AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

THE COUNCIL

Gilbert E. Carmichael

 Chairman

Paul M. Weyrich

 Vice Chairman

Bruce Chapman

Nancy Rutledge Connery

James E. Coston

Wendell Cox 

Christopher K. Gleason

S. Lee Kling

Hon. Norman Y. Mineta

Charles Moneypenny

Hon. John O. Norquist

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Thomas A. Till

__________________________________________________

For Release on Delivery

 February 7, 2002

AN ACTION PLAN 

FOR THE RESTRUCTURING AND

RATIONALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL

INTERCITY 

RAIL PASSENGER SYSTEM

A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE

AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL

PURSUANT TO SECTION 204 OF THE 

AMTRAK REFORM AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1997
   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

THE COUNCIL

Gilbert E. Carmichael

 Chairman

Paul M. Weyrich

 Vice Chairman

Bruce Chapman

Nancy Rutledge Connery

James E. Coston

Wendell Cox 

Christopher K. Gleason

S. Lee Kling

Hon. Norman Y. Mineta

Charles Moneypenny

Hon. John O. Norquist

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Thomas A. Till

February 7, 2002

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney The Honorable Dennis Hastert

President of the U.S. Senate The Speaker of the House of (Vice

President of the United States) Representatives

276 Eisenhower Executive Office Bldg. 232 Capitol Building

Washington, D.C. 20501 Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. President:

Dear Mr. Speaker:

This letter transmits to the Congress, pursuant to Section 204 (c) (1) of the Amtrak

Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134) (Reform Act), an Action

Plan for the Restructuring and Rationalization of the National Intercity Rail

Passenger System (Action Plan). The Council believes that there is a bright future

for passenger rail in America. But Amtrak, as it is structured, managed, and

operated under existing law, cannot achieve that promise. 

Amtrak made this clear in its statement of February 1, 2002, when it announced

that it was deferring maintenance and laying off 1,000 workers, thereby saving

$285 million, to get through the current fiscal year. Amtrak further indicated that it

would request $1.2 billion in funding for fiscal year 2003 and announced that, if

the funding is not forthcoming, it would discontinue operation of 18 of the trains in

its network of long-distance services on October 1, 2002. 

To create a more effective passenger rail program, the Council recommends that a

new business model be implemented. The National Railroad Passenger

Corporation (NRPC), commonly referred to as Amtrak, would be restructured as a

small federal agency responsible for administering and overseeing the nation’s

passenger rail program. The NRPC would implement the program through two

strong companies. One would conduct Amtrak’s nationwide train operations. The

other would own, operate, maintain, and improve Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor and

other real property infrastructure. All services would be provided under

contractual arrangements with performance requirements. Amtrak operates

commuter services under this franchising model today.

As additional incentives to innovation and efficiency, the Council’s proposal

would permit the NRPC to introduce, after a transition period, competition by

competitively bidding train operating services. The combination of performancebased contracts and the possibility of competition will make it possible to deal with

the two chronic problems that have affected Amtrak’s train operations – high

operating costs and poor service quality. This will assist in 
   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

controlling the costs of one of the two unfunded mandates in our national rail passenger system, the

network of long-distance trains. 

The Council’s proposal addresses the second unfunded mandate – the rail infrastructure of the

Northeast Corridor – by placing it in a separate corporation, controlled by the states through which

it runs. The NEC infrastructure is vital to the economy of the Northeastern United States, and

Amtrak has not had – for many years – the resources to maintain it in good operating condition.

Placing the ownership burden on Amtrak, which is the minority user, has not been effective because

Amtrak has never received the funding that is needed to fund the Corridor’s needs. Tying the NEC

infrastructure to Amtrak seriously impairs – financially and operationally – both the Northeast

Corridor infrastructure and Amtrak’s nationwide system of train operations. To promote efficiency,

the infrastructure company could eventually contract out maintenance or the entire operation.

The Council also recommends that the government provide stable and adequate funding to support

the rail passenger program, which will be challenging in today’s budgetary environment. These

funds clearly will not come from a single source. States, localities, and the federal government will

all have to contribute appropriately. Currently pending legislative proposals for tax-exempt and

tax-credit bonds should be considered, as should investment tax credits. Increasing the flexibility of

surface and aviation trust funds should be considered where rail investments make economic and

transportation sense. And, to encourage efficiency, the structure of funding for passenger rail

subsidies needs to be changed. In the future, greater deficits should not be rewarded with greater

funding; funding should be administered to reward efficiency in the provision of rail transportation. 

There is a strong consensus on the Council regarding the recommendations in the Action Plan.

Nine Council members – Ms. Connery and Messrs. Carmichael, Chapman, Coston, Cox, Gleason,

Kling, Norquist, and Weyrich – have voted to approve the Action Plan. Messrs. Coston, Cox, and

Kling have submitted letters of concurrence, which are found in Appendix I. Mr. Charles

Moneypenny, the representative of Rail Labor on the Council, voted against the Action Plan’s

recommendations, and his statement opposing the Council’s views is also in Appendix I. Secretary

of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta, an ex officio member of the Council, has abstained. 

We are pleased to forward this report on behalf of the Council and its staff. Please do not hesitate to

contact any member of the Council or the Council staff should you need additional information or

wish to discuss issues regarding the Council's proposals. 
   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

FOR THE AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL

Very truly yours,

Gilbert E. Carmichael

Chairman

Enclosures

Enclosure: Action Plan for the Restructuring and Rationalization 

of the National Intercity Rail Passenger System

Cc: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation

House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation 

i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 9, 2001, the Amtrak Reform Council found that Amtrak will not achieve operational

self-sufficiency by December 2, 2002, as required by the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of

1997. Amtrak finished FY2001 with a loss of $341 million for purposes of self-sufficiency, as the

test is defined by Amtrak, and a record operating loss of $1.1 billion under Generally Accepted

Accounting Principles.1. Amtrak is no closer to self-sufficiency today than it was in 1997, a

conclusion recently affirmed by the Inspector General of the US Department of Transportation, and

Amtrak’s announcement on February 1, 2002, that unless it receives $1.2 billion of federal funding

in FY2003, it will eliminate all long-haul routes on October 1, 2002. Amtrak’s actions to raise

needed cash by mortgaging a portion of Penn Station and increasing its debt have weakened the

company’s financial condition. 

This report is the Council’s Action Plan for a “restructured and rationalized national intercity rail

passenger system” as required by the Reform Act. The Action Plan is grounded in a thorough,

three-year examination of Amtrak’s financial performance and management practices, as well as a

series of public meetings with state and local officials throughout the United States and lively

discussions among Council members.

The Council’s plan addresses Amtrak’s current and historical problems, but also takes a broader

view by considering reform in the context of a vision for the future of intercity passenger rail

service. The Council’s view is that there should be a bright future for passenger rail service in

America. But the Council believes that passenger rail service will never achieve its potential as

provided and managed by Amtrak. A new and different program is needed to move forward.

A. REFORM CONCEPTS ENDORSED BY THE COUNCIL

The Amtrak Reform Council’s action plan is based on three principal concepts for reform. 

a) A New Business Model for Amtrak. Amtrak’s primary mission is the transportation of people.

Today’s Amtrak also establishes and administers governmental policy on rail passenger issues and

is effectively the sole federal oversight body responsible for monitoring its own business plans and

operations. Amtrak also owns and maintains much of the Northeast Corridor (NEC) rail

infrastructure, an asset shared with commuter authorities and freight carriers and having an

economic significance that transcends Amtrak’s operations. To correct these institutional failings,

the Council recommends: 

• Restructuring the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC) as a small federal program

agency to administer and oversee the intercity passenger rail program. In the absence of

competition, a monopoly operator such as Amtrak needs government oversight. While audits of

Amtrak’s financial performance are regularly performed by at least three agencies, analysis and

 

1 Based on Amtrak’s unaudited financial statements. As of February 5, 2002, Amtrak had not released audited financial

statements for the fiscal year.
ii

reporting functions are not a substitute for effective, hands-on oversight. Amtrak’s current train

operating and infrastructure functions, under the Council’s plan, would be strong companies

with independent boards. The NRPC would actively oversee the new train operating and

infrastructure companies with respect to budget matters and approval of business plans. The

NRPC would also be responsible for administering the federal program for development of

high-speed rail corridors and would have the authority, at its discretion, to introduce competition

for some or all Amtrak markets. 

• Organizing Amtrak’s responsibilities for train operations and infrastructure as separate

companies. This would allow Amtrak to focus on its mission of running trains and free it from

the burden of ownership for the portions of the NEC that it owns. A separate infrastructure

company would ensure that funds earmarked for infrastructure improvements will be used for

the intended purpose, and will better represent and balance the needs of all Corridor users and

stakeholders. The NRPC would insulate both new companies from political interference.

Separation also would highlight the NEC’s 20-year capital needs, estimated by Amtrak to be

nearly $28 billion.

b) The Option of Introducing Competition. The Council’s plan permits, after a transition period, the

introduction of competition through the franchising of train service and NEC maintenance through a

competitive bidding process. The Council believes that, as is the case throughout our free-market

economy, competition would drive down costs and improve service quality and customer

satisfaction. 

Competition would help minimize losses, but in all likelihood would not eliminate the need for

operating subsidies. Some Amtrak services – specifically Amtrak’s long-distance trains – would

need to be offered on a negative bid basis, i.e., the bidder requiring the least subsidy would be

awarded the franchise. 

The Council has taken a strong position in favor of protecting the rights of rail labor in any

franchise arrangement. Congress, of course, would be the ultimate arbiter of the specific laborprotective conditions that would be imposed by law.

c) An Adequate and Secure Source of Funding. The Council believes that long-term sources of

funding are needed to meet the needs of the intercity passenger rail program.

B. THE COUNCIL’S PROPOSAL

At its first working session to consider reform options, there was a consensus among the Council

members that train operations and the Northeast Corridor infrastructure should be organized as

separate companies and that any reform plan should include more effective government policy and

program oversight. The Council then evaluated four distinct approaches for train operations: (1)

national or regional operating monopolies; (2) competition for long-haul markets only; (3)

competition for all markets; and (4) a regionally-managed, operationally self-sufficient rail

passenger network. 
iii

The Council considers all of the options meritorious, but specifically endorses option 3, with respect

to train operations. The most significant amendment makes the introduction of competition

permissive rather than mandatory.2

 

The Council’s proposal thus has three elements: 

1. Federal Program Management and Oversight. The Council recommends that the administration

and oversight of the national passenger rail program be conducted by the National Rail

Passenger Corporation (NRPC),3 which would be restructured as a small government

corporation. The NRPC would operate at arm’s length from Amtrak’s current train operations

and infrastructure, which would be organized as companies with independent boards of

directors. While it may be more appropriate for these companies initially to be subsidiaries of

the NRPC, over the long term they would function more appropriately as separate companies.

The NRPC’s board of directors would comprise representatives from congressionally-defined

regions covering the entire US (the governors of each of the regions would propose candidates

to the President, for nomination to the Senate), the federal government, the railroad industry,

and railroad labor. NRPC would hold the statutory franchise to operate over the rights-of-way

of the freight railroads at incremental cost with operating priority, and would authorize the train

operating company or other service providers to operate under the franchise on its behalf. 

The Council recommends that the NRPC be modeled after the United States Railway

Association (USRA), and be charged to administer and oversee the intercity passenger rail

program. USRA was formed by the Congress in 1973 to plan Conrail and monitor its

performance. USRA reviewed Conrail’s business plans, monitored its progress in executing its

plans, disbursed federal funds, and had the authority to withhold funds if Conrail did not take

actions to improve its performance. USRA enforced discipline, shielded Conrail from political

interference, and, by working closely with Conrail management, contributed to Conrail’s

success. The Council believes the passenger rail program would benefit from a similar

oversight organization.

The NRPC would also:

• Administer federal funds made available for intercity passenger service;

• Administer the development of high-speed rail corridors, including evaluating project

proposals and prioritizing projects for design and construction;

• Oversee the business plans of the train operating and infrastructure companies;

• Divest non-NEC physical assets (e.g., stations and track) to states and localities; 

• Determine whether to franchise train services and/or maintenance of the Northeast

Corridor, design franchises to be offered, administer the competitive bidding process,

and administer contracts with franchisees; and

 

2 A matrix summarizing the major elements of each of the proposals may be found at the end of Chapter IV.

3 The name National Rail Passenger Corporation is retained to make clear that it is intended to be the legal successor to

the existing NRPC. Under existing law, the NRPC holds Amtrak’s statutory right to operate over the lines of the

freight railroads at incremental cost and with operating priority, and such rights would be retained by the restructured

NRPC.
iv

• In cooperation with Congress, the states, passenger and freight railroads and the public,

manage public policy issues with respect to rail passenger service. 

2. Train Operations. There should be a separate company (“Amtrak”) organized to provide trainoperating services. Amtrak’s train-operating services, including passenger and mail/express

operations, equipment repairs, and commuter operations, should be provided by contractual

arrangement with federal or state authorities. NRPC would appoint its board, which would be

comparable to the board of a major transportation operating company, such as an airline.

Amtrak operates a number of services today under contract with state departments of

transportation and commuter authorities and these contracts to operate services franchises are a

model of how franchising can work. Amtrak’s responsibilities are clear and none of these

services involve unfunded mandates to operate particular routes without adequate compensation.

The Council recommends that contracts for train-related services require continuous

improvement in specified performance measures such as cost recovery, customer satisfaction,

and ridership. And train operations, mail and express, the equipment repair shops, and

commuter services should each have transparent accounting. Amtrak must become more

efficient either by meeting the terms of a contract or through the eventual introduction of

competition. 

The Council’s plan would permit a pilot project to be implemented immediately by the NRPC to

gain experience with franchising. Otherwise, Amtrak would be given two to five years to “get

its house in order” before competition could be introduced. During this transition period, the

NRPC would design appropriate franchise units, seeking input from state authorities, the freight

railroads, Amtrak and others.4

 Terms and conditions for franchising would be developed during

this period and decisions made about how to manage the bidding process. Any exercise of

franchise authority by the NRPC would be specific in its terms, would be based on consultation

with all concerned parties, and would require that adequate capacity exist for both passenger and

freight requirements before any expansion of services would be implemented. 

After the initial transition period, the NRPC would have the authority, at its discretion, to

franchise some or all Amtrak train operations, including mail/express. Franchises would be

offered through a competitive bidding process and would provide exclusive rights to operate

passenger and mail/express service. Franchisees would operate under the NRPC statutory

franchise and would be afforded the same liability protection and access to insurance currently

available to Amtrak. Ultimately, Amtrak, as the train operating company, could be privatized. 

All franchisees would be subject to the Railway Labor Act, FELA,5 and railroad retirement.

Current Amtrak employees would be granted hiring preference with new franchisees to the

extent that hiring is necessary. The Council recommends to Congress that in any restructuring,

employees follow their work in seniority order with their collective bargaining agreements

intact. Agreements would be subject to collective bargaining under the normal provisions of the

Railway Labor Act. Labor protection would be provided by the NRPC under the terms of the

then-existing collective bargaining agreements. 

 

4 The Council envisions a relatively small number of franchises to avoid cherrypicking of Amtrak’s routes.

5 Federal Employer’s Liability Act.
v

After transition, the Amtrak shops could be sold, leased to private entities, or operated or

disposed of by the NRPC. Alternatively, train operators might bid to operate equipment repair

shops as part of a franchise or contract with the shops for equipment maintenance. The

equipment itself could be either owned by or leased to franchisees. 

Federal operating subsidies to support train operations after the transition period would be

available only for the long-distance trains that are Amtrak’s most unprofitable operations.

Shortfalls on non-national system routes, including new high-speed corridor services, would be

the responsibility of the states after a transition period. The Council believes equipment capital

should be funded through private financing, if possible.

3. Infrastructure. The Council recommends that Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor infrastructure assets

be organized as a government corporation that would control corridor operations, perform

maintenance, and implement capital improvements. The company’s board of directors would

comprise representatives from the states along the Corridor, the US Department of

Transportation, freight railroads operating on the Corridor, and the intercity passenger service

provider. The Corridor would be managed as a shared regional and national asset. 

As with Amtrak’s train operations, the infrastructure company would operate under a

contractual agreement with the federal government. Performance standards would require

continuous improvement in specified performance measures. After a two- to five-year transition

period, the NRPC could authorize the NEC company to franchise its functions through

competitive bidding. 

Track use fees would continue to be based on incremental costs for passenger operators with

other users paying negotiated rates. Incremental cost is the standard that applies to intercity

passenger services off the Corridor and for that reason is retained as the standard on the

Corridor. 

Significant capital funding is needed for the NEC infrastructure. While the Northeast Corridor is

operationally self-sufficient under the standards of the Reform Act, the infrastructure company will

not be able to fund its own capital needs. The Council’s plan endorses Federal funding but also

expects the states to fund a portion of the need in recognition of the Corridor’s importance to

regional and commuter rail operations.

C. Funding Issues and Alternatives

The cost to fund intercity rail service will be considerable. Based on its FY2001 cash loss,

Amtrak’s federal operating subsidy could approach $600 million annually (with Amtrak currently

receiving another $125 million in operating subsidies from states). Additional operating subsidies

could be needed for high-speed corridors if ridership and revenue targets are overly optimistic. The

Council’s plan would minimize operating subsidies by creating incentives for cost containment and

efficiency either through operating contracts with Amtrak or franchising. The plan also

recommends that after a transition period, federal operating subsidies be limited to long-distance

“national” trains; states would bear the cost of operating subsidies for corridor services, including

new high-speed services.
vi

Capital needs are even greater. The Northeast Corridor infrastructure is in need of about $1 billion

annually in capital funds. According to Amtrak’s estimates, the cost to develop all of the highspeed corridor projects that have been advanced by the states amounts to $70 billion, or $3.5 billion

per year over twenty years. These spending levels may be unrealistic in today’s budget

environment. 

There are no easy answers. But it is clear that given the size of the needed investment, reform of

Amtrak is essential to minimizing costs and protecting the taxpayers’ investment. It is also clear

that all of the stakeholders in intercity passenger rail service – the federal government, the states,

Amtrak and its employees, the commuter authorities on the Northeast Corridor, the freight railroads,

and the public – will need to make a contribution for the program to move ahead. A number of

proposals have been advanced to fund capital needs. The Council has taken no position on these

proposals but supports adequate and secure sources of funding for intercity passenger rail service. 
vii

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Council’s Action Plan for the Restructuring and Rationalization of the National Rail Passenger

System takes a different approach to reforming passenger rail service than most previous proposals.

Rather than trying to redesign the network of trains, individually, in groupings, or all together, the

Council has focused on designing a rational program structure that could develop an efficient and

effective passenger rail system over time. Around the world, most railroad restructurings take from

six to twelve years. Here in the US, Conrail took 13 years, and Amtrak will also take time. 

The Council’s purpose was to design an institution that could, if implemented, sustain a coherent

program. Through a small, focused program agency, directed by a board wit h nationwide

representation, such a program would be properly and equitably administered. It would also

exercise strong oversight. Through an efficient, unencumbered train operating company, with an

experienced business-oriented board, operating on performance based contracts, the program would

implement the development of a market-oriented network of train operations providing efficient,

customer-friendly service. The program would also provide the infrastructure that good train

operations need. Through an infrastructure company that operates and improves the Northeast

Corridor rail infrastructure, directed by a board representing the states in the region, upgrade the

NEC so that it will support, appropriately and most efficiently, all classes of train operations on that

economically vital link. In parallel, the program agency would administer the funding, based on

applications that meet sound economic criteria, to upgrade the infrastructure of the emerging rail

corridors around the nation. Gradually, after a transition, the program could introduce competition,

to improve efficiency and service quality and to spur improvements in the rest of the system. 

For assistance in developing the program that underlies the Council’s Action Plan, the Council

would like to thank the following people for their assistance and expertise. 

• The Council’s staff – Thomas Till, Michael Mates, Kenneth Kolson, Mary Phillips, Deirdre

O’Sullivan, and Felton Jones – for their hard work in serving the Council during three years of

challenging but rewarding effort. And most particularly for their excellent work in preparing

both the finding that Amtrak would not be self-sufficient and this Action Plan for rail passenger

reform. 

• The staff of the Federal Railroad Administration, who have provided helpful counsel responsive

administrative support for the Council since its inception. 

• The Office of the Inspector General (OIG), U.S. Department of Transportation, especially

Inspector General Kenneth Mead and Assistant Inspector General Mark Dayton, for their

recurring analyses of Amtrak’s Strategic Business Plans and the company’s performance, which

has been of great value to the Council and its staff. The OIG has also given the Council

excellent logistical support, through Samuel Davis and his staff, since the Council began regular

operations three years ago. 

• The staff of the U.S. General Accounting Office, working first under Associate Director Phyllis

F. Scheinberg, and then under her successor, Jay Etta Hecker, and with the able assistance of
viii

James C. Ratzenberger, for their productive collaboration on many topics of mutual benefit over

the years. 

• Charles Hoppe, a rail consultant with more than 40 years of domestic and worldwide experience

in redesigning and restructuring railroads, who provided a vital sounding board for the

Council’s staff in many hours of discussion. 

• Mort Lowenthal, a retired investment banker with many years of experience advising railroad

clients, who for two years has provided, pro bono, his wise counsel to the Council’s members

and staff. 

• Louis Thompson, Railways Advisor of the World Bank, for his unlimited availability to discuss

issues, for his thoughtful comments, and for his assistance in understanding the wide range of

reforms that have been adopted for passenger railways in other countries. 

• William Watt, for his valuable counsel in analyzing complex policy issues and for his excellent

editorial assistance in preparing this Action Plan and other Council writings.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. WHY AMERICA’S PASSENGER RAIL PROGRAM DOES NOT WORK AND WHAT IT NEEDS TO

BECOME SUCCESSFUL. ..................................................................................................................................1

A. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................................1

B. PROBLEMS OF A FLAWED INSTITUTION ..............................................................................................................2

C. ROOT CAUSES OF THESE PROBLEMS...................................................................................................................5

D. THE COUNCIL’S VISION......................................................................................................................................6

II. ISSUES GOING FORWARD .............................................................................................................................8

A. THE SHAPE OF INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL SERVICE........................................................................................8

B. LEVERAGING IMPROVEMENTS IN INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL PERFORMANCE...............................................14

C. THE COUNCIL’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.S. FREIGHT RAILROAD INDUSTRY....................................................16

D. PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES.............................................................................................................................17

E. AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH RAIL REFORM................................................................19

III. PRINCIPLES AND KEY CHANGES UNDERLYING THE COUNCIL’S RECOMMENDATIONS......21

A. PRINCIPLES.......................................................................................................................................................21

B. BASIC DESIGN—A NEW BUSINESS MODEL .....................................................................................................22

C. KEY CHANGES TO IMPROVE THE INTERCITY RAIL PROGRAM...........................................................................23

IV. THE COUNCIL'S PROPOSED RAIL PASSENGER RESTRUCTURING PLAN ....................................29

A. A RESTRUCTURED NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION AS THE FEDERAL PROGRAM

MANAGEMENT AGENCY...................................................................................................................................29

B. A SEPARATE CORPORATION TO CONDUCT TRAIN OPERATIONS.......................................................................33

C. A REGIONALLY-DIRECTED COMPANY TO OPERATE, MAINTAIN, AND IMPROVE THE NORTHEAST

CORRIDOR INFRASTRUCTURE...........................................................................................................................35

D. OTHER ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL....................................................................................37

E. TRANSITION PLANNING TO IMPLEMENT THE COUNCIL’S PROPOSAL ................................................................42

V. FUNDING OPTIONS ........................................................................................................................................43

A. FUNDING THE NRPC -- THE GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT AGENCY....................................................................43

B. FUNDING THE OPERATING COMPANY ..............................................................................................................44

C. FUNDING RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................................................................................................46

APPENDIX I: CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINIONS FROM COUNCIL MEMBERS ...................52

A. MR. JAMES COSTON’S CONCURRING OPINION.................................................................................................52

B. MR. WENDELL COX’S CONCURRING OPINION .................................................................................................61

C. MR. LEE KLING’S CONCURRING OPINION........................................................................................................72

D. MR. CHARLES MONEYPENNY’S DISSENTING OPINION.....................................................................................74

APPENDIX II: FINDING RESOLUTION ............................................................................................................79

APPENDIX III: AMTRAK’S CAPITAL PLAN ...................................................................................................91

APPENDIX IV: AMTRAK RIDERSHIP...............................................................................................................92

A. AMTRAK RIDERSHIP 1972 - 2001.....................................................................................................................92

B. AMTRAK SEPTEMBER RIDERSHIP 2001 CHART ................................................................................................93

C. AMTRAK SEPTEMBER RIDERSHIP 2001 ACTUAL NUMBERS .............................................................................94

D. ACELA RIDERSHIP SINCE DECEMBER 2000 ......................................................................................................95

APPENDIX V: AMTRAK’S 2001 PROFIT/LOSS OF INDIVIDUAL ROUTES ..............................................96

APPENDIX VI: INTERNATIONAL MODELS ...................................................................................................97
1

I. WHY AMERICA’S PASSENGER RAIL PROGRAM DOES NOT

WORK AND WHAT IT NEEDS TO BECOME SUCCESSFUL

A. INTRODUCTION

When, on November 9, 2001, the Amtrak Reform Council approved a resolution finding that

Amtrak would not achieve operational self-sufficiency by December 2, 2002, as required by the

Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (Reform Act), it marked a beginning, not an end.6

The Council’s finding reflected the majority’s view that – 

• Amtrak's financial performance since enactment of the Reform Act has deteriorated and will

fall far short of that required by the Reform Act;

• Our nation’s transportation system needs an effective program for the development and

operation of intercity rail passenger service and that passenger rail can and should have a

bright future in America; 

• The current federally-chartered organization for providing intercity rail passenger service,

Amtrak, needs major structural improvement; and 

• The Council should propose a new program for intercity passenger rail in the Action Plan

the Reform Act requires the Council to submit to the Congress. 

The Council’s view is based on its investigations of Amtrak’s institutional structure and

performance. This work led the Council to conclude that Amtrak, as it is currently structured,

funded, and operated, is not capable of delivering the improvements in passenger rail service that

America needs. In the almost four years since enactment of the Reform Act, Amtrak has not made

any significant progress toward operational self-sufficiency. 

The Council is confident that the recommendations for reform proposed in this report, if enacted,

will improve the national passenger rail program. 

Building on the Council’s Second Annual Report, issued in March 2001, the Action Plan proposes a

new policy framework for passenger rail as well as specific proposals for the implementation of the

business model that the Council approved in its Second Annual Report. To ensure that these

options are implemented effectively, the Council’s plans include provisions for a careful transition

from the current corporate and operational structure of Amtrak to the new structure proposed for the

National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 

 

6 The Council’s finding document is attached as Appendix II.
2

B. PROBLEMS OF A FLAWED INSTITUTION

The vision of improved passenger rail operations bears no resemblance to the performance of

Amtrak over its 30-year history. The Council previously determined, as reported in its Second

Annual Report, that the roots of Amtrak’s flaws lie in its institutional structure. While one may

criticize the management, the board of directors, and even the employees or the unions, the

institutional structure is the root cause of Amtrak's problems. Effective reform will ensure that

these same flaws do not undermine a new passenger rail program. 

