The Brigade: 

Its Organization and Employment

John J. McGrath 

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Combat Studies Institute Press

A History 

 in the US Army 
The Brigade: 

A History

Its Organization and Employment

 in the US Army

John J. McGrath

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

McGrath, John J. 

The brigade : a history : its organization and employment in the US Army / John J. McGrath.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. United States. Army--Organization. I. Title. 

UA25.M4 2004

 355.3’1--dc22

 2004003701 
John McGrath

Boston native John McGrath has worked for the US Army in one capacity or another since 1978. 

A retired Army Reserve officer, Mr. McGrath served in infantry, field artillery and logistics 

units, both on active duty and as a reservist. Before coming to work at the Combat Studies 

Institute, he worked for 4 years at the US Army Center of Military History in Washington, 

DC, as a historian and archivist. Prior to that, Mr. McGrath worked fulltime for the US Army 

Reserve in Massachusetts for over 15 years, both as an active duty reservist and as a civilian 

military technician. He also served as a mobilized reservist in 1991 in Saudi Arabia with the 

22d Support Command during Operation DESERT STORM as the command historian and 

in 1992 at the US Army Center of Military History as a researcher/writer. Mr. McGrath is a 

graduate of Boston College and holds an MA in history from the University of Massachusetts 

at Boston. He is the author of numerous articles and military history publications and the book 

Theater Logistics in the Gulf War, published by the Army Materiel Command in 1994. Aside 

from a general interest in things military and historical, his areas of particular interest include 

modern military operations, the German army in World War II, August 1914, and the Union 

Army in the Civil War. He also has a keen interest in ancient history, historical linguistics, the 

city of Boston, and baseball. 
FOREWORD

This is a timely work as virtually all current Army transformation initiatives focus in on 

the maneuver brigade as the key element in future reorganization. New initiatives centered 

on the Unit of Action (UA) concept utilize variations of the basic brigade design currently 

fielded in the Army for revamped organizations using projected or recently fielded technology. 

A study illustrating from where the brigade has come to assume such an important role in Army 

planning and organization is, therefore, very appropriate. This volume in the Combat Studies 

Institute Special Studies series additionally fills a void in the historiography of the US Army, 

illustrating the brigade level of command, both in organizational structure and in battlefield 

employment. 

The brigade has been a key component of American Armies since the establishment of 

the first brigade of colonial militia volunteers under the command of George Washington in 

1758. Brigades were key combined arms organizations in the Continental Army and were basic 

components of both the Confederate and Union forces in the Civil War, and have been the 

backbone of Army forces in Vietnam, the winning of the Cold War, DESERT STORM, and in 

the recent War in Iraq. 

The force structure of the US Army has always been a target of tinkering and major 

readjustments since the short-lived experimentation with the Legion of the United States in 

1792-1996. Nowhere is this more apparent than at the level of the brigade. For most of the 

history of the Army, the brigade was a temporary wartime expedient organization and the first 

level of command led by a general officer. In the 20th century, it was the basic tactical unit 

of trench warfare in World War I. However, in World War II it basically disappeared, though 

organizations such as the armored division’s combat command, retained the spirit, if not the 

name of the organization. Following the late 1950s Pentomic period, the brigade returned in 

1963 in a flexible structure very similar to that of the former combat command. As a missionoriented, task-organized, combat organization, the maneuver brigade has survived the many 

vicissitudes of Army reorganization. 

This work provides an organizational history of the maneuver brigade and case studies of 

its employment throughout the various wars. Apart from the text, the appendices at the end of 

the work provide a ready reference to all brigade organizations used in the Army since 1917 

and the history of the brigade colors. 

Lawyn C. Edwards 

COL, AV 

Director, Combat Studies 

i 
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was a work of love. A love for the US Army, its combat organizations, and its 

organizational and operational history. While I, as the author, take credit for any factual errors, 

a cast of many are responsible for the completion of this work and its associated research. 

Among my colleagues at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Kendall Gott stands out as 

the individual who bird-dogged me onto this project on my very first day on the job. Ken has 

provided valuable insight and advise on a daily basis ever since. We share a certain insight 

despite my being an Eastern suburbanite, while he is a Midwestern small-town guy. Robin 

Kern, the CSI editor and layout wizard, responsible for this project provided its final look and 

had to deal with the over 66 tables, maps, pictures, and graphics that bring the story of the US 

Army brigade to life. Robin is now ready to edit for Marvel Comics! Other section colleagues 

who provided valuable insights, comments, and support include historians Dr. Lawrence Yates 

and Dr. Gary Bjorge, and editors Phil Davis and Patricia Whitten. Other colleagues in the 

various sections of CSI were very helpful but are too numerous to cite here. 

I must also acknowledge the support of three key members of the CSI team, Lieutenant 

Colonel Kevin Farrell, former Chief Research and Publication Team; Dr. William G. Robertson, 

TRADOC Chief of Staff Rides and CAC Command Historian; and Colonel Lawyn C. Edwards, 

Director Combat Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

These three not only hired me from halfway across the country, but were instrumental in 

supporting this project from start to finish. Lieutenant Colonel Farrell nurtured the project, 

but was transferred before seeing the end product. Dr. Robertson was the thought behind the 

project in the first place. With the development of the brigade-based Army in 2003-2004, his 

insight seemed very timely indeed. Colonel Edwards provided valuable insights to the project 

in various stages of development and provided continual key support which has ensured its 

completion. 

Research and publication assistance was done by many. Among those who stand out include 

Ed Burgess, Director of the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), who assisted me either 

directly or through his subordinates, in the use of his excellent facility, and Alice King, Copyright 

Clerk, who processed all the copyrights necessary for this work. Retired Colonel Greg Fontenot 

and his team of researchers assisted greatly by providing materials from his On Point project. 

Off-site support was plentiful. Of those that stand out are many of my former colleagues at the 

US Army Center of Military History (CMH) at Fort McNair in Washington, DC., including the 

Chief of Military History, Brigadier General John S. Brown, and the members of the CMH’s 

Force Structure and Unit History Branch, who will probably cringe at some of the unofficial 

usages of unit organization found in this work. Ned Bedessem and Steve Everett of that branch 

were particularly helpful on various segments of unit organization research. Finally the guys 

who invented the Google website need to be mentioned. Without them much research leads on 

the Internet would be impossible to locate. 

Further acknowledgements need to go to several former colleagues: my mentor as an Army 

historian, Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., who is now enjoying a well-deserved retirement in Florida 

and my oldest friend and colleague in Army history, Dr. Mark Sherry, both of whom advised 

me and read portions of the work. A third person at CMH who needs mentioning is editor and 

iii 
fellow Bostonian Joanne Brignolo, who has provided constant professional support and advice 

on this project. My three children faraway in Massachusetts, Andrew, William, and Barbara, 

will finally know what exactly their father does in Kansas with this publication. 

Hopefully this work, in some small way, will help support the soldiers and officers of the 

US Army worldwide who, as this work goes to press, are still vigorously pursuing victory in the 

Global War on Terrorism which began on 11 September 2001. This work is dedicated to these 

soldiers and to all those who will not be coming home. 

John J. McGrath 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

15 June 2004 

iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page 

FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................ i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................................v

MAP SYMBOLS KEY ........................................................................................................... ix

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. xi

Chapter 1. BRIGADES IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY......................................................1

Colonial Background..........................................................................................................1

Washington and the Brigade...............................................................................................2

Brigades and Brigadier-Generals .......................................................................................7

Chapter 2. THE BRIGADE FROM 1783 TO 1861 ................................................................11

From 1783 to the War of 1812 .........................................................................................11

The War of 1812 ...............................................................................................................11

The Mexican War .............................................................................................................13

The Utah Expedition ........................................................................................................14

Chapter 3. BRIGADES IN THE CIVIL WAR........................................................................17

Organization .....................................................................................................................17

Little Round Top: A Civil War Brigade Action ................................................................20

Brigades in the War With Spain .......................................................................................25

Chapter 4. THE BRIGADE IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY, 1902-1919........................29

Organizational Reforms ................................................................................................... 29

Mexican Expeditions ........................................................................................................ 31

The Brigade and World War I: The Square Division........................................................ 32

Tank Brigades................................................................................................................... 35

The 154th Infantry Brigade in the Argonne ..................................................................... 36

Chapter 5. INTERWAR AND GLOBAL WAR: DEATH OF THE BRIGADE ..................... 45

The Interwar Years: Square and Mechanized Brigades.................................................... 45

Triangularized Divisions .................................................................................................. 46

The Combat Command of the Armored Division ............................................................ 48

Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, at Remagen, Germany ............................. 50

The Regimental Combat Team ......................................................................................... 54

Chapter 6. THE EARLY MODERN BRIGADE, 1958-1972 ................................................. 59

Pentomic Era .................................................................................................................... 59

ROAD Brigades and Airmobile Brigades ........................................................................ 61

The Brigade in Vietnam.................................................................................................... 65

Operation APACHE SNOW: Brigade Employment in Vietnam ...................................... 69

v 
Page 

Chapter 7. COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR ................................................................ 77

Roundout Brigades ........................................................................................................... 77

The TRICAP Division and the Air Cavalry Combat Brigade. ......................................... 79

Forward Deployed and Rotating Brigades in Europe ...................................................... 79

1970s and 1980s Brigade Redesign Initiatives................................................................. 81

Aviation Brigades ............................................................................................................. 86

The Air Assault Division .................................................................................................. 89

Combat Service Support and the Brigade ........................................................................ 90

The Brigade in Panama and in the Gulf War.................................................................... 93

Gulf War Brigade Assignments, 1990-1991..................................................................... 95

24th Mechanized Division Brigades in Operation DESERT STORM............................. 96

Chapter 8. THE MODERN BRIGADE, 1991-2003............................................................. 103

Enhanced Brigades ......................................................................................................... 103

Force XXI and Other Tweaks......................................................................................... 104

Brigade Cavalry Troops, 2003........................................................................................ 106

Stryker Brigades: Army Transformation Redux............................................................. 107

The Brigade Combat Team............................................................................................. 110

Brigades in the War with Iraq, 2003............................................................................... 111

The 3d Mechanized Division’s Brigades in the Iraqi Campaign, 2003.......................... 113

CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE BRIGADE. .............................................131

Conclusion......................................................................................................................131

The Future of the Brigade: Stryker Brigades and Units of Action .................................132

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................141

GLOSSARY..........................................................................................................................151

Appendix 1. DIVISIONAL VERSUS SEPARATE BRIGADES .........................................159

Appendix 2. BRIGADE COLORS .......................................................................................161

Civil War ........................................................................................................................161

Spanish American War ...................................................................................................161

World War I/Interwar (Square Division) ........................................................................162

World War II (Armored Division Combat Command)...................................................162

Current (since 1963) .......................................................................................................163

Appendix 3. WORLD WAR I AND INTERWAR INFANTRY BRIGADES.......................165

Appendix 4. US ARMY BRIGADES SINCE 1958 .............................................................177

Divisional Brigades ........................................................................................................177

Separate Brigades ...........................................................................................................231

vi 
FIGURES

Page 

Figure 1. Continental Army Brigade, 1775-1783 ..................................................................... 4

Figure 2. Washington’s Defensive Concept for the Employment of the Brigade..................... 5

Figure 3. Number of Continental Army Brigades,1775-1783. ................................................. 8

Figure 4. Action at Little Round Top, 2 July 1863 ................................................................. 20

Figure 5. Vincent Directs his Brigade’s Defense of Little Round Top, 

 “Don’t Give Up an Inch” by Don Troiani............................................................. 23

Figure 6. First Peacetime Brigades, 1914 ............................................................................... 30

Figure 7. Pershing’s Provisional Division, 1916 .................................................................... 31

Figure 8. Example of European Organization, 1914-1918 ..................................................... 33

Figure 9. The Square Divisional Brigade, 1917 ..................................................................... 34

Figure 10. World War I Tank Brigade ..................................................................................... 36

Figure 11. Operations of the 154th Infantry Brigade, 2-7 October 1918................................ 39

Figure 12. Units Isolated as the “Lost Battalion, 2-7 October 1918....................................... 40

Figure 13. 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), 1938 ............................................................. 46

Figure 14. Typical Organization of a Light Armored Division Combat Command ............... 49

Figure 15. Remagen Bridgehead, Army in Action Series, DA Poster 21-32........................... 50

Figure 16. Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, 7 March 1945................................ 51

Figure 17. The Advance of CCB, 9th Armored Division, 7 March 1945. .............................. 53

Figure 18. Typical Organization of a Regimental Combat Team. .......................................... 55

Figure 19. Organization of 5th RCT, Korea, 1950.................................................................. 56

Figure 20. The Pentomic Brigade ........................................................................................... 60

Figure 21. The ROAD Divisional Brigade ............................................................................. 62

Figure 22. Example of a Separate Brigade Organization. ...................................................... 63

Figure 23. The First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1965 ...................................................... 64

Figure 24. The 196th Infantry Brigade Ships Out to Vietnam, Boston, 1966 ........................ 65

Figure 25. The Americal (23d Infantry) Division as Originally Organized in 1967 .............. 66

Figure 26. Phase 1 of Operation JUNCTION City, February 1967........................................ 68

Figure 27. Operation APACHE SNOW, May 1969 ................................................................ 71

Figure 28. Final Assault on Hamburger Hill, 19-20 May 1969 .............................................. 73

Figure 29. The TRICAP Division ........................................................................................... 78

Figure 30. Air Cavalry Combat Brigade................................................................................. 80

Figure 31. 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), 1988 ............................................................... 84

Figure 32. Armored/Mechanized Division Aviation Brigade, 2003 ....................................... 88

Figure 33. Light Division Aviation Brigade, 2003 ................................................................. 88

Figure 34. Air Assault Division Structure, 2003..................................................................... 91

Figure 35. Brigade Tactical Logistics Organization ............................................................... 92

Figure 36. 24th Mechanized Division Brigade Operations in the Gulf War, 1991................. 97

Figure 37. Stryker Vehicles. Infantry Carrier and Mobile Gun System................................ 109

Figure 38. The Stryker Brigade ............................................................................................ 109

Figure 39. Brigade Combat Team, 2004 ............................................................................... 110

Figure 40. Drive on Karbala, 2003 ....................................................................................... 115

vii 
Page 

Figure 41. Tallil Airbase, 21-22 March 2003........................................................................ 117

Figure 42. Isolation of Najaf, 23-25 March 2003 ................................................................. 120

Figure 43. Drive on Baghdad, 2003...................................................................................... 123

Figure 44. UA Brigade Design.............................................................................................. 133

Figure 45. Heavy UA Brigade, 2004 .................................................................................... 136

Figure 46. Modular Divisional Aviation Brigade, 2004 ....................................................... 136

Figure 47. Army Brigade Restructuring, 2004...................................................................... 137

TABLES

Page 

Table 1. Number of Brigadier-Generals, 1775-1783 ............................................................... 9

Table 2. Brigadier-Generals, War of 1812 ............................................................................. 12

Table 3. Brigadier-Generals, Mexican War............................................................................ 13

Table 4. Vermont Brigade Losses, 1862-1865 ....................................................................... 18

Table 5. Regiment versus Brigade versus Group................................................................... 48

Table 6. Reserve Component Roundout Brigades, 1973-1996.............................................. 77

Table 7. Army Organizational Redesign Initiatives 1975-1988............................................. 81

Table 8. Combined Arms Battalions in the Motorized Division, 1988.................................. 83

Table 9. Informal Regimental Designations 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions ................... 85

Table 10. Brigades in Panama, December 1989/January 1990.............................................. 94

Table 11. Gulf War Brigade Assignments 1990-1991............................................................ 95

Table 12. 24th Mechanized Division Five-Phased Attack, 1991 ........................................... 96

Table 13. National Guard Enhanced Brigades and AC/RC Divisions ................................. 104

Table 14. Brigade Reconnaissance Troops, 2003 ................................................................ 106

Table 15. Projected Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team Units ...................................... 108

Table 16. Brigade Stationing, 2004...................................................................................... 112

Table 17. Brigades in the War with Iraq, 2003 .................................................................... 113

Table 18. Initial Brigade Organization, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) 2003.............. 114

Table 19. Projected Unit of Action Missions ....................................................................... 134

viii 
MAP SYMBOLS KEY

ix 
x
INTRODUCTION

On 12 August 1999, US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, announced the 

commencement of Army force development initiatives designed to transform the Army into 

a force that would be “more responsive, lethal, agile, versatile, survivable, and sustainable 

to meet the needs of the nation.”1 Shinseki proposed to effect this transformation by creating 

two, later six, “technology-enhanced, fast-deployable, and lethal brigades.”2 These brigades, 

initially coined as Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), because they would be outfitted 

with available equipment on an interim basis, showed a subtle shift in US Army force 

development focus from the division to the brigade. This shift was also reflected in the force 

structure of the US Army in 2003. In the mid-1990s, the Army, reduced in size after the end 

of the Cold War, fielded the 10-Division Force structure. After redesignations and unit shifts, 

there were no nondivisional maneuver brigades in this force structure.3 However, this lack of 

separate brigades was deceptive. A closer examination revealed that, while the Army fielded 10 

divisional headquarters in 1996, only three divisions had all three of their numbered maneuver 

brigades collocated with the division headquarters. Two installations, Fort Lewis, Washington, 

and Fort Riley, Kansas, fielded brigades from different divisions without a division headquarters 

located on post. In both cases, the respective division headquarters were located overseas. The 

1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (ID), located in Alaska, was earmarked to act as the third 

brigade of the two-brigade 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. Each divisional 

brigade located away from its parent division, included the standardized slice of divisional 

combat support and combat service support units. This complete package, referred to as a 

brigade combat team (BCT), is essentially a unit able to operate separately from the division, 

much like the separate brigades were organizationally designed to so operate.4 

The years after 1996 saw further shifts toward a brigade force when two new separate 

brigade headquarters were activated, the 172d Infantry in Alaska replacing the 1st Brigade 

of the previously inactivated 6th Infantry Division, and the 173d Airborne in Italy, and the 

reactivation of two division headquarters, the 7th Infantry and 24th Infantry (Mechanized), 

that had no troops of their own, but were responsible for three separate Army National Guard 

(ARNG) brigades, none of which were located near their respective division headquarters at 

Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Riley. Shinseki’s emphasis on the brigade as the level of 

command to field his new combat teams, in this context, is, therefore, not very surprising. 

The brigade, either as part of a division or as an independent or separate entity, is the major 

tactical headquarters controlling battalions in maneuver combat arms; armor and infantry. The 

modern maneuver brigade is a flexible organization designed to be task organized for specific 

combat missions.5 When operating independently, the brigade is usually the lowest level of 

command led by a general officer. With organic elements, in the case of the separate brigade, or 

with attached elements from the division, in the case of the divisional brigade, it is the smallest 

combined arms unit in the US Amy capable of independent operations. 

In current US Army organizational structure, the divisional brigade is the only unit below 

corps level without a fixed organization.6 While companies, battalions, and divisions all have 

organic assigned units, except for a small reconnaissance troop and a headquarters company, 

the brigade has no assigned troops. Instead it is given a mix of combat battalions from those 

xi 
assigned to the division to complete specific missions. Additionally, in recent years brigades 

have also received slices of combat support and combat service support units from the division, 

as well as combat battalions. In this case, the brigade is usually referred to as a BCT. 

This work studies the evolution, organizational structure, and employment of the maneuver 

brigade. In passing, it will also discuss other army brigades, such as those consisting of field 

artillery, aviation, and engineer units, not usually used in a maneuver role. 

As an organization, the brigade has a long history in the US Army going back to the very 

first organization, the Continental Army. General George Washington established the first 

brigades on 22 July 1775.7 The term brigade itself first entered the English language, like most 

military terms, from the French language. The word is first attested in the 15th century as a 

term for a larger military unit than the squadron or regiment and was first adopted when English 

armies began to consist of formations larger than a single regiment. The term’s origin is found 

in two French roots, which together meant roughly “those who fight.”8 It is totally fitting that 

the brigade be designated as “those who fight” because the organization has, throughout most 

of its existence in the US Army, been a purely tactical, or combat, organization, and currently 

is where the combat power of the US Army is found. 

At the start of the 21st century, debates on the future of warfare and the transformation of 

the US Army to adjust to this future environment are ongoing. The brigade is usually at the 

center of transformational organizational structures, either as a replacement for the division 

as the basic building block for projecting combat power or as the Unit of Action (UA), a 

flexible organization designed to fight and win battles. While debates and final decisions on this 

structure are ongoing as of the publication of this work, it is vital that planners understand the 

history and theory behind the evolution of the US Army maneuver brigade. 

This special study outlines and illuminates the history and evolution of the brigade as an 

organization in the US Army, from the earliest days to the current era. The work follows both 

the organizational structure and how it was actually employed on the battlefield. 

xii 
NOTES

1. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Army TO Develop Future Force, says Shinseki.” Army Link News, 13 October 1999, <http: 

//www.dtic/mil/armylink/news/Oct1999/a19991013shinvis.html>. 

2. Ibid. 

3. The 10-division force consisted of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, 10th Mountain Division, 1st 

Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. “Army Announces Divisions 

to Remain in the 10-Division Force.” DOD New Release Reference Number 067-95, 10 February 1995, <http: 

//www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1995/b021095_bt067-95.html>. 

4. A typical brigade slice included a direct support field artillery battalion, a combat engineer battalion, an air 

defense artillery battery, a forward support battalion, which was already structured to support the specific brigade, 

and military intelligence and signal companies. 

5. Aviation brigades, now organic to all types of army divisions, are considered to be maneuver brigades as well. 

Often such brigades are referred to informally, and incorrectly, as the 4th Brigade of their respective division. This 

will be discussed in detail later in this work. 

6. See the Conclusion for a discussion of the future projected brigade organization (Unit of Action or UA) in 

which the brigade would have a modular organization with assets currently found at division assigned directly to the 

brigade. 

7. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 3. 

8. The roots are the French verb brigare, meaning “to brawl” or “fight,” which was in turn from the late Latin 

word briga, which meant “strife” or “contention,” and the suffix –ade, which was a French adaptation of a suffix 

found in various other Romance languages, such as Provençal, which came from a form of the Latin past participle. 

In French the suffix came to have the meaning “the body concerned in an action or process.” Therefore, the original 

meaning of the term brigade would be something like “the body concerned with brawling or fighting.” J.A. Simpson 

and E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) Vol. I, 148 and Vol. II, 

548. 

xiii 
Chapter 1 

BRIGADES IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 

Colonial Background 

The brigade as a military organization came about starting in the 15th century when the 

British army and militia developed a unit to control more than one infantry regiment or cavalry 

squadron.1 Brigades were traditionally only temporary units organized when necessary, a 

status generally maintained in the US armed forces until early in the 20th century. In the New 

World, where the militia was the only permanent military organization, the separate colonies 

established different, but similar, systems of organization. In New England, for example, each 

town had its own militia company or trainband. Above the town level, each county had a militia 

regiment to control the companies assembled in each of the towns in the county. At the colonial 

level, there was one general officer who commanded all the colony’s militia. This officer was 

usually called the sergeant major-general, later shortened to major-general.2 In some colonies, 

the rank was lieutenant-general or even simply general. In Virginia, the colony was divided 

into districts. A major-general headed each district, with a major-general of the colony as the 

ranking officer.3 

The colonies had little use for brigades. Rarely did a single whole regiment, let alone 

several, assemble to conduct military operations. When larger expeditions were necessary, 

special volunteer or militia companies were raised by quota from each town within the colony. 

On the rare occasions these forces proved to be larger than regimental strength, brigades were 

not organized. For example, the large expedition against the Narragansett Indians in 1675 

consisted of troops from the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Connecticut. 

The forces were organized into specially raised contingents from each colony, each styled a 

regiment, but the force as a whole was considered an expedition, not a brigade. The command 

was referred to simply as “the army.” The Army’s commander, Josiah Winslow, aside from 

being the governor of Plymouth colony, was also given the title of general and commander in 

chief of the expedition. No other officer in the expedition ranked higher than major.4 

The situation was the same 70 years later when the colonials launched their largest 

expedition ever, the successful attack and seizure of the French fortress of Louisbourg, on 

Cape Breton Island, off Nova Scotia. Despite the raising of a relatively large army, the senior 

officer, General William Pepperrell, and his assistant, Major-General Roger Wolcott, were the 

only generals in an army of over 10 regiments.5 The force was not subdivided into brigades, 

though specific missions were often delegated to regimental commanders or to Wolcott.6 

Brigades and brigadier-generals did not appear in North America until the Seven Years 

War, when the British government first sent large continents of regular troops to secure its 

American colonies. The British regular army of the colonial era, like the militia, had no 

permanent organization larger than regiment, and created brigades only when necessary to 

control a force of more than three regiments. Pitched battles in Europe had, however, given the 

British experience with larger units. Brigadier-generals first appear on the continent along with 

the brigades they commanded.7 In the British service, brigadier-general was an appointment 

given to a senior colonel or lieutenant colonel, who was in command of more than one regiment; 

1 
in other words, a brigade. The appointment lasted only as long as the officer was in command. 

Accordingly, the rank of major-general was the first substantive, or permanent, rank of general 

officer in the British army. The British force sent to take Louisbourg in 1757 consisted of 13 

regular regiments. Most regiments had only a single battalion, though two had two battalions. 

These regiments were divided into three brigades of five battalions each, with each brigade 

headed by an officer appointed as brigadier-general (for service in North America only). The 

Army commander designated the brigades by their intended employment as left, centre, and 

right.8 

The first brigade of colonial troops also appeared in 1758 in Brigadier-General John 

Forbes’ expedition against Fort Duquesne, Pennsylvania. In his final approach to the French 

fortress, Forbes organized his command into three brigades. Colonel George Washington, 1st 

Virginia, commanded one of these, consisting of the 1st and 2d Virginia Regiments. The two 

Virginia regiments had been raised as special militia units specifically for participating in the 

Forbes expedition. After the successful seizure of Fort Duquesne, the brigade was discontinued, 

Washington resigned his commission and the 2d Virginia was disbanded.9 

Washington and the Brigade 

In April and June 1775, after the initial skirmishes between the New England militia 

and British regular forces near Boston, Massachusetts, and Fort Ticonderoga, New York, the 

Continental Congress determined to field a force representing all the colonies and run according 

to its wishes. By unanimous vote, Congress appointed Washington, the only colonial with 

experience as a brigade commander as general and commander in chief of this new Continental 

Army on 15 June 1775. 

When Washington was appointed, militia forces from the New England colonies had the 

British garrison in Boston under siege. These forces, organized by state in a very decentralized 

manner, had just fought the Battle of Bunker Hill. Washington arrived and immediately set 

out to create order and organization, using his experience of units above regiment level as a 

guide. He promptly created the first brigades and divisions in US Army history. Initially, the 

number of brigades was determined by the number of brigadier-generals appointed. An extra 

brigade was created and temporarily commanded by its senior colonel, as Congress needed 

to fill one brigadier-general vacancy. Congress had created the first brigadier-generals and 

major-generals on 22 June. Unlike in the British service, the rank of brigadier-general was a 

substantive one in the new Army.10 

Both brigades and divisions were at the start administrative and geographical subdivisions 

of the Army. Washington divided the siege lines around Boston into divisional and brigade 

sectors. One division was in reserve. Each of the three divisions consisted of two brigades. 

Brigades consisted of either six or seven regiments. Only Massachusetts fielded enough total 

regiments to have brigades formed entirely of troops just from that colony. Regiments from 

Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, along with small contingents from Virginia 

and Maryland, were brigaded with Massachusetts units. Brigade strengths fluctuated, with an 

average size of 2,600 soldiers.11 Using this organization, Washington successfully completed 

the siege, which climaxed in the British evacuation of Boston on 17 March 1776. 

2 
Following British practice, brigades were initially considered purely tactical units of a 

temporary nature and accordingly assigned virtually no staff. Originally the regiment was to be 

the Army’s basic administrative and tactical unit. But Washington soon realized the nature of 

the command precluded this. Troops were recruited from up to 13 different colonies for shortterm enlistments. Regiments from different states often had different organizational structures 

and sizes. Therefore, regiments were often fleeting organizations whose strengths went up 

and down, mostly down, as time passed. As a result, in practice, the brigade soon replaced the 

regiment as the Army’s basic tactical and administrative unit. Brigades were commanded by 

brigadier-generals appointed directly by Congress, whose candidacies were usually based on 

Washington’s recommendation. In contrast, regimental colonels were usually appointed by 

their respective colonial governors or legislatures. By shuffling regiments, Washington and 

other independent commanders could keep brigade sizes equal, rather than allowing them to 

wither away, as did some regiments. This allowed for a certain standard flexibility to maneuver 

forces both on the battlefield and at the operational level. The brigade even assumed a certain 

standard size. The brigades at Boston had been relatively large. Later in the war at Trenton, 

New Jersey, in December 1776 and Monmouth, New Jersey, in June 1778, they averaged 1,400 

soldiers, while at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781, brigade strength averaged around 1,000.12 

The increased importance of the brigade as the unit of stability in the Army led to a gradual 

increase in its staff and its role in logistics and administration. Initially the brigade staff consisted of a sole junior officer, the brigade major. The brigade major was a position inherited from 

British tradition. Like the British brigadier-general, the rank was originally only by position 

being filled by a regimental captain. In the American service, the position became substantive, 

with the officer being given the rank of major on the staff. The brigade major was a combination 

adjutant, (i.e., administrator) and aide de camp (messenger and general assistant) to the brigade 

commander. By 1779, two officers supplanted the brigade major with the titles of aide de camp 

and brigade inspector. At the same time, two more staff officers were added to the brigade 

headquarters: a brigade quartermaster, to manage the brigade’s supplies, and a brigade conductor of military stores, to manage the brigade’s ammunition supply and maintain its weapons.13 

After the evacuation of Boston, the war became decidedly more mobile. In the New YorkNew Jersey campaign of 1776, Washington had to be flexible enough to thwart incessant 

outflanking maneuvers, a favorite tactic of British commander General William Howe, while 

at the same time having his troops spread out far enough to respond to and assemble on any 

advancing enemy force. For this type of warfare, Washington depended on the brigade and his 

corps of brigadier-general brigade commanders as his essential elements. Washington did not 

command brigades directly, but used his major-generals to command divisions, which controlled 

the brigades directly. After Boston, most division commanders controlled three brigades, but 

this could be changed or adjusted based on circumstances. Washington’s optimum brigade 

organization was for a brigade to control three regiments of 700 men each, with three brigades 

forming a division. Both brigades and divisions would be commanded by general officers and 

be capable of operating in conjunction with each other or separately. While obtaining the ideal 

strength and organizational structure was mostly out of his hands, Washington clearly was able 

to organize his army to fight together or separately. The brigade was the basic unit Washington 

used to accomplish this.14 

3 
Figure 1. Continental Army Brigade, 1775-1783 

Following the setbacks in New York and New Jersey in 1776, Washington decided to 

strike back at the strung out British forces in central Jersey. Accordingly, on 25 December 

1776, he moved to use his whole army in one stroke to destroy the Hessian mercenary forces 

garrisoning Trenton and threaten the remaining British forces in New Jersey. Minus a diversionary force and a force designated to seal the Hessian route of retreat, Washington had at 

his direct disposal an attack group consisting of two divisions, each with three brigades, and 

a separate brigade acting as the advance guard. In a move of great innovation, he had Colonel Henry Knox’s artillery distributed among the brigades to provide direct support, thus 

creating the first combined arms units in US Army history. With these forces, he crossed the 

Delaware River and advanced on Trenton from the north in two divisional columns, the left 

commanded by very capable Major-General Nathaniel Greene, the right by the experienced 

Major-General John Sullivan. Coordination between the columns worked perfectly so that 

both elements were in position and able to work in unison. The direct support of the artillery 

and the placement of brigades had the Hessians virtually surrounded before the battle even 

began. When they tried to attack one of Greene’s brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General William Alexander, Lord Stirling, whose attached artillery was pouring fire onto their 

right flank, they were stopped by massed fire from one of Sullivan’s brigades, commanded 

by Brigadier-General Hugh Mercer, firing into their left flank. After an abortive retreat in 

which their brigade commander was killed, the Hessians surrendered. The use of combined 

arms and the maneuvering of brigade-sized forces had won the first battlefield victory in US 

Army history. A week later, Washington repeated the performance at Princeton, New Jersey, 

where he outmaneuvered the British relief force. Once again Washington managed to mass 

4 
his forces at one place by maneuvering and assembling brigades and artillery. The British 

rear guard was chewed up, resulting in their virtual evacuation of New Jersey for the winter.15 

After Trenton, Washington formally organized his brigades as combined arms teams and 

perfected his operational concept for using them in both offensive and defensive operations. 

An artillery company of between eight and 10 guns was usually placed in direct support of 

each infantry brigade.16 On the defensive, brigades were to be deployed within mutually 

supporting distance of each other. If one were attacked, it was to fix the attackers and then the 

other brigades in the division, followed by the closest divisions, would advance to mass on 

the attackers and hopefully double envelope and crush them. Even with this relatively simple 

doctrine and honed organizational structure, there were teething problems in executing it, 

especially against the professional soldiers of King George III. This was particularly evident 

at Brandywine, in September 1777. There Howe, advancing from Chesapeake to Philadelphia, 

planned to duplicate his flanking maneuver which had been so successful a year before at the 

Battle of Long Island. Intelligence failures, coupled with a poorly covered right flank, allowed 

the British to advance deep into the right rear of the American position before they were 

discovered. Flexibility of organization and Howe’s penchant for battlefield pauses allowed 

Washington to reconfigure his command on the fly and meet Howe’s force with seven small 

brigades under Sullivan, Alexander, and Major-General Adam Stephen. Amid furious fighting, 

the British overwhelmed the American line, forcing Washington to rush Greene’s two brigades 

from his left flank by forced march 4 miles in 45 minutes to reinforce the position. While this 

maneuver worked, the force Howe left behind now attacked the weakened left, forcing the 

Americans to retreat to avoid being crushed between the two British forces. 

Figure 2. Washington’s Defensive Concept for the Employment of the Brigade 

5 
Things worked much more effectively in 1780, when the British sortied out of their 

Manhattan defensive enclave twice near Springfield, New Jersey. Washington’s defensive 

doctrine had reached its apex in the defensive lines covering the British garrison in New York 

after General Henry Clinton, Howe’s replacement, retreated back there from Philadelphia in 

1778. Washington encircled the city with brigades posted on high ground with clear observation, 

out of naval bombardment range and, to provide warning time, about a day’s march from the 

nearest British outposts. Brigades were positioned to be able to easily support each other. 

Carefully constructed lateral communications allowed for the easy moving of large formations 

to threatened sectors. The brigade at the focus of the enemy attack was to fix the attackers in 

place. All other brigades and divisions were to fall in to mass against the attacking force and 

hopefully double envelope and crush it.17 

The strength of the American defenses was not lost on Clinton, who chose to pursue 

campaigns in the southern states, far from Washington, rather than test them.18 The two 

exceptions were the twin sorties conducted in June 1780 near Springfield. In both cases, the 

British forces were soundly beaten and forced to beat hasty retreats to positions where the Royal 

Navy’s guns could protect them. The memory of Springfield so hung with British commander 

Clinton, that 13 months later when Washington left a skeleton force of 2,500 men behind to 

watch New York while he marched with the rest of the army to Yorktown, Clinton stayed on 

the defensive. He did not move to interfere with the American redeployment until it was too 

late to do anything about it. 

Washington’s concept was designed to work on the offense, as well as the defense. After 

Brandywine, the only offensive actions Washington was able to mount were at Germantown, 

Pennsylvania, in October 1777, and at Monmouth in June 1778. In both cases, the British 

prevailed after a hard fight, due to American mistakes, simple bad luck, and poor synchronization. 

At Germantown, Washington attempted to repeat his success at Trenton on a larger scale, with 

multiple columns massing against the British right flank. Despite ground fog, which limited 

visibility and the diversion of a brigade to frontally assault the Chew House, an impromptu 

fortress in the center of the British line, the attack was succeeding. Brigadier-General Anthony 

Wayne’s two brigades were successfully pushing back the British left, when another American 

division, under Stephen mistakenly came up into Wayne’s rear, rather than that of the British, 

and fired into the backs of their fellow countrymen. In the resulting confusion, the British 

counterattacked and Washington’s right withdrew in confusion. Greene’s division, moving to 

the left of Stephen to encircle the British, was now out on a limb. Greene retreated to avoid 

encirclement, effectively ending the battle. 

The Battle of Monmouth was Washington’s last open battle offensive action of the war. 

In June 1778, British commander in chief Clinton decided to consolidate his forces at New 

York. Accordingly, he evacuated Philadelphia and proceeded to march across New Jersey for a 

rendezvous with fleet transports to ferry the army across New York Bay at Sandy Hook. 

Washington was determined to attack Clinton while he was in the open and not protected by 

the Royal Navy and the natural defenses of New York City. Accordingly, he followed Clinton 

looking for an opening to attack part of the British force. Clinton’s large baggage train meant 

his army was strung out for miles in the New Jersey countryside. 

6 
Washington, having decided to mass against the British rear guard under Lieutenant General 

Charles Cornwallis, divided his army into two wings, the advanced wing, initially under MajorGeneral Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roche Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette, then 

under Major-General Charles Lee, and the main body under himself. Lee’s command, with 

seven brigades, was ordered to attack the rearguard before they reached the safety of high 

ground just south of Sandy Hook, less than a day’s march away. 

Lee, an ex-British officer, shared many of the same low opinions of American fighting 

qualities that his former peers did despite glaring evidence to the contrary. His belief in the low 

quality of his troops made him a timid field commander and a poor choice to head up a mission 

requiring daring and aggressiveness. But, aside from Washington, Lee was the senior officer in 

the Army and he insisted on the command after Washington had initially given it to the much 

more optimistic and energetic Lafayette. 

When the army got within striking distance of Clinton’s rear guard, Washington ordered 

Lee to attack the next day. Instead of developing a plan for this, Lee told his subordinates to 

be prepared to receive orders on the battlefield. The next day, 28 June 1778, Lee advanced on 

Cornwallis’ force just north of Monmouth Court House. Despite outnumbering the strung-out 

British more than two to one, the lack of an overall plan, and Lee’s attempts to move units on 

the cuff resulted in great confusion, piecemeal attacks, and then retreat when the British counterattacked. Washington arrived on the scene and personally rallied Lee’s command, organizing 

them to delay the now reinforced British until the rest of the army could form a defensive line. 

This worked and the American forces, now on the defensive, beat back the British attack. The 

American organizational structure’s flexibility allowed quick recovery even from poor leadership above the brigade and division level. Lee was subsequently court-martialed and cashiered. 

Brigades and Brigadier-Generals 

While Washington reserved the right to move regiments around between brigades as he saw 

fit, he realized it was more practical to stabilize organizations as much as possible.19The Army was 

recruited by state quota, meaning each state was required to recruit a certain number of regiments 

or smaller units from its population, and, whenever possible, brigades were made up of regiments 

from the same state. While in reports brigades were usually referred to by their commander’s 

name, later in the war most brigades were designated by state. States with large contingents had 

several brigades numbered consecutively, for example, the 2d Massachusetts Brigade. Such 

unique formal brigade designations would not return again to the US Army until World War I. 

The number of operational brigades in the Continental Army fluctuated based on the need 

to counter British activities. Fortunately for Washington, during most of the war the British 

maintained only one active area of operations at any given time. An exception to this was the 

summer of 1777, were two major-operations, Howe’s advance on Philadelphia and LieutenantGeneral John Burgoyne’s advance from Canada south along the Hudson Valley. To counter 

these twin thrusts, the number of active Continental Army brigades was increased to over 

22 in the spring of 1777. This number stayed relatively constant, as indicated in Figure 2, 

until the loss of five entire brigades with the surrender of Charleston, South Carolina, in May 

1780. These brigades, consisting of most of the Continental Army contingents from Virginia, 

7 
British finally evacuated the city, ending the need for the Army. Tied directly to the number of 

brigades was the number of brigadier-generals. Washington clearly saw this connection and 

thought it essential that brigade commanders be general officers.21

The Continental Army adopted the grade of brigadier-general from the British army. But, 

the Carolinas, and Georgia, were never replaced.20 The total number of operational brigades 

remained between 10 and 15 for the rest of the war. After the victory at Yorktown, in late 1781, 

the Continental Army was mainly concerned with watching the British garrison in New York. 

With peace on the horizon, the Army was allowed to shrink as regiments were disbanded and 

returned home. The number of brigades, accordingly, also shrank throughout 1783 until the 

Figure 3. Number of Continental Army Brigades, 1775-1783 

unlike the American use of the grade as a substantive rank, brigadier-general had developed 

in the British army as a positional grade much like the grade of commodore in the Royal 

Navy. In the Royal Navy, for most of its history, the rank of commodore was held by a senior 

captain who commanded more than just his own ship, in other words, a naval captain acting 

with the prerogatives of a flag officer, an admiral. The grade came with no additional pay, but 

the commodore was allowed to fly a flag, euphemistically referred to as a “broad pennant” 

from his own ship to indicate his position. Similarly, a British brigadier-general was a colonel 

or, more usually, a lieutenant-colonel, who commanded more than just his own regiment. As 

with commodore in the Royal Navy, the grade was temporary; only granted to the holder 

under specific conditions. In the British army, this often meant the grade was only active when 

the holder was serving in North America. The grade of brigadier-general, also called, almost 

interchangeably, brigadier, first appeared in the British army during the reign of King James 

II. A warrant of 1705 placed the grade directly below major-general, but the appointment was 

always considered temporary and not continuous. The British were ambiguous over whether 

8 
the holder was considered a general officer or a senior field grade officer. However, when 

the British adopted shoulder boards with rank insignia in 1880, the brigadier-general insignia 

included the crossed sword and baton worn by the other general grades. By uniform, in any 

event, a brigadier-general was considered the lowest grade of general. In 1920, the grade was 

abolished and two new substantive grades were created, that of colonel-commandant and 

colonel of the staff. In 1928, these two grades were merged into a new grade, brigadier, which 

still exists in the British army today. That this current grade of brigadier is considered the 

senior grade of field grade officer, rather than a general officer, is clearly indicated by its rank 

insignia, which is similar to a colonel’s with an extra pip added.22 

As with the Army as a whole, brigadier-generals were supposed to be tied to a quota based 

on the number of troops the respective state supplied. While the total number of brigadiergenerals always exceeded the number of brigades by about 10 officers, the number in field 

command was often less. Some brigadiers were diverted to perform administrative duties. 

Others, with no retirement system in place, were still on the rolls though unfit for field duty. 

The number of brigadier-generals reached a high of 35 in 1778, and remained at or near this 

number for the rest of the war. Later in the war, Congress was stingy on promotion, only 

appointing new brigadiers to replace losses. As this also applied to major-generals as well, 

Wayne, promoted to brigadier-general in 1777, remained such for the rest of the war, despite 

his commanding a division at Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. Because of seniority, 

Wayne often reverted back to brigade command long after he had shown his prowess at the 

higher echelon. Statistics for brigadier-generals during the war are as follows: 

Table 1. Number of Brigadier-Generals, 1775-1783 

Washington employed brigades much as Napoleon Bonaparte would use the army corps 

20 years later to revolutionize European warfare, “capable of independent action, but primarily 

. . . to be an interchangeable part in the big picture.”23 He tried to keep brigades at equal sizes 

and use them as standardized units commanded by experienced general officers to execute what 

would otherwise be hopelessly complex battle drills. “In short, each brigade should be an epitome 

of the great whole, and move by similar springs, upon a smaller scale.”24The US Army would not 

again see the brigade play such a prominent role in its operational doctrine for almost 200 years. 

9 
NOTES

1. J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) Vol. 

I, 148 and Vol. II, 548. 

2. Jack S. Radabaugh, “The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts,” Military Affairs 18 (Spring 1954), 2-5.

 3. Frederick S. Aldridge, Organization and Administration of the Militia System of Colonial Virginia, Ph.D. diss. 

American University 1964, 25, 62, 64.

 4. George M. Bodge, Brief History of King Philip’s War (Boston: Printed Privately, 1891), 182-83.

 5. The 4,000-man force raised by Massachusetts Bay Governor William Shirley included eight regiments 

from Massachusetts, including the district of Maine, one each from Connecticut and New Hampshire, and three 

companies from Rhode Island. William Pepperrell, as a colonel, had been the militia commander for the portion 

of the Massachusetts militia from Maine. See the Canadian Parks Service Louisbourg website: <http://www. 

louisbourg.ca/fort/siege1745.htm>, accessed 1 May 2003.

 6. Douglas E. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 

(New York: Macmillan, 1973), 236-41.

 7. A more detailed discussion of the rank of brigadier-general, and the later rank of brigadier, can be found on 

pages 7 through 9. The grade in the British service was not substantive, being given to lieutenant-colonels and 

colonels only while they were in brigade command. (Ranks were hyphenated until after the Civil War.)

 8. The officers were Lieutenant-Colonel James Wolfe, 20th Regiment of Foot; Lieutenant-Colonel Charles 

Lawrence, 40th Regiment of Foot and governor of Nova Scotia; and Colonel Edward Whitmore, 22d Regiment of 

Foot. <http://www.militaryheritage.com/40th.htm>, accessed 1 May 2003; J.W. Fortesque, A History of the British 

Army, Vol. II (London: MacMillan, 1910), 322. In the British service, the regiment was the administrative unit, the 

battalion the tactical unit. Some regiments had more than one battalion but they always fought separately, even when 

part of the same army. With a few unique exceptions, the US Army would also retain single battalion regiments until 

the 1890s.

 9. Walter O’Meara, Guns at the Forks (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 208; Douglas Leach, Arms 

for Empire, 443; James P. Myers, Jr., “General Forbes Roads to War,” Military History 18:5 (December 2001), 

30-36. Forbes’ substantive rank was colonel, 17th Regiment of Foot. The other two brigades were commanded 

by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Bouquet, 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment of Foot, and Lieutenant Colonel Archibald 

Montgomery, 77th Highland Regiment of Foot. 

10. Robert Wright, The Continental Army, 26, 29; Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 Vols., 

Worthington C. Ford, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1904-1937), Vol. 2, 93-94 (hereafter 

cited as JCC). 

11. Brendan Morrissey, Boston 1775: The Shot Heard Around the World. Osprey Campaign Series Number 37. 

(Osprey: London, 1993), 75-76; John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate 

Brigades. Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 3. 

12. Wright, 25; Wilson, 3. 

13. Wilson, 4-5. 

14. Wright, 98, 152; E-mail from Dr. Robert Wright to author, 14 January 2003; Wilson, 5-6. 

15. Craig L. Symonds. A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation 

Publishing, 1986), 30-33. 

16. Wright, 97-98. 

17. Wright e-mail, 14 January 2003; Wright, 152. 

18. Ibid. Clinton’s comments can be found in his Headquarters Intelligence Books, archived at the New York 

Public Library. 

19. The Writings of George Washington, Vol. VII 1778-1779, Worthington C. Ford, ed. (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 

1890), 60-61. 

20. Brigades, which surrendered on 12 May 1780 at Charleston, included the 1st Virginia Brigade; the North Carolina Brigade; Armstrong’s Brigade, of North Carolina troops; the South Carolina Brigade; and the Georgia Brigade. 

21. JCC, 102, 315. 

22. Wright, 26; The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 2, 93-94, 97; Commander (RN) W.E. May, W.Y. Carman 

and John Tanner, Badges and Insignia of the British Armed Service (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974), 141. 

23. Wright e-mail, 14 January 2003; Wright, 152. 

24. The Writings of Washington, 315. 

10 
Chapter 2 

THE BRIGADE FROM 1783 TO 1861 

From 1783 to the War of 1812 

Throughout the 19th century, the largest permanent organization in the regular Army was 

the regiment, usually consisting of 10 subordinate companies. The brigade was a temporary 

organization only established to control forces of multiple regiments, usually more than three. 

Only during the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, the Civil War, and the War with Spain 

were brigades formally established. In all cases they were disestablished almost immediately 

upon the cessation of hostilities. Occasionally in the course of the Indian Wars or domestic 

operations, such as the Mormon Expedition, short-term brigades were sometimes formed in 

the field. 

After the successful conclusion of the War for Independence, the United States’ standing 

Army was allowed to shrink to microscopic proportions. The experience with the self-contained 

combined arms brigade was mostly forgotten except for a brief experiment on a larger scale, 

with the US Legion from 1792 to 1796. The Legion, which was the standing Army as a whole, 

was divided into four sub-Legions, each commanded by a brigadier-general and authorized 

1,280 men. Subordinate organizations included two battalions of infantry, one battalion of 

riflemen, a company of artillery, and a troop of dragoons.1 After 1796, the Army reverted back 

to a more conventional single branch regimental organization, with no established permanent 

units above the regiment. 

In 1792, with a small standing Army and a militia tradition, Congress established a structure 

for larger units of the militia, for possible use in time of emergency, providing for, at least on 

paper, brigades and divisions. A militia infantry brigade’s strength would be roughly 2,500 

men, with four subordinate regiments, each divided into two battalions of four companies. 

The latter was a departure from Continental Army regiments, which generally had its eight 

companies organized as a single battalion. The brigade staff, unlike in the later stages of 

the Revolutionary War, was small, being limited to the brigade commander and his primary 

assistant, called either the brigade major or brigade inspector. This system was, however, not 

implemented in practice. No state raised any unit larger than a battalion for Federal service. 

Congress additionally added a third component of the Army, to go along with the Regular 

Army and the militia, with the calling up of volunteers. The volunteers, until requested, would 

not be part of any standing, organized force. With the extensive legal restrictions on the use 

of the militia, the use of volunteers would be the primary method by which the United States 

mobilized large forces for use in wartime in the 19th century.2 An exception to this was that the 

War of 1812, fought in or near many of the largest states, saw the extensive use of militia. 

The War of 1812 

When the new war with Britain began in 1812, Congress immediately raised forces by 

expanding the size of the Regular Army, while calling for volunteers and mobilizing the 

militia. The largest new units raised were regiments. The use of higher units—brigades and 

divisions—was a lot more of an ad hoc nature than it had been in the Revolutionary War. 

