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92–206 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 107–1108

RAILROAD SAFETY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 

AND MERCHANT MARINE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 10, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director 

MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held July 10, 2002 ..................................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Breaux ................................................................................. 1

Statement of Senator Hollings ............................................................................... 2

Statement of Senator McCain ................................................................................. 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

WITNESSES

Blakey, Hon. Marion C., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board ..... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Gunn, David, President and CEO, National Railroad Passenger Corporation .. 39

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42

Hahs, Don M., International President, Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers .......................................................................................... 55

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57

Hamberger, Edward, President and CEO, Association of American Railroads; 

accompanied by: C.E. Dettmann, Senior Executive Vice President for Safety 

and Operations ..................................................................................................... 44

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Rutter, Hon. Allan, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration ................ 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

APPENDIX

Cleland, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from Georgia, prepared statement ................. 71

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to: 

Marion C. Blakey .............................................................................................. 73

Don M. Hahs ..................................................................................................... 87

Edward Hamberger .......................................................................................... 71

Allan Rutter ...................................................................................................... 75

(1)

RAILROAD SAFETY 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 2002, 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND

MERCHANT MARINE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John B. Breaux, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,

U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA 

Senator BREAUX. The Subcommittee will come to order. Good 

morning everyone. Thanks to our witnesses for being with us. I am 

very pleased that we could assemble here this morning for this 

hearing on the issue of the safety of the Nation’s railroads. We 

have called this hearing because of a rash of severe train accidents 

over the past several months. It seemed that we were becoming frequent witnesses to these accidents on the rails where they involve 

a freight train, Amtrak passenger train, like the Auto Train, or a 

commuter train like the Metrolink in Los Angeles. We also offer 

our condolences to the accident victims and their families that have 

been affected by these tragedies. 

We all know the railroad industry provides a vital transportation 

service in the United States. Our freight railroad system plays a 

significant role in our economy by efficiently moving goods around 

the country. Our national passenger rail system provides a vital 

link for passengers and serves as a foundation for the expansion 

of the high speed rail service across the entire country. Its importance is clearly deserving of attention, and to that end I am very 

pleased to be a cosponsor of S. 1991, legislation by our distinguished Chairman which provides long term solutions for Amtrak 

and also develops our passenger rail infrastructure. 

With the sprawling network of infrastructure, railroads operate, 

of course, in every State. This presents challenges for addressing 

safety risks. My state of Louisiana, this year alone through April, 

has seen 24 reportable train accidents involving over $1 million in 

damages, two injuries, and a total of 63 cars carrying hazardous 

material and 18 of these derailed or were damaged. 

Luckily, none of these accidents resulted in fatalities or the release of any hazardous materials. Louisiana has seen its share over 

the years of severe rail accidents. In May of the year 2000 in Eunice, Louisiana, a Union Pacific freight train derailed causing exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
2

plosions, fire, the release of hazardous materials, evacuation of 

about 3,500 families, people, from the surrounding area and over 

$35 million in damages. 

NTSB found that the accident was caused because of the UP’s ineffective track inspection procedures and inadequate management 

oversight, but other recent incidents have involved even more tragic loss of life and raised even more persistent and widespread safety issues. Today we seek not answers, necessarily, to any one of 

these tragic accidents, but what can be done to prevent tragedies 

in the future as we in the Congress consider a greater role for passenger rail in our transportation system. 

I have every confidence that the causes of these unfortunate 

events will be uncovered and corrective actions taken. I wish to further explore what is being done to solve any underlying safety 

issues, and what can be done by federal and state authorities and 

the private sector to increase the safety of all of our Nation’s rail 

carriers. 

Specifically today the witnesses will address the technologies and 

practices available now, and in the near future, to improve rail 

safety. For example, I understand that rail projects involving positive train control technology are developing. I would like to hear a 

progress report on this effort. In addition, the Committee should 

hear the witness’ views on whether the President’s safety measures 

are adequate to ensure rail safety, especially where both passenger 

and freight trains share the same track. 

I also look forward to the testimony of Hon. Allan Rutter, the 

Federal Railroad Administrator, and Hon. Marion Blakey, who is 

chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. I hope they 

will enlighten us on the status of several of the rail safety 

rulemakings that may prevent some of these accidents and limit fatalities in others. 

Finally, we will listen with interest to representatives from the 

industry, what are the views of the American Association of Railroads, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and Amtrak on 

current track inspection requirements and practices. How do these 

groups view the promise for existing technology, like the positive 

train controls to prevent accidents. 

All of these witnesses today have the knowledge and experience 

about the industry and about these safety efforts, so we look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses, and we recognize the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, Senator 

Hollings, for any comments he may have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this 

very important hearing on safety. Number 1, I noted that my counterpart, the distinguished Chairman on the House side, Don Young, 

has a letter to the editor in the morning Washington Post asking 

for reforms and a complete cleaning out of Amtrak. I do not mind 

cleaning out all except the Chairman himself, or whatever his title 

is, Mr. Gunn. David Gunn is the best reform we have had in my 

31 years around here. 

3

With respect to Amtrak, if they needed any cleaning out, we 

ought to clean out ourselves. What we have done is played games 

for the last 31 years. The best example is already this year we have 

appropriated $28.5 billion for airlines alone, and in the entire 31 

years we never have appropriated $28 billion for rail service, and 

particularly passenger service, so it brings into focus exactly what 

we have been doing. We do not mind spending $400 billion for 

highways, or $281⁄2 billion in this particular year that we have appropriated for the airlines. Now we are going to have auditing, we 

have got to have consultants to find out where we are going to have 

savings, we have got to do this. 

We have got to look at ourselves and realize that you have got 

to make a command decision as to whether or not you want a passenger rail service in this country, and this Committee by a vote 

of 20 to 3, Mr. Chairman, has voted categorically in a bipartisan 

fashion to have in the United States a modern high speed rail service, and along that line we have got to go immediately to the tinkering again by the administration which, kicking and screaming, 

has yet to come into the room of passenger rail service in this country. 

Specifically on safety, only 9 months after 9/11, we appropriated 

some moneys for safety, and just for the tunnels going in to New 

York. They only gave us the money last week, 9 months later. Otherwise, on the loans, they are playing a game. They are trying to 

dismantle long term, long haul service, passenger service, which is 

needed, as conditions for the loans, plus a bunch of other silly conditions. Like they are really concerned that this thing is being operated right. What they are trying to do is put it out of business. 

They have yet to come up with a long term Amtrak bill, or passenger service bill to submit to the Congress. We have been talking 

and talking. We have had three hearings, we have had a vote in 

this Committee, and we continue to work on it then along comes 

the Secretary of Transportation like the perils of Pauline, like they 

are saving it. They are going to give them a $100 million loan, they 

are going to keep them alive. 

Well, the Congress is going to keep them alive. They are going 

to have to veto it, because we are going to put the money in it. We 

are putting the money in there, and we are going for this 12/21, 

our bill on high speed long term passenger service in the United 

States. If anyone has any criticisms I wish they would give them 

to us, because it is not supposed to be a perfect bill, but it does include the reforms. 

It is not that we had not thought this Committee studied and we 

put in the provisions with respect to financing. We require a 5-year 

financial plan. We put in the independent auditor that they are 

trying to get down to corporate America. We put that in our particular bill, S. 1991. Otherwise we put in a $1-1/2 billion for the 

high speed corridor development. 

I ask unanimous consent that we include this sort of cheat sheet 

that summarizes all the reforms. The administration would give to 

the American public the idea that we have got an indolent Congress that has not thought of reforming Amtrak. We have thought 

of all the reforms. We have taken the best advice from the witnesses here appearing this morning. We determined to move forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
4

ward at some time this year and not save Amtrak, but by gosh, institute a passenger service in this United States of America. 

Like I say, by way of emphasis, I think the best reform that we 

have had so far, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. David Gunn, the newly appointed head of Amtrak. I think he knows way more about all of 

this train operation, and he is not going to be fudging like all the 

other particular executives we have had over the 30-years that 

yeah, we can get by, yeah, we’re going to do it. They knew that it 

was impossible, but politically they did not want to tell us, and 

they did not tell us, and that is why we are to blame as much as 

Amtrak is to blame. The Congress on both sides of the aisle, and 

that has got to stop. We have got to go to work. 

Thank you. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For equal time, Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If blame is to be apportioned, the record is very clear on my continued skepticism 

about the previous Amtrak presidents, the skepticism about and 

even strong disagreements with the statements that were made before this committee by Mr. Worthington, and my predictions that 

proved out to be exactly true that, despite our, quote, bail-outs, 

close quotes, that Amtrak would be back again in deep financial 

trouble, so there is blame to be apportioned. 

I will let the record show that this Member—this Member was 

very clear as to the difficulties that Amtrak was suffering, and the 

delusions and illusions that were perpetrated on a glidepath. Just 

a few months ago, the Amtrak executives assured this committee 

they were on the glidepath to financial stability. This statement 

demonstrates one of the most outrageous lacks of candor that I 

have observed in 20 years here in the Congress. 

I hope that Mr. Rutter and Amtrak’s new president, Mr. Gunn, 

will discuss Amtrak’s current financial situation. Prior to the 4th 

of July recess there was an uproar over whether Amtrak would 

have been shut down by now. The administration provided a $100 

million loan and is expected to seek additional assistance from 

Congress to keep Amtrak running through September. I hope Administrator Rutter will be able to tell us specifically what the administration is requesting of Congress. That was very unclear in 

the last hearing appearance by Secretary of Transportation Mineta. 

I hope that he and Mr. Gunn will also further explain to us what 

the emergency financial needs are, and how they define what needs 

were an emergency. I am also interested in knowing what additional reforms the administration recommends to be required as a 

condition of Amtrak receiving additional financial assistance. 

There is no question in my mind that Amtrak will get the money 

it needs to keep operating. After 31 years of subsidies that were 

to have ended by 1973, there is no reason to think Amtrak will not 

get what it is seeking, but why Amtrak waited until the eleventh 

hour to notify Congress of its desperate financial situation is beyond me. I can understand how Mr. Gunn could not have known 

much sooner, because he had only recently joined Amtrak, but 

5

what about the rest of Amtrak’s management and, more importantly, what about Amtrak’s board of directors? 

I believe an important first step toward reform is to call for the 

resignation of the members of the Amtrak reform board who were 

appointed to oversee Amtrak and meet the directives of the Amtrak 

Reform and Accountability Act. After all, these individuals are responsible for Amtrak’s repeated claims that it was on a glide path 

to self-sufficiency, claims that, according to Mr. Gunn, were fictional. 

It is the same board that paid a high-powered consulting firm 

over $10 million for an analysis of where Amtrak should be headed, 

and how Amtrak could cut expenses. That report never saw the 

light of day, probably because the consultant recommended that 

Amtrak become a private company, and prepare for competition, 

similar to the recommendations made by the bipartisan Amtrak 

Reform Council. 

Another point here. The Amtrak Reform Council made recommendations. None of those recommendations that I know of 

were included in the legislation that passed through this Committee. I will attempt on the floor to get some of those recommendations of the Amtrak Reform Council incorporated in any 

further bail-out. Considering the attention being paid to actions 

taken by the boards of directors of private corporations, we should 

be especially concerned about the Amtrak board, whose decisions 

affect a corporation that receives millions of dollars annually from 

the American taxpayer. I believe these board members have failed 

to fulfill their fiduciary obligation and should be asked to step 

down, just as those overseeing private corporations have recently 

been asked to do. 

On June 28, I joined 13 other members in writing President 

Bush to recommend five short-term reforms as a condition of any 

additional Amtrak funding. I will be interested in hearing both Administrator Rutter’s and Mr. Gunn’s views on these modest proposals, which include: 

Transmitting all funds to the Department of Transportation to 

administer and distribute to Amtrak only under formal grant 

agreements. Such agreements tighten the purse strings and ensure 

that funds are spent as intended. 

Prohibiting Amtrak from incurring any new debt obligations unless approved by the DOT Secretary or the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget. 

Directing Amtrak to prepare a contingency plan approved by 

DOT to ensure that commuter and freight operations on the Northeast Corridor as well as commuter service operated by Amtrak 

under contract continue, even if Amtrak ceases intercity operations. 

Directing DOT to establish a commission similar in structure to 

a Base Realignment and Closure Commission to evaluate Amtrak’s 

route structure and develop standards to determine what routes 

should be operated, and requiring Amtrak in an effort to protect 

the investment of the American taxpayers to provide to the Federal 

Government any available non-leveraged collateral in exchange for 

Federal assistance. 

6

If Amtrak’s latest financial crisis is not a wake-up call for reform, I do not know what it is. It is truly a sad commentary on 

Amtrak’s management and board that during the 5 years and $6.2 

billion in Federal and State subsidies Amtrak has received since its 

last reauthorization, the company is once again on the verge of 

bankruptcy, despite repeated assurances that it would be free of 

operating subsidies once that authorization period ended. 

One additional point. The money that we use to subsidize the 

airlines and highways come directly from user fees, from those that 

use the airlines and highways. Rail passenger uses comprises 1/2 

of 1 percent of all traffic passengers in America. We are asking this 

money for Amtrak to be taken out of general revenues. I think it 

is a significantly different situation. I am ‘convinced that without 

major reform in another 5 years or even sooner, we are certain to 

face yet another Amtrak bail-out. I will not give up hope that Congress will embrace real change for our Nation’s national passenger 

rail service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Sen. McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is certainly timely. In a span of less than 

3 months, there have been 13 serious rail accidents involving Amtrak, commuter authorities, and several freight railroads, which have resulted in eight fatalities, over 

500 injuries, and the evacuation of all 2,200 residents of Potterville, Michigan. In 

addition to these accidents, there was a hazardous materials release last January 

in Minot, North Dakota, that killed one and seriously injured 13 others. And it was 

just a year ago that a CSX train derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, 

leaking hydrochloric acid, lighting several carloads of paper on fire and disrupting 

the city for several days. 

While the recent spate of accidents is alarming, statistically, rail safety has made 

great progress. Historically, there appears to have been a fairly strong correlation 

between safety in the freight rail industry and the industry’s financial stability. 

Since the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 partially deregulated the railroads, the rate of 

train accidents has declined 64%, the rate of employee injuries and fatalities has 

fallen 57%, and grade crossing fatalities have been reduced by 50%. I am concerned 

that the recent accidents could be a sign of the end to these positive trends. 

I am interested in hearing from today’s witnesses and learning their views on 

what needs to be done to better protect the safety and security of the both rail employees and passengers, as well as the general public. I also recognize that yesterday, the Administration submitted its proposal to reauthorize our federal rail safety 

programs and hope that our Committee will be able to work together to move this 

important reauthorization during the limited time remaining this session. 

In addition to focusing our attention on railroad safety, today’s hearing also provides us the opportunity to question Administrator Rutter and Amtrak’s new president, David Gunn, about Amtrak’s current financial situation—an opportunity we 

would not otherwise have been given. Prior to the July 4th recess, there was an uproar over whether Amtrak would have been shut down by now. The Administration 

provided a $100 million loan and is expected to seek additional assistance from Congress to keep Amtrak running through September. 

I hope Administrator Rutter will be able to tell us specifically what the Administration is requesting of Congress. I also hope he and Mr. Gunn will further explain 

to us what the emergency financial needs are, and how they defined what needs 

were an emergency. I am also interested in knowing what additional reforms the 

Administration recommends be required as a condition of Amtrak receiving additional financial assistance. 

There is no question in my mind that Amtrak will get the money it needs to keep 

operating. Certainly after 31 years of subsidies that were to have ended by 1973, 

there is no reason to think Amtrak won’t get what it is seeking. But why Amtrak 

waited until the 11th hour to notify Congress of its desperate financial situation is 

beyond me. I can understand how Mr. Gunn couldn’t have known much sooner beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
7

cause he had only recently joined Amtrak. But what about the rest of Amtrak’s 

management and, more importantly, what about the Amtrak Board of Directors? 

I believe an important first step toward reform is to call for the resignation of the 

members of the Amtrak Reform Board who were appointed to oversee Amtrak and 

meet the directives of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act. After all, these 

individuals are responsible for Amtrak’s repeated claims that it was on a glidepath 

to self-sufficiency—claims that, according to Mr. Gunn, were ‘‘fictional.’’ It is the 

same Board that paid a high-powered consulting firm over $10 million for an analysis of where Amtrak should be headed and how Amtrak could cut expenses. Yet, 

that report never saw the light of day, probably because the consultant recommended that Amtrak become a private company and prepare for competition, 

similar to the recommendations made by the bipartisan Amtrak Reform Council. 

Considering the attention being paid to actions taken by the boards of directors 

of private corporations, we should be especially concerned about the Amtrak Board 

whose decisions affect a corporation that receives millions of dollars annually from 

the American taxpayers. Again, I believe these Board members have failed to fulfill 

their fiduciary obligations and should be asked to step down, just as those overseeing private corporations have recently been asked to do. 

On June 28, I joined with 13 other members in writing President Bush to recommend five short-term reforms as a condition of any additional Amtrak funding. 

I will be interested in hearing both Administrator Rutter’s and Mr. Gunn’s views 

on these modest proposals, which include:

• Transmitting all funds to the Department of Transportation (DOT) to administer and distribute to Amtrak only under formal grant agreements. Such agreements tighten the purse strings and ensure that funds are spent as intended;

• Prohibiting Amtrak from incurring any new debt obligations unless approved by 

the DOT Secretary or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;

• Directing Amtrak to prepare a contingency plan, approved by DOT, to ensure 

that commuter and freight operations on the Northeast Corridor, as well as 

commuter services operated by Amtrak under contract, continue even if Amtrak 

ceases intercity operations;

• Directing DOT to establish a commission, similar in structure to a Base Realignment and Closure Commission, to evaluate Amtrak’s route structure and 

develop standards to determine what routes should be operated; and,

• Requiring Amtrak, in an effort to protect the investment of the American taxpayers, to provide to the federal government any available non-leveraged collateral in exchange for federal assistance.

If Amtrak’s latest financial crisis isn’t a wake-up call for reform, I don’t know 

what is. It is truly a sad commentary on Amtrak’s management and Board that during the five years and $6.2 billion in federal and state subsidies Amtrak has received since its last reauthorization, the company is once again on the verge of 

bankruptcy despite repeated assurances that it would be free of operating subsidies 

once that authorization period ended. 

I am convinced that without major reform, in another five years—or even sooner—we are certain to face yet another Amtrak bailout. I will not give up hope that 

Congress will embrace real change for our nation’s passenger rail system.

Senator BREAUX. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Welcome to both of our witnesses, Ms. Blakey and Mr. Rutter. 

We have your prepared statements, and Mr. Rutter, I notice you 

have a 39-minute statement. Ms. Blakey, yours is shorter, but nevertheless we would like you to try and summarize your statement 

so we can proceed to questions. 

Ms. Blakey, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARION C. BLAKEY, CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Ms. BLAKEY. Thank you very much, and I am delighted to be 

here. 

Chairman Breaux, Senator Hollings, Senator McCain, it is a 

pleasure to appear before you. As you know, the National Transportation Safety Board’s most important products are our safety 

8

recommendations. It is a proven fact that our safety recommendations do save lives but unfortunately many of the recommendations 

we have made in the rail area have yet to be implemented. For this 

reason, I recently began meeting with all of the administrators of 

the Department of Transportation, Administrator Rutter included. 

Our goal has been to close satisfactorily many of the open recommendations from the NTSB, including as many as possible of 

those on our most wanted list of safety recommendations. 

As many of you know, the most wanted list contains those issues 

that we believe are most urgent and have the greatest potential to 

advance safety. Over the last few weeks, I have had what I consider to be very successful meetings with a number of the administrators. We are coming to look at the recommendations in two 

groups, those that we can close satisfactorily immediately, based 

upon progress to date, and those that may take 2 years. When you 

look back over this list of recommendations, many of them have 

been open for a decade, and so what we are trying to do is speed 

up this progress. 

Today, I would like to talk with you, therefore, about two specific 

areas in the rail arena that we think are most critical from the 

standpoint of safety improvements. These are, in addition to grade 

crossings, which I will touch on, but in the interest of brevity I will 

go to those two specifics. We think these are the ones that have the 

greatest potential to save lives. Here we are talking about one that 

I know you are familiar with, positive train control, and here we 

have important recommendations on the books which we would like 

to ask for your support to achieve those goals. 

Positive train control has been on our most wanted list of safety 

improvements since 1990. As you know, PTC systems, as they are 

known, prevent train collisions by automatically stopping a train 

when the engineer does not comply with a missed signal. Simply 

put, they have the ability to eliminate almost all rail collisions. 

Let me tell you briefly about a recent collision that could have 

been prevented had PTC been in place. This is one I am personally 

very familiar with, because it is one that I was the Board Member 

on the scene of the accident. As you all may recall, on April 23, in 

Placentia, California, Burlington Northern’s Santa Fe freight train 

collided head on with a Metrolink commuter train. It resulted in 

the deaths of two Metrolink commuters. 

The NTSB learned that the BNSF train had failed to comply 

with two signals, first a yellow, then a red. The train was traveling 

between 40 and 50 miles an hour when it passed the red signal 

very fast, and it was not until the engineer saw the Metrolink train 

ahead that he actually applied the emergency brakes. 

Sadly, this kind of accident, and this accident specifically, could 

have been prevented with PTC. A PTC system would have stopped 

the train after it passed the yellow signal. It would have definitely 

had the train completely braked by the time it reached that red 

signal. 

This is not to say that progress has not been made. Since the 

mid-1990’s, more than $267 million has been spent on PTC systems 

by both industry and Government, and we are encouraged by the 

efforts of some of the railroads to implement these systems. In addition, we recognize that the FRA has a commitment and a real 

9

support of the goal of implementing PTC as soon as possible. In 

fact, in 2001 the FRA published an NPRM to facilitate the development and implementation of the national differential global positioning satellite system, which is critical in making the system possible, and this is real progress. 

Mr. Chairman, the Safety Board recognizes the complexities and 

the costs that are involved in implementing positive train control. 

We are sensitive to these issues, but we genuinely believe much 

more can be done, and it can be done more quickly. We have got 

to increase the current pace of development. After 12 years, it is 

still on the most wanted list, and there is no industry-wide plan 

for the integration of these kinds of systems. In fact, the rail lines 

that primarily serve freight carriers remain largely unprotected. 

We ask for your support, therefore, to help us encourage industry 

to speed up this pace. 

The other important issue I wanted to touch on briefly is track 

safety. Over the years, the Board has issued numerous recommendations to address track safety. In fact, according to the 

FRA, of the 2,962 reported train accidents in 2001, 1,115 were 

track-related. Two recent track-related accidents being investigated 

by the board occurred in Crescent City, Florida, and in Minot, 

North Dakota. 

On April 18, an Amtrak Auto Train en route from Sanford, Florida, to Lorton, Virginia, derailed in Crescent City, Florida, killing 

four passengers. Shortly after the accident, the engineer told Safety 

Board investigators that he saw a misaligned track, but he saw it 

only approximately 60 feet in front of him and the train derailed 

shortly thereafter. Sixty feet is not enough to be able to stop a 

train. We are currently investigating many aspects of this accident, 

but one of the big focuses, of course, is track conditions. 

The other recent accident, and many of you will remember this, 

was on January 18 in Minot, North Dakota, when a Canadian Pacific railway freight train that was pulling tank cars filled with anhydrous ammonia derailed. Approximately 250,000 gallons of ammonia were released, killing one person in Minot. The release created a massive vapor cloud 5 miles long, 2-1/2 miles wide, 350 feet 

high. 

The Minot fire chief estimated that the vapor cloud affected 

15,000 people, or 40 percent of the population of the city. We were 

very lucky in this case—it happened in the middle of the night. 

Most of the population was indoors and they were asleep, therefore 

we did not have the kind of effect on the population we would have 

at just about any other time of day. 

We are currently investigating this accident and we will hold 

hearings next Monday and Tuesday, the 15th and 16th, to address 

the issues involved in that particular accident. But to go to the 

broad point, what can we do to prevent these types of accidents, 

our most recent safety recommendation was issued in April following the Board’s investigation of a train derailment in Eunice, 

Louisiana. 

As a result of this accident, we have asked the FRA to consider 

the volume of hazardous material shipments made over tracks 

when they are looking at the question of the frequency and type 

of inspections that they order. We think this is critical. I am conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
10

fident that by addressing this issue and other issues that I mentioned today we can greatly reduce the number of injuries and the 

number of fatalities on our Nation’s rail system. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to respond to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Blakey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARION C. BLAKEY, CHAIRMAN,

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Good morning Chairman Breaux and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to represent the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) before you today 

on the subject of railroad safety. 

According to the Association of American Railroads, there are more than 600 

freight railroads operating today in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. North 

American railroads operate over 173,000 miles of track, and generate $42 billion in 

annual revenues. In the United States, railroads account for more than 40 percent 

of all freight transportation. 

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data show that in 1996, there were 2,443 

reportable train accidents, and in 2001 there were 2,962 reportable train accidents. 

Although there was a marked decrease in railroad fatalities in 1999—from 1,008 to 

932—this figure has risen to 966 in 2001. Mr. Chairman, as railroad traffic and the 

amount of hazardous materials being transported continue to increase, the railroad 

industry and government must remain vigilant with their efforts to prevent accidents. 

I want today to discuss three areas of concern to the Board—positive train control, 

track safety, and grade crossing safety. 

The NTSB’s safety recommendations are the most important results of its accident investigations. It is clear that adoption of our safety recommendations saves 

lives. We are working closely with the FRA to increase its current recommendation 

acceptance rate of about 71.5%, and to that end I met with Administrator Rutter 

on June 7, 2002, to discuss which of the open safety recommendations can and 

should be accomplished within the next two years. I believe the meeting was productive and will result in accomplishing several open safety recommendations. 

Since its creation in 1990, the Safety Board’s Most Wanted list has highlighted 

safety recommendation issues that have the greatest potential to save lives. Positive 

train control (PTC) systems have been on the list since 1990. PTC systems prevent 

train collisions by automatically interceding in the operation of a train when the engineer does not comply with a required signal indication. In past accidents, engineers failed to comply with signals because of poor visibility, distractions, or other 

human performance failures, such as fatigue. As you are aware, problems associated 

with human fatigue is also a Most Wanted issue. 

Over the years, the Safety Board has repeatedly investigated railroad collisions 

that could have been prevented by a PTC system. Since 1969, when the Safety 

Board made its first safety recommendation related to PTC systems, the Board has 

investigated 15 relevant major railroad accidents related to PTC and completed a 

safety study—resulting in 36 positive train control-related safety recommendations. 

Without the installation of PTC systems, preventable collision accidents will continue to occur and will continue to place railroad employees and the traveling public 

at risk. 

The most recent safety recommendation regarding PTC was issued in May 2001 

as a result of the collision that occurred January 17, 1999, near Bryan, Ohio. Since 

that safety recommendation was issued, the NTSB has launched investigators to six 

railroad collision accidents that may have been prevented had PTC systems been 

in place, including a recent head-on collision that occurred between a freight train 

and a commuter train in Placentia, California, on April 23, 2002. 

As you may recall, at 8:20 a.m. a Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) freight 

train collided with a Metrolink commuter train, resulting in the fatal injuries of two 

Metrolink passengers. The BNSF train was traveling between 40 and 50 miles per 

hour when the engineer saw the Metrolink commuter train on the track put the 

train into emergency braking. Despite application of the train’s emergency brakes, 

the BNSF train struck the Metrolink commuter train at 20 miles per hours, pushing 

it backward more than 300 feet and derailing its front passenger car. 

Since the mid 1990s, more than 267 million dollars have been spent on PTC systems by industry and government. The Safety Board is encouraged by the efforts 

of some railroads to implement PTC systems that have a collision avoidance compoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
11

nent, and several projects have advanced past the developmental phase into revenue 

service. For instance:

• Amtrak continues installation of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 

along the high-density Northeast Corridor (with 198 miles completed);

• Amtrak is also installing the Incremental Train Control System on the Michigan line between Chicago and Detroit (with 76 miles completed);

• New Jersey Transit continues installation of the Advanced Speed Enforcement 

System (with plans to install it on all 540 miles system-wide); and

• The Illinois Department of Transportation, the FRA, the AAR, and the Union 

Pacific are working to install a PTC system on the Chicago to St. Louis Corridor.

In September 1999, the FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) completed a report titled ‘‘Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems. The report 

noted that:

• Approximately 40 to 60 accidents could be prevented by PTC each year;

• Approximately 7 fatalities and 55 injuries could be prevented annually by PTC;

• Testing has shown that PTC is successful; and

• PTC systems can be designed to provide interoperability among many systems.

As a result of the RSAC report, in August 2001, the FRA published a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to facilitate development and implementation of the 

National Differential Global Positioning System (GPS) Network. Previous PTC testing established that a properly augmented GPS can provide a viable, low cost trainborne location determination system for PTC. 

Mr. Chairman, the Safety Board acknowledges progress in this area, and we recognize the complexities and costs involved in the implementation of PTC on the Nation’s railroads. However, the safety Board is not satisfied with the current pace of 

development and implementation of collision avoidance technologies. It is important 

to remember that not only are we seeking to eliminate the fatalities and injuries 

in these collisions, but the devastating financial and environmental costs of hazardous materials accidents. To date, no plan for industry-wide integration has been 

developed. And, while progress has been particularly slow along rail lines that primarily serve freight carriers, even those lines with significant passenger traffic remain largely unprotected today—some 12 years after PTC was first placed on the 

Safety Board’s Most Wanted list. 

Track safety is also an issue that has been addressed by the Board in numerous 

railroad accidents. According to the FRA, of the 2,962 reportable train accidents in 

2001, 1,115 were track-related. Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Bob Chipkevich, Director 

of the Board’s Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials Investigations, 

testified before this Subcommittee in March 2001, he commended the FRA for its 

efforts to revise track standards. He expressed concern, however, that the rule to 

revise track safety standards did not mandate the use of advanced track inspection 

technology, such as track geometry cars. We believe data identified by track geometry cars would enable a track inspector to more effectively identify track anomalies, 

monitor those track segments with potential defects, and monitor the results of 

track work performed. 

The most recent railroad accident report adopted by the Board in which track conditions and inspection were issues resulted from an accident that occurred May 27, 

2000, in Eunice, Louisiana. The derailment of a Union Pacific (UP) freight train resulted in explosions, fire, the release of hazardous materials, and the evacuation of 

about 3,500 people from the surrounding area. Total damages exceeded $35 million. 

After the derailment, a thorough inspection of the jointed rail territory revealed 

track conditions that did not meet the requirements for the type of track used. Furthermore, it was more than likely that these track conditions existed for some time. 

The FRA’s records for the 5 years preceding the accident documented a history of 

weak tie conditions and cracked joint bars in the jointed rail section at the accident 

location. During a walking inspection in 1996, the FRA discovered 36 broken joint 

bars and identified several areas with weak crossties. FRA inspectors inspected the 

track in January 1999 and discovered areas with insufficient crossties and defective 

joint bars. Although an FRA inspector found that the situation had been corrected 

in a follow-up inspection in March 1999, he found defective tie conditions at 11 locations and 2 cracked joint bars in other areas. 

During the Safety Board’s investigation, Union Pacific advised NTSB staff that 

the track at the scene was inspected daily. A post-accident inspection by the Safety 

Board’s investigative team, however, revealed numerous track defects—including 

12

403 cracked and broken splice bars. Since this accident Union Pacific has implemented a more stringent inspection program for jointed track. 

Track issues are also being examined as part of our investigations of recent train 

derailments that occurred on January 18, 2002, in Minot, North Dakota, and on 

April 18, 2002, at Crescent City, Florida. 

The derailment and release of hazardous materials in Minot, North Dakota, occurred on January 18, 2002, at approximately 1:39 a.m., central standard time. The 

accident involved a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train with two locomotives and 

112 cars, 31 of which derailed. Several tank cars were breeched, releasing more 

than 250,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia, creating a vapor cloud that was estimated to be 5 miles long, 2 1⁄2 miles wide, and about 350 feet high. The accident 

resulted in one fatality. The Minot Rural Fire Department Fire Chief estimated that 

the anhydrous ammonia vapor cloud affected approximately 15,000 people, or 40 

percent of the population of the City of Minot. 

The train’s operating crew stated that while traveling at approximately 40 miles 

per hour they felt a rough spot and were attempting to slow the train when the derailment occurred. The Board will hold a public hearing this summer regarding this 

accident and track issues will be addressed. We will keep the Committee advised 

of any developments as they occur. 

Track issues are also being looked into as a result of the derailment in Crescent 

City, Florida, which involved an Amtrak auto train en route from Sanford, Florida, 

to Lorton, Virginia. The accident occurred on April 18, 2002, at approximately 5:40 

p.m. eastern daylight time. The Amtrak train was operating over CSX Transportation track and was carrying 418 passengers and a crew of 34 at the time of the 

accident. The accident resulted in 4 passenger fatalities and over 28 injuries. The 

engineer told Safety Board investigators that he was operating under a clear signal 

indication when he saw a misaligned track approximately 60 feet in front of the engine. Before he could initiate the train’s emergency brakes, he was thrown to the 

side of the locomotive cab. He then initiated the emergency brakes and felt the train 

derail. 

The NTSB believes that the FRA needs to increase track inspections, and recommended—as a result of the Eunice, Louisiana, accident—that the FRA modify its 

track inspection program to consider the volume of hazardous materials shipments 

made over the tracks in determining the frequency and type of track inspections. 