Some outstanding examples of Amtrak's problems under its existing organizational structure

include:

• Failure to develop and execute sound business plans has prevented Amtrak from meeting its

goals for revenue growth and cost containment. 

- Amtrak’s original Strategic Business Plan for FY1999 – FY2002 projected that Amtrak

would achieve self-sufficiency in fiscal year 2002. With the delays in the introduction of

Acela Express service and rising costs, Amtrak had to revise its Business Plan, pushing

back the date for achieving operational self-sufficiency a full year to fiscal year 2003.

Amtrak finished fiscal year 2000 $100 million behind its revised Plan. Amtrak finished

fiscal year 2001 more than $150 million behind its revised Plan and about $280 million

behind its original plan. Its operating loss for purposes of operational self-sufficiency –

as that test is defined by Amtrak – increased in FY2001 to $341 million7, up from $292

million in FY2000.

 

7 Based on Amtrak’s unaudited financial statements for fiscal year 2001. Amtrak concurs with the Amtrak Reform

Council’s calculations for purposes of the self-sufficiency test.

Comparison of Amtrak's Strategic Business Plan with Actual 

Performance for Purposes of Operational Self-Sufficiency

$(60)

$-

$(178)

$(40)

$1

$(292)

$(341)

$(190)

$(184)

$(318)

$(310)

$(400)

$(300)

$(200)

$(100)

$-

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003

($ millions)

Actual Performance

Revised Plan

Original Plan
3

- Amtrak’s costs continue to grow faster than its revenues. Amtrak has projected

significant overall cost reductions in its strategic business plans since 1999, but Amtrak

did not define specific cost reduction initiatives until FY2001, and those proposals total

only $75 million annually, exclusive of any savings from Amtrak's planned reduction in

force. These cost reductions are clearly inadequate to meet Amtrak's strategic business

plan projections.

• In five years, Amtrak has made no progress toward achieving self-sufficiency and is in a

weaker financial condition today than in 1997. While Amtrak made modest improvements

towards self-sufficiency in FY1998 and FY2000, its FY2001 loss was its highest ever.

• On January 25, 2002, the US Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General

(DOT/IG) released its report on Amtrak’s FY2001 performance. The Inspector General

reached the same conclusions as the Amtrak Reform Council about Amtrak’s performance,

stating “Amtrak’s cash losses have not decreased and Amtrak is no closer to operating selfsufficiency now than it was in 1997. With less than a year remaining in its mandate, there is

not sufficient time for Amtrak to implement the kinds of sustainable improvements

necessary to meet its deadline for self-sufficiency. At this point in time, Amtrak will face a

formidable challenge in 2002 just managing its cash resources – be they from operating

revenues or Federal subsidies – to make ends meet without further borrowing.”

• Amtrak's contentions to the contrary, simply meeting an annual target for reduced federal

operating funding does not mean Amtrak is making meaningful strides toward selfAmtrak Financial Performance, FY1997 -- FY2001

$335 $301 $310 $292 $341

$248 $405 $337 $383

$488

$82

$103 $90 $142

$142 $166 $178

$183

$(5)

$37

$66

$-

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001

($ millions)

 Est. Excess Mandatory

Railroad Retirement

 Capital contribution to

operating (progressive

overhauls)

 Depreciation/non-cash

expenses

 Operating loss for

purposes of selfsufficiency

 Operating contribution

to capital

GAAP Loss

$762 million

GAAP Loss

$930 million

GAAP Loss

$916 million

GAAP Loss

$943 million

GAAP Loss

$1,073 million
4

sufficiency. Amtrak has been able to continue operations with more limited federal

operating funds only by using Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA) capital funds for operating

purposes and by engaging in counterproductive practices and transactions that have

weakened the overall financial and physical condition of the company.8 Federal operating

grants for Amtrak may be declining, but Amtrak’s losses for purposes of operational selfsufficiency are increasing. The statutory deadline of December 2, 2002, for operational selfsufficiency is not a finish line. It is instead the starting point from which Amtrak must

sustain operations over the long run without federal operating assistance. 

• Despite receiving appropriated federal funds and TRA funds totaling approximately $5

billion for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2002, Amtrak's assets are in worse physical condition

now than when the ARAA was passed.

• Amtrak’s inability to follow its business plans have led to imprudent borrowing, most

notably the mortgaging of a portion of Penn Station New York to obtain a $300 million loan

that was used to avoid running out of cash in the last quarter of FY2001. In FY2000,

Amtrak also engaged in the sale-leaseback of substantially all unencumbered Amtrak

equipment, which raised $124 million that had not been projected as a cash source in its

strategic business plan for that year. 

• The Penn Station loan and other borrowings, including sale-leaseback transactions, have

tripled9 Amtrak’s debt since 1995, increasing its costs for debt service to about $200 million

annually. 

• Amtrak lacks a transparent accounting system for its operations and infrastructure, an

effective reservations system that will identify seats available on Amtrak trains on a realtime basis (including reservation no-shows), and a system to measure the productivity of its

use of capital, labor, energy, and materials. 

• Amtrak has not made any use of the reforms enacted under the Reform Act. Amtrak has not

used its Reform Act authority to restructure or eliminate unprofitable routes. It has not used

its Reform Act authority to contract out elements of its operations to achieve cost savings.10

• Amtrak has resisted all requests that it separate the financial statements for the Northeast

Corridor rail infrastructure that it owns and maintains from the financial statements of its

train operations. This makes management of both elements more difficult. 

 

8 The sale leaseback of equipment in FY2000 raised approximately $124 million, and the $300 million Penn Station

loan in FY2001 provided additional funds that were not in Amtrak’s strategic business plans, but which helped fund

cash shortfalls from business plan projections. Such additional debt and asset liens will limit future years’ options and

sources of cash flow. 9 Amtrak notes that its debt only doubled since 1995 if cash escrow deposits of approximately $1 billion set aside to

defease (i.e., repay outstanding debt from a dedicated escrow fund) the sale-leaseback obligations are deducted from

the approximately $3 billion of Amtrak debt outstanding at September 30, 2000. 10 The Reform Act eliminated previous statutory prohibitions concerning contracting out work where the loss of a job

would result, and made contracting out a collective bargaining issue. Amtrak and its unions have been in collective

bargaining on the issue of contracting out since June 2000. 
5

• Amtrak lacks a strong policy to improve the intermodal connections of its system. A case in

point is that Greyhound, which serves about 3,500 cities, has secured access to only 55 of

Amtrak’s 500 stations in the 30 years that Amtrak has been in business, and at only 35 of

those 55 stations do all Greyhound buses serving that city come to the train station. 

These flaws make it clear that Amtrak will not achieve operational self-sufficiency because, as an

institution, it has not been able to use the past four years to get its house in order by better managing

revenues, costs, and productivity. The events of September 11th are simply irrelevant to the reasons

why Amtrak's financial situation has not improved over this period, and why Amtrak will fail to

pass the operational self-sufficiency test. 

C. ROOT CAUSES OF THESE PROBLEMS

Amtrak’s poor performance is the result of institutional flaws: 

• Direct susceptibility to political pressures on major and minor management decisions, which

provides strong incentives to make decisions that are politically expedient in the short run,

but financially crippling in the long run. 

• A monopoly structure, that exhibits inherent resistance to innovation and lacks motivation to

improve efficiency.

• Lack of transparency and accountability in Amtrak’s management structure, accounting

system, and financial reporting 

• Lack of effective program administration and oversight. 

• A business model based on the faulty premises of large-scale cross-subsidization and the

availability of federal funding as needed. 

• Lack of Congressional confidence in Amtrak as an institution, making it virtually impossible

for Amtrak to secure stable and adequate funding. 

Both historically and currently, the administration and oversight of the passenger rail program are

ineffective. Without reform, there will be continued reliance on deficit financing with no incentives

for efficiency in the conduct of operations or the use of capital. These practices will continue to

fuel the debate about the efficacy of the institution, making it difficult – if not impossible – to

secure adequate funding. Inadequate funding will continue the cycle of deterioration of assets, both

equipment and infrastructure. This particularly will be true for the passenger equipment on the

long-haul trains and for the NEC infrastructure. The operational reliability of the NEC will

continue to degrade, introducing further train delays that will – if unchecked – act as a drag on the

competitiveness of the regional economy of the Northeastern US (New England and Middle

Atlantic). Impediments to the ability of states outside the NEC to develop their emerging highspeed rail corridors will continue. 
6

Improvement will not come without institutional reform. 

D. THE COUNCIL’S VISION

The Council view is that there should be a bright future for intercity rail passenger service in

America. But the Council also believes that passenger rail service will never achieve its potential as

currently organized and managed by Amtrak. A new and different program is needed to move

forward. 

The basis for reform should be the design of a new program that will support passenger train

operations and infrastructure improvements and that will provide for planning and development of

improved intercity passenger rail services. The program’s basis would be a business model in

which strong federal program administration and oversight works with states and the freight

railroads to provide the high-quality rail infrastructure needed to support a passenger rail program.

This would be so both in the Northeast Corridor and on the track network of the freight railroad

industry. Concomitantly, any needed operating support for passenger rail services would be

provided on the basis of contracts involving performance incentives to lower costs, raise revenues,

and improve the quality of service. 

This program, which would work with states and regions to support the development of passenger

service, would be modeled on the programs for infrastructure development that have been so

successful for highways and airports. The states have been the leaders in the expansion and

improvement of passenger rail service over the past decade, and this program would provide them

with the federal-state partnership to do that job more effectively. 

Amtrak’s primary mission is the transportation of people and mail/express. As presently

constituted, however, Amtrak also administers governmental policy and program authority on rail

passenger issues and is responsible for owning and maintaining much of the Northeast Corridor

(NEC) rail infrastructure, an asset shared with rail commuter authorities and freight railroads and

having a significance that clearly transcends Amtrak’s operations. To correct these institutional

failings, the Council recommends: 

• Restructuring the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC) as a small federal

program agency to administer and oversee the intercity passenger rail program. Under

current law, no federal oversight entity exists to review Amtrak's operations and

performance. Ex post facto audits of Amtrak’s performance by the DOT/IG and GAO

provide analyses and reports, but are not a substitute for hands-on oversight. Amtrak’s

current train operating and infrastructure functions, under the Council’s plan, would be

provided by strong companies, with independent boards. The NRPC would actively oversee

the new train and infrastructure companies with respect to budget matters and approval of

their business plans. The NRPC would also be responsible for managing the federal

program for development of high-speed rail corridors and would have the discretion to

introduce competition in some or all Amtrak markets. 

• Organizing Amtrak’s responsibilities for train operations and infrastructure as separate

companies. This will allow Amtrak as a train operator to focus on its mission as a service
7

provider and free it from the burden of ownership for much of the NEC. A separate

infrastructure company will better represent and balance the needs of all Corridor users and

stakeholders. The NRPC would insulate both new companies from political interference.

Finally, separation will highlight the Northeast Corridor’s capital needs, estimated by

Amtrak to be nearly $28 billion over the next 20 years. 

• The option of introducing competition, through a competitive bidding process, of both

intercity passenger rail services and the operation, maintenance, and improvement of the

NEC. The Council believes that, as is the case throughout our free-market economy,

competition would drive down costs and drive up revenues, service quality, and customer

satisfaction. The Council does not stand alone in making this recommendation. The

introduction of competition has been an effective hallmark of reform of state-owned

railroads world-wide in recent years. And franchising is realistic. Experience shows that a

variety of other interests, both public and private, would be interested in operating Amtrak

services. Under the right circumstances, even some of America’s freight railroads might be

interested in participating. 

• The Council strongly supports protecting the existing rights of Amtrak employees under the

Railway Labor Act, FELA and the Railroad Retirement System. 

• The Council also believes that long-term sources of funding are needed to meet the

operating and capital needs of the intercity passenger rail program. 

This report describes in detail the Council’s Action Plan for implementing its vision. 
8

II. ISSUES GOING FORWARD 

In considering options for restructuring Amtrak, the Council identified a number of core issues for

reform:

• What does the future look like for intercity rail passenger service in America? Where can it

best compete with other modes of transportation? How can rail and other modes best

complement one another?

• How can the program be improved to increase its real and perceived value to customers,

employees, lawmakers, and other stakeholders? How can it be designed to incorporate

incentives for efficiency? 

• What role must the freight railroads play if intercity passenger service is to improve? What

steps must be taken to ensure that passenger improvements do not come at the expense of

diminished ability of the freight railroads to play their vitally important role in the economy? 

• How much will the new program cost? What capital and operating subsidies will be

needed? What are the potential sources of funding, and which are most appropriate? And

who should bear these costs? 

• What experience has there been, both domestic and international, with rail reform? What

lessons are to be learned and what mistakes avoided? 

Each of these is discussed below and was considered in the Council’s deliberations. 

A. THE SHAPE OF INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL SERVICE 

An effective system of intercity rail passenger services has three components: short-distance

corridor trains, long distance trains and intermodal connections to link rail service with other modes

of transportation. Today, most Amtrak riders – 82 percent – use short-haul corridor trains, many of

which receive state operating support. These are the fastest-growing element of the intercity rail

passenger system. The other eighteen percent of Amtrak’s riders use Amtrak’s national network of

inter-corridor long-haul trains. In contrast, the long-haul network experiences poor financial

performance and uneven service quality. It is losing both riders and money. Both of these elements

of the passenger system are important, however, because the Amtrak Reform and Accountability

Act directs the Council to submit an action plan for a ‘restructured and rationalized national

intercity rail passenger system,’ which integrates both corridor and long-haul trains. A third

element must, in the view of the Council, be added to the other two, and that is an effective

intermodal system that connects and integrates all modes of passenger transport – rail, bus, auto,

and air. 
9

1. High-Speed Corridors

The past several years have seen a groundswell of state and local support for expanding intercity

rail service. Interest is focused primarily on developing high-speed (or higher-speed) service along

densely populated urban corridors. Through ISTEA and TEA-21, eleven corridors in 33 states and

the District of Columbia have been designated as candidates for high-speed rail development.

Several federal legislative proposals have been advanced to fund corridor development through the

issuance of bonds, but, despite garnering considerable interest and support, none has been approved

by Congress. High-speed rail initiatives outside the Northeast Corridor include:

• California has announced a $10 billion, 20-year plan to increase train speeds and add

passenger and freight capacity along existing freight rights-of-way in the Capitol, Coast,

Pacific Surfliner and San Joaquin corridors. California projects that the planned

improvements will increase ridership 300 percent and be significantly more cost effective

than comparable highway investments. California’s existing rail program – the most

extensive state-supported rail program in the country – has been highly successful and may

offer a model for the development of additional corridors. In FY2001, California provided

over $60 million in state subsidies to support corridor train operations. Ridership on

California corridor trains has risen 27 percent in the past three years, to 3.5 million riders in

FY2001.

• The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative is a nine-state initiative for the development of a $4

billion hub and spoke system based in Chicago and connecting Chicago with Milwaukee,

Minneapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit and a

number of other Midwestern cities. MWRRI estimates that when fully operational, the

network will carry 9.6 million passengers per year, generating approximately half of the

train miles of Amtrak's current system. Although still awaiting federal financial support for

the project, MWRRI, in cooperation with Union Pacific, has begun upgrading the line

between Chicago and St. Louis. 

• In the Pacific Northwest, Washington and Oregon have plans to increase train speeds along

the Cascades corridor to 110 miles per hour. Since 1992, the states, Amtrak and the freight

railroads have committed nearly $600 million toward the project. In 1999, the state of

Washington purchased two trainsets made by Talgo at a cost of $20 million; Amtrak

purchased a third trainset for the service. The Talgo equipment features advanced tilt

technology that permits the train to approach curves without reducing speed. Ridership on

the Cascades corridor has risen 25 percent in the past three years. 

• In Pennsylvania, years of work are near to producing an agreement for joint state-Amtrak

funding of some $150 million in improvements to the Keystone Corridor. In FY2001, over

one million passengers rode Amtrak’s two Keystone Corridor routes: Route 14 between

Philadelphia and Harrisburg and Route 42 between New York and Harrisburg. About

650,000 of the riders originated and/or terminated between Philadelphia and Harrisburg. 
10

• Other Initiatives are underway in New York, Florida, North Carolina and other states to

increase train speeds and frequencies, often with significant planning and capital and

operating commitments by the states. 

High-speed corridor services can be cost and time competitive with other modes of transportation

for short-distance travel. For trips of approximately 250 miles or less, Amtrak operating expenses

appear to be lower than prevailing air fares.11 In these short-distance lanes, take-off and landing

fees, baggage handling service, and other fixed trip expenses tend to drive up airline ticket prices.

Rail travel can also be time-competitive with air and vehicle travel in shorter distance markets,

depending on the average train speed with intermediate station stops. The maximum speed planned

for most US high-speed rail corridors is 110 miles per hour, since this speed can be accommodated

on existing railroad rights-of-way. Average speeds with station stops, will be closer to 70-80 mph.

At these average speeds, rail can compete with air travel up to distances of 150-200 miles. Nonstop trains moving constantly at the maximum speed of 110 miles per hour could compete up to 300

miles.12

Travel Times (hours) for Selected Train Speeds

 TRIP DISTANCE

AVERAGE 

SPEED 

(miles per hour)

100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 250 miles 300 miles 350 miles 400 miles

60 1.7 2.5 3.3 4.2 5.0 5.8 6.7 

70 1.4 2.1 2.9 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.7 

80 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.8 4.4 5.0 

90 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.4 

100 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 

110 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.6 

Train time the same or less than flight time plus one hour

Train time the same or less than flight time plus two hours

Corridors of about 125 miles or less in length connecting major metropolitan areas may offer some

of the best opportunities for rail development, since there are high travel volumes between such city

pairs and often little commercial air service. The Philadelphia – Baltimore, Washington –

Baltimore, Philadelphia – New York markets and, to a lesser extent, the Baltimore – New York

market have limited air service and account for 40 percent of Amtrak’s ridership between

Washington, D.C. and New York.13

 

11 Based on a comparison of air fares in selected markets with the operating expenses reported by Amtrak in its FY2000

Route Profitability System, or RPS, report. 12 For these short-distance flights, an average flight time (with boarding and deplaning time) of one hour has been

assumed. 13 The American Travel Survey for 1995 shows the following metropolitan area city pairs 125 miles or less apart having

at least one million person trips per year: San Diego – LA/Long Beach; San Jose – Sacramento; San Diego –

Riverside/San Bernadino; Philadelphia – Harrisburg/Carlisle; Sarasota/Bradenton – Lakeland/Winter Haven; Tucson –

Phoenix/Mesa; Portland/Vancouver – Eugene/Springfield; Riverside/San Bernadino – LA/Long Beach; Philadelphia –

New York; San Francisco – Sacramento; Philadelphia – Baltimore; Houston – Beaumont/Port Arthur; Santa

Barbara/Santa Monica/Lompoc – LA/Long Beach; Riverside/San Bernadino – Orange County; Tulsa – Oklahoma

City; Philadelphia – Atlantic City/Cape May; Columbus – Cincinnati; Milwaukee/Waukesha – Chicago; Washington

– Richmond; Indianapolis – Cincinnati. 
11

Corridor trains, defined in this report as trains having an average rider trip length of 300 miles or

less, are Amtrak’s best performers. Nineteen million passengers, or 82 percent of Amtrak total

ridership in FY2001, rode corridor trains (versus 18 percent on long-haul trains such as the

California Zephyr and the Sunset Limited). Incremental revenues on corridor trains have been

growing faster than expenses, a move in the right direction for Amtrak. With many states providing

operating subsidies for corridor trains and the profitability of the Acela service on the Northeast

Corridor, corridor trains as a whole showed a profit of $239 million on direct train expenses in

FY2001 compared to a loss on direct train expenses of $269 million for long-haul trains (excluding

depreciation).14 Corridor trains showed a loss of $191 million on a full cost basis, compared to loss

of $581 million on long-haul trains in FY2001. With the majority (82 percent) of the riders and

lower operating losses, corridor trains have lower operating losses per passenger. (See the chart on

the next page.)

2. Long Distance Trains

Amtrak’s long-haul overnight trains are part of the national network and serve to connect local and

corridor trains with regional and national routes. These long-haul routes, however, are responsible

for the largest share of Amtrak’s direct losses from train operations. 

Recognizing the difficulties of the long-haul network, the Council has recommended that: 

• There should not be any unfunded mandates for passenger rail service. If Congress wishes

to mandate the operation of unprofitable services, it should operate them under contract,

which would provide adequate funding of these operations while at the same time

introducing incentives for the trains to operate efficiently.

• If a national system is retained, it should more closely reflect current travel patterns. Atlanta

– Florida, for example, is a heavily traveled corridor that is effectively not served by

Amtrak. Amtrak’s reservations system routes passengers traveling between Atlanta and

Jacksonville or Orlando, Tampa, or Miami through Washington, D.C. Passengers traveling

between Atlanta and Tallahassee and the other cities in the Florida panhandle are routed

through New Orleans.

 

14 Based on Amtrak’s Route Profitability System report for FY2001. See Appendix V for details on individual routes. 
12

Amtrak Ridership and Profit/(Loss) per Rider, FY2001

-

1,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000

Keystone

&

Clocker

Service

(Rts.

1

3,

1

4,

&

42)

Route

01

Metroliner/Acela

Express

Route

03

Ethan

Allen

Express

Route

04

Vermonter

Route

05

NE

Direct/Acela

Regional

Route

1

5

Empire

Service

Route

20

Chicago-St.

Lou

is

Route

21

Hiawathas

Route

22

ChicagoPontiac Route 23 Illini

Route

24

Illinois

Zephyr

Route

29

Heartland

Flyer

Route

35

Pacific

Surfliner

Route

36

Cascades

Route

37

Capitols

Route

39

San

Joaqu

ins

Route

40

Adirondack

Route

41

International

Route

56

Kansas

City-St.

Lou

is

Route

65

Pere

Marquette

Route

67

Piedmont

Route

1

6

Silver

Star

Route

1

7

Three

Rivers

Route

1

8

Cardinal

Route

1

9

Silver

Meteor

Route

25

Empire

Bu

ilder

Route

26

Capitol

Limited

Route

27

California

Zephyr

Route

28

Southwest

Chief

Route

30

City

of

New

Orleans

Route

32

Texas

Eagle

Route

33

Su

nset

Limited

Route

34

Coast

Starlight

Route

45

Lake

Shore

Limited

Route

48

Silver

Palm

Route

52

Crescent

Route

54

Kentucky

Cardinal

*

Route

57

Pen

Ridership (000)

Ridership (000)Loss per Rider (Full Costs)

Corridor trains Long distance trains
13

• Franchising should be considered for the long-distance trains or for the expensive dining car

and sleeper services associated with these trains. Private operators may be able to provide

these services at lower cost or earn higher revenues with innovative services, thereby

reducing required subsidies. 

3. Intermodalism

The third element vital to the success of intercity rail passenger service is the existence of seamless

links to other modes of transportation. In today’s passenger rail environment, it is simply not

possible in many instances to travel from origin to final destination on Amtrak without transferring

to a bus, an automobile or an airplane.15 While Amtrak lists nearly 300 cities in its timetable as

having connecting bus service, Amtrak and Greyhound actually share only 55 stations nationwide,

and Greyhound has all of its bus operations in only about 35 of those 55 stations shared with

Amtrak.16 For the other 20 or so stations shared by Amtrak and Greyhound, only a portion of the

Greyhound buses stop at Amtrak stations, reducing the value of the intermodal connection. Making

most connections, therefore, involves a taxi or bus ride, adding cost and time to the trip and making

rail a less attractive travel choice. There is also little joint ticketing or coordination of schedules

between Amtrak and other modes17, a distinct disadvantage for Amtrak when so many trips involve

intermodal connections.

One bright spot is California. There, the state Department of Transportation funds any deficits from

providing connecting rail-bus service, and Amtrak contracts with bus operators (generally smaller

bus companies) to provide connecting bus service with Amtrak’s corridor trains under contract

requirements of the state of California. Buses are waiting at Amtrak stations when the trains arrive.

Connecting bus revenue accounted for 5 percent of Amtrak’s revenue in California in FY2001. 

The Council strongly supports the development of more and better intermodal connections,

including connections between high-speed corridor trains and other commuter and long distance

trains. Sharing stations, services and information will make rail travel more convenient and

enjoyable. Sharing stations would also reduce Amtrak’s station-related costs, currently over $100

million annually. The Council believes these efforts should be guided by four principles developed

by the National Center for Intermodal Transportation: 

“CONNECTIONS. All modes must be connected with one another to accomplish the

convenient, expeditious, and efficient movement of commodities and people.

CHOICES. The intermodal network should offer choices, allowing its users to select the

mode that can most efficiently satisfy their transportation needs.

COORDINATION. The transportation infrastructure must be planned, designed, and built

in a way that brings the modal networks sufficiently close together so that connections can

 

15 Amtrak serves a relatively small number of town and cities. Amtrak currently has about 530 stations, for example,

compared to Greyhound’s 3,500 stations. 16 The number of Amtrak stations served by Greyhound buses (55 in total, including approximately 35 that are the only

Greyhound facilities in the towns) was provided to the Council by Greyhound Lines, Inc. on January 18, 2002. 17 Amtrak has established joint ticketing with United Airlines for Amtrak trips combining travel by rail in one direction

and by air in the other. Amtrak has also partnered with a cruise line for rail-cruise vacations in the Caribbean. On

January 17, 2002, Amtrak and Continental Airlines announced joint ticketing and code sharing through the new

Amtrak train station at Newark International Airport, which is scheduled to begin in mid-March of 2002.
14

be made relatively effortlessly. In addition, transportation providers must coordinate their

schedules to reduce dwell time between intermodal movements.

COOPERATION. There must be cooperation and collaboration among transportation

providers and governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to ensure that the

needs of the users for seamless service are realized.”18

Intermodalism also offers broader, more general benefits for our transportation system. As stated

by the National Commission on Intermodal Transportation,

“The benefits of a National Intermodal Transportation System are enormous. Intermodalism

offers the promise of: (1) lowering overall transportation costs by allowing each mode to be

used for the portion of the trip to which it is best suited; (2) increasing economic

productivity and efficiency, thereby enhancing the Nation’s global competitiveness; (3)

reducing congestion and the burden on overstressed infrastructure components; (4)

generating higher returns from public and private infrastructure investments; (5) improving

mobility for the elderly, disabled, isolated, and economically disadvantaged; and (6)

reducing energy consumption and contributing to improved air quality and environmental

conditions.”19

The Council endorses the Commission’s conclusions. It also recommends that Congress give state

and local governments more flexibility in how federal funds are used so that they can make the best

overall transportation decisions rather than the best decisions for each mode. 

