racial prejudice.

For a while, with the integration of the Armed Forces, the talk on bothsides largely disappeared, but when the U.S. Army's official history of theKorean War, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, authored by Roy E.Appleman, appeared in 1961, it reignited the controversy by publicizing thebackground of Kean's charges. During the late 1970s, as a result, a number ofindividuals began an effort to persuade the Army to revise its history toreflect a more balanced view of the performance of the regiment. In 1987, theSecretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., directed that the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History undertake a study of the subject. This history is the result.
Methodology and Sources
As the project proceeded, it became clear that what happened to the 24thwas, in part, the product of injustices that had afflicted the black soldierfrom the very beginning of the American republic. Because of that, the authorsdecided to begin their story with a brief rendition of the background of theAfrican-American soldier in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ashort chapter also appears on blacks in the post-World War II Army, when many ofthe trends that would bear immediately upon the 24th began to come to light.Since the unit's experience as an occupation force in Japan influenced whathappened to it during its early months in Korea, that portion of its story alsoreceived serious treatment.

Few historical problems are more demanding than those that accompany anattempt to reconstruct the performance of a military unit in combat. Everyplatoon, company, battalion, regiment, and division is a unique entity, composedof thinking human beings who act not as robots but as individuals with definiteneeds and beliefs. Even so, the people who compose those units, or any group,will not always behave as they might on their own. A group mind can come intoplay when unusual circumstances intrude, and the effects it produces—whetheracts of extreme bravery or of mass confusion—may at times seem hardlyrational. Much depends upon the group's self-identity and the mutual trust ofits members in one another and in their leaders. If those are solid all will bewell, but if they are weak, the unpredictable may occur. In addition, a group'sidentity can take new forms over time as circumstances and personalities change.Given those uncertainties and the many variables involved, the attributes thatproduce success in combat are not always discernable.

Indeed, the nature of combat is such that it is sometimes difficult even forparticipants to describe the events that occurred coherently and completely.Danger, confusion, and stress distract attention from the main course of thefighting. Meanwhile, perspectives vary widely, depending on an individual'sresponsibilities and his location on the battlefield. The view and understandingof a private will hardly resemble those of a unit commander. Each will reflectthe truth of what happened in his own way. In addition, the emotional intensityof combat may deepen the natural tendency of a soldier to forget unpleasantevents and to focus his attention on aspects of the fighting that appeal to hissense of self-worth. The difficulties and confusion that plague the early monthsof any war compound the problem where the conflict in Korea is concerned.Committed to combat on the spur of the moment, forces in the field had littletime or opportunity for extensive combat interviews. 

In coming to terms with these challenges, the authors had to rely uponcontemporary descriptions of combat compiled by the units involved. Theyincluded daily journals, operational orders and messages, memoranda for therecord, war diaries from every level of command, maps, graphs, and overlays.

These materials contained a wealth of information, but it was clear from thebeginning that they could tell only part of the story. If some were beautifullydetailed and honest, others were poorly formed and less than forthcoming.

To fill the gap, the authors resorted to oral history, but there were alsoproblems with that approach. The participants in that effort, recounting theirexperiences in interviews, had to struggle against their own imperfect memories.Details of one combat action sometimes merged so completely with those of othersthat the resulting stories bore little resemblance to events that were alreadywell established in official records.

Among the sources that proved most valuable to the study were thetranscripts of interviews conducted in 1950 and 1951 by inspector general teamsduring the course of three official investigations into the 24th's conduct inbattle. These materials had to be used with great caution because they were, attimes, racially biased and self-serving. Nevertheless, they contained a wealthof information about the fighting, some of it gathered within days of the eventsdescribed from witnesses who would soon be killed in combat. Many whites inthose interviews blamed their black subordinates or enlisted soldiers for everyproblem, and the blacks, on occasion, held their tongues or played to theprejudices of their interviewers. Statements of that sort, however, were easilybalanced against the official record and against the comments of individuals whowere willing to speak their minds.

In dealing with documentary materials, the authors sought to verifycontroversial occurrences by seeking out multiple sources for the sameinformation. If only one source existed, the reliability of previous assertionsfrom that source was checked, and if any doubt remained, an attempt was made toverify the account by seeking the assistance and comments of veterans who hadalready proved themselves knowledgeable. After that, if doubts still persisted,the information was not used. The same sort of approach applied to oral historyinterviews. An attempt was made in every case to corroborate stories from onesource with material from others or from written records. Where that provedimpossible, the credibility of the source became a concern. Was that person in aposition to know? Did he have something to gain from the statement? Was the restof the information he provided reliable and accurate as far as we could tell? Ifthe responses to those questions were adequate, in important cases, the materialwas sometimes used, but always with an explanation in a footnote. In the sameway, throughout the study, we tried to label hearsay and rumor as such. Butwhether or not a comment was well founded, the mere fact that a number ofsoldiers said substantially the same thing gave it weight as an indicator of themorale and cohesion of the regiment.