We look forward to receiving the FRA’s response. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not discuss a long-standing safety concern of the Board’s—grade crossing safety. Data indicate that every 160 minutes a 

collision between a train and a car or a truck occurs at one of the more than 259,000 

highway/rail grade crossings in the United States, resulting in 419 fatalities in 

2001. 

The most recent railroad/highway grade crossing accident report adopted by the 

Board involved an accident that occurred on March 15, 1999, in Bourbonnais, Illinois, which resulted in 11 fatalities. The Safety Board’s investigation revealed that 

the truckdriver had ample time to safely stop his truck and avoid an accident, but 

likely as a result of fatigue, he failed to respond appropriately to the signals and 

instead decided to cross ahead of the train. 

On-going grade crossing accidents include accidents that occurred November 20, 

2000, in Intercession City, Florida, that involved an Amtrak train and an oversize/

overweight tractor-trailer combination vehicle at a protected crossing, and May 14, 

2002, in Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, that involved an Amtrak train and a tractor-trailer carrying logs at an unprotected crossing. 

Ideally, the Safety Board believes that closing crossings or separating rail traffic 

from highway traffic through bridges and overpasses are the most effective means 

to eliminate accidents between highway vehicles and trains. The Safety Board recognizes that closures or traffic separation is not always possible. Therefore, the NTSB 

has also recommended that grade crossings be equipped with active devices that 

warn motorists of on-coming trains. We have seen, however, that even those crossings with flashing lights and gates do not prevent all accidents. Many Board investigations of accidents that occurred at active crossings have involved drivers who did 

not comply with train-activated warning devices installed at the crossings. Drivers 

often drove around lowered crossing gates or ignored flashing lights. Because of 

these deliberate actions by drivers, the Safety Board believes strong consideration 

should be given to the installation of devices that will prevent motorists from driving around lowered gates or median barriers. 

As a result of the grade crossing accident in Bourbonnais, Illinois, the NTSB recommended that the Department of Transportation provide Federal highway safety 

incentive grants to States to advance innovative pilot programs. These programs are 

designed to increase enforcement of grade crossing traffic laws at both active and 

13

passive crossings. We recognize that not all passive grade crossings will be upgraded 

in the near future with active warning devices, and we believe that education and 

enforcement, such as the use of cameras to catch violators who drive around the 

gates, must be a part of any effective grade crossing improvement plan. Many motorists fail to understand the level of risk at grade crossings, and do not realize that 

a 150-car train traveling at 50 miles per hour will take about 11⁄2 miles to stop. The 

Safety Board fully supports the education efforts of Operation Lifesaver and other 

endeavors to provide information about grade crossing safety to drivers, and has recommended that grade crossing questions be included on all drivers’ license tests. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to respond to any questions.

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Ms. Blakey. We will go on to Mr. 

Rutter’s statement. Please summarize, if you can. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ALLAN RUTTER, ADMINISTRATOR,

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. RUTTER. Thank you, Chairman Breaux. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current state 

of railroad safety in the Nation’s railway industry. 

As FRA Administrator, nothing is more important to me than 

railroad safety. Simply put, safety is what we are all about. It is 

the very reason for our existence. FRA’s primary mission is to oversee and promote the safety and integrity of our Nation’s freight and 

passenger railroad systems. We are responsible for administering 

and enforcing laws and regulations relating to rail safety through 

our headquarters personnel as well as more than 400 safety professionals throughout the field. 

With that as background, I feel comfortable in reporting to this 

body that our Nation’s rail system is among the safest modes of 

transportation in the world. However, as recent accidents indicate, 

even a single railroad incident has the potential to result in injury 

or, worse, loss of life. 

To truly appreciate the safety of today’s industry, it is important 

to look at the tremendous progress which has been achieved in past 

years, a great deal of which is due to the efforts of Members of this 

body. During the last two decades, the rate and number of accidents, employee injuries and fatalities, and train accidents with a 

hazardous material release have all declined significantly. 

Between 1978 and 2001, the number of train accidents and the 

train accident rate dropped by more than 70 percent. Train accidents dropped from nearly 11,000 to just shy of 3,000, and the 

train accident rate dropped from 14.62 accidents per million trainmiles to 4.17. 

During the same period, the number of train accidents involving 

the release of hazardous materials declined nearly 80 percent. Just 

this past year, in 2001, we saw the lowest number of employee fatalities and injuries in the history of the industry, and while our 

numbers for 2002 are preliminary, so far total accidents and incidents have dropped by 22 percent. 

With all that said, I in no way want to minimize the recent accidents, and I assure you that they have our attention. Each of the 

victims involved in these accidents had a name, and had family 

members. If nothing else, we owe it to these families to find out 

what went wrong, and to do all we can to make sure that these 

types of accidents do not happen again. My job, and the job of my 

colleagues, is to see that every railroad employee leaves work in 

14

the same condition as he or she was when they began their shift, 

and that a commuter passenger arrives safely at his or her final 

destination. 

Fortunately, I believe that these most recent accidents, though 

tragic, may not represent a trend. In working to determine what 

the problems are and why they are occurring, FRA does not rely 

on statistics alone. We are focusing on the underlying factor or factors which may have contributed to an accident happening in the 

first place, and how those factors can be mitigated. 

We have changed the way we do business, focusing our inspection efforts and our enforcement tools where they will do the most 

good in terms of reducing the likelihood of train accidents and injuries. Our focus is more on accidents that result in death or injury, 

rather than on minor accidents, most of which happen in yards or 

terminals, which might be referred to as ‘‘fender benders’’. Now, instead of just handing out fines, we are working with all stakeholders, rail labor and management, suppliers and contractors, as 

well as other interested parties, all in the name of safety. 

For example, when Amtrak began reporting a reduction in force 

earlier in this year, FRA immediately intensified efforts to work 

with Amtrak to see that these cuts did not affect basic safety. 

When certain railroads have had continuing incidents, we meet 

with the company’s management to coordinate an effort to address 

these problems. We recently announced an industry-wide effort to 

work with the railroads to increase efficiency testing to reduce 

human factor-caused train accidents by ensuring the train crews 

are alert and complying with safety and operating rules. 

Under performance budgeting, Congress saw fit to provide us 

with greater resources in the form of additional inspectors, which 

have been very helpful in addressing these issues. In addition to 

those actual performance matters, one of the most important ways 

we benefit from safety partnerships is in our rulemaking process. 

Our Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, or RSAC, gives all of the 

affected groups the opportunity to shape rules from their outset. 

Unfortunately, one area of rail safety that continues to plague us 

is grade crossing and trespasser incidents, which account for 95 

percent of all train-related fatalities. It is my opinion that only 

through an intensified and targeted educational effort, along with 

aggressive enforcement of State and local laws, and greater funding 

for physical improvements, will we begin to see those numbers decline. 

In closing, while we will not be satisfied until we reach zero injuries and zero fatalities, I believe progress has been and will continue to be made in improving the safety of America’s rail industry. 

We at FRA are totally committed to aggressive and proactive action 

to this end, and I would be glad to answer any questions you may 

have for me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rutter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALLAN RUTTER, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you to discuss the state of railroad safety on our nation’s railroads. 

On behalf of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the agency charged with 

administering the nation’s railroad safety laws, I extend my deepest sympathy to 

15

the families of the people who died in recent accidents and to those who were injured. My testimony will explain how FRA’s railroad safety program is working 

daily to reduce the likelihood and severity of accidents such as these and will demonstrate that the state of railroad safety is generally very positive. 

FRA’s safety mission can be simply stated: help prevent fatalities, injuries, and 

property damage related to railroad operations and releases of hazardous materials 

from rail cars, and enhance the security of railroad operations. Under the Federal 

Railroad Safety Act of 1970, FRA’s jurisdiction extends to all areas of railroad safety. We have issued rules on a wide range of subjects including track, signal and 

train control, locomotives and other equipment, grade crossing signal devices, and 

operating practices, and we enforce those rules as well as rules related to hazardous 

materials transportation by rail. We conduct inspections of railroad operations to determine the level of compliance with the laws and regulations, and use a variety 

of enforcement tools when necessary to encourage compliance. We help educate the 

public about safety at highway-rail grade crossings and the dangers of trespassing 

on railroad property. FRA has its own accident investigation authority, and works 

closely with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on those accidents 

that NTSB investigates. FRA investigates a broader range of railroad accidents than 

NTSB, including those involving three or more deaths at a highway-rail grade crossing, an employee fatality, damages that exceed $1,000,000, or serious injuries to 

passengers. 

FRA tracks the railroad industry’s safety performance very closely by requiring 

reports of accidents and injuries, investigating major accidents, and inspecting railroads and hazardous materials shippers extensively. FRA’s safety data base is available on its Web site (see www.fra.dot.gov). FRA uses this information to guide its 

accident prevention efforts and continually strives to make better use of the wealth 

of available data to achieve its mission. 

The Current State of Railroad Safety Across the Nation 

As judged by most indicators, the long-term safety trends on the nation’s railroads 

are very favorable. While not even a single death or injury is acceptable, progress 

is being made in the effort to improve railroad safety. Based on preliminary figures, 

last year marked all-time safety records in several important categories. Overall, the 

total number of rail-related accidents and incidents and the total accident/incident 

rate were the lowest on record. Also, 2001 saw the lowest number of railroad employee fatalities (22) and injuries (7,575) on record and the lowest overall employee 

casualty rate (3.19 per 200,000 employee hours). In the period between 1978 and 

2001, the number of reported train accidents dropped from 10,991 to 2,962, and the 

train accident rate fell from 14.62 accidents per million train-miles to 4.17 accidents. 

Also during this period, the number of train accidents involving a release of hazardous material declined from 140 to 31 despite a significant increase in the number 

of hazardous materials tank car shipments to more than two million per year. Since 

1990, a period in which railroads have transported more than 20 million hazardous 

materials shipments, three persons have died as a result of the release of hazardous 

material lading in a train accident. 

In other words, over the last two decades the number and rate of train accidents, 

total deaths arising from rail operations, employee fatalities and injuries, and hazardous materials releases and deaths related to those releases all fell dramatically. 

In most categories, these improvements were most rapid in the 1980s, and tapered 

off in the 1990s. (See the attached graph of train accidents and their rate since 

1978.) Causes of the improvements included a much more profitable economic climate for freight railroads following deregulation in 1980 under the Staggers Act 

(which led to substantially greater investment in plant and equipment), enhanced 

safety awareness and safety program implementation on the part of railroads and 

their employees, and FRA’s safety monitoring and standard setting. 

Similarly, the grade crossing safety picture has shown great progress. In 1990, a 

total of 698 persons died in highway-rail grade crossing collisions. In 2001, the number was down to 419 despite an increase in exposure due to increased highway and 

rail traffic. Here, too, improvement has resulted from a variety of sources, including 

public investment in crossing warning devices and greater awareness of the risks 

present at crossings on the part of highway users, which was brought about by joint 

efforts of railroads, employees, FRA, the states, our Department of Transportation 

partners (Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration), and Operation Lifesaver. 

Despite the impression one might get from news accounts of recent accidents, rail 

remains an extremely safe mode of transport for passengers. In the five-year period 

between 1997 and 2001, just two passengers were killed in train collisions and 

16

derailments, and 13 more in grade crossing collisions, out of the 2.3 billion passengers who rode our nation’s commuter and intercity passenger trains. According 

to the National Safety Council (see attached chart on passenger death rates), the 

number of deaths per 100 million railroad passenger-miles is quite comparable to 

the rate for airline passengers, both of which are a fraction of the rate for automobile passengers. Given the strength of rail passenger equipment and the fact that 

rail passengers are distributed throughout a train in such a way as to minimize the 

impact of a collision or derailment for many, rail passenger accidents-while always 

to be avoided—have a very high survival rate. 

Unfortunately, not all of the major safety indicators are positive. In recent years, 

rail trespasser deaths have replaced grade crossing fatalities as the largest category 

of deaths associated with railroading. In 2001, a total of 508 persons died while on 

railroad property without authorization, which was an increase of nearly 10 percent 

over the previous year. Track safety has also emerged as a growing problem. The 

number and rate of ‘‘track-caused’’ accidents have actually increased over the last 

few years. For the first time in many years, in 2001, track causes actually exceeded 

human factors as the largest category of train accident causes. In that year, track 

causes were cited in about 38 percent of all reported train accidents, while human 

factors accounted for about 34 percent, equipment causes were responsible for about 

14 percent, signal-related factors were causal in about one percent, and miscellaneous causes accounted for the remainder. 

Any discussion of the railroad accident data, however, must take into account the 

fact that, under the current reporting threshold, any train mishap resulting in at 

least $6,700 in damage to railroad equipment or structures must be reported as a 

‘‘train accident.’’ This means that many ‘‘fender benders’’ and mechanical malfunctions that pose no danger to either the public, railroad workers, or railroad operations meet the reporting threshold and are classified by FRA as train accidents. 

For example, FRA recently analyzed the number of train accidents in its database 

that occurred on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor over the past five years. While the 

raw data contained 101 events that were classified as train accidents, closer examination revealed that 84 incidents involved mechanical malfunctions or damage to 

the overhead electrical equipment. These malfunctions cause a loss of electrical 

power that interrupts train service but causes no harm to the passengers. There 

were also three cases of vandalism to trains, five cases of trains striking debris and 

animals on the track, three incidents in which no passenger train was involved, and 

one fire caused by a cigarette in restroom debris. In fact, of the 101 total accidents 

reported on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor over the five-year period, there were only 

three train derailments, two of which occurred at very low speeds, and there were 

two cases where an Amtrak train struck unsecured equipment protruding from 

passing freight trains. 

Another factor to consider when discussing train accidents is that the severity of 

accidents can vary greatly. More than half of all train accidents occur in yards 

where train speeds are low, resultant damages are minor, and casualties are rare. 

Consider, for example, that train accidents, as FRA uses the term, resulted in only 

six of the 966 deaths associated with railroading in 2001. The vast bulk of those 

fatalities involved grade crossing incidents (419 deaths) and trespassers (508 

deaths). Given the limited usefulness of the aggregate data, FRA tries to continually 

mine the accident and inspection data at its disposal to find where the major pockets of risk exist and then determine how its actions can produce the biggest safety 

returns. 

FRA is also quite concerned at the number of recent train collisions in which 

human performance appears to be a primary contributing factor. Since the 

Placentia, California collision in April of this year, there have been seven more serious collisions. In many of these cases, we believe that compliance with the railroad’s 

own operating rules on signals and restricted speed may have prevented the accident. As explained more fully below, FRA has recently launched a nationwide, focused effort to examine how the railroads are implementing their own programs for 

testing their employees’ compliance with these important safety rules. 

FRA’s Safety and Security Program 

FRA’s safety program is the heart and soul of the agency. The program has several elements: setting safety standards, ensuring compliance with those standards, 

focusing attention on serious safety problems whether or not covered by current 

standards, educating the rail industry on the federal standards and the public on 

rail safety issues, focusing on emerging security issues, investigating accidents and 

employee fatalities, conducting research and development on safety issues, and setting the tone for safety efforts in the industry. 

17

The program’s most important element, of course, is its people. Our Office of Safety headquarters staff of 100 works on the gamut of activities including rulemaking, 

compliance, data analysis, and program management. Our field force of 486 (which 

includes safety inspectors, support staff, and managers) works on inspection and 

compliance activities, investigations, and outreach to communities and the public on 

safety issues. More than 160 certified state safety inspectors from 30 states supplement the efforts of our field forces in all of these areas. Supporting the Office of 

Safety is the Safety Law Division of the Office of Chief Counsel, our Office of Administration (which provides human resource, budget, information technology, and 

procurement support), our public affairs staff, and our research and development office. 

Setting Safety Standards 

Congress has authorized FRA, as the delegate of the Secretary of Transportation, 

to issue necessary regulations and orders for every area of railroad safety. Since 

FRA’s inception in 1967, the agency has issued a wide range of standards on subjects such as track safety, signal inspection, freight car safety, passenger car safety, 

locomotive safety, power brakes, alcohol and drug testing, operating rules and practices, accident reporting, hours of service recordkeeping, railroad communications, 

roadway worker and bridge worker protection, engineer qualifications, grade crossing signal maintenance, and passenger train emergency preparedness. FRA also assists the Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), which issues hazardous materials standards for all modes of transportation, in developing standards for rail transportation of those materials. 

In 1996, FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to develop consensus recommendations on safety issues. RSAC contains representatives 

from all major groups interested in railroad safety, including railroads and their associations, railroad labor organizations, the states, suppliers, and public interest 

groups. The NTSB and representatives from Mexico and Canada are associate members of the committee, as are a number of groups added to ensure RSAC’s diversity. 

FRA seeks RSAC’s recommendations on specific tasks; on each task, RSAC can decide whether or not to accept it and begin work. On those tasks it accepts, RSAC 

members appoint a working group of those most involved with the subject covered 

by the task. If the working group’s recommendations are unanimously adopted by 

that group and by a majority of the full RSAC, they are sent to the FRA Administrator. While FRA is free to accept or reject RSAC’s recommendations, we fully engage ourselves in the working group process to ensure that the recommendations 

are consistent with FRA’s goals for the rulemaking project. As a result, our proposed 

and final rules that arise from RSAC recommendations usually incorporate those 

recommendations substantially. 

This consensus approach to rulemaking has produced notable successes: revised 

track safety standards that include rules for high speed operations, revised communication standards reflecting technological advances in the field, and updated certification standards for locomotive engineers. More important, RSAC has helped engender a cooperative approach to developing new safety rules in which the railroad industry’s major players have the opportunity to shape FRA’s, and each other’s, thinking from the start and feel more invested in the final product. 

FRA’s recent standard-setting accomplishments include the first standards for 

passenger cars, issued in 1999, which were the product of a rule-specific consensus 

process separate from RSAC; power brake standards for freight service, which FRA 

issued in 2001 without the benefit of consensus recommendations after an unsuccessful attempt to achieve consensus; and, issued just this year, the first standards 

for locomotive cab sanitation, which are the product of the RSAC process. Late in 

2001, we issued an interim final rule establishing a United States locational requirement for dispatching domestic train operations. 

FRA has several important regulatory projects under development. We are developing, through the RSAC process, standards for processor-based signal and train 

control systems (discussed more fully below), which will lay the foundation for integrating such systems into the existing rail network. We hope to have a final rule 

out this year. We are also using the RSAC process to develop revised event recorder 

standards to facilitate movement to a new generation of recorders and standards for 

the crashworthiness of locomotives. One major rulemaking on which we are not 

using the RSAC process is our final rule on the use of train horns at grade crossings. While very broad-based, RSAC membership is not sufficiently broad to include 

all the interests that might be directly affected by this rule. Instead, to address this 

sensitive subject, we held a dozen public hearings across the country and a technical 

conference and have engaged in extensive outreach with local communities. 

18

Whether or not we employ the consensus process of RSAC, in all of our standardsetting activities we strive to avoid unnecessary regulation, consider all reasonable 

options, and issue rules that embody a fitting balance between benefits and burdens, are clearly stated, and are enforceable. However, neither the consensus rulemaking process nor the more traditional process is designed for quick action. Rulemaking can take a very long time. My philosophy is to try to do fewer things better 

and more quickly rather than trying to write simultaneously every rule that might 

have found its way onto the agency’s agenda. This fits with the Department’s renewed emphasis on rulemaking timeliness, which entails enhanced methods of coordinating and monitoring regulatory projects and tighter control of the clearance 

process. 

Encouraging Compliance and Safety Improvements 

The railroads, of course, have the responsibility for compliance with the standards 

FRA sets and to perform the necessary inspections and tests to ensure that they 

do comply. There are more than 650 railroads in the nation operating more than 

1,000,000 pieces of equipment over more than 200,000 miles of track. FRA’s inspection force cannot possibly observe all railroad activity. Instead, FRA monitors railroads to determine their level of compliance with those standards and employs a variety of tools to encourage compliance. We start with the assumption that railroads 

and their employees want to do the safe thing for their own benefit, not just because 

a law or regulation requires it. And we also understand that the Code of Federal 

Regulations is not the sole source of wisdom on safe practices; there are, in fact, 

safety problems not covered by existing rules that require a solution nonetheless. 

FRA calls its approach to compliance the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP). The basic principles of SACP are to look for root causes of safety 

problems, try to develop solutions to those problems cooperatively with railroad 

management and employees, and focus both inspection activity and the use of enforcement tools on the most serious safety risks, as revealed by our inspections and 

our accident data. On each of the major railroads, SACP teams include FRA inspectors and managers, railroad officials, and employee representatives. The SACP 

teams provide a forum for resolving both compliance issues and safety problems not 

within the four corners of existing rules. Issues can be resolved through informal 

agreements or formal action plans. At the same time, FRA continues its normal review of railroad activities through regular inspections of facilities, vehicles, operations, and records and investigation of complaints. 

FRA’s policy is one of focused inspection and enforcement. That is, we try to concentrate our inspection efforts on detecting conditions that are leading causes of accidents, injuries, and hazardous materials releases, and, where noncompliance is 

found, we try to focus our enforcement efforts on violations that may cause such 

events. Where routine inspections reveal minor defects that pose little risk, FRA 

will certainly address the noncompliance with the railroad but is not likely to take 

enforcement action. Where a railroad has acknowledged the existence of a serious 

safety problem, developed a plan for alleviating it, and implemented that plan in 

a timely way, FRA will ordinarily take no enforcement action in the absence of some 

immediate hazard. However, FRA is very likely to use its enforcement tools where 

FRA discovers serious safety violations causing an immediate and unacceptable risk 

that the railroad should have found and corrected on its own. FRA is also likely to 

take enforcement action where, even though there is no immediate hazard, FRA has 

identified serious rail safety problems requiring concerted action by the railroad to 

prevent an unacceptable risk from developing, and the railroad has failed to make 

a good faith effort to implement a specific remedial program to fix those safety problems by a date certain, despite having agreed to do so. 

Where enforcement appears necessary to encourage compliance, the tool we use 

will depend on the circumstances. Civil penalties are the most frequently used tool. 

In fiscal year 2001, for example, FRA collected over $7.6 million in penalties from 

railroads and hazardous materials shippers. Our Office of Chief Counsel, based on 

the recommendations of our field inspectors and working closely with the Office of 

Safety, assesses and collects these penalties. As the safety statutes encourage us to 

do, we settle nearly all of these cases through negotiations with railroads and shippers, and determine settlement amounts by applying the settlement criteria stated 

in the safety statutes. The settlement negotiations provide an excellent forum for 

addressing the most current and serious compliance issues that have not been resolved through more cooperative methods. 

FRA has several other enforcement tools. Our inspectors can issue special notices 

removing locomotives or freight cars from service until they are repaired, or lowering the speed of track to a speed at which the track segment is in compliance with 

the standards. We sometimes enter into compliance agreements with railroads in 

19

which the railroad promises specific remedial actions and, should it fail to deliver 

on its promise, agrees to the imposition of a compliance order, emergency order, or 

particular fines. The FRA Administrator can address an imminent safety hazard by 

issuing an emergency order, with opportunity for review of the order after its 

issuance. Civil penalties are available against individuals who willfully violate the 

safety regulations, and FRA may disqualify individuals from safety-sensitive service 

if their violation of safety regulations demonstrates their unfitness for such service. 

Criminal penalties apply for certain willful violations of the hazardous materials 

rules and knowing and willful violations of recordkeeping or reporting requirements. 

We have made increased use of these criminal penalties in recent years, especially 

for serious violations of the rules concerning proper documentation of hazardous materials shipments. 

Accident Investigations 

Nearly a century ago, Congress gave FRA’s predecessor, the Interstate Commerce 

Commission (ICC), the authority to investigate railroad accidents. FRA inherited 

that authority and continues to implement it. Where the NTSB decides to investigate, its investigation generally has priority over those of all other federal agencies, but does not extinguish the investigative authority of those agencies. In those 

cases, which usually involve the most serious accidents, our investigators work 

closely with NTSB and serve on NTSB’s teams. As previously noted, FRA also investigates a broader category of accidents and incidents than does NTSB. 

Most or all of the recent accidents that concern this Committee are still under 

investigation by NTSB , FRA, or both. Final determinations of probable cause will 

not be issued for some time. I refer you to NTSB’s testimony for any details of its 

investigations that the Board may be able to share at this time. 

The final, detailed reports that NTSB and FRA produce concerning accidents are 

a very important tool in identifying risks and determining what actions FRA may 

need to take to reduce those risks. While FRA pays very close attention to major 

accidents to determine what conditions might require immediate agency action, 

those accidents sometimes involve such unique combinations of causal factors and 

often take so long to analyze effectively that they do not offer immediate insights 

into actions that might prevent similar accidents. However, because FRA’s role is 

regulatory and not just investigative, where FRA gleans any useful information 

from investigations while they are underway, we use it immediately to try to prevent a recurrence. 

Research and Development 

FRA has an extensive research and development (R&D) program. Although that 

program resides in our Office of Railroad Development rather than our Office of 

Safety, its primary mission is to serve the safety program. Our R&D efforts also 

serve the railroad industry, railroad employees, and suppliers of railroad equipment. 

FRA owns the Transportation Technology Center near Pueblo, Colorado, which is 

operated under contract by a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads 

(AAR). 

FRA’s R&D program includes these elements:

• The Railroad System Issues element encompasses research on technological and 

operational developments in the industry that may affect safety; system safety 

planning; and physical and cyber security in the railroad system.

• The Human Factors element focuses on human performance in railroad operations (e.g., the effects of fatigue) and at grade crossings (e.g., the interface between highway users and visual and audio warnings).

• The Rolling Stock and Components element focuses on improvement of equipment defect detection and control via wayside and onboard technology and the 

development of advanced materials.

• The Track and Structures element focuses on improved methods of detecting 

hazardous conditions that can lead to failure of rails or structures.

• The Track/Train Interaction program assesses improved methods for reducing 

derailments due to interactions of track structures and vehicles.

• The Train Control program involves facilitation, risk analysis, testing, and evaluation of new train control systems, including positive train control.

• The Grade Crossings program focuses on technical aspects of crossings such as 

train presence detection, crossing geometry, and warning device technology.

• The Hazardous Materials element addresses the design and structural integrity 

of tank cars.

20

• The Occupant Protection element looks at the structural crashworthiness of locomotives and passenger cars through simulations, laboratory tests, and full 

scale fire and impact tests.

A theme running through virtually all of the R&D program elements is the use 

of sensors, computers, and digital communications to collect, process, and disseminate information to improve the safety, security, and operational efficiency of railroads. Along the lines of the Intelligent Transportation Systems being developed in 

the highway and transit industries, FRA and the railroad industry are working on 

the development of Intelligent Railroad Systems that would, in an integrated way, 

incorporate the sensor, computer, and digital communications technologies into train 

control, braking systems, grade crossing protection, track and equipment defect detection, and scheduling systems as well. 

The R&D program also includes the Next Generation High-Speed Rail Technology 

Demonstration Program, which will help develop and demonstrate the utility of 

positive train control, a high-speed non-electric locomotive, innovative grade crossing warning systems for application on high-speed corridors, and innovative methods of constructing track and structures suitable for high-speed passenger operations and heavy axle load freight operations. Our R&D office is also implementing 

the Magnetic Levitation Technology Deployment Program. 

FRA’s Strategies for Accident Prevention 

FRA combines all of the elements of its safety program to address current problems that are likely causes of accidents, injuries, and hazardous materials releases. 

Railroad safety contains several sub-fields, or disciplines. For each discipline, I will 

give some examples of how the safety program elements have been brought to bear 

on safety problems. 

Human Factors 

Human performance, especially that of railroad employees and their immediate 

supervisors, is critically important to railroad safety. Human factors cause about a 

third of train accidents and a large portion of employee injuries every year. In the 

1980s, FRA identified abuse of alcohol and drugs by operating employees as a major 

contributor to serious railroad accidents. In 1985, the agency issued the nation’s 

first alcohol and drug testing requirements for private sector employees. At first, 

railroad employee organizations opposed those rules all the way through the Supreme Court, where the rules were upheld in a landmark case in 1988. The rules 

have proven enormously successful and have virtually eliminated the use of alcohol 

and illegal drugs as a cause of train accidents. Although no one likes being tested, 

many employees have praised these rules as having greatly improved the safety of 

the industry and, in some cases, the lives of individual employees whose substance 

abuse has been addressed because of the rules. FRA is currently exploring the subject of legal drug use as a factor in accident causation, having been urged to do so 

by NTSB. 

A more recent example of FRA’s efforts to use the various elements of its safety 

program to address an area of serious safety risk is the Switching Operations Fatality Analysis (SOFA) Working Group. In the late 1990s, FRA realized that an increasing number of employee fatalities and serious injuries were occurring in the 

context of switching operations. FRA organized the SOFA Working Group to develop 

recommendations for preventing such casualties. Representatives of the AAR, the 

United Transportation Union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and The 

American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association analyzed 76 fatal switching 

incidents that occurred between 1992 and 1998. The Working Group recommended 

five basic practices (the ‘‘SOFA lifesavers’’) that, if followed invariably, would prevent such fatalities: notification to the engineer before fouling the track; extra precautions when two or more crews are working on the same track; a safety briefing 

before the work begins; proper radio communications; and paying special attention 

to crew members with less than one year of service. The recommendations were voluntarily adopted by railroads across the nation. The Working Group continues to 

track and report on switching incidents. Switching fatalities have dropped from thirteen in 2000, to eight in 2001, to two so far this year, while both the number and 

rate of yard accidents declined 8 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively, in 2001. This 

is an example of how consensus, non-regulatory actions can be very effective in some 

circumstances. 

Even more recently, FRA has taken action to address a sudden spate of train collisions in which human performance appears to be a primary contributing factor. On 

April 23, 2002, in Placentia, California, a Burlington Northern Santa Fe freight 

train collided with a Southern California Regional Rail Authority passenger train, 

resulting in two fatalities and 161 injuries. We believe the freight train passed a 

21

restrictive signal. In just the past two months, there have been seven additional 

train collisions. Including Placentia, four of these collisions involved passenger 

trains and resulted in two fatalities and 258 injuries, and the other four collisions 

involved freight trains and resulted in one fatality and 21 injuries. 

While the investigations of these accidents are not yet complete, in each case the 

early indications are that human error appears to have been a primary causal factor. The errors included running past restrictive signals, failing to comply with restricted speed requirements, and failure to broadcast on the radio the location of the 

train. All of these behaviors violate railroad operating rules, and in some cases FRA 

safety regulations. FRA requires railroads to conduct periodic operational tests and 

inspections to determine the extent of their employees’ compliance with these critical operating rules. These ‘‘efficiency tests,’’ as they are widely known, entail direct 

observations of employee performance during train operations. 

On June 28, 2002, I wrote to the major railroads, commuter railroads, labor organizations, and trade associations to announce a focused effort to examine railroad 

efficiency testing programs. During the next several months, FRA and state safety 

inspectors will be working intensively with railroad officers to examine each major 

railroad’s efficiency testing procedures, techniques, and results. We believe that improving the quality of efficiency testing programs will play an important role in 

stemming this unfavorable trend. 

Fatigue on the part of operating employees has long been an important safety 

issue. Congress first addressed the subject by enacting the Hours of Service Act in 

1907, which limited duty tours for train crews to 16 hours. As a result of amendments in 1969, that maximum was eventually reduced to 12 hours on duty in a 24-

hour period. Off-duty periods must be at least 8 consecutive hours or, if the employee works 12 consecutive hours, the off-duty period must be at least 10 consecutive hours. FRA does not have authority to change these statutory parameters. Even 

if these restrictions are observed, train crews can work an enormous number of 

hours in a week, month, or year. While commuter train crews may have some predictability in their work schedules, crews of road trains rarely do. The long hours, 

irregular work/rest cycles, and lack of regular days off combine to have a very deleterious effect on employee alertness. 

Operating employee fatigue is clearly a reality. The causal relationship between 

fatigue and particular train accidents or injuries has been clearly demonstrated in 

some instances, and fatigue is suspected as a causal element in many of the human 

factor accidents that comprise a large percentage of all train accidents. The NTSB 

has listed employee fatigue in all modes of transportation among its top ten ‘‘Most 

Wanted’’ recommendations. While research conducted by the Department of Transportation and others has demonstrated that fatigue impairs mental acuity, judgment, and reaction times, the cause of any specific human performance failure can 

be extremely difficult to pinpoint; therefore, it is often difficult to prove the exact 

role that fatigue may have played in a specific accident or what role fatigue plays 

in accident causation as a general matter. 

Even more difficult is deciding how to address fatigue effectively. The major railroads and leading labor organizations have entered into a variety of arrangements 

in the last several years in an attempt to manage fatigue. These efforts to minimize 

the impact of fatigue have been significantly enhanced by utilizing the partnerships 

resulting from the SACP and the North American Rail Alertness Partnership 

(NARAP). The latter, a voluntary coalition of rail labor, management, governmental 

entities including FRA, and other concerned parties, has been especially fruitful in 

identifying fatigue concerns and solutions. As the result of partnership efforts, the 

following measures are becoming the norm throughout the industry: undisturbed 

rest periods; improvements in lodging facilities, including single occupancy; on-duty 

napping policies, especially for the operating crafts; work/rest refinements, e.g., balancing operational requirements with appropriate work/rest schedules; educational 

measures on fatigue management that consider the families of employees; and 

screening for sleep disorders. 

