United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

June 1996 NAVY AVIATION

F/A-18E/F will Provide

Marginal Operational

Improvement at High

Cost

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-98

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260367 

June 18, 1996

Congressional Committees

The F/A-18E/F program is one of the Department of Defense’s most costly tactical aviation

programs. We reviewed the F/A-18E/F program as part of our overall review of the Navy’s

efforts to modernize its tactical aircraft fleet. We included the F/A-18C/D, F/A-18E/F, and DOD’s

plans for the next generation Joint Strike Fighter in our review.

Our review objectives were to (1) determine whether operational deficiencies in the F/A-18C/D

cited by the Navy to justify the need for the F/A-18E/F have materialized and, if they have, the

extent to which the E/F would correct them, (2) ascertain whether the F/A-18E/F will provide

an appreciable increase in operational capability over the F/A-18C/D, and (3) review the

reliability of the cost estimates for the F/A-18E/F and compare those estimates with the costs of

potential alternatives to the E/F program.

Given the high cost and marginal operational improvements that the F/A-18E/F would provide,

this report recommends that the Secretary of Defense reconsider the decision to produce the

F/A-18E/F aircraft and, instead, consider procuring additional F/A-18C/Ds until the next

generation strike fighter achieves operational capability. We also suggest that the Congress, in

considering DOD’s fiscal year 1997 budget request, may wish to direct that no funds may be

obligated for procurement of the F/A-18E/F until alternatives to the E/F program are fully

considered.

We believe that implementing our suggested approach could result in savings of almost

$17 billion. We are addressing this report to you because of your jurisdiction over this issue.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
B-260367 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

Purpose The F/A-18E/F program, at a projected total program cost of $63.09 billion

(fiscal year 1996 dollars)/$89.15 billion (then-year dollars),1

 is one of the

most costly aviation programs in the Department of Defense (DOD). It is

the successor to several unsuccessful attempts to modernize the Navy’s

tactical aviation fleet and is intended to complement and eventually

replace the Navy’s F/A-18C/D and F-14 aircraft. GAO’s review focused on

determining whether continued development of the F/A-18E/F is the most

cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet.

Specific objectives were to (1) determine whether operational deficiencies

in the F/A-18C/D cited by the Navy to justify the need for the F/A-18E/F

have materialized and, if they have, the extent to which the E/F would

correct them, (2) ascertain whether the F/A-18E/F will provide an

appreciable increase in operational capability over the F/A-18C/D, and

(3) review the reliability of the cost estimates for the F/A-18E/F and

compare those estimates with the costs of potential alternatives to the E/F

program.

Background The Navy performs its carrier-based missions with a mix of fighter

(air-to-air), strike (air-to-ground), and strike/fighter (multirole) aircraft.

Currently, carrier-based F-14 fighter aircraft perform the air-to-air

missions; A-6Es perform the air-to-ground missions; and F/A-18s perform

the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

Since the late 1980s, the Navy has participated in several unsuccessful

joint service programs to replace its A-6E attack aircraft with stealth

aircraft. Initial efforts began with the A-12 program, but that program was

terminated in 1991 for technical and cost reasons. The Navy continued its

modernization efforts through a new program designated the A/F-X, and

requested funding to upgrade its F/A-182

 through a modification program

designated the F/A-18E/F. In 1993, DOD’s Bottom-Up Review concluded

that DOD could not afford all of its aviation programs and recommended

termination of the A/F-X program. However, the Bottom-Up Review

recommended that the F/A-18E/F program continue and that a new

program, the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, be

1

Then-year dollar expenditures include estimated inflation for the years in which the expenditures are

expected to occur; constant dollar expenditures, by holding purchasing power constant, eliminate the

effect of inflation. The total program cost has recently been reduced to $80.96 billion (then-year

dollars) based on revised economic assumptions that lowered annual inflation indexes from 3 percent

to 2.2 percent.

2

The first major upgrade to the F/A-18 fleet resulted in the F/A-18C/D. First delivery of the C/Ds began

in late 1987.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

initiated to seek ways to make the services’ next generation strike aircraft

more affordable.

The F/A-18E/F program, which originated from the 1988 Hornet 2000 study

conducted by the Naval Air Systems Command and McDonnell Douglas

Aerospace Corporation, was approved as a Major Modification program on

May 12, 1992. The total program cost, estimated to be $63.09 billion (fiscal

year 1996 dollars)/$89.15 billion (then-year dollars), is comprised of

$5.783 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars)/$5.803 billion (then-year dollars) in

development costs, and $57.31 billion (fiscal year 1996

dollars)/$83.35 billion (then-year dollars) in procurement costs for 1,000

aircraft. Initial operational capability is scheduled for 2000, with fielding of

the first operational carrier-based squadron scheduled for 2003.

Procurement of the E/F is scheduled to continue through 2015.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, in its

May 1995 report, concluded that DOD may have greater quantities of strike

aircraft and other deep attack weapon systems than it needs. The

commission recommended, and DOD agreed to conduct, a DOD-wide

cost-effectiveness study focused on finding the appropriate combination

and quantities of deep attack capabilities currently fielded and under

development by all the services.

In conducting its review, GAO acquired Navy data that the service used to

project operational deficiencies in the F/A-18C/D and compared that data

with the current C/D operational performance to determine whether the

projected deficiencies had materialized; evaluated the Hornet 2000 study,

acquisition reports, operational requirements documents, and engineering

and test data that DOD used in justifying the F/A-18E/F program; and

obtained and evaluated E/F procurement cost data that the Navy provided

to the Congress.

Results in Brief As of December 31, 1995, the Navy had spent about $3.75 billion (then-year

dollars) on the development phase of the F/A-18E/F program. DOD’s next

major decision is whether to proceed into the estimated $57.31 billion

(fiscal year 1996)/$83.35 billion (then-year dollars) procurement program

to manufacture 1,000 aircraft.

The operational deficiencies in the F/A-18C/Ds that the Navy cited in

justifying the F/A-18E/F either have not materialized as projected or can be

corrected with nonstructural changes to the C/D. Furthermore, E/F

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

operational capabilities will only be marginally improved over the C/D

model. In addition, although the E/F will have increased range over the

C/D model, the C/D’s range will exceed the range required by the E/F’s

system specifications and the E/F’s range increase is achieved at the

expense of its aerial combat performance. Also, modifications to increase

the E/F’s payload have created a problem when weapons are released

from the aircraft that may reduce the E/F’s potential payload capability.

Over the years, the Navy has improved the operational capabilities of the

F/A-18C/D so that procuring more of them, rather than the new model E/F

aircraft, could be the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the

Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet in the mid-term. In that regard, additional

upgrades, should they be needed, could be made to the F/A-18C/D, which

would further improve its capabilities. These upgrades include such things

as a larger fuel tank for more range and strengthened landing gear and

other changes to increase carrier recovery payload. Then, for the long

term, the JAST program’s newly designated Joint Strike Fighter could be an

alternative to the F/A-18E/F. The Joint Strike Fighter operational

capabilities are projected by the JAST office to be equal or superior to the

F/A-18E/F at a lower unit cost.

DOD’s $43.6 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) unit recurring flyaway cost3

estimate for the F/A-18E/F is understated. The estimate is based on a total

buy of 1,000 aircraft—660 for the Navy and 340 for the Marine Corps—and

an eventual annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year. However, the

total number of aircraft to be procured and the annual production rate are

overstated. The Marine Corps does not plan to buy the F/A-18E/F aircraft,

and in 1992, the Congress questioned whether an annual production rate

of 72 aircraft was affordable. GAO calculations show that reducing the

number of aircraft to be procured and the annual production rate to more

realistic levels will increase the unit recurring flyaway cost of the aircraft

from about $44 million to $53 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars). This

compares to $28 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) for the F/A-18C/D. GAO

calculated that the Navy could save almost $17 billion (fiscal year 1996

dollars) in recurring flyaway costs by buying 660 new F/A-18C/D model

aircraft instead of 660 F/A-18E/F model aircraft.

3

GAO used recurring flyaway costs because DOD has consistently maintained that these costs are the

most appropriate to compare the costs of different aircraft. Recurring flyaway costs include costs

related to the production of the basic aircraft and do not include all procurement costs. Appendix I

contains a more detailed discussion of what makes up various costs and how they are calculated.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

F/A-18E/F Will Provide

Marginal Improvements

Over F/A-18C/D

The Navy justified the need for the F/A-18E/F in three key areas: increased

range, the capability to return to the carrier with unused weapons and

stores (referred to as carrier recovery payload), and improved

survivability.

Although the F/A-18E/F range will be greater than the F/A-18C/D, the C/D

could achieve strike ranges far greater than the target distances stipulated

in the E/F’s system specifications by flying the same high-altitude missions

as the E/F. Further range improvements, should the Navy decide they are

necessary, can be made to the C/D by using the larger 480-gallon external

fuel tanks that are planned to be used on the E/F. Furthermore, even with

increased range, both the C/D and E/F will require aerial refueling to hit

most targets if low-altitude missions are flown rather than the higher

altitude missions now being planned for. Additionally, the E/F’s increased

range is achieved at the expense of combat performance. Specifically, the

E/F’s limited improvement in engine thrust, coupled with the fact that the

E/F is a larger aircraft than the C/D, results in the E/F having less air-to-air

combat capability in sustained turn rate, maneuvering, and acceleration

than the C/D.

The F/A-18C carrier recovery payload deficiency has not occurred as the

Navy had predicted in 1992 when the F/A-18E/F was approved. F/A-18Cs

operating in support of Bosnian operations are now routinely returning to

the carrier with operational loads that exceed the Navy’s stated carrier

recovery payload capacity. This carrier recovery payload is currently

greater than when the F/A-18C/D was introduced into the fleet in fiscal

year 1988. With landing gear and other modifications, the C/D’s carrier

recovery payload capacity would be greater than the carrier recovery

payload sought for the F/A-18E/F.

Although improvements are planned for the F/A-18E/F to increase its

survivability in combat, the need for the aircraft was not justified to

counter threats that could not be countered with existing or improved

F/A-18C/Ds. Also, the effectiveness of the stealth improvements planned

for the E/F is questionable and might better be attained at less cost with

the next generation Joint Strike Fighter. For example, unlike the

F/A-18E/F, which will carry all of its weapons externally, the Joint Strike

Fighter will likely carry at least two air-to-ground and two air-to-air

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

weapons internally. This configuration will allow the Joint Strike Fighter

to maximize its stealthiness and thus increase its survivability in the

high-threat, early stages of a conflict.

C/D Has Space for Growth

and E/F Must Resolve

Payload Problems

The Navy stated that by the mid-1990s, the C/D would not have space

required for new avionics systems. GAO determined that the growth

deficiency has not occurred as projected and that the C/D does have space

for growth. Furthermore, the use of miniaturization and modularization in

future upgrades to the C/D are expected to increase the C/D’s capacity to

incorporate additional avionics systems.

The Navy also stated that the F/A-18E/F would provide increased payload

capacity. GAO found that projected F/A-18E/F payload improvements may

not occur. The E/F, with its two additional wing stations, will have

increased payload capacity over the C/D. However, air flow problems

around the fuselage and weapons stations, as well as the proposed E/F

weapons carrying configuration that places the weapons closer to the

center fuselage and closer to each other than is the case with C/D models,

may preclude the E/F from safely deploying the larger payload.

Furthermore, a 1,150-pound weight limitation on each of the two

additional E/F stations will not allow the E/F to carry any more of the

heavy precision weapons than the C/D can carry. These weapons, which

include the Harpoon, Standoff Land Attack Missile, Laser Guided MK-84,

Guided Bomb Unit-24, and WALLEYE II, are needed to destroy hardened

targets and to maintain stand-off distances needed for improved

survivability.

