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97–777 PDF 2004

ASSESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE WEST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 

COUNTERTERRORISM

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 21, 2003

Serial No. 108–22

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, 

U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada, Chairman 

JOHN SWEENEY, New York, Vice Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PORTER GOSS, Florida 

PETER KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex officio 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JIM TURNER, TEXAS, ex officio

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and 

Counterterrorism, and a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Nevada .................................................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Shelley Berkley, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 7

The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona .................................................................................................... 1

The Honorable Jon C. Porter, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 12

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jerry Bussell, Special Advisor to Governor, Nevada Homeland Security 

Office 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24

Dr. Dale Carrison, Emergency Department Medical Director, University Medical Center, Trauma Center, 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 47

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50

Mr. Bill Conger, Deputy Chief, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 51

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 53 

Mr. Frank F. Navarrete, Director, Arizona Office of Homeland Security to 

the House Select Committee on Homeland Security ......................................... 2

Mr. William H. Parrish, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Mr. David Shepherd, Head of Security, Venetian Resort 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 36

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39

Mr. Larry L. Todd, Director, Security, Safety and Law Enforcement, Bureau 

of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the Interior 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20

Mr. Randy Walker, Aviation Director, Clark County Department of Aviation 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 41

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 45

(1)

ASSESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE 

WEST 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 2003

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., Clark 

County Commission Offices, 500 South Grand Central Parkway, 

Las Vegas, Nevada. Hon. James Gibbons [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gibbons and Shadegg. 

Also present: Representatives Berkley and Porter. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Good morning, everybody. I’m Congressman Jim 

Gibbons, the Second Congressional District of Nevada, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism for 

the Committee on Homeland Security. 

To my right is Representative John Shadegg from Arizona. We’re 

welcoming him. He’s the chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response for Homeland Security. 

We’d like to welcome all of you here today. Today is a hearing 

on intelligence and homeland security needs of the West. As a result, we directed ourselves to have it in Las Vegas as a perfect 

place to have this hearing. 

Before I begin my opening remarks, I would like to invite our 

two other Congressmen, if they are in the room, to join at the dais. 

And it should be noted that these two Congressmen from Nevada, 

Jon Porter from the Third District and Shelley Berkley from the 

First District here in Las Vegas will be invited to join us on the 

dais, making any opening statements they want, and but they will 

not be able to ask questions simply because they’re not members 

of the committee. 

I’d like to ask unanimous consent from the committee for that. 

Without objection, when they arrive, they will be invited to sit at 

the dais. 

Right now I’d like to turn the mike over to my colleague from Arizona for any motions that he may have at the beginning. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, the only request I would make 

would be an unanimous consent request that the statement of Mr. 

Frank Navarrete, the Arizona director of Homeland Security be included in the record. 

As you know, Mr. Navarrete was supposed to be here today to 

testify before us. Unfortunately, because of an ongoing situation in 

Arizona with the gasoline shortage, it was impacted just yesterday 
2

by some developments affecting the gas pipeline coming to Arizona 

from California. 

Mr. Navarrete is not able to be here, so I would request that his 

testimony, his statement, be included in the record. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The statement of Mr. Navarrete follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK F. NAVARRETE, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

I am Frank Navarrete, Director of Arizona’s Office of Homeland Security and Director of the Arizona Division of Emergency Management.

I would like to begin by thanking Congressman John Shadegg for the invitation to 

present testimony here today, and to thank Congressman Jim Gibbons as well for 

this opportunity.

Homeland Security is a high priority for the Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano, 

and that has naturally benefited homeland security efforts in the state. Arizona was 

one of the first states to develop a homeland security strategy. I traveled to Washington, D.C. this spring to personally deliver copies of the ‘‘Securing Arizona’’ plan 

to our congressional delegation. My office provides montly updates to keep our federal delegation appraised of activities and progress in homeland security in Arizona.

Governor Napolitano created the Office of Homeland Security to embrace homeland 

security needs and provide direction and control. Additionally, she created the 

Homeland Security Coordinating Council to provide broad representation for input 

in homeland security long-range planning. Regionalization and partnerships are recognized as integral elements to ensuring protection and safety for citizens in every 

reach of the state. A couple of months ago, we became the first state in the nation 

to put a statewide fire service mutual aid plan in place. In short, the importance 

the Governor places on homeland security provides high profile for strategy development and problem-resolution. Due to a significant deficit in the state’s budget however, funding for homeland security is tight.

So we have the will and ability to assess needs and vulnerabilities in our state, and 

are therefore able to develop a strategy. As the federal government develops its 

long-term strategy, Arizona will work to align the state strategy to embrace the 

principals and guidance provided in the federal strategy.

Strategic planning, vulnerability and equipment assessments show us where our 

shortfalls are, however we are currently in a position where the gap between needs 

and funding is wide.

Some of our homeland security needs have been satisfied through funding streams 

from federal government agencies including DOJ, ODP, and CDC. For that, we 

would like to express our sincere appreciation.

As you know, updated vulnerability assessments are currently being conducted for 

the ODP’s 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program. In Arizona, we have utilized a 

Domestic Preparedness Terrorism Task Force, co-chaired by myself, as Director of 

the Division of Emergency Management, and by the Director of the Department of 

Public Safety. Stakeholders such as local government, first responders, tribal representatives and private stakeholders, sit on that task force. They make recommendations on spending strategy to an Executive Council. The Council works 

with the Office of Homeland Security to determine how the grant money will be allocated. The money is allocated to the counties, whose local emergency planning 

committees determine local distribution. I would like to note here that, in conducting these assessments we recognize and are taking steps to identify various potential threats or vulnerabilities that lie across our border in Mexico and include 

them in the assessments.

In Arizona, we face many of the same challenges as other states: 

1 We have vulnerabilities, like areas of higher population 

2 We have a need for additional funding: 

• Prevention of a terrorism event is the number one homeland security priority of Governor Napolitano and in the ‘‘Securing Arizond’ strategyplan 

• WMD equipment for first responders 

• The medical community is in need of additional equipment and training 

to deal with potential bioterrorism threats. Additionally, efforts are underway to develop a tracking and reporting mechanism for disease surveillance 
3

• Interoperability problems are widespread and include the additional challenge of a lack of radio coverage in many parts of the state 

• The Arizona Department of Health Services chairs a bi-national bioterrorism committee which closely dovetails the Arizona Office of Homeland 

Security 

3 Information-sharing between different levels of government and among different agencies has improved since September 11th, however emergency managers, first responders and state agencies with homeland security-related missions continue to share concerns about the availability of current intelligence 

information. 

• We appreciate and utilize information provided by the Department of 

Homeland Security. We continually combine federal intelligence and threat 

information with our own state and local input, analyze the information, 

identify pockets of vulnerability, and set forth prudent awareness and security steps for those threatened areas. 

T2We have unique challenges in Arizona as well: 

1 We are a border state. We share 370 miles of border with Mexico. This includes 8 Ports of Entry. 

• A great deal of the border is located in rural areas and has a high incidence of illegal immigrant traffic. 

• Local governments, like counties and tribal communities expend . 

time and personnel resources coping with problems associated with the 

illegal immigration traffic, such as hospitalization and deaths, crime 

and additional law enforcement costs, and littering and property damage. 

Bi-national visit programs—there is a great demand to meet the visitation 

needs of workers who travel back and forth across the border, tourists, and 

also provide a timely flow of commercial traffic, especially during harvest 

season, when produce must be transported quickly from one place to another. This is a federal policy issue with significant local impact. I appreciate the concept of improved security and in improved visit programs. 

• Interoperability and communication problems are vitally in need of equipment so that we are able to communicate with our federal partners and 

Mexican colleagues across the border in Mexico. In November, the Arizona 

Division of Emergency Management will conduct a bi-national WMD exercise in Nogales, which will employ the critical response elements of planning, response, interoperability, and radio communications. 

4 Tourism brings 29.5 million people to the state each year (Arizona’s population from 2000 census is 5.2 million). Arizona ranks 18 among the 50 states 

for domestic tourism: 

• The Grand Canyon, with over 5 million visitors annually 

• Glen Canyon Daml/Lake Powell 

• Conferences and conventions that place large numbers of people 

generally into the downtown area of Phoenix 

• High profile events: 

• Phoenix is one of a handful of cities nationwide that entertains 

the ‘‘Big Four’’ in the world of sports—football, baseball, basketball 

and hockey 

• Other premier sporting events, including the NASCAR and Indy 

Car racing circuits and the World Series 

5 Agriculture in the state, and agricultural products that flow through Arizona 

from other states and from Mexico. Of concern is the spread of disease or bioterrorism attack. 

6 Areas of low population with vulnerable infrastructure like the Mexican border, dams, utilities, bridges and underground power, telephone and fuel lines 

that are located in rural desert or mountainous terrain. 

• Clearly, our current experience with the rupture of a major gasoline line 

in the Tucson area illustrates the disruptions that can result from a terrorist attack on such an easily accessible target. The current event is in its 

third week, and has resulted in gasoline shortages in Maricopa County and 

gasoline price increases that have spread across our borders into other 

states. 

• We note with interest and concern the electrical grid events that resulted in massive blackouts on the East Coast. Having dealt with a similar 

problem with our Western United States electrical grid in the late 90’s, we 

appreciate the importance of the hardening of critical infrastructure. 

7 Hoover Dam and more dams downstream 
4

8 Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in the country and second largest in the world, and located 50 miles from downtown Phoenix 

To meet some of the challenges we face, we have identified ‘‘model’’ programs. As 

an example, we are working with our partners in the 4 corners area—New Mexico, 

Utah and Colorado, to resolve radio interoperability problems. We are working on 

technical solutions along the border to aid in the slowing of the illegal immigration 

flow and overall security improvements. And we have entered in to discussions with 

other border states, including Texas, New Mexico, and California for inter-state 

interoperability solutions. 

In summary, we are actively pursuing enhancements to our homeland security program in Arizona. We developed a statewide strategy plan to provide guidance and 

intend to build on the process by developing a multi-year homeland security plan; 

the Governor created the Office of Homeland Security to lead homeland security efforts and seated a coordinating council; and state, local, federal and tribal partners 

and members of private industry are working closely together. I share Governor 

Napolitano’s philosophy that our objective is to create an environment where homeland security is imbedded into our day-to-day business of governance. 

We are working hard to do our part, appreciate your federal support, and hope that, 

together, we will make our homeland more secure and provide for the heath and 

safety of the citizens of Arizona. 

I thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing.

Mr. GIBBONS. As we might advise the people in the audience 

here today, this is a committee hearing. It is being recorded, and 

it is not what you might otherwise be familiar with as a townhall 

meeting. This is a committee hearing that is part of the congressional process. We take recorded testimony. And as a result, it is 

included in the congressional record. 

At this point in time, I’ll begin with our opening remarks. And 

I would begin by saying that homeland security issues still remain 

a top priority and a major focus for America today. 

The events of September 11th, of course, raise new public policy 

issues affecting every level of government service and private business. 

The United States depends on citizens to be vigilant. It depends 

on State and local government and private businesses to assess 

critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and work with Federal organizations in support of national and collaborative partnerships. 

It depends on businesses to take the necessary steps to protect 

their facilities and their patrons, and it depends on thousands of 

trained personnel to work with communities across the country to 

security our water and power supplies and their distributions systems to secure our transportation systems and to ensure preparedness of expert medical care when needed. 

Facing this first real crisis, it’s first real crisis, since it began operations earlier this year, and the Department of Homeland Security viewed the massive power outage in the northeast United 

States this past week as a test of their ability to respond to a crisis. 

While there were no casualties, no terrorists, and we are thankful for that, and no chemical or biological weapons, the Department 

of Homeland Security was able to assist in the response. 

After receiving word of the outage last Thursday, within hours, 

the Department assembled crisis action teams in preparation to coordinate the Federal response and the Department’s communication network and was assessing its ability to serve as an information clearinghouse, tracking the blackouts impact for local authorities. 
5

The State and local authorities shouldered most of the load in responding to the outage, but the Department of Homeland Security 

emergency response teams stood ready to deploy. 

Again last week, the contingent of Southern Nevadans attended 

a Federal Emergency Management Agency exercise in Maryland to 

test Las Vegas’ long-term hazardous emergency operations plan. 

The City of Las Vegas received praise for its response during the 

mock disaster and passed the course at the Emergency Management Institute. 

Multi-levels exercises such as this are key to discovering an 

emergency response plan’s shortcomings and ingrain the importance of mutual support. 

This week Nevada is currently taking part in a Department of 

Homeland Security and Department of Defense co-sponsored bioterrorism exercise. This joint Federal, State, and local exercise determined promise is testing our readiness and our ability to respond to a local terrorist attack. 

The exercise is being conducted by the newly created U.S. Northern Command in conjunction with the State of Nevada’s Governor’s 

Office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Nevada National Guard, and a number of local first responder organizations. 

The exercise is taking place at Logandale, Nevada, and involves 

upwards of 5,000 local, State, and Federal participants and exemplifies the cooperative nature of operations in protecting our homeland. 

The primary purpose of this hearing today, entitled ‘‘Addressing 

the Security Needs of the West,’’ is to focus on the issues that cut 

across government and industry sectors and ensure a cohesive approach to achieving continuity in delivering critical infrastructure 

and information sharing services in the Western United States and 

then in making sure that is in place and effective. 

It is my pleasure to introduce two members of the distinguished 

panel, when we get to those, the first panel, which will be Colonel, 

retired, with the United States Marine Corps, William Parrish, Assistant Secretary for information analysis for Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Larry Todd, Director of Security, Safety, Law 

Enforcement, Bureau of Reclamation; and Colonel, retired from the 

Nevada Army National Guard, Jerry Bussell, who is the special advisor to the Governor of the State of Nevada for homeland security. 

The second panel we will have today is Mr. David Shepherd, 

head of security for the Venetian Resort; Mr. Randy Walker, Aviation Director for Clark County Department of Aviation; Dr. Dale 

Carrison, Emergency Department Director, University of Nevada 

Las Vegas Medical Center; and Deputy Chief Bill Conger, Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. 

I want to thank all of you for coming, and I will turn the mike 

over now to my colleague from Arizona, the chairman, as I said, of 

the Emergency Preparedness and Response Subcommittee, Mr. 

John Shadegg. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And it is a privilege for me to be here. I want to express my appreciation for your holding this important hearing. It is, of course, 

as a congressman from Arizona, important to me that we, in fact, 
6

assess the security needs of the West. And I think this hearing will 

produce some important information on that topic. 

As I already mentioned, Frank Navarrete, the State of Arizona, 

Director of Homeland Security, unfortunately, had to cancel his appearance today, but his statement is in the record. I wish he could 

be here; however, there are issues that require his attention immediately in Arizona. 

These issues, I think, are very, very important to all of us in the 

West. Oftentimes when we see these crises, and when I interact 

with my colleagues in the U.S. Congress, they think of the homeland security threat as being something unique to the East Coast 

or perhaps to the East and West Coasts, and they forget the intermountain west. And so I’m very appreciative of your holding the 

hearing today. 

Col. Parrish, I want to thank you for coming to the West and getting a chance to view our unique security issues and give us your 

testimony and perhaps firsthand some of the challenges we face. 

I appreciate all the witness that are here today, particularly the 

Bureau of Reclamation. I will tell you that in extensive conversations with Chairman Chris Cox of the Homeland Security Committee, Select Homeland Security Committee in the House, we 

have looked at the issue of whether or not homeland security funds 

are being properly allocated under the current formula. 

And sometimes you hear colleagues say, ‘‘Well, it shouldn’t be 

done on a population basis. It shouldn’t be on done on the current 

formula basis. It ought to be done on a different formula.’’ 

I’d like to chime into those discussions and point out that while 

perhaps the greatest need for the resources may be in our huge 

population centers like New York or Los Angeles or other major cities, I have some deep concerns about the Bureau of Reclamation 

facilities and the fact that they are indeed, I think, fairly vulnerable and were they to become the targets of a terrorist attack, the 

devastation could be vast and far more than I think the country appreciates. So I’m looking forward to your testimony. 

Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the success of our anti-terrorist efforts 

depend a lot on intelligence and your efforts in the intelligence 

arena. 

They also depend upon open lines of communication. One of the 

most common complaints I get when I am out here in the West 

talking with local law enforcement officials or other first responders is the issue of information flow. 

And it is critically important that information flow from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the CIA, TTEC, all the 

Federal offices involved to the State and local personnel so that 

they have an operational knowledge of what is going on, and that 

the information flow in the opposite direction. And I know since 

that this is kind of the first time in our Nation’s history when we 

are confronting the sharing of highly classified national security information with State and local first responders, we’re struggling 

through that process. But I want to stress how important it is. 

And so I hope that at least the one thing that comes out of this 

hearing is improving the lines of communication and a development of relationships. 
7

The Chairman has already mentioned that I chair the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response for the 

Homeland Security Select Committee in the House. I want to make 

it clear that my focus, while making sure that we have the resources to engage in response once an attack occurs, my primary 

focus on that subject is on preparedness. 

I believe the American people expect us to be forward looking, to 

look out into the world to see where the attack is coming from and 

stop it before it occurs. 

It is all well and good that we be in good position to take care 

of the attack once it has occurred, but I want to point out that at 

least from my perspective, terrorist attacks are different than hurricanes, perhaps different than floods and other types of emergencies that our Nation can face. 

I know of nothing we can do to stop a hurricane. I know of nothing we can do to stop a flood. And, yet, I know of things we can 

do to stop terrorist attacks, and I think the American people expect 

that out of us, and I know that Chairman Cox feels that way as 

well. 

One point I want to make. I have been involved throughout my 

congressional career in focusing on the Colorado River, the dams 

on the Colorado River, and my interest in preserving them. There 

are those who would like to take down for, example, Glen Canyon 

Dam. I spent some time opposing those efforts. 

But I would point out we have just had this energy crisis on the 

East Coast, which has cost us electricity. I have just returned from 

Iraq where the absence of reliable electricity is disrupting that society rather severely. 

Glen Canyon Dam has a capacity of 1.2, 1.3 kilowatts; Hoover 

Dam right here just miles from us a little over one million kilowatts. Those are the second and third largest dams that the Bureau of Reclamation has a responsibility for. Davis Dam and 

Parker Dam have 251,00 kilowatts and 120,000 kilowatts each. 

Those are critical work resources to this Nation. Indeed, during the 

California energy crisis of 2001, it was power from those dams that 

enabled us not to have any more severe consequences than we did. 

The last issue I just want to mention in my opening statement 

is a perennial issue for those of us in the Southwest, and that is 

the porous nature of our Arizona-Mexico border. 

And I hope, Mr. Parrish, at some point you’ll get down there and 

be able to see it. It is wide open. You can fly over it. There are vast 

stretches where there is not even three-strand barbed wire fence. 

I think that is a clear security issue for this Nation. 

So I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to the testimony and again 

thank you for holding this important hearing. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Shadegg. 

Mr. GIBBONS. We’ll turn now to our two colleagues who are 

guests on this committee for any remarks that they may have. 

I’ll turn to my left to Ms. Berkley from the First District for her 

remarks. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to thank Ranking Members Jim Turner and Ms. McCarthy for inviting me to this hearing on assessing the security needs 

of the West. The security needs of our Nation must be addressed 
8

in a bipartisan basis, and that’s why I am particularly delighted 

that Congressman Gibbons has invited me to speak with you today. 

I believe this is an important and timely hearing, and I welcome 

my colleagues on the committee to my home town and my congressional district to discuss vital concerns about protecting western 

communities such as Las Vegas from the continuing threat of terrorism. 

Additionally, I would like to recognize my fellow panel members. 

I have had the distinct pleasure of knowing them and working with 

them for quite a while on this and other issues. And I know that 

their leadership IS needed to manage and ensure the protection of 

Southern Nevada. 

September 11th woke our Nation to the fact that we have enemies ready and willing to take dramatic and unconventional action against the United States. As we meet here today, it is very 

likely that terrorists are meeting somewhere in the world planning 

another attack on our Nation. 

In the fall of 2001, that attack was against New York City and 

Washington, D.C. The next attack could very well be against a 

community in the West. 

Federal, State, and local emergency officials across the West recognize this and are working to prevent and prepare for such an occurrence. 