In addition to facilitating NARAP’s cooperative efforts, FRA has embarked on a 

vigorous program to address a multitude of fatigue-related concerns through research on subjects that include: alertness of crew van drivers; measurement tools 

for assessing the success of fatigue countermeasures; individual fatigue awareness 

and behavioral change; alertness training videos; and analysis of a number of accidents/incidents using a software model designed to determine the impact of fatigue 

on performance. 

FRA will continue to monitor the results from these various cooperative arrangements and research projects on fatigue and, as the need arises, recommend legislative action, take relevant regulatory action (to the limited degree it may do so in 

this context), or both. 

22

Track and Structures 

As mentioned previously, track-caused accidents have been on the rise in recent 

years, and track became the leading accident cause in 2001. Reasons for this increase and the deterioration in track conditions it reveals are not certain, but may 

include reduced investment in infrastructure, reduced maintenance-of-way staffs, insufficient training or monitoring of railroad track inspectors, increased traffic, increased axle loadings, and/or higher speeds. Of course, conditions vary from railroad 

to railroad. 

FRA recently had great success in working with CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) 

to improve its track safety program. In 2000, FRA and state inspectors discovered 

disturbing patterns of noncompliance on CSX involving track gage, track inspection, 

and track repair. Track-caused accidents were on the increase. FRA and CSX entered into a unique compliance agreement that blended cooperative aspects with 

strict enforcement. Under the agreement, CSX promised to take specific steps to improve its use of track geometry vehicles, implement revised instructions for track 

inspections, develop performance standards and quality control teams for large scale 

track work, enhance management oversight of track inspections, and provide FRA 

with its capital improvement and maintenance programs for the next three years. 

CSX also agreed that it would pay fines without contesting them if FRA discovered 

any unacceptable track conditions posing an imminent hazard to train operations, 

and that FRA was authorized to issue a compliance order or emergency order that 

CSX would not contest if CSX failed to comply with the agreement. CSX took the 

necessary actions under the agreement (although it paid some uncontested fines 

along the way) and, within a year, had reduced its track-caused derailments substantially. FRA and CSX renewed the agreement for a second year, although, because of CSX’s excellent performance, without certain of the original agreement’s 

harsher enforcement provisions. The agreement expired on May 1st of this year, and 

the second year’s results were also impressive: the number of track-caused 

derailments on CSX in 2001 was 25 percent lower than the number for 2000. The 

compliance agreement, coupled with CSX’s commitment, brought about significant 

safety improvement. 

The trend on track-caused accidents, however, is national in scope. To help address the problem FRA has sought and obtained 12 additional track inspector positions in fiscal year 2002, and the President’s budget for fiscal year 2003 contains 

a request for an additional 12 positions. 

In addition to augmenting its track resources, FRA has brought a fresh perspective to enforcement in the track area. In January 2002, FRA issued a new track 

enforcement manual in that makes focused enforcement a reality. The manual provides guidance on how to focus inspections on the leading causes of train accidents 

and strongly recommends taking enforcement action when certain very serious violations are found. FRA is making use of its new resources and more focused enforcement policy to address the track compliance problem. We will blend cooperative 

measures and tough enforcement to get the job done, as we did with CSX in recent 

years. For those who may be less willing than CSX was to meet the challenge head 

on, we will use whatever level of inducement is necessary to ensure improved compliance and safety results. 

America’s more than 100,000 railroad bridges are generally quite old but in most 

cases structurally sound. Many of the large bridges were designed to carry the 

heavy steam locomotives of their time and have a reserve capacity to safely carry 

today’s railroad traffic. However, present-day car weights are approaching the design capacity of these bridges, and because of increasing traffic density on main 

routes, some of these bridges require increasingly intensive inspections and higher 

maintenance expenditures if they are to remain serviceable. Some shortline railroads lack sufficient capital to upgrade smaller bridges to handle the increasing 

weights of the latest generation of freight cars. FRA has had to issue two emergency 

orders against small railroads removing bridges from service when their owners 

failed to properly evaluate and repair conditions that posed a risk of catastrophic 

failure. In 2001, FRA entered into a successful compliance agreement with a regional railroad in which the railroad agreed to evaluate and repair its bridges in 

an orderly way as an alternative to emergency action by FRA. 

Serious bridge safety problems have occurred infrequently, and FRA has been 

able to resolve them on a case-by-case basis without issuing mandatory regulations. 

Such rules would be very complex and could cause unnecessary expenses by requiring railroads to adapt their successful but varied bridge management practices to 

a common Federal standard. In 2000, rather than issuing binding rules, FRA issued 

a bridge safety policy that establishes suggested guidelines for bridge inspection and 

management. The policy (49 C.F.R. Part 213, Appendix C) makes clear that, if a 

bridge owner jeopardizes public and employee safety by failing to resolve a bridge 

23

problem, FRA will use any appropriate enforcement tool, including an emergency 

order, to bring about elimination of the hazardous bridge conditions. 

Hazardous Materials 

The safety of hazardous materials transportation by rail depends to a large degree 

on safe track, equipment, and operating practices to ensure that the hazardous materials container is not involved in a train accident. The hazardous materials discipline, on the other hand, focuses on the integrity of the containers that hold the 

hazardous materials, the proper identification and marking of those containers, the 

use of appropriate shipping documents identifying the hazards presented by the material, the proper handling of the vehicles that contain these materials, and training 

of all who play a role in the preparation of these shipments and their movement. 

Within the Department, RSPA provides excellent leadership on these matters, 

which cut across the different modes of transportation. 

Railroads have an outstanding record in moving hazardous materials safely. Releases of those materials as a result of train accidents are down sharply from earlier 

years. However, releases from stationary tank cars in rail yards or chemical facilities are a continuing problem. The primary cause of these releases is improper securement of the cars by the shipper. Much of FRA’s enforcement efforts in this area 

are against shippers who commit these securement violations or improperly describe 

the shipments, which impedes appropriate handling and emergency response. Some 

of our investigations have led to criminal charges being brought against companies 

that prepare shipping papers for other companies and do so improperly. 

Our hazardous materials staff closely tracks reports of hazardous materials releases or problems with the integrity of railroad tank cars. This has enabled FRA 

to stay ahead of emerging problems before they lead to tragic results. For example, 

we have on several occasions discovered patterns of cracks, deterioration, and even 

structural failure in particular portions of the tank car fleet. After thorough analysis 

of the problem, we have brought pressure to bear to ensure that all cars of the type 

shown to exhibit the problem are promptly inspected and, if necessary, repaired. We 

have done this through emergency orders and, more recently, through use of a new 

regulatory provision that permits FRA to require special inspections of tank cars in 

these situations. We believe these actions, which draw little public attention, have 

prevented a number of significant releases of hazardous materials. 

FRA has also taken a proactive approach to the transportation of spent nuclear 

fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Our Safety Compliance Oversight Plan for 

transportation of those materials involves participation in route planning, ensuring 

proper training of railroad employees and emergency responders, and more intensive inspection of routes, equipment, and operations involved in those shipments. 

Motive Power and Equipment 

Congress began regulating railroad equipment by enacting the first Safety Appliance Act in 1893 and the Boiler Inspection Act in 1911. FRA has established standards for safety appliances (features of rail cars intended to prevent injury of the employees who work on and around them), power brakes, locomotives, and freight car 

components. We are currently implementing the first standards for passenger equipment, and revised standards on power brakes and their inspection. We are drafting 

standards for the crashworthiness of locomotives. 

While equipment-caused accidents have trended slightly upward in recent years, 

they still account for a relatively small portion (18 percent) of all accidents. However, certain equipment failures can lead to devastating accidents, especially at 

higher speeds, and poorly maintained equipment can cause serious employee injuries. Accordingly, FRA inspectors carefully monitor railroad compliance with the 

equipment standards and employ civil penalties and special notices for repair as 

ways of encouraging compliance on serious matters. FRA’s R&D efforts may play a 

very important role in developing improved methods of detecting equipment defects 

before they cause accidents. 

As this decade unfolds, FRA hopes to find ways of encouraging the railroads to 

use electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) braking. The AAR has been at the 

forefront in developing this technology and making sure it is mature. Now railroads 

need to take advantage of ECP train braking, which can reduce stopping distances 

and in-train forces, making it much easier for locomotive engineers to safety handle 

heavy tonnage trains and consists containing cars of various sizes and weights. 

Signal and Train Control 

Recent collisions, including the fatal collision of April 23rd between a Burlington 

Northern Santa Fe freight train and a Metrolink commuter train at Placentia, California, remind us that current methods of train operation rely too heavily on crew 

recognition of, and compliance with, signal indications (or with mandatory directives 

24

in written form). FRA is supporting deployment of advanced signal and train control 

technology to improve the safety, security, and efficiency of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter rail service. These new systems will use various technologies 

to determine the precise location of trains and automatically control their movements when necessary to prevent a collision. This developing family of technologies, 

which we have referred to as Positive Train Control (PTC), is capable of preventing 

train collisions, overspeed derailments, and casualties to roadway workers (e.g., maintenance-of-way workers, bridge workers, signal maintainers) operating within 

their limits of authority and can meet mandatory requirements for train control systems on developing high speed corridors wherever train speeds will exceed 79 mph. 

This technology has the potential capability to limit the consequences of events such 

as hijackings and runaways that are of special concern in an era of heightened security. Looking well out into the future, PTC will integrate a wide array of hazard 

sensors to protect train movements and will provide the platform for more cost effective warning of motorists at highway-rail crossings as a part of Intelligent Transportation Systems (starting with priority vehicles such as school buses and tractor trailers carrying hazardous materials). 

Communications-based PTC will be more affordable than signal-based systems 

such as automatic train control (ATC) and will address a wider range of safety 

needs. FRA is promoting PTC by describing the necessary conditions for its introduction, putting in place more flexible regulations, investing expertise and funding 

in development and demonstrations of the technology, and requiring the use of technology addressing PTC functions where it is clearly warranted to do so. 

Describing the necessary conditions. FRA’s RSAC provided a Report to the Administrator on Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems in September of 

1999. The report resulted from extensive effort by a working group comprised of representatives of railroads, rail labor organizations, states, and suppliers. One major 

result of the activity is increased understanding by all parties of the complexities 

of designing, installing, operating, and maintaining the proposed systems. FRA 

transmitted this report to the Congress on May 17, 2000, and it is available on our 

Web site at www.fra.dot.gov (under ‘‘Documents’’ for the year 2000). The report describes the safety and business uses of PTC systems and a variety of potential PTC 

architectures. The report documents the fact that risk is widely dispersed on the national rail system and that it will be necessary to implement PTC on a large scale 

in order to address the reality of locomotives which often move throughout the national rail network. The working group carefully studied the record of ‘‘PTC-preventable’’ accidents and developed cost estimates for various levels of PTC. The ultimate 

conclusion was that, based on safety benefits alone, PTC cannot be justified on a 

large scale. However, the RSAC remained optimistic that, as the technology is proven, unit costs decline, and the business benefits of the technology become better evident (e.g., as limitations on rail capacity make it more important to precisely monitor and control rail traffic), passenger and freight railroads will find it attractive 

to make the necessary investments. 

In anticipation of these developments, the RSAC described several things that industry and government need to do to support the growth of this life-saving technology. The major actions and the status of those activities follow. 

Providing safety standards that fit the need. The RSAC recognized that existing 

signal and train control regulations (49 C.F.R. Part 236) were built around older 

technology and present potential obstacles to change. As a result, on August 10, 

2001, FRA published a notice of proposed rulemaking on Performance Standards for 

Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems that was the consensus product 

of the RSAC. The RSAC Working Group has met to consider recommendations for 

finalizing the rule. Consultations among members are continuing to resolve a significant remaining issue, and the Working Group is also helping to develop a risk 

assessment toolset that can be used to make the necessary safety case for new systems under the rule. 

Developing and deploying technology. The RSAC also recognized that public and 

industry investment was necessary to ‘‘jump start’’ PTC deployment by advancing 

the design process and by providing evidence that the technologies will be reliable 

as installed. Since advanced train control systems are mandatory where speeds 

above 79 mph are proposed, developing and demonstrating practical, affordable 

train control technology have been major program elements of FRA’s Next Generation High Speed Rail technology development program. 

In 1995, FRA joined with Amtrak and the State of Michigan to install an Incremental Train Control System (ITCS) on Amtrak’s Michigan line to support proposed 

higher passenger operating speeds on the Detroit-to-Chicago corridor. This project 

includes high-speed grade crossing signal pre-starts and integration of remote 

health monitoring for crossing signals (so that the train is slowed if proper warning 

25

will not be provided). On April 18, 2001, Amtrak turned on ITCS for revenue service, and an increase in train speeds to 90 mph was authorized by FRA in January 

2002. The system is designed to support operations to 110 mph. 

On January 23, 1998, as the RSAC was engaged in its initial work, FRA joined 

with the AAR and the State of Illinois to begin development of a high-speed PTC 

project for the St. Louis-Chicago corridor. The project has now been integrated into 

the North American Joint PTC Program. AAR is contributing $20 million and providing project management. The Illinois Department of Transportation is providing 

over $12 million, and FRA is providing over $28 million as part of the Next Generation High Speed Rail Program (NGHSR). With funds in the FY 2002 appropriation, 

the $60 million project total estimate is now fully funded. Lockheed Martin, the System Development/Integration contractor, and program participants are finalizing 

software and beginning installation of hardware. The system is expected to be ready 

for revenue service by mid–2003. FRA is working with the project team regarding 

necessary safety approvals. The North American PTC Program is also the venue for 

the industry’s development of standards for PTC interoperability (further discussed 

below). 

Utilizing funds provided specifically for this purpose, FRA is also working with 

the Alaska Railroad to identify a migration path to PTC on their current rail lines, 

which are currently operated without the benefit of signal systems. 

Conceiving standards for interoperability. The RSAC also recognized that, were 

the various railroads to ‘‘go their own way’’ in designing PTC systems, the result 

would be either excessive cost (as various train control devices were placed on many 

locomotives) or limited functionality (with trains from one railroad running 

‘‘unequipped’’ on other railroads). This has always been a matter of concern for Amtrak and commuter authorities that operate on the lines of multiple railroads, but 

is of increasing concern today because of the freight railroads sharing of locomotives 

and the extensive networks of trackage and haulage rights conferred in connection 

with recent rail mergers in order to preserve competition. Accordingly, the North 

American Joint PTC Program has been selected as the venue for the industry’s development of standards for PTC interoperability. Interoperability refers to the ability 

of a train to move from one railroad to another (or from one type of train control 

system to another) at track speed while under continuous supervision of the train 

control systems. The North American Joint PTC Program has not completed the desired standards for interoperability, but work is underway including agreement on 

a flexible, modular approach to meet the needs of diverse railroad operations and 

establishment of a master database to standardize the messages transmitted by various PTC systems. Two industry task forces with participation from railroads, suppliers, and FRA are working to standardize the application of electronic devices 

aboard locomotives and the use of wireless communications by railroads, both critical to the ultimate success of PTC systems. 

Ensuring adequate radio frequency (RF) capacity. The RSAC recognized that RF 

data link technology would be the critical communications medium within PTC, particularly to connect trains with the wayside infrastructure and the central office. All 

across the national economy, greater and greater demands are being made on the 

inherently limited RF spectrum. During the late 1990s, the Federal Communications Commission conducted proceedings for ‘‘refarming’’ of assigned frequencies; 

and FRA supported rail industry requests to retain existing frequencies available 

for railroad voice and data communication free of interference from adjacent channels (with splitting of existing railroad channels to make better use of the assigned 

frequencies). These efforts were successful, and the industry and FRA continue to 

study whether existing RF capacity will be fully adequate for PTC and related safety and business requirements. In partnership with the industry Wireless Communications Task Force, FRA is sponsoring the establishment of a radio communications testbed at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado, to provide a means for objective, repeatable testing of the critical communications links 

which will be essential for widespread deployment of PTC systems as well as other 

railroad operations. 

Providing precise and secure positioning. The RSAC also recognized the importance of providing, as a public utility, a nationwide positioning service sufficiently 

precise to support PTC. In order to meet this need and other surface transportation 

requirements, FRA became the Federal program sponsor of the Nationwide Differential GPS (NDGPS) Program. This augmentation to the Global Positioning System 

(which uses a constellation of satellites to broadcast positioning information for military and civilian purposes) provides more precise positioning and continuous integrity monitoring in support of safety-of-life applications for surface transportation 

and other purposes. NDGPS effectively addresses limitations associated with uncorrected GPS signals and provides one-to-two-meter positioning accuracy. NDGPS is 

26

an expansion of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime DGPS network and makes use of 

decommissioned U.S. Air Force Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) sites to 

calculate and broadcast the differential correction signals. NDGPS is now operational with single-station coverage on about 85 percent of the land area of the U.S. 

To ensure continuity, accuracy, and reliability, NDGPS is managed and monitored 

24 hours a day, seven days a week from the Coast Guard’s Master Control Stations 

at Alexandria, Virginia, and Petaluma, California. NDGPS signals are available to 

any user who acquires the proper receiver. 

Requiring PTC where justified. FRA has authority under the former Signal Inspection Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20501–20505) to require installation of a signal or train control system where that is necessary in the public interest. This authority has been used by FRA and its predecessor agency (the ICC) to address specific needs primarily related to the safety of rail passenger service. In 1998, as a 

part of the preparations for enhanced service on the Northeast Corridor (NEC), FRA 

ordered Amtrak to implement the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 

(ACSES) on the NEC between Boston and New Haven and in high-speed territory 

south of New York City. ACSES, which was implemented beginning in October of 

2000, supplements the existing cab signal/automatic train control system on the 

NEC, providing full PTC functionality in support of operations up to150 mph. In 

late 2001, New Jersey Transit (NJT) began progressive implementation of an 

ACSES-compatible system on its property by activating the system on an initial line 

segment. 

ACSES and the NJT system are primarily overlays on traditional signal and train 

control technology, filling gaps that the older technologies cannot address. For instance, existing ATC systems cannot enforce a stop at a signal (although they can 

ensure that the train slows to 20 mph approaching the signal). Nor can ATC enforce 

permanent and temporary speed restrictions along the railroad related to curves, 

stations, bridges, and slow orders placed where track work is underway. ACSES and 

NJT’s compatible system address these needs using a train location system that consists of a transponder and on-board transponder interrogator and computer. While 

this approach does not appear to be preferred for cost and maintenance reasons outside the NEC, it is well suited to support high density passenger and freight operations within that territory, given the existing signal and train control infrastructure and the predominance of traffic that is limited to the NEC and immediately 

associated lines. 

In summary, a wide range of actions are being taken to deploy PTC, but much 

remains to be done. Although I am heartened that several freight railroads are exploring additional PTC technologies beyond those I have described in this statement, I am concerned that the industry’s commitment to interoperability of systems 

has not yet yielded comprehensive industry standards. Further, much of the electronic hardware now being deployed on locomotives for various purposes is not 

known to be forward-compatible with PTC—another objective recognized by the 

RSAC. I am troubled that the four major freight railroads are often unable to agree 

among themselves on relevant issues within industry councils, and I am also concerned that the fragility of Amtrak as a leader in the passenger field may inhibit 

its ability to progress technology. The reluctance of major suppliers to commit capital to system development, given the history of advanced train control systems, is 

a further cause for concern. 

Advanced train control providing PTC safety features was supposed to be the legacy of the 1990s, and so the future is overdue. We will continue to prepare the way 

for PTC deployment, chastened by the hard realities but also convinced that this 

technology will be essential for safety, security, and the economic and environmental 

health of the Nation as we progress through this first decade of the new millennium. 

Grade Crossing and Trespasser Safety 

Grade crossing and trespasser incidents account for about 95 percent of all deaths 

related to train operations. Yet FRA’s regulatory and enforcement authorities are 

of limited value in addressing these two areas. Significant improvements on these 

subjects are more likely to result from effective and intensive educational efforts directed at potential victims of these kinds of incidents, aggressive enforcement of 

state and local laws concerning motorist responsibilities at crossings and access to 

railroad property, funding for physical improvements that reduce the likelihood of 

mishaps, and productive research on technological solutions and behavioral factors. 

Substantial improvement of the grade crossing picture has occurred through just 

these sorts of methods. Grade crossing deaths were down 40 percent in 2001 from 

their level in 1990, even though exposure has risen due to increased highway and 

rail traffic. Operation Lifesaver, Inc., and similar educational initiatives have 

27

spread the message to motorists that ignoring grade crossing warning devices, 

whether passive or active, is flirting with disaster. FRA field forces, especially our 

Regional Grade Crossing Safety and Trespasser Prevention Managers and Assistant 

Managers, are actively engaged in these efforts in communities across the nation. 

We have worked with Operation Lifesaver on a variety of public service announcement campaigns designed to raise awareness. One example is the Albertsons/

FritoLay Rail Safety Contest that brought our safety message to 138 Albertsons 

Food Stores in the Pacific Northwest, including an announcement in the stores’ 

weekly circulars that reach 3.3 million people. We have also persuaded the entertainment media and advertisers to withdraw commercials or other portrayals of unsafe behavior around railroad tracks. FRA has long partnered with state and local 

law enforcement authorities to encourage their aggressive enforcement of highway 

laws related to crossings. We have three part-time regional law enforcement officers 

to promote our National Law Enforcement Liaison program, now in its third year. 

FRA worked with Operation Lifesaver in the production of a video aimed specifically at patrol officers and with state law enforcement training officials to develop 

a course on crossing safety and trespass issues. FHWA has been a partner of FRA 

and Operation Lifesaver in many of these efforts. 

Partnering with FMCSA, Operation Lifesaver, and trucking associations, FRA 

has made concerted efforts to educate the drivers of commercial vehicles on the importance of highway-rail grade crossing safety. FRA was instrumental in having Operation Lifesaver instruction included in the new driver training curriculum for 

Swift Trucking Company, one of the largest in the nation. This program will reach 

approximately 15,000 drivers each year. 

Relying primarily on Section 130 funding made available by FHWA, most states 

have gradually upgraded crossing warning devices, especially at the state’s most 

dangerous crossings. Since its inception in 1975, FHWA estimates the section 130 

program has been responsible for the construction of 30,000 active crossing warning 

devices that helped prevent more than 10,000 deaths and over 50,000 injuries. Of 

course, scores of thousands of crossings still have only passive warning devices, and 

collisions continue to occur at crossings with fully operational active warning devices 

where motorists disregard the warnings. Supplementary safety measures (e.g., traffic channelization devices or four-quadrant gate systems) that would prevent such 

behavior have generally not been installed. We work extensively with railroads and 

local communities to identify crossings suitable for closure because they are either 

redundant or no longer needed and to plan crossing improvements on a corridor 

basis rather than looking at each crossing in isolation. 

FRA’s regulatory authority can play some role. Our rule on maintenance, inspection, and testing of active warning devices (49 C.F.R. Part 234) helps ensure that 

those devices are fully operational and that railroads take proper precautions when 

the devices malfunction. We are working on a final rule on the use of train horns 

at crossings, attempting to achieve a risk-based balance between the need for the 

warning that the train horn provides (which protects drivers and train occupants) 

and the need for reasonable restrictions on train horn noise for the sake of residents 

near crossings. We are also working on a rule that would require a phased-in implementation of retroreflective markings on rail cars, which would help provide additional warning to motorists at night. 

Making safety gains in the trespasser area presents great challenges. Despite the 

daily work of very aggressive railroad police forces, the railroad system is simply 

too vast to prevent trespassing along its entire length. While detection systems can 

be designed to detect actions by trespassers with evil intentions, the people who are 

dying rarely are tampering with railroad equipment and structures. Instead, trespassers are often on railroad property because it is convenient as a route to their 

home, employment, or recreational destination or, sadly, in some cases, because they 

intend to take their own lives. To target the people most likely to trespass, we are 

conducting a pilot project to develop demographic information on railroad trespassers based on railroad police reports. We can use this information to design audience-specific educational campaigns and enforcement. 

FRA is funding a demonstration project in Pittsford, New York, that uses video 

cameras and motion sensors to detect trespassers on a railroad bridge. A verbal 

warning is issued to the trespassers, and the railroad and local law enforcement 

agency are notified as necessary. This installation has already proved effective when 

two teenagers were warned to get off the bridge and a train arrived one minute 

later. FRA is also working with Operation Lifesaver, Transport Canada, and Direction 2006 (Canada’s crossing safety and trespass prevention coalition) to provide 

a simple, easy-to-use, problem solving methodology to enable communities to effectively address trespassing issues. 

28

Railroad Security 

Security is a critical part of railroad safety. The events of September 11 focused 

FRA’s attention on the need to address whatever security vulnerabilities may exist 

in the railroad system. Under AAR leadership, the rail industry has conducted its 

own assessment of those risks. FRA has retained a contractor to review AAR’s work, 

which will help us to decide what action FRA may need to take in this area. We 

would, of course, coordinate any such action with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the new administration within the Department that has overall 

responsibility for transportation security among all modes of transportation, including rail and transit lines, and with the Department of Homeland Security, once it 

is established. Meanwhile, the increased awareness of security issues will cause us 

to bring such issues into sharper focus in our rulemaking projects. For example, 

threats to security that might prevent the proper functioning of a PTC system will 

need to be considered. 

Furthermore, FRA is working in partnership with the FTA to assess the security 

of commuter railroads. FRA and FTA are jointly funding security risk assessments 

on the ten largest commuter railroad systems. FRA is also funding a similar security risk assessment for Amtrak. These security risk assessments are intend to identify potential security risks and appropriate security enhancements to mitigate 

those risks. We will also coordinate these efforts with TSA. 

The Administration’s Rail Safety Reauthorization Proposal 

The Secretary has just recently transmitted to Congress the Administration’s proposal for reauthorization of the railroad safety program. Authorization for the program expired at the end of fiscal year 1998. Our proposed legislation would reauthorize this important safety mission for four years. The bill proposes other measures that would significantly advance railroad safety, primarily by enhancing the 

Secretary’s authority to gather information that will help to assess and reduce or 

offset hazards at highway-rail crossings. The bill would also underscore the Secretary of Transportation’s duty, when issuing rail safety regulations or orders that 

affect the security of railroad operations, to consult the Secretary of the department 

having responsibility for transportation security under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act if those responsibilities are transferred outside of the Department of Transportation. 

The bill seeks to prevent highway-rail grade crossing collisions, which, as discussed above, cause about half of all rail-related deaths each year. The bill proposes 

a measure that would improve the Department’s National Crossing Inventory (Inventory), a large computerized database containing vital safety information on the 

identification, location, physical characteristics, and other salient features of atgrade and grade-separated highway-rail crossings nationwide. The Department, as 

custodian of the Inventory, acts as a clearing house by combining the data supplied 

by both railroads and states into a uniform database. Many states rely upon this 

Inventory in making decisions about which crossings need better warning systems. 

As the only nationwide database that contains the characteristics of crossings, the 

Inventory is used extensively by the Department, states, railroads, and researchers 

for crossing safety studies. Currently, reporting to the Inventory by both states and 

railroads is voluntary; some information is missing, and some is very outdated. The 

bill would require that railroads and states make initial reports to the Inventory 

about new and previously unreported crossings and provide periodic updates for all 

crossings, so that the crossings can be accurately ranked according to risk. These 

improved rankings will assist states in identifying which of the crossings are the 

most hazardous and in channeling Federal safety improvement funds to the most 

hazardous crossings first. 

Other highlights of the bill include provisions that would make other necessary 

enhancements to FRA’s delegated inspection and rulemaking authority. For example, one section would permit FRA inspectors to monitor a railroad’s radio communications outside the presence of the railroad’s personnel for accident investigation 

and accident prevention purposes, and to use the information received for such purposes except for release to a railroad carrier or as direct evidence of railroad safety 

violations. Another section would allow FRA, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to regulate noise emissions from the 

right of way due to the passage of a high-speed train at more than 150 miles per 

hour. 

Enactment of the Administration’s proposed bill would support FRA’s efforts to 

address security threats to railroad operations, to reduce collisions at highway-rail 

crossings, and generally to reduce casualties and damages associated with railroad 

operations. 

29

Conclusion 

The recent railroad accidents of concern to the Committee must be fully examined 

for any lessons they can teach about future accident prevention. However, those accidents are not an indication of fundamental safety deficiencies in the railroad industry. While certain problem areas require concerted attention, the overall industry safety record is generally very positive, and FRA and its many safety partners 

work daily to make it more so.

30


710rut01.eps
31

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Rutter, and thank you for testifying, and Ms. Blakey, thank you for testifying. 

Either one, on this first question. Ms. Blakey, you pointed out 

that there had been a number of recommendations, 50 or so open 

NTSB recommendations that are related to rail safety, significant 

ones, have not been implemented. I note in the proposed safety reauthorization bill the administration has presented, Mr. Rutter, 

that two of the issues that a number of people think are very important, and Ms. Blakey certainly referred to one with regard to 

the positive train control system, the PTC, and the issue of fatigue, 

that neither one of those seems to be, in my glancing at the reauthorization bill, even mentioned in the reauthorization bill. 

The positive train control technology has been around since the 

1990’s, and yet you have a proposed reauthorization safety bill that 

doesn’t even talk about it. How long do we have to wait until technology that is already out there is going to be incorporated in recommendations regarding safety? Ms. Blakey says that it is probably the most important single thing that can be done related to 


710rut02.eps
32

head-on collisions between trains, and yet the reauthorization safety bill does not even mention it. 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, those are two issues, and I will discuss them 

separately. First, with regard to positive train control, without 

mentioning that in the reauthorization bill that we have before us, 

we have been making and continue to make investments and 

progress in putting systems in place that can actually work and 

achieve the promise that I think the NTSB believes those systems 

can achieve. 

Senator BREAUX. What does that mean? Ms. Blakey said there is 

no industry plans for positive train control systems at all, and the 

administration does not call for it in your legislation. You are giving me an answer that does not seem to be reflective of the real 

world. 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, the real world is, we have invested significant 

amounts of money, and are investing right now, in working pilot 

projects to demonstrate how these systems can work in practical 

real world applications, specifically, Illinois. We, the State of Illinois, the Association of American Railroads, and Amtrak have all 

invested in excess of $60 million to put together an advanced positive train control system on a segment of the Union Pacific rail line 

between Chicago and St. Louis that will demonstrate how positive 

train control systems can actually work and will find out ways of 

making sure we can develop interoperability standards so that we 

can come up with overall architectures, so the different systems 

can be provided by suppliers to make these systems work for different carriers. 

Senator BREAUX. The point I am making is that I perceive that 

it sounds like you are in a testing mode. How long has the positive 

train control system been on the recommendation list of the NTSB, 

how many years? Since 1990. 

Ms. BLAKEY. 12 years now. 

Senator BREAUX. 12 years, and yet I get from you that you have 

started looking at it and testing it, and they have been recommending it for 12 years, and yet your bill does not even mention 

the word. 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, that is in large part because we are in the 

process of making sure that these systems can actually work. While 

there are different elements of technology that make positive train 

control possible, integrating all of these technologies into a practical working system is essential. There is not an off-the-shelf system that can deliver the entire gamut of positive train control solutions. That is what we are trying to put in place so that we can, 

by making those happen, demonstrate the lessons that can be 

learned and then applied toward wider spread distribution of those 

systems throughout the industry. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, my own thought is that you are way too 

late on the recommendations. Ms. Blakey says it has been around 

for 12 years, and there is not even a recommendation in the authorization bill that addresses this. 

The only other point I would make is that in my reading of the 

reauthorization bill, the NTSB has been recommending we address 

fatigue more seriously. There is an example of fatigue right there. 

33

I do not see anything in the reauthorization bill that specifically 

tries to address the question of fatigue among railroad engineers, 

and why is that not there? 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, that was a conscious decision. Previous approaches or attempts to get a rail safety reauthorization bill that 

had been made by the administration in prior years, two years, 

both 1998 and 1999, involved a fatigue management plan and program. The whole issue of hours of service and fatigue management 

gets to the heart of what it is to work. How often do you show up, 

how often are you scheduled, how long may you work, how often 

may you go to work? 

Because those questions are that fundamental, there has been an 

inability for both rail labor and management to agree on what the 

best solution is, and therefore all previous rail safety initiatives 

have bogged down on those issues. It was our intention to try to 

get a reauthorization of our basic rail safety program, which has 

been in place since the agency existed in 1970. In the interest of 

getting the basic structure of our rail safety program implemented, 

we had wanted to get something that would not be associated with 

that kind of controversy. 

That being said, we continue to push for fatigue management 

plans throughout the industry, and are very encouraged by work/

rest agreements that have been entered into through the collective 

bargaining process by both rail labor, both specifically UTU and 

BLE, and rail management. Unfortunately, though, while both the 

supervisors and managers of both rail labor and management have 

agreed to that, actually putting those agreements in place at the 

local level has proven more troublesome, or more problematic. 

We continue to push toward those voluntary collective bargaining 

agreements that will reach better scheduling, more regular scheduling, and get to the point where fatigue management plans, more 

than just regulation of hours of service, are an integral part of both 

how employees go and do their jobs and how rail management supervises those jobs. 

Senator BREAUX. I appreciate that, and my time is up, but it 

seems to me that what you are basically saying is because it is controversial we did not want to touch it. It is not in the bill as a result of that, and the two biggest recommendations, something on 

fatigue and on positive train control, neither one of those important 

issues are touched in the reauthorization recommendations on safety. I find that very deficient. 