Joint Strike Fighter Is

Predicted to Be Less

Costly and More Capable

Than the F/A-18E/F

Contractor concept exploration and demonstration studies for the JAST

program indicated that an affordable Joint Strike Fighter can be built that

would be less expensive and more capable than the F/A-18E/F. The JAST

office stated that affordability is a critical characteristic for the Joint

Strike Fighter. Accordingly, it has established a program objective that the

Navy’s version of the Joint Strike Fighter will have a unit recurring flyaway

cost of $32 million to $40 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) compared to

$53 million for the F/A-18E/F, depending on which contractor’s concept is

chosen. According to the JAST office’s Joint Initial Requirements

Document, the Joint Strike Fighter cost objectives are based on projected

budget constraints and service needs. The Navy version of the Joint Strike

Fighter is scheduled to begin delivery in 2007. It is expected to be a stand

alone, stealthy, first-day-of-the-war, survivable aircraft that will not be as

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

dependent on other support aircraft for its survivability as the F/A-18E/F is

expected to be. The operational capabilities of the Navy’s Joint Strike

Fighter are expected to be comparable to what DOD planned to achieve in

the A/F-X aircraft. It is too soon to determine the extent to which the Joint

Strike Fighter cost and performance goals will be achieved.

F/A-18E/F Will Cost More

Than Currently Estimated

The F/A-18E/F production estimate is based on a total program buy of

1,000 aircraft (660 for the Navy and 340 for the Marine Corps) and an

eventual annual production rate of 72 aircraft. Flyaway and total program

costs vary with the total number of aircraft bought and the annual

production rate. According to Marine Corps officials and the Marine Corps

Aviation Master Plan, the Corps does not intend to buy any F/A-18E/Fs.

Therefore, the 1,000-aircraft buy is overstated by 340 aircraft.

Furthermore, the Congress questioned whether an annual production rate

of 72 aircraft is realistic, and it directed the Navy to calculate costs based

on more realistic estimates of 18, 36, and 54 aircraft per year. The Navy

has not yet reported revised cost estimates based on this change to

production rates. However, DOD planning documents show that the annual

production rate of the E/F will be cut to 36 aircraft once the Joint Strike

Fighter becomes available. GAO calculated that a reduction in the total

F/A-18E/F program buy to 660 aircraft and at an annual production rate of

36 aircraft would increase the aircraft’s unit recurring flyaway cost from

$43.6 million to $53.2 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars).

In fiscal year 1996 dollars, the F/A-18C/D has a unit recurring flyaway cost

of $28 million based on an annual production rate of 36 aircraft. This cost

difference in unit recurring flyaway cost would result in a savings of

almost $17 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) if the Navy were to procure 660

F/A-18C/Ds rather than 660 F/A-18E/Fs. GAO’s estimated savings do not

include the cost of C/D upgrades, such as the larger 480-gallon external

fuel tanks for improved range or the strengthened landing gear to increase

carrier recovery payload. However, GAO’s estimated savings are

conservative because they also do not include planned E/F upgrades and

are based on recurring flyaway costs that do not include the other items

that make up total procurement costs. (See app. I for a discussion of how

unit costs are computed.) Additionally, GAO’s estimated savings do not

include savings that would accrue from having fewer models of F/A-18

aircraft in the inventory. The cost benefits would result from having

common aircraft spare parts, simplified technical specifications, and

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

reduced support equipment variations, as well as reductions in aircrew

and maintenance training requirements.

Recommendation Given the cost and the marginal improvements in operational capabilities

that the F/A-18E/F would provide, GAO recommends that the Secretary of

Defense reconsider the decision to produce the F/A-18E/F aircraft and,

instead, consider procuring additional F/A-18C/Ds. The number of

F/A-18C/Ds that the Navy would ultimately need to procure would depend

upon when the next generation strike fighter achieves operational

capability and the number of those aircraft the Navy decides to buy.

Agency Comments

and GAO’S Evaluation

In its comments on GAO’s draft report, DOD said that it is convinced that the

fundamental reasons for developing the F/A-18E/F remain valid. Since DOD

provided no data or information that GAO had not acquired and analyzed

during its review, GAO has not changed its position that procuring the E/F

is not the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy’s tactical

aircraft fleet. GAO recognizes that the E/F will provide some improvements

over the C/D. However, the C/D’s current capabilities are adequate to

accomplish its assigned missions. Based on the marginal nature of the

improvements and the E/F’s projected cost compared to the alternatives

discussed in the GAO report, GAO believes that its recommendation that DOD

reconsider its decision to produce the F/A-18E/F aircraft and, instead,

consider procuring additional C/D aircraft until the next generation strike

fighter becomes operationally available represents sound fiscal planning.

GAO formulated its position within the context of current budget

constraints, the decreased military threat environment, and statements by

DOD officials, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that DOD’s

current plans to upgrade its tactical aircraft fleet will not be affordable.

Additionally, as GAO pointed out, the national military strategy directs that

major new investments should have substantial payoff. GAO does not

believe that procuring the F/A-18E/F would meet this test.

DOD’s entire comments on the draft report and GAO’s evaluation are

included in appendix III. DOD’s specific comments and GAO’s evaluation

regarding the key areas that DOD has cited in justifying the E/F—range,

carrier recovery payload, and survivability—are summarized in the

following sections.

Regarding the comparative range of the C/D and E/F, DOD stated that the

F/A-18E/F Early Operational Assessment verified that the E/F will

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

outperform the C/D in range by 40 to 50 percent. Although GAO also

reported that the E/F will have a range greater than the C/D, its analysis of

the Early Operational Assessment showed that the E/F’s potential range

improvements are not as great as DOD claimed. The specific range data are

classified, but GAO’s analysis showed that the E/F’s range advantage over

the C/D is about half of DOD’s claim. Given that the E/F will have some

range advantage over the C/D, the issue is whether the E/F’s range

advantage justifies buying the E/F at a unit cost of about $53 million

instead of buying the C/D at a unit cost of about $28 million (1996 dollars

for 660 aircraft). In that regard, the Secretary of the Navy has stated that

about 85 percent of the service’s targets are within 200 miles of shore and

are, therefore, within the C/D’s range.4

 Additionally, other DOD assets will

be available to engage targets beyond the C/D’s range. Consequently, GAO

questions whether the E/F’s potential range advantage justifies the

increased procurement cost.

Regarding carrier recovery payload, according to DOD’s comments, payload

of the F/A-18C is 6,281 pounds. This shows that carrier recovery payload

has not declined to 5,785 pounds as the Navy had projected. Furthermore,

a waiver currently permits the F/A-18C aircraft in Bosnia to return to the

carrier with more payload weight than the Navy projected would be

available. However, DOD stated this waiver increases risk and would

adversely affect airframe structural life—particularly in the future when

heavier precision-guided munitions are deployed on the aircraft. DOD also

stated that the C/D landing gear would require strengthened metal to

accommodate the future munitions. The Naval Air Systems Command

officials told GAO that the waiver to increase the C/D carrier landing weight

has been approved as a permanent change in carrier operations. GAO’s

analysis of E/F program management reviews showed that newer, stronger

metals will be used to produce E/F landing gear. DOD did not comment on

why those metals could not also be used to strengthen the C/D landing

gear if greater maximum carrier landing weight is needed.

Regarding survivability, DOD stated that the E/F has a balanced design, of

which radar cross-section reduction is only one part. It cited decreases in

vulnerable areas and an integrated defensive electronic warfare suite as

additional survivability contributors. GAO noted that these additional

survivability contributors were evaluated as part of the E/F Early

Operational Assessment. The specific results of the assessment are

classified, but GAO’s review of the Early Operational Assessment report

4

See U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save

Billions (GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Executive Summary

showed that development issues associated with these contributors need

to be resolved before they will be operationally effective. GAO is currently

reviewing these efforts and will be reporting on them separately.

Additionally, comparisons of E/F and C/D survivability also need to

consider survivability enhancements that have been or are planned for the

C/D. These include such things as the Enhanced Performance Engine, the

ALR-67 (V)3 Advanced Special Radar Warning Receiver, and the use of

standoff weapons. DOD’s comments did not address these C/D survivability

enhancements.

DOD also stated in its comments that GAO’s recommendation was premature

because the decision to procure the E/F will not be made until the first

quarter of calendar year 1997, when a Defense Acquisition Board will

convene for a low-rate initial production (LRIP) milestone decision. GAO

does not believe that DOD should delay the decision on whether to produce

the E/F until after a LRIP review. GAO’s concern is not whether the E/F will

ultimately be able to successfully meet its requirements, which would be a

legitimate consideration for an LRIP decision. Rather, GAO believes that the

comparative operational and cost data for the F/A-18C/D and E/F that it

presents in its report provides an adequate basis for DOD and the Congress

to make an informed decision on whether procuring the E/F is the most

fiscally sound approach to providing the Navy with adequate numbers of

operationally effective tactical aircraft.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

DOD requested funding in its fiscal year 1997 budget request to begin

procurement of the F/A-18E/F. The Congress may wish to direct that no

funds may be obligated for procurement of the F/A-18E/F until it has fully

examined the alternatives to the E/F program. In that regard, the House

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (H.R. 3230, 

sec. 220) directed such an examination, and a DOD deep strike study is

expected to be completed by the end of 1996. Delaying the authority to

begin procuring the E/F would allow DOD to complete its study and time

for the Congress to assess the results of the DOD study and the information

in this report as it decides whether DOD should be provided funding to

proceed with the F/A-18E/F program.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Contents

Executive Summary 3

Chapter 1 

Introduction

16

Navy Tactical Aircraft Modernization Efforts 16

F/A-18 Modernization Effort 17

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Chapter 2 

F/A-18E/F Will

Provide Marginal

Improvements Over

F/A-18C/D

21

Increased Combat Range While Maintaining Combat Performance

Sought for the F/A-18E/F

21

F/A-18E/F Survivability Improvements 34

Chapter 3 

F/A-18C/D Space

Deficiency Has Not

Occurred and

F/A-18E/F Payload

Problems Must Be

Resolved

39

Growth Space Deficiency Has Not Occurred as Predicted 39

F/A-18E/F Has Weapons Release Problems and Provides a

Marginal Increase in Lethality

41

Chapter 4 

The Joint Strike

Fighter Is Predicted to

Be More Affordable

and More Capable

Than the F/A-18E/F

44

JSF Is Predicted to Cost Less and Be More Capable Than the

F/A-18E/F

44

Chapter 5 

F/A-18E/F Will Cost

More to Procure Than

Currently Estimated

48

DOD and Congressional Concerns About F/A-18E/F Program

Cost

48

Unit Acquisition Costs Will Be Greater Than Projected 49

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Contents

Chapter 6 

Conclusions and

Recommendation

52

Recommendation 53

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 54

Matters for Congressional Consideration 54

Appendixes Appendix I: F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D Acquisition Cost

Comparison

56

Appendix II: Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program 61

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 63

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 101

Tables Table 2.1: Comparison of F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Uninstalled

Thrust

29

Table 2.2: Projected and Current Carrier Recovery Payload

Capacity for Fiscal Year 1993 Procurement F/A-18Cs

32

Table 2.3: Routine Payload Recovery for F/A-18Cs Operating in

Bosnia

34

Table 3.1: Effect of Replacing Avionics Systems on the F/A-18

Hornet

40

Table 3.2 Comparison of Selected Payloads for the F/A-18E/F and

F/A-18C/D

43

Table I.1: Navy Unit Cost Estimates for the F/A-18E/F 58

Table I.2: Costs of Producing 660 F/A-18E/Fs or 660 F/A-18C/Ds in

Then-Year Dollars

59

Table I.3: Costs of Producing 660 F/A-18E/Fs or 660 F/A-18C/Ds in

Constant Fiscal Year 1996 Dollars

59

Table I.4: Comparison of Costs to Produce 660 F/A-18E/Fs and

660 F/A-18C/Ds in Then-Year and Constant Fiscal Year 1996

Dollars

60

Table II.1: Projected JSF Acquisitions by Service 61

Figures Figure 2.1: F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Range Comparison:

Low-Altitude Mission Profile

24

Figure 2.2: F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Range Comparison:

High-Altitude Mission Profile

26

Figure 2.3: F/A-18 Aircraft 28

Figure 2.4: F/A-18C Landing on a Carrier During Bosnia

Operations

33

Figure 3.1: F/A-18C/D Weapon Stations 41

Figure 3.2: F/A-18E/F Weapon Stations 42

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Contents

Figure 4.1: JSF Family of Three Aircraft 45

Figure I.1: Breakout of Various Program Costs 57

Abbreviations

AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile

CNA Center for Naval Analysis

DOD Department of Defense

EOA Early Operational Assessment

EPE Enhanced Performance Engine

GAO General Accounting Office

HARM High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

JAST Joint Advanced Strike Technology

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

LRIP low-rate initial production

NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The F/A-18E/F program is the successor to prior unsuccessful attempts to

modernize the Navy’s tactical aviation fleet. The Navy’s initial focus was

on replacing its high-end1

 A-6 attack aircraft. The programs that were

initiated in that regard—the A-12 and then the A/F-X—were eventually

canceled. The Navy also initiated studies to upgrade its multirole F/A-18

low-end2

 tactical aircraft. The upgraded F/A-18 effort was designated the

F/A-18E/F. At a projected total program cost of $63.09 billion (fiscal year

1996 dollars)/$89.15 billion (then-year dollars)3

 the F/A-18E/F program is

one of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly aviation programs.