To achieve balance, the authors sought to fit the 24th into the context ofwhat other military units were doing at the same time and in the same place. Thecomparison proved difficult to make, if only because all-white regiments neverexperienced the particular social and psychological burdens segregation imposedon the 24th. A lack of resources also figured in. Over four hundred oral historyinterviews went into the effort to construct a history for the 24th. A similareffort to do the same for other regiments serving in Korea at the time wasimpossible.

Within these limitations, the authors did manage to pair the 24th withseveral similar regiments, the 5th, 27th, and 35th Infantry Regiments, all ofwhich served in the same vicinity and experienced the same sort of combat.Drawing upon the official records of those units and conducting a number ofinterviews with their veterans in order to determine how each fared in combat,the authors were able to delineate at least the rough dimensions of how the 24thfared in comparison with those organizations.
Historical Background
Was the 24th's reputation in Korea deserved, or was it a gross distortion ofthe facts brought on by racial prejudice? If bigotry was involved, were therenevertheless some grains of truth at the base of the regiment's poor reputation?If so, where does the truth end and the prejudice begin?

The situation in the 24th Infantry did not arise in a day. It grew out of ahistory extending back over a hundred years to the abolition of the system ofslavery that had marred the American experience from its beginning. For once theAfrican-American had been freed of his bondage and had gained some rights ofcitizenship, it made sense that he should serve in the nation's armed forces.Yet vast hostility to blacks remained in the very fabric of the society, so muchso that the integration of whites and blacks into the nation's Army seemed outof the question. As a result, although blacks served, they always did so apart,segregated into battalions, regiments, and divisions reserved exclusively forthem. They fought dependably and creditably on the Western Frontier, in theSpanish-American War, and during the Philippine Insurrection, but they neverseemed able to overcome the attitudes of the white nation that employed them.Instead, the white world pulled back into itself by enacting "separate butequal" laws that had the effect of rendering African-Americans and theircontributions invisible. When segregated soldiers rebelled against that systemat Houston at the beginning of World War I, the mistrust they engendered amongwhites helped to erase whatever credit black units had earned in earlier warsand influenced how white commanders viewed them in subsequent conflicts.

In World Wars I and II, the African-American soldier seemed destined forfailure from the beginning. Ascribing to assertions that blacks were lazy and oflow intellect, the Army's commanders used them mainly to perform menial tasks,such as unloading ships and digging ditches. Even when finally constrained bypolitical pressure to form all-black regiments and divisions and to allowAfrican-Americans to enter combat, they tended to employ them in areas wherelittle would be lost if they failed. When black Americans performed well, asthey did when they fought under French command in World War I, white Americamade little of their successes, but when they failed, as some did, the news waswell circulated. Over all, few in positions of authority were willing to admitthat the system of racial segregation was at fault or that a lack of mutualconfidence and respect between the black soldier and his white commanders hadall but destroyed the sense of oneness, mutual dependency, and self-worth inblack units that are the chief constituents of good military performance.
The 24th Infantry in Japan
The 24th Infantry's service in the occupation of Japan was a model not onlyof the tensions that dogged all-black units in that day but also of the subtleinterplay those problems could have with the many challenges the Army faced inthe postwar period. On the surface, conditions within the unit seemed favorable.The regiment was well situated in its base at Gifu, and life seemed good for itstroops. Down below, however, there was much that was wrong. 

To begin with, the Army itself was undergoing extreme turbulence. Personnelstrengths gyrated up and down throughout the postwar period as budgets andmanpower policies changed with the political winds. Training declined, equipmentshortages grew, and officers who might have sought to make the military a careerleft the service. Training improved in 1949 but still remained inadequate.

The Eighth Army in Japan provides a case in point. Most of its soldiers werecivilians at heart, intent upon enjoying the pleasures of life in occupiedJapan, where a GI's salary could pay for an abundance of readily availablepleasures. In many units, black-market activities thrived, alcoholism was rife,and venereal disease flourished. But the number one transgression in the EighthArmy in the spring of 1950 was drug abuse. It spread with sometimes near abandonin many units, particularly those that served like the 24th Infantry in or nearlarge port cities.