Senator Hollings. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With respect to the airport and airways improvement fund, providing some $14 billion, we are still shy $1.1 billion in this fiscal 

year that had to come from general revenues, so with respect to 

subsidy, let us say we subsidize the airlines $1.1 billion in this regard, whereas we only appropriated some $521 million to the rails, 

so that is double the amount of subsidy there. Otherwise the $15 

billion was all emergency, without any fees. 

So I make the point again and again that we have this pennyante nit picking auditing, making requirements and knowing that 

the predictions are not going to work. There is no fortune teller 

necessary to realize it is not going to work. It has been a disaster 

34

for 30 years, specifically when you say, Ms. Blakey you said safety 

recommendations that were not implemented. Can you flesh that 

out for the Committee? Some of them you say for a decade have 

been made, safety recommendations for a decade, and still yet to 

be implemented. Tell the Committee. Give us a general picture. 

Ms. BLAKEY. When you have over 40 recommendations open to 

the Federal Railroad Administration, and many of these are also 

open to the railroads as well, there is a complex group out there. 

Just to give you the broad picture, positive train control, as I say, 

is the most important one, because it very much speaks to Chairman Breaux’s point about fatigue, and also about human error. 

No matter what we do in this system, people are going to make 

mistakes, and if we have positive train control out there we have 

a technology that prevents those collisions, and it is critical, and 

that has been open for 12 years. 

We also have a number of open recommendations on the issue of 

fatigue across all modes of transportation. We do understand the 

progress that is being made in terms of fatigue management plans. 

We really do get that this is a complex labor management issue. 

At the same time, the hours of service regulations are antiquated. 

They do need to be governed by a more scientifically based approach, and those regulations do need to be revised. 

Finally, I would simply mention track-related issues, because 

there are a number of issues that go to the way the railroads are 

managing their track, issues such as plugs, for example. When you 

put in a temporary plug to repair a track, that needs to be monitored closely and replaced with permanent track quickly. We have 

had accidents that could have been prevented if they had been on 

top of this, and certainly on top of inspections, particularly on those 

routes that are carrying high passenger traffic and that are carrying hazardous materials. We think those deserve a greater degree of inspection and oversight. 

So that gives you some idea of the issues that we see out there 

at this point. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on the track-related accidents, or the plugs 

you talk of, it comes to mind that there are some 22,000 miles of 

track, and the Federal only has about 750 of that, the freight rails 

own and control, some 21,000. Are we on top of that? Who is responsible? Is Amtrak responsible for that track, generally speaking, 

or is the freight companies? When the plug is not administered 

properly and safeguarded, who do you go after? 

Ms. BLAKEY. In those cases, that track is owned by the freight 

railroads, and they are the ones responsible for it, with oversight 

from the Federal Railroad Administration. 

The CHAIRMAN. How is that happening? You say most of them 

are track-related accidents. It seems like we have got to have a better system for getting on those freight railroads. Would you not 

agree? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I would agree that certainly there needs to be a 

greater degree of attention paid to the track problems we have 

across the country. A lot of that is with the freight railroads. I 

think we also need to have a high degree of scrutiny from Federal 

inspectors, particularly in those areas where, we have got the 

greatest risk. 

35

The CHAIRMAN. What about the terminals themselves like Penn 

Central? Everybody is talking about the two that we unfortunately 

lost at the air counter out there in Los Angeles. It happened in the 

last several months, twice into Penn Central a terrorist could have 

gotten way more walking into Penn Central and wandering into 

the air terminal. They are talking about putting them out on the 

sidewalk and all. 

What about the terminals? Do you figure your folks are responsible for terminal safety as well as track safety? 

Ms. BLAKEY. The embarkation and de-embarkation points are 

critical, and some of our recommendations do go to issues of the 

stations and how that is handled from time to time. We do not 

have any current recommendations that are speaking to Penn Central particularly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have some recommendations? Who is 

in charge? Let us assume the counter at the Penn Central Station, 

two people are shot there instead of out at the airline terminal, 

then who would I come to and fix the responsibility for safety violations, if there were any? 

Ms. BLAKEY. The new Transportation Security Administration 

has oversight from a security standpoint for the rail area, as well 

as all of the other areas of transportation. 

The CHAIRMAN. You do not? 

Ms. BLAKEY. We do not. We really look at safety as a pure issue, 

and when it gets to security, if there is criminal intent involved it 

is usually the FBI working with the Transportation Security Administration to fix it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we passed rail safety legislaton before 

Christmas, and it has yet to be called for consideration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the record, the $1.45 billion for the subsidy for the airlines, which is $6 million 

passengers, works out to $2.30 per passenger. Under the Hollings 

bill proposal it would be $190 per passenger. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not enough. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. I certainly understand that philosophy. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. That is one reason why you sit over there and 

I sit over here, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rutter, I want to ask you some really important questions 

here, because the last hearing we had on the whole issue of the future of Amtrak was very unclear to all of us. Amtrak received $100 

million from the administration on July 3 and will need additional 

money to keep it operating through September, is that correct? 

Mr. RUTTER. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you know how much more money it needs? 

Mr. RUTTER. We will be coming to the Congress in a matter of 

days. We promised to do that jointly with Amtrak under the terms 

of the loan agreement that was entered into last week and request 

up to $170 million. 

Senator MCCAIN. And that would just be through September? 

36

Mr. RUTTER. Through the end of September, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Another $170 million, roughly? 

Mr. RUTTER. Up to that amount. Mr. Gunn, when he is up here, 

can probably explain a little better what he believes Amtrak might 

actually need out of that. The target of $170 million is pretty much 

where Amtrak’s auditors have said that they would be looking to 

demonstrate a going concern. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you know why Amtrak was not able to—and that comes to $270 million—to get it right away, in total? 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, in large part, we were able to do $100 million 

on our own because that is what we believed we had legal authority to do under the current RIFF program, which is capital-specific. 

The more we looked at it, the more we were bound to fund capital 

projects on a going-forward basis, not those looking back. 

We will be coming to the Congress, as I said, in a matter of days 

with a proposal to give us the legal authority to make a loan in 

the amount to get up to that $170 million, so that it can be clear 

that we can finish that job, but as the Secretary said, the administration does not have legal authority to do that on its own. 

Senator MCCAIN. The conditions of the loan require Amtrak to 

immediately stop all work on projects to expand service, but the 

terms of the agreement state that this requirement does not apply 

where Amtrak is obligated by an existing contract, and I note that 

Amtrak plans to use about $11 million on its high speed rail 

projects and another $5.1 million for Las Vegas infrastructure improvements, even though it does not currently serve Las Vegas. 

Do you know how many commitments that Amtrak has made in 

the total exposure, and I ask this in the context that we have got 

a terrific problem of safety of tunnels in the Northeast? Do you see 

my point, the reason why I am concerned here? 

Mr. RUTTER. Yes, sir, and I will be happy to get back to you on 

the full extent of how many of those capital projects are subject to 

contractual arrangements. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could you submit that for the record? 

Mr. RUTTER. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. It seems to me we have got like $1 billion in 

possible expenditures just to take care of the tunnels in the Northeast and make sure that they are safe, is that not correct? 

Mr. RUTTER. Those are some of the estimates that have come out 

of the IG’s office. It is for that reason that when Congress gave us 

that first $100 million, we were concerned to make sure that those 

dollars went to projects that could be completed and demonstrate 

safety benefits at the conclusion of those investments, as opposed 

to getting started on a down payment toward a full $900 million 

system. 

Senator MCCAIN. I understand that, but if you have got a situation where you have not even started rail service, and you have got 

that contrasted with a situation where you have tunnels that have 

been judged potentially disastrous situations, should there not be 

some rearrangement of priorities here? 

Mr. RUTTER. That is one of the reasons why we have been so focused on making sure that those investments on the tunnels happen as Congress intended them to do, and those dollars be set aside 

specifically for those uses. 

37

On the issue of the Las Vegas service, I will be happy to get back 

to the committee on the record as to the nature of those contracts 

that Amtrak believes it is bound by, and what those investments 

are going toward, because it involves not only Amtrak but the 

owner of that infrastructure. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Transportation believes that its information on the specific 

commitments may be incomplete since Amtrak does not, as a routine matter, provide the Department with copies of these agreements. Amtrak is still working on 

which of its projects will need DOT approval under the terms of the loan agreement. 

In particular, Amtrak has not shared with us any conclusions about the Las Vegas 

project to date. I wish, therefore, to defer the response to this question until I have 

had an opportunity to compare FRA’s current information with that of Amtrak. 

The high-speed rail project-related activities funded under the loan agreement involve a number of existing and well-established infrastructure improvements to the 

Northeast Corridor and do not expand the existing scope of Amtrak’s high-speed operations. With regard to Amtrak’s involvement in high-speed rail efforts outside the 

Northeast Corridor, Secretary Mineta was very clear in his statement on the future 

of passenger rail service that there is a need to de-link the future of passenger rail 

currently provided by Amtrak from State-based efforts to develop highspeed rail on 

selected intercity corridors. The latter is more appropriately addressed by establishing a long-term partnership between the States and the Federal Government to 

support improved intercity passenger rail service.

Senator MCCAIN. My time is about to expire, but it seems to me 

that we had better establish some priorities here, and I think it is 

pretty clear what some of those priorities are. I say that as a person who does not represent the Northeast, but there are some very 

serious situations that have been identified since September 11, 

and I would think that would get some priority. 

My time is about to expire, but the loan agreements suggest Amtrak is prohibited from incurring additional debt while the loan is 

outstanding, correct? 

Mr. RUTTER. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Yet it states that Amtrak may incur indebtedness in connection with the purchase of assets used in the ordinary 

course of business. I assume this could cover passenger equipment, 

locomotives, or just about anything else needed to run trains and 

stations. What protections does this provision really provide, then? 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, we were mainly concerned Amtrak would not 

enter into additional debt agreements to provide for operating capital. We wanted to control things like the Penn Station financing 

that happened last summer. 

Senator MCCAIN. Finally, how soon can we expect Amtrak reform 

legislation from the administration? 

Mr. RUTTER. Most of those reforms we are looking at in two 

tranches. The first is what can be done in the fiscal year 2003 appropriations cycle. If Congress is contemplating spending up to $1.2 

billion for Amtrak, those dollars should be accompanied by a series 

of reforms to address the fundamental issues that have gotten Amtrak to the financially troubled status that it is in. We hope to have 

specifics on those reforms that we will be seeking in fiscal year 

2003 in a week or so, because frankly the appropriators will be 

marking up their bills in that kind of timeframe. 

As for longer term reauthorization, right now we are focused on 

those first two immediate needs, how to finish the job that we 

started with the $100 million, and then what to do about getting 

38

a fiscal year 2003 appropriation that accomplishes some of the 

movement toward the vision for passenger rail that the Secretary 

has outlined. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may say that I am a 

little concerned about the lack of specificity of the proposals, because if we just leave it to the Appropriations Committee again we 

bypass the authorizing committees, but I hope that we can have 

some reform proposals soon so that they can be considered by all 

Members. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Senator. 

I have just one follow question for Ms. Blakey and Mr. Rutter. 

We have worked on port security legislation requiring every port 

to have a security plan which specifically addresses security concerns at each individual port, coordinated by the Coast Guard with 

other people being involved. 

Mr. Rutter, your testimony indicates one of the greatest increases in loss of life and accidents have been individuals who are 

illegally within the terminal facilities of railroads, or Ms. Blakey, 

maybe you pointed it out, one of you did, about the accidents that 

occur with people who should not be there. I am concerned that the 

potential for terrorist activities within these terminal facilities taking over a train. Do we need a security plan for railroad terminals 

and operations like we have for port facilities? Can either of you 

comment on that? 

Mr. RUTTER. Well, the FRA, working in conjunction with the 

Transportation Security Administration, is currently in the final 

stages of a review of a security assessment that has been prepared 

by the Nation’s railroads themselves to try to adopt security measures, or ensure that security measures are taken, where the most 

vulnerabilities exist. Certainly, on the passenger side, terminals 

and places where many passengers are pose some threats, or at 

least some potential for risk, and we are working with owners and 

operators of those facilities, most of which are public entities, and 

we are working in concert with the Federal Transit Administration 

to develop standards for making sure that those open facilities are 

protected as much as possible. 

Senator BREAUX. Ms. Blakey, do you think that is sufficient? 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, there are over 500 deaths a year, and that is 

500 people where they should not have been, certainly, and a significant number were in the terminals. The AAR has briefed us on 

their planning and security. I think that the effort that they made 

is impressive. That said, I do not have the specifics at this point 

on the terminal security arrangements and would certainly like to 

know more about that. 

Senator BREAUX. I thank both of you. If we have follow questions, Ms. Blakey, Mr. Rutter, we will be back in communication 

with you. Thank you. 

I would like to welcome up our next panel of witnesses and ask 

them to take their place at the witness table. Mr. David Gunn, 

president and CEO of Amtrak, Mr. Ed Hamberger, president and 

CEO, Association of American Railroads, and Mr. Don Hahs, international president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. 

39

Gentlemen, we welcome you, and we are pleased to have you appear before the Committee, and Mr. Gunn, we have you listed first. 

If you would like to go ahead and begin, we would be pleased to 

take your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID GUNN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION 

Mr. GUNN. Good morning, and thank you for inviting me here 

today. I have been in the railroad business for nearly 40 years, and 

the number 1 priority has always been safety wherever I have 

worked, safety for the passengers, employees, for the trains and facilities, and my view is, if a railroad is not safe, it should not be 

in business. 

In the interest of time, I would like to submit my formal statement which details a number of important safety statistics and 

highlights some of the initiatives we have taken to provide a safe 

operating environment at Amtrak, and submit that for the record. 

Then, having said that, I would like to make a few brief comments 

on my approach to running Amtrak. 

Notwithstanding the recent tragedy in Florida involving the Auto 

Train and other well-publicized incidents, there are a number of 

basic indicators that suggest Amtrak is maintaining a high level of 

rail safety. Comparing the year-to-date data for fiscal 2002 in the 

same period for 2001, we have achieved a 22 percent reduction in 

passenger injuries and 11 percent reduction in employee injuries, 

20 percent fewer grade crossing accidents, and about 7 percent 

fewer operating rule infractions. 

As you know, I have been on the job less than 2 months, but I 

do believe that Amtrak is a safe operation, and that its employees 

are dedicated to safety, and I base this not just on statistics, but 

many hours that I have spent out on the railroad riding trains 

meeting and talking to employees, and my sense is that there is 

a really professional work force that is well-trained and dedicated 

to doing the job properly. 

In April, we did see an increase in operating rule infractions, 

which is unacceptable. In response to this increase, our safety department organized nearly 10,000 efficiency tests on nearly 2,900 

engineers, conductors, train dispatchers, and block operators on 17 

safety-critical operating procedures. These activities were done in 

conjunction with representatives from the FRA and host railroads, 

and were performed around the clock in many locations across the 

country. 

The monthly average of operating infractions last year was 14. 

This year, the monthly average is 12. During the month of June, 

we reduced the number of operating rule infractions to 11, but we 

are still working hard to bring that number down even lower. 

Let me now speak for a few moments on my approach and our 

priorities for running this company. I have run larger organizations 

than Amtrak that were in trouble, but I do not recall in nearly 40 

years of service taking the reins of a company with such immediate 

and significant problems. That said, Amtrak will improve its performance. 

Now, my permanent home is on Cape Breton Island in Nova Scotia, and I do get newspapers out of Halifax and Toronto. I do not 

40

get the American papers when I am home, and even with just that 

source of information I knew last summer that Amtrak was in deep 

trouble. When you have to mortgage a busy station just to make 

payroll, you are only a step or two away from financial disaster. 

I mention this only because I want you to know that I accepted 

this job with my eyes open. I knew we faced serious problems, 

maybe not as serious as they are, but I knew they were there. Unfortunately, the plant and equipment for the most part suffers from 

years of neglect. Deferrals of maintenance and elimination of heavy 

overhauls to meet budgetary goals has resulted in a multitude of 

problems. 

In addition, we have nearly 100 cars and locomotives in heavy 

wreck or repair status, the majority of which are our newer cars 

used on long distance trains. With a fleet of 1,500 cars, that means 

approximately 1 in 15 cars are out of service, and some of which 

have been so since the early nineties, and this is unacceptable, and 

it must change. It is having a significant impact on our ability to 

serve our customers. 

I have some very basic core beliefs about the railroad business, 

particularly in the operation of passenger service. First, I cannot 

imagine a country such as ours without a national passenger railroad system. Second, no passenger rail system in the world operates without some form of Government investment. We should not 

fool ourselves into thinking that Amtrak is somehow different than 

every other system around the world. This means Amtrak will a) 

never be profitable, and b) it will always need, just like every other 

mode of transportation, some form of public investment or subsidy. 

Right now, the most important thing I can do for Amtrak and for 

our partners and for you is to bring stability to our operations. 

That is my basic, overarching goal for the next 15 months, and to 

do this, I will go back to basics. First, we will establish a very 

straightforward, transparent, understandable, zero-based budget 

process to set goals and control expenses. We will streamline the 

corporate structure. It will be leaner, and it will look more like a 

railroad, thus reducing overhead and establishing clear lines of authority and responsibility, i.e., you get accountability. 

We intend to repair and overhaul as much equipment as we can 

within budget constraints to support our national system. We will 

make critically needed capital investments on existing infrastructure, our infrastructure. We will build a strong management team, 

and I will not rely on outside consultants. Everything we do will 

be to improve and strengthen or bring efficiencies to what we operate today. I will not take on any new growth or activities that do 

not serve this and/or which increase our deficit. 

Let me say a few words about our recent agreement with the administration to secure a $100 million loan. First, I want to compliment the Secretary, the DOT Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, Michael Jackson and FRA Administrator Allan Rutter, who 

negotiated in good faith and worked closely with us in bringing 

about this loan. As you know, our forecasts indicate that we will 

have a $205 million cash shortfall by the end of this fiscal year. As 

you also know, I believe, Amtrak had planned a line of credit of 

$270 million for this period. In other words, the line would be 270, 

the drawdown would be 205. Those are the two numbers. 

41

Unfortunately, the inability for us to secure a final audit—in 

other words, we had trouble closing our books—prevented access to 

this line of credit and resulted in the threat of a shutdown due to 

a lack of cash by mid–July. With virtually all internal remedies exhausted, we asked the DOT for their help in securing, either 

through a supplemental appropriation, a loan, or a loan guarantee, 

the $205 million needed to get through 2002. As you know, after 

many hours of negotiation, we received a $100 million loan with a 

series of contingencies attached to it, and which basically required 

us to have a more aggressive approach to finding additional and 

meaningful savings. The $100-million loan is enough to keep the trains running 

through early August. The best solution at this time would be to 

receive the $205 million in the form of a supplemental appropriation, which would reduce the amount of debt that we are incurring, 

and would pay back the loan of $100 million once the fiscal 2003 

funding levels are set. In any event, I want to reinforce that the 

$100 million we received will not be enough to get us through to 

the rest of the fiscal year. 

One of the most unfortunate effects of Amtrak’s cash crisis is the 

effect this has on our commuter and State partners. While this is 

clearly a difficult and agonizing process for us at Amtrak, the situation is particularly painful for the States and organizations, some 

of whom have paid us in advance for Amtrak to be a reliable operating partner. I am going to have to work hard to mend fences. 

Let me conclude by saying that while all our focus has been to 

resolve the immediate short-term cash crisis, we have begun the 

fiscal 2003 budget process, and to that end I cannot emphasize how 

important it is for Congress to fully fund Amtrak’s $1.2 billion request for fiscal 2003. Keep in mind that the first thing we will have 

to do when we get that money back is to pay back any loans. This 

level of funding will allow us to begin the work that I have outlined 

in my testimony and start to rebuild the railroad. 

Finally, I want to assure you we will look at every route and 

service we operate to improve efficiencies and cost recovery. While 

it is true that most of our trains lose money and many always will, 

I have every belief that they can be run more efficiently and there 

are opportunities for cost reduction. I believe that it is a much 

more achievable and realistic goal, i.e., cost reduction, than the 

goal of pursuing self-sufficiency. 

It is my hope that Congress, the administration, and Amtrak will 

grapple with and hopefully come to closure on some of the larger 

fundamental issues that we need to resolve about the level of rail 

passenger service and how we pay for it. Unless or until that occurs, we will always be living on the edge. Therefore, I reiterate 

the importance of our budget request of $1.2 billion for next year, 

and to begin the work to resolve these larger fundamental questions. It is my belief you will see significant, positive changes in the 

year ahead, better equipment, investment in infrastructure, a leaner organization, and an open, straightforward approach. 

As I told the subcommittee a few weeks ago, we will build a better railroad, and happily leave the politics to you. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gunn follows:]

42

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID GUNN, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear here today. My name is David Gunn, and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). I have extensive experience in the rail industry, spanning over 38 years. In this business, you 

have to be committed, everyday and in everyway, to safety. At Amtrak, the safety 

of our passengers, employees and communities that we travel through is of the utmost importance. If you are not committed to safety, you have no business running 

trains. 

In my testimony this morning, I’d like to give you some context and insights into 

Amtrak’s safety programs, our record and our major concerns. 

To begin with, I want to emphasize that the safety of all passengers, employees, 

trains and facilities is our number one priority. As the operator of our national passenger rail system, Amtrak has a strong safety record. But of course, when it comes 

to safety, one must never be satisfied with the status quo. That’s why we are constantly studying every aspect and taking every step that’s necessary and feasible 

to ensure greater safety. 

As you know, the railroads in this country were originally financed and built primarily by private interests, and for the most part these companies retained ownership of the tracks when Amtrak was created in 1971. Today about 97% of Amtrak’s 

22,000-mile system—and about half of our daily trains—is operated over tracks that 

are owned and maintained by private freight railroads. Amtrak owns about 730 

route miles of railroad, primarily between Boston and Washington, DC, and some 

in Michigan. Across the rest of the country, we rely heavily on our partners in the 

freight and commuter railroads to provide a safe operating environment. 

Notwithstanding the recent tragedy in Florida involving our Auto Train and other 

well-publicized incidents, there are a number of basic indicators that tell me that 

Amtrak is maintaining a high-level of rail safety. Comparing the first eight months 

of FY’02 to the same period in 2001, we have achieved a 22% reduction in passenger 

injuries . . . a 11% reduction in employee injuries . . . 20% fewer grade-crossing 

incidents . . . and about 7% fewer operating rule infractions. 

These are encouraging numbers and trends. But as I said, we can and must do 

better. Amtrak and its industry partners are constantly seeking ways to improve 

our safety performance. 

As we look at operating rule infractions, they tend to fall into two categories: 

those that occur in fixed facilities like stations, yards and shops, and those that 

occur on the main lines. The majority of Amtrak’s operating rule infractions occur 

in yard-related equipment moves and involve violations of procedures such as running through improperly lined hand switches in a yard, failing to stop short of an 

obstruction in a yard, or failing to secure equipment properly. These are minor infractions, but they have the potential to cause serious problems, so we focus a great 

deal of energy on preventing them. 

We measure and report these infractions on a monthly basis, and if you look at 

the last three years, there has been steady improvement. For example, if you compare the first nine months of this year to the same period in previous years, you’ll 

find that operating rule infractions dropped from 123 in FY 2000, to 118 in FY ‘01, 

to 110 this year. The monthly average for the entire year in the last two years was 

just shy of 14, and the average so far this year has been about 12. 

Despite our overall record of improvement, in April of this year we recorded an 

increase in operating rule infractions, which was unacceptable. In response to this 

increase, our Chief Operations Officer organized a national operating rules awareness blitz for transportation department employees in May. Field supervisors conducted nearly 10,500 efficiency tests on nearly 2,900 engineers, conductors, train 

dispatchers and block operators on 17 safety-critical operating procedures. These activities were done in conjunction with representatives from the FRA and host railroads, and were performed around the clock in many locations across our system 

for a solid week. The safe operation of our trains whether they be in yards or on 

the mainline is one of our management goals. 

In the month of June, we reduced the number of operating rule infractions to 11. 

But we’re still working hard to bring that number down even further. In the month 

of June, we conducted a similar blitz for mechanical department employees, and in 

July, we will do a blitz in the engineering department. We will continue to remain 

vigilant in all areas of our operation to reduce operating rule infractions. 

In an effort to prevent grade crossing accidents, Amtrak and the rest of the railroad industry participate in public education and enforcement campaigns through 

Operation Lifesaver. This program, now entering its 30th year and reaching 49 

43

states, is a joint effort of the Railway Progress Institute, Amtrak and the freight 

railroad industry, and it has assisted in achieving a 70% reduction in grade crossing 

fatalities since 1972. 

Mainline passenger derailments occur infrequently, but of course we are very concerned about them because they can result in serious injuries and deaths. For example, the Auto Train derailment in Crescent City, Florida, on April 18 claimed the 

lives of 4 people and injured 150. All of us at Amtrak extend our deepest sympathies 

to the families of those who were lost and injured. The cause of this derailment is 

still under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board. What I can 

say, though, is that train travel is a very safe mode of transportation, and we will 

not rest as long as there are opportunities to improve our performance. 

Moving to another issue of concern, train crew fatigue is one of the most difficult 

challenges facing the entire railroad industry. Amtrak is governed by—and adheres 

strictly to—guidelines set by Congress on train crew hours of service. Fortunately, 

Amtrak runs a scheduled system with scheduled relief days, which allows employees 

to adequately manage their lives to avoid fatigue. In addition, Amtrak provides fatigue-prevention education to all locomotive engineers as part of their initial certification training, and again when they seek re-certification. Working with the freight 

railroads, the AAR, the FRA, and our rail labor unions through the North American 

Rail Alertness Partnership (NARAP), we are exploring ways to go further in mitigating and preventing fatigue. 

In our constant efforts to improve safety and reliability, Amtrak employs various 

train control systems. For example, all Amtrak-owned main lines have highly reliable systems that automatically apply a train’s brakes if the engineer fails to respond to a signal change. On the Northeast Corridor, we are phasing in an Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, called ACSES, which will enforce stops at 

interlockings and control points, as well as all FRA speed limits. We have just instituted a similar system on our Michigan line, enabling the first significant increase 

in sustained passenger rail speeds above 79 miles per hour outside the Northeast 

in 20 years. Amtrak is also involved in the North American Joint Positive Train 

Control Project, in which the entire industry is looking for a practical, cost-effective 

way to provide positive train control on rail lines where it is deemed appropriate. 

A demonstration project is soon to be implemented on Union Pacific trackage in Illinois, with major participation from the Illinois DOT, FRA and AAR. 

Let me briefly raise another issue that I believe bears strongly on the safety of 

our Northeast Corridor Operations. Some have suggested that Amtrak’s role on the 

Northeast Corridor be limited to operations and that maintenance and dispatching 

be done by another entity much like the recent reorganization of the British Rail 

in England. I believe this would pose serious safety concerns. Amtrak currently has 

the strongest incentive to ensure that the Northeast Corridor rail line is adequately 

maintained for high-speed rail operations—because it runs the trains! Indeed, Amtrak is the only operator of high-speed rail on the Northeast Corridor and has the 

only work force trained to maintain tracks for speeds up to 150 mph. Its operations 

and engineering employees report through the same organization, ensuring the communications and common budget that is essential to safe operations. These employees operate and maintain the nation’s only high-speed service and do an extremely 

good job. 

Amtrak also currently works very closely with the commuter railroads and freight 

lines that operate on the Northeast Corridor to ensure that the corridor is safe, reliable and adequately maintained. The safety record of the NEC is unparalleled. We 

manage to cooperatively dispatch a rail line with hundreds of daily trains—some 

850 commuter and Amtrak trains operate through Penn Station in New York every 

day! We’ve been able to accommodate significant growth in commuter service and 

in our own Acela service. The perennial problem of funding—the corridor requires 

a minimum of $5 billion over the next ten years to upgrade the aging infrastructure—will not be fixed by taking maintenance responsibilities away from Amtrak. 

What is required is a dedicated funding source that will provide the long-term funds 

required for safe rail service on the Northeast Corridor. 

In closing, let me assure you that we are vigilant and do everything in our power 

to maintain and improve the safety of our system throughout the country. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony, Mr. Chairman. I will be 

happy to answer questions.

Senator BREAUX. Mr. Hamberger. 

44

STATEMENT OF EDWARD HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; ACCOMPANIED BY: 

C.E. DETTMANN, SENIOR EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

SAFETY AND OPERATIONS 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you, Chairman Breaux. I appreciate the 

opportunity to be here to discuss freight railroad safety. Nothing is 

more important to the freight railroads than the safety of our employees and the communities in which we operate, and notwithstanding the impression you may have gotten from the previous 

panel, I would like to point out that working on a railroad is safer 

than working in a hotel, on a construction site, or in a grocery 

store. We have an enviable record of safety, and it is getting better. 

Last year was the safest year on record for the ralroad with respect to employee injuries, and I am pleased to say that yesterday 

the FRA released its data for the first 4 months of 2002. Our injury 

rate has gone down 16.8 percent since last year, the safest year on 

record, and our accident rate is down 19.6 percent in the first 4 

months of this year versus last year, so I think we are doing an 

outstanding job of protecting our employees and the communities 

in which we operate. 

Number two, I would like to point out, and you may see on this 

chart that we are also safer than any other mode of transportation. 

Third, the major portion of fatalities comes from trespassers and 

grade crossing accidents, and Chairman Breaux, to your question, 

the majority of those 508 trespassing fatalities were not in yards, 

they were along mainline tracks, outside of the yards. 

Under the security plan which the AAR board adopted last December, we have tightened up access to our yards considerably. In 

fact, I cannot tell you the number of e-mails I have gotten from rail 

fans around the country complaining that they are no longer allowed to come in and take pictures and observe the operations in 

our yards, but that just cannot be allowed in the aftermath of last 

September. 

Nonetheless, improving safety is an ongoing priority for the railroads. One way we are trying to do that is through technology. 

Currently, we are implementing a new program called InteRRIS, 

the Integrated Railway Remote Information Service, which is a series of wayside detectors, including acoustic detectors that can detect defects as the train goes by and report them. It is a predictive 

way, rather than a reactive way, of trying to prevent accidents 

rather than reacting to them after they occur. 

Similarly, we have rail defect cars traveling to detect internal 

rail flaws, and track geometry cars that inspect track conditions, 

including alignment, gauge, and curvature. 

We are also bringing new technology to bear on freight yards, 

where more than half of all train accidents occur. 

Miscommunication between employees on the ground and in the locomotive can be a problem. A new technology called portable locomotive control technology, or PLCT, allows the employee on the 

ground to operate the train, eliminating the possibility of misread 

hand signals or garbled radio communications. PLCT has been 

used widely in Canada and has been since the late 1980’s, and Canadian National Railway reports accident rates in yards using this 

45

technology are down 44 percent, while Canadian Pacific reports a 

two-thirds reduction in such accidents. 

Another technology high on our agenda is positive train control, 

or PTC. PTC is designed primarily to prevent collisions, but let me 

point out that mainline collisions account for less than 2 percent 

of all train accidents, and have been reduced by 82 percent since 

1980. Railroads, as NTSB Chairman Blakey has pointed out, have 

spent over $200 million to develop and test PTC. 

The basic problem, however, is that PTC is extremely expensive 

and, contrary to conventional wisdom, the technology is not proven 

for a final fully integrated PTC system. In 1999, under the previous 

administration, a Rail Safety Advisory Committee submitted a report to the FRA which was then forwarded to Congress indicating 

that the basic PTC system would cost about $1.2 billion, a full system with all the bells and whistles would be about $7.8 billion, but 

the benefits would be far, far less. For the basic system there 

would be about less than $500 million in benefits; for the $7.8 billion system, there would be about $850 million in benefits, so we 

need to be careful about where we allocate our resources so that 

we apply them to the biggest problems. 

Having said that, we are continuing our efforts to develop a PTC 

system. As pointed out by Administrator Rutter, we are cooperating with the FRA and Illinois DOT in spending over $70 million 

to try to prove the technology on the rail line between Chicago and 

St. Louis. The objective is to develop a system that is safer than 

current systems, interoperable among railroads— since we are one 

network—and cost-effective. 

The last issue I would like to address is fatigue. Since 1992, we 

have worked with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and 

the United Transportation Union on the Work/Rest Task Force to 

look at fatigue issues cooperatively. Initiatives undertaken by railroads, working with labor, include assigned work and rest days, development of scheduling alternatives, permitting napping under 

certain circumstances, sleep disorder screening, improvements to 

crew rest facilities, providing predictable call windows, and fatigue 

education programs. 

We have negotiated agreements with labor addressing fatigue at 

over 100 locations around the country. Together, labor and management continue to aggressively pursue a range of fatigue countermeasures. 

We conclude by again emphasizing the importance railroads 

place on safety. With the resources that we devote to safety and 

with the cooperative programs in place with labor, suppliers, and 

the FRA, I believe we will continue to be the safest mode of transportation, and that we will see continued improvement in the future. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS

On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads, I am grateful 

for the opportunity to discuss the critical issue of freight railroad safety. Nothing 

is more important to our nation’s freight railroads than the safety of their employVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
46

ees, customers, and the communities they serve, as will be demonstrated by the 

scope and intensity of the industry’s safety efforts that I will describe today.