Navy Tactical Aircraft

Modernization Efforts

In January 1988, the Navy awarded a fixed-price incentive contract to

McDonnell Douglas Aerospace and General Dynamics Corporation to

develop the Advanced Tactical Aircraft, later designated the A-12. In June

1988, the Navy and McDonnell Douglas also completed a study, known as

Hornet 2000, to study upgrade options to the F/A-18 because of the long

development cycle of planned future fighter aircraft. The A-12 was to

begin replacing A-6Es in the mid-1990s. The Air Force was also

considering a version of the A-12 to replace its high-end F-15E, and F-111

strike aircraft. On January 7, 1991, after making almost $2.7 billion

(then-year dollars) in progress payments, the Navy terminated the A-12

program because of technical and cost reasons.

Almost immediately after terminating the A-12 program, the Navy

requested funding to modernize the F/A-18. A new joint Air Force and

Navy program—designated A-X and later A/F-X—was also initiated to

replace their high-end attack/strike aircraft with more advanced stealthy

aircraft. The A/F-X was to begin fielding a more affordable Navy A-6E

replacement aircraft around 2008. The A/F-X program office estimated it

would cost $22.8 billion (then-year dollars) to develop the A/F-X and

$50 million to $100 million to procure each aircraft.

1

According to the February 1993 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Aircraft

Assessment, high-end tactical aircraft are used for the most demanding missions, such as theater

air-superiority and autonomous deep strike.

2

F/A-18A/B/C/D low-end multirole aircraft are used to handle the less demanding low-end aspects of

both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Low-end multirole aircraft have historically cost half as

much as high-end aircraft and because of this they have provided a much more affordable means of

achieving an adequate force structure.

3

Then-year dollar expenditures include estimated inflation for the years in which the expenditures are

expected to occur; constant dollar expenditures, by holding purchasing power constant, eliminate the

effect of inflation. The total program cost has recently been reduced to $80.96 billion (then-year

dollars) based on revised economic assumptions that lowered annual inflation indexes from 3 percent

to 2.2 percent.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In 1993, DOD’s Bottom-Up Review concluded that DOD had too many new

aircraft programs and that future defense budgets would not support both

the F/A-18E/F and the A/F-X program. Therefore, in accordance with the

review’s recommendations, the Secretary of Defense announced that the

A/F-X advanced tactical aviation program would be canceled, the

F/A-18E/F program would continue, and the services’ efforts to field a next

generation joint strike fighter aircraft would be pursued through a Joint

Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program. The family of three common

aircraft that is to ultimately result from the JAST effort is called the Joint

Strike Fighter (JSF).

The three JSF variants are intended to be (1) a first-day-of-the-war,

survivable strike fighter aircraft to complement the F/A-18E/F for the

Navy, (2) an advanced short-takeoff and vertical-landing aircraft to replace

the AV-8B and F/A-18 for the Marine Corps, and (3) a multirole aircraft

(primary air-to-ground) to replace the Air Force F-16 and A-10 aircraft.

F/A-18 Modernization

Effort

In May 1992, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition approved the

Navy’s Milestone IV, Major Modification F/A-18E/F. A $5.783 billion (fiscal

year 1996 dollars)/$5.803 billion (then-year dollars) F/A-18E/F

development estimate was based on the combined cost to develop the

airframe and the engine and to pay other government costs. The airframe

development contract was awarded to McDonnell Douglas Aerospace,

with Northrop Grumman Corporation as the prime subcontractor.

McDonnell Douglas makes the forward fuselage, the wings, and the aft

wing/horizontal stabilizers. Northrop Grumman makes the forward center

fuselage, the aft center and aft fuselage sections, and the aft fuselage

vertical tail sections. The Navy has contracted with General Electric

Corporation to develop the F/A-18E/F’s engine. The engine will be

provided to McDonnell Douglas Aerospace as a government-furnished

item. Most of the avionics development costs for F/A-18E/F are not

included in the E/F’s development cost estimate.

As of December 31, 1995, the Navy had spent about $3.75 billion on the

development phase of the F/A-18E/F program. Initial operational capability

of the F/A-18E/F is scheduled for 2000, and fielding of the first operational

carrier-based squadron is scheduled for 2003. Procurement of 1,000

aircraft for the Navy and the Marine Corps is planned through 2015.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

We initiated this review because of the magnitude of funds involved in the

F/A-18E/F program. We included the F/A-18C/D, F/A-18E/F, and JSF in our

review to determine whether continued development of the F/A-18E/F is

the most cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy’s tactical

aircraft fleet.

In conducting our work, we evaluated data used to justify the F/A-18E/F

program. We reviewed various documents, including the Hornet 2000

study; Navy documents such as acquisition reports; the Operational

Requirements Document; and related cost, engineering, and test data

supporting the decision to develop the F/A-18E/F. This data showed that

the F/A-18E/F was approved to correct deficiencies in current F/A-18s that

the Navy said existed or were projected to materialize. The F/A-18

deficiencies cited were in range, carrier recovery payload, and

survivability. Improvements in F/A-18E/F growth space and payload over

the F/A-18C/D were also cited by the Navy in seeking E/F approval. Our

specific objectives were to

• determine whether the operational deficiencies in the F/A-18C/D that the

Navy cited in justifying the E/F program have materialized and, if they

have, the extent to which the F/A-18E/F would correct them;

• ascertain whether the F/A-18E/F will provide an appreciable increase in

operational capability over the F/A-18C/D; and

• review the reliability of the cost estimates for the F/A-18E/F and compare

those estimates with the costs of potential alternatives to the E/F program.

To accomplish these objectives, we acquired data on the current

operational capabilities of the F/A-18s and the status of the F/A-18E/F

development effort from the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the

builders of the F/A-18s: McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, Northrop

Grumman Corporation, and General Electric Corporation.

We obtained various studies, test results, performance data reports and

interviewed Navy and contractor officials. Using these data, we conducted

various analyses and calculations, which are explained in the appropriate

sections of our report, to verify the deficiencies in range, carrier recovery

payload and survivability predicted for the C/D, and to ascertain the

probability that the E/F would correct those deficiencies.

To ascertain whether the F/A-18E/F will provide an appreciable increase in

operational capability over the F/A-18C/D we focused on payload capacity

and growth potential. These areas were also cited by the Navy in justifying

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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Introduction

the E/F program. We interviewed Navy and contractor officials and

reviewed data from contractor studies, system specifications, and Navy

reports. We evaluated the Navy’s projections that indicated that the C/D

would have no growth potential to accommodate future avionics

requirements. We also compared the weapons capacity of the C/D with the

potential capacity of the E/F.

Additional information concerning F/A-18C/D operational deficiencies and

the need for the E/F was obtained from documents and interviews with

officials from the Center for Naval Analysis and the Defense Intelligence

Agency.

To evaluate the validity of the F/A-18E/F procurement cost estimates, we

examined the assumptions on which the estimates were based in terms of

numbers of aircraft to be procured and the number of aircraft to be

produced each year. We made these analyses because the Congress and

DOD have expressed concerns in the past that the Navy’s assumptions were

not realistic, given the probable limited availability of annual funding. To

make this evaluation, we acquired data and interviewed officials in the

Naval Warfare’s Aviation Requirements and Aviation Inventory

directorates, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff For Aviation

within the Marine Corps. We obtained procurement cost data provided to

the Congress in the annual Selected Acquisition Report and aircraft

inventory data used by the Navy to calculate the E/F’s projected

procurement cost, which is based on a combined Navy and Marine Corps

buy of 1,000 aircraft. From this data, we developed and then compared

F/A-18C/D and E/F recurring flyaway cost projections.

We also compared projected E/F operational and cost projections with

those of the JAST JSF. This information was acquired from the JAST program

office, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (their Marine Corps

Short-Takeoff Vertical Landing Strike Fighter effort was combined with

JAST), and the contractor teams working on the JSF effort. The contractors

are a consortium of McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, Northrop Grumman

Corporation, and British Aerospace; Boeing Corporation; and Lockheed

Martin Corporation. We obtained the contractors’ and the JAST program

office’s estimates for the future JSF and calculated the cost of continuing

procurement of the F/A-18C/D in lieu of proceeding with the F/A-18E/F

program. Our methodology for calculating comparative costs for the C/D

and E/F programs is explained in detail in appendix I where we present

those cost comparisons.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 1 

Introduction

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments

are presented and evaluated in their entirety in appendix III.

We conducted our review from December 1994 through December 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

The F/A-18E/F is intended to replace current F/A-18C/D aircraft and to

perform Navy and Marine Corps fighter escort, strike, fleet air defense,

and close air support missions. The current F/A-18C/Ds have proven their

value to the battle commander by providing the capability to perform

diverse missions and excellent payload flexibility under dynamic wartime

conditions. However, the Navy stated that in order to maintain a superior

level of combat performance into the 21st century, the F/A-18 will require

increased range, increased carrier recovery payload, and improved

survivability. Our review determined that:

• The Navy’s F/A-18 strike range requirements can be met by either the

F/A-18E/F or F/A-18C/Ds. The increased range of the E/F is achieved at the

expense of aerial combat performance, and even with increased range,

each aircraft will still require aerial refueling for low-altitude missions

against most targets.

• F/A-18C carrier recovery payload deficiency has not occurred as the Navy

predicted. F/A-18Cs operating in support of Bosnian operations routinely

return to the carrier with operational loads that exceed the Navy’s stated

carrier recovery payload capability.

• Although survivability improvements are planned for the F/A-18E/F, the

aircraft was not justified to counter threats that could not be countered

with existing or improved F/A-18C/Ds. Also, the effectiveness of a

survivability improvement planned for the E/F is questionable and might

better be attained at less cost with the next generation JSF.

Increased Combat

Range While

Maintaining Combat

Performance Sought

for the F/A-18E/F

The Navy is reporting that F/A-18E/F strike ranges are significantly greater

than the specifications require. Those E/F strike range projections are

based on a high-altitude mission, which results in increased fuel efficiency

and range, whereas the E/F contract stipulates specifications for a

low-altitude strike mission. McDonnell Douglas Aerospace data show that

the F/A-18C/D can also achieve the E/F’s low-altitude strike range

specification if it carried the larger external fuel tanks that are planned to

be used on the E/F. Navy data also shows that the C/D, without the larger

external tanks, could exceed the target distances stipulated in the E/F

system specifications by flying the same high-altitude mission as the E/F.

Also, we found that the design changes needed to achieve the F/A-18E/F’s

range improvements will adversely affect its aerial combat performance

relative to the F/A-18C/D. Should the Navy not be able to fly the more

fuel-efficient, high-altitude mission profiles, both the E/F and the C/D will

need aerial refueling to reach a majority of targets in many of the likely

wartime scenarios that either aircraft would be employed.