11 
12

The rank of brigadier-general was, again, tied directly to the brigade. The peacetime Army 

of 1812 had three generals: one major-general, and two brigadier-generals. During the war, a 

total of 25 additional officers were appointed to the rank in the Regular Army. Several more 

served temporarily in the militia and volunteers. Given promotions, battlefield losses, and 

resignations, Congressional oversight kept the number of brigadiers at 12 for most of the war: 

In Congressional hearings on the number of generals to be appointed, the War Department 

formally gave its opinion that a brigade consisting of 2,000 men organized in two regiments 

was the appropriate command for a brigadier-general. With the Regular Army expanded to 37 

infantry regiments for the war, seven prewar, 10 more in 1812, and 20 more in 1813, the number of brigadier-generals actually averaged about one for every three regiments, though several, 

instead of commanding brigades, commanded one of the nine geographic military districts.4

After the War of 1812, the Army was reduced to seven infantry regiments and three 

brigadier-generals. Despite the small size of the force, the Army Regulations of 1821, drawn 

up by Brigadier-General Winfield Scott, one of the most successful brigade commanders of the 

war, envisioned much larger organizations, including the army corps, to consist of two or more 

divisions. The brigade was to consist of two regiments and only the brigade major remained on 

the staff. Brigades would be numbered according to the seniority of their commanders, but, in 

official reports, they would be referred to by their commander’s name. A further revision to the 

regulation in 1841 allowed for a bigger brigade staff, but stated that its size and composition 

would be based on the specific mission of the unit. All this organizational thought was purely 

notional as the Army did not operationally field units larger than a regiment.5

Table 2. Brigadier-Generals, War of 1812

Usually a field commander would organize his army into brigades at the start of a campaign or 

whenever reorganization was necessary. Most army commanders controlled brigades directly, 

forces usually being somewhat smaller than during the Revolutionary War. Typically regiments 

would be assigned to brigades based on seniority, with brigades numbered according to the 

seniority of their commanders. Given the ad hoc nature of this organizational structure, brigades 

could vary in strength from 400 to 2,000 soldiers. As a general rule, regular regiments, militia 

regiments, and volunteer regiments were brigaded separately under commanders from their 

own components. While Army documents of the era stated that a brigade staff would only 

consist of the brigade major, public law provided for a staff similar to that employed in the later 

years of the Revolutionary War: five officers on the brigade staff (brigade inspector, brigade 

subinspector, brigade quartermaster, wagon master, chaplain) and, on the brigade commander’s 

personal staff, the brigade major and several aides de camp.3 
13

used in the war consisted of a mix of regulars and volunteers, brevet rank was to be significant. 

Including the two brevet appointments and ignoring the staff brigadier-general, the 

quartermaster general, there were four brigadier-general equivalents in an Army with only 

eight infantry regiments and two cavalry regiments, giving a ratio of one brigadier-general for 

roughly every two and a half regiments, not far removed from the two regiment brigade structure 

officially envisioned by Army regulations. At the height of the war, when the Regular Army 

had been expanded to 18 regiments of infantry and cavalry, there were three line brigadiergenerals and three by brevet only. The ratio of brigadiers to regiments rose slightly to three to 

Table 3. Brigadier-Generals, Mexican War

The Mexican War 

At the start of the Mexican War in 1845, the Army had eight infantry regiments, two dragoon 

(mounted infantry) regiments, and four artillery regiments. In early 1846, a third mounted 

regiment, the US Mounted Rifles, was added. In 1847, eight additional infantry regiments, a 

rifle regiment, and a third dragoon regiment were added to the regular Army for the duration 

of the war. As the war was to be fought mostly on foreign soil, the militia was not called out. 

Instead, Congress authorized 50,000 volunteers in May 1846, of which 18,210 were mustered 

into Federal service, the small number based on belief in a short war. When the war continued 

into fall and winter of 1846, many of the volunteer units were due to be mustered out, as their 

terms of service were for only 12 months. Accordingly there was a second call for volunteers 

that enlisted 33,596 men whose term of service was for the duration of the war.

6 

Both regular and volunteer units were organized permanently at no higher than regimental 

level. Volunteer regiments and smaller units were recruited and organized on a state basis. 

Field commanders then organized brigades and divisions in the field. For example, in early 

1846 Zachary Taylor organized his force, which advanced from Texas into Mexico with 3,500 

men in five regular Army infantry regiments, one dragoon regiment, and several batteries of 

artillery and parts of four artillery regiments fighting as infantry, into three brigades.7 

The grade of brigadier-general remained tied to the number of brigades or brigade equivalents 

fielded by the Army. In 1845, there were one major-general and three brigadier-generals in the 

peacetime Army, one of the brigadiers serving in the staff position of quartermaster general. 

An additional two officers held the rank of brigadier-general by brevet only.8 A brevet rank 

was an honorary one. In the days before medals, a brevet promotion was one of the few 

ways an officer could be recognized. In the Mexican War, brevet rank was used whenever 

the command consisted of soldiers from more than one Army component. Since all the forces 
one. In the volunteer service, where 42 regiments were raised for 12 months service in 1846 and 

1847, 12 brigadier-generals were appointed, giving a slightly higher ratio of 3.5 regiments per 

general for the volunteer service. A breakdown of appointments is shown in Table 3. 

As in the War of 1812, brigades were generally organized and used in the Mexican War 

as temporary expedients or as part of a larger unit, usually a division. For the first time, large 

volunteer forces were raised. These were also formed into brigades and, in some cases, into 

divisions. Regular and volunteer regiments were usually not brigaded together. Unlike in the 

later Civil War, most of the senior officers commanding volunteer brigades and divisions were 

themselves holders of exclusively volunteer commissions. Since the Regular Army was in the 

field, its officers were needed to command their own units. A typical brigade consisted of two 500-

man regiments. In the volunteer force, regiments from the same state were generally brigaded 

together. Sometimes the senior volunteer officer from the state was made brigadier-general of 

volunteers to command such a brigade. For example, Colonel Gideon J. Pillow, 1st Tennessee 

Volunteers, was commissioned as brigadier-general of volunteers and made commander 

of the Tennessee Brigade, consisting of the 1st and 2d Tennessee Volunteer Regiments. But 

even such arrangements could prove to be transitory—in the case of the Tennessee brigade, 

Taylor reassigned its units as he saw fit almost immediately after the brigade came under his 

command.9 

While usually part of a larger organization, most brigades were supported directly by one 

or more companies of artillery and some also by mounted infantry or dragoons. Although the 

current version of the Army regulations maintained that brigade staffs would not be fixed and 

would be based on the specific mission of the brigade, President James Polk and Congress did 

authorize a staff consisting a quartermaster and assistant, a commissary officer and assistant, a 

surgeon and his assistant, and a chaplain.10 

The Utah Expedition 

After the end of the Mexican War, the volunteers were mustered out and the Regular 

Army was reduced back to its small permanent size of eight infantry regiments, one mounted 

rifle, two dragoon regiments, and four artillery regiments, as well as four brigadier-generals, 

counting the quartermaster general. The Army settled down to frontier security, constabulary, 

and coast defense duties. 

In 1857, however, Mormon defiance of Federal authority in the Utah territory compelled 

President James Buchanan to order the Army to assemble the largest peacetime force of the 

era to occupy Utah and enforce Federal governmental authority. Accordingly, a detachment of 

5,606 soldiers was ultimately assembled, including four regiments of infantry, one regiment 

each of dragoons and cavalry, and three companies of artillery. Brigadier-General Persifer F. 

Smith was assigned to command the force, serving in his brevet rank of major-general. Upon 

assembly, Smith was directed to form his command into two brigades headed by his two senior 

officers, Colonels Albert S. Johnston and William S. Harney. Both Harney and Johnston would 

be serving in their brevet rank of brigadier-general. However, Smith died before he could arrive 

and assume command. The Mormon crisis was settled through diplomacy and there was no 

longer a need for such a large force. Johnston, now in command, moved into Utah with a 

reduced force, and the brigades were never actually formed.11 

14 
Within three years of the Utah Expedition, much larger forces would be assembled to fight 

the insurrection the southern states started in reaction to the election of Republican Abraham 

Lincoln as Buchanan’s successor. 

15 
NOTES

 1. James Sawicki, Cavalry Regiments of the US Army (Dumfries, VA: Wyvern Publication, 1985), 15-16. 

2. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 6-7. 

3. Ibid., 8-9. 

4. James Sawicki, Infantry Regiments of the US Army (Dumfries, VA: Wyvern, 1981), 2. 

5. Wilson, 9. 

6. The United States and Mexico at War: Nineteenth-Century Expansionism and Conflict, Donald S. Frazier, ed. 

(New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1998), 24-27, 464-65. 

7. Ibid., 27, 308. 

8. The brigadier-generals were Edmund Gaines, John E. Wool and the Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup. 

The brevet brigadier-generals were Zachary Taylor, colonel, 6th Infantry, and William J. Worth, colonel, 8th 

Infantry. 

9. Frazier, 321. Pillow was later made a major-general in the Regular Army, an appointment he resigned at the end 

of the war. 

10. Wilson, 10. 

11. Headquarters of the Army Circular, dated 11 January 1858; General Orders Number 7, Headquarters of the 

Army, dated 15 April 1858; General Orders Number 14, Headquarters of the Army, 21 May 1858; General Orders 

Number 17, Headquarters of the Army, dated 29 June 1858; Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces 

in Domestic Disorders 1789-1878 (Washington, DC; US Army, 1988), 196-200; 210-15. 

16 
Chapter 3 

BRIGADES IN THE CIVIL WAR 

Organization 

In sheer numerical size, the United States raised its largest force of brigades ever in the 

American Civil War. Between 1861 and 1865 the United States, or Union, forces established 

over 200 brigades to fight the war. These brigades were almost always part of a higher 

command, division and army corps, as the division was then considered the Army’s basic 

administrative and organizational unit. The army corps, as a headquarters controlling two 

or more divisions, made its first appearance in the US Army organizational history. While 

unit designations evolved during the course of the war, the army corps became the uniquely 

designated command, retaining its numerical designation even when it was shifted to a different 

command. Divisions and brigades, on the other hand, were numbered sequentially within their 

respective higher command and called in official reports by their current commander’s name. 

As an exception to this, before 1863 in the portion of the Army fighting in the Western theater, 

brigades were numbered sequentially within their respective army.

1 

Similar to events in the Mexican War, the US government called up a large number of 

volunteers to fight the war. Unlike the Mexican War, the pure numbers of the volunteers 

dwarfed the small Regular Army. Additionally, regular officers were allowed to accept higher 

commissions in the volunteer service, thus fairly wrecking the chain of command of the regular 

units. With recruiting difficulties, the Regular Army, despite being expanded at the beginning 

of the war, basically withered away during the conflict. The war was fought primarily by the 

volunteers. 

Similarly to the Revolutionary and Mexican Wars, brigades often started with regiments 

all from the same state, or composed exclusively of regular regiments. Attrition and a virtually 

nonexistent replacement system broke this down rather quickly. As in the Revolutionary 

War, commanders sought to keep brigades up to a strength of at least 2,000 men by adding 

additional regiments, even as the more veteran regiments grew smaller and smaller. Initially 

the minimum number of regiments in a brigade was two, but this was soon changed to four. 

At Chancellorsville, Virginia, in 1863, Union brigades averaged 4.7 regiments with a strength 

of 2,000. At Cold Harbor, Virginia, a year later, they averaged 5.5 regiments with the same 

strength. In the later stages of the war, whole brigades were amalgamated, as were several 

whole corps, to retain commands of adequate strength. 

Only one brigade retained its organization throughout the entire war, the Vermont Brigade, 

formally the 2d Brigade, 2d Division, Sixth Corps. This brigade, raised in early 1862, retained 

the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Vermont Volunteer Infantry Regiments throughout the war and 

added the 11th Vermont, formerly the 1st Vermont Heavy Artillery Regiment, in 1864. The 

brigade was able to stay together because all its regiments reenlisted when their enlistments 

ran out in 1864. The brigade also, naturally because of its long, continuous service, suffered 

the most fatal combat casualties of any brigade in the war, with 1,172 men killed or dying of 

wounds while serving in its ranks. These losses were distributed almost evenly throughout the 

brigade: 

17 
As with many units in the east, the Vermont Brigade’s toughest week was when it participated 

in the Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. During that week the brigade suffered 266 

killed, 1,299 wounded, and 80 missing, a total of 1,645 casualties out of a command that 

started with 2,800, giving a loss rate of 58 percent. The hardest single 24-hour period was 5-6 

May 1864, in the Battle of the Wilderness when the brigade lost 195 killed, 1,017 wounded, 

and 57 missing, a total of 1,269 men. 

Despite the relative stability of the brigade, the Vermont Brigade had two permanent 

commanders and four temporary commanders during the war. The original commander, 

Brigadier General William T.H. Brooks, a Regular Army infantry major, was promoted to 

division command late in 1862. He resigned in 1864 because of ill health, after failing to 

be promoted to major general of volunteers because of his part in his superior’s, MajorGeneral William Franklin’s, attempt to discredit Army of the Potomac commander, MajorGeneral Ambrose Burnside. Then Colonel Lewis A. Grant, commander, 5th Vermont, a former 

schoolteacher and lawyer, replaced Brooks and remained the permanent commander of the 

brigade until the end of the war. He later received the Medal of Honor for his actions at 

Salem Church during the Battle of Chancellorsville, and was promoted to brigadier general of 

volunteers in 1864. After the war he returned to his law practice.2

Four hundred and fifty men were commissioned as brigadier-generals in either the Regular 

Table 4. Vermont Brigade Losses, 1862-1865

Army or the volunteer service during the Civil War. Theoretically, all brigades were supposed 

to be commanded by brigadier-generals. However, the creation of the army corps as a level 

of command and the extensive use of field armies made up of several army corps created two 

new levels of command. Unfortunately, at the same time, Congress, except for appointing 

Ulysses S. Grant as the sole lieutenant-general in 1864, did not promote officers past the grade 

of major-general, the standard grade for a division commander. Accordingly, major-generals 

commanded armies and corps, as well as divisions. Brigadier-generals frequently commanded 

divisions, as well as brigades, often by using brevet promotions to major-general. Brigades, 

therefore, were often commanded by the senior regimental colonel rather than a general 

officer, most of whom were also brevet brigadier-generals. Authorizing officers to serve in 

their brevet grade had previously been a right reserved for the president, but in February 1865, 

this authority was delegated directly to the Army’s commanding general, Lieutenant-General 

Ulysses Grant. For the first time in US military history, the grade of brigadier-general was no 

longer tied to the number of brigades the Army could assemble. From this time forward, it was 

simply the lowest grade of general officer.3 

18 
Although most brigades served just as a component of a corps, some retained distinctive 

nicknames even when their official designation changed. A good example of this is the famous 

Iron Brigade, which earned its nickname at Second Bull Run while officially designated 4th 

Brigade, 1st Division, Third Corps, Army of Virginia. Later at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, it reaffirmed its nickname while designated officially as the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, First Corps. 

Another famous brigade was the Irish Brigade—2d Brigade, 1st Division, Second Corps— 

originally composed of regiments recruited from the Irish immigrant population of New 

York City. Both brigades were eventually broken up when combat losses were not replaced. 

While being almost purely a tactical unit consisting of only either infantry or cavalry regiments, the Civil War brigade did acquire a small staff as the war progressed: two aides de camp; a 

captain assistant adjutant general, who wrote out orders for the command; a surgeon; an assistant 

quartermaster; and a commissary officer. The brigade headquarters was also authorized three 

wagons to carry supplies. Each subordinate regiment was authorized an additional six wagons.4 

For the first time, brigades had distinctive identifying flags for use on the battlefield. After 

abandoning an elaborate, but generic, flag system used early in the war, a new triangular flag 

was adopted for brigades. The flag would have the symbol used by parent corps on it and was 

color coded to indicate brigade and division number within the corps. 

Infantry brigades in the Civil War consisted almost exclusively of infantrymen. Early war 

experiments placing supporting units of artillery and cavalry in the brigade were abandoned. 

Since brigades seldom fought separated from their parent corps, artillery eventually came to 

be consolidated at the corps level in a command, an artillery brigade. Despite the name, a 

typical corps artillery brigade consisted of between four and six artillery companies and was 

commanded by an artillery officer, usually a colonel, but sometimes a more junior officer. 

Cavalry was rarely organized into units larger than the regiment before the Civil War. The 

branch had previously been divided into three components, dragoons, or mounted infantrymen, 

who were supposed to fight dismounted; mounted riflemen, who were dragoons equipped 

with rifled firearms; and cavalry, which was a lightly armed force designed to fight mounted. 

On the eve of the war, all three elements were consolidated into one branch, called, simply, 

cavalry. Unlike infantry regiments, cavalry regiments were usually divided into subordinate 

units, squadrons, and fought that way on the battlefield. After experiments in attaching cavalry 

directly to lower units, most army commanders organized their cavalry as a separate unit 

reporting directly to them. Depending on the amount of cavalry available, this unit would be a 

corps or division, each with subordinate pure cavalry brigades and one or two small brigades 

of horse artillery. 

In the Civil War, the maneuver brigade was a purely tactical organization, almost always 

consisting of regiments belonging to one arm of the service, either infantry or cavalry. Additionally, brigades were almost always parts of larger organizations, divisions, which were, 

except for early in the war, themselves components of corps. The use of brigades in the Civil 

War was a continuation of their usage in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, but on a larger 

scale. The poor regimental replacement system, which often left veteran regiments at skeletal 

strength, while raising new unblooded regiments, left the brigade as the basic fighting unit 

of consistent size. Since brigades were supposed to be commanded by general officers, their 

19 
size remained constant at about 2,000 soldiers, the difference being made up for by adding additional small regiments to the command. Consequently, in the war of attrition that the Civil 

War became, the brigade remained a unit of constant size that commanders could maneuver. 

Little Round Top: A Civil War Brigade Action 

Brigades were essential to the smooth execution of both offensive and defensive operations 

in the Civil War. While most brigades fought as part of a larger unit, an example of an action 

where two brigades were detached from their parent units to defend a key piece of terrain at 

Gettysburg will be used to illustrate how a brigade was fought during the war. 

On 2 July 1863, the second day of the three-day Battle of Gettysburg, a corps-sized 

Confederate force under Lieutenant-General James Longstreet was ordered to attack the 

opposing Union army’s left flank, which was anchored on a small ridge line, Cemetery Ridge, 

south of Gettysburg. Longstreet chose to attack in echelon from his right to left, with each 

of his divisions attacking in turn. His leftmost division, commanded by Major General John 

Hood, would begin the advance against the Union’s left flank near a rocky outcrop, later called 

Devils Den, and a small rocky hill, locally called Little Round Top. Little Round Top’s forward 

slope, facing the Confederates, had been cleared of vegetation by a farmer before the battle 

increasing its military importance. Its occupation by the Confederates threatened the whole 

Figure 4. Action at Little Round Top, 2 July 1863

20 
Union position. Its occupation by the Federal forces threatened any Confederate attack on the 

Union’s left flank.5 

However, the Union’s left flank was in an uproar as Longstreet began his late afternoon 

attack. Major General Daniel Sickles had unilaterally moved his command, the Third Corps, 

forward of its assigned position. This move not only made him vulnerable to Longstreet’s 

attack, but it also uncovered the Union’s left flank near Little Round Top, exactly where Hood’s 

leftmost brigades were poised to strike. Fortunately for the Union forces, Brigadier General 

Gouverneur K. Warren, the chief engineer officer, discovered the mistake and sent his aides out 

to find troops to defend Little Round Top. 

The 3d Brigade, 1st Division, Fifth Corps, was commanded by Colonel Strong Vincent, 

83d Pennsylvania. Aside from his own regiment, the brigade consisted of the 16th Michigan, 

44th New York, and the 20th Maine. Vincent had assumed command in May when the previous 

brigade commander, Colonel Thomas Stockton, 16th Michigan, suddenly resigned. The 

brigade was greatly reduced in strength, with about 1,000 men bearing arms; the 20th Maine 

being the largest regiment at about 350 men, the 16th Michigan the smallest at about 200.6 In 

the late afternoon of 2 July, the Fifth Corps was under orders to reinforce the Third Corps on 

the Union’s left flank. But when Warren’s aide, Captain Ranald Mackenzie, rode up to Major 

General George Sykes, commander, Fifth Corps, and asked for a brigade to hold Little Round 

Top, Sykes promptly ordered his First Division commander, Brigadier General James Barnes, 

to dispatch a brigade. Barnes chose Vincent’s, as it was on a nearby road lined up in column. 

There was a sense of urgency in this deployment, as Confederate troops were expected 

to advance on Little Round Top from the southwest momentarily. Vincent, therefore, set his 

brigade in motion toward Little Round Top to the south. As the brigade column stretched out 

for about a quarter mile, Vincent rode ahead to examine the ground he was to defend and select 

positions for the brigade on the south side of the hill in the direction the Confederates were 

expected to come. Vincent’s energetic execution of his new mission and ability to place his 

troops in the best possible location to execute that mission would prove to be critical. 

As each regiment arrived, Vincent brought the regimental commander up and showed him 

the regiment’s position. The 20th Maine, under Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, was first and was 

posted on the extreme left. Vincent had to caution Chamberlain that, while his right would be 

tied into the next regiment, his left would be tied into nothing, becoming the left flank of the 

entire army. The main Union wagon train was also parked not far to the rear of Chamberlain’s 

right flank, making this flank doubly important. Posted to the right of the 20th Maine was the 

83d Pennsylvania. The small 16th Michigan was next, but Colonel James Rice, 44th New 

York, asked that his regiment be placed next to the 83d, as they had always fought side by side. 

Vincent agreed and the 16th Michigan was placed on the brigade’s left flank, in the open area 

of Little Round Top facing Devil’s Den. The 16th’s left tied into the 44th New York, but its 

right was in the air. This was less crucial than the 20th Maine’s left flank, though, as the Third 

Corps’ 4th Maine Regiment was posted on the valley floor north of Devil’s Den, as the left 

flank of a Third Corps brigade. There was, however, a sizeable gap between these two units.7 

The regiments formed up in two lines across their assigned fronts. Soldiers stood shoulder 

to shoulder where possible. While later in the war the troops would have immediately dug 

entrenchments or thrown up vegetation as natural breastworks, at this stage of the war they 

21 
just used trees and boulders for cover where available. Each line in the regiment would fight by 

firing massed volleys at the attackers. As a standard measure, the regiments posted a company 

of troops in front of it to act as skirmishers. The skirmishers were designed to provide early 

warning of the enemy’s approach. They fought in small groups and fired individually, using all 

available cover to break up the enemy attack before it reached the main line. The skirmishers 

would then fall back into their regiments. Chamberlain placed his Company B to cover the 

regiment’s front and the brigade’s left. The 16th Michigan dispatched two companies, including 

one of attached sharpshooters, to protect the brigade right flank.8 

Vincent’s troops were in position at approximately 1600. The Confederate advance reached 

Little Round Top within the next 15 minutes. Almost as soon as Vincent’s skirmishers were 

posted, they encountered the main enemy line advancing. The right two brigades of Hood’s 

division, Brigadier-General Jerome Robertson’s composed of Texas and Arkansas regiments 

and Brigadier-General Evander Law’s of Alabama troops, were to advance on Little Round Top 

roughly side by side from the southwest to flank the positions of the Federal Third Corps, which 

the left portion of Hood’s division was about to assault. The skirmishers immediately withdrew. 

The 20th Maine’s skirmishers, however, had been passed by the advancing Confederates and 

remained on the brigade flank waiting for an opportunity to rejoin the regiment. 

The Confederate assault was somewhat uncoordinated. Advancing from covered terrain 

and on a front wider than that Vincent’s men were defending, Robertson and Law had an 

excellent chance of overwhelming or outflanking the Federal brigade, which had both of its 

flanks in the air. After a pause to redress their lines, the rebel brigades advanced up the wooded, 

southern face of the hill. The attack developed first against the center regiments, 44th New 

York and 83d Pennsylvania, and then spread to the right to the 16th Michigan, and then on to 

the 20th Maine on the left. Robertson’s brigade, the 4th and 5th Texas, made several abortive 

assaults against Vincent’s center, having to break formation to pass between the large boulders 

that littered that part of the slope of Little Round Top. 

To Robertson’s left, Law’s 4th Alabama also attacked the center of Vincent’s position. This 

attack was not coordinated with the Texans or with Law’s two other regiments on the right. 

These two regiments, the 15th and 47th Alabama, had fallen behind because of the exertion of 

scaling the heights of Round Top, the large, wooded hill south of Little Round Top. Colonel 

William Oates, 15th Alabama, was in command of both regiments with orders to seize Little 

Round Top, and, as the extreme right of the Confederate Army, to turn the Union flank. After 

a short rest on Round Top, Oates dispatched a company to capture the Union wagon train, and 

then set out to seize Little Round Top. Skirmishers kept the wagons safe. Oates’ delay allowed 

the 20th Maine to volley fire into the 4th Alabama advancing to the right against the 83d 

Pennsylvania. Soon, however, Oates was giving the Maine men the fight of their lives. 

Vincent directed his brigade’s defense of Little Round Top from a position located behind 

the center of the unit. The battle soon developed into waves of attacks, the first two being 

disjointed regimental attacks, the third an all out attack in the pending twilight by the six 

regiments of the two Confederate brigades. As the battle raged over the course of an hour and 

a half, Vincent dispatched aides to both flanks to keep him informed and other runners to bring 

back additional ammunition and find reinforcements. 

22 
Figure 5. Vincent Directs His Brigade’s Defense of Little Round Top 

“Don’t Give Up an Inch” by Don Troiani 

Both sides were fatigued and the Union brigade had suffered heavy losses and was low 

on ammunition when the two rebel brigades advanced for the third time. While Vincent’s 

center was firm, naturally entrenched behind boulders, Oates was trying to maneuver the 15th 

Alabama around the 20th Maine’s left to turn the Union brigade’s entire left flank. On the 

other flank, the 16th Michigan began to give away when an officer ordered a poorly timed 

short withdrawal. In the confusion, a third of the regiment, 45 men, were separated from 

the main line and out of the battle. After ordering the 44th New York to fire into the flank of 

the Confederates attacking the 16th, Vincent rushed to rally the Michiganers and was fatally 

wounded. He would be promoted to brigadier general of volunteers before he died, five days 

later. Rice, 44th New York, immediately assumed command of the brigade.10 

Vincent was not alone in his quest for reinforcements. Warren had remained atop the 

northwest face of Little Round Top while Vincent deployed. Vincent’s march passed out of 

Warren’s view on the east side of the summit, so he was still in search of units to garrison the 

hill. Barnes, one of the Fifth Corps division commanders, had dispatched First Lieutenant 

Charles Hazlett’s four-gun battery, D Battery, 5th Artillery, to Little Round Top to support 

his division’s advance forward of the hill. Hazlett met Warren at the summit and, despite the 

rugged terrain, the guns were manhandled to the top and soon were firing at the Confederates 

attacking Vincent’s left and beyond near Devil’s Den. 

23 
Warren needed infantry and, with his aides already out, he went looking for some himself. 

North of Little Round Top the bulk of the Fifth Corps was now marching to support the 

Third Corps, which was being attacked by the bulk of Longstreet’s force. Warren came upon 

elements of the 3d Brigade, 2d Division, Fifth Corps, waiting to move up. In an ironic twist, 

this was his old command. The previous September he had commanded this brigade when it 

had unsuccessfully tried to hold the Union’s left flank against Hood’s Texans at the Battle of 

Second Bull Run. Now Warren found the commander of the lead regiment, Colonel Patrick 

O’Rorke, 140th New York, with his regiment just north of Little Round Top. On his own 

authority, he gave O’Rorke, who knew him well, orders to move to Little Round Top. The 

regiment, 526 men strong, was formed on the road to the Wheatfield, the main east-west road 

running north of Little Round Top, in a column of fours. O’Rorke, not hesitating, turned the 

head of his column to the left and advanced at a slow run in a column of fours to the top of 

the hill. Sykes had intended to send the brigade O’Rorke’s regiment was in, commanded by 

Brigadier General Stephen Weed, to Little Round Top even before Warren snatched up the 

regiment. However, the order got muddled in the sending and Sykes had to reiterate it to Weed, 

who was not with his brigade when the 140th moved. Weed acted promptly upon returning to 

his command, leading the rest of his brigade to Little Round Top behind O’Rorke’s troops.11 

The 140th New York, with O’Rorke in the lead, reached the forward slope of Little Round 

Top just as the 16th Michigan was about to give way. The 140th, still in a column of fours 

advanced forward, halted, and fired into the Confederate attackers. The timely arrival of these 

reinforcements quickly secured the flank and blunted the impetus of the Confederate attack. 

However, O’Rorke, like Vincent minutes before, was mortally wounded by a minié ball and 

died before he hit the ground. The rest of Weed’s brigade, the 91st Pennsylvania, 146th New 

York, and 155th Pennsylvania, formed up on the 140th’s right, securing that side of Little 

Round Top. 

There were no reinforcements coming to secure the critical left flank where the 20th Maine, 

low on ammunition and reduced in strength, was attempting to prevent being outflanked by 

one Alabama regiment while being attacked frontally by another. Both attacker and defender 

had almost reached the breaking point on this flank. Chamberlain, in order to defend against 

both threats, had thinned his line out and swung his left back to form an inverted V. Still the 

Confederates came on. In desperation born of a lack of ammunition resupply, Chamberlain 

ordered a bayonet charge with his regiment swinging from left to right across the regimental 

front. The shock effect of this unexpected maneuver, along with the opportune reappearance 

of the 20th Maine’s company of skirmishers, along with some US sharpshooters, routed the 

Alabamans. The 20th Maine quickly took over 450 prisoners, including some troops from the 

two Texas regiments. 

Vincent’s brigade, reinforced by the 140th New York, had conducted, perhaps, the most 

important brigade defensive action of the war. While the main attacks were over, balls were still 

flying and both Weed and Hazlett were mortally wounded. The day’s action had cost the Union 

forces two brigade commanders, a regimental commander, and an artillery commander. Total 

losses for the brigade in the battle were 88 killed, 253 wounded, and 11 missing or captured, 

roughly 35-percent losses. A year and 10 months later at Appomattox, the brigade was part of 

the honor guard specially selected to accept the Confederate surrender. The remnants of all the 

24 
Gettysburg regiments, except the 44th New York, were still part of the brigade, along with six 

other regiments, including the 91st and 155th Pennsylvania, which had been in Weed’s brigade 

on Little Round Top.12 

Brigades in the War With Spain 

After the Civil War, the Army again was reduced in size and no permanent units above 

regimental level were retained. It was not until the 1890s that the Army made any significant 

organizational changes, the most important being the reorganization of the regiment with three 

subordinate battalions. When an army was raised in 1898 to fight Spain, many of the precedents 

established in the Civil War were followed. Volunteers were called out and eight corps were 

raised. At full strength, each corps had three divisions with three brigades each. When a corps’ 

strength was less than a full division of three brigades, the extra brigade or two were considered 

“separate” and fell directly under the corps headquarters. An act of Congress in 1898 had 

established the brigade as consisting of three or more regiments, though in practice some 

would only have two. Brigade designations followed the pattern established in the Civil War, 

with brigades numbered sequentially by division and corps, with no unique designations. 

Unlike the previous war, the Regular Army was kept mostly intact during the short war 

with Spain. Most brigades were either all regular troops or all volunteer. The regiments of the 

regular force were mostly consolidated into the brigades of the Fifth Corps, with some in the 

Fourth Corps. Most volunteers raised did not see action. The Fifth Corps provided the attack 

force for the expedition to Cuba. The Fourth Corps served in an occupation role in Cuba and 

Puerto Rico. The Eighth Corps served as the Philippine Expedition and was active in those 

islands long after the other corps had been disbanded. 

While almost every state and several territories contributed at least one regiment of infantry 

or cavalry volunteers, no brigades were formed with regiments all from the same state. A 

special category of volunteers, recruited from the nation at large, rather than from particular 

states, was used extensively during the war itself in 1898 and in operations in the Philippines 

in 1899-1901.13 

The Philippine Expedition, which formally lasted from 1898 to 1901, saw the Eighth 

Corps, the command headquarters in the islands, organized into as many as seven brigades at 

its largest size in January 1900. The organization in the Philippines was a lot more flexible than 

elsewhere. Artillery batteries were often attached directly to brigades and infantry and cavalry 

regiments were sometimes brigaded together. 

As in previous wars, the authorized grade of a brigade commander was brigadier general. 

However, with the paucity of general grades, like in the Civil War, regimental colonels and 

lieutenant colonels often commanded brigades for extended periods of time, the most famous 

being Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, 1st US Volunteer Cavalry, who commanded 

the 2nd Brigade, Cavalry Division, Fifth Corps, in July 1898, after the Battle of San Juan 

Hill.55 The war itself had two phases, a short campaign against Spain in April-July 1898, and a 

longer war from 1898 to 1901 in the Philippines against Filipino insurgents. This duality saw 

the unusual situation of some general officers holding two volunteer commissions, one for the 

1898 campaign and a subsequent one, sometimes at a lesser grade, in the Philippines. While 

25 
most volunteer appointments went to senior Regular Army field grade officers, several were 

given to former Union and Confederate Civil War general officers directly from civilian life. 

At the end of the century, the maneuver brigade remained a temporary organization 

consisting of little or no headquarters staff and troops from a single branch, infantry, or cavalry. 

The brigade structure had changed little from the establishment of the first brigades in the 

War of 1812. The main reason for this static organizational development was, that, despite 

technological advances in weaponry, infantry and cavalry tactics were generally unchanged. 

And a brigadier general could still control on the battlefield a force of 2,000 men divided into 

several large regiments or several more smaller regiments. However military and technological 

advances would see changes in the next century. 

26 
NOTES

 1. Mark M. Boatner III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 611.

 2. Ezra Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 

Press, 1984), 47, 182-44. The Franklin affair was an incident where several generals, Brooks included, complained 

directly to President Abraham Lincoln concerning their army commander, Major General Ambrose Burnside, after 

the Battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862. 

3. To further confuse things, brevets that had formerly been exclusively granted solely in the regular service, 

were also granted in the volunteer service after 3 March 1863. The first brevet brigadier-general of volunteers was 

appointed in June 1864. A Regular Army officer could, therefore, hold four grades in the Civil War—his substantive 

regular grade, a brevet regular grade, a substantive volunteer grade, and a brevet volunteer grade. At Appomattox, 

for example, the famous George Custer was a regular army captain, 5th Cavalry, a brevet major-general in the 

regular army, a brigadier-general of volunteers, and a brevet major general of volunteers. Two weeks later, he was 

promoted to the substantive rank of major-general of volunteers. In 1866 when the volunteer force went away, he 

was a captain in the Regular Army again. See Roger D. Hunt and Jack R. Brown, Brevet Brigadier Generals in Blue 

(Old Soldier Books, 1998), vi-vii. 

4. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1998), 14. 

 5. Best source for the background of the Little Round Top battle is Henry Pfanz, Gettysburg—The Second Day 

(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 113-15, 149-67.

 6. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series 

1, 53 Vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1881-1898) (hereafter OR ), Series I, Volume XXVII, Art 1, Book 43, 616-20.

 7. Pfanz, 211-14. 

8. Ibid., 214. 

9. Pfanz, 220-23. 

10. Pfanz, 225-27. 

11. OR, Series I, Volume XXVII, art 1, Book 43, 771; The 44th New York was mustered out in October 1864 when 

its three year enlistment ran out. 

12. John McGrath, Organization of the Army During the Spanish-American War, unpublished monograph, US 

Army Center of Military History, 2002. As US volunteers, three regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and three of 

engineers were raised in 1898 for service in the Philippines, 24 regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry 

were raised in 1899, serving until 1901. The latter regiments were numbered above the highest numbered regiments 

in the regular service; 10th in the cavalry and 25th in the infantry. 

13. Ibid. Roosevelt commanded in the absence of Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young. The brigade consisted 

of Roosevelt’s regiment and the regular 1st and 10th US Cavalry. Though designated cavalry, the regiments fought 

on foot during the war as infantry. 

27 
Chapter 4 

THE BRIGADE IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY, 1902-1919 

Organizational Reforms 

After almost a century of unchanging organizational structure at the brigade level, 

technological and organizational advances would transform both warfare and the brigade in the 

early 20th century, resulting in the eventual adoption of a permanent brigade organization with 

organic supporting arms. Participation in a European war would directly spur most aspects of 

these changes. But as the century started, these dynamic events were still in the future. 

With the volunteers in the Philippines mustered out in 1901, the regiment returned to its 

status as the largest permanent unit in the Regular Army. However, the period before the US 

entry in the World War I was one of great reforms in the US Army, some in reflection of the 

experience of the war with Spain, others from observing the large conscript armies maintained 

by most of the European powers. As a first response to this, Secretary of War Elihu Root 

established an Army general staff in 1903. Army planners in this new agency soon turned their 

attention to units larger than regiments. 

Before World War I, the basic unit in European armies was the army corps, usually 

consisting of two infantry divisions, each with two brigades of two regiments. The European 

corps also contained cavalry, engineers, and field artillery. The US Army, too, had used the 

corps as its basic unit in both the Civil and Spanish-American Wars. But in the new 1905 

version of the Army’s regulations, the division became the US Army’s basic unit. While the 

regulation did not organize permanent larger units, it directed commanders to form provisional 

brigades and divisions during maneuvers. A division of either infantry or cavalry was to consist 

of three brigades, each with two or more regiments.1 

The Dick Act of 1903 reformed the role of the militia, now universally referred to as the 

National Guard. Where formerly the militia had been restricted in its use, necessitating the 

employment of the volunteer component, under the new law, National Guard units could be 

called upon by the Federal government for unrestricted service in times of national emergency. 

The Guard was also tasked to maintain units with the same organizational structure and 

standard as the Regular Army. Pennsylvania had maintained a nonstandard division since 

1879, and New York organized a division in 1908. These were the first peacetime permanently 

organized brigades and divisions in the Army’s force structure. The Dick Act led to annual joint 

maneuvers and plans to organize the part-time and full-time forces together into permanent 

larger units. In 1909, the War Department divided the country into eight districts. The theory 

was to organize brigades and divisions from the Regular Army and National Guard units 

stationed in each district. The scheme was voluntary for the National Guard, and by 1910 most 

states in the northeast had agreed to participate, though no brigades were actually formed.2 

Between 1910 and 1914, various notional organizations were proposed and authorized. 

The division was now to be uniquely numbered in order of creation, while brigades remained 

being numbered consecutively within the division. Only in 1911 was theory put into practice. 

That year, disorders in Mexico led to the assembly of part of the Regular Army on the border 

in Texas and California. The portion in Texas was organized into a division at San Antonio, 

29 
Texas, the Maneuver Division, consisting of three infantry brigades and a separate cavalry 

brigade, the Independent Cavalry Brigade. At Galveston, Texas, 36 companies of coast artillery were reorganized into three infantry regiments, forming a provisional brigade guarding 

the coast. In San Diego, California, another brigade was formed from two infantry regiments 

and small detachments of medical, signal, and cavalry. This concentration lasted five months, 

the brigades being discontinued in June and July 1911. In 1913, the Secretary of War, Henry 

Stimson, as part of a general review of Army organization, accepted a proposal to organize the 

Army permanently into divisions and brigades. The Regular Army was to organize one cavalry 

and three infantry divisions and the National Guard an additional 12 infantry and three cavalry 

divisions. For the first time the Army produced formal tables of organization. A division had 

three brigades and each brigade three regiments. Cavalry brigades were, however, reduced to 

two regiments, primarily to save road space, not out of any belief in the organizational soundness of a two-regiment brigade. Brigades in the divisions were numbered consecutively within 

the Army, the 1st Division containing the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades; the 2d Division containing 

the 4th, 5th, 6th Brigades; and so forth. Where several brigades were not filled (3d and 9th Brigades), the numbers were retained for future use. Cavalry brigades were numbered separately.3 

Unlike previous plans, the Stimson Plan was implemented in fact in 1913-1914. The Army 

organization is illustrated in Figure 6. Aside from a commander and very small staff, division 

and brigade headquarters staffs were not organized as such. Personnel for these would be taken 

out of hide from the administrative departments or from subordinate regiments, a long standing 

Army practice. The division was to be a self-contained, combined arms organization, while 

the brigade remained purely branch specific. The divisions and some of the brigades were 

Figure 6. First Peacetime Brigades, 1914

30 
scattered at various posts and would not be considered operational until they were mobilized. 

The organization would soon be tested again on the Mexican border. 

Mexican Expeditions 

In February 1913, when the Mexican disorders climaxed in a coup d’etat, President William 

Taft ordered a show of force on the Texas border. The new 2d Division, the only division 

with three full brigades, moved to locations on the Texan Gulf coast. In April 1914, the new 

president, Woodrow Wilson, ordered naval action against the port in Vera Cruz, Mexico, to 

protect American citizens and interests. The 5th Brigade, 2d Division, augmented with cavalry, 

field artillery, signal, aviation, engineers, and quartermasters, landed at the port to relieve 

the Navy personnel, in effect becoming the first brigade combat team in Army history. The 

brigade, under Brigadier General Frederick Funston’s command, stayed until November 1914. 

In Texas, the 2d and 8th Brigades from the other two divisions moved to the border to replace 

the 2d Division elements. In December 1914, the 6th Brigade of the 2d Division deployed 

to the Arizona border. The 2d Division remained on station until October 1915, when it was 

demobilized after a hurricane in Galveston killed a number of soldiers and made the public 

question the necessity for the continuation of the deployment.4 

The situation reversed itself again in March 1916 when Mexican bandits raided Columbus, 

New Mexico. The commander of the Southern Department, now Major General Funston, 

Figure 7. Pershing’s Provisional Division, 1916

31 
ordered Brigadier General John J. Pershing, commander, 8th Brigade, to chase down the 

attackers. Pershing organized a provisional division, the Punitive Expedition, US Army, out of 

his own brigade and additional troops given him. The divisional organization was of Pershing’s 

own devising, and consisted of three combined arms brigades: two cavalry brigades, each with 

two cavalry regiments and a field artillery battery, and an infantry brigade with two infantry 

regiments and two engineer companies (see Figure 7). Pershing planned to pursue the Mexicans 

with the cavalry and use the infantry for security.5 

In June 1916, as Pershing was preparing his expedition, violence on the border increased 

to the point that President Wilson federalized all the National Guard units assigned to divisions 

and brigades under the Stimson Plan. Except for the New York and Pennsylvania divisions, the 

planned mobilization of brigades and divisions worked poorly. In August, the War Department 

directed Funston to form the Guard units into 10 provisional divisions and six separate brigades. 

The border calmed down over time. The first Guardsmen were demobilized in the fall, with 

most released from Federal control by March 1917. Pershing’s expedition remained south 

of the border until February 1917. Pershing then replaced Funston, who had died suddenly, 

as Southern Department commander. As such, he organized the Regular Army units in the 

department into three provisional infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. In April, the United 

States entered World War I and Pershing disbanded his divisions and brigades as the Army 

again reorganized, this time to send an expeditionary force to Europe.6 

The Brigade and World War I: The Square Division 

The major European powers had been at war since August 1914 when the United States 

entered the conflict in April 1917. The continental European armies began World War I with 

large conscript armies organized rigidly into corps of two divisions, each with two infantry 

brigades. Each brigade consisted of two infantry regiments. The powers deployed machine guns 

differently. In the German army, a separate machine gun company was found at the regimental 

level. The French had only a platoon at the regiment. The reality of fighting entrenched 

infantry equipped with machine guns and supported by massed, quick-firing field artillery, 

made the French and Germans change the structure of their divisions during the course of the 

war. With attrition and the accompanying agony of trench warfare, the French and Germans 

had, by 1916, reduced their divisions from four infantry regiments to three. Operationally, the 

regiments reported directly to the division commander, though the Germans retained a brigade 

headquarters to control the three regiments administratively. At the same time, machine guns 

were increased. Both placed a machine gun company in each infantry battalion (there being 

three per regiment) by 1918. Smaller divisions allowed divisions worn out by trench warfare to 

be replaced in the line by a similar unit.7 

American planners looked at the French and British experience. Ironically, however, a 

study completed in May 1917 by the War Department’s War College Division, recommended an 

organization structurally similar to the French and German 1914 divisions. This was the square 

division, organized with two infantry brigades, instead of the traditional three, each with two 

subordinate infantry regiments. Though machine gun units were organized at three echelons, 

regiment, brigade, and division, the structure also provided, once organized for combat, for one 

machine gun company to support each infantry battalion. The design was approved, though it 

was tweaked and changed numerous times in 1917-1918. The theory behind the organization 

32 
Figure 8. Example of European Organization, 1914-1918 

was that the division would normally defend or attack with its two brigades side by side, but 

with each brigade having one regiment forward and the second regiment in reserve directly 

behind it. The regiments would typically deploy its battalions in a column for either an in-depth 

defense or to allow the rotation of fresh battalions in the offensive, with the reserve regiment 

either then taking over to continue the attack or to consolidate the position gained.8 Therefore 

the brigade was to be the basic US Army tactical unit for trench warfare. This was different from 

the French, British, and Germans who used the division in this role. The brigade commander, 

leading a purely tactical unit, would be able to remain forward and leapfrog regiments as 

necessary, given his ability to respond to the battlefield situation quickly.9 

The square divisional brigade was almost purely a tactical unit, with no logistical or administrative functions. While commanded by a brigadier general, its staff was small, consisting 

of three aides, a brigade adjutant, and 18 enlisted men who provided mess, communications, 

and transportation support. Assigned directly to the brigade were two infantry regiments, a 

small ordnance detachment, and a machine gun battalion. Each infantry regiment consisted of a 

headquarters company, a machine gun company, medical section, and three infantry battalions, 

each consisting of four rifle companies. 

Public law complicated the concept of employment of machine guns. The National Defense 

Act of 1916 restricted the size of the infantry regiment. While the Army wanted one machine 

gun company for each rifle battalion, to place the three required companies under the regiment 

33 
Figure 9. The Square Divisional Brigade, 1917 

would mean a loss of two rifle companies. To get around this restriction, each brigade had a threecompany machine gun battalion. When reorganizing for combat, the brigade could provide a 

supporting machine gun company to each battalion except one. To make up for this, the division 

also had a machine gun battalion of three companies, which habitually provided the extra company. In 1918, the organization was tweaked to give the brigade the additional company directly.10 

For service in World War I, the Army raised 112 infantry brigades, all assigned or projected 

to be assigned to divisions. The mobilization of 1917-1918 saw the Army divided into three 

components: the Regular Army, the mobilized National Guard, and the National Army. The 

National Army, filled with draftees, replaced the former Volunteer Army used in the Civil 

and Spanish-American Wars. While the new unit designation scheme adopted by the Army in 

1917 reflected the three-component distinction, it was later blurred. Divisions were numbered 

consecutively by component, with numbers 1-25 reserved for the Regular Army, numbers 26-

42 reserved for the National Guard, and numbers 76 and higher reserved for the National 

Army. Brigades were numbered consecutively, but their numbers reflected their component. 

For example, the 1st Division had the 1st and 2d Brigades, the 2d Division the 3d and 4th, 

and the first National Guard division, the 26th, had the 51st and 52d Brigades. Regular Army 

brigades included the 1st through 40th; brigades above the number 40 were never organized. 

National Guard brigades included the 51st through 84th and the 185th. The National Army 

34 
brigades were the 151st through 184th, 186th, 192d, and 194th.11 Machine gun battalions were 

numbered sequentially within each component using the numbering system used by regiments: 

the Regular Army had numbers 1 to 100, the National Guard 101 to 300, and the National 

Army 301 and higher. For example, the 26th Division’s divisional machine gun battalion was 

numbered 101st, the 51st Brigade’s 102d, and 52d Brigade’s 103d. 

Of the 112 infantry brigades raised for the war, 88 deployed to Europe: 58 brigades saw 

combat, 14 were converted to depot units in France, four were skeletonized, 10 were stripped 

of personnel to provide replacements and two arrived after the fighting ended. The wartime 

buildup lasted 18 months and was immediately halted upon the signing of the armistice on 11 

November 1918.12 A listing of the wartime, and postwar, brigades can be found in Appendix 3. 

With the large number of draftees coming into the Army in 1917, a specialized brigade was 

established, the depot brigade. These brigades, organized for each National Guard and National 

Army division, processed new draftees and provided basic training. Each depot brigade had 

from two to seven training battalions, though some were organized with one or two training 

regiments as well. These units were eventually removed from divisions and placed directly 

under cantonment commanders.13 

The brigade of the square division, with its 8,000 assigned personnel, was the largest 

brigade ever fielded by the US Army and, in 1918, was as large as the average French or 

British division. Accordingly, whenever US forces were placed under Allied command, it was 

common for the French or British commander to ignore US doctrine and place the division 

in a corps sector by itself and deploy the four regiments with three in the trenches and one in 

reserve or with both brigades abreast.14 

Tank Brigades 

Technical innovations created a whole new maneuver arm during World War I: the Tank 

Corps.15 Tanks, though thought of at the time as primarily infantry support weapons, were 

organized into their own battalions and brigades as a separate branch of the Army. Tanks were 

considered an army or corps asset. The Tank Corps developed in two separate branches, the 

Tank Corps, American Expeditionary Force (AEF), in France, and the Tank Corps, National 

Army, in the United States. The AEF formed four tank brigades, initially called the 1st through 

4th Provisional Tank Brigades, in August and October 1918. In November these brigades were 

redesignated as the 304th through 307th Tank Brigades. A shortage of tanks severely restricted 

their employment in 1918. The 2d and 4th Brigades were still forming when the war ended.16 

Initially, tank support was conducted only at the battalion or lower level. Separate tank 

battalions supported one or two divisions. Each battalion was a self-contained unit designed 

to support a division or brigade in an assault. But later two tank brigades did see combat, 

the 1st/304th and the 3d/306th, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel George S. 

Patton, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel D. Pullen. While the AEF had formed five heavy 

and 10 light tank battalions, most of these were used as army- or corps-level assets. Patton’s 

brigade consisted only of two light tank battalions, two repair and salvage companies, and 

a motor maintenance detachment (see Figure 10). Pullen’s command served primarily as a 

liaison detachment with supporting French tanks and also as a command headquarters for some 

French tank units supporting the Americans.17 

35 
Figure 10. World War I Tank Brigade 

Patton’s brigade, with an attached group—roughly equivalent in size to an American 

battalion—of French tanks, participated in the Saint Mihiel offensive in September 1918. The 

brigade supported the 1st and 42d Divisions, with a battalion supporting each division. 

Both brigades participated in the subsequent Meuse-Argonne offensive that started in late 

September 1918 and continued right up to the 11 November armistice. For this operation, 

Patton’s brigade was assigned to support the 35th Division, I Corps. Because of terrain and 

maintenance considerations, Patton deployed the brigade differently than at Saint Mihiel, 

leading with one battalion supporting the infantry and his second battalion following a mile 

to the rear. The brigade initially supported the 35th Division from 26 to 30 September 1918, 

before being withdrawn for refitting. Two days later, the 35th was withdrawn after suffering 

almost 8,000 casualties in the four-mile advance that opened the offensive. Patton was wounded 

early on the first day of the offensive, but the brigade he had trained fought well under his 

replacement, Major Sereno Brett. The brigade returned to the line for short periods throughout 

the rest of offensive, supporting the I and V Corps. Pullen’s brigade, after initially serving as a 

liaison headquarters for the French tanks supporting the II and V Corps between 26 September 

and 10 October, was reorganized with two light tank battalions. It replaced Brett’s brigade in 

early November, but did not participate in any action before the war ended. The tank brigades, 

though sometimes employed as complete brigades, were pure tank formations in World War I 

whose focus was on supporting the maneuver of the infantry, rather than maneuvering on their 

own.18 After the war, the Tank Corps was disbanded and tanks became a purely infantry support 

weapon, without an independent role. 

