NIST NCSTAR 1-8

Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the 

World Trade Center Disaster 

The Emergency Response 

Operations 

J. Randall Lawson 

Robert L. Vettori 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8

Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the 

World Trade Center Disaster 

The Emergency Response 

Operations 

J. Randall Lawson 

Robert L. Vettori 

Building and Fire Research Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

September 2005 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary 

Technology Administration 

Michelle O’Neill, Acting Under Secretary for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

William Jeffrey, Director
Disclaimer No. 1

Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials are identified in this document in order to describe a 

procedure or concept adequately or to trace the history of the procedures and practices used. Such identification is 

not intended to imply recommendation, endorsement, or implication that the entities, products, materials, or 

equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. Nor does such identification imply a finding of fault or 

negligence by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Disclaimer No. 2

The policy of NIST is to use the International System of Units (metric units) in all publications. In this document, 

however, units are presented in metric units or the inch-pound system, whichever is prevalent in the discipline. 

Disclaimer No. 3

Pursuant to section 7 of the National Construction Safety Team Act, the NIST Director has determined that certain 

evidence received by NIST in the course of this Investigation is “voluntarily provided safety-related information” that is 

“not directly related to the building failure being investigated” and that “disclosure of that information would inhibit the 

voluntary provision of that type of information” (15 USC 7306c). 

In addition, a substantial portion of the evidence collected by NIST in the course of the Investigation has been 

provided to NIST under nondisclosure agreements. 

Disclaimer No. 4

NIST takes no position as to whether the design or construction of a WTC building was compliant with any code 

since, due to the destruction of the WTC buildings, NIST could not verify the actual (or as-built) construction, the 

properties and condition of the materials used, or changes to the original construction made over the life of the 

buildings. In addition, NIST could not verify the interpretations of codes used by applicable authorities in determining 

compliance when implementing building codes. Where an Investigation report states whether a system was 

designed or installed as required by a code provision, NIST has documentary or anecdotal evidence indicating 

whether the requirement was met, or NIST has independently conducted tests or analyses indicating whether the 

requirement was met. 

Use in Legal Proceedings

No part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into a structural failure or from an investigation under the 

National Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter 

mentioned in such report (15 USC 281a; as amended by P.L. 107-231). 

National Institute of Standards and Technology National Construction Safety Team Act Report 1-8 

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Natl. Constr. Sfty. Tm. Act Rpt. 1-8, 808 pages (September 2005) 

CODEN: NSPUE2 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON: 2005

_________________________________________ 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov — Phone: (202) 512-1800 — Fax: (202) 512-2250 

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation iii

CONTRIBUTORS

NIST Personnel 

• J. Randall Lawson, leader, data collection, investigation, first-person interviews, analysis and 

report preparation. 

• Robert L. Vettori, data collection, investigation, first-person interviews, analysis, and report 

preparation. 

• Stephen A. Cauffman, first-person interviews and data collection. 

• Schuyler Ruitberg, transcribed audio recordings and emergency response data files. 

• Lisa Petersen, transcribed audio recordings and emergency response data files. 

• Jason Averill, coordinated contractor data collection and coordination on occupant behavior, 

egress, and emergency communications. 

• Ronald Meininger, assisted with formatting and enhancing emergency response audio 

recordings. 

NIST Emergency Responder Experts 

The following personnel provided expert views related to the investigation’s planning, data gathering, and 

review of information. 

• Vincent Dunn, retired Chief Officer, New York City Fire Department (FDNY) 

• John J. Hodgens, retired Chief Officer, (FDNY) 

• Kevin S. Malley, retired Director of Human Performance, (FDNY) 
Contributors 

iv NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation v

DEDICATION

On September 11, 2001, the City of New York was attacked by terrorists who flew large commercial 

aircraft into the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Immediately, emergency responders from across 

the city began operations to protect the citizens of New York City and to save lives at the World Trade 

Center. With these efforts, many emergency responders gave their lives, and many more were seriously 

injured. The injuries from this attack were more than physical. The emotional toll for these emergency 

responders and their families will always be with them. This report is dedicated to all the emergency 

responders who lost their lives that morning, to all emergency responders who were injured, and to all 

emergency responders and the families who live with the anguish caused by this attack. 
Dedication 

vi NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation vii

ABSTRACT

The September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) caused the deaths of 2,749 people. 

Included in the group were approximately 421 emergency responders from The Fire Department of the 

City of New York (FDNY), The New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police 

Department (PAPD), The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), from WTC security 

firms, and volunteer emergency responders who were in the WTC area of the city when the attack 

occurred. This report addresses the operations of these emergency responders, the technologies used 

during WTC operations, and the guidelines and practices that governed these operations. The objectives 

of this study were to 1) fully document what happened during the response by the emergency services to 

the attacks on the WTC, up to the time of collapse of WTC 7; (2) identify issues that need to be addressed 

in changes to practice, standards, and codes; (3) identify alternative practices and/or technologies that 

may address these issues; and (4) identify R&D needs that advance the safety of the fire service in 

responding to massive fires in tall buildings. 

The approach taken was to conduct a comprehensive search for data related to the emergency response on 

September 11, 2001, analyze the data, and report on the findings. Data gathering included the collection 

of written documents, electronic recordings, visual data (both photographs and video), and first-person 

accounts of what happened during WTC operations. Results from this investigation show that the 

emergency responders were faced with the greatest disaster of the last 100 years in the United States. The 

emergency responders had one common focus: to save as many victims of this attack as possible. During 

the response, emergency responders had to function under war-like conditions as they carried out their 

rescue and evacuation efforts. Emergency responders operated with equipment, human endurance, and 

emergency response practices that were stretched well beyond normal limits. This report discusses how 

the emergency response activities and equipment were challenged. The emergency responders paid a 

heavy price in the loss of hundreds of their own lives when the WTC buildings collapsed. 

This study focused on the following topics: 

• emergency responder dispatch and response to the WTC 

• emergency responder access to the WTC site and towers 

• command and control associated with the emergency response 

• communications during operations and the of communications in tall buildings 

• firefighting in high-rise buildings and the evacuation from the WTC towers 

• emergency responder situational awareness and the physiological impact of conducting 

operations in tall buildings 

Keywords: Buildings, emergency responders, emergency medical service, evacuation, firefighters, 

firefighting, police, rescue, search, World Trade Center. 
Abstract 

viii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contributors .................................................................................................................................................iii

Dedication..................................................................................................................................................... v

Abstract.......................................................................................................................................................vii

List of Figures............................................................................................................................................. xv

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................xvii

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations......................................................................................................... xix

Metric Conversion Table ........................................................................................................................... xxi

Preface ...................................................................................................................................................... xxv

Acknowledgments................................................................................................................................... xxxv

Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................................xxxvii

Chapter 1 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................1

1.1 Purpose............................................................................................................................................. 2

1.2 Technical Approach......................................................................................................................... 2

Chapter 2 

Collection of Emergency Response Data.................................................................................5

2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 5

2.2 Methodology.................................................................................................................................... 5

2.2.1 Documentary Data................................................................................................................ 5

2.2.2 Electronic Data..................................................................................................................... 7

2.2.3 First-Person Interviews....................................................................................................... 10

2.2.4 Visual Data......................................................................................................................... 15

Chapter 3 

Impact of the February 1993 Bombing on Emergency Response in Tall Buildings...........17

3.1 Changes Made by PANYNJ .......................................................................................................... 17

3.2 Changes Made by FDNY............................................................................................................... 18

3.2.1 Incident Command System................................................................................................. 18

3.2.2 Communications................................................................................................................. 19

3.2.3 Interagency Protocols ......................................................................................................... 20

3.2.4 Building Systems and Fire Safety Personnel...................................................................... 21
Table of Contents 

x NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

3.2.5 Elevators............................................................................................................................. 21

3.2.6 Protective Clothing............................................................................................................. 22

3.2.7 Contaminated Stairwells..................................................................................................... 22

3.2.8 News Media........................................................................................................................ 23

3.2.9 Preplanning and Command Organization .......................................................................... 24

3.3 References...................................................................................................................................... 24

Chapter 4 

Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data.......................................................25

4.1 Dispatch and Arrival of Emergency Responders Chronology....................................................... 25

4.2 Evacuation Chronology ................................................................................................................. 26

4.3 Emergency Response Operations Chronology .............................................................................. 30

4.4 Chronology of the WTC Towers ................................................................................................... 36

Chapter 5 

Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations.....................................................................39

5.1 Methodology.................................................................................................................................. 39

5.2 Analysis of The influence of building design on emergency response.......................................... 40

5.3 Aircraft Damage, Fuel Run-Off, Building Systems Failures, and Emergency Responder 

Operations...................................................................................................................................... 42

5.3.1 Aircraft Damage and Fuel Run-Off.................................................................................... 42

5.3.2 Systems Failures................................................................................................................. 45

5.3.3 Initial Emergency Response............................................................................................... 46

5.4 Roof Rescue and Aviation Operations........................................................................................... 48

5.5 Emergency Responder Accountability and Tracking .................................................................... 53

5.5.1 FDNY Accountability, Location, and Tracking ................................................................. 54

5.5.2 FDNY Recall Procedure..................................................................................................... 63

5.5.3 EMS Accountability, Location, and Tracking.................................................................... 64

5.5.4 EMS Patient Tracking ........................................................................................................ 66

5.5.5 NYPD Accountability, Location, and Tracking ................................................................. 68

5.5.6 PAPD Accountability, Location, and Tracking.................................................................. 69

5.5.7 General Comments Concerning Accountability, Location, and Tracking ......................... 69

5.6 Fighting Large Fires on the Upper Floors of Tall Buildings ......................................................... 72

5.6.1 Strategies for High-Rise Operations on September 11, 2001............................................. 74

5.6.2 Fighting Fires on the Upper Floors of the WTC ................................................................ 76

5.6.3 Elevator Access and Evacuation ........................................................................................ 77
 Table of Contents 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xi

5.6.4 Stairways, Access and Egress............................................................................................. 81

5.6.5 Physiological Impact on Emergency Responders and the Effectiveness of 

Conducting Operations....................................................................................................... 87

5.6.6 Situational Awareness ........................................................................................................ 92

5.7 Information, Communications, and Responder Evacuation from the World Trade Center........... 95

5.8 Effect of WTC 2 Collapse on Emergency Operations................................................................... 99

5.8.1 Emergency Responder Apparatus at the WTC................................................................. 101

5.8.2 Emergency Responder Equipment ................................................................................... 105

5.9 Emergency Response Operations at World Trade Center 7......................................................... 108

5.10 References.................................................................................................................................... 112

Chapter 6 

Planning for Major Operations in Tall Buildings..................................................................115

6.1 Fire and Emergency Response Protocols for Tall Buildings ....................................................... 115

6.2 Pre-Planning, Training, and Standard Operating Procedures Applied at the WTC..................... 119

Chapter 7 

Emergency Communications and Analysis .........................................................................123

7.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 123

7.1.1 Objectives......................................................................................................................... 123

7.1.2 Telephone and Radio Communications Recordings ........................................................ 124

7.2 Telephone Communications ........................................................................................................ 125

7.2.1 Accounts of Telephone Communications ........................................................................ 125

7.2.2 PAPD Police Desk Telephone Calls................................................................................. 126

7.2.3 New York City 9-1-1 Emergency Telephone System...................................................... 126

7.3 Radio Communications................................................................................................................ 127

7.3.1 Handie-Talkie (HT) Radios Used by FDNY on September 11, 2001.............................. 127

7.3.2 Radio Repeater Systems Used by FDNY at the WTC ..................................................... 129

7.3.3 Building/Complex FDNY Radio Repeater....................................................................... 130

7.3.4 FDNY Battalion Car Cross-Band Repeater...................................................................... 133

7.3.5 Function of FDNY Radio Repeater Systems.................................................................... 133

7.3.6 Communications, Command and Control ........................................................................ 139

7.4 Assessment of Radio Communications Quality........................................................................... 143

7.4.1 Training of Transcribers................................................................................................... 144

7.4.2 Radio Communications Concepts .................................................................................... 144

7.4.3 Communications Data Analysis ....................................................................................... 145
Table of Contents 

xii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

7.4.4 Emergency Response Communications Chronology ....................................................... 145

7.4.5 PAPD Radio Communications......................................................................................... 149

7.4.6 FDNY Radio Communications ........................................................................................ 149

7.4.7 NYPD Radio Communications ........................................................................................ 151

7.5 Radio Communications Readability Analysis ............................................................................. 153

7.6 General Comments on Radio Communications........................................................................... 157

7.7 References.................................................................................................................................... 158

Chapter 8 

Coordination of Response Activities with Other Agencies at the World Trade Center ...159

8.1 Department Operational Responsibility....................................................................................... 160

8.2 Office of Emergency Management and Multi-Agency Operations ............................................. 161

8.3 References.................................................................................................................................... 165

Chapter 9 

Findings...................................................................................................................................167

9.1 Access and Firefighting ............................................................................................................... 167

9.2 Emergency Responder Equipment............................................................................................... 169

9.3 Emergency Communications....................................................................................................... 170

9.4 Command and Control................................................................................................................. 171

Chapter 10 

Post-September 11, 2001, Efforts..........................................................................................177

Attachment 1

Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing.........................................................179

Attachment 2

Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations, World Trade Center Attack, 

September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................................193

Attachment 3

Listing of Port Authority, NYPD, and FDNY Communications ...........................................237

Appendix A

Incident Command System

Appendix B 

Police/Fire Protocol

Appendix C 

Agreements between PANYNJ and FDNY 
 Table of Contents 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xiii

Appendix D 

Elevator Operations 

Appendix E 

Air Support Plan High Rise Fires AUC 269 

Appendix F 

Approved Safety Bulletin 67 Approved Riding Positions on Apparatus 

Appendix G 

Training Bulletin Tools 22 Portable Command Post 

Appendix H 

Regulations for Recall 

Appendix I 

Fire Fighting Procedure High Rise Office Buildings 

Appendix J 

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, World Trade Center Emergency 

Procedures Manual, 2001 

Appendix K 

Utilization of Company Handie Talkie AUC 179 

Appendix L 

AUC #19 Office of Emergency Management 
Table of Contents 

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure P–1. The eight projects in the federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC 

disaster. ............................................................................................................................xxvii 

Figure 1–1. Project 8 interactions with other projects within the NIST WTC Investigation. ................... 4 

Figure 4–1. Number of FDNY units dispatched and signaling arrival at specific times......................... 27 

Figure 5–1. Video image showing a NYPD helicopter flying near the World Trade Center buildings 

before WTC 2 was struck by the second aircraft ................................................................. 52 

Figure 5–2. Photographs of smoke covering the roofs of the World Trade Center buildings................. 52 

Figure 5–3. Diagram showing emergency responder command post locations. ..................................... 57 

Figure 5–4. Diagram of lobby command post location inside World Trade Center 1. ........................... 58 

Figure 5–5. Diagram of lobby command post location inside World Trade Center 2. ........................... 59 

Figure 5–6. Video image of the FDNY Fire Command Board located in the lobby of WTC 1.............. 60 

Figure 5–7. Top view of occupant and firefighter passing on stairs. ...................................................... 83 

Figure 5–8. Front view of occupant and firefighter passing on stairs. .................................................... 83 

Figure 5–9. Front view of occupant and firefighter passing on landing.................................................. 83 

Figure 5–10. View from above of occupant and firefighter passing on landing ....................................... 83 

Figure 5–11. Photograph of a typical World Trade Center staircase, sub-grade level of WTC 4............. 86 

Figure 5–12. Video image showing FDNY firefighters inside the lobby of WTC 1 with protective 

clothing and extra equipment carried for operations inside the building............................. 88 

Figure 5–13. Video image of the FDNY Incident Command Post in front of World Financial 

Center 2................................................................................................................................ 96 

Figure 5–14. Photograph taken from near the corners of West and Vesey Streets looking south 

before the collapse of WTC 2. ........................................................................................... 101 

Figure 5–15. Photograph taken from West Street looking towards (right to left) Liberty Street, 

WTC 2, and the Marriott Hotel before the collapse of WTC 2.......................................... 102 

Figure 5–16. Destroyed fire apparatus following the collapse of WTC 1 and 2..................................... 103 

Figure 5–17. Damaged emergency apparatus at the corners of West and Vesey Street after the 

collapse WTC 1 and 2........................................................................................................ 104

Figure 5-18. Burned out fire apparatus on West Broadway next to WTC 7 following the collapse of 

WTC 1 and 2...................................................................................................................... 104 
List of Figures 

xvi NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 7–1. Illustration showing the location of the FDNY WTC high-rise repeater antenna at 

the site. ............................................................................................................................... 131 

Figure 7–2. Example of a FDNY high-rise repeater. ............................................................................ 132 

Figure 7–3. Example of a Battalion car cross-band repeater................................................................. 132 

Figure 7–4. Video image of the WTC 1 Fire Command Desk and the FDNY repeater speaker 

phone, at left, sitting on top of the console. ....................................................................... 135 

Figure 7–5. Example of handie-talkie radio communications for a two-alarm fire. ............................. 141 

Figure 7–6. Video image of a FDNY/EMS member attempting to communicate using his handietalkie radio inside the lobby of WTC 1.............................................................................. 143 

Figure 7–7. PAPD Police Desk channel 26/W plot of percent transmission versus time. .................... 150 

Figure 7–8. FDNY City-Wide High-Rise channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30) plot of percent 

transmission versus time. ................................................................................................... 151

Figure 7–9. NYPD Division 1 channel plot of percent transmission versus time................................. 152 

Figure 7–10. NYPD Special Operations Division channel plot of percent transmission versus time..... 152 

Figure 7–11. PAPD Police Desk channel 26/W radio communications readability for the time period 

20 minutes before first plane impact.................................................................................. 154 

Figure 7–12. PAPD Police Desk channel 26/W radio communications readability for time period 20 

minutes after first plane impact.......................................................................................... 154 

Figure 7–13. FDNY City-Wide High-Rise channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30) radio 

communications readability for time period 20 minutes after first plane impact. ............. 155 

Figure 7–14. NYPD Special Operations Division channel communications readability for time 

period 20 minutes before first plane impact....................................................................... 155 

Figure 7–15. NYPD Special Operations Division channel communications readability for time 

period 20 minutes after first plane impact.......................................................................... 156 

Figure 7–16. NYPD Division 1 channel communications readability for time period 20 minutes 

before first plane impact. ................................................................................................... 156 

Figure 7–17. NYPD Division 1 channel communications readability for time period 20 minutes after 

first plane impact................................................................................................................ 157 

Figure 8–1. Video image of an NYPD Emergency Service Unit member providing security at the 

FDNY Incident Command Post in front of WFC 2. .......................................................... 163 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xvii

LIST OF TABLES

Table P–1. Federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC disaster..................................xxvi

Table P–2. Public meetings and briefings of the WTC Investigation. ................................................xxix

Table 5–1. WTC 1 evacuation data from emergency responder interviews. .........................................98

Table 5–2. FDNY vehicles and apparatus destroyed by collapse of WTC towers. ............................103

Table 7–1. HT radio frequency allocation and use. .............................................................................128

Table 7–2. Comparison of radio transmissions before and after the first aircraft impact. ...................150

Table 7–3. Comparison of average and maximum radio transmission times before and after first 

aircraft impact. ...................................................................................................................150
List of Tables 

xviii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xix

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronyms 

EMS Emergency Medical Services 

ESU New York City Police Department and PATH Police, Emergency Service Unit 

FDNY The Fire Department of the City of New York 

HAZMAT Hazards Materials 

HT handie-talkie radio 

HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system 

ICP Incident Command Post 

ICS Incident Command System 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NYPD The New York City Police Department 

OEM New York City Office of Emergency Management 

PANYNJ The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

PAPD Port Authority Police Department 

PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson Transportation System 

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

UHF Ultra-high Frequency Radio, frequencies from 300 to 3000 MHz 

VHF Very-high Frequency Radio, frequencies from 30 to 300 MHz 

WFC World Financial Center at the World Trade Center Complex 

WTC 1 World Trade Center 1 (North Tower) 

WTC 2 World Trade Center 2 (South Tower) 

WTC 7 World Trade Center 7 

Abbreviations 

ft foot 

gal gallon 

in inch 

kg kilogram 

l liter 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 

xx NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

lb pound 

m meter 

MHz Megahertz 

min minute 

mm millimeter 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxi

METRIC CONVERSION TABLE

To convert from to Multiply by 

AREA AND SECOND MOMENT OF AREA 

square foot (ft2) square meter (m2) 9.290 304 E-02 

square inch (in.2

) square meter (m2) 6.4516 E-04 

square inch (in.2

) square centimeter (cm2) 6.4516 E+00 

square yard (yd2) square meter (m2) 8.361 274 E-01 

ENERGY (includes WORK) 

kilowatt hour (kW ⋅ h) joule (J) 3.6 E+06 

quad (1015 BtuIT) joule (J) 1.055 056 E+18 

therm (U.S.) joule (J) 1.054 804 E+08 

ton of TNT (energy equivalent) joule (J) 4.184 E+09 

watt hour (W ⋅ h) joule (J) 3.6 E+03 

watt second (W ⋅ s) joule (J) 1.0 E+00 

FORCE 

dyne (dyn) newton (N) 1.0 E-05 

kilogram-force (kgf) newton (N) 9.806 65 E+00 

kilopond (kilogram-force) (kp) newton (N) 9.806 65 E+00 

kip (1 kip=1,000 lbf) newton (N) 4.448 222 E+03 

kip (1 kip=1,000 lbf) kilonewton (kN) 4.448 222 E+00 

pound-force (lbf) newton (N) 4.448 222 E+00 

FORCE DIVIDED BY LENGTH 

pound-force per foot (lbf/ft) newton per meter (N/m) 1.459 390 E+01 

pound-force per inch (lbf/in.) newton per meter (N/m) 1.751 268 E+02 

HEAT FLOW RATE 

calorieth per minute (calth/min) watt (W) 6.973 333 E-02 

calorieth per second (calth/s) watt (W) 4.184 E+00 

kilocalorieth per minute (kcalth/min) watt (W) 6.973 333 E+01 

kilocalorieth per second (kcalth/s) watt (W) 4.184 E+03 
Metric Conversion Table 

xxii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

To convert from to Multiply by 

LENGTH 

foot (ft) meter (m) 3.048 E-01 

inch (in) meter (m) 2.54 E-02 

inch (in.) centimeter (cm) 2.54 E+00 

micron (m) meter (m) 1.0 E-06 

yard (yd) meter (m) 9.144 E-01 

MASS and MOMENT OF INERTIA 

kilogram-force second squared 

per meter (kgf ⋅ s2

/m) kilogram (kg) 9.806 65 E+00 

pound foot squared (lb ⋅ ft2

) kilogram meter squared (kg ⋅ m2) 4.214 011 E-02 

pound inch squared (lb ⋅ in.2

) kilogram meter squared (kg ⋅ m2) 2.926 397 E-04 

ton, metric (t) kilogram (kg) 1.0 E+03 

ton, short (2,000 lb) kilogram (kg) 9.071 847 E+02 

MASS DIVIDED BY AREA 

pound per square foot (lb/ft2) kilogram per square meter (kg/m2) 4.882 428 E+00 

pound per square inch 

(not pound force) (lb/in.2

) kilogram per square meter (kg/m2) 7.030 696 E+02 

MASS DIVIDED BY LENGTH 

pound per foot (lb/ft) kilogram per meter (kg/m) 1.488 164 E+00 

pound per inch (lb/in.) kilogram per meter (kg/m) 1.785 797 E+01 

pound per yard (lb/yd) kilogram per meter (kg/m) 4.960 546 E-01 

PRESSURE or STRESS (FORCE DIVIDED BY AREA) 

kilogram-force per square centimeter (kgf/cm2) pascal (Pa) 9.806 65 E+04 

kilogram-force per square meter (kgf/m2

) pascal (Pa) 9.806 65 E+00 

kilogram-force per square millimeter (kgf/mm2

) pascal (Pa) 9.806 65 E+06 

kip per square inch (ksi) (kip/in.2

) pascal (Pa) 6.894 757 E+06 

kip per square inch (ksi) (kip/in.2) kilopascal (kPa) 6.894 757 E+03 

pound-force per square foot (lbf/ft2

) pascal (Pa) 4.788 026 E+01 

pound-force per square inch (psi) (lbf/in.2

) pascal (Pa) 6.894 757 E+03 

pound-force per square inch (psi) (lbf/in.2

) kilopascal (kPa) 6.894 757 E+00 

psi (pound-force per square inch) (lbf/in.2

) pascal (Pa) 6.894 757 E+03 

psi (pound-force per square inch) (lbf/in.2

) kilopascal (kPa) 6.894 757 E+00 
Metric Conversion Table 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxiii

To convert from to Multiply by 

TEMPERATURE 

degree Celsius (°C) kelvin (K) T/K = t/°C + 273.15 

degree centigrade degree Celsius (°C) t/°C ≈ t /deg. cent. 

degree Fahrenheit (°F) degree Celsius (°C) t/°C = (t/°F - 32)/1.8 

degree Fahrenheit (°F) kelvin (K) T/K = (t/°F + 459.67)/1.8 

kelvin (K) degree Celsius (°C) t/°C = T/K 2 273.15 

TEMPERATURE INTERVAL 

degree Celsius (°C) kelvin (K) 1.0 E+00 

degree centigrade degree Celsius (°C) 1.0 E+00 

degree Fahrenheit (°F) degree Celsius (°C) 5.555 556 E-01 

degree Fahrenheit (°F) kelvin (K) 5.555 556 E-01 

degree Rankine (°R) kelvin (K) 5.555 556 E-01 

VELOCITY (includes SPEED) 

foot per second (ft/s) meter per second (m/s) 3.048 E-01 

inch per second (in./s) meter per second (m/s) 2.54 E-02 

kilometer per hour (km/h) meter per second (m/s) 2.777 778 E-01 

mile per hour (mi/h) kilometer per hour (km/h) 1.609 344 E+00 

mile per minute (mi/min) meter per second (m/s) 2.682 24 E+01 

VOLUME (includes CAPACITY) 

cubic foot (ft3) cubic meter (m3) 2.831 685 E-02 

cubic inch (in.3

 ) cubic meter (m3) 1.638 706 E-05 

cubic yard (yd3) cubic meter (m3) 7.645 549 E-01 

gallon (U.S.) (gal) cubic meter (m3

) 3.785 412 E-03 

gallon (U.S.) (gal) liter (L) 3.785 412 E+00 

liter (L) cubic meter (m3

) 1.0 E-03 

ounce (U.S. fluid) (fl oz) cubic meter (m3

) 2.957 353 E-05 

ounce (U.S. fluid) (fl oz) milliliter (mL) 2.957 353 E+01 
Metric Conversion Table 

xxiv NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxv

PREFACE

Genesis of This Investigation 

Immediately following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 2001, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers began 

planning a building performance study of the disaster. The week of October 7, as soon as the rescue and 

search efforts ceased, the Building Performance Study Team went to the site and began its assessment. 

This was to be a brief effort, as the study team consisted of experts who largely volunteered their time 

away from their other professional commitments. The Building Performance Study Team issued its 

report in May 2002, fulfilling its goal “to determine probable failure mechanisms and to identify areas of 

future investigation that could lead to practical measures for improving the damage resistance of buildings 

against such unforeseen events.” 

On August 21, 2002, with funding from the U.S. Congress through FEMA, the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) announced its building and fire safety investigation of the WTC 

disaster. On October 1, 2002, the National Construction Safety Team Act (Public Law 107-231), was 

signed into law. The NIST WTC Investigation was conducted under the authority of the National 

Construction Safety Team Act.

The goals of the investigation of the WTC disaster were: 

• To investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the technical conditions that 

contributed to the outcome of the WTC disaster. 

• To serve as the basis for: 

− Improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used; 

− Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety officials; 

− Recommended revisions to current codes, standards, and practices; and 

− Improved public safety. 

The specific objectives were: 

1. Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following the initial impacts of the 

aircraft and why and how WTC 7 collapsed; 

2. Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or low depending on location, 

including all technical aspects of fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and 

emergency response; 

3. Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, 

and maintenance of WTC 1, 2, and 7; and 

4. Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and 

practices that warrant revision. 
Preface 

xxvi NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Technology Administration. The 

purpose of NIST investigations is to improve the safety and structural integrity of buildings in the United 

States, and the focus is on fact finding. NIST investigative teams are authorized to assess building 

performance and emergency response and evacuation procedures in the wake of any building failure that 

has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss of life. NIST 

does not have the statutory authority to make findings of fault nor negligence by individuals or 

organizations. Further, no part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into a building failure or 

from an investigation under the National Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action 

for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report (15 USC 281a, as amended by Public 

Law 107-231). 

Organization of the Investigation 

The National Construction Safety Team for this Investigation, appointed by the then NIST Director, 

Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr., was led by Dr. S. Shyam Sunder. Dr. William L. Grosshandler served as 

Associate Lead Investigator, Mr. Stephen A. Cauffman served as Program Manager for Administration, 

and Mr. Harold E. Nelson served on the team as a private sector expert. The Investigation included eight 

interdependent projects whose leaders comprised the remainder of the team. A detailed description of 

each of these eight projects is available at http://wtc.nist.gov. The purpose of each project is summarized 

in Table P–1, and the key interdependencies among the projects are illustrated in Fig. P–1. 

Table P–1. Federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC disaster. 

Technical Area and Project Leader Project Purpose 

Analysis of Building and Fire Codes and 

Practices; Project Leaders: Dr. H. S. Lew 

and Mr. Richard W. Bukowski 

Document and analyze the code provisions, procedures, and 

practices used in the design, construction, operation, and 

maintenance of the structural, passive fire protection, and 

emergency access and evacuation systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7. 

Baseline Structural Performance and 

Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis; Project 

Leader: Dr. Fahim H. Sadek 

Analyze the baseline performance of WTC 1 and WTC 2 under 

design, service, and abnormal loads, and aircraft impact damage on 

the structural, fire protection, and egress systems. 

Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of 

Structural Steel; Project Leader: Dr. Frank 

W. Gayle 

Determine and analyze the mechanical and metallurgical properties 

and quality of steel, weldments, and connections from steel 

recovered from WTC 1, 2, and 7. 

Investigation of Active Fire Protection 

Systems; Project Leader: Dr. David 

D. Evans; Dr. William Grosshandler 

Investigate the performance of the active fire protection systems in 

WTC 1, 2, and 7 and their role in fire control, emergency response, 

and fate of occupants and responders. 

Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability 

Environment; Project Leader: Dr. Richard 

G. Gann 

Reconstruct the time-evolving temperature, thermal environment, 

and smoke movement in WTC 1, 2, and 7 for use in evaluating the 

structural performance of the buildings and behavior and fate of 

occupants and responders. 

Structural Fire Response and Collapse 

Analysis; Project Leaders: Dr. John 

L. Gross and Dr. Therese P. McAllister 

Analyze the response of the WTC towers to fires with and without 

aircraft damage, the response of WTC 7 in fires, the performance 

of composite steel-trussed floor systems, and determine the most 

probable structural collapse sequence for WTC 1, 2, and 7. 

Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency 

Communications; Project Leader: Mr. Jason 

D. Averill 

Analyze the behavior and fate of occupants and responders, both 

those who survived and those who did not, and the performance of 

the evacuation system. 

Emergency Response Technologies and 

Guidelines; Project Leader: Mr. J. Randall 

Lawson 

Document the activities of the emergency responders from the time 

of the terrorist attacks on WTC 1 and WTC 2 until the collapse of 

WTC 7, including practices followed and technologies used. 
 Preface 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxvii

NIST WTC Investigation Projects NIST WTC Investigation Projects

Analysis of 

Steel

Structural 

Collapse

Evacuation

Baseline 

Performance

& Impact 

Damage

Analysis of 

Codes and 

Practices

Emergency 

Response

Active Fire 

Protection

Thermal and 

Tenability 

Environment

Video/

Photographic 

Records

Oral History Data

Emergency 

Response 

Records

Recovered 

Structural Steel

WTC Building 

Performance Study

Recommendations

Government, 

Industry, 

Professional, 

Academic Inputs

Public Inputs

Figure P–1. The eight projects in the federal building and fire safety 

investigation of the WTC disaster. 

National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee 

The NIST Director also established an advisory committee as mandated under the National Construction 

Safety Team Act. The initial members of the committee were appointed following a public solicitation. 

These were: 

• Paul Fitzgerald, Executive Vice President (retired) FM Global, National Construction Safety 

Team Advisory Committee Chair 

• John Barsom, President, Barsom Consulting, Ltd. 

• John Bryan, Professor Emeritus, University of Maryland 

• David Collins, President, The Preview Group, Inc. 

• Glenn Corbett, Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice 

• Philip DiNenno, President, Hughes Associates, Inc. 
Preface 

xxviii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• Robert Hanson, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan 

• Charles Thornton, Co-Chairman and Managing Principal, The Thornton-Tomasetti Group, 

Inc. 

• Kathleen Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, 

University of Colorado at Boulder 

• Forman Williams, Director, Center for Energy Research, University of California at San 

Diego 

This National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee provided technical advice during the 

Investigation and commentary on drafts of the Investigation reports prior to their public release. NIST 

has benefited from the work of many people in the preparation of these reports, including the National 

Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee. The content of the reports and recommendations, 

however, are solely the responsibility of NIST. 

Public Outreach 

During the course of this Investigation, NIST held public briefings and meetings (listed in Table P–2) to 

solicit input from the public, present preliminary findings, and obtain comments on the direction and 

progress of the Investigation from the public and the Advisory Committee. 

NIST maintained a publicly accessible Web site during this Investigation at http://wtc.nist.gov. The site 

contained extensive information on the background and progress of the Investigation. 

NIST’s WTC Public-Private Response Plan 

The collapse of the WTC buildings has led to broad reexamination of how tall buildings are designed, 

constructed, maintained, and used, especially with regard to major events such as fires, natural disasters, 

and terrorist attacks. Reflecting the enhanced interest in effecting necessary change, NIST, with support 

from Congress and the Administration, has put in place a program, the goal of which is to develop and 

implement the standards, technology, and practices needed for cost-effective improvements to the safety 

and security of buildings and building occupants, including evacuation, emergency response procedures, 

and threat mitigation. 

The strategy to meet this goal is a three-part NIST-led public-private response program that includes: 

• A federal building and fire safety investigation to study the most probable factors that 

contributed to post-aircraft impact collapse of the WTC towers and the 47-story WTC 7 

building, and the associated evacuation and emergency response experience. 

• A research and development (R&D) program to (a) facilitate the implementation of 

recommendations resulting from the WTC Investigation, and (b) provide the technical basis 

for cost-effective improvements to national building and fire codes, standards, and practices 

that enhance the safety of buildings, their occupants, and emergency responders. 
 Preface 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxix

Table P–2. Public meetings and briefings of the WTC Investigation. 

Date Location Principal Agenda 

June 24, 2002 New York City, NY Public meeting: Public comments on the Draft Plan for the 

pending WTC Investigation. 

August 21, 2002 Gaithersburg, MD Media briefing announcing the formal start of the Investigation. 

December 9, 2002 Washington, DC Media briefing on release of the Public Update and NIST request 

for photographs and videos. 

April 8, 2003 New York City, NY Joint public forum with Columbia University on first-person 

interviews. 

April 29–30, 2003 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on plan for and progress on 

WTC Investigation with a public comment session. 

May 7, 2003 New York City, NY Media briefing on release of May 2003 Progress Report.

August 26–27, 2003 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on status of the WTC 

investigation with a public comment session. 

September 17, 2003 New York City, NY Media and public briefing on initiation of first-person data 

collection projects. 

December 2–3, 2003 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on status and initial results 

and release of the Public Update with a public comment session. 

February 12, 2004 New York City, NY Public meeting on progress and preliminary findings with public 

comments on issues to be considered in formulating final 

recommendations. 

June 18, 2004 New York City, NY Media/public briefing on release of June 2004 Progress Report.

June 22–23, 2004 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on the status of and 

preliminary findings from the WTC Investigation with a public 

comment session. 

August 24, 2004 Northbrook, IL Public viewing of standard fire resistance test of WTC floor 

system at Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. 

October 19–20, 2004 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on status and near complete 

set of preliminary findings with a public comment session. 

November 22, 2004 Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee discussion on draft annual report to 

Congress, a public comment session, and a closed session to 

discuss pre-draft recommendations for WTC Investigation. 

April 5, 2005 New York City, NY Media and public briefing on release of the probable collapse 

sequence for the WTC towers and draft reports for the projects on 

codes and practices, evacuation, and emergency response. 

June 23, 2005 New York City, NY Media and public briefing on release of all draft reports for the 

WTC towers and draft recommendations for public comment. 

September 12–13, 

2005 

Gaithersburg, MD NCST Advisory Committee meeting on disposition of public 

comments and update to draft reports for the WTC towers. 

September 13–15, 

2005 

Gaithersburg, MD WTC Technical Conference for stakeholders and technical 

community for dissemination of findings and recommendations 

and opportunity for public to make technical comments. 

• A dissemination and technical assistance program (DTAP) to (a) engage leaders of the 

construction and building community in ensuring timely adoption and widespread use of 

proposed changes to practices, standards, and codes resulting from the WTC Investigation 

and the R&D program, and (b) provide practical guidance and tools to better prepare facility 

owners, contractors, architects, engineers, emergency responders, and regulatory authorities 

to respond to future disasters. 

The desired outcomes are to make buildings, occupants, and first responders safer in future disaster 

events. 
Preface 

xxx NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

National Construction Safety Team Reports on the WTC Investigation 

A final report on the collapse of the WTC towers is being issued as NIST NCSTAR 1. A companion 

report on the collapse of WTC 7 is being issued as NIST NCSTAR 1A. The present report is one of a set 

that provides more detailed documentation of the Investigation findings and the means by which these 

technical results were achieved. As such, it is part of the archival record of this Investigation. The titles 

of the full set of Investigation publications are: 

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade 

Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center 7. 

NIST NCSTAR 1A. Gaithersburg, MD. 

Lew, H. S., R. W. Bukowski, and N. J. Carino. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of 

the World Trade Center Disaster: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety 

Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Fanella, D. A., A. T. Derecho, and S. K. Ghosh. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Design and Construction of Structural Systems. 

NIST NCSTAR 1-1A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Ghosh, S. K., and X. Liang. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of Building Code Structural Requirements. NIST 

NCSTAR 1-1B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Fanella, D. A., A. T. Derecho, and S. K. Ghosh. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Maintenance and Modifications to Structural 

Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-1C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, 

MD, September. 

Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions Applied to the Design and 

Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 and Post-Construction Provisions Applied after 

Occupancy. NIST NCSTAR 1-1D. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, 

MD, September. 

Razza, J. C., and R. A. Grill. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of Codes, Standards, and Practices in Use at the Time of the 

Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1E. National 

Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Grill, R. A., D. A. Johnson, and D. A. Fanella. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of the 1968 and Current (2003) New 
 Preface 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxxi

York City Building Code Provisions. NIST NCSTAR 1-1F. National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Amendments to the Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions of the New 

York City Building Code by Local Laws Adopted While World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 Were in 

Use. NIST NCSTAR 1-1G. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems 

of World Trade Center 1 and 2. NIST NCSTAR 1-1H. National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Grill, R. A., D. A. Johnson, and D. A. Fanella. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation 

of the World Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection, Life 

Safety, and Structural Systems of World Trade Center 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1I. National Institute of 

Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Design, Installation, and Operation of Fuel System for Emergency Power in 

World Trade Center 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1J. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD, September.

Sadek, F. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: 

Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center 

Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Faschan, W. J., and R. B. Garlock. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the 

World Trade Center Disaster: Reference Structural Models and Baseline Performance Analysis of 

the World Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-2A. National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Kirkpatrick, S. W., R. T. Bocchieri, F. Sadek, R. A. MacNeill, S. Holmes, B. D. Peterson, 

R. W. Cilke, C. Navarro. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade 

Center Disaster: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers, NIST 

NCSTAR 1-2B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Gayle, F. W., R. J. Fields, W. E. Luecke, S. W. Banovic, T. Foecke, C. N. McCowan, T. A. Siewert, and 

J. D. McColskey. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 

Disaster: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel. NIST NCSTAR 1-3. National 

Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Luecke, W. E., T. A. Siewert, and F. W. Gayle. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Contemporaneous Structural Steel 

Specifications. NIST Special Publication 1-3A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD, September. 
Preface 

xxxii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Banovic, S. W. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 

Disaster: Steel Inventory and Identification. NIST NCSTAR 1-3B. National Institute of Standards 

and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Banovic, S. W., and T. Foecke. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Damage and Failure Modes of Structural Steel Components. NIST 

NCSTAR 1-3C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Luecke, W. E., J. D. McColskey, C. N. McCowan, S. W. Banovic, R. J. Fields, T. Foecke, 

T. A. Siewert, and F. W. Gayle. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Mechanical Properties of Structural Steels. NIST NCSTAR 1-3D. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Banovic, S. W., C. N. McCowan, and W. E. Luecke. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Physical Properties of Structural Steels. NIST 

NCSTAR 1-3E. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Evans, D. D., R. D. Peacock, E. D. Kuligowski, W. S. Dols, and W. L. Grosshandler. 2005. Federal 

Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Active Fire Protection 

Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Kuligowski, E. D., D. D. Evans, and R. D. Peacock. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Fires Prior to September 11, 

2001. NIST NCSTAR 1-4A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Hopkins, M., J. Schoenrock, and E. Budnick. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation 

of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Suppression Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4B. National 

Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Keough, R. J., and R. A. Grill. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Fire Alarm Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4C. National Institute of Standards 

and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Ferreira, M. J., and S. M. Strege. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the 

World Trade Center Disaster: Smoke Management Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4D. National 

Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Gann, R. G., A. Hamins, K. B. McGrattan, G. W. Mulholland, H. E. Nelson, T. J. Ohlemiller, 

W. M. Pitts, and K. R. Prasad. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade 

Center Disaster: Reconstruction of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Pitts, W. M., K. M. Butler, and V. Junker. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of 

the World Trade Center Disaster: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis. 

NIST NCSTAR 1-5A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 
 Preface 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxxiii

Hamins, A., A. Maranghides, K. B. McGrattan, E. Johnsson, T. J. Ohlemiller, M. Donnelly, 

J. Yang, G. Mulholland, K. R. Prasad, S. Kukuck, R. Anleitner and T. McAllister. 2005. Federal 

Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Experiments and 

Modeling of Structural Steel Elements Exposed to Fire. NIST NCSTAR 1-5B. National Institute of 

Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Ohlemiller, T. J., G. W. Mulholland, A. Maranghides, J. J. Filliben, and R. G. Gann. 2005. Federal 

Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Tests of Single 

Office Workstations. NIST NCSTAR 1-5C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Gann, R. G., M. A. Riley, J. M. Repp, A. S. Whittaker, A. M. Reinhorn, and P. A. Hough. 2005. 

Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Reaction of 

Ceiling Tile Systems to Shocks. NIST NCSTAR 1-5D. National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Hamins, A., A. Maranghides, K. B. McGrattan, T. J. Ohlemiller, and R. Anleitner. 2005. Federal 

Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Experiments and 

Modeling of Multiple Workstations Burning in a Compartment. NIST NCSTAR 1-5E. National 

Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

McGrattan, K. B., C. Bouldin, and G. Forney. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety 

Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Computer Simulation of the Fires in the World 

Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5F. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Prasad, K. R., and H. R. Baum. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Fire Structure Interface and Thermal Response of the World Trade Center 

Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5G. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, 

MD, September. 

Gross, J. L., and T. McAllister. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade 

Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center 

Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-6. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, 

September. 

Carino, N. J., M. A. Starnes, J. L. Gross, J. C. Yang, S. Kukuck, K. R. Prasad, and R. W. Bukowski. 

2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Passive 

Fire Protection. NIST NCSTAR 1-6A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Gross, J., F. Hervey, M. Izydorek, J. Mammoser, and J. Treadway. 2005. Federal Building and 

Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Resistance Tests of Floor Truss 

Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-6B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, 

MD, September. 

Zarghamee, M. S., S. Bolourchi, D. W. Eggers, Ö. O. Erbay, F. W. Kan, Y. Kitane, A. A. Liepins, 

M. Mudlock, W. I. Naguib, R. P. Ojdrovic, A. T. Sarawit, P. R Barrett, J. L. Gross, and 
Preface 

xxxiv NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

T. P. McAllister. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 

Disaster: Component, Connection, and Subsystem Structural Analysis. NIST NCSTAR 1-6C. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Zarghamee, M. S., Y. Kitane, Ö. O. Erbay, T. P. McAllister, and J. L. Gross. 2005. Federal 

Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Global Structural 

Analysis of the Response of the World Trade Center Towers to Impact Damage and Fire. NIST 

NCSTAR 1-6D. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

McAllister, T., R. W. Bukowski, R. G. Gann, J. L. Gross, K. B. McGrattan, H. E. Nelson, L. Phan, 

W. M. Pitts, K. R. Prasad, F. Sadek. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade 

Center 7. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6E. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD. 

Gilsanz, R., V. Arbitrio, C. Anders, D. Chlebus, K. Ezzeldin, W. Guo, P. Moloney, A. Montalva, 

J. Oh, K. Rubenacker. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade 

Center Disaster: Structural Analysis of the Response of World Trade Center 7 to Debris Damage 

and Fire. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6F. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Gaithersburg, MD. 

Kim, W. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 

Disaster: Analysis of September 11, 2001, Seismogram Data. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6G. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD. 

Nelson, K. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 

Disaster: The Con Ed Substation in World Trade Center 7. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6H. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD. 

Averill, J. D., D. S. Mileti, R. D. Peacock, E. D. Kuligowski, N. Groner, G. Proulx, P. A. Reneke, and 

H. E. Nelson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: 

Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communication. NIST NCSTAR 1-7. National Institute of 

Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Fahy, R., and G. Proulx. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade 

Center Disaster: Analysis of Published Accounts of the World Trade Center Evacuation. NIST 

NCSTAR 1-7A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Zmud, J. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: 

Technical Documentation for Survey Administration. NIST NCSTAR 1-7B. National Institute of 

Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 

Lawson, J. R., and R. L. Vettori. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster: The Emergency Response Operations. NIST NCSTAR 1-8. National Institute of 

Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxxv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors extend our appreciation to all New York City Fire Department (FDNY), New York City 

Police Department (NYPD), Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), Port Authority of New York and 

New Jersey (PANYNJ), and World Trade Center security and engineering personnel who provided 

information for the investigation and participated in the emergency responder first-person interviews. In 

addition, the authors extend our appreciation to the following individuals who assisted with arranging, 

scheduling, and carrying out work that contributed to this effort: 

• Michael R. Rubin, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Counsel, U.S. 

Department of Commerce 

• Melissa Lieberman, NIST, General Attorney, U.S. Department of Commerce 

• Craig S. Burkhardt, Chief Counsel for Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce 

• James M. Begley, Deputy General Counsel, The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey 

• Saroj Bhol, P.E., Manager, Design Standards Unit Quality Assurance Division Engineering 

Department, The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey 

• Alan L. Reiss, former Director of the World Trade Center, Port Authority of New York & 

New Jersey 

• Alexandra Fisher, Assistant Counsel, The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) 

• Allen S. Hay, Chief of Safety, The Fire Department City of the City of New York (FDNY) 

• Michael F. Healey, Deputy Inspector, The New York City Police Department (NYPD) 

• Jay L. Cohen, Corporation Counsel, World Trade Center Unit, New York City Law 

Department 

• George C. D. Duke, Assistant Corporation Counsel, World Trade Center Unit, New York 

City Law Department 

• Sam M. W. Caspersen, Counsel, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States 

• Madeleine Blot, Counsel, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

• George L. Delgrosso, Investigator, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States 
Acknowledgments 

xxxvi NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• James Miller, Staff Member, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States 

• Catharine S. Taylor, Staff Assistant, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States 

• Kenneth Marr, Forensic Audio Analysis, Engineering Research Facility, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 

• Nustats Inc., Austin, TX, contract data collection 

The following NIST personnel are recognized for their assistance to Project 8 associated with first-person 

interviews information concerning building evacuation and emergency communications inside the 

WTC towers: 

• Jason Averill 

• Richard Peacock 

The following NIST personnel are recognized for their assistance to Project 8 related to information 

concerning WTC building design, building codes and standards, and elevator systems: 

• Richard Bukowski 

• Harold Nelson 

Bill Pitts (NIST) is recognized for his assistance with the collection and analysis of photographic and 

video data. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxxvii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

E.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 

This effort builds upon work already done by The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY), The 

New York City Police Department (NYPD), and McKinsey & Company by: 

• fully documenting what happened during the response by the fire service and other 

emergency responders to the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), up to the time of 

collapse of WTC 7 

• identifying issues that need to be addressed in changes to practice, standards, and codes 

It goes substantially beyond the work previously done by others. 

Task 1. Collect emergency response data to document emergency responder fatalities, command and 

control procedures, and equipment performance. Records of interest included dispatch logs, recorded 

radio communications, run logs from surviving responding units, 9-1-1 records, data recorded by The Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority) operations, FDNY, NYPD, and fire 

ground positioning of emergency apparatus. Information was collected on operations and functions of 

communication systems, on-site emergency information systems, fire alarm panels, elevator control 

panels, standpipes and fire hoses, and other pre-positioned emergency equipment. In coordination with 

project seven, oral history data was collected from witnesses, those in control of emergency operations, 

and surviving emergency responders to the extent their oral history had not already been documented. 

Technical experts reviewed and conducted a fact-based analysis of the data. 

Task 2. Interpret the factual analysis to determine the effect on responder successes of factors such as: 

• the influence of building design (e.g., height, stairways, elevators, smoke control systems) on 

fire service command and control procedures, life saving operations, and safety of emergency 

responders; 

• the influence of aircraft impact damage and fuel run-off on fire service command and control 

procedures, life saving operations, and safety of emergency responders; 

• the impact of systems failures (e.g., communication systems, water supply, sprinklers, 

standpipes) on fire service command and control procedures, life saving operations, and 

safety of emergency responders; 

• building occupant egress as related to emergency responder operations; 

• the ability to fight large fires on the upper floors of tall buildings; 

• the impact that the 1993 bombing of the WTC had on codes, standards, and procedures that 

affected emergency responders in tall buildings; 
Executive Summary 

xxxviii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• pre-planning, training, and standard operating procedures (including command and control) at 

the time of the WTC attack on September 11, 2001; 

• emergency responder accountability, location, and tracking, 

• fire and emergency response protocols for tall buildings; 

• the resources available for initial situation assessment and incident management, and 

practices for determining the possibility of structural collapse; and 

• communication and coordination of response activities amongst the various authorities at the 

WTC. 

Review of various public records showed that most of the data needed for the investigation were 

maintained by the three organizations that contributed to the emergency response: the PANYNJ, FDNY, 

and NYPD. Also, a significant amount of information was available through the various media services. 

Data sources were identified using several different techniques: 

• News media accounts were examined; 

• Books and other public records concerning WTC operations were examined; 

• Public comments were received via the WTC information e-mail address and phone line 

concerning information sources; 

• Team members met with each of the various organizations in an attempt to identify data 

sources; 

• First-person interviews were used to identify data; and 

• Emergency responder experts were employed and assisted with identifying data sources. 

After the data sources were identified, written requests were made to each of the agencies that were 

determined to possess data. The requests were followed by meetings and discussions during which 

agreements were formalized, setting rules for the transfer and protection of the data. After the agreements 

were completed, the data were transferred to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), or 

NIST team members accessed the data at locations identified in the agreements. Approximately half of 

the data requested were transferred to NIST and were entered into the investigation’s files. The other half 

of the data was studied at agreed upon locations in the New York City area. 

Four types of data were identified for this investigation: documentary data, electronic data, first-person 

interview data, and visual data. 

Documentary Data 

• Policies, protocols, and standards used by the various agencies for conducting operations at 

the WTC, 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xxxix

• Records and documents generated by the various agencies during operations at the WTC, and 

• Records and documents generated following the incident, including investigative reports such 

as the McKinsey and Company reports for FDNY and NYPD, and records documenting 

investigative first-person interviews. 

Electronic Data 

There were two forms of electronic data collected from the three emergency responder departments: 

• Radio communication recordings and 

• Telephone communication recordings 

First-Person Interviews 

In October 2003, NIST entered into a three-party agreement between NIST, New York City (NYC), and 

the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). The 

agreement provided procedures under which NIST and the 9/11 Commission would interview a 

maximum of 125 NYC emergency responders, 100 from FDNY and 25 from NYPD. 

In December 2003, NIST officially requested and the Port Authority agreed to interviews with twelve 

Port Authority personnel, including emergency responders, safety, security, and management personnel. 

The first-person interviews were conducted beginning in December 2003 and were completed in 

June 2004. 

The following represents the number of interviews conducted by NIST with each organization: 

• FDNY = 68 

Senior management and officers, mid-level officers, company officers, firefighters, emergency 

medical personnel, and dispatchers 

• NYPD = 25 

Senior management and officers, mid-level officers, emergency service unit personnel, aviation 

personnel, and dispatchers 

• PANYNJ/PAPD = 15 

Senior management personnel, facility safety personnel, building security personnel, facility 

communication personnel, building vertical transportation personnel, senior PAPD officers, midlevel PAPD officers, and PAPD officers 
Executive Summary 

xl NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• OTHER = 8 

Interviewees in this group contacted NIST directly or through third parties and indicated that they 

would like to be interviewed. Approximately half of these individuals were retired FDNY 

personnel. The group consisted of a building security guard, building engineers, a dispatcher, 

firefighters, and a fire safety director. 

• Total Interviews = 116 

Visual Data 

• Photographs, film, and digital; 

• Motion images, video clips, and movie film 

Dr. William Pitts of NIST and his staff acquired a large amount of the visual data. Numerous 

photographs and video records were acquired from FDNY and NYPD. Uncut video was acquired from 

the Naudet brothers’ documentary and video news organizations. Thousands of photographs and video 

clips were obtained from the PANYNJ and other New York City sources, including the media and the 

public. 

E.2 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 

Changes Made by the PANYNJ Following the February 1993 WTC Bombing 

After the February 1993 bombing, the following changes were made at the World Trade Center by the 

PANYNJ that had a direct impact on emergency responder operations on September 11, 2001: 

• Work on the installation of automatic sprinkler systems was accelerated. The installation of 

automatic sprinkler systems began prior to 1993 and involved WTC 1 and WTC 2. 

• Improvements were made to the Concourse level of the WTC to improve egress. 

• A new Port Authority Police Command Center was established inside WTC 5. 

• Fire Command Desks were installed in the lobbies of WTC 1 and WTC 2. 

• A radio repeater (radio repeater: an electronic device for amplifying and retransmitting a 

radio signal) was installed in WTC 5 that operated on the FDNY city-wide high-rise 

frequency. The antenna was located on the top of WTC 5 and was directed at WTC 1 and 

WTC 2. Controls for operating the repeater were originally located at the PAPD Police 

Command Center inside WTC 5. During the spring of 2001, controls for repeater operation 

were moved to the Fire Command Desks inside the lobby of each of the two towers, at the 

request of FDNY. 

• The elevator intercom system was upgraded and could be monitored at the Lobby Fire 

Command Desk in each tower. 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xli

• A new Operations Control Center with the capability to monitor all HVAC systems and 

elevators was constructed on the B1 level of WTC 2. 

• Multiple power sources were installed for exit stairway lighting in the towers. 

• WTC 1 and WTC 2 received a new decentralized Fire Alarm System, Class E (Style 7), with 

three separate data risers to transponders located every three floors, with redundant control 

panels and electronics, and multiple control station announcement capability. 

• Fire drills were conducted in conjunction with FDNY. 

Changes Made by FDNY Following the February 1993 WTC Bombing 

Incident Command System: The scope of the February 1993 bombing was beyond anything ever 

experienced by FDNY, and information overload occurred at the incident command level. Tasks to 

resolve issues related to the 1993 bombing were delegated along the lines of the FDNY incident 

command system in the following areas: command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance. It was 

also recognized that all agencies must be sensitive to and coordinate operations for effective incident 

command. The May 1997, Incident Command System manual and its new policies had been in operation 

with FDNY for approximately four years when the WTC attack occurred on September 11, 2001. 

Communications: 

• To improve communications at a large incident, the city purchased eighty 800-megahertz 

radios for use by deputy fire commissioners, each staff chief, and the Field Communications 

Unit. Twenty of the radios were to be distributed by the Field Communications unit at an 

incident, if needed. 

• A high-rise repeater was requested by FDNY for operations in the WTC, and the Port 

Authority installed it in WTC 5. 

• FDNY companies that were located near the WTC and often responded to the WTC were 

issued Port Authority radios that allowed them to communicate with the building’s Deputy 

Fire Safety Directors and with PAPD. 

Interagency Protocols: The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was established, 

and it took on the job of promoting the improvement of interagency operations; however, on 

September 11, 2001, the OEM center located at WTC 7 became ineffective as WTC 7 was evacuated by 

the emergency response personnel. 

Building Systems and Fire Safety Personnel: In 1993, the Port Authority and New York City entered 

into two Memoranda of Agreement related to fire safety of Port Authority facilities located in New York 

City. The first agreement allowed for the implementation of fire safety recommendations that would be 

made by FDNY after they had inspected PANYNJ facilities located in New York City. The second 

agreement recognized the right of FDNY to conduct fire safety inspections of PANYNJ properties in New 

York City. It provided guidelines for FDNY to communicate needed corrective actions to the PANYNJ, 

and it assured that new or modified fire safety systems were to be in compliance with local codes and 
Executive Summary 

xlii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

regulations. It also required a third party review of the systems by a New York State licensed architect or 

engineer. 

September 11, 2001, Attack on the World Trade Center 

Initial “Size-up” and Impact of Aircraft Damage to WTC 1: The first command officer from FDNY 

to arrive at WTC 1 had actually seen the airplane strike WTC 1. While responding to WTC 1, he radioed 

Manhattan dispatch to advise them that “a plane had hit the World Trade Center” and that “they have a 

number of floors on fire.” Upon entering WTC 1 and going to the fire command desk to set up the Lobby 

Command Post, he met with the former building Fire Safety Director and other Port Authority personnel 

in an effort to determine what damage the building had sustained. During first-person interviews, FDNY 

personnel provided the following information related to building conditions and emergency response 

operations in WTC 1: 

• It was determined that the elevators were not working and/or were not safe for use; therefore, 

firefighters would have to gain access to injured and trapped occupants by climbing the stairs 

and carrying the equipment needed. 

• It was likely that the water supply to the stand pipe and automatic sprinkler systems on the 

upper floors was damaged and that firefighting would not be an option until a reliable water 

supply was established and equipment was carried up to the fire floors. 

• FDNY command personnel learned from 9-1-1 dispatch operators that smoke, fire, and 

structural damage in the building prevented many building occupants from evacuating floors 

above the impact zone. 

• FDNY command personnel knew that jet fuel had flowed into the elevator shafts and into 

other parts of the buildings and presented a danger to building occupants and emergency 

responders. 

• Communication systems to the upper floors via Warden Phones and Stand Pipe phones were 

not working. 

• The building communication system used to make emergency announcements to building 

occupants was not working. 

Based on the following facts, the fire chiefs who established the original Command Post inside the lobby 

of WTC 1 concluded that the fire department efforts should be directed toward evacuation and rescue of 

building occupants:1, 2, 3

 the impact zone and fires were so high in the building, there were large fires on 

multiple floors, the building’s water supply was compromised, and there were no working elevators that 

could transport fire fighters and equipment up to a staging area just below the impact zone. Firefighting 

operations on the upper floors would not have been a reasonable option at that time. The building 

 

1

 FDNY interview 2, winter 2003 

2

 FDNY interview 7, winter 2004 

3

 FDNY interview 20, winter 2004 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xliii

conditions indicated that, at best, it would take hours to establish meaningful firefighting operations on 

the upper floors of the building. The chiefs knew that this assessment did not give much hope for the 

survival of the people trapped above the fires since the fires would continue to grow and the toxic fire 

gases would occupy the building spaces where the people were trapped. It was likely that many of the 

occupants trapped at and above the impact zone would die before help could get to them. 

Physiological Impact of Climbing Stairs: All three responding agencies sent personnel up the stairs in 

both WTC 1 and WTC 2. With the elevators inoperable, all equipment necessary for firefighting, rescue, 

and treatment of injured occupants had to be carried up the stairs. A normally outfitted FDNY firefighter 

wearing full protective clothing (coat, pants, helmet, hood, boots, gloves) and Self-Contained Breathing 

Apparatus (SCBA) carries approximately 23 kg (50 lb) of equipment. Additional equipment, such as 

radios, lights, extra air bottles, forcible entry equipment, ropes, medical kits, or hose packs and appliances 

may add another 23 kg (50 lb) or more to the work load. It is not unusual for firefighters to be carrying 

loads in excess of 46 kg (100 lb) into a building when fighting a fire. The NYPD Emergency Service unit 

(ESU) and PAPD officers who ascended the stairs also wore SCBA. Much of the equipment they carried 

was similar to that of the Fire Department. The major difference between the Fire Department and Police 

Department outfitting was that the Police Department personnel did not wear protective clothing designed 

for firefighting. 