B. LEVERAGING IMPROVEMENTS IN INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL PERFORMANCE 

The most important issue in improving America’s national intercity rail passenger system is making

the existing funding more effective by introducing efficiencies into the design and operation of the

system of services. More efficient services will be better-managed services, and better management

will bring with it the needed focus on market penetration and on improving the quality of the

service. Because of the direct political pressures that, throughout its 30-year history, have affected

Amtrak’s major management decisions, introducing efficiency has not gotten the attention it

deserves. 

Efficiency affects the financial and operational performance of all of Amtrak’s trains. These issues

revolve around very high overhead costs, the structure of services, and low frequencies of service,

causing less efficient use of personnel and equipment. This is particularly true for corridor trains.

Infrastructure conditions and costs affect the efficiency of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor and other

corridor operations, and its long-haul trains. 

The following types of improvements can be implemented to improve efficiency: 

 

18 National Center for Intermodal Transportation, A New Transportation Agenda for America in the aftermath of 11

September 2001, November 2001, pp. 3-4. 19 National Commission on Intermodal Transportation, Toward a National Intermodal Transportation System, final

report, September 1994, p. 3.
15

Substantial reductions in overhead costs, to which Amtrak has been very resistant, are the

quickest way to reduce costs. With about 2,900 non-agreement employees, Amtrak is overstaffed.

As an indication of the level of overstaffing, when fully implemented, the proposed Midwest

Regional Rail Initiative will operate a system of trains that will be equivalent to half of the number

of train-miles of service that Amtrak operates today. The Midwest, which is negotiating with

Amtrak to operate these services, will require that the operation be financially insulated from

Amtrak’s other business operations and that Amtrak operate the system with less than 350 nonagreement employees, less than an eighth of Amtrak’s total complement of non-agreement

employees. There is no reason why Amtrak could not implement, at its own initiative, a program of

overhead cost reductions for its system operations. It has tended to pay little attention to this issue,

providing in its business plans for increases in overhead costs that are greater than expected

increases in revenues. 

Structuring services to increase productivity of passenger equipment and crews is another

important element in improving efficiency, principally for corridor trains. More trips per day,

within the terms of safety regulations and labor agreements, will lower unit costs, and, if the

increased number of trips results in increased frequencies of service, rail travel will likely become

more attractive in the marketplace. 

Together, lower overheads and improved service structure will reduce train-mile costs. In the

Midwest and in Florida, Amtrak has subscribed to plans that would have them operating trains at

less than $30 per train-mile, which is less than half of the train-mile costs that are incurred, on

average, by the trains in Amtrak’s current system. 

Better-managed, more efficient operations, are more likely to lead to higher service quality,

which is being provided today by rail passenger operations designed, funded, and supervised by

states, such as those Amtrak operates under contract for California, Oregon, and the state of

Washington. This improved quality includes better on-time performance, better-maintained

equipment, and better on-board food service operations. In addition, the states are more apt to

design train operations that have more effective rail-bus connections for travelers than Amtrak

provides throughout its own system. And many of the states take over responsibilities for

marketing, reservations, and ticketing, to assure better market penetration and better customer

service. 

Unlike the airline industry, for which the Congress has prescribed a strict regime to ensure that its

customer service is satisfactory, there is not any federal agency to which Amtrak passengers can

report poor service quality. Amtrak’s service quality is known to be uneven; Amtrak’s own service

quality guarantee program is experiencing three times the number of claims that Amtrak had

initially forecast. The Council believes it would be appropriate for the Congress to consider

establishing an oversight mechanism, perhaps similar to that applied to the airline industry, for

reviewing the quality of customer service provided by Amtrak.

Franchising can introduce efficiencies into train operations. Amtrak today operates and maintains

commuter trains under franchise agreements with several public agencies. Experience with

franchising both domestically and internationally confirms that major savings – as high as 50

percent in some cases – can be achieved. Franchising is a promising option for the long-haul
16

trains, or at least for the expensive dining car and sleeper services associated with these trains.20

Private operators, providing higher levels of amenities, augmented by better operating discipline,

may be able to provide these services at lower cost and earn higher revenues, thereby reducing

required subsidies. 

Improving corporate structure will simplify missions and make it easier for the management

teams of separate train operating and infrastructure companies, insulated from political interference

by the NRPC, to focus effectively on their core businesses. The train operating company, with a

board that looks like the board of a major airline or other passenger operating company, will focus

on market and revenues, within the structure of performance measures prescribed in its funding

agreement. The regionally-based board of the NEC infrastructure company will ensure that all of

the revenues from both track usage fees and from non-operating sources will be dedicated to the

operation, maintenance, and improvement of the NEC infrastructure. Such a board will also be

more likely to ensure that the company’s management structure is compact and efficient, and that

business policies ensure that competitive bidding and other efficient business practices are used to

lower costs and improve efficiency wherever possible. 

Designing program funding to incorporate incentives for efficiency is essential. Properly

structured funding can be a lever to achieve improved efficiency. In exchange for stable and

adequate funding for intercity rail passenger capital and operating needs, the Congress should

introduce performance improvement requirements for passenger operations. The Council also

believes, with respect to operating subsidies, that there should not be any unfunded mandates. If

Congress determines that Amtrak should continue to operate money-losing routes, it should first

ensure that measures are taken to introduce efficiencies to minimize operating losses, including

allowing franchising as a way of minimizing operating losses. Ultimately, however, it must

adequately fund these services under specific contracts between the NRPC and the operating

company or a franchise operator.

C. THE COUNCIL’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.S. FREIGHT RAILROAD INDUSTRY

Outside the Northeast Corridor, much of which is owned by Amtrak, our nation’s intercity rail

passenger operations move virtually exclusively over 22,000 miles of track owned by the American

freight railroad industry. It is therefore clear that rail passenger service outside the NEC cannot

improve without the active involvement and cooperation of the freight railroad industry. 

 

20 Between August 1999 and December 2001, a noted rail expert, Charles W. Hoppe, took it upon himself at his own

expense to ride 35,000 miles on many of the trains in Amtrak’s long-haul network, as well as a number of Amtrak’s

short-haul trains. He sent reports of each trip to Amtrak’s top management. In December 2001 he published a

compilation of his trip reports and an assessment of his overall experiences. His assessment concluded: (1) an

Amtrak long-haul passenger has less than a 50 percent chance of having a satisfactory experience; (2) much of the

equipment on the long-haul trains is old and in a poor state of repair; (3) the operating loss imposed on Amtrak by

the long-haul trains is large (in the range of $600 million per year); and (4) it is doubtful that it would make

economic sense for the federal government to invest in rehabilitating or replacing the fleet of equipment for these

services. His recommendation was that, if the Congress determines that it is important for the long-haul trains to

remain in the national system, the long-haul trains should be operated under competitively-bid franchises. 
17

The American freight railroad industry is widely regarded as the most effective freight railroad

system in the world. The nationwide track network that five major and hundreds of smaller railroad

companies own, maintain, and pay taxes on, supports the movement of about 40 percent of the

intercity ton-miles of freight that move in US intercity commerce.21 Profitable, private sector

companies carry this freight. Moving this freight is the most important function of the US rail

network. If this freight were on the roads, it would add to the heavy and worsening road congestion

around our major metropolitan areas and in the heavily traveled intercity highway corridors around

the country. It would also lower the productivity of our economy by making it more costly to

transport freight. The continued health of the freight railroad industry is vital to the US economy. 

In recent years, as their freight traffic has grown constantly during the period of sustained economic

growth, America’s private freight railroads began to encounter congestion on their track networks.

This was a new phenomenon for a rail system that had been slimming down its network since

economic deregulation of the railroads was enacted in the Staggers Act of 1980. Adding new

passenger trains on freight tracks will require – in many instances – investments to increase the

capacity of the freight railroads’ networks. 

An effective program to promote the healthy growth of intercity rail passenger service should

provide for infrastructure improvements on the freight railroad network where passenger trains need

to travel. These infrastructure improvements should ensure that the introduction of expanded

passenger service does not diminish the ability of the freight railroads to operate efficiently.

Payments for improvements would appropriately be allocated to government agencies for public

benefits to passenger service and to private railroads for benefits that inure to them. This kind of a

program for infrastructure improvement would clearly provide benefits to both passenger and

freight traffic. It would be a win-win solution. 

D. PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES

The cost to fund intercity rail service will be considerable. How much funding will be needed

depends on (1) the scope of the program; (2) the extent to which the efficiency of train operations

can be improved through incentive-based funding, operating contracts, and franchising; and (3) the

pace of investment to develop high-speed rail corridors. 

1. Operating Subsidies

Annual operating subsidies for Amtrak’s existing network, as it is operated by Amtrak, are

estimated at $600 million annually (excluding existing state subsidies), based on Amtrak’s cash

operating loss in FY2001.22 To the extent Amtrak’s costs continue to grow faster than its revenues,

the required subsidy could be higher. New high-speed corridor services could also significantly

increase federal and state exposure to subsidies for operating losses. 

State subsidies in support of Amtrak operations are now close to $125 million annually. These

subsidies help support newer train operations, primarily corridor services, that are not part of the

national network. It is Amtrak’s practice to negotiate state support for new services to cover its

 

21 This modal comparison includes railroads, motor carrier, pipeline, barge and air carriers. Railroads carry

approximately 53% of combined rail and truck ton-miles. 22 Cash losses on train operations are closer to $800 million, but are offset by non-train profits of about $200 million.
18

incremental losses. With these state subsidies – and the operating profits of Amtrak’s Acela

Express service – corridor trains as a whole nationwide show a $239 million profit on direct train

expenses.23

Eliminating long-distance trains, which carry 18 percent of Amtrak’s riders and are responsible for

75 percent of Amtrak’s operating losses, could reduce operating subsidies by about $270 million per

year if all direct train expenses could be avoided; additional savings would be possible if some route

and overhead costs could be eliminated. The Amtrak Reform Council takes no position on what

routes should be operated other than recommending that Congress adequately fund the desired

network and do so under a contractual or franchise arrangement administered by the NRPC that

would eliminate the unfunded mandates.

The Council’s plan would minimize operating subsidies by creating incentives for cost containment

and efficiency either through operating contracts with Amtrak or franchising. The plan also

recommends that after a transition period, federal operating subsidies be limited to long-distance

trains that are part of the historical national network; states would bear the cost of operating

subsidies for corridor services, including new high-speed services.

2. Capital Needs

Developing new high-speed rail corridors and maintaining the NEC will require significant federal

capital investment in partnership with the states and the freight railroads. There is a shortage of

needed capacity on certain segments of the freight railroad network if it is to accommodate

additional passenger and freight traffic. To build new high-speed corridors, it may be necessary to

add an additional main line (perhaps including an entirely new right of way) the length of the

corridor and install centralized traffic control. The need to build new track, rather than modify

existing track, will add significantly to initial project construction costs.

In February 2001, Amtrak released a 20-year capital needs report. The report presents two

scenarios, one representing the “minimal investment” needed to support Amtrak’s current services

and a second plan identifying capital needs to significantly increase service. Amtrak’s growth plan

includes “all passenger rail services under study and/or development by the states and Amtrak. It

contains high-speed corridor projects and some long-distance and point-to-point service.”24

According to Amtrak, the amount needed to maintain current service is $23.6 billion over 20 years,

while the total capital cost of the growth scenario is another $73.6 billion. Thus the total need,

according to Amtrak, approaches $100 billion.25

Under Amtrak’s plan, $28 billion would be spent on the Northeast Corridor, including $10 billion to

address the Penn Station tunnels, upgrade the south end of the Corridor between New York and

Washington, and maintain other existing services. The balance, $18 billion, would be applied to

growth projects. Off the Northeast Corridor, $70 billion would be spent over the 20-year period

mostly to develop high-speed rail along the federally designated corridors.

 

23 Corridor trains are defined as Amtrak routes with an average rider trip of 300 miles or less. Revenues and costs are

drawn from Amtrak’s Route Profitability System Report for FY2001. 24 National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Investing in the Future of Passenger Rail – Long-Term Capital Plan,

February 2, 2001, p. 42. 25 Appendix III summarizes Amtrak’s twenty-year capital plan.
19

In essence, Amtrak’s plan calls for spending $5 billion per year on the passenger rail program using

a combination of federal and state funding. Adding the annual operating subsidy would bring the

total to approximately $6 billion annually, a sum that may be unrealistic given funding constraints

at all levels of government. 

The size of these projected capital spending levels compared to Amtrak’s funding of about $25

billion in its first 30 years, and the preponderant portion of the funding that is for infrastructure

improvements, make it clear why the Council is recommending that Amtrak’s government program

administration functions, its train operations, and its real property infrastructure assets be separated

and restructured. There must be effective government oversight to ensure that funds of this

magnitude are properly accounted for. There must also be assurance that infrastructure funds are

spent on needed infrastructure improvements, and not diverted to operating expenses. 

E. AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH RAIL REFORM

The establishment of Amtrak by the US government was one of the first major railroad restructuring

programs in the worldwide realm of railroading. It is important to note, however, that the

establishment Amtrak was incidental to the need to lift the burden of some $500 million in annual

passenger service losses from the nation’s freight railroads, which were in perilous financial

condition. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 was followed closely by the Regional Rail

Reorganization Act of 1973, which established a federal program to restructure the seven bankrupt

railroads in the northeastern quadrant of the United States, the largest of which was the Penn

Central. 

Through a very difficult but ultimately successful program, the United States Railway Association

(USRA), a special purpose government agency, reorganized and rationalized rail service in the

Northeast and Midwest through the creation of Conrail, a company that was privatized through a

public stock offering in 1986. Rail reorganizations, to be effective, take time. Deregulation of the

US railroads in 1980, which included a substantial liberalization of merger procedures, led to a

massive reorganization in the US freight railroad industry, conducted principally in the private

sector, making them currently the most efficient freight railroad system in the world. 

Internationally, significant restructuring of freight and passenger rail service on every continent has

occurred during the past fifteen years.26 The number of countries pursuing reform and the extent of

change has been remarkable. 

While each country has tailored reforms to its particular circumstances, certain trends and

similarities stand out. In general, reform follows financial crises and the need to reduce large

government subsidies.27 Reform has generally been aimed at improving efficiency and market

responsiveness, often through the introduction of competition through concessions or franchises.28

 

26 See Appendix VI 27 The Council’s primary source of information on international reform has been the World Bank and the case studies

published on its website. 28 Concessions make the concessionaire responsible for train operations and infrastructure maintenance; franchises

involve only responsibility for train operations.
20

And many countries, including those of the European Union, have separated infrastructure from

train operations, either through separate accounting or separate operating and infrastructure entities.

The reforms recommended by the Amtrak Reform Council are well within the bounds of the types

of changes implemented internationally. 

Several recurring themes in both US and international railroad reform experience apply to Amtrak:

• Rail restructuring takes time, on average between six and twelve years. In Japan, ten years

passed between the time restructuring was initiated and the listing of the first passenger

company on the Tokyo exchange. In Sweden, rail restructuring was initiated in 1988;

twelve years later it entered a second phase with the division of the operation group into six

independent entities. Closer to home, the planning and privatization of Conrail, begun in

1973, was not completed until 1986.

• The restructuring process should be managed by an independent group or agency at arm’s

length from the railroad. Experiences in other countries suggest that railroads being

restructured are often resistant to change, an obstacle to reform and innovation, and as such

cannot be relied upon to restructure themselves. The agency or group managing the

restructuring process plays an important role in managing the performance of the existing

and the new operators, designing franchises or concessions, managing conflicts between

political and policy objectives, and driving forward the process of reform. 

• Assets and liabilities of the existing railroad must be restructured to reflect new franchise

units and to help ensure that new franchises will be viable. This could mean writing off

some Amtrak debt or renegotiating repayment terms.
21

III. PRINCIPLES AND KEY CHANGES UNDERLYING THE

COUNCIL’S RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PRINCIPLES 

In developing its restructuring plan for Amtrak, the Council has been guided by a number of

principles the Council believes important to improving the rail passenger service program.

• There should be transparency and accountability in management structures, accounting

systems, and financial reporting for both train operations and infrastructure.

• There should not be any unfunded mandates to provide train services nor any crosssubsidization of rail passenger service by offsetting losses from one region or class of

services or with profits from others. Train operating companies, including Amtrak, should

have incentives to maximize profits from specific corridor services and to reinvest operating

profits into such services to improve operations and profitability. 

• Rail passenger service decisions should be made on a regional basis to the maximum extent

possible, particularly if regional entities and states provide operating and capital funding

grants for the rail passenger service. 

• State and local governments should have more flexibility in how they use federal

transportation funds.

• All users of the Northeast Corridor should bear fair and reasonable portions of the operating

and capital costs of maintaining and improving the Northeast Corridor.

• Train operators should be shielded from political influences so that they are free to make

operational and marketing decisions as commercial companies based on customer demand. 

• Any federal subsidy to intercity passenger rail service should be offered on a performance

basis. Such performance-based formulas could include a percentage of revenue

performance measure or a farebox recovery ratio.

• Congress should take steps to improve intermodal connectivity between rail and other

modes of passenger transportation, including direct connections at airports, possibly with

incentives for airport operators to encourage travelers to take trains for shorter trips.

• Inasmuch as transportation policy generally accepts the policy that the Federal government

assumes responsibility for funding infrastructure while the private sector assumes

responsibility for operations, Amtrak is an anomaly. The Council recommends that

Congress recognize the Federal responsibility for rail infrastructure through the creation of a

Rail Infrastructure Trust Fund, (which should not be funded by the current 4.3 percent

deficit reduction tax on rail diesel fuel).
22

• For any franchising to be successful, there must be a level playing field for potential

competitors to Amtrak. Franchisees must be able to access the rights-of-way of the freight

railroads on an incremental cost basis and with operating priority, must be afforded the same

statutory limitation on liability as Amtrak, and must be able to purchase insurance on the

same terms as Amtrak.

• If franchising is invoked, franchises should provide exclusive – not open access – to

franchise operators to provide rail passenger service where the franchisee will operate over

privately-owned rights-of-way. Franchises should be designed to avoid cherrypicking of

Amtrak routes.

• The national network should reflect current and prospective travel demand (with an

emphasis on current travel patterns). A process should be put in place to evaluate routes

based on objective criteria so that service can be added where justified and terminated where

warranted.

B. BASIC DESIGN—A NEW BUSINESS MODEL

To solve Amtrak’s basic problems, a new set of models is needed for organizing, funding, and

implementing train operations, infrastructure management, and government program administration,

policy development, and oversight. 

1. The Role of Government – Administering the Program

Extensive program administration, oversight, and policy development authority resides under

current law in the existing Amtrak organization. The Council recommends that the Congress vest

this authority in a restructured National Railroad Passenger Corporation, which would be a small

government program administration agency directed by a board representing all regions of the US.

The NRPC would perform much as did the United States Railway Association (USRA), which

Congress established in 1973 to carry out the successful planning and oversight of Conrail. USRA

reviewed Conrail’s business plans and monitored their execution, disbursed federal funds, and could

withhold funds if Conrail did not take actions to improve its performance. USRA also shielded

Conrail from political interference, and worked closely with Conrail’s management, contributing its

success. The Council believes that government administration and oversight cannot be exercised

effectively under the current statutory structure and that the national passenger rail program would

benefit from an effective oversight organization.

2. Train Operations – Accountable and Efficient 

The vision for train operations is a customer-focused commercial enterprise shielded from political

interference, and directed by a board with extensive transportation operating experience. The

organization would have the ability to modify routes, schedules, and prices to improve financial

performance, a culture that puts the customer first, the tools to effectively manage the business, and

appropriate compensation incentives. The operating company would also be held to new

performance standards set by a government oversight entity for measures such as operating income,

operating ratio, ridership, and on-time performance. The operating entity would not be expected to

operate unprofitable service unless compensated for losses under a service contract with the federal

government or the affected states. 
23

The Council believes that the most effective means for ensuring that the operating company

operates as an efficient commercial enterprise would be to place the operating company in a

competitive commercial environment. Thus, after an appropriate transition period, the new

government oversight entity would have the option of contracting out specific operating company

services to private, regional, or state operating entities, pursuant to competitively bid franchise

arrangements (in which the operating company would be a participant). To make a clear break with

the current de facto operating monopoly held by the existing Amtrak organization and to fine-tune

the effectiveness of the franchise approach, pilot projects could be immediately introduced for

selected services or operations. Appropriate labor protective conditions (ultimately to be

determined by Congress) would protect the rights of current Amtrak employees for any franchised

operations.

3. Infrastructure Management – Accountability to Regional and Local Needs in the Context of a

Federal-State Partnership 

The model for infrastructure management is a U.S. government-owned corporation responsible for

ownership and maintenance of the Northeast Corridor and (initially) other Amtrak-owned

infrastructure. It would be authorized to buy or sell assets and, to the extent possible, transfer all

non-NEC Amtrak properties to state and local governments. Funding would come (inter alia) from

federal and state capital subsidies, trackage fees on intercity, commuter, and freight carriers for use

of the Northeast Corridor, and real estate development revenues from such things as utility and

communications easements. In addition to current sources of funding for the NEC infrastructure,

which have proven inadequate under the current Amtrak program structure, funding from a variety

of sources will be needed to return the NEC to a state of good repair and to fund improvements.

The reauthorization of Amtrak this year, current proposals to provide infrastructure funding for

corridor development, and reauthorization of TEA-21 and AIR-21 in 2003, may well provide

appropriate opportunities for increasing rail development funding. To ensure accountability to

regional and local needs, the infrastructure corporation would be controlled by a board of directors

consisting of current users of the NEC. The board would also coordinate operations on the NEC by

the various users to ensure equitable access arrangements. To provide incentives for efficient

infrastructure management, the new government oversight entity would, after an appropriate

transition period, have the option to contract out management of the NEC infrastructure or to

transfer ownership and management to the NEC states. Appropriate labor protective conditions

would protect the rights of current Amtrak employees for any franchised operations.

C. KEY CHANGES TO IMPROVE THE INTERCITY RAIL PROGRAM

The Amtrak Reform Council’s recommendations for restructuring Amtrak suggest four major

changes to the intercity passenger rail program. The suggested changes address root causes of

Amtrak’s failure: an unworkable institutional structure, the lack of a government commitment to

intercity passenger rail service – both in terms of policy program management and funding – and

the absence of competition for the provision of services. Options for reform were judged according

to the option’s potential for getting more value out of the federal and state investments in intercity

rail service; managing an effective program instead of a train operating company; and providing a

foundation for the development of high-speed rail corridors. 
24

1. Separation of All of Amtrak’s Passenger Train Operations from the Northeast Corridor

Infrastructure (NEC)

The Amtrak Reform Council recommends that Amtrak’s responsibilities for owning and

maintaining the NEC and other track and related infrastructure should be separated from its

responsibilities for train operations. The Council reached this conclusion based on the following:

• Amtrak’s responsibilities for maintaining the Northeast Corridor make it more difficult for

Amtrak to achieve and sustain operating self-sufficiency. Operating expenses (even without

considering capital costs) associated with maintaining the corridor add significantly to

Amtrak’s operating deficit. And since trackage use fees paid by the commuter authorities

are based on incremental rather than full costs, Amtrak must fund a disproportionate share of

NEC maintenance costs. 

• Amtrak should focus on its core mission as a service provider. Amtrak’s primary mission is

to provide intercity passenger and mail and express service. Amtrak should focus

exclusively on this mission and be freed from the financial and managerial distractions

associated with track ownership and maintenance. 

• Separating the NEC infrastructure from Amtrak’s operations will provide a true picture of

the costs of the infrastructure and how funds are being used to maintain it. There is

currently no separate accounting for the NEC infrastructure. Capital and operating subsidies

appropriated to Amtrak and are used to meet Amtrak’s immediate needs. Critical

maintenance needs are being ignored. For example, the Office of Inspector General of the

U.S. Department of Transportation found that while Amtrak needs to spend at least $135

million annually on minimum operational reliability investments, in fiscal years 1998,1999

and 2000, Amtrak on average invested only $71 million. 

• In November 1999 the Amtrak Reform Council recommended to Amtrak’s Board of

Directors that Amtrak keep separate financial records for the NEC infrastructure. While

Amtrak agreed to do so, Amtrak has never produced this information.

• The Northeast Corridor will require significant capital in the coming years; Amtrak is

looking to ‘non-federal’ sources to provide a significant amount of the needed funding.

Amtrak’s long-term capital plan for FY2001-FY2020 identifies the capital needs on the

Northeast Corridor as $27.9 billion, of which $10 billion is needed to meet current service

needs and $17.9 billion is needed for growth. Amtrak’s plan assumes that $4 billion of the

$10 billion needed to meet current service needs will come from non-federal sources and

that non-federal sources will contribute $15.7 billion of the $17.9 billion needed for growth. 

• The Northeast Corridor is a regional asset and Amtrak is not the dominant user. The NEC

is a critical transportation asset for the northeastern states. The Corridor contributes to the

economic health and growth of the region; its true value greatly exceeds the value to Amtrak

alone. While Amtrak owns the majority of the right-of-way, it is the minority user of the
25

Corridor. A 1996 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office29 found that in 1993,

Amtrak operated only 100 of the 1,200 daily trains on the Corridor. Most of the other trains

are operated by commuter agencies. Of the 100 million passengers estimated to use the

Northeast Corridor in 1993, about 89 million were commuter rail passengers and 11 million

were Amtrak passengers.

• A separate infrastructure company might have a greater opportunity than Amtrak to attract

private capital. Many believe that private capital would influence how the organization

functions financially and would help ensure that funds intended for rail capital programs are

used for that purpose. With an objective of protecting their investment, providers of private

capital can influence the organization to take steps necessary to cut expenses (especially

overhead) and achieve revenue growth to maximize the return on investment. In other

words, private capital could help make a government-owned entity behave more like a

business.

The Council is not proposing – in recommending that the NEC infrastructure be separated from

Amtrak's train operations – to do what was done in Britain with the formation of Railtrack. In

Britain, the track network in all of Great Britain was privatized immediately. Railtrack's directors

do not have any relationship to the train operating companies that operate the 26 passenger

franchises or to the companies operating the two freight franchises. The Council's proposal does

not involve privatization; the Corridor would remain under government ownership. Unlike

Railtrack, the Council proposes that the board of the NEC infrastructure organization would

principally represent the users, not some random group of private shareholders. And the board

would be required to produce an annual five-year business plan for the NEC infrastructure detailing

the required maintenance and improvements and the associated funding requirements. In its 25

years of owning the Corridor, Amtrak has never produced such a plan. In short, the situation in the

Northeast Corridor is not anything like the situation in Britain, and the Council is not doing

proposing – unless the proposal is viewed in the most superficial terms – anything resembling what

was done in Britain. 