Our Nation’s first responders are on the front line of homeland 

security. Local preparedness must be a top priority. Our first responders must be involved in every step of the process and be afforded the flexibility to meet community-specific needs. 

A major concern in Southern Nevada is the availability and distribution of funding resources for homeland security. Local officials 

and first responders know best what their community needs are. 

States and localities should not find themselves in the position 

of having to implement numerous Federal mandates without the 

funding resources needed to support these mandates. 

However, Congress and the Executive Branch continue to place 

expensive requirements on State and local agencies to meet Federal homeland security goals without providing the necessary funding. Among these burdens are: Transit security measures, border 

protection, safeguarding air cargo, port security, the protection of 

chemical facilities, and perhaps most importantly, funding of our 

first responders. 

This is of particular concern at a time when the states are facing 

their greatest financial crisis since World War II. It will continue 

to be my priority in Congress to ensure that states and local communities are provided greater resources to address their security 

needs. Homeland security must be given more than lip service in 

Washington, D.C. It must be a fully funded national priority. 

An issue specific to Las Vegas and other tourism-based areas is 

how tourists and visitors will be accounted for in the homeland security funding formulas. Local officials and emergency response 

personnel must devise security plans to protect not only the 1.5 

million residents, but also 36 million visitors who travel to Southern Nevada annually. 

After September 11th, I held a roundtable discussion with Southern Nevada’s first responders to assess their needs. After this 
9

meeting, I sent a letter to the President and to Secretary Ridge 

urging them to devise a funding formula that would address the 

needs of tourist communities. 

I was very pleased that on July 30th of this year, a provision proposed by Senator Reid and Senator Ensign was approved by the 

Senate Appropriations Committee with jurisdiction over homeland 

security funding. This important resolution changes the homeland 

security funding formula to take tourism into account. I was 

pleased that the Senate recognized the impact tourism has on the 

ability of many communities to adequately prepare for and prevent 

terrorism. 

As this important provision moves to conference, I hope that the 

two bodies can agree that the impact tourism has on many communities greatly affects their ability to prepare for and respond to 

threats. 

However, we need to do more to help these communities. Factoring tourism into the funding formulas is important, but we must 

ensure that actual funds get to the responders protecting these 

communities. 

On a busy weekend there may be upwards of an additional 

300,000 people in Las Vegas. The population of the community increases substantially and the responsibility of local emergency responders increases along with it. Las Vegas officials must be able 

to address the security needs of their residents as well as the 

added burden of thousands of visitors. Therefore, the resources 

available to these emergency responders must take into account 

these added responsibilities. 

Another homeland security issue that affects Nevada and the 

West is protection of Hoover Dam. Hoover Dam provides water to 

Arizona, California, and Nevada and supplies power to the Western 

states. 

A breach at the Dam would be a catastrophic event that would 

affect millions of Americans. As the Federal Government assesses 

the needs of the West, officials must evaluate the possible risks related to the Dam and ensure that resources and information are 

available should there be such an occurrence. 

Yucca Mountain and the proposed shipment and storage of nuclear waste to our State Poses one of the West’s most serious security threats. I have introduced legislation requiring a comprehensive analysis of the Yucca project’s safety and vulnerability to terrorist attacks and the development of a Federal emergency plan, 

including one specifically for airborne attacks, to defend the site. 

Under my legislation, the analysis and defense plan would cover 

the site, transportation routes and shipping casks, waste storage 

containers, and personnel working for the project, among other 

items. 

Instead of making the United States safer, the proposed Yucca 

Mountain project and the shipment of 77,000 tons of nuclear waste 

across our roads and railways provides terrorists a target that 

could cause massive economic and civilian casualties. 

Before we start transporting nuclear waste across the country 

and before we spend another dime on this project, we better know 

what we’re going on to address the possibility of terrorism and how 

we’re going to do it. 
10

Since September 11th, we have continued to hear and read of the 

efforts of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to develop a radioactive 

‘‘dirty bomb’’ or other means of nuclear attack on the United 

States. 

It is naive to believe that thousands of shipments of nuclear 

waste and the storage of spent fuel in a single, massive facility 

without adequate safeguards would not be a target of opportunity 

to these mass murderers. 

I am concerned about the waste at every stage of its transfer. 

Waste would be vulnerable to attack during packaging, shipment, 

temporary storage, repackaging, and finally in a single national repository. It must be realized that the nuclear waste will be stored 

above-ground for a significant period of time before it is actually 

placed in the repository. 

There will be hundreds of shipments of waste across our country 

each year. A single truck bomb, or private plane used as a weapon, 

could release radioactive waste that could endanger lives, pollute 

the environment, and cost millions in economic damages. 

Just last week it was revealed that the Department of Energy secretly shipped nuclear waste from New York to Idaho without informing officials and first responders in the communities along the 

route. The Yucca Mountain project poses far too great a risk to accept blind assurances from the Department of Energy and the nuclear industry that every precaution is being taken to prevent a 

terrorist attack and to prepare communities that would be affected. 

The Federal Government has a duty to assess the risk of this 

misguided plan, not just to protect Nevada and our neighbors in 

the West, but for the well-being of our Nation. 

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I am looking forward to the testimonies of my fellow panel members and further discussion on homeland security 

needs of the West. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. PARRISH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION DIRECTORATE 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I am delighted to appear 

before you today here in Las Vegas, Nevada to discuss The Department of Homeland Security’s role in securing the West.

I am currently the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). Prior to assuming 

this position on July 3rd of this year, I was the Senior DHS representative to the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In this capacity I served in a senior 

leadership position as the Associate Director for Homeland Security. My tenure in 

US Customs as the Executive Director of Anti-terrorism provided the opportunity 

to gain an appreciation for the criticality of information sharing and the necessity 

for recognition and understanding of individual agencies’ capabilities in the fight 

against terrorism.

The Department of Homeland security is focused on a clear mission: to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerability to an attack, and minimize loss of life and 

speed recovery should one occur. Further, the Department’s mission includes reducing the opportunity for terrorists to exploit failures of critical infrastructure caused 

by natural disasters or other unplanned emergency circumstances (e.g., 

vulnerabilities arising from failures in water supply, dams, bridges, or power grids).

In this mission, the Department of Homeland Security is not alone. We are actively 

working with our Federal partners, State and Local governments and the private 

sector. Our strategy for protecting the country is a national strategy for a reason, 
11

as Secretary Ridge has stated on numerous occasions, ‘‘When our hometowns are 

secure, our homeland will be secure.’’ That is not merely rhetoric, but a fundamental 

principle of the nation’s hOl1}e.1and security effort. Everyone is a partner in the 

effort. As you all know, 85 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is owned 

or operated by private enterprise. This includes systems such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy and transportation. The private sector also is 

a key source of new ideas and innovative technologies that will provide tools in the 

fight against terrorism.

We must be aggressive in connecting and staying connected with our partners to 

provide an extraordinary and unprecedented exchange of information. This information must be actionable by local law enforcement and first responders, but must also 

empower the average citizen to do his part in assisting with securing our homeland.

We can never guarantee that we are free from the possibility of terrorist attacks, 

but we can say this: Today, the American people are more secure and better prepared than ever before.

I say that because we are more aware of the threat of terrorism, and more vigilant 

about confronting it. We share more information with the people who need it, including our state and local partners and the private sector. And they share with us. 

Ensuring homeland security requires a nation-wide cooperative effort.

We’ve moved rapidly to map and protect our critical infrastructure, such as power 

plants and financial systems; seal our borders from terrorists and suspicious cargo; 

and prevent and prepare for attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

The terrorist networks we seek to eliminate, in large measure, plot and train overseas. They recruit new members in democratic countries. They launder their money 

through international banks. They communicate through the same networks used 

for global commerce, and travel the same busy ports. That’s why we’re providing 

added layers of security that push our borders outward, making our seaports, airports and borders the last line of defense, not the first. Taken together, these measures help us achieve the mission of homeland security.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection directorate plays an important part in the mission of homeland security 

by: (1) providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS leadership; (2) 

Mapping, with Infrastructure Protection (IP), terrorist threats to the homeland 

against our assessed vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to protect against 

terrorist attacks; (3) conducting independent analyses and assessments of terrorist 

threats, including competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and ‘‘red teaming’’; (4) integrating the work of all DHS components as well as managing the collection and 

processing of information into usable and actionable information from DHS’ intelligence components; and disseminating time sensitive alerts and advisories to federal, state, local governments and private sector infrastructure owners and operators.

IAIP has robust, comprehensive, and independent access to information relevant to 

homeland security—raw and processed—collected domestically and abroad. Accessing the information and intelligence from this mosaic of programs and systems of 

federal, state and local agencies supports our mission to analyze data and take action to protect against terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. homeland. Our Information Analysis (IA) office has the ability to conduct its own analysis and to leverage 

the information of the FBI, the CIA, TTIC and the remainder of the Intelligence 

Community and federal government, plus state and local law enforcement and private sector entities, to protect the homeland.

Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working relationship between 

‘‘IA’’ and ‘‘IP’’ to ensure that threat information is correlated with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and protective programs. This threat and vulnerability information can then be used to recommend preventive and protective measures.

In addition to the unique IA–IP partnership; the Homeland Security Operations 

Center (HSOC) serves as a focal point for the Nation’s efforts to protect our homeland. The HSOC is a 24 x 7 x 365 days a year center comprising members from 

more than 13 federal agencies from the Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement 

Agencies, emergency preparedness organizations and other entities focused on infrastructure protection. Given the information provided from the parent organizations 

of these entities, and the all-source data provided by other DHS partners, information and intelligence relating to threats to the homeland are analyzed from multiple 

arenas. This all-source data-fusion performed at IAIP allows products to be tailored 

to address a specific threat that assist DHS constituents in prioritizing resource allocations in the enhancement of their security posture that supports their efforts in 

countering potential terrorist acts.
12

IAIP is the central information center ofDHS’ efforts to coordinate the protection of 

U.S. homeland security. As such, IA supports DHS’ law enforcement components 

through timely and integrated analytical support. For example: 

• In coordinating with Customs and Border Protection, which process more 

than 1.1 million passengers arriving daily at our Nation’s airports and seaports, and inspects more than 57,006 trucks and containers, 580 vessels, 

2,459 aircraft, 323,622 vehicles, and arrest over 2,500 illegal alien border 

crossers and smugglers daily. IA has immediate access to valuable information regarding potential terrorist activities that further enhances our ability 

to develop threat plot lines - connecting the dots. 

• In coordinating with immigration and Custom Enforcement, which investigates cases involving alien smuggling, terrorist financial dealings and 

other crimes associated with terrorist operations, IA analyses and assessments ensure the ability to identify potential trends of terrorist related activity. 

• In coordinating with the Transportation Security Administration, which 

screens approximately 1. 5 million passengers every day before they board 

commercial aircraft, IA assists in determining individuals to be entered on 

Watch lists.

IA ensures that homeland security products derived from the fusing of disparate 

types of information are shared with Federal, State, and Local governments, as well 

as the private sector. Additionally, IA coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in publishing combined DHS–FBI Intelligence Bulletins.

IAIP is building a strong team of professionals and assigning dedicated and knowledgeable individuals in key liaison positions within our partnering agencies. This 

will further enhance the timely access to critical information that when placed in 

the hands of the dedicated and competent members of DHS serving at our borders, 

airports, seaports across America, will increase our ability to detect, prevent and 

deny terrorists the opportunity to plot a strike against our Homeland. With the continued support of Congress, I am confident that IAIP and our partners in the war 

against terrorism can succeed in meeting the challenges presented before us.

The Department of Homeland Security is the second largest department in our Government. In our first six months we have made progress in numerous areas, but 

we are just at the beginning of this comprehensive effort to protect our Nation from 

terrorism. While much has been accomplished, there is much more work to be done. 

We must stay focused and engaged in this effort so that we can meet the challenges 

of this critical time in our Nation’s history.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have at this time.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much. We’ll turn now to the newest member of the Nevada delegation, who we are all pleased and 

proud to work with, Mr. Jon Porter from the Third Congressional 

District. 

Mr. Porter, welcome to the committee. You have five minutes to 

make your opening statement. 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much, Congressman Gibbons, for 

your leadership and to my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg. 

We appreciate your help and assistance. And of course to the panel 

and all those first responders in the audience today—fire, police, 

highway patrol, Federal agencies, we appreciate your input. And 

trust me, we want to hear what you have to say. 

The events of September 11th, of course, changed forever the 

way that this country considers its safety. Threats we did not think 

were serious or that we failed to recognize have become far too real 

to ignore any longer. 

Thanks to the leadership of the President and farsighted members, such as the panel here today, we now have a Homeland Security Department to coordinate responses to the immense challenges 

of guarding against terrorist attacks and this committee to oversee 

that department and point out where more effort is needed. 
13

Las Vegas and all the other communities here, including the 

County of Clark, have a special challenge since that day of September 11th. We depend upon the free flow of tourists into our 

community, yet we cannot afford any threats to our air transport 

system. We depend on critical infrastructure for our very existence, 

but cannot afford to be over dependent on any single response plan 

or resource for meeting threats to that infrastructure. 

Southern Nevada turns a friendly smile to the world, but cannot 

forget that there are men and women who would take advantage 

of us and threaten our community and our families. 

Since my election to Congress, I have worked with Mr. Gibbons 

and, of course, my colleagues here on the panel, Director Randy 

Walker, who is here today, Rosemary, and to many others, Jerry 

Bussell, friend for years, to help improve our ability to protect ourselves and to prepare Nevada in case of a disaster. 

The Nevada delegation is working to ensure that our massive 

population is taken into account when funds are distributed to cities by population. 

Having chatted with Metro, and I think Stan Olsen is here 

today, Stan, we’re hearing your words. Where at one time we can 

have a population of 250,000 to 300,000 or more at a given time, 

in reality, this is an emergency that can impact millions of people. 

We must have adequate funding to ensure that our first responders continue to be able to ensure the safety of all residents and the 

visitors of our county, aid to communities must be proportional to 

the population and the threat. 

We must also work towards ensuring the safety of our power grid 

and energy generators. The recent blackouts in the Northeast 

show, once again, how important the Hoover Dam and the transmission lines are to Southern Nevada and to the whole West Coast, 

from agriculture, irrigation, to power. We have to ensure that Hoover Dam and other critical infrastructures are physically safe and 

also that our infrastructure is safe from the electronic attack that 

could take place or interfere with water, power throughout the 

community. 

Having met with many local government leaders, city managers, 

a grave concern for our communities is the technology. Imagine for 

a moment an individual sitting in a hotel room or in a tent or in 

a home somewhere around the world with a laptop computer that 

could break into our technology and literally bring our communities 

to a halt. 

Working with Mrs. Berkley, we were able to make sure that 

McCarran Airport is reimbursed for funds it’s put up for security 

improvement. And we want to do more. We were able to convince 

Transportation Security Administration to revoke some of the draconian cuts that is proposed for McCarran. Randy and Rosemary, 

we appreciate everything you’re doing. 

As I mentioned, we are working with Metropolitan Police Department. Another major concern for Nevada and the rest of county is 

uniform communication system. I can remember being at ground 

zero in 1988 shortly after the explosion in Henderson, the PepCon 

line, communication was a challenge. Of course, our heros in the 

fire and rescue and police did a yeoman’s job. But I remember that 

day in 1988, we were talking about having a uniform communica-
14

tion system so our different levels of emergency personnel could respond accordingly. We have yet to meet that challenge. 

In the coming months, we’ll be working together to make sure 

that more resources are available for our communities and to ensure that Southern Nevada is prepared for the challenges our Nation may face. 

I want to thank, of course, all the witnesses and appreciate everyone for being here today, and I’m looking forward to working together as we accomplish this main goal. 

Thank you all very much. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Porter. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Before we begin with our first panel, there’s a few 

housekeeping items that need to take place. 

First, I need to advise the panelists here that we try to restrict 

our opening remarks to five minutes or thereabout. No one is going 

to stop you if you go over, but we would like to proceed timely so 

that both panels will have an opportunity to be heard and for the 

panel here to ask question of each of the members there. 

So with that stated, let me say that each of your written statements in full will be submitted in its entirety for the records. So 

if you want to summarize your remarks, that is fine as well. 

Also, to the audience, for those people here, the record is going 

to remain open for a period of 14 days so that any comment or comments that you want to submit for the record will be allowed. You 

can send those to us at the committee in Washington, D.C. They 

will be entered into the record. 

That being said, let me also now turn to our first panel. Welcome 

each of you. This is a very distinguished moment for all of us here, 

and I am sure that it is for you, to appear before a United States 

Congress committee and have an opportunity to have your voices 

heard. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I will begin with Mr.—Colonel Parrish and his remarks. 

Mr. Parrish, welcome. We’re happy to have you, and the floor is 

yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. PARRISH 

Mr. PARRISH. Thank you very much, sir. And good morning, 

Chairman, and Congressman Shadegg and Congresswoman Berkley, and Congressman Porter. I am delighted to be here and honored before you this morning. 

Before I begin, I would like to express on behalf of the Department, sir, we appreciate, Congressman Gibbons, your tireless and 

dedicated efforts in this fight against terrorism, your recognition of 

how important the efforts of the Department is in securing a safe 

nature. We appreciate that. 

This hearing is also very important to the Department of Homeland Security because it affords me the opportunity to get out of 

Washington and get out in America, and, unfortunately, I just don’t 

have enough time to spend in this great city for a few more days, 

or I think literally I could walk the streets and the lobbies of the 

hotels and probably talk to at least one person in every section of 

this great country and hear firsthand about their views on how the 

scorecard is for the Department of Homeland Security. 
15

But I think it’s safe to say that the people I have talked to, I 

think, without question, that the leadership of Congress and the 

Administration, our President, in developing without and creating 

the Department of Homeland Security was certainly the right step 

to take for this Nation. 

I am the acting assistant secretary for Information Analysis of 

the Information Analysis Infrastructure Protection Directorate. I 

assumed that position on the 3rd of July. 

Prior to that, I was assigned as the Senior Department of Homeland Security representative to the newly created Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center, where I served in a key leadership position 

known as the Associate Director for Homeland Security. 

Prior to that, I stood up for the Office of Anti-terrorism with the 

U.S. Customs Service right after 9–11. During my tenure at Customs is really when I became aware of the fact of that the importance and the critical pieces in this war against terrorism had to 

be information sharing amongst agencies. 

And I will submit that I like to see that the glass is half full. 

And I’m not sure if it was cultural issues or a lack of willingness 

to share information as much as a full understanding and appreciation for what another agency could do with that information if they 

had it. 

I continue to strive for that same type of approach now that I 

am at the inner-agency level, if you will, and not operating just 

within the confines of a single organization. And I’ll refer to that 

a little bit later on. 

Within the Department of Homeland Security, we have the operational organization, as I’ve mentioned, such as Customs, and now 

the integration with Customs and Border Protection. We have 

agencies that have access to a wealth of information that assist in 

connecting the dots, if you will, of terrorist activities or potential 

terrorist activities in this country. 

When you look at the borders, and as Congressman Shadegg indicated, the southwest border there and the vastness of it, certainly, I know it is a priority within the Custom-Border Protection 

with the Secretary of how we address that situation. 

But when on a daily basis, we have over 1 million passengers 

coming across our borders, either through the air or across the 

land, or by sea entering our country—over 57,000 trucks coming 

across our borders and containers, with 580 vessels arriving at our 

seaports on a daily basis, 2,500 aircraft coming into the United 

States and over 323,000 vehicles entering our country, stop and 

think for a moment, though. The Customs inspectors and the border patrol agents have the ability as they access potential information because of their unlimited search authorities at those borders, 

the ability to acquire information that could be a key piece, a missing dot, if you will, in a major FBI case trying to formulate and 

see if we have a potential terrorist plot. 

We have the same with our Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau, again, where they’re working and investigating cases 

on alien smuggling operations, financial operations, and other 

crimes that may be associated with terrorist operations. 

The Transportation Security Administration postured at the airports processing 1.5 million passengers daily, again, another set of 
16

eyes and ears, if you will, out there looking at what’s moving 

through our country. 