The 154th Infantry Brigade in the Argonne 

The 77th Division, consisting of the 153d and 154th Infantry Brigades, served as the left 

flank division of the I Corps, part of the American First Army, at the start of the Meuse-Argonne 

36 
offensive. By Wednesday, 2 October 1918, the division had been attacking for seven days in 

sector as part of the I Corps. Fighting in the Argonne Forest’s rugged terrain, the division had 

initially, through tactical surprise, pushed the Germans back almost 4 miles, ejecting them 

from their first defensive line. The Germans were now in their second defensive line. 

On 2 October 1918, the 77th was ordered to conduct a general assault and take the second 

German defensive line in a sector facing north, which had the 28th Division on the right and 

the French Fourth Army on the left. The day’s objective, an advance of roughly 2,000 meters, 

was to high ground on which was the line of an east-west road and a railroad that paralleled it 

to the north. This was to be a repeat of an unsuccessful attack executed the previous day. 

The 154th Infantry Brigade, the subject of this case study, was composed of the 307th and 

308th Infantry Regiments and the 306th Machine Gun Battalion. While the division had been 

recruited as a National Army unit from the New York City area, attrition and replacements 

had complicated the complexion of the unit. For example, Company K, 307th Infantry, had 

been redesignated from the former Company L, 160th Infantry, California National Guard. 

The company had belonged to the 40th Division, which had been converted into a depot 

division in August 1918. The brigade had been in the line with only a few breaks since August, 

participating in the Oisne-Aisne operation where it was on the right flank during the German 

retreat to the Aisne, suffering heavy casualties. The unit was trucked from the Aisne front 

directly to the Argonne and attacked almost immediately. Due to attrition from these previous 

battles, some battalions were commanded by captains and one regiment, the 307th, was 

commanded by a lieutenant colonel. On the eve of the attack, the brigade received about 1,500 

replacements from the 41st Division, which had been converted into the depot division for the 

I Corps. The replacements had been rushed to join the unit before their training was complete.19 

The division commander, Major General Robert Alexander, directed the 154th Infantry 

Brigade’s commander, Brigadier General Evan M. Johnson, to continue attacking in sector on 

2 October northward against the entrenched Germans. Alexander directed Johnson to advance 

vigorously in disregard of the units on his flanks. The Germans were felt to be withdrawing and 

the units on the flanks, elements of the French Fourth Army’s XXXVIII Corps, and the 28th 

Division, were expected to also be advancing vigorously.20 

The terrain was the harsh easternmost portion of the Argonne Forest. The first German 

defensive line had been taken in the previous days. Despite that, the defense was still solid. 

The Germans had held positions in the Argonne since 1914 and part of the Battle of Verdun 

had been fought in the forest’s eastern side in 1916. The German defenders in the western 

half of the brigade sector were seasoned veterans of the I Reserve Corps, Third Army. The 

254th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 76th Reserve Division, held the line itself. The boundary 

between the I Reserve Corps and the easterly 2d Württemberger Landwehr Division ran along 

a ravine in the left portion of the 154th Brigade’s sector. This boundary was not just between 

two divisions; it was also the boundary between the German Third and Fifth Armies. The 122d 

Infantry Regiment, 2d Landwehr Division, considered the weakest category of German unit by 

US intelligence, held the line in the west half of the brigade sector.

21 

The terrain in the brigade sector was thickly forested with high ground to the north cut by 

the lower reaches of the Charlevaux stream. The thickness of the foliage made the maneuver 

37 
of units difficult and hindered the adjusting of supporting artillery fire. 

In the left portion of the brigade sector, the prominent feature was the ravine, the German 

army boundary. This ravine, an outshoot from the stream, ran roughly southwest to northeast 

from the brigade front line to the German rear area near the high ground that was the day’s 

American objective. Though the German first defensive line had been taken in earlier attacks, 

the German defense was an in-depth defense, with their second line now reached, consisting 

of well-placed trench lines and machine gun positions, but the ravine was a natural weak 

point in the defensive position. While it was covered by fire and trenches at its southern end, 

the extensive barbed wire obstacles, usually found in front of the German trenches, were 

lacking here. This oversight was a consequence of the ravine being the boundary between two 

large units, where coordination between the forces on each side was harder than normal. A 

determined unit could surprise the defenders on each side in the first line. Once past that line, 

the ravine provided a covered, natural corridor into the rear of the German position. 

The 154th Infantry Brigade led the assault with two regiments attacking side by side in 

sectors roughly 2,000 meters wide, the 308th on the left (west), 307th on the right (east). 

Each regiment led with one battalion, followed closely by a second battalion in support. The 

third battalion of each regiment was in reserve, the 3d Battalion, 308th (3/308), serving as 

the brigade reserve and the 1st Battalion, 307th (1/307), serving as the division reserve. Each 

regimental machine gun company was parceled out to the assault and support battalions by 

platoons. Additionally, each assault and support battalion had machine gun platoons from the 

306th Machine Gun Battalion attached to them. 

The 2 October morning attack failed. Johnson called the division commander and received 

firm instructions to try again. Johnson now clearly felt his job was on the line and directed his 

subordinate regimental commanders to attack after noon without worrying about what the units 

to the left and right were doing. 

The assault battalion of the 308th, 1/308th, commanded by Major Charles Whittlesley 

attacked with three of its companies on line. The fourth company was covering the battalion’s 

left flank where the French were supposed to be advancing. The support battalion, the 2d, under 

Captain George McMurtry, followed closely behind with three companies, one company also 

covering the left flank. Whittlesley was a determined commander and the two battalions found 

the gap in the German wire at the ravine and capitalized on it, quickly advancing almost 1,000 

meters to the high ground just south of the day’s objective. In the advance, the Americans 

captured two German officers, 28 enlisted men, and three machine guns, while receiving about 

90 casualties from machine gun fire. Whittlesley set up a perimeter defense for the night and 

maintained contact along the ravine with the rear area by setting up a series of runner posts. 

The brigade reserve battalion had the responsibility to bring forward supplies along the line of 

these posts.22 

Unfortunately for Whittlesley, the units on both of his flanks were stopped cold by the 

combination of German machine guns, mortars, and wire obstacles. The 307th Infantry, on 

the right, was stopped in front of the German defensive line, except for a little progress on the 

right, which was negated by the lack of progress of the 153d Brigade to the east. On the left, 

the French forces were retreating slightly rather than advancing. 

38 
Figure 11. Operations of the 154th Infantry Brigade, 2-7 October 1918 

Johnson relocated his command post to the rear of his two regiments and used runners 

to communicate with his subordinate regimental commanders. Near the end of the afternoon 

after receiving news of the 308th’s success from Colonel Cromwell Stacey, commander, 308th 

Infantry, Johnson, realizing both the precarious position of the units with Whittlesley and 

the opportunity the gap in the German lines gave him, directed Lieutenant Colonel Eugene 

Houghton, commander, 307th Infantry, to send a battalion from his regiment to hold open the 

gap. Houghton immediately set his 3d Battalion in motion to comply with the orders. In the 

darkness the lead company, Company K, led by Captain Nelson Holderman, managed to get 

through, but follow-on units were stopped cold by the now alerted Germans. 

The Germans responded to the apparent breakthrough swiftly. The breakthrough in the 

sector of the 254th Regiment, 76th Reserve Division, cut communications with the units of the 

German Fifth Army on the other side of it and threatened the whole German defensive position. 

39 
The 76th’s front extended across the French sector, with only its left (eastern) flank opposite the 

US 154th Brigade’s sector. The Ia, or the 76th’s Operations Officer, Captain von Sybel, directed 

that the divisional engineer battalion, the 376th, several detached engineer companies, and the 

76th and 77th, be sent to restore the main defensive line even though it was after dark. Major 

Hünicken, commander, 254th Reserve Regiment, would oversee this operation. Coordination at 

the corps level assured that elements on the other side of the army boundary would support the 

counterattack. During the night, the Germans moved in along the ravine between the American 

forward position and their own main line. In the process, they knocked out the string of runner 

posts Whittlesley had established and prevented all but K Company, 3d Battalion, 307th US 

Infantry from getting through the gap. 

Before dawn, patrols from the German 254th Reserve Infantry Regiment infiltrated and 

cut the line of runner posts, killing two runners, capturing another, and driving the rest off. As 

dawn came, a solid German defense formed both on the main line and around the now isolated 

elements of the 308th Infantry. In some cases, the Germans posted alternate machine gun nests 

facing north and south.23 Contact was restored between the 254th Reserve Infantry Regiment 

and the 122d Landwehr Regiment, providing a continuous defensive line once more. Though 

they would not know it until daylight, a force of seven companies was surrounded about 1,000 

meters behind the German main defensive line. This detachment became known popularly 

as the “Lost Battalion,” even though its location was always evident, to both Americans and 

Germans alike, and it was almost the size of two battalions.24 

Despite the successful isolation of the American detachment, the Germans quickly 

discovered how large the American force was and how weak were their own forces in the 

area. The Allied offensive had stretched them thin in the western Argonne and reduced most 

units to a third of their authorized strength. Through a reshuffling of units, the 254th Reserve 

Regiment was given responsibility solely for the front facing the US 154th Brigade and around 

the Lost Battalion and the German 76th Division dispatched its reserve, a battalion of the 254th 

Regiment, to take care of the pocket.25 

Figure 12. Units Isolated as the “Lost Battalion,” 2-7 October 1918

40 
Notwithstanding personnel shortages, the advantages of the thickly wooded terrain, and 

a prepared defensive line fortified the defense. Between 3 and 7 October, the Germans would 

successfully drive off seven attacks designed to free the Lost Battalion and advance the 77th 

Division’s line forward. 

Whittesley made the first of these attacks himself. Upon discovering his isolation in the 

morning, Whittesley dispatched Holderman and his company to reestablish contact with the 

rest of the brigade. The same German security patrols that had picked off the runner posts 

discovered Holderman’s advance and promptly set up an ambush, which forced Holderman 

back into the perimeter. Soon the Germans had strung wire and posted machine guns and 

snipers solidly around Whittesley’s perimeter.264 

Between 3 and 7 October 1918, the 154th Infantry Brigade made the remaining six 

unsuccessful attempts to relieve Whittlesley and advance the line to the objectives of 2 October. 

These attempts were all beaten back by the Germans. The brigade reserve, 3/308th, a battalion 

weakened in previous days of battle, was committed to cover the brigade’s left flank along 

with elements of the brigade machine gun battalion, while Stacey, 308th, led the first three 

attacks on the 3d and 4th. In the afternoon of the 4th, the 308th commander attacked for the 

last time with three companies of his own regiment and the division reserve battalion, 1/307th. 

This attempt to outflank the German positions on the right was defeated by thick underbrush 

and well-prepared defenders. The brigade and division commanders saw something lacking in 

Stacey, who lost his command that night on directive from Alexander, after he requested relief 

based on exhaustion and frayed nerves.27 

The brigade commander, Johnson, personally led the attack on the afternoon of the 5th. 

The 307th Infantry had spent the previous few days trying to crack the nut that was the German 

defensive positions in front of their line. Despite their reputed poor quality, the 2d Landwehr 

Division’s soldiers held off every 307th effort to push them back. For his attack, Johnson used 

the division reserve battalion, now down to 250 men, and the 2/307th, commanded by First 

Lieutenant Weston Jenkins, an attacking force of four companies. Three companies held the 

brigade’s line. Each company was about 55 men strong, but many of Jenkins’ men were raw 

replacements. Johnson’s effort failed too, despite his vigorous leadership. The attacks failed 

through a combination of rugged terrain, a lack of artillery support due to inability to adjust 

fires, and the close proximity of the enemy lines to the American line.28 

Throughout all these efforts, Whittlesley resolutely held on in his pocket, sending messages 

back by carrier pigeon. Attempts to resupply him by air failed when the drops fell into German 

lines and the plane was shot down. The men had started out with two days rations, which were 

stretched to five days. The Germans vigorously shelled the pocket and attacked the perimeter 

with grenades, finally demanding Whittesley’s surrender on the afternoon of 7 October, a 

demand he refused.29 

And rightfully so as the German demand was mostly a bluff: the Lost Battalion’s ordeal was 

almost over, though the Germans tried one last, vigorous grenade attack before withdrawing 

themselves. Earlier in the day at the main line, a crack had appeared in the German defenses 

on the 154th Brigade’s right flank, where the wire obstacles had not been maintained. Both 

the 154th and the adjacent 153d Brigade advanced into the opening and took up positions 

41 
where their fire outflanked the German main line. The Germans began withdrawing. The Lost 

Battalion was relieved by dusk. The original force of 554 was reduced to 194 soldiers capable 

of walking unaided off the hill they had defended against all comers.30 

Part of the reason for the German withdrawal was the advance of another American brigade 

to the east. To ease the pressure on the Lost Battalion, US forces were shuffled to provide fresh 

troops to attack and outflank the Germans defending in the western Argonne. One of these 

units, the 164th Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 82d Division’s 327th and 328th Infantry 

and 321st Machine Gun Battalion attacked to the northwest commencing on 6 October 1918. 

The early success of this attack into the flank of the 2d Landwehr and 45th Divisions resulted 

in a German withdrawal. 

As part of this attack, Corporal Alvin York, Company G, 328th Infantry, executed one of 

the most famous acts of individual heroism in US military history when he single-handedly 

captured almost an entire battalion of Germans on 8 October, earning the Medal of Honor.31 

For their part, members of the Lost Battalion also received several Medals of Honor: 

Whittesley, commander, 1/308; McMurtry, commander, 2/308; and Holderman, commander, 

K/307th. Additionally, the second highest Army award, the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) 

was awarded to 28 members of the Battalion. In the direct attempts to relieve the battalion, 

three additional Medals of Honor and five DSCs were awarded.32 

As for the 154th Infantry Brigade, it continued with the offensive and ended the war on 11 

November 1918 far beyond the Argonne on the heights overlooking the Meuse River south of 

Sedan, France. Johnson commanded the brigade until 30 October 1918, when his health failed, 

necessitating an operation. He had been the brigade’s original commander and died shortly 

after the war.33 

As can be seen from this case study, the brigade in World War I was a fairly inflexible 

fixed organization designed to provide continuous combat power to the front in the form of 

ample reserves ready to continue forward momentum after casualties or terrain had slowed 

up the initial attackers. A brigade with six infantry battalions would often advance with only 

two forward battalions, the rest in reserve to either continue the advance or be shifted to a 

discovered weakness in the enemy defenses. Though the Army maintained a continuous front 

as in previous wars, in this new war, a brigade did not necessarily attack with soldiers shoulder 

to shoulder. Consequently, for the first time, a brigade commander had to rely on various 

command and control means rather than personal contact to control subordinate units. No 

longer was a whole brigade visible to its commander. Unfortunately, means of communication 

had not kept up with tactical innovation. The inadequacy of the use of couriers, carrier pigeons, 

and landline telephones on the tactical battlefield resulted in the uncoordination of brigade 

offensive operations and the subsequent surrounding of a major portion of the command. Such 

coordination problems were apparent in earlier wars at higher levels, but now also appeared at 

the brigade level. 

42 
NOTES

 1. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 24-25. 

2. Ibid., 27, 32. 

3. Ibid., 32-34. 

4. Ibid., 34-35. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid., 35-37. 

7. Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and 

Organization. Combat Studies Institute Research Survey Number 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command 

and General Staff College, 1984), 39-42; Wilson, 48. The British division was three brigades, but the subordinate 

units to the brigade were battalion-sized, so the French and German divisions actually came to resemble the British 

one in terms of number of infantry battalions. 

8. Historical Resources Branch, US Army Center of Military History (CMH), The American Division in World 

War I, undated document. 

9. Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI: US Army Division Design Initiatives and 

Experiments 1917-1995 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1997), 5.; House, 42. 

10. Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Army Infantry Battalion: 1939-1968 (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Combat 

Developments Command, 1968), 7-8; Wilson, 67. 

11. As an exception, the 4th Brigade was actually a US Marine Corps organization attached to the Army. The 185th 

Brigade is numbered as a National Army brigade because it was composed of segregated Guard units assigned 

to one of the segregated National Army units. The missing higher numbered National Army brigades were being 

formed when the war ended. 

12. Wilson, 73. 

13. Wilson, 60; Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, Zone of the Interior: Directory 

of Troops, Vol. 3, Art 3 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1988), 1277-308. 

14. House, 42. 

15. Corps here is used in the sense of an administrative organization and should not be confused with the large 

tactical unit, the corps, or more properly, the army corps. 

16. Ibid., 1543. James Sawicki, Tank Battalions of the US Army (Dumfries, VA; Wyvern, 1983), 4-6. 

17. Dale E. Wilson, Treat ‘Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor 1917-20 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 96. 

18. Ibid., 163, 181. 

19. Order of Battle, AEF, Volume 2, 259, 301-3; Report of the Assistant Inspector General, First Army, Subject: 

77th Division, cutting off of seven companies and one machine gun company, 3 October 1918, dated 8 October 

1918, found in the papers of Major H.A. Drum, Papers Relating to Lost Battalion, 77th Division, Document 12, 

Military History Institute, 25 March 2003, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum 

=12>,(hereafter referred to as Drum Papers). The 77th Division had served in the trenches in Lorraine in July and 

August 1918 and participated in the Aisne-Marne Offensive in September right before moving to the Argonne. 

20. Report of the Assistant Inspector General, Drum Papers. CMH, 1992, reprint of 1938), 176; Thomas M. 

Johnson and Fletcher Pratt, The Lost Battalion (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938), 27; David D. Lee, Sergeant York: 

An American Hero (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 33 

22. Report of the Assistant Inspector General, Drum Papers; Supplementary Report of Operations of the 308th 

Infantry Covering Period from October 2 to October 8, 1918, Drum Papers. 

23. Johnson and Pratt, 61. 

24. Ibid., 41-44, 52-53. 

25. Ibid., 43-44. 

26. Ibid., 81-82, 86-88. 

27. Report of the Assistant Inspector General, Drum Papers; Supplementary Report of Operations of the 308th 

Infantry Covering Period from October 2 to October 8, 1918, Drum Papers. 

28. Ibid. Extract from Report of Operations, 77th Division, Covering Period from November 1 to November 8, 

1918, Drum Papers. 

29. Ibid. 

43 
30. Ibid. L. Wardlaw Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, “Chapter 7 The Lost Battalion.” <http://longwood.k12. 

ny.us/history/upton.miles7.htm”>, 24 Mar 2003. 

31. York captured Germans from the 45th Reserve Division’s 210th Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 2d 

Landwehr Division’s 120th Landwehr Infantry Regiment. Lee, 33-38. 

32. The relief medals were awarded to two airmen who died after their plane was shot down and to a first sergeant 

in the 307th Infantry who destroyed a machine gun nest on 4 October 1918. The Lost Battalion of World War I, 

<http://www.homestead.com/prosites-johnrcotter/lost_battalion_heroes.html>,, and, <http://www.homestead.com/ 

prosites-johnrcotter/lost_battalion_heroes.html>, 28 March 2003 

33. Order of Battle, 296; Johnson and Pratt, 290. 

44 
Chapter 5 

INTERWAR AND GLOBAL WAR: DEATH OF THE BRIGADE 

The Interwar Years: Square and Mechanized Brigades 

The square brigade organization survived the demobilization of the Army after World War I. 

For the first time ever, the Army retained units larger than the regiment after demobilizing from 

a war. Despite several studies urging a smaller, triangular division based on three regiments, 

the four-regiment-, two-brigade division structure was retained throughout the interwar period. 

The Regular Army, though reduced in size, kept the brigade and divisional structure used in the 

war. The tidy numerical structure instituted in the war was soon disrupted by the shuffling of 

the brigades three times, twice in the 1920s, and later in 1933. Additionally, brigades that had 

formerly belonged to the 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions were reassigned to the Panama Canal, 

Hawaiian, and Philippine divisions. In the force structure, seven brigades remained in an active 

status, while the other divisional brigade was retained in an inactive status. The National Guard 

was demobilized back under state control, and after a brief period of organizational turmoil, 

also retained the brigade and divisional designations and structure used in the war, though 

some designations were shuffled around and eight new brigades were created. The National 

Army was demobilized unit by unit, but its unit designations were used to form a new Federal 

Reserve component, the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). Twenty new infantry brigades were 

formed in the ORC, as the ORC created 10 new divisions in the interwar period. 

During the war, the Army had briefly organized the 15th Cavalry Division, consisting of 

the 1st, 2d, and 3d Cavalry Brigades. The brigades continued separately after the division’s 

inactivation until 1919. In 1921, a new 1st Cavalry Division was created, using a variation of 

the two-brigade square division format, with the 1st and 2d Cavalry Brigades replacing the 

infantry brigades.1 

European experimentation made Army leaders relook at the mechanization of cavalry 

and the employment of tanks as an item of interest in the late 1920s. In 1928, the Army 

assembled a group of units, the Experimental Force, at Fort Meade, Maryland. The force, a 

combination of an infantry battalion, two tank battalions, and a field artillery battalion, under 

the command of a colonel, would be the first combined arms maneuver brigade in the modern 

era. A board replaced the Experimental Force in 1928. The Mechanized Force Board report 

recommended the organization of a combined arms mechanized brigade in 1930. However, the 

organization barely got off the ground when fiscal restraints caused by the Great Depression 

reduced it to battalion strength. Under the new Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, the 

project was cancelled all together in 1931. MacArthur preferred a branch-specific approach 

to mechanization and both the cavalry and infantry branches therefore developed mechanized 

units separate from each other.2 

Accordingly, cavalry branch organized the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) in 1932 to 

be its experimental mechanized force. The brigade became the first combined arms maneuver 

brigade organized in the US Army since Washington had attached artillery directly to his 

brigades in 1777. The brigade’s organization grew over time from the arrival of the 1st Cavalry 

Regiment at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in 1933, to the assignment of the 13th Cavalry Regiment 

45 
and a battalion of the 68th Field Artillery in 1938. The cavalry regiments became mechanized 

by using “combat cars,” the cavalry branch euphemism for tanks, in place of horses. While 

the brigade was formally organized without infantry (see Figure 13), the 6th Infantry was 

transferred to Fort Knox and mechanized in 1936 to support the brigade. The 7th Cavalry 

Brigade remained in the force structure until 1940, participating in numerous major exercises 

to validate the mechanized concept. In 1940, it was reorganized into the 1st Armored Division 

with the formal addition of the 6th Infantry Regiment. A provisional tank brigade, which had 

been formed early in 1940 from the infantry’s tank units, was converted later the same year 

into the 2d Armored Division. 

Figure 13. 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), 1938 

Triangularized Divisions 

As was previously discussed, after World War I, the Army retained the square division 

with its two brigades of two infantry regiments. However, since the end of the war, there had 

been a long-standing debate in the Army over the organization of the infantry division. Finally, 

between 1936 and 1939, the 2d Infantry Division experimented with a new triangularized 

infantry division structure, which was ultimately adopted Armywide starting in 1939. In this 

structure, one infantry regiment and the brigade level of command were removed from the 

division. The remaining three infantry regiments, commanded by colonels, were directly 

subordinate to the division commander. The conversion process took several years, with the 

National Guard, which was mobilized in toto in 1940-1941, gradually losing its brigades, until 

the last was gone in 1942. While some Regular Army units simply disbanded their brigades, 

46 
the two brigades of some Regular and all of the National Guard and ORC divisions, the latter 

being reactivated from scratch starting in 1942, were converted to form the new divisional 

headquarters company and either all or part of the new divisional reconnaissance troop.3 

As an exception, one brigade, the 51st Infantry Brigade from the Massachusetts National 

Guard, did, however, manage to get into combat even while its parent division, the 26th, was 

being converted to the triangular structure. The 51st headquarters, having become excess by the 

new table of organization, was available to command the American force sent to garrison the 

French island of New Caledoniain the South Pacific in early 1942. As Task Force (TF) 6814, 

the brigade headquarters left New York in January 1942, arriving in New Caledonia, after a 

stop in Australia on 6 March 1942. Initially, the task force controlled two infantry regiments, 

two artillery regiments, and two engineer regiments. Upon arrival in New Caledonia, a major 

general assumed command of the augmented force. A third infantry regiment and two more 

field artillery battalions were added in April 1942, with the whole force being designated 

as the Americal Division on 24 May 1942. HHC, 51st Infantry Brigade, was retained as the 

division headquarters company, being redesignated so in May 1943. The division fought on 

Guadalcanal from October 1942 to February 1943, and later fought on Bougainville and in the 

Southern Philippines.4 

During World War II, the 1st Cavalry Division was the only division to retain the twobrigade, square division structure. The Army ultimately dismounted the division and sent it to 

the Pacific to fight as infantry, with the tag “Special” added to its designation, while retaining 

the square structure throughout the war and even up to 1949, when the triangular structure 

was finally adopted. The wartime division’s cavalry regiments, after being dismounted, were 

smaller in size than a standard infantry regiment, and were reorganized partially under infantry 

and partially under cavalry organizational tables.5 

After the conversion to the triangular division, only two brigades were organized in the 

Army during World War II. The 1st Parachute Infantry Brigade was organized at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, in 1942. In 1943, the brigade was redesignated as the 1st Airborne Infantry Brigade 

and the 2d Airborne Infantry Brigade was also organized at Fort Benning. Both brigades 

supported airborne training, but after most nondivisional airborne units deployed overseas in 

1944, the 1st Brigade was disbanded. The 2d Brigade deployed to the United Kingdom to 

support airborne training there and was disbanded in early 1945.6 

The US Army fought in World War II with three commands at roughly the same level as 

the former brigade: the regiment, the group, and the brigade, which was still sparingly used as 

an administrative headquarters for pooled separate battalions, were still sparingly used. Both 

groups and regiments were commanded by colonels. While the regiment was composed of its 

own organic battalions and regimental-level companies, the group was merely a headquarters 

to which subordinate General Headquarters (GHQ) battalions could be assigned.7 Table 5 

illustrates the differences and similarities. 

Apart from in the Americal and 1st Cavalry Divisions, for all intents and purposes, the 

maneuver brigade as a tactical command did not exist in the US Army in World War II. However, 

two organizations widely used in the war bear mentioning as the future history of the brigade 

later in the century was clearly descended from these two units: the armored division combat 

command and the regimental combat team. 

47 
The Combat Command of the Armored Division

The organization of a new type of combat division, the armored division, led to experiments 

with unit structure. The basic difficulty with the employment of armor was its inherent 

combined arms nature. An organizational structure of pure tank and infantry regiments would 

not be organized in the manner in which early war experience had shown armor was fought 

best: a combination of tanks, mechanized or armored infantry, and self-propelled artillery. 

The armored division was reorganized numerous times during the early part of the World 

War II. Most revisions involved the ratio of tanks to infantry and the use of brigade and 

regimental headquarters. Additionally, the formation of combat teams of tanks and infantry at 

Table 5. Regiment versus Brigade versus Group

the battalion and brigade level was an operational imperative for the new armored force. Early 

versions of the division contained an armored brigade consisting of three subordinate armored 

regiments. An infantry regiment, which reported directly to the division commander, was also 

part of the organization.8 

Eventually, two different armored division organizations were used in World War II. Both 

no longer had brigade headquarters, but employed a small brigade-equivalent headquarters, a 

combat command, to control the combat teams in which the division was supposed to operate. 

The “heavy” structure retained branch-specific regimental headquarters, as well as two combat 

commands, A and B, which were command and control headquarters without any organic units 

assigned to them. The two armored regiments consisted of six tank battalions. The armored 

infantry regiment in the heavydivision provided three infantry battalions. These battalions were 

then used to form combat teams and the teams were assigned on a mission basis to the two 

combat commands, one of which was commanded by a brigadier general, the other by a colonel. 

The regimental headquarters were, therefore, basically administrative and in combat practice, 

the armored ones were used to create task forces, as were tank battalions, and the infantry 

regimental headquarters was used to form an ad hoc third combat command headquarters. The 

2d and 3d Armored Divisions fought the war under this organization, retaining it as they were 

already in combat when a new, “lighter” organization was adopted in 1943.9 

The majority of the armored divisions in the US Army in World War II, 13 out of 15, 

fought utilizing the light division structure. This organization eliminated the regiment in the 

division. Three separate tank and three separate armored infantry battalions replaced the two 

48 
Figure 14. Typical Organization of a Light Armored Division Combat Command 

tank regiments and infantry regiment. An A and a B Combat Command headquarters were part 

of the division, with a brigadier general and colonel commanding each respectively. A smaller 

headquarters, Combat Command Reserve (CCR), under an infantry colonel, was organized to 

command the divisional reserve or rear area. In practice, the many armored group headquarters 

which had been controlling the GHQ tank battalions before they were assigned to armies and 

corps, were then used to augment the small combat command headquarters and to make CCR 

into a full-sized headquarters equal with the other two. In some cases, combat commands 

fought separate from their parent division, either in support of infantry divisions or under a 

corps headquarters.10 

The combat command was a unique organization. With no forces assigned to it, habitual 

attachments in the light division usually included a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion 

and an armored field artillery battalion. With these, the commander usually formed two task 

forces by having each battalion swap a company. One task force would consist of two tank and 

one armored infantry companies and the other of two armored infantry and one tank company. 

The armored infantry usually was equipped with, and rode into battle on the M2 half track.11 

The mission-oriented/task organized structure of the combat command often did not survive 

the crucible of combat. Many divisions retained the same organization for combat commands 

throughout the war. The detachment of combat commands to support infantry divisions or 

to otherwise fight independent of their parent divisions encouraged this. Nevertheless, some 

divisions did task organize, particularly those that used the reserve command as a reserve or 

rear area command. Some of these divisions rotated combat battalions through the reserve 

command as they got worn out in combat.12 

Throughout World War II, there was a great debate over the ratio of infantry to tanks in the 

armored division. In the light division, the ratio was 1:1. In the heavy division, the ratio was 

49 
1:2. The heavy division, in particular, preferred to operate with an attached infantry regiment 

supported by truck companies to bring its ratio closer to that of the light division. 

The European Theater of Operations General Board, which convened in 1945 to analyze 

combat operations and organization, recommended that the combat command be scrapped and 

replaced by a combined arms regiment. Despite, this, the postwar Army retained the combat 

command. After the war, a modified version of the light armored division structure was adopted 

Armywide, with an additional tank and infantry battalion assigned to the division, with the 

infantry battalions increased by one company each, and the combat command headquarters 

plussed up. Combat Commands A and B were now both commanded by brigadier generals. In 

1954, the reserve command was redesignated as Combat Command C, and elevated to equal 

status with the other two commands, though it was still commanded by a colonel. Despite 

many proposed and tested changes in organization, the combat command remained the major 

maneuver element within the armored division up to 1963, with only the battalion designations 

changing in 1957 when the Army adopted the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), 

which discarded the separate battalion designation system used in the armored division up to 

that point, replacing it with a system based on battalions belonging to nontactical regiments.13 

Figure 15. Remagen Bridgehead. Army in Action Series, DA Poster 21-32 

Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, at Remagen, Germany 

In early March 1945, the US III Corps, consisting of the 1st, 9th, and 78th Infantry 

Divisions and the 9th Armored Division, was fighting in the Rhineland as part of the First 

Army. The corps’ objective was to advance to the Rhine River and link up with elements of the 

US Third Army advancing from the south, in the process trapping as many German units as 

possible on the west bank of the Rhine. 

50 
On 6 March 1945, the 9th Armored Division ripped a big hole in the German line and 

ended the day at Stadt Meckenheim, 10 miles west of the major river obstacle, the Rhine. The 

German forces in the Rhineland, the 15th and 7th Armies, were in disarray, both trying to put 

on a show of defending every inch, to comply with Hitler’s instructions, and at the same time 

retreat across the Rhine in good order before getting trapped on the wrong side of the wide 

river. Trapping the Germans was just what the Americans had in mind. 

For 7 March 1945 the 9th Armored Division had the mission closing up to the Rhine and 

securing the key crossings of the Ahr River near where it met the Rhine. This would prevent 

the Germans from reaching the Rhine and set up a subsequent advance to the south to join up 

with units of Patton’s Third Army near Coblenz, thus cutting off any Germans left on the wrong 

side of the Rhine. Combat Command A (CCA), with the 78th Division on its right, would cross 

the Ahr River at Bad Neuenahr to cut the Ahr Valley escape route of the German LXVII Corps. 

Combat Command B (CCB), commanded by Brigadier General William Hoge, would advance 

to the Rhine on the left of CCA, securing the west bank at the town of Remagen and taking 

easternmost crossings over the Ahr River for a follow on advance to link up with Third Army 

forces. Even though Remagen contained a large railroad bridge across the Rhine, planners gave 

little consideration to capturing the bridge intact. 

Hoge divided his CCB into two task forces even though he had an extra armored infantry 

battalion. Attrition had given him only two seasoned commanders at the battalion/task force 

Figure 16. Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, 7 March 1945

51 
level. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Prince, commander, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, led 

a task force consisting of his own battalion, two tank companies from the 14th Tank Battalion, 

and an armored engineer platoon. TF Prince was the combat command’s main effort, advancing 

to the Ahr River on the left flank of CCA. Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Engeman, the commander 

of the 14th Tank Battalion, headed the other task force. TF Engeman consisted of Engeman’s 

battalion headquarters and his Company A, and the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion and an 

armored engineer platoon from Company B, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion. On Prince’s left, 

Engeman was to advance to the Rhine at Remagen, then advance south along the riverbank. 

The combat command’s reconnaissance troop would screen CCB’s left flank. 

As mentioned previously, Hoge and Engeman gave little thought to capturing the railroad 

bridge at Remagen intact: the Germans had proven to be masters at blowing Rhine bridges up in 

the faces of advancing Americans. Therefore, Hoge was much more concerned with preventing 

the Germans from using the bridge to escape than he was about seizing it for his own use. 

In Remagen, however, the rapid American advance over the previous week had left the 

Germans in disarray. Their LXVII Corps, whose main forces, the 89th Infantry Division and 

the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, were about to be trapped between the III Corps and the 

Third Army, had received responsibility for the bridge at Remagen from the German rear area 

authorities only on 6 March. The corps adjutant, Major Hans Scheller, assumed command of 

the bridgehead, but only arrived at Remagen minutes before the lead American elements arrived 

at the outskirts of the town. The explosives for the demolition of the bridge had only come 15 

minutes before Scheller arrived and were half the required amount and of inferior quality. 

Scheller found a small infantry company at Remagen made up of a mix of seasoned veterans 

and local, overage residents, a small engineer company responsible for the demolition of the 

bridge, and part of an antiaircraft artillery battery. Planned reinforcements of two battalions 

were no longer available. Other German troops continued to stream across the bridge in a panic, 

making them unavailable for its defense. Neither Scheller nor the other officers at Remagen 

received any further instructions from German higher headquarters, even though reports from 

the troops crossing the bridge indicated that the Americans had broken through and would be at 

the river that day. Scheller alone would determine when to blow the bridge.14 

CCB’s advance on 7 March started off against only sporadic and uneven German defenses. 

Both task forces advanced rapidly throughout the morning. TF Prince captured the bridge over 

the Ahr River at Sinzig by noon. Meanwhile, TF Engeman, lead by Company A, 27th Armored 

Infantry Battalion, with a platoon of the newly fielded Pershing tanks from Company A, 14th 

Tank Battalion attached, arrived at the outskirts of Remagen around the same time Scheller 

arrived in the town to assume command. Second Lieutenant Karl Timmerman, commander of 

Company A, was amazed to see the bridge still standing and Germans streaming across it. 

In short order, Engeman, Hoge, and Major Murray Deevers, commander, 27th Armored 

Infantry Battalion, joined Timmerman. A German prisoner captured at Sinzig had indicated, incorrectly as it was later to be shown, that the Remagen Bridge was scheduled to be destroyed at 

1600, less than 5 hours away. Hoge seeing an opportunity to capture the bridge, ordered Engeman 

to make a try. Engeman, in turn, ordered the entire 27th Armored Infantry Battalion to advance 

to the bridge. The tanks and artillery would support in boldly attempting to seize the bridge. 

Hoge was blatantly ignoring new orders to advance south along the river toward Coblenz.15 

52 
Figure 17. The Advance of CCB, 9th Armored Division, 7 March 1945 

The three companies of the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, led by Timmerman’s 

Company A, and supported directly by Company A, 14th Tank Battalion, methodically 

advanced through Remagen, approaching the bridge before the 1600 deadline. The Germans 

responded to the American approach: Captain Karl Friesenhahn, the bridge demolitions 

commander, immediately, on his own initiative, blew a large antitank crater into the bridge’s 

approach road. He then crossed the bridge to look for Scheller, losing 15 minutes when a tank 

round exploded near him, knocking him unconscious. Friesenhahn immediately requested and 

received permission to blow the bridge. However, even though the system had been tested 

several times, in the clinch it failed. The electrical firing circuit had been damaged. By this 

time the American forces had the bridge under small arms and machine gun fire. Nevertheless a 

German sergeant volunteered to go out onto the bridge and manually fire the emergency backup 

charges. He did so successfully, but when the smoke cleared from the explosion, the bridge still 

stood. Before the Germans could try a second charge, Timmerman’s company was crossing 

the bridge, supported by Pershing tanks firing to suppress Germans shooting from the towers 

on each end of the bridge. The armored infantrymen crossed the bridge, clearing the towers as 

they went and the lead elements soon had a toehold on the opposite bank, capturing most of 

Scheller’s men, who meekly surrendered when prompted from their shelter in a railroad tunnel 

next to the bridge.16 

After the first troops crossed the river, Hoge immediately, on his own authority, ordered the 

whole 27th Battalion across. He also had some of his engineers go to the bridge and remove all 

traces of demolitions and set the wheel in motion for the erection of pontoon bridges to augment 

53 
the damaged railroad bridge. Then he contacted the division commander, Major General John 

Leonard, who sent the news up higher and relieved CCB of its mission on the Ahr River so that 

Hoge could get the whole combat command onto the far bank. After dark the tanks of the 14th 

Battalion crossed, followed by the rest of the combat command and elements of the 78th and 9th 

Infantry Divisions. The rest of the 9th Armored Division soon followed, then the whole III Corps. 

Hoge was the bridgehead commander until the first follow-on division commander arrived.17 

The Germans committed sizeable forces to eliminate the bridgehead and utilized frogmen, 

V-2 rocket volleys, and newly fielded jet bombers. The bridge ultimately collapsed on its own 

10 days after its capture. By then, pontoon bridges had replaced it and there was an extensive 

bridgehead was on the west bank. The German attempts to destroy the bridgehead failed. As a 

sign of the low state the German armed forces had reached in early 1945, Scheller was executed 

by a flying court-martial on 12 March 1945. Also executed for their roles at Remagen were the 

commanders of the engineer regiment and the battalion responsible for the bridge and an air 

defense officer who could not prove he had destroyed some of his experimental weapons before 

they could fall into American hands. The commander of the infantry company at Remagen 

was found guilty in absentia, he already being a prisoner of war (POW), while, ironically, the 

engineer company commander, Friesenhahn, who was directly responsible for the demolition, 

also already a POW, was found innocent, probably because of his status as a longtime member 

of the Nazi Party. Scheller had commanded at Remagen less than 4 hours when the bridge was 

crossed and had no control over the supply of demolitions, the American advance, or the troops 

assigned to him. He also had no means of counterattacking or communicating with higher 

headquarters except through personal contact. The only decision he had made was to delay the 

demolition of the bridge a few minutes to let a field artillery battalion cross.18 Portions of the 

German LXVII Corps headquarters escaped across the Rhine south of Remagen, only to be 

committed and depleted in counterattacks against the bridgehead. 

The capture of the bridge at Remagen was essential in speeding the end of the war. The 

depleted Germans were soon surrounded in the Ruhr pocket and American armored forces, 

including the 9th Armored Division advanced far to the east. The 9th itself ended the war 

in upper Bavaria near Weiden. CCB was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its 

actions at Remagen. Hoge went on to command the 4th Armored Division and higher units. 

His flexibility in the use of his combat command validated the concept of its employment in a 

mobile, fluid combat environment. The lesson would not be lost on Army planners later when 

they were seeking a flexible organization below the division level to facilitate and execute 

combat operations on the modern battlefield in all kinds of units, not just armored ones. But 

that would not be until the early 1960s. 

The Regimental Combat Team 

With the adoption of the triangular infantry division, the regiment replaced the brigade as 

the basic subordinate maneuver command in the division. When a separate force of infantry 

smaller than a division was required for operations, the Army formed a new organization based 

on an infantry regimental headquarters. This was the regimental combat team (RCT). By the 

end of the war, almost all infantry regiments not assigned to a division were RCTs. 

54 
•INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER OR SEPARATE BG COULD COMMAND 

•TASK ORGANIZED DEPENDED ON MISSION 

•MOST NONDIVISIONAL INFANTRY REGIMENTS WERE RCTS 

•LATE IN THE WAR DIVISIONS OFTEN GROUPED THEIR UNITS AS 3 RCTS 

•RCTs ALSO USED EXTENSIVELY IN KOREA 

•USMC EQUIVALENT WAS CALLED BRIGADE 

•RCTs GOT THEIR OWN PATCHES AFTER WW2 

•INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER OR SEPARATE BG COULD COMMAND

•TASK ORGANIZED DEPENDED ON MISSION

•MOST NONDIVISIONAL INFANTRY REGIMENTS WERE RCTS

•LATE IN THE WAR DIVISIONS OFTEN GROUPED THEIR UNITS AS 3 RCTS

•RCTs ALSO USED EXTENSIVELY IN KOREA

•USMC EQUIVALENT WAS CALLED BRIGADE

•RCTs GOT THEIR OWN PATCHES AFTER WW2

Figure 18. Typical Organization of a Regimental Combat Team 

The RCT was an infantry regiment augmented with the support and combat support 

elements usually allocated within the division to support the regiment. With such augmentation, 

the RCT was capable of independent action and operations. Most of the time the colonel who 

commanded the infantry regiment commanded the RCT. Occasionally a brigadier general was 

sent to command an RCT. Typically an RCT consisted of, in addition to the infantry regiment, a 

field artillery battalion, engineer and medical companies, and a signal platoon. The organization 

was tailored for its particular mission, so different elements, such as antiaircraft artillery and 

tanks, could be added to groom the RCT for its particular assignment. The US Marine Corps 

also employed the RCT concept in World War II and after, but called their RCTs brigades.19 

In the later stages of World War II, division commanders began organizing their three 

infantry regiments as RCTs within the division, giving them an appropriate slice of the 

division’s combat and combat service support assets. This made it easier to detach regiments 

to other divisions or to attach additional regiments. 

As with the combat command, the RCT concept lasted after World War II. RCTs were 

even authorized their own shoulder patches in the postwar era and were used extensively in the 

Korean War. The 187th Airborne RCT, consisting of parachute units detached from the 11th 

Airborne Division to fight in Korea, executed two combat airdrops during the war. The 5th 

RCT’s structure, as of mid-1950, is given in Figure 18, to illustrate a typical RCT organization 

55 
of the Korean War era. The RCT concept was retained until the Pentomic reorganization in 

1957 (see Figure 19). 

•RCT USUALLY ATTACHED TO A DIVISION ( 24th ID LATER 45th ID) 

•AAA AND ADDIITONAL ENGINEER AND TANK ASSETS PROVIDED BY HIGHER 

•MINIMAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO THE RCT 

5 

5 555 72 5 

105mm 

5 

HVY 

5 

•RCT USUALLY ATTACHED TO A DIVISION ( 24th ID LATER 45th ID)

•AAA AND ADDIITONAL ENGINEER AND TANK ASSETS PROVIDED BY HIGHER

•MINIMAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO THE RCT

5

5 555 72 5

105mm

5

HVY

5

Figure 19. Organization of 5th RCT, Korea, 1950

56 
NOTES

1. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 64, 98. 

2. Ibid., 122-23. 

3. The Regular Army divisions converted to the new structure before 1941 were the ones that disbanded their 

brigades. 

4. Shelby Stanton, Order of Battle: US Army, World War II (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1984), 184-85. 

5. Ibid., 71-72; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 191; John Wilson, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Separate 

Brigades (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1999), 123, 125. 

6. Wilson, Firepower and Maneuver, 169, 190-91; Wilson, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Separate Brigades, 

135-36. 

7. GHQ was the designation for units, usually battalions not assigned to a division or corps, but assigned as 

needed by the theater commander and his subordinates. 

8. Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI: US Army Division Design Initiatives and 

Experiments 1917-1995 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1997), 8; Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical 

Trend Analysis. Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Report No. 14 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 1999), 9. 

9. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 184-85, 198; The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 

Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division, Number 48, 3, A-2, A-3 (hereafter 

referred to as General Board.) 

10. Ibid. 

11. General Board, Appendix 1. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 227-28; General Board, 24. 

14. Ken Hechler, The Bridge at Remagen (New York: Ballantine, 1957), 112-15. 

15. Hechler, 125; US Army Corps of Engineers History Office, Engineer Memoirs: General William M. Hoge, EP 

870-1-25 (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Corps of Engineers, 1993), 143-45. 

16. Hechler, 135-39, 151-52. There are many theories as to why the bridge remained standing. Most likely a tank 

round damaged the connection to the main charge. See Hechler, 219-20. 

17. Engineer Memoirs, 145-46. 

18. Hechler, 130, 196-212. 

19. In the 1990s, the USMC began referring to their reinforced regiments as RCTs. 

57 
Chapter 6 

THE EARLY MODERN BRIGADE, 1958-1972 

Pentomic Era 

Following World War II, the US Army retained the organizational structures, with minor 

modifications, which had won that war. This organization—which did not include a maneuver 

unit called the brigade after the two brigades in the 1st Cavalry Division were eliminated 

in 1949—was also used to fight the Korean War in 1950-1953. Despite the success of the 

triangular infantry division in two wars, the Army radically changed the structure in 1958 by 

converting the infantry division to what became known as the Pentomic Division. Ostensively, 

the Pentomic structure was designed to allow infantry units to survive and fight on an atomic 

battlefield. Structurally it eliminated the regiment and battalion, replacing both with five selfcontained “battlegroups,” each of which were larger than an old style battalion, but smaller 

than a regiment. A full colonel commanded the battlegroup and his captains commanded four, 

later five, subordinate rifle companies. 

The Pentomic Division structurally reflected that of the World War II European theater 

airborne divisions. This was no surprise since three European airborne commanders dominated 

the Army’s strategic thinking after the Korean War: Army Chief of Staff General Matthew 

Ridgway, Eighth Army commander General Maxwell Taylor, and VII Corps commander 

Lieutenant General James Gavin. Though theoretically triangular in design, the two airborne 

divisions Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin commanded in the war, the 82d and 101st, fought as 

division task forces reinforced with additional parachute regiments and separate battalions. 

For most of the Northern European campaign, both divisions had two additional parachute 

regiments attached to them, giving them five subordinate regiments, each commanded by 

colonels. Parachute regiments were smaller than standard infantry regiments by organization 

and attrition often made them even smaller, giving the 82d or 101st commander a perfect 

prototype of the structure that later became the Pentomic Division.1 

The Pentomic organization, officially known as the Reorganization of the Current Infantry 

Division (ROCID) went through frequent modifications from its conception in 1954 to 1958 

when it was finally adopted, and even after adoption. The original tables of organization (TOE) 

which were implemented included a small brigade headquarters commanded by the brigadier 

general assistant division commander. This headquarters was designed to provide command 

and control of attached units from the division as directed by the division commander, and to 

act as an alternate division command post. The concept was not really used in practice and 

when Pentomic TOEs were modified in February 1960, the brigade was eliminated.2 

Except for minor structural modifications, the armored division, with its three combat 

commands, was unaffected by the Pentomic changes. The division was considered already 

well suited for atomic operations and senior armor commanders favored the flexible combat 

command structure.3 

As part of the Pentomic reorganization, the regiment and separate battalion were eliminated 

as tactical units in the infantry, field artillery, and tank units. The battle group, and later the battalion, became the basic maneuver unit. These units were, however, designated as components 

59 
of historic regiments that became notional units. The new system, CARS, and a later variation of 

it, the Army Regimental System, is still in use by the US Army today. In this designation system, 

battalions in the infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery, later field and air defense, were designated as numbered battalions belonging to a particular regiment. Separate companies would be lettered companies of a specific regiment. The regiments themselves were administrative entities, 

except in certain units, like armored cavalry, where the regiment was retained as a combined 

arms unit commanded by a colonel. This will be discussed in greater detail later in this work. 

With the adoption of the new Pentomic divisional structure and the elimination of the 

regiment as a tactical unit, the force structure required a replacement for the now defunct 

RCT. The brigade was revived to fill this role. Accordingly, two brigades, numbered 1st and 

2d, stationed at Fort Benning, and Fort Devens, Massachusetts, respectively, were established 

in the active Army force structure. The Army created three additional brigades. The 29th in 

Hawaii, the 92d in Puerto Rico, and the 258th in Arizona, were created in the Army National 

Guard to replace existing RCTs. 

When established, the new nondivisional Pentomic brigade became the first permanently 

organized combined arms brigade in Army history. The brigade commander was a brigadier 

general and the brigade had two subordinate battlegroups commanded by full colonels, as 

well as a field artillery battalion and a support element, the brigade trains. Each battlegroup 

contained four rifle companies and a 4.2-inch mortar battery. While brigade organization 

varied in other units, the brigade established at Fort Devens in 1958, the 2d Infantry Brigade, 

Figure 20. The Pentomic Brigade 

60 
also included two tank companies, two engineer companies, and a reconnaissance company. Its 

organization is illustrated in Figure 20. 

ROAD Brigades and Airmobile Brigades 

There were concerns about the Pentomic concept almost immediately. The span of control 

for the division commander was great and not compensated by advances in communications 

technology. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) were centralized in a transportation unit 

and assigned with drivers to infantry units as needed, though only one battle group at a time 

could be so mechanized. The command structure jumped from captain to colonel without any 

intermediate levels of command in between. And the infantry and armored divisions remained 

in two completely different organizational structures. 

While the Army adopted the inventive Pentomic structure, most of the rest of the world’s 

armies retained or adopted more traditional organizations. In the British army, the brigade 

had traditionally contained subordinate battalion-sized units, called regiments in the armored 

force, cavalry, and artillery branches, and called battalions in the infantry. During World War 

II, brigades were augmented with support elements and called brigade groups. To the present 

day, the British have maintained this concept. Brigades and brigade groups have, since 1945, 

become the basic operational unit in the British army in lieu of the division.4 

When the new West German army, the Bundeswehr, was established in the mid-1950s, it, 

like the French army of the same era, used the combat command structure of the US armored 

division. However, starting in 1957, the Germans reorganized into a brigade structure. The 

brigades were combined arms organizations and fixed in structure, with permanently assigned 

combat battalions and support elements. While brigades still belonged to divisions, the brigade 

here too replaced the division as the Bundeswehr’s basic tactical unit at the operational level.5 

The US Army’s Continental Army Command (CONARC) began formal studies for 

a new divisional structure in December 1960, only two years after the adoption of the 

Pentomic structure. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy approved CONARC’s proposal, the 

Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD), for immediate implementation. The Army 

was reorganized between 1961 and 1963.6 With later modifications, the ROAD structure is 

basically still in use in the Army today. 

Unlike the previous organizational structure, ROAD created a universal divisional structure, 

which depending on the mix of combat battalions, could be armored, mechanized infantry, infantry, or airborne. ROAD restored the brigade as a command, both in divisions and separately. 

