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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. Case No. 4:21-mj-09-MAF 

DANIEL ALAN BAKER, 

Defendant. 

 / 

ORDER OF DETENTION PENDING TRIAL 

 On January 21, 2021, this court conducted a detention hearing pursuant to the 

Bail Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq. Based upon the 

information contained in the Pretrial Services Report, the evidence presented at the 

hearing, and the arguments of counsel, this court finds that the Defendant must be 

detained pending trial because no condition or combination of conditions reasonably 

would assure the safety of the community. 

Part I—Eligibility for Detention 

The “Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused 

of crimes are available for trials.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452-53, 133 S. 

Ct. 1958, 1972-73 (2013) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 

1871 (1979)). To safeguard victims, witnesses, and the community, and to ensure 

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that defendants are present at their trials, defendants “legitimately may be 

incarcerated by the Government prior to a determination of their guilt or innocence 

. . . .” Bell, 441 U.S. at 523, 99 S. Ct. at 1865-66. To detain a defendant prior to trial, 

however, “the Government must comply with constitutional requirements and any 

applicable statutory provisions.” Id. at 534 n.15, 99 S. Ct. at 1871 n.15 (citation 

omitted). In this case, under the Bail Reform Act as amended, the Defendant is 

eligible for detention. 

Part II—Standard 

 “The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court with two choices when 

dealing with a criminal defendant who has been ‘charged with an offense’ and is 

awaiting trial . . . .” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2025 (1995). 

A court may either release a defendant on appropriate conditions or detain the 

defendant. Id. In determining whether detention is appropriate, courts must keep in 

mind that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 

carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S. Ct. 

2095, 2105 (1987). The policy of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 “is to permit release 

under the least restrictive condition compatible with assuring the future appearance 

of the defendant” and the safety of the community. United States v. Price, 773 F.2d 

1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 

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“A criminal defendant must be released before trial on personal recognizance 

or upon execution of an unsecured bond, unless the court determines that release will 

not reasonably ensure his appearance or will endanger the safety of others.” Taylor 

v. Pekerol, 760 F. App’x 647, 653 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. 3142(b)). On 

the other hand, a defendant must be detained pending trial if he presents a serious 

risk of flight or poses a danger to another person or members of the community. 

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S. Ct. at 2102; see United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 

495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1990) (noting that the Bail Reform Act 

“directs a judicial officer to detain a person charged, pending trial, if the Government 

has made the necessary showing of dangerousness or risk of flight”). Before 

detaining a defendant pending trial, however, the Government must establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant poses a serious risk of flight or show 

by clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to another person or the 

community. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750, 107 S. Ct. at 2103; United States v. 

Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 917 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. King, 849 F.2d 

485, 488-89 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th 

Cir. 1985). 

It is important to note that the term “danger to the community” was “not meant 

to refer only to the risk of physical violence.” United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 

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880, 884 (1st Cir. 1990). Safety of the community under § 3142(e) is not limited to 

the danger of physical violence, but “refers to the danger that the defendant might 

engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community.” United States v. 

Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. 

Supp. 2d 433, 438-39 (D. N.J. 2007) (noting that “danger to the community does not 

only include physical harm or violent behavior”); United States v. Gibson, 481 F. 

Supp. 2d 419, 423 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that “violence is not the only danger to 

the community this court must consider”). 

Clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness exists when the evidence 

induces “an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly 

probable.’” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2437-38 

(1984). “Clear and convincing evidence” entails more than a preponderance of the 

evidence, but less than evidence establishing a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808-09 (1979). 

Accordingly, to show by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant poses a 

danger to the community, the United States need not prove that there is a 100% 

chance that the defendant will commit harmful acts. Rather, the concept of danger 

entails probability of harm and, thus, demonstrating a substantial risk of harm is 

sufficient. United States v. Shea, 749 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (D. Mass. 1990) (“The 

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term ‘danger’ invokes a concept of probability (commonly referred to as risk of 

harm) rather than certainty of harm.”). 