From the time of the first airplane impact into WTC 1 to the collapse of WTC 2, a period of 

approximately one hour and 12 minutes, emergency responders inside WTC 1 were able to climb to floors 

in the 40s. However, a small number of emergency responders got to floors in the 40s by taking the only 

operating elevator to the 16th floor and then using the stairs. A report from one building occupant 

indicated that they saw firefighters located on floors about in the 50s.4

 (NIST 2004) Within WTC 2, one 

FDNY Battalion Chief and Ladder Company got to floors in the 70s. They were able to take an elevator 

from the lobby to the 40th floor before having to walk up the stairs. According to interview information, 

the consequences of firefighters and other emergency responders having to climb many tens of floors to 

get to a fire or other high-rise building emergency without the use of elevators are summarized as follows: 

• The ability to get both personnel and needed equipment to the desired location is limited by 

building height. 

• Emergency responders wearing police uniforms, not wearing a SCBA or carrying extra 

equipment, were able to climb the stairs at a rate of approximately 1.4 minutes per floor while 

climbing to floors in the 40s inside of WTC 1. 

• Emergency responders wearing full firefighter turnout gear, wearing a SCBA, and carrying 

extra equipment were able to climb the stairs at a rate of approximately 2.0 minutes per floor 

while climbing to floors in the 30s and 40s inside of WTC 1. 

• Emergency response time factors related to the rate of fire growth, the ability to rescue 

building occupants, and the ability to bring a fire under control become more critical with 

every additional floor in building height. 

 

4

 Interview 1000118 (NIST 2004) 
Executive Summary 

xliv NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• The ability of emergency responders to climb stairs with equipment and remain physically fit 

to conduct rescue and firefighting operations, treat injured occupants, and remove them is 

diminished with every additional floor in building height that must be climbed. 

Situational Awareness: Situational awareness was an overriding issue with all emergency responders 

during operations at the WTC site. First-person interviews with emergency responders from all agencies 

highlight the importance of situational awareness during this complex emergency response. Results from 

the interviews showed that there were two basic levels of situational awareness: 

1. Emergency responders working outside the buildings, with the ability to observe events and 

conditions as they changed felt that they had good situational awareness. In addition, 

emergency responders who worked inside the buildings and had reliable radio 

communications with people outside the building felt that their situational awareness was 

good. 

2. Emergency responders who worked inside the buildings and had no reliable means of 

communication other than face-to-face communications felt that they had poor situational 

awareness. 

Some senior emergency responder officers inside WTC 1 felt that their situational awareness was poor 

even though they were in radio contact with other senior officers outside the building. One of these 

senior officers stated that he would have known more about what was going on during the incident if he 

had been home watching it on TV.5

For emergency responders already inside WTC 1, it took time to confirm that a second aircraft had 

actually hit WTC 2. A large number of emergency responders working inside WTC 1 realized that 

something had happened but did not know that a second aircraft struck WTC 2. Some emergency 

responders who were going up in the stairways inside WTC 1 did not know that anything had happened 

when the second aircraft struck WTC 2. 

Accountability for and Tracking of Emergency Responders: Accountability encompasses the 

assignment, dispatch, checking in, tracking, locating, and checking out of emergency responders 

operating at an emergency. With the WTC attack, accountability also involved the recall of emergency 

responders. Recall refers to bringing emergency responders who are off duty back to duty status. All 

responding agencies had recall policies in place and did recall personnel for WTC operations. In addition, 

a few emergency responders self-dispatched to the World Trade Center, and as the recalls were put into 

effect some emergency responders went to the scene instead of reporting to their assigned location, 

causing accountability problems at the WTC complex. 

All emergency responder organizations had accountability, location, and tracking plans in place, and they 

generally worked well during the first 30 minutes of WTC operations. However, the FDNY system 

became overwhelmed with the large number of units and personnel arriving at the scene. FDNY used 

magnetic Command Boards to keep track of personnel during operations. NYPD kept their personnel and 

tracking information on a clipboard and paper, and PAPD maintained their accountability and tracking 

 

5

 FDNY interview 7, winter 2004. 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xlv

information at the PAPD Police Desk inside WTC 5. All emergency responder (FDNY, NYPD, and 

PAPD) accountability and tracking systems and records were lost when WTC 2 collapsed, and there was 

no backup for these lost records. 

The FDNY Chiefs in charge of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) operations at the WTC had some 

difficulties with accountability and tracking of their personnel. The size of the incident, the difficulty in 

determining early on what EMS units were there, and the self-dispatch of some non-FDNY ambulances 

added to their difficulties. Not all ambulances operating within New York City are part of the Fire 

Department. Some respond from hospitals or are from private ambulance companies. One of the biggest 

problems for the Emergency Medical Services was the lack of control of the ambulances that were not 

part of the Fire Department. 

Location and tracking of personnel is an issue that has been studied by the emergency responder 

community for many years. Once responders report to a Command Post at the scene of an emergency, 

receive their assignments, and depart to accomplish their tasks, there is no effective means to locate and 

track the activities of the units or individuals. On September 11, 2001, the only means for locating and 

tracking units and personnel was through radio communications. During operations at the WTC, there 

were so many people using the FDNY radio system for ongoing operations that it became ineffective for 

locating and tracking personnel. 

Emergency Medical Services Patient Tracking: There are many reasons to track patients who are 

triaged, treated and transported from an emergency. One important reason is to ensure that no one 

medical facility is overwhelmed by an unexpected influx of patients. The objective is not having an 

ambulance drop a patient off at a hospital, but at a hospital that has the best capabilities to take care of 

that person, avoiding situations in which any one hospital is overwhelmed. Within the individual triage 

and treatment areas that were set up by FDNY, efforts were made to keep track of patients. This was 

done with pencil and paper. All of the data on patients was lost when the buildings collapsed. 

Building Access by Emergency Responders and Evacuation of Civilians by Stairways: During the 

September 11, 2001, operations, stairs were the primary means of access to and egress from the World 

Trade Center towers. Elevator service, practically speaking, did not exist in either of the buildings. Of 

the 99 elevators that were in each tower, only one elevator in each tower was functional and operated in a 

limited capacity to the lower third of each building. The egress of building occupants in the stairways and 

through the stairway doors of WTC 1 and WTC 2 generally had a negative impact on the emergency 

response operations. Emergency responders reported difficulties negotiating the stairway doors and 

stairways as occupants were coming down. Some of the problems experienced by emergency responders 

were: 

• Difficulty accessing the stairway doors and stairways through the lobby and mezzanine levels 

because of building occupant flow out of the doorways and stairways; only one person could 

exit or enter the stairway at a time. If an occupant was leaving through the stairway door that 

stopped the flow of emergency responders into the stairway. If an emergency responder was 

entering the stairway through the stairway door that stopped the flow of occupants from 

leaving the stairway. 

• Emergency responder team personnel became separated by the counter flow as building 

occupants moved down the stairs and the emergency responders attempted to move up. 
Executive Summary 

xlvi NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• Emergency responders experienced difficulty in moving equipment up the stairs as building 

occupants were coming down the stairs. 

Emergency responders interviewed stated that the 1.12 m (44 in)-wide stairways could be easily blocked 

by one person as they attempted to walk down the stairs. An average-sized person could walk down the 

center of the stairway and place one hand on each of the staircase handrails. This posture would block the 

stairway for other people who were trying to move faster down the staircase. This posture was identified 

as being used by mobility-impaired people who were only able to step down to the next step one foot at a 

time. This resulted in both feet standing on the same step, instead of the unimpaired gait where one foot 

is placed onto a step and the other foot is placed on the next step down. 

Emergency responders also reported that the stairways became plugged and traffic was stopped as 

individuals with physical disabilities or obese occupants blocked the stairs. 

After WTC 2 collapsed, emergency responders inside WTC 1 attempted to exit the building by going 

down the various stairways. On the way down, some emergency responders stopped and checked each 

floor to be sure that it was clear before they proceeded down. On about the 12th floor, FDNY personnel 

found approximately 40 to 60 people who had been removed from the stairway by others and placed onto 

the floor because these mobility impaired individuals had been blocking the stairway evacuation routes. 

The emergency responders stopped and began to assist these people with their evacuation. Depending on 

the disability or size of the person, it took from one to four emergency responders to assist one person 

with the evacuation. If the individual being assisted required a lot of assistance or was significantly 

overweight emergency responders had to change teams as fatigue set in. The evacuation pace while 

assisting the mobility challenged occupants was often described by the emergency responders as very 

slow. From the FDNY and PAPD interviews, it was not clear how many of the 40 to 60 occupants were 

safely evacuated from the building before WTC 1 collapsed. It is known from the interviews that a group 

of about 20 of these individuals were being moved out of WTC 1 just before the building collapsed. 

Communications: 

Building Communications: Upon arrival in the lobby of WTC 1, FDNY personnel were told that the 

building communication systems used to make emergency announcements to building occupants was not 

working. Communications to the elevators in the upper third of the buildings were lost. The Warden 

phones did not work, and attempts to use the wire line phones to upstairs were unsuccessful. 

• Building occupants reported that the emergency communication system used to make the 

emergency announcements inside WTC 1 was inoperable as a result of the aircraft impact. 

• The emergency communication system used to make the emergency announcements was 

inoperable as a result of the aircraft impact. FDNY personnel upstairs inside of WTC 1 also 

learned that the warden phone system was damaged and the standpipe phone system was not 

operating. 

Radio Communications: All of the radio systems analyzed appeared to have been working well during 

the period of operations just before the attack on the WTC. There were two cases where handie-talkies 

experienced difficulties with stuck or open microphones just before and during the attack. One of these 

handie-talkies was used by PAPD, and one was used by NYPD. 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xlvii

High-rise buildings create problems with radio communications. The vast amount of metal and steel 

reinforced concrete in high-rise buildings is known to attenuate and block radio signals. This problem 

often occurs with low output power emergency responder handie-talkies. Various documents, including 

information from the 1993 WTC bombing, highlighted the problems FDNY experienced with radio 

communications in high-rise buildings. On September 11, 2001, FDNY again experienced poor handietalkie radio communications within the towers. This had a major impact on FDNY operations particularly 

inside WTC 1 where no one used the WTC radio repeater system or a Battalion Car Cross Band Repeater. 

At WTC 2, the FDNY/WTC radio repeater system was used. 

FDNY WTC Radio Repeater: The FDNY high-rise Channel 7 repeater that was located in WTC 5 was 

functional during operations at the WTC. This radio repeater received FDNY radio communications on a 

specified radio frequency, amplified the signal power, and retransmitted the radio communications on 

another specified radio frequency that the FDNY radios received. Data suggest that the repeater handset 

was broken and/or the handset volume was turned down so that it could not be heard when the repeater 

radio check was conducted. Data also suggest that the repeater’s antenna system was not damaged. This 

is based on the fact that radio communications using the repeater system were carried out inside WTC 1 

and inside WTC 2. The communications were recorded by the repeater’s recording system; therefore, it is 

unlikely that the antenna was damaged by debris from the aircraft impact. 

The recordings of radio communications by the WTC/FDNY repeater system suggest that operations 

communications inside WTC 2 were assisted by the repeater. Also, the radio recordings show that 

communications readability using the repeater was generally good to excellent. Where readability levels 

were poor, it was generally caused by doubling or multiple people attempting to communicate over the 

repeater at one time. If FDNY personnel in both towers attempted to use the repeater for operations, there 

would likely have been additional radio traffic that would have resulted in more unreadable 

communications. However, it would have been likely that the Lobby Command Post in WTC 1 would 

have had somewhat improved communications with personnel operating in the upper floors of the 

building up until the time when WTC 2 collapsed. The radio repeater recordings suggest that the repeater 

system failed during the collapse of WTC 2. 

If the WTC 1 Lobby Command Post had been using the WTC/FDNY repeater system for 

communications inside the tower, it would have lost the primary means of communications with its 

personnel, negatively affecting operations. Since the WTC 1 Lobby Command Post was not using the 

repeater, the apparent repeater failure with the collapse of WTC 2 had no effect on saving lives of FDNY 

personnel located inside WTC 1. If the repeater had been in use inside WTC 1 when WTC 2 collapsed, it 

would have taken time to establish that the repeater system had failed, and FDNY personnel would have 

had to then change radio channels to continue radio communications. 

Although the WTC/FDNY repeater was apparently working inside WTC 1, the earlier tests had indicated 

that it was not working, and emergency responders were informed that it was not working. Therefore, 

emergency responders did not use the repeater in WTC 1. When the repeater actually did fail, with the 

collapse of WTC 2, there was no effect on emergency responder communications inside WTC 1, since the 

repeater was not being used. 

Radio Communications Quantity and Quality: All emergency responders struggled with the high 

volume of radio traffic at the WTC. The surge in radio traffic significantly impacted the quality of radio 

communications during operations at the WTC. Data for the various departments demonstrate the 
Executive Summary 

xlviii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

significant changes that occurred in radio communications traffic during operations at the WTC. It is 

evident that PAPD, FDNY, and NYPD all experienced similar surges in radio traffic volume following 

the first aircraft impact into WTC 1. 

Analysis of the radio traffic for each of the departments shows periods where radio traffic rates during the 

surge conditions potentially resulted in situations where base station radio operators were unable to relay 

important information. 

It is estimated that one-third to one-half of emergency responder radio communications during operations 

at the WTC on the morning of September 11, 2001, were unreadable or incomplete. 

Radio Communications and Incident Command and Control: The poor radio communications at the 

WTC had a serious impact on the FDNY Command Post’s attempts to maintain command and control. 

Radio Communications and Evacuation of Emergency Responders from WTC 1: With the collapse of 

WTC 2, each emergency responder department sent out radio messages calling for the immediate 

evacuation of WTC 1. At least three FDNY Chief Officers transmitted urgent radio messages over their 

handie-talkie radios calling for the evacuation of WTC 1. NYPD ESU personnel inside WTC 1 received 

their orders to evacuate from an ESU Mobilization Point staff person located at Church and Vesey 

Streets. PAPD command personnel also called for the evacuation of WTC 1. 

From first-person interviews with surviving emergency responders who went upstairs in WTC 1, eight of 

the 15 FDNY personnel interviewed who had handie-talkie radios heard the order to evacuate over their 

radios. All three NYPD ESU officers interviewed heard the order to evacuate over their radios. Of the 

three PAPD officers interviewed, two heard the order to evacuate over their radios, and one did not. 

Radio communications associated with the order to evacuate WTC 1 had mixed results after the collapse 

of WTC 2. Data show that some heard the evacuation orders while other personnel on the same floor did 

not hear the orders. Lack of timely information sharing and inadequate communications capabilities 

likely contributed to the loss of emergency responder lives. 

Coordination of Response Activities with Other Authorities at the World Trade Center: In general, 

on the morning of September 11, 2001, all departments attempted to work together to save as many lives 

as possible and protect the citizens of New York City. At the same time, first-person interviews with 

FDNY and NYPD personnel showed that at times some issues related to a given department’s operational 

responsibility and the competitive nature of departments did exist. However, emergency responder 

interviews also suggest that inter-agency competition had minimal effect on operations at the WTC before 

the towers collapsed. 

The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was established in New York City after the 1993 

bombing, in part, to promote unified operations between and among the various city emergency responder 

departments. On the morning of September 11, 2001, OEM operations were disrupted with the loss of the 

city’s OEM operations center located inside WTC 7. Since the OEM center was not available for 

operations, NYPD, FDNY, and OEM Commissioners met the Mayor on the street with the group initially 

assembling at Barclay Street. At the same time, NYPD was establishing an alternate command center for 

the Mayor and his staff at 75 Barclay Street so that he and his staff could oversee operations. 

(Giuliani 2002). However, their operations from 75 Barclay Street were disrupted by the collapse of the 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation xlix

towers, and they had to quickly evacuate from that site. Data show that there was no formal structure of 

unified command between departments below the Mayor and Commissioner level of operations. FDNY 

and NYPD department chiefs were not working together at the same command post, and they did not 

formulate unified orders or directions for their departments. 

NYPD generally has different responsibilities from FDNY related to security, traffic control, protection of 

the public and the crime scene, etc. However, there were overlapping functions with NYPD ESU rescue 

team operations inside and around the WTC towers and FDNY operations. Although ESU rescue teams 

eventually joined and worked with FDNY personnel, functional unified operations were diminished as a 

result of the two departments’ command posts being separated. In addition, the separate command posts 

could not communicate with each other on their different radio systems, and neither FDNY nor NYPD 

had liaison officers working with the other department’s command post until after WTC 1 collapsed. 

The coordination of communications and operations between the responding authorities at the WTC was a 

challenge for all emergency responders working that morning. The short time frame related to the attack 

and emergency responder operations coupled with successive significant threats requiring response (an 

aircraft hitting WTC 2 after WTC 1 was hit, the possible threat of a third aircraft coming in, the collapse 

of WTC 2, etc.) compounded the difficulty of establishing a unified operation. The challenges related to 

the establishment of unified operations were made significantly worse when the OEM facility located 

inside WTC 7 had to be evacuated. Although there was merit to having the FDNY and NYPD Command 

Posts separated, there was no uniform means for communicating between the two Command Posts at the 

time when WTC 2 collapsed. FDNY and NYPD primarily operated as independent organizations based 

on their operational responsibilities. However, FDNY, EMS, NYPD, PAPD, PANYNJ, and OEM 

attempted to work together. These attempts to work together were stymied by a lack of existing protocols 

that clearly defined authorities and responsibilities, communications systems problems, and multiple 

major attacks and threats. 

Emergency Responder/News Media Communications: Evaluation of emergency responder/news 

media operations indicates that communications between the organizations was less than totally effective. 

Critical information related to life safety and evacuation from the WTC towers was not transmitted to the 

news media so that it could be broadcast to people threatened by the attack and building fires. At times, 

news media inquiries interfered with emergency responders as they attempted to carryout life safety 

operations. Appropriate emergency response agency contact points were bypassed or not used by some 

news media for gathering information. It appears that emergency response agencies were overwhelmed 

by news media requests for information. 

Emergency Response Issues 

Preplanning: Preplanning is an integral part of all emergency response operations. Building owners and 

operators, fire departments, emergency medical services, and police departments need pre-plans that 

address safety issues associated with potentially high risk properties like the WTC. Not only do these 

groups need to develop pre-plans for emergencies in high-rise buildings, they need to be sure that each of 

the pre-plans appropriately link to form a cohesive and functional unified plan. The 1993 attack on the 

WTC heightened FDNY’s awareness of the need for preplanning and command organization that went 

beyond the scale of operations carried out during the 1993 bombing. Even with their preplanning, many 
Executive Summary 

l NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

of the same difficulties experienced during the 1993 bombing were evident during the 

September 11, 2001, emergency response to the WTC. Some of these were: 

• Poor radio communication inside the buildings and its effect on command and control. 

• Emergency responders indicated that the buildings were inadequately marked, and many 

emergency responders did not know one building from the other. This resulted in units being 

assigned to one building and reporting to the other building without knowing that it was the 

wrong building. 

• Emergency responder units that did not normally work in the lower Manhattan area were not 

aware of the buildings’ design and construction and did not have information concerning the 

buildings’ operating systems. 

• Management of ambulance and other emergency apparatus access and exit from the site. 

• Difficulties establishing a unified command system. 

Access and Firefighting:

• Physiological impact on emergency responders climbing more than 10 to 12 floors during an 

emergency. 

• Adequacy of building capacity for egress and firefighting access during full evacuation of 

fully occupied tall buildings. Access to high-rise buildings by emergency responders is 

hindered by counterflow, egress capacity, and lack of available elevators. 

• Distance (i.e., remoteness) between stairwells where standpipes are located, redundant 

standpipe and water supply systems. 

• Time factors associated with: structural fire resistance vs. firefighting/rescue operations 

Emergency Communications: 

• Lack of rigorous pre-emergency inspection and testing of radio communications systems 

within high-rise buildings to identify performance gaps and inadequacies. 

• Performance requirements for emergency communication systems in buildings. 

− Design, testing, certification standards 

− Maintenance and inspection requirements 

• Lack of communications network architecture (interoperability) and operational protocols for 

intra- and inter-agency communication at all levels of organizational hierarchy. This includes: 
 Executive Summary 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation li

− Scalability in terms of the number of emergency responders using the system and 

providing radio coverage in large buildings with challenging radio frequency propagation 

environments 

− Interoperability with existing legacy emergency communication systems 

− Localization techniques to identify emergency responders within indoor building 

environments 

− Conventional two-way systems versus wireless network systems 

Command and Control: On September 11, 2001, command and control was seriously affected by the 

lack of effective communications. In addition, the system used for maintaining records of unit 

assignments at each command post was not capable of managing the numbers of units and personnel 

being assigned to operate at the WTC. The following are key issues related to Command and Control: 

• Availability of detailed procedures and methods for gathering, processing, and delivering 

situational information (including voice, video, and data integration) to all emergency 

responders, including 9-1-1 operators, wardens, incident commander, etc. 

• Availability of effective codes and protocols for establishment and uninterrupted operation of 

the incident command and control system, and for preservation and dissemination of 

information managed by command posts. 

− Command posts established within the collapse zone of buildings that received serious 

impact damage and contained large multi-floor fires 

− Establishing the command post prior to the request and dispatch of units in excess of the 

initial alarm assignments (the ability to keep track of personnel before they are sent in.) 

− Effects of self-dispatch and freelancing of emergency responders and ambulances, 

especially teams lacking protective clothing and medical equipment 

− Robustness of assignment and tracking (accountability) system for large-scale 

emergencies 

• Communication of the overall command strategy to all responders relative to conducting only 

rescue and evacuation operations below the fire floors. 

• Secure location of state and local Emergency Operation Centers. 

• Rapid adoption and execution of a unified emergency response mission by all emergency 

responder ranks 

• The dispatch of large numbers of personnel and apparatus and the ability of management to 

maintain accountability in a timely manner. Additionally, the ability of the incident site to 

effectively accommodate large numbers of personnel and apparatus. 
Executive Summary 

lii NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

E.3 REFERENCES 

Giuliani, Rudolph W., with Kurson, Ken. 2002. Leadership, First Edition, Hyperion, Talk Miramax 

Books, New York. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 1

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of September 11, 2001, two hijacked aircraft were deliberately crashed into the World 

Trade Center (WTC) towers in lower Manhattan, New York City. Approximately 17,600 people, 

representing nations from around the world, were inside the buildings as the attack occurred. This attack 

caused a greater loss of human life than the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The two aircraft 

striking the World Trade Center towers resulted in the deaths of 2,749 people. Many of these people died 

at the moment of aircraft impact, hundreds of building occupants were trapped in the buildings above the 

impact zones, and thousands were forced to escape from the buildings. 

New York City emergency responders rushed to the scene in hope of saving human lives, and as a result, 

hundreds of emergency responders gave their lives when the buildings collapsed. A total of 343 Fire 

Department of the City of New York (FDNY) personnel were lost; 37 Port Authority Police Department 

(PAPD) officers plus one K-9 member, and 23 New York City Police Department (NYPD) personnel 

were lost, for a total of 421 emergency response personnel. In addition, there was one employee of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, one employee of the Untied States Secret Service, one Fire Patrolman, 

and 15 other ambulance and volunteer emergency responder personnel who sacrificed their lives that 

morning. 

The names of all emergency responders who gave the ultimate sacrifice on September 11, 2001, are listed 

in Attachment 1 at the end of this report. 

Many of these emergency responder fatalities occurred outside of the WTC towers; data from FDNY 

shows that approximately 160 of the 343 personnel were lost outside the towers. In addition, it is 

believed that all of the 15 volunteer responders were lost outside of the towers. The human toll was not 

just in lives lost; there were approximately 2,000 emergency responders injured as a result of the attack on 

the WTC towers. 

As emergency responders began operations at WTC 1, they were faced with extraordinary conditions with 

hundreds of seriously injured, burned, and dying citizens at the scene. As they worked, the second 

aircraft came from the south and crashed into WTC 2, producing a large fireball and spreading burning 

fuel around the complex. In addition, thousands of aircraft and building fragments fell from the sky and 

struck people and equipment on the ground. Human bodies from the aircraft and buildings fell to the 

streets as a result of the aircraft impact. Even after the aircraft attack was finished emergency responders 

had to negotiate extremely dangerous conditions as they attempted to access the WTC towers. Falling 

building materials, glass, flaming debris, people falling and people deliberately jumping from the 

buildings and falling into the streets and plaza created an extremely dangerous zone around the buildings 

as emergency responders attempted to help those in need. The first FDNY member killed that morning 

was hit by a falling person. Many of the emergency responders at the WTC site indicated that they felt 

they were conducting rescue operations in a war zone. 
Chapter 1 

2 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

This report describes the purpose of the NIST emergency response investigative effort, the methods used 

during the investigation, the analysis of evidence from the investigation, and findings that address the 

advancement of emergency responder operations and safety. 

1.1 PURPOSE 

The emergency response investigative effort focused on the following: 

• fully document what happened during the response by the fire service to the attacks on the 

World Trade Center, up to the time of collapse of WTC 7 

• identify issues that need to be addressed in changes to practice, standards and codes 

• identify alternative practices and/or technologies that may address these issues 

• identify R&D needs that advance the safety of the fire service in responding to massive fires 

in tall buildings. 

1.2 TECHNICAL APPROACH 

Project 8 was divided into four tasks as follows: 

Task 1. Collect emergency response data in cooperation with FDNY, NYPD, and The Port Authority of 

New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority) to document emergency responder fatalities, 

command and control procedures, and equipment performance. Records of interest included dispatch 

logs, recorded radio communications, run logs from surviving responding units, 9-1-1 records, data 

recorded by the FDNY, the PANYNJ operations, and the NYPD, and fire ground positioning of 

emergency apparatus. Information also was sought on operations and function of communications 

systems, on-site emergency information systems, fire alarm panels, elevator control panels, standpipes 

and fire hoses, and other pre-positioned emergency equipment. In coordination with the NIST analysis of 

the occupant behavior, egress, and emergency communication (refer to NIST NCSTAR 1-71

), oral history 

data were collected from witnesses, those in control of emergency operations, and surviving emergency 

responders to the extent that their oral history had not already been documented. This effort also used the 

FDNY and NYPD McKinsey & Company2,3 reports as one source of preliminary investigative 

information. Technical experts reviewed and conducted a fact-based analysis of the data. 

 

1

 This reference is to one of the companion documents from this Investigation. A list of these documents appears in the Preface 

to this report. 2

 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, Fire Department of the City of New York, August 19, 2002. 3

 McKinsey & Company, Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response, New York City Police Department, 

August 19, 2002. 
 Introduction 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 3

Task 2. Interpret the factual data to determine the effect on responder successes of factors such as: 

• the influence of building design (e.g., height, stairways, elevators, smoke control systems) on 

fire service command and control procedures, life saving operations, and safety of rescue 

personnel; 

• the influence of aircraft impact damage and fuel run-off on fire service command and control 

procedures, life saving operations, and safety of rescue personnel; 

• the impact of systems failures (e.g., communications systems, water supply, automatic 

sprinklers, standpipes) on fire service command and control procedures, life saving 

operations, and safety of rescue personnel; 

• building occupant egress as related to fire service operations; 

• the ability to fight large fires on the upper floors of tall buildings; 

• the impact that the 1993 bombing of the WTC had on codes, standards, and procedures that 

affected emergency responders in tall buildings; 

• pre-planning, training, and standard operating procedures (including command and control) at 

the time of the WTC attack; 

• firefighter accountability, location, and tracking, 

• fire and emergency response protocols for tall buildings; 

• the resources available for initial situational assessment and incident management, and 

practices for determining the possibility of structural collapse; and 

• communications and coordination of response activities with other authorities at the WTC. 

Task 3. Identify alternative emergency response practices and technologies that may advance the safety 

and effectiveness of emergency responders, such as: knowledge/information systems for command and 

control decisions; elevator use by firefighters; firefighter tracking systems; interoperability of 

communication systems (occupants, firefighters, police, EMS); fire growth and smoke hazard prediction; 

structural safety monitoring, assessment, and prediction; and simulation tools for training. 

Task 4. Report preparation: The results of this project synthesized into this report describe the actions of 

the fire service and performance of their equipment; identify available alternatives related to fire service 

technology, training, and operational procedures; and identify R&D needs in support of their capability to 

protect the public, themselves, and vital physical infrastructure during extreme events. 

During the course of this investigation, the Project 8 staff interacted with the staff of other projects within 

the NIST WTC Investigation (see Figure 1–1 below). Information gained from interviews and 

radio/telephone recordings was shared, most notably with the following projects. 
Chapter 1 

4 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• Project 1. Analysis of Building and Fire Codes and Practices. Information regarding the 

built environment and how it impacted emergency responders. Information such as the 

effects of elevator usability on emergency responders, and the effects of stairway width and 

door widths on emergency responders in accessing the upper floors. 

• Project 4. Investigation of Active Fire Protection Systems. Reports of any systems that were 

used by emergency responders or activated before their arrival. 

• Project 5. Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability Environment. Information from 

emergency responders on conditions in stairwells and other areas of the towers and WTC 7. 

• Project 6. Structural Fire Response and Collapse Analysis (regarding WTC 7 only). 

Information from first-person interviews on the damage inflicted on WTC 7 by the collapse 

of WTC 1 and WTC 2. 

• Project 7. Occupant Behavior, Egress and Emergency Communications. Information from 

both radio recordings and first-person interviews regarding difficulties civilians had 

descending stairs and evacuating from WTC 1 and WTC 2, emergency communications to 

civilians regarding the evacuation of the WTC complex, and interaction between emergency 

responders and civilians. 

The implementation of this project is discussed in the remainder of this report. 

Emergency 

Services 

Response

Structural 

Collapse

(WTC 7)

Codes and 

Standards

Active Fire 

Protection

Evacuation

Thermal and 

Tenability 

Environment

Interactions With Other WTC Projects Interactions With Other WTC Projects

Figure 1–1. Project 8 interactions with other projects within the NIST WTC Investigation. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 5

Chapter 2

COLLECTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA

2.1 INTRODUCTION 

The attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) generated a massive response from the emergency services 

departments within New York City, which produced a large amount of information concerning the attack 

and emergency response. However, in addition to the human losses, a large quantity of valuable 

information was lost when the building collapsed. The key to performing a valid investigation of 

emergency response operations during an event of this magnitude is to determine where data can be found 

and establish a means to acquire the data for analysis. Review of various public records showed that most 

of the data needed for the investigation were maintained by three organizations that contributed to the 

emergency response: The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority), the 

Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY), and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). 

There also was a significant amount of information available through the various media services. The 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) collected data for WTC emergency operations, 

cataloged the data, and filed the data for future analysis. NIST was able to acquire adequate information 

to support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations regarding the September 11, 2001, emergency 

response to the WTC attack. The following section discusses the methods used for collecting and 

preparing the data for analysis. 

2.2 METHODOLOGY 

Four types of data were identified for use in this investigation: documentary data, electronic data, 

interview data, and visual data. Each of these data forms can be subdivided into smaller groups. 

2.2.1 Documentary Data 

Documentary data includes the following: 

• policies, protocols, and standards used by the various departments for conducting operations 

at the WTC, 

• records and documents generated during WTC operations by the various departments, and 

• records and documents generated following WTC operations, including investigative reports 

such as the McKinsey and Company reports for FDNY and NYPD, and documentation of 

investigative first-person interviews. 

Data sources were identified using several techniques: 

• examination of news media, books, and other materials, 

• examination of public comments received by NIST, 
Chapter 2 

6 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• meetings with each of the three organizations listed above, 

• first-person interviews, and 

• discussion with emergency responder experts. 

Data sources were identified using “lead following” methodologies. In the context of this report, lead 

following describes the process of gathering information and determining the facts, and using the facts to 

provide leads for identifying additional information that is needed. As the data sources were identified, 

written requests were made to each agency identified as possessing the data. The requests were followed 

by meetings and discussions that formalized agreements setting forth rules for the transfer and protection 

of the data. After the agreements were executed, the data were transferred to NIST or NIST investigation 

staff accessed the data at agreed upon locations. Approximately half of the data requested were 

transferred to NIST and were entered into the investigation’s files. The other half of the data was studied 

in the New York City area. 

A large quantity of documentary and electronic data was transferred to NIST from the PANYNJ. This 

included files related to lists of deceased personnel, building operations, fire protection systems, alarm 

systems, elevator systems, emergency practices and protocols, communications transcripts, summaries of 

personal accounts during emergency operations, descriptions of the radio communications systems in the 

WTC towers and sub-grade levels (including the FDNY high-rise radio repeater), and copies of the actual 

radio and telephone communications that occurred during WTC emergency operations. 

FDNY transferred the following documents to NIST: copies of the FDNY McKinsey and Company 

report and supporting documents, documents identifying deceased personnel, lists of personnel injured 

during the attack, lists of all known personnel that responded to the WTC, documents on high-rise 

firefighter training and department practices and protocols, dispatch records, company reports for units 

responding to the WTC, details on radio communications systems and operations, an audio tape of FDNY 

radio communications just prior to the attack on the World Trade Center, and documents concerning the 

1993 attack on the World Trade Center. NIST reviewed the following data in New York City: transcripts 

of 500 interviews conducted by FDNY following the attack, and radio communications for FDNY 

Manhattan dispatch, Brooklyn dispatch, and FDNY City-wide communications. 

NYPD transferred the following documents to NIST: copies of the NYPD McKinsey and Company 

report and supporting documents, documents identifying deceased personnel, information on injuries to 

NYPD personnel, information on aviation rescue, and copies of audio recordings of the NYPD Special 

Operations Division, Division 1, and NYPD City-wide radio communications that took place during 

emergency operations at the WTC. 

As the data were gathered, they were cataloged and filed for use. Records were accessed as needed 

depending upon the part of the investigation that was being studied. When work on the documents was 

completed, the documents were returned to the investigation file system. 
 Collection of Emergency Response Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 7

2.2.2 Electronic Data 

There were two forms of electronic data collected from the three emergency responder departments: 

• radio communications recordings, and 

• telephone communications recordings. 

The electronic data files were processed and transcribed using methods described in the following section. 

Audio Data Files and Processing 

An evaluation of methods for listening to the recorded communications files was carried out. 

Comparisons were made between the functionality of using tape recorders versus that of using digital 

computer-based software for listening to the various emergency response communications files. It 

became apparent that the computer based listening system had advantages over the use of tape recorders. 

Some of the advantages of the computer based system are the ease of operation, ability to use the 

computer monitor for visually observing the beginning and end of communications periods, and the 

ability to easily and accurately reverse through a recording to a selected location so that a selected section 

of a communication could be listened to multiple times. As a result, it was decided to conduct the audio 

communications study using computer based audio software. This decision had a direct impact on the 

type of data format and media that would be needed for conducting the audio communications study. 

Therefore, NIST requested that audio communications be provided in a digital format on CD-ROM disks. 

The communications recordings provided by the PANYNJ were digital files that were copied onto 

CD-ROMs, and they were in a format that could be played by computers while using audio player 

computer software. The audio recordings on each of the NYPD cassettes had to be converted to a digital 

format, and each file was then recorded onto a CD-ROM disk. In addition, some of the recordings that 

were received were recorded at very low amplitude that made it difficult to hear the communications. 

NIST used audio software to increase the low audio volume recordings to a usable audio level. 

An audiotape received from FDNY was unreadable with equipment possessed by NIST. NIST used the 

Forensic Audio Analysis section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Engineering Research 

Facility to listen to and copy segments of the tape relevant to the NIST work. 

Audio Data Computer Software 

Three types of software were used to conduct communications analysis of the audio recordings. Each of 

these software packages incorporated a clock for timing the audio recording enabling NIST to pinpoint 

the times of important communications during emergency operations at the WTC. 

The first, Sound Forge 6.0, a product of Sonic Foundry, Inc. of Madison, Wisconsin, is a professional 

digital audio editor (Sonic 2002). It contains tools that can assist with increasing quality and volume of 

digital audio recordings. It has a graphic output to the computer monitor that allows for rapid evaluation 

of large audio files. It also is capable of operating as a tool for spectrum analysis. As a spectrum 

analyzer, it can be used to analyze waveforms by frequency, and it helps to identify noise problems in 

communications data. In addition, the audio waveforms can be expanded on various scales for detailed 
Chapter 2 

8 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

analysis. This software was used throughout the study for analysis of the recordings that required audio 

adjustments to improve quality. 

The other two software packages were used as general purpose audio players. Both have the same basic 

capabilities and were applied in the audio analysis process based on user preference. 

Windows Media Player, a digital media player software package, is a product of Microsoft, Inc. 

(Microsoft 2003). This media player can be downloaded from the Internet. The player allows for 

viewing of audio wave forms from the digital audio files. It allows for easily changing a computer’s 

audio volume, and it may be used effectively for locating specific points on an audio recording. The 

software also allows for movement through an audio file in a reverse direction so that selections of an 

audio file can be listened to multiple times. 

WinAmp3 is a media playback software package for Windows that can be downloaded from the Internet, 

and it is a product of Nullsoft, Inc. (Nullsoft 2002). This player allows for viewing of audio wave forms 

from digital audio files. It allows for easily changing a computers audio volume and it may be used 

effectively for locating specific points on an audio recording. The software also allows for movement 

through an audio file in reverse direction so that sections of an audio file may be listened to multiple 

times. 

Analysis of Audio Communications Files 

Analysis of the communications recordings was a multi-step process that began with sorting and 

cataloging the files. The initial sort separated radio communications files from telephone 

communications files. The files were also cataloged by PANYNJ, PAPD, FDNY, and NYPD. The 

respective files were then checked for content, and primary emergency response channel files were 

selected for analysis first. Primary emergency response channels were channels specifically used by 

PAPD, NYPD, and FDNY for conducting emergency response operations at the WTC. WTC security 

and maintenance channels and other emergency responder channels that were not directly associated with 

operations at the WTC were considered secondary. 

Analysis was performed using the computer-based software media players described above. The 

professional quality digital audio software, Sound Forge 6.0, was used for listening to and enhancing 

audio files that were difficult to hear. The two other media player software packages, Windows Media 

Player and WinAmp3, were used to listen to the majority of audio recordings. 

Communications Transcription 

Two processes were used to transcribe the emergency communications. Data from the primary 

emergency communications files were put into a spreadsheet format so that a detailed analysis of results 

could be made. The data put into the spreadsheets was used to assist in quantifying communications 

quality and the radio traffic volume as it related to time. The second and simplest form of 

communications transcription, which was used to record the secondary communications files, was the 

verbatim transcription of the communications into a word processor data file. 
 Collection of Emergency Response Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 9

Some primary communications audio files were completely transcribed to generate information 

concerning the quality and quantity of communications. The files selected were the FDNY Channel 

7/PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 radio repeater, the PAPD police desk radio channel 26/W, the NYPD 

Special Operations Division channel and the NYPD Division 1 channel. The data entered into the 

spreadsheets included the following: 

• Start and end times of each radio transmission. Radio transmission times were taken from the 

media player clock and were adjusted for the audio file start time supplied with the 

communications file; 

• Type of radio transmission (voice or tone only for primary emergency response 

communications channels); 

• Readability signal quality as determined by NIST (done only for the primary emergency 

response communications radio channels); and 

• Content of the communication. 

Transcription Methods 

The communications transcripts were generated using three different computer based media players. The 

media players were installed on computer systems that were stand alone and isolated from the internet. 

The process for preparing a communications transcript was the following: 

• The communications data file was loaded onto the computer; 

• The media player was opened and the data file was selected; 

• The spreadsheet on the computer was opened and prepared for data input; 

• The transcriber set the communications recording to the beginning and checked to be sure 

that the media player clock time was zeroed; 

• The data file starting time was entered into the spreadsheet; 

• The communications recording was started, and the output was written into the spreadsheet; 

and 

• To improve accuracy of the transcripts, a second transcriber checked sections of the transcript 

against the audio recording. 

For audio passages that were difficult to understand on the first pass, multiple passes of the section were 

used to improve comprehension. 
Chapter 2 

10 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

2.2.3 First-Person Interviews 

In October 2003, NIST entered into a three-party agreement between NIST, New York City (NYC), and 

the National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United states (the 9/11 Commission). The 

agreement provided procedures under which NIST and the 9/11 Commission would interview a 

maximum of 125 NYC emergency responders, 100 from FDNY and 25 from NYPD. 

In December 2003, NIST officially requested and the Port Authority agreed to interviews with twelve 

Port Authority personnel, including emergency responders, safety, security, and management personnel. 

The first-person interviews were conducted beginning in December 2003 and were completed in June of 

2004. 

In addition to the interviews conducted under the agreements described above, NIST interviewed eight 

people who contacted NIST directly and volunteered. These interviews began in October 2003 and were 

completed in December 2004. 

Most emergency responders who did not volunteer to be interviewed indicated that they did not want to 

relive the tragedy that occurred when the WTC was attacked. Conversely, many of the interviewees who 

did participate indicated that they wanted provide information that could help people in the future if there 

should be another attack on the United States. 

Selecting Interviewees 

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey: The process of selecting individuals from the Port 

Authority to be interviewed began with studies to identify key personnel who worked at the WTC and 

were responsible for building operations and engineering, fire safety operations and equipment, building 

security, emergency response, and vertical transportation, along with PANYNJ personnel who conducted 

emergency operations inside the WTC buildings on September 11, 2001. These studies included the 

analysis of public information from the media, information gathered from the PANYNJ, people who 

contacted NIST indicating they had information relevant to the investigation, and the identification of 

individuals based on discussions with various people who NIST met as the investigation advanced. NIST 

prepared a list of PANYNJ personnel that it wanted to interview and submitted it to the Port Authority. 

The Port Authority then contacted the personnel that NIST had requested and asked them if they were 

willing to be interviewed. Only a small number of the people who NIST requested did not volunteer to be 

interviewed. During the interview process, “lead following” methods were used to identify other 

individuals of interest to the investigation. NIST was able to interview all personnel identified as critical 

to understanding building operations and activities associated with the emergency response on the 

morning of September 11, 2001. 

The Fire Department of the City of New York and The New York City Police Department: With 

FDNY and NYPD, NIST again conducted an extensive study to identify key personnel who worked at the 

WTC during the attack. Once more, these studies included the analysis of public information from the 

media, information gathered from New York City agencies, people who contacted NIST indicating they 

had information relevant to the investigation, and the identification of individuals based on discussions 

with various people who NIST met as the investigation advanced. In addition, during the interview 

process lead following methods were used to identify other individuals of interest to the investigation. 
 Collection of Emergency Response Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 11

Initially, NIST prepared two lists of New York City personnel who it wanted to interview, one for FDNY 

and the other for NYPD. 

Since NIST’s agreement with NYC indicated that 100 FDNY personnel could be interviewed, the initial 

list of approximately 200 names took into account the voluntary nature of the interviews and that many 

people may not have wanted to participate. This list was broken into categories relating to 1) functions 

carried out by individuals and 2) the locations where people worked during the attack. The names of 

individuals on the list were placed in the order of importance to the NIST investigation. The list included 

people who had been identified as working during the attack in senior staff positions, Chief Officers and 

incident command personnel who worked at the command posts and inside the buildings, radio 

communications personnel, dispatchers, FDNY personnel who worked at and inside the WTC towers, 

including Company Officers, firefighters, rescue squad members, and Emergency Medical Service 

personnel. This list included personnel who were still active with the Fire Department and approximately 

five FDNY personnel who had retired. 

FDNY contacted personnel on the list and asked if they would volunteer to take part in the NIST 

interviews. As reported to NIST by FDNY, some individuals contacted did not agree to be interviewed, 

and the department followed up to obtain other interviewees that NIST had identified. As the interview 

process continued, NIST identified other FDNY personnel that needed to be interviewed and also added 

additional interviews with Emergency Medical Service personnel. NIST was able to interview personnel 

from all categories and units that were of interest to the investigation. In all but one case, NIST was able 

to interview multiple personnel from the categories and units identified. In addition, NIST was able to 

interview all personnel identified as being critical for understanding the emergency response operations at 

the WTC. In addition to those on the NIST request list, two FDNY firefighters volunteered and were 

interviewed by NIST. 

For NYPD, NIST prepared a list of personnel divided into categories that included NYPD senior officers, 

incident command personnel, aviation unit personnel who operated the helicopters during the WTC attack 

and operations, emergency service unit personnel who worked inside the WTC the towers, and 

communications personnel. Three of the personnel requested from NYPD did not agree to be 

interviewed. In addition, as the interviews progressed additional names of people to be interviewed were 

identified, and NIST made requests to add the new names to the interview list. NIST interviewed 

personnel who were still employed by NYPD as well as three individuals who had retired. 

NIST was able to interview all personnel identified as being critical to understanding the emergency 

response at the WTC. 

Other: The category listed below as “Other” represents individuals who contacted NIST either directly 

or through third parties and volunteered to be interviewed. Approximately half of the interviewees in this 

category were retired FDNY personnel. The remaining individuals worked at the WTC on the morning of 

September 11, 2001, in building security, building engineering, and fire safety jobs. Several of these 

first-person interviews were conducted over the telephone. 

NIST Interview Staff: The NIST interview staff consisted of two primary personnel who have 

experience with emergency response organizations and operations. One additional interviewer was added 

as a substitute interviewer. NIST personnel conducted all first-person interviews addressed in this report, 

and all interviews were conducted in the New York City and New Jersey area. Personnel from the 9/11 
Chapter 2 

12 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Commission participated in all of the emergency responder interviews conducted with employees of New 

York City (FDNY and NYPD) and the Port Authority. NIST conducted the interviews, which typically 

lasted from one to three hours, and then the 9/11 Commission personnel would address their questions 

over a time period of about one-half hour to one hour in length. NIST personnel sat in while the 9/11 

Commission personnel asked the interviewees their follow-up questions. 

The following represents the actual number of interviews conducted by NIST with each organization: 

• FDNY = 68 

• NYPD = 25 

• PANYNJ/PAPD = 15 

• OTHER = 8 

• Total Interviews = 116 

First-person interviews were conducted with personnel from each of the following categories: 

• FDNY: Senior management and officers, mid-level officers, company officers, 

firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and dispatchers 

• NYPD: Senior management and officers, mid-level officers, Emergency Service Unit 

personnel, aviation personnel, and dispatchers 

• PANYNJ/PAPD: Senior management personnel, facility safety personnel, building 

security personnel, facility communications personnel, building vertical transportation 

personnel, senior PAPD officers, mid-level PAPD officers, and line PAPD officers 

• OTHER: A building security guard, dispatcher, firefighters, WTC building engineer, and a 

fire safety director 

Each interview generally took from one to four hours to complete (including time when questioning was 

conducted by the 9/11 Commission staff), depending on the person’s job and the complexity of their 

involvement in emergency operations. Most of the interviews were digitally recorded, and hand written 

notes were taken throughout all of the interviews. These investigative interviews were carried out using 

the following protocol: 

• The interviewee was met at the designated time and place. 

• Introductions were completed. 

• The NIST investigation and the purpose of the interview were discussed with the interviewee. 

• If a consent form was needed, it was explained to the interviewee, questions were answered, 

and the interviewee signed the consent form. (Only the Port Authority interviews used 

consent forms.) 
 Collection of Emergency Response Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 13

• Just before the interview began and during the interview process, interviewees were ask if 

they needed to take a break before going further. This was particularly important during 

periods of the interview where emotional stress was evident. 

• The interviewee began with an uninterrupted self- narrative that was followed by questions 

addressing specific areas of interest. 

Self-Narrative, Emergency Responder’s Experience at the WTC: 

For response to World Trade Center Buildings 1 and 2: 

• Each emergency responder was asked to describe their experience in their own words and end 

their narrative after WTC 1 and WTC 2 had collapsed. 

For response to World Trade Center Building 7: 

• Each emergency responder was asked to describe their experience in their own words and end 

their narrative after the WTC 7 collapse. 

When the self-narrative was completed, the interviewee was asked if they would like to take a 10-minute 

break or proceed to the next step of the interview. 

The next phase of the interview dealt with follow up questions. 

Follow-up Questions: The follow-up questions were typically related to the interviewee’s timeline of 

events and were used to probe specific points from the narrative. Questions were based on notes taken 

during the self-narrative. The follow-up questions consisted of questions related to the following topics 

and experiences of the interviewee during the WTC operations: 

• dispatch, arrival, and job assignment during emergency operations; 

• the resources available for initial situational assessment and incident management; 

• practices for determining the possibility of structural collapse; 

• command post establishment, information available, communications, and operations; 

• firefighter accountability, location, and tracking; 

• building occupant egress as related to fire service operations, rescue options for building 

occupants; 

• fire and emergency response protocols for tall buildings; 

• the ability to fight large fires on the upper floors of tall buildings (including the human 

physiological factors associated with operations in tall buildings); 
Chapter 2 

14 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• operations and function of information technologies, emergency responder information 

systems, alarm systems, building occupant information systems, communications systems, 

radios and repeaters, other communications systems; 

• the influence of building design (e.g., height, stairways, elevators, smoke control systems) on 

fire service command and control procedures and rescue operations; 

• firefighter operations and safety of emergency responders; 

• elevator conditions and operations, elevator control panel information and function, and the 

use of elevators by emergency responders; 

• environmental conditions inside and around WTC buildings 1, 2, and 7 before the buildings 

collapsed; 

• the influence of aircraft impact damage and fuel run-off on fire service command and control 

procedures, life saving operations, and safety of emergency response personnel; 

• standpipes and fire hoses, and other pre-positioned emergency equipment; 

• the impact of systems failures (e.g., communications systems, water supply, sprinklers, 

standpipes) on fire service command and control procedures, life saving operations, and 

safety of emergency response personnel; 

• pre-planning, training, and standard operating procedures (including command and control) at 

the time of the WTC attack; 

• emergency responder evacuation from the WTC 1; and 

• communications and coordination of response activities between various authorities at the 

WTC, i.e. fire wardens, fire safety directors, building security, FDNY, PAPD, NYPD, OEM, 

and PANYNJ building safety and operations personnel. 

When the interview was complete, depending on the interview agreement, the interviewer gave the 

interviewee a copy of a psychological support resources information sheet containing contact information 

for Project Liberty and their employer’s support services, and the interviewer would answer any 

remaining interviewee questions. (Project Liberty is a New York state program created in 2001 to 

provide supportive crisis counseling to individuals and groups affected by the World Trade Center 

disaster.) 

The interviewer would thank the interviewee for participating and walk them to the door, ending the 

interview. 

The interviewer would complete interview notes, secure the audio recording (if used), and prepare for 

completing work on written documentation of the interview. 
 Collection of Emergency Response Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 15

2.2.4 Visual Data 

• Still photographs, film, and digital images 

• Motion images, video clips and movie film 

The visual data were largely acquired by Dr. William Pitts of NIST and his staff. Numerous photographs 

and video records were acquired from FDNY and NYPD. Many of these images address the WTC towers 

prior to their collapse and images taken after the towers collapsed. Uncut documentary video of FDNY 

operations at the WTC was acquired from Jules and Gedeon Naudet. In addition, thousands of other 

photographs and video clips were obtained from PANYNJ and other New York City news media sources 

and the public. All of these visual data were critical for understanding the facts related to the attack and 

the emergency response that followed. For more information on visual data collection and analysis see 

NIST NCSTAR 1-5A. 

Figure 2–1 provides a map of the WTC location in lower Manhattan. 
Chapter 2 

16 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 2–1. Map showing the World Trade Center location in lower Manhattan. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 17

Chapter 3

IMPACT OF THE FEBRUARY 1993 BOMBING ON EMERGENCY 

RESPONSE IN TALL BUILDINGS

The February 26, 1993, terrorist sub-grade bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) provided insight 

into the complications of a full evacuation of the towers and the complex nature of responding to a large 

incident at the towers. Investigations by The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or 

Port Authority) and New York City emergency response departments identified numerous issues 

concerning the WTC buildings and complex. This chapter addresses these issues and the changes made at 

the WTC following the 1993 attack. The multi-agency study of the WTC bombing identified security 

issues, occupant safety issues, and emergency responder operations and safety issues. Issues addressed 

by the Port Authority were discussed in a document provided for this investigation.1

 In addition, the 

Director of the Port Authority’s World Trade Department discussed the findings from the 1993 bombing 

in his testimony before the 9/11 Commission on May 18, 2004 (Reiss 2004). The following changes were 

made at the World Trade Center after the 1993 bombing and relate to emergency responder operations 

during the attack carried out in 2001. 

3.1 CHANGES MADE BY PANYNJ 

• Installation of tower sprinkler systems was accelerated. The work on the systems began 

before 1993. 

• Improvements were made to the Concourse level to improve egress. 

• A new Port Authority Police Command Center was established inside WTC 5. 

• Fire Command Desks were installed in the lobbies of WTC 1 and WTC 2. 

• A radio repeater was installed in WTC 5 that operated on The Fire Department of the City of 

New York (FDNY) city-wide high-rise frequency. The antenna was located on the top of 

WTC 5 and was directed at WTC 1 and WTC 2. Controls for operating the repeater were 

originally located at the Port Authority Police Desk inside WTC 5. During the spring of 

2001, controls for repeater operation were moved to the Fire Command Desk inside the lobby 

of each of the towers. 

• The elevator intercom system was upgraded allowing for monitoring at the Fire Command 

Desk. 

• A new Operations Control Center with the capability to monitor all HVAC systems and 

elevators in both towers was constructed on the B1 level of WTC 2. 

 

1

 Port Authority Communication: “WTC – CHANGES TO EVACUATION SYSTEMS AFTER 1993.” WTC-115-P. 
Chapter 3 

18 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• Multiple power sources were installed for exit stairway lighting in the towers. 

• A new decentralized Fire Alarm System Class E (Style 7), with three separate data risers to 

transponders that were located every three floors. This system had redundant control panels 

and multiple control station announcement capability. 

• Fire drills were conducted in conjunction with the FDNY. 

Although significant effort and funds were put into improving the WTC complex after the 1993 bombing, 

the damage caused by the aircraft impact left many of these improvements non-functional on 

September 11, 2001 (addressed in Chapter 5). 

In addition to the changes made by the Port Authority, FDNY addressed numerous issues that affected 

their operations and safety at the 1993 WTC bombing. These issues are discussed in a report prepared by 

the FDNY Chief of Department (Fusco 1993). The section below briefly describes each issue followed 

by a discussion of how the lesson-learned impacted FDNY operations on September 11, 2001. 

3.2 CHANGES MADE BY FDNY 

3.2.1 Incident Command System 

Issue 

A better understanding of the incident command system (ICS) was needed by all New York City 

emergency responders to ensure full implementation and better adherence to the system. (Fusco 1993): 

Delegation of Functions: The scope of the 1993 bombing was beyond anything ever experienced and 

information overload occurred at the incident command level. The FDNY Incident Command System 

policies and procedures were upgraded following the 1993 bombing. The May 1997, ICS Manual reflects 

changes made to the Incident Command System, and these new policies had been in operation with 

FDNY for approximately four years when the WTC attack occurred in 2001. Therefore, the Incident 

Command System improvements had been in use by the department for several years before the 

2001 attack and were being followed by department personnel during operations on September 11, 2001. 

The FDNY 1997 Incident Command System Manual revised delegations of responsibility for the incident 

command system in the following areas (Fusco 1993): 

• command, 

• planning, 

• operations, 

• logistics, and 

• finance. 

A copy of the FDNY 1997, Incident Command System manual is found in Appendix A. 
 Impact of The February 1993 Bombing on Emergency Response in Tall Buildings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 19

Issue 

Interagency Representation: All agencies must be sensitive to and coordinate operations for effective 

incident command. A representative from each agency should be at the command post to make 

coordination easier (Fusco 1993). 

Changes to Interagency Coordination: In an attempt to reduce the uncertainty associated with the issue 

of coordination of operations, the New York City Mayor’s Office established an operations protocol. 

(See Appendix B) In April of 1994, FDNY and The New York City Police Department (NYPD) 

published a document entitled “Police/Fire Protocol.” See Appendix B. 

3.2.2 Communications 

Issue 

FDNY needed to improve communications at a large incident (Fusco 1993). 

Change to Communications: New York City purchased eighty 800-Megahertz radios for use by deputy 

fire commissioners, staff chiefs, and the Field Communications (Field Com) Unit. Twenty of the radios 

were to be distributed by the Field Com unit at the WTC during the September 11, 2001, attack. FDNY 

made an effort to significantly improve the radio communications system for high-rise firefighting. The 

high-rise repeater was requested by FDNY for operations in the WTC and the Port Authority installed it.2

 

Even though it did not solve all of the radio communications problems at the WTC FDNY personnel 

interviewed indicated that it did improve operations prior to the September 11, 2001, attack.3

 Another 

item that improved FDNY radio communications at the WTC was that firefighting companies located 

near the WTC and that often responded to the WTC were issued Port Authority radios that allowed them 

to communicate with the building’s Deputy Fire Safety Directors and with the Port Authority Police 

Department (PAPD).4

 FDNY bought new 400 MHz band radios to replace all the radios in the 

department used during the 1993 bombing. However, the new radios had been pulled from service 

because of operational difficulties prior to the WTC attack, and the older VHF radios used during 1993 

were put back into service, leaving the service with equipment that had been judged to be less than ideal.5

 

Issue 

Radios needed a tone alert capability for signaling emergency conditions (Fusco 1993). At the 1993 

bombing, one firefighter became trapped and called a mayday. The incident commander was unable to 

communicate well during this emergency because the volume of handie-talkie traffic made it difficult or 

impossible to hear. It was recommended that a built-in alert tone be added to the radios so that the tone 

could be sent out to clear the air so that control could be regained over the radio system. (Fusco 1993) 

 

2

 PA Interview 11, fall 2003. 

3

 FDNY Interview 16, winter 2004. 

4

 PA Interview 11, fall 2003. 

5

 Written Communication from New York City, October 6, 2004. 
Chapter 3 

20 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

No tone alert was available on the radios used by FDNY firefighters on September 11, 2001.6

Issue 

Command Posts: Command posts needed to be more isolated from the intense activity that takes place 

at a very large incident, and the command post must be clearly identified. Computer terminals and 

communications capabilities are needed in vans for command post operations and the operations should 

be duplicated at the branch and sector command locations. Any data added to the computer systems at 

any location would be automatically updated at all other command locations. (Fusco 1993) 

The capabilities addressed above in the issue were not available to FDNY personnel on 

September 11, 2001.7

Issue 

Transmission of Alarms: FDNY needed to more clearly identify alarms greater than a fifth alarm 

(Fusco 1993). 

The FDNY Communications Manual in effect on September 11, 2001, did not address procedures for 

operations greater than a fifth alarm.8

Issue 

Field Communications Unit: The field communications unit was expected to receive and transmit 

critical information on the fire ground. The incident command system relies heavily on a Field Com unit 

at large incidents, and an officer should be assigned to manage the operations (Fusco 1993). 

Changes for Field Com: FDNY placed an officer in charge of Field Com units and the department’s 

Field Com unit was improved. However, the primary Field Com unit was not available during the period 

of time before the WTC towers collapsed.9, 10

3.2.3 Interagency Protocols 

Issue 

The 1993 post-bombing analysis indicated that frequent drills were needed to ensure that protocols would 

function as planned. All agencies working together needed to have a technical understanding of each 

other’s role so that working cooperation would develop. It was recommended that FDNY and NYPD 

establish working relationships with each other, particularly with aviation rescue operations and that 

aviation rescue drills, including roof top operations, be conducted (Fusco 1993).

 

6

 FDNY Communications Manual, DCN: 3.01.01, January 1, 1997. 7

 FDNY Communications Manual, DCN: 3.01.01, January 1, 1997. 8

 FDNY Communications Manual, DCN: 3.01.01, January 1, 1997. 9

 FDNY Communications Manual, DCN: 3.01.01, January 1, 1997. 10 FDNY, Interview 58, winter 2004. 
 Impact of The February 1993 Bombing on Emergency Response in Tall Buildings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 21

Changes in Interagency Protocols: After the 1993 bombing of the WTC, New York City established 

the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which took on the job of promoting the improvement of 

interagency operations; however, on September 11, 2001, the OEM center located at WTC 7 became 

ineffective as WTC 7 was evacuated.11

3.2.4 Building Systems and Fire Safety Personnel 

Issue 

FDNY maintained that state legislation should be enacted to apply New York City building codes to all 

structures in New York City, including the World Trade Center (Fusco 1993). FDNY needed this to be 

able to enforce the codes and maintain standardization and knowledge of a building’s fire protection 

features (Fusco 1993).

Changes to Building Systems and Fire Safety Personnel: FDNY made progress on this issue during 

the period between 1993 and 2001 through agreements with the PANYNJ. In 1993, two agreements were 

entered into by the Port Authority and New York City regarding fire safety of Port Authority facilities 

located in New York City. These agreements are located in Appendix C. 

• The first agreement allowed for the implementation of fire safety recommendations that 

would be made by FDNY after they had inspected PANYNJ facilities located in New York 

City. 

• The second agreement gave FDNY permission to conduct fire safety inspections of PANYNJ 

properties in New York City and provided guidelines for FDNY to communicate needed 

corrective actions to the PANYNJ. It assured that new or modified fire safety systems would 

be in compliance with local codes and regulations. It also required a third party review of the 

systems by a New York State licensed architect or engineer. 

3.2.5 Elevators 

Issue 

Elevator searches needed to be prioritized, with public assembly elevators having the highest priority, and 

elevator mechanics needed to work with fire department personnel while conducting rescue operations 

(Fusco 1993). 