2. Establishing an Effective Federal Program Administration and Oversight Function

Amtrak is unlike other federally funded transportation programs in that public policy and program

administration is performed essentially by Amtrak itself rather than by a government body. Amtrak

decides what routes will be operated, how corridor development will proceed, and determines the

funding priorities for passenger service throughout the nation. Amtrak even provides federal

planning money to the states to support these planning efforts. These are all public policy roles that

more properly belong with federal and state governments. Neither the Federal Railroad

Administration nor any other executive branch agency has a direct role in overseeing or approving

Amtrak’s operations and expenditures. Amtrak may dispense federal funds as it sees fit and may

retain or initiate money-losing services without objective criteria and based solely on political

considerations. Government oversight is largely restricted to safety matters under the jurisdiction of

the Federal Railroad Administration and audits of Amtrak’s performance by the U.S. General

Accounting Office, the Inspector General’s office in the Department of Transportation and by the

 

29 U.S. General Accounting Office, Northeast Rail Corridor: Information on Users, Funding Sources, and Expenditures,

June, 1996.
26

Amtrak Reform Council. Analysis and reporting functions are not a substitute for hands-on

guidance and oversight. 

Amtrak’s performance under the ARAA demonstrates an emphatic need for more pro-active

involvement. Amtrak has consistently issued its Strategic Business Plans well after the start of the

fiscal year. When it became clear that the introduction of Acela would be delayed, Amtrak took no

steps to develop a contingency plan to stay on track. Amtrak has projected significant overall cost

reductions in its strategic business plans since 1999. Amtrak, however, did not define specific cost

reduction initiatives until FY2001, and those proposals total only $75 million annually, clearly

inadequate to meet Amtrak's strategic business plan projections. Had a federal oversight group had

the authority to require Amtrak to submit realistic business plans and follow through on them as a

prerequisite to receiving federal appropriations, we believe Amtrak would not be in its current

financial crisis. Business plan shortcomings would have become apparent sooner and corrective

actions taken to move Amtrak towards operational self-sufficiency.

The Council believes the federal government’s role should be to:

• Administer federal funds made available for intercity passenger service;

• Facilitate the development of high-speed rail corridors, including evaluating project

proposals and prioritizing projects for design and construction;

• Assisting states and regional compacts of states and other transportation entities to develop,

evaluate and prioritize high-speed rail passenger projects. 

• Actively oversee the business plans of the operating and infrastructure companies (in a

manner similar to that of the United States Railway Association (USRA) during the early

years of Conrail’s operations). The group should have the authority to withhold funds if the

operating and infrastructure companies do not act in good faith to prepare and execute their

business plans;

• Determine whether to franchise any or all Amtrak services, design franchises to be offered,

administer the competitive bidding process and administer contracts with franchisees; 

• Coordinate a national system of ticketing and reservations to permit seamless transfers

between intercity franchises and between intercity travel and other modes of transportation;

and

• In cooperation with Congress, the states, the freight railroads, the public, and other

interested parties, manage public policy issues with respect to intercity passenger rail

service.

3. Allowing the Introduction of Competition

One of the overriding trends in rail reform internationally has been the introduction of competition

into the provision of rail passenger services through some form of franchising. While there are
27

many variations on the process, it generally involves competitively bidding a route or group of

routes for operation under contract with a government authority for a specified period (often five to

ten years). Many people have the mistaken impression that franchising can only be applied to

routes or systems of routes that are profitable. This is not the case. The competition provided by

franchising helps maximize returns on profitable routes (positive bids) and minimize losses on

unprofitable ones (negative bids). 

Competition would force Amtrak to operate more efficiently to successfully bid for franchises.

Competitive forces would drive down the cost of operations, off-setting potentially higher subsidies

to adequately compensate service providers for operating unprofitable routes. Amtrak or other

service providers would essentially be treated like other government contractors.

Under the Council’s recommendations, franchising could also apply to the Northeast Corridor

infrastructure. The NRPC would have the authority to contract out maintenance of the corridor

through a competitive bidding process. As for train operations, the competitive pressures of

franchising could improve productivity and make federal and state dollars go further.

Franchising does not imply open access. The Council’s proposal recommends that if franchising is

implemented, franchisees have exclusive rights to operate services or routes. Because most rail

passenger markets do not appear to be large enough to support multiple operators, exclusive

franchises are most sensible. The Council envisions only a limited number of franchises and

proposes that the freight railroads have input into the design of franchises and operating

requirements, including ensuring that adequate capacity exists or will be provided, so that the

operational effectiveness of freight service will not be adversely affected by additional rail

passenger service. The Council recommends further that the NRPC design franchises in a manner

that prevents bidders from cherrypicking Amtrak’s network and leaving Amtrak to operate the least

attractive routes.30

There are several issues vital to successful franchising. The first is the ability of the franchisee to be

able to access the rights-of-way of the freight railroads on the same basis as Amtrak, i.e. at

incremental cost and with operating priority. Without this, service providers other than Amtrak

would have to negotiate access and track use fees with the freight railroads and would be at a

competitive disadvantage relative to Amtrak. It is also imperative that other service providers be

able to obtain insurance and be afforded the same limitations on liability that apply to Amtrak. 

The members of the Council have taken a strong position in favor of protecting the rights of rail

labor. The Council recommends that all franchisees be subject to the Railway Labor Act, Federal

Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) and railroad retirement. Moreover, all agreement employees

should have hiring preferences with new franchisees and should be transferred to franchisees with

their seniority and existing contracts in place. Collective bargaining agreements would be

renegotiated under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.

 

30 Current law also provides a forum before the Department of Transportation if a dispute develops between Amtrak and

a freight railroad over an introduction of additional trains or accelerated speed that could unreasonably impair freight

operations. (49 U.S.C. 21308.) Such provisions would remain in place under the Council’s proposal.
28

4. A Secure Source of Funding

There is presently no secure source of either capital or operating funding for passenger rail service.

The Council believes Congress should provide a stable and adequate source of capital funding for

the Northeast Corridor, the emerging high-speed corridors and other rail-related infrastructure. The

Council also believes, with respect to operating subsidies, that there should be no unfunded

mandates. If Congress wishes Amtrak to continue to operate routes that lose millions of dollars

annually, it should adequately fund these operations under a specific contract between the NRPC

and Amtrak, and that Congress should further consider allowing franchising as a way of minimizing

operating losses.
29

IV. THE COUNCIL'S PROPOSED RAIL PASSENGER

RESTRUCTURING PLAN

The Council’s proposal is spelled out in detail below. 

A. A RESTRUCTURED NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION AS THE

FEDERAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AGENCY

• Federal governmental responsibilities for administering the program that provides national

rail passenger service should be consolidated in a federal program management entity called

the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("NRPC"). The NRPC would be authorized to

exercise the program management and oversight responsibilities currently lodged in the

existing NRPC as well as to ensure that the train operations and infrastructure

responsibilities of the existing NRPC are properly performed through newly established

NRPC train operation and infrastructure companies. The new NRPC would be the legal

successor to the existing NRPC.31 The NRPC’s strengthened oversight and program

functions would be clearly set forth in its restructured charter.

• The NRPC would be re-chartered as a wholly-owned, independent government corporation

generally subject to the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act to the extent not

inconsistent with its statutory charter. The NRPC would be responsible for administering,

monitoring, planning, and federally funding the national rail passenger program in a role

similar to the United States Railway Association’s ("USRA’s") role in monitoring and

funding Conrail’s early years of operation. It is anticipated that the NRPC would be able to

perform its oversight functions with approximately 50 employees.

• The NRPC would be under the control of a board of directors comprising: (1) ex officio, the

Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of the Treasury; (2) a representative of the

freight railroads (probably nominated by the Association of American Railroads (AAR)); (3)

a representative of the railway labor organizations; (4) a representative of the investment

community; and (5) one representative from each of not less than 7 nor more than 11 regions

constructed on the basis of transportation patterns and population, nominated from lists

provided to the President by the governors of each region and approved by the Senate. The

inclusion of broad regional representation on the board ensures that regional and state

preferences regarding intercity rail passenger needs are effectively represented; it would also

serve to make the NRPC a more effective buffer against political interference in route and

service decisions because board decisions would reflect input across a broad political and

regional spectrum.

 

31 The name National Rail Passenger Corporation is retained to make clear that it is intended to be the legal successor to

the existing NRPC. Under current law, the NRPC holds Amtrak's statutory right to operate over the lines of freight

railroads at incremental cost and with operating priority, and such rights would be retained by the restructured NRPC.
30

• The NRPC would hold Amtrak's existing statutory franchise to operate over the lines of the

freight railroads at incremental cost and with operating priority (“statutory franchise”). The

NRPC would have the authority to authorize its train-operating subsidiary (or subsidiaries)

to operate under the statutory franchise as well as other approved train operating companies

acting on the NRPC’s behalf under competitively-bid franchise contracts. (Amtrak may in

fact contract out operations under current law subject to collective bargaining agreements

with its employees.) 

The NRPC’s Legal Authority To Enter Into Franchise Arrangements

Under current law, the NRPC has specific authority to contract out its rail passenger

operations to other carriers and entities. 49 U.S.C. 24305(a). Indeed, as originally enacted,

the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (“RPSA”) contemplated that Amtrak would

contract with the freight railroads for the provision of rail passenger services which would

generally continue to be provided by freight railroad employees. See RPSA, secs. 305,

401-402. Although the RPSA was amended shortly after to allow Amtrak to employ

directly its own employees and to operate and control directly, to the extent practicable, all

aspects of the services it provides (RPSA, sec. 305, codified at 49 U.S.C. 24305 (b)), the

law contains no prohibition precluding Amtrak from contracting out operations where

“practicality” factors so permit. Moreover, an amended provision in prior law prohibiting

contracting out where the result would be a layoff of an Amtrak employee was repealed by

the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997(“ARAA”) (and the issue of

contracting out left to collective bargaining). ARAA Sec.121.

Under the restructuring recommended by the Council, the NRPC, as Amtrak’s legal

successor, would retain Amtrak’s existing statutory track access rights with respect to rail

passenger operations. The “practicality” and “collective bargaining” requirements of

existing law as applicable to the NRPC’s authority to franchise would be repealed,

however, to allow the NRPC to contract out operations at its discretion to its train

operating subsidiaries or other carriers pursuant to competitively-bid franchise agreements

(with certain labor protections and subject to FRA safety requirements) where financial

and service benefits would result. (Under the Council’s proposal, any franchisees awarded

contracts would have to negotiate with transferred Amtrak employees under existing

collective bargaining agreements before subcontracting out work under the franchise

agreements.)
31

• Federal funding appropriations would be requested and disbursed solely through the NRPC

based on Operating Company and Infrastructure Company proposed business plans that

have been approved by the NRPC and provided that the Operating and Infrastructure

Companies’ individual actual performance meets minimum business plan objectives

contained in their approved business plans. The NRPC would receive all federal funds,

Incremental Cost

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created the National Railroad Passenger

Corporation, doing business as Amtrak, to relieve freight railroads from the financial

burden of operating passenger rail service. A condition for freight railroads' relief from

the “public convenience and necessity” regulatory obligation of providing intercity rail

passenger service was that the freight railroads would only charge Amtrak incremental

cost for passenger trains operating over the freight railroads, and that the freight railroads

would continue to provide operating priority to passenger trains (as required under the

common law).

The Council's Action Plan specifies that the NRPC would retain the right to pay

incremental costs for operating over the tracks of freight railroads, and that passenger

trains would retain their statutory (and common law) operating priority.

Arguably the NRPC and freight railroads may be better served if they were required to

negotiate passenger train trackage fees and incentives that provide adequate profit

incentives to the freight railroads to provide on-time dispatching of passenger trains.

However, the Council recommends retaining the current incremental cost and operating

priority standards in its Action Plan based on the belief that, without them, the freight

railroads would have an unfair position in negotiations with the NRPC over trackage

fees.

The Council would note, however, that retaining the NRPC's right to pay incremental

costs for trackage fees does not preclude the NRPC and freight railroads from negotiating

contracts which specify another trackage fee structure that may be more advantageous to

both parties with respect to the long term operation of rail passenger service.

In fact, there is no assurance that incremental cost-based trackage fees will be lower than

trackage fees based on average costs. Normally, when excess capacity exists, the

incremental cost of running additional trains (freight or passenger) over a track are lower

than the fully allocated average cost of all trains running over the track. However, if

excess track capacity does not exist, or if the speed of additional passenger trains is so

much faster than existing freight trains that all (or most) track capacity is used up

accommodating the faster passenger trains, the incremental cost of providing the track

capacity needed for rail passenger service may be higher than the average cost of

providing track capacity on that route. Federal, state or other contributions to make

capital investments to increase track capacity may rectify such situations.
32

monitor actual Operating Company and Infrastructure Company performance relative to the

companies’ respective strategic business plans, and disburse such funds monthly based on

each company-proposed business plan. If a company’s actual performance deviates from its

plans, it would be required to adopt plans of corrective action acceptable to NRPC as a

condition precedent to continue receiving funding.

• The NRPC would also handle or offer to handle risk management functions, including

bidding and purchasing of insurance, re-insurance and funding of self-insurance (claim

deductible) reserves, for the Operating and Infrastructure companies as well as for

franchisees under competitively–bid contracts. Such activities would ensure that the

Operating and Infrastructure companies and franchisees meet all insurance requirements

currently applicable to existing Amtrak operations under the statutory franchise and as may

be subsequently modified by law. The NRPC would also establish safety policies and

practices, and monitor safety programs (under the general jurisdiction of and consistent with

FRA safety regulations) as part of overall risk management to minimize the cost of

insurance and self-insured losses.

• The NRPC would ensure that train operations (including mail and express and mechanical

shops) and infrastructure would be accounted for separately. To ensure this result, the

NRPC would establish separate companies to perform its train operations and infrastructure

functions. The NRPC would require that the Operating and Infrastructure companies

develop and adopt transparent accounting systems that provide essential business and

financial information for the efficient operation of intercity rail passenger service and the

management, maintenance and improvement of infrastructure.

• The NRPC would also be specifically authorized to:

- Design appropriate train operations franchises, the terms for franchises and minimum

service requirements and to negotiate and administer franchise contracts:

- Establish a decision-making framework for evaluating proposed high-speed rail projects;

- Assist states and regional compacts in designing and evaluating high-speed rail

passenger projects using realistic planning assumptions. 

- Establish a decision-making framework for operating other train service, including longdistance routes;

- Establish a competitive bidding process for franchising train operations and maintenance

of the NEC infrastructure;

- Establish and implement, with its train operating subsidiary, a plan for putting the NEC

in a state of good repair; and 

- Ensure that travelers may make reservations through a national reservations system and

obtain joint tickets on any of the rail passenger services it authorizes and oversees.
33

B. A SEPARATE CORPORATION TO CONDUCT TRAIN OPERATIONS 

• The NRPC would establish a separate train-operating subsidiary under the effective control

and oversight of the NRPC. The NRPC would also establish subsidiary units of the trainoperating company to:

- provide train-operating services over the NEC, other federally designated corridors,

other existing short-haul routes, and for inter-corridor long-haul services. The new

operating units would be based on logical route systems predicated on revenue and

passenger transportation demands and would avoid “cherry-picking” of only the most

profitable services. 

- operate mail and express business;

- operate the locomotive and car repair shops;

- hold ownership and lease rights to operating equipment; and 

- provide commuter services under contracts with state, regional or local authorities.

• The new train-operating subsidiary would serve as the nation’s intercity rail passenger

operator (except as indicated below), perform mail and express business, operate the

mechanical shops that conduct heavy repair and rebuilding operations, and own passenger

rolling stock. All services would be performed under contracts with the NRPC and/or state

or regional authorities. Contracts would include performance standards requiring

continuous improvements in performance (cost recovery, customer satisfaction and

ridership, for example). These performance standards are intended to help the trainoperating subsidiary improve its overall performance to be in a good position to compete

with other service providers after the transition period, should franchising be initiated.

• The train-operating subsidiary would be organized as a wholly-owned government

corporation under D.C. law. It would have a separate board of directors selected by the

NRPC board that would be comprised of business professionals with backgrounds in

operation and finance.

• After a transition period (2 to 5 years), the NRPC would have the option of franchising some

or all operations and services, including corridor trains, long-haul trains, mail and express

service and the Amtrak locomotive and car repair shops. The NRPC train-operating

subsidiary would act as fall-back operator if no competitive bids (positive or negative bids)

are proffered.

• Pilot projects could be initiated within the first year to franchise (pursuant to competitive

bidding procedures) one or several Amtrak routes (e.g., California Corridor Trains, Coast

Starlight, and/or the AutoTrain). Franchisees would be authorized by the NRPC to operate
34

under its statutory franchise. Franchisees would be subject to the same labor (Railway

Labor Act (RLA)), Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and railroad retirement laws

that Amtrak is currently subject to; current Amtrak train operating employees would be

granted hiring preference with the new franchisees to the extent that new hiring is necessary.

The Council recommends that in any restructuring, employees follow their work in seniority

order with their collective bargaining agreements intact. Agreements would be subject to

collective bargaining under the normal provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Labor

protection would be provided by the NRPC under the terms of the then-existing collective

bargaining agreements applicable to Amtrak employees.

• During the transition period, only the national train-operating company (through its

operating units) and franchisees under designated pilot projects would be able to operate

under the NRPC statutory franchise. As under existing law, however, regions or states

would be free to contract with other operators for specific services outside of the statutory

access rights.

• During the transition period, the NRPC would configure the specific corridors or routes that

may be subject to competitively-bid franchise arrangements at the discretion of the NRPC.

At the option of the NRPC, all corridors and routes could be subject to competitively-bid

franchise arrangements (including negative bids) after the transition period, with the NRPC

train-operating subsidiary acting as fall-back operator if no competitive bids are proffered.

• Specific corridors or routes that would be subject to franchise arrangements should be

selected by the NRPC in a manner that will ensure that routes or corridor services to be

provided form part of a rational and viable economic and geographic unit to the maximum

extent possible (i.e., the NRPC should not permit "cherry picking" of only the most

potentially profitable services).

• Franchisees would provide services under contract with either the NRPC or directly with

regions and states for both corridor and inter-corridor services; franchisees would be

authorized by the NRPC (with NRPC program oversight and FRA regulation of safety

requirements) to operate under the NRPC statutory franchise for the services performed on

behalf of the NRPC.

• All franchisees authorized to operate under statutory franchise rights would be subject to

same labor (RLA), FELA and railroad retirement laws that Amtrak is currently subject to;

current Amtrak train operating employees would be granted hiring preference with new

franchisees to the extent that new hiring is necessary. The Council recommends to Congress

that in any restructuring, employees follow their work in seniority order with their collective

bargaining agreements intact. Agreements would be subject to collective bargaining under

the normal provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Labor protection would be provided by the

NRPC under the terms of the then-existing collective bargaining agreements. 

• After franchising is introduced, equipment could be owned by the NRPC, the franchisee, or

a state or states; alternatively, the equipment subsidiary could be privatized after the
35

transition period. Such arrangements would ensure that potential franchisees have access to

equipment on the same terms as the train-operating subsidiary in submitting competitive

franchise bids after the transition period.

• States developing high-speed rail corridors and/or providing operating subsidies on lowerspeed trains would have the right to manage the franchising process for those operations and

select the service providers using their own selection criteria. 

• After the transition period, mail and express operations could be franchised through

competitive bidding as a single unit or as part of the passenger operations franchises, at the

discretion of the NRPC. 

• After the transition period, the NRPC would determine whether to privatize NEC

(Wilmington and Bear, DE shops) and Beech Grove, IN and other maintenance and repair

shops, lease them to private entities, or otherwise operate or dispose of the facilities. At the

discretion of the NRPC, passenger train operators could bid, as part of their franchise

agreements, to operate equipment repair shops or to contract with the train-operating

subsidiary or another service provider for locomotive and car maintenance.

• Operating shortfalls for the long-haul trains would be funded by the federal government both

before and after the transition period; during the transition period, the current arrangements

for funding operating shortfalls for existing and new corridor services would remain in place

(i.e., the federal government would continue to fund operating shortfalls for only “basic

system” services as historically defined; shortfalls for non-basic system and new services

would continue to be funded by the states); after the transition period, including a ramp-up

period for new corridor train services, the states would be responsible for funding operating

losses (if any) on all existing and new corridor services.

• Both during and after the transition period, franchising authorities or train operators would

be responsible for privately financing new equipment purchases or leases; if necessary,

federal funding would be provided for long-haul equipment and state funding for corridor

equipment.

• After the transition period, the train-operating company could be privatized. 

C. A REGIONALLY-DIRECTED COMPANY TO OPERATE, MAINTAIN, AND IMPROVE

THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR INFRASTRUCTURE 

• The NRPC would establish a separate corporation (a wholly-owned government corporation

organized under DC law) to hold title to the NEC infrastructure.32

 

32 The infrastructure company could hold title to the NEC and other infrastructure owned by Amtrak outside of the

NEC subject to the existing USG mortgage lien and as a condition of assuming all outstanding Amtrak debt to the
36

• The NEC infrastructure company would be established with a separate board of directors

comprised of representatives of the Northeast Corridor states' governors, United States

Department of Transportation, freight railroads that use the Northeast Corridor, and the new

intercity passenger train-operating company. 

• During a transition period of 2-5 years, the new infrastructure company would manage the

NEC infrastructure under contract with the NRPC. The contract would include performance

standards requiring continuous improvements in performance (cost recovery, user

satisfaction, and decreases in track speed restrictions for Acela Express and other trains, for

example). 

• If the MTA, Connecticut Department of Transportation, and MBTA consent, their portions

of the Northeast Corridor would be integrated with the infrastructure company; otherwise,

the infrastructure company would coordinate operations, maintenance and capital programs

with the states owning portions of the Northeast Corridor.

• Under the direction of the NRPC, the infrastructure company would have the authority to

sell or transfer unneeded assets within the NEC or acquire needed assets within the NEC

from states and localities. 

• Ownership and responsibility for non-NEC assets (including train stations) would be

divested to the states, local governments, or private enterprises (to the extent possible).

• The NEC infrastructure company would charge an incremental cost-based rate to all

passenger operators on a fair and equitable basis, and market-based rates for other users.

This policy would ensure that all NEC users are treated fairly and that there are no hidden

subsidies. 

• After the transition period, the NRPC would have the authority to contract out management

of the NEC infrastructure to private contractors (under existing labor arrangements

negotiated between the NRPC with NEC employees, as may be subsequently modified), or

to transfer ownership and management of the NEC infrastructure company to the NEC states

or a regional authority under appropriate terms and conditions ensuring fair use and proper

maintenance. 

• The new infrastructure corporation could be modeled on other examples under which the

federal government owns the assets, but competitively awards a contract for the operation of

the assets to a private sector company (i.e., a government-owned, contractor-operated

(GOCO) facility, of which there are many examples in the US). 

 

USG, including the USG-held preferred stock; alternatively, payment of principal on the existing NEC mortgage note

could be accelerated by federal statute as provided for in the mortgage agreement and settled in return for outstanding

debt; under this option the NEC infrastructure company could take title under a new USG mortgage agreement. Other

options, such as the conversion of existing USG debt to equity, are also available.
37

• The federal government would provide funds to the Infrastructure Company via grants

administered by the NRPC, including some initial appropriated funds for the Penn Station

life and safety projects and Northeast Corridor bridge and tunnel projects that need

immediate attention. On a long-term basis, funds would be provided via a trust fund (with

an income source to be determined by Congress).33 States would be expected to fund a

portion of the capital expenditures reflecting the importance of the Northeast Corridor for

commuter rail operations either directly or through flexible transportation funding programs. 

D. OTHER ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL 

The Council initially considered nine different options for restructuring Amtrak. Most of the

differences in the proposals were with respect to train operations. The options ranged from

retaining a national operating company to establishing a group of regional operating companies to

franchising some or all of Amtrak’s operations. All of the options called for a more active federal

role overseeing the passenger rail service program. All of the options also called for separating

Amtrak’s train operations from the Northeast Corridor infrastructure for purposes of accounting

transparency, with eight of the nine options recommending the creation of separate infrastructure

and train operations companies. 

At a public meeting held on December 14th, the Council directed the staff to collapse the nine

options into three. Council Member Cox subsequently offered a fourth option to establish a

regionally-managed, operationally self-sufficient train network. The Council met to consider the

final four options on January 11th. At that meeting, the Council noted that all of the options are

meritorious, but Option 3, with amendments, was specifically endorsed as the Council’s proposal.

The following charts summarize the key differences between the four options and the amendments

adopted to Option 3. 

 

33 Not the 4.3 cent diesel tax currently assessed to the freight railroads.
38

Operating Company Options

OPTION 1: National or Regional 

Monopolies

OPTION 2: Competition for Long 

Haul Markets OPTION 3: Competition for All Markets OP

New High-Speed 

Corridors

Amtrak (as a national operating 

company) or regional operating 

companies.* 

Amtrak.*

Amtrak for a transition period*, then Amtrak 

and/or other franchisees selected through 

competitive bidding process to operate under 

contract to the NRPC or the states. [As 

adopted by the Council, franchising is 

permissible rather than mandatory.]

Pa

(PRT

5 y

thro

O

Existing Corridor 

Trains

Amtrak (as a national operating 

company) or regional operating 

companies.* 

Amtrak.*

Amtrak for a transition period*, then Amtrak 

and/or other franchisees selected through 

competitive bidding process to operate under 

contract to the NRPC or the states. [As 

adopted by the Council, franchising is 

permissible rather than mandatory.]

PRT

franc

bid

Long-Distance Trains

A national operating company or 

regional operating companies. Option to 

organize long-hauls as a separate 

operating company.

Franchised to Amtrak and/or private 

operator(s) through competitive bidding

Amtrak for a transition period, then Amtrak 

and/or other franchisees selected through 

competitive bidding process to operate under 

contract to the NRPC or the states. [As 

adopted by the Council, franchising is 

permissible rather than mandatory.]

PRT

franc

bid

R

RRO

be p

unde

Mail and Express A national operating company or regional operating companies. Amtrak or long-haul franchisee(s).

Amtrak for a transition period, then mail and 

express franchised through competitive 

bidding as a single unit or as part of 

passenger operations franchises. [As adopted 

by the Council, franchising is permissible 

rather than mandatory.]

PRT

*As under current law, states would have the option of operating corridor services and choosing their own operator.
39

OPTION 1: 

National or Regional Monopolies

OPTION 2: 

Competition for Long Haul Markets

OPTION 3: 

Competition for all Markets

Com

A

Commuter Operations

As under current law, performed by 

Amtrak or others under contract with 

commuter authorities

As under current law, performed by 

Amtrak or others under contract with 

commuter authorities

As under current law, performed by 

Amtrak or others under contract with 

commuter authorities

PRTB und

consiste

condition

Right of access to freight 

railroad rights-of-way at 

incremental cost and 

with operating priority

Assigned by NRPC to monopoly 

operator(s). States/regions wishing to 

assume corridor operations would have 

to negotiate access with freight 

railroads.

Assigned by NRPC to Amtrak for 

corridor services and to franchisees of 

long-distance trains; states/regions 

wishing to assume corridor operations 

would have to negotiate access with 

freight railroads

Assigned by NRPC to franchisees. [As 

adopted by the Council, franchising is 

permissible rather than mandatory.]

Access and 

comm

Shops Owned and operated by the NRPC.