The 24th Infantry, for its part, experienced the same difficulties as therest of the Army, but it generally maintained high esprit de corps. It gained adeserved reputation for its prowess at sports and its fine marching. Itstraining was on a par with that of most other units, and at the beginning of theKorean War it was one of a few that had undergone some form of regimentalmaneuvers. While the General Classification Test scores for its men weresignificantly lower than for the whites in other regiments, those figures wereinadequate as measures of innate intelligence. Indeed, many white officersassigned to the regiment would later insist that the enlisted men andnoncommissioned officers of the unit, whatever their schooling, often knew theirjobs and did them well.

Even so, the 24th remained a racially segregated regiment, and the effectsof that system ate incessantly into the bonds that held the unit together. Theywere often hidden at Gifu, which had become an artificial island for blacks—"ourown little world," as some of the men described it—but even there,discontent festered just beneath the surface calm. Unwritten but firmly heldassignment policies, for example, ensured that black officers, whatever theircompetence, would rarely if ever command whites. Throughout the years prior tothe Korean War, as a result, except for one lieutenant colonel, the seniorcommanders of the regiment were white. As for its field-grade officers, only thechaplains and a few majors in unimportant assignments were black.

The mistrust that resulted on both sides was largely hidden behind a screenof military conventions and good manners, but it was still there. Black officerswere frustrated and resentful. They saw that most promotions andcareer-enhancing assignments went to white officers, some of whom were clearlyinferior to them in education and military competence. Aware, as well, that fewif any of them would ever rise to a rank above captain, they could only concludethat the Army considered them second class. They retaliated by developing aview, as one African-American lieutenant observed years later, that the 24th wasa "penal" regiment for white officers who had "screwed up."The whites, for their part, although a number got along well with their blackcolleagues, mainly kept to themselves.

The tensions that existed among the regiment's officers had parallels inenlisted ranks. At times, black soldiers worked well with their white superiorsand relations between the races were open, honest, and mutually fulfilling,primarily because the white officers recognized the worth of their subordinatesand afforded them the impartiality and dignity they deserved. Many whites,however, shared the racially prejudiced attitudes and beliefs common to whitecivilian society. Although infrequent, enough instances of genuine bigotryoccurred to cement the idea in the minds of black enlisted men that their whiteofficers were racially prejudiced.

As the regiment's stay lengthened at Gifu, an unevenness came into beingthat subtly affected military readiness. In companies commanded by whiteofficers who treated their men with respect but refused to accept low standardsof discipline and performance, racial prejudice tended to be insignificant, anda bond, of sorts, developed between those who were leaders and those who wereled. In others, often commanded by officers who failed to enforce high standardsout of condescension, because they wished to avoid charges of racial prejudice,or because they were simply poor leaders, the bonds of mutual respect andreliance were weak. On the surface, all seemed to run well within those units.Underneath, however, hostility and frustration lingered, to break forth onlywhen the units faced combat and their soldiers realized their lives depended onofficers they could not trust.

The problem might have had little effect on readiness if officers hadreceived the time to work out their relationships with their men, butcompetition among them for Regular Army commissions, under the so-calledCompetitive Tour Program, produced a constant churning within the regiment.Officers arrived at units, spent three months in a position, and then departedfor new assignments. In addition, the officer complements of entire companiessometimes changed abruptly to maintain segregation and to ensure that a blackwould never command whites. Under the circumstances, officers often had littletime to think through what they were doing. Not only were their own assignmentstemporary, the group of officers they commanded was also in constant turmoil. Aconfluence of good officers might, for a time, produce a cohesive, effective,high-performing company, but everything might dissolve over night with a changeof command.

Under the circumstances, the personality of the regimental commander wasvital, and for much of the time in Japan the unit was commanded by an officerwho seemed ideally suited for the job. Strong, aggressive, experienced, ColonelMichael E. Halloran held the respect and support of most of his subordinates,whether commissioned or enlisted. The performance of the regiment while he wasin charge was all that anyone could have expected at that time and in thatplace. The effectiveness of Halloran's successor is more in question. ColonelHorton V. White was intelligent and well intentioned, but his low-key, hands-offstyle of command did little to fill the void when Halloran departed.