As discussed above, if the government satisfies its burden of demonstrating 

dangerousness, the Bail Reform Act requires the detention of a defendant. MontalvoMurillo, 495 U.S. at 717, 110 S. Ct. at 2077 (“The Act . . . requires pretrial detention 

of certain persons charged with federal crimes and directs a judicial officer to detain 

a person charged, pending trial, if the Government has made the necessary showing 

of dangerousness or risk of flight.”); United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1209 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The Bail Reform Act requires that a defendant be detained prior 

to trial if there is clear and convincing evidence that no conditions placed upon his 

release would reasonably assure the safety of the community.”). A defendant may 

be detained based either on the risk of nonappearance or his dangerousness; the 

government is not required to establish both. King, 849 F.2d at 488-89; accord 

United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1417 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Because we conclude 

that detention is required on risk of flight grounds, we need not address the issue 

whether appellant also presents a danger to the community.”). 

In determining whether there are conditions of release that reasonably might 

assure the appearance of the Defendant at trial and the safety of the community, 

courts must consider: 

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(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether 

the offense is a crime of violence . . . or involves . . . a controlled substance” or a 

firearm; 

(2) “the weight of the evidence against the person”; 

(3) “the history and characteristics of the person,” including “the person’s 

character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial 

resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, 

history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning 

appearance at court proceedings”; and 

(4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community 

that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 

Part III—Findings of Fact and Statement of Reasons for Detention

 The following factors support the presumption and this court’s finding that no 

condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure Defendant’s 

appearance at trial and the safety of the community: 

 

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A. NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED

The government has charged the defendant with Interstate Communication of 

a Threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). According to the government, on 

January 12, 2021, the Defendant created an “event” on Facebook titled “Defend 

Tallahassee.” In the details section, the Defendant wrote: 

Armed racist mobs have planted the Confederate flag in the nations 

Capitol while announcing their plans to storm every American state 

Capitol on or around Inauguration day. We will fight back. We will 

circle the state Capitol and let them fight the cops and take the building. 

Then we will encircle them and trap them inside. We will drive them 

out of Tallahassee with every caliber available. . . . We must encircle 

them so they cannot escape down Apalachee Parkway. Militant friends 

will . . . coral the trump terrorists into the Capitol building. The enemy 

will have high power rifles and explosives. 

(Doc. 2 at 19). 

Similarly, on January 14, 2021, in a comment to an article posted on the 

internet—specifically on the website of a Tallahassee television station—the 

Defendant posted a “CALL TO ARMS JANUARY 20TH!” At the top of the posting 

was an image of what appears to be a Kalashnikov-type rifle, commonly referred to 

as an “AK-47.” The rest of the Defendant’s message states: 

Armed racists have planted the confederate flag in America’s 

Capitol as they openly declared that they WILL CONTINUE to wage 

an ARMED COUP at every American Capitol, including Tallahassee, 

on Inauguration Day. 

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We need ALL FLORIDA RESIDENTS to RISE UP! Here in 

Florida we must encircle terrorists who attack the Capitol! Let them 

take the capitol and fight with cops, SURROUND THEM AND TRAP 

THEM INSIDE! 

Tally residents have answered the call to arms, including combat 

veterans. Join us! Help protect your community from terrorists. We 

WILL protect capitol RESIDENTS and CIVILIANS from armed racist 

mobs WITH EVERY CALIBER AVAILABLE. 

This is an armed COUP and can only be stopped by an armed 

community! 

If you’re afraid to die fighting the enemy, stay in bed and live. 

(Doc. 2 at 22). 

This court has already determined that these messages contain true threats that 

are not protected by the First Amendment. This court determined that the Defendant 

intended these messages to serve as threats or knew that a reasonable person could 

perceive them to be threats. There is a substantial risk that the Defendant would seek 

to engage in violent acts such as those he threatened, thereby endangering members 

of the community. Thus, the fact that the Defendant made threats of violence—and 

was attempting to recruit others to commit acts of violence—indicates that he poses 

a danger to the community. 

In the threat made on January 12, the Defendant also indicated that he was 

working with “militant friends” and he also previously noted his ties to “Antifa.” 

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The threat of concerted criminal activity poses a greater danger to society and a 

greater risk that the Defendant receives help in fleeing before he is tried. See United 

States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1268 (1975) (noting the 

dangers of “concerted criminal activity”); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 

448-49, 69 S. Ct. 716, 721 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he strength, 

opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more difficult 

to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.”). 

Accordingly, the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses indicates 

that no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably assure the 

Defendant’s appearance at trial or the safety of the community. 

B. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT

This court must also consider the weight of the evidence against the 

Defendant. “This factor goes to the weight of the evidence of dangerousness” or risk 

of flight, “not the weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt,” although these 

concepts often will be related. United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 948 (6th Cir. 