Railroads have achieved tremendous improvement in safety since the Staggers 

Rail Act of 1980 partially deregulated the industry. According to preliminary 2001 

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) statistics, the rail industry has reduced its 

overall train accident rate 64 percent from 1980 to 2001 and 12 percent since 1990. 

The rate of collisions (a subset of the train accident rate) was reduced 82 percent 

since 1980 and 40 percent since 1990. The rate of employee casualties has been reduced 71 percent since 1980 and 57 percent since 1990, and in 2001 was the second 

lowest rate on record.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, railroads have lower employee injury 

rates than other modes of transportation and, indeed, most other major industry 

groups, including agriculture, construction, and manufacturing. U.S. railroads also 

have employee injury rates well below those of most major European railroads. Railroads are also far safer than trucks. Rail freight transportation incurs an estimated 

one-fourth of the fatalities that intercity motor carriers do per billion ton-miles of 

freight moved. 


710ham01.eps 710ham02.eps
47

These improvements have come about precisely because railroads recognize their 

responsibilities regarding safety and have devoted enormous resources to its advancement. Through comprehensive employee training; massive investments in infrastructure and technology (totaling $145 billion just in the ten years from 1992 

to 2001); cooperative efforts involving rail management, rail suppliers, rail labor, 

and the FRA; collaboration with customers and communities; cutting-edge research 

and development; and steadfast commitment to applicable laws and regulations, 

railroads are actively and consistently at the forefront of advancing safety. 

Railroads recognize, though, that more work remains to be done, and believe that 

government, management, and labor must work together to further improve rail 

safety. Several recent high profile accidents have brought renewed attention to the 

topic of rail safety, and over the past few years the train accident and employee casualty rates—while remaining at historically low levels—have leveled off. Below I 

will discuss several ways that railroads are working to improve safety and suggest 

steps we believe the government should (and should not) take to advance the cause 

of rail safety. 

To start, though, it is important to recognize that the most critical safety problems faced by railroads are collisions at highway-rail grade crossings and incidents 

involving trespassers on railroad rights-of-way. In 2001, these two categories accounted for 96 percent of rail-related fatalities. Unfortunately, these incidents generally arise from factors that are largely outside of railroad control.

Due largely to railroads’ and others’ efforts to close crossings and to educate the 

public about the dangers of grade crossings, in conjunction with the Section 130 federal grade crossing program, the number of collisions, injuries, and fatalities at 

highway-rail grade crossings has fallen steadily over the years. From 1980 to 2001, 

the number of grade crossing collisions was reduced 70 percent, injuries declined by 

70 percent, and fatalities were down 50 percent. Despite these impressive declines, 

far too many grade crossing accidents occur each year. 

The vast majority of grade crossing fatalities are preventable because they are 

caused by a driver’s proceeding through a crossing in error. Consequently, grade 

crossing accident prevention efforts have centered on improved warnings and educating the public about the life-or-death consequences of their actions at grade crossings. 

The high cost of current active warning devices—approximately $150,000, on average, per installation—has limited the number of crossings at which they have 

been installed. Research into improved low-cost grade crossing warning systems is 

underway, but increased federal funding for highway-rail crossing hazard abatement 

would permit additional crossings to be protected immediately. 

Under regulations implementing the federal grade crossing program, the responsibility for surveying highway-rail crossings, and prioritizing them for improvement 

according to the level of hazard, is accorded to the states. The decision of what type 

of warning devices to install at which crossings is made by the state (and approved 


710ham03.eps
48

by the FHWA). Railroads provide information about train operations to support 

these decisions made primarily by the state’s traffic engineering experts. This allocation of responsibility is appropriate because grade crossing warning devices are 

highway traffic control devices, there to protect motor vehicles, not trains, and because state highway officials, not railroads, possess the requisite data and expertise 

about traffic volumes and road building plans. Railroads spend well over $200 million each year maintaining grade crossings, 

plus millions more on educational programs. They cooperate closely with state agencies to install and upgrade grade crossing warning devices and signals, and they 

(along with rail suppliers and the U.S. DOT) support Operation Lifesaver, a nationwide organization that educates the public about the dangers of grade crossings. Operation Lifesaver also has an educational program addressing the hazards of trespassing on railroad rights-of-way. In addition to increased dedicated public funding 

for grade crossing warning device installation and maintenance, railroads support 

the implementation of a comprehensive agenda of engineering, education, and enforcement actions so that further significant improvement in crossing safety can be 

achieved. 

Beyond their efforts to reduce accidents at grade crossings and limit trespasser 

incursions onto their rights-of-way, railroads are engaged in an extensive range of 

activities designed to improve rail safety, many of which are outlined below. 

1. Railroads are engaged in aggressive efforts to understand and respond 

to the issue of worker fatigue. 

Work/rest issues have long been a major priority for railroads and their employees. In 1992, the AAR joined with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) 

and the United Transportation Union (UTU) to create the ‘‘Work/Rest Review Task 

Force’’ to examine the application of the Hours of Service Act, review work procedures, and identify ways to reduce rail employee fatigue and improve employee 

quality of life. The Task Force conducted studies of crew work schedules employing 

a database of over five million crew starts, and shared information on various efforts 

to address fatigue. It also provided a forum for rail labor and management to share 

information and ideas for new approaches to work/rest issues. 

In 1998, the Task Force published a report entitled ‘‘Current Status of Fatigue 

Countermeasures in the Railroad Industry’’ that described the many initiatives addressing fatigue undertaken by rail labor and rail management. The report was updated in 2000 and is currently being updated again. 

In 1999, Class I railroads, the BLE, and the UTU reached an agreement covering 

workplace fatigue. The accord provides for labor and management on each railroad 

to establish joint work/rest committees that would address the establishment of predictable rest days, the timing of duty calls, and the transportation of crews to their 

terminals after they have completed their maximum service under the Hours of 

Service Act. 

The FRA, too, has been addressing work/rest issues. In 1997, the FRA, with rail 

labor and management, formed the ‘‘North American Rail Alertness Partnership’’ 

(NARAP), which focuses on fatigue education, including a study of the effectiveness 

of training. 

In addition to industry-wide efforts, many individual railroads are working to 

identify and combat worker fatigue with work/rest committees and with scientifically-based programs such as CANALERT, a collaborative effort of the major Canadian railroads and their employees. 

Thanks largely to extensive cooperation between labor and management, North 

American railroads have been aggressive in the practical application of fatigue countermeasures in the workplace. Initiatives undertaken by some railroads include 

changes in work schedules (e.g., assigned work and rest days), developing scheduling alternatives in cooperation with labor, permitting napping by train crew members under limited circumstances such as where the train is expected to remain motionless for a minimum period of time, sleep disorder screening, improvements to 

crew rest facilities, returning crews home rather than lodging them away from 

home, running more scheduled trains and groups of trains, providing predictable 

calling windows, and fatigue education programs for employees and their families. 

The importance of education in this area cannot be overstated, since the value of 

these initiatives is highly dependent upon employee actions while off duty. 

While evaluations of specific railroad programs have found safety benefits, railroads and employees are continuing their efforts to gain an ever-greater understanding of fatigue-related issues and are seeking innovative solutions. Key to the 

success of these programs is the flexibility to tailor fatigue management efforts to 

address local circumstances. Significant variations associated with local operations 

(e.g., types of trains, traffic balance, and geography), local labor agreements, and 

49

other factors require customized measures. Together, rail management and rail 

labor are aggressively pursuing a broad range of worker-fatigue countermeasures, 

and these efforts should be allowed to continue. 

2. Railroads are actively pursuing reliable, cost-effective automatic train 

control systems. 

For many years, major freight railroads and others have been researching the development and implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) systems, mainly as 

a way to reduce the occurrence of train collisions. (Mainline collisions constitute 

about 2 percent of total rail accidents, and the Class I mainline collision rate has 

been reduced by 82 percent since 1980 and 41 percent since 1990. However, such 

accidents tend to be especially dangerous and destructive, and railroad actions to 

reduce them further continue unabated.) PTC systems, which would use digital communications technology and advanced processors to control train movements, would 

be self-enforcing—i.e., they would apply brakes automatically to stop a train if the 

engineer failed to obey speed limits or continued onto sections of track without proper authorization. More advanced versions of PTC might also provide warning of 

damaged track or bridges, track obstructions, and/or other on-track equipment. 

In addition to reducing train collisions, a successful PTC system would reduce the 

number of derailments caused by excessive speed, reduce the number of train incursions in track maintenance zones, and facilitate high-speed rail projects by making 

rail lines safer for concurrent use by both passenger and freight trains. To date, railroads have spent more than $225 million to develop and test positive train control 

technology. 

The basic problem confronting PTC systems is that, with available technology, 

they are extremely expensive and still of questionable reliability. The most recent 

estimated costs—from a 1999 benefit/cost analysis using standard U.S. DOT methodology and performed by the FRA-sponsored Rail Safety Advisory Committee 

(RSAC)—range up to $7.8 billion for system-wide implementation of the most advanced current systems. The RSAC study found that the total costs of even a limited 

PTC system would be more than double the expected benefits, while the benefits 

of the most advanced PTC system would be less than 10 percent of total costs. The 

FRA forwarded the RSAC’s findings to Congress. 

In view of these findings, railroads and their suppliers are continuing efforts 

aimed at developing cost-effective, functional train control systems. For example, the 

FRA, the Illinois DOT, and the AAR are jointly funding, developing, testing, and 

implementing a PTC system for a portion of a Union Pacific rail line from Chicago 

to St. Louis. The nearly $70 million project will begin testing this fall, with full implementation planned for the summer of 2003. Meanwhile, CSXT is testing a PTC 

system called Communications Based Train Management (CBTM) in South Carolina 

and Georgia. Another PTC system—the Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), 

developed by the FRA, the Michigan DOT, and Amtrak—is being used on a line in 

Michigan. 

These field tests, under actual operating conditions, are critical to determining the 

effectiveness of the experimental PTC systems. As with any experimental system, 

there is a concern that if PTC is implemented before the system design and software 

are perfected, the safety environment could actually be worsened. 

The key objectives of the rail industry’s PTC efforts are to create a system that 

is safer than the present, is interoperable among railroads, and is cost-effective. To 

that end, railroads are working to develop industry standards to provide for potential implementation at different levels of capability. Each railroad will be able to 

choose the specific means by which it would attain the industry standard, but interoperability will be assured. This approach will provide train control standards that 

allow each railroad to determine its needs and implementation strategy and to coordinate PTC with investments in communications systems and processor technology. 

Freight railroads oppose statutory train control mandates. The diversion of huge 

amounts of limited railroad capital to unproven and uneconomic technology would 

not improve safety. Instead, it would limit what railroads could spend on more effective safety enhancements, would raise industry costs, and would ultimately restrict 

railroads’ ability to invest in the equipment and infrastructure they require to meet 

their customers’ needs. The cause of safety is not advanced if premature PTC mandates ultimately lead to a diversion of rail traffic to highways that, as noted above, 

are less safe than rail. 

50

3. Railroads are actively pursuing other technological advances in track 

and equipment safety. 

Railroads have achieved dramatic advancements in safety through the introduction of new technology, much of which was developed and/or refined at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado. The center, which is operated by 

a wholly-owned subsidiary of the AAR—the Transportation Technology Center, Inc. 

(TTCI)—is generally considered the finest rail research facility in the world. The following are just a few examples of the wide variety of significant technological advances, some completed and some still under development, that are having or will 

have a direct positive impact on rail safety:

• Wayside detectors identify defects on passing rail cars before structural failure 

occurs. The types of defects that wayside detectors can identify include overheated bearings and wheels, deteriorating bearings, cracked wheels, and excessively high and wide loads.

• Trackside acoustic detector systems, currently in the developmental stage, identify internal bearing defects through ‘‘acoustic signatures.’’ Existing bearing detectors identify bearings in the process of failing by measuring the heat they 

generate. Acoustic detectors would be able to identify bearings with defects before they fail, thereby preventing accidents.

• Wheel profile monitors, which are also under development, use lasers and optics 

to capture images of wheels. The images show if wheel tread or flanges are 

worn and, consequently, whether the wheels need to be removed from service.

• Rail defect cars are used to detect internal rail flaws. The AAR and the FRA 

have jointly funded a Rail Defect Test Facility that railroads and suppliers can 

use to test improved methods for detecting rail flaws. TTCI is also investigating 

new rail defect detection technologies. A new ultrasonic system under development by TTCI and researchers from the Johns Hopkins University is scheduled 

for testing and evaluation later this year.

• Track geometry cars, which combine sophisticated electronic and optical instruments, are used routinely to inspect track conditions, including alignment, 

gauge, and curvature. TTCI is developing an on-board computer system that 

provides an even more sophisticated analysis of track geometry, predicting the 

response of freight cars to track geometry deviations. This information will better enable railroads to determine what track maintenance is necessary.

• Improved metallurgy and premium fastening systems improve the stability of 

track geometry, reducing the risk of track failure leading to derailments.

• TTCI is also developing Integrated Railway Remote Information Service

(InteRRIS), an Internet-based data collection system with wide potential applicability. For example, an early project using InteRRIS collects data from wheel 

impact detector systems and truck performance detectors along railroad rightsof-way, and processes the information to produce vehicle condition and exception reports. Wheels with certain surface defects generate greater forces, and 

the wheel impact detectors identify wheel defects by measuring the force generated by wheels on track. Truck performance detectors identify suspension systems that are not performing properly on curves. Suspension defects can lead 

to greater wear on wheels and rails, and even to derailments.

• Electronically-controlled pneumatic brakes use an electronic signal along an ontrain communications network to initiate brake applications and releases, thereby permitting the simultaneous application of all brakes on a train and reducing braking distances by as much as 40 percent.

• TTCI supports three affiliated laboratory programs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Texas A&M University, and the University of Illinois. TTCI 

also actively participates in the activities of the National Academy of Science’s 

Transportation Research Board (TRB) and the national laboratories. The university programs provide a way for the industry to engage in long-term partnerships with strong technical schools, thereby enabling cost-effective exploration 

of technical improvements to rail transportation. TTCI’s ties to the universities, 

TRB, and the national laboratories also provide the industry with knowledge of 

cutting-edge technologies and applications that could benefit the rail industry. 

4. Class I railroads are deploying portable locomotive control systems that 

promise significant safety benefits. 

Accidents in rail yards account for more than half of all train accidents. Human 

factors-caused accidents in yards account for about half of all yard accidents, or 

about one-quarter of all train accidents. Portable locomotive control technology 

51

(PLCT), which allows railroad personnel on the ground to operate and control locomotives through the use of a small control device that transmits signals to a microprocessor on board a locomotive, promises to bring about a significant reduction in 

human-factors caused yard accidents and hence a noticeable decline in the overall 

train accident rate. 

A major advantage of PLCT is that it eliminates the need for communication between employees on the ground and operators on a train. In conventional operations, ground employees often give directions to train employees using hand or 

voice signals. The potential for miscommunication is significant. With PLCT, however, the ground employee who would have been giving signals to the train employee is the one using PLCT to operate the train. The danger of miscommunication 

is dramatically reduced. 

PLCT has been used extensively for several years on the two major Canadian railroads, numerous U.S. non-Class I railroads, and many private industrial U.S. railroads. It is now being put to use on U.S. Class I railroads. Where used, it has proven to be significantly safer and more efficient than conventional operations. On the 

Canadian National Railway (CN), PLCT has been used since 1989 and is now used 

for almost half of the railroad’s Canadian yard operations. At CN, accident rates 

from the 1997–2001 period for yard operations using PLCT were 44 percent lower 

than the rates for yard operations using conventional technology, and no accidents 

have been attributed to the PLCT system itself. On Canadian Pacific (CP), which 

has used PLCT since 1994, the rate of yard accidents under PLCT has been about 

one-third that of conventional technology. Yard accidents on CP have fallen some 

70 percent since the introduction of PLCT. 

In February 2001, the FRA released guidelines addressing PLCT design, operation, training, and inspection and testing. As with other aspects of railroad operations, the FRA will retain authority over the safe operation of PLCT systems. The 

rail industry has developed a comprehensive training program for PLCT operators, 

who are certified pursuant to FRA-approved certification programs. PLCT equipment will be inspected daily and will not be used on passenger trains. 

5. Railroads work diligently to ensure the safety of hazmat transport. 

Thanks to massive infrastructure and equipment investments, safer operating 

procedures, freight car design improvements, and other factors, railroads have an 

excellent—and improving—hazmat safety record. In fact, railroads are by far the 

safest way to transport hazardous materials. 

Approximately 1.7 million carloads of hazardous materials are transported by rail 

each year—double the number handled in 1980—and 99.996 percent of rail hazmat 

shipments reach their final destination without a release caused by an accident. 

Based on U.S. DOT data, in 2000 there was a release of hazardous materials from 

a rail car in a train accident only once for every 48,000 cars shipped. Railroads have 

reduced overall hazmat accident rates by 86 percent since 1980 and by 26 percent 

since 1990.


710ham04.eps
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There is a far greater chance of hazmat release when materials are shipped by 

truck than by rail. Freight railroads have less than seven percent of the hazmat incidents that trucks do, despite having roughly equal hazmat ton-mileage. 

Railroads pursue a wide array of efforts to ensure the safety of hazmat transport 

by rail. These efforts include rigorous tank car quality assurance programs, field 

testing, and inspections of chemical loading facilities; cooperative outreach programs 

with chemical companies to assist communities in developing and evaluating emergency response plans; hazmat training for emergency responders from municipal fire 

departments, chemical shippers, and others; and support for Operation Respond, a 

nonprofit institute devoted to improving the communication of emergency response 

information to police and fire departments. The value of these efforts is manifest 

by the fact that in the ten years from 1992 to 2001, only three persons died because 

of exposure to hazardous materials in rail transportation, according to the Research 

and Special Programs Administration of the U.S. DOT. 

Trains containing specific amounts of the most hazardous materials transported 

by rail—referred to as ‘‘key trains’’—are subject to special speed limits, passing restrictions, and inspection requirements. Railroads increase track inspections, training, and installations of hot box detectors on routes over which key trains operate. 

Tank cars, which transport most hazardous materials, must meet stringent U.S. 

DOT specifications if used to transport hazardous materials. For example, they 

must be equipped with pressure relief devices (to protect the tank in the event of 

fire), double shelf couplers (designed to prevent tank punctures by a coupler), and 

steel ‘‘head shields’’ at each end of the car (intended as further protection against 

puncture). Some cars also have thermal shields, jacketed insulation systems, and 

protected top and bottom fittings. 

AAR and the railway supply industry jointly fund the Tank Car Safety Research 

and Test Project. This project monitors tank car accidents and is continually updating a comprehensive database on the precise nature of damage to tank cars. Analysis of these data better enables researchers to identify the causes of tank car releases and determine the effectiveness of options to further improve tank car safety. 

The project database is often cited by the U.S. DOT as a role model for other modes 

of transportation. 

In addition to its ongoing safety data collection and analysis activities, the project 

also has a number of ongoing research efforts, including efforts aimed at developing 

better steels for tank cars and developing a method for testing the effectiveness of 

surge suppression devices for tank cars. (Surge suppression devices reduce the 

movement of tank car liquids accompanying freight car acceleration and deceleration, which can lead to releases during transportation.) 

To help protect their employees and the communities they serve, railroads offer 

basic hazardous material awareness training to all employees. Employees learn to 

recognize a hazmat emergency, whom to contact in an emergency, and proper evacuation procedures. Rail employees responsible for emergency hazmat response efforts 

receive much more in-depth training. Emergency response should be left to those 

specialized employees and contractors who are trained and equipped for this highly 

technical and dangerous work. Non-trained employees are expected to notify appropriate authorities, then move to a safe area while highly-trained specialists respond 

to the emergency. 

6. Railroads work constantly to assure rail safety through rigorous management of the AAR’s Interchange Rules. 

The AAR’s Interchange Rules are a series of requirements and specifications for 

freight railroad equipment. Extending far beyond federal requirements, the rules 

apply in the United States, Canada, and Mexico to equipment moving from one railroad to another. The rules help assure railroads, and the public at large, that rail 

equipment is interoperable and safe to operate. Virtually all freight railroads and 

all rail car owners in the United States have agreed to abide by the rules. 

In addition to equipment standards, the Interchange Rules contain quality assurance requirements for manufacturers of freight equipment and components. AAR inspectors monitor compliance with the rules and the quality assurance program, and 

mechanisms are in place to enforce the rules. 

An important feature of the Interchange Rules is the Early Warning System. The 

rules require railroads and car owners to notify the AAR if they discover a critical 

safety defect that, if not corrected, could result in severe injury or damage. If such 

a defect is found, the AAR will issue an Early Warning requiring all railroads and 

car owners to take appropriate action—for example, stopping cars and making repairs, if necessary. Railroads and car owners are required to report to the AAR action taken with respect to cars covered by an Early Warning. An example of an 

Early Warning is attached as Appendix A. 

53

7. Railroads cooperate with their employees to improve safety. 

Railroads are constantly working to develop cooperative relationships with their 

employees to enhance safety. Cooperative efforts aimed at combating worker fatigue 

were noted above. Another example is the Switching Operations Fatalities Analysis 

(SOFA) Working Group. 

The SOFA group was formed in February 1998 to develop recommendations to reduce fatalities in switching operations. Along with the FRA, the AAR, BLE, UTU, 

and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association participate. After 

analyzing incident data, in 1999 the working group made five recommendations covering the securing of equipment while crew members are working on rolling stock, 

protection for train crews where two or more crews are working on the same tracks, 

job briefings at the beginning of tours of duty, communication between crew members when controlling train movements, and additional training for crew members 

with less than one year of experience. These recommendations have now been fully 

implemented by the railroad industry, and early results are encouraging. The SOFA 

group continues to meet to identify additional measures that can be taken to reduce 

the number of accidents involving railroad switching operations. 

8. Railroads favor alternatives to the costly, anachronistic rail workers’ injury compensation system. 

Under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), which covers rail industry 

employees, employer liability for workplace injuries is predicated on fault. If the employer is found to be at fault, it is liable for damages. If the employee is also found 

to be at fault, compensation is reduced proportionately. Virtually all other workers 

in the United States are covered by no-fault workers’ compensation systems, under 

which they are compensated for work-related injuries without regard to negligence. 

From a safety perspective, FELA is counterproductive. It creates a highly adversarial relationship in the workplace—since both sides must seek to place blame on 

the other—thereby hampering the railroads’ ability to investigate accidents to determine their causes, an essential step to finding ways to prevent future accidents. 

Just as rail labor and management worked together to reform the railroad retirement system, AAR hopes that rail labor and management can work together to replace FELA with a more effective workers’ compensation system that fairly compensates injured employees while reducing costs and enhancing safety. 

9. Railroads advocate the adoption of performance standards in place of 

rigid design-based rules to regulate rail safety. 

There are two general approaches to workplace safety regulation: design-based 

standards and performance standards. 

Design-based standards specify the precise characteristics of facilities, equipment, 

and processes a firm must use in the manufacture and delivery of its product or 

service. The FRA relies overwhelmingly on design-based standards in its regulation 

of railroad safety. 

Design-based standards are costly for both railroads and the FRA to administer 

and maintain. They also tend to impede innovation because they ‘‘lock in’’ existing 

designs, technology, and ways of thinking. The infamous discolored wheel rule provides a classic example of a regulation that discourages the use of new technology. 

For many years, this FRA rule required railroads to remove wheels that showed 

four or more inches of discoloration, then thought to portend possible wheel failure. 

However, research in the 1980s demonstrated conclusively that discoloration in the 

newer heat-treated, curved plate wheels did not portend failure. Despite this evidence, the FRA took more than a decade to exempt such wheels from the requirement, during which railroads were forced to discard these perfectly safe wheels at 

a cost that reached $100 million per year. 

In contrast to design-based standards, performance-based standards define the desired result rather than mandating the precise characteristics that a workplace 

must exhibit. Performance-based goals focus attention and effort on the outcome, not 

the method. The railroad industry believes that performance standards are far more 

likely to have a positive impact on railroad safety than continued reliance on designbased standards. 

Under a rail safety regime based on performance standards, each railroad would 

have annual goals for train safety (e.g., accidents per million train-miles) and employee safety (e.g., injuries per 100 employees) as part of a comprehensive risk management plan, based on targets established by the industry and approved by the 

FRA. If a railroad failed to meet these goals, it would come under increased FRA 

scrutiny, be required to specify measures it would take to correct the problems, and 

eventually be subject to monetary penalties. The FRA would retain the power to 

54

conduct safety audits and to impose emergency directives at any time to protect 

public safety. 

Risk-based performance standards represent a reform, not an abandonment, of 

safety regulation. Except in emergencies or after continued failure to meet targets, 

the FRA would no longer specify how a railroad would achieve its safety goals. Instead, the FRA would oversee and validate the goal-setting process, ensure that the 

measures and data are accurate, and impose any necessary sanctions. 

Under safety performance standards, railroads would have the opportunity and 

incentive to achieve the desired outcome in the most efficient way possible. Performance standards would rely on the superior knowledge railroads and rail employees 

have regarding their operations, and would give railroads the discretion to experiment with new technologies and processes to improve safety. The result would be 

superior safety performance at a lower cost to railroads and their customers. 

10. Railroads have taken proactive steps to increase the security of our nation’s rail network. 

Safety through security has become a major priority for the railroad industry. Immediately after the events of September 11, 2001, the railroad industry began developing a comprehensive Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan. 

The industry formed a security task force composed of railroad representatives with 

expertise in areas such as operations, legal issues, railroad police activities, hazardous materials transportation, and information technology. Outside consultants 

with expertise in intelligence and counter-terrorism were retained to provide advice 

on best practices. 

The task force created five Critical Action Teams addressing hazardous materials, 

operations security, infrastructure, information technology and communications, and 

military liaison. The task force undertook a comprehensive risk analysis which identified critical assets, vulnerabilities, and threats, and assessed the overall risk to 

people, national security, and the nation’s economy. The task force then identified 

more than 50 countermeasures. The Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan, which is now in effect, puts all this information together and establishes 

four different alert levels, with implementation of specific countermeasures dependent on the alert level in effect. 

The plan also provides for the establishment of a Railway Alert Network (RAN), 

a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week communications center operated by the AAR. 

Through the RAN, railroads share information with our nation’s intelligence community. In addition, the RAN provides a means for instituting appropriate alert levels and begin taking appropriate countermeasures. 

The AAR also operates the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC). Presidential Decision Directive 63 called for the creation of 

private sector ISACs to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from attack. The 

ST-ISAC, formed at the request of the U.S. DOT, collects, analyzes, and distributes 

security information from worldwide resources to protect vital information technology systems from attack. The ST-ISAC also operates 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-aweek. 

Finally, let me add that FRA safety programs should be funded through general 

appropriations, not by reimposing safety ‘‘user fees’’ on railroads. Proposed FRA fees 

are a form of tax that other industries do not pay. Firms whose safety is regulated 

by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) do not pay fees to 

that agency for its safety regulation. Equity demands that railroads not pay fees to 

the FRA to cover the FRA’s safety regulation. Their imposition would constitute a 

shift to private industry of the costs of government regulation to achieve public 

goals. They would increase rail industry costs substantially, but would not enhance 

railroad safety. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this critical topic. The railroad industry looks forward to working with Congress, the FRA, its customers, its employees, 

and others to ensure that rail safety continues to improve. 

APPENDIX A 

Association of American Railroads

Early Warning

June 11, 2001

EW–5180

Subject: Ladder Pan Support Stiffeners on CN Multi-Levels

To: MEMBERS AND PRIVATE CAR OWNERS

55

File Number: c–9326

Canadian National Railways has advised that 68 CN multi-level racks receiving 

AAR Specification M–941 end enclosure modifications in 2000 had the ladder pan 

support stiffener coped to allow door clearance. The coping is not a requirement of 

Specification M–941 and has subsequently weakened this area of the rack. Such a 

condition may result in the ladder pan support stiffener cracking and this could 

propagate into the ladder pan support, eventually causing a complete separation. If 

the ladder pan support and stiffener break the ladder pan could become separated 

from the rack structure. In accordance with UMLER-TRAIN II procedures in effect 

May 1, 1994 this Early Warning is assigned Severity Code ‘‘MD’’—Withhold empty 

car from loading, contact owner for disposition. The end ladder pan area (4 corners 

of the rack) on these bi-level cars (a photograph of a side view of the ladder pan 

support and stiffener is appended to this Early Warning) should be inspected. If the 

car is safe to move, home: shop disposition should be requested from CN. If the car 

is not safe to move, perform temporary repairs and then request home shop disposition from CN. Home shop disposition may be obtained by contacting: Ms. Christine 

Carrier Canadian National Railways AAR Billing 935 de La Gauchetiere St. West 

Montreal, QC, H3B 2M9 Ph. 514–399–3738 Fax. 514–399–4941 Email Christine.Carrier@cn.ca Cars inspected and sent to home shop should be reported to the 

RAILINC UMLER Section via on-line processes, e-mail: umler@railinc.com, or FAX: 

(919) 651–5405 as Code ME—Car Inspected, MOVING TO SHOP. Note: Until cars 

are unloaded, inspected and routed to shop, caution should be exercised on loaded 

cars by unloading personnel and M&R pool repair personnel. 

In accordance with AAR Interchange Rule 125 procedures in effect July 22, 2002, 

this Early Warning is assigned SEVERITY CODE: 04-Withhold empty car from 

loading-contact owner

Equipment Attachments

http://ewguest:railinc@64.80.98.164:8080/5180

Assignment Marks associated with this notice:

AAR Only

Inspection Marks associated with this notice:

Open

Allowable Final Inspection Codes Associated with this Notice:

MH-Car repaired, return car to service

MR-Car inspected, return car to service

Mechanical Designations Associated with this Notice:

No Mechanical Designations Specified

Early Warning EW–5180 will expire on June 11, 2003

Senator BREAUX. Mr. Hahs. 

STATEMENT OF DON M. HAHS, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, 

BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS 

Mr. HAHS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. In the interests of time, my comments will be a brief summary of our written position. It is an honor for me to testify today 

on rail safety, and particularly on fatigue experience by locomotive 

engineers and other works in the rail industry, a subject of great 

concern to this country and all employees on the Nation’s railroads. 

The BLE represents 59,000 professional locomotive engineers 

and other rail workers in the United States and Canada. I am also 

representing the interests of more than 30 labor unions belonging 

to the AFL–CIO Transportation Trades Department. The headlinegrabbing railroad accidents in the past several months unfortunately provide us an unwelcome opportunity to reiterate our concern with the current level of safety practice in the railroad industry. 

56

First and foremost, we extend our heartfelt sympathies to all 

those impacted by these tragic events. The BLE lost one of its own 

members, Mr. Gaylen D. Shelby of Lubbock, Texas, in a fatal wreck 

in May of this year. Sadly, Mr. Shelby is the 27th member of the 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers killed in on-the-job accidents 

since 1996. 

The headlines of these stories describing these transportation 

disasters must always be viewed as opportunities to learn so that 

they might be avoided in the future. Our members are active participants in investigations being conducted by the NTSB, and for 

that reason I will not comment specifically on open investigations. 

It is well-documented in the rail industry that the likelihood of 

accidents and injuries increases when employees are fatigued. Federal regulations limit the number of hours that employees in various transportation modes can work in 1 month. For example, a 

commercial airline pilot can fly no more than 100 hours per month, 

a truck driver can drive no more than 260 hours per month, but 

railroad operating employees under existing Federal regulations 

can work up to 432 hours per month. 

The BLE advocates a solution of eliminating fatigue-related accidents in the rail industry that combines scientific knowledge about 

fatigue and what the brotherhood’s 139 years of experience in operating trains have taught us. BLE advocates a three-pronged approach to eliminating fatigue, education, information, and empowerment. 

The most important of the three is empowerment that will give 

employees a demand right to absent themselves from work if they 

are fatigued from previous service, or if they are ill. We request 

congressional leadership to bring us together to achieve this with 

a goal of eliminating fatigue as to factors in rail accidents. 

Contributing to fatigue among rail operating employees and all 

employees in the railroad industry is a problem associated with 

staffing to do the work of keeping the railroads safe. Employees are 

continually being required to do more with less staff. This staffing 

shortage contributes to the core problem of rail safety. Currently, 

employees in signal, track maintenance, and track inspection, and 

in many cases operating, are stretched to their limits. 

Insofar as remote control technology is concerned, PLCT and 

yard service is concerned, we are not convinced at this time that 

accident statistics provided by salesmen are entirely accurate, and 

we reserve the right to provide additional written documentation 

on this subject at a later time. However, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has long supported positive train separation as 

a major part of railroad safety. Positive train control can act as a 

guardian angel to protect the lives of train crews. 

As we have been told, PTC has been on the National Transportation Board’s 10 most wanted list for over 10 years, the safety improvements for that time. The fact of the matter is that several accidents could have been prevented and many lives could have been 

saved had positive train control been implemented sooner. Rail 

labor recognizes the difficulty involved in deploying a sophisticated 

technology such as PTC, and therefore recommends a reasonable 

approach must be taken to achieve an orderly cost-effective implementation of PTC technology. 

57

On the final note, I want to express rail labor’s support for Amtrak by urging Congress to support its short-term funding and 

long-term survival. As Americans, we need to fund Amtrak to make 

the promise of high speed rail a reality. Amtrak should be funded 

to the extent that America funds our Nation’s highways and airports, make rail passenger service a viable alternative. With the 

volatile situation in the Middle East, we may soon find ourselves 

over the OPEC oil barrel again. 