But to further enhance this process of correlating the information 

from other agencies, we have within the information analysis and 

the infrastructure protection directive, the homeland security operations center, which we man 24 hours per day, seven days a week, 

365 days a year. And in reference, Chairman Gibbons, to last 

week’s blackout was a major active player in the immediate processing of information to be able to advise key leadership of the 

country what was happening with the northeast corridor during 

that blackout period. 

Additionally, within that center, we have approximately 15 different Federal agencies represented. In my experience, any time 

you bring different agencies sitting down in a room together next 

to each, a tremendous amount is learned about the capabilities and 

what each agency brings to the fight. 

I’m proud to say each morning between 9:00 and 9:30, the director of the operations center huddles all those agencies, and each 

one reports on the major activities of their agencies what they’re 

getting from the operations center, another step in the information 

sharing process, which is so critical. 

As these reports are received into the operations center, they 

may be coming, again, from our supportive agencies. They may be 

coming from State and local authorities, and even the private sector, suspicious activity reports. 

These reports are then processed with the information analysis 

director, the people under my staff. We analyze this information. 

We coordinate it with other agencies in order to identify if there 

is any possible correlation with terrorists’ nexus to these reports 

that are coming in. 

For example, a report of suspicious person videotaping the entrance to a nuclear power facility at one location and perhaps two 

days later at another site in another State, a similar vehicle is also 

observed. 

How is this correlated to see if, in fact, we have now a 

presurveillance operation in place? 

This is the type of information that we look to bring into the operations center at our department so we can conduct this in-depth 

assessment, independent assessment and an analysis of what we’re 

dealing with. 

I’m confident that the process and procedures that we are continuing to build upon, though, that I have described here, are in 

full compliance with the legislature that had been passed by you, 

by the Congress, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

Specifically, though, regarding, on the success, the most recent 

successes of the FBI and CIA, who should very well be commended 

on those great Americans, what they are doing, we have succeeded 

in arresting some very key members of al-Qaeda over the past 12 

months. I think you have been hearing about some of the reporting 

and the information that we are learning. 

What we are seeing is that the organization al-Qaeda singles out 

targets whose destruction may have symbolic resonance, strike a 

blow to U.S. power and prestigious impacts, causing mass casualties and generate economic shockwaves throughout the country, 
17

and, of course, us being the center of the world, if you will, a global 

economic impact. 

Further, the concept of multiple and simultaneous attacks are 

part of this modus operanti, as we observed here in the U.S. on 

September 11th and other attacks overseas. And although we have 

learned of their focus on these type of targets, specific intelligence 

is not always present. It’s a very daunting and very challenging 

process of trying to acquire that type of specific intelligence. 

However, it’s important to ensure that our State and local partners as well as the private sector entities are aware of the terrorist 

focus on such high value targets. Many such examples are present 

here in the West. 

As you know from previous reporting, in our major metropolitan 

areas, such as Washington, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, 

we have numerous facilities that offer this type of high value targets. We have learned from detaining debriefings that al-Qaeda is 

interested in a range of facilities from transportation, infrastructure nodes to apartment buildings and tall buildings. 

Some domestic targets may include symbolic structures, particularly the White House, the Capitol, and other Federal buildings 

here in the West. Symbolic icons might include tall buildings and 

other high profile landmarks. Headquarters for major corporations 

and financial centers would achieve their intent of disruptions of 

our economy. 

The energy sector including the U.S. nuclear facilities, petroleum, tank farms, and refinery facilities are also target lists for alQaeda. 

The railway, the mass transit systems, and things such as 

bridges and tunnels also have been reported as potential for alQaeda. The dams and water systems have also been addressed in 

some of the debriefings. Public venues, we can no longer conduct 

a large scale public event without having a detailed, well rehearsed 

security plan in advance. 

And, finally, aviation remains a target since September 11th operation of al-Qaeda’s greatest success and one that their masterminds consider worth repeating. 

Late last month, the Department issued a threat advisory warning of a potential hijacking end of summer plot in the U.S. and 

abroad. 

I would like to say here, going back to the last year, when Congressman Shadegg had asked me to do an independent assessment, 

I will tell you I was a holdout in the intelligence community on 

that report. Secretary Ridge has an undaunting, challenging task 

of making that announcement to the American people. 

As we understand the limited resources of the states and private 

sectors to expend their resources to enhance security, securities, it 

is my responsibility to ensure that I am picking up every rock, 

every piece of raw material and analyzing it to the greatest extent 

possible so that I can look the Secretary in the eye and say, ‘‘I 

agree that this is a credible threat that needs to go out.’’ 

I delayed the process probably for 24 hours because I had to be 

convinced, and I will tell you I was convinced in the end based on 

the intelligence report that I reviewed. 
18

But I just want to share that with the panel that we in the Department of Homeland Security are very sensitive to the State, 

local, and private sector on how they need to prepare for it. I think 

the focus of our Homeland Security advisory bulletins and information bulletins when we put those out, we try to put something out 

that says, ‘‘Here is a threat, but yet here are protective measures 

that you may consider to employ as we address this threat.’’ 

We want to do more to help our partners. And when I say ‘‘our 

partners,’’ I mean the State and local Americans that are out there 

that are doing such a tremendous job. They are a wealth of information for us as well in being able to provide information that can 

help us connect the dots. 

I’d like to just close here, then, and just to say that our robust 

and comprehensive independent assessment, we are continuing to 

refine that. It’s not a push-pull system yet. We are still pulling for 

information. 

As I said before to the committee, ‘‘Parrish has not been told no 

yet when he’s asked for a piece of key intelligence,’’ and the day 

that Parrish is told no, you will be the first to know, sir. 

We are just at the beginning, though. We have a long ways to 

go in this processing. Hearings such as yours today provides each 

of us, though, an opportunity to learn and look back at where we 

have come as a Nation since that dark day in our history on September 11th. 

We need to recognize that thanks to you and to your staffs and 

our Federal agencies, including all law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the dedicated State and local authorities in the 

private sector, and the American people in general have risen to 

the challenge of the new enemy threat, the new enemy threatening 

our security. 

The coordinated efforts of all of us, sharing, in a key part sharing 

the challenges and responsibilities together, we have made a difference, and our Nation has not suffered another attack. We must 

not become tired or grow weary. The dedication and commitment 

must continue, and above all, continuous prayers for the safety and 

security of this great Nation. 

Thank you, sir, for this hearing and the opportunity. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Secretary Parrish. And I do 

apologize. I should have said Secretary Parrish when I introduced 

you earlier. That was my mistake. 

Your testimony and statement is very enlightening, very helpful 

to the community, and I am sure the public was listening to it as 

well. 

Right now we’ll turn now to Mr. Larry Todd. Welcome, and the 

floor is yours, Mr. Todd.

STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY TODD, DIRECTOR, SECURITY, 

SAFETY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Mr. TODD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

it is a pleasure to be here today to provide this report on what the 

Bureau of Reclamation is doing to address the security needs of its 

water and power facilities in the Western United States. 
19

My name is Larry Todd. I am the Director of Security, Safety, 

and Law Enforcement for the Bureau of Reclamation. 

Reclamation is responsible for over 350 major dams and reservoirs and 58 power plants in the West. In carrying out this responsibility, the security and safety of the public, and our employees and the facilities is our highest priority. 

Reclamation has had a long-standing and effective safety program for public and employee safety, as well as dam safety. However, our efforts in establishing a separate security program only 

began in 1995. At the time, we hired a security officer, complete 

security reviewed, established work levels, and began hardening 

our facilities. Reclamation thus had various security measures and 

response plans in place prior to September 11th. Those measures 

were instrumental in our ability to respond quickly and effectively 

to the events of that tragic day. 

Since 9–11, Reclamation has significantly improved its security 

efforts by implementing long-term security programs. Key elements 

of the program include establishing a security, safety, and law enforcement office; conducting vulnerability risk assessments at all 

major dams and facilities; contracting for a top-down security programs review by outside experts; implementing Reclamation’s new 

law enforcement authority and implementing various informational 

and personnel security measures and polices. 

Currently, we have designated 280 facilities that are being assessed by the end of 2005. This past year we have assessed and implemented security measures on 55 of those most critical facilities, 

and 12 Reclamation Visitor Centers. 

On these facilities, we have implemented well over 50 percent of 

the accepted recommendations. We have developed personnel security, designating for background checks when necessary for both 

employees and contractors who access facilities. 

We have instituted an information policy to more closely control 

sensitive information about facilities. And we have staffed the security and law enforcement functions with in-house expertise as well 

as experts recruited from other agencies. We have also created secure office space to effectively deal with classified and control documents and have established a secure communications systems. 

We are progressing very well in established a secure security 

program with Reclamation. For example, with Hoover Dam, we 

have made several security-related enhancements since 9–11. First, 

we have enhanced our relationship on security matters with the 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including Clark 

County, Las Vegas Metro Police and the National Park Service. We 

also maintain a close working relationship with the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Intelligence, and its 

Nevada counterpart in sharing relevant intelligence information. 

Second, we have increased the number of law enforcement officers and security guards on site. We then enhanced checkpoints on 

both the Nevada and Arizona side and added lighting and electronic monitoring surveillance devices at selected sites. 

Third, we have limited traffic across the Dam to passenger vehicles, vans that are easily inspected, and short-haul trucks with permits. All vehicles are subject to random checks. The long-haul 
20

trucks are being re-routed around the Dam through US 95 and 

Interstate 40. 

Fourth, we have added physical security upgrades and modified 

visitor tours. 

In conclusion, I believe that Reclamation has made considerable 

progress to date in ensuring our dams and other facilities are much 

more secure today than they were on September 11th. 

However, we recognize that a great deal of work still needs to be 

done as more risk assessments are completed and new 

vulnerabilities and threats are discovered. Reclamation remains 

fully committed to the safety and security of the public, our employees, and our water and power facilities which provide these 

vital resources to so much of the West. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I am 

ready to address any questions the committee may have. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Todd. We appreciate 

your statement and your comments here as well. They have been 

very helpful to us. 

[The statement of Mr. Todd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY L. TODD 

My name is Larry L. Todd. I am Director of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement 

for the Bureau of Reclamation. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today to 

provide this report on what the Bureau of Reclamation is doing to address the security needs of its water and power facilities in the Western United States. Reclamation is responsible for over 350 major dams (including 58 power plants) and reservoirs in the West, and the security and safety of the public, our employees, and 

our facilities is our highest priority.

Reclamation has a long-standing and effective safety program for public and employee safety, as well as in dam safety. However, our efforts in establishing a separate security program only began in 1995. At that time, we first established the position of Security Officer, performed initial vulnerability assessments at five of our 

dams, and formalized the emergency action plans exercise program. In subsequent 

years, we continued to perform more in-house vulnerability assessments at key facilities, developed a data base on resulting recommendations for improving security, 

and implemented site security improvements. These improvements consisted of 

measures such as ensuring access doors and gates were locked, improving lighting 

of key areas, and increasing employee security awareness. We also developed continuity of operations plans for all our major offices and developed threat response 

measures for 4 different alert levels. Reclamation worked closely with other Federal 

water and power resource agencies through the Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection in developing risk assessment tools and sharing technologies, and 

also participated in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force to share intelligence information. The coming of the new millennium and the concern over Y2K issues raised 

our awareness of electronic security. These events resulted in Reclamation contracting with the United States Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories for an IT Security assessment.

Reclamation had various security measures and response plans in place prior to 

September 11, 2001 (9–11). Those measures were instrumental in our ability to respond quickly and effectively to the events of that tragic day. On 9–11, we immediately implemented high alert levels and threat response measures commensurate 

with those levels. This program included closing all visitor centers and halting all 

tours, posting Department of the Interior and State law enforcement officers at 

major dams on a 24/7 basis, increasing security patrols at all our facilities, and 

shutting down our web site to review it for sensitive information and to protect potentially sensitive information during the review process. Reclamation’s response activities were closely coordinated within the Department of the Interior, which provided law enforcement assistance. This was necessary since, at that time, Reclamation did not yet have its own law enforcement authority. We began working with 

the new White House Office of Homeland Security and other Federal infrastructure 

agencies to share information on potential threats and on response measures being 
21

taken. There were no interruptions in any of our water or power deliveries as a result of the events of 9–11.

In the months following 9–11, Reclamation developed and provided guidance to our 

regional and area offices on critical considerations such as: addressing chemical, biological, and radiological attacks; ensuring that necessary emergency management 

actions are taken; protecting and safeguarding information and records; and providing for tourism security, particularly as it relates to international visitors.

Reclamation’s four-level threat-response measures were revised to match the fivecolor- level alert system established by the Office of Homeland Security. Under 

these measures, there are specific security steps to be taken at each facility, depending on the type of facility it is, for each of the national threat levels. There are also 

exact procedures in place for ensuring that, in transitioning from one alert level to 

the next, certain tasks are met, such as: timely communicating the transition; ensuring that all necessary measures are implemented in a timely manner; and transmitting situation reports to keep management informed of changing conditions. 

These procedures have been tested and successfully applied on several transitions 

to date.

In addition to these short-term responses, Reclamation recognized the need to develop a comprehensive long-term security response plan. Key elements of the long 

term response plan that were developed include: establishing a Security, Safety and 

Law Enforcement Office; conducting vulnerability and risk assessments at all dams 

and major facilities; contracting for a top-down security program review by outside 

experts; implementing Reclamation’s new law enforcement authority in Public Law 

107–69, and implementing various informational and personnel security measures 

and policies.

In 2002, Reclamation Commissioner John W. Keys, III established the Office of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement, and appointed me as the Director reporting directly to the Commissioner. The Office is located in Denver, Colorado and it includes 

the previously existing occupational safety and health, dam safety, emergency management, and security functions, as well as Reclamation’s new law enforcement 

function. We have staffed the security and law enforcement functions with in-house 

expertise and with experts recruited from other agencies. We also created secure office space to effectively deal with classified and controlled documents, and have established secure communication systems.

To facilitate the potential re-opening of the 12 major visitor centers at Reclamation 

facilities, we contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to conduct security risk 

assessments at our visitor centers. Following implementation of the recommended 

security improvements—which included posting armed guards at visitor centers and 

on tours, screening visitors, and limiting tour routes—visitor centers were re-opened 

to the public and tours were re-initiated.

Under Reclamation’s Safety of Dams program, we have 252 ‘‘high and significant 

hazard’’ dams, which are facilities where failure could cause loss of life or significant 

economic damage. Reclamation committed to conducting vulnerability and risk assessments at all those facilities, as well as at 28 other critical facilities, such as 

power plants, pumping plants, and canals. Using carefully defined key factors to 

rate each facility, we prioritized all 280 facilities to be assessed. In 2002, Reclamation contracted with security experts at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and five other private security firms, to 

have our 55 most critical facilities assessed for risk, vulnerability and security. 

Those assessments were completed in 2002. The recommendations resulting from 

those assessments were analyzed by Reclamation’s security experts with assistance 

from experts from the Corps of Engineers and Sandia National Laboratories. These 

recommendations were then presented to management for development of a final decision document for implementing the accepted recommendations to enhance security procedures and fortify the facilities. Approximately 54% of the nearly 1,400 recommendations resulting from the first 55 risk assessment reports have been implemented to date, and many others are in the process of being implemented. Risk assessments are being initiated in fiscal year 2003 at an additional 101 facilities; the 

remaining facilities will be assessed in fiscal year 2004.

For example, at Hoover Dam we have made several security related enhancements 

since 9–11. First, we have enhanced our relationship on security matters with the 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including Clark County, Las 

Vegas Metro Police and the National Park Service. We also maintain a close working relationship with the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal 

Intelligence and its Nevada counterpart in sharing relevant intelligence information. 

Second, we have increased the numbers of Law Enforcement Officers and Security 
22

Guards on site, enhanced checkpoints on both the Nevada and Arizona side with 

lighting and barrier gates, and added lighting and electronic monitoring and surveillance devices at select sites. Third, we have limited traffic across the Dam to passenger vehicles, vans that are easily inspected, and short-haul trucks with permits. 

All vehicles are subject to random checks. Long-haul trucks are being re-routed via 

US 95 and Interstate 40. Fourth, we have added physical security upgrades and 

modified the visitor tour.

A top-down review of Reclamation’s security program was conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in 2002 and included members of the Interagency Forum for Infrastructure Protection. The purpose of the review was two-fold: (1) to evaluate the 

current organization, policies, and processes of Reclamation’s security program by 

reviewing numerous security documents and interviewing all levels of Reclamation 

and Interior personnel, and (2) to make recommendations for a mature, sustainable 

security program. The final report was presented to Reclamation’s senior management in June 2003 and they are currently considering the review’s findings and recommendations.

Until the enactment of Public Law 107–69 on November 12, 2001, Reclamation had 

no law enforcement authority. Public Law 107–69 provided Reclamation with the 

authority to enforce Federal laws on Reclamation projects and lands and to contract 

for law enforcement services with other Federal, state, Tribal, or local law enforcement agencies. Following enactment, Reclamation published regulations on public 

conduct on Reclamation lands and at Reclamation facilities, and on the use of non–

Interior law enforcement officers to enforce Federal laws on Reclamation lands. (It 

should be noted, however, that at Hoover Dam, Reclamation has long had authority 

under different statutes and regulations to maintain an armed police force.)

Since 9–11, in the area of personnel security, we have put in place a policy requiring 

background checks of our employees and contractors. This includes identifying additional positions needing security clearances. We have also implemented a policy on 

restricting and protecting security-sensitive information and have installed perimeter security around our information technology systems.

In fiscal year 2002, Reclamation received $30.2 million in supplemental appropriations for our security and counter-terrorism efforts. That funding was used primarily for guards and surveillance, studies and risk assessments, law enforcement 

and interim security equipment. In fiscal year 2003, our $28.4 million appropriation 

for site security/anti-terrorism was increased by $25 million through a supplemental 

appropriation, for a total of $53.4 million. Those funds are being used for guards 

and surveillance, including those needed to maintain our continuing heightened 

state of alert at all our facilities; for additional risk assessments at key facilities; 

for further implementation of our law enforcement program; for law enforcement 

and security equipment; and for hardening our facilities through the implementation of recommendations in the completed vulnerability risk assessments.

In conclusion, I believe Reclamation has made considerable progress to date in ensuring our dams and other facilities are more secure today than they were on September 11, 2001. However, we recognize that a great deal of work still needs to be 

done as more risk assessments are completed, more recommendations are accepted 

for implementation, and new vulnerabilities and new threats are discovered. Reclamation remains fully committed to the safety and security of the public, our employees, and our water and power facilities which provide these vital resources to 

much of the West.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks and I stand ready to address 

any questions the Committee may have.

Mr. GIBBONS. We turn now to my good friend, Mr. Bussell, Colonel, retired, now the head of this State’s Department of Homeland 

Security for Nevada. 

Jerry, welcome.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL JERRY BUSSELL, SPECIAL ADVISOR 

TO THE GOVERNOR, NEVADA HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE 

Colonel BUSSELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, as you can see in my written 

statement, I plan to address five areas—funding, communication 
23

interoperability, critical infrastructure, homeland advisory system, 

and Nevada’s need for a civil support team. 

I’d like to deviate from that just a little bit. Congressman Berkley’s statement so cleared walked right down my funding list, I 

think it would be repetitive that I go over those things again. I 

would just like to jump over and talk about communication interoperability. 

But before I go there, there’s a couple of things that I would add 

in the areas of vulnerability in the funding. Las Vegas has 18 of 

the 20 largest hotels in the United States, and they are located on 

our 2.1 mile Las Vegas Strip. Understanding that the Las Vegas 

Strip is not actually in Las Vegas, it is in the unincorporated greater Clark County, that 11 of those largest hotels are right next to 

McCarran Airport, which is the seventh busiest airport. 

At any one time, 24/7, 365, the Las Vegas Strip has more people 

than Fort Lauderdale, Florida, or Salt Lake City, Utah. If that is 

not a vulnerability, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know what is. 

Moving on, in the areas of communication interoperability, 

should an incident occur, it’s important that first responders have 

the ability to talk with each other. I think that is a pretty commonly accepted statement, one of the fireman would be able to talk 

with the policeman and both to be able to talk to the first medical 

responder. In a perfect world, wouldn’t it be nice if every policeman 

and fireman and medical responder could talk to each other anywhere and everywhere. 