Changes to Elevator Policies: By 1997, FDNY had instituted these new elevator policies and 

procedures. The 1997 FDNY elevator policy is located in Appendix D of this report. 

 

11 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 
Chapter 3 

22 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

3.2.6 Protective Clothing 

Issue 

The weight and bulk of turnout coats and boots were determined to reduce the effective working time of 

firefighters when they had to climb stairs for hours. Other work jackets and shoes were recommended for 

climbing the stairs if fire was not an issue, and they recommended that protective clothing be available 

when it was needed (Fusco 1993).

Changes for Protective Clothing: The recommendations from the 1993 post-bombing analysis had little 

impact on what happened during the attack of 2001. Firefighters climbed many flights of stairs while 

wearing their protective clothing and carrying heavy firefighting equipment. Since there were large fires 

burning in the buildings, this protective clothing and equipment would have been used if they had been 

able to reach the fire floors and conducted firefighting operations.12 Also, the Port Authority had installed 

small stocks of firefighting equipment at the Sky Lobbies on the 44th and 78th floors. A Port Authority 

Police officer wearing his duty uniform was able to climb to the 44th floor and open the equipment storage 

locker. However, these supplies would not have been adequate for conducting the large-scale firefighting 

operations that were needed. In addition, NYPD Emergency Service Unit personnel were operating in the 

buildings with air-packs but without thermal protective clothing.13

3.2.7 Contaminated Stairwells 

Issue 

The stairways in the World Trade Center towers were smoke filled throughout their entire 110 floors 

during the 1993 bombing. Smoke moved through the building mainly by elevator shafts and stairways. 

Then the smoke moved onto the floors and into other stairways as evacuees opened stairway doors 

(Fusco 1993).

Changes for Stairwells: Although the Port Authority had made some changes to the buildings’ 

stairwells, on September 11, 2001, the stairs above the fires again became filled with smoke and hot 

gasses, trapping people on the upper floors of the buildings.14 Primary improvements to the stairways 

were to new emergency lighting systems and painting photo-luminescent markings on the stairs and 

connecting stairway landings. Some of the changes did have a positive impact on the stairways located 

below the impact zones. Stairways are discussed in section 5.6.4. 

 

12 FDNY Interview 17, winter 2004. 

13 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 

14 PA Interview 11, fall 2003. 
 Impact of The February 1993 Bombing on Emergency Response in Tall Buildings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 23

3.2.8 News Media 

Issue 

A chief officer needed to be assigned to work with the media on large incidents (Fusco 1993). 

The study of news media operations at a large incident was not a goal associated with the NIST 

investigation. However, during the course of the investigation, it became apparent that news media 

functions associated with a large disaster was a subject that required review. It is apparent from FDNY 

Chief Fusco’s report of the 1993 bombing at the WTC that emergency responders and the news media 

needed a better means to coordinate their operations (Fusco 1993). 

Changes Associated with News Media: The 1997 FDNY Communications Manual describes the 

department’s policy for media liaison operations.15 However, on September 11, 2001, operations between 

emergency responders and the news media were not totally effective. The difficulties impacted 

emergency responders, the news media, people trapped inside the WTC towers, and the public at-large. 

As the attack and emergency operations at the WTC unfolded, many of the emergency responders either 

learned of the attack from the news media or obtained some of their most useful information about the 

attack from media coverage. In contrast, it is apparent that New York City emergency response agencies 

had less than effective operations associated with gathering information and communicating it to 

appropriate parties. This included the communication of some critical emergency response and 

evacuation information to the news media so that it could be broadcast to the public. One example of this 

was the fact that stairway “A” in WTC 2 was passable for evacuation from floors above the building’s 

aircraft impact zone (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). It is apparent that this information was neither gathered nor 

communicated to the news media so that evacuation directions could be broadcast to people trapped on 

the upper floors of the building. 

News service personnel responded quickly to the WTC site to cover this tragic event. Mayor Giuliani and 

his staff of Commissioners attempted to provide information to the news media (Giuliani 2002). 

However, the number of reliable information sources available to the news media did not appear to be 

adequate for the influx of requests for information. Port Authority records indicate that the news media 

from around the world were attempting to access the emergency responder departments.16 This is 

highlighted by the fact that during the first two hours of the attack and emergency operations at the WTC, 

the Port Authority telephone system at WTC 5 recorded 19 telephone calls from the news media. Many 

of these telephone calls were received by the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) at their desk 

located at WTC 5 while they were attempting to carryout life saving operations. This interfered with the 

PAPD’s ability to conduct emergency operations that were critical to life safety issues such as medical aid 

for the injured, the rescue of trapped building occupants, and the evacuation of people from the WTC site. 

It also interfered with PAPD facilities security operations. 

News media telephone calls were captured on PANYNJ telephone communications recordings covering 

Channels 2, 8, 9, 10, 23, 24, and 26. Some of these news media telephone calls were from New York 

City area organizations. Others were from news departments and radio talk shows from across North 

 

15 FDNY Communications Manual, DCN: 3.01.01, Chapter 7, January 1, 1997. 16 Port Authority telephone communications recordings Channels 2, 8, 9, 10, 23, 24, and 26. 
Chapter 3 

24 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

America. At least one of the media calls was received from Europe. All the news media telephone calls 

were transferred to the appropriate PANYNJ public information office. 

The following summarizes findings associated with emergency responder/news media operations: 

• Emergency responder/news media communications were less than totally effective during the 

WTC operations on the morning of September 11, 2001. 

• Critical information related to life safety and evacuation from the WTC towers was not 

communicated to the news media so that it could be broadcast to people trapped inside the 

WTC towers above the building fires. 

• Some news media contacts with emergency responder agencies interfered with the emergency 

response and life saving operations. Appropriate emergency response agency contact points 

were bypassed or not used by some news media for gathering information. 

• It appears that emergency response agencies were overwhelmed by news media requests for 

information. 

3.2.9 Preplanning and Command Organization 

Issue 

The magnitude of the 1993 attack heightened FDNY’s awareness of the need for preplanning and 

command organization that went beyond the scale of operations carried out during the 1993 bombing. 

Intra and interdepartmental drills were needed to ensure operations, and the specter of larger disasters was 

raised (Fusco 1993).

As shown above, FDNY made numerous changes to department operations and planning in an attempt to 

successfully function under conditions where a large number of people are affected over a large area. As 

will be seen in the rest of this report, some of their improvements had a positive effect on fire department 

operations until WTC 2 collapsed. With the collapse of the towers and the loss of large numbers of 

personnel, emergency operations radically changed. 

3.3 REFERENCES 

Fusco, A. L. 1993. Unprecedented Complexity, WNYF, 3rd, New York City Fire Department. 

Giuliani, Rudolph with Kurson, Ken, 2002. Leadership, First Edition, Hyperion, Talk Miramax Books, 

New York. 

Reiss, A. 2004. Testimony Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,

May. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 25

Chapter 4

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS BASED ON COMMUNICATIONS DATA

The chronologies listed in this chapter were drawn from the detailed chronology located in Attachment 2. 

These chronologies provide the reader with a sense of timing related to the WTC attack and the unfolding 

emergency response operations. The following selected communications provide information concerning 

(1) dispatch and arrival of emergency response units, (2) evacuation, (3) emergency response operations, 

and (4) chronology of the WTC towers. 

Note: These chronologies are based on the best possible data provided to NIST for the analysis. The 

times are given to represent the event sequence. Based on the variations of recorded clock times for the 

data and times assigned for each recording provided by the departments, it is estimated that the margin of 

error for each time is approximately ±2 minutes. (E) indicates that the time is an estimate from the 

original source or has been estimated by the authors based on the available data. All other times listed are 

based on time recordings or reported clock readings. 

4.1 DISPATCH AND ARRIVAL OF EMERGENCY RESPONDERS 

CHRONOLOGY 

The following chronology demonstrates that the emergency response to the World Trade Center (WTC) 

was immediate. Within the first three minutes after the aircraft impact into WTC 1, (1) the Port Authority 

Police Department (PAPD) responded by providing information on the attack to the police desk; (2) The 

Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) dispatched 26 units to the WTC; and (3) The New 

York City Police Department (NYPD) called a department mobilization that included dispatching aviation 

units to the WTC for visual assessment. In less than 10 minutes, PAPD called a chemical mobilization; 

NYPD dispatched five Emergency Service Unit (ESU) teams and had two aviations units at the scene 

providing observations. In less than 30 minutes, 121 FDNY units had been dispatched to the scene and 

30 units had signaled their arrival at the scene. 

8:46 a.m. FDNY Battalion Chief reports that an airplane has struck the upper floors of a 

WTC building and transmits a first and second alarm (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 

2002) 

PAPD officer reports to the police desk an explosion at the WTC. (PAPD Radio 

 Channel Y/Channel 2) 

8:48 a.m. 26 FDNY units dispatched. (FDNY Dispatch log) 

 NYPD calls for a department mobilization. (NYPD Special Operations Division (SOD) 

Radio Channel) 

8:49 a.m. NYPD requests that aviation units get into the air and make a visual assessment of the 

WTC (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 
Chapter 4 

26 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

8:50 a.m. PAPD officer calls for a chemical mobilization. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

8:52 a.m. A total of five NYPD Emergency Service Units dispatched. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

Company, 2002) 

 NYPD aviation requests landing zone in the vicinity of the WTC. (NYPD SOD Radio 

 Channel) 

 NYPD aviation unit arrives at the WTC and examines possibilities of roof rescue. 

 (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

8:54 a.m. NYPD aviation advises they have two units in the air to do aerial survey. (NYPD SOD 

 Radio Channel) 

8:59 a.m. FDNY Chief calls for all but one Rescue Squad to the WTC. (FDNY Manhattan 

 Dispatch Radio Channel) 

9:00 a.m. A total of 66 FDNY units have been dispatched at this time. (FDNY Dispatch log) 

9:03 a.m. FDNY Marine unit reports that a second plane struck WTC 2. (FDNY Manhattan 

 Dispatch Radio Channel and FDNY, World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:15 a.m. A total of 121 FDNY units dispatched, and 30 FDNY units signal*

 their arrival. (FDNY 

Dispatch log) 

9:29 a.m. FDNY dispatcher relays that a department-wide recall has been instituted. (FDNY, 

 World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:59 a.m. A total of 171 FDNY units dispatched, and 74 FDNY units signal their arrival. (FDNY 

Dispatch log) 

10:29 a.m. A total of 214 FDNY units dispatched, and 103 FDNY units signal their arrival. (FDNY 

Dispatch log) 

*

Note: FDNY arrival times are determined from 10–84 signals transmitted by units as they arrive at their 

assigned location. A 10-84 signal is sent by a firefighter from a fire department vehicle by pressing a 

button on the communications console. Figure 4–1 below gives a visual representation of the FDNY 

units dispatched versus a specific time. 

4.2 EVACUATION CHRONOLOGY 

The evacuation chronology exhibits a mix of responses to the disaster. It provides insight into the 

successes and shortcomings of the evacuation from the WTC buildings and site. The first noteworthy 

event is that multiple orders were given by a senior PAPD police officer to evacuate the WTC buildings 

and the entire complex. There is no evidence that these orders were transmitted to appropriate personnel 

at the site to initiate the full evacuation of the complex. Some of these communications also show that the 
 Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 27

3

26

66

121

171

214

3 5 5

30

74

103

0

50

100

150

200

250

8:46 8:48 9:00 9:15 9:59 10:29

Dispatched Signal Arrival 10-84

Figure 4–1. Number of FDNY units dispatched and signaling arrival at specific times. 

evacuation process was not always orderly and controlled. It was reported that people were running from 

the PATH trains, and a report came in to the PAPD police desk from a police officer in WTC 5 stating 

that “I have people going crazy.” Since people could not evacuate from floors above the impact zone and 

large fires were burning below them, the first-person jumped from WTC 1 at 8:52 a.m., only 6 minutes 

after the first aircraft struck WTC 1. However, a significant portion of the evacuation process from the 

WTC complex was orderly. This chronology also indicates that PANYNJ, PAPD, and building security 

personnel held their posts in the face of life threatening conditions to assist people in the evacuation. In 

addition, these communications provide some basic information about the status of people trapped in the 

buildings and the fact that the elevators in the buildings were not functioning or dangerous to use. 

Finally, several cases are listed where injured, elderly, or physically impaired people were not able to 

walk down the stairs in the building and needed assistance to evacuate. 

8:47 a.m. WTC Vertical Transportation receives a message to evacuate the building (WTC 1) and 

send people out toward WTC 5. (PA/WTC Vertical Transportation, Radio Channel Z) 

 WTC Vertical Transportation receives a message from a PAPD officer instructing 

employees to avoid the Concourse. (PA/WTC Vertical Transportation, Radio Channel Z) 

8:48 a.m. WTC Vertical Transportation receives two orders calling for the evacuation of the 

building, WTC 1. (PA/WTC Vertical Transportation, Radio Channel Z) 

8:52 a.m. PAPD police desk receives report from police officer that people are jumping out of the 

windows from WTC 1. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 
Chapter 4 

28 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

8:53 a.m. WTC Security report indicates that people are running from the PATH trains. (WTC 

 Security Radio Channel X) 

8:54 a.m. A dispatcher relays information to the FDNY Command Posts that people are trapped on 

floor 106 of WTC 1. (FDNY, 9-11-2001 Time Line Document and FDNY 9/11 

Summary notes) 

8:56 a.m. PATH trains are still bringing people into the WTC site. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

 WTC Operations attempts to assemble personnel at WTC 1 exits to the plaza to show 

people how to get out. One Port Authority employee responds to the message saying that 

he cannot get over to the building exits because glass is falling all over the place. 

(PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

 WTC Security receives a radio message that they need assistance in WTC 4 because 

people are attempting to exit the building. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

8:57 a.m. WTC Security: a message is sent stating, “Don’t let anyone in the building evacuate to 

the Plaza at this time.” (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

8:58 a.m. WTC Security instruction to security guards: hold your post and don’t allow people into 

the Plaza or out onto the Courtyard. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

 PAPD police desk reports that people are trapped on floor 79 of WTC 1. (PAPD Radio 

 Channel W) 

8:59 a.m. PAPD police desk: a senior PAPD officer calls for the evacuation of WTC 1 and WTC 2. 

(PAPD Radio Channel W) 

 PAPD police desk: a senior PAPD officer calls for the evacuation of the entire 

WTC complex, all buildings. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:00 a.m. PAPD police desk: a police officer asks if building five should be evacuated, and he was 

told to stand by. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

 WTC Security receives a report that there are people trapped inside suite 8711 of WTC 1 

and they can’t get out. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

 PAPD police desk: orders were given to evacuate WTC 1, B4 level. (PAPD Radio 

 Channel W) 

 WTC Operations: a Port Authority employee calls in that he is on floor 27 in the 

C staircase and has a man in a wheel chair and needs assistance. (PA/WTC Operations 

Radio Channel Y) 

9:01 a.m. PAPD police desk: a senior PAPD officer calls for the evacuation of all buildings in the 

WTC complex. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 
 Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 29

9:02 a.m. WTC Operations: Port Authority employee calls in reporting that he is stuck in an 

elevator on floor 78 of WTC 1 in car number 81A. (PA/WTC Operations Radio 

Channel Y) 

9:03 a.m. A second aircraft strikes WTC 2. (FEMA 403) 

9:04 a.m. WTC Operations: A call is made to evacuate everybody from the building now. Note: 

Building not identified. (PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

9:05 a.m. WTC Security: a security officer indicates that WTC 4 is being evacuated. He is then 

going to WTC 5. He also reports “I have people going crazy.” (PA/WTC Security Radio 

Channel X) 

 WTC Operations: A report comes in that Port Authority employees heard people stuck 

inside of some elevators and also report that they are getting them out. (Note: Building 

and location not identified.) (PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

 WTC Operations: A call comes in to get everybody off the complex. (PA/WTC 

 Operations Radio Channel Y) 

9:07 a.m. WTC Operations: A report comes in that somebody is stuck in an elevator on floor 76. 

(Note: Building not identified.) (PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

9:08 a.m. WTC Security: report from an officer that debris is falling from WTC 2 by WTC 4 and 

Liberty Street, and to let the people out of WTC 4. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:09 a.m. WTC Security report is received indicating that FDNY is entering elevator bank 11, 12. 

(Note: Building not identified. Elevators 11 and 12 are shuttle elevators. Elevator 11 

goes from the lobby to the 44th floor. Elevator 12 goes from the lobby to the 78th floor.) 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:10 a.m. WTC Security receives a report that the express elevators could be in jeopardy of falling. 

(Note: Building not identified.) (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:12 a.m. WTC Security receives a radio report from the Command Desk in the lobby of WTC 2 

saying that they cannot communicate with the Warden phones and that they are making 

announcements telling people not to stay at the Warden phones. (Note: This 

communication indicates that the Warden phones in WTC 2 were not working. Warden 

phones are located on each floor of the building for the use of floor wardens. They are 

wired for communications with the fire command desk in the building lobby.) 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:14 a.m. PAPD police desk receives confirmation that no elevators are working. (Note building 

not identified.) (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:16 a.m. FDNY radio dispatcher advises a chief that there are people trapped in WTC 1 at the 

following locations: floor 82 east side; floor 83, room 8311; floor 103, room 103 near the 
Chapter 4 

30 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

corner, floor 104; and floor 106, and in WTC 2 at the following locations: floor 82 west 

side; floor 88; and floor 89. (FDNY 9/11 Summary notes) 

9:17 a.m. PAPD police desk reports that four callers have made contact and need assistance on 

floor 106 of WTC 1. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:20 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a message from an officer that no one is down on the B4 level 

of WTC 1. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:23 a.m. FDNY radio dispatcher advises FDNY Field Communications Unit that 100 people are 

overcome in WTC 1 on the northwest and southwest corners of floor 103. The dispatcher 

also reports that Ladder 3 reports numerous injuries in the stairwell at floors 35 and up. 

(FDNY 9/11 Summary notes) 

9:24 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a report from an officer that people from floor 64 are now 

coming down onto the courtyard level of WTC 1. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:28 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a radio report of a person with burn injuries caused by a 

falling elevator. (Note: Location of injured person was provided as A20. This may mean 

WTC 1 on floor 20 on the A stairway.) (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:29 a.m. WTC Security reports that there is a medical emergency in the B stairway; there is a 

person that cannot walk down. The people are coming down from floor 51, and the 

person needing assistance has asthma. (Note: Building not identified.) 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:30 a.m. WTC Security receives a report that two elderly people on floor 51, B stairway, WTC 1, 

 cannot walk down and need medical assistance. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:37 a.m. PAPD police desk recorded the following message: “All World Trade Center units to the 

Command Post. All World Trade Center units escort everybody over the land bridge on 

West Street to the Financial Center. Do not, repeat, do not send people out into the 

Concourse on to south side.” (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:45 a.m. WTC Security receives a report that officers are sending people down, evacuating on the 

A stairway in WTC 1. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

 WTC Security gets a request for crowd control on Broadway. Answer to the request is 

that the City police should be responding. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:56 a.m. WTC Security receives a report that WTC 1 is not completely evacuated and that people 

are still coming out of each stairway. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

4.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS CHRONOLOGY 

This section provides an overview of the emergency response operations carried out by FDNY, NYPD, 

and PAPD at the WTC. The chronology highlights several communications that identify cases where 
 Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 31

emergency responders were assisting injured people, calling for EMS assistance, and searching for 

functioning elevators to help evacuate injured people. Some fires in the buildings are identified, and 

some firefighting operations in WTC 2 are identified. Communications from PAPD provide information 

on the locations of many people who were trapped in the buildings and in elevators. Several 

communications provide insight into FDNY operations in WTC 2 and show that some firefighters 

actually reached the 78th floor in WTC 2. This ascent to the 78th floor was assisted by the use of an 

elevator that operated until just before the building collapsed. The elevator became stuck in the elevator 

shaft, and the firefighter operating the elevator was chopping his way out when the building collapsed. 

Several radio communications provide insight into the difficulty that emergency responders had trying to 

climb the stairs of the WTC towers. Cases are noted where FDNY personnel had to stop and rest. Radio 

communications from the FDNY channel 7 repeater also point out the difficulty that some firefighters had 

with the identification of the two buildings. The exchange of communications by FDNY personnel at 

9:29 a.m. clearly shows this difficulty. Several communications from NYPD aviation units show how the 

aircrews repeatedly explored the possibility of landing on the roof of WTC 1 and reported that conditions 

were not safe for landing. However, at 9:38 and 9:40 a.m., an aviation unit calls in for permission to land 

on the roof of WTC 1. No evidence has been found that indicates that WTC occupants were seen on the 

tower roof or that conditions had improved when these radio requests were made. Interviews with 

aviation personnel indicate that many of them were highly troubled by the number of occupants trapped in 

the buildings and the number of people jumping from the buildings, and they were distressed that they 

were unable to help them.1, 2, 3 At 9:43 a.m., a senior police department official ordered that no one from 

the aviation units was to “rappel” on the building’s roofs. Rappel in this case means to descend down a 

rope attached to a helicopter onto the roofs of the WTC buildings. Communications in this section also 

reflect the fact that many people were coming to the WTC to volunteer their assistance. Many volunteers 

were turned away as the emergency responders felt that they needed to get everybody away from the 

WTC complex. 

8:46 a.m. An aircraft strikes WTC 1. (FEMA 403) 

8:49 a.m. WTC Security: A message is received that Emergency Medical Service (EMS) is needed 

because there is an injured security guard. The message was not complete; the location 

was not understandable. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

8:50 a.m. FDNY establishes a command post in the lobby of WTC 1. (FDNY McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

 WTC Security message from an officer on the B2 level of WTC 1 saying that there are 

two workers injured on that level and that EMS is needed “ASAP.” (PA/WTC Security 

Radio Channel X) 

 PAPD police desk receives a radio call from FDNY Ladder 10 requesting information 

from PAPD about which building was struck and the location of the fire, WTC 1 or 

 

1

 NYPD, Interview 14, winter 2004. 

2

 NYPD, Interview 20, winter 2004. 

3

 NYPD, Interview 21, winter 2004. 
Chapter 4 

32 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

WTC 2. FDNY uses a Port Authority Radio for the communication. (PAPD Radio 

Channel W) 

8:52 a.m. NYPD aviation unit arrives at the WTC to examine possibilities for roof rescue. (NYPD 

 McKinsey & Company 2002) 

8:56 a.m. WTC Security: an officer calls for an ambulance at WTC 4 for an injured person. 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

8:58 a.m. NYPD aviation unit advises that they are unable to land on the roof due to heavy smoke 

conditions. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:00 a.m. WTC Security receives a message saying that there is an injured person between floors 

14 and 15 of WTC 2. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:01 – 9:03 (E) FDNY Incident Command Post is established on West Street opposite WTC 1 (FDNY, 

McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:01 a.m. WTC Security receives a report of a fire in a parking lot. (PA/WTC Security Radio 

 Channel X) 

9:02 a.m. WTC Security receives a report of a gas leak. (Note: Incomplete message, location of 

leak not identified.) (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:03 a.m. An aircraft strikes WTC 2. (FEMA 403) 

 PAPD – by this time a PAPD senior officer has called three times for the evacuation of 

the World Trade Center, WTC 1 and WTC 2, and then “all buildings in the complex.” 

(PAPD Radio Channel W) 

 WTC Security reports that another aircraft has stuck WTC 2. (PA/WTC Security Radio 

 Channel X) 

9:05 a.m. PAPD police desk, an officer calls in and requests that every ambulance that can be 

spared be sent to the WTC. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:08 – 9:13 (E) FDNY establishes a Lobby Command Post inside WTC 2 at the Fire Command Desk.4

 

9:10 a.m. FDNY dispatcher receives a message saying that people are trapped on floor 86 of 

WTC 2. (FDNY 9-11-2001 Time Line Document) 

9:11 a.m. FDNY Field Com unit begins operations to maintain status. (FDNY, McKinsey & 

Company, 2002) 

9:11 a.m. FDNY reports that Engine 10 requests that all responding units stop short of the 

WTC buildings, either north or south of Liberty and West Street because of the large 

 

4

 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 
 Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 33

number of parked ambulances and debris falling from the buildings. (FDNY 9/11 

Summary notes) 

9:16 a.m. (E) FDNY Command Post and Staging area designated for WTC 2 at West and Albany 

Streets. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:17 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) indicates that they are using an elevator for operations in WTC 2. 

(PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:18 a.m. FDNY radio communication from WTC 2 indicates they have one elevator working to 

floor 40, and it is staffed by a firefighter from Ladder 15. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 

recording) 

 PAPD police desk receives a report that FDNY is abandoning its command post and 

going across the street. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:22 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) states that a Battalion Chief is on floor 43 or WTC 2 in the B stairway. 

(PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

 FDNY Battalion Chief now located on floor 43 of WTC 2 receives a message from a 

FDNY member that NYPD Emergency Service police officers (Emergency Service Unit) 

are in the building and want to provide support for him. The Battalion Chief gives the 

Emergency Service Unit police officers direction to his location on floor 43 in the 

B stairway. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:26 a.m. NYPD aviation unit advises that it is impossible to land on the roof at this time. (NYPD 

 SOD Radio Channel) 

9:29 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30): a Battalion Chief is communicating that he is located inside “Tower 2, the 

South Tower.” A firefighter follows the communication attempting to correct the Chief 

by saying that he was actually in the “North Tower, Tower 2.” (Note: This 

communication confused the actual location of the Battalion Chief, who later came back 

on the radio reporting that he was in the South Tower. Interviews with FDNY personnel5

conclusively show that the Battalion Chief was actually inside WTC 2, the South Tower.) 

(PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:30 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a report that EMS is setting up a triage station in the lobby of 

WTC 2. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

 

5

 FDNY interview 2, winter 2003 and FDNY interview 7,winter 2004. 
Chapter 4 

34 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:32 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) Firefighters communicated that they have been able to get to floor 55 inside 

WTC 2. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:38 a.m. NYPD aviation unit calls in to request a landing on the roof of the North Tower as soon 

as possible. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:39 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30): FDNY officer inside WTC 2 indicates that he is sending 10 to 15 injured 

people down to floor 40 and that the firefighter at that location should take the injured to 

the building’s lobby in the elevator. The officer also requests that the firefighter 

operating the elevator bring an EMS crew back up with him. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 

30 recording) 

9:40 a.m. NYPD officer advises that they need the aviation units on the roof as soon as possible. 

(NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:41 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30): Hazmat 1 (Hazardous Materials Unit) reports that they are on floor 48 of 

WTC 2 in the B stairway. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:42 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) A firefighter informs the Battalion Chief that he cannot find any elevator 

banks that are operating above floor 40. The Chief advises the firefighter that he should 

climb the B stairway from his location. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

 WTC Security receives a report that people have arrived and want to volunteer to help 

and asks where they should be sent. Answer: “Right now just send everybody away 

from the World Trade. We are not letting anybody come close to it.” (PA/WTC Security 

Radio Channel X) 

 PAPD police desk receives a radio report that a triage center has been set up at WTC 4 at 

Victoria’s Secret. (PAPD Radio channel W) 

9:43 a.m. NYPD officer advises that no one is to rappel onto the tops of the buildings. (NYPD 

SOD Radio Channel) 

9:44 a.m. WTC Security receives a communication saying that “They haven’t evacuated the Fire 

Command over here in building 2 or 1.” (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:44 a.m. (E) The Office of Emergency Management operations center inside WTC 7 is evacuated. 

(FDNY, interview 24, winter 2004) 

9:45 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) A firefighter calls the Battalion Chief and reports that they had to take their 

coats off. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 
 Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 35

9:49 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) A Battalion Chief instructs a firefighter that it is imperative that he get 

down to the lobby command post to get some people up to floor 40. Injured people are 

being sent down from floor 70. The firefighter is inside an operating elevator and is 

reporting that it is not operating properly and expresses concerns about the elevator 

becoming stuck in the shaft. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:50 a.m. WTC Security receives a message saying that FDNY needs a resuscitator on floor 19, 

B corridor of WTC 1. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:54 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) A Battalion Chief calls for a Ladder company in the A stairway to 

extinguish two fires. They are attempting to stretch building hose lines on about floor 78. 

(PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

 FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) A firefighter calls to the Battalion Chief that he is on floor 55 and must stop 

to rest. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

 WTC Vertical Transportation message indicates that an officer is located on floor 22, fire 

command center and that there is heavy traffic in the B stairway. The person indicates 

that they cannot release any emergency locked doors due to fire and the loss of electrical 

power. (Note: Communication appears to originate from WTC 1.) (PA/WTC Vertical 

Transportation Radio Channel Z) 

 WTC Security receives a report that there are 18 passengers stuck in an elevator on the 

floor 78 sky lobby of WTC 2 and that firefighters are working to get them out. They 

request EMS at the location on the double. (PA/WTC Security Channel X) 

9:56 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30): inside WTC 2, a firefighter states they are in the B stairway and that they 

will have to put some fire out in order to get to the A stairway. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 

30 recording) 

9:57 a.m. WTC Security receives reports by radio on the Security Radio Channel X and by phone 

from floor 78 of WTC 2 that people are coming out of the elevator banks. 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

 At and below floor 79 of WTC 2, FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD personnel are evacuating 

occupants, assisting the injured and fighting fires. 

 FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30) A firefighter in WTC 2 reports that he is trapped in an elevator in the 

elevator shaft and that they are chopping their way out. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 

recording) 
Chapter 4 

36 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:59 a.m. FDNY Marine unit reports the collapse of WTC 2. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident 

 Summary, 2001) 

10:28 a.m. FDNY Marine unit advises that the second WTC tower collapsed. (FDNY World Trade 

 Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

4.4 CHRONOLOGY OF THE WTC TOWERS 

Information provided by this chronology partially describes the variable conditions found in WTC 1 and 

WTC 2. The impact of the first aircraft into WTC 1 and the fires and overpressure that resulted created 

significant damage down to the building’s basement. The impact of the aircraft into WTC 2 produced jet 

fuel fires in the building on the 51st floor. Other communications indicate that there was no smoke or fire 

on the 68th, 73rd, or 74th floors and that the walls in stairway B had been breached. A telephone call to a 

New York City 9-1-1 telephone operator at 9:37 a.m. indicates that a floor in the 90s level of WTC 2 had 

collapsed. According to NYPD records, information from this call concerning the floor collapse in the 

90s appears to have been conveyed inaccurately by the 9-1-1 call taker and the NYPD radio dispatcher.6

 

The NYPD dispatcher transmitted the message at 9:41 a.m. and again at 9:51 a.m., identifying the 

collapsed floor as being the 106th floor. Communications from the NYPD aviations units describes a 

steady deterioration of the two WTC towers before they collapsed. 

8:47 a.m. WTC Security reports that there is a fire on floor 22 of WTC 1 (PA/WTC Security 

 Radio Channel X) 

 8:49 a.m. WTC Security reports that there is damage and a lot of debris on floor 22 of WTC 1 

 (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

8:51 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a call that an explosion was observed in the basement of the 

B1 level of WTC 1. The police desk informs the officer on the B1 level that what he saw 

resulted from an explosion on the upper floors of the building. (PAPD Radio 

Channel W) 

8:57 a.m. PAPD police desk receives report that water pipes are broken on the B4 level of WTC 1. 

(PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:02 a.m. WTC Operations receives a message from a person trapped in an elevator on floor 78 of 

WTC 1 that the area has smoke, and water and debris are coming down from above. 

(PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

9:10 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a report that there is burning jet fuel on floor 51 of one of the 

towers. (Note: Communications suggest this is WTC 2.) (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:13 a.m. WTC Security receives a report that WTC 1 is flooding. (PA/WTC Security Radio 

 Channel X) 

 

6

 McKinsey & Company, NYPD call-routing and message dispatch, “106th floor is collapsing,” draft summary report 

July 23, 2002. 
 Chronology of Events Based on Communications Data 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 37

9:32 a.m. WTC Security receives a message from an officer that the WTC Concourse is flooding. 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:37 a.m. New York City 9-1-1 telephone operator receives a message from an occupant of WTC 2 

that a floor had collapsed below them in the 90’s level. (Note: The person calling the 

9-1-1 operator indicated they had gone to floor 105.) (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 

call-routing and message dispatch summary report, 2002) 

9:41 a.m. NYPD dispatcher advises units that floor 106 in WTC 2 is collapsing and that the 

message comes from someone on that floor. (NYPD Division 1 Radio Channel) 

9:47 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio 

Channel 30): a firefighter inside WTC 2 reports that he is standing in the B stairway on 

floor 74 and there is no smoke or fire problem. He reports that the stairway walls have 

been breached on floors 73 and 74. Another FDNY unit in the same stairway reports that 

the walls were also breached on floor 68. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording) 

9:51 a.m. NYPD dispatcher advises that at WTC 2, floor 106 is crumbling per communications 

with victims trapped on the floor. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:52 a.m. NYPD aviation unit gives a radio report stating that “large pieces” may be falling from 

the top of WTC 2. Large pieces are hanging up there. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel, 

NYPD interviews #21 and #23) 

9:58 a.m. NYPD aviation unit advises that the south tower is coming down. (NYPD SOD Radio 

 Channel) 

10:06 a.m. NYPD officer advises that it isn’t going to take much longer before the north tower 

 comes down and to pull emergency vehicles back from the building. (NYPD SOD Radio 

 Channel) 

10:20 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the top of the tower might be leaning. (NYPD SOD 

 Radio Channel) 

10:21 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the north tower is buckling on the southwest corner and 

leaning to the south. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

 NYPD officer advises that all personnel close to the building pull back three blocks in 

every direction. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

10:27 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the roof is going to come down very shortly. (NYPD 

 SOD Radio Channel) 

10:28 a.m. NYPD officer reports that the tower is collapsing. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 
Chapter 4 

38 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 39

Chapter 5

ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY RESPONDER OPERATIONS

5.1 METHODOLOGY 

For this project, data were collected as described in Chapter 2. NIST personnel began analyzing the first 

data as soon as it was collected and continued throughout the investigation as new information was 

gathered. NIST personnel working on this part of the investigation carried out “lead following” activities 

to locate information critical for analysis, and as the “lead following” activities progressed analysis 

processes became a natural part of the work. The process of “lead following” was also used to assist in 

identifying emergency responders who needed to be interviewed. Information analysis and “lead 

following” made up a substantial part of the first-person interview process. However, the final analytical 

work was not completed until report writing was in progress. 

One of the first steps in the analysis was to create a chronology of factual data associated with the 

emergency operations. The chronology was developed from a large number of sources that are identified 

in Attachment 2 of this report. The second step in the analysis was to convert all of the written 

documents and interview notes into a searchable computer database. ATLAS.ti, a commercial 

quantitative analytical software program, was used for structuring the database and conducting searches 

for any given emergency response subject of interest (Muir 1997). This software allowed personnel to 

assemble related data from numerous different digitally based data sources so that they could be brought 

together for final analysis. The analysis process consisted of one person analyzing information gathered 

followed by multi-person discussions among project staff and agreement on the findings. 

ATLAS.ti Program Usage 

For this part of the investigation, the ATLAS.ti program was limited to textual data only. All first-person 

interviews conducted by NIST were transcribed along with radio and telephone communications of 

interest. The transcripts and other pertinent documents were converted to a text file format and imported 

into the ATLAS.ti program. A total of 812 documents were entered into the ATLAS.ti program. Firstperson interviews accounted for 116 of these, radio and telephone transcriptions accounted for 46, and 

other documents obtained by the investigation accounted for the remaining 650. These other documents 

were from the various emergency response organizations mentioned earlier (The Fire Department of the 

City of New York (FDNY), The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), and The New 

York City Police Department (NYPD)) and contained a broad variety of information dealing with 

standard operating procedures, training, equipment, and practices used during operations at the WTC. 

Information and topics selected for analysis were processed using ATLAS.ti by introducing codes into the 

text or marking specific portions of text and assigning them into categories of interest. The NIST 

investigation identified 125 categories associated with the emergency response analysis at the WTC, and 

the 812 documents were coded or marked so that ATLAS.ti could recover information for each of the 

categories. For example, one category of interest was accountability or tracking of personnel. Within the 

116 first-person interviews conducted, the idea or concept of accountability of personnel was coded 
Chapter 5 

40 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

93 times. Some individuals interviewed never mentioned accountability while others spoke about it 

multiple times. The information on accountability gathered from these interviews was further broken 

down by organization (FDNY, NYPD, or PANYNJ) and at what level in the organization the person was 

working. The interviewee could be identified as a firefighter, police officer, team leader, or command 

officer, etc. Whether the individual was speaking of something that happened on September 11, 2001 

regarding accountability or something that they wished for in the future that would make accountability at 

any incident an easier task was also coded. By polling the database using ATLAS.ti, information from 

each source and category could be gathered for analysis. Review and analysis of each item located by 

ATLAS.ti in the database and analysis of the complete data set assembled provided detailed, as well as 

generalized, information about the category searched. 

The following sections discuss results of the analysis, including supporting evidence of the emergency 

response carried out on September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center. 

5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF BUILDING DESIGN ON EMERGENCY 

RESPONSE 

Building design can have a significant impact on the ability of emergency responders to access involved 

areas, access areas where occupants may be trapped, evacuate building occupants, and conduct safe 

emergency response operations. Building access is critical to emergency responders, both for ground 

level entry and for all parts of a building where emergency response operations are needed. High-rise 

building designs present their own unique challenges for the emergency responder. Some of these 

challenges are: (O’Hagan 1977) 

• entry and overall building access; 

• elevators, elevator communications, elevator information panels, and control systems; 

• egress, stairways, and the limits to firefighting strategy related to stairway locations; 

• building information systems, fire alarm panels; 

• emergency and fire alarm communications systems; 

• active fire suppression systems, building water supply, fire pumps, and standpipe systems; 

• smoke management systems; 

• height of the building and limits related to exterior fire attack strategies; 

• large area open floor plans with minimal compartmentation; and 

• emergency responder communications, command and control. 

Building height becomes an immediate challenge when safe and operational elevator systems are not 

available. As building height increases, emergency responder access becomes limited. The emergency 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 41

responder must rely on other building systems and other aspects of the building design to assist with 

managing an emergency. 

Building design has an influence on emergency responder Command and Control as well. Building 

construction materials and separations can adversely affect the ability of emergency responders to 

communicate. Additionally, in recent years, lightweight building construction using truss joist systems 

has led many fire departments to institute additional safety policies related to the possibility of structural 

collapse (Dunn 1988). These policies relate to both metal truss and wood truss systems. This has 

affected fire department operations when addressing life saving and firefighting operations. The issues 

raised by truss construction are highlighted in the building construction section of the fire service training 

manual entitled, Essentials of Fire Fighting (Hall 2000). Building design is an integral part of emergency 

response and firefighting operations. As discussed below, building design can seriously affect emergency 

responder operations. 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the largest fire in the World Trade Center towers above the lobby level 

occurred on February 13, 1975. This fire broke out on the 11th floor of WTC 1. The fire grew and 

involved approximately one quarter of the 11th floor. The fire also spread into the telephone equipment 

closets and extended from the 9th floor through the 16th floor (O’Hagan 1977). This experience provided 

FDNY with the first opportunity to fight a sizable fire in the towers and provided lessons for operations in 

the towers for the future. In his analysis of this fire, former FDNY Fire Commissioner John O’Hagan 

pointed out the following issues related to fighting fire in the World Trade Center towers: 

▪ Floor size and the size of the fire in the 1975 incident: “If the alarm had been 

delayed an additional 30 to 60 minutes, it is reasonable to expect that the 

entire east half of the building could have been involved.” “If the east half of 

the building had been involved, it is unlikely that a direct attack would have 

been successful. In that case we may have had to choose a defensive 

strategy.” (O’Hagan 1977) 

O’Hagan’s statement refers only to the east half of the 11th floor in WTC 1 and raises the issue of the 

large size of the floors in the World Trade Center towers. One half of one floor involved in fire would 

have been approximately 1,350 m2

 (15,000 ft2). According to standard calculation methods used by the 

fire service, it would take water flow rates of approximately 4,700 l/min (1,250 gal/min) to extinguish 

half of a WTC floor. This would require approximately five 63.5 mm (2.5 in) handlines with 28.5 mm 

(1.125 in) diameter smooth tip nozzles (NFPA 1997). With a fire this size on the 11th floor of the 

building, O’Hagan suggests that a defensive strategy may have been the only way to fight the fire until 

additional resources were available and master streams could be used against the fire. O’Hagan suggests 

a defensive strategy for attempting to stop fire spread across the remaining floor. This would be done by 

establishing handline fire hose operations at the floor’s central corridor and attempting to hold the fire’s 

progress long enough to get large master stream nozzles onto the floor. 

O’Hagan also raises the issue of time. He refers to a delay of 30 to 60 minutes that would allow the fire 

to grow. Since the 1975 fire was on the 11th floor, the time delay in getting personnel and equipment up 

to the fire floor was relatively short. However, on September 11, 2001, the lowest part of the aircraft 

impact zone for WTC 1 was the 93rd floor, and the lowest part of the aircraft impact zone for WTC 2 was 

the 77th floor. Without the use of elevators it would take firefighters approximately two hours or more to 
Chapter 5 

42 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

get to the impact zones and fires.1, 2 For more detailed information on firefighter climbing rates see 

section 5.6 in this report. 

▪ John O’Hagan discusses the 1975 fire, building evacuation, and smoke 

control: “the only occupants of the building were maintenance and security 

employees and, therefore, there was no rescue problem. Had the building 

been occupied, and given the stack action that exists in this 110-story 

building, the rescue problem would have been tremendous.” (O’Hagan 1977) 

O’Hagan’s prediction was proven correct during the bombing of the World Trade Center that occurred on 

February 26, 1993. (Cerreta 1993) 

▪ “Tower 1 was acting as one of the main vents for the cellar fire; it had 

become a 110-story chimney. (We would later learn that a huge amount of 

smoke also was entering the elevator shafts from the B-2 level, where the 

explosion had demolished the shaft walls.)” (Cerreta 1993) 

Observations of smoke density on the 44th floor of WTC 1 indicated that the visibility had dropped to 

about 0.3 m (1 ft) within one minute after the explosion. It was determined that the smoke on the 44th

floor mainly traveled upward through the elevator shafts and stairwells (Isner 1993). 

The observations above by O’Hagan and Cerreta illustrate some of the key issues associated with fighting 

large fires in tall buildings. In these cases the tall buildings were the World Trade Center buildings. It is 

noteworthy to remind the reader that the 1993 WTC fire was below grade, and the 1975 WTC fire was 

mostly contained on the 11th floor of the building. Smoke in the buildings seriously affected firefighting 

operations and the evacuation of building occupants. During the 1993 bombing, it is estimated that it 

took occupants 1 1⁄2 hr to 3 hrs to fully evacuate from the upper floors of the World Trade Center towers, 

and it took approximately 5 hours to locate and free a group of kindergarten students and several adults 

trapped in an elevator in WTC 2. (Isner 1993) 

5.3 AIRCRAFT DAMAGE, FUEL RUN-OFF, BUILDING SYSTEMS FAILURES, 

AND EMERGENCY RESPONDER OPERATIONS 

5.3.1 Aircraft Damage and Fuel Run-Off 

The aircraft impacting on the towers caused major damage to the buildings. In addition, the jet fuel 

distribution through the buildings and down the elevator shafts generated large fires. The elevator shafts 

inside WTC 1 contained a fast moving jet fuel droplet cloud fire which damaged shaft walls, elevator 

doors, and floors near the elevator shafts due to the over pressures that were generated (NIST 

NCSTAR 1-2 and NIST NCSTAR 1-5). At 9:10 a.m., the PAPD Police Desk inside WTC 5 received a 

report of burning jet fuel on the 51st floor of WTC 1.3

 In addition, in first-person interviews PAPD 

personnel reported a huge fireball that came from the elevator shafts and filled the visible volume of the 

 

1

 FDNY Interview 9, winter 2004. 

2

 FDNY Interview 16, winter 2004. 

3

 PAPD Police Desk, PA Channel W radio recording. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 43

Concourse level between WTC 1 and the entrance to the Marriott Hotel.4

 PAPD personnel reported that 

they observed numerous people being enveloped in flames as the fireball swept through the 

WTC Concourse level.5

 In addition, burning jet fuel and burning debris from the impact fell to the Plaza 

and streets and started fires at ground level.6

 Several people on the Plaza were injured or killed by the 

falling debris and flames.7

Emergency responders observed burning jet fuel and the fires created by it: 

▪ When WTC 2 was hit, the interviewee saw a cloud of burning oil. There 

was fire falling down and there was fuel on the ground. A person could 

feel radiant heat on their face from the fireball.8

▪ The jet fuel had gone down the elevator shaft and had blown out the 

elevator doors and that is why the lobby windows were blown out and 

why interviewees had seen seriously burned people in the lobby.9

 (Inside 

WTC 1) 

▪ Kids told us that the burning jet fuel rolled down the side of the building 

and burned people in the street.10

▪ The interviewee said he looked to the left and saw the fireball coming 

out of the lobby of WTC 1 on the Marriott side. He turned to his left and 

ran down the main corridor toward WTC 2 to get away from the fireball 

and dived into the corridor that led to a freight elevator.11

▪ Elevators 6A and 7A were out of service for modernization. The doors 

were blown off by the fireball that came down the elevator shaft and the 

elevator cars were burned.12 (Basement level of WTC 1) 

▪ The interviewee said that he could actually see from his side of the 

building the fireball from the jet fuel coming down, and the blast blew 

out the windows on the 44th floor and knocked him and about 10 people 

on the floor.13 (Inside of WTC 1 when WTC 2 was struck) 

 

4

 PA Interview 1, fall 2003. 

5

 PA Interview 1, fall 2003. 

6

 FDNY Interview 52, winter 2004. 

7

 FDNY Interview 47, winter 2004. 

8

 FDNY Interview 30, winter 2004. 

9

 FDNY Interview 27, winter 2004. 

10 FDNY Interview 47, winter 2004 

11 PA Interview 1, fall 2003. 

12 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 

13 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 
Chapter 5 

44 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

▪ A fire was started on the B4 level of WTC 1 when the first plane struck. 

The interviewee said that he believes that burning jet fuel ignited the 

fires.14

Since the first fire department personnel who entered WTC 1 following the aircraft impact actually saw 

the aircraft hit the building, these firefighters had a general idea of building damage before they got to the 

scene. They knew that the building safety systems were likely damaged and that the building had 

absorbed the energy of a large aircraft impact.15, 16 Upon entering WTC 1, FDNY personnel met with 

Port Authority personnel and the former WTC 1 Deputy Fire Safety Director to learn more about building 

conditions.17 Also upon entering the building, FDNY saw victims burned by the fireball that came into 

the building’s lobby. Some of these seriously burned people were still alive; fire department personnel 

tried to give them aid even though they were not likely to survive. Some of the bodies were still burning 

and firefighters used handheld fire extinguishers to put them out. 18

FDNY personnel identified the following related to building conditions and emergency response 

operations in the building:19, 20

• the initial fire department size-up of the event was that a large aircraft had hit WTC 1, and 

there were large fires burning on multiple floors at and above the impact zone, 

• it was reported to the FDNY Battalion Chief who established the WTC 1 Lobby Command 

Post that the elevators were not working and/or were not generally safe for use during the 

WTC operations; however one elevator was used briefly by FDNY, 

• people were trapped inside many of the elevators, 

• firefighters would have to gain access to the injured and trapped occupants by climbing the 

stairs and carrying the equipment needed up the stairs, 

• it was likely that the water supply on the upper floors was damaged and that firefighting 

would not be an option until a reliable water supply was established and equipment was 

carried up. It appeared that the sprinkler and standpipe systems were compromised at the 

impact zone, 

• FDNY command personnel learned from 9-1-1 dispatch operators that smoke, fire, and 

structural damage in the buildings prevented many building occupants from evacuating floors 

above the impact zones, 

 

14 Other Interview 1, fall 2003. 

15 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

16 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

17 FDNY Interview 24, winter 2004. 

18 FDNY Interview 13, winter 2004. 

19 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

20 FDNY interview 7, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 45

• FDNY command personnel knew that jet fuel had flowed into the elevator shafts and into 

other parts of the buildings and presented a danger to building occupants and emergency 

responder personnel, 

• the known extent of the impact damage, fires in the buildings, and the height of the impact 

zones indicated that many of the people trapped above the impact zones were already dead or 

would likely die before emergency responders could reach them, 

• the impact zones were located at heights in the buildings that would require hours for the 

emergency responders to accumulate appropriate equipment and personnel to carry out the 

large scale operations needed to successfully access the upper floors, and 

• structural damage and fires caused by the aircraft impact would likely result in localized 

collapses in and above the impact and fire zones. 

As described above, aircraft impact damage and the fires started by burning jet fuel had a major impact on 

fire department operations. Access to the impact zone and fire floors was limited to climbing the stairs. 

Also, FDNY Chiefs knew that it would take hours to get enough people and equipment up to the impact 

zone to provide aid for the people trapped above the fires. 

5.3.2 Systems Failures 

The WTC towers contained building systems that were designed to help protect the occupants and the 

buildings, and also assist with emergency responder operations. Some of these key systems were as 

follows: 

• fire detection and alarm systems, 

• active fire suppression systems including the water supply, 

• fire pumps and standpipe systems to supply water for firefighters to use in extinguishing fires, 

• emergency communications systems for making announcements, elevator intercom systems, 

and communications systems for use by emergency responders, 

• access and egress systems including elevators and stairways, 

• emergency power and lighting systems, and 

• smoke control and ventilation systems. 

Each of the two aircraft struck the WTC towers at high speed, resulting in serious damage to their 

structural elements, and all of the life safety systems mentioned above were either damaged or 
Chapter 5 

46 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

destroyed.21, 22, 23, 24 The structural damage, as well as the loss of the building’s safety systems, had a 

direct negative effect on the evacuation of building occupants and emergency responder operations. 

5.3.3 Initial Emergency Response 

Building tenants, including Port Authority personnel, became the first “emergency responders inside” the 

WTC towers on the upper floors, and they had very little equipment to assist them. One building 

occupant from the 73rd floor of WTC 1 stated the following during their first-person interview: 

▪ First responders on the high floors were the building tenants, and there 

were no adequate tools to use for rescue or fire suppression.25

(NIST 2004) 

Initial “size-up” of the conditions at WTC 1 was carried out by the first FDNY Battalion Chief who 

arrived on the scene. The following information is drawn from interviews with WTC 1 FDNY Command 

Post personnel and PANYNJ Fire Command Desk personnel and documents from the two agencies. The 

first Battalion Chief on the scene had observed the aircraft impact into the WTC 1 tower and immediately 

responded to the building.26 Upon arrival at WTC 1, the FDNY Battalion Chief met with Port Authority 

personnel as he entered the building and requested information available concerning the attack, building 

conditions, and status of the elevators. A PANYNJ Vertical Transportation office employee had begun 

calling each of the building elevators over the dedicated elevator telephone system that was located at the 

lobby Fire Command Desk.27 The building’s former Deputy Fire Safety Director who operated the Fire 

Command Desk was checking building alarms and trying to make evacuation announcements.28 It was 

found that the emergency communications system used to make the emergency announcements was 

inoperable as a result of the aircraft impact.29 It was also learned by FDNY personnel upstairs inside 

WTC 1 that the warden phone system was damaged and the standpipe phone system was not 

operating.30, 31, 32 However, the former WTC 1 Deputy Fire Safety Director indicated that he did receive 

calls at the Fire Command Desk over the warden phone system.33 This information was communicated to 

the FDNY Chiefs. A building Fire Safety Director spoke with one of the FDNY Chiefs about the 

possibility of using elevator phones for communication with the building’s Operations Command Center 

 

21 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

22 PA Interview 3, fall 2003. 

23 FDNY Interview 27, winter 2004. 

24 FDNY Interview 58, winter 2004. 

25 Interview 1000118 (NIST 2004). 

26 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

27 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 

28 Other Interview 3, spring 2004. 

29 Other Interview 3, spring 2004. 

30 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

31 FDNY Interview 23, winter 2004. 

32 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 

33 Other Interview 3, spring 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 47

(OCC). This person and a FDNY Battalion Chief were dispatched to go and check it out. These men 

were never seen again.34

The FDNY chiefs who were establishing the WTC 1 Command Post received information from the data 

sources described above and through their personal investigation of systems in the building. 

Emergency responders reported the failures of critical communications systems inside WTC 1: 

▪ One firefighter called up on the warden phone. There was one on every 

floor in the building and you can call the Lobby Command Post with it. 

He called but he couldn’t get through. We went to the Verizon Company 

on the 23rd floor, and he called the Manhattan dispatcher on the phone 

and told them to pass a message to the Lobby Command Post.35

▪ The building intercom system was not working after the plane hit. 

Normally, announcements over the intercom would tell what stairways to 

use when going down.36

The facts that the impact zone and the large fires were so high in the building and that the building’s 

water supply was compromised led the fire chiefs who established the original Command Post inside the 

lobby of WTC 1 to conclude that fire department efforts should be directed toward evacuation and rescue 

of building occupants.37 Also, there were no working elevators that could transport firefighters and 

equipment up to a staging location just below the impact zone. The building conditions presented to them 

indicated that at best it would take hours to establish meaningful firefighting operations on the upper 

floors of the building.38 The chiefs knew that this assessment did not give much hope for the survival of 

the people trapped above the fires in the building since the fires would continue to grow and the toxic fire 

gases would increasingly occupy the building spaces where the people were trapped. 

Several of the early arriving FDNY firefighter companies, however, were originally ordered by Command 

Post personnel to go up the stairways to a couple of floors below the impact zone and establish a staging 

area and operations post for rescue and firefighting operations.39 Some of these firefighter companies 

carried high-rise hose line packs up with them so that they would have the equipment for fighting fires if 

a water supply was available. After these initial firefighter companies were sent up, newly arriving 

companies were instructed only to carry out occupant evacuation and search and rescue operations.40

Failures of critical building systems (water supply, sprinkler systems, emergency egress routes, smoke 

control systems, and firefighting systems) and large fires that trapped large numbers of people on the 

upper floors of the exceptionally tall buildings created a difficult evacuation and rescue problem for the 

emergency responders. The fire chiefs at the original Command Post inside the lobby of WTC 1 knew 

 

34 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

35 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 

36 FDNY Interview 43, winter 2004. 

37 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

38 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 

39 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

40 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 
Chapter 5 

48 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

that they could not reach the building occupants trapped above the fires in time to successfully rescue 

them.41 This critical factor was made clear by the dozens of people jumping from the upper floors of the 

building, and it directly influenced FDNY’s planning and operations.42 

5.4 ROOF RESCUE AND AVIATION OPERATIONS 

Although the PANYNJ had not endorsed a plan for roof rescue from the towers, it appeared to be one of 

the few options available for occupants trapped above the fires. Recognizing the limited options for 

building evacuation at the WTC, the NYPD Special Operations Division (SOD) dispatched helicopters to 

the site for reconnaissance and to assess the possibility of roof rescue.43, 44

Roof Access and the WTC Emergency Preparedness Plan 

The PANYNJ’s 2001 WTC Emergency Preparedness Manual and evacuation procedures did not include 

a plan to provide roof rescue for occupants trapped in a building at the WTC site. Instead, the standard 

occupant evacuation procedures and drills required the use of stairwells to exit at the bottom of the 

WTC towers (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). The PANYNJ reports that it never advised tenants to evacuate 

upward (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). The WTC building evacuation training did not explicitly instruct 

occupants not to evacuate upward or attempt to access the roof. This also is confirmed by statements 

made by the Port Authority World Trade Director during his testimony to the 9/11 Commission on 

May 18, 2004 (Reiss 2004). The standard policy was to keep the doors to the roof locked with a key 

being required to gain roof access. No fire safety procedures explicitly called for opening these doors, 

including anyone on a “key run.” On September 11, the WTC 1 Security Control Center (SCC) attempted 

to release all locks controlled by the computerized access system but was unable to do so because of 

aircraft damage to the system. During the 1993 bombing, NYPD conducted successful roof rescue 

operations from the top of the WTC towers. These operations were responsible for removing a small 

number of people during rescue operations.45

Roof Access and the New York City Building Code 

The 1968 Building Code of New York City (BCNYC) paragraph C26-604.8(k) required access to roofs 

with slopes less than 20 degrees from at least one stair in buildings greater than three stories (12.1 m or 

40 ft) in height. The Code does not state the purpose for this access, but since it is in the section on stair 

construction and not Means of Egress, it does not necessarily imply roof rescue but more likely providing 

fire department access to flat roofs. The current Code (2003) permits such access from a stair, ladder or 

scuttle, even more clearly not intended as an egress way for rescue. There is no prohibition of locking 

this access, which is consistent with fire department use since they have the means to open locked doors. 

 

41 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003 and FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 42 FDNY Interview 34, winter 2004. 

43 NYPD, SOD radio channel communications. 

44 NYPD Interview 20, spring 2004. 

45 NYPD Interview 19, spring 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 49

Aviation Based Roof Rescue 

Aviation-based roof rescue procedures have a history that goes back to the 1970’s. O’Hagan writes about 

two high-rise building fires that took place in Brazil, the Andraus building fire (February 24, 1972) and 

the Joelma Building fire (February 1, 1974). (O’Hagan 1977) The first fire occurred in a 31-story 

building, so many occupants who were cut off by the fire went up to the roof. As the fire burned out in 

the building, helicopter rescues were conducted. Even under favorable wind, weather, and fire 

conditions, it took helicopters approximately four hours to remove approximately 350 victims from the 

building’s roof. The 1974 fire occurred in a 25-story building, and again, occupants went to the roof to be 

rescued. On this day, however, the wind and fire conditions had a negative impact on the safe operation 

of helicopters above the building. There was no wind, and the thermal plumes and smoke went directly 

up. It was dangerous for helicopters to attempt to fly in these conditions. Changing thermal conditions 

cause serious problems with lift in aircraft, and the reduced oxygen levels in the smoke clouds can cause 

aircraft engines to fail. As a result, approximately 90 of the 150 people who went to the roof perished 

since helicopter operations were not possible. 

After the 1993 bombing, FDNY and NYPD developed a plan for roof rescue in the event that it was 

needed. Both departments realized the dangerous nature of conducting roof rescues. The following is 

extracted from the FDNY September 9, 1993 All Units Circular 269 entitled, Air Support Plan – High 

Rise Fires (Air Support Plan).46 The complete document is contained in Appendix E. 

“In recent years, several high-rise fires have occurred throughout the 

world at which occupants became isolated from fire forces when they 

fled to the roof. Due to the media attention given to these events and the 

spectacular nature of helicopter evacuation, it can be anticipated that at 

future high-rise fires, people will ignore department advice and flee to 

the roof. Roof evacuation by helicopter is both hazardous and time 

consuming. Therefore, it shall only be undertaken as a last resort, and 

only upon the direction of the Fire Department Incident Commander 

(IC). However, large numbers of people on the roof cannot be ignored 

and the possibility exists that a helicopter approach may be the only 

access available.” 

The Air Support Plan addresses roof evacuation issues raised by investigations of high-rise building fires 

in other cities: 

“FDNY observers who visited the scene of these fires concluded that 

evacuation was unnecessary since the people on the roof were never in 

any immediate danger. On the other hand, many of the fatalities at these 

fires were people who suffered smoke inhalation in the halls and 

stairways while attempting to reach the roof. Had fire personnel been 

airlifted, ventilation and search of the stairwells and halls could have 

been effected.” 

 

46 FDNY September 9, 1993 All Units Circular 269 entitled, Air Support Plan – High Rise Fires.
Chapter 5 

50 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Objectives of the Air-Support Plan were: 

• Provide FDNY with the capability to place fire personnel on the roof of high-rise buildings, 

otherwise inaccessible due to fire conditions for the purpose of ventilating and search. 

• Control, comfort, and direct people who view themselves as trapped and remote from help. 

• Provide the lobby command post with intelligence on roof conditions. 

• Evacuate persons in need of immediate medical attention. 

• Provide a capability to evacuate the roof as a last resort. 

The following information pertinent to this investigation was extracted from section 105-6 of the NYPD 

manual entitled, Aviation Manual – “High Rise Emergencies”.

47

High-Rise Emergencies: 

• A high-rise emergency is an urgent situation in a building, which is over nine stories high, 

and in which persons are trapped or victims of crime and the rooftop is inaccessible from the 

ground level by emergency equipment or rescue personnel. The emergency may be the result 

of fire, explosion, terrorist act or other criminal activity. 

 Upon confirmation of a high-rise emergency: 

• Operations Supervisor: If the emergency is a high-rise fire, have FDNY personnel respond to 

the staging area and the highest ranking Fire Officer and aide will board the primary Bell 412 

after Emergency Services Unit has secured the rooftop landing zone. 

Note: If persons are to be immediately removed from the high-rise roof via the hoist or by 

means of a rooftop landing, it is not necessary for any FDNY personnel to be onboard the 

aircraft, unless the FDNY personnel will be administering emergency care to those rescued. 

• In the event of a non-crime fire, notify the flight crews that no landings on the roof will be 

attempted without FDNY approval. 