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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

F/A-18C/D’s Strike Range

Will Exceed F/A-18E/F

Specifications

In justifying the F/A-18E/F, the Navy cited, among other factors, the

F/A-18C/D’s inability to perform long-range unrefueled missions against

deep, high-value targets. The Navy incorporated major airframe

modifications to the F/A-18E/F to increase its long-range strike capability.

However, we found that the F/A-18C/D can achieve greater ranges without

making modifications to its airframe. These ranges will exceed the

F/A-18E/F’s low-altitude range specifications.

F/A-18E/F specifications call for the aircraft to have a range of 390 nautical

miles while performing low-altitude bombing with four 1,000-pound

gravity bombs and using two 480-gallon external fuel tanks. This strike

range is 65nm longer than the reported 325nm low-altitude strike range of

the F/A-18C/D using two smaller 330-gallon external fuel tanks and

carrying four 1,000-pound gravity bombs. The F/A-18E/F will achieve its

greater strike range primarily from its greater internal fuel capacity and

larger wings, and its larger 480-gallon external fuel tanks. In total,

F/A-18E/Fs will carry 980 gallons more fuel (450 gallons external/

530 gallons internal) than F/A-18C/Ds.

Larger External Fuel Tanks Will

Increase F/A-18C/D’s Range

The 480-gallon tank planned to be used on the F/A-18E/F uses new

filament-winding technology and a toughened resin system to produce a

lightweight external fuel tank. It carries 45 percent more fuel than the

330-gallon tank, but its diameter is only 3.1 inches greater and it has the

same empty weight as the 330-gallon tank. F/A-18 E/F program officials

informed us that the 480-gallon tanks planned for the E/F cannot be

carried by the C/D. Furthermore, current Navy operational documents will

not allow 480-gallon external tanks on the C/Ds. However, we have

identified McDonnell Douglas and Navy studies that state that the larger

480-gallon external fuel tanks can be used on existing F/A-18C/D aircraft.

The 1988 Hornet 2000 study, prepared by a team led by the Naval Air

System Command with the Center for Naval Analyses and McDonnell

Douglas assisting, addressed the issue of carrying larger 480-gallon

external fuel tanks on existing F/A-18C/Ds. The study reports that

“Range/radius improvements can be achieved with larger external fuel

tanks. The 480 gallon fuel tank rather than the 330 gallon can be

accommodated on inboard wing stations of all configurations, including

the baseline.”

The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s March 1992 F/A-18E/F Technical

Risk Assessment Team report also addressed the use of 480-gallon

external fuel tanks on the E/F. This report stated that

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

“The 480-gallon fuel tank was initially designed for carrier use, but the production version

has been modified for use on the Canadian CF-18. Additional testing must be completed to

requalify the fuel tank for carrier use and the aft pylon attach point will require

strengthening for the carrier environment. The modifications appear to be low risk.”

A 1991 McDonnell Douglas report, “480 Gallon External Fuel Tank,”

concluded that the 480-gallon external fuel tank can be carried on the

F/A-18C/D inboard wing stations for carrier operations. According to the

report, use of the 480-gallon tank on the C/D does not require any

structural changes to the aircraft and the 480-gallon tank can be used with

all weapons qualified for the F/A-18C/D. The report also stated that the

new 480-gallon tank increases the multimission capability and flexibility of

the F/A-18 fighter. As shown in figure 2.1, the 480-gallon fuel tank extends

the C/D strike interdiction range flying low-altitude missions with two

external tanks from 325nm to 393nm.1

 This increased range exceeds the

390nm specification range for the F/A-18E/F flying the low-altitude strike

mission profile.

1

According to the report, adding a 330-gallon external fuel tank to the C/D’s centerline station, with the

two 480-gallon tank configuration, would further increase its range to 437nm.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Figure 2.1: F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Range Comparison: Low-Altitude Mission Profile

Low-Altitude Mission Profile

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

465

393

325

Range (in nautical miles)

F/A-18E/F

(2-480 gallon tanks)

F/A-18C/D

(2-480 gallon tanks)

F/A-18C/D

(2-330 gallon tanks)

E/F strike range specification (390nm)

Source: McDonnell Douglas and NAVAIR.

Additionally, the McDonnell Douglas report stated that the 480-gallon

tanks increase the deck cycle2

 time of the F/A-18C/Ds configured for a

fighter escort mission, to over 3 hours. Also, the report noted that two

480-gallon tanks on the C/D effectively replace three 330-gallon tanks. This

gives the mission planner the option to have the C/Ds carry additional

weapons, sensors, or fuel on the centerline station.

2

Deck cycle refers to the time required to launch and recover aircraft. The greater the cycle time, the

more flexibility the carrier commander has to safely conduct aircraft sorties.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Flying E/F’s Mission Profile

Will Also Significantly Increase

the C/D’s Range

Recent Navy range predictions show that the F/A-18E/F is expected to

have a 683nm strike range, carrying two 2,000-pound precision-guided

bombs. The Navy plans to achieve this significant range, a range that

approaches that planned for the canceled A/F-X program and the Navy’s

JAST variant, by flying F/A-18E/F strike missions with the larger 480-gallon

tank and using a more fuel-efficient, survivable, and lethal high-altitude

mission profile rather than the specified low-altitude profile.

However, as shown in figure 2.2, the same Navy predictions show that

F/A-18C/D’s strike ranges also increase significantly when flying at high

altitudes because of increased fuel efficiency at higher altitudes.

According to Navy data, the F/A-18C/D flying at high altitudes with its

normal configuration of three 330-gallon external fuel tanks has a range of

566nm—176nm more than the F/A-18E/F’s strike range specification.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Figure 2.2: F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Range Comparison: High-Altitude Mission Profile

High-Altitude Mission Profile

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Range (in nautical miles)

F/A-18E/F

(3-480 gallon tanks)

F/A-18C/D 

(2-480 gallon tanks &

1-330 gallon tank)

F/A-18C/D 

(3-330 gallon tanks)

683

>600

566

Source: NAVAIR.

F/A-18E/F Range Increase

Achieved at the Expense of

the Aircraft’s Aerial

Combat Performance

According to Navy and contractor documents, key factors in determining

combat performance of an aircraft are thrust, turn rate, and acceleration.

The Navy stated that to maintain the combat performance of the larger and

heavier F/A-18E/F relative to the F/A-18C/D, it would develop and

incorporate new higher thrust engines. However, program data shows that

the range improvements sought by the larger and heavier F/A-18E/F will be

achieved at the expense of the aircraft’s combat performance and that the

F/A-18E/F’s aerial combat performance in key areas will be inferior to

current F/A-18C/Ds.

The F/A-18E/F’s larger fuel capacity, due to its larger size, allows the

aircraft to achieve greater range than the F/A-18C/Ds. The F/A-18E’s empty

weight without fuel and ordinance is about 6,100 pounds heavier than that

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Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

of the C’s. The E is 4.3 feet longer than the C, and its wing area is

25 percent greater. The F/A-18E can carry about 6,600 more pounds of fuel

than the F/A-18C. The F414-GE-400 engine being developed for the E/F by

General Electric is designed to provide added thrust to compensate for the

added weight of the aircraft and fuel. (See fig. 2.3.)

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Figure 2.3: F/A-18 Aircraft

Source: McDonnell Douglas.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

According to program documents, the F414-GE-400 engine generates

about 22,000 pounds of uninstalled thrust,3

 a 37.5-percent increase over

the F404-GE-400 engine used in the F/A-18A/B and some early F/A-18C/D

aircraft. However, technical manuals show that the F/A-18E/F’s

F414-GE-400 engine develops only 20,727 pounds of uninstalled thrust.

Furthermore, the latest F/A-18C/Ds are equipped with an enhanced version

of the F404 engine, known as the F404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance

Engine. This new engine that was developed to meet foreign buyers’

requirements for better combat performance has been adopted for Navy

use. The enhanced engine increased the uninstalled thrust from 16,000 to

17,754 pounds. Consequently, as shown in table 2.1, the F/A-18E/F has

about a 17-percent improvement in uninstalled thrust over the C/Ds fitted

with the F404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance Engine, rather than

37.5-percent reported in program documents.

Table 2.1: Comparison of F/A-18C/D

and F/A-18E/F Uninstalled Thrust Thrust in pounds

Engine

Uninstalled

thrusta

F/A-18C/D 

(F404-GE-402, enhanced performance engine) 17,754

F/A-18E/F 

(F414-GE-400 engine) 20,727

Difference 17 percent

aSea Level, Standard Day.

Source: NAVAIR.

This limited improvement in uninstalled thrust, coupled with a much

heavier operationally loaded F/A-18E/F, means that the E/F will have less

air-to-air combat capability in its sustained turn rate, maneuvering, and

acceleration than F/A-18C/Ds with the enhanced performance engines.

Sustained turn rate,4

 maneuvering,5 and acceleration contribute to an

aircraft’s combat performance and survivability by increasing its ability to

3

Static, sea level, maximum power, standard day.

4

Sustained turn rate is the maximum rate of turn, measured in degrees per second, the aircraft can

sustain without losing speed.

5

Maneuvering is expressed as instantaneous bleed rate, which is a measure of how quickly an aircraft

loses speed during maneuvering.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

maneuver in either offensive or defensive modes. Navy data6 comparing

the F/A-18C to the F/A-18E shows the following:

• At sea level, the F/A-18C’s sustained turn rate is 19.2 degrees per second,

while the F/A-18E’s sustained rate is 18 degrees per second. The

instantaneous bleed rate of the F/A-18C is 54 knots per second, whereas

the F/A-18E will lose 65 knots per second in a turn.

• At 15,000 feet, the F/A-18C’s sustained turn rate is 12.3 degrees per second,

while the F/A-18E’s sustained rate is 11.6 degrees per second. The

instantaneous bleed rate of the F/A-18C is 62 knots per second, whereas

the F/A-18E will lose 76 knots per second in a turn.

Aircraft acceleration affects an aircraft’s combat performance in a number

of ways, ranging from how quickly the aircraft can reach its area of

operation to its ability to close the gap in air-to-air engagements or to

evade air-to-ground missiles. Navy data shows the following:

• At 5,000 feet at maximum thrust, the F/A-18C accelerates from 0.8 Mach to

1.08 Mach7

 in 21 seconds, whereas the F/A-18E will take 52.8 seconds.

• At 20,000 feet at maximum thrust, the F/A-18C accelerates from 0.8 Mach

to 1.2 Mach in 34.6 seconds, whereas the F/A-18E takes 50.3 seconds.

• At 35,000 feet at maximum thrust, the F/A-18C accelerates from 0.8 Mach

to 1.2 Mach in 55.80 seconds, whereas the F/A-18E takes 64.85 seconds.

The F/A-18C accelerates from 0.8 Mach to 1.6 Mach in 2 minutes 

12 seconds, whereas the F/A-18E takes 3 minutes and 4 seconds.

All F/A-18s Will Need

Aerial Refueling to Attack

Most Targets for

Low-Altitude Missions

In justifying the low-altitude 390nm strike range specification for the

F/A-18E/F, the Navy cited the F/A-18C/D’s shorter strike range (325nm

flying the low-altitude mission profiles) and its inability to perform

long-range unrefueled missions. Current Navy modeling projects that the

F/A-18E/F will have a strike range of 465nm when flying the specified

low-altitude mission profile, or 75nm greater than the 390nm development

specification. However, the Center for Naval Analysis reported that with

these ranges, the F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D will both need aerial refueling

to reach most targets in two of the most likely wartime scenarios if

high-altitude mission profiles are not flown.

6

Weapons load is 2 AIM-9 and 2 AIM-120 carried externally, no external fuel tanks and 60 percent fuel

remaining. F/A-18E data are Navy estimates.

7

At sea level, the maximum speed of the F/A-18 is limited and cannot reach 1.2 Mach.

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A 1993 Center for Naval Analysis8 report indicates that the E/F, even with

its range improvement over the F/A-18C/D, would require in-flight

refueling to reach a majority of targets in many of the likely wartime

scenarios in which the E/F would be employed. The Center’s 1993 report

was consistent with its 19899

 report that concluded that an upgrade to the

F/A-18C/D (now identified as the F/A-18E/F) would probably retain its

need for in-flight refueling. Therefore, according to the 1989 report, the

desire for additional internal fuel should not be the driving force in the

design of the F/A-18E/F.