However, at this time we do not live in a perfect world. We live 

in a world that is at war. But we do need to build a system where 

a first responder’s leadership or the first responder leader could 

talk. The incident commander could have a full chain of communication abilities, not just for voice, communications for the computer, and maybe even the future, the video. An instant commander would need the ability to talk not only to the firemen, the 

policemen, or the emergency medical responders, but, for example, 

he may need to talk or she may need to talk to Department of 

Transportation, the water company, the power company, schools, or 

those other first responders that we don’t normally think of, some 

people like our civil support team, Hazmat teams, the National 

Guard, maybe the directors of the different securities or the security directors of our different hotels, not to include the number of 

Federal agencies, whether it be the FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE, and on 

and on and on. 

Nevada is probably no more unique in the areas of communication interoperability than many other states. Since there is no perfect system available, we are looking at a number of options, but 

there’s a clear problem. With Nevada’s current shortfall, it is going 

to be almost impossible to completely fund even a partial system 

without help. 

That completes my initial formal remarks, Mr. Chairman. I look 

forward to your questions. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bussell. 

[The statement of Colonel Bussell follows:]
24

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JERRY BUSSELL 

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to have this opportunity to testify. You have 

been provided a copy of my written testimony for the record. 

In my written testimony, I will address five areas: funding, communications Interoperability, critical infrastructure, homeland security advisory system, and Nevada’s 

need for a Civil Support Team. 

Due to time constraints this morning, I will only formally discuss funding.

FUNDING 

As you are aware, I have been critical of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

funding formula for some time. As I understand it, current Homeland Security formulas are based on three criteria: the 2000 Census, critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessments. Before I proceed, I must state, I was personally disappointed 

that Las Vegas was not Included In the fiscal year 1903 Supplemental Budget 

Grant given directly to 30 cities.

We can all agree, Las Vegas is a unique city in itself, but the Las Vegas Valley is 

even more unique. The majority of people think the Las Vegas Strip is in Las Vegas. 

Most of it is actually In the unincorporated area of Clark County. The greater Las 

Vegas Valley includes the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, Henderson and unincorporated Clark County, where most of the Las Vegas Strip and 

the cities of Jean and Primm, Nevada are located.

If you merely look at the population of Las Vegas as shown in the 2000 Census, 

one receives an Incorrect picture. The 1.7 million population of the Las Vegas Valley 

is significantly greater than the 400,000 population of the City of Las Vegas. The 

figures used by the Department of Homeland Security must not have included the 

1.7 million Las Vegas Valley residents.

To receive a clear picture of our needs, one must look at the 1.7 million Las Vegas 

Valley residents; then include the 40 million plus tourists.

In the vulnerability area, Las Vegas has 18 of the 20 largest hotels in the United 

States, located on a 2.1 mile strip. It includes the first 11 largest hotels. Right next 

to the Las Vegas strip is McCarran International Airport, which is the 7th busiest 

airport in the United States.

To put it another way. Our tourist population on the Las Vegas Strip, on any given 

night, exceeds the population of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida or Salt Lake City, Utah.

Now I want to talk about critical infrastructure. Without going into significant detail, there are a number of critical infrastructure and key assets located In the Las 

Vegas Valley. Most prominent is Hoover Dam. Hoover Dam not only supplies water 

for most of the southwestern United States, It is a major source of electric power.

Why these unique factors were not considered in the Department of Homeland Security’s funding equations seems strange.

It is my understanding there is a Senate Bill, that has passed Committee, addressing some of these funding inequities. I am asking for your support in changing the 

Department of Homeland Security’s funding formula.

Funding to protect the citizens of this great country should not be based on their 

street address—but on where they are should an incident occur.

COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 

Should an incident occur, it is important that first responders have the ability to 

talk with each other. One would want the firemen to be able to talk with a policeman, and both to be able to talk to a first medical responder. In a perfect world, 

It would be desirable for every policeman, fireman and emergency medical responder to be able to talk with each other. However, at this time, we do not live 

in a perfect world. To build the system where every first responder could talk with 

each other Is probably not practical and may be cost prohibitive.

Nonetheless, we must have a system where first responder leadership can communicate with one another. Where an Incident Commander has a full range of communications ability-not Just voice (radio) communications - but computer and maybe 

In the future, video. An Incident Commander needs to be able to communicate with 

a number of organizations. For example, the Nevada Department of Transportation, 

the water company, the power company, schools, and other special response units 

like the National Guard, Civil Support Teams, HAZMAT teams, or the directors of 

security at our major hotels. I have not Included federal agencies like the FBI, ATE 

DEA, ICE, and on and on.

With Nevada’s unique needs and no perfect system readily available, we are looking 

at a number of communication options. With the state’s current funding shortfalls, 
25

it is going to be almost impossible to fund even a partial system without federal 

help.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

With the recent multiple power outages in the Northeastern United States, critical 

infrastructure is on the forefront. Everyone knows that water, power, banking/finance, and transportation are vitally important to the United States.

Critical infrastructure, to me, is reliability and availabllity-based. To assure reliability and availability, we must protect our critical infrastructure. To protect the 

critical Infrastructure, a meaningful vulnerability assessment is necessary—a vulnerability assessment based on a national standard.

Yet there is no national plan clearly defining roles and responsibilities of critical Infrastructure protection in either the public or private sectors. There are no objectives, milestones, or time frames leading to achievable performance measures.

Over 80% of our nation’s critical infrastructure is in the private sector, however, 

they are operating in a vacuum. There is no immediate method of notification of 

threat or any way to give our critical infrastructure specific, actionable Information 

on a timely basis.

We ask our private entities to perform vulnerability analysis and correction using 

their own resources. There must be some way to help private and semi-private entities with public funding. It could be in the form of specialty tools, training, training 

aids, standardized vulnerability assessments or tax incentives.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS 

Nevada does not have a Civil Support Team. Nevada’s Adjutant General, Major 

General Giles Vanderhoof, lists the need for a Civil Support Team as his number 

one unit priority. I certainly agree with the Adjutant General based on my recent 

observations during DP–03 where a clear need for such a team was evident. 

Mr. Chairman, I know you have personally been working on this project for several years, but I cannot emphasize any stronger how important this critical asset 

is for Nevada.

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM 

The Homeland Security Advisory System is vague, difficult to explain, and lacks 

public confidence. The color-code system initiated by the Department of Homeland 

Security in March of 2002 has not worked well. It does not define what states, cities, 

businesses or Individuals should do at a particular color code level. It clearly does 

not explain what should happen when the color code changes—either up or down.

I would like to recommend several methods to improve the color code system, Including Issuing specific warnings to targeted regions or facilities. I would further 

recommend that certain protective measures for specific states and cities be channeled regionally If they do not affect the entire country.

Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory and Color Code System should be Initiated Immediately.

Public confidence is at stake.

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify today. 

Mr. GIBBONS. We’ll turn now to questions from the committee. 

And let me begin by thanking each of you once again for taking 

time out of your busy day to come here before the committee and 

provide us your testimony. 

My question would first go to Mr. Parrish. Just on a generality, 

Mr. Parrish, and knowing the fact that I was one of the architects 

of the language which created the Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, what is your assessment after one and 

a half years of the Department’s capabilities? Where are we? 

We have got a massive new organization, second largest department in the United States Federal Government. We merged more 

than 100 separate agencies together in a colossal effort to address 

the issue of homeland security and issues that are pertinent to 

that. 
26

What is your assessment of the functionality? How is it doing 

after one and a half years? Is this a toddler that is up and walking? 

Is it ready to run? Is able to talk? Where are we in that? 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, it’s a very timely question. Yesterday morning 

I was at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 

speaking to the national—international security manager’s course, 

which, as you know, has a significant audience of tremendous leadership from around the Federal Government as well as international equal. 

The point that I made in there to a similar question was comparing us to the Department of Defense, we’re the second largest—

if you look at the Department of Defense since 1947, actually when 

we demonstrate our successes in the war in Iraq in 1991, we kind 

of got it right, from 1947 to 1991. 

The Department of the Homeland Security is coming on up its 

six months anniversary. It’s pulling together those agencies and 

bringing each one to the table to be able to make sure that we are 

having the interoperability, as Jerry indicated, remains a process 

that we’ll continue to work on very closely and very diligently. 

I think what we are finding is the success is that now the Federal Government and interagency because of our change in liaison 

programs, as I said earlier in opening remarks, having people from 

those agencies present is really assisting in that. 

I think when we look back at some of the initiatives that our organization brought to us within the department, it continued to 

build on those. I look at the Customs programs and what they are 

doing on the borders to enhance the security screening there, the 

outreach of the container security initiative overseas. If you look at 

that, the department is engaging heavily with those organizations 

to make sure that we have this defensive depth and later strategy, 

if you will, of trying to bring together the best practices, the best 

capabilities of all the agencies to be able to detect and prevent a 

terrorist activity, detect as far out as possible to prevent any type 

of activities here in the United States. 

I think the area that we need to move faster on, and I have made 

notes to myself on this, is hearing from State and local and the private sector because the wealth of information out there is what we 

need to hear from them and also that we need to make sure that 

we are getting to them. 

I think the Homeland Security advisory bulletins and information bulletins that we have been putting out, we’ve been getting 

good feedback from that. 

An example of that, I think, is showing now that other agencies 

recognize the importance of the department and what we are trying 

to do and serve the American people in the private sector. Because 

immediately after the attacks of Al Kot on May 11th, at that time, 

I was the associate director in the Terrorist Threat Integration 

Center. When I got to work that morning at six o’clock and began 

looking at the very sensitive national security type intelligence information that was coming out from those reports, I immediately 

contacted then the assistant secretary Paul Redmond back at the 

Department at Homeland Security who was the information analysis secretary, assistant secretary. 
27

And I said, ‘‘Paul,’’ I said, ‘‘Start working on protective measures 

because we have seen some new tactics and techniques employed 

by al-Qaeda in this attack. I will work the terror line with the CIA 

and get this information downgraded so that we get it out in the 

hands of State, local, and private sector.’’ So talking to hotels and 

industries and chemical facilities and those things. 

And to the credit of the interagency process, by the end of the 

day, we had out on the street a document which we have gotten 

remarks that it not only quickly described what happened in Al 

Kot, a breakdown of the three compounds and the tactics and techniques employed by al-Qaeda, but we had protective measures that 

would help the states and locals be able to prioritize what they 

were looking at and trying to support the expenditures of limited 

resources. 

So I think that is an example of how the Federal Government 

recognized the mission of the department in conveying this type of 

information. So I think we are moving the ball forward. We have 

got a long ways to go, but I think right now we are making great 

strides in making that happen. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Secretary, many people in the audience here 

time and time again hear about our security warning status and 

the levels of security, whether it is yellow today, orange tomorrow, 

or red, and wonder how we get to each one of those. 

Whether or not, we are vertically integrating the intelligence, as 

you have already talked about, down to our law enforcement first 

responders that allow for the average citizen out here to feel safe, 

that someone knows about the information, that someone knows 

about the criticality of this intelligence, that is on our local first responder’s list that can assess that because the average public 

would never be able to say, ‘‘Well, what does the orange threat 

mean to me? I’m going from my home out to Lake Mead, for example, am I at risk?’’ They will never know that. 

How is that vertical integration going and what are your responses to those people who will probably come later to say that 

they don’t feel they are getting enough information? 

I guess my final part of that long detailed question is how is the 

reverse of that information flowing? Are you getting critical information from first responders who are by far and away our best intelligence source? When a policeman stops an individual that is on 

a suspect list, does that information go up vertically quick enough? 

How is the two-way flow of that information going. 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, if I could start, kind of work backwards a little 

bit, but on that last question, the flow of information coming in, 

you remember Operation Liberty Shield, as this Nation began to 

commence hostilities in Iraq, I was presented the great opportunity 

on Friday afternoon, the 28th of February, the day before the department stood up to develop Operation Liberty Shield and bring 

it to the White House by four o’clock Monday afternoon. It was a 

very long weekend, as you might imagine, but to the credit of the 

government, we had 25 Federal agencies working diligently 

throughout that weekend to develop the protective measures that 

we employed in Liberty Shield to include the active support there 

of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of Interior, and 

each agency had their protective measures. 
28

Once we initiated and commenced Liberty Shield, the operations 

center received a report one night from a local police department 

up around the oil facilities outside of Philadelphia. As you go up 

the Delaware River, you see some oil facilities. They picked up two 

individuals that apparently had been surveilling those oil facilities. 

At the same time the Coast Guard came in with their report. We 

had a foreign flag oil tanker in the Delaware River getting ready 

to bring its oil. We ran the manifest on the crew. The captain of 

the vessel was an Iraqi. The senior first engineer was an Iraqi, and 

15 Pakistani crew members. 

Was there a correlation here to what was going on? In the end, 

no, but we didn’t take any chances. We removed the captain of the 

vessel. We brought on a Coast Guard crew to drive the vessel up 

to offload that, and the another two individuals were turned over 

to the JTTF in Philadelphia for further questioning. 

It’s that type of information flow that was coming into the operations center and exchange of information. So the eyes and ears 

that are out there in the streets of America are front line defenders 

are critical to get that information in. 

The process of going to change the national threat level is a tremendous effort, as you might imagine, because Secretary Ridge 

takes great, great concern over this. 

I have had the privilege and the opportunity to be with him in 

the last three times that we have made that decision. What we are 

trying to do right now in the homeland security advisory system is 

to go back and take a look at that. 

Is it practical to say that the entire country orange, when yet the 

intelligence we are looking at may only be focusing on a threat to 

the chemical facility or it may only be focusing in an area around 

the northeast? 

But we have to be very careful, though, that we don’t convey 

that, and then the rest of the country says, ‘‘Well, drop my pack. 

It’s not—I don’t have to worry about it.’’ 

So we are trying to look really close at how we can go back and 

take a look at the homeland security advisory system in that regard. 

I think we have to do better in working with our State and local 

authorities in being able to help them understand that. As many 

may think, there is this great fountain of top-secret SCI, sensitive 

intelligence sitting there in Washington, and it’s not getting handed down. 

I wish there was because I would be fighting everyday to make 

sure it was getting downgraded. 

But, you know, to our successes now and the people that we have 

picked up, that’s the good news. Now we may be not quite getting 

as much of the information we had gleaned before. But I think it’s 

important to recognize getting the system explained to the State 

and locals. 

An initiative that I have under—the program known as risk-net, 

which is a regional information sharing system. We have a pilot 

program we’re kicking off this month, and right now we are going 

to target just nuclear power facilities. But in risk-net now, we’ll 

have the nuclear facilities be able to report to us any suspicious activities, and we’re initiating this in six states. 
29

I want to build on this as quickly as possible so that we can use 

risk-net for this dialogue that will go back and forth between our 

operations center, getting information out to the State and local. 

Risk-net covers, I want to say, it’s about 65 State and local authorities around the country. I want to be able to have a website there 

so we can put up the daily homeland security intelligence summary 

which will be at law enforcement sensitive or official-use only level. 

And the second piece that I want to do, and you have heard talk 

about Parrish’s concept of the hybrid analyst. In this war we have, 

we need to create an individual who is looking at the operational 

environment as well as the intelligence, who understands the Department of Homeland Security’s operational environment. This fusion will be built around some of our subordinate agency people 

that are coming in, agents, inspectors, and that type, we’ll have 

some analysts, and we will create this hybrid. 

We also now are working with emergency defense preparedness. 

We’re reviewing a program of instruction that we’re going out to 

State and locals on intelligence analyst training. I want to be able 

to prioritize where we are going to send that, and I want to be able 

to regionalize it so that we have, for example, a course that may 

come out here to Nevada, and we bring in analysts from the western region. So when they graduate from this course, and I’m not 

sure exactly whether it’s going to be one week or two weeks, they 

will then have a counterpart over in California or down in Arizona 

and say, ‘‘Have you seen this? We just pulled this guy over, and 

we found in part of his documents here a hotel receipt from Arizona. Do you know anything about this?’’ And this type of information sharing. 

The next step to that is I want to bring these analysts into our 

fusion cell in Washington where they would spend two weeks. They 

would see then the type of information that we are getting in there, 

and I think it would be a better appreciation of exactly how this 

is all processed. 

So I think that we are moving forward in getting that information out as quickly as possible. That is my number one priority in 

working with the sensitive intelligence that comes out and getting 

it downgraded into the hands of the State and the locals as quickly 

as possible. We have to get it down to those operators in the field 

because they will be the ones that either going to prevent, detect 

or deny terrorists from conducting an operation here in the United 

States. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Secretary Parrish, I have a number of other questions for you, but I know that the other members of this panel, Mr. 

Shadegg, would like to also engage you in some questions, and I 

don’t want to take up the whole time. So I’ll ask Mr. Shadegg for 

questions. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I have questions for each of you, so I’m going to ask 

you to be as brief as you can in your responses. 

Mr. Parrish, I want to thank you for your testimony before the 

committee previously and for your testimony here today. I find in 

very informative and helpful. I think I expressed the last time you 

testified the admiration I have for the incredible challenge we have 

given the department, to try to stand up a department of this size 
30

and scope and to try to get all these diverse and disparate agencies 

working together in a common effort, I think, is a daunting task. 

As you pointed out, you are barely six months into it, and, yet, I 

think the statement you make in your testimony that the Nation 

is, in fact, safer now was accurate. And I think it can be safer still. 

But I have great admiration for the task that Secretary Ridge is 

doing with trying to pull all this together, especially, I spent some 

time in law enforcement myself, the years I was in the Attorney 

General’s office dealing the disparate interests of all the law enforcement agencies in Arizona and trying to get them to pull together rather than be at war with each other was a significant 

challenge. I can’t imagine trying to do it nationwide. 

I want to ask you a few specific questions directly from your earlier testimony. There is a statement in your testimony that says, 

‘‘Our Information Analysis Office,’’ which is what had, ‘‘has the 

ability to conduct its own analysis of the security information you 

get.’’ I’m very pleased to hear that. As you know, the statute requires you to be able to do that. 

Can you give me here today an idea of how many people are engaged in that task at this time and whether there is yet room to 

grow in that area? 

Mr. PARRISH. Yes, sir. We are still somewheres right around 

about the 55 people. Again, that’s analysts as well as the liaison 

from the other agencies. We are looking to grow. As you know, we 

are moving into a larger facility. The time line on that may be slipping a little bit, but we are pushing very quickly to do that because 

once we do, we’ll be able to bring in the other individuals. 

When you look across the Department of Homeland Security and 

at the other intelligence organizations that exist, there are a number of analysts in there. It could be in excess of 800 across the 

other departments. We are going now to look at that and making 

sure we don’t have duplication of effort. In fact, maybe some of 

those analysts may need to be migrated into the Information Analysis Office, which will increase our capabilities. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I guess the second question, and the only other 

one I have for you this morning, and that is in your prepared statement says, ‘‘We share more information with people who need it including our State and local partners.’’ Could you briefly summarize 

for the committee precisely how you share that information with 

State and local officials? 

And I’ll warn you in advance, I’m going to ask Mr. Bussell how 

he sees that working. 

Mr. PARRISH. Right now what we’re pushing out is the information bulletins and the advisory bulletins. We coordinate with the 

FBI when they put out their weekly intel summaries, that goes out 

every Wednesday, and also when they put out an advisory through 

the NLETS system. 

The success, I think, on the advisory bulletins and information 

has been being able to engage members of the intelligence community and getting a tear line. A tear line, as you know, is getting 

a sensitive or highly classified piece of intelligence tear line that 

will make it unclassified or at the secret level. 

Sometimes I have been only able to get it to the secret level. But 

we do have now within our states the Homeland Security advisors 
31

having that classification and being able to get that piece of intelligence. 

And then, of course, on the official-use only, we do that. Suicide 

bomber vests, again, Marines over took that one facility in Bagdad. 

Photographs I saw of the suicide leather vests, and these types of 

things, I went to DIA immediately. That afternoon we had photographs made, and we put out an advisory so that every State and 

local would be to see exactly if they pulled somebody over and 

opened the trunk and found these, they would know exactly what 

they’re looking at. 

I want to be able to do better than that. I want electronically—

I want a web page so that they can each day pull up. 