I thank you for the opportunity to speak today, and welcome any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hahs follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DON M. HAHS, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,

BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS

Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. It is an honor for 

me to testify today on rail safety and particularly, on the fatigue experienced by locomotive engineers and other workers in the railroad industry, a subject of great 

concern to this country and to all employees of the nation’s railroads. My name is 

Don Hahs, and I am the International President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Engineers. The BLE represents 59,000 professional locomotive engineers and other 

rail workers in the United States and Canada. I am also representing the interests 

of more than 30 labor unions belonging to the AFL-CIO’s Transportation Trades Department. The headline-grabbing railroad incidents of the past several months, unfortunately, provide us an unwelcome opportunity to reiterate our concern with the 

current level of safety practices in the railroad industry. First and foremost we extend our heartfelt sympathies to all those impacted by these tragic events. The BLE 

lost one of its own members—Gaylen D. Shelby of Lubbock, Texas—in a fatal wreck 

on May 28. Sadly, Mr. Shelby is the 27th member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Engineers killed in an on-the-job accident since 1996. The headlines and the stories 

describing these transportation disasters must always be viewed as opportunities to 

learn so that they might be avoided in the future. Our members are active participants in investigations being conducted by NTSB, and for that reason, I will not 

comment specifically on open accident investigations. 

Rail Safety and Infrastructure 

The link to rail safety and the economic health of a railroad is undeniable. On 

June, 2002, in testimony delivered by Mr. Dan Pickett, President of the Brotherhood 

of Railroad Signalmen, rail labor stated its support for the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s commitment to improve 

the safety of railroads as demonstrated by their comprehensive and visionary legislative agenda. The Committee’s goal to provide capital in the railroad industry for 

maintenance, expansion, and improvements for infrastructure is commendable and 

recognizes this vital link between safety and rail infrastructure. 

Fatigue 

It is well documented in the rail industry that the likelihood of accidents and injuries increases when employees are fatigued. No rail safety initiative would be complete without proper fatigue countermeasures, which must take into consideration 

the fact that not all persons, nor railroad operations, require the same solutions for 

remedy. Some rail operators, for example, are motivated to work for long periods 

of time and experience no negative effects, while others will tire quickly depending 

on the cycles over which they work and how the cumulative effects of sleep deprivation may take its toll. As a threshold position to any fatigue management plan it 

should be understood that workers must not be subject to an involuntary reduction 

of earnings. 

Federal regulations limit the number of hours that employees in the various 

transportation industries can work in one month. However, the limits vary from one 

mode of transportation to another, putting locomotive engineers at a higher risk of 

fatigue than almost any other worker in the nation. For example, a commercial airline pilot can fly no more than 100 hours per month. A truck driver can drive no 

more than 260 hours per month. But, railroad operating employees under existing 

federal regulations, can work up to 432 hours per month. 

58

Hours of Service for operating employees 

Significant changes have occurred over the last 15 years in our industry and these 

changes have had a negative impact on the ability to go to work rested. Some of 

those changes include fewer operating employees sharing greater responsibility for 

longer and heavier trains. Scheduled trains and thus scheduled crews are rare. Dispatching of trains from centralized offices has resulted in prioritizing train movement on the basis of the crew’s time remaining to work, fuel efficiency, and congestion avoidance. Trips are longer and the territory over which a locomotive engineer 

operates has expanded. The long commute times required of workers have negatively impacted the little rest time they are allowed under the existing law. And, 

centralized crew calling operations have become automated and our members find 

it difficult to get the required information to determine an accurate prediction of 

their next duty assignment, thus impairing their ability to achieve required rest. We 

propose that one solution to this chronic transportation problem is to actually reduce the exposure to the total number of hours an employee must work or is susceptible to interruptions of rest by our employers. The BLE is advocating a 21st century solution to eliminate fatigue-related accidents in the railroad industry, a solution that combines scientific knowledge about fatigue with our Brotherhood’s 139 

years of experience in operating trains. 

BLE advocates a three-pronged approach to eliminate fatigue—education, 

information and empowerment. 

Education of workers is key. Education incorporates knowledge of the body’s circadian rhythms, knowledge of work/rest cycles, knowledge of split shifts, knowledge 

of backwards and forwards shift rotation, knowledge of sleep requirements, and 

knowledge of peer intervention and counseling. 

Information incorporates labor and management working together to exchange information about conditions that can contribute to fatigue, such as lineups, call notification, and traffic patterns. The BLE believes that the current chaotic scheduling 

practices contribute greatly to locomotive engineer fatigue and railroads, operating 

employees and the government must work together to help solve the problem. 

Empowerment—authentic employee empowerment—incorporates labor working 

together with management and government to develop a structure that empowers 

workers to remove themselves if they are unfit to work because of fatigue or illness. 

It also incorporates giving all workers the right and responsibility to assist other 

workers to understand and deal with their fatigue. 

The belief is that our safety depends on our mutual alertness. Railroad employees 

are in the best position to observe when one of our own—because of fatigue—cannot 

fulfill their obligation to be alert. We see the elimination of fatigue as a cultural 

change in the industry, and this cultural change must be driven by fellow workers. 

However, we need Congress to give us the tools to do it. 

In order to address fatigue in a scientific manner that draws on current research, 

experiences of other transportation modes in the United States, and the political realities of the stakeholders, we request Congressional leadership to bring us together 

to achieve the worthy goal of eliminating fatigue as a factor in rail accidents. Absent 

satisfactory resolution for the implementation of this proposal in a collaborative 

process, Congress should act to:

Require the Secretary of Transportation to:

1) Issue a regulation within 180 days to require that:

No railroad employee shall operate railroad equipment, and a Railroad 

shall not require or permit an employee to operate railroad equipment, while 

the employee’s ability or alertness is so impaired, or so likely to become impaired, through fatigue, illness, or any other cause, as to make it unsafe for 

him/her to begin or continue to operate the railroad equipment. However, in 

a case of grave emergency where the hazard to rail operations would be increased by compliance with this section, the railroad employee may continue 

to operate the equipment to the nearest place at which that hazard is removed.

For the purpose of this regulation, an employee having worked a minimum 

of 20 starts(equivalent to 2680 miles) of Hours of Service duty in the previous 

thirty days, or five starts (equivalent to 650 miles) in a seven day period, and 

requesting relief for fatigue will have met a definition of fatigue. A ‘‘start’’ is 

defined as any work period that requires a corresponding rest period as prescribed by 49 CFR Ch.II Part 228 Hours of Service of Railroad Employees.

59

For the purpose of this regulation ‘‘illness or any other cause’’ may include 

prescription and/or over the counter medication that may impair the employees ability or alertness.

This regulation is taken from 49 CFR 392.3, a Federal regulation implemented 

in the 1970’s for the commercial trucking industry. The approach advocated by the 

BLE is desirable for the following reasons:

• It builds on the partnership principles between the railroads, labor, and government to develop a real solution to cumulative fatigue—more rest for the individual affected by erratic work scheduling.

• The regulation was modified to incorporate issues and history particular to the 

railroad industry.

• The suggested process also was effectively used to promote change in the aviation industry.

• The regulation is attainable within the constraints of the Hours of Service and 

existing FRA authority.

• It incorporates the desire for regulatory change voiced by the NTSB recommendations.

• The regulation builds on the use of education by empowering individuals to 

apply the knowledge learned from fatigue research. It does no good to know you 

must take time off, if the system arbitrarily restricts that off duty time.

• From the railroads’ perspective, this proposal creates a minimum definition before fatigue is claimed. From this definition, the railroad would be able to 

project possible manpower shortages with a consistent standard in place. The 

railroads could plan and schedule both train movements and staffing requirements from the information this regulation would generate.

• The regulation would compliment the existing Hours of Service Law, and make 

the industry safer.

For the employee, this regulation empowers the worker to take control of his or 

her own rest and revitalization. For the majority of workers, this recommendation 

would widen the safety net for workers suffering from fatigue. BLE has given careful consideration to our responsibilities to the carriers, our fellow workers, and the 

public and we believe acceptance of responsibility for fatigue management is incumbent on all parties. To that extent the BLE commits to do all within our power to 

educate our members and other railroad employees of the provisions of this proposal. 

Signalmen, Maintenance of Way Staffing Issues 

Contributing to fatigue among all railroad employees, is the problem associated 

with sufficient staffing to do the work of keeping the railroads safe. This absence 

of rested workers goes to the core of the problem of rail safety. There has been a 

mass exodus of workers taking advantage of early retirement legislation, passed in 

the form of the Railroad Retirement and Survivors’ Improvement Act of 2001. Members of AFL-CIO affiliated unions, including the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, 

will face increased responsibilities until the railroads get staffing to adequate, prelegislation levels—especially in the area of signal maintenance. Currently, maintenance levels are stretched to their limits. Staffing levels are expected to be reduced 

by an additional 5 to 20 percent while the remaining 80 to 95 percent of the employees are required to handle the increased work load. This is unsafe and unacceptable. 

My brothers and sisters in another AFL-CIO affiliated union, the Brotherhood of 

Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE), are facing similar problems. Members of 

the BMWE build, maintain, inspect, and repair the tracks, bridges and related railroad infrastructure on Class I railroads in the United States and Canada. Over the 

past several decades, there has been a precipitous drop in the number of maintenance of way workers nationwide. While some of this manpower decline can be attributed to technological advances in track maintenance equipment and work processes, and while part of the decline can be attributed to the early retirement legislation, a majority of these cuts are attributable to lay-offs, furloughs, and lack of hiring. Like I mentioned in regard to signal staffing, we strongly believe the industry 

has cut its track maintenance forces too deep and there are not enough track maintenance personnel to stay ahead of declining track conditions. 

In the past 15 years, staffing levels in the maintenance of way field has declined 

more than 40 percent on our nation’s railroads. BMWE records indicate a full 50% 

reduction in maintenance of way staffing over the past 20 years. 

Clearly, this type of precipitous decline in track maintenance personnel has a direct and substantial effect on track safety and the overall condition of the nation’s 

60

railroad infrastructure. While, in general terms, the roadbed does not deteriorate 

overnight, we do believe that we are beginning to see adverse affects of reduced 

staffing and deferred track maintenance. Rail labor is concerned that until we reverse this dangerous trend and put more maintenance personnel out on the rightof-way, things will continue to deteriorate exponentially. 

We can look to Federal Railroad Administration for data, which indicates an 

alarming trend in track-caused derailments. In 1999, main line reportable train accidents numbered 858 and the main line normalized accident rate was 1.37. In 2001, 

main line reportable train accidents numbered 1,026 and the normalized main line 

accident rate climbed to 1.64. In 1999, reportable yard train accidents numbered 

1,531 with a normalized yard accident rate of 17.51. In 2001, reportable yard accidents numbered 1,517 and the normalized yard accident rate increased to 17.72. 

The spike in track caused derailments is not a statistical aberration, but rather, 

it indicates a definite systemic trend. Let’s compare the overall number of track 

caused reportable accidents in the five year period from 1997 to 2001. In 1997 there 

were 879 reportable track-caused accidents overall(main line, yard and other), in 

2001 that number increased to 1,115 track-caused accidents. The normalized overall 

track-caused train accident rate increased from 1.3 to 1.57 during the same five-year 

period. To break this down further, in 1997 the main line track-caused reportable 

accident rate was 0.58. In 2001 the main line track-caused rate increased to 0.62, 

the highest rate since 1997. In yards, the track-caused reportable accident rate in 

1997 was 4.63, while in 2001 it increased to 6.22. 

Clearly, these alarming statistics prove beyond any doubt that the train accident 

rates and track-caused accident rates are moving in the wrong direction and 

changes have to be implemented now to prevent greater deterioration of the roadbed 

and rail safety in the near-term future. The fix to this escalating infrastructure 

problem is within reach. Increase track maintenance staffing levels to facilitate proactive track maintenance and repair, improve employee training, develop more thorough track inspection and defect repair procedures, and improve conditions under 

which track inspections are conducted. These are the steps necessary to reverse the 

dangerous trend of deteriorating track conditions, escalating train accident rates, 

and track related railroad accidents. 

Track Inspector Staffing 

With regard to track inspection, responsible modification of track inspection processes and procedures is also essential to improving track safety. The amount of territory a track inspector is responsible to inspect on a weekly basis is overwhelmingly 

too large. FRA confirmed this in its audit report entitled ‘‘CSX Track Audit 2000.’’ 

A pertinent excerpt from that report states, in part:

Recently, CSX management has reduced the number of track inspector positions at a vast majority of their divisions and system wide. At the same 

time, CSXT has increased the track inspectors’ territories at numerous locations. During listening sessions conducted with BMWE employees and first 

line supervisors, both voiced their concerns relative to the size of the inspection territories and the work requirements placed on the inspectors.

Track inspectors are highly skilled and dedicated employees on the front line of 

railroad safety. Track inspectors are required by Federal law to inspect track at certain frequencies, however, Federal law does not place any meaningful limits on the 

length of an inspector’s territory or the speed over which the territory may be inspected. This problem has been exacerbated in recent years by manpower shortages, 

which places a heavier burden on the track inspector. In years past, track inspectors 

often had local maintenance crews available to correct track deficiencies as they 

were found and reported by the inspector. Today, however, the cut-backs in manpower have left many inspectors with no maintenance crews to facilitate repairs of 

identified track defects. In these situations, the track inspector is required to stop 

the inspection to effectuate the repair personally. This practice severely limits the 

time an inspector has to dedicate to the performance of actual track inspection, and 

he or she often has no other recourse except to make up that time by finishing the 

inspection of the territory at a speed which is not necessarily conducive to quality 

inspections. Thus, as stated previously, we believe that the industry must restore 

the ranks of local track maintenance forces to facilitate the timely repair of track 

defects and provide greater attention to problem areas before they become defects 

which can adversely affect railroad safety and the safe passage of trains. 

Additionally, the re-establishment of rail safety user fees to pay for additional rail 

safety inspectors should be on the table. Furthermore, we believe that rail safety 

would benefit if some of those inspectors had specific training in computer technology, locomotive electronics, and train control. 

61

Enhanced Coverage of the Hours of Service Act 

It has been an unfortunate trend in the railroad industry that workers employed 

by outside contractors perform the same work as railroad employees. Although both 

groups are subject to the same hazards and have the same potential impact on public safety, the Hours of Service Act applies only to rail workers. The Act, 49 U.S.C. 

§21101–21108, should be extended to cover contractor’s forces and certain other 

groups as follows:

• All employees of a contractor to a railroad, including employees of a sub-contractor to a railroad contractor, performing a covered service, as well as any individual who directly supervises an individual engaged in those activities;

• Power Directors, defined as railroad or contractor employees who affect the 

movement of trains through control of third rail or pantographic electric power, 

including persons who otherwise supervise, direct, connect, disconnect, or sectionalize power distribution for the electric propulsion of trains and/or for the 

protection of persons engaged in work on or in proximity to the power distribution system; and

• Dually Employed Persons, meaning persons at the same time in the employ of 

two or more railroad carriers, contractors or sub-contractors, or a combination 

thereof. 

Enhance Rail Safety Enforcement 

Rail labor believes rail safety would benefit from changes in law to:

• Extend the prohibition against employee harassment, intimidation and job retaliation to include railroad employees who step forward to file a complaint or 

testify in legal or regulatory action against the railroad;

• Enact new provisions making it unlawful for any person to knowingly interfere 

with, obstruct or hamper a railroad safety investigation, or knowingly or intentionally to use intimidation, harassment, or threats to influence the testimony 

of any person or prevent a person from attending such investigation. Both civil 

and criminal penalties should be imposed for violations;

• To ensure accountability for the safe operation and maintenance of railroad 

equipment and facilities, create a certification program for personnel with safety responsibilities that would include engineers, carmen, mechanics, signalmen 

and track inspectors;

• Direct the Department of Transportation to develop model state legislation to 

penalize drivers who maneuver around grade crossing gates;

• Require establishment of notification systems utilizing toll-free telephone numbers that the public can use to convey to carriers information about malfunctions of automated warning devices or other safety problems at highway-rail 

grade crossings;

• Amend 49 U.S.C. §20142 to direct the Secretary to issue rules requiring that 

no visual track inspection be conducted from a vehicle traveling at a speed of 

more than 15 miles per hour; and,

• Make provisions requiring all track motor vehicles, self-propelled maintenance 

of way equipment, and other equipment which is designed with permanent or 

retractable flanged wheels, to be designed and maintained so as to conduct electrical current from one rail of the track to the other. This will activate signal 

systems designed to detect the presence of locomotives, cars, trains, and other 

rolling equipment on the track. 

Positive Train Control 

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has long supported positive train separation as a major part of railroad safety. Positive Train Control can act as a ‘‘guardian angel’’ to protect the lives of train crews. PTC has been on the National Transportation Safety Board’s ‘‘10 Most Wanted List’’ of safety improvements for more 

than a decade. While progress is being made toward the implementation of positive 

train control, the fact of the matter is that several accidents could have been prevented and many lives could have been saved had Positive Train Control been implemented sooner. Rail Labor recognizes the difficulty involved in deploying a sophisticated technology such as PTC and therefore, recommends a reasonable approach must be taken to achieve an orderly, cost effective implementation of PTC 

technology. 

62

Conclusion 

On a final note, I want to express Rail Labor’s support for Amtrak by urging Congress to support its short-term funding and long-term survival. As Americans, we 

need to fund Amtrak to make the promise of high-speed rail a reality. Amtrak 

should be funded to the extent that America funds our nation’s highways and airports. Make rail passenger service a viable alternative. 

I thank you for this opportunity to speak today and welcome any questions you 

may have.

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Hahs, and gentlemen, for your 

presentations. Let me start. 

Mr. Gunn, you addressed the suggestion that the administration 

has made in proposing the separation of Amtrak’s responsibility of 

operating the trains in the Northeast, with their responsibility to 

maintain the conditions of the right-of-way, and you said that you 

believed that this would pose serious safety concerns. Mr. Hamberger, what are your thoughts on the administration’s proposal to 

separate the maintenance of the track operations from the operating responsibility from Amtrak? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. I concur in Mr. Gunn’s analysis. The British experience where there was separation of ownership was, in fact, a 

disaster. The Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary 

of AAR, was in fact brought over to London to do an analysis of 

what happened. What was seen was that the wheel-rail interface, 

which is what we are talking about here as far as safety, was ignored because the incentives for the operator and for the maintainer of the infrastructure to provide that interface were not the 

same. So we believe that it is important to have the vertical integration between ownership of right of way and the operations. 

Senator BREAUX. Mr. Hahs, would you agree with that position? 

Mr. HAHS. I am not an expert on that. I would agree we want 

a safe railroad to operate on, and I will defer to the people who 

have more knowledge in that area than I do. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you. 

You heard the discussion that I had with the previous panel of 

witnesses with regard to the administration’s proposal on reauthorizing the Rail Safety Act. They did not mention two items that everybody from NTSB’s perspective thinks is very important dealing 

with rail safety, and that is the positive train control, the PTC systems, and the fatigue question, and Mr. Hahs, you have addressed 

the fatigue question. It is not even mentioned in the reauthorization request from the administration. 

I basically got the impression they did not do it because it is 

pretty controversial. I understand from staff that the fatigue hours 

in which rail engineers are required to work, that has been around 

for how long, since 1907, and it has not been updated? I mean, 

would you like to see a recommendation on this? Would your brotherhood have recommendations on it, or is this something we should 

just stay the hell out of and let labor and management negotiate 

how long you work? Do we have a legitimate concern about how 

many hours an engineer can work a week? 

Mr. HAHS. We would not like to see the hours of service opened 

up. We would like to work with management and with Congress to 

put protections in place and agreements in place, or regulations, 

whatever it takes to provide engineers and other operating employVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
63

ees, other people in the rail industry with an opportunity to get 

needed rest when they require it. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, I take it you would agree with what Mr. 

Rutter says, Congress has no role in this. 

Mr. HAHS. Congress would have a role insofar as helping us 

reach a consensus on how we might obtain needed rest as far as 

employees are concerned. I mean, only as a mediator, I would 

think. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you. Mr. Gunn, Amtrak has positive 

train control operations on your Northeast Corridor tracks. How 

long have you all had that in operation? 

Mr. GUNN. Well, the positive train control is in effect from New 

Haven to Boston, and that was put in when they electrified and rebuilt the old New Haven line, and I do not know the exact date, 

but we are operating with, we call it ASCES between New Haven 

and New York. On the rest of the corridor we have cab signals from 

New York to Washington—and I believe we have small stretches 

of ASCES installed there. We want to install ASCES on the entire 

length of the Northeast Corridor, but our cab signal system there 

enforces speed down to, I believe it is 20 miles an hour. At that 

point, it stops enforcing the signals so that you do not have positive 

stop, and that has been there for years. We have cab signals on the 

Springfield line as well that we operate, and that is the same as 

the corridor. It enforces the speed down to, I believe, 20 miles an 

hour. 

Senator BREAUX. Mr. Hamberger, is it just a question of cost? I 

got the impression from NTSB the positive train control system 

should be part of the administration’s recommendation, and I got 

sort of an answer from Mr. Rutter that, well, we are still studying 

it, but it has been around since the 1990’s. It has been used in Europe. It is on some of the Amtrak lines. Is it not a legitimate argument to say we do not know enough about this to install it on 

trains around this country, or is it really just because it is going 

to be costly, and we do not want to put it in? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Well, I think there are two specific answers. 

One is that, as I understand the technology that is on the Northeast Corridor, it is not a full-blown PTC system. It is a predictive 

braking system. It does not provide all of the safety benefits that 

a full-blown system——

Senator BREAUX. But it is 100 percent more than we have got 

any place else. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. It is also a very expensive system paid for by 

the Federal Government when it was put in. It is a matter of costbenefit. Is that the most effective use, when only 2 percent of all 

accidents are, in fact, mainline collisions? Is that the most effective 

use when you take a look at where the fatalities and injuries occur? 

Is that where the resources should be placed, or should they be 

placed on track geometry cars, for example? 

Senator BREAUX. How about the runaway CSX train that we 

could not stop? Would a positive train control system have been 

able to stop that or not? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. I do not know the answer to that. I would point 

out that fortunately that did not cause——

64

Senator BREAUX. Well, we are all thankful that it did not, but 

the potential for a runaway train that we cannot stop, I mean, it 

seems like technology would be available to be able to stop a train 

that is running down the tracks with no engineer. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. I am told that PTC would not have stopped 

that train, but I would like to provide a more complete answer for 

the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The train in question was actually a yard switching movement. This locomotive 

had operating brakes, but the cars that were being handled did not have the brakes 

engaged. This is a completely normal train operation throughout the North American rail industry. The engineer had applied the locomotive brakes but mistakenly 

opened the throttle wide open which overcame the braking effect on the locomotive. 

No system currently available anywhere in the world or under design would have 

prevented this unfortunate occurrence.

Senator BREAUX. I would like to know why, because that is part 

of the design, they tell me, if PTC is supposed to be positive train 

control, and that if something happens to the train and PTC does 

not do it, what the heck does it do? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. With your permission, Chuck Dettmann, our 

senior Executive Vice President for Safety and Operations is right 

behind me. Chuck. 

Senator BREAUX. Sure. 

Mr. DETTMANN. Mr. Chairman, on any of these type of systems, 

which are computer and communications based systems, the system has to know, just like in air traffic control, that the airplane, 

or in this case that the train, is allowed out in the system in order 

to activate all of the safety systems that come with positive train 

control. 

In the particular example of the CSX train south of Toledo, there 

was no authorization. There was no system that was set up, because that was a yard movement. It is just like any other switch 

engine moving around in the yards of this country that unfortunately got out on the main track, and without the system having 

been activated, PTC would not have stopped it. 

Senator BREAUX. I appreciate that, but we have got systems that 

you can install on cars now that if someone steals your car, you can 

push a button and stop the operation of that automobile. It seems 

to me that when we are talking about trains, that some type of a 

system in today’s technology ought to be available to have some 

control over a train that is running down the track with no one at 

the controls. 

I mean, positive train control systems are in place in many parts 

of the world, and yet industry seemingly is not doing anything, according to NTSB, to promote it. The administration does not want 

to recommend it, and yet other railroads are using it, but we are 

not. 

Mr. DETTMANN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, there is no PTC system 

anywhere in this world that is working according to the designs 

that we, FRA, and the IDOT are designing in the State of Illinois, 

especially with Amtrak’s help. The first one will be put in in Switzerland, in a 40-kilometer stretch, called ETCS this year at a cost 

of $2 million a mile. That is funded by the Swiss Government. 

65

Now, having said that, we have been working diligently—we have spent over $250 million of private and Federal money to develop a system, and the Illinois project, which will be in a demonstrable phase in spring of next year, with Amtrak’s help, with the 

State, and with FRA, and $20 million private money put in, that 

will demonstrate the viability of bringing all of the communications 

and computer technologies together, which has not been done to 

this point, sir, and to show that this system will work, and then 

how we can make it cost-effective. 

For example, the Union Pacific, Burlington Northern, and GE spent $30 million in the Portland, Oregon area trying out a PTC 

system, and one of the things we found is the new generation of 

alternating current locomotives completely destroyed the computer 

and communications systems abilities to communicate because of 

the EMF that they put out. There are technical difficulties, Senator, that we are addressing as fast as we can. It is critical. We 

are working toward it, but there is no PTC system you can pick off 

the shelf and put into play, especially today, certainly not since 

1990, when NTSB began their recommendations. 

Senator BREAUX. The chief investigator of accidents is recommending it, it does not seem like much is being done to try and implement it, and they have been doing it for 12 years. 

Senator Hollings. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dettmann, let me get a fellow that knows 

this about thing. I am not talking about the PTC system. I am 

talking about the highway rail, these regular crossings, which at 

41 percent is almost half. Now, you do not need a PTC system. All 

you need is that cross arm, and I speak advisedly. I made a living 

on you folks. That is how I got to be able to afford to serve in the 

U.S. Senate. 

Fifty years ago I got the largest rail crossing verdict in the history of South Carolina, and I said, all you need to do is put up a 

cross arm, and the railroads absolutely opposed it. I went all the 

way to the Public Service Commission voluntarily and set up a 

hearing, and we ordered it at the Liberty Hill crossing in North 

Charleston, $7,500. That was way cheaper than the $300,000. That 

was 50 years ago. They get millions now. 

But what about regular cross arms, protection at the highway 

crossings? That is not so sophisticated. Instead of the bell ringing 

automatically and the flashing light flashing, the cross arm comes 

down. You have got to break the arm to get up onto the track. That 

would save you a lot of lawyers and a lot of verdicts. 

Mr. DETTMANN. Senator, if I may, the grade crossing protection 

is for the benefit of the highway population. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about for the benefit of the railroads. I did not sue the highway. I sued the railroad. 

Mr. DETTMANN. I understand that, Senator. It is the State authorities that determine where the available money—and we certainly believe in the section 130 funds you have provided for this 

work, that it is critical. We at the AAR have on our own begun research into new low-cost crossing warning devices that, admittedly 

they are anywhere from $1/4 million to $1 million per installation 

now, to see if we can work with the suppliers to come up with a 

less costly grade crossing. 

66

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gunn, on this limited time, I am worried, 

since 1996, 27 locomotive engineers have been killed. That is more 

than four a year. That is more than the pilots. What would you do, 

he says more empowerment, but I am running a railroad. I do not 

want all my engineers coming up to me and saying, I don’t feel 

well, I don’t feel well, I am empowered to say I don’t feel well. On 

the other hand, something is wrong with work rules. They have got 

to cut back on their fatigue somehow. In your experience, what 

would you do? 

Mr. GUNN. Well, Amtrak has a different situation to some extent 

from the freight railroads. First of all we operate a scheduled service, which means that our employees can, most of the time, plan 

their days off. Our policy is that—and we come under the hours of 

service law, which is now 12 hours, I believe, so we cannot have 

anybody on duty more than 12 hours. 

We have a rule that if the run is more than 6 hours, we put a 

second person in the cab. That is what we do today, and on the 

high speed trains the runs are generally, less than 4 hours, and 

then the employee is off duty for a couple of hours until they return, so we will get two round-trips, New York to Washington. 

I think the most important thing to me would be schedule. If you 

can schedule employees’ time so they can plan their lives, I think 

that is important. I think you would not in our case want somebody 

running a passenger train, unless it was an absolute emergency, 

for like, 12 hours, trying to sit there and be alert. That is asking 

for too much, although out West that will happen. If you get into 

a delay it can happen, but I think scheduling, being able to schedule your time off is important, and that gets to the whole issue of 

having the railroad in good shape, having a minimum number of 

slow orders, and being able to move over the road quickly to do 

your day’s work, so that you can have routines and that you can 

plan your rest. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree, Mr. Hahs? 

Mr. HAHS. Well, that is a great concept, and he is exactly right. 

If you had a scheduled operation that is the way it would work. 

You could plan your time off. 

The fact of the matter is, in the early nineties the railroads made 

a major effort to study scheduling trains, and they apparently have 

given up on it because they later in the nineties decided to start 

scheduling time off for employees and both have been very limited, 

with very limited success. 

When I said people should be empowered to mark time off, I did 

not mean you could just walk in any day. I thought you would have 

to meet a criteria where you had been previously taxed from service. You had to work so much in a period of time, and you ought 

to be able to request rest if you need it. Not everyone is the same. 

Some people need more rest than others, and yet a lot of times employees on the railroad, operating employees are treated like a 

piece of equipment. If you are there and you are rested and available under the Hours of Service Act they expect you to go to work, 

and it just does not work like that for every individual, and that 

is all we are trying to do, is get some control over our lives, and 

we believe if we could get into a situation where people could request rest when they meet a certain criteria, that the railroads 

67

may get more interested in trying to do a scheduled operation like 

we talked about to give time off. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gunn, you diverted from your prepared remarks, and I was impressed with everything you had to point out 

with respect to the operation of Amtrak. Look at S. 1991 and find 

out where we are lacking, or wrong, or any criticism that you have 

for the Committee. We would appreciate it, because we work hard, 

and we think we have got the right approach, and any amendments or any suggestions that you have the Committee would appreciate it. Specifically on the contingencies on this $100 million loan, I want 

to make sure that those are eliminated. I have seen the comments 

publicly about those particular requirements in order to get the 

loan, and it looks like more or less you are trying to get us out of 

business rather than in business, so make sure that we also take 

care of those contingencies in our measure as we try to pass something and keep it going. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BREAUX. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gunn, I thank you for your candor and your honesty, and we 

all have high hopes as to the results of your stewardship of Amtrak. 

You wrote a letter dated May 30 and you stated, I quote, for the 

past few years Amtrak pretended it was on a glide path to self-sufficiency, and maintained that fiction for too long. As a result, decisions that Amtrak made thinking it could achieve that mandate 

were unwise. Too many happy words have hidden some very dismal financial results, unquote. Do you not think somebody at Amtrak, namely, the board of directors, should be held accountable for 

these decisions? 

Mr. GUNN. Well, first of all, obviously, I was not present. I do not 

know exactly what the interaction between management and the 

board was. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you know what the interaction is between 

any board of directors and a corporation? 

Mr. GUNN. Let me just say that I think, in fairness, the board 

was given some information which was not clear. 

Should they have realized that the situation was deteriorating? 

I think once they mortgaged Penn Station that should have sent 

alarm bells ringing off in everybody’s head. When they did that is 

when I suddenly realized Amtrak was obviously in big trouble, but 

I do not want to characterized behavior before the time I got here, 

but I think people should have been aware that something was 

radically wrong. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, let me say that you did characterize their 

behavior in your letter to me. Have you closed your books for last 

year? 

Mr. GUNN. We do not have an auditor’s letter yet, but we have 

reached the point where our income statement, the draft income 

statement, unaudited, does reflect GAAP, and we had to make—I 

forget the exact number, but including both 2001 and 2000 almost 

$200 million of adjustments in the bottom line and, of course, it 

was the wrong way. 

68

Senator MCCAIN. I do not agree with threatening to shut down 

the entire Amtrak system, including commuter and freight operations in the Northeast Corridor and other commuter operations 

performed by Amtrak under contract. Don’t you think there should 

be a contingency plan in place to avoid this possibility in the future? 

Mr. GUNN. Well, I think what should be available in the future 

is some predictability about Amtrak’s survival. The problem we 

had in June is that we were about to run out of cash. Had that 

happened then, all of your employees basically are off the payroll. 

If you want a contingency plan for, let us say, the Northeast Corridor, you have to put in place a plan that will keep Amtrak, at 

least in the Corridor, running. 

Senator MCCAIN. That is what I am referring to. 

Mr. GUNN. But that would require a long term plan for how you 

are going to fund Amtrak, and what Amtrak is going to be. I mean, 

it was absolutely an awful period of time. I spent most of my time 

on the other side of the fence being the operator of a service that 

depended on Amtrak like SEPTA, for example, so I know what my 

compatriots were going through a very difficult period with us. 

It was not a threat to shut down. It was just a description of the 

reality of what was going to happen, and it was a terrible time for 

them, and I am going to have a real hard time, I think, just reestablishing some trust with my fellow managers out there. I am 

going to try to do it, but the solution is to fund whatever it is Congress wants Amtrak to be. The solution is to put it on a stable fiscal basis so that you know that the services you want to continue 

will continue. 