ROAD established three brigade headquarters in each division, the 1st, 2d, and 3d. The new brigade combined features of the former divisional regiments and the armored division’s combat 

commands. Like the former regiments, the new divisional brigades controlled battalions, were 

commanded by colonels, and reported directly to the division commander. Like the combat command, the ROAD brigade was a headquarters with no organic troops, being task organized by 

the division commander for particular missions. The brigade was not to be part of the division’s 

administrative or logistical chains of command. Maneuver combat battalions (infantry, mechanized infantry, armor) would be assigned to the brigade in a mix of from two to five battalions, 

to complete specific missions. One of three divisional direct support field artillery battalions 

would normally be assigned to support each brigade. A slice of combat support and combat 

service support elements assigned to the division would be placed in support of the brigade.7 

61 
A new type of infantry, mechanized, was established with the ROAD reorganization. This 

type of infantry was the lineal descendent of the armored infantry formerly found in the armored 

divisions. Unlike the old armored infantry, mechanized infantry battalions could now be part 

of organizations other than armored divisions. And unlike the APC-mounted infantry in the 

Pentomic division, the new mechanized infantry had its APCs assigned directly to the unit, with 

one per infantry squad. In brigades with a mix of tank and mechanized infantry battalions, the 

old task force concept was codified into battalion task forces and company teams. A battalion 

task force was a tank or mechanized infantry battalion with one or more companies of the 

battalion cross-attached to an equivalent battalion of the other branch. Therefore, a battalion 

task force could consist of a mix of tank and mechanized infantry companies. Once formed, 

a battalion task force could in turn combine mixes of tank and mechanized infantry platoons 

under its companies, the resulting unit being referred to as a company team.8 

In armored divisions, lineages for the new brigades were created by the redesignation 

of the former combat commands. In infantry, mechanized, and airborne divisions, the third 

brigade was created from scratch or from the former divisional headquarters company, which 

had been eliminated in the Pentomic division. The 1st and 2d brigades were created based 

on the lineages of the old square division brigades. While some of these had been disbanded, 

many had been converted to all or part of the divisional reconnaissance troop in the triangular 

division. Some Army National Guard divisional brigades were given special numbers, to reflect 

historical designations. This was done particularly in divisions that were formed of contingents 

from multiple states. Active Army separate brigades were named using the designations of 

former Organized Reserve/Army Reserve divisional brigades no longer in the force structure. 

Figure 21. The ROAD Divisional Brigade 62 
Four separate infantry brigades were also created from inactivating Army Reserve divisions, 

designating them with the lower brigade number formerly associated with the division under 

the square organization (before 1942). In both cases this was done so as to give the brigades 

numerical designations high enough not to be confused with the numbers used in divisional 

brigades. ARNG separate brigades were designated either with old square division brigade 

designations or, if they were replacing an inactivated ARNG division, by using the former 

division number. Several ARNG brigades were designated with the number of former infantry 

regiments that had been replaced in the force structure. Army Reserve training divisions, 

which formerly had training regiments directly under the division headquarters, concurrently 

converted these regiments to sequentially numbered brigades. A complete listing of all brigades 

since 1958 may be found in Appendix 4. 

Separate, nondivisional brigades were part of the ROAD concept from the start for missions 

requiring less than a division or for the reserve components. Unlike divisional brigades, which 

were commanded by colonels, the separate brigade retained the tradition of being commanded 

by a brigadier general. While planners envisioned these brigades to be like divisional ROAD 

brigades, a bare bones headquarters with two to five attached maneuver battalions, and support 

provided either by a corps or a division to which the brigade would be attached, one brigade, 

the 173d Airborne Brigade on Okinawa, was established from the start with organic support 

troops. This was because Army planners envisioned the airborne brigade as a special task force 

that could deploy rapidly and act independently. Within a year similar support elements were 

applied to all separate brigades. As with the earlier RCTs, the separate brigades were also given 

their own unique shoulder patches.9 

Figure 22. Example of a Separate Brigade Organization 63 
The standard separate ROAD brigade, thereafter, in addition of having between two and 

five maneuver battalions, consisted of a small headquarters company, an armored cavalry troop, 

an engineer company, a direct support field artillery battalion, and a support battalion. The 

support battalion consisted of a small headquarters and administrative, medical, maintenance, 

and supply and transportation companies. The 173d Airborne Brigade additionally contained 

a separate tank company. An example of a typical brigade organization is found in Figure 22. 

The brigade illustrated was a US Army Reserve (USAR) brigade located in New England. 

While the Army reorganized under ROAD at Fort Benning, an experimental organization 

was formed to test the incorporation of the helicopter directly into the divisional structure. 

This test unit, designated the 11th Air Assault Division, was ultimately redesignated as the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in mid-1965, becoming an additional type of ROAD division: 

the airmobile division. The airmobile division was designed with helicopter, and originally 

fixed wing, assets to provide operational troop movements and fire support. Two aspects of the 

organization and employment of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) relates specifically to 

the employment of brigades. One brigade of the division, including a brigade headquarters and 

three of the infantry battalions, was qualified additionally as paratroopers, along with one of the 

field artillery battalion and slices of the division’s support command. This unique composition 

of one brigade within a division lasted only until 1968, when the paratrooper qualification was 

dropped.10 The second brigade-specific feature of the airmobile division was in its inherent 

structure. Assigned to the division was an aviation group which consisted of two assault 

Figure 23. The First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1965

64 
12

helicopter battalions equipped with the UH-1 Huey light transport helicopter and one assault 

support helicopter battalion equipped with the medium CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter. 

Each aviation battalion could carry a comparable sized infantry or artillery unit. Accordingly, 

the airmobile division was designed so that the aviation assets could move only one brigade 

at a time. The division, therefore, was naturally fought by maneuvering brigades. One brigade 

was in contact, one was in reserve, and one was reequipping and guarding the division’s 

large base camp. The 1st Cavalry Division’s organizational structure upon its deployment to 

Vietnam in 1965 is illustrated in 23.11 In 1968 the 101st Airborne Division became the second 

changed to “air assault” in 1974. 

Army airmobile division, a role it continues to the present day, with the tag “airmobile” being 

Figure 24. The 196th Infantry Brigade Ships Out to Vietnam, Boston, 1966 

The Brigade in Vietnam 

The ROAD reorganization had barely been effected when it was given its first test in 

Vietnam. Earlier units that arrived were either separate brigades or brigade elements of 

deploying divisions. The first Army unit deployed was the 173d Airborne Brigade in May 

1965, followed closely by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and 2d Brigade, 1st 

Infantry Division. From then until the end of the US ground involvement in the war in 1972, 

18 divisional brigades, including one detached from its division for a long period of time, five 

separate brigades, including three later made part of the Americal Division, and two brigades 

detached from their parent division served in Vietnam at one time or another. In June 1972, the 

196th Infantry Brigade departed Vietnam as the last brigade in country. 

In many ways Vietnam was a war of brigades. Brigades, especially in the early days, were 

moved from one part of the country to another or from one mission to another with a flexibility 

and celerity that quickly validated the ROAD concept. The flexibility of the ROAD brigade 

65 
with its subordinate, self-contained battalions, greatly facilitated the use of the helicopter 

to transport infantry. Several times in the course of the war, brigade elements operated far 

from their parent unit for extended periods. In one case, in August 1967, the 4th and 25th 

Infantry Divisions swapped brigades including subordinate infantry, armor, and field artillery 

battalions, with the brigades changing designations.13 One division was created in Vietnam by 

assigning three separate brigades, the 11th, 196th, and 198th Light Infantry, to a single new 

command. The new division so cobbled together, was given the designation of the Americal 

Division, as that division had been created in World War II under similar circumstances. The 

early organization of the Americal, whose official designation was 23d Infantry Division, is 

illustrated in Figure 24. The division was later reorganized as a standard ROAD division, except 

that its brigades retained the 11th, 196th, and 198th designations. The Americal Division also 

retained an attached aviation group throughout its stay in Vietnam.14 

For duty in Vietnam, both separate and divisional brigades were modified, either prior 

to deployment or in country. A new type of brigade, the light infantry brigade, was created 

specifically for service in the counterinsurgency environment of Vietnam. The brigade contained 

less than half of the number of vehicles found in the standard infantry brigade. The infantry 

battalions were organized with a structure similar to the airmobile infantry battalions of the 

First Cavalry Division, to facilitate the conduct of airmobile operations.15 Most light brigades 

had four assigned infantry battalions, instead of the more typical three. 

There were additional attachments found in Vietnam. Early on brigades acquired provisionally organized long-range patrol companies. These were later standardized and then redesigned as ranger companies. The 173d Airborne Brigade received its own aviation company in 

Figure 25. The Americal (23d Infantry) Division as Originally Organized in 1967

66 
1966, making the brigade a de facto airmobile brigade. During the course of the war, several 

divisional brigades were detached from their parent divisions and deployed to Vietnam. These 

separate divisional brigades were given a slice of division support elements, typically a direct 

support field artillery battalion, an engineer and a signal company, and an armored cavalry 

troop. For these geographically separate brigades, the parent divisions also organized a provisional support battalion made up of companies from the division support battalion, similar to 

those found in the support battalion of the separate nondivisional brigades, i.e., an administrative, medical, maintenance, and supply and transportation company.

16 

The ubiquitous use of the helicopter and the area, rather than linear, nature of warfare in 

Vietnam gave brigade operations a unique flavor. Typically a brigade in counterinsurgency 

mode would be given a geographically based tactical area of operations (TAOR). In its TAOR, 

a brigade would defend any fire support bases (firebases or FSBs) established in the TAOR, as 

well as any helicopter landing zones (LZs) and any other larger bases located in the TAOR. A 

brigade would also secure any land supply routes between the bases and to sources of supply 

outside the TAOR. Aside from these defensive missions, the brigade conducted offensive 

operations within its TAOR to destroy any Communist forces and assisted in the internal 

development and defense of the civilian populace and infrastructure in the TAOR.17 In Vietnam, 

the brigade usually fought from a series of LZs and FSBs. Initial operations were designed 

to find and fix the enemy. FSBs would be established within artillery range of probable or 

known enemy positions and artillery batteries would be airlifted into the FSBs. Follow-on 

operations would air assault troops into LZs whose locations were designed to surround the 

enemy. Then the brigade commander would coordinate the maneuver of the battalions toward 

the enemy positions. Once the exact positions were found, the battalions would either assault 

them directly or attack them by fire support assets followed by an assault, usually from two 

directions. A good example of this type of operation can be found in the actions of the 3d 

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), in the A Shau Valley in May 1969, this action 

codenamed Operation APACHE SNOW, culminated in the Battle of Hamburger Hill, which 

is highlighted in the next section of this chapter. 

Sometimes combat operations in Vietnam consisted of multiple brigades and a combination 

of air assault and ground assault operations. A good example of this was the first phase of 

Operation JUNCTION CITY, conducted by the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions in War Zone 

C, Tay Ninh province, in February and March 1967. Executed over two years earlier than 

Operation APACHE SNOW and several hundred miles to the south, Operation JUNCTION 

CITY was a much larger operation in both concept and execution. In fact, its initial air assault, 

which utilized 249 helicopters to insert eight battalions, with a ninth parachuted in by Air 

Force aircraft, was the largest airmobile operation of the Vietnam War. The nine battalions 

were under the control of three brigade headquarters. The three brigades, plus another in 

the southwest which had deployed via ground transportation, were maneuvered to set up 

a massive cordon around War Zone C, the sparsely settled, heavily vegetated area of Tay 

Ninh province directly adjacent to the Cambodian border. In 1967 the major headquarters 

controlling Communist operations in the south, Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), 

was believed to be in War Zone C. The 9th Viet Cong (VC) Division also operated out of War 

Zone C, though the 1st Infantry Division had, in 1966, kept the division’s two subordinate 

regiments away from the heavily populated areas to the south and east.18 Two additional 

67 
Figure 26. Phase 1 of Operation JUNCTION City, February 1967

brigades, along with an armored cavalry regiment (ACR), executed a ground attack the next 

day from the south into the area previously cordoned off. Two divisions, the 1st Infantry and 

25th Infantry, controlled the six brigades and one ACR assigned to the operation under the 

overall command of the corps-equivalent headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam. The brigades 

included a separate infantry, a separate airborne brigade, and a brigade from the 4th Infantry 

Division attached to the 25th Division.19 

While only traces of COSVN were found, the operation battered the 9th VC Division, 

whose response, aside from fleeing, was a series of small scale assaults on US positions that 

appeared to be isolated, but in fact were not. Operation JUNCTION CITY validated the flexibility of the ROAD brigade concept with its mix of forces, ground and air assaults, and paratrooper drops. This flexibility was the hallmark of US brigade operations in the Vietnam War. 

Foreshadowing postwar plans for brigades of different capabilities in the same division, 

the Army organized one brigade of the 9th Infantry Division as a special amphibious force 

to operate in the densely populated and enemy infested Mekong River Delta area south of 

Saigon. The 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, referred to as the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), 

consisted of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 60th 

Infantry; and the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery; along with slices of divisional support elements. 

68 
The MRF was specially organized for its mission in the United States prior to deployment 

and served on the Mekong River from 1967 to 1969. The Army selected a brigade-sized unit 

for the mission because experience had taught that the brigade was the smallest unit capable 

of operating independently in the Delta. The force worked out of a base on an island in the 

river at Dong Tam. The Navy directly supported the brigade with five self-propelled barracks 

ships, two landing ship, tank (LST) landing craft, two large harbor tugboats, and two landing 

craft repair ships. Additionally, two Navy river assault groups, each capable of transporting 

a battalion at a time, provided mobility for the force. The river assault groups, which were 

redesignated later as river assault squadrons, were each equipped with 52 LCM-6 armored 

landing craft, for use as troop carriers.20 

The operations of the MRF were highly successful. Viet Cong forces were pushed away 

from the populated areas of the Delta and the main roads were kept open, allowing farm produce 

to reach markets in Saigon. The brigade was so successful, that the 9th Division’s headquarters 

eventually moved to Dong Tam as the brigade shifted operations farther south. During the 1968 

Tet Offensive, the MRF successively ejected communist forces from the cities of My Tho, 

Vinh Long, and Can Tho, effectively saving the Delta area from enemy takeover. The brigade 

was a unique organization in the Army and in Vietnam.21 

Operation APACHE SNOW: Brigade Employment in Vietnam 

The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) executed Operation APACHE SNOW in the 

northern portion of the A Shau Valley in Thua Thien province between 10 May and 7 June 

1969 with its 3d Brigade and elements of two regiments from the Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam’s (ARVN) First Infantry Division. This was the middle of three operations that the 

101st conducted in different sections of the narrow, 30-mile long valley in 1969. 

In May 1969, the A Shau Valley, located on the Laotian border west of Hue, had been a 

North Vietnamese-controlled sanctuary since a Special Forces camp had been driven out of the 

valley in 1966.22 Since then, the valley and its adjoining jungle-covered ridgelines had become 

a major Communist base area and supply route into the coastal regions of Thua Thien province, 

Hue, and Quang Tri province to the north. The enemy forces that attacked Hue city during the 

Tet Offensive in 1968 had assembled in the A Shau Valley and infiltrated out of there. The 

valley’s location next to the safe haven of Laos and the Ho Chi Minh Trail made it of great 

importance to the North Vietnamese. Later in 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) had 

conducted operations in the valley, but did not establish a permanent presence there. After the 

air cavalry’s departure, the Communists restored their infrastructure, which included a main 

supply route running down the middle of the valley on an improved road, Route 548. Junglecovered mountains surrounded the valley itself. One of these, the 937-meter high Dong Ap Bia, 

would become the focus of the 3d Brigade’s activities during Operation APACHE SNOW. 

The 3d Brigade, commanded by Colonel Joseph Conmy, consisted of three airmobile 

infantry battalions: 1-506th Infantry, 2-506th Infantry, and 3-187th Infantry. Each battalion had 

one or more companies detached for FSB security or in a reserve role during the operation. One 

field artillery battalion, 2-319th Artillery, was in direct support of the brigade, with an additional 

three batteries in general support, reinforcing. The divisional aerial rocket artillery battalion 

was also in direct support of the brigade. In addition, an engineer company and two assault 

helicopter companies from the division’s 160th Aviation Group were supporting the brigade. 

69 
Troop A, 2-17th Cavalry, from the divisional air cavalry squadron, support the brigade with 

air reconnaissance and related activities. Companies from the division medical, maintenance, 

and supply and service battalions were assembled to support the brigade as Forward Service 

Support Element (FSSE) 3. Supporting brigade operations to the north was the 1st ARVN 

Infantry Regiment of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division.23 

The objective of Operation APACHE SNOW was to locate and destroy any enemy found 

in each battalion’s assigned sector, destroy any enemy infrastructure, and, if necessary, fix the 

enemy in place until reinforcements could arrive. The operation was called a reconnaissance in 

force (RIF), as the North Vietnamese locations, bases, camps, and defensive positions, would 

have to be found as the operation progressed. Battalions normally separated into companysized elements to conduct RIF operations, massing as a battalion as necessary. At the brigade 

level, airmobile assets would be used to shift battalions to large enemy locations. LZs for the 

battalions were selected in the hilly area west of the A Shau Valley on the Laotian border, the 

theory being to get US forces between the Communists and their Laotian sanctuary area, to 

which, upon contact, they would naturally tend to try to move. All operations were conducted 

within the range of preemplaced field artillery located at FSBs established in the hills on the 

eastern side of the valley and at one FSB, Currahee, built on the valley floor south of the area 

where the battalions were to operate.24 

Unidentified enemy forces were known to be located in the northern A Shau Valley. The 

large troop concentration near Dong Ap Bia turned out to be the 29th North Vietnamese Army 

(NVA) Regiment, a well-trained and reconstituted unit that had not been located since 1968. 

Two battalions, the 7th and 8th, plus part of the regimental headquarters, defended a hilltop 

fortified area with extensive bunker and trench line complexes. Farther to the northwest in the 

A Shau Valley were elements of the 6th NVA Regiment’s 806th Battalion and the separate K10 

Sapper Battalion.25 

In preparation for the operation, the infantry battalions were shifted from LZs and FSBs 

near Hue to FSBs Blaze and Cannon, located on hilltops east of the A Shau Valley near the main 

ground supply route into the area, Route 547. The brigade command post moved from its large 

base camp near Hue, Camp Evans, to FSB Berchtesgaden. Three new or formerly abandoned 

FSBs were quickly built to support the operation: FSB Bradley, located to the north and to be 

primarily used by the ARVN 1st Regiment; FSB Airborne, located in the hills overlooking the 

valley from the east, north of FSB Berchtesgaden; and FSB Currahee, built on the valley floor 

itself at its broadest section, 3,000 meters wide near the village of Ta Bat, . The new FSBs, 

plus FSBs Cannon and Berchtesgaden, were designed to be mutually supporting and allow the 

entire area of operations to be within the range of field artillery. On 9 May (D-1), 10 batteries 

were shifted to these FSBs to support the initial insertions of the infantry. 

As mentioned above, the brigade command post was located at FSB Berchtesgaden during 

the operation. The brigade commander controlled the overall operations of the brigade through 

the extensive use of nonsecure and secure FM radio, with VHF radio being used between the 

brigade and division. He augmented radio communication with personal observation from a 

command and control light observation helicopter and personal visits to unit locations. 

Logistics support for the brigade in Operation APACHE SNOW was tailored for the 

operation. While most logistics assets remained back in the division support command base 

70 
camp near Hue, medical support and ammunition resupply was brought forward to FSB 

Blaze. Route 547, the improved road built by Army engineers from Hue to the A Shau Valley, 

provided a ground main supply route up to FSB Bastogne, several miles short of FSB Blaze. 

From FSB Bastogne forward, almost all supplies were airlifted, primarily by medium cargo 

helicopters, the CH-47 Chinook.26 

On D-Day, 10 May, 65 UH-1H Huey helicopters airlifted the four battalions in consecutive 

company-sized lifts from FSBs Blaze and Cannon into new LZs on the Laotian border in the 

jungle area west of the A Shau Valley proper. An extensive 70-minute artillery, aerial rocket, 

and air support preparation preceded the combat assaults.27 The battalions all landed without 

contact and immediately commenced company-sized RIF operations to find the enemy forces 

known to be in the area. While all four battalions received sporadic contact of one kind or 

another, one of the companies of 3-187 was stung by contact with entrenched North Vietnamese 

troops below the summit of Dong Ap Bia, a 937-meter high mountain that dominated the 

northern A Shau Valley from the west. 

Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt, 3-187, had a tiger by the tail. But it took him and 

his brigade commander, Conmy, several days to realize the extent of the enemy force atop 

Dong Ap Bia. Honeycutt initially continued RIF operations with his other companies and had 

a single company assault the hilltop on 11 May. When this failed, he went with a two-company 

assault on 12 May. The terrain and the enemy hindered coordination and this attack also failed. 

Figure 27. Operation APACHE SNOW, May 1969

71 
A three-company advance the next day also got bogged down, with the third company, advancing to the left of the other two, getting pinned down by heavy enemy fire. A day later, on 14 May, 

Honeycutt again tried with three companies. Two squads of one company actually reached the 

summit, but with the other two stopped cold, had to withdraw. The next day the advance began 

again with three companies. A combination of stiff resistance from NVA soldiers in bunker 

complexes and a friendly-fire incident with aerial rockets stopped the attack. Honeycutt’s original estimate of two companies on the hill was now raised to two battalions. The enemy also 

seemed to be reinforced nightly from additional forces across the border in Laos. For five days 

the 3-187th Infantry had attacked Dong Ap Bia without success and against stiff resistance.28 

Elsewhere in the brigade operational area, early in the morning on D+ 3, 13 March 1969, 

two company-sized elements of the enemy’s 806th NVA Battalion and K12 Sapper Battalion 

infiltrated FSB Airborne, supported by mortar and rocket propelled grenade fire. Stationed 

at the firebase were three field artillery batteries: C/2-11th Artillery, four 155 mm howitzers; 

C/2-319th Artillery, four 105mm howitzers; and a composite battery from B and C/2-319th 

Artillery, four 105mm howitzers. The firebase was defended by Company A, 2-501st Infantry. 

The defenders drove off the attack with the attacking force suffering heavy casualties, but five 

howitzers were damaged and 22 American soldiers were killed and another 61 wounded.29 

With enemy forces obviously in the area of FSB Airborne, the brigade commander pulled 

the rest of the 2-501st out of its area on the Laotian border and airlifted it to FSB Airborne to 

commence RIF operations near the firebase. 

After the heavy repulses of the 3-187th on Dong Ap Bia, clearly a larger enemy force 

held the hilltop than could be ejected or destroyed by a single battalion. As early as noontime 

on 13 May, the brigade S3 (operations) staff alerted Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Bowers that his 

battalion, the 1-506th infantry, then conducting RIF operations south of Dong Ap Bia, was to 

plan for immediate movement overland to attack the hill from the southwest in conjunction 

with 3-187th’s attacks from the northwest. Bower’s movement commenced on 14 May for a 

projected two-battalion attack on the 16th.30 At first, the 1-506th advanced with little contact, 

while the 3-187th paused to await its arrival. But soon Bower’s advance was stopped by a large 

NVA bunker complex on Hill 916, a peak on the same ridgeline as Dong Ap Bia’s 937-meter 

summit, roughly 1,500 meters to the southwest. This delayed the combined two-battalion 

attack until the 17th, as the 506th soldiers cleared Hill 916 and then began advancing up Hill 

937 itself.31 

The concept of the 17 May attack was for the companies of the 3-187th to hold blocking 

positions to the northwest of the fortified enemy position and support by fire the 1-506th’s 

three-company, on-line advance from the southwest. Extensive artillery, rocket, and air strike 

preparation would precede the attack. As part of this prep, about 200 105mm artillery rounds 

of CS gas (tear gas) would be used to force the NVA troops out of their bunkers before the 

conventional high-explosive artillery barrage. Despite the preparatory fires, the attack met stiff 

resistance near a small knoll on the ridge, Hill 900. The intense enemy fire prevented the 1-

506th from advancing farther than 300 meters.32 

The renewed attack the next day, 18 May, used both battalions with six companies 

advancing. Bowers’ three companies advanced slowly against heavy fire. Honeycutt’s three 

companies advanced anyway and one company took over 50-percent casualties in short order. 

72 
Figure 28. Final Assault on Hamburger Hill, 19-20 May 1969 

Nevertheless two companies of the 187th were on the hilltop, while part of the 506th was 

just below the top on the opposite side. At this point, torrential rain started to pour hindering 

operations and forcing Honeycutt to withdraw his two unsupported companies from the top to 

more defensible positions.33 

The enemy force and the terrain indicated that two reduced battalions would need 

reinforcement to take Dong Ap Bia. Accordingly, the division commander gave the 2d 

Brigade’s 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, to the 3d Brigade for use in the operation. The battalion 

moved to FSB Blaze and its A Company was airlifted into LZ 2 for attachment to the 3-187th 

on 19 May. The 1st ARVN Division supplied its 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment, which 

was airlifted to FSB Currahee the same day for use by the 3d Brigade. The 2-501st, which had 

been conducting RIF operations near FSB Airborne, in the wake of the sapper attack, was also 

added to the ong Ap Bia force for the 20th. Both battalions were airlifted into LZs around the 

hill on the 19th, the 2/3 ARVN on south and the 2-501st on the north side of what was now 

being referred to as “Hamburger Hill.” 

The combined force of four battalions was in its attack positions at nightfall on the 19th 

and attacked after preparatory fires from all sides on 20 May, destroying the remaining enemy 

forces on the hilltop and securing the position 11 days after the start of the operation.34 

73 
APACHE SNOW officially continued until 7 June 1969. After the conclusion of the 

Battle of Hamburger Hill, most enemy contacts, except for several additional sapper attacks 

on firebases, consisted of much smaller contacts than was had on Dong Ap Bia.33 During the 

operation, the 2d Brigade showed its flexibility and, once the size of the enemy force was 

appreciated, its capability to mass multiple battalions against a large, well-dug in enemy force. 

The operation was typical of many of the airmobile brigade operations conducted in Vietnam 

between 1965 and 1972. 

74 
NOTES

1. Lalev I. Sepp, “The Pentomic Puzzle: The Influence of Personality and Nuclear Weapons on U.S. Army 

Organization 1952-1958,” Army History 51 (Winter 2001), 8-11. The organic regiments in the 82d were the 504th 

and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiments and the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment. For most of 1944 and 1945, the 

nondivisional 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments were attached to the division. The 507th was later 

assigned to the 17th Airborne Division. The 101st originally had as organic the 502d Parachute and 401st and 327th 

Glider Infantry Regiments. The 401st was later broken up to provide third battalions for the 325th and 327th as glider 

regiments originally only had two battalions. The 501st and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiments were attached to 

the 101st for most of the war, with the 506th becoming organic in March 1945. See Order of Battle, United States 

Army, World War II, European Theater of Operations: Divisions (Paris: Office of the Theater Historian, European 

Theater, 1945), 283-84, 383-85. 

2. Glen R. Hawkins and James Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI: US Army Division Design Initiatives and 

Experiments 1917-1995 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History (CMH), 1997), 14. 

3. Sepp, 11. 

4. Ibid., 5; Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, KS: University 

Press of Kansas, 2001), 223 

5. Sepp, 6. 

6. Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis. Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Report 

No. 14 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 1999), 23. 

7. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1998), 169, 190-91; Wilson, Armies, Corps, Divisions 

and Separate Brigades, 297. 

8. House, Combined Arms Warfare, 213. 

9. Wilson, Firepower and Maneuver, 300-303; John J. McGrath, History of the 187th Support Battalion. 

Brochure created for the inactivation of the battalion, Brockton, Massachusetts, 1994. 

10. Shelby Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC: US News Books, 1981), 71-72, 101. 

11. Shelby Stanton, Anatomy of a Division: The First Cav in Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987), 195-201. 

Despite its organization, original employment plans for the division in Vietnam was to split it up by brigade and 

send it to different parts of the country. To retain a limited airmobile capability in each brigade, the aviation group 

would have had to provide a slice to each brigade. See Stanton, Anatomy of a Division, 39. 

12. Wilson, Firepower and Maneuver, 356. 

13. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 75-77, 81-82. The battalions were transferred back to their original divisions 

after the war, as these divisions were considered their “traditional” assignment. 

14. Ibid., 79-80. 

15. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 325. 

16. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 77-78, 82-83, 85. 

17. Duquesne A. Wolf, The Infantry Brigade in Combat: First Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (“Tropic 

Lightning”) in the Third Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Offensive, August 1968 (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower 

University Press, 1984), 3. 

18. Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. 

DePuy, USA Retired (Washington, DC: CMH, 1985), 163. 

19. George L. MacGarrigle, Taking The Offensive: October 1966 to October 1967. The United States Army in 

Vietnam (Washington, DC: CMH, 1998), 115-17. 

20. Major General William B. Fulton, Riverine Operations 1966-1969. Vietnam Studies (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1985), 31-33; Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 77-78. 

21. Fulton, 190-93. 

22. As a major, Colin Powell served as an advisor to the ARVN forces which evacuated the A Shau Valley in 

1966. 

23. 22d Military History Detachment, Narrative Operation “Apache Snow” 101st Airborne Division, 1969, 8 

(hereafter referred to as Apache Snow). 

24. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division 

(Airmobile) for Period 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U), dated 9 December 1969, 4 (hereafter referred to as 

101st ORLL). 

75 
25. 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),Combat Operations After Action Report—Summary APACHE 

SNOW, dated 25 June 1969, (hereafter referred to as 3d Bde AAR), Enclosure 2, Intelligence, 2. 

26. 3d Bde AAR, 2, and Enclosure 4, Logistical Support. 

27. Apache Snow, 2. 

28. Ibid., 4-12; 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Apache 

Snow, dated 20 June 1969, 30, 32-33 (hereafter referred to as 3-187th AAR). 

29. 101st ORLL, 8-9. 

30. 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Apache Snow, dated 

18 June 1969, 6 (hereafter referred to as1-506th AAR). 

31. Apache Snow, 12-15. 

32. 1-506th AAR, 9; Apache Snow, 16; 3-187th AAR, 36. 

33. Apache Snow, 18. 

34. Apache Snow, 19-20. 

35. 3d Brigade commander, Colonel Joseph Conmy, considered one of the sapper attacks, which was aimed at the 

brigade headquarters at FSB Berchtesgaden on 13-14 June 1969 to be an attempt to personally kill him in revenge 

for Hamburger Hill. See Joseph B. Conmy, Jr., “Crouching Beast Cornered,” Vietnam (December 1990), 36. 

76 
Roundout Brigades

After the withdrawal of the major US Army units from Vietnam in 1972, the Army shifted 

its attention back to the Cold War and the European battlefield. While the ROAD brigade 

had vindicated its adoption, its design as a tailored task organized maneuver command often 

seemed endangered. Many Army initiatives, in both force development and unit stationing 

,seemed to solidify the brigade as a specific combat command containing certain units. These 

Chapter 7 

COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR 

Table 6. Reserve Component Roundout Brigades, 1973-1996 

initiatives, most prompted by the smaller size of the All-Volunteer Army, adopted in 1973, 

included the creation of divisions with brigades of different capabilities, the stationing of 

divisional brigades overseas away from their parent unit, and the use of separate reserve 

component brigades to “round-out” active divisions staffed to only two-thirds strength by 

providing a third brigade with its slice of support and combat elements. 

The latter organizational concept, officially known as the Reserve Component Roundout 

Brigade Program, commenced in 1973 when the Hawaii Army National Guard’s 29th Infantry 

Brigade rounded out the 25th Infantry Division, which had never reestablished its 3d Brigade 

upon return from Vietnam. The program had a precedent during the Vietnam War when several 

ARNG separate brigades were mobilized to augment active Army divisions in the strategic 

reserve.1 The roundout concept lasted, in one form or other, until 1996, when the ARNG 

enhanced brigade concept supplanted it. At its height from 1986 to 1991, Reserve Component 

brigades rounded out five Army divisions. The roundout program ebbed and flowed with other 

Army force structure issues. 

When the program began in 1973, the Army was a 13-division force and the 25th Division 

was left at two brigades because of environmental concerns at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, 

77 
Hawaii. In 1974 the Army added two mechanized divisions, the 5th and 24th, and an infantry 

division, the 7th. Each were eventually organized with only two brigades, being rounded out 

with Army National Guard separate brigades.2 This force structure remained basically intact 

until the mid-1980s, when the 7th and 25th Divisions were reorganized as new style light 

infantry divisions, each gaining an active third brigade in the process. At the same time, the 

Army organized two new light infantry divisions, the 6th in Alaska and the 10th Mountain 

Division, split between Fort Drum and Fort Benning (the brigade at Fort Benning later relocated 

to Fort Drum). The new divisions were organized by design with only two brigades. One of the 

three USAR separate infantry brigades, the 205th from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, rounded out 

the 6th. The Army removed the 27th Brigade, a component of the New York Army National 

Guard’s 42d Infantry Division, from its parent division and reorganized it as a separate light 

infantry brigade to round out the 10th Mountain Division.3 

The roundout concept was extended even to units expected to deploy early as contingency 

forces under the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), created in 1980 and redesignated 

as the US Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983. The RDJTF’s early deploying heavy 

division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), remained at two brigades, being rounded 

out by the Georgia Army National Guard’s 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). In 1990, the 

roundout concept was tested when Army forces were quickly deployed to Saudi Arabia to 

forestall an Iraqi attack after the invasion of Kuwait. The 24th, followed by the 1st Cavalry 

Division, deployed without their roundout brigades, using instead the separate 197th Infantry 

Brigade (Mechanized) and a brigade from the 2d Armored Division, respectively.4 The reasons 

for not using the ARNG brigades were complicated and still controversial years later, but the 

Figure 29. The TRICAP Division, 1971-1974

78 
net effect was to discredit the roundout program. After 1991, units expected to deploy early in 

contingencies were removed from the roundout program. In 1996 the Army replaced the program 

completely with the ARNG Enhanced Brigade Program, which will be discussed later in this 

work. Table 6 lists the roundout brigades, as they existed throughout the duration of the program.5 

The TRICAP Division and the Air Cavalry Combat Brigade 

Even before the end of the Vietnam War, the Army was experimenting with the ROAD 

force structure, proposing a division where the three maneuver brigades each had a different 

structure or function. This division, the TRICAP division, for triple capability, essentially 

would consist of an armored brigade, an airmobile brigade, and a new type of unit which had 

been experimented with in Vietnam, an air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB). The plan was on 

the drawing board in 1970 for the 1st Armored Division. But when the 1st Cavalry Division 

returned from Vietnam to Fort Hood, Texas, in 1971 with two brigades, one remaining in 

Vietnam until 1972, it fell in on the personnel and equipment and mission of the 1st Armored 

Division, which had, in turn, fallen in on the personnel and equipment of the 4th Armored 

Division in Germany, which was inactivated in turn.6 

The resulting experimental division design included a brigade of three tank and one mechanized infantry battalions, supported by a battalion of self-propelled field artillery; a brigade 

of three airmobile infantry battalions supported by a divisional aviation battalion and a towed 

field artillery battalion; an air cavalry combat brigade, consisting of an air cavalry squadron 

like the one fielded by the airmobile 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions in Vietnam; and 

one, two on paper, new attack helicopter battalion, equipped with Cobra attack helicopters.7 

Even though technically all the maneuver and aviation battalions belonged to the division 

directly, the three brigade headquarters, with three distinct organizational structures and 

missions, actually controlled the battalions, with division support elements equally organized 

to specifically support specific brigades. For example, the division support command 

(DISCOM) organized a special support battalion tailored for supporting the ACCB. The 

TRICAP experiment lasted until 1974, when Army planners, concerned with a new emphasis 

on armored combat in Europe, converted the division into a standard armored division and 

made the ACCB into the separate 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat).8 It’s organization is 

depicted in Figure 30. 

Forward Deployed and Rotating Brigades in Europe 

While the Army was involved in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had been building up its 

forces in Central Europe, and in 1968, used military force to put down a reform movement 

in Czechoslovakia. Accordingly, the Army turned its focus back to Europe in the early 1970s. 

As part of this focus, the brigade again was tailored as a separate force, despite division 

affiliations. 

The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) had returned from Germany in 1968, leaving its 

3d Brigade behind. In 1970, the 1st Infantry Division returned from Vietnam and replaced the 

24th Division at Fort Riley and in Germany. The original concept for the brigade remaining 

in Germany was that the rest of the division would return to Germany for periodic training 

exercises, called the Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER), and swap brigades. While 

79 
Figure 30. Air Cavalry Combat Brigade 

the swap never took place, except for the change in unit designation from 24th to 1st, the brigade 

was upgraded with support elements and a brigadier general commander and redesignated as 

the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) in 1975.9 

The idea of brigade swaps was revived several years later. Congress passed the Nunn 

Amendment in 1974, which called for an increase of combat troops in Europe at the expense 

of support troops. The Army sought to meet the conditions of the amendment by placing two 

brigades in Europe on continuous six-month rotations. The headquarters and support elements 

would be permanently assigned to Germany, but the combat troops would rotate over sixmonth periods, not bringing dependents or requiring on or off-post quarters. The brigades 

would be stationed at the Army training areas of Grafenwöhr, Wildflecken, and Hohenfels, 

Germany, as well as at the former Air Force base in Wiesbaden. The two brigades chosen 

were the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, from Fort Hood, designated Brigade 75, and a 

newly raised 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), from Fort Carson, as Brigade 

76. Each division raised an additional brigade to replace the rotating one, the 2d Armored 

Division raising its 4th Brigade. Some units for the rotating brigades came from the 1st Cavalry 

Division and 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). Brigade 75 moved to Germany between 

March and June 1975. Brigade 76 followed a year later. Army studies quickly decided that 

the rotation of combat battalions did not enhance readiness and both brigades were designated 

for permanent assignment to Germany. The 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 

was permanently assigned to Wiesbaden Air Base in the fall 1976. Though considered a V 

Corps asset, the brigade was operationally attached to the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 

while that division’s 2d Brigade, located at Baumholder, the farthest major unit from the East 

80 
81

German border and on the wrong side of the Rhine, was detached operationally as the V 

Corps operational reserve. The 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, did not become a permanent 

European brigade for two more years. In 1978, the brigade moved into a new kaserne built 

for it in northern Germany at Garlstedt near the port of Bremerhaven, becoming the only 

US Army unit in northern Germany. As with the 1st Infantry Division’s forward brigade, 

this brigade received a brigadier general commander, a support slice, and was called the 2d 

Armored Division (Forward). The 2d Armored Division then inactivated its now extra 4th 

Brigade. The 4th Division retained its extra brigade, as, operationally, its 4th Brigade was no 

longer part of the division.10 

1970s and 1980s Brigade Redesign Initiatives 

The original Army concept after Vietnam was for a 13-division active force. As part of this 

force, the Army retained separate brigades for special missions or as theater defense forces, and 

in the reserve components. Brigades were stationed in Alaska, Panama, Berlin, and to support 

the Infantry and Armor Schools. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve still maintained 

a large number of separate armor and infantry brigades. The use of separate brigades made up 

of troops from one state often simplified the force structure in the state-specific Army National 

Guard. In the mid-1970s, the Army increased its force structure gradually by three divisions, 

each with only two brigades and a roundout brigade, but no new separate brigades were added 

to the force.11 

In the decade between 1976 and 1988, the Army conducted major consecutive or 

simultaneous studies of organizational structure (listed in Table 7). For the maneuver brigade, 

the culminative effect of these studies was the adoption of modified brigade organizations, 

the creation of divisional aviation brigades, and a revision of the divisional brigade service 

support organization. The new organization retained the ROAD concept of brigades as unfixed 

task forces. 

Table 7. Army Organizational Redesign Initiatives, 1975-1988 
General William DePuy, the first commander of the Army’s new Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC), which was established in 1973, commenced many organizational and 

doctrinal initiatives during his tenure (1973-1977). DePuy’s focus was based on a combination 

of the Soviet buildup in Europe, the Army’s placing of Europe on the back burner during 

the Vietnam War, the impact of modern weapons demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 

and the projected introduction of new weapons systems and equipment into the Army in the 

early 1980s. This new equipment included a utility/transport helicopter (UH-60 Blackhawk), 

a tank (M1 Abrams), an infantry/cavalry fighting vehicle (M2/M3 Bradley), and an attack 

helicopter (AH-64 Apache). In May 1976 DePuy initiated a study of the divisional and brigade 

operational structure, again using the 1st Cavalry Division as the test unit. The study, known 

as the Division Restructuring Study (DRS), proposed a divisional organization which included 

a fixed brigade structure for the armored and mechanized infantry divisions. Each brigade 

would consist of three tank battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions. Only the 2d 

Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, implemented the structure in a test mode and the fixed brigade, 

as it was called, was ultimately nixed by DePuy’s successor, General Donn Starry and the then 

Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, in 1979.12 

Meyer and Starry transformed DePuy’s DRS study into a more wide-ranging one, called 

Division 86, which eventually was expanded into the Army 86 and, under Meyer’s successor, 

General John Wickham, the Army of Excellence (AOE) programs. The revised Army 

organizational schemes were adopted both as the new equipment was fielded and as a matter 

of course. Army armored and mechanized units began implementing the Division 86 structure 

in 1983, with AOE changes. In 1986, the armored and mechanized divisions completed the 

AOE conversion by forming the divisional aviation brigades. 

The new organization, while changing the structure of the maneuver battalions, basically 

retained the nonfixed brigade standard of the ROAD configuration. The tank and mechanized 

battalions were standardized in structure, with a fourth line company added to each and 

supporting elements, such as mortars and scouts, moved to the battalion headquarters company 

from the now deleted combat support company. Doctrinally, the old ROAD standard of cross 

attaching platoons to make combined arms company teams, was discouraged, with the lowest 

level for such actions now to be the battalion.13 Forward support battalions, which consisted of 

a slice of division service support elements to support each brigade, also came into being. 

When Meyer expanded Division 86 to include other types of units, he set up the High 

Technology Test Bed (HTTB) in 1980 at Fort Lewis. Using the 9th Infantry Division, the 

HTTB tested organizational structure and equipment to try to produce a lighter version of the 

armored or mechanized division which could be deployed easily by aircraft, while maintaining 

more firepower than the standard infantry division. Meyer’s successor, Wickham, branched 

the project off into two directions in 1983: a lighter infantry division and a motorized infantry 

division equipped with enhanced technology to give it deployablity and firepower. The 9th 

Division continued with the motorized mission and the 7th Infantry Division, at Fort Ord, 

California, assumed the light infantry test mission. 

At Fort Lewis, the 9th Infantry Division continued to develop a motorized divisional 

structure, using available wheeled equipment to stand in for projected technological 

developments. The organizational structure was tweaked and changed numerous times 

82 
division was predicated on the fielding of new equipment. In 

except in the case of the LAB, with substitute items. The projection 

with three of fast attack vehicles A dune 

until a final structure was adopted in 1988, which included two motorized brigades and a 

roundout mechanized infantry brigade from the Washington state Army National Guard and 

an air cavalry attack brigade. As subordinate units to the two motorized brigades, the division 

developed three new types of combat battalions: a light combined arms battalion CAB (L), 

a heavy combined arms battalion CAB (L), and a light attack battalion (LAB). The types are 

listed in Table 8.14 

Table 8. Combined Arms Battalions in the Motorized Division, 1988 

The motorized the interim, it 

was equipped, was for the 

LAB to be equipped companies (F V), buggies armed 

with TOW missile systems or .50 caliber machine guns. Replacing the dune buggies, which 

were still in the developmental stage, were armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicles (HMMWV) equipped with TOW missiles and the new Mark 19 40mm grenade 

machine gun (GMG). The combined arms battalions were organized as a mix of assault gun 

companies and motorized infantry companies. The heavy CAB had two assault gun companies 

and one motorized infantry company, while the ratio was reversed in the light CAB. The assault 

gun was a proposed system (AGS) being developed as a lightly armored tracked vehicle armed 

with a low-velocity 105mm gun. In place of the AGS, the M551 Sheridan light tank was 

initially used, later replaced with the ubiquitous TOW or Mk 109 GMG HMMWV. Each CAB 

and the LAB also had an organic combat support company containing, along with mortars 

and scouts, an antiarmor platoon slated to be equipped by 1989 with HMMWVs mounting a 

specially designed ground version of the Hellfire missile. In lieu of this system, which was 

ultimately never fielded, the TOW was again used. The motorized infantry companies rode in 

specially modified M998 cargo HMMWVs, mounting GMGs.15 

The end of the Cold War and budget considerations doomed the motorized division 

experiment. A standard mechanized infantry roundout brigade had already replaced the 2d 

Brigade in 1988. The 1st Brigade was inactivated in 1990 and the division headquarters and 

support elements followed in 1991, while the 3d Brigade was converted into the separate 199th 

Infantry Brigade. The 199th was then redesignated as the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1992. 

83 
Figure 31. 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), 1988 

At Fort Ord, the 7th Infantry Division developed a new, lighter infantry division structure. 

After some modifications and adjustments, the new light infantry division resembled the 

heavier Division 86 in general structure, with less heavy equipment. The nine light infantry 

battalions were parceled out between the standard three brigade headquarters. The division 

also contained a modified aviation brigade, with less attack and more utility helicopters than 

found in the armored or mechanized division. In addition to the 7th Infantry Division, the 25th 

Infantry Division also converted to the light design. Three new divisions, the 10th Mountain, 

the 6th Infantry, and the Army National Guard, of Virginia and Maryland’s, 29th Infantry were 

activated, the former two with reserve component roundout brigades.16 

In the 1980s, the Army also experimented with modifications of the unit manning system. 

Since the end of World War II, with a few exceptions, the Army had manned units based on 

individual replacements. Meyer proposed to rotate personnel as units. To execute this, in the 

mid 1980s, he modified the CARS unit designation system, which had been used to identify 

units in the combat arms since 1957. The new US Army Regimental System (USARS) applied 

the regimental system to the entire Army, making many of the noncombat branches into single 

branch regiments and attempting to make the regiments into the avenue along which the 

unit replacement system would run. Battalions belonging to the same regiment would rotate 

between Continental United States posts and overseas sites. Accordingly, the system required 

large-scale unit redesignations and the loss of many regimental designations made excess. An 

additional component of this system was the Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training 

(COHORT) project, which trained a company-sized unit of combat arms soldiers from basic 

training and then kept them together for an overseas and Continental US tour of duty. 

84 
85

Both COHORT and the unit replacement system were eventually abandoned after a period 

of experimentation. However the redesignations remained and in divisions with nine infantry 

battalions and only three regimental affiliations, like the 101st and 82d Airborne, the battalions 

ended up grouped in the same brigade by regiment and the brigades are often referred to, 

informally, and confusingly, as regiments. In the 82d, the informal usage includes reversion to 

a mixing of World War II and Korean War era designations. 

After several years of rotating units and downsizing, when the rotation program ended, 

many Army battalions ended up under divisions to which they did not traditionally belong. 

In 1995 the Army, as the final act of the 1980s flirtation with unit replacement, redesignated 

battalions to return these traditional designations to their long-established divisions. 

However, vestiges of the regiment as a tactical unit roughly equivalent to the brigade 

still remained. AOE planners had sought to turn the Army’s ACRs into brigades, but after 

resistance from the cavalry community, the ACRs were retained. The trend was taken further 

with the creation of several other regiments including the 75th Ranger Regiment in 1985, as 

a controlling and planning headquarters for the Army’s three Ranger battalions. Originally 

a special task force, then a battalion and a group, the 160th Aviation Regiment (Special 

Operations) was activated in 1990 and controls various elements including four organic 

battalions. The regiment is equipped with specialized helicopters and trains to conduct special 

operations worldwide. 

Table 9. Informal Regimental Designations 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions 
As in the case of the 82d and 101st Divisions’ combat brigades, often units that are 

not regiments have been informally referred to as such, even in official or semiofficial 

correspondence. A good example of this is the 11th Aviation Group, which had served in 

Germany since 1993 as a group, although it had formerly been an aviation brigade. The group 

was often referred to in the 2003 Iraqi War as the “11th Aviation Regiment” or the “11th Attack 

Helicopter Regiment.” However, the name was officially incorrect and the organization had no 

organic battalions assigned to it.17 Some Army brigades have official special designations or 

nicknames, the most famous being the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, which in the 1991 

Gulf War was much more widely known as the Tiger Brigade. These designations are found in 

the brigade listing located in Appendix 4. 

Aviation Brigades 

One of the novel concepts of Division 86 and its follow on, the AOE, was the inclusion 

of an aviation brigade in the divisional structure. The amount and placement of aviation in 

the division structure had gone up and down since the adoption of ROAD in 1963. ROAD 

initially included an aviation battalion in each division, a unit basically responsible for 

providing command and control helicopters, and limited troop and supply transportation. The 

battalion was reduced to a company in the ROAD armored and mechanized divisions, and 

then had been removed entirely during Vietnam, only to return in 1970.18 In Vietnam itself, 

each deployed division retained the organic aviation battalion, some even receiving additional 

companies or battalions for extended periods.19 

An aviation brigade was used in Vietnam, but in a far different way from the projected use 

of the new aviation brigades. The 1st Aviation Brigade, which stood up in 1966, essentially 

controlled administratively all aviation assets not assigned to divisions and at one time or 

another had seven aviation group headquarters, 20 aviation battalions, and four air cavalry 

squadrons under its control. For operations, the aviation groups with attached battalions, were 

assigned or attached to divisions or higher headquarters. The 1st Aviation Brigade’s legacy 

would be found in the corps and theater aviation brigades deployed in the 1980s and 1990s. 

These brigades provided aviation assets to subordinate units, while not usually being used as 

operational headquarters.20 

Originally the divisional aviation brigade was called the air cavalry combat brigade. 

As mentioned previously in this work, the ACCB was a concept experimented with in the 

TRICAP division, resulting in the creation of the separate 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) 

in 1975.21 The new brigade was initially the simple addition of the ACCB to the division 

structure, with other divisional aviation assets added. The divisional ACCB included the 

divisional cavalry squadron, which was reorganized to include air cavalry elements; an attack 

helicopter battalion or two; and the former divisional aviation battalion, which was originally 

designated as a general support aviation battalion and later as an assault helicopter battalion. 

The brigade was an anomaly in that its structure contained aspects of an administrative 

and of a tactical organization. Many aviation proponents and the Army itself, considered the 

brigade, with its attack helicopter battalions, to be a fourth maneuver brigade in the division. 

The brigade also consisted of an assault helicopter battalion, used to carry troops and supplies, 

and the divisional cavalry squadron. The latter, with its mix of air cavalry and armored cavalry 

86 
troops, normally worked directly for the division commander, while the former generally 

served in a combat support role, moving troops and supplies.22 

To reflect the notion of the brigade as a combat organization, in spite of its possession of 

units it only controlled administratively or in a supporting capacity, the organization has often 

been referred to in doctrinal literature as the divisional combat aviation brigade and in the field 

as the 4th Brigade. However, its actual designation is simply “Aviation Brigade, XX Division.”23 

As with all AOE organizational structures, the aviation brigade evolved from its original 

structure into a more robust organization. The modern brigade consists of one or two attack 

helicopter battalions, an assault helicopter battalion, and the divisional cavalry squadron. 