It would be interesting to determine what the results would have been if the24th had gone to war under Halloran rather than White, but the efficiency of aunit in combat is rarely determined by the presence of a single individual,however experienced and inspiring. What is clear, is that if the 24th went intobattle much as the other regiments in the Eighth Army did—poorly trained,badly equipped, and short on experience—it carried baggage none of theothers possessed, all the problems of trust and lack of self-confidence that thesystem of segregation had imposed.
The Korean War: Deployment and Initial Combat
The mistrust endemic to the 24th Infantry began to appear just as soon asword arrived at Gifu in early July 1950 that the regiment was to depart forKorea along with its associated engineers and artillery. Almost immediately,rumors began to circulate among both whites and blacks that the regiment wouldnever go into combat because of the supposed poor performance of all-black unitsin earlier wars. Then, as the date of departure approached, white officers beganto hear reports that a black chaplain had undermined the chain of command bysuggesting during a meeting that it was inappropriate for men of color to fightone another on behalf of whites. Black officers received unsubstantiated wordthat the black commander of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel James F.Lofton, had been reassigned to prevent him from commanding whites in combat.And, even as the unit moved from Pusan to Sangju in central South Korea, aspeculative story made the rounds to the effect that the regimental executiveofficer had faked a heart attack rather than go into combat with an all-blackunit.

Although indicative of poor discipline in portions of the 24th and a sourceof doubts on the part of whites about the advisability of committing theregiment to war, disturbances at Gifu and later at the port of Moji on the firstleg of the trip from Japan to Korea involved only a small minority of the unit'smen and said little about its readiness. In fact, on paper, the 24th wasprobably more prepared for combat than the other regiments of the 25th Division.It had three full battalions instead of the two characteristic of the post-WorldWar II Army, and if its equipment was old and worn and its men nervous andunseasoned, it had, at least, exercised at the regimental level in fieldmaneuvers. Unlike Major General William F. Dean's 24th Infantry Division, theunit also had the opportunity to introduce itself gradually to combat ratherthan have to face enemy fire from almost the moment it arrived. Indeed, its 3dBattalion was fortunate enough to win a small victory at Yechon, one of thefirst successes of the war for United Nations forces.

While hardly significant for the course of the war, Yechon could have hadimportant benefits for both the 3d Battalion and the rest of the 24th. Once thesoldier has tasted victory, so the reasoning goes, his self-confidence rises andcombat becomes easier for him to face. In the case of the 24th, however, therewas no time for Yechon to take root. The unit began to encounter misfortunesalmost immediately, just as soon as it entered combat near the town of Sangju inlate July.

There was no single reason for what happened. An aggressive enemy, old andworn equipment, inexperience at all levels, leadership failures high and low,casualties among key personnel, and a lack of bonding and cohesion in some unitsall played their part. There was no lack of courage among the officers and men.A number of well-trained squads, platoons, and companies performed ably. Nevertheless, all military units undergo a winnowing when they first enter combat.Inept officers die or move aside to make room for the more competent. Much thesame thing happened in the other American regiments fighting in Korea at thattime. The same reasons for failure were present and the same process occurred.

Disturbing trends nonetheless emerged within the 24th almost immediately,and no one took action to correct them. When straggling increased to sometimesepidemic proportions, the leadership of the regiment did little more to stop itthan to return offenders to their units. Every occurrence made the next oneeasier. Some units became so accustomed to withdrawals that their men began toabandon their positions at only the sound of firing or after receiving minorenemy sniper or mortar fire. As the trend continued, the trust of one soldier onthe line for the man next to him deteriorated and each became more inclined toflee.

Other units experienced similar difficulties, but what happened in the 24thwas complicated by segregation and the expectations it fostered. In an attemptto lead by example, officers stayed at their posts with those of their men whowere willing to hold, suffering inordinately high casualties as a result. Asthat occurred, mistrust between whites and blacks grew apace and rumors began tocirculate among the whites about how black soldiers had abandoned a woundedwhite officer on the battlefield. Whites in other units picked up the storiesand spread them, giving credence to the word of white officers who, in somecases, appeared to be shifting blame for what happened from themselves to theirmen alone.

White stereotypes contributed to the process. In other units, commandersheld officers responsible for the performance of their men and concentrated uponmilitary causes for any failures that occurred. In the case of the 24th,military reasons meant less. Failures often were attributed to the race of themen. Blacks were afraid of the dark, so the reasoning went. They would not digfoxholes, and they lacked the native intelligence to keep their equipment ingood repair.
The Pusan Perimeter
The problems confronting the regiment deepened when the fighting shiftedsouth from Sangju during August and September to the area west of Masan on thePusan Perimeter. Casualties among officers reached critical levels, with somecompanies going through five commanders in less than a month, and thereplacements were often inexperienced and untrained in infantry skills. Thesituation was little better among the sergeants. As for the enlisted men, manyreplacements reported for duty unable even to load and fire their rifles withoutfirst receiving instruction. Already deteriorating, the self-confidence of theunit and the trust of its members in one another worsened. More failuresoccurred.