Senator MCCAIN. I agree totally, and the problem we have had 

in the past, you identified in your letter to me we were not given 

correct information, and without correct information, it is impossible for the Congress to act responsibly. We are counting on you 

to give us accurate information no matter how bleak that picture 

might be. 

Last year, Amtrak hired McKinsey & Company to conduct a strategic analysis of Amtrak, and made recommendations. As I understand it, McKinsey concluded Amtrak should become a private forprofit company operating profitable service in corridors, providing 

subsidized long distance service under contract, and that Amtrak 

should prepare for potential competition. How much, in total, did 

McKinsey charge for its work, do you know? 

Mr. GUNN. I believe that the total payments to McKinsey was 

over $11 million. 

Senator MCCAIN. And why has Amtrak been reluctant to release 

the reports of this $11 million contract? 

Mr. GUNN. Well, McKinsey came to me before I took the job. 

They obviously were interested in continuing the work. They actually came to Nova Scotia, and they promised me at that time that 

I would get the documents of the work that they had undertaken, 

and I am still waiting for that, and so I want to see——

Senator MCCAIN. You never got the report? 

Mr. GUNN. I saw a pile of reports that were not synthesized. It 

was about that high, and in them there were a whole series of recommendations. They may have recommended what you just said. 

69

That I do not remember. We talked more about the number of car 

cleaners, the switch-engine tricks, two three-man crews who switch 

engines, and things like that, but I am waiting—I am sure they are 

going to give it to me, because they said they would, but I do not 

have it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I think we have ways of acting if you do 

not get it. McKinsey does a lot of business with the Federal Government, and I hope you will share that. I believe you are obliged 

to share that information with us when you receive it. 

Mr. GUNN. I would. The only reservation I have is, I think when 

they signed the contract with McKinsey there was some sort of a 

confidentiality agreement. That is in the back of my mind, and as 

long as there is nothing to legally interfere with my giving you the 

information, you are more than welcome to it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Could I ask one further question? 

Senator BREAUX. You may. 

Senator MCCAIN. What do you forecast Amtrak’s operating loss 

will be for this fiscal year, roughly? 

Mr. GUNN. For this fiscal year it will probably be over $1 billion. 

In terms of cash, it will be somewhere around $500 million. In 

other words, when you take out depreciation charges it will be 

about $500 million. Our operating subsidy was about $200 million, 

which is why we have a $300-million problem. 

Senator MCCAIN. Finally, I would like to know your view of the 

administration’s announced plans for Amtrak and how you would 

like to see Amtrak reformed. 

Mr. GUNN. The administration, if I remember rightly, there were 

five points, and I certainly agree with a couple of them. That is, 

to establish economic standards for Amtrak’s services. I think that 

has to be done legislatively. I think it is very difficult for the management to do that. 

I agree with running the place in an open and transparent way 

so that you feel comfortable with how we budget and what we 

budgeted for. You may not agree with it, but at least you will know 

what we are doing. 

I disagree with the idea that you turn Amtrak into an operating 

company and put all of the routes up for bid for profit. The reason 

I disagree with that is that the routes are not profitable, and so 

what they are really saying is, you go out of business. 

I disagree with separating the corridor infrastructure from the 

operation. I think that is a very, very unwise move, and as Mr. 

Hamberger said, the British have already proven, they have experimented for us, and we can thank them for that. We should learn 

from what has happened over there. It has not been a success, and 

I can tell you why, if you are interested, but there is a number of 

reasons why it does not work. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, maybe you could provide for the record 

some more specifics as to how you would like to see Amtrak reformed, Mr. Gunn. 

Mr. GUNN. Well, I think my own view, and this is just my view 

at this point, is that there should be—first of all I agree with people who say that at the present time there is a certain inequity in 

the way that we allocate resources. I mean, some States pay subVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
70

sidized services, and pay 105 percent of long term variable costs. 

Other States get a lot of service with very little investment, and 

there should be equity across the board. 

We should have a basic understanding of how we fund Amtrak, 

both capital and operating, and I would point to the transit model 

as an example. In transit there is a pool of money, with an 80/20 

funding arrangement wherein the Federal Government puts in 80 

percent of a project’s cost, but there has to be 20-percent share of 

local commitment. I think some sort of arrangement where you 

have a method of allocating resources to people who really want 

service is important. 

I think a number of our services, however, have to be funded as 

a national service, and those costs are relatively small, in the 

scheme of things. Primarily those are your transcontinentals, 

where it is very difficult to get support from a given State for a 

train that is passing through the State maybe in the middle of the 

night. So, I think there are a few services, the transcontinentals, 

the ones that go from Chicago West, for example, that need to be 

funded separately from the short haul services, and from the proposed high speed corridors. 

I really think we need to decide how, and the split should be on 

funding between the local governments and the Federal Government, or Amtrak. 

And on the operating subsidies, I think on the trains other than 

the transcontinentals we should set a very definite, what I call cost 

recovery target, and that is revenue over operating costs. In other 

words, you want to have some rules around where we run service 

and how it is funded, and I think that requires legislative action, 

because I cannot enforce that on my own. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you very much. I think it has been an 

excellent discussion on not only the safety, but on where we are 

with Amtrak. I think overall on the safety issues, which is the subject of this hearing, we have heard some positive things both from 

the freight railroads as far as the record is concerned, and also the 

record of Amtrak. 

With regard to safety, I think there is always more that can be 

done. We are going to work on the safety reauthorization bill to see 

if we cannot improve some of those recommendations which I think 

are not as efficient as they should be. With that, this hearing has 

been very helpful, and I thank the witnesses very much for being 

with us. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.] 

(71)

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

Immediately after the terrorists attacks on America, when U.S. commercial jetliners were grounded, the only way I could get to my state of Georgia was by rail. 

It was an Amtrak train that took me to Atlanta, just as Amtrak safely delivered 

countless other Americans to their destinations during those critical days following 

September 11th. Mr. Chairman, you understood the critical importance of securing 

not just our airports and airways, but all of America’s borders and transportation 

corridors. And so after 9–11 you called this subcommittee together to hear testimony 

on securing our national rail system. 

At that October hearing George Warrington, then President of Amtrak, asked 

Congress for $3.2 billion to cover the safety, security and capacity needs of the national passenger rail system. Congress responded to Mr. Warrington’s request in the 

same way we generally respond to Amtrak. Once again we treated Amtrak as the 

little ‘‘red-headed stepchild’’ of the transportation family and gave Amtrak a fraction 

of the amount it asked for. Instead of the $3.2 billion it needed, we have so far given 

Amtrak just $100 million to improve its tunnels and $5 million to help keep its passengers out of harm’s way. 

For three decades it has been Congress’s pattern to short-change Amtrak. Since 

Amtrak was created over 30 years ago, our government has invested $25 billion in 

the system. In contrast, during this same time period, we have invested $750 billion 

in our highway and aviation systems. And in recent years, Congress has appropriated less than half the money it promised to appropriate in the 1997 Amtrak Reform Act. The $100 million loan the Transportation Department has said it would 

lend Amtrak is only about half of what Amtrak said it needed to operate until the 

start of the next fiscal year. As the distinguished chairman of the Transportation 

Appropriations Subcommittee has said, ‘‘proposing short-term loan guarantees simply kicks the can down the road and fails to face reality.’’ This, my friends, is no 

way to run a railroad. It is, in short, a fiscal policy that undermines safety and ensures failure. 

I am the proud cosponsor of legislation introduced by the Chairman of this Committee, Senator Hollings. We should all take note of the particular title of that bill—

the National Defense Rail Act. It is predicated on the notion that a significant and 

substantial investment in rail infrastructure is an investment in America’s economy 

and long-term national security. It is a concept not unlike President Eisenhower’s 

vision 50 years ago of a system of Interstate and Defense Highways. It was a vision 

made reality only by our willingness to invest the nation’s dollars in the nation’s 

highways. A viable—and safe—national passenger rail system will also require this 

same kind of financial commitment—beginning with our willingness to provide to 

Amtrak $205 million in the Supplemental and an additional $1.2 billion in next 

year’s Transportation Appropriations bill. I hope today’s hearing provides an opportunity to ask some tough questions so that we can begin to get the even tougher 

answers we need to constructively move ahead. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

EDWARD HAMBERGER

Question. What did the freight railroads operating on the Northeast Corridor plan 

to do if Amtrak shut down as it threatened? 

Answer. While the Northeast Corridor is principally used for intercity passenger 

and commuter operations, freight railroads have a critical need for uninterrupted 

access to the Corridor to serve a variety of customers, including automotive, chemical, electric power, and poultry feed operations. In fact, a significant portion of some 

individual railroad’s revenues are derived from serving these customers. 

Some of the affected customers’ facilities are located directly on the Corridor, but 

others are located on freight-owned lines that can be reached only via the Corridor. 

72

1 I.e., from 1.30 to 1.56 per million train miles, up 20%. 2From 3.54 to 4.17 per million train miles, up 18%. 

While some of these locations could be served by alternative rail service over less 

efficient routes or by intermodal service, many current rail customers would lose 

service entirely if an Amtrak shutdown resulted in freight railroads being unable 

to use the Northeast Corridor. 

When the threat of an Amtrak shutdown arose, freight railroads identified which 

of their customers would be affected and examined the options available to permit 

service to continue. In addition to ensuring that the customers were aware that 

service to their facilities could be affected, the railroads made certain that the Surface Transportation Board and the Congress were aware of the potential impacts. 

Freight railroads also identified segments of the corridor where a freight railroad 

would be the only remaining operator and were exploring whether it might have 

been possible to arrange continued operations temporarily without requiring any 

services from Amtrak. Freight railroads were also prepared to pursue arrangements 

that would give them temporary access to required Amtrak facilities and personnel 

(especially dispatching, maintenance, and security personnel), although the uncertainty about Amtrak’s future prevented freight railroads from fully exploring this 

possibility. Despite these various efforts, however, it is a certainty that some major 

rail freight customers, particularly in the southern tier of the Corridor, would have 

experienced significant disruptions were freight railroads forced to embargo their 

traffic.

Question. What do you think needs to be done to avoid the possibility of a shutdown of freight operations on the Corridor in the future? 

Answer. Over the short term, directed service has been proposed as an alternative. Amtrak could be directed to keep the Corridor open for freight and commuter service by staffing the dispatching and maintenance functions. Freight and 

commuter operations would then take place as at present. 

Long term, regardless of ownership, the Corridor must be funded sufficiently so 

that commuter and freight carriers have access to sufficient, well-maintained trackage to serve present and future markets. Insufficient funding means that passengers and freight will increasingly be diverted to cars and trucks on the region’s 

highways. If another other than Amtrak acquires and maintains the Corridor, access for the freight and commuter carriers are similarly important.

Question. You noted in your written testimony that the overall train accident rate 

declined 64% from 1980 to 2001. However, the accident rate has been creeping up 

again, from 3.54 accidents per million train-miles in 1997 to 4.17 accidents per million train-miles in 2001. Is the increase in the accident rate due primarily to track 

failures? What specific actions has the industry taken to address the problem? 

Answer. According to FRA statistics track-caused train accidents account for 

about 37% of all train accidents. Since the rate for track-caused accidents grew 

slightly faster 1 that the rate for all accidents 2 between 1997 and 2001, track-caused 

accidents accounted for about 42% of the increase in the overall train accident rate 

in that period. Most of the increase in train accidents in this period occurred in 

yards, where speeds are often slower. 

Specific actions that the industry is taking to address this problem include: significant research in better quality track components such as rail and ties; more 

modern track inspection technology such as rail defect cars, track geometry cars and 

gauge restraint measurement systems; and cooperative industry-Labor-FRA programs such as Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), Safety Assurance and Compliance Programs (SACP), and core competency training.

Question. There have been many concerns raised about the ability to safely transport spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from locations around the 

country to the planned repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. What special precautions 

do the railroads take in moving such shipments? Has the Department of Energy 

been willing to pay to have the material shipped in special train service? 

The AAR has two programs to reduce the risk of the transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The first is AAR’s ‘‘Recommended Railroad Operating Practices for 

Transportation of Hazardous Materials’’ or OT–55. SNF and High Level Radioactive 

Waste (HLRW) are shipped in accordance with OT–55. Some of the provisions of 

OT–55 include:

• 1. Maximum speed of 50 MPH.

• 2. Special requirements if a wayside bearing detector finds a hot bearing condition.

73

1Truck hunting is an instability at high speed of wheel set (truck) causing truck to weave 

down the track, usually with the flange of the wheel striking the rail. 2 Excessive lateral rocking of cars and locomotives can occur, usually at low speeds. The speed 

range at which this cyclic phenomenon occurs is determined by such factors as the wheel base, 

height of center of gravity of each individual car or locomotive, and the spring dampening associated with each vehicle’s suspension system. 3 A wheel flat is a flat spot or loss of roundness of the tread of a railroad wheel. 

• 3. Bearing detectors are placed no more than 40 miles apart

• 4. Main line track and sidings are inspected for rail defects and track geometry 

at an increased frequency.

In addition, AAR has drafted recommend practices governing the specifications for 

the rail cars that will be used for SNF transportation. Freight cars meeting these 

specifications will perform at higher standards than current freight cars. An important feature is the use of electronic controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes. ECP brakes 

used in unit train service today, can stop up to 30% faster than conventional brakes 

because the signal is transmitted the length of the train electronically instead of by 

a pneumatic signal. In addition to providing superior braking performance, ECP 

brakes utilize a communication system throughout a train that can be used to transmit train ‘‘health’’ information to the locomotive crew and security personnel. The 

train health information includes monitoring for known derailment causes such as 

truck hunting,1 rocking,2 wheel flats,3 defective bearings, vertical and longitudinal 

acceleration, and, of course, braking performance. It is noteworthy that the Private 

Fuel Storage (PFS) consortium, which is seeking to build a temporary storage facility for SNF in Utah, is currently designing their system to meet AAR’s recommended practices for SNF Trains, and intends to use and pay for dedicated trains 

incorporating ECP brakes and a train health monitoring system. 

While DOE has shipped most of its recent SNF shipments via dedicated trains, 

DOE has not yet committed to their use in their draft Request for Proposal (RFP) 

for Acquisition of Waste Acceptance and Transportation Services for the Office of 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. In the draft RFP, DOE indicates they will 

evaluate the proposals based upon ‘‘the degree to which the Offeror demonstrates 

that its proposed use of special trains and advanced rail technology for shipping 

SNF is cost effective and lessons the potential for adverse railroad equipment incidents, e.g. derailment, cask failure, and cask leakage of radioactive contaminants, 

among others.’’ AAR believes that DOE should follow the lead of PFS and require 

the use of dedicated trains, and not leave it to the proposal evaluators to decide 

whether or not to use dedicated trains. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

HON. MARION C. BLAKEY

Question. NTSB is investigating at least five of the recent rain accidents, including the accidents near Minot, North Dakota, which involved the release of anhydrous ammonia and caused one fatality; the Auto Train derailment near Crescent 

City, Florida, which took four lives; and the rear-end collision of a BNSF freight 

train with a Metrolink train south of Los Angeles, which involved two fatalities. 

What conclusions have you reached to date? When can we expect the NTSB’s probable cause of these accidents? 

Answer. NTSB tries to complete major railroad accident investigations in approximately one year from the accident’s occurrence. Each of the 3 accident investigations 

mentioned is at various stages in our process and on that one-year schedule. No conclusions have yet been made in these investigations. Below is a brief update:

• Minot, North Dakota, January 18, 2002—The NTSB completed a two-day hearing on July 16, 2002, that covered two major issues: track maintenance by the 

railroad and vulnerability of hazardous materials-carrying tank cars.

• Crescent City, Florida, April 18, 2002—The NTSB, during the week of July 22, 

2002, interviewed track maintenance crews and supervisors in Jacksonville, 

Florida. CSXT track conditions are a focus of our investigation.

• Placentia (Los Angeles), California, April 23, 2002—We have interviewed the 

train dispatchers, requested cell phone records from the BNSF crew, conducted 

all signal tests, and are reviewing Federal Railroad Administration compliance 

records. Human performance of the BNSF train crew is an issue in this investigation.

74

Question. In your written testimony, you stated that ‘‘the Safety Board believes 

strong consideration should be given to the installation [at grade crossings] of devices that will prevent motorists from driving around lowered gates or median barriers.’’ My understanding is that gates have been intentionally designed to allow 

emergency vehicles to drive around the gates. How would your proposal deal with 

emergency vehicles? 

Answer. We understand the concern that has been expressed regarding emergency 

vehicles at grade crossings, and we are aware that some crossings have been intentionally designed to allow emergency vehicles to drive around gates. However, we 

do not believe this situation is wise and we do not support the notion that any vehicle, emergency or otherwise, should be permitted to traverse a grade crossing when 

the gates are lowered. 

The regulatory minimum warning time for lights to activate at actively protected 

crossings—those with lights and gates—is 20 seconds, after which the gates begin 

to lower. The gates are then required to be horizontal for only 5 seconds before the 

arrival of a train. Given these short warning times and the inability of a train to 

stop to avoid a collision due to its mass and inertia, the risk of collision and death 

to highway vehicle occupants and train crews or passengers when a vehicle tries to 

circumvent lowered gates is simply too great. Our recent investigation of the grade 

crossing accident at Bourbonnais, Illinois, is an example of the risk involved and 

the tragic consequences in such cases.

Question. Preventing employee fatigue has been on the NTSB’s ‘‘most wanted’’ list 

since 1990. What recommendations do you have with respect to the rail industry 

and how can this best be accomplished? 

Answer. Fatigue in all transportation modes has been of concern to the NTSB for 

many years. The most recent safety recommendations regarding this matter were 

issued to the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administrator on June 1, 1999. Recommendation I–99–1, which supersedes a 

1989 recommendation, and recommendation R–99–2, state: 

Require the modal administrations to modify the appropriate Code of Federal Regulations to establish scientifically based hours-of-service regulations that set limits 

on hours of service, provide predictable work and rest schedules, and consider circadian rhythms and human sleep and rest requirements. Seek Congressional authority, if necessary, for the modal administrations to establish these regulations. (I–99–

1) 

Establish within 2 years scientifically based hours-of-service regulations that set 

limits on hours of service. Provide predictable work and rest schedules, and consider 

circadian rhythms and human sleep and rest requirements. (R–99–2) 

We are aware that some individual railroad companies are addressing the fatigue 

problem, and the FRA has told the NTSB that it essentially concurs with the Board 

on the need to adequately address fatigue on the Nation’s railroads. We believe the 

current hours-of-service regulations are obsolete and need to be revised based on the 

latest scientific findings. While sleep cannot be regulated, the NTSB believes that 

adequate time for sleep can be provided through changes in the hours-of-service regulations. We understand from the FRA that changes in statute are required to alter 

railroad hours-of-service, and we would encourage the Congress to act to address 

this critical problem.

Question. Are Amtrak’s current procedures adequate for responding to a serious 

train accident and dealing with victims’ families? How quickly was Amtrak able to 

provide a manifest following the Crescent City, Florida, derailment? 

Answer. Because Amtrak has not been required to provide assistance to family 

members of accident victims, their current procedures are probably not adequate. 

However, Amtrak has advised NTSB staff that it is currently working to review and 

revise its procedures dealing with families of victims, and we have provided Amtrak 

staff with copies of the NTSB’s federal disaster plan, and samples of aviation family 

assistance plans and emergency procedures. 

Following the Crescent City, Florida, accident, many of the uninjured survivors 

did not receive timely Amtrak assistance or direction on how to proceed with their 

travel, and additional Amtrak staff on site would have been useful. In addition, Amtrak employees could not handle the volume of inquiries to its 1–800 number following the accident, and callers repeatedly received a busy signal for up to 3 hours. 

Amtrak did not provide the Safety Board with a manifest until several days after 

the accident, even though the train was an all-reserved train. When we received the 

manifest, it did not have complete information, such as addresses or contact information. 

As we have noted in past accidents, the manifest issue is one that will be difficult 

to resolve. On most passenger trains, advance reservations are not necessary or reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
75

quired, and passengers are able to board a train without a prior ticket purchase. 

Even on reserved trains, a reservation for a group may only include the name of 

the person purchasing the ticket for the group, and not the name of everyone in the 

group. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

HON. ALAN RUTTER

Amtrak Loan 

Question. Why specifically was Amtrak not able to get the full $270 million from 

the Department of Transportation through a loan or loan guarantee? 

Answer. The Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program 

authorizes the Secretary to provide direct loans and loan guarantees to eligible applicants for eligible purposes. Those purposes include the acquisition, improvement, 

or rehabilitation of rail equipment or facilities. It specifically provides that such 

loans and loan guarantees shall not be used for railroad operating expenses. The 

only eligible purpose that was immediately identifiable was Amtrak’s capital expenditure program for FY 2002. However, Amtrak has already funded much of that 

program throughout the year. Only the July, August, and September portions of 

that program, which totaled approximately $100 million, remained unfunded and 

were eligible under the RRIF program. 

Amtrak Operating Expenses 

Question. If Amtrak needs cash for operating expenses, what good is a loan for 

capital projects?

• If Amtrak is using the loan to free up its own capital funds to cover operating 

loses, doesn’t this mean that Amtrak actually had over $100 million available 

to continue operating? If this is the case, why did you threaten to shut down 

the system?

Answer. First, the Administration did not threaten to shut down the Amtrak system. Amtrak management did that. Postponing capital expenditures was one of the 

strategies advocated by the Department and other members of Amtrak’s Board of 

Directors to help the company get through fiscal year 2002. Amtrak’s management, 

however, maintained that the $100 million in capital expenditures planned for July, 

August, and September in 2002 were required for the operational integrity of Amtrak or were required to meet obligations under existing agreements and contracts. 

Given the limited time available to the Department to prevent a shutdown of Amtrak service and commuter service dependent upon Amtrak, the Department was required to accept this statement of management. 

Amtrak Loan Conditions 

Question. The conditions the Administration put on the loan to Amtrak are a step 

in the right direction. Better financial controls and accounting transparency have 

been called for by many different interests, including the Amtrak Reform Council 

and a number of states, which often can’t understand for what Amtrak is billing 

them. I am especially encouraged that Amtrak is required to develop a plan to reduce operating expenses by at least $100 million in fiscal year 2003.

• Please provide a valuation of all Amtrak assets.

• Are the conditions in the agreement only effective for the period the loan is outstanding—in other words, until November 15, 2002? Do you recommend that 

these same conditions be attached to Amtrak’s fiscal year 2003 appropriations?

Answer. As a condition of the loan, Amtrak is required to provide the Department 

with a current inventory and valuation of its assets from existing sources of information within 30 days of the loan. FRA’s work in evaluating Amtrak’s loan application, however, showed that Amtrak’s existing data on its assets are out of date. It 

is for that reason that the Department also intends to assure that an independent 

third party undertakes an updated arms-length valuation of all assets. I will keep 

the Committee informed as this effort progresses. 

Sections 1.3 and 4.12 of the Financing Agreement provide that the conditions imposed as Attachments A and B to the ‘‘Loan Commitment Letter’’ dated June 28, 

2002, will survive the termination of the Financing Agreement and will remain in 

effect to the extent provided in those conditions. 

76

Service Expansions 

Question. The conditions of the loan require Amtrak to immediately stop all work 

on projects to expand service. But the terms of the loan agreement state that this 

requirement does not apply where Amtrak is obligated by an existing contract or 

law to continue to fund such services. It is worthy to note that Amtrak plans to use 

about $11 million of its loan on high-speed rail projects and another $5.1 million 

for Las Vegas infrastructure improvements even though it doesn’t currently serve 

Las Vegas.

• How many commitments has Amtrak made and what is the total exposure?

• Do the commitments include new high-speed rail projects in California, the Midwest, Florida and other areas? How do you defend such expenditures as ‘‘emergency’’ needs?

Answer. The Department of Transportation believes that its information on the 

specific commitments may be incomplete since Amtrak does not, as a routine matter, provide the Department with copies of these agreements. Amtrak is still working on which of its projects will need DOT approval under the terms of the loan 

agreement. In particular, Amtrak has not shared with us any conclusions about the 

Las Vegas project to date. I wish, therefore, to defer the response to this question 

until I have had an opportunity to compare FRA’s current information with that of 

Amtrak. 

The high-speed rail project-related activities funded under the loan agreement involve a number of existing and well-established infrastructure improvements to the 

Northeast Corridor and do not expand the existing scope of Amtrak’s high-speed operations. With regard to Amtrak’s involvement in high-speed rail efforts outside the 

Northeast Corridor, Secretary Mineta was very clear in his statement on the future 

of passenger rail service that there is a need to de-link the future of passenger rail 

currently provided by Amtrak from State-based efforts to develop high-speed rail on 

selected intercity corridors. The latter is more appropriately addressed by establishing a long-term partnership between the States and the Federal Government to 

support improved intercity passenger rail service. 

Consultant Report 

Question. One of the conditions of the loan is that Amtrak turn over to DOT all 

of the work product of Amtrak’s third party consultant. Does this refer to the work 

Amtrak hired McKinsey and Company to perform? Hasn’t the Administration seen 

this information—after all, Secretary Mineta does sit on Amtrak’s Board. 

Answer. The third party consultant work referred to in this condition is that undertaken by McKinsey and Company. While Amtrak’s Board of Directors, including 

Deputy Secretary Jackson and me serving as the Secretary’s representatives on that 

Board, have been briefed by McKinsey on several occasions, we were not provided 

with anything resembling a final report. That is the reason for the condition. 

Report Recommendations 

Question. Could you please summarize some of McKinsey’s recommendations with 

respect to the strategic direction Amtrak should be pursuing? 

Answer. Amtrak has only just recently submitted a copy of the report to the Department’s Inspector General, and I have not yet had an opportunity to review that 

material. I will provide the Committee with this information as soon as I determine 

whether there is any material difference between the briefings I have received and 

the report provided to the Inspector General. 

Additional Amtrak Debt 

Question. The loan agreement suggests Amtrak is prohibited from incurring additional debt while the loan is outstanding. Yet, it states that Amtrak may incur indebtedness in connection with the purchase of assets used in the ordinary course 

of business. I assume this could cover passenger equipment, locomotives and just 

about anything else needed to run trains and stations.

• What protections does this provision really provide? Shouldn’t we require that 

any new indebtedness be approved by the Department of Transportation?

Answer. Certain types of debt, such as long-term debt to acquire capital assets 

needed for operations and short-term instruments to mitigate cyclical swings in cash 

flow can be viewed as normal to conducting business. The Department’s intent for 

this condition was to convey to Amtrak that taking on long-term debt to raise cash 

for operations is not an acceptable business practice and would be challenged by the 

Department. I do not believe additional action by Congress on this point is needed 

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at this time. Amtrak must now obtain the Department’s approval for any financing 

secured by an asset of the Corporation. 

Shortline Loans 

Question. Shortlines have been trying to access this program for several years 

now, with no success. Yet, Amtrak is able to secure a loan in a matter of days.

• What kind of reaction are you getting from shortlines about the RRIF loan?

• What do you plan to do to improve the process for shortlines?

• How did the Administration rationalize not requiring any kind of credit risk 

premium from Amtrak?

Answer. The Department has received one letter written before the loan was 

made, from The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), 

expressing concern that Amtrak not be treated differently than other applicants for 

financial assistance. The Department required Amtrak to comply with the same 

statutory and regulatory requirements as any other applicant under the RRIF program. 

FRA has completed one loan and is near completion on another loan to shortline 

railroads. Once completed, FRA will conduct a program review of RRIF to identify 

the lessons that can be learned from these two agreements and other expressions 

of interest in the RRIF program that have not resulted in financing agreements. 

The program review will examine every step of the process to see where the procedures used by FRA can be improved and make us a better, more responsive participant in assuring that the essential capital investment needs of the rail industry are 

met. FRA will welcome the input of all interested persons, including the Committee, 

as part of this review. 

Amtrak’s loan request was extensively analyzed and was subjected to detailed and 

difficult negotiations before approval was granted. The Amtrak loan did not require 

a credit risk premium because of the extremely short-term nature of the loan (only 

four months) and the high amount of collateral pledged ($180 million for a $100 million loan). The credit risk premium calculation was performed using FRA’s financial 

model in the same way as it is used in all other applications. 

Amtrak Short-term Reforms 

Question. Do you support the recommendations for short-term reforms that I and 

thirteen of my Senate colleagues have made to President Bush? 

Answer. The Department and Administration share with the authors of that letter 

the view that Federal funding should be provided to Amtrak through formal grant 

agreements; Amtrak should not take on any new long-term or secured debt obligations without the approval of the Secretary; and, that a contingency plan needs to 

be developed to ensure that commuter and freight rail service can continue if Amtrak ceases intercity operation. 

The Department continues to assess the benefits of establishing a commission to 

evaluate Amtrak’s route structure and develop standards to determine what routes 

are operated. As you know, the Department sees the future of intercity passenger 

rail service in the context of Federal-State partnerships and believes that the States 

must play a strong role in determining which services are operated. So any such 

commission must also allow for State participation. Indeed, such a commission 

might not be needed if States were required to support those services that did not 

cover their net operating expenses. I believe that an important first step is to improve Amtrak’s accounting systems so that decision-makers—be they Amtrak’s 

Board, the States or a commission—have confidence that they have an accurate understanding of the revenue and expenses of specific routes and services. Development of such a transparent accounting system was required by the Department as 

a condition of the loan. 

Finally, the Administration continues to review options concerning Amtrak’s assets pledged to the Secretary in return for past and future investments in Amtrak. 

Thus, I do not yet have a position on the fifth proposal contained in the letter. I 

would note, however, that the independent valuation of Amtrak’s assets which will 

also identify the extent to which they are encumbered, is an important first step 

in determining whether there should be a change in the Department’s existing liens 

and mortgages on Amtrak’s assets. 

Track-Related Accidents 

Question. What do you believe is the root cause for the increase in track-related 

accidents? Are the railroads deferring maintenance? Is track under more stress due 

to more train traffic and heavier loads? 

78

Answer. Track-caused accidents have been on the rise in recent years, and track 

became the leading accident cause in 2001. Reasons for this increase and the deterioration in track conditions it reveals are not certain, but may include reduced investment in infrastructure, reduced maintenance-of-way staffs, insufficient training 

or monitoring of railroad track inspectors, increased traffic, increased axle loadings, 

and/or higher speeds. Of course, conditions vary from railroad to railroad. 

FRA recently had great success in working with CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) 

to improve its track safety program. In 2000, FRA and state inspectors discovered 

disturbing patterns of noncompliance on CSX involving track gage, track inspection, 

and track repair. Track-caused accidents were on the increase. FRA and CSX entered into a unique compliance agreement that blended cooperative aspects with 

strict enforcement. Under the agreement, CSX promised to take specific steps to improve its use of track geometry vehicles, implement revised instructions for track 

inspections, develop performance standards and quality control teams for large scale 

track work, enhance management oversight of track inspections, and provide FRA 

with its capital improvement and maintenance programs for the next three years. 

CSX also agreed that it would pay fines without contesting them if FRA discovered 

any unacceptable track conditions posing an imminent hazard to train operations, 

and that FRA was authorized to issue a compliance order or emergency order that 

CSX would not contest if CSX failed to comply with the agreement. CSX took the 

necessary actions under the agreement (although it paid some uncontested fines 

along the way) and, within a year, had reduced its track-caused derailments substantially. FRA and CSX renewed the agreement for a second year, although, because of CSX’s excellent performance, without certain of the original agreement’s 

harsher enforcement provisions. The agreement expired on May 1 of this year, and 

the second year’s results were also impressive: the number of track-caused 

derailments on CSX in 2001 was 19.8 percent lower than the number for 2000, and 

the number of those derailments on CSX declined by 26.2 percent from July 2001 

to July 2002. The compliance agreement, coupled with CSX’s commitment, brought 

about significant safety improvement. 

The trend on track-caused accidents, however, is national in scope. To help address the problem, FRA has sought and obtained 12 additional track inspector positions in fiscal year 2002, and the President’s budget for fiscal year 2003 contains 

a request for an additional 12 positions. 

In addition to augmenting its track resources, FRA has brought a fresh perspective to enforcement in the track area. In January 2002, FRA issued a new track 

enforcement manual that makes focused enforcement a reality. The manual provides guidance on how to focus inspections on the leading causes of train accidents 

and strongly recommends taking enforcement action every time the most serious 

violations are found. Of course, inspectors are expected to use appropriate prosecutorial discretion when other violations are found. FRA is making use of its new resources and more focused enforcement policy to address the track compliance problem. We will blend cooperative measures and tough enforcement to get the job done, 

as we did with CSX in recent years. For those who may be less willing than CSX 

was to meet the challenge head on, we will use whatever level of inducement is necessary to ensure improved compliance and safety results. 

Railroad Bridges 

Question. Many of the nation’s railroad bridges are 80 to 100 years old. Does FRA 

have an estimate of how many of these bridges need to be replaced in the next five 

years? Over the next ten years? And what is the estimated cost of replacement? In 

highway terms, what percentage of the bridges do you estimate are ‘‘functionally obsolete’’ or ‘‘structurally deficient′′? 

Answer. FRA does not have definitive figures or estimates on the age of railroad 

bridges, or the number that might be replaced in the next five or ten years. We do 

not maintain an inventory of bridges, because the cost would far outweigh any safety benefit from doing so. Bridge replacement decisions are the responsibility of the 

railroads that own the bridges, and FRA is not normally involved in the process. 