Owned and operated by NRPC unless 

transferred to states/regions as part of 

corridor operations they assume.

Owned and operated by NRPC during 

transition; then may be retained, leased 

or sold. Franchisees could bid to 

operate shops or contract with the 

Amtrak shops or another service 

provider for equipment maintenance. 

[As adopted by the Council, franchising 

is permissible rather than mandatory.]

P

Equipment Ownership

Existing equipment transferred to new 

subsidiary of NRPC; equipment could 

be leased to national or regional 

operating companies or leased or sold 

to contract operators or states operating 

corridor services. New equipment 

owned by states or train operator(s).

Existing equipment transferred to new 

subsidiary of NRPC; equipment could 

be leased to Amtrak or leased or sold to 

franchisees, contract operators or 

states operating corridor services. New 

equipment owned by states or train 

operator(s).

Existing equipment transferred to new 

subsidiary of NRPC; equipment could 

be leased to Amtrak or leased or sold to 

franchisees and states operating 

corridor services. New equipment 

owned by states or train operator(s).

Existing e

RROCs. Eq

or sold to fr

could be o

Labor Protection and 

Labor Contracts

National or regional monopolies 

assume Amtrak contracts. In the case 

of regional monopolies, future contracts 

would be negotiated on a regional basis.

Labor protection provided by NRPC. Amtrak employees have preferential 

hiring status with long-haul franchisees 

but franchisees may immediately 

negotiate new labor contracts.

Labor protection provided by NRPC. 

Amtrak employees have preferential 

hiring status with corridor and long-haul 

franchisees but franchisees may 

immediately negotiate new labor 

contracts. D15

Pr
40

OPTION 1: 

National or Regional 

Monopolies

OPTION 2: 

Competition for Long Haul Markets

OPTION 3: 

Competition for all Markets

O

Compet

Acc

Insurance and 

Liability

NRPC insures operator(s); 

liability limited as under 

current law

NRPC insures operators or operators obtain 

their own insurance, at their election; liability 

limited as under current law

NRPC insures operators or operators obtain 

their own insurance, at their election; liability 

limited as under current law

National Pass

Association 

operators or t

their own insur

liability limited 

Status of Amtrak

National or regional 

monopolies remain quasigovernment organizations. Remains a quasi-government organization. Ultimately privatized [if franchising is invoked under Option 3, as amended] Transitional. T

be wound dow

Time to Implement Six-month transition to new organization. One year-transition period to new organization and franchised long-haul routes. Immediate projects to introduce competition; two to five years for full implementation. [As adopted by the Council, franchising is permissible rather than mandatory.] Conversion t

years. No PRT

to receive ope

th

Funding 

Requirements -- 

Operating 

Subsidies

Federal operating subsidies 

for long-haul trains; after 

transition period, states to 

cover losses associated with 

existing and new corridor 

services

Federal operating subsidies for long-haul 

trains; after transition period, states to cover 

losses associated with existing and new 

corridor services

Federal operating subsidies for long-haul trains; 

after transition period, states to cover losses 

associated with existing and new corridor 

services

Consistent wit

and Accounta

federal operat

subsidies wou

three years. S

s

Funding 

Requirements -- 

Equipment Capital

Capital funds would be 

provided on a federal-state 

matching basis.

Train operators responsible for securing 

new equipment and related financing based 

on the value of the equipment and their 

operating contracts with possible 

state/corridor/federal credit enhancement; 

to the extent equipment cannot be funded 

from operating profits, the federal 

government would be responsible for 

funding equipment on long-haul trains and 

states would fund equipment for corridor 

services. 

Train operators responsible for securing new 

equipment and related financing based on the 

value of the equipment and their operating 

contracts with possible state/corridor/federal 

credit enhancement; to the extent equipment 

cannot be funded from operating profits, the 

federal government would be responsible for 

funding equipment on long-haul trains and states 

would fund equipment for corridor services. 

RROCs, us

subsidies o

Equipment 

RROCs o

National System

Marketing, coordination and 

intermodal arrangements 

administered by Amtrak or, in 

the case of regional 

monopolies, by the NRPC.

Marketing, coordination and intermodal 

arrangements administered by Amtrak or 

the NRPC.

Marketing, coordination and intermodal 

arrangements administered by the NRPC.

Marketing

intermod

administe

Passenge

Association (N

the 
41

Additional Amendments to Option 3 Adopted by the Amtrak Reform Council

Sponsor

1 The Council recommends that any federal subsidy to intercity passenger rail service should be offered on a performance 

basis. The basis of any operating subsidy should include a percentage of revenue performance measure or a farebox recovery ratio.

Norquist 

(seconded 

Cox)

2 The Council recommends that Congress establish an investment tax credit for the purchase of rights of way, roadbed, 

equipment, station property and other facilities needed to support regularly scheduled passenger service. (This would be analogous to the low income housing tax credit, which rewards investment in affordable housing. With the housing tax credit, the credits are rewarded at the state level under an overall cap, they can be flexibly pooled to meet overall project financingneeds, and spread over a period of years.)

Norquist 

(seconded 

Weyrich

3

The Council recommends that Congress allow states and units of local government to use federal transportation funds with more flexibility.

Norquist a

amended 

Gleason 

(seconded 

Chapman

4

The Council recommends that Congress encourage intermodal connectivity between rail and other modes of transportation, including airports. For example, perhaps Congress should allow airports to treat passenger rail facilities, including the intermodal stations necessary to connect air and rail, as the equivalent of runways. Short route rail can cost effectively replace short distance aviation if there is an easy point of transfer. Known as the “landside access issue,” this flexibility would enable current funding authority (normally secured by anticipated airline revenue) to be pledged against long term rail revenue. Airport operators could then charge a passenger facility charge to replace the revenue they currently collect from short route air travel, and to cost share with the private sector and other levels of government as funding is available for further improvements.”

Norquist a

amended 

Gleason 

(seconded 

Chapman

5 Whereas in the past four years in hearings held across the country the states have expressed an interest in having more 

decision-making authority for scheduling, operations and other passenger service matters, the Council recommends that Congress adopt a principle that train service decisions and administration should be handled at the regional level to the maximum extent possible.

Cox (seconde

Chapman

6

Inasmuch as transportation policy generally accepts the policy that the Federal government assumes responsibility for funding infrastructure while the private sector assumes responsibility for operations, Amtrak is an anomaly. The Council recommends that Congress recognize the Federal responsibility for rail infrastructure through the creation of a Rail Infrastructure Trust Fund,

Coston a

amended 

Chapma

(seconded 

Norquist

7 The Council recommends to Congress that in any restructuring, employees follow their work in seniority order with their 

collective bargaining agreements intact. Agreements would be subject to collective bargaining under the normal provisions of the RLA.

Moneypen

(seconded 

Weyrich

8 Franchising should be permissible rather than mandatory. Franchises should be designed to avoid cherrypicking particular 

routes.

Kling (secon

by Chapma
42

E. TRANSITION PLANNING TO IMPLEMENT THE COUNCIL’S PROPOSAL 

To prepare for the implementation of the Council's proposed rail passenger restructuring plan, a

number of transition tasks will need to be executed by appropriate implementing agencies, should

the Congress decide to adopt the Council’s Proposals. Examples of some of the more important

transition planning efforts and tasks are summarized below:

• Prepare detailed lists of Amtrak's assets, liabilities, and contingent liabilities including

descriptions of the condition, location and use of physical assets; the realizable value of

other assets and liabilities; the likely cost of outstanding Amtrak guarantees and contracts;

and the likely cost of settling outstanding self-insured losses, claims in excess of insurance

for damages to third parties, FELA claims to employees, etc. These lists will be needed to

organize the train operating and infrastructure companies and to determine the funding

requirements of the NRPC during the transition period from the current Amtrak organization

to the new structure for rail passenger service.

• For each of the principal business components organized under the restructuring plan, the

National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the Passenger Train Operating Company, and the

NEC Infrastructure Company, it will be necessary to develop: (1) organization charts and

staffing plans; (2) lists of equipment and other assets to be transferred to each entity,

including their current use, their condition, and their future maintenance and capital

expenditure requirements; (3) debt and other obligations to be transferred to each entity; (4)

recommended capital structures for each entity in view of the debt and other obligations

being assumed and the future funding and financing requirements of the entity; and (5)

financial pro forma projections for each entity projecting operating revenues and expenses,

capital expenditure requirements, and working capital requirements.

• For the NEC Infrastructure Company it will be necessary to develop an assessment of: (1)

train operating capacity and operating cost analyses in the aggregate and by each user of the

NEC infrastructure; (2) requirements for returning the NEC to a state of good repair; (3)

requirements for annual normalized maintenance; (4) priority capital needs; and (5) longterm capital needs.

• The NRPC will need to develop, in cooperation with the emerging corridors, state and

regional proposals for investments to develop improved passenger service.

• The NRPC will need to estimate the transition costs, including costs of planning for the

restructuring, costs of restructuring existing financial obligations of Amtrak, costs of

employee severance and labor protection, costs of current obligations and future liabilities of

Amtrak that are not due for payment, and the NRPC will need to develop a plan for paying

such transitional obligations as economically as possible as they mature and become due for

payment.
43

V. FUNDING OPTIONS

The proposed rail passenger restructuring plan will only be effective if there are adequate, reliable

sources of funding for the three types of entities being proposed: the NRPC (the government

oversight agency), the Operating Company, and the Infrastructure Company. Potential funding

options and issues of each will be discussed separately. The Council is providing funding options

for Congressional consideration and debate. Funding is critical to the success of any transportation

mode to provide the service demanded by the market place. However, the Council is not making

specific recommendations to the Congress concerning the most appropriate financing mechanisms

to adopt because, among other reasons, such recommendations would be premature until the

institutional structure of rail passenger service is determined.

With a few notable exceptions around the world, rail passenger operations require governmental

assistance with long term capital funding and, in many cases, with annual funding to cover

operating deficits. For the past 31 years, Amtrak has received approximately $25 billion in funding

to cover its operating cash shortfalls and capital expenditures. 

The funding needs of rail passenger service are enormous, and there is no assurance that merely

providing federal and state funding grants to the existing Amtrak will result in the types of capital

investments which are needed to expand and improve rail passenger service in the United States.

The separation of the Northeast Corridor and other corridor infrastructure assets from train

operations and government oversight will help ensure that the funds which the federal and state

governments provide to Amtrak for selected capital projects are actually spent on the intended

projects. However, both the infrastructure and operating companies will need reliable sources of

operating and capital funds provided with the right incentives to use the funds efficiently to meet

the market demands for rail passenger service.

A. FUNDING THE NRPC -- THE GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT AGENCY

The NRPC, a government oversight agency, is anticipated to be funded by annual federal

appropriations in a manner similar to the way that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) are funded, except that these two government agencies

receive appropriated funds from dedicated trust funds while the NRPC will receive appropriated

funds from general funds, unless Congress creates a trust fund for rail passenger service. The

NRPC is envisioned to have a small staff of approximately 50, excluding staff dedicated to

providing insurance and risk management functions. After initial funding of the insurance and risk

management staff and administrative functions, the cost of the insurance and risk management

staff's salary and administrative costs may be passed on to the operating companies utilizing the

insurance and risk management functions as a percentage of the cost of insurance premiums and

claims paid.

Appropriated funds will also be needed by the NRPC to fund any labor protection costs, excess

railroad retirement costs (which may be advanced to the operating and infrastructure companies

which actually are liable for the excess railroad retirement payments), and remaining obligations of

Amtrak which mature after the Action Plan is adopted (i.e., FELA claims for employee injuries;
44

unpaid amounts due to states or for Amtrak's share of joint projects; liability claims to passengers

and others for accidents; environmental clean-up costs; payments which may be made under

Amtrak loan guarantees, to the extent that the federal government agrees to fund them; etc.).

B. FUNDING THE OPERATING COMPANY

1. Corridor Trains

After an initial transition period, during which all routes may initially receive federal operating

subsidies, any operating deficits of regional corridor trains are anticipated to be funded by states and

regional compacts of states and other transportation entities affiliated with the state and local

governments. The Council recommends increased transportation funding flexibility to allow states

to decide how to utilize all available transportation funds. 

As discussed previously, most of Amtrak's operating losses historically have been generated by the

long-haul, overnight trains. With implementation of recommended operating efficiencies and

overhead reduction programs, coupled with better utilization of equipment and crews to generate

additional ticket revenues and seat miles of transportation service, the regional corridors are likely

to cover their direct operating costs, particularly after the corridors mature and have the levels of

ridership projected as mature passenger rail corridors. 

Although operating subsidies of corridor trains are anticipated to be funded after an initial transition

by state and local governments, the capital requirements of corridor trains are anticipated to be

funded by locally controlled, flexible funding as well as other capital investment financing

mechanisms discussed in greater detail in the section below on capital funding.

2. Long-haul Trains

The operating company (or, optionally over time, franchisee operating companies) are likely to

always need operating subsidies for certain long haul routes due to the inherent costs of providing

long haul rail passenger service and due to the market price that can be charged for rail passenger

tickets. Since there will be no unfunded mandates, uneconomical, long haul trains will only be

retained if the federal government decides to subsidize the operating company (or new,

competitively-bid franchisee operators) to provide such long haul services. Theoretically, before

the operating company abandons long haul rail passenger routes (or any rail passenger route being

considered for discontinuance) such routes could be competitively bid out by the NRPC to private

operators offering to operate the services on a contractual basis, with the NRPC selecting franchisee

operators based on the most attractive terms offered such as levels of service, implicit governmental

operating subsidies, and other social considerations such as mitigation of highway and airport

congestion.

Long-haul, intercity rail passenger trains are anticipated to receive federal operating funds under

subsidy contracts with the NRPC on a train by train basis provided that Congress funds the specific

operating deficits through the NRPC and affirmatively determines that such trains should be run at

the subsidy levels specified for the service levels proposed. 

The current approach to funding Amtrak rewards inefficiency by basing operating subsidies on the

size of Amtrak's operating losses. The greater the operating losses Amtrak incurs, the greater the
45

funding the government needs to provide. The Council recommends that the Congress change this

approach by requiring that funding to the NRPC or any other authorized franchising authority (if the

NRPC has authorized contracting out) be based upon performance criteria, such as a percentage of

revenue measure or a farebox recovery measure. These performance criteria would be the basis of

the federal funding allocation throughout the nation.

It is possible that, when multiple franchising authorities are in operation, more successful authorities

may develop surpluses as a result of the national funding formula. In these cases, the franchising

authorities would establish additional services or expand present services through competitive

franchising arrangements or contracts negotiated with the operating company.

3. Capital Funding

With appropriately set operating subsidies provided by the states for corridor trains and the NRPC

(with operating subsidies set as a percentage of ticket revenues collected) for long-haul trains, the

operating company or companies should be able to finance equipment debt and leasing costs.

However, the actual ownership or leasing of equipment from third parties may more logically reside

with a separate NRPC subsidiary (which, in turn, enters into short-term operating leases of its

equipment with the actual train operators), states, or regional corridors for a number of reasons.

• Ownership or leasing control of equipment would give the operating company with such

control undue advantages in any competitive re-bidding for the service routes or corridors.

• States such as California have historically purchased equipment specifically designed for

their service requirements.

• Equipment manufacturers or lessors are more likely to provide equipment at low financing

rates to regional corridors or states since such entities are not likely to go out of business,

and since the inherent demand for transportation service by local voters will ensure that the

equipment is used in revenue service, regardless of the financial condition of the train

operating company using the equipment.

Like airlines, with proper operating subsidies, equipment leasing and financing costs incurred by

operating companies should be able to be funded out of operations. For routes with high costs

structures or low ticket revenues, the federal government and states or regions may choose to

subsidize trains providing certain train services which are considered to be essential or desirable.

As long as federal, state and/or local subsidies are provided in sufficient amounts to enable marginal

routes or trains to cover their full operating costs and, presumably, a reasonable profit to the

operating company, economically marginal services may be maintained at the lowest cost to the

taxpayers thanks to the competitive bidding by operating companies for the franchises to operate the

trains with the subsidies offered.

Stations should be developed and funded by local governments, with multi-modal access to buses,

transit, airlines and other modes, as applicable. Existing tax-exempt bonds, municipal investments,

and private sector funds from commercial real estate developers should provide sufficient financial

resources and credit to develop the stations in many cities. Operating rail carriers will pay rents to

use the facilities, which will be funded out of their operating cash flows.
46

If rail operating companies own and maintain their own equipment, they may need to finance the

cost of building and furnishing equipment maintenance facilities along with trucks and other

vehicles associated with providing rail operating services. Such financing needs will not be

materially large relative to the overall scope of the operations. Such equipment maintenance

facilities and equipment supporting train operations can be financed with traditional tax-exempt,

private activity bonds, operating and capital leases of equipment, and some of the funding

mechanisms described below for development of high speed rail corridors.

C. FUNDING RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE

With proper user fees, the Northeast Corridor infrastructure company should be able to fund its

operating costs, but the approximately $28 billion of capital investment needed by the NEC

infrastructure company along with the approximately $70 billion34 of investment needed to develop

a number of federally-designated high-speed rail corridors in other areas of the country, will need

long term capital funding sources providing: (1) at least $1.5 billion annually over approximately 20

years to just maintain and expand the capacity of the Northeast Corridor; and (2) as much as $3.5

billion annually for 20 years or more to develop a number of the federally-designated high-speed

rail corridors.

Such large amounts of capital funding will require new sources of funding from federal and state

sources. A number of alternative sources of capital investment financing have been proposed. The

Council identifies these options as alternatives for the Congress to consider, but makes no specific

recommendations other than certain policy guidelines summarized below.

• Financing mechanisms should facilitate federal-state partnerships.

• Financing mechanisms should encourage regional decision-making to the maximum extent

possible, and at the lowest level practical, ideally at the state or local levels.

• Mechanisms or financing programs adopted should not encourage political allocations of

funding in projects which do not make transportation and economic sense. Accordingly,

funding mechanisms which require state or local participation are preferred to options that

rely solely on federal financing mechanisms.

• Funding options that encourage flexibility of funding from various sources at the lowest

level of decision-making appropriate are encouraged.

1. Current Legislative Proposals

During the past two years, proposed legislation has been offered in several forms to facilitate rail

infrastructure and high-speed rail development projects including, but not limited to, the following

 

34 Amtrak anticipates that states and interstate compacts will fund a significant portion of the approximately $100 billion

capital investment requirements identified over the next 20 years with state funds or financing mechanisms such as tax

exempt bonds, tax credit bonds, and other financing mechanisms.
47

mechanisms, which can be used to begin funding capital projects of both the Northeast Corridor

infrastructure and the federally-designated high-speed rail corridors. 

• The RIDE-21 (Rail Infrastructure Development and Expansion Act for the 21st Century)

legislative proposal, H.R. 2950, proposed total federal funding of $71 billion for high-speed

rail investment by (1) allowing the states to issue $36 billion ($3.6 billion per year for 10

years) of tax-exempt, high-speed rail infrastructure bonds which would exempt from the tax

exempt volume caps contained in Section 146 of the Internal Revenue Code, and (2)

increase the amount of funds available in the RRIF Loan Program from $3.5 billion to $35

billion, including $7 billion for short lines, which funds would be available to freight rail as

well as passenger rail projects; and (3) reauthorize the Swift Act at $35 million per year

through 2009, allocated $25 million for corridor planning and $10 million for technology

development and make the $25 million available for acquisition of rolling stock.

• The High-Speed Rail Investment Act Bond proposals anticipated that bonds would be issued

by Amtrak and possibly others which would provide for federal investment tax credits in

lieu of cash interest for the 20 year lives of the bonds. These bonds were proposed by

S.1900 and H.R. 3700 in the summer of 2000. The proposals would have required state or

other matching funds equal to at least 20 percent of the loan principal, which would have

gone into an escrow fund to repay the bonds after 20 years.35

• Infrastructure and economic stimulus bills introduced in the 107th Congress would provide

funding for high speed rail include the $9 billion of high speed bonds in the proposed

Economic Security and Recovery Act of 2001 (H.R. 3090 introduced by Representative

Thomas) and the $15 billion of high speed bonds in the proposed "Rebuild America:

Financing Infrastructure Renewal and Security for Transportation Act of 2001 (H.R. 3166

introduced by Representative Borski).

• Other emergency bond and grant legislation proposed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist

incidents, with Amtrak originally requesting $3.5 billion, and finally getting approximately

$100 million to be administered by the Federal Railroad Administration to begin addressing

life safety projects in the tunnels leading to Penn Station, New York, and $5 million to

Amtrak for additional security costs.

The above bond mechanisms require repayment in some form or other. The high speed rail bonds

use a 20 percent or more escrow fund contributed by states and others when the bonds are issued,

which escrow fund presumably will grow over time to fully redeem the bonds in 20 years when they

mature, with the federal government providing investment tax credits to holders of the bonds in lieu

of cash interest. Other bonds rely on user fees to pay both interest and bond principal. The tax

credit bonds are very costly to the federal and state taxpayers. A federal funding program providing

80 percent of the funds from appropriated sources as long as the states fund a 20 percent matching

amount would be less costly to the taxpayers over the 20 year lives of the bonds than the high speed

rail bonds, but the bonds may be preferable from a public policy perspective of having financing

 

35 To ensure that the escrow funds will be adequate to fully redeem the proposed bonds when they mature in 20 years, a

number of states determined that initial escrow deposits of approximately 30 percent would be advisable.
48

decisions made at the lowest level possible since states have to put up funds equal to 20 percent of

the face amount of the bonds being issued before the federal investment tax credits are issued.

Proposed legislation to provide significant funding for rail passenger development, other than the

$105 million of emergency funding for security and life safety expenditures after September 11,

2001, has not been passed by both houses of Congress, and is unlikely to be enacted until the reauthorization of Amtrak, or its successor, is completed.

2. Financing Northeast Corridor And Other Infrastructure

NEC ownership and maintenance places an unreasonably large financial burden on Amtrak. This

burden is not reasonable because Amtrak is the minority user of the corridor, and is not in a position

to access or provide the capital resources necessary for the Northeast Corridor. Indeed, the NEC

clearly should be owned and controlled by those who operate the dominant and economically vital

commuter and freight traffic on the corridor. Once the NEC infrastructure is separated from

Amtrak, the result will be an immediate and positive major impact on Amtrak’s bottom line

profitability and a significant reduction in Amtrak's capital funding requirements. 

Amtrak’s status as the minority user is evident from the fact that only a small fraction of the

massive long-term funding needs of the NEC infrastructure are related uniquely to Amtrak’s higher

speed passenger operating requirements. In its 20-year plan for capital requirements of the south

end of the NEC, issued early in 2000, Amtrak identified only about $700 million of the $12 billion

in total funding needs as related directly to its new high-speed service. The preponderance of the

remaining needs are for conventional intercity passenger, commuter and freight railroad service. 

If an original expectation of transferring the NEC infrastructure to Amtrak in 1976 was that it would

provide a pipeline to the US Treasury for capital, that expectation has simply not been the case.

Further, Amtrak's ability to access additional federal appropriations for the NEC's maintenance and

infrastructure requirements have been minimized by recent changes in federal transportation policy.

Thus today, there is not any obvious single source, particularly any single federal source, for

funding the NEC infrastructure’s investment needs. It is important to note, however, that

Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, the three Northeast Corridor states that own all or part

of the NEC spine in their states, have managed to find funding for maintaining and improving their

portions of the Corridor.

For two basic reasons, it is vitally important that the NEC infrastructure be properly funded. First,

it is vital to the economy of the Northeast, particularly its need to maintain its economic

competitiveness with other regions of the nation. In no part of the Corridor is this more important

than in the highly congested Northern New Jersey-New York-Western Connecticut metropolitan

area, where the preponderance of the commuter train operations are conducted, and where the need

for additional commuter rail capacity, and the major additional investments to support that traffic, is

greatest. 

Second, the Council strongly believes that, if Amtrak continues to be burdened by the ownership

and maintenance of the Northeast Corridor infrastructure, its ability to secure sufficient funding for

its nationwide train operations will be threatened. The Council’s assessment is that Amtrak’s
49

ownership of the Northeast Corridor infrastructure has been a lose-lose proposition – bad for

Amtrak’s nationwide train operations and bad for the NEC infrastructure. 

Because of the importance of funding the NEC infrastructure, the Council retained the assistance of

BGL Rail Associates to compile the latest assessments of capital investment requirements and to

assess the sources of funding that might be marshaled to finance them. The BGL report emphasized

the limitations on federal appropriations and the lack of any single source of funding able to fund

the entire needs of the NEC. The report indicated, however, that there were a number of sources

that might each make a contribution to the Corridor’s funding needs. 

These potential sources, some existing and some proposed, could be applicable not only to the

Northeast Corridor, but also, where appropriate, for the development of other high-speed rail

corridors as well: 

• Expand transit-related contributions from the Mass Transit Account, as is currently done on

portions of the NEC owned by New York’s MTA and Connecticut DOT; 

• Partnership with the Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)36 in the Northeast and

Middle Atlantic regions to assist in funding the $800 million cost of the new catenary

system south of New York; 

• Federally guaranteed loans for large (greater than $100 million) rail projects under the

Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA); 

• Federally guaranteed loans for smaller rail projects under the Railroad Rehabilitation and

Improvement Financing (RRIF) Program; 

• Bond financing, such as the tax credit bond financing proposed in the High Speed Rail

Investment Act (S. 250), introduced by Senator Biden, and the tax exempt bond financing

proposed in the Rail Infrastructure Development and Expansion Act for the 21st Century

(RIDE-21)(H.R. 2950), introduced by Representative Young of Alaska. 

• The Rail Security Act of 2001 (S. 1550), sponsored by Senators Hollings and McCain, $1.8

billion to fund security and safety, including Penn Station New York (PSNY) and the

Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). 

• Tax incentives or tax-exempt financing for investment in qualified rail projects that might be

offered in economic stimulus proposals put forward by the Congress. 

• Expanding the flexibility of current surface transportation funds for the funding of

economically justified rail projects that would reduce congestion on other modes of

passenger transportation. TEA-21 included flexibility provisions that allowed states to

 

36 Regional Transmission Organizations were created by electric utility companies to interconnect their systems of

electrical generation plants and transmission facilities. One or more RTOs may be willing to fund much of the cost of

the new catenary system south of New York in return for easements giving one or more RTOs the right to use the

NEC to run new high voltage transmission lines.
50

“flex” funds allocated to their states for transportation projects that were their highest

priority. Funds eligible for flexing included those in the Surface Transportation Program

(STP) and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement program (CMAQ),

though federal law does not currently stipulate whether railroad projects would be eligible

for the flexible funding; 

• Expanding the flexibility of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund has also been suggested,

especially in the aftermath of September 11th. The purpose of such flexibility would be to

invest in rail projects that would substitute rail service in higher-density corridors for shorthaul air services that are no longer economic (such as the air link between Chicago and

Milwaukee). It could also be used to expand capacity of rail services that provide direct

intermodal access to airports, encouraging integrated, through-ticketed multi-modal

transportation services to most efficiently serve the transportation needs of region. This

source of funding might be useful on the Northeast Corridor in certain markets connecting

with airlines at airports such as Baltimore-Washington International and Newark, New

Jersey, as well as other airports along the Northeast Corridor and other regional corridors

throughout the United States;

• Another source of potential funding for rail bridges over navigable waterways in the

Northeast Corridor and other high-speed rail corridors would be as civil works projects

carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers, where bridges essential to rail or highway

traffic have received such funding. In Maryland alone, bridges over the Susquehanna, the

Bush, and the Gunpowder rivers might conceivably quality; and 

• Freight users could possibly contribute to financing of infrastructure capacity that is used by

all NEC users.