F/A-18C Carrier Recovery

Payload Deficiency Has

Not Occurred as Predicted

The Navy cited an anticipated deficiency in F/A-18C carrier recovery

payload capacity10 as one of the primary reasons for developing the

F/A-18E/F. In 1992, when seeking approval for the F/A-18E/F, the Navy

stated that F/A-18Cs procured in fiscal year 1988 had a total carrier

recovery payload capacity of 6,300 pounds. However, it projected that

F/A-18C enhancements planned through the fiscal year 1993 procurement

(delivery in fiscal year 1995)(Lot XVII) would increase the aircraft’s

operating weight and decrease its total carrier recovery capacity to 

5,785 pounds. It said this condition would constrain the ability of the

carrier’s air wing to fulfill its full spectrum of training

requirements—especially under the worse case scenario of conducting

night training and carrying greater amounts of reserve fuel needed for a

divert field landing.

As shown in table 2.2, the F/A-18C carrier recovery payload capacity is

substantially greater than the Navy projected it would be and, in fact, is

greater than when the F/A-18C was introduced into the fleet in late 1987.

8

Analysis of AX Design Range, Center for Naval Analysis (CRM 93-2, Mar. 1993).

9

F/A-18 Upgrade Project, Center for Naval Analysis (CRM 88-74, Mar. 1989).

10Carrier recovery payload is defined as the amount of fuel, weapons, and external equipment (such as

navigation and targeting pods) that an aircraft can carry when landing on a carrier. It is the computed

difference between maximum landing weight and the aircraft operating weight.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Table 2.2: Projected and Current

Carrier Recovery Payload Capacity for

Fiscal Year 1993 Procurement

F/A-18Cs F/A-18C carrier recovery payload

Capacity in pounds

Projected capacitya

(Navy’s estimate)

Current capacity (our

calculation)

Maximum carrier landing

weight

33,000 34,000

Total operating weight –27,215 –26,987

Total carrier recovery

payload

5,785b 7,013b

aBased on Navy’s 1992 projection of mid-1990’s capacity.

bIncludes 5,000 pounds of reserve fuel.

As indicated in table 2.2, current F/A-18Cs have 7,013 pounds of carrier

recovery payload capacity, rather than the 5,785 pounds the Navy

predicted. The higher carrier recovery payload capacity calculation is the

result of

• the Navy, in 1994, increasing the F/A-18C’s maximum allowable carrier

landing weight from 33,000 to 34,000 pounds, thereby adding 1,000 pounds

to the payload and

• (1) replacement of the canceled Advanced Self Protection Jammer with a

lighter system, the ALQ-126 and (2) a prior overestimate of weight needed

for contingencies.

The F/A-18C’s better than projected carrier recovery payload is being

demonstrated during actual flight experience of the F/A-18Cs flying

military operations in Bosnia. (See fig. 2.4.)

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Figure 2.4: F/A-18C Landing on a Carrier During Bosnia Operations

Source: Reuters/Archive Photos.

According to data provided by the F/A-18 program office, as shown in

table 2.3, F/A-18Cs routinely bring back 7,156 pounds of recovery payload.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Table 2.3: Routine Payload Recovery

for F/A-18Cs Operating in Bosnia Weight in pounds

Item Weight

1 High-speed anti-radiation missile 

2 Guided bomb unit-12s 

Forward looking infrared radar pod

2 AIM-9 Sidewinders

3 External tanks

778

1,220

371

390

897

Total munitions 

Fuel reserve

3,656

3,500

Total carrier recovery payload 7,156

The Navy achieved this recovery payload by increasing the F/A-18C’s

maximum landing weight to 34,000 pounds and decreasing the reserve fuel

level from 5,000 to 3,500 pounds.

The Navy has stated that although it is currently able to bring back a full

operational load of existing weapons, it will not be able to bring back the

heavier, more expensive precision-guided munitions planned for the

future. Because the Navy has demonstrated the ability to manage the

recovery payload of the F/A-18C by increasing the maximum landing

weight of the F/A-18C by 1,000 pounds for Bosnian operations, we

attempted to determine whether the maximum landing weight could be

further increased to compensate for future munitions. Navy program

officials did not know whether the maximum landing weight could be

increased further; however, the Hornet 2000 Technical Report states that

the carrier landing design gross weight of the F/A-18C can be increased to

37,000 pounds with landing gear and other changes, thereby providing an

additional 3,000 pounds of recovery payload. Adding this weight to the

total carrier recovery payload shown in table 2.2 would result in a total

recovery payload of 10,013 pounds for the F/A-18C. That amount of carrier

payload recovery for the F/A-18C is greater than the 9,000 pounds of

payload sought for the F/A-18E/F.

F/A-18E/F

Survivability

Improvements

The Navy is seeking to improve F/A-18E/F survivability compared to the

current F/A-18C/D by reducing its detectability and the probability of it

being destroyed. Although survivability improvements for the F/A-18E/F

are planned, the F/A-18E/F was not justified to counter a particular

military threat that could not be met with current F/A-18C/Ds or

F/A-18C/Ds that will be enhanced by additional planned survivability

features. In addition, the effectiveness of an F/A-18E/F survivability

improvement is questionable. Moreover, the JSF represents an alternative,

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

affordable next generation aircraft that is projected to surpass the

survivability of the F/A-18E/F at less cost.

F/A-18E/F Survivability

Increases Not Driven by

F/A-18C/D Survivability

Deficiency

In August 1993, we reported11 that the F/A-18E/F was not justified to

counter a particular military threat that could not be met with current

capabilities. In responding to our report, the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition disagreed with our conclusion that the F/A-18E/F decision

was not threat based. He referred to the April 1993 “Report to Congress on

Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation Modernization,” which he stated included

intelligence data on projected threats in the post-year 2000 period, which

require improvements in the survivability of tactical fixed-wing aircraft. He

stated that these improvements were part of the process for approving the

modification of the F/A-18C/D to the F/A-18E/F. We reviewed this report

and found that although this study discussed future threats, it was in

system-to-system engagements, not as part of a force package where other

assets are used to increase aircraft survivability. According to Navy

officials, the F/A-18E/F will be operated as part of a force package—just as

the F/A-18C/D currently operates. These aircraft will not operate alone as

the stealthy F-22 and the Navy’s JSF are planned to be. (Chapter 4 discusses

the JSF and its planned survivability features.)

The relative importance of a threat-based justification for the E/F is also

supported by a March 24, 1992, memorandum from the Vice Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

It said that the main consideration in the timing of buying the F/A-18E/F

was not an emerging threat. This is consistent with statements contained

in the May 1992 F/A-18E/F Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis

Summary.

According to the summary, the Navy’s current F/A-18 warfighting

capability was expected to be adequate in dealing with the projected

threat beyond the turn of the century. Further, the key components of

potential threats have stabilized in response to East European political

economic shifts. Also, the Commonwealth of Independent States’

emphasis on development and deployment of advanced air, ground, and

naval weapons had greatly declined, particularly the anti-air warfare

threat.

11Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives Before Proceeding With the F/A-18E/F (GAO/NSIAD-93-144,

Aug. 27, 1993).

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

Additional Features

Planned to Enhance

F/A-18C/D Survivability

According to the May 1992 F/A-18E/F Acquisition Plan, the aircraft’s

weapon system architecture was to be essentially the same as the

F/A-18C/D Night Attack aircraft. An October 1995 F/A-18 program brief

and a more recent Naval Intelligence study on strike warfare state that the

F/A-18C is survivable against all current air-to-air threats. The October

brief further states that the F/A-18C Night Strike Hornet (compared with

previous F/A-18s) increased the exchange rate against the MiG-29 by a

factor of 4, increased survivability against surface threats, and is

23 percent more effective in strike warfare.

Additional improvements have subsequently been made or are planned for

the F/A-18C/D to enhance its survivability. For example, according to Navy

program documents, improvements were made to reduce its radar

detectability. Although these improvements are classified and cannot be

discussed in this report, Navy and contractor officials agreed that the

radar detectability has been reduced. Other improvements to the

F/A-18C/D include the following:

• The F404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance Engine to provide increased

combat performance and, therefore, increased survivability.

• The ALR-67(V)3 Advanced Special Warning Receiver and the ALE-47

Countermeasures Dispensing System (chaff and flares) will be installed on

new F/A-18C/Ds to alert the aircrew of potential threats and automatically

deploy countermeasures, thereby decreasing the probability of the aircraft

being hit should it be fired on.

• Standoff weapons, such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Standoff

Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response, improved Advanced Medium

Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and AIM-9X to be installed on the

F/A-18C/D will improve its standoff range from the threat and thus further

improve its survivability.

F/A-18E/F Survivability

Improvements Are

Questionable

The Navy listed reduced aircraft radar signature as an objective and key

measure of aircraft survivability when discussing F/A-18E/F survivability

improvements. Navy and McDonnell Douglas officials said they have

significantly reduced the F/A-18E/F’s frontal radar signature compared to

the C/D model. The specifics of how radar signature reduction is achieved

are classified. However, according to Center for Naval Analysis and Navy

officials, the F/A-18E/F’s reduced radar signature only helps it penetrate

slightly deeper than the F/A-18C/D into an integrated defensive system

before being detected.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

When Navy officials referred to the F/A-18E/F’s reduced frontal radar

signature, they cite low observability improvements made to the aircraft

structure. However, because the F/A-18E/F will be carrying weapons and

fuel externally, it will diminish the radar signature reduction

improvements derived from the structural design of the aircraft. The need

to carry weapons and fuel internally to maintain an aircraft’s low

observability is consistent with low observability or stealthy aircraft

designs, such as the F-117, the A-12, the A/F-X, the F-22, and the B-2, all

designed to carry fuel and weapons internally.

A 1994 Lockheed Corporation briefing document entitled “The Value of

Stealth,” discussed the value of frontal radar signature reduction and the

impact on detection ranges when such things as pylons, munitions, and

fuel tanks are carried externally. The brief stated that:

“While very beneficial in a one-on-one engagement, nose-on to the threat, treatments to

enhance the survivability of a conventional aircraft by reducing the forward aspect

observable level is not sufficient to successfully penetrate a typical threat environment.

The long detection and engagement range of modern threat systems against the side sector

of an Enhanced Conventional Aircraft will significantly decrease the likelihood of a

successful mission.”

“Further, the addition of external stores to enable an Enhanced Conventional Aircraft to

accomplish a military objective, may well eliminate much of what is gained in reduced

threat capability, even in the nose region.”

This is further validated by the current JAST program commitment to

designing its JSF to carry its weapons internally because carrying weapons

externally does not meet the Navy’s reduced signature needs for first day

survivability. The JAST office concluded that the treatment of external

equipment, to limit their negative effect on radar signature reduction,

would be expensive and would have a negative effect on aircraft

performance, supportability, and deployability. In summary, the JAST office

has concluded that the most cost-effective and overall operational

beneficial solution if low observability is required, appears to be carrying

weapons and other equipment internally.

In December 1995, the F/A-18E/F program office asked McDonnell

Douglas to define the work necessary to develop simple, affordable,

low-observable treatments for certain equipment that will be carried

externally on the E/F aircraft. The program office stated that the E/F

program has produced a low-observable aircraft, but that low-observable

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal

Improvements Over F/A-18C/D

externally carried equipment and weapons were outside the scope of the

E/F program. The program office stated that this equipment, when

installed on the E/F with low-observable compatible weapons, would be

necessary to yield a low-observable weapon system.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 3 

F/A-18C/D Space Deficiency Has Not

Occurred and F/A-18E/F Payload Problems

Must Be Resolved

In addition to the operational capability improvements discussed in the

preceding chapter, the Navy also stated that the E/F (1) was needed to

provide critically needed space for avionics growth and (2) with its two

additional weapons stations, would be more lethal. However, our review

indicates that

• the decline in avionics growth space has not occurred as predicted, and

• weight limitations, problems when weapons are released from the aircraft,

and the limited increase in weapons payload associated with the new

weapons stations raises concerns about how much increased lethality the

E/F will have.