The other piece of that is the best practices. Let’s learn how some 

of the great American State and locals are out there effecting their 

jobs, conducting their jobs, and paste that on this web page. This 

is how it was done in Arizona, this was how it was done in Nevada, 

and let other states learn from that. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Bussell, it’s your chance to say what’s working 

and what could be improved. 

Colonel BUSSELL. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Shadegg, 

thank you very much. 

Let me start out by saying that this individual homeland security 

advisor organization, Homeland Security directors are different in 

every State. Saying that, I’m a homeland security advisor with one 

person. However, I have the same responsibilities maybe a larger 

State would have a number of people. 

The intelligence information that is coming down is in its very 

embryotic stages. There is no question about that. Mr. Secretary, 

it’s clearly on the right steps. I can say with absolute confidence 

if we needed to know something, some actionable, absolutely certain intelligence, there would be no question in my mind that I 

have would it immediately, and I could go straight to the Governor. 

However, we do need to take some real looks at how we are handling this. As an example, if you send something down and it just 

comes through normal routine procedures, I may or may not be 

able to get that. Where I get most of my intelligence is from the 

folks in the back of this room every single day. They have a spot 

report that comes up from Clark County, comes up from the JTTF 

down here, from Washoe County, and it goes in. 

I’ll be very candid with the group, the committee. I look there 

first now. Now, leading to that if something is really happening, we 

can talk. And I have been very critical of the current system. The 

Homeland Security advisory system, I have been vocal, very vocal. 

And as Mr. Secretary said, we are changing it. I have been vocal 

about the intelligence system. I hope that answers your question, 

sir. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Yes, it does. It helps give us some information on 

how it’s flowing at this earlier stage. 

Mr. Todd, let me conclude the questioning with you. I read your 

written statement and was impressed at the steps that the Bureau 

of Reclamation has taken to try to upgrade its security and its 

analysis of its exposure in the time since 9–11. 

But I did not read in there anything that suggested to me that 

you have done an analysis of kind of a worst case scenario. As a 
32

Westerner and native of Arizona, it randomly goes through my 

mind exactly what would happen if you successfully blew up Hoover Dam? Exactly what would happen if you successfully brought 

down Glen Canyon Dam? 

And I guess my question of you is in addition to assessing how 

vulnerable your facilities are, have you yet contemplated to perform an analysis of kind of a ‘‘What if’’ scenario if, in fact, your security measures fail, and one of those facilities was breached? 

Mr. TODD. The answer is yes, we have, Congressman. There’s 

two ways that we have looked at this. 

The first way is that we have a very high expert safety dam program where we understand what the extent of these dams will do, 

and that consequence analysis goes right into our vulnerability 

analysis that we have completed for each of these dams. 

And so with the consequences on the one hand, the threats that 

we know about on the other, and then the potential in the middle, 

we look at that with the analysis of the assessment. From that, we 

make decisions about how far to go with instituting and implementing the security measures. 

For instance, on Glen Canyon and on Hoover, we had Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency do the assessment. We looked at that information and then looked at our dam safety consequences information and made sure those were talking to each other before we 

made the decision. 

Mr. SHADEGG. And all of that information has been made available to the private contractors who have also looked at your security measures? 

Mr. TODD. I’m—. 

Mr. SHADEGG. There was some reference to private contractors 

that have looked at it, and, also, I think, the National Laboratories 

at Sandia? 

Mr. TODD. The Sandia has done a couple of different things. The 

private contractors we had looked at a number of sites. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency looked at national critical structures. We had 50 other sites that prior contractors looked at. All 

of those went through a security advisory team meeting to really 

look at the consequences and how we would put in our security 

measures. On that panel sat a Sandia member. As well as Sandia 

also looked at top-down review for our overall umbrella security 

program. So there were two top-down focuses that were provided 

us. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, I’m well over the five minutes. I 

appreciate your indulgence. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, I think simply because there’s just the two 

of us here that we can engage in extended question and answer 

without offending anybody else. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Unfortunately, I have obligations, and so I’m going 

to have to conclude at this point. So I’ll leave it to you. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Shadegg, thank you—. 

Mr. SHADEGG. So you can ask questions. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you for your presence and thanks for your 

time here. 

Let me continue with this. And I want to go back to Mr. Bussell 

and ask him a question about the State of Nevada. We have heard 
33

criticisms sometimes in the media that the Federal Government is 

not giving any Homeland Security dollars to the State of Nevada. 

What is your comment with regard to being on the receiving end 

of those dollars if you are not getting any and how many dollars 

or how much money has been sent to the State of Nevada in the 

course of time for homeland security problems? 

Colonel BUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a very interesting question, and sometimes one wonders where does the 

money come from. So the money I’ll be talking about this morning 

it is in two breaks. It’s at the fiscal year 2003 phase I—. 

Mr. GIBBONS. That’s fiscal year 1903 for these people who don’t 

know what fiscal year 2003 means. 

Colonel BUSSELL. Yes, sir. It was $6.77 million that arrived in 

Nevada April of 2003. And for record, I will be putting these notes 

later on, Mr. Chairman. That was $6.7 million followed in July by 

$17.9 million for a total for 27, almost—I’m sorry—25, almost $25 

million. Nevada received that and in the process of passing it on 

down and basically the 80/20, with 80 down to the first responders. 

Mr. Frank Circusa, the director of the Department of Emergency 

Management is the administrative agent and actually handles the 

operational part of disbursing the money through a homeland security committee that is in the process of being changed. It will be 

based on recent State legislature Assembly Bill 441. We’re in the 

process of forming a homeland security commission, and certainly 

that will be a top priority. 

But back to your question, sir. We have received that money. It 

is here, and we’re in the process of getting it out to the first responders. 

Mr. GIBBONS. So just this year alone, you’ve gotten nearly $25 

million into the State of Nevada for the homeland security efforts. 

How is that money apportioned between cities, counties, and 

states? You said it was 80/20, but 80 percent going to first responders. 

Colonel BUSSELL. Yes, sir. 80 percent going out through an interesting system. We use the LEPC system in the State of Nevada. 

It was in place way before I came on the station. LEPC is an local 

emergency planning committee. The group gets together, and then 

there are 17 LEPCs because there’s 17 counties in the State of Nevada. They get together and decide what their priorities are. The 

LEPC arranges their horizontal priorities into a vertical priority. 

They come to the Homeland Security Committee subcommittee, 

present their priorities by LEPC, by county. That is then taken 

into a vertical and presented to the Homeland Security Committee 

for final review, and it’s passed out in that process. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Todd, let me you ask when you talk about 24/

7 security at a lot of our dams and other infrastructures that you’re 

responsible for, you indicated in your testimony that both Department of—Bureau of Reclamation and State security, how is that 

breakdown cost arrived at? 

Mr. TODD. Well, many of our dams, we have our own security 

guards contracted for, and, specifically, at Hoover we have a police 

department. We also contract for armed guards. 

We have also contracted with the local sheriff department, and 

sometimes local PDs, and certainly we contracted with the Na-
34

tional Park Service for rangers to watch our dams. After 9–11, we 

certainly did that for quite a while. 

Mr. GIBBONS. To summarize, if you have a responsibility and you 

have contracted it out to either the State, the county, or locality 

metropolitan police, you pay them to do the security on your facilities? 

Mr. TODD. That’s correct if we have a contract, that’s correct. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And includes the State if it were the National 

Guard? 

Mr. TODD. We don’t go with the National Guard. There’s ome authorities that prohibit Federal funding of the National Guard in 

that kind of situation. But we do certainly with the State patrols, 

and we have that on a number of sites. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Okay. There is a number of other questions. Mr. 

Parrish, Secretary Parrish, there are those of us in Nevada who are 

very, very concerned with the Yucca Mountain. There is no doubt 

about it. To those of us here, it’s not something that we look forward at all. 

And my question would be with our concerns—and I, for one, as 

a scientist, have concerns just about the structures that there are 

for the security of the material incitsu, let alone any kind of an act 

that might jeopardize that. 

My greater concern is that of the transportation of the material 

from nuclear power plants across this country to Yucca Mountain. 

I know of no studies that have been done to look at either the 

structural—infrastructure risks that are there. 

How do you assure communities, states across this country that 

that material coming through there is not going to be the subject 

of a terrorist attack with devastating consequences? 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, the Department of Energy, and I really can’t 

speak for them, but I think they have a program, as you know, in 

the movement of special assets, but I think maybe a blueprint for 

what we need to build upon in this process as we look as the movement of these type of hazardous materials and waste that are 

moved across the United States. Energy will have the lead in this 

area, but, again, working very closely with the Department of 

Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as the Department of 

Transportation. 

Our infrastructure protection director is heavily involved with 

these other agencies in assessing this. I think you raised a good 

point about the study that has been looked at, and I will go back 

and try to see if we have either something in progress or, if not, 

an area that we probably should move to. 

But each of agencies in varying degrees have a certain responsibility. And, again, as Department of Homeland Security is now up 

and running, we would certainly have a major role in making sure 

that event of the coordination is being done with most of these 

agencies when we start talking about moving any significant 

amounts of hazardous materials, such as nuclear waste across the 

country. 

So I have the specifics, and perhaps when I’m back in Washington, I can sit down with you and we can get a little bit more 

detail. But at this point in time, based on my phone calls and talk-
35

ing to our infrastructure protection director, they are engaged with 

the Department of Energy at this time. Under Secretary Laguti 

and I, in fact, we meet with the National Regulatory commission, 

I believe it is, next week, and one of these will be the topic of discussion. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Let me say that your department will be well into 

which all of this intelligence information is poured. You will have 

the responsibility to ferret it out, digest, and analyze potential risk 

and threats that would be made to that. I see that as an overwhelming problem because of the vulnerability. We have already 

talked about porousness of our borders, the porousness of infrastructures, rail systems, highway systems, bridges, rivers for this 

material is—I mean it’s incalculable how large that problem could 

be for you. I’m very concerned about it. I look forward to talking 

to you further to get your information. 

Mr. Todd, let me ask you one final question as well with regards 

to water supplies, Hoover—Lake Mead provides an enormous quantity of water, a reservoir, but it’s always a reservoir from which 

communities are served water, especially the Las Vegas community 

and Clark County, and community downstream from Lake Mead. 

What steps have you taken or the Bureau of Reclamation taken 

to assure that these critical water sources are safe for our communities with regard to some type of chemical or biological agent that 

might be used to contaminate those waters? 

Mr. TODD. Well, early on, we put out some memos and guidance 

to field staff on being watchful and understanding what the chemical biological kind of attacks may be. We have more to do in that 

area, but certainly we have the guidance there for the field people 

to really be aware of what may happen. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Are you coordinating those investigations with 

other agencies to share that information, say, for example, with 

Homeland Security who might know of information that could relate to that? 

Mr. TODD. Yes, we are. We have a lot of coordination with Homeland Security at the Washington level and then also our local offices are coordinating with the local first responders and so forth. 

We have a program where we do environmental—not environmental—emergency preparedness work. We do table top function 

exercises and so forth. Those exercises many times include that 

kind of work where we may have a truck affecting the carrying of 

the chemical that is affecting the reservoir, and so how would we 

deal with that on an emergency basis. 

So those exercises are ongoing continually, and we work right 

along with first responders on those kinds of things. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Knowing the size of Las Vegas, I cannot imagine 

being able to just turn the tap off if there were a problem with the 

water supply out here at Lake Mead. And it’s something I’m sure 

that the community here is very concerned about, and I would look 

forward to spending time with you to discuss the issue further to 

make sure that we have reached a satisfactory answer to the question about the security of that water system for Las Vegas. 

Mr. TODD. I’d be happy to. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Gentlemen, we have to go to the second panel here. 

We have taken a great deal of your time, and the committee is 
36

grateful for your presence and your testimony. We would like to excuse the panel with thanks from me personally and from the committee. 

We will take a 5-minute break, and when we come back, we will 

call up our second panel for the committee. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. We’ll take a 5-minute break. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. GIBBONS. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and 

Counterterrorism will come back to order. 

At this point in time, we would like to call our second panel, and 

that will include Mr. David Shepherd, head of security at the Venetian Resort; Mr. Randy Walker, aviation director of Clark County 

Department of Aviation; Dr. Dale Carrison—am I pronouncing your 

name correctly, Doctor? 

Dr. CARRISON. Yes. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Emergency Department Medical Director, UMC 

Trauma Center; and Deputy Chief Bill Conger, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. 

Gentlemen, we want to welcome you here. Just as you heard 

from the previous witnesses, we try to limit our opening remarks 

to 5 minutes, but we will include your complete and full and written testimony for the record. 

And simply because I’m the only person here doesn’t mean that 

it isn’t important what you say because all of these hearings are 

recorded. We have a process whereby the record will reflect what 

you say and it will be reviewed after this subcommittee returns to 

Washington, D.C. 

With that in mind, I’ll just proceed from left to right, my left, my 

right, or your left, or your right to your left, whichever, but I’ll 

start with Mr. Shepherd, head of security for the Venetian Resort, 

for your opening remarks. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Shepherd, welcome. We’re happy to have you 

before the committee.

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SHEPHERD, HEAD OF SECURITY, 

VENTIAN RESORT 

Mr. SHEPHERD. Good morning. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And you have to push the red button so that you 

can be heard. 

Mr. SHEPHERD. Good morning. I would like to thank Congressman Jim Gibbons for the opportunity to speak before this prestigious panel assembled today. It is truly an honor and pleasure to 

be here. 

I am a blend of both the private and public sectors. I retired from 

the FBI after 24 years of service in 1999 and began my career in 

the private sector immediately thereafter. As a supervisory special 

agent with the FBI, I participated in counterterrorism matters with 

SWAT, Team Leader, and as the Coordinator for this program. 

For nearly 16 years, I dealt with terrorism matters at the Nevada Test Site, Tonopah Missile Range and Hoover Dam. I trained 

with Delta Force, Army Rangers, Special Forces and Navy Seals, 

and, of course, the security forces from each of these special sites. 

I further participated in intelligence gathering, with the Office of 
37

Threat Assessment, U.S. Department of Energy and participated in 

numerous nuclear exercises through the United States. 

In the private sector, I am the Executive Director of Security for 

the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino in Las Vegas. The Venetian is 

the third largest hotel in the world with over 7 million square feet 

of space, 4,049 suites, and has an average daily visitor rate of 

80,000 guests per day, which is four times the average American 

city. 

I have attempted to extract from both sectors the best of each 

world in the protection of the property. The tourist/entertainment/

gaming industry presents its own challenges, because if I create an 

airport style of visible protection and security precautions, the 

guests will go across the street to another property. If the city receives too many threats, the guests will stay at home. 

Security in the customer service industry is a delicate balance 

and froth with challenges at every turn. Most people sitting here 

today have no idea what it takes to operate a security department 

in today’s marketplace. I would like to shed some light on our challenges and outline some of the great lengths security must envision 

to ensure the safety of our guests and property. 

As the security director, I must be concerned with civil liability 

issues, criminal activities, and terrorism, plus the threat of SARS 

or other diseases that our world travelers might bring to the property. 

During the height of the worldwide SARS scare, the Venetian 

hosted the JCK Jewelry Show, a show where over 35,000 conventioneers participated, over 1,500 exhibit booths displaying jewelry 

products throughout the property. Included in the booths, 1,500 

booths, were 110 booths from China and 40 booths from Canada. 

The Venetian maintained contact with the CDC and Clark County Health District concerning possible courses of action to take in 

the event that one of our conventioneers displayed signs of SARS. 

Fortunately, no cases were reported, but we planned for the worst, 

just as we are required to do for each key security issue. 

The security directors of today face greater challenges than ever 

before, and we must be forward-thinking each and every day, because our greatest concern is the safety of our guests, first and 

foremost. 

Today’s directors cannot rely on successes of the past or the tools 

and equipment of the past or the training used in the past. Technical advances coupled with a trained, alert staff can speak volumes, when the lives of thousands rest in their hands. 

If you haven’t prepared or anticipated each threat, the fear of 

failure and disaster are the end results. The repercussions of a 

failed security defense can have lingering effects for years to come. 

We do plan and must plan for every contingency to ensure the safety of our guests and team members. 

The security directors of today must anticipate the source of each 

threat or situation and then establish policies and procedures to 

meet the threat head on under the principles of ‘‘Total Prevention’’ 

and/or ‘‘Damage Limitation.’’ In ‘‘Total Prevention,’’ the department 

must stop every conceivable plan of attack. Not one attack or plan 

can be successful. Each attempt must be crushed without the 

slightest bit of damage or loss of life. 
38

In ‘‘Damage Limitation,’’ the department must limit the loss of 

life and the spread of further damage. Each minute that we fail to 

act could have deadly effects on those caught in harm’s way. 

Many of the thousands of survivors in the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon owe their lives to the foresight and training of 

those dedicated security and safety professionals who anticipated 

the threat. The casino security directors in Las Vegas have planned 

and are working together to anticipate each threat. 

In Vietnam, we did what is called, ‘‘looking at both sides of the 

wire.’’ We look at the property from the angle of protection and 

from the angle of penetration. What holes do they see in our defenses? How would they approach the property? Can we turn a 

weak point into a strength? 

A good friend of mine once said, ‘‘Being forewarned is being 

forearmed.’’ If we know what they can do and have done, then we 

can plan accordingly. 

A security plan begins with research. Each day I review intelligence reports from around the world, but not just from one 

source. Several sources, documents and agencies are contacted before I start my day. I want to know what happened in the world 

yesterday and today. I want to know what the latest trick or tactic 

they tried. I want to listen to minutest shred of data or perceived 

concept, then say, ‘‘What if they tried the same thing here?’’

Under the same concept, at the Nevada Test Site, we did what 

is called, ‘‘What ifs.’’ What if the enemy did this or did that? Are 

we prepared to defeat, defend, and neutralize the aggressors? That 

is how we plan. Not for just one key event, but multi-events, 

threats and attacks. 

As an example of our foresight, the Venetian has analyzed the 

threats and implemented 84 changes to the property to ensure the 

safety of our guests and team members, just during the first year 

following September 11th. That number has now toppled over 100 

improvements or modifications to our security measures. 

Recently in Indonesia, a taxi, dropping off a guest in the porte 

chere of a hotel, exploded, killing 13 people and wounding over 100. 

We modified our procedures in accepting taxis on property. We innovate, adapt and overcome any threat that is presented to us. 

In SWAT we stated, ‘‘We are only as strong as our weakest link.’’ 

How do you ensure the preventive measures and concepts are firmly entrenched into your property on every level? Training. Training 

for what? Training for everything. 

In security we don’t need to know the political motivation or the 

reason why the person is doing such a horrific act. We need to 

know the physical actions and their tactics. In football, no team 

goes straight to the Super Bowl without first practicing, creating 

defensive and offensive plays, and scouting out the other team. In 

security we must do the same. We establish plans, obtain intelligence, implement the preventive measures and train. 

After September 11th, I received more calls than Allied Van 

Lines has movers. Every suspicious person or situation was reported. People broke the mold. They didn’t say, ‘‘That’s not my job,’’ 

or ‘‘I don’t want to get involved.’’ They became part of the security 

department. The size of my department isn’t the number of officers 
39

I have on my staff, but it should be everyone that walks in that 

property. 

We cannot afford to become complacent as the al-Qaeda training 

manual has indicated. We continuously train our front line staff to 

be vigilant and recognize suspicious persons or situations. 

Ask your staff this one question, ‘‘Do you feel safe?’’ If they don’t 

feel safe, then the directive of each security director and corporate 

officer is to reverse this sense of insecurity without question. 

In conclusion, Mel Gibson played Benjamin Martin in the movie, 

‘‘The Patriot.’’ He said, ‘‘This war will not be fought, not on the 

frontier, not on some distant battlefield, but amongst us, among 

our homes. Our children will learn of it with their own eyes.’’

Isn’t that what happened on September 11th? 

In the field of casino security, the casino chiefs’ association has 

brought together security chiefs to develop training programs, 

opened lines of communication between multiple agencies and 

raised the level of security in Las Vegas. We cannot afford to become complacent as the al-Qaeda training manual has indicated 

just because nothing has happened in the United States since September 11th and the terrorist acts have occurred in foreign lands. 