During the first hour of the WTC operations, FDNY did not consider the option of roof rescue. The 

department was busy and focused on getting as many people out of the building as possible through the 

normal egress routes and providing aid for the injured.48, 49, 50 In addition, when the second aircraft struck 

WTC 2 it was clear that this was a terrorist attack, and it resulted from criminal activity.51 Therefore, the 

decision whether to conduct roof top operations became the responsibility of NYPD. Two NYPD 

 

47 New York City Police Department, Aviation Manuel – “High Rise Emergencies,” 1993. 48 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

49 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

50 FDNY Interview 9, winter 2004. 

51 FDNY Interview 19, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 51

helicopters crews looked at the towers in an attempt to 1) determine if there was initially anyone on the 

roof of WTC 1 that required rescue, and 2) assess the overall roof conditions for possible emergency 

responder access to the building from the air.52, 53 One of the two NYPD helicopters was almost hit by the 

second hijacked aircraft as it flew into WTC 2. Fortunately, one of the crew members on the helicopter 

saw the hijacked aircraft coming in from the south and yelled to the pilot to pull up.54 The pilot 

immediately pulled up and looked through the viewing bubble at his feet and saw the airline pass just 

under the helicopter and crash into WTC 2.55 Despite this near collision, the helicopters continued their 

observations, and one flew in toward WTC 1 to determine flight conditions near the northwest corner of 

the building.56 Only the northwest corner of the building presented any chance for aviation operations 

since smoke from WTC 1 and WTC 2 covered the remaining top of WTC 1 and completely covered the 

top of WTC 2. 57, 58 See Figure 5–1 and Figure 5–2. 

As the helicopter approached the northwest corner of the WTC 1 roof, aircrew members observed that 

window washing machinery and equipment was in the way. 59 Then, one of the aircrew monitoring 

instruments on the aircraft noted that the engine temperature suddenly began to rise. The pilot was 

informed, and the helicopter retreated from the approach, reporting that roof operations were not possible 

at that time60, 61. The following documents the radio transmissions from the aviation units to the SOD 

dispatcher concerning roof conditions and observations related to the possibility of roof operations: 

 8:52 a.m. NYPD aviation unit arrives at the WTC to examine possibilities of roof rescue. 

(NYPD, SOD Radio Channel) (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 8:58 a.m. An aviation unit advises that they are unable to land on the roof due to heavy smoke 

conditions. (NYPD, SOD Radio Channel) 

9:26 a.m. An aviation unit advises that it is impossible to land on the roof at this time. 

(NYPD, SOD Radio Channel) 

 

52 NYPD Interview 7, winter 2004. 

53 NYPD Interview 10, winter 2004. 

54 NYPD Interview 20, spring 2004. 

55 NYPD Interview 20, spring 2004. 

56 NYPD Interview 20, spring 2004. 

57 NYPD Interview 10, winter 2004. 

58 NYPD Interview 20, spring 2004. 

59 NYPD Interview 14, winter 2004. 

60 NYPD Interview 10, winter 2004. 

61 NYPD Interview 12, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

52 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–1. Video image showing a NYPD helicopter flying near the World Trade Center 

buildings before WTC 2 was struck by the second aircraft 

Figure 5–2. Photographs of smoke covering the roofs of the 

World Trade Center buildings 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 53

While this was happening in the air, senior NYPD SOD officers at the mobilization point were discussing 

the possibility of putting an Emergency Service Unit team on the roof of WTC 1. A roof rappel team was 

assembled and dispatched to the ball field located just off of West Street and adjacent to the schools 

located at the site.62 A helicopter was dispatched to the site to pick them up. Over this same time period, 

NYPD aviation crews were observing increasing numbers of people jumping or falling from the towers 

and called for permission to land on the roof.63 They stated that landing conditions had not changed on 

the roofs, but they wanted to help those people who were about to fall. At 9:35 a.m. the NYPD First 

Deputy Commissioner ordered that no roof rescues were to be attempted.64 The NYPD aviation unit 

made the following radio transmissions: 

 9:38 a.m. A NYPD aviation unit calls in to request a landing on the roof of the North Tower as 

soon as possible. (NYPD, SOD Radio Channel) 

 9:40 a.m. A NYPD officer advises that they need the aviation units on the roof as soon as 

possible. (NYPD, SOD Radio Channel) 

Shortly after these actions were taken, a senior NYPD SOD officer (after collecting information on the 

possibility of conducting roof operations) ordered that there would be no rappels onto the roofs of the 

towers. 

 9:43 a.m. NYPD officer advises that no one is to rappel onto the top of the buildings. (NYPD, 

SOD Radio Channel) Note: The term rappel refers to the process of using a rope 

suspended from a helicopter to descent on to the roof of a building. 

The “no rappel” decision ended organized efforts to conduct aviation/roof operations on top of the World 

Trade Center towers. 

5.5 EMERGENCY RESPONDER ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRACKING 

The control of human resources is an important task and safety issue at all emergencies. It becomes 

significantly more important as emergency operations get larger and the numbers of units and people 

increase. Because of this, emergency responder organizations have instituted practices designed to help 

manage human resources. The policies and practices associated with the control of human resources at 

the scene of an emergency are referred to as accountability by the emergency responder community. 

Accountability includes the assignment, dispatch, checking in, tracking, locating, and checking out of 

emergency responders who operate at an emergency (Hall 2000). With the WTC attack, this also related 

to the recall of emergency responders. Recall refers to bringing emergency responders who are off duty 

or on leave back to duty status.65 FDNY and the other responding agencies had recall policies in place 

and did recall personnel for WTC operations.66, 67 Some emergency responders self-dispatched to the 

 

62 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 

63 NYPD Interview 20, spring 2004. 

64 NYPD, McKinsey & Company report, 2002. 

65 FDNY Recall Procedures, see Appendix H 

66 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004 

67 FDNY Interview 17, winter 2004 
Chapter 5 

54 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

World Trade Center, and as the recalls were put into effect, it was reported that some emergency 

responders went to the WTC instead of reporting to their location of assignment.68, 69 This created 

accountability problems for FDNY at the WTC.70

5.5.1 FDNY Accountability, Location, and Tracking 

Firefighter accountability may be defined as the means of identifying and maintaining a time based record 

of where individual firefighters are located and working at an incident and what each firefighter is doing 

at the scene. Firefighter accountability is a critical part of the Incident Command System that assists with 

human resource management and the safety of individuals (Hall 2000). Basically, if there is a loss of 

firefighter accountability, the firefighter becomes lost at the incident. Unfortunately, failures of 

accountability on the fire ground have often been associated with the injury or death of firefighters (Hall 

2000). 

The FDNY Incident Command System Manual71 published in 1997 says the following about the Incident 

Command System and accountability: 

• The Incident Command System will improve firefighter safety by providing better 

accountability of personnel and improved use of resources and tactical effectiveness. 

• STAGING – A specific area to which resources are assigned before deployment. Staging has 

several advantages: 

1. It gives the Incident Commander (IC) breathing room to make better decisions about 

deployment. 

2. It is a checkpoint to provide accountability and prevent freelancing. 

3. It provides an area of protection from exposure in hazardous environments. 

4. It establishes a reserve immediately available for a contingency. 

The FDNY Incident Command System Manual, Part 1, 1997 is located in Appendix A. 

The understanding of firefighter accountability is a basic part of initial firefighter training. It is a concept 

and a practice learned during the first phases of training and it receives continued training throughout a 

firefighter’s career because of its importance to personal safety and successful emergency responder 

operations (Hall 2000). The 4th edition of Essentials of Fire Fighting (2000) says the following about 

personnel accountability systems (Hall 2000). 

“Each department must develop its own system of accountability that 

identifies and tracks all personnel working at an incident. The system 

should be standardized so that it is used at every incident. All personnel 

must be familiar with the system and participate when operating at an 

emergency incident. The system must also account for those individuals 

 

68 FDNY Interview 58, winter 2004. 

69 FDNY interview 63, winter 2004. 

70 FDNY Interview 68, spring 2004. 

71 FDNY Incident Command System Manual, ICS Manual, Part 1, May 1997. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 55

who respond to the scene in vehicles other than fire department 

apparatus. 

Accountability is vital in the event of a serious accident or structural 

collapse. If the IC does not know who is on the fireground and where 

they are located, it is impossible to determine who and how many may be 

trapped inside or injured. ...Too many firefighters have died because 

they were not discovered missing until it was too late.” 

In career fire departments, firefighter accountability typically begins at the fire house. Firefighters 

working on a company shift are managed by an officer who ensures that the company roster has a full 

complement of firefighters for that shift. Firefighters are checked in, and a riding list is prepared for each 

company. The riding list identifies personnel and job assignments for each firefighter.72, 73 On 

September 11, 2001, the attack occurred just before shift change.74, 75 In some firehouses, this resulted in 

two crews of firefighters being available at the firehouse to fill one company’s riding list.76 Since the 

previous shift’s crew was technically off duty, they would normally not be a part of a crew responding to 

an operation after the shift change had occurred. However, FDNY has a policy that allows a company 

officer to assign extra volunteer members to the crew, and they would be added to the company’s riding 

list.77 When the alarms for the WTC started coming into the firehouses, numerous firefighters from the 

previous shift were available to work. Interviews with FDNY company officers and firefighters indicated 

that there were many cases where firefighters that had just gone off duty were officially added to the 

company roster for work at the WTC.78 FDNY company officers typically limited the number of 

volunteer members to the maximum number of riding positions located on a fire apparatus.79

FDNY Safety Bulletin 67, Approved Riding Positions on Apparatus80, dated December, 1982 describes 

approved riding positions: 

• Bearing in mind that an enclosed, seated, belted position is the safest location while riding an 

apparatus, officers shall assign these positions first. The officer then assigns positions in a 

descending order of priority. Ex.: 1. Enclosed, seated, belted position; 2. Seated, belted 

position; 3. Standing – side positions/ with restraining devices; 4. without restraining devices. 

• The rear step of the apparatus is never to be used as a riding position. Its sole function is to 

load and unload hose. 

Safety Bulletin 67, Approved Riding Positions on Apparatus, 1982 is reproduced in Appendix F. 

There was one report that off-duty firefighters rode the rear step of a fire apparatus to get to the WTC.81 

It is not known if the company officer was aware that these individuals were riding on the apparatus. The 

 

72 FDNY Interview 1, fall 2003. 

73 FDNY Interview 31, winter 2004. 

74 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

75 FDNY Interview 37, winter 2004. 

76 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

77 FDNY Regulations, Chapter 11, Fire and Emergency Operations, DCN 3.01.00, January 1997. 78 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

79 FDNY Safety Bulletin 67, Approved Riding Positions on Apparatus, December 1982 (See Appendix F). 80 FDNY Safety Bulletin 67, Approved Riding Positions on Apparatus, December 1982. 81 FDNY Interview 12, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

56 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

practice of firefighters riding the rear step of an apparatus is unsafe and was discarded by FDNY in 1982 

as a result of firefighter injuries and deaths that were occurring across the country.82

After arrival at the scene of an emergency, firefighter accountability becomes a matter of the units 

reporting to a Command Post or Staging Area, maintaining unit cohesion and discipline, and keeping the 

Command Posts informed of unit locations and operations (Hall 2000).83 The first Command Post 

established at the WTC was set up at the Fire Command Desk inside the lobby of WTC 1.84 This was the 

primary Incident Command Post that was moved outside and managed by the Chief of Department.85, 86

Figure 5–3 shows locations for the FDNY Incident Command Post setup on West Street just outside of 

World Financial Center 2, the NYPD Mobilizations Points set up around the WTC site, the general 

locations of other Command Posts, and the Engine 10 / Ladder 10 firehouse location. Figures 5–4 and 

5–5 show locations of the buildings’ fire alarm panels, Fire Command Desks, and FDNY Lobby 

Command Post locations inside WTC 1 and 2.87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93 Also, it should be noted that the elevator 

operations data system and elevator communications phone was located at each of the buildings’ Fire 

Command Desks. 

When FDNY sets up a Command Post, it also sets up a Portable Command Post for the operation. The 

Portable Command Post is described in Appendix G. The Portable Command Post is also referred to by 

the firefighters as the Command Board. The Portable Command Post consists of an aluminum case 

measuring approximately 457 mm x 711 mm x 203 mm (18 in. x 28 in. x 8 in.). See the photograph of 

the Command Board that was set up inside WTC 1 in Figure 5–6. The Command Board case contains the 

following (Appendix G): 

• A vertical magnetic surface for recording box identification, time out, incident location and 

height, construction, dimensions if building is involved. 

• A supply of magnetic identifiers that provide color code identification for units: Engine, 

black; Ladder and Tower Ladder, red; Battalions, gold; special units, blue; and sectors, 

purple. Unit numbers were typically written on the identifiers by marking pens. 

• A 25 Watt, 6 channel radio with DC power supply and AC power pack and a magnetic base 

antenna with wiring and terminal blocks. 

• A folding aluminum stand with legs and nylon straps to support the Portable Command Post. 

 

82 FDNY Safety Bulletin 67, Approved Riding Positions on Apparatus, December 1982. 83 FDNY Interview 56, winter 2004. 

84 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

85 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

86 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

87 PA Interview 11, fall 2003. 

88 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

89 FDNY Interview 5, winter 2004. 

90 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

91 FDNY Interview 62, spring 2004. 

92 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004. 

93 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 57

Figure 5–3. Diagram showing emergency responder command post locations. 
Chapter 5 

58 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–4. Diagram of lobby command post location inside World Trade Center 1. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 59

Figure 5–5. Diagram of lobby command post location inside World Trade Center 2. 
Chapter 5 

60 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–6. Video image of the FDNY Fire Command Board located in the lobby 

of WTC 1. 

FDNY Training Bulletin, Tools 22, December 199194 says the following about the Portable Command 

Post: 

• The Portable Command Post (PCP) will be carried in the division vehicle. Deputy Chiefs 

shall utilize the PCP at fires, emergencies and other incidents where its deployment will assist 

the operation. 

• The Portable Command Post will assist the Incident Commander in efficiently executing the 

responsibility of incident management. 

The training bulletin highlights the following advantages of the Portable Command Post: 

• Establishes a Fire Department Command presence at the scene. 

• Serves as a physical focal point for incoming Fire Department Units as well as other agencies 

reporting to the operation. 

• Provides a convenient means of direct radio communication with the Borough 

Communications Office. 

• Facilitates the recording of the location and status of Fire Department units. 

 

94 FDNY Training Bulletin, Tools 22, December 1991 (See Appendix G). 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 61

• Facilitates the recording of the ranking official present from other agencies. 

• When manned by an aide, the Incident Commander will be freed from the distraction of units 

and agencies reporting in to the operations. 

• Satisfies federal regulation regarding the establishment of a Command Post. 

• Provides own light for viewing and recording information. 

• Improves safety by promoting accountability of personnel, efficient use of resources and 

tactical planning. 

• As a visual aid the PCP will assist Incident Commanders in assigning Chiefs areas of 

responsibility. 

The complete FDNY Training Bulletin, Tools 22, December 1991 on the Portable Command Post is 

reproduced in Appendix G. 

The Command Board is used by Command Post personnel for logging in and assigning units for 

operations at an incident.95 A FDNY interviewee indicated that on September 11, 2001, the Command 

Board approach to managing operations at the WTC became overwhelmed with the number of units and 

personnel reporting in for operations. In addition, the interviewee indicated that not all personnel that 

arrived at the WTC site were logged in on the Command Board.96 This is partially due to the size and 

complexity of operations at the WTC, but it also relates to personnel not always following department 

policies on reporting to the Command Post for assignment. 97, 98

Another problem related to accountability and tracking of personnel faced by the emergency responders 

as they arrived at the WTC site was that some emergency responders did not know which building was 

Tower 1 and which building was Tower 2.99, 100 The towers were not well marked.101 First-person 

interviews with firefighters coming in from other parts of the city showed that they were not familiar with 

the WTC site and did not know one tower from the other.102, 103 Some units assigned to WTC 2 by 

dispatchers or from staging areas arrived at the scene and had to take time to find out which tower was 

which. Some of these units were approaching WTC 2 when it collapsed and members of their company 

survived. 104 Other firefighters that were interviewed and were assigned to work in WTC 2 went through 

WTC 3, the Marriott Hotel, and ended up inside WTC 1. They attempted to get to WTC 2 by following 

 

95 FDNY Training Bulletin, Tools 22, December 1991. 96 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004. 

97 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004. 

98 FDNY Interview 63, spring 2004. 

99 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004. 

100 FDNY Channel 7 / PA WTC Channel 30 radio communications recording. 101 FDNY Interview 18, winter 2004. 102 FDNY Interview 60, winter 2004. 103 NYPD Interview 7, fall 2003. 104 FDNY CD 12 (Chief’s Report of Service at Fire) / CD 15 (Report of Company Operations). 
Chapter 5 

62 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

the Concourse level to the building. 105, 106 Fortunately, this delay in getting to WTC 2 played a part in 

saving the lives of these firefighters when WTC 2 collapsed. 

In general, FDNY units responding to the WTC followed good practices as related to reporting in and 

accountability. However, there were a few cases where individuals did not report in to the Command 

Post and became freelancers. Interviews with FDNY personnel showed that some fire department 

personnel came to WTC facilities without unit approval. In addition there were various emergency 

responders from NYPD and PAPD that entered the towers without reporting into the FDNY Command 

Posts. The following statements were taken from first-person interview notes: 

▪ One FDNY interviewee said that there were a lot of guys freelancing at 

the WTC. Many of them were FDNY guys that were off duty and 

wanted to help, and they were coming into the buildings.107

▪ Another FDNY interviewee reported that he and three or four other 

firefighters from his company attempted to get from Brooklyn to 

Manhattan by crossing the Brooklyn Bridge. Some of the firefighters 

were stopped by FDNY Chiefs at the bridge staging area. The group got 

back together and hid in the back of an ambulance that agreed to carry 

them into Manhattan and to the WTC site.108

The account below by the PAPD officer suggests either their unfamiliarity with the FDNY operating 

procedures for high-rise fires and the function of the FDNY Lobby Command Post and that the 

firefighters in the lobby were awaiting check-in and assignment. 

▪ One PAPD officer reported that his group went into the lobby of WTC 1 

and that there were a lot of fire department units in there just standing 

around. The interviewee said that they could hear people screaming and 

that there were a lot of casualties in the sky lobby of the building. The 

interviewee remembered thinking “What is everybody standing around 

for?” The interviewee gathered up his team and started up stairs without 

reporting in to the FDNY Command Post.109

There also was at least one case where an NYPD team entered WTC 1 without checking in with the 

FDNY Lobby Command Post. Again, this may be attributed to the lack of knowledge on the part of 

NYPD personnel concerning FDNY operations in high-rise buildings. At approximately 9:22 a.m. a 

NYPD Emergency Service Unit (ESU) team reported to the WTC 2, FDNY Lobby Command Post and 

received an assignment to meet with and assist a Battalion Chief who was located on the 43rd floor of the 

building in stairway B. Evidence of this assignment was found on the recording of the FDNY high-rise 

radio repeater channel/PA/WTC Radio Channel 30. The radio communication provides significant details 

on this Command Post assignment. Also, an interviewee from the OEM staff indicated that he saw an 

ESU team enter WTC 2 and ordered them to report to the FDNY Command Post. The interviewee 

 

105 NYPD Interview 22, spring 2004. 106 FDNY Interview 62, spring 2004. 107 FDNY Interview 58, winter 2004. 108 FDNY Interview 63, spring 2004. 109 PA Interview 8, fall 2003. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 63

indicated that the ESU team reluctantly complied with his order.110 Data analysis suggests that this may 

be the same team that received the assignment to assist the Battalion Chief. It is critically important that 

emergency responder departments that work together have a good understanding of each other’s 

operational practices as far as safety and personnel accountability is concerned. 

It is clear that the NYPD and PAPD units that entered the buildings without reporting to the FDNY 

Command Post felt that they were conducting operations within the bounds of their responsibility and 

authority.111 However, these police department units and other FDNY personnel who entered the 

buildings without being logged in with the Command Posts and receiving assignments created personnel 

accountability problems for FDNY.112 At times, command personnel at a fire department command post 

have to make immediate decisions that may relate to the life safety of all personnel at an incident. These 

decisions often have altered the degree and direction of fire growth, and in some cases, emergency 

responders have died because the Incident Commander was not aware that the individuals were in the 

path of the altered and dangerous conditions.113 In addition, fire can change in characteristics and in the 

direction of travel as a result of changes in building and/or weather conditions. Again, the Incident 

Command needs to know where all personnel are in order to carryout a successful and safer operation. 

The collapse of WTC 2 seriously complicated the task of accountability and personnel tracking. When 

WTC2 collapsed, each of the three FDNY Command Posts and all of their data were lost. Information for 

unit and personnel assignments that were being maintained on FDNY’s Fire Command Board 

disappeared into the rubble. There was no backup of these records at the site or at an offsite location.114 

This created a problem for FDNY when it came time to locate missing personnel.115

5.5.2 FDNY Recall Procedure 

The following was extracted from the FDNY recall procedure (FDNY Regulations, Chapter 18, Recall, 

January 1997) 116 that was in effect at the time of the WTC attack: 

The Recall Procedure: 

• In the event it becomes necessary to augment temporarily the numerical strength of 

manpower on duty within the Department during actual or potential emergency conditions, 

the signal 65-2 will be transmitted under jurisdiction and authorization of the Fire 

Commissioner. 

• Upon receipt of signal 65-2 transmitted to implement recall, chief and company officers shall 

follow instructions transmitted. Depending upon the area affected and the degree of 

 

110 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 111 NYPD Interviews 5 and 6, winter 2004. 112 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 113 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 114 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004 115 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004 116 FDNY Regulations, Chapter 18, Recall, January 1997 
Chapter 5 

64 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

necessity, the orders relative to scope of the recall will be announced over the Department 

radio, voice alarm, and by teleprinter messages. 

• Recall may be total (city-wide) or partial (confined to one or more boroughs). It may affect 

all units or selected units, such as Engine companies only. The time frame may run from 

continuous duty to specific tours or hours. 

Notification of Members: 

• In those instances requiring a citywide recall, it shall be the responsibility of each member to 

monitor the news media and report for duty as required. 

• In limited recall situations where media coverage may be limited officers on duty shall 

immediately notify affected off duty members as necessary. 

• Commanding officers shall, in order to insure prompt telephone notification of off duty 

members, maintain a current and accurate personnel record of emergency telephone numbers 

in the office record journal. 

The complete FDNY recall procedure (FDNY Regulations, Chapter 18, Recall, January 1997) is 

contained in Appendix H. 

5.5.3 EMS Accountability, Location, and Tracking 

The FDNY Chiefs who had responsibility for the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) response to the 

WTC developed a plan of action.117 They divided the area into quadrants, set up staging, triage, and 

treatment areas. Inside those areas other FDNY EMS officers were sectoring the workload as described 

below. The following are statements extracted from EMS first-person interviews regarding EMS plan of 

action: 

▪ I informed him that I was there as well and he had other representatives 

from the fire department. We started to set up our treatment and triage 

sectors as units were reporting in and officers were reporting in. Because 

of the large area involved, we sectored off different EMS areas in 

accordance with our incident command system where they functioned as 

teams so they could deal with patients as they come out of the complex. 

As I was doing that, a chief reported in and I asked him to become my 

operations officer so this way I could be involved and function as liaison 

with the incident commander. I recall speaking to a commissioner there 

because he had some questions as far as resources coming in and where 

they were coming from and how I was going to set up the EMS 

operation.118

 

117 FDNY Interview 64, spring 2004. 118 FDNY Interview 68, spring 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 65

▪ At this point we had quite a few FDNY EMS supervisors coming in. I 

happened to be the highest ranking officer in the area. There were no 

chiefs; it was me and some Lieutenants. As they came in, I started to 

assign them sectors to organize in the area; a transportation officer, a 

treatment officer, a triage officer among others. So we were using our 

triage tags and we're trying to separate the patients into different 

categories of priority and as ambulances were coming in, we'd load the 

most serious first to be taken away. We had little areas for people badly 

hurt people, right on the corner. We separated the area with tape to 

designate it as an area for patients and also to keep the flow of people 

from tracking through that area on their way out. So this corner was 

rapidly becoming overwhelmed with the amount of people coming out 

who were hurt. That was becoming almost 10 o clock. We had just 

really started getting a foothold on the patients; ambulances were coming 

in and going out. We were starting to get some organization of where 

the ambulance should park, then load up and leave. We were thinking 

about alternatives of patient transport because there were so many, 

maybe commandeering city busses. I asked the Lieutenant with the 

portable radios to request additional units as well as city busses to come 

and help us out.119 

Several obstacles with regard to accountability of EMS personnel added to the Chiefs’ difficulties. The 

first was the size of the event as it unfolded and the difficulty that EMS Chiefs had in determining who 

was at the scene.120 The second was the “self dispatch” and “freelancing” of some non-FDNY 

ambulances.121 The third was the inability of FDNY EMS supervisors to communicate with some of the 

non-FDNY ambulances.122 The following are statements taken from first-person interviews: 

▪ We turned and looked and there were two ambulances coming with 

stretchers from opposite directions. If they were ours I would have 

recognized them. I thought who is controlling these guys; we needed to 

get this under control.123

▪ I think the biggest problem at the World Trade Center was lack of 

control of non fire department personnel. City and private, we are 

supposed to be in control of them, even though they are supposed to 

listen to us, but it does not happen. It is hit or miss if a voluntary 

ambulance will follow your command. It is a safety issue for those units, 

on September 11, 2001, there were units that responded there that wanted 

to run in, I saw my guys stop them and tell them no, there were words 

exchanged, there was no time to argue the point.124

 

119 FDNY Interview 49, winter 2004. 120 FDNY Interview 50, winter 2004. 121 FDNY Interview 51, winter 2004. 122 FDNY Interview 64, spring 2004. 123 FDNY Interview 40, winter 2004. 124 FDNY interview 51, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

66 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

▪ A few blocks up, it had gotten safer and some ambulances were coming 

in and I was trying to flag them down telling them not to go further 

because it was too dangerous. Some of them stopped, some of them 

didn't.124

▪ The private ambulance teams that responded had no equipment and no 

protective clothing at all. They also do not have the same radios so it 

was not possible to communicate with them via radio. Those who were 

in the EMS and mutual aid system did have radios that were operating.125

5.5.4 EMS Patient Tracking 

There are many reasons to track patients that are triaged, treated, and transported from an emergency. 

One important reason is to ensure that no single medical facility is overwhelmed by an unexpected influx 

of patients.126 At the scene of a mass casualty incident, an emergency medical services officer is usually 

designated the duty of seeing to it that no one hospital is inundated with patients beyond its capabilities. 

This emergency medical services officer often is called the “transport officer” within the incident 

command system. The “transport officer” not only helps to prevent overwhelming of each hospital but 

also ensures that each injured patient goes to a medical facility best able to treat the medical condition.127 

The objective is not having an ambulance drop a patient off at a hospital, but at a hospital that has the best 

capabilities to take care of that person. The following description of one of the triage areas was extracted 

from a first-person interview. 

▪ At the triage area we basically triage and rapid transport with strict Mass 

Casualty Incident Protocol. The first arriving medical authority on the 

scene, the first EMT or Paramedic becomes the triage officer, and they 

are also in charge until an officer gets to the scene. Usually we try and 

turn it over to a paramedic officer. Then you have someone responsible 

to make sure the patients are triaged, and the treatment officer who stays 

in the treatment area determines what kind of treatment we give them. 

Then you would have the staging officer who would be responsible for 

ambulances, there is egress for them, there is ingress for them. The 

transport officer would work right were the patients are being loaded 

from the treatment area and direct what hospital the patients should be 

transported to. Normally patients are transported based on injury, closest 

trauma center, nearest 9-1-1 center, nearest burn center, etc. In times like 

this there are so many patients a lot of times you may overwhelm one 

hospital. What you need to do, for instance Saint Vincent's which is a 

trauma center, if there are too many patients there it might be worth 

sending patients somewhere else further away and they can get treated 

more quickly. I felt that when I got there some patients had been 

transported, that actually the patients were transported in a system. I was 

surprised that we were already sending people out to Brooklyn and stuff 

 

125 FDNY Interview 64, spring 2004. 126 FDNY Interview 51, winter 2004. 127 FDNY Interview 51, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 67

like that, which was really a good idea. At least we were thinking 

globally at that point.128

Within the individual triage and treatment areas that were set up it appears that efforts were made to keep 

track of patients. This was done with pencil and paper.129 All the data on patients was lost when the 

buildings collapsed.130 The loss of WTC 7, which housed the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 

hampered the ability to track patients within the system.131 One of the EMS Chiefs assigned to go to 

WTC 7 was inside the OEM when it was ordered evacuated, describes what the loss of OEM meant to 

them, not only for the ability to track patients but other aspects of command and control.132 The 

following is taken from a first-person interview: 

▪ My concern was if there were things needed by the Fire Department then 

I could get them from OEM. We had a lot of different tools available to 

us. We had 4 or 5 positions in the OEM Operations Center that were 

assigned to the Fire Department. We had the terminals where we could 

monitor the dispatch system, and patient tracking information. We had 

the EMS radio frequencies and their transmitting capabilities. We had a 

monitoring terminal for the fire dispatch system. We had all the fire 

radios as well. We had a lot of technology there to assist us, mapping 

capabilities and mapping files to show where our units are. We were at a 

disadvantage because we didn't have those tools. I would have had a 

better idea of what was going on.133 

Another factor that had an effect on the FDNY’s ability to track patients was the self-dispatch of some 

non 9-1-1 ambulances. The following was extracted from a first-person interview: 

▪ Because of the self-dispatch of non 9-1-1 resources there were patients 

being removed from the location by those units, and the EMS officer did 

not know it. Normally, what we try to do with patient tracking is to get 

the information before the patient leaves the scene, but because of the 

way this operation developed, we had to put systems in place to retrieve 

the information from the hospitals.134

There also were people who transported themselves to the hospital.135 Due to the size of the disaster and 

number of patients generated, medical aid was not confined only to one jurisdiction. This situation was 

much like the Sarin gas attack that occurred in Tokyo, Japan where injured people obtained medical aid 

from numerous medical facilities in various jurisdictions (Strasser 1995). The following was taken from 

an emergency responder first-person interview: 

 

128 FDNY Interview 51, winter 2004. 129 FDNY Interview 51, winter 2004. 130 FDNY Interview 51, winter 2004. 131 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 132 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 133 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 134 FDNY Interview 50, winter 2004. 135 FDNY Interview 50, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

68 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

▪ Not all patients at the hospitals arrived by ambulance. Nor was this 

situation isolated to just New York City. Because of self-evacuation to 

Jersey and other Boroughs within the city people were just jumping on 

transit buses. We found out later that buses were just going to hospitals 

and dropping off patients. This may have caused some hospitals to have 

a lot more minor injuries to take care of at one time.136 

5.5.5 NYPD Accountability, Location, and Tracking 

Information in this section was drawn from first-person interviews with NYPD Special Operations 

Division, Emergency Service Unit personnel, NYPD Special Operations Division (SOD) Division radio 

communications and department documents. 

The primary mobilization point for the NYPD Special Operations Division that sent Emergency Service 

Unit (ESU) rescue teams into the WTC was located at the corner of Church and Vesey Streets.137 The 

post was managed by a SOD detective that had just gone off of duty and was still at his office when the 

attack occurred.138 He traveled to the WTC with the on duty ESU team, and since he was not in full 

uniform, it was decided that he would manage the mobilization point for the operations in the towers. As 

the post was set up, the detective obtained information on the attack over the radio, began assembling 

ESU teams and then sent them into WTC 1 and WTC 2.139 Only six ESU teams were dispatched from the 

mobilization point to the towers. Each team consisted of about five ESU personnel. Records for each 

team were written onto paper attached to a clipboard.140

A second SOD mobilization point was established at the corner of West and Vesey Streets.141 This post 

operated in the same fashion as the first. However, this post was associated more with providing security 

for the site.142 ESU teams that came to the WTC typically came to the mobilization points as teams with 

all members present. Since the NYPD efforts at the WTC were primarily focused on the aviation units 

and the ESU teams, there was not a large influx of people coming to the command post as was 

experienced by FDNY. Therefore, the tasks associated with personnel accountability, location, and 

tracking were not as complex as those experienced by FDNY. The mobilization point officer was able to 

maintain reasonable radio communications with all units assigned to duty at the site, and tracking 

problems were minimal until the collapse of WTC 2.143 With the collapse of WTC 2, all written records 

were lost as the high winds and debris blew through the mobilization points.144 Since NYPD had only a 

limited number of personnel actually operating at the site, managers of the mobilization points were able 

to easily reconstruct the lost data on their personnel. 

 

136 FDNY Interview 50, winter 2004. 137 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 138 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 139 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 140 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 141 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 142 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 143 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 144 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

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5.5.6 PAPD Accountability, Location, and Tracking 

Information in this section was drawn from first-person interviews with Port Authority Police Department 

(PAPD) personnel, radio communications recorded at the PAPD Police Desk, and Port Authority 

documents. 

Immediately after PAPD officers reported the impact of the first aircraft into WTC 1, the PAPD police 

desk began a roll call to determine condition of their police officers and where they were located.145 

PAPD had the primary law enforcement responsibility at the WTC site and officers were working their 

assignments at the WTC when the attack occurred.146 In addition, several PAPD teams were dispatched 

from various locations from around the city and from Jersey City to the site.147 The PAPD officers who 

arrived at the WTC before the collapse of WTC 2 typically reported to PAPD personnel that were located 

at the WTC 1 lobby Fire Command Desk.148 A PAPD Inspector was working at the command desk and 

was working with FDNY at their Command Post. This officer gave direction to incoming PAPD 

personnel.149 The WTC Police Desk was located inside of WTC 5 and had a view of the Plaza area. 

PAPD operations for the WTC site were normally conducted from this location.150 In addition, the 

WTC radio system was maintained at WTC 5 with antennas located on top of the building.151 With the 

collapse of WTC 2, the PAPD Police Desk and Command Center was evacuated, and many of the 

emergency response records were lost. Police Desk communications tape recordings were recovered 

some days later.152

5.5.7 General Comments Concerning Accountability, Location, and Tracking 

All of the emergency responder organizations that responded to the WTC on September 11, 2001, had 

accountability, location, and tracking plans in place, and they generally worked well during the first 30 

minutes of operations at the WTC. However, the FDNY system became overwhelmed with the large 

number of units and personnel arriving at the WTC. The PAPD system became stressed with the collapse 

of WTC 2 and the loss of the WTC 5 Police Desk operations. 

The location and tracking of personnel is an issue that has been studied by the emergency responder 

community for many years. Once responders report to a Command Post at the scene of an emergency, 

receive their assignments, and depart to accomplish their tasks, there is no positive means to locate and 

track the activities of the units or individuals. On September 11, 2001, the only means for locating and 

tracking units and personnel was through radio communications, and during operations there were so 

many people using the system for ongoing operations that the FDNY radio system and procedures were 

inadequate for locating and tracking personnel.153 In addition, all three FDNY Command Posts and their 

 

145 PAPD Police Desk communications, Channel W, 2001. 146 PA Interview 1, fall 2003. 147 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 148 PA Interview 14, summer 2004. 149 PA Interview 14, summer 2004. 150 PA Interview 15, summer 2004. 151 PA Interview 2, fall 2003. 152 PA Interview 3, fall 2003. 153 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004. 
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70 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Command Boards and the NYPD mobilization points with their records were destroyed, and all 

operations records were lost for the hundreds of emergency responders who were operating at the site, 

and there was no backup for these lost records. 

Resources Available for Initial Situation Assessment and Incident Management, and 

Practices for Determining the Possibility of Structural Collapse 

Information for initial situational assessment and “size-up” of an event begins with the fire department 

when the incident report is filed through the 9-1-1 emergency dispatch center or from an alarm received 

from a pull box at the scene (NFPA 1997) (Bush 1979). Information gained from these sources is the 

basis for information provided to the fire department responders when they are dispatched to an incident. 

On September 11, 2001, a FDNY Battalion Chief observed the first aircraft crash into WTC 1, and he 

immediately got on the radio and reported the aircraft crash to the FDNY dispatcher. In addition, he 

reported to the dispatcher that he and his companies were responding to the WTC.154 The 9-1-1 

emergency dispatch center began receiving telephone calls from citizens and Port Authority personnel 

concerning the attack and gathered additional information (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). As fire department 

companies received dispatch orders for the WTC, the FDNY dispatch center sent out a Critical 

Information Dispatch System (CIDS) message for the site.155 This provided basic information concerning 

known hazards at the WTC site and was based on information from facility inspections that were done 

earlier. 

The following information is based on first-person interviews with FDNY, Port Authority, and 

WTC personnel: 

When the first FDNY units arrived at the WTC, the Battalion Chief went inside the building to the 

WTC 1 Fire Command Desk that was located inside the lobby. Information concerning building 

conditions related to fire alarm status and the activation of sprinkler systems were displayed on the wall 

panels behind the Fire Command Desk and on the Command Desk’s computer terminal.156 The former 

Deputy Fire Safety Director, who operated the Fire Command Desk, reported the building status as he 

understood it to the Battalion Chief.157 The Battalion Chief inquired about elevator status and was told by 

a Port Authority employee that it appeared that no elevators were operating in the building. After a few 

minutes, other WTC officials arrived at the Fire Command Desk. The Battalion Chief then met with the 

WTC personnel as needed, the former Port Authority Fire Safety Director, and Port Authority Vertical 

Transportation personnel. The Vertical Transportation personnel worked with the elevator systems and 

reported to FDNY the locations of elevators where occupants were trapped.158

The following statement about initial “size-up” and building conditions was extracted from an FDNY 

first-person interview. 

 

154 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 155 FDNY Communications Manual, DCN: 3.01.01, January 1, 1997. 156 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004 157 Other Interview 3, summer 2004 158 PA Interview 5, fall 2003 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

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▪ As the interviewee entered the door from West Street, he saw two very 

badly burned people lying on the floor. The lobby had been badly 

damaged. Some of the windows had been broken out, glass was on the 

floor, and marble from the walls had been broken and fell to the floor. 

The interviewee initially met with the former WTC 1 Deputy Fire Safety 

Director and received a report that fires were burning above the 

78th floor. They began to set up the Command Post, and he again met 

with the former Deputy Fire Safety Director and asked about elevator 

status. He was told that no elevators were operating in the building.159

A senior-level Chief arrived, and the interviewee reported his findings. They discussed the rescue plans. 

The plan was to rescue people in the building who needed help, get people out of the building, and cut a 

way through the damaged floors above to create a rescue path for those trapped above the impact zone 

and fires in the upper part of the building.160 Firefighters were sent upstairs in the building, accompanied 

by Chief Officers. The orders given were to go no higher than the 70th floor.161 This would leave eight 

floors above them as a buffer. Initially, firefighters were ordered to take hose up with them for cutting 

through the fires on the floors to rescue the people above. Additionally, firefighters were told to go up 

and report their observations back to him since he didn’t really know what the conditions were at the 

aircraft impact area.162

As described above, information was available during initial “size-up” that defined the building 

conditions, but details needed for refining FDNY operations were limited. As time passed, additional 

information came into the Command Post from radio communications, the Port Authority, and FDNY 

personnel.163 However, some information did not get transferred to the FDNY Command Post inside 

WTC 1. The following comments from a 9/11 Commission hearing address this issue: 

 Chief Officer’s Comment: 

“One of the most critical things in a major operation like this is to have 

information. We didn’t have a lot of information coming in. We didn’t 

receive any reports of what was seen from the helicopters. It was 

impossible to know how much damage was done on the upper floors, 

whether the stairwells were intact or not. A matter of fact, what you saw 

on TV we didn’t have that information.” (9/11 Commission 2004) 

Another Chief Officer’s Comment: 

“People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what was 

happening a hundred floors above us than we did in the lobby. Certainly 

without any information, without critical information coming in, it’s very 

difficult to make informed and critical decisions without that 

information. And it didn’t exist that day. Our communication systems 

 

159 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004 160 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004 161 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004 162 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004 163 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 
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72 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

were down. Our building suppression systems were down, the elevators, 

we had no video capability throughout the entire operation. (9/11 

Commission 2004) 

Other information that was not available to the FDNY command personnel was information on building 

conditions near the aircraft impact zones. One example is information transmitted to a family member 

over the telephone describing building conditions inside WTC 1. At approximately 8:58 a.m., a telephone 

call to a relative noted that the 92nd floor (just below the aircraft impact point) was flooding with water 

(NIST NCSTAR 1-7). This is one of the only piece of data that potentially supports the conclusion by 

FDNY that the water supply at the impact zone had been compromised, and this information was not 

available for FDNY command personnel. 

As far as assessments related to the structural stability of the building were concerned, the WTC 1 

Command Post knew that significant damage had been done to the building. 164 They knew that large 

fires were burning above them. Their firefighting experience led them to believe that the buildings would 

remain in place throughout their operations, but they did expect that there would be some localized 

collapse conditions in the impact zone and the fire zones. No one interviewed indicated that they thought 

that the buildings would completely collapse. This perception is reflected in the following first-person 

interview statement: 

▪ The issue of total structural collapse was not taken into consideration in 

the plan. Today it is. There was no information on the vulnerability of 

the buildings to total collapse. That type of information is needed on all 

operations today. There should be a guide for collapse of different types 

of structures, an assessment that is accessible but is secure. The question 

is, if you lose so many floors what is the condition of the building? The 

buildings should be rated for structural capability. NIST could help with 

this.165

5.6 FIGHTING LARGE FIRES ON THE UPPER FLOORS OF TALL BUILDINGS 

Fighting fires in tall buildings is not the same as fighting fires in buildings that are less than 30 m (100 ft) 

high. The height of a building has a direct impact on the ability of fire departments to carry out 

successful operations, and each high-rise building has design factors that may alter the way firefighting 

operations are carried out. O’Hagan (O’Hagan 1977) discusses this in his book. 

“a high-rise building may be defined as one that lacks viable exterior 

access to the upper floors for firefighting, and in which firefighters must 

place almost complete reliance on the building’s systems and 

components for fire suppression. This definition takes in all buildings in 

excess of 100 feet in height which are beyond the reach of the standard 

Aerial Ladder. 

 

164FDNY Interviews 2, 7, and 20, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 165 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 73

Since reliance must be placed on the building’s integrity, this criterion 

suggests the mandatory use of fire-resistive construction. However, in 

New York and many other cities, fire-resistive construction is required in 

all buildings exceeding 75 feet in height. This difference does provide 

an additional margin of safety, but it also serves to illustrate the rather 

loose definition of a high-rise building. From a fire fighting viewpoint, 

the distinguishing characteristic of a high-rise is its excess height which 

deprives a fire strategist of exterior attack and at the same time restrains 

his strategy to interior attacks from locations that are dictated by the 

building design.”

There are issues specific to fighting fires on the upper floors of high-rise buildings that become more 

challenging as building height increases. Generally, a firefighter can climb a stairway at a rate of about 

one floor per minute.166 Climbing the stairs causes a significant physiological impact on firefighters 

wearing protective clothing and equipment, and carrying equipment needed for fighting fires and carrying 

out rescue operations. Fatigue becomes a factor after approximately 12 floors of climbing, and fatigue 

caused by climbing diminishes the functional capabilities of the emergency responder to carry out 

operations once they reach the fire floor.167 Fire burning rates for different fuel loads and ventilation 

vary. A fuel load of about 48.8 kg/m2

 (10 lb/ft2) with normal interior finishes, furnishings, and contents 

will take approximately one hour to burn out, depending on ventilation (Gross 1977). Without the use of 

elevators to access the floors just below the fire floor, it will take fully equipped firefighters carrying 

equipment approximately 60 minutes to get up to a fire on the 60th floor. In addition, it will take time to 

prepare the water supply - if there is one - and stretch hoselines for firefighting. Over this time period, the 

floor may have completely burned out, and the fire may have spread to other floors and other parts of the 

building.168

Even though the WTC towers contained large fires, very little firefighting was conducted during 

operations that morning. Analysis of electronic and interview data identified three cases where 

firefighting was carried out inside the WTC buildings before the collapse of WTC 2. They are as follows: 

• Firefighters used handheld fire extinguishers to extinguish flames on people located in the 

lobby of WTC 1.169

• A Port Authority employee was using a fire hose to suppress a fire along a stairway wall 

inside one of the staircases in one of the WTC towers. (No tower or floor identification was 

available.) It was reported that the Port Authority employee indicated that he was going to 

keep trying to suppress the fire until the firefighters got there. Also, the Port Authority 

employee is credited with holding the flames in check to allow many people to get by on the 

stairway. It was stated that no one would have gotten out from this level if this man was not 

trying to control the fire and keep the staircase clear for evacuation (Atwell 2002). 

 

166 FDNY Interview 9, winter 2004. 167 FDNY Interviews 1, 7, and 11, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 168 FDNY Interview 11, winter 2004. 169 FDNY Interview 13, winter 2004. 
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74 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• At approximately 9:55 a.m. firefighters were attempting to stretch building hose lines in the 

“B” stairway on about the 78th floor of WTC 2 in order to extinguish two fires. The collapse 

of WTC 2 occurred at approximately 9:59 a.m.170

The challenge of firefighting at the WTC on September 11, 2001, was greater than any that had been 

experienced before.171 The height and size of the fires in the buildings produced varying strategies related 

to how operations should be conducted. These strategies varied across a range based on the firefighter’s 

years of experience, knowledge, and the quality of information they received. For complex operations to 

function smoothly, it is important that personnel working the task have an understanding of the mission 

and an understanding of the strategy applied for accomplishing the task. 

5.6.1 Strategies for High-Rise Operations on September 11, 2001 

According to the FDNY first-person interviews, there appear to be three approaches for the FDNY 

response to the World Trade Center. These different approaches are associated with the level of 

command responsibility for the different individuals at the WTC and are identified as follows: 1. Outside 

Command Post and Inside Command Communicating with the Outside Command Post, 2. Inside 

Command Post for Building Operations, and 3. Company Level Command. 

Outside Command Post and Inside Command Communicating with the Outside 

Command Post 

The approach to these operations by many of the Chief Officers appeared to be based on knowledge from 

the perspective of outside views and additional information that was being fed back from inside the 

buildings. Some Chief Officers in this category were totally aware of the nature of the multi-floor fires 

that were burning on the upper floors of the building. An understanding of the nature of multi-floor fires, 

the height of the fires in the building, the lack of adequate equipment and water in the building, and their 

experience over the years has shown that the extinguishment of high rise fires greater than 15,000 feet 

square on a single upper level floor is almost impossible (O’Hagan 1977). A Chief Officer referenced a 

1977 publication on high rise firefighting by John T. O’Hagan, a former New York City Fire Chief and 

Fire Commissioner (O’Hagan 1977).172 O’Hagan uses the World Trade Center fire of February 13, 1975, 

as an example in his book. This fire was located on the 11th floor of WTC 1 and consumed 

approximately one quarter of the floor. O’Hagan’s analysis of this fire indicated that “If the east half of 

the building had been involved, it is unlikely that a direct attack would have been successful. In that case, 

we may have had to choose a defensive strategy.” In this case, O’Hagan is referring to a fire that covered 

only one quarter of the 11th floor, a floor that is much more accessible than anything above the 77th floor 

where the aircraft struck the WTC buildings. Also, O’Hagan’s reference to the “east half of the building” 

only refers to the east half of the 11th floor. This knowledge led some officers in this category to believe 

that the people above the impact zone and fires were not likely to survive, and that it would not be 

possible to rescue them before the fire gases and thermal conditions on the upper floors became 

 

170 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 171 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 172 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 75

untenable.173 In addition, the Chief Officers in this category, taking note of the large fires on these 

multiple floors and recognizing the impact of the structural damage, expected that there would be some 

localized structural collapses inside the building.174 Communications between the Chief Officers at the 

Outside Command Post and a primary Chief Officer inside WTC 1 indicated that they recognized the 

possibility that a large portion of the top of the tower might collapse, breakaway, and fall into the streets 

below.175 The following statements were extracted from FDNY Chief Officer interviews: 

▪ Different Chief Officers would come into the building (WTC 1) from 

the Command Post outside mostly to discuss the possibility of 

collapse. There were discussions related to the collapse of not only 

portions of the buildings but also about the collapse of complete 

floors in the buildings. A Safety Chief came in one time and 

discussed the possibility of collapse. The feeling at the time was that 

there would be some type of collapse. There may be a collapse of 

the upper floors or an upper section of the building. No one 

envisioned the magnitude or the type of collapse that occurred and 

particularly at the early time that it occurred.176

▪ There were reports coming into the building (WTC 1) from outside 

that they all thought that there may be some form of collapse, local 

on a floor or a portion of the building falling into the street. There 

was no discussion of a total collapse of the WTC buildings.177

The experience and training of these officers, relative to past large high rise fires within the city or 

elsewhere in the world, did not lead the officers to expect a total collapse of either structure. Based on the 

above understanding, the Chief Officers in this category saw the operations at the World Trade Center 

during the first hours as strictly an attempt to evacuate occupants from below the fire floors, rescue 

trapped occupants from below the fire floors, and provide medical assistance to the injured.178 This 

strategy is supported by the following statement drawn from the FDNY first-person interviews: 

▪ The Chief at the Incident Command Post said that they were not 

going to be able to put the fire out and that they were just going to be 

saving people.179

Command Officers for Inside Operations 

Generally, FDNY Command Officers who were planning for operations inside the towers saw the 

unfolding building and operating conditions from the perspective that the fires on the upper floors were 

too large to extinguish. For some of these officers, the goal was to get enough equipment and personnel 

up stairs to use hose lines to cut safe zones through the multi-floor fires to get to the upper floors for 

 

173 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 174 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 175 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 176 FDNY interview 20, winter 2004. 177 FDNY Interview 2, winter 2003. 178 FDNY Interviews 2, 7, and 20, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 179 FDNY interview 45, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

76 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

rescuing the hundreds of people trapped above the impact zone and fires.180 These officers also knew that 

it was unlikely that they would be able to control the multi-floor fires over the short term.181 However, 

they felt that they could cut a safe path through to make the rescues.182 These officers also expected that 

there would be localized collapse conditions on the damaged fire floors. The officers did not expect that 

there would be any massive collapse conditions or complete building collapse.183

Company Level Command 

Although FDNY Company Officers were given information defining their mission at the WTC, several of 

them saw the event as a very large and dangerous yet still conventional high rise fire.184 Their approach 

to the fire conditions inside the building was to get up to the fire as soon as possible, put the fire out, and 

get ready for their next assignment.185, 186, 187 This approach was based on their normal company 

operations, and was generally compatible with the expected mission.188 These officers believed that there 

would be some localized collapse conditions at the impact zone and at the fire floors. They did not expect 

a massive collapse of the structures.189

These three operations strategies highlight differences that may be attributed to years of experience, level 

of training, and institutional focus of the various command levels. As the senior command level 

operational strategies were communicated to the lower levels, the concepts appeared to take hold at a 

slower pace at the next level down. Some firefighters at the Company level were disturbed by the 

operations orders that signaled a change toward assisting with the evacuation. They wanted to go up and 

put the fires out.190 It is possible that the orders to assist with the evacuation saved the lives of many 

more firefighters. This was because the orders may have resulted in fewer firefighters being assigned to 

firefighting preparations on the upper floors. 

5.6.2 Fighting Fires on the Upper Floors of the WTC 

On the morning of September 11, 2001, FDNY was faced with the possibility of having to extinguish 

multi-floor fires in both towers of the WTC. In high-rise buildings, fire departments must rely on the 

building design, fire suppression systems, ventilation control systems, fire pumps, and standpipe systems 

to assist them with controlling and extinguishing fires. Fire pumps and standpipe systems must be able to 

provide enough water flow to extinguish any fires beyond the reach of apparatus operating from ground 

 

180 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 181 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003 and FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 182 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 183 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 184 FDNY Interviews 16, 18, and 27, winter 2004. 185 FDNY Interview 41, winter 2004. 186 FDNY Interview 35, winter 2004. 187 FDNY Interview 9, winter 2004. 188 FDNY Interviews 16, 18, and 27, winter 2004. 189 FDNY Interviews 27 and 66, winter and spring 2004. 190 FDNY Interviews 31, 55, and 57, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 77

level. On September 11, 2001, the initial “size-up” indicated that the buildings’ sprinkler systems were 

not working or controlling the fires and that the standpipe systems were inoperable at the impact zones.191

The following information concerning firefighting water supply systems at the WTC are based on a firstperson interview:192

It was understood that the WTC fire pump system was functional, at least until the collapse of WTC 2. 

The damage to the standpipe systems in each building meant that significant work would be needed to 

reestablish a functional water supply that could have been used for firefighting. In addition, since both 

towers shared the same reserve water tank system and both towers sustained damage to their standpipe 

systems, a person who worked at the WTC would have to go to and manually close an isolation valve 

located between the buildings in order to get the fire pump system prepared for operation. Also, several 

WTC employees would have to go with FDNY up into the building to assist with sealing the broken 

standpipe system and to operate the various fire pumps, hand valves, gravity water tanks, and booster 

pumps needed for firefighting operations on the upper floors. At the point in time when WTC 2 

collapsed, WTC personnel had not accomplished tasks required for operating the building’s fire pump 

systems, and WTC personnel had not given orders for starting the building’s fire pump system. 

The discussion below provides some insight into firefighting operations that may have been carried out if 

the WTC towers had not collapsed. 

In Section 5.2 of this report, it was estimated that it would take a water flow rate of approximately 

4,700 l/min (1,250 gal/min) to extinguish one-half of a floor that would be burning inside one of the 

WTC towers. This amounted to approximately five 63.5 mm (2.5 in) diameter hoselines using nozzles 

with a 28.5 mm (1.125 in) tip diameter. For a full size floor on fire in one of the WTC towers, it would 

take approximately twice this flow rate, 9,400 l/min (2,500 gal/min), with a total of approximately 

10 hoselines to extinguish the fire. This type of operation would likely involve a minimum of 15 to 

20 Engine companies that would typically be able to work for periods of between 15 to 20 minutes before 

they would have to be relieved. This estimate for the extinguishment of a full floor fire at the WTC is 

based on operations under ideal conditions where the building’s fire pumps would be supplying adequate 

water supplies for firefighting. If a building’s fire pumps are not functioning, the fire department must 

rely upon its own resources. Special high-rise pumper apparatus would have to be coupled with the 

building’s standpipe system to provide water supply for the upper floors. 

5.6.3 Elevator Access and Evacuation 

Elevators often are an integral part of high-rise building firefighting. They are relied upon by fire 

departments for transporting personnel and equipment up inside tall buildings. Over the years, elevator 

companies have improved the technology of high-rise building lift systems, but many fire departments 

still do not trust elevators to carry out critical tasks in high-rise buildings when human safety is the 

highest priority (Klaene 2001). Also, building code developers have been attempting to address the 

difficult issues of making elevator usage safe for emergency responders during firefighting operations 

 

191 FDNY Interviews 2, 7, and 20, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 192 Other Interview 7, fall 2004. 
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78 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

through the consensus process (Winslow 2003). Many elevator components are susceptible to damage 

from fires, smoke, water, and earthquakes (NFPA 2003). Emergency responders will not use systems 

with limited safety margins when lives are at stake (Klaene 2001). FDNY recognized these issues and 

discussed them in their training bulletin, FDNY DCN: 3.02.17 Training Bulletin Emergencies 1, entitled, 

Elevator Operations, dated March 15, 1997193. In addition, the following general procedures taken from 

the bulletin describe FDNY procedures for elevator operations during fires: 

General Procedures for Elevator Operations during Fire Operations 

• Account for all elevators serving the fire floor, checking them for victims. 

• When it is confirmed that the fire is on the 7th floor or below units should avoid the use of 

elevators. It is safer to utilize the stairway to reach the fire floor. 

• Do not use an elevator in a bank which services the fire floor if a lower bank of elevators 

reaches within five floors of the fire floor. 

• When it is necessary to use an elevator in a bank which serves the fire floor: 

If Firemen Service is available, use a car with the Firemen Service feature. (Note: This 

feature is required in many elevators which enables the fire department personnel to gain 

exclusive control of the elevators.) 

Select a floor at least two floors below the fire floor or two floors below the lower level of an 

access stair in the fire area, whichever is lowest. 

• A service elevator shall not be used until it is declared safe for use by the officer in command 

of the fire. Be aware that in many high rise office buildings the service elevators have been 

converted for Firemen Service. Use of such an elevator must be avoided until declared safe 

by the officer in command. 

• There must be a member equipped with a handie-talkie in each car whenever the elevator is 

in use. 

• Not more than six members are to be permitted in any elevator car. This precaution is 

required to prevent overloading. 

• Forcible entry tools must be carried aboard each elevator car. 

• Elevator should be stopped every five floors (precautionary stops) to confirm that the elevator 

will respond to the selected floor. At each stop a new selection must be made. 

The complete FDNY DCN: 3.02.17 Training Bulletin Emergencies 1, entitled, Elevator Operations, dated 

March 15, 1997, is reproduced in Appendix D. 

 

193 FDNY DCN: 3.02.17 Training Bulletin Emergencies 1, entitled, Elevator Operations, dated March 15, 1997. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 79

The following is drawn from Port Authority and FDNY first-person interviews, and FDNY high-rise 

radio repeater communications: 

There were 99 elevators inside each of the WTC towers for a total of 198 elevators.194 Port Authority 

vertical transportation personnel began an evaluation of elevator operations immediately after the aircraft 

hit the towers. This was done by checking the elevator operations panels at the Fire Command Desk and 

calling the elevators using the elevator intercom phones.195 Their initial analysis indicated that no 

elevators were operating in either building, and this was reported to the FDNY Chiefs running the 

building Operations Posts in the lobbies.196 197 Therefore, the fire department did not direct any personnel 

to use any elevators for operations inside of WTC 1. Some FDNY personnel went to the elevator banks 

in the building and personally checked the elevators.198 Out of the 99 elevators that were located inside 

each of the two buildings, FDNY personnel found that only one elevator in WTC 1 and one elevator in 

WTC 2 appeared to be working.199 200 The Port Authority vertical transportation personnel and FDNY 

Command Post staff were unaware of the elevator that was operating inside of WTC 1.201 This elevator 

was staffed by a WTC building Elevator Starter. The Elevator Starter took a small number of FDNY 

personnel up to the 16th floor using this elevator.202 It does not appear that information about this 

operating elevator was ever reported to the FDNY Operations Post or the PA vertical transportation 

personnel that were operating in the lobby. Other emergency responders who saw that the elevator was 

operating did not trust it and chose to climb the stairs. The following is a statement made during a firstperson interview by a PAPD Officer concerning the use of elevators inside of WTC 1: 

▪ We were in a situation that was so desperate that I was not comfortable 

taking the elevator from the 1st to the 44th floor. There is no way I 

would use it, I know the dangers of a dead elevator.203

Under normal circumstances, the 50 Car elevator would be used by FDNY for access to the upper floors 

inside WTC 1.204 The 50 Car elevator had access to all floors in WTC 1 and was a large capacity utility 

elevator.205 During an interview, a contract employee at the WTC described what happened with the 

50 Car elevator and why it was not available for use by the fire department. The following information is 

drawn from the first-person interview: 

▪ The employee was working on the 7th floor of WTC 1 when the aircraft 

hit the building. The building shook and continued to shake. The 

interviewee said that the 50 Car elevator shaft was located just beyond 

 

194 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 195 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 196 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 197 PA Interview 13, fall 2003. 198 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 199 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 200 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 201 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 202 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 203 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 204 FDNY Interview 42, winter 2004 and Other Interview 3, spring 2004. 205 PA Interview 5, fall 2004. 
Chapter 5 

80 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

the room’s wall where he was working. He heard the elevator falling and 

fly past his location. He heard people inside the elevator when it went 

past him. Then he heard the elevator crash to the bottom of the shaft, 

and he heard the elevator cables falling down the shaft after the 50 Car 

fell. A second explosion followed, and something came through the wall 

of the room. A fireball came into the room from the elevator shaft. The 

building had moved, and the room’s door became jammed. Fire gasses 

that came into the room took his breath away, and when the interviewee 

finally got out of the room he collapsed on the corridor floor. Building 

occupants helped him up and helped to carry him out of the building. 

Two of the interviewee’s associates were injured by flying concrete 

block on the B2 and/or B4 levels when the 50 Car elevator crashed to the 

bottom of WTC 1.206

In addition to the loss of lives and injuries caused when the 50 Car elevator fell, the loss of this elevator 

seriously hindered FDNY operations inside WTC 1. The primary means of transportation to the upper 

part of WTC 1 was no longer available. 