Growth Space

Deficiency Has Not

Occurred as Predicted

In justifying the need for the F/A-18E/F, the Navy stated that the additional

space to be provided by the F/A-18E/F was critically needed because by

the mid-1990s, the F/A-18C/Ds would not have space to accommodate

some additional new weapons and systems under development without

removing an existing capability. However, as previously discussed, an

increased threat is not driving decisions to add new systems. Furthermore,

the growth space deficiency anticipated for the F/A-18C/D has not

occurred as predicted.

According to 1992 Navy predictions, by fiscal year 1996, the ongoing

program to upgrade the F/A-18C/D’s avionics would result in an aircraft

with only 0.2 cubic feet of space available for future growth. However, in

1995, McDonnell Douglas representatives indicated that the F/A-18C had at

least 5.3 cubic feet of space available for system growth. This additional

space is available from the following two sources:

• Replacing the F/A-18C/D’s ammunition drum with a linear linkless feed

system would provide 4 cubic feet of additional space in the gun bay.

• The right leading edge extension on the F/A-18C, which is an extension of

the frontal aspect of the wing, has 1.3 cubic feet of space available for

growth.

Furthermore, indications are that technological advancements will result

in additional avionics growth space. The effect of these advancements,

which include such things as miniaturization, modularity, and

consolidation, are indicated in some upgraded avionics systems employed

on the F/A-18C/D. We reviewed the changes scheduled for the F/A-18C/D

between fiscal years 1992 and 1996 and identified seven upgrade

replacement systems that would be used in the latest versions of the

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 3 

F/A-18C/D Space Deficiency Has Not

Occurred and F/A-18E/F Payload Problems

Must Be Resolved

F/A-18C/D and the F/A-18E/F. We found that because of the reduced size

of modern avionics systems, in total, the new systems provided 3 cubic

feet of additional space and reduced the total avionics systems’ weight by

about 114 pounds. Table 3.1 shows the details of this calculation.

Table 3.1: Effect of Replacing Avionics Systems on the F/A-18 Hornet

Equipment Old system Replacement system

Weight

(pounds)

Volume (cubic

feet)

Radar APG-65 APG-73 –12.0 –0.90

Communication receiver/ transmitter ARC-182 (2) ARC-210 (2) +5.6 +0.12

Chaff countermeasures set AN/ALE-39 AN/ALE-47 +22.7 –0.14

Missile command launch computer AWG-25 AWG-25 MOD

Downsized HARM

–11.0 +0.01

Weapon station management system SMS SMS (upgrade) –71.9 –1.20

Countermeasures receiving set ALR-67(V)2 ALR-67(V)3 –8.4 –0.30

Global positioning system MAGR EGI Combined

GPS/INS

–38.6 –0.63

Inertial navigation system ASN-139A

Total –114.0 –3.0

Source: McDonnell Douglas.

The Navy also contends that the availability for growth on the F/A-18C/D is

not possible due to the lack of sufficient power and cooling capability.

However, according to McDonnell Douglas engineering representatives,

the F/A-18C/D’s power and cooling needs have not been validated through

an actual test. Rather, the statements that the C/D has no more growth

capability are based on analysis using estimated and outdated data.

Additionally, the Hornet 2000 study suggested options to increase power

and cooling capacity within the current space/volume of the baseline

F/A-18 aircraft. To increase the aircraft’s power capacity, the report

suggested

• a new generator system with more than a 30-percent increase in power

capacity and/or

• a monitored bus system capable of shedding selected loads when one

generator becomes inoperative.

To increase the F/A-18C/D’s cooling capacity, the Hornet 2000 report

stated that the air cooling system could be modified to increase capacity

by 47 percent.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18C/D Space Deficiency Has Not

Occurred and F/A-18E/F Payload Problems

Must Be Resolved

F/A-18E/F Has

Weapons Release

Problems and

Provides a Marginal

Increase in Lethality

The F/A-18E/F is designed to have more payload capacity than current

F/A-18C/Ds as a result of adding two new wing weapon stations—referred

to as the outboard weapons stations. However, unless the current

problems when weapons are released from the aircraft are resolved, the

types and amounts of external weapons that the E/F can carry may be

restricted. Also, while the E/F will provide a marginal increase in air-to-air

capability, it will not increase its ability to carry the heavier air-to-ground

weapons that are capable of hitting fixed-targets and mobile hard targets

and the heavier stand-off weapons that will be used to increase aircraft

survivability.

Weapons Release

Problems

As illustrated in figures 3.1 and 3.2, airframe modifications, such as larger

geometrically shaped engine inlets and additional weapon stations, have

reduced the critical distance between several F/A-18E/F weapon stations.

Figure 3.1: F/A-18C/D Weapon Stations

9 8 76 5 4 3 2 1

Source: NAVAIR.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 3 

F/A-18C/D Space Deficiency Has Not

Occurred and F/A-18E/F Payload Problems

Must Be Resolved

Figure 3.2: F/A-18E/F Weapon Stations

11 10 987654321

(New) (New)

Source: NAVAIR.

A NAVAIR representative stated that it has been estimated that the distance

between the inboard weapon stations and the engine inlet stations on the

E/F has been reduced by about 5 inches compared to the C/D. The

distance between the new outboard (stations 2 and 10) and mid-board

stations (stations 3 and 9) is smaller than between the mid-board (stations

3 and 9) and inboard stations (stations 4 and 8), 35 inches versus 46

inches, respectively.

The space reduction adversely affects the E/F’s capabilities. For example,

wind tunnel tests show that an external 480-gallon fuel tank or a MK-84

2,000-pound bomb, carried on the inboard station, will hit the side of the

aircraft’s fuselage or make contact with other weapons when released.

Additionally, according to the representative, the limited distance between

the new outboard and mid-board stations, coupled with outboard pylons

that are shorter and closer to the wing, will cause problems when

releasing large, finned weapons, such as the High-Speed Anti-Radiation

Missile (HARM).

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 3 

F/A-18C/D Space Deficiency Has Not

Occurred and F/A-18E/F Payload Problems

Must Be Resolved

F/A-18E/F airframe changes have also increased adverse airflows that

exacerbate these problems. Wind tunnel testing shows that the F/A-18E/F

is experiencing increased yaw and pitch motion1

 of its external equipment.

The increased yaw motion is the result of increased air outflow at the nose

of a weapon and increased inflow at the tail of a weapon, causing the tail

of the weapon to make contact with the aircraft. Similarly, the increased

pitching results from the air sweeping over the nose of a store in a

downward direction while an upward airflow causes the tail of the store to

make contact with the aircraft.

The Navy and McDonnell Douglas are studying a number of airframe fixes

to correct the airflow problem. They are also studying options that place

tactical restrictions on weapon deployments. These options include

reducing the number of weapons the E/F carries and reducing the speed

the aircraft is flying when the weapons are released.

Improvements in

F/A-18E/F Weapons

Carrying Capacity Are

Marginal

Our analysis showed that the F/A-18E/F will provide a limited increase in

payload over the C/D model. In the air-to-air role, as shown in table 3.2, the

F/A-18E/F will have a two-missile advantage over the F/A-18C/D.

The F/A-18E/F’s new outboard stations are limited to carrying weapons

weighing no more than 1,150 pounds per station. In the air-to-ground role,

this precludes the F/A-18E/F from carrying a number of heavy

precision-guided munitions such as the Harpoon, Standoff Land Attack

Missile, Laser Guided MK-84, Guided Bomb Unit-24, and WALLEYE II that

weigh more than the weapon station weight limit. Consequently, because

of these limitations, the F/A-18E/F will carry the same number of these

heavier precision-guided munitions as the F/A-18C/D.

Table 3.2 Comparison of Selected

Payloads for the F/A-18E/F and

F/A-18C/D

Weapon F/A-18C/D F/A-18E/F Difference

AIM-120 AMRAAM 6 8 +2

AIM-9 Sidewinder 6 8 +2

AIM-7 Sparrow 4 6 +2

Source: McDonnell Douglas and NAVAIR.

1

Yaw is the side-to-side movement, and pitch is the up-and-down movement of the nose and tail of

external equipment.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 4 

The Joint Strike Fighter Is Predicted to Be

More Affordable and More Capable Than the

F/A-18E/F

The JAST program office is developing technology for a family of affordable

next generation JSF aircraft for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

(See app. II for a discussion of JAST program objectives and approach.) The

Navy plans to procure 300 JSFs and use them as a stand alone, first-day

survivable (stealthy) complement to the F/A-18E/F. The first Navy JSF

aircraft is scheduled to be delivered in 2007. On the basis of contractor

trade studies and a recent Naval Intelligence assessment, JSF is projected

to have an overall combat effectiveness greater than the F/A-18E/F. JSF is

also projected to have a lower unit flyaway cost than the E/F.

JSF Is Predicted to

Cost Less and Be

More Capable Than

the F/A-18E/F

Concept exploration and development trades studies from three major

potential aircraft production contractors—Boeing Corporation; Lockheed

Martin Corporation; and a consortium of McDonnell Douglas Aerospace,

Northrop Grumman, and British Aerospace Corporations—indicated that

an affordable family of stealthy strike aircraft could be built on a single

production line with a high degree of parts and cost commonality.

(See fig. 4.1 for JAST concept.) According to the JAST Joint Initial

Requirements Document, the recurring flyaway cost of the Navy variant

will range from $33 million to $40 million (in fiscal year 1996 dollars),

depending on which contractor design is chosen. The JAST office projects

that the Navy’s JSF variant will have operational capabilities, especially

range and survivability, that will be superior to the F/A-18E/F. It is too

soon to determine the extent to which the JSF cost and performance goals

will be achieved.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 4 

The Joint Strike Fighter Is Predicted to Be

More Affordable and More Capable Than the

F/A-18E/F

Figure 4.1: JSF Family of Three Aircraft

Source: JSF Program Office.

JSF Predicted to Cost Less

Than the F/A-18E/F

The driving focus of JAST is affordability. Contractor studies indicate that

JAST has the potential to reduce total life-cycle cost by approximately

40 percent. Life-cycle cost is made up of research and development costs,

production costs, and operations and support costs. According to a

McDonnell Douglas study, their JAST proposal would have a flyaway cost

14 percent lower than the F/A-18E/F. To arrive at these goals, the

contractor studies concluded that the family of aircraft would have to

contain such features as:

• a single, common engine;

• use of advanced avionics and exploitation of off-board sensors;

• advanced diagnostics to reduce supportability costs;

• maximum commonality to include a common fuselage for all service

variants that could be built on a common production line; and

• affordable requirements.

According to the participating contractors and the JAST program office,

tri-service commonality is the key factor in achieving JSF affordability

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 4 

The Joint Strike Fighter Is Predicted to Be

More Affordable and More Capable Than the

F/A-18E/F

goals, and if this commonality is to occur, the services must compromise

on operational needs.

The Navy’s JSF variant is expected to be the most costly of the three

service variants due in part to carrier suitability features and the greater

operational capability in range and internal payload proposed for the

Navy’s variant. Current unit recurring flyaway cost objectives for the Navy

variant range between $33 million and $40 million (fiscal year 1996

dollars), based on a total buy of 2,816 aircraft for the three services. This

compares to $53 million per unit recurring flyaway (fiscal year 1996

dollars) for the F/A-18E/F based on total procurement of 660 E/F’s at 

36 per year. According to the JAST office’s Joint Initial Requirements

Document, the JSF cost objectives are based on projected budget

constraints and service needs.

The JAST program office projects that significant life-cycle savings for JSF

are achievable through implementation of new acquisition processes,

technologies, manufacturing processes, and maintenance processes being

developed as part of the JAST program. Depending on the degree of

commonality between the service variants and the ability to implement

other cost-saving measures, the JAST office projects the total life-cycle cost

could be as much as 55-percent less than if it used traditional acquisition

and production processes.