2010); see United States v. Berkun, 392 F. App’x 901, 903 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting 

that when “the evidence of guilt is strong, it provides” a defendant “with an incentive 

to flee”). 

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The weight of the evidence against the Defendant is substantial. Although 

certainly the Defendant had no burden of proof at the detention/preliminary hearing, 

even one of the Defendant’s witnesses, his roommate, seemed to concede that the 

Defendant was the author of the threatening messages. Furthermore, the evidence 

showed that a paper copy of one of the threatening messages was seen in the 

Defendant’s residence when he was arrested. The weight of the evidence, therefore, 

is substantial. 

Because the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that the Defendant was 

the author of the violent threats, the weight of the evidence affirms that the 

Defendant poses a danger to other persons and the community. The weight of the 

evidence also suggests that the Defendant poses a risk of flight because a defendant 

facing a trial in which substantial evidence will be presented has a greater incentive 

to flee than a defendant facing a weaker case. See United States v. Al-Arian, 280 F. 

Supp. 2d 1345, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that a defendant has incentive to flee 

commensurate with the strength of the prosecution’s case, especially if he is facing 

a substantial sentence). 

C. THE HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENDANT

Aspects of the Defendant’s history and his various characteristics also suggest 

that he poses a risk of flight and a danger to other persons and the community. 

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1. Participation in Violent Acts in the Middle East 

Among other things, the evidence showed that in 2017, the Defendant 

travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the “People’s Protection Units” (also known as the 

“YPG”) in fighting forces of the so called “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” and 

the Republic of Turkey. The YPG is affiliated with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, 

which is a Marxist terrorist organization. The Defendant remained in the Middle 

East from approximately 2017 to April 2019. He was filmed fighting, admitted 

training others in military tactics, and told people that he was trained as a sniper. A 

reasonable person could conclude from this that the Defendant had the training and 

inclination to carry out his threats, that he previously engaged in acts of violence, 

and that he is prepared to kill people. Prior acts of violence suggest a propensity for 

violence or at least indicate that a defendant will employ violence when he believes 

it is necessary. 

A “prior record of violence eases the government’s burden of showing 

dangerousness.” United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1991). A court 

“may infer a present danger to the community” from a defendant’s prior commission 

of violent acts. United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(Kennedy, J.). Defendant’s multiple violent offenses only strengthen this inference. 

 

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2. Access to Firearms and Efforts to Obtain More Firearms 

The evidence also showed that the Defendant owned two firearms (which 

were loaded with ammunition), recently purchased a .22 caliber rifle which he had 

not yet retrieved from a pawn shop, and was seeking to obtain multiple additional 

firearms, including an AK-47. Because firearms make those who possess them more 

lethal, possession of and access to firearms make defendants more dangerous. See 

United States v. Abboud, 42 F. App’x 784, 784 (6th Cir. 2002) (while affirming the 

district court’s pretrial detention order, noting that firearms were recovered in a 

search of the defendant’s home and business and one was loaded with ammunition); 

United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the defendant 

posed a threat to the community, warranting pretrial detention, in part because agents 

found firearms at his home). The Defendant’s penchant for violence, his proficiency 

with firearms, his efforts to obtain firearms, and his statement that he has “militant 

friends” who might very well help him obtain firearms, make him particularly 

dangerous to the community. “[C]riminals with an affinity for guns and violence are 

the least likely to change their ways.” Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1255 

(11th Cir. 2018) (W. Pryor, J., concurring). This factor, therefore, also demonstrates 

that no condition or combination of conditions could assure the safety of others. 

 

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3. Defendant’s Lack of Substantial Work History 

The evidence also indicates that the Defendant currently is unemployed and 

worked in 2020 only for a “few weeks.” He, thus, has no job or occupation tying 

him to Tallahassee. 

4. Lack of Substantial Ties to Tallahassee 

It is also relevant that the Defendant lacks substantial ties to Tallahassee. As 

noted above, he has no job in Tallahassee. He also has no children, siblings, or 

spouse tying him to Tallahassee. As for relatives, the Defendant indicated that only 

his stepmother lives in Tallahassee and possibly an adopted brother with whom the 

Defendant is not close. The Defendant also does not own a home in Tallahassee and 

had resided at his apartment for only a few months. Prior to that, he resided in a tent 

in Leon County, Florida. And prior to that, he lived in a tent in other parts of the 

United States. The lack of ties to Tallahassee increase the risk that Defendant will 

flee rather than be tried. 