3. Proposal For Tax Credit Financing Incentives

Although the Council makes no recommendations in this Action Plan, in response to Congressional

requests that funding mechanisms and options be provided by the Council, the following additional

financing mechanism favored by certain large freight railroads is offered as an alternative

mechanism to encourage rail infrastructure and high-speed corridor development. 

The new rail funding mechanism offered for consideration by the Congress is a tax credit for

qualified rail investments, possibly fashioned after the federal low income housing tax credits.

Federal low income housing tax credits are earned over a 10 year period based on the value of low

income housing investment, provided that such housing remains rented to qualifying low income

residents. The housing credit is either 4 percent per year for 10 years or 9 percent per year for 10

years, which, on a net present value basis, amounts to either 30 percent or 70 percent, respectively,

of the investment in low income housing. The 4 percent low-income housing credits are available

to projects that receive tax-exempt or federally supported funding. The 9 percent low-income

housing credits are available to projects, which receive no federally supported or subsidized debt

financing. 

For a possible multiyear rail investment tax credit, the annual percentage, the number of years that

the tax credit is earned, and the net present value of the multi-year credit need to be determined by
51

Congress. The advantage of such a tax credit is it would benefit the freight railroads, which

presumably will upgrade their facilities for rail passenger service, but the credit could be designed

so that the freight railroads would only get the full financial benefit if the rail facility remained in

passenger use for 10 or more years, giving the freight railroads an incentive to provide good

passenger service over their lines. Another advantage of such a multi-year tax credit is that it can be

administered by states just as the low income housing credits are issued, subject to overall

limitations by state which are determined by the federal government. 

4. Conclusion

Rail passenger projects will only succeed if there is a multi-year, assured funding source, (funded in

a way that Congress and the Administration determine) to enable commitments to build multi-year

capital investments in new and renovated facilities. Ideally, multi-year facilities would ensure that

political pressures to keep unprofitable trains would be minimized.
JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

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THE COUNCIL

Gilbert E. Carmichael

 Chairman

Paul M. Weyrich

 Vice Chairman

Bruce Chapman

Nancy Rutledge Connery

James E. Coston

Wendell Cox 

Christopher K. Gleason

S. Lee Kling

Hon. Norman Y. Mineta

Charles Moneypenny

Hon. John O. Norquist

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Thomas A. Till

APPENDIX I: CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINIONS FROM

COUNCIL MEMBERS

A. MR. JAMES COSTON’S CONCURRING OPINION 

   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

February 4, 2002

Mr. Gilbert E. Carmichael

Chairman

Amtrak Reform Council

400 Seventh Street, SW

Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have voted in favor of the Amtrak Reform Council's Final Action Plan, even

though I retain serious reservations about and even objections to--several of the

its central elements. 

I set aside those reservations and objections for two simple reasons: political

expediency and practical necessity. 

Amtrak's funds are dwindling so rapidly that a systemwide shutdown can be

avoided only through an immediate reform of the company's organizational

structure and managerial practices. It is too late to wait for the Ideal Plan to

emerge. Something must be done to change the way passenger trains are run in

this country now. 

Yet only the Reform Council has recommended any reforms, flawed though

some of them may be.

AMTRAK RESISTS CHANGE 

Amtrak, in its announcement of February 1, suggested no reforms of any kind.

All it advocated was that Congress pump more money into both an

organizational structure and managerial system which together have led not 
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53

that waste under a claim that Amtrak was actually on a "glide path" to only to waste of the

taxpayers' resources, but to a four-year effort to conceal financial self-sufficiency as mandated by

Congress in 1997. Amtrak is organizationally, intellectually and financially bankrupt and

ultimately obsolete as currently configured. A compelling case can be made that in its present form

it is not a fit receptacle for additional funding.

Thus, while I feel compelled to distance myself from some of the flaws in the ARC Plan, I sense an

even greater gap between my vision of an American passenger railroad and that to which Amtrak

has clung undeviatingly for the last five years. 

AMTRAK'S TRUE COLORS: NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A ONE-REGION RAILROAD

Amtrak's vision and values now stand revealed. Amtrak has exhibited a solid and enduring

commitment only to a Northeastern railroad over which 90 per cent of the trains are state or local

commuter trains. Amtrak apparently sees nothing wrong in demanding funds from all of the

nation's taxpayers while applying them to a single region. But this regional favoritism on the part of

Amtrak management actually is contrary to law. Congress established Amtrak in 1970 for the

purpose of operating a national passenger railroad system, and Congress never provided Amtrak

with any other legal mandate. From a legal standpoint, Amtrak is ultra vires in its focus on the

Northeast Corridor at the expense of other promising routes and other deserving states whose

taxpayers furnished dollars in good faith that Amtrak would try to meet their mobility needs. In the

past, Amtrak always made a token effort to keep a national system intact. Now, shaken by the fear

of imminent failure, Amtrak has shown its true colors by turning its back on the nation at large and

fleeing to the protection of those it has favored. 

Thus, I am compelled to vote in favor of the only existing Plan that provides Congress with a

mechanism under which it can fund Amtrak and still be assured that it is funding a national

transportation provider.

THE ARC, THE PLAN AND THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY DELUSION

Before I move on, let me just explain why my embrace of the ARC's plan remains reluctant.

First. the ARC plan, like the ARC itself, suffers from a terrible defect. It is linked legislatively to

the 1997 mandate that Amtrak become operationally self-sufficient within five years. I have stated

before and will now state again that demanding passenger trains to be financially self- sufficient is

unfair and foolish. While I welcome the idea of a congressional commission exercising oversight

over Amtrak's performance (and in fact propose below that Congress create a permanent citizens'

panel for just that purpose), I see no purpose in holding American passenger trains to a strict

profit/loss or even "operational self-sufficiency" standard. No such demand is made on passenger
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54

rail's competition, chiefly commercial and private automobiles, and, in fact, the transportation

providers competing against rail are not self-sufficient. 

The U.S. airline industry since its founding in 1926 has been profitable in some years and

unprofitable in others, but its net aggregate performance over its entire 76-year lifetime has been a

financial loss, even though the U.S. government has provided the industry with a trillion-dollar

airport and air-traffic-control infrastructure for which user fees were not charged until 1971. 

As for private autos, their "profitability" cannot be compared with that of trains, planes or buses. By

definition private autos are not operated commercially and their transportation function is

confounded and co-mingled with other functions such as personal amusement and vanity.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that with an average of 1.2 persons occupying a machine built for five

or six, and with most private vehicles spending 18 to 20 hours our of each 24 standing idle in a

garage or parking lot, the utilization rate of the typical personal auto, as well as the vast tracts of

real estate set aside for its storage and operation, is so low as to make it unacceptable as a business

proposition. Moreover, private autos, like commercial aviation, have been supplied with a state-ofthe-art infrastructure system which the federal government continues to update and expand. In 1992

a distinguished professor of transportation evaluated that infrastructure as having a net current

replacement value of over $1 trillion. Nothing on the order of that infrastructure is available to

American passenger trains.

Despite the manifest unfairness and self-evident impossibility of the self-sufficiency mandate,

Amtrak management eagerly and uncritically embraced it on taking office in 1998 and until the

spring of 2001 issued a virtual blizzard of happy-talk news releases claiming that the company was

"on glide path" toward meeting the self-sufficiency deadline of 2003. 

Not until his address to the National Press Club last May did the Chief Executive Officer even hint

at a potential problem in achieving self-sufficiency. Instead, he concealed his growing doubts

behind a verbal smoke screen that talked of a gap between Amtrak's "commercial mission" and its

"public-service mission." 

Moreover in the nine months between that first storm warning and the disaster alert he issued last

Friday, the Chief Executive Officer still tried to have it both ways. He continued to warn of a

disconnect between the "commercial mission" and the "public-service mission" while insisting that

self-sufficiency still was achievable. If so, why the warnings? 

I knew four years ago that the congressional mandate for Amtrak to achieve operational selfsufficiency by 2003 was literally Mission: Impossible. So did most of my fellow Council members.

So did the General Accounting Office and the DOT Inspector General, both of which issued interim

reports suggesting very strongly that Congress's unrealistic self-sufficiency mandate not only would

not be met by 2003 but would be missed by an ever-widening mark. It didn't take a rocket scientist

or even a part-time bookkeeper to know the numbers weren't adding up. Yet Amtrak the people
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55

who controlled the company and collected the figures and had first crack at evaluating the numbers

was the last to know that numbers weren't working. Or the last to say so. I don't know which is the

more grievous failure. As the saying goes, "If they didn't know, shame on them. If they did know

and didn't tell, shame on them again."

THE INFRASTRUCTURE QUESTION

As preposterous as it is to imagine a national passenger railroad becoming operationally selfsufficient in five years, it is even more preposterous to imagine such an outcome when that railroad

lacks the one prerequisite without which no transportation system can function: a modern

infrastructure.

Yet this is the very core of the Mission: Impossible that Congress handed Amtrak in 1997—and that

Amtrak's new management took home like a pig in a poke in 1998. Amazingly, the management of

Amtrak promised Congress they could operate a profitable passenger railroad—a railroad that could

successfully compete against the federal government's Interstate highway network and the FAA's

trillion-dollar air-traffic control and airport infrastructure--over a 19th- century network of railroad

tracks on which the average track speed is 48 miles per hour and both the main lines and junctions

are congested with mile-long freight trains that make reliable scheduling impossible. Amtrak told

Congress what it wanted to hear: We won't try to do very much and we won't ask you for a lot of

money.

I have argued virtually from my first day on the Amtrak Reform Council that nothing remotely

approaching financial self-sufficiency is in the cards for American passenger trains until Congress

funds a modern system of railroad tracks and signals for trains as it funded modern infrastructure

and control systems for the nation's motor vehicles, airplanes and inland watercraft. The privately

owned railroads over which Amtrak operates most of its national system cannot raise the necessary

capital in the private capital markets, nor have they the motivation to do so, since passenger trains

no longer are their business. Only government has the financial strength to build the next

generation of railroad infrastructure, and the nation's travelers cannot expect to ride fast,

comfortable, reliable, frequent, safe or commercially successful passenger trains until government

until it drops its anachronistic demand for profit and builds the kind of infrastructure that makes

profits possible.

 

The federal government has been using tax money to fund commercial airports since 1946, but it

has never closed an airport down because it didn't handle enough passengers at a "profit," and it has

provided millions of dollars to the airline industry to provide Essential Air Services to sparsely

settled communities that the airlines cannot serve profitably. The federal government spent over

$80 billion to build an Interstate highway system, but it never threatened to close I-94 through

North Dakota and Montana so it could "concentrate" all the Chicago-Seattle truck traffic on I-80 to

San Francisco and then up I-5 to Seattle in order to get more efficiency out of its concrete. Why are
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trains alone forced into this antiquated 19th-century private-business model? Why are trains

subjected to a Darwinian struggle for existence while our government builds roads and airports

everywhere regardless of economic justification?

Raising the money for rail infrastructure? We've already collected it now let's invest it:

"Repatriate" the 1942-1962 rail-passenger ticket tax.. 

Some will ask, "But how can we pay for a nationwide program of railroad infrastructure

improvements?" All of the other transportation infrastructures have been taken off the federal

budget and turned into quasi-businesses that meet their expenses by charging user fees that are paid

into a dedicated trust fund. How can passenger trains which carry less than one per cent of

America's travelers raise enough money from a ticket tax to kick off a program like the Interstate or

the Inland Waterways or the FAA's air-traffic control system?

Setting aside for a moment the dirty little secret that user fees have never fully funded the nation's

highway and civil-aviation programs and that both consume billions of dollars of subsidies from the

General Fund each year, the answer to the question of raising even more funds for a rail

infrastructure program is simple: Enough money to kick off a railroad infrastructure program

already has been raised indeed, it was raised by the federal government many, many years ago but it

was never paid into a trust fund and never appropriated to fund improvements to the nation's

privately owned railroad system. 

In 1942 Congress passed an "emergency" World War II tax of 15 per cent on all intercity passenger

railroad tickets in order to raise money for the war effort as well as to discourage unnecessary

civilian travel at a time when every coach seat and sleeping-car berth was needed for essential

military transportation and civilian travel connected to the war effort.

Unlike federal gasoline taxes, which always were used to build new highways, and unlike the 10-

per-cent airline ticket tax of 1971 which raised money to expand airports and fund the FAA's radar

technology and control towers, the 1942 railroad ticket tax was not placed in a special trustfund to

modernize and improve America's 19th-century railroad infrastructure. None of the money

collected from America's rail passengers was used to straighten curves or reduce steep grades, or to

replace single track with double track, or to modernize the signal systems so high- speed trains

could be stopped automatically if the engineer inadvertently passed a red signal, or to eliminate

highway grade crossings, or to build viaducts and flyover ramps so trains would not get stuck at

busy junctions. 

Instead, the federal government took all of that money from railroad passengers and applied it to

other uses, including expansion of the highway system and the airport system, creating taxfinanced advances in highway and aviation and even waterway technology that the privately

financed railroads could not afford to duplicate.
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Nor did the government cease confiscating money from railroad passengers when the wartime

emergency ended. The war ended in 1945, but the "emergency" 15-per-cent tax on railroad tickets

continued for another nine years, and even then, in 1954, it was not abolished, but merely reduced

to a 10-per-cent tax, which continued to be collected until 1962. 

Throughout those 20 years, the federal government continued to invest the proceeds of the rail

passenger ticket tax in a massive buildup of the airport, air-traffic-control, highway and waterway

systems, all of which used their efficient new transportation plants to divert freight and passenger

business away from the helpless railroads, whose rates and business practices were still regulated so

rigidly by the federal and state governments that they could not raise the capital to make their

antiquated tracks and signal systems competitive.

It is over those same antiquated, congested tracks and under those same antiquated 19th-century

block signals that Amtrak was required by Congress in 1997 to run "self-sufficient" passenger trains

and it is Amtrak's complacent willingness to go along with this Mission: Impossible that today has

brought this hapless company to the brink of disaster.

What is the quickest and surest way to end this carnival of folly and provide the nation's travelers

with the efficient, modern rail travel they deserve? 

It is for this Congress to acknowledge the mistakes of its predecessors by "repatriating" the 1942-

1962 railroad ticket tax to its rightful recipients and beneficiaries, the travelers and shippers who

have been unfairly deprived of the advanced rail transportation to which they are entitled, and to the

railroad industry, which was forced by congressional bungling into a century-long technological

stall and an unnecessary commercial decline. 

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the $3.9 billion collected during the 20-year life

of the Revenue Act of 1942 has a current value of more than $30 billion. It is time for Congress to

pass legislation making this money available to the railroads, to state departments of transportation,

to local and regional commuter rail agencies and to interstate passenger-rail compacts for

construction of vital improvements and upgrades that will allow higher speeds, increased frequency

and assured protection against train-to-train and train/vehicle collisions on the nation's busiest

railroad main lines. And the time to get started is now, when Amtrak's emergency coincides with a

national logistical emergency that is raising the costs of passenger travel and freight transportation

nationwide and retarding the expansion of the North American economy.

Privatization: The fatal flaw in the ARC Plan

Some on the Amtrak Reform Council have argued that the answer to the nation's passenger-train

problem is to eliminate government from the equation and to "privatize" Amtrak either wholesale,
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58

at the corporate level, or piecemeal, by asking private-sector businesses to operate specific routes or

trains.

Let me explain why this call for privatization is the chief obstacle to my embracing of the ARC

Final Plan.

I believe that the economics of transportation in the United States have been fundamentally settled

by the federal government's eight decades of funding, building, owning and managing non-railroad

infrastructure. Government-funded highways and government-funded airways are so far ahead of

rail in their technological development that only the massive low-cost capital available to the

federal government can close the rail technology gap and enable rail to reach its full logistical and

economic potential. Without a massive federal investment in railroad track, signaling and routing

technologies, including high-speed flyovers and merge ramps, passenger rail will not be able to

catch up to and surpass the enormous advances in productivity and efficiency that highway and air

transportation technologies have achieved over the last three quarters of a century thanks to federal

investment.

But precisely because even a very large federal investment in modern rail technology will take

many years to complete, any private operators entering the passenger-rail field today will be forced

to operate trains just as inefficient as Amtrak's. 

The fact is, the vast majority of the costs associated with operating passenger trains are outside the

train operator's control. The losses associated with operating passenger trains in the U.S. are

generated not by the trains but by the antiquated tracks and signals that prevent rail operators from

attracting large numbers of passengers at high fares. The result is that private operators using U.S.

rail infrastructure will continue to require a subsidy and, after discovering the real costs of operating

shiny new trains over an outdated and congested infrastructure, will continually return to

government for higher and higher levels of subsidy. 

This is what happened in Britain after the Conservative government sold off both the obsolete

infrastructure and train operations to private interests, only to discover that 50 years of

underinvestment in the infrastructure had deprived the over-optimistic train operators of the

conditions they needed to run a successful business operation and saddled the infrastructure owners

with investment needs far too steep for them to meet out of their own pockets. In the end, the

government has been forced to dole out more in subsidy payments to the private train operators and

the private infrastructure owner than it would have spent had it kept the whole operation in house

and brought it up to date under one management with taxpayer funds. In the words of railway

reporter Christian Wolmar, "Privartisation, it had now become evident, had not freed government

from the financial burden imposed by the railways; it had simply removed much of government's

ability to control and limit that burden."
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59

It will be many years, if ever, before private train operators will be able to operate commercially

successful passenger trains on American railroad infrastructure. To bring them in now will raise

public expectations again--only to disappoint the public again and depress passenger rail's

credibility even further at a time when everything must be done to strengthen it. 

Premature privatization will also have another baleful side effect. As the train operators discover

that obsolete infrastructure artificially raises the costs and diminishes the profitability of their

operations, and as they come to realize too late that they have no control over this fundamental cost,

they will focus their drive toward profitability increasingly and unfairly--on the one remaining area

they see as under their control: labor. The result will be an ugly effort to out- source jobs to nonunion suppliers and to force "give-backs" out of unionized employees. As a former Amtrak

employee and union member who was supported by organized labor for appointment to the ARC, I

cannot countenance any scenario which would leave management with union-busting as its only

effective means of cost control. Passenger-train cost efficiency must be built in from the

infrastructure up, not from the employees down. Privatization is not a universal solvent that makes

all managerial problems, including labor costs, disappear, especially when the fundamental

problem, lack of a modern rail infrastructure, continues to go untreated.

PERMANENT CITIZENS' COMMISSION TO MONITOR PASSENGER RAIL

Although I see flaws in the ARC"s Final Action plan and in the ARC's origins in the selfsufficiency mandate, I conclude my service on the Council with essentially positive feelings about

the panel, its members and its mission. So much so that I believe that Congress can best serve the

cause of passenger rail service by establishing and funding a permanent independent citizens'

commission to monitor the progress of rail passenger service in the U.S. and to report periodically

to Congress on how it can best be improved. The British have a worthy model in their Central

Railway Users Consultative Committee and its six regional chapters.

CONCLUSION 

Amtrak is a failed experiment, but let's be clear about what exactly failed. 

It is not passenger train technology that has failed. Modern passenger rail technology has not yet

been tried in America. 

Nor is it government ownership that has failed. The ownership format, whether public or private,

is irrelevant if the owner fails to provide or obtain capital funding, and this a succession of

Congresses has failed to do. As the British are learning to their pain, if a nation is determined to

neglect its rail infrastructure, it matters little whether it is owned by the public or by private

interests. The results of neglect are the same.
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60

But Amtrak management has failed because it did not notice or did not care enough to acknowledge

these fundamental truths until it was too late. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, including a

trillion-dollar Interstate highway system and a trillion-dollar civil-aviation infrastructure, it

promised Congress it could operate old-fashioned passenger trains on old- fashioned tracks and do

it without a subsidy. 

That kind of thinking needs to change, and I am setting aside my objections and voting "Yes" to the

Amtrak Reform Council's Final Action Plan, a thoughtful and useful report representing an

enormous amount of hard work, as America's best hope for getting the process of change started. 

Respectfully Submitted,

James E. Coston

Coston & Lichtman

407 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, IL 60605
61

B. MR. WENDELL COX’S CONCURRING OPINION

Wendell Cox Consultancy

demographia.com • publicpurpose.com

PO Box 841 • Belleville, Illinois 62222 USA

+1.618.632.8507 • Fax: +1.810.821.8134 • policy@publicpurpose.com

Concurring Statement of

Wendell Cox,

Member, Amtrak Reform Council

On the

Amtrak Reform Council

Action Plan

7 February 2002

Background: Amtrak has been granted billions in federal subsidies since 1971. As a monopoly, its

unit costs have been exempt from the competition that has improved the performance of airlines,

intercity buses and freight transport. Amtrak has also been a tool of politics. Unprofitable routes

have been operated in response to the political agendas of members of Congress and even the

Amtrak board itself. 

The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act (ARAA) of 1997 requires Amtrak to become

operationally self-sufficient (no federal operating subsidies) by December 2002. That objective will

not be met, which has made it necessary for the Amtrak Reform Council (ARC) to make the ARAA

required finding that Amtrak will not achieve operational self-sufficiency. ARC is now issuing its

Action Plan for a “restructured and rationalized national intercity rail passenger system,” as

required by ARAA. 

Amtrak does not appear to have taken the self-sufficiency requirement of ARAA seriously, having

acted as if it were “business as usual.” Amtrak has, until very recently, perpetuated the charade that

it was on a “glide-path” to self-sufficiency. But, under the leadership of new management and a

“reform board,” Amtrak has failed to exercise the new and considerable flexibility accorded it under

ARAA. It is true that Amtrak has improved its operating revenues somewhat. But it is just as true

that Amtrak has outrightly neglected addressing its excessive expense structure. For post-ARAA

Amtrak, it appears that the answer to every question has been “more money.” Today, as the Action

Plan and US Department of Transportation Inspector General have concluded, Amtrak is no closer

to operating self-sufficiency than it was before the ARAA. 

Reform of Amtrak’s dysfunctional organizational and political structure is a prerequisite to both the

operational self-sufficiency required by national policy and the improvement of passenger rail. The
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ARC Action Plan proposes important reforms, such as transferring service authority to state-based

corridors and implementation of competitive franchising. There is US precedent for competitive

franchising, which has been used to provide commuter rail service in Boston, San Francisco, Los

Angeles, San Diego, Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, Washington, DC and Dallas-Fort

Worth. In some cases, the franchises have been awarded to Amtrak itself. It is time, as the Action

Plan indicates, for competitive franchising to be extended to intercity rail. I am pleased to be able to

support the Action Plan because of these important improvements.

But the Action Plan does not go far enough. This concurring statement outlines proposals that

would have improved the Action Plan and thereby increased the changes for intercity passenger rail

to achieve its potential in the United States. These proposals are consistent with Option 4:

Competition and Local Accountability, which was considered by ARC.

More Fundamental Structural Reform is Required: The Action Plan represents too timid a

departure from the present structure. The National Passenger Rail Corporation (NRPC) would

continue to administer the passenger rail network, and Amtrak would survive as a subsidiary that

operates service. This is unnecessary and creates the potential for continuing the failed policies of

the past. The federal government does not own a commercial airline or a bus company. And, no

public purpose justifies federal ownership of a passenger rail company.

Further, under the Action Plan, NRPC could competitively franchise services, and its own

subsidiary, the Amtrak operating company, could compete. It can be expected that managers and

employees of the Amtrak operating company would exert their considerable influence (as before),

both through NRPC and the political process to skew franchise awards in their direction or even to

prevent franchising. International and US experience has shown that fairness cannot be guaranteed

when the organization administering a procurement is also a competitor (even a subsidiary). 

Riders and taxpayers would be better served by establishing a federal Passenger Rail Transitional

Board (PRTB) that would administer transfer of services to Regional Rail Operating Corporations

(owned by states and interstate compacts). During the transitional period, PRTB would conclude the

Amtrak operations company. The assets that Amtrak currently holds in trust for the riders and

taxpayers would be transferred to the Regional Rail Operating Corporations for continued public

service. The process outlined in Option 4 could be implemented while preserving service to the

riders and protecting the interests of employees.

The Action Plan should have proposed more fundamental structural reform by

transferring service oversight to Regional Rail Operating Corporations, while

phasing out Amtrak.

Subsidies are Unnecessary: The Action Plan indicates that passenger rail should receive “adequate

and stable” funding. This is an appropriate objective, but only to the extent that funding is provided

by intercity rail users. For example, Wal-Mart (and other firms) offers sufficient value in goods and

services to its customers that they provide “adequate and stable” funding to pay the operating,

capital, tax and return on investment needs of the company. Similarly, users of the nation’s intercity

highways and commercial air transport systems receive sufficient value that they provide “adequate

and stable” funding for building and maintaining required infrastructure. But, at least as currently
63

constituted, intercity passenger rail costs are so high that, even at passenger fare levels higher than

that of intercity highways and airlines,37 customers provide revenue that is neither adequate nor

stable. The Action Plan inference is that “adequate and stable” funding should be provided by nonusers. This would not be appropriate.

Subsidy by non-users is justified only where there is a compelling public purpose. For example,

national defense, public welfare, education and a host of other programs provide societal benefits

that justify general subsidies, and would be impossible to fund with user fees. For intercity rail to

receive non-user subsidies would require identification of such a compelling public purpose. 

Trains are not a Substitute for Short Distance Air Travel: ARC discussions and the Action Plan

have considered short distance air market substitution as a purpose for subsidizing Amtrak. But,

comparatively little short distance air travel in the United States can be diverted to rail, because

demand is so dispersed and decentralized. Short distance travel markets are overwhelmingly private

vehicle markets (automobiles and sport utility vehicles). Airlines account for only 0.3 percent of

travel over 100 to 200 mile distances and 2.6 percent from 200 to 400 miles (Figure 1). Most

current “high speed rail” proposals would operate at average speeds of barely 80 miles per hour. At

such slow speeds, it is unlikely that the new rail services would be competitive with airlines for

more than three-hour trips (225 air miles). Only 2.1 percent of US air travel is in such markets

outside the Washington-New York-Boston corridor (which already has frequent rail service).38 The

genuine high-speed rail services of Japan and Europe operate from 40 percent to 100 percent faster.