JSF Predicted to Have

Better Performance Than

the F/A-18E/F

The participating contractors presented the results of their concept

development studies to the JAST office and the Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisitions and Technology) in August 1995. The presentations outlined

the latest design capabilities and projected costs for each of the services’

JSF designs. The JSF is expected to have an overall combat effectiveness

greater than any projected threat and greater than the F/A-18E/F. The

Navy’s JSF variant is also expected to have longer ranges than the

F/A-18E/F to attack high-value targets, such as command and control

bunkers, without using external tanks or tanking.

Unlike the F/A-18E/F, which will carry all of its weapons externally, the

Navy’s JSF variant will carry at least two air-to-ground and two air-to-air

weapons internally. By carrying its weapons internally, the JSF will

maximize its stealthiness and thus increase its survivability in the high

threat early stages of a conflict.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 4 

The Joint Strike Fighter Is Predicted to Be

More Affordable and More Capable Than the

F/A-18E/F

The Navy expects that its JSF variant will have the capability to go into

high-threat environments without accompanying electronic warfare

support aircraft in the first day or early phase of a conflict and be

survivable. For example, the JSF would have the capability to attack these

high-threat targets without jamming support from EA-6B aircraft that the

F/A-18E/F would need to be survivable against integrated air defense

systems and sophisticated aircraft that would still be operating during the

early stages of a conflict.

Combat range improvement was a primary objective of the F/A-18E/F

program. JAST program contractor studies indicated that the Navy variant

would have significantly greater range than the F/A-18E/F using internal

fuel only and even greater range after the enemy threat is reduced and the

aircraft can use external fuel tanks.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 5 

F/A-18E/F Will Cost More to Procure Than

Currently Estimated

The potential cost of the F/A-18E/F aircraft has been a source of debate

among the Congress, DOD, and the Navy for many years, starting before the

program was formally approved. Our review indicated that the Navy’s cost

estimates to procure the F/A-18E/F are still questionable.

The $43.6 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) unit recurring flyaway cost1

estimate for the F/A-18E/F is understated. The estimate is based on a

1,000-aircraft total buy that is overstated by at least one-third because the

Marine Corps does not plan to buy the E/F and an annual production rate

that the Congress has stated is probably not possible due to funding

limitations. Reducing the total buy and annual production rate will

increase the unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/A-18E/F from $43.6 to

$53.2 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars).

DOD and

Congressional

Concerns About

F/A-18E/F Program

Cost

In May 1992, the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the Navy’s

request that the F/A-18E/F be approved as a Milestone IV, Major

Modification program, even though some Defense Acquisition Board

participants had the following concerns about the program:

• E/F development cost projections had increased from $4.5 billion to

$5.8 billion (then-year dollars);

• the unit cost of the E/F was estimated to be 65 percent greater than

F/A-18C/D unit cost;

• the projected development cost of $5.8 billion (then-year dollars) was

underfunded by as much as $1 billion;

• the cost of E/F pre-planned product improvements are not included in

either development or production estimates; and

• the E/F was considered an upgrade to the F/A-18C/D rather than a new

start, even though the E/F airframe was projected to be only 15-percent

common to the C/D.

In evaluating the fiscal year 1993 DOD budget request, the Congress

addressed its F/A-18E/F concerns and established a number of fiscal limits

on the program. The $5.783 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars)/$5.803 billion

(then-year dollars) F/A-18E/F development estimate, presented to the

Defense Acquisition Board, was established as a funding ceiling for

development costs. Also, the Congress stated that F/A-18E/F unit flyaway

1

We used recurring flyaway costs because DOD has consistently maintained that these costs are the

most appropriate to compare the costs of different aircraft. Recurring flyaway costs include costs

related to the production of the basic aircraft and do not include all procurement costs. Appendix I

contains a more detailed discussion of what makes up various costs and how they are calculated.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Cost More to Procure Than

Currently Estimated

costs should be no greater than 125 percent of the F/A-18C/D’s unit

flyaway cost.

Congressional concern about E/F unit cost projections was based in part

on the high annual production rate that the Navy used in arriving at its per

unit procurement estimates. The Navy projected that beginning in 2007,

and continuing through 2015, it would procure 72 F/A-18E/Fs per year. The

Congress believed this was unrealistic and directed that DOD calculate a

range of unit costs based on production rates of 18, 36, and 54 aircraft per

year. According to program officials, they are not required to report

revised cost estimates based on the change to production rates until an

early operational assessment is completed in the spring of 1996.

Unit Acquisition Costs

Will Be Greater Than

Projected

DOD’s F/A-18E/F unit recurring flyaway cost estimate is $43.6 million (fiscal

year 1996 dollars). This cost is understated because

• the total F/A-18E/F procurement levels and annual production rates that

are essential for predicting acquisition unit costs are overstated and

• contract estimates for initial production aircraft are higher than projected.

Procurement Levels and

Production Rates

In calculating the F/A-18E/F unit acquisition costs, the Navy assumed it

would procure 1,000 aircraft from 1997 through 2015—approximately 660

for the Navy and 340 for the Marine Corps at a high annual production rate

of 72 aircraft. However, the Marine Corps does not plan to purchase any

F/A-18E/Fs, and indications are that once the Navy’s JAST variant becomes

available fewer F/A-18E/Fs will be procured annually.

The Marine Corps Aviation Plan and the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of

Staff for Aviation in a 1994 memorandum and in 1995 testimony2

 before

the Congress stated that the Corps plans to “neck down” to one aircraft in

the future. It plans to replace all of its current F/A-18C/D and AV-8B

aircraft with the Advanced Short-Takeoff and Vertical-Landing aircraft

now under management of the JAST program. Because the Marine Corps

does not plan to procure any F/A-18E/Fs—data from a Navy’s program

cost analysis report and discussions with NAVAIR cost officials and

confirmed by the Marine Corps identifies 340 aircraft as the programmed

Marine Corps buy—the total F/A-18E/F buy would be reduced from 1,000

to 660 aircraft. The likelihood that fewer F/A-18E/Fs will be procured is

2

Statement before the Airland Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mar. 29,

1995.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 5 

F/A-18E/F Will Cost More to Procure Than

Currently Estimated

possible once the JSF, projected to be more capable and less costly than

the E/F, becomes available around 2007.

Additionally, the E/F unit cost is affected by a lower-than-projected annual

production rate. The Navy’s unit cost calculations assumed an annual peak

production rate of 72 aircraft for 8 years, representing over half the

production run. The Congress, in its fiscal year 1993 Authorization

Conference Report, questioned whether an annual production rate of 

72 aircraft was realistic and directed the Navy to provide cost-estimates

for smaller production quantities (18, 36, and 54) with the results of the

F/A-18E/Fs initial operational assessment, which is scheduled for the

spring of 1996. However, data shows that E/F production rate is expected

to be lowered to only 36 F/A-18E/Fs annually rather than 72.

Historically, reductions in annual production rates have increased the per

unit procurement cost of aircraft. The Navy has not provided us the

increased unit cost based on reduced annual production rates. Therefore,

we approximated what the unit cost increase would be based on a total

procurement of 660 rather than 1,000 aircraft and an annual production

rate of 36 rather than 72 aircraft. Using the A/F-X cost model to predict the

effect of total buy and annual production rate changes on recurring

flyaway cost, we calculated that the F/A-18E/F unit recurring flyaway cost

would be $53.2 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) rather than the

$43.6 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) estimated by DOD. The $53.2 million

unit recurring flyaway cost for the F/A-18E/F indicates that the E/F would

have a unit recurring flyaway cost that is 189 percent of the F/A-18C/D’s

unit recurring flyaway cost ($53 million compared to $28 million). As

shown in appendix I, this cost difference in unit recurring flyaway would

result in a savings of almost $17 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) or savings

of over $24 billion when expressed in then-year dollars, if the Navy were to

procure 660 F/A-18C/Ds rather than 660 F/A-18E/Fs. Our estimated savings

do not include the cost of C/D upgrades, such as the larger 480-gallon

external fuel tanks for improved range nor the strengthened landing gear

to increase carrier recovery payload. However, our estimated savings are

conservative because they also do not include planned E/F upgrades and

are based on recurring flyaway costs that do not include the other items

that make up total procurement costs. (See app. I for a discussion of how

unit costs are computed.) Additionally, our estimated savings do not

include savings that would accrue from having fewer type model F/A-18

aircraft in the inventory. The cost benefits would result from having

common aircraft spare parts, simplified technical specifications, and

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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F/A-18E/F Will Cost More to Procure Than

Currently Estimated

reduced support equipment variations, as well as reductions in aircrew

and maintenance training requirements.

Also, there are other indications that F/A-18E/F procurement costs could

increase further. According to contractor estimates, the cost of LRIP for the

E/F is currently projected to be 8.5-percent greater than estimates

provided to the Congress.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendation

DOD faces funding challenges as it attempts to modernize its tactical

aircraft fleet through the Air Force’s F-22 program, the Navy’s F/A-18E/F

program, and the tri-service JSF program. Various DOD officials have

recognized that funding for each of these programs may not be

forthcoming. In that event, DOD will be forced to make some funding

trade-offs among these three competing aircraft programs.

In prior reports,1

 we offered alternative procurement strategies for the Air

Force’s F-22 program. Regarding the Navy’s F/A-18E/F program, DOD’s next

major decision is whether to proceed into production. The Navy has spent

about $3.75 billion (then-year dollars) on the E/F engineering and

manufacturing development effort and plans to spend $57.31 billion (fiscal

year 1996 dollars)/ $83.35 billion (then-year dollars) to procure 

1,000 aircraft. This report demonstrates that the justification for the E/F is

not as evident as perhaps it was when the program was approved in 1992

because the E/F was justified, in large part, on projected operational

deficiencies in the C/D aircraft that have not materialized. This report also

demonstrates that proceeding with the E/F program is not the most

cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet.

Therefore, the information provided in this report should be fully

considered before a production decision is made on the E/F. Such

consideration should take into account the following.

• Operational deficiencies in the F/A-18C/D cited by the Navy in justifying

the need for the F/A-18E/F—range, carrier recovery payload, survivability,

and system growth—either have not materialized as projected or can be

corrected with nonstructural changes to the F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, E/F

operational capabilities will only be marginally improved over the C/D

model. The E/F’s increased range is achieved at the expense of combat

effectiveness and increased F/A-18E/F payload capability has created

weapons release problems that, if not resolved, will reduce the F/A-18E/F’s

payload capability compared to the F/A-18C/D.

• A more cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy’s tactical aircraft

fleet exists. In the short term, the Navy could continue to procure the

F/A-18C/D aircraft. In the mid-term, upgrades could be made to the C/Ds to

further improve the C/D’s operational capabilities. These upgrades could

include such things as: using the larger 480-gallon external fuel tanks to

achieve more range; modifying landing gear to increase carrier recovery

payload; using advanced avionics that require less space, cooling and

power; and incorporating add-on survivability features.

1

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25,

1994) and Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should Be

Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendation

• For the long term, the Navy is considering JSF as a complement to the

F/A-18E/F. DOD is predicting that the next generation strike fighter will

provide more operational capability at less cost than the E/F. Therefore,

the next generation fighter should be considered as an alternative to the

F/A-18E/F.

• The F/A-18E/F will cost more to procure than DOD currently projects. The

$43.6 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars) unit recurring flyaway cost estimate

is based on a total buy of 1,000 aircraft—660 for the Navy and 340 for the

Marine Corps—at a high annual production rate of 72 aircraft per year.

However, the Marine Corps does not plan to buy the F/A-18E/F aircraft

and the Congress has stated that an annual production rate of 72 aircraft is

not realistic. Reducing the number of aircraft to be procured and the

annual production rate to more realistic levels would reduce the total

program cost but would increase the unit recurring flyaway cost of the

aircraft to about $53 million (fiscal year 1996 dollars).

• In a related report on the F/A-18E/F,2 we stated that the Navy’s plan to

procure the E/F appears to contradict the national military strategy, which

cautions against making major new investments unless there is

“substantial payoff.” We pointed out that Navy data show both the C/D and

E/F are expected to hit the same ground targets with the same weapons.