Inside WTC 2, Port Authority vertical transportation personnel also evaluated elevator operations.207 An 

FDNY firefighter found that one elevator was working from the lobby and that it would go up to the 

40th floor.208 Information about this elevator was reported back to the WTC 2 Operations Post located at 

the building’s Fire Command Desk. This elevator was put into use and was used to shuttle personnel and 

equipment up to the 40th floor. The elevator operated until just prior to the collapse of WTC 2.209 A 

firefighter who was operating the elevator became trapped in it just prior to the building collapse. At 

approximately 9:57 a.m., a FDNY radio communication over the high-rise repeater channel reported that 

firefighters were trapped inside the elevator that was being used to carry personnel and equipment up the 

40th floor inside WTC 2. FDNY also used the elevator to carry injured building occupants to the lobby.210 

The radio message also stated that they were chopping through the wall to get out. WTC 2 collapsed 

about two minutes later. This radio communication may also have been heard by a FDNY Chief Officer 

who was working inside of WTC 1. The following was extracted from a first-person interview related to 

the emergency response: 

▪ Another I remember, I believe I heard over the radio that a Truck 

Company was stuck in an elevator. There was a lot of traffic going on, 

on the radio, but you key into companies you know. I tried to contact the 

one guy who was trapped in the elevator and I couldn’t get to him, but I 

could hear him calling for help. Sometimes you can transmit or you can 

just receive.211

The following information is based on first-person interviews with Port Authority personnel: 

 

206 Other Interview 7, fall 2004. 207 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 208 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 209 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 210 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 211 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 81

Port Authority personnel indicated that they were able to identify three elevators in WTC 1 that contained 

people.212 One elevator had 4 people, one elevator had 1 person, and one elevator had 9 people. FDNY 

personnel were directed to each of the elevators. The elevator with 9 people in it was located on the 

ground floor. It is believed that the people in this elevator were rescued. Port Authority employees on 

the upper floors of WTC 1 found two men trapped in an elevator on the 71st floor213 (NIST 2004). The 

elevator doors were jammed, and they had no tools to get the men out. Two of the rescuers went up to the 

73rd floor to get tools that could help. After returning with the tools the two men were rescued from the 

elevator.214 The status of the other elevators containing people is unknown. 

Elevator checks were made on all Zone 1 and Zone 2 elevators inside WTC 1 before WTC 2 collapsed.215 

Elevator checks had started on Zone 3 at the point of building collapse. In Zone 3, banks B, C, and D did 

not show any signals on the elevator panel at the Fire Command Desk in the lobby of WTC 1 and were 

assumed to be inoperable.216 (Note: Each of the WTC towers was divided into three vertical zones. 

Zone 1 reached to the 43rd floor. Zone 2 reached from the 44th floor to the 77th floor, and Zone 3 went 

from the 78th floor to the top of the building.) 

Inside WTC 2, it was reported that when the aircraft struck the building one elevator with 18 people in it 

became stuck in the shaft.217 It is unknown if this was the elevator that was reported to be stuck near the 

78th floor. The final status of this elevator and its occupants is unknown. This radio report was received 

by a PA technical specialist located inside WTC 1 at the lobby elevator panel and was received from his 

PA counterpart in WTC 2.218 No further information is known. 

Based on the first-person interviews with FDNY personnel and the high-rise radio repeater recording, 

FDNY personnel who used each of the single elevator cars inside each of the towers basically followed 

fire department protocol. 219, 220 However, the elevator operation to the 16th floor of WTC 1 was never 

reported to the building’s FDNY Command Post.221

5.6.4 Stairways, Access and Egress 

Stairs were the primary means of access to and egress from the World Trade Center towers after the 

aircraft impact. Elevator service, practically speaking, did not exist in either of the buildings. As stated 

earlier, only one elevator functioned in each of the towers, and they only functioned in a limited capacity 

to the lower third of each building. This lack of available elevators forced emergency responders to use 

the stairways for building access. The effect of building evacuees and emergency responders using the 

same stairways for egress and access (counterflow) was studied by NIST’s Project 7 investigators. This 

 

212 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 213 Building Occupant Interview 1000118. 214 Building Occupant Interview 1000118. 215 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 216 PA Interview 5, fall 2003. 217 Port Authority, WTC Security radio channel X, communications recording. 218 PA Interview 5, fall 2003 and PA Interview 13, fall 2003. 219 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 220 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 221 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

82 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

study is reported in NIST NCSTAR 1-7, Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World 

Trade Center Disaster, Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications. This document 

states that few building occupants felt that counter flow on the stairways had much effect on their 

evacuation. In contrast, many emergency responders suggested that counter flow on the stairways in 

WTC 1 generally had a negative impact on the emergency responder operations. Emergency responders 

reported difficulties negotiating the stairways as occupants were coming down. A sample of emergency 

responder comments concerning stairways and counter flow is located below. 

Some of the problems experienced by emergency responders are as follows: 

• Difficulty accessing the stairways at the lobby and mezzanine levels because of building 

occupant flow out of the stairway doors, 

• Firefighter company personnel and police officer team personnel became separated from their 

colleagues by the counter flow as building occupants moved down the stairs and the 

emergency responders attempted to move up, and 

• Emergency responders experienced difficulty moving equipment up the stairs as building 

occupants were coming down the stairs. 

The following are supporting statements made by emergency responders about the stairs and problems 

with counter flow on the stairs: 

▪ You could fit two people abreast on the stairs, one going down and one 

going up. It was just slow going up because of the lack of room. In my 

opinion, they should have had wider staircases. I do not think anyone 

anticipated this.222

▪ It was a single file up and a single file down, I am not an architect but 

this was not sufficient.223

▪ The building intercom system was not working after the plane hit. 

Normally, announcements over the intercom would tell people to use a 

different stairway when they were going down.224

▪ With all the people going the other way on the stairs, even if you were a 

marathon runner, you are not going to get very far.225

▪ We didn’t know how long it would take us to get up to the 70th floor. 

You never know with the people coming down and if you had to fight the 

crowds. That takes a lot out of you sometimes.226

 

222 FDNY Interview 43, winter 2004. 223 FDNY Interview 52, winter 2004. 224 FDNY Interview 43, winter 2004. 225 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 226 FDNY Interview 37, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 83

Figures 5–7 through 5–10 show an occupant and a firefighter carrying a length of hose passing on a 

1,118 mm (44 in) wide stairway. The Figures also show a firefighter and occupant passing at the landing. 

Note that the stair width does not provide adequate space for the individuals to pass without hitting each 

other. This occurs on the stairway as well as on the landing when the firefighter makes the turn to start 

climbing the next flight of stairs. 

Source: NIST. 

Figure 5–7. Top view of occupant and 

firefighter passing on stairs. 

Source: NIST.

Figure 5–8. Front view of occupant and 

firefighter passing on stairs. 

Source: NIST.

Figure 5–9. Front view of occupant and 

firefighter passing on landing. 

Source: NIST.

Figure 5–10. View from above of occupant 

and firefighter passing on landing. 

It was stated during the emergency responder interviews that the 1.12 m (44 in) wide stairways could be 

easily blocked by one person as they attempted to walk down the stairs.227 An average-sized person could 

walk down the center of the stairway and place one hand on each of the staircase hand rails. This posture 

would successfully block the stairway for other people who were moving faster down the staircase.228 

This posture was identified as being used by mobility impaired people who were only able to step down 

 

227 FDNY Interview 42, winter 2004. 228 FDNY Interviews 41 and 42, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

84 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

to the next step one foot at a time, which resulted in both feet standing on the same step, instead of the 

unimpaired gait where one foot is placed onto a step and the other foot is placed on the next step down.229

Emergency responders also reported that the stairways became plugged and traffic was stopped as 

individuals with other physical disabilities or significantly overweight occupants blocked the stairs as 

they were attempting to evacuate. A building occupant reported that as he went down the stairs between 

the 50th and 43rd floors there was a steady flow of firefighters going up the stairs spaced about two feet 

apart vertically on the stairs (NIST 2004). At about the 45th floor, the occupant encountered a group of 

slow moving elderly people who were mobility challenged230 (NIST 2004). 

The following is a sample of statements from FDNY and PAPD emergency responder personnel 

concerning people who were mobility challenged: 

▪ At the 27th floor I ran into a guy in a wheel chair with his friend. He was 

waiting for the crowds to clear so that he could make it down the 

stairs.231

▪ Inside the stairway in WTC 1, it was strange, people were still coming 

down as we were evacuating. More incapacitated people, they were 

holding people up. How were we going to move these people? We 

didn’t want to hold people up. That is how I got separated. We were 

letting people go by us.232

After WTC 2 collapsed, FDNY personnel inside WTC 1 attempted to exit the building by going down the 

various stairways. On the way down, some of the emergency responders stopped and checked each floor 

to be sure that it was clear before they proceeded down. On about the 12th floor, FDNY personnel found 

approximately 40 to 60 people who had been removed from the stairway by others and placed onto the 

floor because the mobility impaired individuals had been blocking the stairway evacuation routes. These 

people were mostly physically challenged building occupants and significantly overweight occupants who 

were having trouble going down the stairs.233 The emergency responders stopped and began to assist 

these people with their evacuation. Depending on the disability or size of the mobility challenged person, 

it took from one to four emergency responders to assist one person with the evacuation. If the individual 

being provided aid required a lot of assistance or was significantly overweight, emergency responders had 

to change teams with those assisting as fatigue set in.234 The evacuation pace while assisting the mobility 

challenged occupants was often described by the emergency responders as very slow.235 One wellpublicized case involved a mobility challenged occupant, several firefighters, and a PAPD officer who 

were trapped inside a staircase when WTC 1 collapsed. These emergency responders were able to extract 

themselves from the collapsed staircase and were assisted by other firefighters as they crossed the rubble 

 

229 FDNY Interview 39, winter 2004. 230 Building Occupant Interview 1000118. 231 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 232 FDNY Interview 41, winter 2004. 233 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 234 PA Interviews 7 and 8, fall 2003. 235 FDNY Interview 56, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 85

pile.236, 237, 238 The occupant was taken from the rubble pile by firefighters that came to the person’s aid. 

From the FDNY and PAPD interviews, it was not clear how many of the 40 to 60 occupants were safely 

evacuated from the building before WTC 1 collapsed. It is known from the interviews that a group of 

about 20 of these individuals were being moved out of WTC 1 just before the building collapsed. 

Another problem reported with the stairways in WTC 1 and to a slightly lesser degree in WTC 2 during 

the evacuation was that the stairways in the impact zone were damaged, and the stairways above the 

impact zone were typically filled with smoke and hot gases (NIST NCSTAR 1-7). The stairways were 

functioning as chimneys for the fire gases and smoke that blocked the evacuation routes for the occupants 

above the impact zones. Several occupants inside WTC 2 above the impact zone found that stairway A, 

for a period of time, had a smoke level low enough for them to successfully escape from the upper floors. 

For additional information see NIST NCSTAR 1-7, section 8.1, and NIST NCSTAR 1-7B. Also inside 

WTC 2, FDNY personnel reported over the radio that stairway walls were breached from the aircraft 

impact on the 68th, 73rd, and 74th, floors.239 It should be pointed out that the aircraft struck WTC 2 

between the 77th and 85th floors (NIST NCSTAR 1-5A). 

Another problem with the stairways occurred when WTC 2 collapsed. As WTC 2 collapsed, the 

stairways in WTC 1 became filled with dust and smoke, reducing visibility to near zero.240 It was 

reported that emergency responders with flashlights could get near the floor and see the steps and floor 

that were painted with photo-luminescent paint, marking the stairway routes. They could also see the 

reflective exit signs.241, 242 Figure 5–11 shows an identical staircase with painted floor markings that was 

located in the sub-grade level of WTC 4. This photograph was taken in one of the WTC 4 stairways 

several months after the WTC attack in 2001. 

The following first-person interview statements provide insight into how emergency markings and exit 

signs helped to save lives: 

▪ One piece of equipment that I carried was a small Mag-Light. It was 

enough to illuminate the reflective markings on the stairs.243

▪ My flashlight saved my life with the reflective exit signs leading to the 

outside.244

It also was noted that on about the 3rd floor of WTC 1, where water had entered the stairway from broken 

pipes or discharged sprinklers, the water mixed with the dust and the floors became very slippery, causing 

emergency responders to fall as they went down the stairs.245

 

236 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 237 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 238 FDNY Interview 56, winter 2004. 239 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 240 PA Interviews 6, 7, and 8, fall 2003. 241 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 242 PA Interview 1, fall 2003. 243 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 244 PA Interview 1, fall 2003. 
Chapter 5 

86 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Source: NIST. 

Figure 5–11. Photograph of a typical World 

Trade Center staircase, sub-grade level 

of WTC 4. 

As the emergency responders approached the lobby level on several of the stairs they found them blocked 

by debris generated when WTC 2 collapsed.246 Some of the emergency responders were able to move 

debris and get past it, and others tried to find different routes out of the building.247 Interviews with 

FDNY and PAPD personnel indicated that a firefighter with an axe cut a hole in a wall to allow them to 

escape out of the stairway.248 Two PAPD personnel reported that they were trapped inside WTC 1 and 

used their service pistols to shoot windows out so that they could get out of the building.249 A NYPD 

officer also used a service pistol to shoot a window out in an attempt to escape the collapse.250 This was 

done when an NYPD Special Operations Unit team was trapped near the front of WTC 7 and a window 

was shot out in an attempt to form an exit route through the WTC 7 building. 

 245 PA Interview 9, fall 2003. 246 PA Interview 7, fall 2003. 247 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 248 PA Interview 7, fall 2003. 249 PA Interview 9, fall 2003. 250 NYPD Interview 8, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 87

5.6.5 Physiological Impact on Emergency Responders and the Effectiveness of 

Conducting Operations 

Since the elevators were not functioning or safe to use, firefighters had to climb the stairs in order to assist 

with the evacuation and rescue building occupants. Many of these firefighters were carrying additional 

equipment with them that would be needed for conducting rescues and firefighting. 

A normally outfitted FDNY firefighter wearing a full protective clothing ensemble (coat, pants, helmet, 

hood, boots, and gloves) and a SCBA (self-contained breathing apparatus) carries approximately 23 kg 

(50 lb) of gear (Lawson 2000). This does not include any additional tools, radios, lights, extra air bottles, 

medical kits, or hose packs that may be carried by a firefighter. This additional equipment that may be 

carried by a firefighter may add another 23 kg (50 lb) or more to the work load. It is not unusual for 

firefighters to be carrying loads in excess of 46 kg (100 lb) into a building when fighting a fire. 

On September 11, 2001, firefighters who responded to the World Trade Center carried these loads as they 

ascended the stairways in the buildings. At a minimum, firefighters with only their protective clothing 

ensemble and SCBA carried approximately 23 kg (50 lb) of equipment up the stairways. This extra 

weight has a serious impact on the physical capabilities of firefighters or any emergency responder trying 

to climb stairs. The following first-person interview statements address the issue of equipment weight: 

▪ I’m surprised I made it up to the 30 floors. It’s heavy, bulky, hot and 

sweaty. The most that we could do was 10 floors at a time. I think that 

we were taking about 100 extra pounds of weight: heavy boots, bunker 

pants, tanks on your back and tools in your hands and a heavy helmet on 

your head.251

▪ We were all carrying one roll up. I needed a little more time to 

recuperate. We figured that if two guys carried one roll up, we would 

make better time so we left two fire hoses on the 31st floor. The guys 

were so fatigued carrying all the stuff. It took about an hour to get to the 

31st floor252

▪ It is tiring climbing the stairs. I carried about 105 lb with bunker pants, 

tools and water can. You have got to keep things light.253

The Figure 5–12 shows FDNY firefighters in the lobby of WTC 1 and the equipment they carried. 

 

251 FDNY Interview 17, winter 2004. 252 FDNY Interview 39, winter 2004. 253 FDNY Interview 42, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

88 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–12. Video image showing FDNY firefighters inside the lobby of WTC 1 with 

protective clothing and extra equipment carried for operations inside the building. 

A basic rule of high-rise firefighting mentioned by emergency responders during the investigation 

indicates that, a fully equipped firefighter can climb approximately one floor per minute.254 This means 

that it would take a firefighter approximately one hour to climb to the 60th floor. However, some 

firefighters estimated that it would have taken them as long as two hours to climb to the 70th floor where 

FDNY was planning to establish an Operations Post.255 Some FDNY personnel that were interviewed by 

NIST and were inside WTC 1 had heard that a small number of FDNY rescue personnel had climbed to 

about the 50th floor in WTC 1 before WTC 2 collapsed.256 This was also reported by a building occupant 

who stated that as they evacuated down the stairs, “We saw distressed firemen around the 50th floor”257

(NIST NCSTAR 1-7). Inside WTC 2, a FDNY Chief Officer reached the 78th floor just before the 

building collapsed. This climb included a trip on an elevator up to the 40th floor before the FDNY Chief 

began to climb the remaining 38 floors using the stairs.258 This officer was noted to be a marathon runner, 

and during his climb up the stairs he was likely wearing an SCBA breathing apparatus but was not 

carrying extra firefighting equipment. For additional information on the locations of interviewed 

personnel inside WTC 1, see Section 5.7, Table 5–1. 

 

254 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 255 FDNY Interview 16, winter 2004. 256 FDNY Interviews 20 and 54 winter 2004. 257 Building Occupant Interview 1000118. 258 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater communications recording. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 89

Interviews with FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD personnel identified the following concerning climbing the 

stairs inside WTC 1 on September 11, 2001: 

Initial Climbing Period 

• Firefighters were able to climb the first 10 to 12 stories in 2 to 5 minutes. The climbing rate 

depended upon the individual’s physical condition and the amount of equipment being 

carried. 

• After the first 10 to 12 floors the firefighters had to stop and rest. 

Supporting First-Person Interview Comments: 

▪ We started taking breaks around the 9th floor, and then started marching 

up again. One of our guys had some chest pain. We made another few 

flights and he got worse.259

▪ Climbing was tough but orderly. Carrying equipment was a strain. The 

first 12 floors felt like I had climbed 100 floors260

Repetitive Climbing and Rest Periods 

• After the rest period that may last several minutes the firefighters would climb again, but this 

time they would usually complete only 5 to 6 floors before they would have to stop and rest 

again. 

• After resting again the firefighters would again climb another 5 to 6 floors and rest again. 

Some individuals would only make about 3 to 4 floors before having to stop for a rest. 

Supporting First-Person Interview Comments: 

▪ A lot of companies had taken rests at about every 4th or 5th floor because 

we kept passing one another. It was very hot in the stairway, especially 

with all your gear and hood on, with no ventilation. I ended up going up 

to the 19th floor.261

▪ Our crew made it up to 21 or 22. I was not exhausted, but it was taking a 

toll. If we had to go another 20 flights we would have to take longer rest 

breaks. With us going up about five flights of stairs at a time it would 

have taken us about two hours to get to the 70th floor.262

 

259 FDNY Interview 35, winter 2004. 260 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 261 FDNY Interview 27, winter 2004. 262 FDNY Interview 16, winter 2004. 
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90 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Physical Impact of Climbing: Fatigue, Heat Stress, and Dehydration 

• As a result of the climb, the human body becomes fatigued and thermally stressed. Many of 

the emergency responders indicated that they were also dehydrating and needed water to 

drink. 

• During rest periods, the firefighters would usually take off their helmets and open their coats 

in order to cool off. The firefighter protective clothing is designed to be a thermal barrier 

during firefighting operations, and as a result it is a thermal insulator. Human body 

temperature rises rapidly under work conditions while clothed in insulating apparel. Many 

firefighters interviewed indicated that they also removed their SCBA’s and coats while they 

were trying to cool down and rest. 

Supporting First-Person Interview Comments: 

▪ You go up about 10 flights and take a rest. You have to because you will 

be tired if you don’t. If you run up to the 20th floor and you are tired, you 

can’t work. You have to rest before you get up there.263

▪ Before the other building collapsed, firefighters were out of the stairway 

in the office area, laying on the floor, masks on the floor, and coats off or 

open, and resting.264

▪ We stopped every 10 floors to see the conditions. When we got up to the 

20th floor we were really huffing and puffing so we broke a couple of 

vending machines and took the water out and started distributing it to 

those who were in need and then continued up.265

▪ I saw those firemen on the 27th floor. They were totally exhausted. They 

basically crawled onto the floor. That’s why I ran and got them the 

water.266

There were several cases of firefighters suffering from chest pains or heart attacks. 267, 268 Other 

emergency responders were called to their aid, and at a minimum, oxygen was administered to the chest 

pain patients.269 No other data were found related to these cases except that some of the emergency 

responders were assisted down the stairs to ambulances. FDNY interviews indicated that at least one of 

the chest pain cases was associated with strained chest muscles.270

 

263 FDNY Interview 42, winter 2004. 264 FDNY Interview 11, winter 2004. 265 FDNY Interview 17, winter 2004. 266 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 267 FDNY Interview 35, winter 2004. 268 FDNY Interview 16, winter 2004. 269 PA Interview 7, fall 2003. 270 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 91

Many additional interviewees provided information similar to that reported above. With the information 

gathered, NIST attempted to estimate the climbing times for the emergency responders who were 

interviewed. There was no accurate starting time, and there was no precise ending time for the estimates. 

The starting times are based on the known arrival time for a person or a unit at the WTC, an estimated 

time to get equipment off of an apparatus, and the estimated time it took to arrive at the Lobby Command 

Post and get an assignment. It is estimated that it took approximately three to five minutes for firefighters 

to get to the Lobby Command Post and get an assignment after arriving at the WTC. The ending times 

for all of the calculations for personnel inside WTC 1 are based on the floor they were on at the time 

when WTC 2 collapsed. Of the 26 emergency responders interviewed who were inside WTC 1, the 

following represents the maximum floor heights that they achieved: 

• One police officer carrying no extra equipment and wearing a patrolman’s uniform climbed 

to the 44th floor.271

• Seven emergency responders including personnel from FDNY and NYPD climbed to the 

30’s. Two of these FDNY personnel took an elevator to the 16th floor.272 

• Sixteen emergency responders (FDNY, PAPD, and Port Authority Security) climbed to floors 

in the 20’s.273

• Two emergency responders, FDNY and NYPD, climbed to the teens.274

Based on the data gathered, it is estimated that climbing rates varied between approximately 1.4 minutes 

per floor for personnel not carrying extra equipment to approximately 2.0 minutes per floor for personnel 

wearing firefighters’ protective clothing and carrying extra equipment. These estimates have an error of 

approximately ±0.5 minutes per floor. 

The consequence of firefighters and other emergency responders having to climb many tens of floors to 

get to a fire in a high-rise building can be summarized as follows: 

• The climbing rate will be approximately one to two minutes per floor for emergency 

responders attempting to access a fire zone 30 floors or more high. 

• The ability to get both personnel and needed equipment to the desired location becomes 

limited by building height. 

• Emergency response time factors related to the rate of fire growth, the ability to rescue 

building occupants, and the ability to bring a fire under control becomes more critical with 

every additional floor in building height. 

 

271 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 272 FDNY Interviews 12, 13, 17, 25, and 39 winter 2004; NYPD Interviews 5 and 6, winter 2004. 273 FDNY Interviews 9, 11, 16, 29, 33, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 52, and 56; PA Interviews 4, 6, 7, and 8, falls 2003. 274 FDNY Interview 27, winter 2004 and NYPD Interview 22, winter 2004. 
Chapter 5 

92 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• The ability of emergency responders to climb the stairs with equipment and remain physically 

fit to conduct rescue and firefighting operations is diminished with every additional floor in 

building height that must be climbed. 

5.6.6 Situational Awareness 

Situational awareness is one of the overriding factors associated with understanding the operational 

environment, decision making, and operations command and control during periods where large amounts 

of information are needed and are critical to the successful outcome of a task. 

Endsley defined situational awareness as follows: “the perception of the elements in the environment 

within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status 

in the near future” (Endsley 1988). In simpler terms, situational awareness refers to the degree of 

accuracy by which one’s perception of his current environment mirrors reality (Naval Aviation Schools 

Command 2004). The U.S. Navy website also lists two sets of factors that affect situational awareness: 

Perception versus Reality 

• View of the Situation 

• Incoming Information 

• Expectations and Biases 

• Incoming Information versus Expectations 

Factors that Reduce Situational Awareness 

• Insufficient Communication 

• Fatigue / Stress 

• Task Overload 

• Task Underload 

• Group Mindset 

• “Press on Regardless” Philosophy 

• Degraded Operating Conditions 

On September 11, 2001, many emergency response personnel who conducted operations at command 

posts within the WTC towers indicated that they received large quantities of information related to the 

event, and other individuals indicated that they did not receive enough information about the situation. 

Both too much information and lack of information prevented responders from having adequate, accurate, 

and timely information for decisions that were critical to operations and may have been critical to life 

safety, whether it was their personal safety or the safety of others. All of the factors listed above that 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 93

reduce situational awareness, except underload, came into play during WTC operations, and as a result, 

many of the emergency responders struggled with their perception of what was happening compared to 

what was really happening. 

Situational awareness was an overriding issue with all emergency responders during the WTC operations. 

First-person interviews with emergency responders from all agencies highlight the importance of 

situational awareness during this complex emergency response. Results from the interviews show that 

emergency responders had one of two levels of situational awareness: First, emergency responders 

working outside the buildings with the ability to observe site conditions as they changed felt that they had 

good situational awareness.275 In addition, emergency responders who worked inside the buildings and 

had reliable radio communications with people outside the building felt that their situational awareness 

also was good. Second, emergency responders who worked inside the buildings and had no reliable 

means of communication other than face-to-face felt that they had poor situational awareness.276

Many of the emergency responders who did not see the aircraft impact into WTC 1 and reported to the 

scene before the second aircraft struck WTC 2 did not understand that a large commercial aircraft had 

struck WTC 1.277 Many thought that a small private or commuter aircraft had hit the building. 

Emergency responders who could see WTC 1 and then later saw WTC 2 as they approached the towers 

could tell that the buildings were seriously damaged and that large fires were burning in the buildings.278 

Many thought that what had happened to WTC 1 was caused by an accident.279 These original ideas may 

be related to insufficient information associated with the initial situational cues and were based on their 

understanding of the event as it related to past experience. However, the situation became much clearer 

to all that it was a terrorist attack as they either saw or received reports that a second aircraft had crashed 

into WTC 2.280

Some senior officers inside WTC 1 felt that their situational awareness was poor even though they were 

in radio contact with other senior officers outside the building.281 One of these senior officers stated that 

he would have known more about what was going on during the incident if he had been home watching it 

on TV.282 It took time to confirm that a second aircraft had actually hit WTC 2. A large number of 

emergency responders who were working inside WTC 1 realized that something had happened but did not 

know what had occurred when the second aircraft struck WTC 2.283 Some firefighters who were going up 

in the stairways inside WTC 1 did not know that anything had happened when the second aircraft struck 

WTC 2.284

 

275 FDNY Interviews 1 – 68, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 276 FDNY Interviews 1 – 68, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 277 FDNY Interview 1, fall 2003 and FDNY Interview 4, winter 2004. 278 FDNY Interview 4, winter 2004. 279 FDNY Interview 4, winter 2004. 280 FDNY Interviews 12, 21, and 29, winter 2004 and NYPD Interview 6, winter 2004. 281 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 282 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 283 FDNY Interviews 11 and 12, winter 2004. 284 FDNY Interview 42, winter 2004. 
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94 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

The situation was somewhat different when WTC 2 collapsed. Many emergency responders inside 

WTC 1 felt the building shake violently and thought that another aircraft had flown into WTC 1 or that a 

portion of WTC 1 had collapsed above them.285 All emergency responders interviewed knew that 

something significant had occurred, but they didn’t know exactly what had happened. This lack of 

situational awareness clearly had a negative impact on some emergency responders who did not 

understand what had happened when WTC 2 collapsed. It may have been responsible to some degree for 

the slow evacuation pace that some emergency responders observed after the responders themselves were 

ordered to evacuate from WTC 1. The following quote describes situational awareness for a small group 

of firefighters inside WTC 1 shortly after WTC 2 collapsed: 

“We were trapped in the interior space, deaf and blind to the rest of the 

world, to the devastation outside our windows – probably the only group 

of people in the civilized world who hadn’t seen what had happened to 

the south tower. We might as well have been in a cave, for all we could 

tell about what was unfolding on the plaza below.”(Picciotto 2002) 

The following statements concerning situational awareness were extracted from FDNY and PAPD firstperson interview notes: 

▪ We are in the forest here and we are talking about various trees in the 

forest; we are really just talking about communications. Everybody, my 

wife and the people in California knew more about the situation than me. 

It was ridiculous. I didn’t know what was going on out there.286

▪ In between the 21st and 22nd there were some firefighters coming down 

who said they were told to evacuate. At that time, we still did not know 

the other tower had collapsed.287

Situational awareness is influenced by the amount and quality of information available (Endsley 1988). 

The following statement provides information concerning communications capabilities related to the 

ability to share critical information inside WTC 1: 

▪ It was found that FDNY didn’t have effective radio communications with 

the floors above the lobby. Mostly, their handie-talkie radio 

communications were ineffective. The interviewee instructed one of his 

associate Chiefs to activate the building repeater. The repeater didn’t 

seem to work and they thought that the airplane impact destroyed the 

repeater system. In order to establish some type of communications in 

the building they tried the standpipe phones and they tried intercom 

systems. Nothing worked.288

Many of the emergency responders who narrowly escaped the collapse of WTC 1 never understood that 

WTC 2 and WTC 1 had fully collapsed until the dust and smoke began to clear almost an hour after 

 

285 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 286 FDNY Interview 11, winter 2004. 287 FDNY Interview 16, winter 2004. 288 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 95

WTC 1 had collapsed.289 Some responders indicated that they did not understand the magnitude of what 

happened that morning at the WTC until the next day.290

5.7 INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESPONDER EVACUATION 

FROM THE WORLD TRADE CENTER 

Information coming into several of the New York City emergency response communications centers 

indicated that building conditions for the two WTC towers were steadily degrading. At approximately 

9:36 a.m., a New York City 9-1-1 telephone operator received a call from inside of WTC 2 stating that a 

floor had collapsed somewhere in the 90s.291 This information was then transferred to a NYPD dispatcher 

who communicated at about 9:51 a.m. that the 106th floor inside WTC 2 was crumbling. According to a 

NYPD document, this report appears to have misidentified the floor that had collapsed.292 However, this 

information concerning the floor collapse was still important as it related to the seriousness of the 

degrading conditions. Just prior to this message, at approximately 9:49 a.m., one of the NYPD helicopter 

units reported over the Special Operations Division radio channel that “large pieces” were falling from 

WTC 2. Each of these messages suggested that the top floors of WTC 2 were experiencing significant 

degradation; however, none of the emergency responders interviewed believed that there would be total 

collapse of the building. Also, emergency responders reported during their interviews that around the 

same time period that these radio messages were being collected and distributed, a runner was sent from 

OEM to the FDNY Incident Command Post (ICP) to inform them that an engineer believed the 

WTC towers were nearing conditions that would cause a collapse.293 The runner got to the FDNY 

Incident Command Post located in the front of World Financial Center 2 just before WTC 2 collapsed and 

was in the process of delivering the message when WTC 2 collapsed.294 Figure 5–13 shows the FDNY 

ICP located in the garage driveway of WFC 2. 

With the collapse of WTC 2, each emergency responder department sent out radio messages calling for 

the immediate evacuation of WTC 1.295, 296 At least three FDNY Chief Officers at ground level 

transmitted urgent radio messages over their handie-talkie radios calling for the evacuation of WTC 1 

following the collapse of WTC 2.297, 298 Additionally, one FDNY Chief Officer located upstairs inside 

WTC 1 called over his radio for emergency responders to evacuate the building.299 Interview data from 

emergency responders who were located upstairs inside WTC 1 provide some insight into how orders to 

 

289 FDNY Interview 10, winter 2004. 290 FDNY Interview 5, winter 2004. 291 McKinsey & Company, NYPD call-routing and message dispatch, “106th floor is collapsing,” draft summary report 

July 23, 2002. 292 McKinsey & Company, NYPD call-routing and message dispatch, “106th floor is collapsing,” draft summary report 

July 23, 2002. 293 FDNY Interview 46, winter 2004. 294 FDNY Interview 46, winter 2004. 295 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 296 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 297 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 298 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 299 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 
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96 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–13. Video image of the FDNY Incident Command Post in front of World 

Financial Center 2. 

evacuate the building were received following the collapse of WTC 2. Several firefighters and FDNY 

officers heard the evacuation orders on their radios while others did not hear the orders. (Table 5–1) One 

firefighter received the information to evacuate from a FBI employee300, and the remaining firefighters 

received their evacuation information from other FDNY personnel.301

NYPD ESU personnel inside of WTC 1 received their orders to evacuate from an ESU Mobilization Point 

staff person located at Church and Vesey Streets.302 These radio communications came over a point-topoint radio channel that was being used to communicate with the ESU teams inside the buildings. 

PAPD command personnel also called for the evacuation of WTC 1. One PAPD Police Officer heard the 

order to evacuate over his handie-talkie radio.303 One of the PAPD Police Officers was told to evacuate 

by a FDNY Company Officer.304 Another PAPD Police Officer was told to evacuate by a FDNY 

firefighter, and one was told to evacuate by another PAPD Police Officer.305

 

300 FDNY Interview 12, winter 2004. 301 FDNY Interviews 11, 12, 13, 16, 33, 35, 41, 43, and 52, winter 2004. 302 NYPD Interview 5, winter 2004. 303 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 304 PA Interview 8, fall 2003. 305 PA Interview 7, fall 2003. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 97

Table 5–1 summarizes information gathered concerning how evacuation messages were distributed to the 

surviving WTC 1 emergency responders who were interviewed. In the table a floor height is given for 

each emergency responder indicating what floor they were on when they received the message to 

evacuate WTC 1. The emergency responders were located at various places inside the building. They 

may have been inside any of the three stairways or out on the building’s floors when the evacuation 

message was received. 

As demonstrated in Table 5–1, radio communications associated with the order to evacuate WTC 1 had 

mixed results. The data shows that different personnel located on the same floors of the building either 

heard the evacuation orders or did not hear the orders over the radio. This failure to receive the 

evacuation messages may be attributed to a number of factors, including: 

• the person’s location inside the building and their relative position to building materials or 

structures that attenuated radio signals,

• the operational condition of their radio,

• their radio volume may have been turned down,

• they or someone nearby was transmitting on the same radio channel at the time when 

evacuation orders were given, and/or

• noise levels around the person, etc.

Also, the interview information gathered demonstrates that individuals who had the evacuation 

information actively told others that the building was being evacuated. 

After receiving the order to evacuate, some FDNY personnel indicated that there were people in the 

building who needed medical attention and assistance in evacuating. Several FDNY personnel told the 

survivors that were interviewed by NIST that they were going to stay behind to help the people who 

needed them.306 The following interview statements made by FDNY firefighters relate to personnel 

staying behind: 

▪ One firefighter got the order to evacuate, but he refused because he 

was helping injured people. He was in the WTC 1 Sky Lobby, on 

the 44th floor. Another firefighter the interviewee saw was standing 

in a doorway. The interviewee told him “Let’s go, we have to 

evacuate.” The firefighter told him okay, but he was waiting for his 

chief. The interviewee said that these guys were much like him and 

the others that were evacuating while helping a lady out of the 

building. It was the nature of the beast. A firefighter could not just 

walk out and leave these people who needed help. Other firefighters 

 

306 FDNY Interview 56, winter 2004. 
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98 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

wanted to be sure that their company members were accounted for 

and also out safe, and they didn’t want to leave without them.307

▪ The interviewee was evacuating down the stairway inside WTC 1 

and came across two PAPD officers. They were heading up the 

stairs. He told them that they had to evacuate, but they said that they 

had to get to the other Port Authority officers in the building.308

▪ After realizing that WTC 2 had collapsed we started our evacuation. 

We then heard the order on the radio to evacuate. From the 27th

floor, as we were going down the stairs, I could hear radio reports 

from a Captain who was around the 40th floor. One FDNY Captain 

reported on the radio that there were too many burned people with 

him and that he was not going to leave them.309

Table 5–1. WTC 1 evacuation data from emergency responder interviews. 

 FDNYa 

NYPDb 

ESU PAPDc 

Personnel interviewed that went up stairways inside WTC 1 18 3 5 

Personnel with handie-talkie radios 15 3 3 

Personnel with handie-talkies radios that heard the 

evacuation order for WTC 1 on their radio

8 3 2 

 Floors responders were on when message was 

received to evacuate WTC 1 

19, 22, 23, 27, 

27, 31, 35, 36 

11, 31, 31 22, 35 

Personnel with handie-talkie radios who did not hear the 

evacuation order for WTC 1 on their radio, but were told 

to evacuate by other personnel 

7 0 1 

 Floors responders were on when message was 

received to evacuate WTC 1 

21, 23, 27, 27d, 

28, 34, 25 

n/a 24 

Personnel without handie-talkie radios 3 0 2 

Personnel without handie-talkies radios that heard the 

evacuation order for WTC 1 over someone else’s s radio

1 0 0 

 Floor responder was on when he heard the order to 

evacuate WTC 1. 

23 n/a n/a 

Personnel without handie-talkie radios that were told to 

evacuate by other personnel

2 0 2 

 Floors that responders were on when told to evacuate 

WTC 1 

22, 31 n/a 24, 25 

a. FDNY Interviews # 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 25, 27, 29, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 52, and 56 

b. NYPD Interviews # 5, 6, and 22 

c. PAPD/PA Security Interviews # 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10 

d. This emergency responder had made an independent decision to leave WTC 1 before the collapse of WTC 2 because 

one of his members was experiencing medical problems. The responder received a verbal evacuation order as they were 

in the process of evacuating the building. 

 

307 FDNY Interview 56, winter 2004. 308 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 309 FDNY Interview 56, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 99

Many of the emergency responders who were interviewed indicated that as they came down the stairs 

they stopped on each floor to check for occupants or called out that everyone should leave the building.310 

The emergency responders also reported that there were still a few civilians still going down the stairs as 

they went down the staircases.311 Several of the civilians were building occupants who were mobility 

impaired and needed assistance.312 Emergency responders provided assistance to these individuals as 

needed.313 As the responders went down through the building, they found approximately 40 to 

60 mobility impaired people sitting inside offices on the 12th floor. 314 These individuals had been placed 

on the floor in order to clear the staircases since they had been causing the evacuation to slow. The 

emergency responders got approximately 20 of these people up and began assisting them down the stairs 

as they were attempting to evacuate the building.315 Other firefighters stayed behind to assist others who 

needed help.316 WTC 1 collapsed as firefighters and police officers were getting this first group of 

mobility impaired people outside.317 It is not known how many mobility impaired building occupants or 

emergency responders died during this part of the operation. Additionally, a building occupant who was 

able to exit WTC 1 just in time to save his life reported that as he went through the lobby, “there were 

firefighters who did not leave the building, they were milling around the fire desk in the lobby.”318

(NIST 2004) 

5.8 EFFECT OF WTC 2 COLLAPSE ON EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 

With the collapse of WTC 2, all emergency responder operations at the WTC were disrupted. This 

included operations being carried out by FDNY, NYPD, PAPD, PANYNJ, and OEM. When WTC 2 

collapsed, it resulted in fatalities and injury of many emergency responders at the scene. Also, all 

operations at emergency responder command posts and mobilizations points at and near the 

WTC complex were disrupted. Falling debris destroyed command posts and critical equipment being 

used by emergency responders during the ongoing operations.319 The wind and dust cloud generated 

during the collapse also hampered operations. Emergency responders reported being blown into the air 

and tumbling down the street as WTC 2 collapsed.320 Some police officers reported that the wind was so 

strong that it ripped equipment from their gun belts and blew it away.321 With these high winds, some 

emergency responders felt intense heat as the wind blew past them, and they were hit by flying debris.322 

All of the emergency responders interviewed who were near street level when WTC 2 collapsed reported 

 

310 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 311 FDNY Interviews 11, 13, and 16, winter 2004. 312 PA Interviews 8 and 10, fall 2003. 313 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 314 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 315 NYPD Interview 22, spring 2004 and PA Interviews 7 and 8, fall 2003. 316 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 317 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 318 Building Occupant Interview 1000118. 319 FDNY Interviews 20, 51, and 65, winter and spring 2004. 320 NYPD Interviews 8 and 16, winter 2004 and FDNY Interview 67, spring 2004. 321 PA Interview 9, fall 2003. 322 FDNY Interviews 64 and 65, spring 2004. 
Chapter 5 

100 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

that the dust cloud and smoke was so thick and black that they could not see anything or breathe. The 

dust in the air was so thick that it filled their eyes and mouths.323

Immediately following the collapse, emergency responders reported that there was a period where they 

heard no radio communications.324 They did not know whether it was caused by the thick dust cloud 

preventing radio signals from getting through or if no one was able to communicate on the radio. As the 

dust and smoke began to clear, many of the emergency responders found that their radio microphones and 

speakers were filled with dust and debris.325 Also, police officers’ firearms were clogged with dust and 

debris.326 The emergency responders generally indicated that they immediately attempted to clear their 

critical equipment to get it working again.327 As the radio systems came back on line, emergency 

responders indicated that the radios became filled with Mayday distress messages, and surviving 

personnel began to respond to these calls for help.328

As the dust and smoke continued to clear, emergency responders also began to assess their operational 

situation. The FDNY Incident Command Post located in front of World Financial Center 2 (WFC 2) on 

West Street was destroyed and many of its personnel were missing. The FDNY Field Com unit that was 

located at the Incident Command Post also was lost, and the personnel operating the system evacuated 

toward the Hudson River.329 Therefore, all FDNY command communications at the site were lost except 

those that could be carried out using the low output power handie-talkie radios carried by the command 

officers. It soon became apparent that WTC 2 had fully collapsed, and that the Lobby Command Post 

there was destroyed, and the FDNY personnel operating the command post were missing. The FDNY 

Command Post located on the corner of Liberty Street and West Street was destroyed, and personnel were 

missing, and the Lobby Command Post inside of WTC 1 had been abandoned as personnel evacuated in 

an attempt to save their lives.330 When WTC 2 collapsed, it fell into the Marriott Hotel killing, injuring, 

and trapping many firefighters inside the damaged structure. This also ended the Command Post 

operations inside the hotel.331 The primary NYPD mobilization point located at Church Street and Vesey 

was abandoned as WTC 2 collapsed, and operations at the NYPD mobilization point on West Street and 

Vesey Street were ended.332 The PAPD police desk inside WTC 5 also was abandoned following the 

collapse of WTC 2.333 Although the OEM command center inside WTC 7 had already been evacuated, 

OEM personnel working around the site and stationed with the Mayor also had to evacuate from the 

WTC site, which had a negative impact on effective operations at the highest command level.334 Loss of 

the various critical personnel and the emergency responder command posts seriously disrupted emergency 

operations at the WTC. In addition, all records associated with emergency responder personnel 

 

323 FDNY Interview 64, spring 2004. 324 FDNY Interview 22, winter 2004. 325 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 326 PA Interview 9, fall 2003. 327 PA Interview 9, fall 2003. 328 FDNY Interviews 30 and 31, winter 2004. 329 FDNY Interviews 58 and 61, winter 2004 and spring 2004. 330 FDNY Interviews 2 and 7, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 331 FDNY Interview 62, spring 2004. 332 NYPD Interview 24, spring 2004. 333 PA Interview 3, fall 2003. 334 NYPD Interview 2, winter 2004 and FDNY Interview 46, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 101

accountability and operations were lost, and vital equipment for carrying out the emergency operations 

was destroyed by debris and fire. 

5.8.1 Emergency Responder Apparatus at the WTC 

During emergency operations, it is important that a fire department assigns and dispatches the appropriate 

types and numbers of apparatus and personnel needed to accomplish the mission. As fire department 

personnel arrived at the WTC scene, they positioned their apparatus in a fashion that would allow them to 

quickly access their equipment and bring it into use to control the fire and protect lives.335 Firefighters 

knew that they would have to be at the WTC for many hours and that they would need a significant 

amount of equipment to conduct operations inside the WTC towers.336 Figure 5–14 and Figure 5–15 

show the locations of parked emergency vehicles at the WTC before the towers collapsed. 

Figure 5–14. Photograph taken from near the corners of West and Vesey Streets looking 

south before the collapse of WTC 2. 

 

335 FDNY Interviews 16, 32, 39, and 44, winter 2004. 336 FDNY Interviews 18 and 30, winter 2004. 
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102 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–15. Photograph taken from West Street looking towards (right to left) Liberty 

Street, WTC 2, and the Marriott Hotel before the collapse of WTC 2. 

Firefighters had never experienced the total collapse of a tall high-rise building and did not believe that 

the towers would fully collapse during their operations.337 Therefore, many FDNY vehicles and other 

emergency apparatus were parked within the collapse zone of the towers. The total number of emergency 

response apparatus near the WTC towers ranges from approximately 100 to 170 vehicles.338 As a result 

of the collapse, 91 FDNY vehicles and apparatus were destroyed when the buildings collapsed.339 

Table 5–2 contains a list of vehicles destroyed: 

Each of the vehicles and firefighting apparatus listed in Table 5–2 carried equipment vital for conducting 

firefighting and rescue operations. The loss of the 343 firefighters coupled with the loss of the valuable 

equipment listed above created a significant reduction in FDNY’s capabilities. This loss of human life 

and the capital assets makes it imperative that emergency operations protocols for tall buildings be 

critically reassessed. Figures 5–16, 5–17, and 5–18 show some of the emergency response apparatus 

destroyed during the collapse of the WTC towers. 

 

337 FDNY Interviews 1, 2, 6, 7, 11 – 15, 17, 19, and 20, fall 2003 and winter 2004. 338 FDNY, Vehicles Missing or Destroyed at WTC Disaster, 2002. 339 FDNY, Vehicles Missing or Destroyed at WTC Disaster, 2002. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 103

Table 5–2. FDNY vehicles and apparatus destroyed 

by collapse of WTC towers. 

Vehicles or Apparatus Destroyed Number Destroyed 

Ambulances 5 

Ladders or Trucks 15 

Engines or Pumpers 18 

Satellite Pumper 1 

Rescue Vehicle, Primary 2 

Rescue Vehicle, Secondary 1 

Squad Vehicle, Secondary 3 

High-Rise Vehicle 2 

Emergency Crew Vehicle 2 

Field Comm (Spare) 1 

Mask Service Unit 1 

Tac (Tactical Equipment Unit) 1 

Sedans 23 

Staff Utility Vehicles 16 

Total 91 

Figure 5–16. Destroyed fire apparatus following the collapse 

of WTC 1 and 2. 
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104 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Figure 5–17. Damaged emergency apparatus at the corners of West and Vesey Street 

after the collapse WTC 1 and 2. 

Figure 5–18. Burned out fire apparatus on West Broadway next to WTC 7 following the 

collapse of WTC 1 and 2. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 105

5.8.2 Emergency Responder Equipment 

Generally, before the towers collapsed equipment used by emergency responders at the WTC was 

adequate for the operations being carried out.340 However, there are some points related to equipment that 

need consideration. 

Thousands of pounds of emergency equipment are typically needed for operations where people are 

seriously injured, buildings are damaged with the possibility of structural collapse, and large fires are 

burning. All of these conditions existed at the WTC on September 11, 2001. As a result of the elevators 

being unsafe or inoperable, emergency responders hand carried almost all equipment needed with them 

up the stairs. This emergency equipment included rescue equipment, medical equipment, and some 

firefighting equipment. The equipment locker on the 44th floor of WTC 1 that was opened by a Port 

Authority employee did not have the equipment necessary for conducting large scale operations that were 

required in the building.341 Also, tenants on the upper floors of WTC 1 who attempted to provide medical 

aid to the injured and rescue people trapped in elevators indicated that they did not have the equipment 

needed to carryout those tasks.342 Additionally, protective clothing systems produced heat stress and 

added to the firefighters’ fatigue as they climbed the stairs.343 From these observations, it is apparent that 

the issue of pre-positioned equipment is vitally important for emergency response in high-rise buildings, 

and there should be a means for the emergency responder agencies and high-rise building owners to 

ensure that the pre-positioned equipment is adequately inspected, maintained, and certified for use. 

The emergency responder first-person interviews highlighted three pieces of equipment that made a 

difference in their operations that day; in fact, they are credited with saving the lives of many emergency 

responders. These items were: radios, flashlights, and SCBA’s (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) 

carried by the emergency responders. 

Radios 

Although significant problems were reported with the use of handie-talkie radios at the WTC site, many 

emergency responder personnel, from each of the emergency response organizations, reported that their 

radios played a part in saving their lives. Some statements extracted from first-person interviews related 

to hearing the calls for evacuating WTC 1 follow: 

▪ Later on my handie-talkie I heard an order to evacuate. Then there was a 

lot of handie-talkie communications. I believe there was a PAPD officer 

with an air-pack, and he had a radio and he told us there was an order to 

evacuate the building, WTC 1.344

 

340 FDNY Interview 37, winter 2004 and NYPD Interview 19, spring 2004. 341 PA Interview 10, fall 2003. 342 Building Occupant Interview 1000118. 343 FDNY Interviews 17, 28, and 33, winter 2004. 344 FDNY Interview 39, winter 2004. 
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106 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

▪ When I got to the 22nd floor there was a lot of debris, everything was 

pushed to the center of the building. The windows were knocked out and 

I could feel the wind. I could not see. I got a radio transmission that said 

everyone in Tower 1, get out.345

▪ Firehouse 10 located across the street from the WTC gave us the 

information that we needed. Lucky for us, those items were all relevant 

to Tower 1. House 10 was monitoring Tower 1 radio transmissions.346

▪ I heard my boss calling for help on the radio. He was trapped and calling 

for help. I knew that I had to go find him so I started talking to him on 

the radio. He was found by another fireman buried in rubble and he was 

rescued.347

▪ I heard a muffled message on my radio that there was a mayday, get out 

of the building. The south tower has come down.... I had an older radio; 

I didn’t have the new radio that they were phasing in. I had the old 

antique MX 330, it was twice the size of a normal radio, but it picked up 

everything.348

Flashlights 

During the response on September 11, 2001, emergency responders found that flashlights were an 

extremely important piece of equipment. In the darkness, smoke, and debris throughout the 

WTC complex, flashlights enabled emergency responders to find other emergency responders, occupants, 

and identify hazards. 349 Emergency responders used flashlights to find and navigate routes of evacuation 

for themselves and others. 350 In addition, flashlights provided a source of hope and comfort in the 

darkness. Emergency responders and others gathered around those who had flashlights as they evaluated 

their situation and developed evacuation strategies. There were cases where as many as 25 to 30 people 

would gather around a single flashlight in the darkness.351 Numerous emergency responders credited 

flashlights with saving their lives. 

The following statements concerning flashlights were extracted from the emergency responder firstperson interview notes: 

▪ I was in the super heated gases in the epicenter, which was sort of 

hellish. A fellow responder took his flashlight and pointed me in a 

direction. I hobbled and crawled. I finally hit WFC 2.352

 

345 FDNY Interview 42, winter 2004. 346 FDNY Interview 47, winter 2004. 347 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 348 FDNY Interview 9, winter 2004. 349 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 350 FDNY Interview 32, winter 2004. 351 NYPD Interview 19, spring 2004. 352 FDNY Interview 12, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 107

▪ I told everyone, don’t move, and stay where you are. I didn’t want to 

cause a secondary collapse. Just look, we were able to find flashlights... 

I said, just look around you, and see if you can see a way out.353

▪ It was dark in the stairwell. If I didn’t have a flashlight, I’d be on night 

vision. It was dark. Plus, with the smoke and soot and there’s no 

windows. I think the emergency light was working, but it wasn’t very 

bright.354

▪ The interviewee began to hear the beeping and chirping of the 

firefighters pass devices. The interviewee didn’t have a flashlight and it 

was pitch black inside the building, but someone did have their flashlight 

and turned it on. He could see the light and he then knew that he was not 

blind. That gave him hope. They had light. Others gathered around the 

light. Soon there was a large group of people only a few around the light 

could see.... Others got close and made physical contact in the darkness. 

The little flashlight helped. The people in the front of the line with the 

light could see where they were going. The people at the other end of the 

line away from the light could not see and held on following the lead of 

the rest.355

▪ The firefighter chopped a hole through the wall. The police and the Port 

Authority personnel went through the same hole to exit. He was using 

his flashlight to help people walking through the hole to see.356

▪ He also gave the medical oxygen bottle to a firefighter that needed help. 

His flashlight saved his life by lighting his way out.357

▪ People were in sneakers and they had flashlights and masks and the only 

thing I could assume right there is that these people knew what they were 

doing because of 1993. I’m quite sure that they had some kind of fire 

drills because of the bombing in 1993.358

These comments from emergency responders point out the importance of having a reliable flashlight 

during a serious incident. The comments are only a small sample of statements made by emergency 

responders concerning their flashlights and how they played an important roll in life saving that day. 

When considering the issue of flashlight usage, it should not be forgotten that on September 11, 2001, it 

was a clear, blue sky day with no clouds. By the time WTC 2 collapsed, the sun had risen to a relatively 

high angle in the sky, and the WTC site was well illuminated. However, with the collapse of WTC 2, this 

pristine day suddenly became so black that people literally could not see their hands in front of their 

 

353 FDNY Interview 25, winter 2004. 354 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 355 NYPD Interview 3, winter 2004. 356 PA Interview 2, fall 2003. 357 PA Interview 6, fall 2003. 358 PA Interview 9, fall 2003. 
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108 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

faces, even outside of the buildings in the open space of the streets. 359 Inside the buildings, emergency 

responders not only had to deal with dust and smoke, but also were located in areas where the loss of 

electrical power made the area pitch black. This condition was described particularly by people who were 

trapped in the Concourse level of the WTC and people in the lower floors of the WTC 1 staircases. 

Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) 

The third piece of equipment reported as being extremely valuable by emergency responders was the airpack or SCBA. Numerous emergency responders indicated that they used their SCBAs to breathe after 

the WTC towers fell. The air was thick with debris, dust, and smoke and most people found it difficult to 

breathe.360 Personnel with SCBAs were able to place the mask over their faces and breathe fresh air from 

the air bottle even through the outside air was thick with dust and smoke. Many of the emergency 

responders with SCBAs shared their air supply with others around them. The following is a sample of 

statements made by emergency responders during first-person interviews related to the use of their 

SCBA’s: 

▪ One of the men near him had a SCBA air-pack and they were able to 

buddy breathe as they made their way out of the building.361

▪ One of then had an air-pack. They were all vomiting; breathing was 

difficult. They shared the air-pack so that they could breathe fresh air. 

They were able to exit the building in about ten minutes and ended up on 

South End Avenue.362

▪ My air-pack was great; it saved my life and I am glad I was trained with 

it.363

▪ My air-pack and my flashlight saved my life.364

▪ If we didn’t have our air-packs, we wouldn’t have made it.365

5.9 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS AT WORLD TRADE CENTER 7 

World Trade Center 7 (WTC 7) was an important building with regard to the attack on the World Trade 

Center. The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was located on the 3rd and 23rd

floors of WTC 7.366 The OEM office on the 23rd floor contained the emergency operations post for OEM 

and was designed to function as a command center to help coordinate multi-agency operations at 

 

359 FDNY Interview 12, winter 2004. 360 FDNY Interview 67, spring 2004. 361 FDNY Interview 67, spring 2004. 362 FDNY Interview 64, spring 2004. 363 NYPD Interview 8, winter 2004. 364 NYPD Interview 19, winter 2004. 365 PA Interview 8, fall 2003. 366 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 109

incidents in the city.367 (Sheirer 2004) On September 11, 2001, WTC 7 became threatened as the 

WTC complex was attacked. 

When the first aircraft struck WTC 1, the electrical power went out for several seconds inside WTC 7.368 

Many people immediately began leaving the building, and the OEM operations center began receiving 

calls related to the emergency.369 As the second aircraft struck WTC 2, a decision was made to evacuate 

WTC 7.370 By the time WTC 2 was struck by the second aircraft at 9:03 a.m., many WTC 7 occupants 

had already left the building and others had begun a self-evacuation of the building. Shortly after WTC 2 

was struck, a firefighter entered WTC 7 from the Washington and Vesey Streets side, connected a hose 

line onto the “A” stairwell sprinkler riser and started the Engines pumps.371 At approximately 9:30 a.m., 

FDNY, EMS established a Division for assisting victims at WTC 7.372 An EMS triage center was 

established in the lobby of WTC 7 as occupants from WTC 1 and WTC 6 evacuated through WTC 7.373 

At approximately 9:44 a.m., after the report of a third aircraft heading into the city and news that the 

Pentagon had been attacked, a Deputy OEM Commissioner ordered the complete evacuation of WTC 7. 

(Sheirer 2004) This order included the evacuation of the OEM operations center on the 23rd floor. The 

loss of the OEM operations center created difficulties related to the coordination of emergency responder 

operations and resources.374 Before the OEM operations center was evacuated, OEM had assigned 

personnel to work with each of the emergency responder command posts. This reduced the impact of the 

loss of the WTC 7 OEM office. (See Chapter 8.) Occupants evacuating from WTC 7 used both the 

elevators and stairways as they left the building.375 Shortly after WTC 7 was evacuated, the FDNY Fire 

Commissioner arrived, looking for the Mayor who he believed to be at the OEM center on the 23rd floor. 

A guard met the Commissioner in the lobby and ordered him and his staff out of the building. The guard 

told him, “This building has been evacuated.” and that “OEM, the mayor, they’re all gone.” 

(Von Essen 2002) 

At 9:59 a.m., WTC 2 collapsed, and debris from the collapse struck the south face of WTC 7.376 At 

10:28 a.m., WTC 1 collapsed and a significant amount of damage was done to WTC 7.377 A large amount 

of debris crashed through the front center of the building from approximately the 10th floor down to 

ground level, and debris ripped a part of the southwest corner off from approximately the 8th floor up to 

the 18th floor.378 The collapse of WTC 1 also appears to be responsible for starting fires inside of 

WTC 7.379 With the collapse of the two towers, a New York City employee and a WTC 7 building staff 

person became trapped inside of WTC 7.380 The two had gone to the OEM center on the 23rd floor and 

 

367 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 368 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 369 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 370 WTC 7 Interview 1110402, fall 2002. 371 WTC 7 Interview 2110402, fall 2002. 372 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, New York, August 2002. 373 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 374 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 375 WTC7 Interviews 1110402 and 2110402, fall 2002. 376 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 377 PAPD Interview 1, fall 2003. 378 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 379 FDNY Interview 19, winter 2004. 380 WTC 7 Interviews 2041604 and 1041704, spring 2004. 
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110 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

found no one there. As they went to get into an elevator to go downstairs the lights inside of WTC 7 

flickered as WTC 2 collapsed. At this point, the elevator they were attempting to catch no longer worked, 

so they started down the staircase. When they got to the 6th floor, WTC 1 collapsed, the lights went out in 

the staircase, the sprinklers came on briefly, and the staircase filled with smoke and debris. The two men 

went back to the 8th floor broke out a window and called for help. Firefighters on the ground saw them 

and went up the stairs. In addition, a security officer for one of the businesses in the building was also 

was trapped on the 7th floor by the smoke in the stairway. As the firefighters went up, they vented the 

stairway and cleared some of the smoke. They first met the security officer on the 7th floor and 

firefighters escorted him down the stairs. Other firefighters from the group continued up the stairs, shined 

their flashlight through the staircase smoke and called out. The two trapped men on the 8th floor saw the 

flashlight beam and heard the firefighters calling and went down the stairway. The firefighters took the 

men outside and directed them away from the building.381

At approximately 11:30 a.m., FDNY assigned a Chief Officer to take charge of operations at WTC 7. 

The Chief was initially given orders to put the fires out in WTC 7.382 From the Chief’s assigned location 

at WTC 7, he reported that looking south toward WTC 7, they could not see the building because of the 

large smoke and dust cloud. The Chief Officer was able to negotiate the debris fields, get to the building, 

and see the WTC 7 logo on the side. There were numerous burned out FDNY vehicles around WTC 7. 

At the corner of Vesey and West Broadway, a FDNY Engine was connected to a hydrant at the corner of 

WTC 7. Hose lines were stretched, and the Engine’s pump was still running even though the Engine was 

on fire and was almost burned out. There was no water coming out of the hydrant system.383 One FDNY 

Chief Officer that entered WTC 7 indicated that he opened a standpipe on the 4th floor of one stairway 

and found no water in the standpipe system.384 A FDNY fire boat and the retired FDNY fire boat 

“Harvey” were located at the shore on the Hudson River near the site. They were starting to stretch lines 

up to the WTC.385 According to the FDNY first-person interviews, water was never an issue at WTC 7 

since firefighting was never started in the building.386 When the Chief Officer in charge of WTC 7 got to 

Barclay Street and West Broadway, numerous firefighters and officers were coming out of WTC 7. 

These firefighters indicated that several blocks needed to be cleared around WTC 7 because they thought 

that the building was going to collapse.387

Con Edison personnel arrived at the scene and consulted with FDNY. They wanted to know if they 

should cut the power off at the WTC 7 power station. It was decided to leave the power on and not allow 

Con Edison personnel to enter WTC 7 because it was not safe.388 The Con Edison personnel also 

indicated that fuel tanks were located in the lower level of WTC 7. However, they could not determine if 

the fuel tanks were involved with the fires burning in the building. FDNY personnel reported that they 

did not see any indication of burning liquid fuels before the building collapsed.389 No accurate time is 

 

381 WTC 7 Interviews 2041604 and 1041704, spring 2004. 382 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 383 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 384 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 385 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 386 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2003. 387 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 388 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 389 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 111

available for this event during the operations; however, the sequence of events indicates that it occurred 

between approximately 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. 

One Battalion Chief coming from the building indicated that they had searched floors 1 through 9 and 

found that the building was clear.390 In the process of the search, the Battalion Chief met the building’s 

Fire Safety Director and former Deputy Fire Safety Director on the ninth floor. The Fire Safety Director 

reported that the building’s floors had been cleared from the top down. By this time, the Chief Officer 

responsible for WTC 7 reassessed the building again and determined that fires were burning on the 

following floors: 6, 7, 8, 17, 21, and 30.391 No accurate time is available for these actions during the 

WTC 7 operations; however, the sequence of event indicates that it occurred during a time period from 

12:30 p.m. to approximately 2:00 p.m. 