We are working together daily to ensure the safety of our guests 

and employees, but not on just one property. All casinos are part 

of the protection equation. They will never take away our freedom 

or our way of life. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Shepherd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SHEPHERD 

Good morning. I would like,thank Congressman Jim Gibbons for the opportunity to 

speak before this prestigious panel assembled today. It is truly an honor and privilege ’to be here today.

I am a blend of both the private and public sectors. I retired from the FBI after 

twenty-four years of serve in 1999 and began my career in the private sector immediately thereafter. As a supervisory special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation I participated in counter terrorism matters as the SWAT Team Leader and 

as the Coordinator for this program. For nearly sixteen years I dealt with terrorism 

matters at the Nevada Test Site, Tonopah Missile Range and Hoover Dam. I training with Delta Force, Army Range, Special Forces and Navy Seals, and of course 

the security forces from each of these special sites. I further participated in intelligence gathering, with the Office of Threat Assessment, US Department of Energy 

and participated in numerous nuclear exercises throughout the United States.

In the private sector, I am the Executive Director of Security for the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada. The Venetian is the third largest hotel in 

the world with over 7 million square feet of space, 4049 suites, and has an average 

daily visitor rate of 80,000 guests per day, which is four times the average American 

city.

I have attempted to extract from both sectors the best of each world in the protection of the property. The tourist/entertainment/gaming industry presents its own 

challenges, because if I create an airport style of visible protection and security precautions, the guests will go across the street to another property. If the city receives 

too many threats, the guests will stay at home. Security in the customer service industry is a delicate balance and froth with challenges at every turn. Most people 

sitting here today have no idea what it takes to operate a security department in 

today’s marketplace. I would like to shed some light on our challenges and outline 

some of the great lengths security must envision to ensure the safety of our guests 

and property.

As the security director I must be concerned with civil liability issues, criminal activities and terrorism, plus the threat of SARS or other diseases that our world travelers might bring to the property. During the height of the worldwide SARS scare, 

the Venetian hosed the JCK Jewelry Show. A show in which over 35,000 conven-
40

tioneers participated. Over 1500 exhibit booths displayed jewelry products throughout the property. Included in the exhibit booth total were 110 booths from China 

and 40 booths from Canada. The Venetian maintained contact with the Center for 

Disease Control and the Clark County Health District concerning the possible 

courses of action to take in the event that one of our conventioneers displayed signs 

of the SARS virus. Fortunately, no cases were reported, but we planned for the 

worst, just as we are required to do for each key security issue.

The security directors of today face greater challenges than ever before and we must 

be forward thinking each and every day, because our greatest concern is the safety 

of our guests, first and foremost. Today’s directors cannot rely on the successes of 

the past or the tools and equipment of the past or the training used in the past. 

Technical advances coupled with a trained alert staff can speak volumes, when the 

lives of thousands rest in their hands. If you haven’t prepared or anticipated each 

threat, the fear of failure and disaster are the end results. The repercussions of a 

failed security defense can have lingering effects for years to come. We do plan and 

must plan for every contingency to ensure the safety of our guests and team members.

The security directors of today must anticipate the source of each threat or situation 

and then establish policies and procedures to meet the threat head on under the 

principles of ‘‘Total Prevention’’ and/or ‘‘Damage Limitation’’. In ‘‘Total Prevention’’ 

the department must stop every conceivable plan of attack. Not one attack or plan 

can be successful. Each attempt must be crushed without the slightest bit of damage 

or loss of life. In ‘‘Damage Limitation’’ the department must limit the loss of life 

and the spread of further damage. Each minute that we fail to act could have deadly 

effects on those caught in harms way. Many of the thousands of survivors in both 

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon owe their lives to the foresight and training of those dedicated security and safety professionals who anticipated the threat. 

The casino security directors in Las Vegas have planned and are working together 

to anticipate each threat.

In Vietnam we did what is called, ‘‘looking at both sides of the wire’’. We look at 

the property from the angle of protection and from the angles of penetration. What 

holes do they see in our defenses’’ How would they approach the property? Can we 

turn a weak point into a strength? A good friend of mine once said, ‘‘Being forewarned is being forearmed’’. If we know what they can do and have done, then we 

can plan accordingly. A security plan begins with research. Each day I will review 

intelligence reports from around the world, but not just from one source. Several 

sources, documents and agencies are contacted before I start my day. I want to 

know what happened in the world yesterday and today. I want to know what the 

latest trick or tactic they tried. I want to listen to the minutest shred of data or 

perceived concept, then say, ‘‘What if they tried the same thing here’’. Under the 

same concept, at the Nevada Test Site we did what is called, ‘‘What iPs’’. What if 

the enemy did this or did that. Are we prepared to defeat, defend and neutralize 

the aggressors? That is how we plan. Not for just one key event, but multi-events, 

threats and attacks.

As an example of our foresight, the Venetian has analyzed the threats and implemented eighty-four changes to the property to ensure the safety of our guests and 

team members, just during the first year following September 11th. That number 

has now toppled over one-hundred improvements or modifications to our security 

measures. Recently in Indonesia a taxi dropping off a guest in the porte cochere of 

a hotel, exploded killing 13 people and wounding over 100. We modified our procedures in accepting taxis on property. We will innovate, adapt and overcome any 

threat that is presented to us.

In SWAT we stated, ‘‘You are only as strong as your weakest link’’. How do you ensure the preventive measures and concepts are firmly entrenched into your property, on every level? Training. Training for what? Training for everything. In security we don’t need to know the political motivation or the reason why the person 

is doing such a horrific act, we need to know the physical actions and their tactics. 

In football no team goes straight to the Super Bowl without first practicing, creating 

defensive and offensive plays, and scouting out the other team. In security we must 

do the same. We establish plans, obtain intelligence, implement the preventive 

measures and train.

After September 11th I received more calls than Allied Van Lines has movers. Every 

suspicious person or situation was reported. People broke the mold. They didn’t say, 

‘‘That’s not my job’’ or ‘‘I don’t want to get involved’’. They became part of the security department. The size of my department isn’t the number of officers I have on 

my staff, but it should be everyone that enters the property. We cannot afford to 
41

become complacent as the Al Qaeda training manual has indicated. We continuously 

train our front line staff to be vigilant and recognize suspicious persons or situations. Ask your staff this one question, ‘‘Do you feel safe?’’ If they don’t feel safe, 

then the directive of each security director and corporate officer is to reverse this 

sense of insecurity without question.

In conclusion, Mel Gibson played Benjamin Martin in the movie, ‘‘The Patriot’’, he 

stated, ‘‘This war will not be fought, not on the frontier, not on some distant battlefield, but amongst us. Among our homes. Our children will learn of it with their 

own eyes’’. Isn’t that what happened on September 11th? In field of casino security 

the casino chief’s association has brought together the security chief’s to develop 

training programs, opened lines of communication between multiple agencies and 

raised the level of security in Las V egas. We cannot afford to become complacent 

as the Al Qaeda training manual has indicated just because nothing has happened 

on United States soil since September 11th and the terrorist acts have occurred in 

foreign lands. We are working together daily to ensure the safety of our guests and 

employees, but not on just one property. All casino properties are part of the protection equation. They will never take away our freedom or our way of life.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Shepherd. Your testimony was excellent as we anticipated. And it reminded me of something that I wanted to do at the beginning of this second panel, if 

I may take a moment of just personal privilege. 

I want to recognize and thank all the members out here in the 

audience who belong to our first responders, whether they’re fire, 

police, Metro, Highway Patrol, you did a wonderful job just 48 

hours ago responding to the floods that were here in Las Vegas. 

The footage that we watched on the television were just heroic of 

your efforts. 

So on behalf of, not just Congress, but myself and I think a lot 

of Nevadans, we all want to say thank you to you personally for 

the efforts that you’ve done. 

This is part of our Homeland Security. You are a big part of it, 

and we want you to know that we appreciate your efforts. 

Mr. GIBBONS. With that being said, let me now turn to Mr. 

Randy Walker for your opening statements. Mr. Walker, welcome, 

and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDY WALKER, DIRECTOR, CLARK 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Clark 

County and the Clark County Department of Aviation, I thank you 

for this invitation to address the security needs of Las Vegas 

McCarran International Airport. 

On September 11th, 2001, almost two years ago, the aviation industry suffered a devastating blow, as we all know. As airplanes 

were forced down onto airfields around the Nation and all air travel was suspended for days, the problems facing our industry 

changed in an instant. 

You may recall that prior to 9–11, we were faced with unprecedented passenger traffic, which created significant strains on the 

Nation’s aviation infrastructure. Before 9–11, our focus was on 

more runways, airspace efficiency enhancements and a passenger’s 

bill of rights. 

Almost overnight, our concerns shifted to the survival of the Nation’s airlines and the major security enhancements necessary to 

assure the traveling public it was safe to fly again. We applaud 

Congress for responding in record time by enacting Federal legisla-
42

tion which imposed sweeping security obligations and requirements 

on all airports and airlines. 

A new Federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration (or TSA), was created, and a new Federal security screening 

workforce began to assume the security related responsibilities previously borne by the airlines. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required the TSA 

to install Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) at 429 commercial 

airports to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2002. In 

addition, TSA and its industry partners were given deadlines for 

enhanced screening of passengers, checked luggage, and cargo shipments. 

In retrospect, we all knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, 

for TSA to meet this deadline at 100 percent of the Nation’s commercial airports. According to the Department of Transportation 

Inspector General, as of July 6, 2002, a little over a year ago, six 

months before the screening deadline, there were only 215 EDS 

machines and 273 Explosive Trace Detection machines in use at 59 

airports. 

Consequently, TSA would have had to purchase and install 1,000 

EDS machines and 5,600 EDT machines at airports in just five 

months, approximately one machine every 37 minutes between 

July and December 31st to fulfill the 100 percent explosive detection mandate. 

Even if manufacturers could produce that many machines, TSA 

would have been required to hire and train enough baggage screeners to operate the EDS and ETD machines. TSA would have needed to recruit, hire, and train approximately 21,600 screeners to operate these machines. 

Again, according to the DOT Inspector General, by July of last 

year, the TSA had hired and trained only 215 baggage screeners. 

Consequently, the agency was given the impossible task to recruit, 

hire and properly train approximately 21,400 screeners over five 

months, approximately one screener every four minutes. 

With encouragement from the airports, including McCarran 

International Airport, Congress responded by providing the TSA 

needed flexibility to meet the statutory deadlines imposed, particularly at unique airports like McCarran. 

These requirements have posed a significant burden on airports 

everywhere; however, I dare say, with the exception of New York 

and Washington, D.C., no one has felt the adverse impact more 

than we have Las Vegas and at McCarran. 

From a high of 3.4 million passengers in the month of August 

2001, passenger traffic at McCarran fell 37 percent almost overnight. Our hotel occupancy plummeted during the fall of 2002 as 

cancellations reflected the somber and apprehensive mood of the 

Nation. This, combined with the fear of flying, kept many of our 

tourists away from Las Vegas. Thousands of hotel workers lost 

jobs. At McCarran, most of the planned capacity expansion projects 

were shelved and our focus shifted immediately to meeting the enhanced security requirements imposed by the Federal law. 

Interesting enough, air traffic to Las Vegas was really the first 

to begin to recover in the Nation. By Christmas of 2001, we began 

to see a return of some of the lost passenger volume. While our 
43

numbers during 2002 failed to match our record highs of the previous year, they grew gradually from the post 9–11 traffic levels, 

while traffic at most other airports continued to decline or at best 

remained flat. 

However, with the return of our passengers came a host of new 

challenges. Long lines and extensive delays sprung up at the security points in the airport as a result of the required enhanced passenger processing and security screening. This problem was exacerbated by the layoffs of airline employees by many of the carriers 

serving McCarran as they struggled to survive financially. 

I am sure I do not need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the endless lines that stretched out the doors and onto McCarran’s roadways, because I know you experienced them personally, and I know 

you stood in the lines as well, or the hour it took to pass through 

the security checkpoints. 

Immediately this highlighted another security threat that I don’t 

think people have thought about. Such long lines give terrorists an 

alternative and attractive target, thereby creating an unacceptable 

increased security risk at airports. 

In addition to the security risks, we feared that tourists whose 

travel is discretionary would choose to avoid screening delays and 

business travelers might not choose to endure the hassle of traveling to Las Vegas if the delay problems were not rapidly solved. 

McCarran is unique among the Nation’s airports when you consider that we handle approximately 36 million passengers who use 

our airport each year; 82 percent of McCarran’s passengers are 

tourists or conventioneers who are vital to the continued economic 

well being of Southern Nevada. 

Las Vegas is the second leading airport in the Nation for origination and destination passengers. This means that we handle more 

passengers through the security screening than any other airport 

in the world except for Los Angeles. Las Vegas handles an average 

of 50,000 departing passengers per day. These passengers bring 

with them approximately 60,000 bags per day that need to be 

checked, which means we must screen more luggage than most of 

the Nation’s larger airports. 

On our weekly peak days of Thursday or Sunday, when tourists 

coming and from leaving Las Vegas, we screen over 65,000 passengers. 

Like most airports, Las Vegas McCarran was not designed with 

adequate space in the ticket lobby or bag makeup rooms for the installation of large numbers of screening machines, which are now 

required by the TSA. Shoehorning such equipment into the existing 

space just to meet an arbitrary deadline would have led to inefficiencies, delays, and economic burdens and even security-related 

problems, with masses of people cramped into a small area. 

McCarran’s analysis has shown that under one development scenario, proposed by the TSA early in 2002, passengers checking baggage would have waited up to four hours in line to check their 

bags. Clearly unacceptable from a security and from customer service standpoint. 

Giving TSA more flexibility to work with a few selected airports 

like McCarran on how to efficiently install in-line ESD and ETD 

luggage screening machines helped prevent further economic dis-
44

ruption to the airline industry and tourism following 9–11 and also 

allowed us to meet the security goals that Congress had established for airports. 

McCarran has moved aggressively and was one of the first airports in the Nation to be given approval to commence construction 

of the In-line baggage screening system at our main terminal. This 

in-line system will change the passenger ticket counter experience 

to almost a pre-9–11 experience for the customer. 

Luggage checked at the ticket counter will be directed to the TSA 

through a complex system of conveyor belts and screening machines. TSA employees will screen each bag for dangerous materials before the bag is returned to an airline for processing. This 

system will cost approximately $125 million dollars to install and 

is scheduled to be operational by December 31, 2004. In fact, the 

first two notes of this six-note system are under construction as we 

speak. 

Recently, we faced an additional challenge when the TSA announced plans to reduce the number of passenger screeners assigned to our airport. Upon our investigation of the methodology 

used by TSA to make personnel and equipment allocations among 

the Nation’s airports, we found several major flaws: 

TSA’s staffing formula was not based on the number of passengers that require security screening, but rather upon the number of checkpoint screening lanes that an airport may have. 

TSA screeners were assigned to match the number of screening 

lanes at an airport regardless of the need. If an airport had more 

physical space for lanes, they would get more staff regardless of the 

number of passengers using those lanes. 

TSA’s own formula underestimated staffing needs at McCarran. 

Their initial proposal was for 528 screeners, and our calculations 

showed that the average passenger wait time at the screening 

checkpoint would have been 41 minutes under that plan, well in 

excess of the 10-minute commitment provided by the Federal Government initially. 

Our analysis shows by adding one staff member per shift per 

checkpoint lane, we could reduce the average passenger wait to 13 

minutes. And this would bring the total staffing requirements from 

TSA to 630. 

We are moving aggressively at McCarran to add more security 

checkpoint lanes. On June 6, 2002, we added three new screening 

lanes to serve Concourses C and D. We are about to begin construction on a project to extend the screening areas over baggage claim 

so that we can install six more screening lanes. However, this will 

require an additional TSA staffing to fully man and operate them. 

We want to thank Congress for recognizing in the recently approved FAA Reauthorization Conference report that allocation of 

TSA personnel and equipment based exclusively upon lanes or 

hubbing passengers was not the right approach. We gratefully 

thank our congressional delegation for their support in this effort. 

We now believe that the TSA has a greater appreciation of the security problems, especially at McCarran and is moving to address 

them. 
45

Our local Federal Security Director is an essential member of our 

McCarran team and has proven to be an excellent partner in addressing these problems. 

We still have a long way to go, however. Last month, for example, we enjoyed the fifth busiest month in the history of the airport. 

In July, just this last month, we processed more passengers than 

we did July 2001. 

We have resumed the expansion of the ‘‘D’’ satellite concourse. 

We anticipate that as soon as three years form now, depending on 

traffic flow, we could begin construction of another Unit Terminal 

along Russell Road in front of ‘‘D’’ gates. This will necessitate new 

in-line baggage screening equipment and additional screening 

checkpoints for passengers who will use that terminal. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to review the significant security-related challenges we faced at McCarran. Our success 

is of vital importance for the continued recovery and expansion of 

Las Vegas’ economy, and I’m sure you know that very well, and we 

appreciate your assistance. I express our appreciation for your previous help and previous help of our congressional delegation on 

these issues. I am thanking you in advance for the help I know 

that you will give us in the future. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker. As a frequent 

flyer into and out of Las Vegas, I can attest to everything you have 

said in your comments. I can understand and appreciate your efforts to make it better. 

[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL WALKER 

Chairman Gibbons and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for 

this invitation to address the security needs of Las Vegas McCarran International 

Airport.

On September 11th, 2001 almost two years ago, the aviation industry suffered a 

devastating blow. As airplanes were forced down onto airfields around the nation 

and all air travel was suspended for days, the problems facing our industry changed 

in an instant. You may recall that prior to 9–11, we were faced with unprecedented 

passenger traffic, which created significant strains on the nation’s aviation infrastructure. Before 9–11, our focus was on more runways, airspace efficiency enhancements and a passenger’s bill of rights.

Almost overnight, our concerns shifted to the survival of the nation’s airlines and 

the major security enhancements necessary to assure the traveling public it was 

safe to fly again. We applaud Congress for responding in record time by enacting 

federal legislation which imposed sweeping security obligations and requirements on 

all airports and airlines. A new federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration (or TSA), was created and a new federal security screening workforce 

began to assume the security related responsibilities previously borne by the airlines. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required the TSA to install Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) at 429 commercial airports to screen all checked 

baggage by December 31, 2002. In addition, TSA and its industry partners were 

given deadlines for enhanced screening of passengers, checked luggage and cargo 

shipments.

In retrospect, we all knew it would be difficult—if not impossible—for TSA to 

meet this deadline at 100 percent of the nation’s commercial airports. According to 

the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General as of July 6-six months 

before the screening deadline—there were only 215 EDS machines and 273 Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines in use at 59 airports. Consequently, TSA 

would have had to purchase and install approximately 1,000 EDS machines and 

5,600 EDT machines at airports in just five months—approximately one machine 

every 37 minutes between July and December 31 to fulfill the 100% explosive detection mandate. Even if manufacturers could produce that many machines, TSA would 

have been required to hire and train enough baggage screeners to operate the EDS 
46

and EID machines. TSA would have needed to recruit, hire and train approximately 

21,600 screeners to operate these machines. Again, according to the DOT Inspector 

General, by July of last year the TSA had hired and trained only 215 baggage 

screeners. Consequently, the agency was given the impossible task to recruit, hire 

and properly train approximately 21,400 screeners over five months—approximately 

one screener every 4 minutes.

With encouragement from the airports, including McCarran, Congress responded 

by providing the TSA needed flexibility to meet the statutory deadlines imposed—

particularly at unique airports like McCarran.

These requirements have posed a significant burden on airports everywhere; however, I dare say no city with the exception of New York and Washington D.C. felt 

the adverse impacts of9–11 more than Las Vegas. From a high of 3.4 million passengers in of the month of August 2001, passenger traffic at McCarran fell 37% percent almost overnight. Our hotel occupancy plummeted during the fall of 2002 as 

cancellations reflected the somber and apprehensive mood of the nation. This, combined with the fear of flying, kept many of our tourists away from Las Vegas. Thousands of hotel workers lost jobs. At McCarran, most of the planned capacity expansion projects where shelved and our focus shifted immediately to meeting the enhanced security requirements imposed by federal law.

Interestingly enough, air traffic to Las Vegas was really the first to begin to recover. By Christmas of 2001, we began to see a return of some of the lost passenger 

volume. While our numbers during 2002 failed to match the record highs of the previous year, they grew gradually from the post 9–11 traffic levels, while traffic at 

most other airports continued to decline or at best remained flat.