After much debate over whether tanks should be included in the cavalry squadron in the 

heavy division (i.e., armored and mechanized), the tanks remained in the ground cavalry 

troops, which consisted of a mix of M1 Abrams tanks and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. 

In the light infantry division, the ground cavalry troops used the HMMWV. Each squadron 

also contains two or three air cavalry troops, equipped primarily with the OH-58D Kiowa 

observation helicopter. 

The assault helicopter battalion provided helicopters for small-scale (up to a battalion) air 

assault operations, aerial resupply, casualty evacuation, and command and control and special 

mission helicopters. 

In the DISCOM was found an aviation maintenance battalion, which was essentially the 

support battalion for the aviation brigade. This battalion provided centralized maintenance for 

the division’s aviation, though each aviation battalion also had limited maintenance assets of 

its own. 

The attack helicopter battalions contained the AH-64 Apache in the heavy division and 

modified OH-58Ds in the light and airborne divisions. The attack units of the aviation brigade 

provided the basis for its consideration as a maneuver brigade. The original air assault division 

had the forerunner of the attack helicopter battalion in its aerial surveillance and escort 

battalion. The battalion was equipped with armed Mohawk planes and designed to support 

airmobile operations. It was scrapped from the final division design, though rocket-firing 

helicopters were found in a battalion that was part of the division artillery. The new attack 

helicopter battalions, equipped primarily with antiarmor weaponry, were designed to destroy 

enemy forces at decisive points throughout the depth of the battlefield. 

Aviation units in the new aviation brigades suffered from a long-term identity crisis 

concerning unit designations in the 1970s and 1980s. There was debate in the 1970s over 

whether attack helicopter units should be considered attack helicopter aviation battalions or 

air cavalry squadrons. The air cavalry won that round, but in 1983 the Army made aviation 

a separate branch and attack helicopter aviation battalions were organic components of the 

new aviation brigades, though air cavalry attack battalions still existed as well in some 

nondivisional units. 

Adding to the confusion, aviation units were formerly labeled with separate battalion 

designations, but in the late 1980s the branch adopted a regimental system, causing the 

renaming of all aviation units, including the maintenance battalion in the DISCOM. Since 

87 
Figure 32. Armored/Mechanized Division Aviation Brigade, 2003

Figure 33. Light Division Aviation Brigade, 2003

88 
aviation did not possess a history of regimental organization, most divisional battalions 

became elements of a regiment created from the former division aviation battalion. 

At one point during the TRICAP experiment, an air cavalry combat brigade was designed 

to consist of one airmobile infantry battalion and two attack helicopter squadrons, without 

any support elements. This plan, which would have provided a truly combined arms aviation 

brigade, was scrapped and when the aviation brigade eventually joined the division, ostensively 

as a maneuver brigade, it was as an entirely aviation entity, including combat support aviation 

elements used to support the division as a whole.24 

The Air Assault Division 

The Army left Vietnam with two airmobile divisions. As we have seen, the 1st Cavalry 

Division was promptly converted into the TRICAP division, and then later into a standard 

armored division. The other airmobile division was the 101st Airborne, which had been converted 

from airborne to airmobile division status while in Vietnam in 1968. The 101st returned to Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky, in 1972. Awaiting it there was the 173d Airborne Brigade, which the 

Army had retained after Vietnam as a quick deploying contingency brigade. Later in 1972, the 

173d merged with the 101st, which had to be rebuilt after its Vietnam service as part of the 

new all-volunteer Army. The 173d was resdesignated as the division’s 3d Brigade, paratrooper 

qualified, a revived status that had been dropped from the airmobile division in Vietnam. In 

1974, the Army again dropped the paratrooper status. However, the 101st commander, Major 

General Sidney Berry, capitalized on the division’s unique organization, getting the division 

redesignated as an air assault division and receiving authorization to award its members the 

newly created air assault badge.25 

With the adoption of the AOE program, the air assault division was modified. To standardize 

the division’s unique aviation group with the terminology used by the other divisions, the 

group was upgraded to become the 101st Aviation Brigade. The new AOE brigade contained 

the divisional air cavalry squadron, a general support, or command, aviation battalion; 

two combat assault aviation battalions, one medium, one light; and four attack helicopter 

battalions.26 The structure was, however, again modified, even as it was being implemented. 

The 101st retained the second light assault battalion the division already had under the earlier 

tables of organization and never activated the fourth attack helicopter battalion, while, in turn 

inactivating the third battalion.27 

Robust modifications to the air assault division, initially done ad hoc and later officially 

sanctioned, provided the 101st with eight aviation battalions in its aviation brigade at the start 

of the 1991 Gulf War. With an additional attached attack battalion added to the division after the 

war, this provided a unique aviation force of three attack battalions, three assault battalions, a 

medium assault battalion, and the divisional cavalry squadron and a battalion, which provided 

command and control and special operations helicopters. This organization permitted the 

forming of air assault brigade combat teams, each consisting of three infantry battalions, a 

field artillery battalion, an assault aviation battalion, and an attack aviation battalion. When 

so organized, the divisional brigades could conduct separate air assault operations. When not 

so organized, the attack battalions provided a separate strike force available to the division 

commander. The division was truly an air assault organization in that each brigade could 

conduct such operations simultaneously, unlike the Vietnam era airmobile divisions. 

89 
However, placing nine battalions under one brigade headquarters was difficult, both 

administratively and for command and control purposes. Accordingly, in 1997, a reorganization 

divided the aviation assets of the Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), into 

two brigades: the 101st Aviation Brigade and the 159th Aviation Brigade. The attack assets, 

along with the command battalion and air cavalry squadron, were under the control of the 

101st Brigade. The one Chinook medium and three Blackhawk assault battalions were placed 

under the 159th Brigade.28 The revived number 159 was one of the original brigades of the 

101st Division under the square division. Number 101, used as the divisional aviation brigade, 

was the organizational descendent of the ROAD-era 101st Aviation Group. 

Two systems developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s drove the force structure of the 

air assault division: the UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopter and the AH-64 Apache attack 

helicopter. The Blackhawk was issued to the division starting in 1979. The AH-64 replaced 

older AH-1 Cobras as the division embraced the attack helicopter concept in the early 1980s. 

Additionally, the 101st contained the only divisional battalion equipped with the CH-47 

Chinook. The Chinook, technically a medium cargo helicopter, was capable of heavy duty 

carrying troops, supplies, equipment, and even sling-loading towed howitzers. The helicopter, 

around since Vietnam, was refitted in the 1980s and 1990s, allowing it to keep up with the 

times in military technology. 

In the 1990s, for the first time, air assault infantry battalions were deployed outside the 

101st Airborne Division, with two battalions in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea and an 

additional battalion in the Alaska-based 172d Infantry Brigade. The 2d Division, therefore, 

had the capability to organize one of its brigades as a small air assault brigade. 

Combat Service Support and the Brigade29 

Since the adoption of ROAD in 1963, with its task organized brigade structure and 

consolidated logistical units in the DISCOM, brigade commanders depended on a slice 

of support from the division’s assets. This support typically included a supply and truck 

company from the division supply and transportation battalion, which provided fuel, rations, 

ammunition, and trucks; a medical company from the medical battalion of the division, to 

provide a medical clearing station complete with ambulances; and a maintenance company 

from the divisional maintenance battalion, to provide direct support maintenance and repair 

parts supply. 

The separate brigade, though originally configured with no service support elements, 

was quickly given an organic support battalion containing all of the above elements and an 

administration company to augment the brigade headquarters with support normally provided 

by the divisional adjutant general section. 

In Vietnam, brigade combat service support usually consisted of a large base camp that 

contained the brigade rear elements including the field train elements of the combat battalions 

(unit supply and maintenance) and the brigade’s slice of the division support command assets. 

This slice, the FSSE, usually consisted of a company from the medical battalion, a company 

from the maintenance battalion and platoon- or company-sized elements from the division’s 

supply and services or supply and transportation company. Sometimes the FSSE echeloned 

90 
Figure 34. Air Assault Division Structure, 2003 

itself with a forward element located at a forward support base, usually collocated with the 

brigade command post.30 

After Vietnam, the armored and mechanized divisions developed a logistical support 

concept similar to the FSSE. This was the Forward Area Support Team (FAST), which provided 

similar slices of the DISCOM, as were found in the FSSE, to support the divisional brigades 

logistically. The FAST Team was headed by a Forward Area Support Coordinator (FASCO), 

who was usually the executive officer of one of the DISCOM’s functional battalions. By the 

early 1980s, the FASCO was permanently detailed to that job.31 

Almost from its inception, the separate ROAD brigade had its own logistical element, 

a multifunctional support battalion. This battalion provided most of the same type of 

support found in the FAST Team. However, the organization was permanent and under its 

own commander. The separate brigade support battalion also included an administrative 

company, which was later made a separate element. In the transformation from ROAD to AOE 

structures, the separate brigade’s logistical structure remained basically as under ROAD, with 

the additional of a Brigade Materiel Management Center (BMMC) in the support battalion’s 

headquarters company. The BMMC matched a similar organization added to the divisional 

DISCOM in the 1970s to provided automated management of logistics. 

91 
Division 86 and AOE transformed brigade logistics from depending on ad hoc task forces 

from the DISCOM’s functional battalions to permanent, tailored multifunctional FSB. The new 

FSBs were organized with a headquarters company, supply company, maintenance company, 

and medical company. The FSB commander also commanded the brigade rear area or brigade 

support area (BSA) and had an organic support operations section to plan and execute the 

logistics mission for the brigade. The emphasis was now on forward support, typified by the 

placing of an ammunition transfer point (ATP) at the brigade level. The ATP was essentially 

the brigade’s own mini-ammo dump. AOE organization also provided a tailored support 

battalion for the aviation brigade.32 

With the AOE adjustments, brigade logistics were organized in the late 20th and early 21st 

centuries as follows: each unit echeloned its logistics assets to provide for their survivability 

and responsiveness. 

At the lowest level, the company, the company first sergeant, or sometimes the executive 

officer, oversaw the company trains, which generally consisted of only the logistic elements 

the company would most need, but would not survive well in the frontline. This typically 

was a recovery vehicle with several mechanics, the company armorer, and medics from the 

battalion headquarters company with an ambulance. The company trains normally located 

themselves one terrain feature behind the company, less than a kilometer from the frontline. 

The next level was the battalion or task force’s combat trains. The battalion executive 

officer located the combat trains in the battalion sector, within 5 kilometers of the frontline 

Figure 35. Brigade Tactical Logistics Organization

92 
units. These trains typically consisted of the battalion’s S1 (personnel) and S4 (logistics) 

officers with part of their respective sections. The battalion medical platoon established the 

battalion aid station at the combat trains. There would also be some ammunition, fuel, and 

rations loaded into trucks or into packets for resupply. 

The brigade support area would be located in the brigade sector behind the battalion 

sectors on a defensible terrain feature with a good road network. The BSA contained the 

brigade’s forward support battalion, battalion/task force field trains, and, in some cases, 

elements from higher echelon logistical units. Battalion/task force field trains, normally 

headed by the battalion headquarters company commander, included the elements of the 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) not already deployed forward, such as the 

battalion mess section, maintenance platoon, and fuel and ammunition stockpiles. The line 

company supply sections would also be located in the field trains. FSB elements in the BSA 

included the brigade medical clearing station and ammunition transfer point, as well as various 

types of supply points and direct support maintenance activities. The BSA would be organized 

either as one large base camp or a series of smaller positions, each of which could mutually 

support each other if attacked. In each case, the overall commander of the BSA was the FSB 

commander.33 

As part of the support forward philosophy, resupply from the BSA was executed through the 

use of Logistical Packages (LOGPACS), specially tailored supply convoys which would move 

forward and link up with the battalion field trains or company trains at predetermined logistical release points. LOGPACS would also bring forward mechanics, mail, and personnel replacements. 

Above the BSA level was the division support area, where various DISCOM and corps 

support group (CSG) elements would be found. Resupply above the brigade worked both 

ways, with supplies being brought forward from higher or retrieved, if necessary, by brigade 

logistical elements. 

The Brigade in Panama and in the Gulf War 

The 1980s were a turbulent decade for the US Army and its brigades. By the end of 

the decade, however, the AOE organizational changes were implemented, the light divisions 

fielded, and the Cold War was virtually over—symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 

November 1989.34 This portended an Army downsizing, which would have a great impact on 

the brigade and its role. 

But first, two foreign threats needed to be dealt with. The initial one, December 1989’s 

Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama to remove the regime of Manuel Noriega, 

highlighted both the flexibility inherent in the ROAD/AOE brigade concept and the utility 

of the new light divisions. Brigades from the 7th Infantry Division (Light), the 82d Airborne 

Division, and the separate, Panama-based, 193d Infantry Brigade task organized to complete 

specific operational missions. The operation commenced on 20 December 1989, and employed 

six brigades, including three in the initial phase: the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the 

division’s contingency brigade, called by the designation division ready brigade-1 (DRB-1), 

parachuted and airlanded into Panama and conducted immediate air assault operations; the 

193d Brigade moved from its garrison locations to neutralize key Panamanian Defense Force 

(PDF) positions on the Pacific side of the Canal Zone; and the 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division 

93 
(Light), forces placed in Panama prior to the operation, neutralized key PDF positions on the 

Atlantic side of the Canal Zone. Elements of the 7th Division’s aviation brigade supported 

the operation and the bulk of the 7th Division, two brigades and part of the aviation brigade, 

arrived in follow-on echelons. The successful operation’s tactical phase lasted until the end of 

January 1990. Brigades that participated in Operation JUST CAUSE are listed in Table 10. 

The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait set the stage for the largest overseas deployment 

of US Army forces since Vietnam, culminating in a brief, highly successful ground campaign 

in March 1991.35 In total, the Army deployed 21 maneuver brigades, excluding divisional 

aviation brigades, under seven divisional headquarters. But the deployment of brigades is not 

Table 10. Brigades in Panama, December 1989-January 1990 

94 
95

The Gulf War was the first large-scale deployment utilizing the new AOE brigade and 

logistical organizations, as well as the new equipment and weapons ushered into the force 

in the 1980s. The speedy deployment of two corps worth of brigades, the execution of a 

rapid, decisive campaign, and the subsequent redeployment, were feats unique in US military 

as clear-cut as the 21 to 7 ratio would seem to indicate. The drawdown, which had commenced 

with the end of the Cold War, was in full swing when forces were needed to defend Saudi 

Arabia and restore Kuwait. As previously mentioned, several divisions deployed without 

their ARNG roundout brigades. Additionally, the 1st Infantry Division’s forward deployed 3d 

Brigade was in the middle of drawing down. Filler brigades were used to replace the missing 

ones. The separate 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) at Fort Benning, was assigned to the 

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and two brigades of the partially inactivated 2d Armored 

Division were used to fill out the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions. Additionally, US 

Army Europe (USAREUR) substituted one of the brigades of the 3d Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) for the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. The equipmentless 3d Brigade, 1st 

Infantry Division (Mechanized), used its personnel at the port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia as a 

badly needed port support activity, supervising and conducting the unloading of ships during 

the deployment. The 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, originally deployed as a filler brigade 

for the 1st Cavalry Division, was detached and assigned to support the US Marine forces 

south of Kuwait City, providing an armored force to augment the Marines in their drive on the 

Kuwait airport. The assignment of brigades during the deployment and ground campaign are 

listed in Table 11. 

Gulf War Brigade Assignments, 1990-1991 

Table 11. Gulf War Brigade Assignments, 1990-1991 
96

battalions and a tank battalion and the 2d Brigade the reverse, two tank battalions and a 

mechanized battalion. The brigades were supported by from two to five artillery battalions at 

any given time. An engineer battalion was also in direct support of each brigade. 

history. The fast ground campaign generally did not allow for extensive independent brigade 

maneuvers and was over quickly as the Iraqi Republican Guard and Army forces were swiftly 

destroyed in an uneven clash of arms, facilitated by the six-week air campaign and by air and 

artillery support on the ground. 

In Operation DESERT STORM, brigades were components of larger forces and were 

seldom used for independent maneuver. The flexible organizational structure of the AOE 

division and the use of brigades as intermediate headquarters and task forces ratified the AOE 

force structure. When US forces returned to Iraq in 2003, the flexible organization would allow 

for the more independent use of the brigade in combat. In the next section, the operations of 

the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) will be examined to illustrate brigade operations in 

1991. 

24th Mechanized Division Brigades in Operation DESERT STORM 

The mission of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in the ground campaign phase 

of Operation DESERT STORM was to attack northeast from Saudi Arabia on the right flank 

of the XVIII Airborne Corps and advance almost 200 miles to the Euphrates River valley, 

block this key escape route for the Iraqi forces trying to escape from the Kuwaiti Theater of 

Operations (KTO), then wheel to the right and advance 70 miles to the east toward Basra to 

help complete the destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard.36 

To control the operation, the division commander used graphic control devices. Each 

brigade was given a sector. Movement was keyed to perpendicular phaselines, battle positions, 

areas of operation (AO), and objectives. The division planned and executed the operation in 

five phases. The phases were as follows:37 

Each brigade contained three battalions. The 1st and 197th had two mechanized infantry 

Table 12. 24th Mechanized Division Five-Phased Attack, 1991
Figure 36. 24th Mechanized Division Brigade Operations in the Gulf War, 1991 

Initial coordination for the attack required that the 24th not initiate offensive operations for 

over 24 hours after the Marines south of Kuwait and the rest of the XVIIII Corps had done so. 

However, the rapidity of the Iraqi collapse in other sectors pushed the attack ahead 15 hours 

and the three division brigades crossed the line of departure at 1500 on 24 February 1991, with 

the 197th on the left, the 1st in the center, and the tank-heavy 2d on the right. Upon reaching 

Phaseline Colt, 27 miles inside Iraq, Phase 1 ended and the 197th and 2d Brigades continued 

the advance, while the 1st followed the 2d Brigade. Opposition was light and spotty. The 

aviation brigade conducted aerial reconnaissance forward of each brigade and the brigade’s 

armored cavalry troop preceded the 197th, with the divisional squadron scouting forward for 

the 2d Brigade. Throughout the afternoon and evening, the brigades advanced, even when 

sandstorms reduced visibility to zero. The terrain hindered the 2d Brigade’s advance, when 

the unit had to negotiate a rugged escarpment. The 197th secured Objective Brown at 0700 

25 February and linked up with elements of the 101st Airborne Division to its left. The 2d 

Brigade secured Objective Grey at 1600. By then, the 1st Brigade had already passed through 

the 2d Brigade and advanced an additional 60 miles to the north to secure Objective Red and 

establish east-facing blocking positions. The 1st Brigade secured Objective Red at 2230. In 

a little over a day and a half the three brigades had advanced 160 miles into Iraq and were 

preparing to close the back door on the KTO.36 

97 
As the 1st Brigade advanced on Objective Red, the 197th Brigade continued its advance 

from Objective Brown to the northeast to a battle position to launch Phase 3. Rain and rugged 

terrain slowed the advance, but the brigade was in its forward position at Objective Red. 

At 1400 on 26 February the 1st Brigade commenced Phase 3 as the division’s main attack. 

Severe sand dunes hindered the brigade’s advance, followed by defensive actions from the 

battalion-sized Iraqi 3d Commando Regiment, the first real opposition encountered by any 

of the brigades. After close in action where several small American units were briefly cut off, 

precision artillery strikes broke the Iraqi will to fight and they surrendered. The 197th Brigade 

secured its battle position overlooking the Tallil Airbase facing west at 0430 on 27 February. 

To the east, the 2d Brigade had already secured its eastward-facing battle position near the 

Jalibah Airbase at 0110. Phase 3 was over—the Euphrates Valley escape route was blocked.37 

With the brigades in position, the division turned its attention to the key Tallil and Jalibah 

Airbases. At 0600 on 27 February, while the 1st Brigade fixed the enemy along east-west 

Highway 8 to the north and the 197th Brigade protected the western flank, the 2d Brigade, 

supported by an artillery barrage from five battalions, assaulted Jalibah with its two tank 

battalions supporting by fire, while the mechanized infantry battalion seized the airfield 

itself. Within 4 hours the facility was secured. The Iraqi tank battalion defending Jalibah was 

destroyed along with 80 antiaircraft guns. Over 200 prisoners were taken. On the afternoon 

of 27 February, after an air strike preparation, the 197th’s TF 2-69 Armor raided Tallil to 

neutralize fire coming from the airbase. The raid ended the threat, but the 197th was not 

directed to secure the airfield, as the division was now turning east to execute the fifth and final 

phase of the operation. Tallil was left to the 101st Airborne Division.38 

For Phase 5, the 24th Division reoriented to the east. Corps attached the 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment to the division, allowing the division commander, Major General Barry 

McCaffrey, to place the 197th Brigade in reserve. Phase 5 commenced at 1300 on 27 February. 

The division attacked with the 1st Brigade on the left as the main attack, 2d Brigade in the 

center, and the 3d ACR on the right. The 197th Brigade protected the division rear area and 

followed behind the 2d Brigade, ready to assume the main attack if necessary. The advance 

was steady, even though elements of the Republican Guard Al Faw, Adnan, Hammurabi, and 

Nebuchadnezzar Divisions opposed it, mostly with ineffective artillery fire. The swift drive 

captured a major Iraqi logistics hub, including 1,300 ammunition bunkers. The division had 

planned to continue the advance toward Basra on the 28th, but President George H.W. Bush 

issued orders for a ceasefire effective at 0800 on that day.39 

Even though the war was technically over, elements of the 1st Brigade fought the Battle of 

Rumaylah on 28 March. Fleeing portions of the Hammurabi Division were discovered trying 

to fight their way across to the north on the causeway across marshy Lake Hawr Al Hammar, 

in the 1st Brigade’s sector. The brigade, reinforced with an air cavalry troop and five artillery 

battalions, sealed off this northern escape route. As a coupe de grace, brigade received an 

Apache attack helicopter company which destroyed 102 enemy vehicles with Hellfire missiles 

from long range. To finish things, the brigade sent a reinforced armored battalion task force to 

attack the length of the enemy column from south to north. In the whole action the 1st Brigade 

destroyed over 187 Iraqi armored vehicles, 400 wheeled vehicles, 34 artillery pieces, and 

98 
seven FROG missile systems, with the loss of one soldier wounded and one M-1 tank disabled 

when it caught fire from being too close to an exploding Iraqi T-72 tank.40 

The 24th Division used its three maneuver brigades to both fight and maneuver. Flexible 

organization and teamwork with supporting elements enhanced the division’s ability to 

accomplish its mission quickly and effectively, even though the operation was complex, the 

terrain daunting, and the enemy aggressive when cornered. 

99 
NOTES

1. The brigades were the 69th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Kansas ARNG, which filled in for the 5th Infantry 

Division’s brigade in Vietnam at Fort Carson from 1968-1969, and the 29th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army 

National Guard, which served at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, as Pacific strategic reserve in 1968-1969. Both units 

sent soldiers as individual replacements to Vietnam.

 2. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. Army Lineage 

Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 355-65. 

3. Ibid., 395. 

4. Both of these units subsequently, after redeployment, were redesignated as the 3d Brigade of each division. 

5. Ibid., 364-66, 421-22; RC combat battalions were also used to round out AC divisions. 

6. Shelby Stanton, Anatomy of a Division: The First Cav in Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987), 246-50 

7. There was controversy over the naming of the attack helicopter units between being designated as attack 

helicopter battalions (aviation battalions) or air cavalry squadrons. The cavalry designation won out in the TRICAP 

division. However, with the creation of a separate aviation branch in the 1980s, the designations were switched 

back to aviation ones. 

8 Colonel Charles E. Canedy, “From ACCB to the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat),” United States 

Army Aviation Digest, 21 (May 1975), 1-4; Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Martin, “First Cavalry Division 

Reorganization,” Armor, 83 (July-August 1974), 51-52; Ivan H. Oleson, “TriCap: A New Logistics Challenge,” 

Army Logistician 3 (September-October 1971), 5-7, 33. The 3d Brigade of the division (the airmobile brigade) was 

originally designated 4th Brigade, as the 3d Brigade was still in Vietnam. Upon that brigade’s return from Vietnam, 

the 4th was redesignated the 3d, although the troop units in the brigade remained the same. 

9. John Wilson, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History (CMH), 1999), 137; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 337. 

10. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 366-67. 

11. Ibid., 353, 355-56, 361, 364-65. 

12. John L. Romjue, A History of Army 86. Volume I Division 86: The Development of the Heavy Division 

(September 1978- October 1979), Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), August 

1980, 43, 66. 

13. Romjue, 44. 

14. John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 

1993), 18, 20, 75, 179-86; The 2d Brigade with three combined arms battalions (CABs) was inactivated in 1988, 

replaced by the roundout brigade. The CABS were given infantry regimental designations, while the light attack 

battalions were given armor regimental designations, as there was no provision for CAB designations except within 

the existing branches. When Combat Arms Regimental System was first adopted in 1957, it initially merged the 

infantry and armor units into combined arms regiments. But it was soon dropped in favor of the traditional branch 

system. 

15. Richard J. Dunn III, “Transformation: Let’s Get It Right This Time, ” Parameters (Spring 2001), 22-28; 

Romjue, Army of Excellence, 76; Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Bowman, “‘The Old Reliables’ One of a Kind,” Army 

38 (February 1988), 29-31. 

16. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 397. 

17. A clarification of this point may be found on the CMH’ website, written 31 January 2002, but current as of 24 

April 2003, <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/lineage/branches/av/default.htm>. 

18. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 354. 

19. Shelby Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC: US News Books, 1981), 109-23. 

20. Ibid., 109. 

21. In 1996, the 21st Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) was created at Fort Hood, Texas, from the redesignation of 

the former US Army Combat Aviation Training Brigade. However this brigade is a purely training init, despite its 

designation. 

22. Field Manual (FM) 71-100, Division Operations, 28 August 1996, states “the aviation brigade is a maneuver 

force...,” g. 1-9. 

23. As an exception to this, the aviation brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division is officially called “Cavalry Brigade, 

1st Cavalry Division.” 

24. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 359. 

100 
25. Ibid., 356. 

26. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 78. 

27. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 400. 

28. Sometimes the command battalion, 6-101st Aviation, is placed under the 159th Bde. 

29. This section is largely, but not exclusively, based on the author’s experiences. Headquarters, Department of 

the Army. FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion 

Task Force, and Company Team (Washington, DC: US Army, 1992), and US Army Logistics Management College. 

Support Operations Course (Phase I). Lesson Book (Fort Lee, VA: US Army Logistics Management College, 

1992). 

30. 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),Combat Operations After Action Report—Summary 

APACHE SNOW, dated 25 June 1969, 1-2. 

31. Romjue, Division 86: The Development of the Heavy Division, 87. In 1981, the FASCO had his own office in 

the headquarters, 2d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Smith Barracks, Baumholder, Germany. 

32. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 49, 55, 91.Colonel John R. Landry and Lieutenant Colonel Bloomer D. Sullivan. 

“CSS: Resourcing and Sustaining the AirLand Battle: Forward Support Battalion,” Military Review 67 (January 

1987), 27-29. 

33. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 10; Landry and Sullivan, 27; Major John E. Edwards, Combat Service Support 

Guide. Second Edition (Harrisburg, VA: Stackpole Books, 1993), 51. 

34. Operation URGENT FURY, the invasion of the island of Grenada, October 1983, saw the use of three brigade 

headquarters and attached units from the 82d Airborne Division, still organized under the old ROAD tables of 

organization. 

35. The deployment of US forces was actually two roughly 90-day deployments: XVIII Airborne Corps in 

August-November 1990, and VII Corps in November 1990- February 1991. See John J. McGrath. Gulf War Build 

Up, unpublished PowerPoint document, 2001, CMH, Washington, DC. 

36. The Victory Book: A Desert Storm Chronicle (Fort Stewart, GA: Public Affairs Office, 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), 1992), 70-71; Major Joseph C. Barto III, Task Force 2-4 Cav-“First In, Last Out”: The History of 

the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, During Operation Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 1993), 47. 

37. The Victory Book, 76; Barto, 47-51. 

38. The Victory Book, 82-91; Barto, 57-60, 62-71. 

39. The Victory Book, 94-95; Barto, 72-76. 

40. The Victory Book, 98, 100-1; Barto, 76-77, 79-81. 

41. The Victory Book, 104-5; Barto, 80. 

42. The Victory Book, 108-16; Barto, 96-99. 

101 
103

Chapter 8

THE MODERN BRIGADE, 1991-2003

Enhanced Brigades

In the early 1970s, the Army had embraced the “Total Army” concept, which made 

the reserve components, ARNG and USAR, full partners in the defense establishment with 

projected roles and missions upon mobilization. The Total Army concept had its ups and 

downs as the readiness of reserve component units fluctuated, based on recruitment, turnover, 

equipment, and training time factors. Various programs, such as the use of roundout brigades 

and the affiliation program, where Reserve Component (RC) units were made partners with 

similar active component units, were designed to enhance reserve readiness. After the Gulf 

War, where the roundout brigades remained nondeployed, the Army’s drawdown required the 

continuation of the program. Once the Army reached its 10-division structure in 1996, however, 

the roundout program was replaced. The new program, ARNG Enhanced Brigades, utilized 

the acronyms eSB (enhanced separate brigade) and eHSb (enhanced heavy separate brigade). 

The Army selected 15 separate Army National Guard brigades, most of which had been part 

of the roundout program, for special (enhanced) status. The program was a comprehensive 

planning, training, and equipment package designed to enhance the ability of the brigades 

to mobilize and be combat ready within between 90 and 120 days. The selected brigades 

received special attention from active component soldiers, most of whom were assigned to 

regionally based readiness groups.

In 1999, the Army initiated two new organizational changes to increase the readiness status of the enhanced brigades. The first was the activation of two division headquarters without 

assigned brigades of their own. The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 7th Infantry Division, activated at Fort Carson, were designated as Active 

Component (AC)/RC integrated divisions: divisional headquarters staffed with active duty 

soldiers, but with subordinate units consisting of assigned Army National Guard separate brigades. The divisions were the first units to combine active duty and nonmobilized reserve soldiers under the same headquarters in US Army history. Additionally, all the support elements 

normally assigned to the division were assigned directly to each brigade in their separate brigade configurations. The only previous parallel to this, was the assembly of the Americal Division in Vietnam in 1967. The divisions were organized to enhance pre- and postmobilization 

training, war preparation, and facilitate rapid deployment. The division headquarters oversaw 

the planning, preparation, and coordination of training for the assigned enhanced brigades.1

The second change was the merging of the active component readiness groups with the 

Army Reserve exercise divisions into a new organization, the training support division. The 

readiness groups were regionally based active Army agencies designed to advise and support 

reserve component training. With the creation of the enhanced brigades in 1996, the readiness 

groups were the spearhead of the Army’s effort at supporting the brigades. The Army Reserve 

exercise divisions had been created in the mid-1990s to prepare and run training exercises 

for RC units After 1999, the new training support division was specially tailored to support 

the enhanced brigades, containing a special eSB training support brigade for each enhanced 

brigade within its assigned region.
104

Enhanced brigades not assigned to an integrated division were given a status of “training 

association” with specified active component units, as well as being supported by eSB training 

support brigades in the AC/USAR training support divisions. A listing of the enhanced brigades 

follows in Table 13.

Table 13. National Guard Enhanced Brigades and AC/RC Divisions

From 1994-1995, the Army Reserve lost its three maneuver brigades to force cuts. 

However, the training divisions of the USAR still retained from three to nine training brigades 

in each division. Between 1994 and 1999, the training divisions were reorganized into two 

new types of divisions: institutional training divisions, which, in addition to conducting the 

traditional entry training missions of the former training divisions, also assumed the reserve 

component military occupational specialty and NCO and officer training missions formerly 

conducted by US Army Reserve Forces (USARF) school units; and the previously mentioned 

exercise divisions, which planned and executed both computer simulated and on-the-ground 

training exercises, in specially prepared training “lanes.” Each of these divisions had 

subordinate training brigades, which carried the colors and traditions of brigades belonging to 

the divisions when they were tactical units. As mentioned above, the exercise divisions were 

merged with the active component readiness groups in 1999 to form new AC/RC training 

support divisions. 

Force XXI and Other Tweaks 

A combination of force reductions and an analysis of the 1991 Gulf War made the Army 

reanalyze its force structure. Technological advances promised to digitalize future Army 

organizations. Digitalization meant the linking of combat elements by computer, allowing for a 
105

higher situational awareness and a speedy transmission of reports and orders, easing command 

and control and logistics accordingly. The Army formally initiated its new organizational study, 

coined Force XXI, in March 1994. Planners developed a divisional structure, referred to as the 

Interim Division Design, in 1995. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) became the test unit 

at Fort Hood, experimenting with the interim design in 1996-1997. 3

In terms of the brigade, Force XXI had three structural changes: it added a small brigade 

reconnaissance troop in armored HMMWVs at the brigade level, made the brigade organizational 

structure fixed, and proposed the removal of all organic combat service support elements 

from the brigade’s combat battalions to the forward support battalions of the DISCOM. The 

reconnaissance troop, which was implemented Armywide, separate from Force XXI, will be 

discussed below. The fixed brigade included a division of one armored and two mechanized 

brigades. The armored brigade would consist of two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry 

battalion, the mechanized brigades of one tank battalion and two mechanized battalions. Each 

battalion would consist of only three line companies instead of the four found under AOE. 

As of 2003, the fixed one armored, two mechanized brigade structure, had not been adopted 

even in the 4th Infantry Division, which fielded two armored and one mechanized brigade, 

despite its designation, as an armored division.4

 The combat service support modifications 

were based on the advantages of a centralized system of digitalized logistics, which allowed 

units to send logistics support requests quickly and accurately direct to the units responsible for 

providing the support. As of spring 2003, only the 4th Mechanized Division and parts of the 

1st Cavalry Division were organized under Force XXI structure. The 4th ID was completely 

digitalized in Fiscal Year 2000, with the 1st Cavalry Division following. The rest of the Army 

retained modified AOE force structure organizations reflected in Limited Conversion Division 

XXI (LCD XXI), which reduced the line companies to three in each battalion and added a 

reconnaissance troop to the brigade.5

Even while the Force XXI study and test unit were being developed, tweaks and changes 

to Army brigade and division structure continued apart from Force XXI. Among these were the 

creation of divisional engineer brigades, the addition of an organic reconnaissance troop to the 

brigade, and the widespread adoption of the BCT concept. 

In the Gulf War, virtually every brigade had a combat engineer battalion attached. 

Accordingly, the Army initiated a program called the Engineer Restructuring Initiative almost 

immediately after that war. The result was the addition of two engineer battalions and an engineer 

brigade headquarters to the heavy division. Unlike the aviation brigade, there was no pretense 

that the engineer brigade was a maneuver element. Instead, the brigade headquarters was 

considered much like the division’s artillery (DIVARTY) headquarters, a specialty headquarters 

controlling troops usually placed in direct support of the division’s maneuver brigades. Army 

thought flip-flopped back and forth about retaining the engineer brigade headquarters or simply 

assigning the battalions either directly to the division or the brigades. However, as of early 

2003, the engineer brigade was still a basic component of the heavy divisions, though in most 

divisions the engineer battalions were attached directly to the brigades under the BCT concept. 

In 2004, as will be seen in the next chapter, the engineer brigade is to be converted into a fourth 

maneuver brigade headquarters in the division.

Separate brigades had long been authorized a brigade reconnaissance element, a troop 
106

of armored cavalry. Divisional brigades would normally receive similar support from the 

divisional cavalry squadron. However, after the Gulf War, and in studies promulgated under 

Force XXI, planners focused on the need for an organic reconnaissance troop in each armored 

and mechanized infantry brigade assigned to a division. The troop would provide the brigade 

commander with direct reconnaissance assets already found at both the battalion and division 

levels, but lacking at the brigade level. In 1998, under LCD XXI, the Army authorized the 

troop, commonly referred to as the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), but officially given 

a cavalry designation.6 Troops were added to brigades over the next two years. This marked 

the first time since the creation of the brigades under ROAD in 1963 that the brigade had an 

organic combat element.

The brigade reconnaissance troop organization consisted of a troop headquarters and 

two scout platoons. The scout platoons were made up of six M1025 HMMWVs, divided into 

three squads. Each squad comprised two HMMWWVs, one with a MK19 GMG or M240B 

medium machine gun and the other with the M2 .50 caliber machine gun. The HMMWVs 

were manned by a three-scout crew. The troop was often augmented with other reconnaissance 

assets, particularly Combat Observation Laser Teams (COLT), to provide specialized indirect 

fire observers.7

 The troops as fielded and configured in 2003 are shown in Table 14.

Brigade/Cavalry Troops, 2003

Table 14. Brigade Reconnaissance Troops, 2003
107

Despite many changes in Army organization, force strengths and the adoption of whole 

new generations of weapons systems and participation in conflicts as varied as Vietnam and 

Iraq, the brigade’s basic design remained a flexible task force to which combat units were 

attached based on specific mission requirements. The reason the structure was retained was not 

institutional lethargy or resistance to change. It was retained because it worked. The brigade had 

proven to be a highly effective means of organizing to execute most aspects of modern warfare. 

Tweaks such as the reorganizing of the division support command to provide multifunctional 

support battalions for each brigade and the addition of an organic brigade reconnaissance troop 

were just fine-tuning an organizational concept that had repeatedly proven its value. But force 

drawdowns, stationing concerns, and the desire to create special types of forces in sizes smaller 

than division would impact on the brigade concept at the close of the century.

Stryker Brigades: Army Transformation Redux

In the modern era, the Army has suffered from the perennial problem of projecting forces 

to the far reaches of the globe quickly and with adequate firepower to deal with indigenous 

threats. Armored and mechanized units require a lot of shipping and extended periods of up to 

30 days to arrive on the scene, unless propositioned equipment is used. Light units can arrive 

via parachute or aircraft relatively quickly, but are then often too light to successfully fight 

the heavy forces of the threat already there. The deployabilty versus survivability debate was 

not a new one. The testbed motorized division and light divisions formed in the 1980s were 

approaches to solving the same problem. 

In October 1999, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki announced the latest effort at providing 

a highly deployable and combat capable Army force with the creation of the Interim Brighade 

Combat Team (IBCT) project. Like the 9th Infantry Division motorization project from almost 

20 years before, the IBCT project’s goal was to use new technology to field lightweight 

motorized vehicles with adequate firepower. The program postulated the development of a 

family of wheeled armored vehicles to provide both troop carriers and assault guns.8

Instead of selecting a division to be the experimental force (EXFOR) for the IBCT, in 

April 2000, the Army selected two divisional brigades, which were stationed at Fort Lewis, 

away from their respective parent units in Korea and Hawaii. One brigade was a mechanized 

brigade, the other light. An additional four brigades were added to the program in July 2001, 

including a separate light brigade, a divisional light brigade, a light armored cavalry regiment, 

and a mechanized divisional brigade from the Army National Guard. The brigade package, 

once deployed, was designed to be used under a division or independently and be capable 

of deployment worldwide by air force transports within 96 hours. The brigade was to fill the 

deployment gap between early-entry units (light infantry and airborne) and the later deploying 

heavy forces.9

The centerpiece of the new brigade was a new light-armored wheeled vehicle. When the 

IBCT program commenced, the vehicle did not exist. The first brigade utilized a combination 

of Land Assault Vehicles (LAV-III) borrowed from the Canadian army and HMMWVs. 

General Dynamics and General Motors developed the new vehicle under a contract awarded 

in November 2000. The first models were delivered in March 2002. Initially called the Interim 

Armored Vehicle, the Army officially renamed the vehicle the Stryker after two unrelated Army 

Medal of Honor winners in February 2002. As developed, the Stryker is a 19-ton, 8-wheeled 
108

armored vehicle with eight different variants and capable of speeds up to 60 miles per hour. A 

single C-17 Air Force cargo airplane can carry three Strykers. The first Strykers delivered were 

infantry carriers, capable of carrying a nine-man infantry squad and armed with either a MK19 

GMG or .50 caliber machine gun. Other models included the mobile gun system (MGS), the 

first of which were delivered as test systems in June 2002. The MGS mounts a stabilized 

105mm gun. Until it is fully fielded in 2005, the MGS units of the brigade will substitute the 

Stryker antitank missile variant. The other variants are reconnaissance, mortar, command, fire 

support, engineer, medical, and nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) reconnaissance vehicles. 

In addition to the Strykers, the brigade would also utilize digital technology to provide wireless 

communications and sensors to enhance the unit’s ability to maintain situational awareness on 

the battlefield.10

The first Stryker brigade was projected to be operational by December 2001, with the 

second a year later and the remaining four over the course of the next few years. However, 

developmental problems with the Stryker and its production delayed the program. The first 

IBCT, the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, commenced its final two-month field training at 

the Army training centers at Fort Irwin, California, and Fort Polk, Louisiana, in late March 

2003. Upon successful completion of the tests, the brigade was considered operational. It 

began deploying to Iraq for employment in contingency operations in late 2003. Stryker units 

are shown in Table 15. 

Stryker brigade organization contained 309 Strykers and over 700 other wheeled vehicles. 

The brigade consisted of three combined arms infantry battalions and a new type of cavalry 

squadron, the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. The 

brigade also included antiarmor and engineer companies, a field artillery battalion, military 

intelligence and signal companies, and a brigade support battalion. The organization is 

structured to allow it to readily fight as combined arms units down to the company level.11

The combined arms infantry battalions consisted of three companies, each organized with 

three infantry platoons (three Stryker infantry vehicles), a 81mm mortar section (three Stryker 

mortar carriers), and a MGS platoon (four Stryker MGS vehicles), as well as a sniper team. At 

the battalion level were also found reconnaissance and mortar platoons and a sniper squad.12

The RSTA squadron was organized with three reconnaissance troops and a surveillance 

troop. The reconnaissance troop was composed of three reconnaissance platoons and a mortar 

section. The surveillance troop consisted of a platoon of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 

NBC reconnaissance platoon, and a multisensor platoon. 

Table 15. Projected Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team Units
109

The rest of the Stryker brigade consisted of a towed M198 155mm field artillery howitzer 

battalion, an antitank company equipped with TOW missile mounted Strykers (to be ultimately 

replaced with a new “bunker-busting” TOW), an engineer company geared to clearing 

obstacles, a military intelligence company specially designed to facilitate the use of human 

intelligence assets, an organic signal company to provide command and control support, and 

a support battalion consisting of a medical company, a support company, and a headquarters/

supply company. The support battalion was designed to provide self-sustaining combat service 

support to the brigade for the first 72 hours of combat operations.13

Figure 37. Stryker Vehicles. Infantry Carrier (left) and Mobile Gun System (right)

Figure 38. The Stryker Brigade
110

The Brigade Combat Team

A combination of downsizing and stationing issues in the late 1990s affected the role of 

the brigade vis-à-vis the division. In 2003, there are more Army brigades stationed apart from 

their parent divisions then ever since the revival of the brigade in 1963. Ironically, at the same 

time, the Army’s force of separate brigades, which at one point in the late 1990s was at zero, 

was now at only two: one theater defense brigade, the 172d Infantry, in Alaska and one special 

purpose brigade, the 173 Airborne, in Italy. In effect, the 21st century Army had replaced 

the self-contained separate brigade’s role with divisional brigades, which had become selfcontained through the use of the BCT concept.

The BCT is based on analogy with the pre-1957 RCT concept. It designates a brigade 

with, in addition to the 2-5 maneuver battalions typically attached to it, an attached slice of 

divisional support elements designated to support it. The terminology is a bit of a misnomer, 

as the brigade, unlike the old regiment, is a task force headquarters by design. Nevertheless the 

term BCT allows the Army to easily designate divisional brigades that are basically configured 

as self-contained units. 

In 2003 almost all divisional brigades, whether collocated with their parent division or 

not, were organized as BCTs. Stationing considerations enhance the viability of the BCT, 

particularly when several large Army posts had two brigades from different divisions assigned 

to them without either divisional headquarters onsite. The designation of the test organization 

Figure 39. Brigade Combat Team, 2004
111

for the Stryker brigades as BCTs, with no divisional headquarters, and the selection of Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) from three different divisions, a separate brigade, and an 

armored cavalry regiment, clearly indicated that SBCTs were being packaged as independent 

entities, rather than divisional components, despite their designations. Brigades active in 2004 

and their home stationing are listed in Table 16. (Those in boldface are not stationed with their 

parent divisions or are separate by organization.)

An example of the organization of a typical brigade combat team organization is shown 

in Figure 39. 

Brigades in the War with Iraq, 2003

In the March-April 2003 war with Iraq, the Army deployed far fewer ground combat 

maneuver brigades than in the 1991 Gulf War: eight versus 21 in 1991. However, the results 

were far more decisive in a much shorter period of time: in 22 days the Iraqi army was destroyed 

as a viable combat force and the capital city of Baghdad occupied, versus in 1991, a six-week 

air campaign followed by a four-day ground campaign against only a portion of the Iraqi 

army, which left much of that army intact. Brigades deployed in the ground campaign phase of 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are included in Table 17. 

The campaign once again proved the utility and flexibility of the maneuver brigade on 

the modern battlefield. The three heavy brigades of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

spearheaded the advance on Baghdad, moving almost 200 miles in less than 40 hours, then, 

after a preplanned logistical halt, which coincided with bad weather conditions, completed the 

movement to the Iraqi capital, after a major river-crossing operation, in two days, and secured 

major portions of the city over the course of several more days.14

The air assault brigades of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and a paratrooper 

brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, both supported by elements of the heavy 3d Brigade, 

1st Armored Division, advanced after the 3d Mechanized Division, relieved brigades of that 

division containing bypassed cities and protected the long supply and communications line, 

while destroying enemy resistance at Samawah, Najaf, Karbala, and Hillah. The 173d Airborne 

Brigade parachuted into key positions in northern Iraq to assist the Kurdish forces and complete 

the defeat of the demoralized Iraqi forces on that front. The use of the 173d as a component of 

a Special Operations task force was a unique first in US Army history.15

Aviation brigades, both divisional and the corps-level 11th Aviation Group and 12th 

Aviation Brigade, saw extensive service in the Iraqi War. However, use of these organizations 

as maneuver elements was limited at best. The 11th was an attack helicopter organization, 

while the 12th provided mostly lift assets for maneuver units. The 3d Infantry Division’s 

Aviation Brigade was, however, used in the later stages of the campaign near Karbala to control 

reconnaissance and security operations, traditionally maneuver-type missions.16

Other future works will undoubtedly fully document the activities of these brigades and 

the Marine, air and naval forces involved in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This work will 

now offer a preliminary analysis of the operations of the three maneuver brigades of the 3d 

Infantry Division (Mechanized) as the final case study in this history of brigade development 

and operations in the US Army. 
112

Table 16. Brigade Stationing, 2004
113

The 3d Mechanized Division’s Brigade in the Iraqi 2003 Campaign

The V Corps’ 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) executed the main attack of the coalition 

ground assault to depose Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime. The division’s operation concept was 

to advance as fast and expeditiously to Baghdad as possible, acting as a dagger thrust to the 

heart of that regime. The daring thrust would deliberately bypass cities and, except for securing 

bridges for follow-on forces, remain on the Euphrates River’s west bank until after defeating 

the Republic Guard forces defending the area around Karbala, 50 miles southwest of the capital. 

It was hoped the immediate presence of US forces near Baghdad would cause the collapse of 

the regime. Central Command (CENTCOM) deliberately designed its strategy to contrast with 

that used in 1991. The Iraqi command, advised by two former Russian generals, was expecting 

just such a replay.17 The 1991 campaign had consisted of a long air campaign, followed by a 

large-scale ground campaign where most units moved with friendly units on their flanks and 

nothing was bypassed. The design of the new campaign capitalized on advances in precision 

munitions, digital communications, and intelligence gathering. Using these advantages, the 

goal was to move too swiftly and unpredictably for the Iraqi defenders to respond with an 

effective defense. This switch was euphemistically referred to as “the running start.”18

For Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 3d Mechanized Division’s BCTs were initially 

organized into one tank-heavy brigade force, one mechanized-heavy, and one balanced brigade 

force with two mechanized and two tank battalions. The task organization are shown in Table 

18.

The division had additional attached assets including a PATRIOT antimissile battalion (5-

52d ADA), and a logistical corps support group.

Table 17. Brigades in the War with Iraq, 2003
114

The issuing of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems to 

all commanders, company and above, greatly enhanced the division’s ability to command 

and control. This recently fielded digitalized system enabled commanders to have almost 

immediate situational awareness involving friendly forces, and to a lesser sense, enemy forces, 

by providing a display of force locations.19

The three brigades of the 3d Mechanized crossed the berm separating Kuwait from Iraq 

between dusk and dawn of 20-21 March 2003. The division was on the left of the coalition 

ground forces front. To the west (left) was open desert, a flank which intelligence sources 

indicated was devoid of Iraqi troops. To the east, 1st Marine Division elements of the I Marine 

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) crossed the frontier near Safwan, astride the main road (Highway 

8) from Kuwait to Nasiriyah. The I MEF’s initial mission was to secure the Rumaylah Oil 

Field, then to advance on Highway 8 to Nasiriyah, cross the Euphrates River, and move on 

Table 18. Initial Brigade Organization, 3d Infantry Division (Mech), 2003
115

Baghdad west of the river. To the right (east) of I MEF, was the UK 1st Armoured Division. 

Along with the UK 3d Commando Brigade, the division had the mission of securing the area 

around Basra. 

The 3d ID was to advance cross-country in two columns from Kuwait to the Euphrates 

River Valley near Nasiriyah and Samawah. Each brigade had a specific mission as it crossed 

into Iraq. The 1st on the right and 2d Brigade on the left initially cleared the border defenses 

and established breaching lanes, allowing the divisional cavalry squadron, 3-7th Cavalry, and 

the bulk of the 1st and 3d Brigades to pass through and commence the two pronged advance to 

the Euphrates River. Each brigade then followed the forward elements.20

Figure 40. Drive on Karbala, 2003
116

The cavalry squadron advanced rapidly on the left through open desert to the vicinity 

of Samawah, where its mission was to isolate the city from the south and east by securing 

two bridges over a canal southwest of the city, which also would secure Route 28, the main 

axis of advance the division intended to follow past Samawah. The tank heavy 2d Brigade 

was right behind the cavalry troopers, with the job of advancing north up Route 28, past the 

3-7th Cavalry to the vicinity of Najaf to the northwest, and securing the projected site of the 

divisional and corps logistical base southwest of the city.21

The axis of advance on the right consisted of the 1st and 3d Brigades. The pincer had 

the mission of securing the line of advance near Nasariyah, including the large Tallil Airbase 

complex south of the city along with Routes 1 and 8, and the Highway 1 expressway bridge 

over the Euphrates River west of Nasariyah. This bridge was important because the Marines 

would use it later in their advance to the Tigris River. After securing these objectives, the 

brigades would then hand off to elements of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), 

which was responsible for rear area security in the Nasiriyah area, and continue the advance 

along the Euphrates River Valley to Samawah and Najaf. The initial advance was cross-country 

through empty desert with rear elements following on roads or trails. 