The Chief Officer then met with his command officer to discuss the building’s condition and FDNY’s 

capabilities for controlling the building fires. A Deputy Chief who had just returned from inside the 

building reported that he had conducted an inspection up to the 7th or 8th floor.392 He indicated that the 

stairway was filling with smoke and that there was a lot of fire inside the building. The chiefs discussed 

the situation and the following conditions were identified: 393, 394

• The building had sustained damage from debris falling into the building, and they were not 

sure about the structural stability of the building. 

• The building had large fires burning on at least six floors. Any one of these six fires would 

have been considered a large incident during normal FDNY operations. 

• There was no water immediately available for fighting the fires. 

• They didn’t have equipment, hose, standpipe kits, tools, and enough handie talkies for 

conducting operations inside the building. 

At approximately, 2:30 p.m., FDNY officers decided to completely abandon WTC 7, and the final order 

was given to evacuate the site around the building. 395, 396 The order terminated the ongoing rescue 

operations at WTC 6 and on the rubble pile of WTC 1. Firefighters and other emergency responders were 

withdrawn from the WTC 7 area, and the building continued to burn. At approximately 5:20 p.m., some 

three hours after WTC 7 was abandoned the building experienced a catastrophic failure and collapsed. 

 

390 FDNY Interview 26, winter 2004. 391 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 392 FDNY interview 14, winter 2004. 393 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 394 FDNY Interview 14, winter 2004. 395 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 396 FDNY interview 14, winter 2004. 
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112 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

5.10 REFERENCES 

9/11 Commission, 2004. Eleventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 

the United States, video transcript, May. 

Atwell, Mitchell Production, 2002. A Tale of Two Towers – Part One, Electric Sky, Brighton, UK. 

Bush, L. S., et al. 1979, Introduction to Fire Science, second edition, Macmillan Publishing Company, 

Inc., New York. 

Cerreta, Kenneth, 1993. Stopping the Smoke, WNYF 3rd, New York City Fire Department, New York, 

NY. 

Dunn, Vincent, 1998. Collapse of Burning Buildings, A Guide to Fireground Safety, Fire Engineering 

Books and Videos, Penn Well Publishing Company, Saddle Brook, NJ. 

Endsley, M.R., 1988. Design and evaluation for situation awareness enhancement, Proceedings of the 

Human Factors Society, 32nd Annual Meeting, pp. 97-101, Santa Monica, CA. 

Gross, D., 1977. Measurements of Fire Loads and Calculations of Fire Severity, Wood and Fiber, Vol. 9, 

No. 1, Special Fire Symposium Issue, the Society of Wood Science and Technology, Part 1, Spring. 

Hall, Richard, and Adams, Barbara, editors, 2000. Essentials of Fire Fighting, fourth edition, 

International Fire Service Training Association, Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma State University, 

Stillwater, OK, April. 

Isner, Michael S., and Klem, Thomas J., 1993. Explosion and Fire Disrupt World Trade Center, NFPA 

Journal, Quincey, MA, November/December. 

Klaene, Ben, 2001. Firefighters’ use of elevators, NFPA Journal, National Fire Protection Association, 

Quincy, MA. 

Lawson, J. Randall, Twilley, William H., and Malley, Kevin S., 2000. Development of a Dynamic 

Compression Test Apparatus for Measuring Thermal Performance of Firefighters’ Protective Clothing, 

NISTIR 6502, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, April. 

Muhr, Thomas, 1997. Atlas.ti, Scientific Software Development’s, Berlin. 

National Fire Protection Association, 1997. “Fire Protection Handbook,” Section 6 - Suppression, 

Quincy, MA. 

NIST, 2004. NIST Face-to-Face Interview data set, Gaithersburg, MD. 

NFPA, 1997. Fire Protection Handbook, eighteenth edition, National Fire Protection Association, 

Quincy, MA. 

NFPA, 2003. Fire Protection Handbook, nineteenth edition, National Fire Protection Association, 

Quincy, MA. 
 Analysis of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 113

Sheirer, Richard J., 2004. Testimony Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, May. 

Situational Awareness (SA), Naval Aviation Schools Command website, 

https://wwwnt.cnet.navy.mil.crm/crm/stand_mat/seven_skills/SA.asp, Pensacola, FL. 

O’Hagan, John T., 1977. High Rise/Fire and Life Safety, Fire Engineering, Saddle Brook, NJ. 

Picciotto, Richard, and Paisner, Daniel, 2002. Last Man Down, The Berkley Publishing Group, Penguin 

Putnam Inc., New York, May. 

Reiss, Alan, 2004. Testimony Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, May. 

Strasser, Steven, 1995. A Cloud of Terror – And Suspicion, Article 13 of 18, Newsweek, April 3. 

Von Essen, Thomas, 2002. Strong of Heart Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York, Regan 

Books, HarperCollins Publishers, New York. 

Winslow, Daniel J., 2003. Elevator Usage in Fire Emergencies, American Society of Mechanical 

Engineers (ASME) International, Fairfield, NJ. 
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Chapter 6

PLANNING FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS IN TALL BUILDINGS

6.1 FIRE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROTOCOLS FOR TALL 

BUILDINGS 

On September 11, 2001, FDNY was conducting high-rise firefighting procedures based on their 

document, FDNY DCN: 3.02.01, Fire Fighting Procedures High-Rise Office Buildings, Volume 1, 

Book 5, January 1, 1997.1

 A complete copy of this document is located in Appendix I. The purpose of 

this documents as stated in the introduction is: 

• To describe High-Rise Class “E” office buildings. Over 800 of these structures can be found 

in New York City. 

• To point out the problems and features of such buildings with regard to fire. 

• To establish methods of operating at fires in such buildings, and recommend precautions that 

should be taken. 

According to this document there were three types of high-rise office buildings in New York City: 

1) Class “E” built before 1945, 2) Class “E” built between 1945 and 1968, and 3) Class “E” built after 

1968.1

 The WTC towers were built after 1968 and were in the third class. Construction characteristics of 

the post 1968 buildings are found in section 2.4 of the FDNY procedure. The following lists several 

construction details of a Class “E” high-rise building that are important to fire department operations: 

• The construction techniques used in these buildings resulted in a "lightweight" building 

• They were constructed with a lack of compartmentation. 

• The protection of the structural steel component is usually done by sprayed fire-resistive 

material. 

• Exterior walls or curtain walls constructed of a combination of glass and metal. 

• The ceiling plenums of these buildings are extensive and lack fire stopping. They are used to 

return the air to the air-conditioning system and for electrical, communications and other 

building support equipment. 

• Exterior windows usually can not be opened. 

• Fire towers are not required. 

 

1

 FDNY DCN: 3.02.01, Firefighting Procedures, High-Rise Office Buildings, Volume 1, Book 5, January 1, 1997. 
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116 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• Floors are light in weight usually consisting of lightweight concrete 

• Core construction techniques are used extensively. 

The FDNY strategic operating plan for evacuation and firefighting for the first alarm Battalion Chief is 

presented in section 6.1 of the FDNY High-Rise Building document.1

 The following provides a brief 

summary of the FDNY Strategic Operating Plan. See the complete Strategic Operations Plan in 

Appendix I. 

Strategic Operating Plan: 

• Determine the specific fire floor or the floors on which smoke is reported from any 

information that is available to you in the building lobby. 

• Verify the fire floor. Analyze information received from responsible occupant/building 

management personnel and/or the first arriving Ladder company. Determine the fire floor 

location as rapidly as possible. All future actions hinge on this vital information. 

• Simultaneously, or as soon as possible, begin the process of controlling evacuation. 

Occupants of numerous floors may have self-initiated evacuation. Due to large floor areas or 

maze like corridors, occupants on the fire floor may be unaware of the fire until it is too late 

to evacuate. Search of large areas will be required. Search and evacuation of the floor above 

the fire will also be required. 

• Gain control of the building systems: elevators, HVAC (Heat, Ventilation, and Air 

Conditioning system), communications, and fire pumps, confine and extinguish the fire. 

• Experience indicates any serious fire will require a large commitment of units and equipment 

because of extensive logistic problems and a need for frequent relief of members. 

In addition to these tasks listed above a Lobby Command Post is to be established and the Incident 

Command System is to be activated. The following FDNY procedure details information concerning the 

Lobby Command Post.1

Lobby Command Post: 

The lobby command post is established by the arriving units inside the building and manned by each 

succeeding officer in command. From this post operations conducted in the building by Fire Department 

units are coordinated and controlled. 

• The early establishment of a lobby command post will enable the chief in charge to exert 

central control over: evacuation, building systems, and the Fire Department units being 

deployed to locate, confine and extinguish the fire. 

• To assist the lobby command post, it may be necessary to establish areas of command as 

follows: operations post, search and evacuation post, and staging areas. 
 Planning For Major Operations in Tall Buildings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 117

• The lobby command post should provide the officer in command access to the following: the 

fire safety director, the fire safety plan, floor plans, the class "E" communications system, 

outside telephone lines, in-house telephone lines if available, building, elevator and window 

keys. 

• The lobby command post shall be established at a location that provides the following: 

accessibility to incoming units, control of the elevators, control of the building fire command 

station, facilities for communications with all needed fire department communications and 

established operations posts and staging areas, the fire pump room, the HVAC control center, 

and the building occupants. 

In addition to the establishment of the Lobby Command Post, Operations Posts are to be established 

within the high-rise building. The following procedure located in section 6.5 describes the Operations 

Post: 1

Operations Post: 

• It shall be established on the first floor below the fire, where conditions permit, and its 

location shall insure reliable communications with the operating units and the lobby 

command post. 

• The chief in charge of the operations post shall be responsible for control, communications 

with, and coordination of the in building staging areas, and units operating on the fire floor 

and the floor above. 

• Communications between the operations post and the lobby command post and the 

implementation of tactical procedures received from the lobby command post. 

• Advising the lobby command post of conditions, problems and the need for additional units, 

and consult with the lobby command post about tactical procedures. 

• Keeping in reserve an adequate number of units at the operations post for the orderly relief of 

units operating on the fire floor and the floor above. 

As the Command Posts are established the FDNY Incident Command System also became established. 

The FDNY Incident Command System Manual, ICS Manual, Part 1, May 1997 2

 describes policies and 

the structure of the system. The following is extracted from the manual: FDNY INCIDENT COMMAND 

SYSTEM. The complete document is located in Appendix A. 

FDNY Incident Command System Policy: 

The FDNY Incident Command System policy provided guidelines and concepts to manage an incident in 

an efficient organized manner; the document describes the components, operating capabilities and 

functions of the New York City Fire Department Incident Command System (ICS). The Incident 

 

2

 FDNY Incident Command System Manual, ICS Manual, Part 1, May 1997. 
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118 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Command System was designed to improve firefighter safety by providing better accountability of 

personnel and improved use of resources and tactical effectiveness.

The policy provides a general description of the ICS organizational structure and describes the duties and 

responsibilities for each position at various types of incidents. The FDNY-ICS breaks down the system 

elements for managing an incident into 5 main functions: COMMAND, PLANNING, OPERATIONS, 

LOGISTICS, and FINANCE. It was the function of the initial Incident Commander, to implement the 

necessary parts of the ICS based on the needs of the incident. As the incident grows in complexity, the 

Command function is transferred to succeeding officers. 

The FDNY Incident Command System described in this document was the official policy for the 

management of all incidents and the development of standard operating procedures that were in effect 

during the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001. The New York City Fire Department 

Incident Command System provided for the following kinds of operations: 

• Single jurisdiction and single agency. 

• Single jurisdiction and multi-agency. 

• Multi-jurisdiction and multi-agency involvement. 

This FDNY document stated that characteristic components of the Incident Command System policy 

interact to create a system that ensures optimum information management and control under normal or 

crisis conditions. Characteristics attributed to ensuring optimum information management and control 

are: common terminology, manageable span of control, modular organization, integrated 

communications, unified command structure, incident action planning, designated incident facilities, and 

resource management. During the WTC attack and operations, all of these Incident Command System 

procedures and policies were seriously challenged and experienced various degrees of performance. 

The above procedures and policies represent the basis for FDNY operations at the WTC associated with 

the 2001 attack. Review of the procedures and policies and comparing them with the actions taken by 

FDNY at the WTC shows that the procedures and policies were, to a great extent, being followed with 

this extremely large and complex operation. 

• In less than one hour FDNY had established three Lobby Command Posts, the original Lobby 

Command Post that was set up inside WTC 1, the second Lobby Command Post was set up 

inside of WTC 2, the third Lobby Command Post was set up inside the Marriott Hotel, a 

fourth FDNY Command Post was established on the street at the corner of West and Liberty 

Streets, and the Incident Command Post was set up near West and Vesey Streets in front of 

World Financial Center building two (WFC 2).3, 4

 

3

 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

4

 FDNY Interview 62, winter 2004. 
 Planning For Major Operations in Tall Buildings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 119

• The FDNY Field Communications unit had arrived and was functioning at the Incident 

Command Post in front of WFC 2.5

• FDNY had also set up an EMS Operations Post and they sectored the WTC area into four 

zones for operations regarding patient triage and treatment.6

• FDNY had also established staging areas for firefighting and EMS units, and EMS had called 

in a Mobile Emergency Response Vehicle (MERV) that established operations on Vesey 

Street between West Street and North End Avenue.7, 8

First-person interview data, FDNY documents, and media video support the premise that FDNY had 

established a functional Incident Command System when WTC 2 collapsed, and FDNY had the human 

and equipment resources committed for conducting high-rise operations at the WTC. However, the 

FDNY Incident Command System was hampered by the loss of the OEM Command Center, the lack of a 

fully functional Field Comm unit, poor radio communications, and limited access to shared information 

critical to operations.9, 10 The collapse of WTC 2 not only caused the death of numerous citizens and 

emergency responders, but it totally disrupted the ongoing Incident Command System Operations being 

carried out by the Fire Department. The Lobby Command Post inside WTC 2 was destroyed and all of its 

personnel died in the collapse. Orders were issued to evacuate WTC 1, and the WTC 1 Lobby Command 

Post was abandoned. The Incident Command Post in front of World Financial Center 2 (WFC 2) was 

mostly destroyed by the collapse of WTC 2, and robust operations ended at that location. The FDNY 

Incident Command Post in front of WFC 2 was completely destroyed with the collapse of WTC 1, and 

several of the commanding officers, including the FDNY Chief of Department, died at this time. 

6.2 PRE-PLANNING, TRAINING, AND STANDARD OPERATING 

PROCEDURES APPLIED AT THE WTC 

High-rise buildings, such as the WTC towers, are complex structures that house many thousands of 

people. Detailed emergency planning for these types of buildings is needed to enhance the safety of 

building occupants and emergency responders. Building owners and operators, fire departments, 

emergency medical services, and police departments need well-developed pre-plans that address safety 

issues associated with these unique and potentially high-risk properties. Not only do these groups need to 

develop pre-plans for emergencies in high-rise buildings, they must be sure that each of the pre-plans 

appropriately link to form a cohesive and functional unified plan that will be successful when it is 

challenged by an emergency situation. 

On September 11, 2001, the initial responding fire department companies were familiar with operations 

within the WTC and were familiar with the emergency plans for the towers. Many of the firefighters had 

been inside the towers before on previous operations. The Port Authority had conducted pre-planning for 

 

5

 FDNY Interview 61, winter 2004. 

6

 FDNY Interview 49, winter 2004. 

7

 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, New York, August 2002. 8

 FDNT Interview 55, winter 2004. 

9

 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 

10 FDNY Interview 58, winter 2004. 
Chapter 6 

120 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

building emergencies in the towers and had worked with FDNY, particularly after the 1993 bombing, to 

enhance safety at the buildings. As part of FDNY’s document “Firefighting Procedures, High-Rise Office 

Building,”1

 a section refers to the “Strategic Operations Plan” for high-rise operations. This plan 

established operations practices that were designed to link with the building owner’s high-rise emergency 

plan. 

Some key elements of FDNY pre-planning for high-rise building operations relate to: 

• planning for operations with the high-rise building’s safety personnel 

• planning for operations with building security personnel 

• planning for operations with the local police department 

• knowing the construction and physical layout of the building, 

• understanding the building’s fire alarm and protections systems, 

• understanding the building’s standpipe systems, fire pumps, hookup points, in-house 

firefighting resources, and the overall firefighting water supply, 

• understanding the design and operations of the building’s emergency communications 

system, 

• understanding the building’s evacuation plan, elevators, stairways, and other building egress 

ways 

• plan for the safe use of fire department controlled elevators 

• knowing the capabilities of fire department radios and other means of communication as it 

relates to building design and locations where radio signals become lost or attenuated, and 

• information on the building’s HVAC system, its function, and means of building ventilation. 

Procedures for Implementing the Strategic Operating Plan 

The FDNY document “Firefighting Procedures, High-Rise Office Buildings” has a detailed description of 

how the Strategic Operating Plan was to be implemented. Listed below are some of the key factors for 

how the fire department was to put the plan into operation. The following was extracted from the FDNY 

document entitled “Firefighting Procedures, High-Rise Office Buildings,” January 1997.1

 Also see 

section 6.1 that lists details of the strategic operations plan and Appendix I. 

• The first arriving Battalion Chief was responsible for implementing the strategic operating 

plan, and the Battalion Chief was to position operations at the lobby command post. From 

this post, there would be control over all building systems through the fire safety director or a 

surrogate. The Battalion Chief would receive first-hand information about other problems 

that might develop on floors above the fire through the building communications networks. 
 Planning For Major Operations in Tall Buildings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 121

The Chief would have liaison with the Police Department for control of the lobby and the 

streets in the vicinity of the fire building. 

• The first arriving Battalion Chief would be required to make an initial size up to determine 

the adequacy of the response and the need for additional response. 

A 10-76 signal would be transmitted when a report of fire is confirmed. Any fire in a highrise office building which requires the stretching and operating of one hose line would 

necessitate the use of "All Hands." 

A second alarm would be warranted for any visible fire or smoke emanating through the 

exterior skin of the building or when a serious fire had been verified. 

Because of the large number of occupants in high-rise office buildings, even fires of a minor 

nature might require additional units to prevent unnecessary evacuation and panic. 

• The first arriving Battalion Chief would be also required to establish liaison with the fire 

safety director if present, or a surrogate to determine the following: 

Has the fire floor definitely been determined? 

What is the extent of the evacuation that has been implemented? 

Have there been any reports of severe life hazards? 

What is the status of the elevators and the HVAC system? 

Are there any access stairs in the vicinity of the reported fire floor? 

What communications have been established between the fire floor and the lobby command 

post? 

What communications have been established between the lobby command post and the 

occupants of the building? 

• Under normal fire situations in high-rise buildings, the Battalion Chief would arrange for the 

fire safety director or the evacuation supervisor to make an announcement over the PA 

system or the intercom system. "This is your Fire Safety Director, Dr. John Doe. The New 

York City Fire Department has just arrived to extinguish a fire on the floor. As they obtain 

information, we will pass it along to you. If your assistance is required, I will make such an 

announcement. In the meantime, please remain calm at your place of employment." In 

WTC 1, the intercom system was not functioning, and therefore, an announcement of this 

type could not have been communicated. In fact, there is no evidence that this type of 

message was delivered. In WTC 2, there is no evidence from the several announcements 

made from the Fire Command Desk in the building that a message containing this content 

was communicated. 
Chapter 6 

122 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• The fire department also had a high-rise operations check list that would be used for 

obtaining additional information critical for operations in the fire building. The first arriving 

Battalion Chief would make use of this check list as soon as possible to advance the 

collection of additional information needed for operations. 

The Port Authority had prepared an extensive pre-plan manual for emergency procedures at the WTC. 

The original manual was prepared in 1988 and had been updated annually. The manual had already been 

updated during 2001 and this revised plan was in effect on September 11, 2001. The manual was entitled, 

“World Trade Center Emergency Procedures Manual 2001,”11 it contained plans for natural disasters and 

a full range of other threats to the buildings. A copy of this Port Authority emergency procedures manual 

are contained in Appendix J. In addition, the plan highlighted cooperation between PAPD, FDNY, and 

NYPD. 

Firefighter Training 

At the time of the 2001 WTC attack, FDNY had several training programs to prepare its members for 

operations inside high-rise buildings. The basic Probationary Firefighter School curriculum gave new 

personnel a minimum of 25 weeks of training. This training provided basic skills that were needed by a 

firefighter for operating under the direction of a Company Officer in a high-rise firefighting environment. 

A second level of training consisted of the “First Line Supervisors Training Program” which was directed 

at training company officers. In this program, the officers received approximately eight hours in training 

that focused on high-rise firefighting. The third level of training on high-rise operations was for Battalion 

Chiefs and consisted of training associated with the department’s 40-plus page document on high-rise 

firefighting. A copy of this document is located in Appendix I. The Battalion Chief training dealt with 

building design and construction, working with building fire safety directors, communications, incident 

command, use of fireman service elevators, stairways, evacuation, Ladder company operations, and 

firefighting operations. 

 

11 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, World Trade Center Emergency Procedures Manual 2001, New York, NY.
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 123

Chapter 7

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS AND ANALYSIS

7.1 INTRODUCTION 

On September 11, 2001, radio and telephone communications played a significant role in the operations 

of emergency responders at the World Trade Center (WTC). Radio and telephone communications were 

a primary means of communicating information to emergency responders. These forms of 

communication were also used by emergency responders to communicate with people trapped in the 

WTC buildings and people attempting to evacuate from the buildings. They were used to communicate 

between members of the same emergency responder departments for planning and operations at the WTC, 

and they were used to communicate between different departments or responding organizations. 

Each of the governmental departments that had emergency responders at the WTC—New York City Fire 

Department (FDNY), New York City Police Department (NYPD), and the Port Authority Police 

Department (PAPD)—depended on their ability to communicate to accomplish their mission and to 

obtain information related to operations safety during the attack. Personnel from each of the departments 

used radios, cellular phones, and wired or landline telephones for communications during the 

WTC operations. Other forms of communication at the WTC included the warden telephone system, and 

the use of Blackberry communications systems. In addition, the emergency responders relied on the most 

basic form of communication, direct face-to-face communications. 

As a normal practice during a typical emergency response many radio and telephone communications are 

recorded by the respective departments that respond to an incident. These recordings are normally made 

by the departments to provide an accurate record of operations during an incident. These records are 

often used by departments during review of department operations. They are also used for investigative 

purposes and are sometimes used as evidence in legal cases. During the attack on the WTC, many of the 

emergency responder communications were recorded and preserved. This study is based on these 

recordings. In addition, information gathered by personnel from the NIST, during first-person interviews 

with more than 100 emergency responders has contributed to the report. 

7.1.1 Objectives 

The objective of this section is to develop a better understanding of the role that emergency 

communications played during the response to the WTC attack, and to quantify information related to 

communications effectiveness. 

Many factors are associated with the ability of emergency communications to be successful. The 

following objectives were set in this report: 

• To document radio and telephone communications operations, 

• To document radio communications readability or understandability, 
Chapter 7 

124 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• To quantify radio communications traffic volume, 

• To understand the impact of traffic volume on communications readability and the transfer of 

information, 

• To identify communications associated with dispatch and arrival of responders, 

• To identify communications related to evacuation and emergency response operations, and 

• To identity communications related to building conditions at the WTC and the impact of this 

information on the emergency response. 

7.1.2 Telephone and Radio Communications Recordings 

Both the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) and the NYPD supplied copies of audio 

recordings from the emergency response operations at the WTC. The PANYNJ provided digital copies of 

the audio communications tapes recorded by them during operations on September 11. These recordings 

included communications from emergency response personnel, maintenance personnel, PAPD personnel, 

and a recording of the FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio repeater that was located at the 

WTC. The FDNY Channel 7 and PA, WTC Channel 30 radio frequencies are the same radio 

communications frequencies. The FDNY Channel 7 designation represents the actual tuning knob switch 

location on the fire department’s handie-talkie radios. The Port Authority identified this same repeater 

channel as Channel 30 as a result of the PA radio communications system architecture. The FDNY 

Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater frequency was a FDNY city-wide channel designated for use 

in high-rise building operations. This repeater was installed because FDNY handie-talkie radio 

communications within the WTC towers was relatively poor, and the radio repeater would increase 

transmission power improving the radio signal. The combination of increased radio transmission power 

and the location of the repeater antenna outside of the WTC buildings on top of WTC 5 provided better 

radio coverage for the complex and increase the likelihood that FDNY personnel working inside the 

towers would be able to communicate with others while using their handie-talkie radios. The Port 

Authority had installed this radio repeater system at the WTC for use by FDNY after the 1993 

bombing.1, 2 

Because telephone communication (both landline and cellular phone) was a contributing part of the 

emergency communications process during the WTC attack, NIST received copies of telephone 

emergency response communications from the PANYNJ. Identification information for these recordings 

is listed in Attachment 3. 

The NYPD submitted their communications to NIST in the form of audio tapes copied from the original 

tapes recorded on September 11, 2001. These tapes included radio communications from NYPD Special 

Operations, Division One, and city-wide operations. 

 

1

 PA Interview 2, fall 2003. 

2

 PA Interview 11, fall 2003. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 125

FDNY communications recordings were not available from the WTC location on September 11, 2001, 

because the primary Field Communications truck was in the shop for repairs and a backup Field 

Communications van was used in its place. The backup Field Communications van did not have the 

capability to record the on-scene incident command or tactical communications. Also, the backup van 

was destroyed when the towers collapsed. Therefore, the best record of radio communications available 

to NIST on FDNY operations at the WTC came from the FDNY Channel 7 high-rise repeater / PA, 

WTC Radio Channel 30 tape and accounts provided by FDNY personnel during their interviews. The 

Channel 7 / Channel 30 tape provides a limited amount of information on FDNY communications and 

operations at the WTC, but it does provide insight into FDNY operations inside WTC 2. NIST also 

received the FDNY Manhattan radio dispatch channel recordings for the period just prior to the 

WTC attack until the time when WTC 1 collapsed. 

Each audio communications file was received from the source with the starting and ending times marked 

on the media jacket or the surface of the media. A list of all communications recordings acquired from 

the various departments is found in Attachment 3 at the end of the report. 

The City of New York provided NIST with opportunities to review their telephone recordings for 9-1-1 

Emergency Operators and FDNY fire dispatchers in their New York City offices. 

7.2 TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS 

7.2.1 Accounts of Telephone Communications 

There were 116 first-person interviews conducted with emergency responders who reported to the 

WTC on the morning of September 11, 2001. The following information was drawn from these 

interviews: 

• Before the attack occurred on the WTC, both the landline and cellular systems appeared to be 

working normally. 

• Only moments after the first aircraft impacted WTC 1, the landline and cellular telephone 

systems were stressed by increased caller volume making it difficult to get messages through. 

This condition continued for many hours following the attack. 

• Telephone calls from the WTC to the 9-1-1 emergency operators and statements from various 

individuals being interviewed show that even though WTC 1 and WTC 2 were severely 

damaged by the aircraft impact and fires, many of the landline telephones in the buildings 

continued to work up until the collapse of WTC 2. 

The following is from emergency responder first-person interviews and deals with telephone 

communications from inside WTC 1: 

▪ One of my guys called up on the warden phone. There was one on every 

floor in the building and you can call the Lobby Command Post with it. 

He called but he couldn’t get through and we went to the Verizon 
Chapter 7 

126 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Company on the 23rd floor and he called the Manhattan dispatcher on the 

phone and told them to pass a message to the Lobby Command Post.3

▪ I didn’t have a dial tone. So I went into another office there and I called 

the fire dispatcher and got through on a regular telephone. This was 

around the 18th floor. We could not get through on the radio, and I am 

sure they had their hands full down there at the Lobby Command Post.4

• After the collapse of WTC 2, a number of cellular phone systems were not functional in the 

area of lower Manhattan. A number of emergency responders attempted to use their cellular 

phones to make calls since they were unable to communicate using their radios. Many of 

these attempts were unsuccessful either due to failure of the cellular phone system or the high 

communications traffic volume that occurred. 

• After the collapse of WTC 2, there were still some landline telephones working within the 

city block areas adjacent to the WTC site. 

7.2.2 PAPD Police Desk Telephone Calls 

Throughout the operations, while the PAPD Police Desk in WTC 5 was staffed and just before the 

collapse of WTC 2, the police desk was receiving radio and telephone calls concerning building 

occupants, building conditions, and operations. Most of the telephone calls related to operations and the 

location of people in the buildings. However, there was another category of telephone calls coming in 

that distracted the Police Desk operators from their efforts to save lives: calls from the news media. 

These included calls from news organizations in the immediate area and other locations on the east coast 

of the United States. In addition, there was a telephone call from a radio talk show on the West Coast and 

another telephone call from a news service in Europe. The PAPD Police Desk personnel tried to be 

helpful but also attempted to transfer the callers to another telephone number for assistance. These efforts 

took valuable time and potentially delayed critical communications with the emergency responders at the 

scene. 

7.2.3 New York City 9-1-1 Emergency Telephone System 

The New York City 9-1-1 Emergency Telephone System also was flooded with telephone calls and 

experienced periods where the system was stressed by the number of incoming calls.5,6 The New York 

City 9-1-1 Emergency Telephone Center was staffed as usual with dozens of telephone operators who 

received incoming calls and determined if the calls were for NYPD, FDNY, or EMS. Each 9-1-1 operator 

had a computer for logging in calls, transferring written information, and the ability to switch telephone 

 

3

 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 

4

 FDNY Interview 35, winter 2004. 

5

 NYPD Interview 13, winter 2004. 

6

 NIST review of 9-1-1 tapes, 2004. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 127

calls to the appropriate city department.7

 As emergency calls were being switched, the 9-1-1 operators 

would monitor the call to insure that it was responded to by the assigned department. 

On the morning of September 11, 2001, telephone calls received from people trapped inside the 

WTC towers were transferred to the FDNY dispatchers. Information concerning injured and trapped 

people was collected by the FDNY dispatchers, the information would be evaluated, and then the 

dispatcher would attempt to transmit the information to the FDNY Incident Command Post or to the Field 

Comm unit located at the Incident Command Post in front of WFC 2. Since the radio communications 

system also was experiencing problems with a large volume of radio traffic, all information did not get 

through to the people who needed it. Additionally, the large amount of incoming data presented a 

problem for FDNY dispatchers related to evaluating and retransmitting the information to all individuals 

needing it. Once information was transmitted by the FDNY dispatchers and received by the FDNY 

WTC Incident Commander, FDNY units were assigned to go to a specific location and assist the trapped 

or injured occupant (s). 

7.3 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 

In general, emergency responders felt that their equipment was adequate for the operations they were 

carrying out before the WTC towers collapsed. There was one notable exception: this was the FDNY 

handie-talkies used throughout the department by Chief Officers down to the first line firefighter. 

7.3.1 Handie-Talkie (HT) Radios Used by FDNY on September 11, 2001 

FDNY personnel knew from years of experience - including their communications experience during the 

1993 bombing of the WTC - that the handie-talkies used by the department did not work well inside highrise buildings. (Fusco 1993) Buildings containing large amounts of steel and reinforced concrete are 

known to attenuate radio communications signals. Radio signals also may be attenuated by 

electromagnetic interference and radio signal reflections, and each of these attenuation modes can be 

found in large cities with high-rise buildings. The radios used by FDNY during the 1993 bombing and 

until March 14, 2001, were Motorola Saber 1 and Saber 1E models. These radios had the following 

attributes: 

• Operating frequency - 150 MHZ, VHF band 

• Type of operation - analog with 1 Watt of output power 

• The radios had seven radio channels distributed as follows: Six channels were simplex or 

point-to-point operation channels; one channel was a duplex or repeater channel which used a 

153 MHz transmitter frequency and a 154 MHz receiver frequency. 

Table 7–1 shows the HT operating channels and radio frequencies as specified in FDNY A.U.C. 179 

Utilization of Company Handie Talkie8

. The complete document is located in Appendix K. It should 

be noted that this document was in abeyance as the result of a March 22, 2001, FDNY order. However, 

 

7

 NYPD Interview 15, winter 2004. 

8

 Fire Department City of New York, DCN 4.0306, Utilization of Company Handie Talkie, A.C.U. 179, July 1996. 
Chapter 7 

128 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

the document was the basis for Company handie-talkie radio usage during the WTC attack on 

September 11, 2001. 

Table 7–1. HT radio frequency allocation and use. 

 Channel Frequency 

1 Universal Handie - Talkie 153.83 MHz 

2 City Wide Base 154.43 MHz 

3 Queens Mobile 154.40 MHz 

4 Manhattan Mobile 154.01 MHz 

5 Brooklyn Mobile 153.95 MHz 

6 Staten Island Mobile 154.07 MHz 

7 Hi - Rise Repeater TX 153.89 MHz 

RX 154.43 MHz 

Note: In the table above, TX refers to the transmit frequency and RX refers to the receive 

frequency. 

The radio channel is set on the handie-talkie radio by rotating a control knob at the top of the radio. 

In addition to these VHF band HT frequencies FDNY was using the following communications 

frequencies on September 11, 2001: Manhattan Fire 154.25 MHz, Brooklyn Fire 154.37 MHz, Bronx 

Fire 154.19 MHz, and Staten Island Fire 154.19 MHz. 

On March 14, 2001, FDNY began to field new 400 MHz band handie-talkie radios. They were Motorola 

model XTS 3500 R radios with the following attributes: 

• Operating frequency band - 400 MHZ, UHF. 

• Type of operation - digital operation. 

• Transmitter output power - 2 Watts and 5 Watts. 

• The radios had 16 communications channels of which channels 15 and 16 were not assigned. 

The remaining channels were assigned as follows: channels 1 through 3 were all Borough 

fireground tactical and command channels; channel 4 through 8 were assigned as specific 

Borough fireground channels; channel 9 was the future high-rise in-building repeater channel; 

channel 10 was the Battalion mobile repeater channel; channels 11 and 12 were subway 

repeater channels; channel 13 was EMS/fire fireground; and channel 14 was the railroad 

repeater channel. 

On March 19, 2001, a FDNY firefighter using the new 400 MHz digital radio became trapped during 

firefighting operations. The firefighter used his radio and called Mayday several times but was not heard. 

The firefighter was rescued, but the failure of this Mayday to get through raised questions about the new 

radio’s capabilities.9

 On March 21, 2001, the new 400 MHz band radios were recalled by FDNY and 

 

9

 Written Communication from New York City, October 6, 2004. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 129

were replaced by the Saber radios previously used by the department for a period of about 10 years.10 

These were the radios used by FDNY during emergency operations at the 1993 WTC bombing. These 

Saber handie-talkie radios were used by FDNY during the September 11, 2001, attack on the WTC. The 

poor operating performance of these older radios in high-rise buildings was well known to firefighters and 

chiefs, and raised concerns by many personnel that the radios would not perform well during the 

WTC operations. Their concerns were proven to be valid. 

The following is a statement drawn from the emergency responder first-person interviews and concerns 

communications in high-rise firefighting environments: 

▪ It was stated that communications in high-rise fires had been a problem 

as long as the interviewee had been on the department, so it was not a 

surprise that they had problems at the WTC on the morning of 

September 11, 2001.11

In addition, FDNY management, selected chiefs, and Field Comm were using some Motorola UHF, 

800 MHz, analog radios for command communications.12 These radios were used on a trunking system 

that processes the radio communication and then routes the message as it is being retransmitted by the 

system. These 800 MHz radios were not used by FDNY fire and rescue companies operating inside the 

WTC complex. However, it was being used by FDNY command personnel for communications during 

WTC operations. FDNY informed NIST that the FDNY 800 MHz command radio traffic was not 

recorded during the WTC operations on September 11, 2001. 

As mentioned earlier, another component of the FDNY radio communications system used on 

September 11, 2001, at the WTC was the high-rise repeater system located in WTC 5. Communications 

through the WTC high-rise repeater were carried out with the use of the Saber handie-talkie radios 

discussed above. The handie-talkie radio’s channel selector switch would be set on Channel 7, which 

would allow communications through the high-rise repeater system. 

7.3.2 Radio Repeater Systems Used by FDNY at the WTC 

FDNY had instituted several efforts to improve communications inside high-rise buildings. They worked 

with building owners and encouraged them to install building/complex repeater systems that would assist 

with building radio communications. The PANYNJ installed a building/complex repeater system for 

FDNY following the 1993 bombing. This repeater system was designed to provide 95 to 98 percent 

coverage for the WTC site.13 In addition, FDNY conducted tests to evaluate the repeater’s performance 

and found it to be acceptable.14 In addition, FDNY developed what they referred to as the “battalion car 

cross-band repeater” that also could be used to enhance radio communications inside of high-rise 

buildings. In a 1998 article, Battalion Chief Orio J. Palmer of FDNY wrote about the use of repeater 

 

10 Written Communication from New York City, October 6, 2004. 

11 FDNY Interview 34, winter 2004. 

12 Written Communication from New York City, October 6, 2004. 

13 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey written communication, August 1, 2005. 14 Letter from Stephen M. Gregory, FDNY, to Alan L. Reiss, PANYNJ, dated January 19, 1994. 
Chapter 7 

130 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

systems to improve radio communications during high-rise operations. The following is a quote from his 

WNYF article: 15

“The primary use of the battalion car repeater was to assist the Incident 

Commander in the lobby of a high-rise building in communicating with 

members on the upper floors when transmissions were affected adversely 

by the building. If the battalion car with the installed cross-band repeater 

is positioned approximately 60 feet from the building, there is a much 

greater chance of the battalion car repeater receiving a one-watt signal 

form a handie-talkie transmitting from an upper floor than any handie 

talkies located within the building at the lobby command post (LCP). 

The signal does not have to pass through numerous floors of steel and 

steel-reinforced concrete.” 

“The battalion car cross-band repeater is not a cure-all for 

communications in high-rise buildings or large complexes, but the UHF 

radio may provide a link between the lobby command post and remote 

members where no link exists.” 

Two different radio repeater systems were used at the WTC during the 2001 operations. One was the 

building/complex radio repeater system installed at the site by the PA, and the second was the battalion 

car cross-band repeater (Figures 7–1, 7–2, and 7–3). The following are descriptions of the two systems. 

7.3.3 Building/Complex FDNY Radio Repeater 

The WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater was located inside WTC 5 and the antenna for the repeater was 

located on roof of WTC 5 and was aimed up and directly at WTC 1 and 2.16 With this antenna 

configuration, the repeater provided coverage for both towers. The repeater was a Motorola base station 

model MSR 2000. It had an output power of approximately 50 watts. The radio repeater was a duplex 

design having an input receive frequency of 154.430 MHz and an output transmit frequency of 

153.890 MHz. Note that the receive frequency was exactly the same as that of the FDNY Channel 2 

command frequency and the FDNY City Wide base frequency. This repeater had three different locations 

where it could be turned on and operated.17 Two were located at the tower’s Fire Command Desks, one in 

the lobby of WTC 1 and one in the lobby of WTC 2. The third repeater control point was located at the 

PAPD Police Desk inside WTC 5. 

 

15 Palmer, Orio J., Battalion Chief, Repeater Systems, WNYF, 3rd edition, FDNY, New York, 1998. 16 PA Interview 2, fall 2003. 

17 PA Interview 2, fall 2003. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 131

Source: Original artwork by Marco Crupi. Enhancement by NIST. 

Figure 7–1. Illustration showing the location of the FDNY WTC high-rise repeater 

antenna at the site.
Chapter 7 

132 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Example: Radio Example: Radio Repeater System Repeater System

Building

Radio

Repeater

HT HT

TX 153 MHz

RX 154 MHz

TX 153 MHz

RX 154 MHz

RX 153 MHz TX 154 MHz

Duplex

Operation

Only one radio transmission at a time.

HT

RX 154 MHz

TX 153 MHz

Figure 7–2. Example of a FDNY high-rise repeater. 

Example: Battalion Car Cross Example: Battalion Car Cross-band Repeater band Repeater

Signal attenuation,

multiple floors of

steel and concrete

Rx

Tx

Tx

Rx

460 MHz, UHF 

154 MHz, VHF

460 MHz HT

154 MHz HT’s

Clear line-of-sight signal path

L-CP

Only one transmission at a time.

154 MHz HT’s

Drawing by NIST base on document by Battalion Chief Orio J. Palmer and original drawing by

FF Bill Kristoff, FDNY, WNYF, Repeater Systems, 3rd 1998. 

Figure 7–3. Example of a Battalion car cross-band repeater. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 133

7.3.4 FDNY Battalion Car Cross-Band Repeater 

The FDNY Battalion car cross-band repeaters operated on the VHF band input or receive frequency of 

154.430 MHz and an UHF output or transmit frequency of 460.625. The car repeater system consisted of 

two units the receiver/transmitter and band/frequency conversion part and a UHF handie-talkie that could 

be removed from the vehicle and carried into the building’s Lobby Command Post.15 The most important 

feature of the Battalion car cross-band repeater was not that it amplified the radio signals from the Lobby 

Command Post to the upper floors of a high-rise building, but that it could receive a one watt radio signal 

from the upper floors of a high-rise building and retransmit it to the Lobby Command Post that normally 

would not be able to receive the signal. This would allow for two-way communications.15 Battalion 

Chief Orio Palmer pointed out the following critical issue when comparing the operations of the two 

different repeater systems: 

“The crucial difference between the battalion car repeater and a 

building/complex repeater is that the battalion car repeater- - even if not 

operating properly or if improperly positioned - -will not affect 

communications adversely. This is not the case when using channel 7 

and a building/complex repeater system. If the building/complex 

repeater system malfunctions, all communications on channel 7 cease.” 

(Palmer 1998) 

The above provides necessary basic information for understanding the function of radio systems used by 

FDNY during the attack on September 11, 2001, and helps in understanding issues related to questions 

concerning the function of the WTC/FDNY high-rise radio repeater. 

7.3.5 Function of FDNY Radio Repeater Systems 

After the towers had collapsed and 2,749 people were killed (including approximately 421 emergency 

responders and building security personnel), the questions raised were as follows: (1) whether the 

WTC/FDNY repeater was actually working, (2) if the repeater had been working would radio 

communications have been better, and (3) would emergency communications made using the repeater 

have saved the lives of WTC occupants and FDNY personnel inside WTC 1? 

Based on the information gathered throughout this investigation - both documentary and first-person 

interview data - and the repeater’s radio operations recording recovered from the WTC 5 rubble, the 

following is an assessment of what occurred concerning operation of the WTC/FDNY repeater system: 
Chapter 7 

134 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Question (1) Was the WTC/FDNY repeater actually working? 

• Prior to the WTC attack on the morning of September 11, 2001, and before the WTC/FDNY 

repeater was activated inside WTC 1, the Port Authority repeater recording system was 

recording radio communications made by the FDNY City Wide radio channel, 154.43 MHz. 

It also recorded radio transmissions coming from the Monmouth County, New Jersey Fire 

Department.18 This indicates that the repeater recorder was collecting communications from 

these other sources for the period after the repeater was activated inside WTC 1 by FDNY. 

This is supported by the repeater’s recording. The fact that these other communications were 

being recorded by the WTC/FDNY repeater’s recording system complicates the analysis of 

the repeater’s operation. Another complicating factor is that the FDNY Battalion Car CrossBand repeater also used the 154.43 MHz frequency as its receiving frequency. 

• When the first FDNY personnel entered WTC 1, a Chief Officer, believed that there would be 

communications problems at the WTC towers and requested that the repeater system be 

turned on.19

• A FDNY member went to see that the repeater was turned on. 

• Radio transmission analysis conducted by NIST and the Port Authority communications 

personnel showed that at approximately 8:53 a.m., a 1450 Hz audio tone was transmitted 

indicating that the F4 button on the repeater’s phone console had been pressed to activate the 

repeater. (Note: The repeater’s phone console was designed to transmit a series of audio 

tones that were received and transmitted by the repeater. These tones identified operational 

functions of the repeater and the console.) 

• At approximately 8:55 a.m., 8:56 a.m., and 9:04 a.m., the repeater console phone’s handset 

was operated and sent out a 2175 Hz audio tone.20

• At approximately 9:05 a.m., two FDNY Battalion Chiefs using the Fire Command Desk’s 

Vega, Model C-514B Four-Frequency Tone-Remote Control Console and their FDNY 

handie-talkies checked the repeater’s operation.21 See the photograph in Figure 7–4 that 

shows the speaker phone and handset assembly sitting on top of the Fire Command Desk 

console. 

• The repeater check was carried out inside the lobby of WTC 1 with the two Battalion Chiefs 

standing only a short distance from each other.22 As this radio check was started, the 

WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater recorded the 2175 Hz tone generated by pressing the hand set 

button followed by another 1450 Hz audio tone indicating that the F4 button that activates the 

repeater had been pressed again. Following these tones, one Battalion Chief attempted to call 

 

18 Other Interview 2, winter 2004. 

19 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

20 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio communications recording. 21 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio communications recording. 22 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 135

the other Battalion Chief who was listening on his handie-talkie. During this exchange of 

radio calls (that were recorded by the repeater’s recording device), another Chief Officer who 

identified himself as being in a WTC lobby said that he could hear the radio transmissions. 

This was followed by the second Battalion Chief attempting to call the first Battalion Chief. 

This exchange was repeated approximately three additional times. 

Figure 7–4. Video image of the WTC 1 Fire Command Desk and the FDNY repeater 

speaker phone, at left, sitting on top of the console. 

• After multiple attempts to establish communications using the WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater 

console’s handset, the first Battalion Chief called to the second Battalion Chief using his 

handie-talkie and indicated that he didn’t think the repeater was working: 

“I don’t think we have the repeater. I picked you up on my radio but not 

on the hard wire.”23

This indicates that the listening part of the repeater hand set may not have been functioning or 

was not adjusted to provide adequate volume to hear the communication. However, if each 

of the Battalion Chiefs had their handie-talkie radios set to channel 7 and the first Battalion 

Chief heard the transmissions over his handie-talkie, this indicates that the repeater was 

working. During this exchange of radio communications, the two Chiefs established that 

FDNY Channel 2 would be the command channel for operations inside WTC 1 and that the 

Battalion Car Cross-Band repeater would be taken to WTC 2. Channel 2 on the FDNY 

handie-talkies was the city-wide base channel that was being recorded by the repeater’s 

recorder prior to the attack, and it also was the repeater’s receive or input frequency. 

 

23 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio communications recording. 
Chapter 7 

136 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• This plan to take the Battalion Car Cross-Band repeater to WTC 2 left the Lobby Command 

Post inside WTC 1 with no repeater to use for communicating with personnel on the upper 

floors of the building. The only evidence that the Battalion Car Cross-Band repeater may 

have been used came from a radio message at 08:56 a.m. made by the second Battalion Chief 

over the 154.25 MHz channel to the Manhattan dispatcher that stated the following: 

“I am going to stay on the Cross-Band repeater of the Battalion Car as a 

back-up to the building repeater.”24

• Based on interviews with FDNY personnel, WTC 1 established its communications in the 

following fashion: FDNY Channel 1 became the tactical channel and Channel 6 became the 

command channel in WTC 1.25 FDNY Channel 2 became the tactical channel and Channel 4 

or 5 was the command channel for WTC 2.26, 27 FDNY Channel 7 was not used again inside 

WTC 1 but appears to have been used inside WTC 2. In addition, FDNY Channel 3 or 6 was 

used for the tactical channel inside the Marriott.28

• The second Battalion Chief was dispatched to operate inside of WTC 2 and he left to assist 

with operations in that building. 

• At approximately 9:17 a.m., radio communications were established inside WTC 2 by the 

second Battalion Chief and his aide using the WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater input frequency 

and the FDNY Channel 2 frequency 154.43 MHz.29 The clear exchange of radio 

communications from the Battalion Chief located on the 40th floor to his aide located 

somewhere below shows that the repeater was working or exceptional point-to-point 

communications inside WTC 2 were occurring. The repeater communications recording 

system recorded a complete communications exchange between the two FDNY personnel. 

No 2175 Hz tones were recorded indicating that the officer and the aide were both using their 

handie-talkies for communications. This communication was followed by many additional 

radio communications that were recorded by the repeater’s recording system between 

personnel on the upper floors of WTC 2, other locations in the building, and the lobby of 

WTC 2. These communications continued until seconds before the collapse of WTC 2 when 

the repeater system went silent. 

The following is a statement extracted from emergency responder first-person interviews concerning 

WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater operations: (Note: The firefighter was operating inside WTC 1.) 

▪ Usually when you get the repeater it’s supposed to be on channel 7, but 

we were never told. They said that the repeater system was not working, 

 

24 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio communications recording. 25 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

26 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004. 

27 FDNY Interview 62, winter 2004. 

28 FDNY Interview 31, winter 2004. 

29 FDNY Channel 7 / PA, WTC Channel 30 radio communications recording. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 137

but I was not sure. I got clear messages from handie-talkies, and I’m 

assuming the repeater was on.30

NIST studied three suggested theories as to why the repeater system did not seem to function correctly 

that morning: 

• The antenna system was damaged when the aircraft struck the towers, and communications 

were not possible inside of WTC 1. 

• The repeater console handset was broken 

• The volume on the repeater console handset was turned down. 

From the above data, it can be stated that the repeater was operating inside of WTC 1 when the repeater 

check was underway. The first Battalion Chief transmitted radio communications using the console 

handset, which was recorded, and that another Chief Officer called to the two Battalion Chiefs and stated 

that he could hear the radio transmissions. The first Battalion Chief could not hear communications over 

the repeater console handset that he was using inside WTC 1.31

Since (1) the radio communications were being heard by others, (2) the repeater system was recording the 

exchange of calls between the two Battalion Chiefs, and (3) the operating tones were being transmitted 

and recorded by the repeater recording system, there is strong evidence that the repeater was working and 

that the communications difficulties were associated with the repeater console handset. However, with 

the information available, there is no way to conclusively determine the exact performance of the 

WTC/FDNY building radio repeater system that was used on the morning of September 11, 2001. Also, 

it is not possible to determine whether the handset was broken or if the volume was turned down since the 

repeater’s handset was destroyed by the building collapse. It is likely that the handset either had a 

malfunction and/or the handset listening volume was not turned up high enough to allow the user to hear 

the returning radio transmissions. 

Related to the possibility of radio antenna damage causing a problem, one should note that radio 

communications using the WTC/FDNY repeater system were carried out on the inside of WTC 1 and 

inside of WTC 2. These radio communications were recorded by the repeater’s recording system from 

each location. Therefore, it is likely that the antenna and repeater system was functional and not disabled 

as a result of damage from debris produced by the impact of aircraft. 

Question (2) If the repeater had been working would radio communications have been better? 

The recording of radio communications by the WTC/FDNY repeater system suggests that 

communications for operations inside of WTC 2 were assisted by the repeater. Also, the radio recordings 

show that communications readability using the repeater was generally good with readability often 

reaching levels of 3 to 5. (See section 7.4 concerning the assessment of radio communications quality.) 

Where readability levels were lower, it was generally caused by doubling or multiple people attempting to 

 

30 FDNY Interview 17, winter 2004. 

31 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 
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138 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

communicate over the repeater at one time. If FDNY personnel in both of the towers attempted to use the 

WTC/FDNY repeater for operations, there likely would have been additional radio traffic resulting in 

more unreadable communications. (Note: The term “unreadable” is used in this document to identify 

radio or other forms of telecommunications that could not be understood by persons receiving the 

message.) However, it would have been likely that the Lobby Command Post located in WTC 1 might 

have had somewhat improved communications with personnel operating up inside the building until the 

time when WTC 2 collapsed. The radio repeater recording suggests that the WTC/FDNY high-rise 

repeater failed during the collapse of WTC 2. Additionally, if personnel inside both towers had been 

attempting the use the same repeater at the same time, firefighters might have become confused as to 

which communication related to operations inside which tower. During the first-person interviews, 

several firefighters indicated that at times they were unsure as to which tower they were really working in. 

This difficulty with identifying which tower was which is also demonstrated by a series of radio 

transmissions recorded by the WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater where a Chief Officer and his Aide 

attempted to communicate which tower they were in to the WTC 2 Lobby Command Post. 

Question (3) Would emergency communications made using the repeater have saved the lives of 

WTC occupants and FDNY personnel inside WTC 1? 

With the collapse of WTC 2 and failure of the WTC/FDNY repeater system, the Lobby Command Post 

inside WTC 1 would have lost its primary means of communicating with personnel operating inside of 

WTC 1. On that morning of September 11, the Lobby Command Post inside WTC 1 was not operating 

through any radio repeater system while communicating with personnel under its command. Therefore, 

since the WTC/FDNY repeater appeared to fail with the collapse of WTC 2, it would have had no effect 

on saving lives of occupants or FDNY personnel located inside WTC 1. Additionally, if the repeater 

system had been in use inside WTC 1 when WTC 2 collapsed, it would have taken time to establish that 

the repeater system had failed, and FDNY personnel inside WTC 1 would have had to change radio 

channels to continue radio communications. This need to change radio channels may have complicated 

the transmission and reception of emergency evacuation orders given over the radio for personnel inside 

WTC 1. 

Evidence supporting these findings concerning the FDNY radio repeater systems at the WTC also 

suggests radio communications options that may have advanced the ability of FDNY to communicate. 

This raises the question: What basic radio system would have assisted FDNY personnel inside each tower 

to successfully communicate during operations at the WTC? 

The magnitude of events on September 11, 2001, was greater than anything experienced previously by 

emergency responders in New York City. Emergency response operations were focused on multiple and 

parallel tasks, WTC 1 and WTC 2. This suggests that FDNY needed a capability for handling a large 

amount of communications traffic, requiring a minimum of two separated radio repeater systems 

functioning on a minimum of two different pairs of radio frequencies. The separate repeaters would 

double the capability of FDNY to communicate with personnel inside the buildings, and the different 

pairs of radio frequencies would prevent radio interference between the two repeater systems. One of 

these repeater systems would have been operated at WTC 1, and the second would have operated at 

WTC 2. In addition, the Incident Command Post would need to be able to monitor radio traffic on each 

of these repeater systems and be able to transmit emergency messages to all personnel by overriding fire 

ground radio traffic. The radio used for overriding radio communications on the fireground would have a 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 139

higher output power than the handie-talkies and the repeaters in use at the site. This radio that would 

have been located outside the WTC buildings could have been used to transmit emergency messages and 

evacuation orders to firefighters inside the buildings. The options discussed here provide one basic 

approach to improving communications for multiple operations during a large emergency response 

operation. 

7.3.6 Communications, Command and Control 

Communications in a high-rise building emergency is a critical part of command and control and is a key 

element of the Incident Command System. 

The following statement was extracted from an emergency responder first-person interview and relates to 

the issue of communications and command and control: 

▪ Control is always a big issue with operations, but if we have 

communications, we will be able to control any operation.32

High-rise buildings are known to create problems with radio communications. The vast amount of metal 

and reinforced concrete in high-rise buildings is known to attenuate and block radio signals. This is often 

a problem with low output power emergency responder handie-talkies. Various documents including 

information from the 1993 WTC bombing highlighted the problems that FDNY experienced with radio 

communications in high-rise buildings. (Fusco 1993) (Palmer 1998) On September 11, 2001, FDNY 

again experienced poor handie-talkie radio communications within the towers. This had a major impact 

on FDNY operations particularly inside of WTC 1 where no one used the WTC radio repeater system. At 

WTC 2, the FDNY/WTC radio repeater system was successfully being used for operations. 

Emergency responders reported that they had difficulties with the communications systems from the time 

they arrived at the WTC, and the difficulties became progressively worse. 33 There were problems 

communicating with firefighters as they climbed higher in WTC 1. There were no communications with 

the elevators, and attempts to use the wire line phones to call upstairs were unsuccessful. 34 Radios 

worked when communicating with other emergency responders in close proximity, only a few floors 

apart. As FDNY personnel attempted to communicate with others located more than about five floors 

from them, they would have to move around inside the building to find locations where radio signals 

could get through. 35 They needed areas with line-of-sight without reinforced concrete and steel between 

them. At times, they tried to set up line-of-sight communications relays. 36 Some of the locations where 

radio communications appeared to work were inside stairways and next to windows. 37

 

32 FDNY Interview 14, winter 2004. 

33 FDNY Interview 43, winter 2004. 

34 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

35 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004. 

36 FDNY Interview 30, winter 2004. 

37 FDNY Interview 33, winter 2004. 
Chapter 7 

140 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

The following statements were extracted from emergency responder first-person interviews and relate to 

radio communications inside the WTC towers: 

▪ The interviewee stated that he never had good radio nor telephone or any 

other form of communication in the building to the floors above the 

lobby of WTC 1. At best, radio communications were poor. Throughout 

the time of operations in the building, handie-talkie radio 

communications was a negative factor. If communications were better, 

more firefighters would have been saved... People went between 

Command Posts with messages to determine conditions and deliver 

orders. The best form of communications was face-to-face between the 

Command Post and the other building, WTC 2.38

▪ The interviewee had trouble inside WTC 1 with handie-talkie radio 

communications. He could not talk with this commanding officer or 

anyone at the command post. His radio did work with people working 

near him since they used a different tactical channel and established 

radio calls or IDs unique to their operations.39

▪ Inside WTC 1, I heard a muffled message on my radio that there was a 

mayday, get out of the building, the south tower has come down. The 

guys standing around me, said, what was that? I said, I think they were 

saying, get out of the building and the other guys said they didn’t get it 

on their radios, and I said that I got it. There were Brooklyn units 

stationed on the floors below and were waiting orders to proceed and 

they never heard the radio transmission to exit the building as far as one 

of the officers told me.40

▪ There was no effective form of communication that day. First of all, 

when you work for a FDNY company near by and you go into the 

WTC buildings for a sprinkler discharge, as soon as you walk into the 

lobby, the first companies get one of their Port Authority radios. So right 

away you know when you walk in there your radio in no good. Right 

there in the lobby, they have seven of their radios. They are attached to 

the building repeater. So those radios were compatible with the Port 

Authority’s building repeater, and our FDNY WTC site repeater wasn’t 

compatible with the Port Authority radios. You know if you have a fire 

in the building, you can’t communicate with the FDNY radios. With the 

FDNY radios, you can communicate from floor to floor, but not lobby to 

wherever the fire is. It’s out of our range. Say you have a small fire in 

WTC 1 on an upper floor that would be a 2nd alarm and you have 60 

people with 7 radios. What good is that?41

 

38 FDNY Interview 2, fall 2003. 

39 FDNY Interview 3, winter 2004. 

40 FDNY Interview 9, winter 2004. 

41 FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 141

Radio Traffic 

In addition to the poor operating characteristics of the handie-talkie radios inside of high-rise buildings, 

emergency responders also were struggling with the high volume of radio traffic. This was due in part to 

the design of the FDNY radio system. Figure 7–5 below shows an example how radio communications 

may be structured by the Fire Department during a two-alarm firefighting operation. When evaluating 

this figure, it should be remembered that there were many more people attempting to use the radio system 

than shown in the example. There were firefighters at the WTC complex representing three five-alarms 

and one two-alarm. All of these firefighters were attempting to communicate over the FDNY radio 

system before WTC 2 collapsed. An example of staffing for a single five-alarm fire would be 

approximately four battalions dispatched to yield a total of 20 Engine companies and 8 Ladder companies 

at the scene. Each tower was assigned one tactical radio channel and one command radio channel. At 

minimum, there were about 40 FDNY companies trying to communicate over each of the tactical radio 

channels during the WTC operations, and only one person could talk at a time. 

Example: Handie Example: Handie-Talkie Radio System Structure Talkie Radio System Structure

FDNY Command Post

Bat. Chief Bat. Chief Bat. Chief

3 to 5 Engine

Companies

3 Ladder

Companies

3 Radios/

Company 4 Radios/

Company

3 to 5 Engine

Companies

3 Ladder

Companies

3 Radios/

Company 4 Radios/

Company

3 to 5 Engine

Companies

3 Ladder

Companies

3 Radios/

Company 4 Radios/

Company

Potentially 90 radios on

one frequency at one time 

HT frequency 154 MHz, VHF

Point-to-Point Communications

Only one radio transmission at a time

Figure 7–5. Example of handie-talkie radio communications for a two-alarm fire. 

Emergency responders reported that they experienced extreme radio traffic on September 11, 2001. Too 

many people were trying to communicate at once, and the handie-talkie channels were overwhelmed. 42 

People were stepping on other people’s radio transmissions, and feedback was a problem, making those 

transmissions that did get through incomplete. 43, 44 

 

42 FDNY Interview 19, winter 2004 

43 FDNY Interview 38, winter 2004 
Chapter 7 

142 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

The following statements were extracted from emergency responder first-person interviews concerning 

the level of radio traffic they experienced during their WTC operations: (Also see section 7.5 that follows 

and provides quantitative data on radio traffic.) 

▪ I never saw him again. I couldn’t get him on the radio. There were too 

many people trying to talk at once. Radio communications were almost 

non-existent.45

▪ Radio communications that day were terrible; you couldn’t get a word in. 