5. Foreign Contacts and Travel to Foreign Countries 

As noted above, the Defendant also has ties to Syria and contacts in a militant 

arm of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party. The Defendant resided with this group from 

2017 to 2019, and there is nothing stopping the Defendant from returning to them 

and thereby evading prosecution in the United States. This fact strongly militates in 

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favor of detaining the Defendant. See United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1193 

(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the defendant was detained as a flight risk because of 

substantial foreign contacts). 

The Defendant argued that he lacks the funds to make such a trip, but he has 

demonstrated resourcefulness and the ability to raise capital without working, such 

as fundraising on the internet. Indeed, the Defendant stated in a Facebook post that 

he was “willing to do ANYTHING to ANYONE”—including “robbing the rich and 

pedophiles too”—in order to raise the capital he needed to attend a community 

college. Someone who expresses a willingness “to do ANYTHING to ANYONE” 

merely to attend a college probably also is willing to do anything to anyone—

including robbing the rich and pedophiles—to avoid prosecution. This, too, strongly 

suggests that the Defendant poses a substantial risk of flight. 

6. Travel to and Ties to Other Locations in the United States

 The evidence also shows that in 2020, the Defendant travelled to various parts 

of the United States—including Nashville, Tennessee and Seattle, Washington—to 

participate in protests. The Defendant was able to travel without having the benefit 

of a job or any known means of support, which further suggests that he has access 

to sources of capital. Once in Seattle, the Defendant resided in an area taken over by 

protestors and from which the protestors excluded the police. The Defendant’s 

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roommate testified that the Defendant and he had contemplated and discussed 

traveling to other locations. If this court were to release the Defendant, there would 

be nothing to prevent him from returning to one of these cities, or some other 

location in the United States, in order to evade prosecution. 

7. Repeated Public Endorsement of Violence and Violent Acts 

 As articulated in the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint and arrest 

warrant, and as partially outlined in this court’s order regarding probable cause, the 

Defendant repeatedly has expressed an interest in violence and repeatedly endorsed 

violent means to advance the political beliefs that he espouses. For example, he 

endorsed stabbing, the manufacture and use of bombs, violent revolution, taking up 

arms against then President Trump, “death to amerikka,” “slaying” his enemies, the 

murder of Turkish aviators, and the murder of U.S. military officers. This indicates 

that the Defendant likely would endorse and use violence to avoid re-arrest and 

prevent his trial and possible conviction. 

8. The Defendant’s Alias

 Also relevant is the fact that the Defendant has an alias, “Ali Sharem 

Ourecox.” Courts have noted that the existence or use of an alias also is a factor in 

favor of detaining a defendant because an alias can assist a defendant in fleeing, 

traveling, and evading re-arrest. United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 

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339 (2d Cir. 1986); Abdullahu, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 439; United States v. Giordano, 

370 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 

D. THE NATURE AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE DANGER POSED BY RELEASE

As the discussion above indicates, release of the Defendant poses a serious 

risk of danger to the community, including a risk of violence. 

Based on this short summary of some of the evidence adduced at the detention 

hearing and contained in the Pretrial Services Report,1

 and having considered the 

statutory factors and the findings of fact above, this court finds that no condition or 

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance as 

required or the safety of the community or another person. Accordingly, Defendant 

shall be detained pending trial. 

Part IV—Directions Regarding Detention

 The Defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his 

designated representative for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the 

extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in 

1

 Because this court is ordering Defendant’s detention, its findings and analysis 

focused on the factors that warrant detention. Some factors weighed in favor of 

releasing the Defendant—for example, the fact that the Defendant resided in the 

Northern District of Florida when he was arrested, and the fact that the Defendant 

has a promise of employment if he were released. This court considered these factors 

and other factors not specifically discussed in this order. 

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custody pending appeal. The Defendant shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity 

for private consultation with defense counsel. On order of a court of the United States 

or on request of an attorney for the Government, the person in charge of the 

corrections facility shall deliver the Defendant to the United States Marshal for the 

purpose of an appearance in connection with any federal court proceeding. 

SO ORDERED, at Panama City, Florida, this 25th day of January, 2021. 

/s/ Michael J. Frank 

Michael J. Frank 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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