The division advanced an average of 150 miles on the first day with an march rate of about 

24 miles an hour. The brigades advanced differently. On the left, the 2d Brigade, following 

behind 3-7th Cavalry, divided into two elements. All the tracked vehicles moved rapidly crosscountry through the rugged desert terrain, while the wheeled elements moved separately on a 

paved road at a slower pace. On the right, the 1st Brigade advanced cross-country, at first in a 

wedge formation with one battalion task force in the lead flanked by the other two, then later 

with all three abreast of each other.22

Except at the border, the Iraqis did not oppose the advance to the Nasariyah area. The 1st 

Brigade, tasked with covering the right (east) flank, moved and secured the Jalibah airfield east 

of Tallil Airbase and west of the Rumaylah oil fields then being secured by the Marines. After 

this, the 3d Brigade passing through the 1st to attack the Tallil area and defeat the defending 

Iraqi 11th Infantry Division. 

The 3d BCT formed up southeast of Tallil at a desert location designated Assault Position 

Barrow, then attacked Tallil in a series of maneuvers utilizing its three forward task forces (one 

tank battalion was retained in reserve) to isolate the airfield then secure it. Advancing in the 

late afternoon of 21 March, TF 2-69th Armor, following behind the brigade reconnaissance 

troop, advanced on the left along the Route 1 expressway bypassing the airfield and up to the 

highway bridge over the Euphrates River, a location designated Objective Clay. Throughout 

the afternoon and evening, the task force fought and defeated dismounted Iraqi elements to 

secure the south side of the bridge, doing so by 2350 on 21 March and then crossing the river 

and securing the north bank by 0500 on 22 March.23 While the bridge battle was raging, the 

brigade’s other two committed task forces went into action. TF 1-15 Infantry’s mission was to 

secure a barracks area northeast of the Tallil Airfield, designated Objective Liberty. Moving 

out in the evening of 21 March, the task force secured the objective in the early morning 

hours of the 22 March against minimal opposition that melted away (or surrendered including 

an Iraqi air defense general), completing the isolation of the airfield. TF 1-30th Infantry, 

with responsibility for clearing the airfield, then advanced directly on it from the southeast, 
117

breaching the berm surrounding the airfield and assaulting across it supported by artillery, 

attack helicopter, and air fires, seizing Tallil against light resistance.24

In a maneuver that would be repeated throughout the campaign, the 3d Brigade consolidated 

its gains and provided security forces to contain Nasariyah, while the 1st Brigade passed 

through it and advanced along Route 8 to Samawah to the west. The 3d Brigade remained in 

the Nasariyah area until relieved by the 2d MEB moving up from the east on Routes 8 and 1 on 

23 March. The brigade then moved off to the northwest to secure the road to Samawah.

At Samawah, the 3-7th Cavalry’s ground elements arrived after dawn on 22 March. The 

following 2d Brigade’s tracked vehicle elements caught up with the cavalry troop and, after 

resting, bypassed the Samawah area, heading to Najaf. The cavalry squadron advanced to 

secure its objectives—two canal bridges—on the south side of the city, designated as Objective 

Figure 41. Tallil Airbase, 21-22 March 2003
118

Chatham, linking up with Special Forces elements on the way. The cavalrymen then became 

involved in a fierce firefight with Iraqi paramilitary forces, but soon gained the upper hand. 

On the same day, the1st Brigade advanced along Route 8 beside the Euphrates River from the 

Nasiriyah area toward Samawah, engaging the enemy briefly before handing the battle off to 

the cavalry squadron and following the 2d Brigade around Samawah westward along Route 28 

to the vicinity of Najaf. The cav squadron remained around Samawah containing the city and 

was attached to the 3d Brigade on the 23d. 

After relief by the Marines, the 3d Brigade came forward and completed the isolation of 

Samawah after being relieved by the Marines at Nasariyah. While containing the city, Iraqi 

paramilitary forces repeatedly abandoned the defensive advantages of the urban landscape to 

execute charge-style attacks against the 3d Brigade’s armored forces, with predictable results. 

The brigade remained around the city until relieved by the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, 

on 29 March. Upon relief, it moved to an assembly area northwest of Najaf to prepare for 

future operations near Karbala.25

Najaf, the sacred Shiite city, was next on the horizon for the 3d Mechanized’s brigades, 

This large city was also to be isolated. As a Shiite city, resistance was expected to be less than 

fanatical. This was to prove not to be the case. Objective Rams, a patch of desert southwest 

of Najaf along Route 28, had been designated to be the division’s main logistical base for the 

final drive on Baghdad. The battle to secure Objective Rams and isolate Najaf involved the 1st 

and 2d Brigades and the 3-7th Cavalry Squadron. The 2d Brigade, in the lead, was to secure 

Objective Rams, completing a 230-mile advance in less than 40 hours. 1st Brigade would then 

pass through Objective Rams and isolate Najaf from the north (the direction of Baghdad). The 

3-7th Cavalry would come up Route 8 along the Euphrates River and isolate Najaf on the east. 

As at Samawah, the Iraqi enemy resisted mostly with paramilitary forces operating out of, 

but not remaining within, the city. While Objective Rams was expected to be deserted, it was not. 

A mix of Iraqi irregulars and regulars occupied the site defending a radio tower communications 

facility. The defenders were not aware of the swift American advance, expecting instead an 

airborne insertion.26 The 2d Brigade‘s lead elements, a tank-heavy battalion task force, arrived 

at Objective Rams in the last hours of 22 March, about a day earlier than originally projected, 

and then fought and defeated the fanatical, but suicidal Iraqi militia, securing the objective 

by 1000 on the 23d, assisted by close air support and field artillery fires. Subsequently, in 

a second phase of action, Iraqi raiders from Najaf repeatedly attacked brigade elements on 

Objective Rams. The brigade remained at Objective Rams in a defensive posture for the next 

two days.27

The 1st Brigade, after being relieved at Nasiriyah, had bypassed Samawah and followed the 

2d Brigade to Objective Rams, then passing through to advance farther to the northwest along 

Route 28 to an intermediate objective, Raiders, late on the morning of the 23d. The advance on 

Objective Raiders cut Najaf off from the northeast and would be followed immediately by an 

advance to the east to secure a bridge over the Euphrates River at Kifal, designated Objective 

Jenkins. This latter move isolated Najaf from the northeast. Highway 28 from Objective Rams 

to Raiders cut across the high escarpment upon which Najaf sat. The road there, a cut through 

the escarpment, was a natural choke point with restrictive terrain on both sides and no place to 

maneuver. Iraqi forces were dug in astride Route 28 and along both sides of the escarpment with 
119

infantry and well-placed artillery. As the 1st Brigade began its advance from Objective Rams, 

direct and indirect fires started racking the lead elements. In response, the brigade called upon its 

supporting fire elements to clear the way. After firing smoke to obscure the column from enemy 

view, the direct support field artillery battalion, the 1-10th Field Artillery, unleashed 58 separate 

fire missions that suppressed the Iraqi resistance. 1st Brigade secured Raiders in the early morning hours of the 24th and prepared to move on Jenkins. Later in the day, the brigade established 

blocking positions along Route 9 running north out of Najaf between Raiders and Jenkins. 

At dawn on the 25th, the advance on Jenkins commenced in the height of a sandstorm. A 

task force organized around an air defense artillery (ADA) battery and tank company secured 

the western approaches to the bridge on Jenkins several hours prior to the advance of the 

bulk of the brigade. The Iraqis defended the near side of the bridge from prepared positions 

with now typical fanaticism. The ADA team engaged the defenders for 9 hours with artillery 

fire until infantry from 1st Brigade’s TF 3-69th Armor, including Company B, 3-7th Infantry, 

arrived and cleared that portion of Kifal west of the river. Immediately thereafter, a platoon of 

tanks forced its way across the bridge to the east bank while the Iraqis tried to blow it up. The 

detonation, while failing to topple the structure, damaged it to the point that tanks had to be 

led across one at a time. This the TF did, until it had moved its entire complement of tanks to 

the far bank. The forces now across the river then repulsed repeated Iraqi dismounted suicidal 

attacks, while establishing a strong defensive position. With the bridgehead achieved, the 1st 

Brigade had completed the isolation of Najaf from the north.28

Meanwhile near Nasiriyah on the 23d, while the forward elements of the division were at 

Najaf, the wheeled elements of the division support command continued their slower movement 

to Objective Rams. As the line of communications extended great distances, initially bypassing 

urban areas, the danger for rear area convoys was accordingly increased. One of the division 

support command convoys was ambushed after misrouting into unsecured portions of Nasiriyah 

resulting in prisoners of war and casualties, primarily from the maintenance company of the 

PATRIOT battalion attached to the division. 

Back forward at Najaf, the divisional cavalry squadron now joined the 1st and 2d Brigades 

in the fight. To complete the isolation of the city, the 3-7th Cavalry Squadron, upon relief of its 

containment mission at Samawah, was to advance on 24 March up Route 9, 45 miles along the 

Euphrates River to Objective Floyd, centered on a two-part bridge across the Euphrates River 

near the town of Abu Sukhayr, south and east of Najaf. The cavalry’s route paralleled to the 

east that of the 2d and 1st Brigades moving to Objective Rams. The advance along Highway 

9, was, however, constricted by terrain to the one road and the movement quickly became a 

running fight. The cavalrymen had to break up a series of large ambushes established by Iraqi 

paramilitary and militia forces, who were equipped with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) 

and antitank missiles. Additionally, the beginning of a three-day sandstorm, which restricted 

visibility, resulted in some combat taking place at close range. Fighting at Faysaliyah was the 

fiercest, particularly when a canal bridge collapsed, blocking a road, damaging an M1 tank, 

and requiring a detour and bypass, while temporarily stranding a tank—Bradley, hunter-killer 

team on the far bank. With the squadron still fighting all along the route, at dawn on 25 March, 

advance elements reached the southern edge of Floyd after a 9-hour, 45-mile movement down 

a road, now forever known to the troops as “Ambush Alley.”29
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Upon finally reaching the vicinity of Objective Floyd, 3-7th Cavalry immediately attacked 

to secure the bridge. This attack, in the midst of the dust storm, relied on thermal and night 

vision sights. Iraqi paramilitary personnel fiercely defended the bridge. Nevertheless, by late 

morning it was secure and part of the squadron was able to move north along the east bank 

of the river through Abu Sukhayr to secure a dam and another bridge to the north. Again 

resistance was tooth and nail against the advance, with fighting at close range because of the 

poor visibility induced by the sandstorm.30

As Iraqi pressure increased, 3-7th Cavalry was soon fighting simultaneously on three 

separate fronts on both sides of the Euphrates River. Ammunition supply was soon running low. 

Division responded quickly by placing the 1st and 2d Brigades on alert to assemble forces to 

reinforce or link up with the cavalry squadron. At dusk on the 25th, the 1st Brigade dispatched 

elements from a tank task force, 2-69th Armor, out of its bridgehead at Kifal, down the east 

Figure 42. Isolation of Najaf, 23-25 March 2003
121

bank of the Euphrates to the cavalry, bringing limited resupply. The two units linked up within 

3 hours of the start of the 3d Brigade’s movement. Meanwhile to the southwest, 2d Brigade, 

charged with securing Objective Rams and relieving the cavalry squadron in place, did so on 

the 26th, completely blocking Najaf off from the south. For this mission the brigade received 

two additional tank battalion task forces that had been guarding the division rear elements as 

they occupied Objective Rams. 

Operations around Najaf were hindered by the massive sandstorm, which blanketed all 

of southern Iraq and Kuwait for three days (25-27 March) and reduce visibility to zero. The 

storm, however, did not prevent the brigades of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) from 

completing the isolation of Najaf and the establishment of a large logistical base at Objective 

Rams, in preparation for expected subsequent operations against the Iraqi Republican Guard 

near Karbala and on to Baghdad.31

While the command was earmarked to take an operational pause before advancing against 

the Republican Guard units expected to be near Karbala, by the end of 26 March 2003, all three 

brigades of the 3d Mechanized Division had all been diverted from this primary mission, to 

conducting security missions along the route of that advance. From 25 to 29 March virtually 

all movement north ceased. To the south, the 3d Brigade was cordoning Samawah. Fifty miles 

to the northwest, the 2d Brigade from the south and the 1st Brigade from the north were 

containing Najaf. 

In order to allow the brigades to begin preparations for the Karbala-Baghdad operation, V 

Corps dispatched the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne 

Division, to relieve them of their security missions. Elements of the 82d relieved the 3d Brigade 

around Samawah on the 29th, while the same day, the 101st relieved the other two brigades 

around Najaf. Both the 101st and 82d would spend the next few days reducing these enemy 

resistance centers, located on the 3d Mechanized Division’s lines of communication.32

Upon relief, the 3d Division’s brigades moved to the vicinity of Objective Rams to 

continue refitting and reorganizing for the next operation, a process that had been ongoing 

even while the units were arrayed around Samawah and Najaf. During the Najaf operation, the 

division reorganized its task organization under its three maneuver brigade headquarters. With 

the 3d Brigade, first at Nasiriyah, then at Samawah, containing pockets of resistance, TF 2-

69th Armor was detached to the1st Brigade on 22 March for its advance on Objective Raiders. 

The tank battalion attached to the 3d Brigade from the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the 

2-70th Armor, along with the 2d Brigade’s 1-64th Armor, were detached to provide security 

for the Division Support Command at Objective Rams on 24 March. Both battalions were 

then attached to the 2d Brigade on the 26th for the relief operation at Objective Floyd. When 

the division began preparing for the Karbala operation on 29 March, the 2-70th Armor was 

permanently detached to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and TF 1-15th Infantry was 

detached from 3d Brigade to 2d Brigade for the duration of the Karbala-Baghdad operation. 

This gave the division a configuration of 1st Brigade with two mechanized infantry task forces 

and a tank task force, 3d Brigade with a mechanized and a tank task force and 2d Brigade 

with two mechanized and two tank task forces. 2d Brigade would, in turn, detach one of 

its mechanized TFs, TF 3-15 Infantry, to provide security for the division’s Euphrates River 

crossing site for several days. The task organization would then revert to that of the start of 
122

the campaign once Baghdad was reached, with the 3d Brigade receiving back its original 

habitually attached battalions.33

The final operation of the campaign consisted of an advance to bypass Karbala, a crossing 

of the Euphrates River, and a movement directly on and then isolating Baghdad. With Baghdad 

isolated, the brigades would subsequently execute forays into the city, the intensity of which 

would depend on resistance and the status of the Iraqi regime. 3d ID had responsibility for 

isolating Baghdad west of the Tigris River, which bisected the city from the north to the south. 

I MEF advancing up from the southeast, had responsibility for the portion east of the Tigris 

River. For this operation all three divisional maneuver brigades would be employed in key 

roles, each with a final objective in the encirclement of Baghdad from the north (3rd Brigade), 

west (1st Brigade), and south (2d Brigade).34

Baghdad is east of the Euphrates River. With Army forces at Objective Rams west of the 

river, it had to be crossed before advancing on the Iraqi metropolis. The terrain west of the 

Euphrates River was restrictive to the movement of large armored forces, being cut with berms, 

canals, irrigation ditches, rock quarries, and the urban precincts of Karbala. The only passable 

terrain, both for forward movement and ultimately for the division’s line of communications, 

was through the 2-mile wide gap between Karbala and the large lake referred to by the Iraqis 

as the Salt Sea, but commonly called Lake Karbala by the Americans. Intelligence analysis 

indicated that the enemy was shaping the Karbala Gap, west of the city, into an artillery and 

missile killing ground. Despite this, the terrain forced the US forces to advance through the 

gap. Accordingly, in the days before the renewal of offensive operations, V Corps made every 

effort to find and destroy all enemy weapons capable of ranging the gap.35

The nearest and best Euphrates crossing site to the Karbala Gap was northwest of Karbala 

where Route 9 crossed the river on two four lane highway bridges at Musayyib. Using this 

crossing site would be obvious to the defending Iraqis. In order to deceive them as to the true 

intentions of the US forces, V Corps devised various feints and misleading activities prior to 

the actual advance. 

As part of this strategy, V Corps directed the 3d Mechanized Division to conduct a feint 

to deceive the Iraqis as to the division’s planned Euphrates River crossing point. East of 

Karbala, a bridge crossed the Euphrates River at Hindiyah on a road that went on to Hillah, 

established next to the ruins of ancient Babylon. This bridge was designated Objective Murray. 

The real crossing site, a dual-span expressway bridge located northeast of Karbala on Route 9 

in Musayyib, was designated Objective Peach. While elements of the 101st Airborne Division 

feinted from near Najaf toward Hillah from the southwest, as a prelude to the advance on the 

Karbala Gap, the 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, would do the same from Objective Rams 

to Objective Murray. Additionally, the 2d Brigade would clear the area in front of the projected 

division advance of small enclaves of enemy soldiers.

On 30 March, the 2d Brigade moved out to clear the division front between Najaf and 

Karbala, using its two mechanized infantry task forces to clear enemy forces from rock 

quarries. Artillery and attack helicopters supported the task forces. The following day saw the 

whole V Corps in motion with various feints and air attacks designed to divert enemy attention 

from the Karbala Gap and allow for the destruction of Iraqi artillery and missile units. For 
123

the 3d Infantry Division, the main effort was the 2d Brigade’s feint to the bridge at Hindiyah, 

Objective Murray. The 2d’s mission was to drawn Iraqi units away from the main attack near 

Karbala and deceive the enemy into thinking the main crossing would occur at Hindiyah . 

Starting at 0600 on 31 March, with two mechanized task forces covering the flanks, TF 4-64th 

Armor moved down the main road through Hindiyah to the Euphrates bridge, clearing the 

town in the process, while being supported by field artillery and engineers. Resistance was 

intense, consisting of mortar and artillery fire and the ubiquitous RPGs fired from buildings 

and street corners. The defenders were a mix of irregular Fedayeen troops and elements of the 

Republican Guard Nebuchadnezzar Division’s the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry Brigade. This 

was the first encounter between the 3d Mechanized Division and elements of the Republican 

Guard. The tankers secured the west side of the Euphrates bridge in less than an hour and, 

after engineers removed demolitions from the structure, fought the enemy on the far bank for 

several additional hours. The defenders began using civilians as shields and hostages to cover 

their movements and firings. As the operation was a feint, TF 4-64 did not cross the river. 

Allowing the enemy to believe his defense had succeeded, 2d Brigade withdrew to blocking 

positions on Route 9 southeast of Hindiyah late in the afternoon. The blocking positions were 

designed to support the operations of the other two brigades the next day, as well as to deceive 

the Iraqis into expecting another attack at Hindiyah.36

Figure 43. Drive on Baghdad, 2003
124

The real attack began during the night of 1-2 April. The 1st Brigade, led by TF 3-69th Armor 

on the right and TF 2-7th Infantry on the left, advanced through the Karbala Gap, securing 

the Gap by 0700 against surprisingly light opposition. The expected resistance from the 

Republican Guard’s Medina Division did not materialize. Counterbattery fire, in coordination 

with 2d Brigade’s feint, had shattered the Iraqi missile-artillery fire ambush before it could be 

executed . Objective Muscogee, a dam/bridge complex located in the northwest corner of the 

gap, received special attention from the tank task force, while the mechanized TF fended off 

the now routine attacks of irregulars from inside the western portion of Karbala. The bridges 

and dams were seized by 0600 on 2 April and the gap was cleared before full daylight. Artillery 

and attack helicopter fires supported the advance, particularly in suppressing Iraqi artillery. 1st 

Brigade elements contained Karbala to the west as the 3d Brigade moved up on the right, in its 

now familiar role, and set up positions to contain Karbala from the east.37

The division leadership, particularly the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), Brigadier General Lloyd Austin, wanted to maintain the momentum created by the quick seizure of 

the gap and advance straight to the Euphrates bridges (Objective Peach) and cross the river. Before 0700, the 3d Brigade assumed full responsibility for containing Karbala and securing the 

gap, while the 1st Brigade prepared to advance to Objective Peach. An attached engineer brigade 

headquarters, the 937th, was also brought forward to coordinate traffic flow through the gap.38

The 1st Brigade then advanced on Objective Peach at midday on 2 April. The lead element, 

TF 3-69th Armor, reached the area of the bridge very quickly and by 1500 had secured the west 

bank of the twin span Highway 9 expressway bridges which were located north of Musayyib. 

Artillery, close air, and attack helicopters mechanized infantrymen from the 3-7th Infantry 

battalion, along with engineer troops assigned to the brigade combat team’s engineer battalion, 

crossed the river on rubber rafts to the far bank to secure the bridges before the Iraqis could 

blown them up. This attempt was only partially successful. The enemy fired the demolitions on 

the northern span before the engineers could stop them. Despite the explosion, the bridge still 

stood, though it had a big hole in its center and structural damage that caused its center to sag 

toward the river below. The southern span, however, was captured intact and soon TF 3-69th 

Armor was across. The rest of the day and night involved securing the bridgehead, defending 

it against the inevitable counterattacks on the east bank, and preparing to pass the 2d Brigade 

through the brigadehead to continue the advance.39

The 2d Brigade, fresh from its feint at Hindiyah, had the mission of following 1st Brigade 

and passing through it at Objective Peach and advancing to secure Objective Saints, on the 

south side of Baghdad. Objective Saints controlled the important intersection of Routes 1 and 

8, blocking Baghdad west of the Tigris River from the southern part of the country. Urged to 

come forward rapidly, the 2d Brigade initially tried to move to the west of Karbala rather than 

through the gap itself. While geographically shorter, this route was on soft or rugged terrain 

unfavorable to armored and wheeled vehicles. The road network was poor, muddy, and laced 

with irrigation ditches and canals. As a result, part of the brigade had to ultimately turn back 

and go through the gap after all. Delayed so, the 2d Brigade was unable to reach Objective 

Peach until early on 3 April.40

While awaiting the 2d Brigade’s arrival, the 1st Brigade, in its bridgehead positions, 

repulsed a major, well-coordinated Iraqi armored attack. The Medina Division’s 10th Armored 
125

Brigade executed perhaps the best counterattack conducted by the Iraqis in the whole campaign 

on the 2d Brigade at dawn. Despite its quality, the American defenders repulsed the attack and 

the Iraqi commander was killed.41

After the counterattack, 2d Brigade crossed to the east bank and passed through the 1st 

Brigade, leaving a mechanized TF (3-15th Infantry) behind to provide security at the bridges 

and advancing one mechanized TF (TF 1-15th Infantry) in an axis north along on the southern 

edge of Baghdad. The advance met light resistance, mostly of the paramilitary variety and 

some elements of the Nebuchadnezzar Republican Guard Division, and reached Objective 

Saints in roughly 3 hours. The mechanized infantrymen fought in the early afternoon of 3 

April to secure that objective, supported by close air and artillery fires against dug-in Iraqi 

mechanized and dismounted forces. While the fight for Objective Saints was taking place, 2d 

Brigade dispatched an armored task force (TF 4-64th Armor) to secure Highway 8 south of its 

junction with Highway 9. The remnants of the Medina Division were supposed to be in that 

area. The TF defeated and destroyed small Iraqi armored forces whose defenses were facing 

the opposite direction, apparently attributed to the success of the feints at Hindiyah. The 2d 

Brigade’s last crossing task force, TF 1-64th Armor, followed TF 1-15 Infantry to Objective 

Saints. All brigade units consolidated at Saints for the evening. Baghdad was effectively 

isolated from the south.42

After securing Objective Peach, 1st Brigade prepared to execute its on order mission of 

occupying the Saddam International Airport, codenamed Objective Lions, on the west side of 

Baghdad. The brigade began moving almost as soon as the last elements of 2d Brigade passed 

through on their way to Objective Saints. But many things were happening at once to slow up 

the 1st Brigade: 3-7th Cavalry, the division reconnaissance element, had to first pass through as 

it was to advance before the 1st Brigade to secure its left (west) flank; the brigade had to hand 

off crossing site security responsibilities first to the battalion left behind by the 2d Brigade, 

then to the divisional engineer brigade; all the brigade’s units had to assemble to cross; and 

additional engineer units were arriving to add more bridges. While the advance started on time, 

1st Brigade units were, however, strung out from the beginning of the movement and would 

arrive at the objective piecemeal rather than en masse.

43

The 1st Brigade’s advance would initially be via restrictive country roads directly north 

from the Objective Peach area to Highway 1, a major expressway running northwest to southeast 

below Baghdad. Once astride this road, brigade elements would travel down the highway to 

within a mile and a half of the Baghdad airport complex, then conduct a coordinated assault on 

the airfield. Traveling in advance of the brigade, the 3-7th Cavalry would continue down Route 

1 to its intersection with another major highway, Route 10, northwest of the airport. There the 

squadron would guard the flank of the brigade as it attacked the airport.44

Late in the afternoon of 3 April, the advance began. During the first part, the movement 

through the countryside, 1st Brigade soldiers encountered their first positive reaction from 

Iraqi civilians who cheered the passing vehicles not very far south of Baghdad. The restrictive 

terrain and a small ambush delayed the movement. Nevertheless, Highway 1 was soon met 

and the BCT initiated planned supporting fires against Objective Lions. The lead element, 

TF 3-69th Armor, arrived in the environs of the airport at a little after 2200. With the rest of 

the brigade strung out to the rear, TF 3-69 commenced the attack on its own, advancing and 
126

assaulting the southern end of the large airfield complex, attacking throughout the night of 

3-4 April. The task force secured a perimeter and repulsed counterattacks. Brigade followon elements began arriving at dawn, with TF 2-7th Infantry entering from the south and 

establishing blocking positions facing Baghdad on the eastern side of the complex. Engineers 

and other elements arrived to assist in clearing debris from the airfield. The 1st BCT cleared 

barracks, compounds, and bunkers methodically, while outside the airport, paramilitary forces 

and occasionally T-72 tanks fired at the Americans. One company-sized dismounted attack 

was repulsed mainly through the heroism of an engineer platoon sergeant who took over the 

.50 caliber machine gun mounted on a destroyed M113 APC and fired suppressive fires until 

he was mortally wounded. 1st Brigade had established a major base of operations blocking 

Baghdad from the west.45

While the 1st and 2d Brigades maneuvered against Baghdad, the 3d Brigade remained 

outside Karbala, screening the city, deflecting desultory charges from paramilitary forces and 

waiting for relief from the 101st Airborne Division. After this relief took place on 5 April, the 

brigade moved through the Objective Peach crossing site and up to 2d Brigade’s operating 

base at Objective Saints, where the brigade had all its habitually attached elements rejoined 

it for the first time since the Battle of Tallil. From Saints, the 3d BCT began executing its 

mission of isolating Baghdad from the north by advancing down Highway 1 to its junction 

with Highway 10 (Objective Montgomery), where 3-7th Cavalry had been holding off Iraqi 

attacks since late on the 3d. From Objective Montgomery, the 3d Brigade advance to the 

northeast, along the way to establish blocking positions at major roads, intersections, and then 

securing the Highway 1 bridge over the Tigris River. These positions, collectively known as 

Objective Titans, were held by the brigade until Baghdad fell. Brigade elements fought the 

Iraqis sporadically and later sent a task force to support the defenders at Objective Lions. On 

9 April Brigade elements advanced into Baghdad itself.46

Once Baghdad was isolated, the original plan was to probe the defenses of the large city 

gingerly. However, intelligence indicators, including the reactions of a captured Republican 

Guard colonel who was stunned to see American forces so close to Baghdad, showed that 

aggressiveness could possibly secure the city without a block by block fight.47 The colonel was 

captured on 5 April when the 2d Brigade sent its TF 1-64th Armor on a raid north up Route 8 

from Objective Saints into Baghdad then over to the west to Objective Lions, the now renamed 

Baghdad International Airport, and returned through the countryside to Objective Saints. The 

raid, while resisted fiercely, was also resisted erratically. No organized urban-style defense 

materialized, though one M1 tank was disabled when antitank fire hit its rear deck. With enemy 

fire not allowing the tank to be safely recovered, it was destroyed in place and abandoned, 

becoming an instant landmark. The success of the raid made a large-scale movement into 

downtown Baghdad seem very plausible.48

Accordingly, the 2d Brigade still south of the city at Objective Saints, received the 

mission to advance into the downtown districts of the city on 7 April on a brigade-sized raid. 

If successful, the raid would be transformed into a physical occupation of the center city. 

The brigade advanced in force to the center city early on the 7th, with its two tank battalion 

task forces racing into the downtown area to secure key installations, while the mechanized 

battalion task force followed to secure the supply line and key intersections. The Iraqi irregulars 
127

defending the city let the tank battalions pass after short firefights, having finally learned 

the futility of using RPGs and truck mounted machine guns against the formidable Abrams 

tank. These enemy fanatics, however, reappeared when the mechanized task force, TF 3-15th 

Infantry, moved to secure the key highway intersections between the airport and the Tigris 

River, which snaked its way through the heart of Baghdad. After a running daylight battle 

at three intersections, designated Objectives Moe, Larry, and Curly, the infantrymen totally 

routed the disorganized defenders, while the rest of the brigade completed its 12-mile advance 

into the heart of the city in 2 hours and secured key bridges, palaces, and government buildings 

in the former stronghold of Saddam’s regime. 

While the 2d Brigade advanced into downtown Baghdad, an Iraqi surface-to-surface 

missile made a direct hit on the brigade’s tactical operations center (TOC) at Saints, killing or 

wounding a number of soldiers and putting that key communications node out of action for 

2 hours. However, the flexibility of the brigade organization and its redundant command and 

control facilities allowed this hit to only have a minor impact on combat operations.49

The success of the mechanized infantrymen at securing the line of communications, 

allowing resupply into the forward elements deep in the city, transformed the 2d Brigade’s 

raid into a permanent move into downtown Baghdad. The 2d Brigade and the US Army was 

in Baghdad to stay, securing the west bank of the Tigris River. The 2d Brigade remained and 

had two more days of steadily decreasing fighting. The arrival of elements of the I MEF on the 

opposite side of the Tigris River on 9 April marked the effective end of the Saddam regime’s 

organized resistance. As Marine forces secured the east bank of the river, statues began 

toppling because the Iraqi people realized their moment of liberation had arrived.50

The 3d Mechanized Division’s masterful use of the brigade in the Iraqi war was the climax 

of over 50 years of force design at the organizational level just below division. The brigades, 

formed up with supporting and attached elements as BCTs, provided the necessary flexibility 

and fightability to execute complicated combat maneuvers, fight several different battles at the 

same time,and shift missions almost on the head of a dime. At one point the three divisional 

maneuver brigades were each fighting outside a different key Iraqi city, Nasiriyah, Samawah, 

or Najaf, which were separated by between 60 and 75 miles, on a total frontage of over 150 

miles. The ability of the brigade to disperse, then mass for operations like the Karbala-Baghdad 

drive, and its ability to fight alone or as part of the larger mix, bodes well on its future as a US 

Army organizational element.
128

NOTES

 1. Memorandum, AFOP-TR, dated 20 Nov 2001, Subject: Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) 

Integration Item 96-10, Active Component/Army National Guard (AC/ARNG) Integrated Divisions.

 2. Despite its designation, the 116th Cavalry Brigade is by organization a standard separate armored brigade with 

two tank battalions (designated cavalry battalions) and a mechanized infantry battalion. The brigade designation 

comes from an old Idaho Army National Guard unit. 

 3. Jim Caldwell, “Army Leaders Announce New Design Framework for Army XXI Heavy Division,” Army 

Communicator 23 (Summer 1998), 14. 

 4. The 4th Infantry division, as of April 2003, contained five tank battalions and four mechanized battalions. 

 5. “Army Announces Final Drawdown Plan,” Army News Service (15 January 1999), <http://www.dtic.mil/

armylink/news/Dec1998/a19981223downsize.html>. 

 6. Ibid. LCD XXI also reduced tank and mechanized battalions to three (rather than four companies) and had 

other small changes throughout divisional structure.

 7. Discussion of the BRTs is primarily based on Captain Ross F. Lightsey, “Establishing and Using the Brigade 

Reconnaissance Troop,” Infantry, (Jan-Apr 2000), 10-14.

 8. Brochure produced by the GM-BDLS Defense Group, entitled “Stryker Family of Vehicle,” in November, 

2001; Major Gregory A. Pickell, “The New Interim Brigade Combat Team: Old Wine in New Bottles?” Military 

Review 82 (May-June 2002), 71-72; Brian J. Dunn, “Equipping the Objective Force,” Military Review 82 (MayJune 2002), 29-31; Richard J. Dunn III, “Transformation: Let’s Get It Right This Time,” Parameters 31 (Spring 

2001), 22-28.

 9. Ibid. 

10. Scott R. Gourley, “Significant Events in Transformation: Stryker Battalions Enter Evaluation Phase,” Army

53 (February 2003), 65-66. General Dynamics later bought out GMC’s portion of the venture in March 2003. The 

MOH winners were PFC Stuart S. Stryker, World War II, and SP4 Robert F. Stryker, Vietnam. 

11. Ibid. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team. 

(Washington, DC: US Army, 2003), 1-14.

12. FM 3-21.31, 1-15.

13. Ibid., 1-20.

14. 3d Infantry Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Report, Final Draft, 12 May 2003, 6-3.

15. US Army Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group. On Point: The US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Draft 

Manuscript. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute, 15 August 2003), 4-87.

16. 3d Infantry Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Report, 5-5. 

17. David A. Fulghum, “The Pentagon’s Force-Transformation Director Takes an Early Swipe at What Worked 

and What Didn’t in Iraq.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 158 (28 April 2003).

18. On Point, 3-11

19. 3d Infantry Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Report, 8-2.

20. On Point, 3-35, 3-39-43, 3-45, 3-48.

21. Ibid., 3-48, 3-70, 4-16-7.

22. Ibid., 3-48, 3-85. 

23. Ibid., 3-59, 3-62.

24. Ibid., 3-61-2.

25. Ibid., 3-80-1. 

26. Ibid., 4-17.

27. Ibid., 4-17-9.

28. Ibid., 4-59-62

29. Ibid., 4-23-5; Sean Naylor, Sean, “‘Like Apocalypse Now’ 7th Cavalry Squadron Runs Gauntlet of Iraqi Fire 

During Its Longest Day,” Army Times, 7 April 2003, 14-16.

30. On Point, 4-63-4.

31. Ibid., 4-10-11.

32. Ibid., 4-69-70, 5-12. V Corps was holding the 101st back for use in isolating Baghdad; the 82d’s brigade was 

the theater reserve. 

33. 3d Infantry Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Report, xi-xix.

34. On Point, 5-6.
129

35. Ibid., 5-4-6. 

36. Ibid., 5-19-20, 5-19-24-26. 

37. Ibid., 5-52.

38. Ibid., 5-53.

39. Engineers would quickly rig the northern bridge so it could be used and install as float bridge next to it, 

minimizing the effects of the demolition. On Point, 5-55. 

40. Ibid., 5-60.

41. Ibid., 5-61.

42. Ibid., 5-61-63.

43. Ibid., 5-65-66.

44. Ibid., 5-66. The Highway 10/Highway 1 intersection was codenamed Objective Montgomery. 

45. Ibid., 5-66-68, 5-72-73. 

46. Ibid., 5-82, 5- 87

47. John Diamond and Dave Moniz. “Iraqi Colonel’s Capture Sped Up Taking of City.” USA TODAY, 9 April 

2003.

48. On Point, 6-17-18.

49. Ibid., 6-31-33.

50. Ibid., 6-51, 6-8-9. 6-22, 6-34-6
CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE BRIGADE 

Conclusion 

The maneuver brigade is as viable a fighting formation in 2004 as it was in 1775. The 

combined arms brigade of the Revolutionary War soon gave way to a pure formation throughout 

the 19th and early 20th centuries. But combined arms returned with the adoption of the combat 

command task force concept for the new ROAD brigade in 1963 and its evolutionary ancestors, 

the AOE brigade, the 2003 BCT, and the 2004 UA Brigade, making the brigade, operating as 

part of a division or apart from a division, the true fulcrum for maneuver and firepower. 

Before World War I, the brigade was the basic unit through which US commanders fought 

their armies. The reason for this was a historically poor replacement system. The replacement 

system allowed regiments to wane in strength. Brigades had to remain of a size suitable for 

command by a general officer and were maintained not by a state government, but by the 

Army. Therefore, they did not wane. Instead brigades were simply reorganized with more, but 

smaller regiments. Throughout the 19th century, a commander could expect that the brigades 

he would maneuver would be roughly 2,000 soldiers, no matter the state of his replacement 

system or the size of his regiments. 

World War I saw the organization of the first permanent fixed brigades. The large size of 

the World War I square division, its organic brigades, and its design for use in trench warfare, 

saw the flexibility and maneuverability of the brigade wane. When the division was redesigned 

to fight in World War II, the brigade echelon was deleted completely, with the regiment taking 

over its former role. 

However, modern armored warfare with its fluid movements and mission-oriented tactics, 

saw the adoption of the combat command in lieu of the regiment or brigade as the tactical 

headquarters between battalion and division levels in the armored division. The combat 

command concept—a flexible headquarters without any troops of its own except those 

temporarily assigned to execute specific missions—proved a highly successful way to execute 

armored operations. 

In 1963, the Army adopted the combat command concept across the board, enlarged it and 

renamed the unit with the more traditional title of brigade. This brigade, controlling attached 

maneuver battalions and supported by combat support and service support units from the 

division, has remained ever since. 

During the recent war in Iraq, the brigade played a prominent role as the basic maneuver 

unit. At one time, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) was fighting three separate battles 

on three fronts, spread over a large geographical expanse. Each battle was directed by a 

reinforced brigade. The division maneuvered by employing its brigades as separate entities 

working in coordination. For example, when the 3d maneuvered to simultaneously bypass both 

Samawah and Najaf, cities about 50 miles apart, one brigade contained Samawah, while the 

other two maneuvered to surround Najaf. Once relieved at Samawah, the brigade there in turn 

moved around the other two brigades to advance an additional 50 miles beyond Najaf toward 

Karbala. Upon their own relief, the other two brigades moved up to Karbala from outside 

Najaf to participate in the operations to seize Baghdad. In the subsequent direct advance on 

131 
Baghdad, one brigade contained Karbala, one secured the Euphrates River crossing site, and 

the third passed through to advance onto Baghdad. After being relieved at the crossing site, the 

brigade there then passed through the advance brigade and secured the Baghdad airport. The 

commander of the 3d Mechanized Division continually rotated or flip-flopped his brigades to 

maintain initiative with fresh troops, while at the same time providing security and protection 

along a narrow axis of advance and long supply line, while simultaneously containing several 

major urban areas until follow-on troops could take over that mission. 

The jury is still out on the effectiveness or reality of the combat aviation brigade as a 

maneuver brigade. While the Army considers it so, there are no real historical examples of 

the brigade being used in actual combat as a maneuver force, except to lay down fires, a task 

that division artillery and field artillery brigades also do quite well, with no claim of being a 

maneuver element.1 During the 2003 Iraqi War, the 3d Infantry Division’s Aviation Brigade 

retained this role, while also performing some limited reconnaissance and security missions 

for the division. 

The Future of the Brigade: Stryker Brigades and Units of Action 

In the last few years several military theorists, most notably Colonels Douglas MacGregor 

and John Brinkerhoff, have urged the Army to reorganize itself with the brigade as its basic 

tactical unit, rather than the division. MacGregor compares the division to the unwieldy, 

though highly successful, phalanxes of ancient Greece and favors a more flexible design based 

on the brigade. One of the oft-cited points is that European armies, particularly the German 

Bundeswehr, are organized on a brigade basis, with the division as primarily a command and 

control headquarters. However, this ignores the small size of the German army and its focus on 

fighting in central Europe.2

 MacGregor and Brinkerhoff would both place the brigade directly 

under a corps headquarters, deleting the division echelon of command completely from the 

force structure.3 As will be seen below, the division has remained, at least for the foreseeable 

future, even as brigades assume more independent roles and missions. 

The future of the brigade and division and which will be the Army’s organizational building 

block, may well depend upon the size and future missions of the force. And even before the 

advent of the UA/UEx (unit of action/unit of employment) concept in 2003, explained below, 

while the division was still the primary unit, the brigade had, in any event, assumed many 

independent roles formerly associated primarily with the division. Size considerations after 

the drawdown had basically already converted the Army National Guard into a brigade-based 

force. Stationing considerations for the active force resulted in almost a third of the brigades, 

8 out of 31, being either separate by design or detached from their parent division. The SBCT 

program virtually ignored the division in its organizational development, and the almost 

universal application of the BCT concept means, in many respects, that the US Army was 

already a brigade-based force. 

The brigade’s future as a key Army organizational element seems assured by its key role 

as the UA in the Army’s Future Force program, originally called the Objective Force. This 

program, initially an extension of the Stryker Brigade, or “interim,” program, is a long-term 

force development initiative aimed at the development and fielding of a Future Force, or final 

developmental force, capable of employing technological advances to accomplish military 

132 
objectives in a joint environment in the 21st century. As part of this force development 

initiative, the Army focused on two levels of unit deployment packages, a force called the Unit 

of Employment , typically of division size, but capable of being army or corps in size, and a 

brigade-sized element, the Unit of Action. 

While the UEx concept shows many innovative shifts from current divisional doctrine and 

organization, including an emphasis on tailorability, being able to command forces from other 

services, jointness, and a capability to command a theater operation or a portion of a theater 

operation, the UA falls in well with previous brigade force design concepts. 

The brigade-sized UA is considered modular in design, with subunits and capabilities 

being added or subtracted based on mission, environment, and other factors.4 In this respect, 

the UA meshes exactly with all brigade organizational schemes employed by the Army 

since the adoption of the ROAD brigade in 1963 and is, in fact, an extension of the current 

informal, but virtually universal use of BCTs. The first designed UA was an outgrowth of the 

Stryker Brigade Program. The Stryker Brigade UA was organized as a high-technological 

unit employing advances in digital communications and armored combat vehicles, not yet 

developed, with a quick deployment capability. Though modular in design concept, the Army’s 

Objective Force Task Force developed a basic organizational structural design for the UA 

brigade, illustrated in Figure 44. 

Figure 44. UA Brigade Design5 

133 
The brigade, as configured doctrinally, contained three combined arms battalions, composed 

of two infantry companies mounted in a Stryker wheeled, armored or a follow-on vehicle, a 

similarly mounted company-sized reconnaissance detachment, mortar battery, and a mobile 

gun company equipped with a armored gun Stryker wheeled or follow-on vehicle system.6 In a 

departure from previous organizations, the logistical element of the brigade, a forward support 

battalion, would contain its own organic security element and the reconnaissance element 

would contain two air cavalry troops.7

The desired missions for the Stryker UA Brigade are outlined below:

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the new revised Stryker Brigade UA was organized 

with an additional maneuver battalion called the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target 

Acquisition Squadron or RSTA. Under the UA implementation plan established in 2004 

(discussed below), one maneuver battalion will be deleted from all UA maneuver brigades, 

except the Stryker UA, which would retain three combined arms battalions along with the 

RSTA squadron.

The development of the UA, first with the Stryker Brigades, then across the board to all 

Army brigades, light and heavy, and its establishment as the smallest combined arms unit 

that can be committed independently, is a direct evolutionary advance in the history of the 

maneuver brigade from its predecessors, the AOE brigade, the ROAD brigade, and the combat 

command. Its use as the new basic maneuver unit of the Army, with the UEx division becoming 

more a controlling headquarters and facilitating force, harkens back to the earliest days of the 

US Army, when Washington used his brigades as the basic maneuver unit of the Army. 

Table 19. Projected Stryker Unit of Action Missions8

In early 2004 the Army announced plans to adopt the UA concept Armywide. The concept 

extended the idea of modularity to mean that the brigades needed to be self-contained and as 

identical in structure as possible, so that they could be shifted between controlling divisions 

and missions as necessary. While divisions will continual as operational headquarters, usually 

controlling four maneuver brigades, in essence the Army redesign concepts for the 21st century, 

replace the division as the basic tactical unit with a “brigade-based modular Army.”9 The 

current mix of light brigades (infantry, light infantry, airborne, air assault) and heavy brigades 

134 
(armored and mechanized infantry) will be transformed into three basic types by the end of 

the conversion process: heavy (from the former armored and mechanized infantry brigades), 

medium (the new Stryker brigade combat teams created from former light infantry divisional 

brigades), and light (from the remaining light, airborne and air assault brigades). The modular 

concept of interchangeability shuns specialized units. The formerly specialized air assault and 

airborne brigades will remain specialized, while at the same time being reorganized identical 

with the other light UA brigades.10 The projected goal, as this work goes to press, is the 

creation of four brigades with the equivalent combat power, out of the division’s previous three 

maneuver brigades, and to standardize all divisional aviation brigades.11 To do this, the new 

brigades have been reduced from three maneuver battalions to two, but a cavalry squadron, 

RSTA, will replace the former brigade recon troop. Army leadership contended that the new, 

smaller brigades would have greater, up to one and a half times, the combat power than the 

previous, larger brigades. The creation of more, though smaller brigades, would increase the 

flexibility at the operational level by allowing brigade rotations and deployments based on 

personnel replacement cycles done by unit rather than by individual.12 The new brigades most 

resemble in organization the combat commands in the light armored division in World War 

II, which, in typical organization, included a single tank battalion, a single armored infantry 

battalion, and a single armored field artillery battalion. This smaller structure had been 

maintained in the armored division up until the adoption of the ROAD brigades in 1963.13 To 

make the brigades modular, each heavy brigade (armored and mechanized infantry) and each 

light brigade (infantry, light infantry, airborne, air assault) is to be organized similarly. The 

brigades would be capable of working under any division headquarters.14 In a new concept, 

long debated within the Army, the two maneuver battalions in the heavy UA brigade are to be 

organized as a combined arms organizations, with two tank, two mechanized infantry, and one 

engineer companies. This made each maneuver battalion similar in organization. The eight 

maneuver companies organized in two battalions reflected well with the typical predecessor 

AOE brigade, which had nine maneuver companies organized in three battalions. The addition 

of three reconnaissance troops in the RSTA actually gives the new brigade (if the AOE recon 

troop is included) a net gain of one maneuver company in the heavy UA brigade over its 

immediate predecessor. This organization is depicted in Figure 45.15 

The divisional aviation brigade would also be standardized. Each brigade would consist 

of two attack helicopter battalions with 24 Apache attack helicopters each, an assault aviation 

battalion with 30 UH-60 Blackhawk light utility helicopters, a medium company of eight CH-47 

medium cargo helicopters, a command and control helicopter company with eight Blackhawks, 

organic aviation maintenance, and a unit, probably designated as a company, of unmanned 

aerial vehicles.16 Division would come to resemble the integrated divisions. Previous practice 

saw different sized AH-64 and UH-60 battalions in aviation brigades in different divisions. 

This reorganization of the aviation brigade into the modular configuration, however, still 

retains the dichotomy found in previous such organizations—on the one hand it controls 

maneuver fighting elements such as the attack helicopter battalions, and on the other 

administrative/support elements, such as the assault and medium aviation battalions and 

companies. The desire to consolidate all aviation assets into one organization creates this 

duality and continues the debate into the future as to whether the aviation brigade is a true 

maneuver element or an administrative one like the division artillery headquarters. 

135 
Figure 46. Modular Divisional Aviation Brigade, 2004

Figure 45. Heavy UA Brigade, 2004

136 
The reorganization of the divisional aviation brigade also reflects the concept Army force 

developers called modularity. As with the maneuver brigades, a divisional aviation brigade 

could fight under any division headquarters.17 

When the modular brigade redesign is completed in 2007, the reshuffling of maneuver 

assets into the UA brigades will result in the creation of 15 new brigades in the active Army 

and the transformation of the 15 enhanced Army National Guard brigades into 22 UA BCTs. 

While the brigade has been a very flexible organization in its own structure since the creation of 

the first ROAD brigades in the early 1960s, the UA brigade, with its interchangeable, modular 

structure, will add a level of flexibility at the operational and strategic levels as well. For the 

first time since George Washington’s reorganization in 1778, the brigade will be the Army’s 

basic tactical combined arms unit. With the transformation of the division into essentially a 

controlling headquarters, the Army’s future, as has been much of its past, clearly belongs to 

the brigade. 

As this study concludes, it should be noted that there have been no recent historical 

examples to support the need for or desirability change the structure of the brigade. The 

latest military operations, particularly the 2003 Iraqi campaign, tend to validate the flexibly 

Figure 47. Army Brigade Restructuring, 2004

137 
organized ROAD/AOE style BCT. At no time were brigades broken up into smaller units to 

add flexibility to maneuver. Under the AOE concept, the modular elements are the combat 

and combat support battalions and companies, not brigades. In the 2003 campaign, the 3d 

Infantry Division (Mechanized) commander had the capability to organize his brigades by 

their particular missions, a capability he used often. It remains to be seen whether the UA 

brigades will provide similar flexibility while adding flexibility at levels above brigade. For a 

historical example of the Army’s use of a similarly sized unit at the brigade level, the armored 

division combat command which lasted from 1943 to 1963, was similarly organized to the 

new UA brigade, with a battalion each of infantry, tanks, and field artillery. The adoption of 

the combined arms maneuver battalion in the UA brigade, permanently organized as it fights, 

is the most revolutionary change in the brigade since the adoption of ROAD in 1963.The UA 

brigades may, due to their additional numbers, provide a flexibility to Army operations at a 

level higher than that of the AOE brigades, enhancing the rotation of brigade-level units and 

allowing for a unit replacement personnel system keyed into the brigade level rather than the 

individual. Level as was done previously With additional brigades, some units can be allowed 

to be unready as they take in an influx of new soldiers. The lessons for this will be those of the 

future rather than those of past history of the brigade. 

138 
NOTES 

1. The 10th Mountain Division’s Aviation Brigade was used as a command and control headquarters in 

the Mogidishu peacekeeping operation from August 1993 to February 1994. The brigade, which was heavily 

augmented, controlled two infantry battalions, an assault aviation battalion, and a forward support battalion, the 

46th, apparently activated in anticipation of the division activating a third brigade, which it never did, and the 

forward support battalion was inactivated in 1993, and armored and mechanized elements from the 24th ID (M). 

See Colonel Lawrence E. Casper, “The Aviation Brigade as a Maneuver Headquarters,” Army 45 (March 1995), 

20-23. 

2. Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 

Kansas, 2001), 261-63.

 3. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, (Westport, 

CT: Praeger, 1997), 68-69, 227; John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Brigade-Based New Army,” Parameters (Autumn 

1997), 62. 

4. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-90, O&O, The United States Army 

Objective Force Operational and Organizational Plan for Maneuver Unit of Action, TRADOC, dated 22 July 2002, 

25. 

5. Ibid., 26-47. 

6. Ibid., 33-40. 

7. Ibid., 41, 47. Recent plans to modularize the Army brigade would indicate that this Stryker brigade model will 

lose one of its combined arms battalions.

 8. Lieutenant General John M. Riggs, “Building an Army... FCS [Future Combat Systems] as Part of the 

Objective Force,” briefing dated 9 November 2001, US Army Objective Force Task Force, slide 6R.