Despite the pattern, when the 24th pulled into the Pusan Perimeter, itmanaged to hold the line. In the fight for Battle Mountain, Company C wasreduced to a shell and other portions of the regiment suffered heavily.Misfortune, nevertheless, continued to dog the regiment. Focused on themountains south of Haman rather than on the low hills just to the west of thetown, the unit was unprepared on 1 September when the enemy attacked through thecenter of its position and the 2d Battalion collapsed. Unreliable South Koreantroops manning portions of the line were partially to blame. So were a weakregimental reserve and poorly fortified positions. A key ingredient in thecollapse, however, was the large number of stragglers who left their positionswithout leave during the early portions of the fight. Remnants of Companies Eand G held on. Much of Company F escaped to the north. The battalion commandpost conducted a brief but spirited defense. Even so, the 2d Battalion ceased toexist as a combat organization, and only the fortuitous presence of the 27thInfantry saved the day.

The white leadership of the regiment and the division blamed the soldiers ofthe 24th for what had happened, but they themselves were at least as much atfault. The new regimental commander, Colonel Arthur J. Champeny, and his staffhad not only approved the weak tactical dispositions of the 2d Battalion, butChampeny himself had done much to destroy whatever self-confidence was left inthe regiment's men by making ill-advised, public remarks about the conduct ofblacks in World War II.

It was at that point that General Kean recommended that the Eighth Armydissolve the regiment. The evidence submitted—a whole series of exhaustiveinterviews with black and white officers—gave overwhelming testimony to thepresence of heavy straggling within the unit but said little about the tacticalincompetence and the accumulating failures of leadership that were at the rootof what had happened. Kean's recommendation led to further investigations and toa determination that the 24th should indeed be disbanded, but the Eighth Army'sinability to organize a new regiment to take the unit's place on short noticeput the decision on hold for a time.

In the interim, Champeny, and his successor, Colonel John T. Corley, movedat last to punish chronic stragglers. Long overdue, the effort put an effectiveend to the problem, but the court-martials that followed did nothing torehabilitate the 24th Infantry's reputation in the eyes of white commanders.Indeed, a sentence of death handed down against a lieutenant who had refused toreturn to the line only added to the aura of shame surrounding the regiment.
The Move into North Korea
The 24th itself soldiered on despite those difficulties. Over the precedingmonths, casualties had taken a heavy toll of the unit's problem soldiers. Still,a core of brave, capable enlisted men remained. To that group was added a wholenew shift of soldiers, untrained and inexperienced but unencumbered by feelingsof mistrust, racial alienation, and drug dependency that had afflicted a numberof their predecessors. These men learned their jobs and drew together under thestrain of combat. A new group of white officer replacements also arrived. Somewere also green, but many were capable, combat-seasoned veterans of World WarII. If they had their prejudices, they kept them to themselves to gain theconfidence of their subordinates. The 24th, to all intents, was a new unitpeopled by new men.

The regiment took long strides toward recovery during the attack north thatfollowed the U.S. landing at Inchon and the breakout from Pusan. The troops hadtime to train, and, in the process of fighting their way back to Seoul, theygained in confidence. The test for them came during the offensive into NorthKorea following the recapture of Seoul, when United Nations forces crossed theCh'ongch'on River and neared North Korea's border with China. Advancing in lateNovember through rugged terrain north of the town of Kunu-ri while flankingunits moved to either side along valley floors, the body of the regiment playedonly a minor defensive role when the Chinese counterattacked, but the unit stillincurred heavy damage in the fighting that ensued.