There were so many people talking on the radio and everything was 

jammed up. Radio reception was really bad, also.46

▪ Radio traffic was unbearable at that point. I was trying to call 

headquarters to ask for portable handie-talkies and flashlights and some 

uniformed firefighters to set up a much larger Command Post somewhere 

outside in the immediate area. I had a lot of trouble trying to call 

headquarters.47

▪ On the radio I heard, “Evacuate the building.” Then everyone around me 

was like, did you hear that, “evacuate the building?” Then you couldn’t 

get on the radio because everyone was calling everyone. It was like 

radio gridlock.48

Radio Communications and Incident Command and Control 

The poor radio communications at the WTC had a serious impact on the Lobby Command Post’s attempts 

to maintain command and control. The following statement extracted from an emergency responder firstperson interview addresses this issue: 

▪ The radio communications from up inside the building were sporadic and 

ineffective. Any direction the Lobby Command Post gave over the radio 

was sporadic and a lot of the information transmitted was not 

acknowledged. So they didn’t know whether the messages got through, 

and it was frustrating.49

The Lobby Command Post inside WTC1 repeatedly tried to call the different Battalion Chiefs that were 

up in the building. Neither the interviewee nor the other two FDNY Chief Officers at the Lobby 

Command Post ever got an acknowledgement for the calls.50 During the call to evacuate WTC 1, some 

units did respond over the radio to the call to evacuate.51 The photograph Figure 7–6 shows an 

 44 FDNY Interview 58, winter 2004 

45FDNY Interview 29, winter 2004 

46 FDNY Interview 30, winter 2004 

47 FDNY Interview 60, winter 2004 

48 FDNY Interview 39, winter 2004 

49 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004 

50 FDNY Interview 20, winter 2004 

51 FDNY Interview 7, winter 2004 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 143

FDNY/EMS member attempting to communicate from the lobby of WTC 1 by holding his radio high in 

the air. 

Figure 7–6. Video image of a FDNY/EMS member attempting to communicate using his 

handie-talkie radio inside the lobby of WTC 1. 

In Figure 7–6, note that the FDNY/EMS member is holding the radio’s microphone that is attached to an 

extension wire in his right hand at mouth level as he attempts the communication. 

7.4 ASSESSMENT OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS QUALITY 

The Readability, Signal Strength, and Tone system for rating the quality of radio communications is used 

widely throughout the field of radio communications and is described in The ARRL Handbook for Radio 

Communications (ARRL 2003). This system is broken into three distinctive groups that can be rated: 

Readability, Signal Strength, and Tone. The rating for “Tone” is only used to identify the quality of radio 

communications for “Continuous Wave” transmissions, and it does not apply to this analysis as “Tone” 

does not relate to voice communications. For voice radio communications, only “Readability” and 

“Signal Strength” are used. “Signal Strength” is usually read from a signal strength meter at the time of 

the actual radio communication and is not available on the audio recordings. 

Thus, in this study, “Readability” was used for rating the primary emergency responder radio 

communications channel recordings. It is recognized that this form of analysis is subjective, and it relates 

to the ability of an individual to hear and understand the radio communications. In an attempt to 

minimize the influence of the subjective rating system, individuals with extensive experience using radio 

communications and project staff trained by the experienced personnel were used to conduct the analysis. 

In addition, communication periods from the various recorded data sets were reviewed by more than one 

person where radio communications readability was difficult. 
Chapter 7 

144 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

The rating table for communications readability is listed below (ARRL 2003): 

Readability (the term “readable” means “understandable”): 

• 1 – Unreadable (A term meaning the communication is not understood.) 

• 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 

• 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

• 4 – Readable with practically no difficulty 

• 5 – Perfectly readable 

7.4.1 Training of Transcribers 

Four NIST personnel were used to transcribe the emergency responder communications files. This 

included the project leader and three other staff personnel. The transcription protocol listed above was 

planned and tested by the two senior NIST personnel, including the project leader. When the protocol 

was found to be acceptable, the two other NIST personnel were trained by the senior members of the 

group. After the basic transcription training was completed, each of the new transcribers was given a 

communications file to transcribe. This communications file had previously been transcribed by the two 

senior personnel. After the file was transcribed by the new transcriber, their results were compared to that 

transcribed by the senior personnel. When it was demonstrated that the new transcriber had a full 

understanding of the transcription process, they were then assigned communications files to transcribe. 

7.4.2 Radio Communications Concepts 

Currently, the only way for most emergency responder radio systems to produce a totally clear 

communication (one can be received and understood) is for one communications signal to be transmitted 

at a time on a given radio frequency. This means only one person can transmit a radio message at a time 

to avoid communications interference on that radio frequency. If two or more radio transmissions are 

made on the same radio frequency at the same time using these systems, signal mixing may occur and the 

communications may not be understandable. This difficulty with radio communications often is referred 

to as doubling. Under these conditions, usually the radio with the highest transmitting power will 

override transmissions from the lower-power radios and only the highest-power radio signal will be 

heard. This is often the case where an emergency response radio system uses a higher-power base station 

for dispatch communications or where a repeater is used to amplify a radio system’s signal output. Where 

multiple radio communications are received by a radio repeater, signal mixing is likely to occur and the 

communications will not be understandable (ARRL 2003). 

Over the last several years, radio communications technology has undergone some significant 

advancement, particularly with cellular phones. These new systems can increase the effective use of the 

radio frequency/time factors related to radio communications (ARRL 2003)], and are now beginning to be 

applied to emergency responder communications equipment. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 145

7.4.3 Communications Data Analysis 

This analysis of communications addresses four major areas: (1) radio traffic volume, (2) transmission 

time periods, (3) readability of communications, and (4) the development of a chronology of radio 

communications from the emergency responders conducting operations related to the WTC attack. 

The first two factors, radio traffic volume and communications duty cycle, are directly related. Each has 

an impact on readability as well as the ability to understand and deal with the information being 

communicated. Generally, as radio traffic rate increases, the operations duty cycle approaches overloaded 

conditions. With very high traffic volumes, it becomes more difficult for personnel at central 

communications facilities and personnel in the field to respond to the volume of traffic. Human operators 

of communications equipment become overloaded with work. Not only do the operators have to verbally 

communicate with personnel over the radio, but they must often transfer the information gained to other 

locations. The transfer of information also may be done verbally using other communications systems, by 

hand through keyboard inputs, or simply face to face. Analysis of the radio traffic for each of the 

departments shows periods where radio traffic rates during the surge conditions potentially resulted in 

situations where base station radio operators were unable to relay important information. 

7.4.4 Emergency Response Communications Chronology 

This chronology provides information on communications difficulties experienced by NYPD, PAPD, PA 

Security, PA Operations, and PA Vertical Transportation units following the attack on the WTC. Much 

has been published concerning the communications difficulties experienced by FDNY at the WTC, and 

first-person interviews with FDNY personnel confirm some of these difficulties. However, this 

chronology shows that FDNY was not the only emergency responder department that experienced radio 

equipment and communications difficulties. There are reports of radios not working well and 

communications showing that some personnel were not being heard or responded to. Also, some of the 

radio transmissions demonstrate the failure to communicate as a result of radio traffic surge conditions. 

The chronology provides examples of numerous cases where radio transmissions were not understood 

because of “crossing or doubling” of radio signals when too many people are trying to talk at one time. 

8:45 a.m. PAPD police desk: requests a radio check to locate an open microphone on a handietalkie radio. [Note: This occurred just before the aircraft struck WTC 1.] (PAPD Radio 

Channel W) 

8:49 a.m. WTC Security requests, as a result of the surge in radio traffic volume, that police 

officers stay off the air. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

 PAPD police desk Channel W: extended period with an open microphone, lots of 

background noise and people talking. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

8:50 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a message that the officer did not copy the previous 

transmission and asks what is going on. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 
Chapter 7 

146 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

8:51 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises a police lieutenant that his 

message was crossed and to repeat it. A message came through that he can’t get a hold of 

someone on the cell phone. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

8:53 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises a police department truck that 

their radio message is cutting off and all that the dispatcher got was something about the 

upper floors. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

8:54 a.m. WTC Security is reporting that it is having trouble reading incoming radio transmissions. 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

 WTC Security receives a message that an officer is having trouble reading radio 

messages because of so much commotion on the floor. (PA/WTC Security Radio 

Channel X) 

8:55 a.m. A Battalion Chief says, I am going to stay on the Cross-Band repeater of the Battalion 

Car as a back-up to the building repeater. (FDNY channel 7 / PA/WTC Channel 30) 

8:59 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises a police truck that their radio 

message is breaking up, and the dispatcher asks what units he wants to respond. (NYPD 

SOD Radio Channel) 

9:00 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: dispatcher advises that various units are crossing 

each other and that the dispatcher cannot understand them. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:01 a.m. WTC Operations: a microphone is stuck open, interfering with communications. 

(PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

9:02 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a police officer asks the dispatcher if the last 

transmission was heard. The police office asks twice. There is no answer. (NYPD SOD 

Radio Channel) 

9:03 a.m. WTC Operations receives a report that someone has found a supervisor’s radio that has 

been lost. (PA/WTC Operations Radio Channel Y) 

 NYPD Special Operations Division: an officer in an NYPD car requests that units give 

their messages slowly. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:05 a.m. FDNY chief officers conduct tests of the City-wide, high-rise repeater located at the 

WTC. (PA/WTC Channel 30 radio recording) 

9:07 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a police officer requests that the air be cleared for 

emergency vehicles and personnel unimpeded. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:08 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises officers directing traffic that 

they are coming over the air. Approximately 30 seconds later the dispatcher advises a 

second time that the officers directing traffic are coming over the air and requests that 

they stop. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 147

9:09 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a Special Operations Division officer requests that 

the dispatcher designate two channels for this emergency, one for units on the scene and 

one for units that are responding. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:11 a.m. NYPD: a backup transmitter for City-wide communications is put into service in 

anticipation of potential problems with the primary transmitter. (NYPD McKinsey& 

Company, 2002) 

9:12 a.m. NYPD City-wide: a dispatcher advises that “We need to keep this frequency clear unless 

it is in regards to the level four mobilization.” (NYPD City-wide Radio Channel) 

 NYPD Special Operations Division: dispatcher states “Only emergency transmissions are 

to be made on this frequency.” (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

 FDNY Chief begins using the FDNY channel 7 repeater while working inside WTC2. 

(PA/WTC Channel 30 radio recording) 

 WTC Security receives a radio report from the Fire Command Desk in the lobby of 

WTC 2 that they cannot pick up the Warden phones and that they are making 

announcements telling people not to stay at the Warden phones. Note: This 

communication indicates that the Warden phones in WTC 2 were not working. 

(PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:15 a.m. PAPD police desk: a radio microphone is stuck open. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:19 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises a police officer that his message 

was being cut off and that only part of the message was copied. (NYPD SOD Radio 

Channel) 

9:20 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises that there is an open carrier and 

the units should check their radios. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:22 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher advises a police truck that his radio 

message was unreadable. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

 NYPD Special Operations Division: the dispatcher advises a second time that there is an 

open carrier and that messages are not being understood. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:23 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: the dispatcher advises that the two frequencies are 

the Manhattan IO (Interoperability Channel) and the City-wide. The dispatcher also 

advises that the various units are crossing. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:25 a.m. PAPD police desk: a radio microphone is stuck open and interfering with 

communications. Radio signals are garbled and broken, and there is a high level of 

background noise. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:30 a.m. WTC Security Radio Channel X has a communication indicating that everybody should 

turn their phone off. 
Chapter 7 

148 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:31 a.m. WTC Security: a Port Authority officer is questioned as to whether they have brought any 

red bags with radios for the fire department. The answer is no, and is it safe to go into the 

building. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X) 

9:32 a.m. NYPD City-wide channel: a unit advises that he cannot communicate, his radio is going 

in and out and the cell phone is not working. (NYPD City-wide Radio Channel) 

9:36 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a police officer reports that the telephones at his 

location are not working. Note: Location not identified. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:43 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a police officer advises that he heard over an AM 

radio that a plane had crashed into the Pentagon. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:49 a.m. PAPD police desk instructs officer that he was speaking too fast and that he must slow 

down so that he could be understood. (PAPD Radio Channel W) 

9:53 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: the dispatcher advises all units to check their 

portable radios for an open carrier. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

9:54 a.m. NYPD City-wide channel: a dispatcher requests “Keep the air clear. We have problems 

in the City. Keep the air clear right now.” NYPD City-wide Radio Channel) 

9:55 a.m. WTC Vertical Transportation: personnel are having trouble reading communications over 

the radio and indicate that they will try to call on the telephone. PA/WTC Vertical 

Transportation Radio Channel Z) 

9:57 a.m. WTC Security: a report is received that an officer is responding to WTC 1 Fire Command 

and that he had been trying to contact the Command Center on floor 22, but they didn’t 

know how to operate the other set of communications equipment. (PA/WTC Security 

Radio Channel X) 

9:59 a.m. WTC 2 collapsed. (FEMA 403) 

9:59 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: an Emergency Service Unit police officer calls 

several times for the dispatcher. The dispatcher answers each time and apparently was 

not heard by the calling unit. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

10:03 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: a dispatcher requests that some units standby while 

the needs of other units are addressed. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel) 

10:05 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: the dispatcher advises that all units need to talk one 

by one. The dispatcher further advises that units are cutting each other off. (NYPD SOD 

Radio Channel) 

10:09 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: an Emergency Service Unit advises the dispatcher 

that he can hear the dispatcher but is not sure if the dispatcher is hearing him. (NYPD 

SOD Radio Channel) 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 149

10:10 a.m. NYPD Special Operations Division: the dispatcher advises that there are three units 

trying to talk at the same time and requests, “One at a time.” (NYPD SOD Radio 

Channel) 

7.4.5 PAPD Radio Communications 

All radio communications evaluated for this report experienced traffic volume surge conditions as a result 

of the WTC attack. The traffic volume surge greatly exceeded the traffic volume experienced under 

normal operating conditions. 

PAPD Channel 26/W was used to demonstrate typical radio communications and operational conditions 

that occurred with the PAPD minutes before the terrorist attack, during the attack, and during operations 

that followed the WTC attack. This radio channel is used by PAPD police officers, NYPD supervisors 

and FDNY Engine 10 and Ladder 10 for communications at the WTC site. Table 7–2 and Table 7–3 

compare the number of transmissions and their length of time before and after the first aircraft impacted 

WTC 1. The percent of radio transmissions versus time is in Figure 7–7. This figure and others give the 

rate of radio transmissions over a 40 minute period, 20 minutes prior to the first airplane impact and 20 

minutes after the impact. This percent of radio transmission, as well as others discussed in this report, 

was calculated as the sum of transmission time and no transmission time over the total period of time. 

These data show that there was an approximately 13 percent rate of radio transmissions on the PAPD 

police desk channel for the 20 minutes prior to the aircraft impact. After the first aircraft impact on 

WTC 1, the radio communications were occurring 80 percent of the time. This surge in communications 

significantly impacted the functional capability of the radio system. After approximately 10 minutes, 

communications dropped to a steady operating level of approximately 48 percent capacity. 

7.4.6 FDNY Radio Communications 

The communications for the FDNY City-wide high-rise building radio Channel 7 was recorded by PAPD 

on their Channel 30. The Port Authority installed this high-rise repeater at the WTC for FDNY following 

the 1993 bombing. This FDNY channel was used primarily by FDNY personnel during operations in 

WTC 2. Personnel using this channel were FDNY chief officers, company officers, aides, and 

firefighters. 

While looking at these data, it is important to keep in mind that several FDNY personnel at the WTC did 

not think that the WTC complex high-rise channel radio repeater was working. This is based on radio 

communications tests that were conducted by two Chief Officers working inside WTC 1 when the first 

Command Post was being set up in that lobby. A record of this radio communications test was recorded 

on the PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 tape. Following this radio test, a Chief Officer involved in the test 

chose to use different channels for command and tactical communications. However, as FDNY 

operations increased in WTC 2, it was determined by members of the FDNY that the high-rise channel 

was functioning and use of the channel developed. 

Traffic load for this FDNY channel is summarized in Table 7–2 and Table 7–3. The percent of radio 

transmissions versus time is shown in Figure 7–8. The radio communications on the repeater channel 

prior to the first airplane impact could have been operations at other high rises in the city or radio 

transmissions from the Monmouth County, New Jersey Fire Department that shared the radio frequency. 
Chapter 7 

150 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Table 7–2. Comparison of radio transmissions before and after the first aircraft impact. 

Department 

Number of transmissions before first 

aircraft impact 

(20 min period) 

Number of transmissions after first 

aircraft impact 

(20 min period) 

PAPD, Ch. 26/W 42 176 

FDNY, Ch. 7 high-rise 39 134 

FDNY, Manhattan 

Dispatch 

25 258 

NYPD Division 1 171 225 

NYPD Special 

Operations Division 

72 192 

Table 7–3. Comparison of average and maximum radio transmission times before and 

after first aircraft impact. 

Department 

Average time per transmission before 

first aircraft impact 

(s) 

Average time per transmission after 

first aircraft impact 

(s) 

PAPD, Ch. 26/W 3.8 (maximum 21.8) 3.3 (maximum 19.7) 

FDNY, Ch. 7 high-rise 3.8 (maximum 50.9) 3.1 (maximum 19.5) 

FDNY Manhattan 

Dispatch 

4.9 (maximum 21.7) 3.1 (maximum 22.6) 

NYPD Division 1 5.3 (maximum 19.0) 3.4 (maximum 12.6) 

NYPD Special 

Operations Division 

2.8 (maximum 22.3) 5.7 (maximum 31.5) 

Note: All minimum transmission times were typically less than 1 s and were often related to the keying of a microphone. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40

Time (minutes)

Percent Transmission (%)

First Aircraft Impact

Second Aircraft Impact

Figure 7–7. PAPD Police Desk channel 26/W plot of percent transmission versus time. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 151

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40

Time (Minutes)

Percent Transmission (%)

First Aircraft Impact

Second Aircraft Impact

Figure 7–8. FDNY City-Wide High-Rise channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30) plot of 

percent transmission versus time. 

The following is from a first-person interview that dealt with fire department communications: 

▪ High-Rise firefighting operations are transmitted on 154.430 MHz. This 

is the frequency that is used by the high-rise repeaters and one of the 

frequencies used by the Battalion Chiefs Car Repeater. This high-rise 

frequency is not used very often because it will interfere with other local 

area fire departments that are also using the frequency. This is the 

primary turnout frequency for the Monmouth County, New Jersey Fire 

Department that is located about 25 to 35 miles from here.52

In the analysis of the 20 minutes after the first airplane impact there appears to be several instances where 

the communications recorded on this channel originated from other fire departments. 

7.4.7 NYPD Radio Communications 

The third example illustrates radio communications for the NYPD Division 1 channel and the NYPD 

Special Operations Division channel. The Division 1 channel was used by police officers and supervisory 

police officers. The Special Operations Division channel was used by senior level NPYD management, 

supervisory police officers, Emergency Service Unit personnel, and aviation unit personnel. 

 

52 Other Interview 2, winter 2004 
Chapter 7 

152 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Table 7–2 and Table 7–3 compare the number of transmissions and their length of time before and after 

the first aircraft impacted WTC 1 for both of the NYPD channels. Figure 7–9 and Figure 7–10 give the 

percent transmissions versus time for the NYPD Division 1 and NYPD SOD channels, respectively. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40

Time (minutes)

Percent Transmission (%)

First Aircraft Impact

Second aircraft 

Impact

Figure 7–9. NYPD Division 1 channel plot of percent transmission versus time. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40

Time (minutes)

Percent Transmissions (%)

First Aircraft Impact

Second Aircraft 

Impact

Figure 7–10. NYPD Special Operations Division channel plot of percent transmission 

versus time. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 153

7.5 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS READABILITY ANALYSIS 

As each of the communications files was transcribed, a readability value was assigned for each attempt to 

communicate. Results of this analysis are shown in Figure 7–11 through Figure 7–17. Analysis of these 

data showed that the ability to transmit a complete message was difficult during the communications 

surge. Data showed that approximately one-third to one-half of the radio communications for each of the 

three departments did not exceed a readability level of 2. These emergency communications were not 

complete and may have not been fully understood. The largest fraction of readability for all radio 

communications analyzed was recorded at a readability level of 3. This means that this fraction of 

communications was readable, but audio and radio transmission problems were being experienced. Some 

conditions that will cause poor communications quality are: 

• Background noise either at the transmission point or receiving point or both, 

• Operating health of transmitting and receiving radios and antenna systems, 

• Doubling or crossing of radio signals caused by multiple transmissions at the same time on 

the same radio frequency, and 

• Radio transmissions that may be affected by attenuating materials or electromagnetic 

interference. 

In addition, approximately 25 percent of the radio communications had readability levels 4 or above. 

Typically, the higher readability levels were produced by the various department base stations that 

operate at a higher radio transmission output power than the hand held radios. However, there is one 

exception: several of the radio communications on the FDNY City-wide high-rise radio channel, the 

PAPD recording of Channel 30. It appears that the repeater was operating at the WTC site. Several of the 

radio communications on this channel were assigned readability values of four and five as the FDNY 

began its operations in WTC 2. In addition, some of these 4 and 5 readability value radio 

communications were occurring between FDNY personnel in the lobby of WTC 2 and FDNY personnel 

some 40 or more floors up inside the same building. 
Chapter 7 

154 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

3

19% 4

56%

5

0% 1

8%

2

17%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4. – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5. – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–11. PAPD Police Desk channel 26/W radio communications readability for the 

time period 20 minutes before first plane impact. 

2

24%

1

9%

5

0%

4

24%

3

43%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4. – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5. – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–12. PAPD Police Desk channel 26/W radio communications readability for time 

period 20 minutes after first plane impact. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 155

2

26%

1

10%

5

4%

4

18%

3

42%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4. – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5. – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–13. FDNY City-Wide High-Rise channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30) radio 

communications readability for time period 20 minutes after first plane impact. 

3

14%

4

5 23%

63%

1

0%

2

0%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4. – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5. – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–14. NYPD Special Operations Division channel communications readability for 

time period 20 minutes before first plane impact. 
Chapter 7 

156 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

2

35%

1

10%

5

4%

4

19%

3

32%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4. – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5. – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–15. NYPD Special Operations Division channel communications readability for 

time period 20 minutes after first plane impact. 

3

8%

4

21%

5

60%

1

2% 2

9%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4. – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5. – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–16. NYPD Division 1 channel communications readability for time period 

20 minutes before first plane impact. 
Emergency Communications and Analysis 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 157

2

26%

1

11%

5

8%

4

23%

3

32%

Note: Readability scale: 

 1 – Unreadable 4 – Readable with practically no difficulty 

 2 – Barely readable, occasional words distinguishable 5 – Perfectly readable 

 3 – Readable with considerable difficulty 

Figure 7–17. NYPD Division 1 channel communications readability for time period 

20 minutes after first plane impact. 

7.6 GENERAL COMMENTS ON RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 

NIST’s analysis of PA and NYPD radio systems indicated that they were working during the period of 

normal operations one half hour before the attack on the WTC. Also, the FDNY Manhattan Dispatch 

channel was functioning normally prior to the attack on the WTC. No other radio communications 

recordings relevant to the attack were available from FDNY. However, it was noted that Channel W of 

the PAPD was experiencing some difficulty with a handie-talkie radio transmitting a carrier wave as a 

result of an open or keyed microphone which disrupted communications on that channel. PAPD 

personnel recognized the problem and were busy trying to correct it just before the first plane struck 

WTC 1. The keyed microphone problem continued after the attack occurred. NYPD also had a problem 

with an open or keyed microphone after the attack began; it occurred on the Special Operations Division 

(SOD) channel. The problem was recognized and efforts were also made by the NYPD desk operator to 

get the problem cleared up. Initial attempts to correct the open microphone problem appeared to be 

successful. 

Also, the data above for the various departments demonstrate the significant changes that occurred in 

radio communications traffic during the WTC operations. It is evident that PAPD, FDNY, and NYPD all 

experienced similar surges in radio traffic volume following the first aircraft impact into WTC 1. It is 

noteworthy that when the second aircraft struck WTC 2, 17 minutes later, there was no major surge in 

radio communications. This may be attributed to the fact that the initial emergency response assignments 

had already been made and that operations had already begun at the WTC, so an additional surge in radio 

communications was not needed. In addition, it is observed from the communications recordings and 

from first-person interviews that the emergency responders were trying to limit their use of the radios to 

reduce interference on their operating frequencies. 
Chapter 7 

158 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

7.7 REFERENCES 

ARRL (American Radio Relay League). 2003. The ARRL Handbook for Radio Communications. 

Newington, CT. 

Fusco, A. L. 1993. Unprecedented Complexity, WNYF, 3rd, The Fire Department of the City of New 

York. 

Palmer, Orio J. 1998. Repeater Systems, WNYF, 3rd, The Fire Department of the City of New York. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 159

Chapter 8

COORDINATION OF RESPONSE ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER AGENCIES AT 

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER

The issue of coordination of emergency response activities among the different authorities (the New York 

City Fire Department [FDNY], the New York City Police Department [NYPD], The Port Authority 

Police Department [PAPD], and the New York City Office of Emergency Management [OEM]) at the 

World Trade Center (WTC) has implications for each of the emergency response departments. The attack 

on the WTC created a large and complex emergency response challenge for each responding 

organization. It is apparent that in general on the morning of September 11, 2001, all departments 

attempted to work together to save as many lives as possible and protect the citizens of New York City. It 

is also apparent that there were difficulties associated with inter-department operations. This is 

demonstrated by statements extracted from first-person interviews with NYPD Emergency Service Unit 

(ESU) officers and FDNY personnel. 

The following statement describes interactions between NYPD ESU personnel and FDNY Rescue One 

personnel who were operating together up inside WTC 1 as they heard radio messages ordering the 

evacuation of the tower: 

▪ The firefighters were contacting their command post as we were 

contacting ours. I asked the firefighter, did you hear the same thing and 

he said yes. The interviewee said we are getting out and the firefighter 

said yes. The firefighter from Rescue One that the interviewee was 

talking to perished that day. The interviewee thought that the firefighter 

was a hero. He kept all of the guys calm that were there. He also 

worked well with the interviewee in communicating back and forth what 

FDNY had and what NYPD ESU had. The interviewee told the 

firefighter that they would be exiting the building and the firefighter 

wanted to confirm that all NYPD ESU members were evacuating the 

building so he could inform his command post. The firefighter said that 

he was going to inform his guys and that they would be coming down 

right behind the ESU team.1

First-person interviews with FDNY and NYPD personnel also showed that at times some issues related to 

operational responsibility and the competitive nature of departments’ did exist during the 

WTC operations. The following information was extracted from first-person emergency responder 

interviews: 

▪ A team of ESU police officers went into WTC 1 and the fire department 

and Port Authority were there. They stopped at the FDNY Command 

Post. A Sergeant and a Lieutenant from the team approached the fire 

 

1

 NYPD Interview 6, winter 2004. 
Chapter 8 

160 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

department to let them know they were there. The fire department did 

not acknowledge. There was no response. Since they got no response 

from the fire department they decided to go up the stairway to the upper 

floors.2

▪ A team of ESU police officers received instructions from an OEM staff 

member to report to the FDNY Lobby Command Post inside of WTC 2. 

The OEM member indicated that the ESU officers reluctantly followed 

his directions. The ESU team did report to the FDNY Command Post 

and they were given an assignment to assist a FDNY Chief many stories 

up in the building.3

The two interview statements above highlight issues related to departmental operational responsibility and 

the function of the operations command structure during the emergency response at the WTC. In general, 

emergency responder interviews suggest that inter-agency competition had minimal effect on operations 

at the WTC before the towers collapsed. 

8.1 DEPARTMENT OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 

The issue of which emergency responder department, police or fire, has command authority of a given 

operation has been a subject of discussion throughout the emergency response community for many 

years. In an attempt to reduce the uncertainty associated with this issue, the New York City Mayor’s 

Office established an operations protocol. In April of 1994, FDNY and NYPD published a document 

entitled “Police/Fire Protocol.”4

 The complete document is located in Appendix B. The introduction of 

this document stated that the protocol was “established to put and end to the confusion concerning the 

roles and responsibilities of the Police and Fire Departments at emergencies.” In section 2.2 it states: 

“At the scene of a fire, the ranking Fire Department officer will assume 

command. The ranking member of the Police Department will report to 

the fire officer in charge and offer any assistance that may be required. 

The police supervisor will request the Fire Department commander to 

inform Fire Department subordinates that evidence, especially in 

suspected arson or explosive cases MUST be preserved and 

safeguarded.”4

The following section, 2.3, stated that the Police Department would assume command at the scene of a 

non-fire emergency, and that the Fire Department would provide assistance for the Police Department as 

required. In addition to these two sections (that clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of the Police 

and Fire Departments at emergencies), section 2.5 addresses the protocol for how emergency responders 

would receive their directions and orders during an incident. This section stated the following: 

“During a joint operation, specific direction to members of both 

departments will be issued through their department’s chain of 

 

2

 FDNY Interview 5, winter 2004. 

3

 FDNY Interview 54, winter 2004. 

4

 New York City, Police/Fire Protocol, April 1994. 
 Coordination of Response Activities with Other Agencies at the World Trade Center 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 161

command. Ranking police and fire commanders will confer frequently 

concerning orders and directions to be issued. The ranking officers of 

the Police and Fire Departments MUST be aware of the need for mutual 

cooperation. All police and fire personnel MUST understand that they 

will be held strictly accountable for their conduct during joint 

operations.”4

The sections discussed above make it clear that FDNY was responsible for incident command at the 

WTC site since both of the WTC towers were on fire. As mentioned earlier, NYPD was in charge of 

aviation and roof operations since this was a criminal act. Relative to building collapse, section 3.4 of the 

protocol states that FDNY would be in command of rescue operations during a structural collapse. This 

issue saw intense debate by some personnel after the buildings collapsed and rescue operations were 

begun in the rubble field. Additionally from above, section 2.5 addressed the issue of how members of 

each department received directions during joint operations. Generally, this protocol was followed by the 

departments. FDNY was providing direction for its members and NYPD was providing direction for its 

members. This protocol potentially assisted in creating a conflict relative to operations inside the 

WTC towers. The protocol may have been associated with the response of FDNY Lobby Command Post 

personnel when NYPD personnel arrived, or it may also be associated with the reluctance of NYPD ESU 

personnel to report to the WTC 2 Lobby Command Post before going to work inside the tower. Also, 

section 2.5 indicated that ranking police and fire department commanders were to confer frequently 

concerning orders and directions to be issued. Information gathered related to the origination of unified 

orders and directions for FDNY and NYPD shows the process took place only at the department 

commissioner level. Evidence shows that FDNY and NYPD department chiefs were not working 

together at the same command post or that they formulated unified orders and directions for their 

departments. 5, 6

8.2 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND MULTI-AGENCY 

OPERATIONS 

The OEM was created in New York City after the 1993 bombing in part, to promote unified operations 

between and among the various city emergency responders. OEM was basically a support organization 

for expediting emergency response operations within the city. An analysis of the overall city emergency 

response structure indicates that New York City did not have a formalized Incident Command System 

that encompassed city wide emergency response operations. However, FDNY documents and firstperson interviews show that FDNY was working under an established Incident Command System that 

was updated by the department in May of 1997.7

 A description of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency 

Management (OEM) and its functions is provided in Appendix L. 

On the morning of September 11, 2001, OEM operations were disrupted with the evacuation of the city’s 

OEM operations center located inside WTC 7.8

 The FDNY Fire Commissioner stated the following 

 

5

 NYPD Interview 12, winter 2004. 

6

 FDNY Interview 65, spring 2004. 

7

 FDNY Interviews 2, 7, and 20, winter 2004. 

8

 FDNY Interview 45, winter 2004. 
Chapter 8 

162 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

concerning the loss of the OEM center when he was turned away from WTC 7 shortly after it had been 

evacuated: 

“How ridiculous, I thought. We’ve got a thirteen-million-dollar 

command center and we can’t even use it.” (Von Essen 2002) 

Since the OEM center was not available for operations, NYPD, FDNY, and OEM Commissioners met the 

Mayor on the street with the group initially assembling at Barclay Street. At the same time, NYPD was 

establishing an alternate command center for the Mayor and his staff at 75 Barclay Street so that he and 

his staff could oversee operations. However, their operations from 75 Barclay Street were disrupted by 

the collapse of the towers, and they had to quickly evacuate from that site. Data show that there was no 

formal structure of unified command between departments below the Mayor and Commissioner level of 

operations. Also data indicates that FDNY and NYPD department chiefs were not working together at 

the same command post, and that they did not formulate unified orders and directions for their 

departments. 

Unified command for the emergency response also was hampered by FDNY and NYPD setting up 

separate command posts for operations at the WTC. FDNY established its Incident Command Post (ICP) 

in the driveway of the parking garage at World Financial Center 2 (WFC 2), and there is no record that 

the ICP had any senior NYPD personnel assigned to it to provide liaison or assist with operations. One 

armed ESU team did provide a security sweep for the FDNY ICP, and it provided security for the ICP as 

operations were being established. However, NYPD set up its own separate command posts at Church 

and Vesey Streets and at West and Vesey Streets. It should be noted that the NYPD post at West and 

Vesey was only a short distance from the FDNY Incident Command Post at WFC 2. Figure 8–1 shows 

an armed NYPD ESU team member at the FDNY ICP location in front of WFC 2. 

It is recognized that NYPD generally has different responsibilities from FDNY that relate to security, 

traffic control, protection of the public, and the crime scene. However, there were overlapping functions 

associated with ESU rescue team operations inside and around the WTC towers and FDNY operations. 

Although ESU rescue teams did eventually meet up with and work with FDNY personnel, functional 

unified operations were diminished as a result of the two departments’ command posts being separated. It 

is also apparent from the emergency responder interviews that the separate command posts could not 

communicate with each other on their different radio systems. Additionally, neither department had 

liaison officers working with either the FDNY or NYPD command posts until after WTC 1 collapsed. 

With the collapse of the towers, a FDNY Chief was assigned to work at the newly establish command 

center at One Police Plaza. 

The following information is extracted from FDNY Circular, A.U.C. 319, Office of Emergency 

Management, April 1996.9

 

 

9

 FDNY Circular, A.U.C. 319, Office of Emergency Management, April 1996. 
 Coordination of Response Activities with Other Agencies at the World Trade Center 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 163

Figure 8–1. Video image of an NYPD Emergency Service Unit member providing security 

at the FDNY Incident Command Post in front of WFC 2. 

Purpose of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM):

• Emergency management requires inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination as well 

as communication with the public and the press. The performance of these functions by the 

City is best coordinated by the Office of the Mayor. The Mayor’s Office of Emergency 

Management has been established for this purpose. 

Relevant Functions of OEM: 

• Coordinate the City’s response to all emergency conditions and potential incidents which 

require a multi-agency response, including but not limited to severe weather, threats from 

natural hazards and natural disasters, power and other public service outages, labor unrest 

other than the keeping of the peace, water main breaks, transportation and transit incidents, 

hazardous substance discharges, building collapses, and acts of terrorism. 

• Monitor all potential emergency conditions and potential incidents which may require a 

multi- agency response. 

• Coordinate and implement training programs, including emergency response drills, to prepare 

for emergency conditions and potential incidents which may require a multi-agency response. 
Chapter 8 

164 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• Increase public awareness as to the appropriate responses by members of the public to 

emergency conditions and potential incidents, and review the City’s systems for 

disseminating information to the public. 

• Operate and emergency operations center to assist the City in managing emergency 

conditions and potential incidents which may require a multi-agency response. 

• Coordinate with the Police Department to ensure that the City agencies develop and 

implement emergency response plans in connection with planning for major City events. 

• Coordinate with state, federal and other governmental bodies to effectuate the purposes of 

OEM.

On September 11, 2001, the OEM Operations Center located inside WTC 7 on the 23rd floor was 

disrupted when the building underwent an emergency evacuation after the second hijacked aircraft struck 

WTC 2. As a result, this center became unusable and the operations of the OEM office became less than 

totally effective until after WTC 1 and 2 collapsed. This loss of OEM operations had a negative impact 

on interagency operations during WTC operations. As the Mayor learned of OEM’s evacuation, he 

immediately devised two priorities: 1) set up a new OEM Command Center, and 2) find a way to 

communicate with the people of New York City (Giuliani 2002). The following concerning unified 

emergency operations for the WTC event was extracted from the book by Mayor Giuliani: 

• It was felt that this attack on the World Trade Center placed the city “in uncharted waters” 

and it was also felt that they would have to make up their response to the attack.

• It was also reported by the Mayor that early in the emergency operations a decision was made 

to establish two command posts: one for the Fire Department and one for the Police 

Department. 

It was stated that two different command posts were needed because the departments were 

going to perform different tasks and had different requirements. The following direct quotes 

are from Mayor Giuliani’s book: 

“The Fire Department had to lead the rescue and evacuation. The Police 

Department had to protect the rest of the city. As the team leading the 

rescue, the Fire Department immediately became the incident 

commander. They set up their command post so that they had the 

buildings in their line of sight. The Police Department had already 

begun setting up at 75 Barclay. 

Had the Police Department established its command post on West Street 

with the Fire Department, it would have been impossible for them to 

access the hardlines and necessary communications for the defense of the 

city. Had the Fire Department put its command post with the Police 

Department at 75 Barclay, it would have been impossible to observe the 

buildings and fight the fire. It was absolutely necessary to have two 

command posts – one to observe the fire and the other to permit 

communication via hardline. Having the police commissioner, the fire 

commissioner and Director of OEM together with me ensured 
 Coordination of Response Activities with Other Agencies at the World Trade Center 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 165

coordination of the emergency rescue recovery and provided for the 

security of both the site and the city.” 

The different standard operating procedures of the agencies address cooperation between departments. 

However, the agencies have found it difficult in practice to operate under command of another group. 

This is especially true during large complex incidents. 

The coordination of communications and operations between the responding authorities at the WTC was a 

challenge for all emergency responders working that morning. The short time frame related to the attack 

and emergency responder operations coupled with successive significant threats (an aircraft hitting 

WTC 2 after WTC 1 was hit, the threat of a third aircraft coming in, the collapse of WTC 2, etc.) that had 

to be responded too by the different agencies compounded the difficulty for establishing a unified 

operation. The challenges related to the establishment of unified operations were made significantly 

worse when the OEM facility located inside WTC 7 had to be evacuated. Although there was merit to 

having the FDNY and NYPD Command Posts separated related to the different types of operations, there 

was no uniform means for communicating between the two Command Posts by the time that WTC 2 

collapsed. FDNY and NYPD were primarily operating as independent organizations based on their 

operational responsibilities. Consequently, functional unified operations were diminished as a result of 

the two department’s command posts being separated, coupled with their inability to directly 

communicate with each other. It has been demonstrated in earlier parts of this report, however, that 

FDNY, EMS, NYPD, PAPD, PANYNJ, and OEM were attempting to work together at the 

WTC complex. 

8.3 REFERENCES 

Giuliani, Rudolph W., with Kurson, Ken. 2002. Leadership, First Edition, Hyperion, Talk Miramax 

Books, New York. 

Von Essen, Thomas. 2002. Strong of Heart Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York, Regan 

Books, Harper Collins Publishers, New York. 
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NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 167

Chapter 9

FINDINGS

The emergency response to the World Trade Center (WTC) was complex and of unprecedented scale. 

Although New York’s emergency responders had never experienced an operation of the size presented by 

the attack on the WTC, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has determined that they 

typically followed their department policies and procedures for the operations they were required to carry 

out. The WTC attack and its results presented unprecedented challenges to emergency responder 

practices and equipment. The following addresses the findings of this investigation. 

9.1 ACCESS AND FIREFIGHTING 

Building Access and Evacuation 

The ability of occupants to evacuate from a building and the ability of emergency responders to access a 

building is largely a function of the building’s design. During the attack on the WTC, the elevators and 

stairways were the primary means for moving through and out of the buildings. The following findings 

highlight the conditions and difficulties related to these building components: 

• It was reported to the FDNY Battalion Chief who established the WTC 1 Lobby Command 

Post that the elevators were not working and/or were not generally safe for use during the 

WTC operations; however one elevator was used briefly by FDNY. 

• People were trapped inside many of the elevators. 

• Firefighters had to gain access to the injured and trapped occupants by climbing the stairs and 

carrying the equipment needed up the stairs. 

• FDNY command personnel learned from 9-1-1 dispatch operators that smoke, fire, and 

structural damage in the buildings prevented many building occupants from evacuating floors 

above the impact zones. 

• Mobility impaired individuals blocked stairway evacuation routes in WTC 1, and 

approximately 40 to 60 of these individuals were temporarily placed on the 12th floor to clear 

the stairways so others could evacuate. 

• It is estimated that emergency responder climbing rates varied between approximately 1.4 

minutes per floor for personnel not carrying extra equipment to approximately 2.0 minutes 

per floor for personnel wearing protective clothing and carrying extra equipment. 

• Communications records and interviews indicate that smoke and heat conditions on the top of 

the two WTC buildings prevented the NYPD helicopters from conducting safe roof 

evacuation operations. 
Chapter 9 

168 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• NYPD aviation unit personnel reported critical information about degrading building 

conditions before WTC 2 collapsed and critical information about the impending collapse of 

the WTC 1 several minutes prior to its collapse. No evidence has been found to suggest that 

the information was further communicated to all emergency responders at the scene. 

Emergency Response Operations 

The magnitude of the attack and the results were far greater that anything that the city’s emergency 

responders had ever experienced. The facts below provide a brief summary of emergency response 

operations that were critical to how operations were carried out before the collapse of WTC 2: 

• A review of procedures and policies compared to the actions taken by FDNY at the 

WTC shows that the procedures and policies were being followed to a great extent at the 

WTC. 

• The initial fire department size-up of the event was that a large aircraft had hit WTC 1, and 

that large fires were burning on multiple floors at and above the impact zone. 

• It was likely that the water supply on the upper floors was damaged and that firefighting 

would not be an option until a reliable water supply was established and equipment was 

carried up. 

• It appeared that the sprinkler and standpipe systems were compromised at the impact zone. 

• FDNY command personnel knew that jet fuel had flowed into the elevator shafts and into 

other parts of the buildings and presented a danger to building occupants and emergency 

responder personnel. 

• The known extent of the impact damage, fires in the buildings, and the height of the impact 

zones indicated that many of the people trapped above the impact zones were already dead or 

would likely die before emergency responders could reach them, 

• The impact zones were located at heights in the buildings that would require hours for the 

emergency responders to accumulate appropriate equipment and personnel to carry out the 

large scale operations needed to successfully access the upper floors, 

• Structural damage and fires caused by the aircraft impact would likely result in localized 

collapses in and above the impact and fire zones. 

• The fact that the impact zone and fires were so high in the building and that the building’s 

water supply was compromised brought the fire chiefs that established the original Command 

Post inside the lobby of WTC 1 to the conclusion that fire department efforts should be 

directed toward evacuation and rescue of building occupants. 

• At the point when WTC 2 collapsed, WTC personnel had not yet accomplished tasks required 

for operating the building’s fire pump systems, and WTC personnel had not given orders for 

starting the building’s fire pump system. 
Findings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 169

• The consequence of firefighters and other emergency responders having to climb many tens 

of floors to get to a fire in a high-rise building can be summarized as follows: 

− The climbing rate is approximately one to two minutes per floor for emergency 

responders attempting to access a fire zone 30 floors or more high. 

− The ability to get both personnel and needed equipment to the desired location becomes 

limited by building height. 

− The time factors related to fire growth, the ability to rescue building occupants, and the 

ability to bring a fire under control becomes more critical with every additional floor in 

building height. 

− The ability of emergency responders to climb the stairs with equipment and remain 

physically fit to conduct rescue and firefighting operations is diminished with every 

additional floor in building height that must be climbed. 

• The private ambulances or EMS teams that responded to the WTC had no equipment and no 

protective clothing at all. They also did not have the same radios so it was not possible to 

communicate with them by radio. 

9.2 EMERGENCY RESPONDER EQUIPMENT 

Generally, the equipment used by the emergency responders was adequate for the operations being 

carried out. However, there are some points related to equipment that need consideration. 

For high-rise buildings, fire departments should work with building owners to establish caches of 

equipment that can be assessed at different locations inside the buildings. Firefighters should not be 

expected to carry heavy equipment up dozens of flights of stairs. Firefighters and other emergency 

responders who are forced to climb stairs to access a fire or other emergency should not have to wear or 

carry equipment that can be secured and maintained on the upper floors of high-rise buildings. Within the 

agreements developed between emergency responders and high-rise building owners, there should be a 

means for the emergency responder agencies to insure that the pre-positioned equipment is adequately 

inspected, maintained, and certified ready for use. 

Equipment That Facilitated Operations 

The emergency responder first-person interviews did highlight three pieces of equipment that made a 

difference in their operations that day; in fact, they are credited with saving the lives of many emergency 

responders. These items were: radios, flashlights, and SCBA’s (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus). 

Radios 

Chapter 7 discussed the significant problems reported with the use of handie-talkie radios during the 

WTC operations on September 11, 2001. However, it is shown that numerous emergency responders felt 
Chapter 9 

170 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

that their radios played a critical role in saving their lives. As seen in section 5.8.2, this viewpoint was 

expressed by personnel from each of the emergency responder departments. 

Flashlights 

A second piece of equipment credited with assisting operations and saving lives was the flashlight. 

Although the WTC attack took place on a clear and sunny day, flashlights became critical to emergency 

responders and occupants at the WTC complex when electrical power was lost and when the towers 

collapsed. Flashlights provided the light needed to evacuate from dark, smoky, and dust filled 

environments. (Section 5.8.2) 

Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) 

The third piece of equipment given high marks by emergency responders was the air-pack or SCBA. 

Numerous emergency responders indicated that they used their SCBAs to breathe after the WTC towers 

fell. The air was thick with debris, dust, and smoke and everyone found it difficult to breathe. Personnel 

with SCBAs were able to place the mask over their face and breathe fresh air from the air bottle even 

through the outside air was thick with dust and smoke. Many of the emergency responders with SCBAs 

shared their air supply with others around them. (Section 5.8.2) 

9.3 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 

Building Emergency Communications 

• It was found through building occupant and emergency responder interviews that the 

emergency communications system used to make the emergency announcements inside 

WTC 1 was inoperable as a result of the aircraft impact. 

• It also was learned by FDNY personnel up inside of WTC 1 that the warden phone system 

was damaged and the standpipe phone system was not operating. 

Emergency Responder Radio Communications 

• After the first aircraft struck the WTC, there was a peak increase in emergency responder 

radio communications by approximately a factor of 5, followed by an approximate factor of 

3 steady level of radio communications. 

• Analysis of the radio traffic for each of the departments shows periods where radio traffic 

rates during the surge conditions potentially resulted in situations where base station radio 

operators were unable to relay important information. 

• During the surge in emergency responder radio traffic that occurred as a result of the attack 

on the WTC, approximately 1/3 to 1/2 of the emergency radio communications were not 

complete messages nor understandable. 
Findings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 171

• For the number of people at the WTC, the FDNY radio system was inadequate for locating 

and tracking personnel. 

Repeater 

• Radio communications recordings from the Port Authority radio communications system for 

their channel 30, which was the same as the FDNY channel 7 high-rise repeater channel, 

demonstrates that the FDNY high-rise repeater was operating. 

• Some of the 4 and 5 readability value radio communications occurred between FDNY 

personnel in the lobby of WTC 2 and FDNY personnel some 40 or more floors up inside the 

same building. 

9.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Even though the footprint of the WTC was small compared to the large areas that can be destroyed by 

earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, wildfires, and urban conflagrations, the height and size of the 

buildings, the concentration of large numbers of occupants, and the large number of emergency 

responders needed to conduct operations created significant difficulties for emergency responder 

command and control. The vertical volume associated with the towers and the effects of tall building 

design and construction had an overall negative influence on emergency operations: firefighting, 

evacuation, rescue, and communications. The following addresses the findings associated with 

emergency responder command and control during these attacks. 

• A FDNY interviewee indicated that on September 11, 2001, the Command Board approach to 

managing operations at the WTC became overwhelmed with the number of units and 

personnel reporting in for operations. In addition, an interviewee indicated that not all 

personnel that arrived at the WTC site were logged in on the Command Board. This is 

partially due to the size and complexity of operations at the WTC, but it also relates to 

personnel not always following department policies on reporting to the Command Post for 

assignment. 

• FDNY had established a functional Incident Command System when WTC 2 collapsed, and 

FDNY had the human and equipment resources committed for conducting high-rise 

operations at the WTC. 

• The FDNY Incident Command System was hampered by the loss of the OEM Command 

Center, the lack of a fully functional Field Comm unit, poor radio communications, and 

limited access to shared information critical to operations. 

• The collapse of WTC 2 not only caused the death of numerous citizens and emergency 

responders but it totally disrupted the ongoing Incident Command System Operations being 

carried out by FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD. 
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172 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Command Posts 

The emergency responder operations associated with the WTC attack exhibited a situation where almost 

all emergency responder departments established their command posts within the potential collapse zone 

of the buildings. This approach had been a standard operating procedure for years since there had been 

no prior history of collapsing high-rise buildings. However, on September 11, 2001, it suddenly became 

apparent to all Command Post personnel that the posts were located too close to the buildings. 

Personnel Accountability and Tracking 

With any large emergency response, personnel accountability and tracking are vital part of command and 

control. 

• In general, responding FDNY units to the WTC followed good practices as related to 

accountability. However, there were some cases where individuals did not report to the 

Command Post and became freelancers. Interviews with FDNY personnel showed that some 

fire department personnel came to WTC facilities without unit approval. In addition, there 

were various emergency responders from NYPD and PAPD that entered the towers without 

reporting into the FDNY Command Posts. 

• Several obstacles with regard to accountability of EMS personnel added to operations 

difficulties. They were first, the size of the event as it unfolded and the difficulty that EMS 

Chiefs had in determining who was at the scene. Second, “self dispatch” and “freelancing” of 

some non FDNY ambulances. Finally, there was an inability of FDNY EMS supervisors to 

communicate with some of the non FDNY ambulances. 

• Within the individual triage and treatment areas that were set up by EMS, it appears that 

efforts were made to keep track of patients. This was done with pencil and paper. All the 

data on patients were lost when the buildings collapsed. The loss of WTC 7 which housed 

the OEM hampered the ability to track patients within the system. 

• Because of the self dispatch of non 9-1-1 resources, there were patients being removed from 

the location by those units and the EMS officers did not have any knowledge or records of 

these patients, or even knew if or where they had been transported. 

• Once responders reported to a Command Post at the WTC, received their assignments, and 

departed to accomplish their tasks, there was no positive means to locate or track the 

activities of the units or individuals. 

Communications and Information Sharing 

All three of the emergency responder departments, FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD experienced difficulties 

with radio communications during the attack that occurred on the WTC. Each of the different 

departments was well aware of the shortfalls of their radio communications systems as it related to 

operations in the city and in high-rise building operations. They all knew not to expect perfect radio 

communications. There were two basic issues related to the quality of radio communications on 

September 11, 2001. One was the function of the radio equipment in the manor that it was being used 
Findings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 173

during the high-rise operations, and the other was the volume of radio traffic. For NYPD and PAPD, 

radio equipment did not appear to be a major problem during the operations. 

Within the WTC site, the PAPD maintained a reasonable quality of radio communications as it related to 

the capabilities of the radio and antenna systems in the buildings and site. The Port Authority had added 

an extensive radio antenna system for Port Authority and PAPD operations at the site, and it worked well 

until WTC 2 collapsed. With the collapse of WTC 2, the abandonment of the Police Desk at WTC 5, and 

the PAPD repeater being lost, personnel were forced to switch to point-to-point communications. 

NYPD also experienced successful operations with its radio equipment during communications at the 

WTC site. This may be attributed to the fact that only a small number of NYPD personnel entered and 

operated inside the WTC towers and that the mobilizations points for the NYPD personnel were located 

outside of the WTC towers (roughly a city block or more away from the towers). This location provided 

an unobstructed line of sight route for radio signals to travel to and from the towers allowing the radio 

signals to enter and exit the building’s windows. The radio signals did not have to pass through floors of 

steel or steel-reinforced concrete. 

It was well known by FDNY that handie-talkie radios did not work well in high-rise buildings that 

contain large amounts of metal and steel reinforced concrete. FDNY made attempts to overcome this 

challenge by developing the Battalion Car Cross-Band Repeater, and working with building owners to 

have building/complex repeaters put into areas where poor radio communications existed. FDNY also 

was attempting to improve the radio communications shortfall by the purchase of new handie-talkies. 

Even with all of this effort, FDNY radio communications suffered. One of the main contributing factors 

to poor FDNY communications at the WTC was that its primary Command Posts for conducting 

operations inside the buildings were located inside the lobby of each of the towers. This arrangement put 

the Chiefs managing operations inside the buildings at a location where radio signals would be attenuated 

by the building’s structure and did not allow a clear path for radio signals from the lobby to propagate up 

through the building. This arrangement also blocked radio signals coming down to the lobby from 

upstairs. A solution to this problem was the use of the WTC/FDNY high-rise building repeater or the use 

of the Battalion Car Cross-band Repeater. Since the WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater appeared to have a 

communications handset malfunction and it was not understood, that repeater became ineffective in 

WTC 1. However, the WTC/FDNY high-rise repeater was apparently used by personnel inside WTC 2. 

The radio transmission record indicated that the Battalion Car Cross-band Repeater was taken over to the 

lobby of WTC 2. Only one radio message from the Battalion Chief who activated the cross-band repeater 

provides evidence that it was being used as a backup to the WTC site repeater. No other record has been 

located concerning the use of that repeater at the WTC. Also, the rules for using a Battalion Car Crossband Repeater states that only one of these repeaters can be use at a time at one incident. With this, 

WTC 1 was apparently left without any capability of getting a radio signal outside of the building so that 

it could be retransmitted up with a clear propagation path. Therefore, radio communications to personnel 

working inside WTC 1 were seriously limited. 

The lack of information sharing that resulted from poor radio and telephone communications, and the 

information overload conditions resulted in serious operational difficulties. Emergency responder 

communications systems are the critical link for command and control and personnel safety. The 

incoming data and other information were not being pooled and analyzed in real time during operations, 

were not being distributed to all emergency responders who needed it; and were not being delivered to 
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174 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

emergency personnel and the public (WTC occupants) in a timely fashion. As a result, many emergency 

responders were not getting the critical information they needed for conducting operations and for 

maintaining the safety of their personnel. This had a significant impact on many of the emergency 

responders’ attempts to maintain good situational awareness. In addition, some occupants inside the 

WTC were not getting information that potentially could have saved their lives. An example is that there 

was one staircase inside WTC 2 that was passable for a period of time to the area above the impact zone. 

Information on this escape route was not acquired from the evacuating occupants and not passed on to 

others trapped above the impact zone. The gathering, analysis, and distribution of critical emergency 

information by responders and government agencies not only affect them and their operations but also 

affect citizens at the scene and citizens within the community where a large emergency occurs. 

There was a large amount of critical data gathered and transmitted through the various communications 

routes during the approximate two hours following the first aircraft impact. It has been learned that a 

sizable fraction of this information was either not acted upon or was not transmitted to all appropriate 

parties. As a result, the emergency responder’s information matrix was left with holes where these 

critical data should have been available for decision making and promoting safe operations. An example 

of this is where a senior level PAPD officer - with the authority to call for a total evacuation - 

immediately called for the evacuation of WTC 1 just after it was hit and again called for the evacuation of 

the entire complex before the WTC 2 building was hit. There is no record of any action being taken 

related to these instructions. These communications are found in the Evacuation Chronology section of 

this document. 

Finally, a preponderance of evidence indicates that emergency responder lives were likely lost at the 

WTC resulting from the lack of timely information sharing and inadequate communications capabilities. 

Emergency Responder Evacuation of the WTC 

• Radio communications associated with the order to evacuate WTC 1 had mixed results. Data 

shows that different personnel located on the same floors of the building either heard the 

evacuation orders or did not hear the orders. 

• Based on emergency responder interviews approximately one half of the personnel located up 

inside WTC 1 heard radio messages calling for the immediate evacuation of the building. 

• Individuals who had the evacuation information were actively telling others that the building 

was being evacuated. 

Emergency Responder/News Media Communications 

• Emergency responder/news media communications were less than totally effective during the 

WTC operations on the morning of September 11, 2001. 

• Critical information related to life safety and evacuation from the WTC towers was not 

communicated to the news media so that it could be broadcast to people trapped inside the 

WTC towers above the building fires. 
Findings 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 175

• Some news media contacts with emergency responder agencies interfered with the emergency 

response and life saving operations. Appropriate emergency response agency contact points 

were bypassed or not used by some news media for gathering information. 

• It appears that emergency response agencies were overwhelmed by news media requests for 

information. 

Inter-agency Operations and Unified Command 

During the WTC operations, there were many cases where FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD worked together to 

provide aid or to rescue people. There were cases where personnel from one agency needed to report to 

the Command Post of a different agency and get a job assignment. At times, fire or police departments 

may be compelled to conduct operations that can be dangerous to other emergency responders. In this 

event the locations of all emergency responders must be known at the event and all emergency responders 

must receive timely information from a unified command in order to maintain their safety. 

• It is apparent that in general on the morning of September 11, 2001, all departments 

attempted to work together to save as many lives as possible and protect the citizens of New 

York City. 

• On the morning of September 11, 2001, OEM operations were disrupted with the loss of the 

city’s OEM operations center that was located inside WTC 7. 

• There was no formal structure of unified command between departments below the 

Commissioner level of operations. 

• Data indicate that FDNY and NYPD department chiefs were not working together at the 

same command post, and that they did not formulate unified orders and directions for their 

departments. 

• Functional unified operations were diminished as a result of the FDNY and NYPD 

department command posts being separated. Emergency responder interviews show that the 

separate command posts could not directly communicate with each other using their handietalkie radios. 

• There were overlapping functions associated with ESU rescue team operations inside and 

around the WTC towers and FDNY operations. 

• Neither FDNY nor NYPD had liaison officers working with the other department’s command 

post until after WTC 1 collapsed. 

Many of the items listed above highlight areas where the WTC emergency response had difficulties. 

These items include command and control, command post locations, staging, assignments, personnel 

accountability, information overload, inter-agency operations, communications, information sharing, 

situational awareness, and equipment for operations in high-rise buildings. Most of these areas of 

concern are associated with emergency response operations that occur daily throughout the United States. 

It points out the importance of emergency responders and governments having the capability to greatly 
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176 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

advance operations beyond the normal scale of business while maintaining the above items under control. 

Additionally, it is imperative that emergency responders and governments are prepared for high risk 

operations by planning, equipping, training, and testing of emergency response capabilities so that all will 

function effectively when they are needed. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 177

Chapter 10

POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, EFFORTS

Following the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), New York City has actively analyzed the events 

of September 11, 2001. During the period following the attack up until present, the Fire Department of 

the City of New York (FDNY), the New York City Police Department (NYPD), and other city agencies 

have been making progress toward enhancing preparedness.1, 2 The Office of Emergency Management 

has been reestablished and is operating. The city has developed new policies and procedures related to 

city-wide emergency operations. In addition, the city is studying the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS) as a potential means for operating a city-wide incident command system. FDNY has 

replaced all lost firefighting apparatus and has re-staffed the department to its pre-September 11th levels. 

Additionally, FDNY has concentrated on developing the following areas: 

• training of firefighters related to complex operations, 

• comprehensive training of personnel related to the Incident Command System (ICS), 

• training of multiple teams as Incident Management Teams (IMT), 

• increasing capabilities related to HazMat operations, 

• helping to establish and participate in a City-wide Incident Management System (CIMS), 

• developing an updated Strategic Plan for the department, 

• developing an improved communications system incorporating new radio technologies with a 

focus on interoperability with other agencies they would be expected to work with, 

• establishing an intelligence sharing and needs effort with other agencies, 

• establishing a new Fire Department Operations Center, 

• developing an advanced Electronic Command Board for incident command operations, 

• developing specific emergency response plans that take into account updated practices on 

recall, staging, and multi-agency operations, 

• conducting internal and multi-agency drills and exercises to train personnel, 

• ongoing preparedness planning effort to deal with new threats and long-term challenges, and 

 

1

 The Fire Department of the City of New York, Written Statement of the FDNY Before the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, November 22, 2004. 2

 The City of New York Law Department, written communication, August 4, 2005. 
Chapter 10 

178 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

• as related to prevention, FDNY has also been working on the revision of the building code 

and fire codes in New York City. 