Even the 200 mile per hour proposed Florida Overland Express high speed rail system (canceled by

Governor Jeb Bush due to its overly optimistic ridership projections and high taxpayer cost) would

have, based upon promoter projections, permitted only a two percent reduction in commercial

flights between airports in central and south Florida along the route.39

Today, Americans travel far more than ever before. Most of this travel is by airplane. The high

volume of airline patronage was not taken from passenger rail; it was rather created by faster travel

and the less expensive fares made possible through competition (deregulation).

 

37 Attributable infrastructure costs are included in airline and intercity bus fares. 38 www.publicpurpose.com/icair-225.htm. 39 Wendell Cox, Evaluation of the FDOT-FOX Miami-Orlando-Tampa High Speed Rail Proposal, James Madison Institute, 1997.
64

Indeed, air travel has been democratized, making it possible for the overwhelming majority of

people to travel farther and more often than ever before. The increase in air travel demand has been

more than 10 times the loss in rail per capita travel since 1950 (Figure 2).40

 

40 www.publicpurpose.com/ic-airallhist.htm
65

Trains are Not, in Themselves, Essential Transportation Service: It was suggested that Amtrak’s

long distance services provide mobility between small towns, and that this serves a need similar to

that of the airline essential air service program.41 In fact, however, Amtrak service is available only

to the small percentage of the nation’s communities that are, by chance, located along the surviving

historical passenger routes. Operating without subsidy, the nation’s intercity bus companies serve at

least four times as many communities and five times as many passenger miles. The nation’s airlines

serve more 30 percent more locations (700 commercial airports42) and nine times as many

passenger miles.43 If providing “essential transportation” were a genuine objective of public policy,

then it would be best achieved by awarding competitive franchises to whatever mode, airline, bus or

passenger rail, could provide the service for the least amount of subsidy.44 Such a program would

also be based upon objective criteria, such as service to all communities exceeding a particular

population threshold, or a minimum distance from the commercial intercity transportation system

(rail station, bus station or commercial airport). But to consider intercity rail itself as essential

transportation service violates “equal protection of the law,” by placing the interests of citizens

living in communities along passenger rail routes above those of the more numerous comparable

communities not so fortuitously located.

Costly Passenger Rail Cannot Provide Meaningful Redundancy: A related argument is that the

nation needs passenger rail for redundancy, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist

attacks. This is a variation on the “essential transportation service” argument. To the extent that

transportation redundancy may be required, intercity buses can provide four times the service as

intercity rail under the present structure. There is insufficient public funding for meaningful levels

of transportation redundancy to be provided by a passenger rail system that is so non-cost

competitive. 

Operating Subsidies Violate the Intent of ARAA: The Action Plan is inconsistent with Congressional

policy on operating subsidies, in suggesting operating subsidies for long distance trains. The ARAA

required that Amtrak achieve operational self-sufficiency. Congress did not require self-sufficiency

by Amtrak in the expectation that the very organization formed to rule upon Amtrak’s failure, ARC,

would itself propose an Action Plan violating the operational self-sufficiency test. Like other modes

of intercity transport, long distance trains should be operated only if they are valued enough by their

customers to pay for them. Today, intercity buses and airlines provide high levels of long distance

service, without subsidy. There is, in addition, a robust, unsubsidized commercial market for long

distance vacation travel, using charter buses, air packages and even commercial rail tours, following

the successful model of ocean cruise lines. 

Envy is Not a Public Purpose: An even less compelling justification for subsidizing passenger rail is

envy. It is argued that passenger rail should be subsidized because other modes (highways and the

commercial air system) are subsidized. This is, however, a fundamental difficulty with the “envy”

 

41 The essential air service program suffers from some of the same deficiencies as apply to the concept of passenger rail as essential

transportation service. 42 www.bts.gov/publications/airactstats2000/intro.html 43 Based upon information from National Transportation Statistics. 44 As noted elsewhere, intercity bus and commercial airline costs per passenger mile are considerably lower than that of Amtrak.
66

justification --- at its core it is fallacious.45 With the exception of Amtrak, US intercity passenger

transport is unsubsidized, both operations and infrastructure. Federal expenditures on the intercity

highway and commercial air transport systems46 are fully supported with fees paid by users (such as

the gasoline tax and the airline ticket tax). User fees are fundamentally different from public

subsidies. This is illustrated by the example of a municipally owned electric utility. Customers of

the utility pay for the service they consume. These payments are not subsidies; they are user fees.

The fact that the electric utility is government owned does not make user payments a subsidy any

more than payments to a privately owned utility are subsidies. Subsidies involve general taxpayer

support of consumption by users. There is a simple test. A payment is a user fee if it is limited to the

users of a good or service.47 It is a subsidy if it is collected from the tax base in general, without

regard to use. Those who use highways pay for them. Similarly, those who use airports pay for

them. Those who do not use highways and airports do not pay for them. It should be the same for

passenger rail.

If an amount equal to Amtrak’s federal subsidy per passenger mile were applied to air travel, the

annual cost would be more than $35 billion (three times the present revenues provided by users).

The same passenger mile subsidy rate would equate to more than $300 billion annually for

highways (nearly 15 times the federal revenue provided by personal vehicle users). Parity with the

roadway and air modes would require imposition of a ticket tax or other user fee on Amtrak users. It

is the other intercity modes, highways and commercial air transport that have intercity passenger

rail to envy in terms of public subsidies. But envy is not a legitimate public purpose.

A Cost-Competitive Passenger Rail System Would be Profitable: Congressional intent under ARAA

permits continued federal capital subsidies, but does not require it. Indeed, there is evidence that the

national intercity passenger rail system does not need subsidies, operating or capital. Amtrak fares

per passenger mile are higher than that of both airlines and intercity buses, neither of which is

subsidized (Figure 3).48 Amtrak costs per passenger mile are four times that of intercity buses and

3.5 times that of airlines. Passengers already pay fares well above those of competing intercity

buses and airlines (above the market rate for intercity passenger transportation). The subsidies

simply finance Amtrak’s excessive, above market costs. If Amtrak were cost-competitive, the

present service levels could be operated with no subsidy at all. 

Moreover, Amtrak is losing ground in cost control. While airlines and intercity buses have

improved their performance over the past 25 years, Amtrak has become less productive (Figure 4).

 

45 A related argument is that other modes of transport received direct government aid in their early years, and only later transitioned

to user fee financing. In that vein, it was argued during ARC deliberations that the proceeds from a 1943 to 1962 rail ticket tax

(approximately $18 billion in 2000$, estimated from US Statistical Abstract data), spent for general purposes, should be made

available retroactively for passenger rail. Contrary to the perception, before the interstate era, federal highway user fees exceeded

federal highway expenditures by more than $100 billion (1921 to 1956, www.publicpurpose.com/hwy-us1921.htm.). In fact,

Amtrak has already received $44 billion (inflation adjusted) in federal funding (www.publicpurpose.com/amtrak-subys.htm), nearly

2.5 times the ticket tax revenue. Finally, passenger rail service was the beneficiary of massive government support in its early

years, through land grants and other subsidies. Taxpayers should not have to live in fear that special interests will successfully mine

Treasury archives to justify new spending on the pretext of revisionist interpretations that are applied to repealed tax policies This

would make federal tax policy even less rational and fair. 46Since 1999, federal air user fees have exceeded federal air expenditures. Small subsidies occurred before that time.

47 It may be argued that the current highway and commercial air transport user fees may not be the most efficient form of pricing, and

that the benefit received by users varies significantly in relation to payment. To the extent that this may be true, it would imply less

than optimal distribution of fees among users, not the existence of subsidies. 48 These airline and intercity bus revenues include profits, taxes and return on investment. Amtrak figures do not.
67

Amtrak has not been under-funded, it has been over-funded,49 reflecting the reality that Amtrak’s

fundamental problem is not funding; it is cost control. The ARC Action Plan appropriately

addresses excessive costs by proposing competitive franchising, but fails to recognize that, in the

longer run, a cost competitive passenger rail system would not require subsidies.

The Action Plan should have recommended phase out of subsidies (capital and

operating) for intercity passenger rail. 

 

49 Calculated from 1998 Bureau of Transportation Statistics data (latest available)
68

Access to Infrastructure Should be Commercial: The Action Plan would extend the current

operational priority for Amtrak trains over freight rail rights of way. Further, the Action Plan would

extend the federal requirement that Amtrak receive discounted pricing for infrastructure access, in

effect taxing freight railroads to subsidize Amtrak.50 Both of these provisions make freight railroads

less competitive in their core business, reducing their capacity to handle freight volumes. Extending

these provisions could force more rail freight business to trucks on the nation’s highways.

Among high-income nations, only the United States and Canada have significant freight rail

operations. Even today, more ton mileage moves by rail than by truck in the United States and

Canada, in contrast to elsewhere in the high-income world.51 There is little or no evidence that

effective freight and passenger rail systems can share the same rights of way in a modern nation.52

In the last 30 years, US freight rail companies have reduced their rate of market share loss to trucks

by one-half. Rail ton mileage has nearly doubled. This has been possible because freight railroads

have had to contend with much less interference from passenger trains since Amtrak began

operations. It may be surprising that freight rail trends have improved in the era of interstate

highways, during which it would have been expected that truck competitiveness would have

accelerated relative to rail.

 

50 This freight railroad subsidy to Amtrak is not included in the subsidy figures cited elsewhere in this statement. 51 Wendell Cox, Freight Rail’s Potential to Reduce Traffic Congestion, Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2002 (www.tppf.org). 52 In fact, genuine high-speed rail operations do not even share rights of way with conventional passenger trains, as in Europe and

Japan.
69

The US experience is in stark contrast to elsewhere in the high-income world, where rail freight

market shares and ton-mile volumes have fallen substantially. As a result, traffic congestion has

become much worse --- trucks account for double the US share of all traffic Europe and five times

the share in Japan. The high volume of trucks contributes to much higher urban traffic congestion in

Europe and Japan 53

American urban areas are already facing a serious highway traffic congestion crisis. Political

pressures have made it virtually impossible to provide the urban highway capacity required to

accommodate increasing travel demands. Federal Highway Administration projections indicate that

truck volumes will double in the next quarter century, with a similar increase anticipated for freight

railroads. Because they occupy the space of nearly four cars on freeways, trucks disproportionately

contribute to urban traffic congestion. Moreover, despite the training of professionalism drivers,

higher truck volumes retard highway safety. Trucks also contribute disproportionately to air

pollution. Passenger rail pricing and access policies that drive rail volumes to trucks can only make

the urban traffic congestion worse, with no material compensating benefit. To control urban traffic

congestion, passenger rail policy should require access and pricing to be determined in the

commercial market, not by legislative or regulatory fiat.

The Action Plan should have recommended access and charges to be

determined through commercial processes, to maximize the urban highway

traffic reduction potential of freight railroads.

Effective Standards Should Apply to the Use of Air User Fees: The Action Plan raises the

potential of using air travel user fee revenues to support rail connections that would replace short

distance air services. Such a program could be subject to abuse. As currently occurs in the transit

program, local and state governments would be strongly pressured by the rail construction/railcar

builder/rail consultant lobby to build systems that do not, in actual performance, achieve the

purposes of the program. Regrettably, state and local governments have been inclined to build

excessively costly infrastructure where federal funding is available.54 Moreover, cost overruns,

large subsidies and minimal impacts on traffic congestion have been typical with respect to rail

infrastructure.55

A prerequisite to such use should be judicially reviewable findings that the rail system is likely to be

commercially viable (would pay operating costs, capital cost and debt service from its own

commercial revenues) and that substantial and sustainable commercial airline operation reductions

would be achieved.56 Further, the use of air user fees should be limited to securing debt. The local

or state government airport owners57 should be required to guarantee the self-sufficiency of any

 

53 www.demographia.com/db-intltraffic.htm. 54 This is evident, for example, in federal clean water, wastewater and transit programs, where federal funding has been associated

with unnecessarily expensive technologies. 55 For example, Britain’s under construction West Coast Main Line 140 mile per hour upgrade project has been reported to

Parliament to have risen in cost from $3.2 billion to nearly $10 billion. 56 These findings would be based upon planning studies, the projections of which would be financially guaranteed by airport owners

as noted below. 57 In the case of airports owned by regional authorities, the local government members would be required to provide full faith and

credit financial guarantees.
70

such rail systems, paying any capital, debt service or operating shortfalls from their own general tax

base (not airport user fees or federal funds).

The extent of air user fees that might be available for rail expansion is likely to be limited.

Increasing burdens are being placed on air user fee revenue sources, with the need for expanding

airports and improving security in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Finally, there

is considerable question as to the potential for rail service to substitute for short distance airline

operations (above).

The Action Plan should have recommended strong safeguards to ensure that

any use of air user fee revenues is consistent with the purpose of air

substitution.

The Labor Provision is Unfair: The Action Plan would require labor provisions beyond legal or

contractual requirements. Amtrak employees already have among the strongest labor protections in

the nation. Amtrak labor contracts provide for severance pay of up to 5 years, during which period

Amtrak continues to pay for medical and dental insurance. In contrast, US Department of Labor

surveys indicate that most US employees have no severance pay (Table 1), much less continuing

health and dental benefits financed by former employers. Amtrak employees already have superior

separation benefits,58 which are ultimately guaranteed by taxpaying workers who typically have

little or no coverage themselves. 

Worse, the Action Plan would require the transfer of Amtrak labor contracts to new rail operators.

A similar “successorship” provision was rejected by an Amtrak-union arbitration panel in 1999 and

is not in current Amtrak labor contracts. Thus, the Action Plan would grant Amtrak’s unions special

privileges that they were unable to win in the bargaining process. Further, the ARC labor proposal

goes well beyond what even Congress has been willing to grant to Amtrak’s unions. Concerns have

already been raised by Congressman James Oberstar, who offers wise counsel:

... the Council seems to have made promises to organized labor that it cannot possibly deliver.

... This would appear to greatly constrain the range of recommendations that the Council can

put forth. I certainly hope that the Council would be wise enough to simply present its views,

even if unpopular... 59

Further, the Action Plan labor protection provision could sabotage state-based rail corridor projects

intended to expand passenger rail services. As services are transferred to the states, the overly

generous Action Plan provision would impose higher than competitive unit costs. This would

necessitate larger subsidies, lower service levels or both. 

Passenger rail’s potential can never be achieved if the interests of customers are subservient to those

of employees (or management). In the private sector, businesses placing internal interests before

customer interests fail. At Amtrak, operations continue, costs rise and inordinately large revenues

 

58 At average US employee compensation rates, this could approach a maximum advantage of up to $200,000 for individual Amtrak

workers (1999). 59 Letter to Mr. Gilbert Carmichael, Chairman, Amtrak Reform Council, from Representative James L. Oberstar, Ranking Member,

U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, January 9, 2002.
71

are extracted from taxpayers for no public purpose. Amtrak employees should be entitled to no

greater protection than their already superior benefits. More than that is both extravagant and unfair,

especially in the era of Enron. 

The Action Plan should have simply recommended labor protection consistent

with current labor contracts and applicable laws.

Res

pect

uall

y

submitted,

Wendell Cox

Table 1

Amtrak & Average US Employee: Severance Pay

Length of Amtrak Employees Average US Employee

Employment Wages Medical /Dental Wages Medical /Dental

Under 2 Years None None None None

2 to 3 Years 0.5 Years 0.5 Years None None

3+ to 5 Years 1.0 Years 1.0 Years None None

5+ to 10 Years 1.5 Years 1.5 Years None None

10+ to 15 Years 2.0 Years 2.0 Years None None

15+ to 20 Years 3.0 Years 3.0 Years None None

20+ to 25 Years 4.0 Years 4.0 Years None None

Over 25 Years 5.0 Years 5.0 Years None None
JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

72

THE COUNCIL

Gilbert E. Carmichael

 Chairman

Paul M. Weyrich

 Vice Chairman

Bruce Chapman

Nancy Rutledge Connery

James E. Coston

Wendell Cox 

Christopher K. Gleason

S. Lee Kling

Hon. Norman Y. Mineta

Charles Moneypenny

Hon. John O. Norquist

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Thomas A. Till

C. MR. LEE KLING’S CONCURRING OPINION

   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

February 4, 2002

Mr. Gilbert E. Carmichael

Chairman

Amtrak Reform Council

400 Seventh Street, SW

Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I came on to the Amtrak Reform Council with no preconceived thoughts

concerning Amtrak, nor necessarily any specific actions to be taken. Thus, I

believe I have been able to take an open-minded and constructive view of the

issues confronting Amtrak and the Amtrak Reform Council.

In the past few years, I have heard a lot and learned a lot more about

passenger rail, and Amtrak in particular.

With this in mind, I support the Amtrak Reform Council’s findings and the

recommendations in this report.

I do believe, however, that while this suggested plan has considerable merit,

this might not be the only plan possible, and changes and modification in it

or a completely different plan might be in order, depending on what actions

Congress might take.

Regardless of Congressional actions, if Amtrak in any form is to be funded

and continued, changes in its operating manner must be made. I mean by

this that Amtrak must operate on a more businesslike basis with greater fiscal

controls, restrictions, and more accountability, with better financial planning

for capital and operations and improved marketing programs and direction -

whenever appropriate, Amtrak should consider and implement privatization.
   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P. L. 105-134)

73

Mr. Gilbert E. Carmichael

February 4, 2002

Page Two

Congress, in its deliberation, should seriously consider eliminating political involvement and allow

decisions to be made on what best makes operational sense. A national rail system is in our national

interest, and needs to be adequately funded, but without political influence on day to day

operational aspects.

The Council report speaks to modern train sets, fast train sets and greater track availability to

accomplish modernization. This is what is needed to give our populous a means of moving through

our country in a safe, fast and comfortable environment and one that will serve our disadvantaged

and disabled citizens, as well as our more affluent. Of course, our national defense is a factor not to

be overlooked in this equation, as well as the need for a more multi model means of transportation.

Having said all this, much work has been done by the Council members, its executive director and

the staff in order to offer this analysis and report.

The report offers a well thought out, documented recommendation for propelling a sound national

rail system. At its best the report will be accepted in its entirety. At the least, it will be a document

to help let the debate begin.

Respectfully submitted,

S. Lee Kling

Council member

* I did not vote for the finding in November only because I thought the timing of the finding was

inappropriate—not the fact.
74

D. MR. CHARLES MONEYPENNY’S DISSENTING OPINION 
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76
77
78
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APPENDIX II: FINDING RESOLUTION

A Declaration by the Amtrak Reform Council

Preamble

Whereas, the Amtrak Reform Council is charged with oversight of Amtrak’s performance

under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, and

Whereas, the Council has reached a judgment regarding Amtrak’s performance, and 

Whereas, the Council believes that passenger rail can and should have a bright future in

America, and 

Whereas the Congress has declared that a national system of intercity rail passenger service

is essential to the overall transportation needs of America, and 

Whereas there are a variety of ways to realize this end, and

Whereas the Council has studied Amtrak’s institutional structure and performance and has

concluded that Amtrak, as it is currently structured, funded, and operated, is not capable of

delivering the improvements in passenger rail service that are needed, and 

Whereas the Council will provide recommendations for reform that can be implemented by

a transition that minimizes interruption of service and impact on the employees, and 

Whereas there is indisputable evidence that throughout the years since enactment of the

Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, Amtrak has not made any significant progress

toward operational self-sufficiency ―
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Resolution

The Amtrak Reform Council on this9th day of November 2001, resolves that –

1. Pursuant to Section 204 of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (Public Law

105-134) (ARAA), the Amtrak Reform Council, after taking into account and giving due

and careful consideration to all the relevant factors set forth in that section, formally finds

that Amtrak’s business performance will prevent it from meeting the financial goals set forth

in 49 U.S.C. 24101(d).

2. Pursuant to Section 204 of the ARAA, the Amtrak Reform Council, after taking into account

and giving due and careful consideration to all the relevant factors set forth in that section,

formally finds that Amtrak will require operating grant funds after December 2, 2002. 

3. Pursuant to Section 204(a) of the ARAA, the Council shall immediately notify the President,

the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the United States Senate and

the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the United States House of

Representatives of the above findings.

4. Pursuant to Section 204 (c) of the ARAA, the Council shall develop and submit to the

Congress an action plan for a restructured and rationalized national intercity rail passenger

system within 90 days of the above findings. 
81

Statutory Factors Considered in Finding

The Amtrak Reform Council has reached its finding that Amtrak will not achieve operational selfsufficiency by the statutory deadline of December 2, 2002. Nor will Amtrak, with a flawed

institutional framework and incentives, reach self-sufficiency by any reasonable later date. The

Council has also found, for the same reasons, that Amtrak, as structured and operated today, will

require operating grant funds after December 2, 2002.

As required by the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act (ARAA), the Council has considered the

following factors in reaching these conclusions.

A. Amtrak’s Performance

1. Amtrak's financial performance is worsening. Amtrak's FY2001 performance was worse than

its performance in FY2000 and is in a weaker financial position than prior to passage of the

ARAA.

2. Amtrak finished FY2000 more than $100 million behind its own Strategic Business Plan. Its

operating loss for purposes of the self-sufficiency test was $290 million1. 

3. For the first nine months of FY2001, the most recent period for which the Amtrak Reform

Council has received Amtrak's financial statements, Amtrak was $34 million behind its

Strategic Business Plan, and Amtrak was also $50 million behind its actual performance for the

first nine months of FY2000.

4. Annualizing Amtrak's nine-month results suggests that for FY2001, Amtrak will report

operating performance $185 million worse than its business plan, resulting in a loss of

approximately $365 million for self-sufficiency test purposes. Because Amtrak's practice has

been to heavily back-load projected operating improvements in its Strategic Business Plans to

the final quarter of the fiscal year, the loss for purposes of self-sufficiency could be more than

$365 million. 

5. Amtrak is not on a glide-path to operating self-sufficiency. The statutory deadline of

December 2, 2002 for operational self-sufficiency is not a finish line. It is instead the starting

point from which Amtrak must sustain operations over the long run without federal operating

assistance. Amtrak's contentions to the contrary, simply meeting an annual target for reduced

federal operating funding does not mean Amtrak is making meaningful strides toward selfsufficiency. Amtrak has been able to continue operations with more limited federal operating

funds by using Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA) capital funds for operating purposes and by

engaging in counterproductive practices and transactions that have weakened the overall

financial and physical condition of the company. Federal operating grants for Amtrak may be

 

1 Importantly, this is the self-sufficiency test as it has been defined by Amtrak. This definition excludes depreciation

and other non-cash items, capital funds used for certain equipment maintenance expenses that are actually operating

expenses ("progressive overhauls"), and excess Railroad Retirement taxes. On a Generally Accepted Accounting

Principles (GAAP) basis, Amtrak's loss was $943 million in fiscal year 2000.
82

declining, but Amtrak’s losses for purposes of operational self-sufficiency are increasing (see

Attachment 1). Actions taken by Amtrak that are probative that it is not on a glide-path to

operating self-sufficiency include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Tripling Amtrak’s debt in the past five years to about $3 billion60 including more than $1

billion due to the sale, leaseback and financing of existing equipment and other assets.

Specifically, three FY2000 sale-leaseback transactions totaling $915 million raised $124

million of additional funds not included in Amtrak's FY2000 Strategic Business Plan.

These additional funds were used to offset cash flow shortfalls resulting from actual

FY2000 performance that was approximately $100 million below its Strategic Business

Plan. 

(b) Mortgaging a portion of Penn Station to obtain a $300 million loan that was used to avoid

running out of cash in FY2001. 

(c) Deferring maintenance of way expenditures called for in Amtrak's Strategic Business Plan

levels in FY2001. These reductions offset increases in other operating expenses, but they

reduced Northeast Corridor maintenance below levels needed to sustain operational

reliability. 

6. Amtrak's assets are deteriorating from deferrals of maintenance expenses as evidenced by

increases in numbers of hours of delay on the Northeast Corridor due to infrastructure problems

(see Attachment 2).

7. Amtrak has been unable to meet its goals for revenue growth and cost containment.

(a) Initiation of Acela Express service, Amtrak’s showcase product and the linchpin for

achieving operational self-sufficiency, was delayed more than a year. Even at this writing,

only 14 of 20 Acela trainsets are in service. The ramp-up to expected ridership and

revenue levels (incremental revenues of $300 million annually and profit contribution of

$180 million) has also been slower than expected. Of most concern is that when it

became apparent that Acela would be delayed, Amtrak did not implement a contingency

plan to reduce costs or increase other revenues.

(b) Amtrak mail and express is growing more slowly than expected.

(c) Amtrak’s ridership and revenues in FY2001, while up over FY2000, were 5.1 percent and

8.4 percent respectively below Amtrak’s Strategic Business Plan.

8. Amtrak’s costs have been growing faster than its revenues. Amtrak has projected significant

overall cost reductions in its strategic business plans since 1999. Amtrak, however, did not

define specific cost reduction initiatives until FY2001, and those proposals total only $75

million annually, exclusive of any savings from Amtrak's reduction in force currently being

implemented, clearly inadequate to meet Amtrak's strategic business plan projections. 

 

60 The approximately $3 billion of debt includes almost $1 billion of debt that is economically but not legally defeased.

Even excluding such defeased debt, Amtrak's debt has more than doubled.
83

9. Amtrak first took action to reduce management overhead costs well into FY2001. This was

more than three years after the self-sufficiency requirement was established and after Amtrak

chose to take a $300 million loan on a portion of Penn Station. 

10. The Council is aware that Amtrak recently retained the consulting services of McKinsey and

Company in an effort to improve its financial performance. Amtrak has not informed the

Council of the scope of McKinsey's work (which, according to Amtrak, is not yet completed)

and the Council thus cannot comment on it. However, to have had an impact on Amtrak's

ability to reach self-sufficiency by December 2, 2002, McKinsey's recommendations would

have needed to have been implemented at least one to two years sooner.

11. At the outset of this critical fiscal year, Amtrak had no Board-approved, strategic business plan

in place. The Council believes that unless Amtrak has at least a preliminary business plan

developed and in place well before the start of a fiscal year, with specific financial, operating

and service goals identified and monitored by managerial responsibility center, Amtrak will not

achieve its Strategic Business Plan objectives.

12. Amtrak does not use its strategic business plans effectively to manage Amtrak and bring about

change. Amtrak's FY2000-FY2004 Strategic Business Plan, for example, contained a total of

$737 million in undefined management actions to reduce costs. Amtrak's FY2001 Business

Plan was not released until the second quarter of the fiscal year.

13. Except with respect to certain statutorily-mandated changes in employee protection conditions,

Amtrak has made no use of the reforms enacted under the ARAA. Although Amtrak was given

authority to cut unprofitable routes, it has not done so. Although the Reform Act provided

Amtrak with new authority to contract out operations where cost savings could result, it has not

taken any such actions. Indeed, Amtrak did not even place the "contracting out" issue on the

bargaining table until June 2000, although the statute required it to do so by November 1, 1999.

14. Amtrak has no standard in place by which to measure the productivity of its work force. As the

GAO concluded, the development of such a standard is essential if Amtrak is to control its

labor costs, which constitute over 50 percent of its operating costs. Amtrak also has no

standards in place to measure the productivity of capital, energy, or materials, which constitute

the remainder of its costs. 