Pursuing other alternatives, rather than proceeding with the F/A-18E/F

program, would save billions of dollars. Continued procurement of the

Navy’s less expensive F/A-18C/D aircraft (the fiscal year 1996 unit

recurring flyaway cost of F/A-18C/Ds is $28 million compared to

$53 million for the F/A-18E/F) could be done only to the level needed to

sustain inventories until the next generation strike fighter becomes

available. Furthermore, reliance on the more affordable next generation

strike fighter as the Navy’s primary tactical aircraft would help keep that

aircraft affordable by increasing the total buy.

Recommendation Given the cost and the marginal improvements in operational capabilities

that the F/A-18E/F would provide, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense reconsider the decision to produce the F/A-18E/F aircraft and,

instead, consider procuring additional F/A-18C/Ds. The number of

F/A-18C/Ds that the Navy would ultimately need to procure would depend

2

Combat Airpower: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Chapter 6 

Conclusions and Recommendation

upon when the next generation strike fighter achieves operational

capability and the number of those aircraft the Navy decides to buy.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD said that it is convinced that

the fundamental reasons for developing the F/A-18E/F remain valid. Since

DOD provided no data or information that we had not acquired and

analyzed during our review, we have not changed our position that

procuring the E/F is not the most cost-effective approach to modernizing

the Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet. We recognize that the E/F will provide

some improvements over the C/D. However, the C/D’s current capabilities

are adequate to accomplish its assigned missions. Based on the marginal

nature of the improvements and the E/F’s projected cost compared to the

alternatives discussed in this report, we believe that our recommendation

that DOD reconsider its decision to produce the F/A-18E/F aircraft and,

instead, consider procuring additional C/D aircraft until the next

generation strike fighter becomes operationally available represents sound

fiscal planning. We formulated our position within the context of current

budget constraints, the decreased military threat environment, and

statements by DOD officials, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, that DOD’s current plans to upgrade its tactical aircraft fleet will not

be affordable. Additionally, as we pointed out in our report, the national

military strategy directs that major new investments should have

substantial payoff. We do not believe that procuring the F/A-18E/F would

meet this test.

DOD’s entire comments and our evaluation are included in appendix III.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

DOD requested funding in its fiscal year 1997 budget request to begin

procurement of the F/A-18E/F. The Congress may wish to direct that no

funds may be obligated for procurement of the F/A-18E/F until it has fully

examined the alternatives to the E/F program. In that regard, the House

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (H.R. 3230, 

sec. 220) directed such an examination, and a DOD deep strike study is

expected to be completed by the end of 1996. Delaying the authority to

begin procuring the E/F would allow DOD to complete its study and time

for the Congress to asses the results of the DOD study and the information

in this report as it decides whether DOD should be provided funding to

proceed with the F/A-18E/F program.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix I 

F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D Acquisition Cost

Comparison

In annual selected acquisition reports to the Congress, the Department of

Defense (DOD) provides F/A-18E/F program cost data in both fiscal year

1990 base year and inflated then-year dollars. The report provides various

procurement data from recurring flyaway costs to program costs.

Figure I.1 lists the items that make up the various aircraft unit acquisition

costs and demonstrates how DOD can present different procurement

values.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix I 

F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D Acquisition Cost

Comparison

Figure I.1: Breakout of Various Program Costs

=

=

=

=

=

Airframe Engine Avionics Recurring flyaway

cost

Recurring flyaway

cost Nonrecurring Ancillary

 equipment

Total flyaway

cost

Total flyaway

cost Support Advance

 procurement

Weapons system

cost

Weapons system

cost Initial spares Procurement cost

Procurement cost RDT &E MILCON Program cost

Source: Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix I 

F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D Acquisition Cost

Comparison

Table I.1 shows F/A-18E/F unit cost estimates based on Navy data

(1,000-aircraft buy and a high annual production rate of 72 aircraft)

escalated to fiscal year 1996 dollars and in then-year dollars.

Table I.1: Navy Unit Cost Estimates for

the F/A-18E/F Dollars in millions

In fiscal

year 1996

dollars

In

then-year

dollars

Recurring flyaway cost (Airframe, engine and avionics costs) 43.60 62.20

Total flyaway cost (Recurring flyaway, nonrecurring flyaway,

and ancillary equipment costs) 48.70 69.50

Total procurement cost (Total flyaway, initial spares and

support costs) 57.31 83.35

Program cost (procurement and RDT&E costs) 63.09 89.15

In chapter 5, we provided a comparison of F/A-18C/D versus F/A-18E/F per

unit recurring flyaway costs in fiscal year 1996 dollars to place better focus

on the cost difference between these two aircraft. Table I.2 shows the

annual and total recurring flyaway cost in then-year dollars of procuring

660 F/A-18C/Ds or F/A-18E/Fs starting in 1997. The cost figures for the C/D

are based on an annual procurement rate of 36 aircraft and a per unit cost

extrapolated from actual fiscal year 1994 unit costs escalated using Navy

supplied inflation factors. The cost figures for the E/F buy are based on an

adjusted procurement schedule that assumes that funding limitations

would only allow a high annual production rate of 36 aircraft. Table I.3

shows the cost of producing 660 F/A-18E/Fs and 660 F/A-18C/Ds in

constant fiscal year 1996 dollars.

Table I.4 shows the recurring flyaway cost savings that would accrue from

the Navy procuring an equal number (660) of F/A-18C/Ds rather than E/Fs.

As table I.4 shows, continued procurement of the F/A-18C/D would result

in a savings of almost $17 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) or over

$24 billion (then-year dollars) based on recurring flyaway costs.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix I 

F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D Acquisition Cost

Comparison

Table I.2: Costs of Producing 660 F/A-18E/Fs or 660 F/A-18C/Ds in Then-Year Dollars

F/A-18E/F F/A-18C/D

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Number of

aircraft

produceda

Average

recurring

flyaway cost

Total recurring

flyaway cost

Number of

aircraft

produced

Average

recurring

flyaway costb

Total recurring

flyaway cost

1997 12 $54.8 $ 658 36 $28.5 $1,026

1998 24 56.4 1,354 36 29.4 1,058

1999 36 58.1 2,092 36 30.3 1,091

2000 36 59.9 2,156 36 31.2 1,123

2001 36 61.6 2,218 36 32.1 1,156

2002 36 63.5 2,286 36 33.1 1,192

2003 36 65.4 2,354 36 34.1 1,228

2004 36 67.4 2,426 36 35.1 1,264

2005 36 69.4 2,498 36 36.1 1,300

2006 36 71.5 2,574 36 37.2 1,339

2007 36 73.6 2,650 36 38.3 1,379

2008 36 75.8 2,729 36 39.5 1,422

2009 36 78.1 2,812 36 40.7 1,465

2010 36 80.4 2,894 36 41.9 1,508

2011 36 82.9 2,984 36 43.2 1,555

2012 36 85.3 3,071 36 44.5 1,602

2013 36 87.9 3,164 36 45.8 1,649

2014 36 90.5 3,258 36 47.2 1,699

2015 36 93.3 3,359 12 48.6 583

2016 12 96.0 1,152000

Total 660 $48,689 660 $24,639

aInitial production of F/A-18E/F aircraft is limited to 12 and 24 aircraft for the first 2 years.

bBased on a fiscal year 1994, $26.175-million average recurring flyaway cost for 36 aircraft

escalated by inflation factors provided by the Navy.

Table I.3: Costs of Producing 660

F/A-18E/Fs or 660 F/A-18C/Ds in

Constant Fiscal Year 1996 Dollars F/A-18E/F F/A-18C/D

Dollars in millions

Fiscal

years

Number of

aircraft

produceda

Average

recurring

flyaway

cost

Total

recurring

flyaway

cost

Number of

aircraft

produced

Average

recurring

flyaway

costb

Total

recurring

flyaway

cost

1997-

2016 660 $53.2 $35,112 660 $27.7 $18,282

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix I 

F/A-18E/F and F/A-18C/D Acquisition Cost

Comparison

Table I.4: Comparison of Costs to

Produce 660 F/A-18E/Fs and 660

F/A-18C/Ds in Then-Year and Constant

Fiscal Year 1996 Dollars

F/A-18E/F F/A-18C/D

Dollars in millions

Type of Dollars

Total recurring

flyaway costs

Total recurring

flyaway costs

Difference in total

flyaway cost

Then-year $48,689 $24,639 $24,050

Constant fiscal year

1996

$35,112 $18,282 $16,830

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix II 

Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program

The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program’s objective is to

develop a technically superior but less costly, more affordable aircraft

than today’s strike aircraft. The basis for this objective is to be able to

affordably meet potential future threats that cannot be met by today’s

aircraft. The aircraft that will evolve from the JAST program has been

designated the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

As of November 1995, the total number of JSF aircraft projected to be

acquired is shown in table II.1.

Table II.1: Projected JSF Acquisitions

by Service

Service Requirement

Number of

aircraft

Air Force Conventional takeoff and landing

multirole aircraft to replace the F-16

and A-10 aircraft 1,874

Navy First-day-of-the-war survivable,

carrier-suitable aircraft to

complement the F/A-18E/F 300

Marine Corps Short-takeoff and vertical-landing

aircraft to replace the F/A-18 and

AV-8B 642

Total 2,816

In addition, the United Kingdom is participating in the program and is

expected to buy an unspecified number of the short-takeoff and

vertical-landing versions.

The JAST Program Is

Using Cost-Cutting

Development Methods

To create the building blocks for an affordable, successful development of

next generation strike weapon systems, the JAST office is using joint

service teams to implement a series of new weapon systems development

processes and techniques. This new process is aimed at developing

innovative means to significantly lower the life-cycle costs of developing,

producing, and maintaining an advanced strike aircraft; identify weapons

systems requirements; and identify, develop, and demonstrate advanced

technologies for the aircraft that could be matured to a low-risk level

heading into a decision to contract for the engineering and development of

a new aircraft.

To accomplish its development objectives, the JAST office is implementing

a three-phase program, after which it expects to enter into the engineering

and manufacturing development phase of an aircraft acquisition program

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix II 

Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program

for a Joint Strike Fighter. This approach is designed to develop

requirements for the fighter and demonstrate technology and operational

concepts in the areas of propulsion, flight systems, weapons, structures

and materials, avionics, manufacturing, and supportability. The three

phases are as follows:

Concept exploration. Studying innovative, high-payoff advanced

technologies and system concepts that would reduce costs for joint strike

warfare. This phase, from May 1994 to November 1994, involved 

12 exploration contracts for $10.5 million.

Concept development. Further defining concepts and conducting

additional cost and design trade-off analyses, design research, and

technology maturation research. This phase, scheduled from January 1995

to March 1996, involves 26 contracts for $127.2 million, 4 of which were

contracts to major potential aircraft producers to refine cost and design

trade studies and aircraft concept designs. Subsequent to the awards, two

of the major contractors—McDonnell Douglas and Northrop

Grumman—teamed together with British Aerospace to develop a single

concept design and perform cost and design trade studies.

Concept demonstration. Demonstrating weapon systems concepts and

leveraged technologies with flying concept demonstration aircraft. This

phase is scheduled to occur from mid-fiscal year 1996 to mid-fiscal year

2000. During this phase, two contractors will each build and demonstrate

two flying concept aircraft that would include demonstration of short

takeoff and vertical landing. One of these teams will be chosen to enter

into a low-risk engineering and manufacturing development phase in 2000.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: DOD’s comments in

its transmittal letter and

attachment 1 are restated

in attachment 2 of its

comments. Therefore,

GAO’s evaluation of the

comments is presented in

attachment 2.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 79.

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 92.

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 40.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 100 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven F. Kuhta

Jerry W. Clark

William J. Gillies

Charles R. Climpson

Kansas City Regional

Office

Lawrence A. Dandridge

Lillian I. Slodkowski

(707072) Page 101 GAO/NSIAD-96-98 Navy Aviation
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