However, with the return of our passengers came a host of new challenges. Long 

lines and extensive delays sprung up at the security points in the airport as a result 

of the required enhanced passenger processing and security screening. This problem 

was exacerbated by the layoffs of airline employees by many of the carriers serving 

McCarran as they struggled to survive financially. I am sure I do not need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the endless lines that stretched out the doors and onto 

McCarran’s roadways, or the hours it took to pass through the security checkpoints. 

Immediately this highlighted another threat. Such long lines give terrorists an alternative and attractive target, thereby creating an unacceptable increased security 

risk. In addition, we feared that tourists whose travel is discretionary would choose 

to avoid screening delays and business travelers might not choose to endure the hassle of traveling to Las Vegas if the delay problems were not rapidly solved.

McCarran is unique among the nation’s airports when you consider that: • There are more than 36 million passengers who use our airport each year. • 82% of McCarran’ s passengers are tourists or conventioneers who are vital 

to the continued economic well being of Southern Nevada. 

• Las Vegas is the second leading airport in the nation for origination and destination passengers. This means that we handle more passengers through security screening than any other airport except for LAX. 

• Las Vegas handles an average of 50,000 departing passengers per day. These 

passengers bring approximately 60,000 bags per day, which means we must 

screen more luggage than most of the nation’s larger airports. 

• On our weekly peak days of Thursday or Sunday (when tourists come in and 

out for the weekend) we screen over 65,000 passengers. 

• Like most airports, Las Vegas McCarran was not designed with adequate 

space in the ticket lobby or bag makeup rooms for the installation of large numbers of the screening machines, which are now required by the TSA. 

• Shoehorning such equipment into the existing space just to meet an arbitrary 

deadline would have led to inefficiencies, delays, and economic burdens on our 

air carriers and potentially to our tourism based economy. 

• McCarran’s analysis has shown that under one deployment scenario, proposed 

by the TSA early in 2002, passengers checking baggage could be waiting in line 

for four hours. 

Giving TSA more flexibility to work with a few selected airports like McCarran 

on how to efficiently install inline EDS and EID luggage screening machines helped 

prevent further economic disruption to the airline industry and tourism following 

9/11. 

McCarran has moved aggressively and was one of the first airports in the nation 

to be given approval to commence construction of the In Line baggage screening system at our main terminal. This in-line system will change the passenger ticket 

counter experience to almost a pre–9–11 experience. Luggage checked at the ticket 

counter will be directed to the TSA through a complex system of conveyor belts and 

screening machines. TSA employees will screen each bag for dangerous materials 
47

before the bag is returned to an airline. This system will cost approximately $125 

million dollars to install and is scheduled to be operational by December 31, 2004. 

Recently, we faced an additional challenge when the TSA announced plans to reduce the number of passenger screeners assigned to our airport. Upon our investigation of the methodology used by TSA to make personnel and equipment allocations 

among the nations airports, we found several major flaws: 

• TSA’s staffing formula was not based upon the number of passengers that 

require security screening but rather upon the number of checkpoint 

screening lanes an airport may have. 

• TSA screeners were assigned to match the number of screening lanes at 

an airport regardless of the need. If an airport had more physical space for 

lanes, they would get more staff regardless of the number of passengers 

using those lanes. 

• TSA’s own formula underestimated staffing needs at McCarran (the actual calculation was not correct!) 

• With TSA’s initial proposal for 528 screeners, the average passeneer wait 

time would have been 41-minutes at McCarran. well in excess of the 10-

minute commitment made by the federal government. 

Our analysis shows by adding one staff member per shift per checkpoint lane we 

could reduce the average passenger wait time to 13 minutes. By adding one more 

person to each lane, total TSA staffing requirement would be 630 based on existing 

lanes. 

We are moving aggressively at McCarran to add more screening checkpoints 

lanes. On June 6, 2002 we added three (3) new screening lanes serving Concourses 

C and D. We are about to begin construction on a project to extend the screening 

areas over baggage claim so we can install 6 more screening lanes. However, this 

will require an additional TSA staffing to fully man and operate them. 

We want to thank Congress for recognizing in the recently approved FAA Reauthorization Conference report that allocation of TSA personnel and equipment based 

exclusively upon lanes or hubbing passengers was the not the right approach. We 

now believe that the TSA has a greater appreciation of the security problems, especially at McCarran and is moving to address them. Our local Federal Security Director is a member of our McCarran team and has proven to be an excellent partner 

in addressing these problems. 

We still have a long way to go however. Last month, for example, we enjoyed the 

fifth busiest month in our history. We have resumed the expansion of the ‘‘D’’ satellite concourse and we anticipate that as soon as 3 years from now we could begin 

construction of another Unit Terminal on Russell Road in front the ‘‘D’’ gates. This 

will necessitate new inline baggage screening equipment and additional screening 

checkpoints for passengers who will use that terminal. 

Thank you for allowing me to review the significant security related challenges 

we have faced and are facing at McCarran International Airport. Our success is of 

vital importance to the continued recovery and expansion of Las Vegas’ tourist dependent economy while maintaining a high level of safety. Along with providing the 

highest level of safety and security, we strive to maintain an exceptional customer 

service environment. We certainly are appreciative of the recent revision to the allocation of Homeland Security funds that now includes tourist numbers in the formula which was accomplished by our Nevada delegation. We recognize our vital role 

as the gateway to the most exciting city in the world. We are truly the first impression and last look of every air passenger to Las Vegas. 

I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for helping to ensure 

that every air passenger to Las Vegas enjoys a safe, secure and hassle- free experience.

Mr. GIBBONS. We turn now to Dr. Carrison. Welcome, the floor 

is yours. We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. DALE CARRISON, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT MEDICAL DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, 

TRAUMA CENTER 

Dr. CARRISON. Thank you, Congressman Gibbons, it’s a privilege 

to be here. I appreciate you having us here, and I think it is extremely important. 
48

You have my document for submission in the record. I will address some issues in that and make some extemporaneous comments based on what I heard here today. 

I am proud to represent University Medical Center, the only public hospital in Southern Nevada and the only level-one trauma center in the State of Nevada. We have been fortunate that we’ve had 

incidents with regards to weapons of mass destruction that occurred at our hospital, and we have learned from those. 

The first two incidents were prior to September 11th. We had an 

incident when an anthrax exposure came into the hospital. At that 

time we had post-incident debriefing, which involved essentially 

the emergency department, the agency that brought the alleged 

victim of anthrax infection in. We learned from that. It was not 

what I would call an ideal debriefing. 

We had a second incident in the community where there was a 

sarin gas threat of a person who had taken over a facility and 

threatened that they had sarin gas. We were able to respond to 

that with the help of Nellis Air Force Base. We were able to obtain 

the medications that would have been necessary to address this 

had there, in fact, been sarin gas. 

We had a much better post-incident debriefing on that incident. 

We were able to establish some policies and procedures that would 

assist us if that occurred in the future. 

But I think at that point reality had not really set in. Reality set 

in as of 9–11. Since 9–11, we had an incident where an individual 

in the community manufactured some lysine and injected himself. 

That incident after 9–11 showed the hospital and community really 

had their heart in finding out what we could do to prevent casualties from these weapons of mass destruction similar to this biological chemical radiological. 

That incident, we had 20 agencies, 50 people. The post-incident 

debriefing was outstanding. We went back to the hospital. Since 

that time, that gave us new life. After 9–11, of course, we started 

like everyone else to look at our systems and see what could be 

prepared better. We reviewed our policies and procedures, modified 

them. We have a committee, a WMD committee. We established an 

incident command. We have enhanced our security capabilities. We 

expanded the staff training just so that people know what these 

agents are and what their effects on. With ignorance, you can’t 

have that because people become terrified. 

Our nursing, clerical, from the janitors to the clerks, everyone involved in the hospital, we’ve attempted to educate them on weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological that we would see 

in a hospital so everybody understands and that there is no mystery and they understand that it is a disease. 

With that, we expanded that decontamination plan. And just so 

I better address the EMS system so that the committee understands that I am EMS friendly. I’m a former deputy sheriff, Orange 

County, Southern California. I’m a former special agent of the FBI, 

and the current medical director for Clark County Fire Department, Medical Director for Mercy Air Helicopter, which provides 

the emergency helicopter services in the county, Medical Director 

for Lake Mead National Recreational Area, and I’m an active responder with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department as a 
49

tactical position for the SWAT team. So I am EMS friendly and I 

have been a responder and I am a responder. 

Communications are extremely important. We have enhanced 

our internal communications. And as you respond, it’s as you train. 

We have increased our training. I don’t think it’s enough yet, but 

we’re working on that. Training takes resources as everything associated with this does. 

We have done a much better job of coordinating with local communities and working with the Clark County Health Department, 

the LEPC, Clark County Public Safety Coordination Team, the 

FBI, and local law enforcement terrorism. We have good communication with that now. 

Mr. Shepherd brought up a point that it’s only as good as the 

weakest link. I have concerns that as a director of an emergency 

department and responsible for two other emergency departments 

in the community that we may be the weak link. 

Without allocation resources to the EMS community, first responders to law enforcement, I think we need to remember that the 

last link in that chain is the hospital. Without that link, our best 

efforts of first responders will bear no fruit. We won’t save people. 

We won’t be able to treat their injuries. It won’t happen. 

And no offense to anyone, but the allocation of resources to the 

State of Nevada as the public hospital in Southern Nevada, University Medical Center for my WMD program, I received zero. Zip. 

Nothing. We want to be a link in that chain, but we want to be 

a strong link. We don’t want to be the weak link. 

As everything, everyone wants, everyone wants more resources 

so they can do a better job at being prepared. I understand that. 

I understand the allocation and limitation of resources, but I would 

point out once again, that what we have are patients. Those people 

who are victims of a weapons of mass destruction event are going 

to the hospitals. They’re going to come to us for treatment. 

We have—the Clark County Fire Department Hazmat is outstanding. They would be at an incident. What does my Hazmat do 

for decontamination at the hospital? I have the ability to decontaminate two people at a time. Past Federal rules indicate that the 

decontamination area should be within the walls of the hospital. 

We know now that is a great mistake. The last thing you want in 

a hospital emergency department is to bring a contaminated person 

within those walls because then you will set down the only patient 

emergency system that you have because the whole place would be 

contaminated, and that would be the end of that link in the chain. 

Extremely important to remember the hospital—extremely important that we remember our patients and our mission to our patients, and if we are not included in that first responder as the 

emergency responder that the patients are going to come to. 

The other part we don’t address, you can’t think of how many 

people are going to get in their cars when they think they’ve been 

exposed, and we saw this with the anthrax. We had people bringing letters into the emergency department that had a white powder. We have to address that from a security standpoint. We have 

to address that multiple people showing up that we can’t allow into 

the emergency department from both a security point and from a 
50

decontamination point, so that the safety of those people who are 

providing the patient care is ensured. 

We also have to remember that because we have an incident of 

this sort, the other things that occur in our community are not 

going to stop. We are going to continue to have motor vehicle crashes. We are going to continue to have people with heart attacks. We 

are going to continue to have people that have respiratory illnesses 

that require emergent intervention. I can go on with that list of 

things. 

I can tell you that the system right now is stressed to the max. 

And if we had an incident, it could break that system. 

That was one consideration given for having a mobile hospital, 

something that we could set up immediately to provide the care for 

those people who may be contaminated and provide them a safe environment and a safe environment for those persons who are taking care of them. 

In closing, I appreciate, again. Being here. I will tell you that we 

are committed to staying ever vigilant in our efforts and to the best 

of our ability to respond to any disaster in our community. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Doctor. You have brought 

some new information to light here with this committee and have 

raised a number of questions even in my mind that I’ll talk to you 

about in a minute. 

[The statement of Dr. Carrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DALE CARRISON 

HOSPITAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT, ENHANCEMENTS AND PLANNING

As the only public hospital in Southern Nevada, University Medical Center of 

Southern Nevada (UMC) has been actively involved in emergency response planning 

for a number of years. After the tragic events of September 11, UMC initiated a 

number of analyses to help ensure its readiness to respond to a man-made or natural disaster. In particular, UMC conducted a hazardous vulnerability assessment 

to identify the range of hazards to which UMC could be called upon to respond. As 

a result of these analyses, UMC has identified some specific areas on which immediate efforts could be focused, given existing resources, to help increase UMC’s readiness to respond in the event of a disaster in our community. Additional emergency 

response enhancement opportunities have also been identified for possible future 

implementation in the event that additional resources become available. 

The following is a list of the emergency response enhancements that have been 

implemented since September 11: 

1) Review and revision of emergency response policies and procedures. 

2) Formation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) committee. 

3) Establishment of an Incident Command System (ICS). 

4) Enhancement of security capabilities. 

a) Traditional personal safety and site security. 

b) ‘‘Medical’’ safety, contamination prevention. 

c) Coordination with local law enforcement agencies. 

5) Expansion of staff training on clinical and operational emergency response. 

6) Establishment of decontamination plan. 

7) Establishment of clinical resource library. 

8) Enhancement of internal and external communications equipment and systems. 

9) Expansion of in-house disaster planning drills. 

10) Coordination with all local emergency response agencies and participation 

in emergency response drills. 

a) Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) 

b) Clark County Public Safety Coordination Team 

c) Clark County Health District Incident Response 

d) FBI and Local Law Enforcement Terrorism Coordination 
51

With the implementation of these immediate enhancements, UMC has increased 

its readiness to respond in the event of a disaster in our community. In addition, 

UMC has identified other enhancement opportunities in the areas of equipment, 

supplies, capacity, planning and coordination that it is working to develop with existing and/or potential future resources. The following is a sample of the additional 

enhancements that have been identified for future emergency readiness: 

1) Enhance internal and external communication systems and technology. 

2) Acquire additional personal protective equipment and supplies. 

3) Increase emergency patient decontamination capacity. 

4) Increase emergency patient isolation capacity. 

5) Enhance security-related technology. 

6) Enhance training and education. 

7) Acquire additional clinical equipment. 

8) Enhance ICS capabilities. 

9) Acquire ‘‘mobile hospital’’ MASH-style capabilities. 

10)Enhance coordination with local, state and federal agencies to help institute 

a uniform leadership policy in Southern Nevada. 

11)Initiate coordination with FEMA regarding emergency pharmaceutical distribution. 

Since September 11, a great deal of effort has been devoted to helping ensure 

UMC’s readiness to respond to any type of disaster, man-made or natural. As a result of our initial assessments, we have identified a number of immediate and longterm opportunities to enhance our ability to respond. While we have learned a great 

deal and instituted some successful enhancements, we realize that we have some 

future enhancements that would further increase our response capabilities, and potentially new challenges that may arise. It is with this in mind that we are committed to staying ever vigilant in our efforts to do the best of our ability to be ready 

to respond to any disaster in our community.

Mr. GIBBONS. Now, I’ll turn it over to Mr. Bill Conger for your 

comment. Bill, welcome, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MR. BILL CONGER, DEPUTY CHIEF, LAS 

VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. CONGER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to 

speak this morning. I’m substituting for Sheriff Young because he 

is unable to be with us today. 

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is the eleventh 

largest police department in the country with 4,300 employees and 

jurisdictional responsibility of 7,800 square miles. 

We are responsible for all of unincorporated Clark County, which 

includes the Strip corridor, McCarran Airport, the sixth or seven 

busiest, depending on who you talk to, Nellis Air Force Base, Hoover Dam, portions of the Nevada Test Site, and all other outlying 

areas, including the population centers of Laughlin and Primm. 

Our jurisdiction also includes the City of Las Vegas. Most of the 

entertainment industry in Southern Nevada and approximately 1.2 

million of the county’s 1.6 million population and most of the 35 

million visitors that visit our community each year are also our responsibility. 

Our local response community has long recognized the need for 

a regional approach to preparedness and response to any eventuality that could occur. 

This valley has a longstanding history of major events from the 

MGM/Hilton fires in the early 1980s, the PepCon explosion, and 

the yearly preparation for New Year’s Eve, which is second only to 

New York in size and scope. These major events have created a 

viable emergency management community that has been in full 

swing for many years. 
52

The preparedness/response piece of the puzzle is a focus that is 

vital to the future of our community, but it is only a part of the 

total picture, especially in areas that are totally reliant on tourism, 

as we are, and the economic impact that its loss would incur. Because, without a doubt, our most important economy and a significant portion of the state’s economy is based on discretionary spending from tourism and the entertainment industry. Any impact on 

those dollars would have a staggering effect both on the local economy and the State. 

When I speak about our community, I am speaking regionally, 

which includes the cities of Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder 

City, and Mesquite, because all the local governments recognize the 

impact of an event anywhere in this valley. 

This brings me to the focus of the Metropolitan Police Department in the fight against terrorism. Prevention of an act in our 

community is the most important issue we deal with on a daily 

basis. The fact that the economic life of our community is dependent on the discretionary dollars makes us vulnerable to those who 

would make our community unsafe for visitors. To put it bluntly, 

people won’t vacation where they don’t feel safe. Even the threat 

of an event could have a substantial impact. 

The national strategy includes the prevention of an act as a significant portion of its effort. Prevention from our perspective is twofold: 

Number one, the open and overt aspect of the policing function 

including partnerships within both the public and private sector 

and educating people on what to look for and where they can go 

with the information. We have created a preparedness document 

for the citizens of Clark County called ‘‘H.A.N.D.S.S.’’ and 

partnered with the Sprint Telephone Company to get it printed in 

the phone book essentially got it out to 1.3 million copies in the 

local community. This gave citizens instructions on how to prepare 

for any diaster. 

We have created a Homeland Security Bureau and activated a 

hotline for citizens to call to report suspicious activity. All leads 

that come in on that hotline are investigated and either verified 

and passed on to the JTFF or defunked with no further investigation necessary. Open source information is collected daily, analyzed, and disseminated to both law enforcement and the public/

private sector, especially if the information is a potential challenge 

for that particular group or industry. 

Communications operability and interoperability are significant 

issues that not only affect our community, but most other jurisdictions as well. Prevention of an act and the coordinated response to 

an act are linked to the ability for police and the rest of the first 

response community to communicate with each other. 

It is important to talk with other agencies and jurisdictions, but 

also a major challenge facing us currently is the inability for police 

officers to talk to each other inside buildings and in certain areas 

of town. 

The second side of prevention has to do with the covert aspect 

of what we as a police agency do with our Federal partners. After 

9–11, our department moved very quickly to get security clearances 

for officers involved in the JTTF. Key administrative personnel 
53

were also given clearances in order to make decisions based on national security for determination of whether a mobilization may be 

necessary to prevent an event. 

Covert operations have long been a vital aspect of the police 

function. In today’s environment with the potential for individuals 

to destroy the safety and security of our community, covert operations with Federal partnerships are necessary to protect our tourist lifeblood. 

I am reticent to discuss whether we are a target or vulnerable 

to terrorism in an open forum, but I know the local and Federal 

partnerships that have been created have gone a long way in ensuring the creation of an inhospitable environment for those who 

would cause our community harm. 

I want to thank you for giving the Metropolitan Police Department the opportunity to share our views on the vital mission of 

homeland security as it relates to Clark County and the southwest 

region. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Conger. 

[The statement of Mr. Conger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. BILL CONGER 

Mr. Gibbons, members of Congress, my name is Bill Conger. am a Deputy Chief 

with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department substituting for Sheriff Young 

who is unable to be with us today.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is the eleventh largest police department in the country with 4,300 employees and jurisdictional responsibility of 

approximately 7,800 square miles. We are responsible for all of unincorporated 

Clark County which includes Congressional Hearing, August 21, 2003 Testimony of 

Deputy Chief Bill Conger Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department the Strip corridor, McCarran Airport (the sixth busiest airport in the nation), Nellis Air Force 

Base, Hoover Dam, portions of the Nevada Test Site, and all other outlying areas 

of the county, such as Laughlin and Primm. Our jurisdiction also includes the city 

of Las Vegas. Most of the entertainment industry in Southern Nevada and approximately 1.2 million of the county’s 1.6 million population and most of the 35 million 

visitors that visit our community yearly are also our responsibility.

Our local response community has long recognized the need for a regional approach to preparedness and response to any eventuality that could occur.