 9. Ann Roosevelt, “Army Chief Approves Major Aviation Restructuring,” Defense Daily (January 30, 2004), 

4. The redesign into four smaller maneuver brigades and an aviation brigade does bare more than a passing 

resemblance to the Pentomic redesign of the 1950s, with its five small subordinate elements. 

10. Jim Garamore, “Army to Restructure, Will Grow by 30,000,” American Forces Information Service News 

Articles (January 29, 2004); Roosevelt, 5. 

11. The fourth maneuver brigade headquarters would come from conversion of the divisional engineer brigade 

headquarters. 

12. SFC Marcia Triggs, “New CSA Vision: More Brigades—Smaller But Lethal, “ Army News Service (October 

8, 2003); Jon R. Anderson, Army Studies Forming Careerlong Brigades,” Stars and Stripes (February 17, 1004) 

13. Of course, the original concept for the combat command was to only have two of them in the armored division, 

making each somewhat larger. However, in practice, the Reserve Command became a third combat command. This 

structure was formalized after the war as mentioned in the section of the text dealing with the combat command. 

14. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “New Model Army,” Wall Street Journal (February 3, 2004); Rowan Scarborough, 

“Major Overhaul Eyed for Army: Schoomaker Crafts Retooling,” Washington Times (February 3, 2004), 1; 

Garamore. 

15. Elaine M. Grossman, “Army Eyes ‘Joint Fire Control Teams to ‘Enable’ Lighter Troops,” Inside the Pentagon, 

(January 29, 2004), 1; Schoomaker, 1. 

16. Ann Roosevelt, 4. 

17. Ibid. 

139 
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150 
GLOSSARY

AAA antiaircraft artillery 

AAsslt air assault 

AC active component 

ACCB air cavalry combat brigade 

ACR armoed cavalry regiment 

AD armored division 

ADA air defense artillery; branch of Army responsible for tactical and 

operational defense against air attack 

AEF American Expeditionary Force 

AGS assault gun system 

air assault units moved into battle via helicopter 

airborne units moved into battle via aircraft, usually synonymous with 

paratroopers 

airmobile units moved into battle via helicopter (term used between 1965

 and 1974) 

ANGB Air National Guard Base 

AOE Army of Excellence 

AO area of operation 

APC armored personnel carrier 

armored units composed of elements mounted in armored tracked vehicles; 

tank units 

ARNG Army National Guard 

Arty artillery (term used between 1957 and 1972 when field artillery

 and air defense artillery were one branch) 

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

assault aviation units equipped with light utility helicopters, designed to

 land combat troops under fire 

assault support aviation units equipped with medium utility helicopters, designed

 to land combat troops and equipment, usually not under fire 

AT antitank 

ATP ammunition transfer point 

battalion a unit of roughly 500 soldiers composed of companies and commanded by a lieutenant colonel; in regimental organizations 

with only one battalion (before 1898), virtually synonymous with

 term regiment 

battery lettered company-sized unit in the artillery 

BCT brigade combat team 

Bde brigade 

BG battle group (1957-1963) 

BMMC brigade materiel management center 

Bn battalion 

151 
brevet 

brigade 

BRT 

BSA 

BSB 

Bundeswehr 

CAB (H) 

CAB (L) 

CARS 

Cav cavalry 

CCA 

CCB 

CCC 

CCR 

CD 

CENTCOM 

CFV 

CMH 

Co 

COHORT 

COLT 

Combat Command 

company 

component 

CONARC 

corps 

COSVN 

CS 

CSC 

CSG 

CSI 

CSS 

152 

system of honorary promotions used in US Army before1914 

unit of either regiments or battalions of roughly 3,000 soldiers,

 commanded by either a brigadier general or colonel 

brigade reconnaissance troop 

brigade support area 

brigade support battalion 

Army of the Federal Republic of Germany 

combined arms battalion (heavy) 

combined arms battalion (light) 

Combat Arms Regimental System 

reconnaissance troops; troops mounted on horses (before1943) 

Combat Command A 

Combat Command B 

Combat Command C 

Combat Command Reserve 

cavalry division 

Central Command 

cavalry fighting vehicle, M3Bradley 

US Army Center of Military History 

company 

Cohesion, Operational Readiness, Training; US Army program of 

the1980s-1990s which trained company-sized units of soldiers 

together and retained them as a unit throughout their Army term

 of enlistment 

Combat Observation Laser Team 

task organized command found in US Army armored divisions 

from 942 to 1963 

lettered unit composed of platoon, of roughly 100 soldiers, com-

 manded by a captain 

major subdivisions of the Army-active component (Regular 

Army and nonregular soldiers on active duty) and the reserve

 components-Army Reserve and Army National Guard 

US Army’s Continental Army Command 

large units consisting of divisions and designated by Roman

 numeral identifiers (since 1917) 

Central Office for South Vietnam 

combat support; units whose function is to directly support 

combat units, such as engineers, signal troops, military police,

 and military intelligence 

combat support company 

corps support group 

Combat Studies Institute 

combat service support; logistics support units such as supply,

 maintenance, transportation 
direct support support unit placed in exclusive support of a specific unit, while

 not being technically assigned to it 

DISCOM Division Support Command 

DIVARTY division artillery 

Division unit consisting of brigades or regiments, with a strength of 

between 10,000 and 20,000 soldiers, typically commanded by a 

major general 

dragoon mounted infantry (term replaced in US Army in 1861when dragoons

 became part of the cavalry) 

DRB division ready brigade 

DRS Division Restructuring Study 

DSC Distinguished Service Cross 

DZ drop zone; designated point for paratroopers to be airdropped 

eHSB enhanced heavy separate brigade 

EOY end of year 

eSB enhanced separate brigade 

EXFOR experimental force 

FA field artillery; branch of Army responsible for providing fire support (cannons, rockets, missiles) to support the Army in the field 

FASCO forward area support coordination officer 

FAST forward area support team 

FAV fast attack vehicle 

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

FCS Future Combat Systems 

Field Force corps-sized headquarters used in Vietnam 

FM field manual 

force structure the design and structural organization of the Army 

FROG free rocket over ground 

FSB fire support base; forward support battalion 

FSSE forward service support element 

functional a combat service support unit with only one type of function

 (a transportation company, a supply company, etc.) 

GHQ general headquarters 

GMG grenade machine gun 

Group Army organization, commanded by a colonel, consisting of non-

 organic subordinate battalions, 

HHC headquarters and headquarters company 

HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle; replaced jeep and 

 other vehicles in Army in 1980s 

HQ/HQs headquarters 

HTLD High Technology Light Division 

153 
HTMD High Technology Motorized Division 

HTTB High Technology Test Bed 

IA Operations officer 

IAP International Airport 

IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team renamed Stryker Brigade Combat 

Team (SBCT) 

ID, ID (M) infantry division; infantry division (mechanized) 

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force 

Joint a military operation or organization in which the forces come 

from more than one armed service, such as the Army and the Air 

Force 

KTO Kuwaiti Theater of Operations 

LAB light attack battalion 

LAV land assault vehicle 

LCD XXI Limited Conversion Division XXI 

legion brigade-sized unit consisting of infantry, artillery and cavalry, used 

 by the Army briefly in the 1790s 

LOGPAC logistics package (consolidated convoy of logistics resupply) 

LST landing ship, tank 

LW Landwehr- in World War I (a category of German reservist troops) 

LZ landing zone (for helicopter-borne troops) 

maneuver combat troops capable of maneuvering against enemy forces on 

the battlefield-usually refers to infantry, cavalry, and tank units 

and sometimes attack helicopter units 

MARCENT US Marine Corps Central Command 

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade; US Marine Corps organization 

consisting of an infantry regiment reinforced with support

 elements including tactical air (fixed wing) 

Mech Mechanized (infantry); mechanical; shorthand term used to indicate

 a mechanized infantry unit 

mechanized troops mounted on tracked vehicles 

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force; US Marine command roughly 

equivalent to a corps, consisting of a division (sometimes two) 

reinforced with various assets including tactical air 

MG machine gun 

MGS mobile gun system 

MI military intelligence 

MMC also DMMC, BMMC; Materiel Management Center; Division 

Materiel Management Center; Brigade Materiel Management

 Center 

154 
MOS Military Occupational Specialty 

Mot motorized; on wheels; not mech 

MRF Mobile Riverine Force 

multifunctional combat service support units organized to do various CSS functions 

NA National Army 

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NVA North Vietnamese army 

Obj objective 

OPCON operational control 

OPFOR opposing force 

ORC Organized Reserve Corps 

ord ordnance; branch of the Army responsible for ammunition and

 maintenance 

PATRIOT Phased Array Tracking Radar Intercept On Target 

PDF Panamanian Defense Force 

pentomic Army organizational structure used from 1957 to 1963 which had 

 five battle groups subordinate to infantry divisions in lieu of 

regiments or brigades 

PL phaseline 

Platoon, plt Army unit of about 30 soldiers led by a lieutenant 

POW prisoner of war 

RC Reserve Components (the Army National Guard and Army

 Reserve) 

RCT regimental combat team 

RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany; annual exercise where Army units 

from the continental United States practiced deploying to Central 

Europe, begun in ate 1960s when 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) redeployed to United States, leaving one brigade in Germany 

Regiment Army unit commanded by colonel traditionally consisting of 

subordinate companies or battalions (partially after 1861 and 

totally after 1898); after 1957 purely an administrative entity 

(with several exceptions such as the ACR); regiments are usually 

referred to by branch without the regimental designation: 3d 

Infantry instead of 3d Infantry Regiment 

Reserve in World War I (a category of unit in the German army initially

 made up of reservist personnel) 

rgt, regt regiment 

RIF reconnaissance-in-force (operation conducted in Vietnam when

 the enemy’s location was not known) 

155 
ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Division; Army organization 

adopted in 1963 which restored the brigade as the major subordinate unit of the division 

ROCID Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division; official name of

 the Pentomic division concept 

roundout program where RC units filled out AC force structure 

RPG Rocket-propelled grenade launcher; a very common Soviet-made 

short-range shoulder fired antitank rocket launcher; unlike the 

US LAW, the RPG was reloadable; the latest version was the 

RPG-7 

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

Salv salvage 

SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team 

separate a unit not an organic component of any higher unit 

signal communications branch of the Army 

Spt support 

squadron battalion-sized unit in the cavalry 

SROTC Senior Reserve Officer’s Training Course 

SWA Southwest Asia (i.e., the Persian Gulf region) 

TAOR tactical area of responsibility 

team company-sized combined arms force formed on a temporary

 basis 

TF task force; battalion-sized combined arms force formed on a 

temporary basis; in World War II also sometimes used for largersized such forces 

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

TOE table of organization and equipment 

TOW highly effective antitank guided missile (ATGM) used in US 

Army in 1970s to present 

TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

trains company and battalion CSS assets pooled together for self-defense

 and operations 

TRICAP triple capability; experimental US Army division 1971-1975 

troop company-sized unit in the cavalry 

UA Unit of Action 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UE, UEx, UEy Unit of Employment Doctrinally, the acronyms UEx and UEy 

have supplanted UE. UEx indicates a deployable unit of 

employment at the division or corps level, while UEy indicates a 

deployable unit of empoyment at levels higher than corps 

156 
UK United Kingdom 

USAC United States Army Corps 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

USAREUR United States Army, Europe 

USARF United States Army Reserve Forces; designation used for Army

 reserve school units 

USARS United States Army Regimental System 

VC Viet Cong 

VHF very high frequency; type of radios used by aviation and higher 

 headquarters organizations 

Volksgrenadier honorific designation given some low grade German divisions

 near end of World War II 

Volunteers component of the Army before 1917, in which individuals and 

units were formed to fight specific wars or campaigns, with most

 units formed on a state basis 

157 
APPENDIXES

158 
159
Appendix 1 

DIVISIONAL VERSUS SEPARATE BRIGADES 

The major differences between separate brigades and divisional brigades since the 

introduction of ROAD in 1963, and continued under AOE are as follows: 

Divisional Brigade 

Commander Colonel 

Maneuver Forces Two to five attached battalions 

Reconnaissance Troops Organic brigade recon troop 

(in heavy brigades) 

Combat Support Attached MI company, signal 

company; direct support 

engineer battalion/company, 

field artillery battalion, ADA 

battery 

Combat Service Support Forward support battalion in 

direct support 

The difference between the support battalions are as follows: 

Materiel Management Center 

Support Operations Section 

Admin Company 

Supply and Transportation 

Company 

Medical Company 

Maintenance Company 

Divisional Forward 

Support Battalion 

None at division-level 

In headquarters company 

None 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Separate Brigade 

Brigadier General 

Two to five organic 

battalions 

Organic armored cavalry 

troop 

Organic engineer company, 

MI company, signal 

company, field artillery 

battalion, ADA battery 

Organic support battalion 

Separate Brigade 

Support Battalion 

BMMC in headquarters 

company 

None 

Organic; later attached as a 

separate personnel service 

company 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

159 
Appendix 2 

BRIGADE COLORS

War

War

Civil 

Spanish-American 

161
World War I/Interwar (Square Division)

World War II (Armored Division Combat Command)

162
Current (Since 1963) 

Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized 

Armored & Cavalry 

163
Cavalry & Aviation

164
Appendix 3

WORLD WAR I AND INTERWAR INFANTRY BRIGADES

Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

1st Infantry Brigade 16th 18th 1st Jun 1917-1939 Lineage to current 1st 

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 

2d Infantry Brigade 26th 28th 1st Jun 1917-1939 Lineage to current 2d Brigade, 

1st Infantry Division 

3d Infantry Brigade 9th 23d 2d Oct 1917-1939 Lineage to current 3d Brigade, 

2d Infantry Division 

4th Infantry Brigade 1st 20th 2d Oct 1920-1939 4th Brigade in WW1 

consisted of two USMC 

Regiments; Lineage to current 

2d Brigade, 2d Infantry 

Division 

5th Infantry Brigade 4th 7th 3d Jan 1918-Oct 1939 Lineage to current 2d Brigade, 

3d Infantry Division 

6th Infantry Brigade 30th 38th 3d Jan 1918-Oct 1939 Lineage to current 3d Brigade, 

3d Infantry Division 

7th Infantry Brigade 39th 47th 4th Dec 1917-1921 Inactivated 1921 

1927-1939 7th Division 1927-1933; 47th 

replaced by 29th after 1927; 

Lineage to current 2d Brigade, 

4th Infantry Division 

8th Infantry Brigade 58th 59th 4th Dec 1917-Oct 1939 Lineage to current 3d Brigade, 

8th 22d 1922-1940 4th Infantry Division 

9th Infantry Brigade 60th 61st 5th Dec 1917-1921 Inactivated 1921 

1922-1939 8th Division 1927-1933; 

Lineage to current 1st 

Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 

10th Infantry Brigade 6th 11th 5th Dec 1917-Oct 1939 Lineage to current 2d Brigade, 

10th 1922-1939 5th Infantry Division 

11th Infantry Brigade 51st 52d 6th Dec 1917-1921 Inactivated 1921 

1922-1939 9th Division 1927-1933 

designation later used by 

Vietnam era brigade and 

current 1st Brigade, 6th 

Infantry Division 

165 
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

12th Infantry Brigade 53d 54th 6th Nov 1917-Oct 1939 Lineage to current 2d Brigade, 

2d 6th 1922-1939 6th Infantry Division 

13th Infantry Brigade 55th 56th 7th Dec 1917-1921 Inactivated 1921 

53d 54th 1922-1939 47th replaced 53d after 1927; 

Lineage to current 2d Brigade, 

7th Infantry Division 

14th Infantry Brigade 34th 64th 7th Dec 1917-1940 Lineage to current 3d Brigade, 

7th Infantry Division 

3d 17th 1922-1940 6th Division 1927-1933 

15th Infantry Brigade 12th 62d 8th Jan 1918-Feb 1919 Inactivated 1921; Lineage 

to current 2d Brigade, 8th 

Infantry Division 

16th Infantry Brigade 8th 13th 8th Dec 1917-Nov 1918 

12th 34th 1923-1927 4th Infantry Division 1927-

1933-1940 1933; Lineage to current 3d 

Brigade, 8th Infantry Division 

17th Infantry Brigade 45th 67th 9th Dec 1917-Feb 1919 

36th 37th Inactivated 1921; Lineage 

to current 2d Brigade, 9th 

Infantry Division 

18th Infantry Brigade 46th 68th 9th Jun 1918-Feb 1919 

5th 13th 1923-1927 5th Infantry Division 1927-

1933-1940 1933; Lineage to current 3d 

Brigade, 9th Infantry Division 

19th Infantry Brigade 41st 69th 10th Aug 1918-Feb 1919 

14th 65th Panama 1919-1927 65th in Puerto Rico 

Canal 

20th Infantry Brigade 20th 70th 10th Aug 1918-Feb 1919 

33d 42d Panama 1919-1927 

Canal 

21st Infantry Brigade 17th 71st 11th Aug 1918-Feb 1919 

19th 21st Hawaiian 1921-1941 24th Infantry Division 

166
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

22d Infantry Brigade 63d 72d 

27th 35th 

23d Infantry Brigade 36th 73d 

44th 57th 

24th Infantry Brigade 42d 74th 

45th 31st 

25th Infantry Brigade 1st 75th 

26th Infantry Brigade 44th 76th 

27th Infantry Brigade 10th 77th 

28th Infantry Brigade 40th 78th 

29th Infantry Brigade 43d 79th 

30th Infantry Brigade 57th 80th 

31st Infantry Brigade 21st 81st 

32d Infantry Brigade 32d 82d 

33d Infantry Brigade 5th 83d 

34th Infantry Brigade 29th 84th 

35th Infantry Brigade 19th 85th 

36th Infantry Brigade 35th 86th 

37th Infantry Brigade 14th 87th 

38th Infantry Brigade 2d 88th 

39th Infantry Brigade 48th 89th 

40th Infantry Brigade 50th 90th 

11th Sep 1918-Feb 1919 

Hawaiian 1921-1941 25th Infantry Division 

12th Aug 1918-Jan 1919 

Philippine 1921-1941 44th not manned and Division 

(44th 1931-1942) triangularized 1941; Brigade 

inactivated Apr 1941 

12th Aug 1918-Jan 1919 

Philippine 1921-1930 44th not manned 

13th Aug 1918-Mar 1919 

13th Aug 1918-Mar 1919 

14th Jul 1918-Feb 1919 

14th Jul 1918-Feb 1919 

15th Sep 1918-Feb 1919 Currently designation used by 

HI ARNG brigade 

15th Sep 1918-Feb 1919 

16th Sep 1918-Feb 1919 

16th Sep 1918-Feb 1919 

17th Sep 1918-Feb 1919 

17th Jan 1919-Feb 1919 

18th Aug 1918-Feb 1919 

18th Aug 1918-Feb 1919 

19th Oct 1918-Jan 1919 

19th Oct 1918-Jan 1919 

20th Oct 1918-Feb 1919 

20th Oct 1918-Feb 1919 

167
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

51st Infantry Brigade 101st 102d 26th Aug 1917-Apr 1919 MA, CT, RI, NH, VT, ME 

Army National Guard 

101st 182d 1921-1941 MA Army National Guard 

164th 182d 1941-1942 (Americal Officially became HHC, 

Division May 1942) Americal Division, 1 May 

1943; 132d Infantry arrived 

May 1942 

52d Infantry Brigade 103d 104th 26th Aug 1917-Apr 1919 MA, CT, RI, NH, VT, ME 

Army National Guard 

181st 104th 1923-1941 MA Army National Guard 

53d Infantry Brigade 105th 106th 27th Oct 1917-Apr 1919 NY Army National Guard 

1921-1940 

54th Infantry Brigade 107th 108th 27th Oct 1917-Apr 1919 NY Army National Guard 

1921-1940 

55th Infantry Brigade 109th 110th 28th Sep 1917-May 1919 PA Army National Guard; 

1921-1941 Designation used by current 

55th Brigade, 28th Infantry 

Division 

56th Infantry Brigade 111th 112th 28th Sep 1917-May 1919 PA Army National Guard; 

1921-1941 Designation used by current 

56th Brigade, 28th Infantry 

Division 

57th Infantry Brigade 113th 114th 29th Sep 1917-May 1919 NJ Army National Guard 

113th 114th 44th 1921-1941 NJ Army National Guard 

58th Infantry Brigade 115th 116th 29th Sep 1917-May 1919 MD, DE, VA Army National 

Guard 

115th 175th 29th 1923-1941 MD Army National Guard; 

Lineage linked to current 

3d Brigade, 28th Infantry 

Division 

59th Infantry Brigade 117th 118th 30th Sep 1917-Apr 1919 NC, SC Army National Guard 

118th 121st 1921-1942 SC, GA Army National Guard 

60th Infantry Brigade 119th 120th 30th Sep 1917-Apr 1919 NC Army National Guard 

117th 120th 1921-1942 

168
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

61st Infantry Brigade 121st 122d 31st Aug 1917-Nov 1918 GA Army National Guard 

155th 156th 1921-1942 MS, LA Army National 

Guard 

62d Infantry Brigade 123d 124th 31st Aug 1917-Nov 1918 FL, AL Army National Guard 

124th 167th 1921-1942 

63d Infantry Brigade 125th 126th 32d Sep 1917-May 1919 MI Army National Guard 

1921-1942 

64th Infantry Brigade 127th 128th 32d Sep 1917-May 1919 WI Army National Guard 

1921-1942 

65th Infantry Brigade 129th 130th 33d Aug 1917-May 1919 IL Army National Guard 

1921-1942 

66th Infantry Brigade 131st 132d 33d Sep 1917-Jun 1919 IL Army National Guard; 

1921-1942 Designation linked to current 

66th Brigade, 35th Infantry 

Division 

67th Infantry Brigade 133d 134th 34th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 IA, NE Army National Guard 

168th 1921-1942 IA Army National Guard; 

Designation linked to current 

67th Brigade, 35th Infantry 

Division 

68th Infantry Brigade 135th 136th 34th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 MN Army National Guard 

1921-1942 

69th Infantry Brigade 137th 138th 35th Aug 1917-May 1919 KS, MO Army National 

Guard 

134th 1921-1942 KS, NE Army National 

Guard; Designation used by 

KS Army National Guard 

Brigade 1963-1984 

70th Infantry Brigade 139th 140th 35th Sep 1917-May 1919 MO Army National Guard 

138th 1921-1942 

71st Infantry Brigade 141st 142d 36th Sep 1917-Jun 1919 TX Army National Guard; 

1921-1942 Designation later used by TX 

Army National Guard sep 

airborne brigade 

169
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

72d Infantry Brigade 143d 144th 36th Sep 1917-Jun 1919 TX Army National Guard; 

1921-1942 Lineage carried by 49th AD; 

Designation later used by TX 

Army National Guard sep 

Infantry brigade 

73d Infantry Brigade 145th 146th 37th Sep 1917-Apr 1919 OH Army National Guard 

148th 1921-1942 

74th Infantry Brigade 147th 148th 37th Sep 1917-Apr 1919 OH Army National Guard 

1921-1942 

166th 1921-1942 

75th Infantry Brigade 149th 150th 38th Sep 1917-Nov 1918 KY Army National Guard 

1921-1942 

76th Infantry Brigade 151st 152d 38th Sep 1917-Nov 1918 IN Army National Guard; 

1921-1942 Currently designation used 

by IN Army National Guard 

Brigade 

77th Infantry Brigade 153d 154th 39th Aug 1917-Jan 1919 Army National Guard 

78th Infantry Brigade 155th 156th 39th Aug 1917-Jan 1919 Army National Guard 

79th Infantry Brigade 157th 158th 40th Aug 1917-Apr 1919 CO, AZ Army National 

Guard 

159th 184th 1921-1942 CA Army National Guard 

80th Infantry Brigade 159th 160th 40th Aug 1917-Apr 1919 CA Army National Guard 

185th 1921-1942 

81st Infantry Brigade 161st 162d 41st Sep 1917-Mar 1919 

163d 1921-1942 WA Army National Guard; 

Currently designation used 

by WA Army National Guard 

Brigade 

82d Infantry Brigade 163d 164th 41st Sep 1917-Feb 1919 

162d 186th 1921-1942 Organized Reserve Army 

National Guard 

83d Infantry Brigade 165th 166th 42d Aug 1917-Feb 1919 Army National Guard 

84th Infantry Brigade 167th 168th 42d Sep 1917-May 1919 Army National Guard 

85th Infantry Brigade 102d 169th 43d 1921-1941 CT Army National Guard 

170
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

86th Infantry Brigade 103d 172d 43d 1922-1941 ME, VT Army National 

Guard; current designation 

used by 86th Brigade, 42d 

Division 

87th Infantry Brigade 71st 174th 44th 1921-1941 NY Army National Guard 

88th Infantry Brigade 116th 176th 29th 1921-1941 VA Army National Guard 

89th Infantry Brigade 157th 158th 45th 1921-1941 CO, AZ Army National 

Guard 

90th Infantry Brigade 179th 180th 45th 1921-1941 OK Army National Guard 

92d Infantry Brigade 205th 206th Sep 1924-1940 MN Army National Guard; 

brigade converted to 101st 

Coast Artillery Brigade, 

1940 and 205th and 206th 

converted to 215th and 216th 

Cost Artillery Regiments 

92d Infantry Brigade Sep 1940-1942 PR Army National Guard; 

Currently designation used 

by PR Army National Guard 

Brigade 

93d Infantry Brigade 10th 14th Sep 1924-1940 NY Army National Guard; 

(NY) (NY) 10th later became new 106th 

in 27th Infantry Division; 

brigade headquarters 

converted to 71st FA Brigade 

1940 

151st Infantry Brigade 301st 302d 76th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army 

304th 385th 1921-1940 CT/RI Organized Reserve 

152d Infantry Brigade 303d 304th 76th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army 

417th 418th 1921-1940 CT Organized Reserve 

153d Infantry Brigade 305th 306th 77th Aug 1917-May 1919 National Army; Lineage 

perpetuated by 2d Brigade, 

77th Infantry Division 

154th Infantry Brigade 307th 308th 77th Aug 1917-May 1919 National Army; Lineage 

perpetuated by 3d Brigade, 

77th Infantry Division 

155th Infantry Brigade 309th 310th 78th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Lineage 

linked to current 2d 

Brigade, 82d Airborne 

Division 

171
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

156th Infantry Brigade 311th 312th 78th Aug 1917-May 1919 National Army; Lineage linked to 

current 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne 

Division 

157th Infantry Brigade 313th 314th 79th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; PA Organized 

1921-1942 Reserve; Designation later used 

by USAR brigade and briefly 

in 1998-1999 by the current 5th 

Brigade, 87th Division 

158th Infantry Brigade 315th 316th 79th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Lineage linked 

to current 2d Brigade, 81st 

Infantry Division; Designation 

briefly used in 1998 by current 2d 

Brigade, 87th Infantry Division 

159th Infantry Brigade 317th 318th 80th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Lineage to 

current 2d Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division 

160th Infantry Brigade 319th 320th 80th Aug 1917-May 1919 National Army; Lineage to 

current 3d Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division 

161st Infantry Brigade 321st 322d 81st Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Linked to 

current 2d Brigade, 81st Infantry 

Division 

162d Infantry Brigade 323d 324th 81st Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Lineage linked to 

current 2d Brigade, 81st Infantry 

Division 

163d Infantry Brigade 325th 326th 82d Sep 1917-May 1919 National Army 

164th Infantry Brigade 327th 328th 82d Aug 1917-May 1919 National Army 

165th Infantry Brigade 329th 330th 83d Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army; Lineage linked to 

current 2d Brigade, 83d Infantry 

Division 

166th Infantry Brigade 331st 332d 83d Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army; Lineage linked to 

current 3d Brigade, 83d Infantry 

Division 

167th Infantry Brigade 333d 334th 84th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army; Lineage to 

current 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry 

Division 

172
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

168th Infantry Brigade 335th 336th 84th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army; Lineage to 

current 2d Brigade, 25th 

Infantry Division 

169th Infantry Brigade 337th 338th 85th Aug 1917-Apr 1919 National Army; Lineage to 

current 1st Brigade, 24th 

Infantry Division 

170th Infantry Brigade 339th 340th 85th Aug 1917-Apr 1919 National Army; Lineage to 

current 2d Brigade, 24th 

Infantry Division 

171th Infantry Brigade 341st 342d 86th Sep 1917-Nov 1918 National Army; Designation 

used by AC Infantry Brigade 

1963-1973 

172th Infantry Brigade 343d 344th 86th Aug 1917-Nov 1918 National Army; Designation 

used by AC Infantry Brigade 

1963-1986; 1998-present 

173th Infantry Brigade 345th 346th 87th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army; Designation 

used by AC airborne Brigade 

1963-1972; 2002-present 

174th Infantry Brigade 347th 348th 87th Aug 1917-Feb 1919 National Army; Designation 

briefly used by current 2d 

Brigade, 78th Division 1998 

175th Infantry Brigade 349th 350th 88th Sep 1917-Jun 1919 National Army 

176th Infantry Brigade 351st 352d 88th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army 

177th Infantry Brigade 353d 354th 89th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Designation 

used by AC armored Brigade 

1991-1994, 1998 

178th Infantry Brigade 355th 356th 89th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army 

179th Infantry Brigade 357th 358th 90th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Lineage 

linked to current 1st Brigade, 

90th Division 

180th Infantry Brigade 359th 360th 90th Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army; Lineage 

linked to current 2d Brigade, 

90th Division 

181st Infantry rigade 361st 362d 91st Aug 1917-Jun 1919 National Army 

182d Infantry Brigade 363d 364th 91st Sep 1917-Apr 1919 National Army 

183th Infantry Brigade 365th 366th 92d Nov 1917-Mar 1919 National Army 

173
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

184th Infantry Brigade 367th 368th 92d Nov 1917-Mar 1919 National Army 

185th Infantry Brigade 369th 370th 93d Dec 1917-May 1918 NY, IL Army National Guard 

186th Infantry Brigade 371st 372d 93d Dec 1917-May 1918 National Army from Army 

National Guard units from DC, 

OH, CT, MD, MA, TN 

187th Infantry Brigade 301st 302d 94th 1921-1940 MA Organized Reserve; 

Designation later used by USAR 

brigade 1963-1994 

188th Infantry Brigade 376th 419th 94th 1921-1940 MA Organized Reserve; 

Designation used briefly in 1999 

by 4th Brigade, 87th Division 

189th Infantry Brigade 377th 378th 95th 1921-1940 OK Organized Reserve; 

Designation briefly used by 

current 4th Brigade, 78th 

Division 1998 

190th Infantry Brigade 379th 380th 95th 1921-1940 OK Organized Reserve; Lineage 

to current 3d Brigade, 24th 

Infantry Division 

191st Infantry Brigade 381st 382d 96th 1921-1942 Organized Reserve Organized 

Reserve; Designation used later 

by USAR brigade 1963-1968 

192d Infantry Brigade 383d 384th 96th Sep 1918-Dec 1918 National Army; Organized 

1921-1942 Reserve Organized Reserve 

193d Infantry Brigade 303d 386th 97th 1921-1940 RI/ME Organized Reserve; 

Designation later used by AC 

brigade in Panama 1962-1994 

194th Infantry Brigade 387th 388th 97th Oct 1918-Dec 1918 National Army 

387th 388th 1921-1940 NH/VT Organized Reserve; 

Designation used by AC armored 

Brigade 1962-1995 

195th Infantry Brigade 389th 390th 98th 1921-1940 NY Organized Reserve; Lineage 

to current 3d Brigade, 25th 

Infantry Division 

196th Infantry Brigade 391st 392d 98th 1921-1940 NY Organized Reserve; 

Designation used by AC Infantry 

Brigade 1965-1972 

174
Designation Regiments Division Service Dates Remarks 

197th Infantry Brigade 393d 394th 99th 1921-1940 PA Organized Reserve; 

Designation used by AC Infantry 

Brigade 1962-1991 

198th Infantry Brigade 395th 396th 99th 1921-1940 PA Organized Reserve; 

Designation used by AC 

Infantry Brigade 1967-1971 

199th Infantry Brigade 397th 398th 100th 1921-1940 WV Organized Reserve; 

Designation used by AC 

Infantry Brigade 1966-1970; 

1991-1992 

200th Infantry Brigade 399th 400th 100th 1921-1940 KY Organized Reserve 

201th Infantry Brigade 401st 402d 101st 1921-1940 WI Organized Reserve 

202d Infantry Brigade 403d 404th 101st 1921-1940 WI Organized Reserve 

203d Infantry Brigade 405th 406th 102d 1921-1940 AR, MO Organized Reserve; 

Lineage to current 2d 

Brigade, 102d Infantry 

Division 

204th Infantry Brigade 407th 408th 102d 1921-1940 MO Organized Reserve; 

Lineage to current 3d 

Brigade, 102d Infantry 

Division 

205th Infantry Brigade 409th 410th 103d 1921-1942 AZ, NM Organized Reserve; 

Designation used later by 

USAR brigade 1963-1994; 

Designation used briefly in 

1998-1999 by current 4th 

Brigade, 70th Division 

206th Infantry Brigade 411th 412th 103d 1921-1942 CO Organized Reserve 

207th Infantry Brigade 413th 414th 104th 1921-1942 Organized Reserve, 104th 

Infantry Division Organized 

Reserve 

208th Infantry Brigade 415th 416th 104th 1921-1942 WA, MT Organized Reserve 

175
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

Appendix 4 

US ARMY BRIGADES SINCE 1958

Divisional Brigades 

Designation Dates Active 

1st Brigade, 1st ID 1917-1939 

1943-1944 

1958-1962 

1964-present 

2d Brigade, 1st ID 1917-1939 

1943-1945 

1958-1962 

1964-present 

Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

Organized 1917; Disbanded 1st Bde (1 ID) (1917- Devil 

1939; Reconstituted 1921) Brigade 

1943; Disbanded 1944; 1st Infantry Bde (1 ID) 

Reconstituted 1958; (1921-1925) 

Inactivated 1962; 1st Bde (1 ID) (1925-

Redesignated and 1936) 

reactivated 1964; Fort Riley 1st Infantry Bde (1 ID) 

1964-1965; Vietnam 1965- (1936-1939) 

1970; Fort Riley 1970- 1st Airborne Infantry Bde 

present; Deployed to SWA (1943-1944) 

1990-1991 1st Infantry Bde (1958-

1962) 

Organized 1917; Inactivated 2d Bde (1 ID) (1917- Dagger 

1940; Reconstituted 1921) 

1943; Disbanded 1945; 2d Infantry Bde (1 ID) 

Reconstituted 1958; (1921-1925) 

Inactivated 1962; 2d Bde (1 ID) (1925-

Redesignated and 1936) 

reactivated 1964; Fort Riley 2d Infantry Bde (1 ID) 

1964-1965; Vietnam 1965- (1936-1939) 

1970; Fort Riley 1970- 2d Infantry Bde (1939-

1996; Deployed to SWA 1940) 

1990-1991;replaced 3d ID 2d Airborne Infantry Bde 

(Mech) at Schweinfurt, (1943-1945) 

Germant 1996; Bosnia 2d Infantry Bde (1958-

1996-1997; Kosovo 1999- 1962) 

2000; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004 

177 
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

3d Brigade, 1st ID 1964-1991 HQs Troop, 1st Div (1917-

1996-present 1921) HQS and MP Co, 1st 

Div (1921-1942) HQS Co, 

1st ID (1942-1960); Disbanded 1960; Reconsitituted 1963 and activated 1964; 

Fort Riley 1964-1965; Vietnam 1965-1970; Germany 

1970-1991; Deployed to 

SWA 1990-1991 and served 

as Port Support Activity at 

Dammam; Between 1991 

and 1996, 218th Infantry 

Bde (Mech), SC ARNG, 

served as roundout brigade; 

Vilseck, Germany 1996-

present; Bosnia 1996-1997; 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

1st Brigade, 1st AD 1962-present Organized as CCA, 1942; 

Redesignated 1946; Inactivated 1947; Reactivated 

and redesignated 1951; 

Redesignated 1962 at Fort 

Hood; Flag moved to Germany, 1971 (to replace 4th 

AD); Germany 1971-present; Did not deploy to SWA 

in 1990 with rest of division 

(replaced by 3d Bde, 3d ID; 

Bosnia 1995-1996: Kosovo 

1999-2000: Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

2d Brigade, 1st AD 1962-present Organized as CCB, 1942; 

Inactivated 1946; Reactivated 1951; Inactivated 1957; 

Redesignated and reactivated 1962 at Fort Hood; Flag 

moved to Germany, 1971 

(to replace 4th AD); Germany 1971-present: Deployed 

to SWA 1990-1991: Bosnia 

1995-1996; Kosovo 2000-

2001: Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004 

Other Designations Nickname 

1st ID (Forward) (1975- Iron 

1991) 

CCA, 1st AD (1942- Forerunners 

1946) 

3d Constabulary Regt 

(1946-1947) 

CCA, 1st AD (1951-

1962) 

CCB, 1st AD (1942-1946; Iron Brigade 

1951-1957) 

178
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

3d Brigade, 1st AD 1962-1995 Organized as Reserve 

1996-present Command, 1944; 

Inactivated 1946; 

Reactivated 1951; 

Redesignated CCC, 

1954; Inactivated 1957; 

Redesignated and 

reactivated 1962 at Fort 

Hood; Flag moved to 

Germany, 1971 (to replace 

4th AD); Deployed to SWA 

1990-1991; Fort Lewis, 

1994-1995 Inactivated 

1995; Reactivated 1996 

at Fort Riley; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003-

2004 

1st Brigade, 1st CD 1918-1949 Organized 1917; Activated 

1963-present 1918; Demobilized 

1919; Reconstituted 

1921; Inactivated 

1949; Redesignated 

1949 and reactivated; 

Inactivated 1951 and 

disbanded; Reconstituted 

and redesignated and 

reactivated 1963; Korea 

1963-1965; Flag moved 

from Korea to Fort Benning 

1965, replaced by 2d ID; 

Airmobile bde 1965-1971; 

Vietnam 1965-1971; 

Replaced 1st AD elements 

at Fort Hood in 1971 (1st 

AD replaced 4th AD in 

Germany); Fort Hood, 

1971-present: Armored 

bde in TriCap division 

1971-1974; Deployed to 

SWA 1990-1991; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

Other Designations Nickname 

Reserve Command, 1st Bulldogs 

AD (1944-1946) 

CCR, 1st AD (1951-1954) 

CCC, 1st AD (1954-1957) 

1st Cavalry Bde (15 CD) Iron Horse

(1918-19)

1st Cavalry Bde (1 CD)

(1921-1949)

1st Constabulary Bde 

(1949-1951)

1st Bde, 1 CD (1963-

present)

179 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

2d Brigade, 1st CD 1918-1949 Organized 1917; Activated 2d Cavalry Bde (15 CD) Black Jack 

1963-present 1918; Demobilized (1918-19) 

1919; Reconstituted 2d Cavalry Bde (1 CD) 

1921; Inactivated (1921-1949) 

1949; Redesignated 2d Constabulary Bde 

1949 and reactivated; (1949-1951) 

Inactivated 1951 and 

disbanded; Reconstituted 

and redesignated and 

reactivated 1963 in Korea; 

Flag shifted to Fort Benning 

1965; Troops came from 

2d Bde, 2d ID; Brigade 

airmobile-airborne 1965-

1968; airmobile Bde 1968-

1971:Vietnam 1965-1971; 

Replaced 1st AD elements 

at Fort Hood in 1971 (1st 

AD replaced 4th AD in 

Germany); Fort Hood, 

1971-present; Air Cavalry 

Combat Bde 1971-1974; 

Assests used to form 6th 

ACCB 1974; deployed to 

SWA 1990-1991; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

3d Brigade, 1st CD 1917-1919 Organized 1917; Activated 3d Cavalry Bde (15 CD) Grey Wolf 

1940-1942 1918; Demobilized 1919; (1917-1918) 

1963-1980 Reconstituted 1921 but 3d Cavalry Bde (1918-19) 

1991-present not activated until 1940; 3d Cavalry Bde (2 CD) 

Redesignated 1942 and (1940-1942) 

inactivated 1945; Converted HHC, 9th AD Trains 

and redesignated and (1942-1945) 

reactivated 1963; Vietnam 3d Bde, 1 CD (1963-

1965-1972; served as present) 

separate brigade in RVN, separate brigade in 

1971-1972; Fort Hood Vietnam (1971-1972) 

1972-1990, 1991-present; [from left] 

airmobile bde 1972-1974; Operation IRAQI 

155th Armd Bde (MS FREEDOM 2004 

ARNG) roundout brigade 

1984-1991; 1st Bde, 2d AD 

redes 3d Bde, 1st CD, 1991; 

[see next column] 

180
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

4th Brigade, 1st CD 1971-1972 Organized at Fort Hood to 

fill out the 1st Cavalry Div 

while the 3d Bde remained 

in Vietnam; Replaced 1st 

AD elements at Fort Hood 

in 1971 (1st AD replaced 

4th AD in Germany); Airmobile bde inTriCap Division 1971-1972: Inactivated 

upon 3d Bde’s return

1963-1991 

1992-1996 

1st Brigade, 2d AD Redesignation of CC A un- CCA, 2d AD (1942-1963) Tiger Brigade 

der ROAD reorganization 

in 1963; Fort Hood 1963-

1991; Deployed to SAW 

with 1st Cavalry Div 1990; 

Fought with MARCENT 

1991; Fort Polk, 1992-1996 

(redesignation of 1st Bde, 

5th ID (Mech); Replaced at 

Fort Polk by 2d ACR 

2d Brigade, 2d AD 1963-1990 Redesignation of CC B CCB, 2d AD (1942-1963) St. Lo Brigade 

1992-1996 under ROAD reorganization in 1963; Fort Hood 

1963-1991; Inactivated 

Sep 90 while other two 

brigades were going to 

SWA; Reactivated at Fort 

Polk by redesignation of 

2d Bde, 5th ID (Mech), 

1992; Fork Polk 1992-

1996 

3d Brigade, 2d AD 1963-1992 Garrisoned in Garlstedt, HQs, 41st Armored Blackheart 

Germany 1979-1992; Infantry (1942-1946) 

Deployed to SWA with CCR, 2d AD (1946-1949) 

the 1st ID (Mech) 1990- Bde 75 (1975) 

1991; Inactivated in 2d AD Forward (1976-

Germany 1992; Replaced 1991) 

by 256th Infantry Bde 

(Mech), LA ARNG 

roundout brigade 1994-

1997 

181
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

4th Brigade, 2d AD 1975-1979 Fort Hood; Replaced Bde 3d Armor Group 1944-

75; Inactivated upon PCS 1947; 1954-1955) 

of 3d Bde to Germany 

1st Brigade, 2d ID 1963-present Redesignated from former Iron 

HQS Co, 2d ID under 

ROAD; Fort Benning 

1963-1965; Korea, 

1965-present; Replaced 

1st Cavalry Division 

elements in Korea 

2d Brigade, 2d ID 1963-present

3d Brigade, 2d ID 1963-1992 

1995-present 

Redesignated under 4th Infantry Bde (1920- Strike Force 

ROAD from dormant 1939) 

square division brigade; 

Fort Benning 1963-1965; 

Bde attached to 11th 

Air Assault Division 

1964-1965; Korea 

1965-present; Replaced 

1st Cavalry Division 

elements in Korea 

Redesignated under ROAD 1st Provisional Bde Arrowhead 

from dormant square (1917) Brigade 

division brigade; Korea 3d Infantry Bde (1917-

1965-1992; Replaced 1st 1939) 

Cavalry Division elements 

in Korea; 81st Infantry Bde 

(Mech), WA ARNG, served 

as roundout brigade, 1992-

1995; Reactivated 1995 at 

Fort Lewis; Stryker Bde 

1999-present 

182
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

1st Brigade, 3d AD 1963-1991 Germany 1963-1990; 

Deployed to SWA 1990-

1991; Germany 1991; 

remainder of division 

inactivated 1992 

2d Brigade, 3d AD 1963-1992 Germany 1963-1990; 

Deployed to SWA 1990-

1991; Germany 1991-1992 

3d Brigade, 3d AD 1963-1992 Germany 1963-1990; 

Deployed to SWA 1990-

1991; Germany 1991-1992 

1st Brigade, 3d ID 1963-present Redesignated from former 

HQS Co, 3d ID under 

ROAD; Germany 1963-

1996; Fort Stewart 1996-

present; Replaced 24th ID 

(Mech) 1996; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003 

Other Designations Nickname 

CCA, 3d AD (1942-1945; 

47-1963) 

HQS, 36th Armored 

Infantry (1942-1945) 

Reserve Command, 3d 

AD (1947-1954) 

Combat Command C, 3d 

AD (1954-1963) 

CCA, 3d AD (1942-1945; 

47-1963) 

Raider 

183
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

2d Brigade, 3d ID 2d Brigade, 3d ID 1963-1994 Redesignated under 

1996-present ROAD from dormant 

square division brigade; 

Germany 1963-1994; Fort 

Stewart, 1996-present: 

Replaced 24th ID (Mech) 

1996; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2003 

3d Brigade, 3d ID 1963-present Redesignated under 

ROAD from dormant 

square division brigade; 

Germany 1963-1990, 

1991-1996 deployed to 

SWA with 1st AD, 1990-

1991; Fort Stewart 1996-

present: Replaced 24th ID 

(Mech) 1996; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003 

1st Brigade, 4th AD 1963-1971 Germany; Replaced by 

1st AD 

2d Brigade, 4th AD 1963-1971 Germany; Replaced by 

1st AD 

3d Brigade, 4th AD 1963-1971 Germany; Replaced by 

1st AD 

Other Designations Nickname

5th Infantry Bde (1917- Spartan 

1939) 

6th Infantry Bde (1917- Hammer

1939)

CCA, 4th AD (1942-

1946; 1954-1963)

2d Constabulary Bde 

(1946-1949)

CCB, 4th AD (1942-1946; 

1954-1963)

3d Constabulary Bde

(1946-1947)

Reserve Command, 4th 

AD (1943-1946)

CC C, 4th AD 1954-1963)

184
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 4th ID 1963-1995 Created from former HQS 

1996-present Co, 4th ID; Fort Lewis 

1963-1966; Vietnam, 

1966-1970; Fort Carson 

(where replaced 5th ID 

(M); 1970-1995; Fort Hood 

1996-present (replaced 2d 

AD); Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2003-2004 

2d Brigade, 4th ID 1963-1989 

1996-present 

3d Brigade, 4th ID 1963-1970 

1970-present 

4th Brigade, 4th ID 1975-1984 

Jan-Mar 

1996 

Fort Lewis 1963-1966; 7th Infantry Bde (1917-

Vietnam, 1966-1970; Fort 1940) 

Carson (where replaced 

5th ID (M); 1970-1989; 

Replaced by r oundout 

brigade 116th Cavalry Bde 

(ID ARNG); Fort Hood, 

1996-present (replaced 2d 

AD); Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2003-2004 

Fort Lewis 1963-1966; 8th Infantry Bde (1917-

Vietnam, 1966-1970: 1940) 

1967 swapped designation 

with 3d Bde, 25th ID; 

1970 redeployed to Fort 

Lewis where inactivated; 

Reactivated at Fort Carson 

1970; Brigade remained 

at Fort Carson while rest 

of division shifted to Fort 

Hood in 1996: Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003-

2004 

Activated at Fort Carson Bde 76 (1975-1977) 

in 1975 as the 4th ID’s 

contribution to Bde 76, a 

temporary duty brigade 

for service in Germany; 

Deployed to Germany 

1976 and made permanent 

in 1977-stationed at 

Wiesbaden AB and attached 

to 8th ID (M); Fort Carson 

1996 

185
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 5th ID 1962-1972 Fort Carson 1962-1968; 9th Infantry Bde (1917-

1974-1997 Vietnam 1968-1971; 69th 1940) 

Infantry Bde (Mech), 

KS ARNG, mobilized to 

replace brigade at Carson 

(1968-1969); Fort Carson 

1971; Fort Polk 1974-1997; 

Replaced at Fort Polk by 

2d AD 

2d Brigade, 5th ID 1962-1970 Created by conversion of 10th Infantry Bde (1917-

1977-1992 Pentomic 2d Infantry Bde at 1939) 

Fort Devens; Fort Devens 

1962-1965; Replaced at 

Fort Devens by 196th 

Infantry Bde; Fort Carson 

1965-1970; Replaced at 

Fort Polk by 2d AD 

3d Brigade, 5th ID 1962-1970 Fort Carson 1962-1970; HQS Co, 5th ID

Replaced by roundout 

brigade 256th Infantry Bde 

(Mech), LA ARNG 1975-

1992

4th Brigade, 5th ID 1969-1970

1st Brigade, 6th ID 1985-1996

186 

Fort Carson 1969-1970; 

organized to replace 69th 

Infantry Bde (Mech), KS 

ARNG, which was filling 

in for 1st Bde which 

was in Vietnam and had 

demobilized 

Alaska, 1985-1996; 11th 

Infantry Bde fought in 

Vietnam separately and as 

part of the Americal Div 

(see sep listing); Roundout 

to 10th Mountain Div 1994-

1996; Redesignated 172d 

Infantry Bde 1996 

HQS Co, 5th ID

11th Infantry Bde (1917-

1939)

11th Infantry Bde (Light) 

(1966-1971)
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

1967-1968 Ft Campbell, 1967-1968; 12th Infantry Bde 

1986-1994 Alaska 1986-1994 (1917-1939) 

3d Brigade, 6th ID 1967-1968 Ft Campbell, 1967-1968; HQS Co, 6th ID 

1986-1994 Alaska 1986-1994 

2d Brigade, 6th ID 

4th Brigade, 6th ID 

2d Brigade, 6th ID

3d Brigade, 6th ID

4th Brigade, 6th ID

1st Brigade, 7th ID

1967-1968 Hawaii, 1967-1968 

1963-1971 Korea 1963-1971; HQS Co, 7th ID 

1974-1995 Inactivated at Fort Lewis 

1971; Fort Ord 1974-1994; 

Fort Lewis 1994-1995; 

Replaced at Fort Lewis by 

1st Bde, 25th ID 1995 

2d Brigade, 7th ID 1963-1971 Korea 1963-1971; 13th Infantry Bde (1917-

1974-1993 Inactivated at Fort Lewis 1940) 

1971; Fort Ord 1974-1993 

187
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

3d Brigade, 7th ID 1984-1993 Korea 1963-1971; 14th Infantry Bde (1917-

Inactivated at Fort Lewis 1940)

1971; Replaced by roundout 

brigade 41st Infantry Bde 

(OR ARNG) 1977-1985; 

Fort Ord 1984-1993

1st Brigade, 8th ID 1963-1992 Mannheim, Germany; HQS Co, 8th ID 

Replaced by 1st AD 

2d Brigade, 8th ID 1963-1992 Baumholder, Germany; 15th Infantry Bde (1917-

Replaced by 1st AD 1940) 

3d Brigade, 8th ID 1963-1992

1st Brigade, 9th ID 1966-1969 

1972-1990 

Mainz, Germany; Replaced 

by 1st AD; airbornemechanized bde from 1963 

to 1973 with two airborne 

mechanized battalions and 

an airborne qualified slice 

assigned from division 

Ft Riley 1966; Vietnam 

1966-1969; Inactivated in 

Hawaii 1969; Fort Lewis 

1972-1988; HTMD 1984; 

motorized 1986 

16th Infantry Bde (1917-

1940) 