Each portion of the regiment faced its own unique challenge. Located on aridge overlooking a valley where part of the enemy's main assault occurred,Companies E and G held off strong attacks for most of a day before escapingovernight into the lines of the 9th Infantry. Assisting the 9th until they couldmake their way back to the 24th, they fought on with distinction. Meanwhile, tothe west, most of the 1st Battalion was able to pull back with only minordifficulty, but Company C, fighting as part of Task Force Wilson in anothervalley, was less fortunate. Because of communications failures and confusedcommand arrangements, the unit found itself abandoned and eventuallysurrendered. The 3d Battalion, for its part, occupied the center of the 24th'sline. Withdrawing without major difficulty and in relatively good order, itnonetheless suffered from breakdowns in control at its own command post as wellas at corps and division levels. Holding in an exposed position and unaware thatthe rest of the regiment had received orders to retreat, the unit suffered amassive enemy attack and collapsed in what became a major debacle. In that case,as with Company C, what happened received heavy play in the press. For whitecommanders already resolved to disband the 24th, it became just one more exampleof black ineptitude and the inability of all-black units to carry their load incombat.
Recovery and Final Operations
The 24th recovered once more. When it reentered combat in late February1951, it demonstrated its ability both in the attack and on the defense, but itremained no less immune than any other unit to the misfortunes of war. Itsperformance at the Han River crossing in March, for example, was all that anyonecould have hoped for. The assault across the Hant'an in April, however, onlyadded to its poor image in the eyes of white commanders. In that operation the1st Battalion performed well, securing a crossing and then advancing throughdifficult terrain against a strongly emplaced enemy. Setbacks in another areanonetheless diminished that accomplishment. The 3d Battalion also crossed theriver, but only after a last-minute change of plans that put it well downstreamfrom the 1st Battalion in difficult terrain, heavily defended by a strong enemyforce. The unit made the crossing and pressed forward up a steep mountainside,but then it collapsed under enemy fire and fell back in disorder. Eitherinadvertently or on purpose, officers passed information to the rear depicting afar more favorable situation than the one that prevailed. When the divisioncommander found out, he lost all confidence in the regiment forever.

From that day on, the division followed the unit's operations closely.Although the regiment delivered a generally solid performance in the attacknorth of the Hant'an and then conducted an orderly withdrawal to Line Goldenafter the Chinese Spring Offensive, the suspicion never departed. When itparticipated in the Eighth Army's drive back to the north in May and June,despite a few exceptions, it again performed well.

When the last commander of the regiment, Colonel Thomas D. Gillis, tookcharge in August, he received a warning from the division commander that the24th held the weakest line in all of the Eighth Army. Arriving at the unit, herapidly decided his superiors were mistaken. Surveying the regiment, heconcluded that leadership was the problem and proceeded to relieve a number ofofficers. His efforts were rewarded on 15 September, when Company F of the 2dBattalion conducted a heroic bayonet and grenade assault. That accomplishment,however, like so much that had happened to the 24th, received little notice.Buried in unit records, the achievement went largely unrecognized andunremembered except by Gillis and a few veterans.

The incident on 15 September marked the last significant attack conducted bythe 24th. On 22 September the regiment received formal notice that on 1 Octoberthe 14th Infantry regiment would replace it on the line and that it would ceaseto exist as a unit. For a time, some thought had been given to the possibilitythat the 24th might remain in Korea as an integrated unit. In that case, itwould merely have exchanged groups of personnel with the all-white 34th Infantryregi ment, then training in Japan. In the end, however, the Far East Commandrejected the plan because it would have violated the 1866 act of Congress thathad designated the 24th as an all-black unit. When integration came, as aresult, other all-black units—the 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry, forexample, and the 64th Tank Battalion—remained in existence; the asteriskthat designated them as segregated units was dropped from their names and theirpersonnel were exchanged with other regiments in the Eighth Army. Only the 24thInfantry, because of its peculiar legal status, ceased to exist.
Conclusions
Over all, if American history shows anything, it reveals that raciallysegregated combat units have succeeded in battle. Segregated regiments performedwell during the American Civil War and throughout the nineteenth century in theUnited States. The black regiments of the 93d Division in World War I fought tohigh acclaim, as did segregated platoons thrown into the line after the Battleof the Bulge in World War II.

The results of the study clearly suggest that what happened to the 24thInfantry in Korea was a product of injustices that afflicted black Americansprior to the formal integration of the Army. Until recently, historians havetended to interpret the regiment's performance without recognizing thoseprejudices and the corrosive effects they had on cohesion within the unit. Thewhole story is much different. If it reflects lapses of command and deficienciesin leadership, training and equipment—the sort of failings that burdenedall units during the initial stages of the conflict—it also containsdisplays of honor, commitment, selflessness and heroism that are in keeping withthe best traditions of the United States Army. Indeed, that the 24th Infantryachieved what it did—at Yechon, in the early weeks in Korea, at the Han andHant'an River crossings, and elsewhere— can only underscore the courage anddetermination of those among its members who chose to persevere and to do theirduty in the face of adversity.