This valley has a long-standing history of response to major events from the 

MGM/Hilton fires in the early 1980’s, the PepCon explosion, and the yearly preparation for New Year’s eve which is second only to New York City in size. These major 

events have created a viable emergency management community that has been in 

full swing for several years.

The preparedness/response piece of this puzzle is a focus that is vital to the future 

of our community, but it is only a part of the total picture, especially in areas that 

are totally reliant on tourism and the economic impact its loss would incur. Because, 

without doubt, our most important economy and a significant portion of the state’s 

economy is based on discretionary spending from the tourism, entertainment industry. Any impact on those dollars would have a staggering effect on both the local 

economy and the state.

When I speak about our community, I am speaking regionally, which includes the 

cities of Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and Mesquite, because all the 

local governments recognize the impact of an event anywhere in this valley.

This brings me to the focus of the Metropolitan Police Department in the fight 

against terrorism. Prevention of an act in our community is the most important 

issue we deal with on a daily basis. The fact that the economic life of our community 

is dependent on discretionary dollars makes us vulnerable to those that would make 

our community unsafe for visitors. To put it bluntly, people won’t vacation where 

they don’t feel safe. The threat of an event could have a substantial impact.

The national strategy includes the prevention of the act and is a significant portion of our effort. Prevention from our perspective is twofold:
54

1. The open aspect of the policing function including partnerships within both the 

public and private sector and educating people on what to look for and where they 

can go with the information. We have created a preparedness document for the citizens of Clark County called ‘‘H.A.N.D.S.S.’’ and partnered with Sprint Telephone to 

get it printed in the phone book. This gave citizens instructions on how to prepare 

for a disaster.

We have created a Homeland Security Bureau and activated a hotline for citizens 

to call to report suspicious activity. All leads that come into our office are investigated and either verified and passed on to the JTTF or debunked with no further 

investigation necessary. Open source information is collected daily, analyzed, and 

disseminated to both law enforcement and the public/private sector, especially if the 

information is a potential challenge for that particular group or industry.

Communications operability and interoperability are significant issues that not 

only affect our community, but most other jurisdictions as well. Prevention of an act 

and the coordinated response to an act are linked to the ability for police and the 

rest of the first response community to communicate with each other. It is important to talk to other agencies and jurisdictions, but a major challenge facing us currently is the inability of police officers to talk to each other inside buildings and in 

certain areas of town.

2. The second side of prevention has to do with the covert aspect of what we as 

a police agency do with our federal partners. After 9–11, our department moved 

very quickly to get security clearances for officers involved in the JTTF. Key administrative personnel were also given security clearances in order to make decisions 

based on national security for determination of whether a mobilization may be necessary to prevent an event.

Covert operations have long been a vital aspect of the police function. In today’s 

environment with the potential for individuals to destroy the safety and security of 

our community, covert operations with federal partnerships are necessary to protect 

our tourist lifeblood. I am reticent to discuss whether we are a target of terrorism 

in an open forum, but I know the local and federal partnerships that have been created have gone a long way in ensuring the creation of an inhospitable environment 

for those that would cause ourcommunity harm.

I want to thank you for giving the Metropolitan Police Department the opportunity to share our views on the vital mission of Homeland Security as it relates 

to Clark County and the southwest region.

Mr. GIBBONS. And to each of you, I’m sure you can tell by the 

tenor of your statements to the records that all is not quite as rosy 

as you might have heard from those people on the higher echelon 

in homeland security. That’s one of reasons why we are here in this 

hearing is to have the differences, the gaps, the weakness of this 

chain, as Mr. Shepherd said, brought to light so that we in Congress can have an idea on how better to help you do your job. 

Let me begin by asking Mr. Conger—I know that your position, 

you have a great deal of day-to-day contact with the soldier who 

is down there in the trenches doing the battle on the streets fighting crime, drugs, and terrorism. 

Do you feel that your officers are as prepared as they can be to 

recognize needed indexes of terrorists and tactics of terrorism to be 

able to report back to you, which then can be shared vertically that 

information? Are they trained to look at those issues? 

Mr. CONGER. I’m going to answer that this way, sir. We still have 

a long way to go. We have a department of 4,300 and we also have 

a large jurisdiction, and it doesn’t just include our employees being 

prepared. It includes the first response community, the entire—requires the help of the citizens of Clark County, and it is our goal 

to get everybody prepared and everybody up to the level that they 

need to be, that if they see something suspicious, they can give us 

that information knowing that we are going to take care of it. 

Are we there yet? No. 
55

Are we as prepared as any community in the United States to 

respond to any eventuality? Yes, with some caveats, and those caveats being we have to overcome a person’s innate fear of the word 

‘‘weapon of mass destruction,’’ of the word ‘‘it’s radiologic,’’ or of the 

word, ‘‘it’s biologic.’’ And we need to be able to create an environment that the first responders and the citizens don’t go into a panic 

when those issues raise their head. 

I was the incident commander on the lycine incident in Clark 

County. The call that I received at two o’clock in the morning was, 

‘‘Chief, we have a lycine exposure, we have two emergency rooms 

closed, we have several officers exposed,’’ et cetera. It brought this 

community to the forefront on the response aspect of this very 

quickly. 

Did we make mistakes? Yes. 

Are we going to do it better next time. And as Dr. Carrison 

talked about, working as a partnership is what is most important 

to this community. In that lycine incident after about three hours, 

we knew that it was a horrible public relations nightmare for this 

community. So we needed to get that information out as fast as we 

could that this was not a terrorist event, it was an individual act. 

Did I answer your question, sir? 

Mr. GIBBONS. Very well. 

Mr. CONGER. Thank you. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And it’s nice to know that you’re making a difference and that we are better prepared today than we were yesterday for events that reflect terrorism. As you indicated, prevention 

is the number one goal. Being a first responder says that somehow 

we didn’t bat 1000. We are now responding to something. And, unfortunately, there’s no luxury of batting 1000 in this world. You 

have to do the best you can. Unfortunately, you are not in baseball. 

If you’re batting even 500 in baseball, you would be paid millions 

and millions of dollars. But if you’re batting 500 in defending this 

country, defending the citizens, you’re basically at risk for being 

criticized. 

And what I want to say is that I hope our police forces, our 

Metro and first responders, aren’t handcuffed by risk aversion considerations. In other words, there’s so many political and sociological forces that drive us today that we are risk averse. We’re 

afraid of being sued. Unfortunately, sometimes that can have a 

dramatic effect on how we view the overall picture. 

It’s something that I don’t know how to address, and perhaps you 

can address it as you work through these issues, but it’s something 

that does concern me. 

Thank you for your comments. They have been great, and I really appreciate it. 

Dr. Carrison, is UMC part of the overall county picture that goes 

to the State, as we heard Jerry Bussell talk about earlier, to decide 

how that in the last three or four months $25 million that have 

come to the State and shared 20 percent to the State, 80 percent 

to counties and cities, are you part of that decision process? Are 

you involved in that? 

I’m concerned if you say you get zero, and we understand the 

risks you just described. 
56

Dr. CARRISON. I’m concerned also because that’s the first time 

I’ve heard those figures. I’d have to defer that to acting CEO, Mike 

Walsh is here. I can tell you as the director of the emergency department and actively involved in medical staff and medical executive committee of the hospital, no. 

Mr. GIBBONS. You’ve never heard of—. 

Dr. CARRISON. Never heard of the process and having been involved. 

Mr. GIBBONS. That means that there’s somehow a breakdown in 

the communication on the county side because the counties are involved, obviously from the county perspective, we were told there 

are 17 representatives, one for each county, as to the body that 

makes the decisions about how this money is to be allocated, resources provided is going to be divided up. 

Dr. CARRISON. The one thing that someone might say is we are 

a county-supported hospital. If that’s the only county hospital, 

we’re court of last resort for those people who don’t have resources 

to go elsewhere for good medical care or for any medical care. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And you are probably going to be the court of first 

response when it comes to finding something biological or other attack that comes in because you have to treat individuals that are 

to be—. 

Dr. CARRISON. Individual— 

Mr. GIBBONS. Treat—. 

Dr. CARRISON. And the teaching hospital, we have those resources with regard to what some of the research that is being 

done, number one trauma center, we are talking about explosive 

type injuries. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Perhaps you could do me a favor because I realize 

that is a Federal level we’re talking about on this committee, but 

this is an issue for county officials and county hospital, if you talk 

to the county and find out what the answer is to that question and 

respond back to me. I would like to know just for my own satisfaction. I’m sure there’s a lot people out there that would like to know 

why the county is—major hospital, the county hospital in this community gets zero dollars out of that first responder money. 

Dr. CARRISON. I understand that. I think we also have to consider—I don’t want be cavalier on this or give the wrong impression, but I think we have to consider that we have a hospital that 

was losing lots of money since 9–11 because of the number of 

indigents or patients without resources increased dramatically. We 

required increased subsidy from the county. We are receiving a 

subsidy from the county, and the county manager, Mr. Wiley, is—

I’ve worked with him, I spoke with him. He’s done an excellent job. 

Mr. Walsh is stepping in as the acting CEO, and his staff are doing 

an excellent job addressing our shortfalls and they’ve reduced that. 

But that may be a consideration in the funds. 

But, again, that’s operating costs versus costs that we are looking at to give us the equipment necessary to be that link in the 

first responder chain if we have a WMD incident. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, in any event, if you can find an answer in 

that determination and share that with us, we would be very interested. Because I’m sure it is not a unique problem to Las Vegas. 
57

I think this has got widespread problematic concerns and much 

broader applications than just what you indicated. 

Dr. CARRISON. Even if I were to say a comment for all hospitals 

and particular emergency departments and emergency personnel, 

physicians that staff those hospitals, it is a problem throughout the 

United States, and, again, we’re establishing an excellent infrastructure from the Federal level going down to the State level and 

then into the county levels, but the problem is the hospital is still 

there. In some areas it’s only private hospitals that have that, but 

they are still going to be the ones that take care of our citizens and 

our patients, then they cannot be overlooked because the system 

will break if that happens. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I think people for all good reasons anticipate that 

the hospital will be there and capable of taking care of any illness 

that they have because you have done a great job in the past, and 

you’ve always been there for them, you will always be there in future, and we may be making an assumption that shouldn’t be 

made. 

Dr. CARRISON. I believe it is an assumption that absolutely 

should not be made. Because in most places of the United States 

now, if you look at the emergency visits and how they have increased and the number of hospitals that have closed, the system 

is really stretched to the max right now. If something happened, 

major incident in any number of places, the hospitals are going to 

be completely overwhelmed, completely overstressed. And, you 

know, we need part of that allocation of resources and with particularly the training and the knowledge that go with that to be able 

to be that final link in the chain. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I have a number of questions that I’ve love to engage with you in, including some ideas about how you create a list 

of doctors and health care providers from around the State that can 

respond and how do we get that coordinated and how do we work 

on an emergency list that is—. 

Dr. CARRISON. What’s actually doing a decent job on that is association with FEMA through the fire department and the FEMA. 

We have done much with local coordination with them, because, as 

you know or probably know, with the event of a chemical biological 

incident, we have to depend on FEMA because the medical resources with regard to pharmaceuticals in our community would be 

overwhelming without FEMA bringing those in. So that coordination is going on. There are physicians associated with that. 

I think that part of it is much better than it was, but, unfortunately, I still see people having meetings. I was able to be included 

on the planning session for operation determined promise, but the 

physician that is there today is there with Clark County Health 

District. I think we have to remember, again, I hate to be redundant, but we still have to remember that the role the hospitals play 

in that first responder situation. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And I think that’s part of the whole process of this 

determined promise exercise that is going through right now out in 

Mesquite or Logandale about health care issues. 

Doctor, let me go over to Mr. Walker and ask him a question because I know that aviation is absolutely unique. It’s unique in its 

whole character. There is no industry that is like it from the stand-
58

point of how it provides the basis for an economy such as Las 

Vegas. 

I know that many times Congress does things in an effort to 

bring about some assurances to the public that we are taking steps 

to ensure their safety. Of course, the December 31st deadline for 

100 percent baggage screening, 100 percent passenger screening 

that was required by us oftentimes didn’t consider the reality that 

those machines hadn’t been built and couldn’t be built by December 

31st. 

My question would be to you: Knowing the strategies of a layered 

defense and knowing the risk that airports have throughout the 

Nation, not necessarily Las Vegas, but all airports throughout, 

where should the first layer of security be at an airport? 

Should it be before they ever get to the grounds of the airport? 

Should it be on the airport premises? Should it be in the ticketing 

and baggage screening area? Where should that first layer is? 

Mr. WALKER. Our goal is the Federal intelligence and the local 

intelligence will sniff out any plots and prevent them. 

Mr. GIBBONS. That is my goal as well, too, and it’s something I’m 

working on. 

Mr. WALKER. But if that doesn’t happen, then I’ve heard—we’ve 

gone through at one time—when we talked about whole masses of 

people in the terminal, somebody had the brilliant idea that we 

can’t let anybody come to the terminal. We better have a processing 

center away from the airport that doesn’t blow up. 

But the question was then you have to build holding buildings 

somewhere else and have all the people standing there, and that’s 

the building they’ll blow up. So at some point in time, you have to 

understand that you can have a lot of people come somewhere, 

you’re going to have a lot of people. 

So I think given the way the airport operates, the way that the 

bags and the people are being screened, at the airport, I think, is 

the right location. And then we set up a lot of layers in there, a 

lot of them we don’t tell everybody what they are in order to enhance them. 

There are airports—one of the things we’ve done, of course, is 

put a lot of cameras in the security checkpoints to record everything. If an incident happens, we have very—it’s all digital. We 

have very instantaneous information about what happened at the 

checkpoint. 

We’ve also put in a lot of automatic doors that are tied to the 

checkpoints, so if the emergency button is pushed, basically seal off 

sections of the airport so that two things happen. One is whoever 

has penetrated the security inappropriately can’t get too far into 

the system. And, secondly, if there becomes a situation where we 

have to empty the terminal, we only have to empty part of a terminal instead of the full terminal, which enhances our customer 

service. So we are looking at all of those kind of things to help secure it. 

I think the biggest area that I would be concerned about as the 

director of an aviation system that I don’t think Congress has 

spent enough time addressing, and that is the whole noncommercial aviation, the whole general aviation. 
59

You know, we have close to 500,000 operations in McCarran annually. About 32 percent of those are not commercial aircraft. Some 

of those aircraft are very large. There are Boeing business jets 

which are as large as 737. And we have G–5s and other significant 

sized airplanes that come in and out of our airport that go through 

very little security. We don’t know where they come from when 

they get here. We don’t know what kind of security they have had 

at the other side. 

And the whole security at that side of the field is much less than 

it is at the passenger side, yet, those airplanes are fairly large. And 

if someone were able to take command of one of those airplanes 

and get full control of it, I think we could have a serious problem. 

So I think that needs to be looked at in the future. 

General aviation at small airports is also a concern, but those 

aircraft tend to be a little smaller. So if I were looking at the biggest threat, I would look at larger airports and the type of business 

aircraft that come in in the larger size. But I think that is a concern from my perspective. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, I know that your concern that you just alluded to, the private sector aircraft, has been one which the Federal Government has looked at with regard to security of many of 

the nuclear power plants because there was a theoretical prospect 

that some private aircraft loaded with some type of explosive would 

be used to crash into a nuclear power plant causing an enormous 

disaster. So that’s an issue that they are looking into on the Federal level right now. 

Mr. WALKER. When we talk about general aviation, most people 

think of small private planes, but general aviation actually includes anything from a Boeing business jet, which is very large, 

down to a single engine propeller airplane. So I think maybe there 

has to be some categories of different sizes of aircraft and what 

kind of security you might have based on the potential threat to 

the size of an aircraft being posed if it were taken over by people 

with some ill intent. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Shepherd, I’m sorry we left you to the last. 

You provided your testimony first. It was enlightening to say the 

least. I heard Mr. Conger talking about H.A.N.D.S.S. program, H–

A–N–D–S–S, sharing of information or creating and establishing 

an informational net is provided in telephone books. 

Do hotels like the Venetian give information like that to their 

tourists when they arrive? 

Mr. SHEPHERD. Pretty much when they ask. We try to have more 

of appearance of security they’ll see when they come in with the 

armed checkpoints as they come on the property, where the officers 

will meet them when they come in. That’s how we end up doing 

it most of the time. 

Mr. GIBBONS. From your experience, I’m sure the Venetian is 

much like any other infrastructure sensitive industry, whether it’s 

the power and gas company, whether it’s the communications, 

whether it’s a hotel, motel, or whether it’s trucking industry. 

When you do your risk assessment for vulnerabilities inside your 

structure, do you work with the local police, local fire departments 

when you look at that and made some coordinated effort with them 
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to determine what the best recourse would be for an incident that 

occurred in your hotel? 

Mr. SHEPHERD. Sir, that’s correct. We use all kinds of different 

sources, whether it be law enforcement, private vendors, or threat 

assessment people, as well as people on our staff that are from 

other countries as well. We look at it from all sides again trying 

to stop any threat, whether it be a terrorism threat. 

Our emergency command center, for an example, we have set up 

in three different way. We set it up for terrorism, we set it up for 

life safety, and we also set it for a natural disaster be it an earthquake. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Finally, Mr. Congers, my last question, because we 

are out of time, we were required to vacate this room by one 

o’clock, and it’s little after, the program that I just talked about 

that you created that you put in the phone books for advising tourists, is that shared outside of the Clark County? Is it shared in 

other counties in the State of Nevada, other communities? Is it 

shared nationally or internationally? It seems like it is a creative 

program that you made and one which has a great deal of merit 

to it. 

Mr. CONGER. Actually the genesis of the project was from the 

FEMA preparedness handbooks that had been around for a long 

time. After 9–11, people became very cognizant of potential danger 

and potential manmade disaster and started calling and asking 

questions, ‘‘What do we do? How do we do it? Who do we notify? 

Where do we go? What happens if we have an event? Do we shelter 

in place? Do we evacuate?’’ That type of stuff. 

We had a very creative person on our department that came forward with this during Sheriff Keller’s tenure last year, and we carried it forward, partnered with Sprint Telephone, including 1.3 million phone books. 

We have disseminated this to all major cities and major cities 

chiefs association. The Sheriff, when he goes to those, he disseminates H.A.N.D.S.S. handbook, and he also disseminates a disk. 

The challenge that we had initially was not producing the document, it was getting it disseminated. That’s where the actual costs 

are involved with the document. It was going to cost the department 600 to 800 to a million dollars to get it produced and distributed to people. 

When Sprint Telephone came forward and offered that it went in 

the phone book, and it was minimal, we were able to provide for 

essentially everybody in the community. If we send a document to 

each address in the phone book or—excuse me—each address on 

the mailing list, the MGM Hotel would get one, the Venetian Hotel 

would get one, et cetera. By doing it in the phone book, each phone, 

each room in every hotel room in Las Vegas has a phone book, and 

they have access to that. 

The biggest challenge we have now is getting the information to 

the tourists that that is there, ‘‘If we have an incident, look in the 

book. It’s in the first part of the January phone book.’’ And we intend to carry forward with this and get it further into the communities as we go forward. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Gentlemen, I know that we have run out of time. 

And there’s many, many questions that I have just sitting here on 
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my mind wishing to ask you, but we are out of time. I want to 

thank you for your patience. I want to thank you for your presence 

and your testimony here today. 

If you wouldn’t mind, just as with any other members of the previous panel, we oftentimes will write questions and submit them to 

you, if you wouldn’t mind giving us an answer to some of those 

questions. Maybe the questions will be generated out of the testimony that you have presented to us today. 

We would appreciate it if you would respond to our questions so 

that we can add that information to the congressional hearing 

today. 

With that, I want to thank you again. I want to thank the audience for being out there as patient as they have been, and let them 

know that they also can submit a statement that will be included 

in the record if they so choose. That has to be submitted to us within 14 days of this hearing. So if you are of a mind to do that and 

want to add your thoughts to the congressional record on this hearing, please remember the time lines and that it has to be sent to 

us at the congressional committee which is in Washington, D.C. for 

Homeland Security. 

With that, I’m going to close this hearing and excuse our panels 

for today. Thank you very much again. And this hearing is now 

closed. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