HQS Co, 9th ID 

188 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

2d Brigade, 9th ID 1966-1969 Ft Riley 1966; Vietnam 15th Infantry Bde (1917) 

1972-1988 1966-1969; Mobile 17th Infantry Bde (1917-

Riverine Force 1966-1969: 1940) 

Inactivated in Hawaii 1969; 

Fort Lewis 1972-1988; 

HTMD 1984; Motorized 

1986; Replaced by rondout 

brigade 81st Infantry Bde 

(Mech) WA ARNG 1989-

1991 

3d Brigade, 9th ID 1966-1970 Ft Riley 1966; Vietnam 18th Infantry Bde (1918-

1973-1991 1966-1970; Separate 1940)

brigade in Vietnam, 1969-

1970, under OPCON of 

25th ID; Inactivated 1970, 

Fort Lewis; Fort Lewis 

1973-1991; HTMD 1984; 

Motorized 1986

1st Brigade, 10th 1986-present Ft Drum; Somalia 1992- HQS Co, 10th ID 

Mountain Div 1994; Haiti 1994-1995; 

Afghanistan 2001-2002, 

2003-2004

2d Brigade, 10th 1985-present Fort Benning 1985-1988; 

Mountain Div Fort Drum 1988-present; 

Afghanistan 2001-2002, 

2003: Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004-2005 

189 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 11th 1963-1965 Ft Benning; Converted to 

AAslt Div 1st Cavalry Div (Airmobile) 

elements 

2d Brigade, 11th 1963-1965 Ft Benning; Converted to 

AAslt Div 1st Cavalry Div (Airmobile) 

elements 

3d Brigade, 11th 1964-1965 Ft Benning; Converted to 

AAslt Div 1st Cavalry Div (Airmobile) 

elements 

1st Brigade, 24th ID 1963-1970 Germany 1963-1968; 169th Infantry Bde 

1974-1996 Fort Riley 1968-1970; (85 Div) 

Fort Stewart, 1974-1996; (1921-1942)

Deployed to SWA 1990-

1991; Replaced by 3d ID 

(M), 1996

2d Brigade, 24th ID 1963-1970 Germany 1963-1968; 170th Infantry Bde 

Fort Riley 1968-1970; (85 Div) 

Fort Stewart, 1974-1996; (1921-1942) 

Deployed to SWA 1990-

1991; Replaced by 3d ID 

(M), 1996 

190
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

3d Brigade, 24th ID 1963-1970 Germany 1963-1970; 

1991-1996 Replaced by roundout 

48th Infantry Bde (Mech) 

GA ARNG 1975-1991; 

Fort Benning 1991-1996; 

Replaced 197th Infantry 

Bde, 1991; Replaced by 3d 

ID, 1996 

1st Brigade, 25th ID 1963-present Schofield Barracks 1963-

1966; Vietnam 1966-1970; 

Schofield Barracks 1970-

1971; Fort Lewis 1995-

present; Replaced 1st Bde, 

7th ID 1995; Stryker Bde 

1999-present 

2d Brigade, 25th ID 1963-present Schofield Barracks 1963-

1966; Vietnam 1966-1971; 

Separate brigade in Vietnam 

1970-1972; Schofield 

Barracks 1971-present; 

Haiti 1995: announced 

as future Stryker Bde, 

2003; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004 

3d Brigade, 25th ID 1963-1972 Schofield Barracks 1963-

1985-present 1966; Vietnam 1966-

1970; 1967-19 swapped 

designation with 3d Bde, 

4th ID; Schofield Barracks 

1970-1972; Roundout 29th 

Infantry Bde (HI ARNG) 

1973-1985; Schofield 

barracks 1985-present: 

Haiti 1995; Afghanistan 

2004 

4th Brigade, 25th ID 1969-1970 Schofield Barracks 1969-

1970; Replaced 2d Bde still 

in Vietnam 

Other Designations Nickname 

190th Infantry Bde (95 

Div) 

(1921-1942)

167th Infantry Bde (84 Lancers

Div) 

(1921-1942)

168th Infantry Bde (84 Warrior

Div) 

(1921-1942)

195th Infantry Bde (98 Bronco

Div) 

(1921-1942)

191
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 26th ID 1963-1988 MA ARNG; Dorchester HQS, 1st BG, 101st Inf

1963-1967; Waltham 1967-

1975; Lexington 

1988; Replaced by 86th 

1975-

Bde in 1988

43d Brigade, 26th ID 1967-1993 CT ARNG; former CT HQs, 43d ID 

portion of 43d ID 

3d Brigade, 26th ID 1963-1993 MA ARNG; Springfield HQS, 1st BG, 104th Inf

1963-1974; Holyoke 1974-

1976; Westover AFB 

1993; became 26th Bde, 

1976-

29th ID, 1993

1st Brigade, 27th AD 1963-1968 NY ARNG; Division CCA, 27th AD (1955-

amalgamated into 27th Bde, 1963)

50th AD 1968

2d Brigade, 27th AD 1963-1968 NY ARNG; Division CCB, 27th AD (1955-

amalgamated into 27th Bde 1963) 

192
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

3d Brigade, 27th AD 1963-1968 NY ARNG; Division CCC, 27th AD (1955-

amalgamated into 27th Bde 1963) 

2d Brigade, 28th ID 1963-1978 PA ARNG; Washington, PA 

(Mech) 1975-present 

55th Brigade, 28th ID 1963-present PA ARNG; Created from 

(Mech) 109th Inf elements; New 3d 

Bde, 28th ID created from 

MD ARNG elements 1968-

1971 and redesignated 58th 

Bde, 28th ID 1971-1975; 

Scranton, PA 

56th Brigade, 28th ID 1963-1968 PA ARNG; Replaced in 

(Mech) 1975-present 28th ID by 116th Bde 

(VA ARNG) 1968-1975; 

designated as future Stryker 

Bde 2001; Philadelphia, 

PA; Kosovo 2003-2004 

1st Brigade, 29th ID 1963-1968 VA ARNG; Staunton, VA 

1986-present 

HHC, 1st BG,110th Inf 

689th MP Co (1968-199) 

408th Gen SupportCo 

(1969-1975) 

3d Bde, 28th ID (1963-

1968) 

1st Bde, 28th ID (1963- Independence 

1968) 

56th Bde, 42d ID (1968-

1975) 

116th Infantry Bde (1975-

1986) 

193
194

2d Brigade, 29th ID 1963-1968

1985-1993

VA ARNG; Replaced by 

26th Bde (MA ARNG) 

1993

116th Bde, 28th ID 

(1968-1975)

3d Brigade, 29th ID 1963-1968

1985-present

MD ARNG; Baltimore, MD 

1963-1968; Pikeville, MD 

1985-present

3d Bde, 28th ID (1968-

1971)

58th Bde, 28th ID 

(1971-1975)

58th Infantry Bde (1975-

1985)

26th Brigade, 29th ID 1993-present MA ARNG; Springfield, 

MA

Former 3d Bde, 26th ID

and elements of HQs, 

26th ID

Yankee

1st Brigade, 30th AD 1963-1973 MS ARNG; Converted to 

155th Armored Bde; Tupelo

108th ACR

2d Brigade, 30th AD 1963-1973 TN ARNG; Amalgamated 

into 30th Armored Bde 

1973

CCB, 30th AD (1955-

1963)

Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

3d Brigade, 30th AD 1963-1973 TN ARNG; Amalgamated CCC, 30th AD (1955-

into 30th Armored Bde 1963)

1973

31st Brigade, 30th AD 1968-1973 AL ARNG; Became 2d Bde, 31st ID (1963-

31st Armored Bde 1973; 1968) 

Tuscaloosa, AL 

1st Brigade, 30th ID 1963-1973 NC ARNG; 3d and 1st Co B, 1st BG, 119th Inf 

Bdes merged 1968 as new 3d Bde, 30th ID (1963-

1st Bde; Clinton, NC; 1968) 

Amalgamated into 30th 

Infantry Bde 1973 

2d Brigade, 30th ID 1963-1973 AL ARNG; Tuscaloosa, AL 

3d Brigade, 30th ID 1968-1973 GA ARNG; Macon; 1st Bde, 48th AD (1963-

Converted to 48th Armored 1968) 

Bde 1973 

195
196

1st Brigade 32d ID 1963-1967 WI ARNG; Milwaukee; 

Became part of 32d Infantry 

Bde

3d BG, 127th Inf

2d Brigade 32d ID 1963-1967 WI ARNG; Became part of 

32d Infantry Bde

3d Brigade 32d ID 1963-1967 WI ARNG; Became part of 

32d Infantry Bde

Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 31st ID 1963-1968 AL/MS ARNG 

2d Brigade, 31st ID 1963-1968 AL ARNG; Redesignated Co D, 1st BG, 200th Inf 

31st Bde, 30th AD 1968 

3d Brigade, 31st ID 1963-1968 AL/MS ARNG
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade 33d ID 1963-1968 IL ARNG; Became part of 

33d Infantry Bde 

2d Brigade 33d ID 1963-1968 IL ARNG; Became part of 

33d Infantry Bde 

3d Brigade 33d ID 1963-1968 IL ARNG; Became part of 1st BG, 131st Inf 

33d Infantry Bde 

1st Brigade, 34th ID 1991-present MN ARNG; Stillwater, 1st Bde, 47th ID (1968-

MN; Replaced 47th ID: 1991) 

Kosovo 2004 

2d Brigade, 34th ID 1991-present IA ARNG 34th Bde, 47th ID 

(1963-1991) 

197
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

32d Brigade, 34th ID 1991-2001 WI ARNG; designation 

from former 32d ID; 

became seperate light inf 

bde 2001 

66th Brigade, 35th ID 1997-present IL ARNG; mobilized 2002 

and deployed to Germany 

67th Brigade, 35th ID 1985-2002 NE ARNG; converted to 

67th Area Support Group, 

2003 

149th Brigade, 35th ID 1985-present KY/AL ARNG; Louisville, 

KY; AL portion added 2002 

from former 31st Armored 

Bde; designation comes 

from old 149th Infantry 

2d Brigade, 38th ID 2d Brigade, 38th ID 1977-present IN ARNG; Kokomo, IN

Other Designations Nickname 

HQs, 32d ID Red Arrow 

32d Infantry Bde (1967-

1997) 

66th Bde, 47th ID 

(1968-1991) 

67th Infantry Bde (1964- Nebraska 

1985) Brigade 

149th Armored Bde Louisville 

(1980-1985) Legion 

1st Bn, 150th FA 

198
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

37th Brigade, 38th ID 1968-1977 OH ARNG; Columbus 

1994-present 1968-1977; North 

Canton 1994-present; 

designation from former 

37th ID; projected Kosovo 

deployment 2005 

46th Brigade, 38th ID 1968-present MI ARNG; Wyoming, MI; 

designation from former 

46th ID 

1st Brigade, 39th ID 1963-1967 LA ARNG; Converted to 

256th Infantry Bde 1967 

2d Brigade, 39th ID 1963-1967 LA/AR ARNG; Converted 

to 39th Infantry Bde 

3d Brigade, 39th ID 1963-1967 LA/AR ARNG; Converted 

to 39th Infantry Bde 

Other Designations Nickname 

HQS, 37th ID 

73d Bde, 38th ID (1968-

1977) 

73d Infantry Bde (1977-

1992) 

37th Bde, 28th ID 

(1992-1994) 

2d Bde, 46th ID (1963-

1968) 

199
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 40th AD 1963-1968 CA ARNG 

2d Brigade, 40th AD 1963-1968 CA ARNG

1st Brigade, 40th ID 1974-present CA ARNG; Los Angeles HQS Co, 40th Armored 

1974-1976; Fort MacArthur Bde (1968-1974) 

1976-present 

2d Brigade, 40th ID 1974-present CA ARNG; Los Alamitos, 3d Bde, 40th AD (1963-

CA 1968)

111th Armor Group

(1968-1971)

111th Area HQs (1971-

1974)

3d Brigade, 40th ID 1974-present CA ARNG; San Jose, CA; 79th Support Center 

Mobilized 1992 

200
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 41st ID 1963-1965 OR ARNG; Became 41st 

Infantry Bde 

2d Brigade, 41st ID 1963-1968 WA ARNG

3d Brigade, 41st ID 1963-1968 WA ARNG

3d Brigade, 42d ID 1986-present NY ARNG; Buffalo, NY; 

Replaced 27th Bde which 

became roundout to 10th 

Mtn Div 

50th Brigade, 42d ID 1993-present NJ ARNG; Fort Dix; HQS, 50th Armored DIv Jersey Blues 

designation from former 

50th AD 

201
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

86th Brigade, 42d ID 1993-present VT ARNG; Berlin, VT; 86th Infantry Bde (1963- Vermont 

designation from former 1964) Brigade 

86th Infantry Bde 86th Armored Bde 

(1964-1968) 

86th Bde, 50th AD 

(1968-1988) 

86th Bde, 26th ID 

(1988-1993) 

1st Brigade, 45th ID 1963-1968 OK ARNG 

2d Brigade, 45th ID 1963-1968 OK ARNG

3d Brigade, 45th ID 1963-1968 OK ARNG

1st Brigade, 46th ID 1963-1968 MI ARNG

202 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

2d Brigade, 46th ID 1963-1968 MI ARNG; Became 46th 

Bde, 38th ID; Grand Rapids 

1963-1965; Wyoming 

1965-1968

3d Brigade, 46th ID 1963-1968 MI ARNG 

1st Brigade, 47th ID 1968-1991 MN ARNG 1st Bn, 135th Inf 

34th Brigade, 47th ID 1968-1991 IA ARNG Red Bull

66th Brigade, 47th ID 1968-1991 IL ARNG 2d Bn, 130th Inf 

203 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

1963-1968 GA ARNG; Became 3d CCB, 48th AD (1955-

Bde, 30th ID 1968 1963)

1st Brigade, 48th AD 

2d Brigade, 48th AD 1963-1968 GA ARNG

3d Brigade, 48th AD 3d Brigade, 48th AD 1963-1968 GA ARNG 

1st Brigade, 49th AD 1973-1992 TX ARNG; San Antonio 1st Bde, 36th ID (1963- Texas 

1965) Brigade 

36th Infantry Bde (1965-

1973) 

2d Brigade, 49th AD 1963-1968 TX ARNG; Fort Worth CCA, 49th AD (1955-

1963) 

49th Armor Group 

(1968-1971) 

49th Armored Bde 

(1971-1973) 

1973-present 

204
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

1963-1968 TX ARNG; Dallas HQS Infantry Bde 

1973-present (1968-1973) 

3d Brigade, 49th AD 

36th Brigade, 49th 1992-present TX ARNG; Houston; 71st Airborne Bde Arrowhead 

AD designation from former (1968-1973) 

36th ID 36th Airborne Bde 

(1973-1980) 

36th Bde, 50th AD 

(1988-1992) 

1st Brigade, 50th AD 1968-1993 NJ ARNG; Woodbridge, 

NJ; Became 50th Bde, 42d 

ID

2d Brigade, 50th AD 1975-1993 NJ ARNG; Cherry Hill, NJ; 

86th Bde was division’s 3d 

Bde 1968-1988; 36th Bde 

1988-1992

1st Brigade, 63d ID 1963-1965 USAR; Bell, CA HQS Co, 63d ID 

205 
2d Brigade, 63d ID 

Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1963-1965 USAR; Pasadena, CA 181st Bde (1921-1942) 

3d Brigade, 63d ID 1963-1965 USAR; Los Angeles, CA 182d Bde (1921-1942) 

1st Brigade, 70th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Fraser, MI 1968- HQS Co, 70th ID 

1980; Livonia, MI 1980-

1990; Inkster, MI 1990-

1995; Mobilized 1991 

2d Brigade, 70th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Flint, MI 1968- 883d FA Bn 

1996 

3d Brigade, 70th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Fort Wayne, IN; 270th Engineer Bn 

Mobilized 1991 

206
207

Simulations training

2d Brigade, 75th Div 1993-present USAR; Fort Sam Houston, 

TX; Exercise training

3d Brigade, 75th Div 1993-present USAR; Fort Worth, TX 

1993-1999; Fort Riley, KS 

1999-present; Exercise 

training

4th Bde, 75th Div 1993-present USAR; Oklahoma City, 

OK 1993-1999; Fort Sill, 

OK 1999-present; Exercise 

training

 (479th FA Bde)

Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

4th Brigade, 70th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Indianapolis , 770th Ordnance Bn 

IN 1968-1969; Camp (205th Infantry Bde) 

Atterbury, IN 1969-1995 

1st Brigade, 75th Div 1993-present USAR; Houston, TX; 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

5th Brigade, 75th Div 1993-present USAR; Kansas City, KS; 

Exercise training 

1st Brigade, 76th Div 1968-1995 Portsmouth, NH 1968- HQS, 76th ID 

1993; Saco, ME 1993-1995 

2d Brigade, 76th Div 1968-1996 USAR; Warwick, RI 1968- 901st FA Bn 

1973; East Windsor, CT 

1973-1993; Lodi, NJ 1993-

1996 

3d Brigade, 76th Div 1968-1973 USAR; East Hartford, CT 301st Engineer Bn 

1993-1995 1968-1971; East Windsor, 

Ct 1971-1973; Red Bank, 

NJ 1993-1995 

4th Brigade, 76th Div 1968-1996 USAR; Providence, RI; 776th Ordnance Bn 

Replaced by 98th Division 

Bde 

208
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 77th ID 1963-1965 USAR; New York, NY HQS Co, 77th ID 

2d Brigade, 77th ID 1963-1965 USAR; Bronx, NY 153d Infantry Bde (1917-

1942) 

3d Brigade, 77th ID 1963-1965 USAR; Hampstead, NY 154th Infantry Bde (1917-

1942) 

1st Brigade, 78th Div 1968- USAR; Fort Hancock, NJ HQS Co, 78th ID 

present 1968-1983; Red Bank, NJ 

1983-1993; Camp Kilmer, 

Edison, NJ 1993-present; 

Simulation training 

2d Brigade, 78th Div 1968- USAR/AC; Lodi, NJ 1968- 903d FA Bn 

present 1993; Mobilized 1991; Fort (174th Infantry Bde)

Dix, NJ 1993-1999; Fort 

Drum, NY 1999-present; 

Exercise training/training 

support

209
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

3d Brigade, 78th Div 1968-1973 USAR/AC; Kearny, NJ 303d Engineer Bn 

1993-2002 1968-1973; Fort Devens, (3d Support Bde)

MA 1993-2002; Exercise 

training/training support

4th Brigade, 78th Div 1968-

present 

5th Brigade, 78th Div 1993-

present 

USAR/AC; Nixon, NJ 778th Ordnance Bn 

1968-1975; Edison, NJ (189th Infantry Bde) 

1975-1992; Richmond, VA 

1992-1999; Fort Bragg, 

NC 1999-present; Exercise 

training/training support 

USAR/AC; Baltimore, MD, 78th Committee Group 

1993-1999; Fort Meade, (1968-1978) 

MD 1999-present; Exercise 78th Training Command 

training/training support (1978-1984) 

(15th Support Bde) 

6th Brigade, 78th Div 1993-1999 USAR; Oakdale, PA 1993-

1994; Uniontown, PA 1994-

1999; Exercise training 

7th Brigade, 78th Div 1993-1999 USAR; North Syracuse, 

NY 1994-1999; Exercise 

training 

8th Brigade, 78th Div 1993-1995 USAR; Fort Dix, NJ; 

Exercise training 

210
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

9th Brigade, 78th Div 1993-1995 USAR; Fort Dix, NJ; 

Exercise training 

1st Brigade, 80th Div 1968-1995 

1996-

present 

2d Brigade, 80th Div 1968-

present 

3d Brigade, 80th Div 1968-1973 

1988-1995 

1996-

present 

4th Brigade, 80th Div 4th Brigade, 80th Div 1968-present

USAR; Alexandria, VA HQS Co, 80th ID 

1968-1995; Fort Meade, 

MD 1996-present; MP 

OSUT 

USAR; Salem, VA; IET 905th FA Bn 

USAR; Richmond, VA 305th Engineer Bn 

1968-1973; Charleston, WV 

1988-1990; Big Chimney, 

WV 1990-1995; Harrisburg, 

PA 1996-present; Combat 

support MOS training 

USAR: Norfolk, VA 780th Ordnance Bn 

1968-1977; Fort Story, VA 

1977-1996; Charleston, 

WV 1996-present; Combat 

service support MOS 

training 

211 
212

training

7th Brigade, 80th Div 1996-present USAR; Salem, VA; 

Training support

80th Committee Group 

(1968-1978)

80th Training Command 

(1978-1984)

8th Brigade, 80th Div 1996-present USAR; SROTC; 

Provisional unit

1st Brigade, 81st ID 1963-1965 USAR; Atlanta, GA HQS Co, 81st ID

2d Brigade, 81st ID 1963-1965 USAR; Athens, GA 161st Infantry Bde 

(1917-1942)

Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

5th Brigade, 80th Div 1996-present USAR; Wilmington, DE; 

Health services training 

6th Brigade, 80th Div 1996-present USAR; Fort Belvoir, VA; 

Professional development 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

1963-1965 USAR; Nashville, TN 162d Infantry Bde 

(1917-1942) 

3d Brigade, 81st ID 3d Brigade, 81st ID

1st Brigade, 82d AB 1964-present Fort Bragg, NC; Deployed 

Div to Dominican Republic 

1965. Panama 1989-1990, 

SWA 1990-1991; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

2d Brigade, 82d AB 1964-present Fort Bragg, NC; Deployed 

Div to Dominican Republic 

1965, Grenada 1983, 

Panama 1989-1990, SWA 

1990-1991; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003-

2004 

3d Brigade, 82d AB 1964-present Fort Bragg, NC; Deployed 

Div to Dominican Republic 

1965, Grenada 1983, 

Panama 1989-1990, SWA 

1990-1991; Separate 

brigade in Vietnam 1968-

1969; Afghanistan 2002-

2003; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004 

4th Brigade, 82d AB 1968-1969 Fort Bragg, NC; 

Div Replacement for 3d Bde 

while it was in Vietnam 

Command and Control 

Bn, 82d AB D (1957-

1964) 

155th Infantry Bde, 78th 

ID 

(1917-1942) 

156th Infantry Bde, 78th The Golden 

ID Brigade 

(1917-1942) 

213
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 83d ID 1963-1965 USAR; Akron, OH HQS Co, 83d ID

2d Brigade, 83d ID 2d Brigade, 83d ID 1963-1965 USAR; Columbus, OH 165th Infantry Bde 

(1917-1942) 

1st Brigade, 84th Div 

3d Brigade, 83d ID 1963-1965 USAR; Cincinnati, OH 166th Infantry Bde 

(1917-1942) 

1968-present USAR; Milwaukee, WI HQS Co, 84th ID 

1968-1993; Fort Sheridan, 

IL 1993-1996; Livonia, MI 

1996-present; Infantry One 

Station Unit Trng (OSUT) 

2d Brigade, 84th Div 1968-present USAR; Beaver Dam, WI; 909th FA Bn 

Basic Combat Trng 

214
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

3d Brigade, 84th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Milwaukee, WI 309th Engineer Bn Timberwolf 

1996-present 1968-1993; Fort McCoy, Brigade 

WI 1993; St Louis, MO 

1993-1995; Fort Snelling 

(St Paul), MN 1996-

present; Combat support 

MOS training 

4th Brigade, 84th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Milwaukee, WI 784th Ordnance Bn 

1996-present 1968-1995; Indianapolis, 

IN 1996-present; Combat 

service support MOS 

training 

5th Brigade, 84th Div 1996-present USAR; Milwaukee, WI; 

Health services training 

6th Brigade, 84th Div 1996-present USAR; Waukegan, IL; 

Professional development 

training 

7th Brigade, 84th Div 1996-present USAR; Milwaukee, WI; 84th Committee Group 

Training support (1968-1978) 

84th Training Command 

(1978-1984) 

215
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

8th Brigade, 84th Div 2000-present USAR; Milwaukee, 

WI; SROTC support; 

Provisional unit 

1st Brigade, 85th Div 1968-present USAR; Waukegan, IL 1968- HQS Co, 85th ID 

1992; Fort Sheridan, IL 

1992-present; Simulations 

training 

2d Brigade, 85th Div 1968-present USAR/AC; St Louis, MO 910th FA Bn 

1968-1993; Fort McCoy, (12th Support Bde) 

WI 1993-present; Exercise 

training support 

3d Brigade, 85th Div 1968-present

4th Brigade, 85th Div 1968-1973 

1993-present 

USAR/AC; Des Plaines, 310th Engineer Bn The Bayonet 

IL 1968-1972; Arlington Brigade 

Heights, IL 1972-1992; 

Selfridge ANGB, MI 1992-

present; Exercise training 

support 

USAR/AC; Chicago, Il 785th Ordnance Bn 

1968-1973; Fort Sheridan, 

Il 1993-present; Exercise 

training support 

216
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

5th Brigade, 85th Div 1993-1999 USAR; Fort Snelling, MN; 85th Committee Group 

Exercise training (1968-1978) 

85th Training Command 

(1978-1984) 

6th Brigade, 85th Div 1993-1999 USAR; Fort Benjamin 

Harrison, IN; Exercise 

training 

1st Brigade, 87th Div 1993-present USAR; Birmingham, AL; 

Simulations training 

2d Brigade, 87th Div 1993-present USAR/AC; Louisville, KY (158th Infantry Bde) 

1993-1999; Patrick AFB, 

FL 1999-present; Exercise 

training support

3d Brigade, 87th Div 1993-present USAR/AC; Jackson, MS (177th Armored Bde) 

1993-1999; Camp Shelby, 

MS 1999-present; Exercise 

training support

217
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

4th Brigade, 87th Div 1993-present USAR/AC; Fort Gillem, (188th Infantry Bde)

GA 1993-1999; Fort 

Stewart, GA 1999-present; 

Exercise training support

5th Brigade, 87th Div 5th Brigade, 87th Div 1999-present USAR/AC; Fort Jackson, (157th Infantry Bde) 

SC; Training support

6th Brigade, 87th Div 1993-1999 USAR; Fort Buchanan, 

PR; Exercise training 

1st Brigade, 89th Div 1968-1975 Wichita, KS; Training HQS Co, 89th ID

2d Brigade, 89th Div 2d Brigade, 89th Div 1968-1975 USAR; Denver, CO; 914th FA Bn 

Training 

218
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

1968-1975 USAR; Lincoln, NE; 314th Engineer Bn 

Training 

3d Brigade, 89th Div 

1st Brigade, 90th ID 

4th Brigade, 89th Div 1968-1975 USAR; Kansas City, KS; 789th Ordnance Bn

Training

1963-1965 San Antonio, TX 179th Infantry Bde 

(1917-1942) 

2d Brigade, 90th ID 1963-1965 San Antonio, TX 180th Infantry Bde 

(1917-1942) 

3d Brigade, 90th ID 1963-1965 Dallas, TX 915th FA Bn 

219 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

1st Brigade, 91st Div 1968-present USAR; Sacramento, CA HQS Co, 91st ID

1968-1993; Camp Parks, 

Dublin, CA 1993-present; 

Simulations training

2d Brigade, 91st Div 1968-present USAR/AC; Hamilton AFB, 916th FA Bn

CA 1968-1992; Norco, CA

1992-1999; Fort Carson, 

CO 1999-present; Exercise 

and training support

3d Brigade, 91st Div 1968-1973 USAR/AC; San Jose, CA 316th Engineer Bn 

1984-present 1968-1973; Marina, CA (21st Support Bde) 

1984-1992; Dublin, CA 

1992-1999; Travis AFB, CA 

1999-present; Exercise and 

training support 

4th Brigade, 91st Div 1968-present USAR/AC; Fort Cronkhite, 791st Ordnance Bn 

CA 1968-1978; Presidio of 

SF 1978-1992; Tumwater, 

CA 1992-1996; Fort Lewis, 

WA 1996-present; Exercise 

training 

5th Brigade, 91st Div 1996-192000 USAR; Salt Lake City, UT; 91st Committee Group 

Exercise training (1968-1978) 

91st Training Command 

(1978-1984) 

220
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

6th Brigade, 91st Div 1996-2000 USAR; Denver, CO; 

Exercise training

1st Brigade, 95th Div 1967-1995 USAR; Tulsa, Ok 1967-

1996-present 1995; Lawton, OK 1996-

present; Field Artillery One 

Station Unit Trng 

2d Brigade, 95th Div 1967-present USAR; Lawton, OK 1967- 920th FA Bn 

1984; Norman, OK 1984-

1997; Oklahoma City, 

OK 1997-present; Basic 

Combat Trng 

3d Brigade, 95th Div 1967-1995 USAR; Oklahoma City, OK 320th Engineer Bn 

1996-present 1967-1975; Stillwater, OK 

1975-1995; Broken Arrow 

OK, 1996-present; Combat 

support training 

4th Brigade, 95th Div 1967-present USAR; Shreveport, LA 795th Ordnance Bn 

1967-1975; Bossier City, 

LA 1975-1995; Lafayette, 

LA 1995-1996; Dallas, 

TX, 1996-present; Combat 

service support training 

221
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

5th Brigade, 95th Div 1996-present USAR; San Antonio, TX; 

Health services training 

6th Brigade, 95th Div 1996-present USAR; Topeka, KS; 

Professional development 

training 

7th Brigade, 95th Div 1996-present USAR; North Little Rock, 95th Committee Group 

AR; Training support- (1968-1978) 

basic combat training and 95th Training Command 

engineer MOS training (1978-1984) 

8th Brigade, 95th Div 2000-present USAR; Stillwater, 

OK; SROTC support; 

Provisional unit 

1st Brigade, 98th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Schenectady, NY HQS Co, 98th Div 

1996-present 1968-1995; Providence, 

RI 1996-present; Replaced 

76th Division units 1996 

222
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

2d Brigade, 98th Div 1968-present USAR; Buffalo, NY; Basic 923d FA Bn 

combat training support 

3d Brigade, 98th Div 1968-present USAR; Ithaca, NY 1968- 323d Engineer Bn 

1993; Mattydale, NY 1993-

1997 

Bronx, NY 1997-present; 

Combat support MOS 

training 

4th Brigade, 98th Div 1968-1995 

1996-present 

5th Brigade, 98th Div 1996-present 

USAR; Swornville, NY 798th Ordnance Bn 

1968-1970; Buffalo, NY 

1970-1995; West Hartford, 

CT 1996-present; Replaced 

1037th USARF School (Ft 

Devens); Combat service 

support MOS training 

USAR; Fort Hamilton, NY; 

Health services training 

6th Brigade, 98th Div 1996-present USAR; Mattydale, NY; 

Professional development 

training 

223
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

7th Brigade, 98th Div 1996-present USAR; Rochester, NY; 98th Committee Group 

Training support- basic (1968-1978) 

combat training and 98th Training command 

engineer MOS qualification (1978-1984) 

8th Brigade, 98th Div 2000-present USAR; West Hartford, 

CT; SROTC support; 

Provisional unit 

1st Brigade, 100th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Lexington, KY; HQS Co, 100th ID 

2d Brigade, 100th Div

1996-present Mobilized 1991; Current 

mission: armor basic 

combat training 

2d Brigade, 100th Div 1968-present USAR; Owensboro, 925th FA Bn 

Kentucky; Current mission: 

cavalry training 

3d Brigade, 100th Div 1968-1996 USAR; Lexington, KY 325th Engineer Bn 

1996-present 1968-1996; Huntsville, 

AL 1996-present; Current 

mission: Cbt Spt training 

224
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

4th Brigade, 100th Div 1968-1973 USAR; Louisville, KY 800th Ordnance Bn 

1996-present 1968-1973; Montgomery, 

AL 1996-present; Current 

mission CSS training 

5th Brigade, 100th Div 5th Brigade, 100th Div 1996-present USAR; Memphis, TN 

(1996-1997); Millington, 

TN (1997-present); Current 

mission health services 

training 

6th Brigade, 100th Div 1996-present USAR; Louisville, 

KY; Current mission 

professional development 

training 

7th Brigade, 100th Div 1996-2000 USAR; Fort Knox, 100th Committee Group 

KY; Exercise brigade (1968-1978) 

inactivated upon division’s 100th Training command 

reorganization as a training (1978-1984) 

support division 

1st Brigade, 101st AB 1964-present 

Div 

Fort Campbell, KY 1964-

1965; Vietnam 1965-1972; 

Separate brigade in Vietnam 

1965-1967; Fort Campbell, 

KY 1972- present; air 

assault bde since 1968 

(called airmobile until 

1974); SWA 1990-1991; 

Haiti, 1995-1996; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003-2004 

HHC, Command and 

Control Bn, 101st AB D 

(1959-1964) 

225
2d Brigade, 102d ID

Designation Dates Active Remarks 

2d Brigade, 101st AB 1964-present Fort Campbell, KY 1964-

Div 1967; Vietnam 1967-1972; 

Fort Campbell, KY 1991-

present; Fort Campbell, KY 

1972- present; air assault 

bde since 1968 (called 

airmobile until 1974); SWA 

1990-1991; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003-

2004 

3d Brigade, 101st AB 1964-present Fort Campbell, KY 1964-

Div 1967; Vietnam 1967-1972; 

Fort Campbell, KY 

1972- present; replaced 

173d AB Bde 1972; 

parachutist qualified 

1972-1974; air assault 

bde since 1968 (called 

airmobile until 1974); SWA 

1990-1991; Afghanistan 

2002: Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2003-2004 

 1st Brigade, 102d ID

2d Brigade, 102d ID

1st Brigade, 102d ID 1963-1965 USAR; St. Louis, MO 

1963-1965 USAR; Quincy, IL 

3d Brigade, 102d ID 1963-1965 USAR; Urbana, IL

Other Designations Nickname 

159th Infantry Bde (80th 

Div) (1917-1942) 

160th Infantry Bde (80th 

Div) (1917-1942)

HQS Co, 102d ID (to 

1959) 

203d Infantry Bde 

(1921-1942) 

204th Infantry Bde 

(1921-1942) 

226
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

1st Brigade, 104th Div 1968-present USAR; Vancouver HQS Co, 104th ID 

Barracks, WA; Current (before 1959) 

mission: basic combat 

training 

2d Brigade, 104th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Pasco, WA 929th FA Bn 

(before 1968) 

3d Brigade, 104th Div 1968-1995 

1996-

present 

4th Brigade, 104th Div 1968-

present 

5th Brigade, 104th Div 1996-

present 

USAR; Fort Lawton, WA 329th Engineer Bn 

1968-1989; Bothell, WA (before 1968) 

1989-1993; Fort Lewis, 

WA 1993-1995; Vancouver 

Barracks, WA 1996-present; 

Current mission: 

combat support training 

USAR; Fort Lawton, WA 804th Ordnance Bn 

1968-1982; Fort Lewis, WA (before 1968) 

1982-1993; Sacramento, 

CA 1993-1996; Camp Parks 

(Dublin), CA 1996-present; 

Current mission: combat 

service support training 

USAR; Fort Douglas, UT; 

Health services training 

227
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

6th Brigade, 104th Div 1996- USAR; Aurora, CO; 

present Current mission: USAR 

professional development 

(CGSC, CAS3); Replaced 

5046th United States Army 

Reserves Forces School 

7th Brigade, 104th Div 1996-present USAR: Fort Lewis, WA; 

Training support brigade 

8th Brigade, 104th Div 2000-present USAR; Fort Lewis, 

WA; SROTC support; 

Provisional unit 

4690th Brigade, 4690th Brigade, 1999-present USAR; Fort Shafter, HI; 

104th Div Multifunctional training; 

Provisional unit 

1st Brigade, 108th Div 1968-present USAR; Clemson, SC 

(1968-1995); Spartanburg, 

SC (1995-present); Current 

mission: basic combat 

training 

Other Designations Nickname

104th Committee Group 

(1968-1978) 

108th Training Command 

(1978-1984) 

4690th USAR Forces 

School 

HQS Co, 108th ID (1946-

1959) 

228
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

2d Brigade, 108th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Hickory, NC (1968- 507th FA Bn 

1996-present 1995); Garner, NC (1996- (before 1968)

present); Current mission: 

basic combat training

3d Brigade, 108th Div 1968-1995 USAR; Charlotte, NC 235th Engineer Bn 

1996-present 1968-1980; Winston- (before 1967)

Salem, NC 1980-1995; Fort 

Jackson, SC 1996-present; 

Current mission:combat 

support training

4th Brigade, 108th Div 1968-1996 USAR: Raleigh, NC 1968-

1996-present 1978; Garner, NC 1978-

1996; Decatur, GA 1996-

present; Current mission: 

combat service support 

training 

5th Brigade, 108th Div 1996-present USAR; Jacksonville, FL; 

Health Services training 

6th Brigade, 108th Div 1996-present USAR; Charlotte, NC 

(1996); Concord, NC 

(2002); Officer Educational 

System/ NCO Educational 

System support 

229
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

7th Brigade, 108th Div 1996-present USAR; Fort Jackson, SC; 108th Committee Group 

Training support (1967-1978) 

108th Training Command 

(1978-1984) 

8th Brigade, 108th Div 2000-present USAR; Puerto Rico; 

Multifunctional training 

9th Brigade, 108th Div 2000-present USAR; SROTC support; 

Provisional unit 

230
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname

Separate Brigades 

Berlin Brigade 1961-1994 TDA [i.e. administrative] 

unit 1961-1983; West 

Berlin, Germany 

1st Infantry Brigade 1958-1962 Fort Benning, GA; See 1st Bde, 1st ID 

Replaced by 197th Infantry 

Bde 

2d Infantry Brigade 1958-1962 Fort Devens, MA; Replaced See 2d Bde, 1st ID 

by 2d Bde, 5th ID 

5th Brigade 1975-1994 

(Training) 

6th Cavalry Brigade 1975-present 

(Air Combat) 

USAR armor training 

brigade in Lincoln, 

Nebraska; Converted from 

former 5th Armor Group 

(1954-1956), descended 

from 5th ACR (1951-1954) 

and 5th Tank Destroyer 

Group (1942-1945) 

Air cavalry attack brigade 

created as a separate 

brigade from assets of 

the 1st Cavalry Division 

(TRICAP)’s 2d Brigade; 

Transferred from Fort Hood 

to Korea in 1996 

231 
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

11th Infantry 1966-1971 Activated in Hawaii with 

Brigade (Light) number of old 6th ID 

brigade as the 6th was 

projected to be activated 

next; Sent to Vietnam 

(1967) and became part of 

Americal Division. 

21st Cavalry Brigade 1984-present Fort Hood, TX 

(Air Combat) 

26th Infantry 1993-1995 CT/MA ARNG; see 

Brigade 26th Bde, 29th ID 

(L); Springfield, MA; 

designated after former 

26th ID 

27th Infantry 1986-present NY ARNG; former 27th 

Brigade ID (NY ARNG); Roundout 

brigade for 10th Mountain 

Div (1986-1992); Enhanced 

brigade 1996; designated 

after former 27th ID/AD; 

slated to lose enhanced 

status in 2006 

29th Infantry 1959-present HI ARNG/USAR; 

Brigade Organized as a Pentomic 

brigade; Reorganized as 

a ROAD brigade 1963; 

Mobilized 1968-1969; 

Roundout for 25th ID 1973-

1985; Enhanced brigade 

1996; Honolulu, HI 

30th Armored 1973-1997 TN ARNG; Became 230th 

Brigade Spt Gp; designated after 

former 30th AD; Jackson, 

TN 

Other Designations Nickname 

1st Bde, 6th ID (current) 

AH-1964 Task Force 

HQs, 6th Cavalry Bde 

(1984-1985) 

Apache Training Bde 

(1985-1991) 

US Army Combat 

Aviation Training Bde 

(1992-1996) 

26th Infantry Div Yankee 

3d Bde, 26th ID 

26th Bde, 29th ID (L) 

(1995-present) 

27th Infantry Div Empire 

(1917-1955) 

27th Armored Div 

(1955-1968) 

27th Bde, 50th AD 

(1968-1975) 

27th Bde, 42d ID (1975-

1986) 

3d Bde, 30th AD Volunteers 

HQs, 30th ID (Tenn part) 

(before 1973) 

232
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

30th Infantry 1973-present NC ARNG; Enhanced 

Brigade (Mech) brigade 1996; Under 

24th ID (M) headquarters 

1999; designated after 

former 30th ID; Clinton, 

NC; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004 (attached 

to 1st ID (M)) 

31st Armored 1973-2001 AL ARNG; Became 31st 

Chemical Bde; Tuscaloosa, 

AL 1973-1979; Northport, 

AL 1979-2001; designated 

after former 31st ID 

Brigade 

32d Infantry Brigade 1967-1997 WI ARNG; Became 

2001-present mechanized in 1971; 

designated after former 32d 

ID; Milwaukee, WI; slated 

to gain enhanced status in 

2006 

36th Infantry 1968-1980 TX ARNG; Disbanded 

Brigade 1980; Reconstituted as 

a divisional element 

1988; patch with star was 

authorized 1968-1973, but 

never worn (authorized 

for 36th Bde but unit was 

called 71st then); Houston, 

TX 

39th Infantry 1967-present AR ARNG; Enhanced 

Brigade brigade 1996; Under 7th 

ID headquarters 1999; 

Little Rock, AR; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

(attached to 1st CD) 

Other Designations Nickname 

HQs, 30th ID (NC part) Old Hickory 

(before 1973) 

31st Infantry Div (1917- Dixie 

1968) 

31st Bde, 30th Armored 

Div (1968-1973) 

32d Infantry Div Red Arrow 

32d Bde, 34th ID 

(1997-present) 

36th Infantry Div (1917- Arrowhead 

1968) 

71st Airborne Bde 

(1968-1973) 

36th Airborne Bde 

(1973-1980) 

36th Bde, 50th Armored 

Div (1988-1992) 

36th Bde, 49th Armored 

Div (1992-present) 

39th Infantry Div (1917- Arkansas 

1967) Brigade 

39th ID Artillery 

(Arkansas part] (1946-

1967) 

233
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

40th Armored 1968-1974 CA ARNG; Los Angeles, 

Brigade CA 

40th Infantry 1968-1974 CA ARNG; Became 

Brigade elements of the 40th ID; 

41st Infantry Brigade 1968-present OR ARNG; Roundout 7th 

ID 1977-1984; Enhanced 

brigade 1996; Under 7th 

ID headquarters 1999; 

Portland, OR 

45th Infantry 1968-present OK ARNG; Enhanced 

Brigade brigade 1996; Under 7th 

ID headquarters 1999; 

Edmond, Ok 1969-1996; 

Oklahoma City, OK 1996-

present 

48th Infantry 1968-present GA ARNG; Roundout 

Brigade (Mech) 24th ID (M) 1975-1992; 

Mobilized 1990-191; 

Enhanced brigade 1996; 

Under 24th ID (M) 

headquarters, 1999; Macon, 

GA 

Other Designations Nickname

40th Infantry Div (1917-

1954; 1974-present) 

40th Armored Div 

(1954-1968) 

41st Infantry Div (1917-

1968) 

45th Infantry Div (1920- Thunderbird 

1968) 

59th Infantry Bde, 30th Gray 

ID (1922-1942) Bonnets 

121st Infantry, 48th ID 

(1946-1955) 

CCB, 48th Armored Div 

(1955-1963) 

1st Bde, 48th Armd Div 

(1963-1968) 

234
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

49th Armored 1971-1973 TX ARNG; Fort Worth, TX 

Brigade 

53d Infantry Brigade 1968-present FL ARNG; Enhanced 

brigade 1996; Tampa, 

FL; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2003-2004 

58th Infantry Bde 1975-1985 MD ARNG; Baltimore, MD

69th Infantry Bde 1963-1984 KS ARNG; Mobilized and 

attached to 5th ID (M), 

Fort Polk, LA, 1968-1969, 

replacing the division’s 1st 

Bde, stationed in Vietnam; 

Replaced by 4th Bde, 5th 

ID Dec 69; Converted 

to HQs, 35th ID 1984; 

Topeka, KS 

72d Infantry Bde 1968-1973 TX ARNG; Dallas, TX 

(Mech) 

Other Designations Nickname 

CCA, 49th Armored Div 

(1946-1961)

49th Armor Group (1968-

1971)

2d Bde, 49th Armored 

Div (1961-1968; 1973-

present)

HQs, 51st ID 

(Florida part) (1946-

1963)

53d Armored Bde 

(1964-1968)

3d Bde, 29th ID (1963-

1968)

3d Bde, 28th ID (1968-

1971)

58th Bde, 28th ID 

(1971-1975)

3d Bde, 29th ID (L)

(1985-present)

3d Bde, 49th Armored 

Div (1963-1968; after 

1973)

235
Designation Dates Active Remarks 

76th Infantry 1994-present IN ARNG; Enhanced 

Brigade (Light) brigade 1996; Indianapolis, 

IN; Bosnia 2001: Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2003-

2004 

81st Infantry Brigade 1968-present WA ARNG; Roundout to 

(Mech) the 9th ID (1988-1991); 

Enhanced brigade 1996; 

Seattle, WA; Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM 2004 

86th Armored 1964-1968 VT ARNG; Montpelier, VT 

Brigade 

92d Infantry Brigade 1959-present PR ARNG; Pentomic 1959-

1963; San Juan, PR 

116th Cavalry 1989-present ID ARNG; Enhanced 

Brigade brigade 1996; designation 

from 116th Cavalry 

Regiment (ID ARNG); 

Actually a mechanized 

infantry brigade in 

organization; Boise, ID; 

Roundout 4th ID 1989-

1996; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2004-2005 

Other Designations Nickname 

1st Bde, 38th ID (1963-

1994) 

76th Bde, 38th ID 

(1965-1994) 

HQS, 41st ID 

(Washington part) (1917-

1968) 

86th Infantry Bde (1963- Vermont 

194) Brigade 

86th Bde, 50th Armored 

Div (1968-1988) 

86th Bde, 26th ID 

(1988-1993) 

86th Bde, 42d ID 

(1993-present) 

236
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

116th Infantry 1975-1985 VA ARNG; Staunton, VA; 2d Bde, 29th ID Stonewall 

Brigade designation comes from old (1963-1968) Brigade

116th Infantry regimental 116th Bde, 28th ID 

headquarters (1971-1975)

1st Bde, 29th ID (L) 

(1986-present) 

149th Armored 1980-1984 KY ARNG; Bowling 

Brigade Green,/Louisville, KY; 

Became part of 35th ID; 

designation comes from 

former 149th Infantry 

155th Armored 1973-present MS ARNG; Roundout 108th ACR 

Brigade brigade 1st Cavalry Div 1st Bde, 30th AD 

1984-1991; Mobilized (1968-1973) 

1990-1991; Enhanced 

brigade 1996; Tupelo, MS 

157th Infantry 1963-1995

Brigade (Mech) Brigade (Mech)

171st Infantry Brigade 1963-1972

USAR brigade in 

Pennsylvania; designation 

from former 79th Division 

Bde; Created from excess 

USAR personnel after inact 

of 79th ID (USAR); Upper 

Darby, PA 1963-1968; 

Horsham, PA 1968-1995 

Stationed in Alaska; 

Designation from former 

86th Division Bde 

237 
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

172d Infantry Brigade 1963-1986 Stationed in Alaska; 

1998-present Replaced by 6th ID (L) 1986; 

designation from former 86th 

ID Bde; Replaced 1st Bde, 

6th ID; Stryker Bde 2000 

173d Airborne Brigade 1963-1972 Activated in Okinawa 

2002-present and deployed to Vietnam 

(1965-1971); Inactivated 

at Fort Campbell, 1972; 

Reactivated in northern 

Italy 2000; 2d maneuver 

battalion added 2002; 

designation from former 87th 

ID bde; Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 2003-2004 

177th Armored 1991-1994 OPFOR brigade, Fort Irwin; 

Brigade designation from former 89th 

ID bde; Replaced by 11th 

ACR; designation briefly 

used by USAR/AC training 

support brigade in 1999 

187th Infantry Brigade 1963-1994

191st Infantry Brigade 1963-1968

USAR brigade in New 

England; designation from 

former 94th ID bde; Created 

from excess USAR personnel 

after inactivation of 94th 

ID (USAR); Boston, MA 

1963-1971; Wollaston, MA 

1971-1976; Fort Devens, MA 

1976-1994 

USAR bde in Montana, 

Arizona; designation from 

former 96th Division Bde; 

Created from excess USAR 

personnel after inact of 96th 

ID (USAR); Helena, MT 

238
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

193d Infantry Brigade 1962-1994 Panama; designation from 

former 97th Division bde; 

Reorg as light infantry 1985 

194th Armored Brigade 1962-1995 Fort Knox; designation from 

former 97th Division bde 

196th Infantry Brigade 1965-1972 Replaced 2d Bde, 5th ID 

(Light) 1998-present at Fort Devens; Originally 

designated to deploy to 

Dominican Republic, instead 

went to Vietnam (1966) 

and attached to Americal 

Division; Separate again 

1971-1972; designation from 

former 98th Division Bde; 

Reactivated 1998 to serve 

as AC/RC training support 

element for Hawaii, Alaska 

and the Pacific area 

197th Infantry Brigade 1962-1991 Replaced 1st Infantry Bde at 

Fort Benning; Converted to 

mechanized 1984; Attached 

to 24th ID (M) for DESERT 

STORM; 1991; Inactivated 

1991 and replaced by new 

3d Bde, 24th ID; designation 

from former 99th Division 

Bde 

198th Infantry Brigade 1967-1971 Activated at Fort Hood 

and deployed to Vietnam 

(1967), where attached to 

Americal Div; designation 

from former 99th Division 

Bde

239
Designation Dates Active Remarks Other Designations Nickname 

199th Infantry Brigade 1966-1970 Activated at Fort Benning; 

1991-1992 Deployed to Vietnam 

(1966); designation from 

former 100th Division Bde; 

Reactivated at Fort Lewis 

to replace 3d Brigade, 9th 

ID; Transferred to Fort 

Polk, LA, and replaced by 

2d ACR 

205th Infantry Brigade 1963-1994 USAR brigade in 

Minnesota and Iowa; 

designation from former 

103d Division Bde; 

Created from personnel 

of inact 103d ID (USAR); 

Roundout unit to 6th ID (L) 

1985-1994; Fort Snelling, 

MN

218th Infantry Brigade 1974-present SC ARNG; former 2d 2d Bde, 30th ID (1968-

(Mech) Bde, 30th ID; Roundout 1974)

brigade for 1st ID (M) 

1991-1996; Enhanced 

brigade 1996; Under 24th 

ID (M) headquarters, 1999; 

Newberry, SC

256th Infantry Brigade 1967-present

402d Brigade (Training) 1985-1996

LA ARNG; Roundout 1st Bde, 39th ID (1961- Louisiana 

brigade for 5th ID (M) 1967) Brigade 

1975-1992; Converted 

to mechanized 1977; 

Mobilized 1990-1991; 

Roundout 2d AD 1992-

1996; Enhanced brigade 

1996; Lafayette, LA 

USAR Artillery training 

brigade at Fort Sill; Part of 

95th Div (Trng) 

240