Railroads base their bridge maintenance and replacement decisions on safety, 

service, and economic considerations. From the standpoint of safety, every bridge requires a level of inspection and regular maintenance to ensure its adequacy to safely 

carry railroad traffic. When service levels and equipment weights increase, the expense of maintaining an individual bridge in service will also increase until at some 

time the replacement or substantial rehabilitation of the bridge will be economically 

justified. 

FRA foresees future safety concerns as the railroads’ cost of maintaining the 

structural integrity of their bridges begins to increase significantly. Two years ago, 

FRA doubled the size of its bridge safety staff, from one to two persons. We have 

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managed to deal with bridge safety issues as they arise, including complaints with 

and without substance, and to generally monitor the bridge management practices 

of the railroad industry. However, we are beginning to see an increase in the number of bridge safety issues that must be properly handled by FRA and the railroad 

industry if the current excellent record of bridge safety is to continue. 

Bridge integrity is a unique issue in the field of railroad safety because it demands a proactive program. Given the potentially disastrous consequences of bridge 

failure, waiting for such accidents to become statistically significant would be an unacceptable course. Therefore, FRA plans to intensify its bridge safety program with 

increased staffing in order to enhance its ability to detect and resolve problems before they become accidents. We also intend to adhere to our policy of non-regulation, 

for reasons stated in the earlier testimony. 

Although we do not maintain a bridge inventory, FRA surveyed the railroads in 

1992 to compile a rough count of bridges carrying railroad tracks in the United 

States at that time. From that count adjusted for time, and current experience, we 

can make some general statements about the continued serviceability of the Nation’s railroad bridges. 

We estimate that there exist 100,000 bridges that carry railroad tracks in the 

United States, or approximately one bridge for every 1.4 miles of track. Approximately 50 percent are steel or iron, 33 percent are timber trestles, and the remainder are of reinforced concrete or other masonry. 

Railroad bridges are subjected to different loads and outside influences than are 

highway bridges. Railroad bridges carry much heavier loads, and they are not subjected to deterioration from the application of de-icing chemicals. The most significant factors in the serviceability of a railroad bridge are the intensity and the frequency of the loads it carries. A majority of the Nation’s older railroad bridges (pre1950) were designed to carry the heavy steam locomotives of the time, pulling lighter freight cars that normally weighed 177,000 pounds. Today’s diesel locomotives do 

not impose the high impact stresses on bridges that were caused by steam locomotives, but common freight car weights have increased to 286,000 or even 315,000 

pounds per car. It is these heavier cars that greatly affect the serviceable life of 

many existing bridges. The loads affect different classes of bridges in different ways. 

The concrete and masonry structures vary widely in age and configuration. The 

most recent of these, with prestressed concrete superstructures, generally are designed to carry modern railroad loads, and they are not a major concern for accelerated renewal. The older ones—massive stone, brick, and concrete structures—are 

not greatly affected by increased loads provided they receive normal maintenance. 

In fact, the oldest railroad bridge in service in the United States is a large stone 

arch bridge in Baltimore, Maryland, which was built in 1828 and continues to carry 

modern CSX freight trains with no weight restriction. 

The most common type of timber bridge found on the Nation’s railroads is the 

timber trestle, representing approximately one-third of all railroad bridges. These 

typically consist of a series of short spans of ten to fifteen feet on timber piles or 

posts. They were relatively inexpensive to construct, but they require continuous 

maintenance. Although many timber trestles have been in place as such for more 

than 100 years, few if any of their components are more than 50 years old, having 

been replaced for maintenance or upgrading of the bridge over time. 

These timber trestles are greatly affected by the recent increase of car weights 

to 286,000 pounds. Many are beginning to show accelerated deterioration from these 

increased loads, and they will rapidly become very expensive to maintain in service. 

Because of this, and the increasing scarcity of good structural grade timber material, it can be expected that they will be replaced with steel or concrete structures 

as they reach the end of their economic lives. Over the next ten years, at least onethird of these bridges will probably be replaced, a total of 12,000 bridges, or 750 

miles of bridge. The larger railroads have been progressing this replacement on 

heavy traffic routes for more than a decade. The expense of this renewal will be a 

major problem for many smaller railroads if they are to retain their ability to handle the heavier cars that operate in the general railroad system. 

Heavier cars are having a significant effect also on the serviceability of iron and 

steel bridges. The great majority of these bridges, both large and small, were built 

during the first two decades of the twentieth century to carry the large steam locomotives of the time. Steam locomotives impose very high dynamic loads on bridges, 

and these bridges were designed to handle these high impact factors. 

Today’s 286,000-pound freight cars are imposing the same stresses in some steel 

bridge components as those developed by steam locomotives. However, instead of 

stressing the bridge member once per locomotive passage, the stress cycles are imposed by every loaded car, or sometimes 100 times more frequently than during the 

80

earlier life of the bridge. The effects of these loading cycles accumulate as fatigue, 

and increase the likelihood that some bridge members will develop cracks. 

The type of steel bridge most susceptible to this type of fatigue is the pin-connected truss. We have a very rough estimate that 300 to 500 bridges of this type 

exist in the Nation’s railroad network, with a common span length of 150 feet. Of 

that number, probably 100 to 150 will become uneconomical to maintain in service 

and will be replaced in the next ten to twenty years. Of the remainder, probably 

100 more will be modified or rehabilitated with the replacement of floor systems or 

some critical components. 

The terms ‘‘functionally obsolete’’ or ‘‘structurally deficient,’’ as applied in highway 

practice, have little significance when applied to railroad bridges. These terms are 

defined by the Federal Highway Administration as follows: 

A functionally obsolete bridge is one that cannot safely service the volume or type 

of traffic using it. These bridges are not unsafe for all vehicles, but have older design features that prevent them from accommodating current traffic volumes and 

modern vehicle sizes and weights. 

A structurally deficient bridge is closed or restricted to light vehicles only because 

of deteriorated structural components. Structurally deficient bridges are not necessarily unsafe. Strict observance of signs limiting traffic or speed on bridges will 

generally provide adequate safeguards for those using the bridges. 

These classifications are used to classify bridges as discrete components of a highway transportation system. Railroads, however, consider bridges as links in a linear 

route, so that the capability of a route to handle cars of a certain weight is normally 

determined by the capacity of all the bridges on that route. The railroad considers 

the bridges on a given route to be suitable for service if they are capable of economically handling the traffic moving on that route. Bridge and other improvements to 

permit the movement of heavier or larger dimension cars are an economic issue that 

is internal to the railroad. 

For FRA to develop an accurate, detailed, quantified analysis of the long-term 

serviceability of railroad bridges under heavier loads would require a major commitment of resources and funding which, up to now, has not been justified. We can justify a small increase in the safety effort, however, based on the information at hand, 

which has been summarized above. That some bridges are coming close to the end 

of their economical lives calls for more intensive monitoring of the safety aspects 

of railroad bridge management so that safety will continue to be the primary governing factor in all decisions related to the continued service of railroad bridges. 

Employee Fatigue 

Question. What kind of monitoring is FRA doing with respect to employee fatigue? 

Are the railroads required to submit records on how many hours individual employees are working on a daily, weekly and monthly basis? In other words, how well 

is this problem being documented? 

Answer. FRA monitors fatigue through its efforts to enforce the statutory maximum on-duty requirements and minimum off-duty requirements of the hours of 

service law (49 U.S.C. 21101–21108). The statute applies to railroad employees who 

perform any of three types of service covered by the statute (‘‘covered service’’): train 

and engine service, dispatching service, and signal service. FRA regulations (49 

C.F.R. part 228) require railroads to maintain records of the hours worked by all 

of their covered service employees (i.e., those subject to the hours of service law) and 

to make these records available to FRA upon request for inspection and copying. In 

addition, these FRA regulations oblige railroads to submit to FRA reports of their 

employees’ excess service on a monthly basis. FRA periodically audits railroads’ 

hours of service records to assure that the railroads are accurately reporting this 

information to FRA. Were we to find instances of inaccurate hours of service reporting, we would not hesitate to initiate corrective measures, including the issuance 

of civil penalties against a railroad, when warranted. Beyond the information provided through part 228, FRA receives a number of complaints annually of hours of 

service violations, which it investigates. In summary, by conducting field inspections 

of hours of service records on the railroads’ premises, by reviewing the monthly reports of excess service submitted to the agency, and by investigating alleged hours 

of service violations, FRA has gathered sufficient documentation with which to 

gauge a carrier’s compliance with the hours of service law. 

Despite our efforts to ensure the accuracy of hours of service reporting, FRA recognizes that more needs to be done to better gage the effects of fatigue on safetysensitive railroad workers. The establishment of maximum work shifts and minimum rest periods is but one element of the complex set of issues that contribute 

to fatigue in the railroad environment. 

81

For many years FRA had incorporated the monitoring of fatigue into its traditional enforcement and inspection activities. However, past monitoring efforts focused primarily on determining compliance with the hours of service law and hours 

of service recordkeeping regulations. Beginning in 2001, FRA undertook a much 

more aggressive approach to gauging the causes and effects of fatigue among railroad workers. These enhanced fatigue monitoring efforts may be partially attributed 

to the FRA Office of Safety’s receiving its initial line-item funding for fatigue in its 

FY 2001 appropriations from Congress. 

Consequently, FRA has embarked on several new initiatives aimed at more accurately monitoring fatigue in the railroad environment. These new initiatives include 

the following activities:

• FRA recently awarded a contract to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to analyze selected accidents/incidents in order to ascertain the role, 

if any, played by fatigue. SAIC is utilizing a software model it developed that 

provides an assessment of the level of crewmembers’ fatigue.

• Additionally, FRA has tasked SAIC with developing fatigue protocols to be used 

during FRA accident investigations. The agency is developing an accident investigation check list for use by safety inspectors to more accurately determine 

whether fatigue may have been a factor in train accidents where human error 

was found to be the primary cause. The results generated by the analysis and 

protocols will provide the foundation for data-driven fatigue initiatives, including recommendations in the area of work/rest scenarios.

• In partnership with The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company 

(BNSF) and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, a pilot study is underway on the BNSF’s Chicago Division, in which railroad employees will use a device called an ‘‘actigraph’’ to measure their actual hours of sleep and wakefulness over a several week period. This will provide an accurate measurement of 

typical work/rest cycles.

• FRA initiated a project at the Volpe Center to test and validate experimental 

fatigue monitoring devices and alerter technologies for application to the railroad industry. Once validated for practical use in the railroad industry, these 

devices could monitor and provide real time feedback about an individual’s state 

of fatigue. If used as data-collection devices, they could help monitor the prevalence and incidence of fatigue in the railroad industry.

• FRA is also working collaboratively with other Departmental modal administrations as part of a procurement on fatigue management and assessment technologies. This procurement will lead to validated fatigue modeling and work 

schedule evaluation tools that may be used to track and help mitigate performance-critical levels of fatigue. (The recent award to SAIC to develop software for 

analyzing accidents/incidents for fatigue grew out of this effort.)

• FRA will soon award a grant to the University of South Australia to work cooperatively with the American railroad industry to identify specific locomotive 

simulator and event recorder performance measures sensitive to fatigue. Once 

validated, these measures can be used to help clarify how varying levels of fatigue interact with various operating tasks and environmental factors to impair 

performance. ‘‘Benchmark’’ operating scenarios can then be created to help estimate the risk of fatigue, and quantify what constitutes a ‘‘safe’’ level of fatigue, 

in different operational environments. Results of this project should help monitor some of the transient fatigue risk factors and reduce the risk of fatigue in 

the rail industry, where more effective interventions can be developed before accidents and incidents actually occur.

• In addition, discussions are underway with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health to conduct a collaborative study to monitor the levels 

of fatigue and stress of yard personnel.

• Beginning in FY 2003, FRA anticipates working with SAIC and a Class I carrier to explore the feasibility of using electronic hours of service documentation 

to supplement our fatigue data base(s).

• In the future, FRA intends to develop measurement tools to evaluate the success of fatigue initiatives that are currently being developed. As a corollary to 

efforts in this area, under terms of a cooperative agreement between FRA and 

the United Transportation Union, the latter will conduct pilot projects of various work/rest schedules to determine the effectiveness of these schedules in reducing employee fatigue.

FRA also monitors fatigue in the railroad industry through the exchange of information provided by the participants of the North American Rail Alertness PartnerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
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ship (NARAP). Established by FRA in late 1997, NARAP is comprised of representatives from all of the major railroads, rail labor organizations, and other concerned 

parties. NARAP provides an open forum for the discussion of fatigue-related issues 

and for the identification of best practices. 

Whistle Bans 

Question. With over 400 grade crossing fatalities in 2001, why is FRA considering 

rules that would allow municipalities to enforce whistle bans? Won’t this be detrimental to the safety program? Will the railroads be liable for damages if there is 

an accident at a crossing where a whistle ban is in effect? 

Answer. FRA is considering rules that would allow whistle bans because FRA is 

required by statute to do so. 

Completion of this rulemaking is essential to reconciling highway-rail crossing 

safety with the quiet of communities. In response to 1994 legislation and FRA’s own 

studies showing that local bans on use of train horns result in increased crashes 

and casualties at highway-rail crossings, FRA issued a proposed rule in January 

2000. While proposing to require use of the train horn at public crossings, the notice 

also proposed alternatives that could be implemented by local communities that 

would be equally effective as the train horn in reducing safety risk. These ‘‘quiet 

zones’’ will enable communities to reduce noise while maintaining safety at highway-rail grade crossings. Increasing rail traffic on many rail lines is reducing community tolerance for train horn noise. FRA feels that without these proposed regulations many of these communities will ban the use of the train horn without implementing additional safety measures and thus create a greater risk to the motoring 

public. 

FRA also thinks that the use of the supplemental safety measures to create a 

quiet zone will also increase safety and will have a positive impact on the overall 

crossing safety program. Four-quadrant gates or conventional gates with median 

(just two of the proposed supplemental safety measures) will make it much more 

difficult for motorists to disregard the automatic warning devices at the crossings 

and will increase crossing safety even with the horn being silenced. The proposed 

rule will also require corridor reviews that will look at the safety conditions at all 

of the crossings in the quiet zone. FRA’s goal of closing redundant crossings will also 

be advanced as a community may be willing to close these crossings rather than 

make the safety improvements necessary to have a quiet zone. 

The proposed regulations stated that the establishment of a quiet zone does not 

preclude the sounding of locomotive horns in emergency situations, nor does it impose a legal duty to sound the locomotive horn in emergency situations. Simply stated, a railroad would not be found liable for damages in a collision with a motor vehicle on grounds that the railroad failed to sound the train horn in a quiet zone established under the proposed rule. 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe 

Question. A number of recent accidents have involved head-on and rear-end collisions involving Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF). On April 23, a BNSF container train rear-ended a Metrolink commuter train south of Los Angeles, apparently after the BNSF engineer ran a signal. On May 11, two BNSF coal trains collided head-on in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming, injuring four crew members. 

On May 28, two BNSF trains collided head-on in Clarendon, TX, killing an engineer. 

On May 29, a runaway car from a BNSF work train struck and killed a track worker. What are BNSF and FRA doing in response to these accidents? 

Answer. Shortly after the coal train collision on May 11, the FRA Office of Safety’s Operating Practices Division, our State Participation Program partners, and 

BNSF management began in-depth assessments of levels of compliance with BNSF 

and FRA operating rules and the railroad’s efficiency testing program in all 13 of 

the railroad’s divisions. This project relies heavily on communication of risks and 

results between railroad front line supervisors and managers and the operating 

crews of freight and passenger trains. FRA and State Operating Practices Inspectors 

are accompanying railroad managers in the field to observe and assess their competence in conducting the efficiency testing program, and to ensure that testing 

managers are accurately detecting rules noncompliance that may result in humanfactor-caused train accidents or incidents. 

Following the BNSF maintenance of way (MOW) employee fatality on May 29 and 

other MOW injuries on other major railroads, our Office of Safety’s Track Division 

joined the Operating Practices Division in assessing levels of compliance with FRA’s 

roadway worker protection regulations (RWP) and railroads’ MOW Operating Rules. 

This initiative is similar in design to the Operating Practices Division’s program and 

capitalizes on FRA’s already-initiated intense inspection activity on major railroads 

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nationwide. In this initiative, track safety personnel from FRA and our State program partners are working with the rail unions and management to conduct systematic evaluations of RWP compliance levels and to communicate risks and hazards to railroad MOW employees and those who manage them. 

These safety initiatives by both FRA’s Operating Practices and Track safety personnel will run concurrently through the summer months, and they are planned to 

be completed in September 2002 on BNSF. 

Crashworthiness Structural Requirements for Tank Cars 

Question. Several recent train accidents have involved hazardous materials releases. In the Minot, North Dakota accident last January, the release of anhydrous 

ammonia killed one and seriously injured another 13 people. In the Potterville, 

Michigan accident on May 2, 200 people had to be evacuated due to the release of 

liquid propane gas. It certainly seems that today’s cars cannot withstand a serious 

derailment without the threat of puncture. Has FRA initiated a rulemaking or other 

action to reevaluate the structural requirements for railroad tank cars? 

Answer. While there is no question that train accidents involving the release of 

hazardous materials have the potential for widespread, serious harm, the long-term 

safety trends on the Nation’s railroads, as judged by most indicators, are very favorable. While even a single death or injury is not acceptable, progress is being made 

in the effort to improve railroad safety. Based on preliminary figures, last year 

marked all-time safety records in several important categories. Overall, the total 

number of rail-related accidents and incidents and the total accident/incident rate 

were the lowest on record. In the period between 1978 and 2001, the number of 

train accidents involving a release of hazardous material declined from 140 to 31 

despite a significant increase in the number of hazardous materials shipments from 

approximately 750,000 to nearly two million per year. Since 1990, a period in which 

railroads have transported more than 20 million hazardous materials shipments, 

three persons have died as a result of the release of hazardous material lading in 

a train accident. 

In other words, over the last two decades the number and rate of train accidents, 

and the hazardous materials releases and deaths related to those releases, all fell 

dramatically. At least part of the credit for the decline must go to enhanced safety 

awareness and safety program implementation on the part of railroads and their 

employees, and to FRA’s safety monitoring and standard setting. 

FRA has been engaged for more than three decades in an active, ongoing program 

to improve the safety of tank cars. This program has involved regulation, education, 

and research and much of its success is the direct result of the partnerships FRA 

has fostered with tank car builders, users, and repairers. Many of the specific aspects of this program will be detailed later. Right now, FRA is engaged in a recall, 

inspection, and ‘‘repair before next loading’’ program affecting some 7,000 cars built 

before 1974. This program is an outgrowth of regulations requiring tank car facilities to institute quality assurance programs as described below. In addition, FRA 

is developing an improved compliance program to ensure that tank cars are maintained in a railworthy state throughout their service life. 

Regarding the derailments at Minot, North Dakota and Potterville, Michigan, we 

are not absolutely certain why the cars fractured or ruptured in either train derailment; however, based on our knowledge of the severe forces involved in each situation, we believe these cars encountered such extreme energy that no reasonable 

tank car design could have survived. While it is impossible to prevent every release 

of product as a result of a train derailment, great strides have been made, as I will 

detail later, and the agency is working to reduce the impact zone of a hazardous 

material release should one occur as a result of a train derailment. These efforts 

will help protect the public, train crew personnel, and the affected environment 

should a release occur. 

FRA, AAR (the Association of American Railroads), and RPI (the Railway 

Progress Institute) have studied the issue of tank car vulnerability in train 

derailments since the late 1960s. As a result of these studies, improvements were 

made to tank car steels with respect to both their chemical make-up and the controls used in processing the steel plates. Each of these improvements was the result 

of technological advances in material science and steel-making practice. The end 

product of these studies is significantly improved steel, steel that exhibits both increased crashworthiness and puncture resistance in train derailments. 

While we continue to quantify the dynamic effects of fracture and puncture of 

tank car steels involved in a train derailment, we have realized that more research 

is needed. In FRA’s Five Year Research Vision Statement, the agency has targeted 

research to characterize the following phenomena:

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• The Impact Energy During Train Derailments. This project would develop a load 

model to estimate the impact energy into the tank envelope and on appurtenances during a derailment and the effects of those energies on the tank and 

appurtenances. A combination of computer modeling and analysis, FRA accident 

data, and detailed tank car damage data contained in the RPI-AAR Tank Car 

Project database would be used to develop the spectrum of loads. The results 

of the study will help establish quantitative estimates of the risk of using different materials in the construction of tank cars.

• The Dynamic and Static Loadings During In-Train Operations. This project 

would explore the effects of in-train (non-accident) related forces and the pathways of these forces through the tank envelope. This will require over-the-road 

testing of a representative number of tank cars to determine the dynamic forces 

acting upon the car structure during normal in-train service. An understanding 

of these loads is important in the design and material selection stage with respect to fatigue related failures—failures related to cyclic loading.

• Material Behavior. This project would review the results of the above two studies for the development of an ideal steel specification; a steel that has improvements in its ability to resist puncture, rupture, and fatigue. The research would 

characterize the effect of material behavior on the structural response of tank 

cars involved in accidents and normal loading. By quantifying this effect, there 

will exist an understanding of the consequences of structural steel properties 

with respect to the risks of using different materials in the construction of tank 

cars.

• In addition to FRA’s proposed research, at the July 2002 Tank Car Committee 

meeting, FRA, working in cooperation with the railroad tank car industry, 

agreed to form two government/industry task force groups to characterize the 

following:

• The risks and consequences of various tank car designs, materials, and service 

with respect to their (tank shell) vulnerability to fail catastrophically at temperatures below the nil-ductility temperature of the steel.

• The types of tests for determining the nil-ductility temperature of the steel and 

recommend changes in the Tank Car Manual with respect to quantifying the 

materials for use in new pressure tank car construction, including the minimum 

design temperature range of the tank and the minimum grain size of the steel. 

(Reducing the grain size improves the fracture toughness and crashworthiness 

of the steel.)

While much can be said with respect to what the agency is doing to reevaluate 

the structural crashworthiness of tank cars involved in train derailments, no story 

is complete without the context of what has already been done to radically improve 

the crashworthiness of tank cars since the 1970s. 

Safety Improvements 1970–1990

From 1970 to 1990, there were five major areas of safety improvements:

(1) Shelf Couplers: Research on accidents showed that a frequent cause of hazardous materials releases was a coupler that vertically disengaged during a derailment or, due to overspeed switching, acted as a battering ram to puncture an 

adjacent tank car. Top and bottom shelf couplers were found to be effective at 

keeping couplers engaged during switching and in derailments, thereby preventing this type of release. These double shelf couplers are now required on all 

tank cars transporting hazardous materials.

(2) Head Shields: Related to the above problem was the need for extra protection 

of tank heads, particularly in derailments when a coupler or a rail might puncture 

the tank head. Head shields are thick steel plates that are mounted on the ends 

of a tank car used to haul high-risk materials, such as compressed gases and materials poisonous by inhalation. These shields provide extra puncture resistance 

for the tank heads in accidents.

(3) Thermal Protection: In the past, when tank cars carrying certain compressed gases, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), were involved in 

derailments in which the cars were exposed to fire, the LPG was heated, its pressure rose, and it vented through the pressure relief valve. However, as the liquid 

level inside the tank dropped, the flame could heat and weaken the tank steel in 

the vapor space. Thermally induced internal pressure acting on the weakened 

tank steel could cause the tank to fail and rupture violently. The solution was to 

apply a layer of thermal protection on these tank cars to slow the rate of heating 

and provide time for the tank to vent its contents, thus greatly reducing the likeliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:48 Mar 30, 2005 Jkt 092206 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\92206.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
85

hood of a tank failure. Subsequent accidents involving cars with these materials 

and design modifications have shown them to be highly effective.

(4) Bottom Outlet Protection: Fittings on the bottoms of tank cars are susceptible to damage when there is a derailment. Tank car companies and valve manufacturers developed valves that were less likely to leak when damaged. These 

companies also developed skid protection devices that were mounted around the 

bottom outlet to further protect them as the tank skidded in a derailment. Subsequent analysis by the RPI-AAR Tank Car Safety Project has shown that these devices reduced the frequency of leaks from bottom fittings by 55 percent and also 

reduced the severity of those leaks that did occur. The AAR Tank Car Committee 

required that all new tank cars manufactured since 1978 have bottom fitting protection and developed a schedule for retrofitting existing tank cars with skid protection based on the hazard posed by the chemicals they carried. This retrofit was 

completed in the 1990s.

(5) Quality Assurance: Starting in the 1980s, AAR imposed a rigorous quality 

assurance certification and auditing program on certain railcar components and, 

in particular, on the tank car building and repair industries. The program provides a disciplined approach for the examination of contractors’ quality management programs and the effectiveness of their implementation. The goal is to ensure that materials, products and services conform to specified requirements. 

These requirements are now mandatory under Federal law. 

Safety Improvements 1990–2000

From 1990 to 2000, more safety progress was made, as illustrated by the following 

eight initiatives:

(1) OT–55-D: Based on recommendations of the Inter-Industry Task Force (IITF), 

a group comprised of senior executives from the rail, chemical and tank car industries, the AAR implemented recommended practices for the rail transportation of 

hazardous materials. OT–55 designates trains carrying a specified number of cars 

of hazardous materials as ‘‘Key Trains.’’ Key Trains are limited to 50 MPH and 

hold the main track at meeting and passing points when possible. In the past, 

when railcars equipped with plain (friction) bearings were still in interchange 

service, the cars were not permitted in key trains, and currently other operating 

restrictions are imposed on these trains. Routes carrying more than a designated 

number of carloads of certain hazardous materials are designated as key routes. 

Key routes are equipped with wayside bearing-defect detectors at a minimum of 

every 40 miles and must be inspected by rail-defect detection and track geometry 

inspection cars (or equivalent) not less than twice a year. Yard coupling speeds 

are limited to four MPH, and certain cars may not be cut off in motion in more 

than two-car cuts. Additionally, training recommendations for transportation employees were established.

(2) More Damage-Resistant Tank Cars for Certain Dangerous Goods: FRA 

and the railroads were concerned that chemicals classified as poisonous (Poison 

Inhalation Hazard) or extremely harmful to the environment (Environmentally 

Sensitive Chemicals) were permitted to be shipped in tank cars that were susceptible to damage in accidents. A risk analysis of stronger tank car designs was conducted using FRA and the RPI-AAR Project statistics together with an assessment 

of the hazards posed by different chemicals. Based on these results and other factors, railroads, shippers, tank car owners and regulators agreed on requirements 

that more damage-resistant tank cars be used for these products.

(3) Tank Car Stub Sill Inspections: In response to the discovery of cracks in 

tank car stub sills, and at the request of FRA and Transport Canada, the railroads, tank car builders and chemical industry developed a program to inspect 

tank cars to determine the frequency and seriousness of these cracks. The program was developed to prioritize these inspections based on design-related criteria 

so that cars considered highest risk were inspected first.

(4) Damage Tolerance Analysis of Tank Car Stub Sills: A follow-up to the 

stub sill inspection program is Damage Tolerance Analysis (DTA). This investigation has been underway for several years to develop an improved understanding 

of the structural design requirements for tank cars based on the forces actually 

exerted on the cars in normal operation. The results of this investigation have 

helped tank car manufacturers improve the designs of their cars so that they are 

better able to withstand the railroad operating environment. DTA is ultimately 

intended to develop inspection intervals for each car design to ensure the safe operation of these cars.

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(5) North American Non-Accident Release Reduction Program: The railroad and chemical industries have been at work for several years on a program 

patterned after a successful Canadian project to reduce the frequency of non-accident caused releases of hazardous materials. These releases are usually the result 

of improperly secured fittings on tank cars. The strategy of the program is to inform chemical shippers if they appear to have an inordinate number of releases 

and to provide them with information and guidelines on how to curtail these 

leaks.

(6) Tank Car Safety Vent Surge Reduction Devices: Throughout most of the 

1990s, the leading source of hazardous materials releases in rail transportation 

was from tank car safety vents. FRA and AAR research showed that devices designed to prevent these leaks were effective, and this led the Tank Car Committee 

(TCC) to require that they be installed on new tank cars built after 1995 and 

equipped with safety vents. Further research identified which devices were most 

effective. FRA and TCC are in the process of establishing performance requirements for the devices, and a retrofit schedule based on this research is currently 

underway. Related to this, DOT now requires higher-rated frangible discs (165 

pounds per square inch) to be used, also reducing the likelihood of a leak from 

a safety vent.

(7) Non-destructive Evaluation (NDE): Federal regulations now require the 

use of non-destructive evaluation processes to determine the fitness for service of 

tank cars. These methods have replaced the hydrostatic test of tank car tanks as 

the means to periodically qualify tank cars for continuing service. Whereas the 

hydrostatic test was a simple test of a tank’s ability to hold pressure, the qualification of NDE personnel and the quantification of the NDE procedure are designed and intended to detect cracks and other flaws in tanks and tank structure 

prior to failure.

(8) Tank Car Damage Assessment: When a tank car is damaged in an accident, 

it is important to understand the consequences of the damage and the extent that 

a car’s structural integrity has been compromised. FRA-sponsored research has 

resulted in an improved scientific and engineering basis for assessing the condition of a tank car and providing emergency responders with an improved basis 

for safety-critical decisions at an accident scene. 

NTSB Recommendation 

Question. The NTSB has recommended that FRA consider the volume of hazardous materials shipments in determining the frequency and type of track inspections. What is your view on this recommendation? 

Answer. I understand your question to refer to NTSB Recommendation No. R–02–

13, which reads ‘‘[m]odify your track inspection program to incorporate the volume 

of hazardous materials shipments made over tracks in determining the frequency 

and type of track inspections.’’ The NTSB preceded this recommendation with the 

statement that it ‘‘concluded that the frequency and type of track inspections routinely performed by the FRA on the Beaumont Subdivision were inappropriate given 

the fact that this was a key route that carried large volumes of hazardous materials.’’

As to FRA’s view on this recommendation, the transport of hazardous materials 

has always been a factor that FRA’s management must consider when establishing 

priorities necessary to efficiently allocate the agency’s inspector forces throughout 

the large territories that FRA monitors. This policy is currently defined in Chapter 

Two of FRA’s Safety Assurance and Compliance Program Manual under the heading 

of ‘‘Allocation of Resources: Prioritization.’’ In addition, the volume of hazardous materials transported over a particular route is weighted heavily in a list of factors 

used to identify and prioritize routes to be surveyed by FRA’s Automated Track Inspection Program, utilizing the T–2000 vehicle. 

To implement this prioritization policy more effectively, FRA is engaged in two 

improved efforts to identify and describe those routes where hazardous materials 

are hauled, including the type and volume of hazardous materials traffic on those 

routes. First, FRA is using the data from its Regional Inspection Points Program 

to adjust the information relative to heavy tonnage routes likely to support large 

volumes of hazardous materials shipments that have been identified by FRA’s twopercent waybill sampling initiative. Second, FRA is gathering information on ‘‘Key 

Trains’’ and ‘‘Key Routes’’ from the individual railroads. As I discussed earlier, these 

terms have been defined by the Association of American Railroads to characterize 

the type and volume of hazardous materials being transported over particular 

routes. 

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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

DON M. HAHS

July 19, 2002

Hon. John McCain 

Washington, DC.

Dear Senator McCain:

This is in response to your post-hearing question addressed to me in which you 

asked, ‘‘From an employee’s perspective, what is the most pressing rail safety concern?’’

Without any doubt, the most pressing rail safety concern of railroad employees 

is fatigue. Fatigue in the railroad industry is caused by many factors. Understaffing, 

not properly relieving employees after the hours of service has expired, i.e, limbo 

time, irregular work schedules and the absence of a mandatory right of employees 

to take time off from work when they are exhausted are a few of the contributing 

factors to the problem of fatigue. 

For many years, railroad companies have pressured their employees to work more 

so that they will need fewer employees. They have applied this pressure through 

threats and actual discipline assessed against employees who the company feels has 

not worked enough. As the work force decreases the employees are required to work 

more. Railroad companies deny many employees’ requests for days off. So you have 

situations existing on a daily basis in which trains are being operated across the 

country by employees that are suffering from fatigue. 

All passenger train engineers have a scheduled time to report to work. If a passenger train engineer is expected to work six hours or more, there is a requirement 

for an assistant engineer, who is certified to operate the train, to be in the cab of 

the locomotive with the engineer. These are a safety measures. However, on freight 

trains, engineers can operate the locomotive for twelve hours with no assistant engineer in the cab of the locomotive and with the additional burden of never knowing 

when they will required to report for work. 

Understaffing in maintenance, signal and dispatching can lead to fatigue because 

all qualified employees are requested to work more hours or train new employees, 

which also can be taxing. 

A few remedies for these very legitimate safety concerns are a regulation that empowers employees with the absolute right to take time off when they are suffering 

from fatigue. In addition, railroad companies need to be required to maintain sufficient manpower in all departments. Giving employees a scheduled time to go to 

work, instead of being ‘‘on call’’ twenty-four-seven, not knowing when you are going 

to work, increases the risk of employees coming to work fatigued. Empowerment of 

the employees of the right to take time off after working a certain number of runs 

would provide for a safer industry. These are just some of the means that could 

begin to address fatigue in the industry. 

I am hopeful that my response to your post-hearing question has provided you 

with the information you were seeking. We would be glad to meet and discuss this 

issue further at your convenience. 

Very truly yours, 

DON M. HAHS

President

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