15. In the business judgment of the Council, Amtrak could have taken more effective measures to

meet operational self-sufficiency. If Amtrak had been on top of its business plans earlier, it

could have implemented contingency plans of corrective actions to offset the delay in the

introduction of Acela Express. It also could have undertaken cost cutting measures,

particularly overhead cost reductions. Amtrak has not made an effective attempt to achieve

self-sufficiency.

B. The Findings of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation
84

1. In his September 2000 report to Congress, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of

Transportation ("IG") concluded that “Without major corrective action Amtrak will not

achieve operating self-sufficiency in 2003.” The report noted that ridership and revenue

trends were positive but that expenses were growing faster than revenues and had kept

Amtrak’s cash loss from declining. The IG concluded that Amtrak needed to curtail expense

growth to achieve operational self-sufficiency “Amtrak’s Plan projects operating selfsufficiency largely on the back of the $737 million in undefined management actions...Time

is running short to develop and put into place the meaningful actions needed to close the gaps

we have identified.”

2. In testimony before the Railroad Subcommittee of the House Transportation and

Infrastructure Committee in July, 2001, the Inspector General stated that “Amtrak’s financial

performance has not met expectations and Amtrak’s ability to meet its self-sufficiency

mandate is in serious jeopardy. . .. Amtrak’s window for incrementally improving its bottom

line is rapidly closing. Amtrak has not been successful in closing significant portions of the

gap each year, and now has very little time to reduce its annual cash losses by over $300

million.” The Inspector General went on to note that: “We have no doubt that Amtrak could

make the kind of draconian cuts necessary to meet its self-sufficiency mandate on time, but it

should not do so at the cost of the assets and human resources necessary to maintain a healthy

railroad beyond 2003. Such a victory would be hollow and have serious repercussions for the

future of intercity passenger rail.” The Inspector General encouraged Congress to act sooner

rather than later on the subject of Amtrak’s future.

3. The Inspector General’s office is expected to issue its report on Amtrak’s actual performance

and its FY2001 Strategic Business Plan at the end of November, 2001. Although the report

itself is not available at this time, discussions regarding the report were recently conducted by

the staffs of the Amtrak Reform Council and the Inspector General. Based on these

discussions, it is evident that the Inspector General and the Council have reached comparable

conclusions about Amtrak’s performance in FY2001. The Inspector General’s staff believes

the terrorist attacks on September 11th may cause a sustainable increase in Amtrak ridership,

particularly on the south end of the Northeast Corridor, but that this alone will not enable

Amtrak to achieve self-sufficiency.

C. The Level Of Federal Funds Available For Carrying Out Amtrak’s Financial Plan

1. The ARAA authorized appropriations for Amtrak totaling $5.2 billion for the fiscal years

1998 through 2002. Amtrak’s actual appropriations over this period total $2.8 billion, or

about 55 percent of the authorized amount. Amtrak, however, also received $2.2 billion in

grants under the Taxpayer Relief Act over this period, bringing Amtrak’s total appropriations

to $5.0 billion, or about $150 million short of the total funding authorized. 

2. Amtrak did not effectively utilize the approximately $2.2 billion of TRA funds it received.

Although, Amtrak represented that TRA funds would be used primarily for high-return capital

expenditures, about 25 percent of total TRA commitments were used for expenditures that
85

most companies and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) would treat as

ordinary operating expenses.

3. In each of the first four years of the five-year period for achieving operational selfsufficiency, Amtrak received the amount of funding its Strategic Business Plans forecast as

needed to achieve operational self-sufficiency. Amtrak did not suggest it needed, nor did

Amtrak request, funding at the fully authorized level.61 Amtrak's business plan for the period

FY2001-FY2005 stated that Amtrak would need to receive a grant at the fully authorized

level of $955 million. Amtrak's actual appropriation is $521 million or $434 million less than

requested for FY2002. Amtrak supported this lower appropriation, however, concluding that

receiving the full $521 million at the beginning of the fiscal year would be more valuable to

Amtrak than receiving only 40 percent of $955 million at the beginning of FY2002 and the

remaining 60 percent at the end of the year. 

4. It is arguable whether Amtrak would have achieved self-sufficiency as of December 2, 2002 if

it had requested and received both the TRA funds and all authorized funds (a total of $7.4

billion). In the business judgment of the Council, while another $2.4 billion in funding over

the period FY1998-FY2002 might have enabled Amtrak to start operations after December 2,

2002 without immediate resort to federal operating assistance, it would not have enabled

Amtrak to sustain operational self-sufficiency over the long term. Based on Amtrak's use of

TRA funds and Amtrak’s lack of effective management tools and business focus, it is the

business judgment of the Council that Amtrak would not have effectively spent the money on

capital projects necessary to improve its bottom line. Indeed, Amtrak did not even define its

long-term capital needs until fiscal year 2001. Moreover, Amtrak's capital needs are so vast

that the $2.4 billion, even if effectively spent, would only have covered a small percentage of

Amtrak's essential needs, including deferred maintenance.

D. Acts Of God, National Emergencies, And Other Events Beyond The Reasonable Control Of

Amtrak

1. The terrorist attacks on September 11th caused a brief spike in Amtrak's ridership. For the

month as a whole, however, Amtrak's ridership was 6.4 percent lower than in September,

2000, and was 16.3 percent less than projected in Amtrak's Strategic Business Plan. It is too

soon to tell whether Amtrak will attract additional riders in the coming months due to

lengthier security procedures at airports.

2. Higher ridership and revenue could help improve Amtrak's financial condition. However,

Amtrak has historically been unable to convert increases in ridership to bottom line

profitability. This pattern is apparently not changing. As part of its initial request for $3.2

billion in emergency funding, Amtrak said that it needed $77 million to cover incremental

 

61 See Amtrak’s Strategic Business Plan FY1999 - 2000, p. 51. Under key assumptions, Amtrak’s plan assumes

receiving the TRA funds and that a “Federal capital appropriation is equal to $609 million for FY1999.” See also

Amtrak’s Strategic Business Plan for FY2001 – 2005, p. 25. Key assumptions include “Amtrak receives $521 million

from a federal capital grant in FY2001, and a federal capital appropriation in FY2002 at or above Amtrak’s authorized

level of $955 million.”
86

operating losses associated with in 15-20 percent increase in ridership after September 11th.

These added costs were attributed to overtime, reservation services, and mechanical terminals,

not to security-related expenses.

3. The events of September 11th are not the reason Amtrak will fail to achieve self-sufficiency.

Amtrak will fail to pass the test because it will not have used the past five years to get its

house in order by better managing revenues, expenses and productivity. September 11th has

demonstrated, however, that rail passenger service can provide an important complement to

other modes of transportation. It has become even more important to reform Amtrak, or

replace it if necessary, to achieve efficient, productive and service-conscious passenger rail

service in the United States. 
87

Finding Resolution: Attachment I

Operating Self-Sufficiency

0 

100 

200 

300 

400 

500 

1999 2000 2001

($millions)

Operating loss for purposes of self-sufficiency

Federal operating support (excluding RRTA)

(ARC f orecast loss)

(loss based on actual

results for nine months, 

FY2001)

$59

$184

$318

$296 $290

$365

$425
88

Finding Resolution: Attachment II

Growth in Minutes of Delay on the Northeast Corridor, 

1998 - 2000

6,859

12,756

9,698 9,015

8,213 5,889

6,240

11,811 18,111

18,315

1,860

6,377

7,672

4,127

3,074

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

1998 1999 2000

Bridges and

buildings

Communication

and Signals

Speed

restrictions

Maintenance of

way

Electric traction
   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997

(P. L. 105-134)

89

THE COUNCIL

Gilbert E. Carmichael

 Chairman

Paul M. Weyrich

 Vice Chairman

Bruce Chapman

Nancy Rutledge Connery

James E. Coston

Wendell Cox 

Christopher K. Gleason

S. Lee Kling

Hon. Norman Y. Mineta

Charles Moneypenny

Hon. John O. Norquist

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Thomas A. Till

November 12, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush

President 

United States of America

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

This letter transmits, as provided for in section 204 (a) of the Amtrak Reform and

Accountability Act of 1997 (Reform Act), a finding by the Amtrak Reform

Council that Amtrak will not be operationally self-sufficient by December 2, 2002,

as the Reform Act requires. Also provided is a companion document that sets forth

the grounds for the Council’s decision. 

Amtrak’s financial performance over the past four years has provided clear and

indisputable evidence for this conclusion. Amtrak has made no significant

progress toward self-sufficiency. But the problem goes much beyond financial

performance. 

In the Council’s assessment, there are major inherent flaws and weaknesses in

Amtrak’s institutional design. Amtrak simply cannot conceive and implement the

improvements that are needed in intercity rail passenger service in the United

States. America has a critically-flawed rail passenger company. America needs a

sound passenger rail program. 

A growing number of states, regions, and corridors are placing increased reliance

on improved intercity passenger rail service in short- to medium-haul corridors.

The challenges they face as they seek to expand economical and well-planned

passenger rail services are complicated by the lack of a responsible program

structure at either the state or federal level. A new program must encompass

effective organizations and related funding mechanisms to support both train

operations and the provision of adequate infrastructure. 

This is why the Council believes that the reauthorization debate for passenger rail

service in the second session of the 107th Congress must be like no other such

debate before it. The coming debate must address root causes and real reforms, not

simply apply more funding through an approach that has failed again and again. 

The Council believes that, under a program that fosters imaginative and innovative

approaches, intercity passenger rail transportation can and should play a larger and

growing role in selected corridors.

The plan (“an action plan for a restructured and rationalized national intercity rail
   AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL   

JM-ARC, Room 7105 Phone: (202) 366-0591

400 Seventh Street, SW Fax: (202) 493-2061

Washington, DC 20590



The ARC is an independent federal commission established under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997

(P. L. 105-134)

90

passenger system”) that the Council sends to the Congress within 90 days, as called for by the

Reform Act, will provide the Council’s recommendations for the needed reforms.

Very truly yours,

Gilbert E. Carmichael

Chairman

Enclosures

Identical Letters to: The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings, 

Chairman 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

U. S. Senate

The Honorable Don Young

Chairman

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee

U. S. House of Representatives
91

APPENDIX III: AMTRAK’S CAPITAL PLAN

Summary of Passenger Service Funding Needs (FY2001 -- FY2020)

Total Need

(millions of 2000 $)

AMTRAK ESTIMATE

Capital Project Category Current Service Needs Growth Service Needs Total NeedNortheast Corridor Infrastructure 6,949 $ 15,830 $ 22,77

$ 

Other Infrastructure 2,734 $ 2,73

$ 

 Other Corridors $ 34,19

34,190 $ 

 Long-Distance Point-to-Point 8,865 $ 8,86

$ 

Equipment 5,985 $ 10,980 $ 16,96

$ 

Stations/Facilities 2,590 $ 3,160 $ 5,75

$ 

Mail and Express 1,015 $ 1,01

$ 

Information Technology 1,330 $ 1,33

$ 

Debt Service 2,790 $ 155 $ 2,94

$ 

Program Management 200 $ $ 400 $ 60

 Grand Total $ 73,580 23,593 $ 97,17

$ 
92

APPENDIX IV: AMTRAK RIDERSHIP

A. AMTRAK RIDERSHIP 1972 - 2001 

Amtrak Yearly Ridership (in millions)

-

5.0

10.015.020.025.0

1972197419761978198019821984198619881990199219941996

(millions of passengers)
93

B. AMTRAK SEPTEMBER RIDERSHIP 2001 CHART

AMTRAK SEPTEMBER 2001 RIDERSHIP 6.4% Less Than Last Year

30,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000

SAT,

SEPT

1

SUN,

SEPT

2

MON,

SEPT

3

TUES,

SEPT

4

WED,

SEPT

5

THU,

SEPT

6

FRI,

SEPT

7

SAT,

SEPT

8

SUN,

SEPT

9

MON,

SEPT

1

0

TUES,

SEPT

1

1

WED,

SEPT

1

2

THU,

SEPT

1

3

FRI,

SEPT

1

4

SAT,

SEPT

1

5

SUN,

SEPT

1

6

MON,

SEPT

1

7

TUES,

SEPT

1

8

WED,

SEPT

1

9

THU,

SEPT

20

FRI,

SEPT

21

SAT,

SEPT

22

SUN,

SEPT

23

MON,

SEPT

24

TUES,

SEPT

25

WED,

SEPT

26

THU,

SEPT

27

F

RIDERSHIP

 37,129

Tuesday

SEPT 11TH

74,352 S

Friday

SEPT 21ST

 63,043

 Friday

 SEPT 14TH

73,960

Friday

SEPT 7TH

42,516

Saturday

SEPT 8TH 38,458

Saturday

SEPT 15TH

38,156

Saturday

SEPT 22ND

Average Daily Ridershipfor FY 2001 (64,366)49,271

Sunday

SEPT 2ND
94

C. AMTRAK SEPTEMBER RIDERSHIP 2001 ACTUAL NUMBERS 

Date Of Departure

Date Day Riders Revenue Riders Revenue Riders Revenue Riders 

Sep. 01 Saturday 25,997 1,340,053 16,979 1,290,831 17,226 452,298 60,202 

Sep. 02 Sunday 20,917 1,093,434 14,272 1,141,723 14,082 378,041 49,271 Sep. 03 Monday 30,464 1,906,222 14,889 1,093,853 14,957 524,391 60,310 Sep. 04 Tuesday 38,528 1,812,953 12,590 999,369 12,242 271,895 63,360 Sep. 05 Wednesday 38,347 1,876,089 10,997 974,508 11,680 249,496 61,024 Sep. 06 Thursday 39,649 1,991,643 12,052 1,033,994 10,963 242,626 62,664 Sep. 07 Friday 44,970 2,378,200 13,976 1,042,554 15,014 318,047 73,960 Sep. 08 Saturday 19,079 971,803 11,759 952,070 11,678 288,423 42,516 Sep. 09 Sunday 27,998 1,679,695 13,466 1,057,726 12,374 304,480 53,838 Sep. 10 Monday 39,498 2,057,775 9,992 829,381 11,323 298,629 60,813 Sep. 11 Tuesday 19,371 934,877 9,840 1,019,189 7,915 188,203 37,126 Sep. 12 Wednesday 30,982 1,784,984 13,477 1,562,306 9,414 237,306 53,873 Sep. 13 Thursday 31,179 1,695,743 15,528 1,760,161 9,881 268,169 56,588 Sep. 14 Friday 35,133 2,013,024 15,914 1,643,597 11,996 346,758 63,043 Sep. 15 Saturday 15,760 895,490 13,626 1,472,347 9,072 267,242 38,458 Sep. 16 Sunday 23,028 1,484,039 14,483 1,470,403 10,106 306,377 47,617 Sep. 17 Monday 34,092 1,657,175 11,024 1,141,100 10,661 290,737 55,777 Sep. 18 Tuesday 30,244 1,423,228 11,017 1,170,145 9,348 232,286 50,609 Sep. 19 Wednesday 36,174 1,912,999 11,372 1,154,977 10,137 238,998 57,683 Sep. 20 Thursday 39,468 2,162,883 13,127 1,180,458 10,552 229,007 63,147 Sep. 21 Friday 45,303 2,584,304 14,826 1,254,980 14,223 330,480 74,352 Sep. 22 Saturday 15,657 881,648 12,343 1,098,487 10,156 258,843 38,156 Sep. 23 Sunday 27,929 1,814,845 15,268 1,265,881 11,432 302,467 54,629 Sep. 24 Monday 38,974 2,187,078 10,771 972,521 9,905 231,121 59,650 Sep. 25 Tuesday 38,371 2,186,150 10,067 981,896 9,193 204,263 57,631 Sep. 26 Wednesday 40,321 2,262,914 11,128 1,007,583 10,072 220,914 61,521 Sep. 27 Thursday 38,495 2,062,323 13,100 1,112,165 10,487 224,665 62,082 Sep. 28 Friday 50,264 2,863,838 15,261 1,250,944 14,774 307,892 80,299 Sep. 29 Saturday 19,904 1,110,558 14,357 1,242,807 12,867 295,428 47,128 Sep. 30 Sunday 32,422 2,166,539 15,180 1,220,098 12,764 314,315 60,366 

Totals 968,518 53,192,503 392,681 35,398,053 346,494 8,623,797 1,707,693 

Average Ticket Price $54.92 $90.14 $24.89 

NEC SBU Intercity SBU Western SBU TOTAL AMTRA
95

D. ACELA RIDERSHIP SINCE DECEMBER 2000

ACELA Express Ridership & Ticket Revenue Through December 2001

Actual Implied Acela Express Revenues & Riders

ACTUAL RIDERSHIP & REVENUES Equivalent Based On $300 Million Revenues From 18

Number Of Trainsets In Service & $120 Average Fare

Average Acela Express Projected Projected

Ticket Revenue Per Trainsets Implied Ticket Revenue Per

Month (FY2001) Ridership Revenue Passenger In Service Ridership Revenue Passenger

December 2000 (Acela #1 on 11th) 8,848 1,024,513 115.79 0.68 7,841 940,860 120.00

 January 2001 12,138 1,383,449 113.98 1.00 11,574 1,388,889 120.00

 February 2001 12,324 1,410,726 114.47 1.00 11,574 1,388,889 120.00

 March 2001 (Acela # 2 & 3 on 5th) 22,151 2,717,868 122.70 2.74 31,735 3,808,244 120.00

 April 2001 (Acela #4 & 5 on 29th) 24,611 2,952,109 119.95 3.20 37,037 4,444,444 120.00

 May 2001 50,414 5,792,290 114.89 5.00 57,870 6,944,444 120.00

 June 2001 52,197 6,002,097 114.99 5.00 57,870 6,944,444 120.00

 July 2001 (Acela #6 & 7 on 9th) 72,096 7,947,024 110.23 6.48 75,045 9,005,376 120.00

 August 2001 (Acela # 8 & 9 on 13th) 96,037 10,551,523 109.87 8.23 95,206 11,424,731 120.00

 September 2001 (Acela # 10 & 11 on 30th) 110,980 13,073,935 117.80 9.07 104,938 12,592,593 120.00

Totals Through September 30, 2001 461,796 52,855,534 114.46 490,691 58,882,915 120.00

 October 2001 201,176 24,066,716 119.63 11.00 127,315 15,277,778 120.00

 November 2001 193,859 22,968,788 118.48 11.00 127,315 15,277,778 120.00

 December 2001 175,089 20,323,039 116.07 11.00 127,315 15,277,778 120.00

Totals Through December 30, 2001 1,031,920 120,214,077 116.50 872,635 104,716,249 120.00

MEMO: Combined Metroliner/Acela Express FY2001 vs. FY2000 - 12 Months Through September 30

Oct. 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001 2,652,358 263,040,815 99.17

Oct. 1, 1999 to September 30, 2000 2,408,244 216,350,046 89.84

Change In Metroliner/Acela: FY2001 vs. FY2000 244,114 46,690,769 9.34

MEMO: Metroliner EXCLUDING Acela Express: FY2001 vs FY2000 - 12 Months Through September 30

Oct. 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001 2,190,562 210,185,281 95.95

Oct. 1, 1999 to September 30, 2000 2,408,244 216,350,046 89.84

Change In Metroliner Only: FY2001 vs. FY2000 (217,682) (6,164,765) 6.11

MEMO: Combined Metroliner/Acela Express - October, November and December 2001 vs. 2000

Oct./Nov./Dec. 2001 Combined Metroliner/Acela Express 894,600 99,880,200 111.65

Oct./Nov./Dec. 2000 Combined Metroliner/Acela Express 648,000 61,520,800 94.94

Change In Combined Metroliner/Acela: Oct. Through Dec. 

2001 vs. Oct. Through Dec. 2000 246,600 38,359,400 16.71

MEMO: Metroliner EXCLUDING Acela Express - October Through December 2001 vs October Through December 2000

 October, November, & December 2001 324,476 32,521,657 100.23

 October, November & December 2000 639,152 60,496,287 94.65

Change In Metroliner Only: Oct./Nov./Dec. 2001 vs. 2000 (314,676) (27,974,630) 5.58
96

APPENDIX V: AMTRAK’S 2001 PROFIT/LOSS OF INDIVIDUAL

ROUTES

2001 Route Profitability System Report*

 Ridership (000) 

Revenue 

Excluding State 

Payments 

(millions)

State 

Payments 

(millions)

Total 

Revenue 

(millions)

Total Costs 

excluding 

depreciation 

(millions) 

Profit/Loss on 

Full Costs 

(millions)

 Loss per 

Rider 

(Full Costs) 

Operating Ratio - 

expenses divided by 

revenues (revenues 

include state 

subsidies)

Corridor Trains

Keystone & Clocker Service (Rts. 13, 14 42.4 2.8 45.2 65.6 (20.4) 3,021 $ (6.75) 1.45

Route 01 Metroliner/Acela Express 2,652 271.2 0.0 271.2 220.0 51.3 $ 19.33 0.81

Route 03 Ethan Allen Express 42 2.0 0.2 2.2 4.5 (2.2) $ (52.91) 1.99

Route 04 Vermonter 69 4.3 1.5 5.8 6.4 (0.6) $ (9.09) 1.11

Route 05 NE Direct/Acela Regional 6,262 328.6 0.0 328.6 400.1 (71.5) $ (11.42) 1.22

Route 15 Empire Service 1,304 52.5 0.0 52.5 89.0 (36.5) $ (27.97) 1.69

Route 20 Chicago-St.Louis 254 7.8 3.8 11.5 27.7 (16.1) $ (63.63) 2.40

Route 21 Hiawathas 424 7.6 5.1 12.6 26.0 (13.3) $ (31.47) 2.06

Route 22 Chicago-Pontiac 295 9.7 0.0 9.7 30.9 (21.2) $ (71.95) 3.20

Route 23 Illini 105 3.5 2.4 6.0 9.1 (3.1) $ (29.75) 1.52

Route 24 Illinois Zephyr 100 2.7 2.8 5.5 8.2 (2.7) $ (27.09) 1.49

Route 29 Heartland Flyer 58 1.2 4.6 5.8 5.2 0.6 $ 9.93 0.90

Route 35 Pacific Surfliner 1,716 31.0 21.5 52.5 78.6 (26.1) $ (15.21) 1.50

Route 36 Cascades 565 15.5 16.3 31.8 38.1 (6.3) $ (11.21) 1.20

Route 37 Capitols 1,073 11.7 18.4 30.2 34.6 (4.4) $ (4.11) 1.15

Route 39 San Joaquins 712 19.8 23.2 43.0 52.0 (9.0) $ (12.62) 1.21

Route 40 Adirondack 100 4.4 2.7 7.1 7.8 (0.7) $ (7.29) 1.10

Route 41 International 105 3.4 3.7 7.1 10.0 (2.9) $ (27.47) 1.41

Route 56 Kansas City-St.Louis 177 4.5 6.1 10.5 12.6 (2.1) $ (11.75) 1.20

Route 65 Pere Marquette 59 1.9 2.2 4.1 6.6 (2.5) $ (42.61) 1.61

Route 67 Piedmont 51 0.7 3.2 4.0 5.0 (1.0) $ (20.35) 1.26

Totals, corridor trains 19,146 826.4 120.4 946.9 1137.9 (191.1) (9.98) $ 1.20

Long Distance Trains

Route 16 Silver Star 266 30.7 0.0 30.7 60.8 (30.0) $ (112.86) 1.98

Route 17 Three Rivers 134 26.5 0.0 26.5 59.3 (32.8) $ (244.69) 2.24

Route 18 Cardinal 68 4.4 0.0 4.4 17.1 (12.6) $ (186.91) 3.85

Route 19 Silver Meteor 252 28.5 0.0 28.5 49.8 (21.2) $ (84.12) 1.74

Route 25 Empire Builder 398 53.3 0.0 53.3 98.7 (45.4) $ (114.14) 1.85

Route 26 Capitol Limited 154 21.4 0.0 21.4 45.6 (24.2) $ (157.33) 2.13

Route 27 California Zephyr 361 51.7 0.0 51.7 103.7 (52.0) $ (143.93) 2.01

Route 28 Southwest Chief 265 65.9 0.0 65.9 128.7 (62.8) $ (236.76) 1.95

Route 30 City of New Orleans 187 15.3 0.0 15.3 39.1 (23.7) $ (126.81) 2.55

Route 32 Texas Eagle 149 22.4 0.0 22.4 60.7 (38.4) $ (258.25) 2.72

Route 33 Sunset Limited 110 17.7 0.0 17.7 56.1 (38.3) $ (347.45) 3.16

Route 34 Coast Starlight 494 41.2 0.0 41.2 87.1 (45.9) $ (92.98) 2.11

Route 45 Lake Shore Limited 293 30.6 0.0 30.6 72.4 (41.9) $ (142.65) 2.37

Route 48 Silver Palm 219 28.3 0.0 28.3 57.0 (28.7) $ (131.31) 2.01

Route 52 Crescent 265 30.8 0.0 30.8 65.8 (35.0) $ (132.37) 2.14

Route 54 Kentucky Cardinal* 29 1.4 0.0 1.4 7.6 (6.2) $ (211.65) 5.39

Route 57 Pennsylvanian 90 9.2 0.0 9.2 35.4 (26.3) $ (292.34) 3.87

Route 63 Auto Train 214 54.6 0.0 54.6 66.4 (11.8) $ (54.96) 1.22

Route 66 Carolinian 242 13.5 2.7 16.2 20.2 (4.0) $ (16.37) 1.24

 Totals, long-distance trains 4,190.0 547.5 2.7 550.2 1131.4 (581.2) (138.71) $ 2.06

Grand Total, all trains 23,335.7 1374.0 123.1 1497.1 2269.3 (772.2) (33.09) $ 1.52

Source: Amtrak; excludes special trains and $4.3 million in unallocated labor expense 

* Kentucky Cardinal classified as a long-distance train because it is an overnight train with sleeping accomm
97

APPENDIX VI: INTERNATIONAL MODELS

Precedent Passenger Rail Restructuring Models Worldwide

Infrastructure 

separated from 

Operations

Open Access Franchise 

Operations

Regional 

Focus Subsidized Privatized

Japan X X X X *

United Kingdom X/ **

Sweden X X

Italy *** X

Hong-Kong XX X

Singapore X X/ ** 

** 

Australia *** 

*** X ** 

***

Amtrak X XXX X

Amtrak Reform 

Council 

Recommendation

X Optional Optional

 Exhibits the attribute, e.g. separates infrastructure from operations

X Does not exhibit the attribute; e.g. does not separate infrastructure from operations

* Costly capital projects are undertaken by the Japan Railway Construction Corporation (a state-owned entity) and 

 subsequently leased to the JRs over a very long period.

** In Great Britain, operators must compete for franchises; thereafter, in most cases, the operator enjoys exclusive access.

*** Italy is contemplating limited on-rail competition.

  Singapore - Government develops infrastucture; competition for network operations

** *** Australia: Infrastructure leased to operators

****** Some Australian states to have a form of separation

Source: UBS Warburg, with Sweden and Amtrak Reform Council recommendations added