The above efforts represent some of the areas where FDNY identified needs related to their capabilities as 

they addressed the lessons learned following the September 11, 2001, attack on the WTC. Many of these 

efforts are ongoing and will take commitment, time, and funds to complete. FDNY is making progress 

with their efforts. However, it is noted that many of the areas addressed above also reflect on the needs of 

other fire departments and emergency responders located across the United States. Serious efforts are 

needed to insure that our nation’s emergency responders are ready to safely operate at unexpected and 

complex events where large numbers of personnel are needed and where multi-agency operations are 

required for saving lives and minimizing the impact of the incident. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 179

Attachment 1 

EMERGENCY RESPONDER LIST OF FATALITIES AND MISSING

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

 

Angello, Joseph Firefighter Ladder 118 

Ahearn, Brian Lieutenant Engine 230 

Allen, Eric Firefighter Squad 18 

Allen, Richard Firefighter Ladder 15 

Amato, James Captain Squad 1 

Anaya, Jr., Calixto Firefighter Engine 4 

Angelini, Joseph Firefighter Rescue 1 

Angelini, Jr., Joseph Firefighter Ladder 4 

Apostol, Jr., Faustino Firefighter Battalion 2 

Arce, David Firefighter Engine 33 

Arena, Louis Firefighter Ladder 5 

Asaro, Carl Firefighter Battalion 9 

Atlas, Gregg Lieutenant Engine 10 

Atwood, Gerald Firefighter Ladder 21 

Baptiste, Gerard Firefighter Ladder 9 

Barbara, Gerard Assistant Chief City Wide Tour 

Barnes, Matthew Firefighter Ladder 25 

Barry, Arthur Firefighter Ladder 15 

Bates, Steven Lieutenant Engine 235 

Bedigian, Carl Lieutenant Engine 214 

Belson, Stephen Firefighter Ladder 24 

Bergin, John Firefighter Rescue 5 

Beyer, Paul Firefighter Engine 6 

Biefeld, Peter Firefighter Ladder 42 

Bilcher, Brian Firefighter Squad 1 

Bini, Carl Firefighter Rescue 5 

Blackwell, Christopher Firefighter Rescue 3 

Bocchino, Michael Firefighter Battalion 48 

Bonomo, Frank Firefighter Engine 230 

Box, Gary Firefighter Squad 1 
Attachment 1 

180 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Boyle, Michael Firefighter Engine 33 

Bracken, Kevin Firefighter Engine 40 

Breman, Michael Firefighter Ladder 4 

Brennan, Peter Firefighter Rescue 4 

Brethel, Daniel Captain Ladder 24 

Brown, Patrick Captain Ladder 3 

Brunn, Andrew Firefighter Ladder 5 

Brunton, Vincent Captain Ladder 105 

Bucca, Ronald Fire Marshal 

Buck, Greg Firefighter Engine 201 

Burke, Jr., William Captain Engine 21 

Burns, Donald Assistant Chief City Wide Tour 

Burnside, John Firefighter Ladder 20 

Butler, Thomas Firefighter Squad 1 

Byrne, Patrick Firefighter Ladder 101 

Cain, George Firefighter Ladder 7 

Calabro, Salvatore Firefighter Ladder 101 

Callahan, Frank Captain Ladder 35 

Cammarata, Michael Firefighter Ladder 11 

Cannizzaro, Brian Firefighter Ladder 101 

Carey, Dennis Firefighter Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Carlo, Michael Firefighter Engine 230 

Carroll, Michael Firefighter Ladder 3 

Carroll, Peter Firefighter Squad 1 

Casoria, Thomas Firefighter Engine 22 

Cawley, Michael Firefighter Ladder 136 

Cherry, Vernon Firefighter Ladder 118 

Chiofalo, Nicholas Firefighter Engine 235 

Chipura, John Firefighter Engine 219 

Clarke, Michael Firefighter Ladder 2 

Coakley, Steven Firefighter Engine 217 

Coleman, Tarel Firefighter Squad 252 

Collins, John Firefighter Ladder 25 

Cordice, Robert Firefighter Squad 1 

Correa, Ruben Firefighter Engine 74 

Corrigan, James Captain Engine 320 

Coyle, James Firefighter Ladder 3 
 Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 181

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Crawford, Robert Firefighter Safety Battalion 1 

Crisci, John Lieutenant Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Cross, Dennis Battalion Chief Battalion 57 

Cullen, III, Thomas Firefighter Squad 41 

Curatolo, Robert Firefighter Ladder 16 

D'Auria, Michael Firefighter Engine 40 

Datri, Edward Lieutenant Squad 1 

Davidson, Scott Firefighter Ladder 118 

Day, Edward Firefighter Ladder 11 

DeRubbio, David Firefighter Engine 226 

Deangelis, Thomas Battalion Chief Battalion 8 

Delvalle, Manuel Firefighter Engine 5 

Demeo, Martin Firefighter Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Desperito, Andrew Lieutenant Engine 1 

Devlin, Dennis Battalion Chief Battalion 9 

Dewan, Gerard Firefighter Ladder 3 

Dipasquale, George Firefighter Ladder 2 

Donnelly, Kevin Lieutenant Ladder 3 

Dowdell, Kevin Lieutenant Rescue 4 

Downey, Raymond Battalion Chief Special Operations 

Duffy, Gerard Firefighter Ladder 21 

Egan, Jr., Martin Captain Division 15 

Elferis, Michael Firefighter Engine 22 

Esposito, Francis Firefighter Engine 235 

Esposito, Michael Lieutenant Squad 1 

Evans, Robert Firefighter Engine 33 

Fanning, John Battalion Chief Haz-Mat Ops 

Farino, Thomas Captain Engine 26 

Farrell, Terrence Firefighter Rescue 4 

Farrelly, Joseph Captain Division 1 

Feehan, William Chief 1st Deputy Comm. 

Fehling, Lee Firefighter Engine 235 

Feinberg, Alan Firefighter Battalion 9 

Fiore, Michael Firefighter Rescue 5 

Fischer, John Captain Ladder 20 

Fletcher, Andre Firefighter Rescue 5 

Florio, John Firefighter Engine 214 
Attachment 1 

182 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Fodor, Michael Lieutenant Squad 1 

Foley, Thomas Firefighter Rescue 3 

Fontana, David Firefighter Squad 1 

Foti, Robert Firefighter Ladder 7 

Fredericks, Andrew Firefighter Squad 18 

Freund, Peter Lieutenant Engine 55 

Gambino, Jr., Thomas Firefighter Rescue 3 

Ganci, Jr., Peter Chief of Department Chief of Department 

Garbarini, Charles Lieutenant Battalion 9 

Gardner, Thomas Firefighter Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Garvey, Matthew Firefighter Squad 1 

Gary, Bruce Firefighter Engine 40 

Geidel, Gary Firefighter Rescue 1 

Geraghty, Edward Battalion Chief Battalion 9 

Germain, Denis Firefighter Ladder 2 

Giammona, Vincent Lieutenant Ladder 5 

Giberson, James Firefighter Ladder 35 

Gies, Ronnie Lieutenant Squad 288 

Gill, Paul Firefighter Engine 54 

Ginley, John Lieutenant Engine 40 

Giordano, Jeffrey Firefighter Ladder 3 

Giordano, John Firefighter Engine 37 

Glascoe, Keith Firefighter Ladder 21 

Gray, James Firefighter Ladder 20 

Grzelak, Joseph Battalion Chief Battalion 48 

Guadalupe, Jose Firefighter Engine 54 

Guja, Geoffrey Lieutenant Battalion 43 

Gullickson, Joseph Lieutenant Ladder 101 

Halderman, David Firefighter Squad 18 

Halloran, Vincent Lieutenant Ladder 8 

Hamilton, Robert Firefighter Squad 41 

Hanley, Sean Firefighter Ladder 20 

Hannafin, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 5 

Hannon, Dana Firefighter Engine 26 

Harlin, Daniel Firefighter Ladder 2 

Harrell, Harvey Lieutenant Rescue 5 

Harrell, Stephen Lieutenant Battalion 7 
 Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 183

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Haskell, Jr., Thomas Battalion Chief Division 15 

Haskell, Timothy Firefighter Squad 18 

Hatton, Terence Captain Rescue 1 

Haub, Michael Firefighter Ladder 4 

Hayes, Philip Firefighter Engine 217 

Healey, Michael Lieutenant Squad 41 

Heffernan, John Firefighter Ladder 11 

Henderson, Ronnie Firefighter Engine 279 

Henry, Joseph Firefighter Ladder 21 

Henry, William Firefighter Rescue 1 

Hetzel, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 13 

Hickey, Brian Captain Rescue 4 

Higgins, Timothy Lieutenant Special Operations 

Hohmann, Jonathon Firefighter Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Holohan, Thomas Firefighter Engine 6 

Hunter, Joseph Firefighter Squad 288 

Hynes, Walter Captain Ladder 13 

Ielpi, Jonathon Firefighter Squad 288 

Ill, Jr., Frederick Captain Ladder 2 

Johnston, William Firefighter Engine 6 

Jordan, Andrew Firefighter Ladder 132 

Joseph, Karl Firefighter Engine 207 

Jovic, Anthony Lieutenant Battalion 47 

Juarbe, Jr., Angel Firefighter Ladder 12 

Judge, Mychal Chaplain Chaplain 

Kane, Vincent Firefighter Engine 22 

Kasper, Charles Battalion Chief SOC Battalion 

Keating, Paul Firefighter Ladder 5 

Kelly, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 105 

Kelly, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 15 

Kelly, Jr., Richard Firefighter Ladder 11 

Kennedy, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 101 

Kerwin, Ronald Lieutenant Squad 288 

Kiefer, Michael Firefighter Ladder 132 

King, Jr., Robert Firefighter Engine 33 

Kopytko, Scott Firefighter Ladder 15 

Krukowski, William Firefighter Ladder 21 
Attachment 1 

184 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Kumpel, Kenneth Firefighter Ladder 25 

Kuveikis, Thomas Firefighter Squad 252 

Laforge, David Firefighter Ladder 20 

Lake, William Firefighter Rescue 2 

Lane, Robert Firefighter Engine 55 

Langone, Peter Firefighter Squad 252 

Larsen, Scott Firefighter Ladder 15 

Leavey, Joseph Lieutenant Ladder 15 

Leavy, Neil Firefighter Engine 217 

Libretti, Daniel Firefighter Rescue 2 

Lillo, Carlos Paramedic Battalion 49 

Linnane, Robert Firefighter Ladder 20 

Lynch, Michael Firefighter Engine 40 

Lynch, Michael Firefighter Ladder 4 

Lyons, Michael Firefighter Squad 41 

Lyons, Patrick Firefighter Squad 252 

Maffeo, Joseph Firefighter Ladder 101 

Mahoney, William Firefighter Rescue 4 

Maloney, Joseph Firefighter Ladder 3 

Marchbanks, Jr., Joseph Battalion Chief Battalion 57 

Margiotta, Charles Lieutenant Battalion 22 

Marino, Kenneth Firefighter Rescue 1 

Marshall, John Firefighter Ladder 27 

Martin, Peter Lieutenant Rescue 2 

Martini, Paul Lieutenant Engine 201 

Mascali, Joseph Firefighter Tactical Support 2 

Maynard, Keithroy Firefighter Engine 33 

McAleese, Brian Firefighter Engine 226 

McAvoy, John Firefighter Ladder 3 

McCann, Thomas Firefighter Battalion 8 

McGinn, William Lieutenant Squad 18 

McGovern, William Battalion Chief Battalion 2 

McHugh, Dennis Firefighter Ladder 13 

McMahon, Robert Firefighter Ladder 20 

McPadden, Robert Firefighter Engine 23 

McShane, Terence Firefighter Ladder 101 

McSweeney, Timothy Firefighter Ladder 3 
 Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 185

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

McWilliams, Martin Firefighter Engine 22 

Meisenheimer, Raymond Firefighter Rescue 3 

Mendez, Charles Firefighter Ladder 7 

Mercado, Steve Firefighter Engine 40 

Miller, Douglas Firefighter Rescue 5 

Miller, Jr., Henry Firefighter Ladder 105 

Minara, Robert Firefighter Ladder 25 

Mingione, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 132 

Mitchell, Paul Lieutenant Battalion 1 

Modafferi, Louis Captain Rescue 5 

Mojica, Dennis Lieutenant Rescue 1 

Mojica, Manuel Firefighter Squad 18 

Molinaro, Carl Firefighter Ladder 2 

Montesi, Michael Firefighter Rescue 1 

Moody, Thomas Captain Division 1 

Moran, John Battalion Chief Battalion 49 

Morello, Vincent Firefighter Ladder 35 

Mozzillo, Christopher Firefighter Engine 55 

Muldowney, Jr., Richard Firefighter Ladder 7 

Mullan, Michael Firefighter Ladder 12 

Mulligan, Dennis Firefighter Ladder 2 

Murphy, Raymond Lieutenant Ladder 16 

Nagel, Robert Lieutenant Engine 58 

Napolitano, John Firefighter Rescue 2 

Nelson, Peter Firefighter Rescue 4 

Nevins, Gerard Firefighter Rescue 1 

Oberg, Dennis Firefighter Ladder 105 

O'Callaghan, Daniel Lieutenant Ladder 4 

Oelschlager, Douglas Firefighter Ladder 15 

Ogren, Joseph Firefighter Ladder 3 

O’Hagan, Thomas Lieutenant Battalion 4 

O’Keefe, William Captain Division 15 

O’Keefe, Patrick Firefighter Rescue 1 

Oitice, Samuel Firefighter Ladder 4 

Olsen, Eric Firefighter Ladder 15 

Olsen, Jeffery Firefighter Engine 10 

Olsen, Steven Firefighter Ladder 3 
Attachment 1 

186 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

O'Rourke, Kevin Firefighter Rescue 2 

Otten, Michael Firefighter Ladder 35 

Palazzo, Jeffery Firefighter Rescue 5 

Palmer, Orio Battalion Chief Battalion 7 

Palombo, Frank Firefighter Ladder 105 

Pansini, Paul Firefighter Engine 10 

Paolillo, John Battalion Chief Battalion 11 

Pappageorge, James Firefighter Engine 23 

Parro, Robert Firefighter Engine 8 

Pearsall, Durrell Firefighter Rescue 4 

Perry, Gleen Lieutenant Ladder 25 

Petti, Philip Lieutenant Battalion 7 

Pfeifer, Kevin Lieutenant Engine 33 

Phelan, Kenneth Lieutenant Engine 217 

Pickford, Christopher Firefighter Engine 201 

Powell, Shawn Firefighter Engine 207 

Princiotta, Vincent Firefighter Ladder 7 

Prior, Kevin Firefighter Squad 252 

Prunty, Richard Battalion Chief Battalion 2 

Quappe, Lincoln Firefighter Rescue 2 

Quilty, Michael Lieutenant Ladder 11 

Quinn, Ricardo Paramedic Battalion 57 

Ragaglia, Leonard Firefighter Engine 54 

Ragusa, Michael Firefighter Engine 279 

Rall, Edward Firefighter Rescue 2 

Rand, Adam Firefighter Squad 288 

Regan, Donald Firefighter Rescue 3 

Regan, Robert Lieutenant Ladder 118 

Regenhard, Christian Firefighter Engine 279/Ladder 131 

Reilly, Kevin Firefighter Engine 207 

Richard, Vernon Captain Ladder 7 

Riches, James Firefighter Engine 4 

Rivelli, Jr., Joseph Firefighter Ladder 25 

Roberts, Michael Firefighter Ladder 35 

Roberts, Michael Firefighter Engine 214 

Rodriguez, Anthony Firefighter Engine 279 

Rogan, Matthew Firefighter Ladder 11 
 Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 187

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Rossomando, Nicholas Firefighter Rescue 5 

Rubach, Paul Firefighter Ladder 25 

Russell, Stephen Firefighter Engine 55 

Russo, Michael Lieutenant Special Operations 

Ryan, Matthew Battalion Chief Battalion 1 

Sabella, Thomas Firefighter Ladder 13 

Santora, Christopher Firefighter Engine 54 

Santore, John Firefighter Ladder 5 

Saucedo, Gregory Firefighter Ladder 5 

Scauso, Dennis Firefighter Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Schardt, John Firefighter Engine 201 

Scheffold, Fred Battalion Chief Battalion 12 

Schoales, Thomas Firefighter Engine 4 

Schrang, Gerard Firefighter Rescue 3 

Sikorsky, Gregory Firefighter Squad 41 

Siller, Stephen Firefighter Squad 1 

Smagala, Jr., Stanley Firefighter Engine 226 

Smith, Kevin Firefighter Haz-Mat Co. 1 

Smith, Jr., Leon Firefighter Ladder 118 

Spear, Jr., Robert Firefighter Engine 26 

Spor, Joseph Firefighter Ladder 38 

Stack, Lawrence Battalion Chief Battalion 50 

Stackpole, Timothy Captain Division 11 

Stajk, Gregory Firefighter Ladder 13 

Stark, Jeffery Firefighter Engine 230 

Suarez, Benjamin Firefighter Ladder 21 

Suhr, Daniel Firefighter Engine 216 

Sullivan, Christopher Lieutenant Ladder 111 

Sweeney, Brian Firefighter Rescue 1 

Tallon, Sean Firefighter Ladder 10 

Tarasiewicz, Allan Firefighter Rescue 5 

Tegtmeier, Paul Firefighter Engine 4 

Tierney, John Firefighter Ladder 9 

Tipping, II, John Firefighter Ladder 4 

Tirado, Jr., Hector Firefighter Engine 23 

VanHine, Richard Firefighter Squad 41 

Vega, Peter Firefighter Ladder 118 
Attachment 1 

188 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Fire Department City of New York/Paramedics 

List of Dead and Missing: 

September 11, 2001 

Name Rank Unit 

Veling, Lawrence Firefighter Engine 235 

Vigiano, II, John Firefighter Ladder 132 

Villanueva, Sergio Firefighter Ladder 132 

Virgilio, Lawrence Firefighter Squad 18 

Wallace, Robert Lieutenant Engine 205 

Walz, Jeffery Firefighter Ladder 9 

Warchola, Michael Lieutenant Ladder 5 

Waters, Partick Captain Special Operations 

Watson, Kenneth Firefighter Engine 214 

Weinberg, Michael Firefighter Engine 1 

Weiss, David Firefighter Rescue 1 

Welty, Timothy Firefighter Squad 288 

Whelan, Eugene Firefighter Engine 230 

White, Edward Firefighter Engine 230 

Whitford, Mark Firefighter Engine 23 

Wilkinson, Glenn Lieutenant Engine 238 

Williamson, John Battalion Chief Battalion 6 

Wooley, David Captain Ladder 4 

Wren, William X. Firefighter Ladder 166 

York, Raymond Firefighter Engine 285 

Roma, Keith Fire Patrolman Fire Patrol 2, New York Board of Fire 

Underwriters 
 Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 189

 

Other Fire/EMS, Emergency Responders 

 

Fire Service 

Lovero, Joseph Fire Dispatcher Jersey City, NJ 

 

Paramedic/EMS 

Fairben, Keith Paramedic/Lieutenant Hospital EMS, New York Presbyterian Hospital / 

 Floral Park, NY Volunteer Fire Department 

Hamdani, Mohammed S. Ambulance Driver Howard Hughs Medical Institute 

Merino, Yamel J. Paramedic/EMT Hospital EMS, Metro Care Ambulance 

Pearlman, Richard A. Paramedic/EMT Hospital EMS, Forest Hills Volunteer Ambulance Corp. 

Santoro, Mario L. Paramedic/EMT Hospital EMS, New York Presbyterian Hospital 

Schwartz, Mark Paramedic/EMT Hospital EMS, EMT 7981, Hunter Ambulance 

Simpson, Jeff Paramedic/EMT Triangle Rescue Squad, Inc., Dumfries, VA 

Sullins, David Marc Paramedic/EMT Hospital EMS, Cabrini Hospital 

Winuk, Glenn J. Firefighter Volunteer Firefighter 
Attachment 1 

190 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

New York City Police Department 

List of Dead and Missing 

 

Name Rank Unit/Command 

 

Coughlin, John Sergeant ESU Truck 4 

Curtin, Michael Sergeant ESU Truck 2 

Gillis, Rodney Sergeant ESU Truck 8 

Roy, Timothy Sergeant Bus Squad 

Richards, Claude Detective Bomb Squad 

Vigiano, Joseph Detective ESU Truck 2 

D'Allara, John Police Officer ESU Truck 2 

Danz, Vincent Police Officer ESU Truck 3 

Dominguez, Jerome Police Officer ESU Truck 3 

Driscoll, Stephen Police Officer ESU Truck 4 

Ellis, Mark Police Officer Transit District 4 

Fazio, Robert Police Officer 13th Precinct 

Kloepfer, Ronald Police Officer ESU Truck 7 

Langone, Thomas Police Officer ESU Truck 10 

Leahy, James Police Officer 6th Precinct 

McDonnell, Brian Police Officer ESU Truck 10 

Perry, John Police Officer 40th Precinct 

Pettit, Glen Police Officer Police Academy 

Smith, Moira Police Officer 13th Precinct 

Suarez, Ramon Police Officer Transit District 4 

Talty, Paul Police Officer ESU Truck 10 

Valentin, Santos Police Officer ESU Truck 7 

Weaver, Walter Police Officer ESU Truck 3 

 
 Emergency Responder List of Fatalities and Missing 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 191

Port Authority Police Department PAPD/PANYNJ 

List of Dead and Missing 

 

Name Rank Unit/Command 

 

Morrone, Fred V. Superintendent of Police Headquarters Command 

Romito, James A. Chief of Police Headquarters Command 

Mazza, Kathy N. Captain, CO PAPD Academy 

Infante, Anthony P. Jr. Police Inspector, CO JFK International Airport 

Cirri, Robert D. Lieutenant Executive Officer 

Kaulfers, Robert M. Sergeant PATH ESU 

Amoroso, Christopher Police Officer Tactical Response Unit 

Barry, Maurice V. Police Officer PATH ESU 

Callahan, Liam Police Officer PATH ESU 

Davis, Clinton Police Officer WTC Command 

Foreman, Donald A. Police Officer Holland Tunnel Command 

Froehner, Gregg J. Police Officer PATH ESU 

Gorman, Thomas E. Police Officer PATH ESU 

Houston, Uhuru Gonga Police Officer WTC Command 

Howard, George G. Police Officer JFK ESU 

Huczko, Stephen Police Officer Newark Int'l Airport Command 

Jurgens, Paul W. Police Officer PAPD Academy 

Laszezynski, Paul Police Officer PATH ESU 

Lemagne, David P. Police Officer PATH Command 

Lennon, John J. Police Officer PATH ESU 

Levi, John D. Police Officer Port Authority Bus Terminal 

Lynch, James F. Police Officer WTC Command 

McIntyre, Donald J. Police Officer PATH Command 

McNeil, Walter A. Police Officer Holland Tunnel Command 

Navas, Joseph M. Police Officer PATH ESU 

Nelson, James Police Officer PAPD Academy 

Niedermeyer, Alphonese J. Police Officer Commercial Vehicle Inspection Unit 

Parham, James W. Police Officer PAPD Academy 

Pezzulo, Dominick A. Police Officer Port Authority Bus Terminal 

Reynolds, Bruce A. Police Officer George Washington Bridge 

Rodrigues, Antonio J. Police Officer Port Authority Bus Terminal 

Rodriguez, Richard Police Officer PAPD Academy 

Skala, John P. Police Officer Lincoln Tunnel Command 

Stuart, Walwyn W. Police Officer PATH Command 

Tietjen, Kenneth Police Officer PATH Command 
Attachment 1 

192 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Webb, Nathaniel Police Officer Holland Tunnel Command 

Wholey, Michael T. Police Officer PATH Command 

Sirius Police K-9 Explosives Detection Team 

Volunteer Responders 

 

Bourdier, Francisco Security at Deutche Bank Building 

Costello, Charles G Elevator Technician 

Jurgens, Thomas E. Volunteer Responder 

Lovero, Joseph Volunteer Responder 

Thompson, Capt. Harry W. Volunteer Responder 

Wallace, Mitchel S. Volunteer Responder 

United States Government Personnel 

 

Hatton, Leonard W. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Miller, Craig James U. S. Secret Service 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 193

Attachment 2 

CHRONOLOGY OF EMERGENCY RESPONDER OPERATIONS, WORLD 

TRADE CENTER ATTACK, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 

Note: (E) indicates that time is an estimate from the original source or has been estimated by the authors 

based on the available data. All other times listed are based on time recordings or clock readings. These 

data are compiled from many different sources. The authors of this chronology have included the time 

based on the best possible data, and the detailed times showing hour, minute, and second are given to 

represent the exact sequence of events during a given minute or block of time from the same set of 

recorded data. Based on the variations of recorded and clock times or different time stamps on different 

sets of recorded data, it is estimated that the error in time for this chronology is on the order of ±2 

minutes. 

8:46 a.m. Aircraft strikes WTC 1 on north side causing serious building damage and starting fires 

on floors 94 through 98. (FEMA 403) 

 The aircraft impact is observed by FDNY personnel assigned to Engine 7 and Ladder 1 as 

they investigate a gas odor at street level at the intersection of Church Street and 

Lispenard Street. Ladder 8 is also located at this scene. (FDNY interviews; New York 

Times; CBS Television documentary) 

 Battalion 1 Chief (at the intersection of Church Street and Lispenard Street) calls in 

aircraft impact to the communications center. Personnel and apparatus at the gas odor 

immediately respond to WTC 1 about fourteen blocks away. The Chief is located at the 

intersection of Church Street and Lispenard Street. 

 2nd and 3rd alarms (Note: For FDNY a first alarm requires that the following apparatus 

be dispatched: 

8:46 a.m. PAPD Police Desk radio report, Channel W – A unit reports by radio to the Police Desk 

at the World Trade Center that there has been an explosion at the World Trade Center. A 

PAPD unit reports that there are major injuries at the Plaza. 

8:46 a.m. WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – (Note: Significant static on the 

following transmissions.) “...?... the building. Evacuate the building” “Evacuate the 

building.” “...?... debris ...?...” “...?... some kind of explosion.” 

8:46 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – There is an open microphone transmission 

with a lot of people yelling. 

8:47 a.m. NYPD – Level 1 mobilization called; Level 3 mobilization called 8 seconds later (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

8:47 a.m. Box 8087-2, location of alarm box - Fire Command Desk in WTC 2, location of alarm 

box in the lobby at Command Desk via Liberty Street Note: Each “Box” record 

represents the formal dispatch of a unit to the incident location of the “Box.”. (FDNY 

Box Alarm data sheets) 

Battalion 1 (WTC 1) 

Battalion 2 (WTC 1 Command Post, fatalities) 
Attachment 2 

194 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Engine 4 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

Engine 6 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

Engine 7 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations) 

Engine 10 (1WTC, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, fatality) 

Engine 24 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

Engine 263 (post collapse operations) 

Ladder 1, (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

Ladder 8 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, evacuation of West St., fatality) 

Ladder 10 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

Ladder 15 (WTC 2, search and evacuation, fatalities) 

Rescue 1 (WTC 1, operation on upper floors, fatalities) 

Marine 1 (evacuated injured to Jersey City, drafted water) 

Marine 6 (operated fire boats Kane and Smoke, evacuated injured to Jersey City, drafted 

water) 

8:47 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... There is a fire on 22.” 

8:47 a.m. WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “A4 to ...?... hook up” “Roger, 

evacuate the building, evacuate the building. Head out towards Building 5.” 

8:47 a.m. WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “B6 ...?... employees, avoid the 

Concourse, avoid the Concourse.” 

8:47 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... on the 22nd floor a lot of debris.” 

8:47 a.m. PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “The top ten floors of the Trade Center 

are on fire, possible aircraft. 

8:48 a.m. EMS confirms incident (FDNY, McKinsey & company, 2002) 

8:48 a.m. Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

data sheets) 

SOC Battalion 1 (WTC 1, operations on upper floors, fatality) 

Battalion 4 (WTC 1, fatality) 

Battalion 6 (WTC 1, fatalities) 

Battalion 7 (WTC 2, operation on upper floors, fatalities) 

Engine 5 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, relayed water to E 247 & 

E 41, 5 WTC, fatality) 

Engine 9 & Sat 1 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations) 

Engine 15 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

Engine 28 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations) 

Engine 33 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, post collapse – relayed 

water from fire boat to manifold, fatalities) 

Ladder 6 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, trapped in B stairway upon collapse) 

Ladder 20, (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

8:48 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “.....Be advised I have two (ATM ?) 

workers down here on B2 between the red and the yellow lot. Be advised, I got 

two...workers hurt. I need a, ah, EMT down here ASAP.” “Where do you need 

assistance for the (ATM?) workers?” “...?... between a the red lot and yellow lot where 

the walkway where the (ATM?) office is” 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 195

8:49 a.m. PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “....... (garbled).....but start doing the 

evac, the upper levels. Have the units put on the Scot air-packs...apparatus.” 

8:49 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “10-4, S4, I understand there may have been 

an explosion on Liberty Street.” 

8:49 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Stay off the air.” 

8:49 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... I need EMS by ...?... I got a 

security guard that’s hurt.” 

8:50 a.m. 5th alarm called for WTC 1 (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

Command Post established at WTC 1 lobby by Battalion 1 

8:50 a.m. Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

data sheets) 

Engine 1 (WTC 1, fatality) 

Engine 3 (WTC 2, WTC 7, WFC 3) 

High Rise 1 (WTC 2, WTC 7, WFC 3) 

Engine 16 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

Engine 55 (WTC 1, Siamese connections, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

Ladder 5 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

Rescue 2 (WTC 1, operations on upper floors, fatalities) 

Rescue 4 (operations unknown, fatalities) 

HAZMAT 1 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

8:50:04 PAPD Police Desk radio, PA Channel W – FDNY Ladder 10 calls to identify which 

 World Trade Center building was involved. “Ladder One Oh, WTC, Go ahead Ladder 

 One Oh. .... Is it Two World Trade or One World Trade? (response PAPD) One World 

 Trade, on the upper ten floors. (FDNY) Two or One? (response PAPD) Building One. 

8:50:38 10-84, Engine 55, Note: This transmission was by error. FDNY, World Trade Center 

Incident Summary (WTC 1, Siamese connections, upper floors operations, fatalities. 

(FDNY CD12/CD15) 

 Note: Code 10-84 denotes that the unit has arrived at the scene. 

8:50 – 8:59 Incident Command Post established in WTC 1 lobby (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 

 2002) 

 14 units responding to WTC 1, all from lower Manhattan. Three of the 14 units reporting 

 are dispatched from stations that have already sent other units to the WTC. (New York 

 Times, website, timeline) 

8:50:35 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – An Officer calls for chemical 

mobilization. 

8:50:48 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... Be advised, I have two.... workers 

 down here on B2 between the red and ...Be advised I got two...workers I need an EMT 

 down here ASAP.” “Where do you need assistance for the ....workers?” “B2 between 

 the red...walkway...” 
Attachment 2 

196 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

8:51 EMS - 10-40 transmitted Note: Code 10-40 denotes a gas or electrical condition. 

8:51:12 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W –“Four One to WTC” “Go ahead.” “B1 

 Level ..(garbled).. We had a minor explosion or major explosion. Something happened 

 down here.” (Response) “There was an explosion on the upper floors.” 

8:51:25 WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “Everybody head over to the B 

 Tower escalators. I’ll set up over here.” 

8:51:35 10-84, Ladder 1, (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

8:51 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

data sheets) 

 Squad 18 (WTC 1 operate on upper floors, fatalities) 

8:51:43 Box 9031, location of Alarm Box, West and Liberty Streets (FDNY Box Alarm data 

sheets) 

 Battalion 31 (Command Post at WFC 3, Command Post at Marriott) 

 Engine 205 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets) 

 Ladder 110 (WTC 1, up to 21st floor) 

8:52 (E) 10-60 alarm for WTC 1 Note: Code 10-60 denotes a Major Emergency (FDNY, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

8:52 NYPD – ESU responds to WTC, five ESU teams deployed into WTC buildings and 

 plaza, one additional ESU team prepares for helicopter rescue that was canceled for 

 safety reasons. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 Aviation unit arrives at scene and examines possibility for roof rescue (NYPD, McKinsey 

 & Company, 2002) 

 Truck 1 establishes ESU Command Post at Church and Vesey Streets 

 30 extra staff members assigned to take 9-1-1 calls (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 

 2002) 

8:52 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

data sheets) 

 Engine 39 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, trapped in B stairway at collapse) 

 High Rise 2 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

 Rescue 3/RCO 1 (WTC 2, operations on upper floors, fatalities) 

8:52:01 10-84, Engine 18 (FDNY Box Alarm data sheets) 

8:52:09 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight One to TC” “CBD’s aware; 

 they’re mobilizing at this time.” 

8:52:17 WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “Seven Two Six Mark.” “Go 

John” “Elevator in A Tower is stuck right now...?...in the elevator.” “Alright, John try 

to try to calm them down. There’s nothing we can do right now. Stand by ...?...” “OK” 

8:52:49 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “People are jumping out the windows.” 

 (response) “What location?” “Tower 1.” 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 197

8:52:59 FDNY, Police Precinct 76. (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

8:53 EMS - 042 arrives and establishes EMS Command. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 

 2002) 

8:53 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log) 

 Ladder 3 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

8:53:23 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... Please let me get through the PATH 

 train. Something is going on at the PATH train. Can you ask somebody...?... make 

 announcement 310B...people running out of the PATH train. Copy?” 

8:54 Battalion 2 assigned as Comcord. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

8:54 NYPD – PAPD is notified to shut down all PATH tunnels and trains 

 All ESU teams advised to respond to Church and Vesey Streets. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

8:54 Almost 50 percent of special operations units deployed (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

8:54 EMS – Task forces are staging at Manhattan bridges. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 

 2002) 

8:54 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log) 

 Battalion 40 (Command Post at Marriott), 

 Battalion 48 (Operations unknown, fatalities), 

 Engine 202 (Command Post at WFC 3 on West Street) 

 Engine 204 (Command Post at WFC 3 on West Street) 

 Engine 210 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, hydrant hookup at West and 

 Liberty, at WTC 1 Command Post when WTC 2 collapsed) 

 Engine 224 Command Post on West Street, relayed water to WTC 2, supplied hoselines 

 for firefighting) 

 Engine 235 (WTC 2) 

 Engine 239 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets, relayed water to E 24) 

 Ladder 101 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, operations in WTC 2, fatalities) 

 Ladder 105 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Ladder 131 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, while in Marriott WTC 2 

 collapsed, when exiting Marriott WTC 1 collapsed, all injured) 

 Ladder 132 (WTC 2, rescue work on upper floors, fatalities) 

8:54:02 WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “OS6, OS4 Bryan” “Go ...?... 

 we’re on 33, C staircase. We’re heading down.” “All right hurry up Bryan. The lobby 

 is a ... mess Bryan. There’s ...?... on the way down. You come out of the building, 

 there is ... falling down from the side of the building, OK. Be very careful...?... a 

 mess.” 

8:54:22 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “... (?)... Do you know basically where the 

plane hit the building?” (Note: Two unreadable transmissions follow.) “...(?)... By the 

side right over the ... (?)...” “Come back, I didn’t read your transmission. It is on the 
Attachment 2 

198 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

side of Building Six Tower One.” “...(?)... One hundred One floor you said?” “ ... (?)... 

I got too much... (?)... Here, if you can hear me ... (?)... Can you hear me with so much 

commotion?” “What floor? ...(?)... Building Seven. ...(?)... Hit Building Seven.” 

“No it hit World Trade Center One but ... (?)... Building Seven. Copy?” “What floor 

did it hit?” “....(?)... All the way at the top ... (?) ... and above.” 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

8:54:31 10-84, Ladder 20, (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

8:54:39 10-84, Battalion Chief 2, (WTC 1 Command Post, fatalities) 

8:54:41 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... by the side right over the ...?...” 

“Come back, I didn’t read your transmission.” “It is on the side of Building 6, Tower 1, 

....” “101st floor you said?” “I got too much ....hear if you can hear me...” “Can you 

hear me with so much commotion?” “What floor?” 

8:54:42 10-84, Ladder 6, (WTC 1, upper floors operations, trapped in B stairway upon collapse) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

8:54:49 WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “...?...B to all ACE employees 

 report down to 310B lobby.” 

8:54:57 FDNY report of people trapped on 106th floor of World Trade Center 1. (FDNY, World 

 Trade Center Incident Summery, 2001) 

8:55 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log) 

 Squad 1 (operations unknown, fatalities) 

8:55 a.m. The first fire companies arrive at WTC 1. Some firefighters start up stairs. (New York 

Times, website, timeline) 

 Chiefs set up command post in lobby of WTC 1. 

8:55 EMS – Initial staging area established on West Street across from WTC 1. (FDNY, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

8:55:02 FDNY report of people trapped on 87th floor of World Trade Center 1. (FDNY, World 

 Trade Center Incident Summery, 2001) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

8:55:12 10-84, Engine 15 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

8:55:18 10-60, Called by Division Chief 1 

8:55:21 10-84, Rescue Squad 1 (operations on upper floors, fatalities) 

8:55: 37 10-84, Engine 24 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

8:55:48 FDNY radio dispatcher relays that people are trapped on the 106th floor and Division 

 Chief 1 (DC01) states he has units on the way up. He has unconfirmed reports of fire on 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 199

 the 78th floor. He also requests Police Department for security. (FDNY World Trade 

 Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

8:55:49 10-84, Engine 4 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations fatalities) (FDNY Box 

 Alarm Dispatch log) 

8:56 NYPD – ESU sends team to meet helicopters for possible roof rescue. (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

8:56:11 10-84, Ladder 5 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

8:56:22 10-47, from FDNY Note: Code 10-47 denotes request for police response. 

8:56:24 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Plaza, be advised through our contact 

 ....?.... We still have trains coming into the Trade Center.” 

8:56:30 10-84, Battalion Chief 7 (WTC 2, operation on upper floors, fatalities) (FDNY Box 

 Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

8:56:30 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X - ...(?)... Go. Need an ambulance 

 immediately at Building Four. Have a person injured here. Building Four. That’s a 

 copy. 

8:56:32 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Need and ambulance immediately at 

Building 4. Have a person injured here.” “Building 4, that’s a copy.” 

8:56:44 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... security dispatch on the side of 

Building 4 and 2. We have people trying to exit out of the building. Need some 

assistance...on keeping the people inside.” “That’s a copy.” 

8:56:51 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X - ... (?)... security officer dispatch on the side 

of Building Four and Two. We have people trying to exit out of the building. Need some 

assistance... (?)... on keeping the people inside. That’s a copy 

8:57 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Squad 288 (operations unknown, fatalities) 

8:57:20 10-84, Engine 5, (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, relayed water to 

 E 247 & E 41, 5 WTC, fatality) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

8:57:27 PAPD Police Desk radio reports, PA Channel W – Unit reports broken water pipes at the 

 P4 Level. 

8:57:30 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Don’t let anyone in the building.” 

“Evacuate the Plaza at this time.” 

8:57:33 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – Evacuate the Plaza at this time. 
Attachment 2 

200 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

8:57:49 WTC Elevator operations radio report, PA Channel Z – “Seven, Seven, all ACE 

 mechanics respond down to 310 fire command. Seven, seven, all ACE mechanics 

 respond down to 310 fire command.” 

8:57:52 FDNY Battalion Chief 2 (BC02) advises there are jumpers and confirms for Division 

 Chief 1 (DC01) that the jumpers have already jumped. (FDNY World Trade Center 

 Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

8:58 NYPD – Chief of Department calls Level 4 mobilization. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

8:58 EMS – Staging established at Church and Fulton Streets. (FDNY, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

8:58:04 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “What elevators are running in Building 

number One?” ...(?)... OCC... (?)... “S2 to all security guards, hold your posts. Don’t 

allow people in ... (?)... Do not allow anyone into the courtyard or any ... (?)... leading 

into the ...(?)... copy?” 

8:58:09 10-84, Battalion Chief 6, (WTC 1, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15) 

8:58:26 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “S2 to all security guards, hold your posts. 

 Don’t allow people in the Plaza...Do not allow anyone onto the Courtyard or any ... 

 leading into the ...” “Copy?” 

8:58:29 10-84, Engine 3, (WTC 2, WTC 7, WFC 3) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15) 

8:58:48 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Seventy Ninth floor. We have various 

 people trapped at that location.” 

8:59 NYPD – First ESU team enters WTC 1. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

8:59 Eighteen fire apparatus are parked outside of WTC 1. (New York Times website) 

8:59:08 Dispatch 5th alarm (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

8:59:12 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... the Plaza. Evacuate the people.” 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

8:59:26 10-84, Engine 28, (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations) 

8:59:32 10-84, Engine 202, (Command Post at WFC 3 on West Street) 

8:59:32 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W –“Eight One, TC” “Go One.” “As soon 

 as we’re able, I want to start a building evacuation, building one and building two, till we 

 find out what caused this.” 

8:59:41 10-84, Ladder 101, (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, operations in WTC 2, 

 fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 201

8:59:47 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Sir, be advised on forty-four, Building 

 One, I have people upstairs... (?)... Copy?” “We are aware ... (?)...EMS... (?)... 

 emergency people in route. ...(?)...up there. You all right?” 

8:59:54 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Let’s begin an evacuation of the 

entire complex.” “All buildings, copy?” “Roger 8.” 

9:00 second 5th alarm for WTC 1 

9:00 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 21 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, fatality) 

 Engine 34 (WTC 1, operated at Command Post and Field Comm Unit) 

 Engine 54 (WTC 1, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Engine 65 (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

 Engine 207/Sat. 6 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, Siamese to 90 West Street, upper floors 

 operations WTC 1, fatalities) 

 Engine 226 (Command Post on West Street, provided water from hydrant, operations 

 unknown, fatalities) 

 Ladder 9 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

 Ladder 18 (WTC 1, lower floors operations) 

 Rescue 5 (operations unknown, fatalities) 

9:00:07 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...to S4” “Be advised suite 4711 Building 

 1, there is a report of glass...” “...couldn’t get outside the room. There’re stuck inside 

9:00:26 FDNY radio dispatcher advises smoke is on 83rd, 103rd, and 104th floors, reiterates about 

 the people trapped on the 106th floor. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary 

 notes, 2001) 

9:00:33 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X - “S4 to 77, K” “Be advised, you have a 

 report of an injured person two World Trade between the 14th and 15th floor. OK” 

9:00:51 WTC Elevator operations radio report, Channel Z – “...?...” “Go” “Yea Pete, I’m stuck 

 in the stairway.” 

9:00:54 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Building five, start to evacuate 

building five?” “Stand by on building five.” “Roger.” (Skip portion of transmission) 

“Go down to the B4 level ....” “Roger” “...Start at the B4 level for evacuation.” 

“Affirmative.” 

9:00 – 9:09 Most companies arriving during this period go the WTC 1. (New York Times, website, 

 timeline) 

9:01 – 9:03 (E) FDNY Incident Command Post is established on West Street opposite WTC 1 (FDNY, 

McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:01 NYPD – 1st and 5th precinct Executive Officers advise new mobilization point at Vesey 

 and West Streets (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 
Attachment 2 

202 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:01 EMS - Assistant Chief of EMS arrives (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:01:09 FDNY radio dispatcher advises Car 4D that there are 25 to 30 people trapped on the 104th

 floor back room, and 103rd floor north room. Also reports people trapped on 83rd floor. 

 FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:01:58 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Evacuate all buildings in the complex. 

 You copy? All buildings in the complex.” “Roger. Units evacuate all units, all tenants 

 in the buildings, at the Trade, at the Trade Center.” 

9:01:59 10-84, Safety Battalion 1 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

9:02:43 FDNY reports people trapped on 105th floor of World Trade Center 1. (FDNY, World 

 Trade Center Incident Summery. 2001) 

9:03 a.m. Aircraft strikes WTC 2 on the south side causing serious building damage and starting 

 fires on floors 78 through 84. (FEMA 403) 

 A command post is set up in WTC 2 on the West Street side. A second fifth alarm is 

 established to support operations in WTC 2. Sixteen firehouses from lower Manhattan 

 have units responding to the WTC. Five of the sixteen firehouses have multiple units 

 responding to the WTC. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

9:03 Incident Command Post established on West Street across from 6 WTC (FDNY, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:03 NYPD – Level 4 mobilization transmitted on Citywide 1 (NYPD, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:03:00 10-84, Ladder 110, (WTC 1, search and evacuation up to 21st floor) (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:03:08 FDNY report of person trapped on 68th floor of World Trade Center, building not 

 identified. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:03:22 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “S4...?... The A stair case is clear, copy, 

 from 77 to ...?...” 

9:03:33 PAPD Police Desk radio report, Channel W – “Some kind of explosion in building 2.” 

 “Roger.” 

9:03:37 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... Hit the building. Another plane 

 ...?... Another plane just hit the building... (?)... Liberty Street 

9:03:50 10-84, Engine 205, (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets) (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:03:51 FDNY radio dispatcher advises Car 4D (Car 4D is the Incident Command’s Vehicle) 

 about the second plane hitting World Trade Center 2 and advises about people trapped on 

 the 83rd floor in room 8311. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 203

9:03:52 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “S4 to FCC” Run those smoke units. 

 They’ll clear the air up there.” 

9:04:09 10-84, Battalion Chief 31, (Command Post at WFC 3, Command Post at Marriott) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:04:30 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Be advised that a second plane has 

 struck the building.” (Response) “Be advised, the building has already been shut down.” 

 (Response) Be advised, another aircraft has struck the building.” 

9:04:50 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “We have visual on that. Not known if 

 it was a second plane, possibly a missile.” 

9:05 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion 8 (Command Post, operations unknown, fatality), 

 Battalion 9 (Command Post, operations unknown, fatalities) 

9:05:21 FDNY radio dispatcher attempts to reach Car 4D which he is unable to contact. The 

 dispatcher relays the information to Division Chief (DC 01). (FDNY World Trade 

 Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:05:51 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight One, TC” “Go ahead Eight 

 One.” “The city is aware, right, that we need every ambulance that we, ah, that they can 

 spare? Correct?” (response) I’ve notified them again, about five minutes that we have to 

 mobilize everybody. Be advised. We still have people trapped on the upper floors. Fire 

 crews have some units up there to evacuate. 

9:05:51 FDNY report of a few hundred people trapped on 104th floor of the World Trade Center, 

 building not identified. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:05:48 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – (Note: This series of 

 communications started at 9:05:48 and ended at approximately 9:07:37.) “Battalion 1 to 

 Battalion 7” “Battalion 1 to Battalion 7” “Battalion 7 to Battalion 1, How do you read 

 me?” “Battalion 1 to Battalion 7” “Battalion 7 to Battalion 1, How do you read me?” 

 “Battalion 1 to Battalion 7” “Battalion 7 to Battalion 1, How do you read me?” “Four 

 Bravo to One” (Note: Period of mixed transmission and walkover followed by a 

 possible female voice “20”) “Battalion 1 to Battalion 7” “Bravo to 7” “Go ahead Bravo 

 from Battalion 7” (Note: possible female voice “...?...closed to 10 o’clock”) “I’m 

 down in the lobby and I can read ya.” “Battalion 1 wanted a radio check.” (Note: 

 possible female voice “...?... doing some work;”) “Battalion 1 to Battalion 7, I don’t 

 think we have the report. I picked you up on my radio but not the hard wire.” “Alright, 

 would you want me to remain on channel 7 or go the channel 1?” “...?... Bravo to Field 

 Com” “...?... We’re going to have to use the car repeater. You said you have the 

 repeater on.” “I’m going to give it to Chief Burns in the lobby of Tower 2.” “OK, we’re 

 going to need something in this Tower 1 here.” “Alright, I’ve got the repeater on 

 ... (walkover)... radio OK.” “Battalion 7 to Battalion 1” “Battalion 1, we ah, we’ll use 

 this channel 2 in, ah, this building as a command channel for the Chiefs.” “Alright, 

 you’re going to stay on channel 1 for the tactical.” “Stay on tactical, um ...?..., on the 

 command channel 2.” “10-4” 
Attachment 2 

204 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:05:53 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “SS6 to anybody.” “Go” “We have a fire 

here and the smoke is developing and we can’t even breathe. We have eyes burning 

here.” “That’s a copy, sir.” 

9:06 NYPD – (Chief of Department) orders that no aerial rescue is to be attempted. (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:06:31 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Units on channel W, this is 8581 

 Sierra. There’s been a reported missile launching from the Woolworth Building. CPD, if 

 you are monitoring, get in touch with New York City. Have them check the Woolworth 

 Building roof top. 

9:07 EMS – Assistant Chief of EMS Ops assumes command. EMS Ops moves into lobby and 

 coordinates with Fire Department. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:07 (E) FDNY Chief and NYPD Chief receive briefing from FBI officer at Church and Vesey 

 Streets. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:07 NYPD – Police Chief (PC) orders Command Post to be set up at Barclay Street. (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:07:20 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... Ok, I’m still evacuating 4 World 

 Trade, 4 World Trace Center, going to Building 5. I have people going crazy.” “Let 

 them go out Building 4. Let them go out Building 4 to the side.” “That’s a 10-4. I’ll let 

 them go 4 World Trade Center.” 

9:08 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 22 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities), 

 Engine 40 (Reported to Command Post WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities), 

 Engine 44 (West and Vesey Streets, ordered to maintain street control, assisted Marine 1 

 with water supply), 

 Engine 53 (2 WFC, street control, water supply and hose lines), 

 Engine 211 (hydrant hookup at Barclay and Church Streets, at Command Post at West 

 and Vesey Streets when WTC 2 collapsed), 

 Ladder 11 (WTC 2, upper floors operations, fatalities), 

9:08 – 9:13 (E) FDNY establishes a Lobby Command Post inside WTC 2 at the Fire Command Desk. 

(FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:08:27 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... Martinez to the units that are 

listening. Bring ...Liberty Street...5 World Trade Center.” “Debris coming down. Let 

em out, let em out, let em out, little by little, let em out.” “I got debris falling from 2 

World Trade Center by 4 World Trade Center, Liberty.” “By Liberty, let em out. I can 

see, not that much debris.” “Alright 10-4.” 

9:09 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion 10 (Command Post, West and Vesey Streets), 

 Battalion 12 (Marriott, supervised operations at Command Post, fatalities), 

 Ladder 2 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities), 

 Ladder 13 (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 205

 Ladder 16 (Command Post at 2 WFC, fatalities) 

9:09 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion Chief 11 (WTC 1, operated with Ladder 110, used elevator to travel up to the 

 16th floor, operations up to the 35th floor, trapped in B stairway with Ladder 6, Engine 16, 

 Engine 39, Battalion Chief 2, and one civilian at collapse) CD12/CD15 and “Last Man 

 Down” 

 Ladder 22 (Marriott) 

9:09:26 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight One, WTC, Eight One. Be 

advised, we have 105 people, 75 to 100 people trapped up on the Windows of the World, 

up on the 106th floor....garbled... starting to panic. Roger, we copy.” 

9:09:05 10-84, Battalion Chief 4, (WTC 1 fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15) 

9:09:42 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... OK? They are aware you can’t open 

 that door. They’ll be up there to get the debris out of the way. 

9:09:51 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Quartermaster WTC, Be advised the fire 

 department is now ... going into the elevator bank L1L2. Copy?” 

9:10 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY, Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 201 (WTC 2, operations unknown, WTC 2 post collapse, fatalities), 

 Engine 240 (At staging area West and Albany Streets when WTC 2 collapsed, stretch 

 hoselines, relayed water from Marine 1, extinguished fire at 90 West street.) 

 Engine 249 (post collapse operations, victim rescue and fires extinguished using hand 

 extinguishers) 

 Engine 278 (post collapse operations) 

 Ladder 102 (post collapse operations, evacuated Brooklyn Battery Tunnel) 

 Ladder 113 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, on way to WTC 2 when it 

 collapsed, then to 3 WTC) 

 Ladder 114 (Reported to Albany and West Streets, arrived just post collapse of WTC 2) 

 Ladder 119 (post collapse operations, operated Tower on 5 WTC) 

 Ladder 122 (Reported to Command Post on West street, in Marriott lobby when WTC 2 

 collapsed) 

9:10 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 23 (Marriott, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Engine 209 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets) 

 Engine 212 (approaching WTC 2 from CP at collapse.) 

 Engine 214 (Command Post at WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Engine 216 (WTC 2 firefighter killed by human falling from Tower, fatality) 

 Engine 217 (WTC 2 assisted E 216 with injured firefighter, fatalities) 

 Engine 220 (Command Post West and Liberty Streets, approaching WTC 2 at collapse, 

 extinguish fire on 9th floor of Gateway Plaza, assisted with water relay from Marine 1 to 

 Vesey and West streets) 
Attachment 2 

206 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

 Engine 221 (Command Post at WFC 3 West Street, approaching WTC 2 at collapse, set 

 up water relay and hand lines) 

 Engine 229 (at Command Post 1 WFC on West Street when WTC 2 collapsed, supplied 

 Tower Ladder 146 and 58) 

 Engine 230 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Engine 235 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Engine 238 (WTC 2, ordered to search upper floors, building collapsed while unit was in 

 stairway, fatality) 

 Engine 279 (WTC 2 operations, hydrant hookup West and Liberty, fatalities) 

 Ladder 7 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Ladder 12 (Marriott, upper floors, fatalities) 

 Ladder 24 (Marriott, search and evacuation) 

 Ladder 118 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

9:10 (E) Chief of EMS Ops arrives at WTC 

9:10 100 percent of rescue and high rise units are deployed (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

9:10:01 FDNY report of people trapped in 86th floor suite 8617, World Trade Center 2. (FDNY 

 World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:10:06 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “(Section Manager?) The express elevators 

 could be in jeopardy of falling. Be prepared for that. Do you copy?” (Note: No recorded 

 response to this transmission.) 

9:10:19 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “TC ...garbled..., Report of burning jet 

 fuel up on five one, jet fuel on five one, eight, eight. (Response) That was 51st floor, 

 smell of jet fuel? Negative, burning jet fuel, burning jet fuel, Roger. (Response) Ladder 

 ten you copy that? FDNY, on the 51st floor, burning jet fuel. 

9:10:40 10-84, Engine 34, (WTC 1, operated at Command Post and Field Comm Unit) (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:10 – 9:19 Companies arriving now are mostly sent to WTC 2. A third command post is established 

 at the Marriott Hotel, 3 WTC. 50 companies have arrived on the scene. 23 units from 

 Manhattan (8 of 23 units represent multiple units from the same firehouse) units are from 

 lower and central Manhattan, 4 units arrive from Brooklyn, 2 units arrive from Queens, 

 and 1 unit arrives from The Bronx. (New York Times website, timeline) 

9:11 FDNY - Field Com begins to maintain status (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:11 NYPD – Back-up transmitter for Citywide channel put in service in anticipation of 

 potential problem with primary transmitter on WTC 1 (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 

 2002) 

9:11 EMS – Staging area designated at West and Vesey Streets (FDNY, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:11 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 207

 Squad 252 (Command Post WTC 1, operated on upper floors, on 20th floor worked to 

 remove occupants from elevator, fatalities) 

9:11:02 EMS, Trauma, need numerous EMS units (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:11:37 FDNY reports that Engine 10 requests that all responding units stop short of the World 

 Trade Center buildings, either North or South of Liberty and West streets due to large 

 amount of ambulances on the scene and debris falling from the buildings. (FDNY World 

 Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:12:21 FDNY reports people trapped on 83rd floor of World Trade Center 2. (FDNY 

 World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:12:22 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “310B to any unit. Be advised that 

Building 2 ...Warden Phones. We can’t pick up Warden Phones. We’re just making 

straight announcements, telling the people not to stay at the Warden phones. We can’t 

pick them up.” “That’s affirm.” 

9:13 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion 41 (Staging area at Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, responded to Vesey Street 

 Command Post) 

 Battalion 42/32 (Staging area at Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, responded to Command Post 

 at Broadway and Vesey Streets, 5 WTC) 

9:13:02 FDNY reports a second time a person trapped on the 68th floor of World Trade Center, 

 building not identified. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

9:13:11 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “A1, WTC, ... A1. They want a Port 

 Authority representative at the Fire Command A-SAP.” 

9:13:12 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “I’m locked out of 4 World Trade Center. 

 Where do you want me to go?” 

9:13:18 10-84, Battalion Chief 9, (Command Post, operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box 

 Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:13:23 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Let them out by Building 4.” “....?...” 

 Let em out by Church Street, by Church Street. Let the people out to Church Street.” 

9:13:28 10-84, Engine 65, (WTC 1, upper floors operations) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15) 

9:13:39 10-84, Engine 226, (Command Post on West Street, provided water from hydrant, 

 operations) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:13:39 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight to TC. Be advise I’m 

 responding to Fire Command. Copy?” 

9:13:39 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X - : Building 1 is flooding. Building 1 is 

 flooding. 
Attachment 2 

208 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:13:49 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “There’s a lot of water in Building 1. It’s 

 flooding.” 

9:14 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 47 (WTC 1, upper floors operations), 

 Engine 58 (Lobby of Marriott, fatality), 

 Engine 74 (Marriott, upper floors operations, fatality), 

 Engine 76 (2 WFC, hydrant hookup, Siamese connections on Vesey Street), 

 Engine 91 (Command Post/West Street) 

 Ladder 4 (operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Ladder 21 (operations unknown, fatalities) 

 Ladder 22 (Marriott, upper floors operations, in route to WTC 2 at collapse) 

 Ladder 25 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities), 

 Ladder 35 (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

9:14:02 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight One, WTC.” “Eight One.” 

 “Can we get someone up to the 105th floor, Windows of the World, 75 to 100 people. 

 They need ...garbled... They’re loosing ...garbled... options at the location.” 

9:14:20 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Evacuate, evacuate ...?...” 

9:14:21 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “TC1,” “Head” “Alright, fourteen oh, 

confirmation at this time, we have no elevators working.” (response) No elevators 

above?” “That’s affirmative.” 

9:15 5th alarm for WTC 2, a radio communication from the PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater 

recording 

 NYPD calls for the evacuation of the United Nations building. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:15 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 26 (operations unknown, fatalities), 

 Engine 289 (ordered to pickup air cylinders at Mask Service Unit, arrived at WTC 1 

 during collapse) 

9:15:00 PAPD Police Desk radio, PA Channel W – (Note: Radio communications on channel W 

 is very poor at this time. Static and multiple signals mixing with garbled 

 communications) 

9:15:28 PAPD Police Desk radio, PA Channel W – (Note: A radio mike is stuck open. There is a 

 repeated whaling sound from a building alarm system. The mike is keyed again at, and 

 the transmission stops.) 

9:15:34 10-84, Special Operations Command 1, (WTC 1, operations on upper floors, fatalities) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 209

9:16 (E) FDNY Command Post and Staging area designated for WTC 2 at West and Albany 

Streets. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:16 (E) NYPD – Manhattan South begins to establish perimeter 2 blocks around WTC (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:16:27 10-84, Engine 207/Sat. 6 (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, Siamese to 90 West Street, upper 

 floors operations WTC 1, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:16:30 FDNY radio dispatchers advise Car 3 that there are people trapped in World Trade Center 

 Building 1 at the following locations: 82nd floor east side, 83rd floor room 8311, 103rd 

 floor room 103 near corner, 104th floor, and 106th floor. World Trade Center Building 2 

 at the following locations: 82nd floor west side, 88th floor, 89 floor. (FDNY World Trade 

 Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:16:53 10-84, Rescue Squad 3, (WTC 2, operations on upper floors, fatalities) (FDNY Box 

 Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:17 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 286/10 (initially out of service, back in service at 0917, relocated to E-10, arrived 

 at WTC 1 when it collapsed, relayed water from Marine 1, fought fires from upper floors 

 of 85 West street to 90 West street) 

9:17:03 10-84, Rescue Squad 4, (operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log 

 and CD12/CD15) 

9:17:20 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 7, Battalion 7 

Alpha” “Alpha” “Alright, we’re sending the elevator down to ya.” “10-4” 

9:17:50 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight One from WTC.” “Eight One.” 

 “Roger, if possible can you go with the status of the evac? I’ve got four callers loosing 

 oxygen on the 106th floor, One World Trade.” Roger, we’ve got people going up there 

 now. “Roger, Eight One.” 

9:17:58 10-84, Engine 21, (WTC 1, hydrant hookup, upper floors operations, fatality) (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:18:01 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “This is ...?... Battalion 

7 in the South Tower to lobby command post, Tower 2.” “...?... not ...?... reading you. 

Not picking you up.” 

9:18:14 FDNY radio communications, Channel 30 repeater – (Note: Battalion 7 is on floor 40 in 

 WTC 2. There is one elevator working to the 40th floor.) “This is Battalion 7 on floor 40 

 in Tower 2. We’ve got one elevator working up to the 40th floor staffed by a member of 

 Latter One Five, K.” 

 NYPD calls for the evacuation of the Empire State Building. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:18:29 10-84, Ladder 21, (operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15) 
Attachment 2 

210 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:18:43 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – Nancy, its Salinger. The fire department 

 tells me they’re abandoning ...?... and go across the street, copy, because there is too 

 much stuff falling.” “Salinger abandon....” “The door is completely closed.” “That’s a 

 copy, door is completely closed.” 

9:18:55 10-84, Hazmat 1, (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

 log and CD12/CD15) 

9:19 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Ladder 149 (Staging area West and Chambers Street, post collapse operations) 

9:19:45 10-84, Ladder 12, (Marriott, upper floors, fatalities) 

9:19:53 l0-84, Ladder 24, (Marriott, search and evacuation) 

9:20 – 9:29 WTC 2, three fire companies travel to 40th floor by work elevator and check offices to be 

 sure civilians have evacuated. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

 30 Manhattan firehouses report companies dispatched. 10 of the 30 firehouses have 

 multiple units responding. Manhattan firehouses are from lower, central, and northern 

 parts of the borough. Brooklyn has 7 firehouses with units dispatched, 1 of the 7 houses 

 has multiple units responding. Units from Brooklyn use the tunnel and bridges to enter 

 Manhattan. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

9:20 (E) EMS – Division 3 Chief in WTC 1 lobby assigned as operations chief and reports to 

 Incident Command Post (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:20:04 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “A2Jouilie and A2, ah David ..?.. . Be 

 advised that the, ah, B4 Levels a negative condition down there. No one’s down there. 

 Also, be advised there are four additional Path Officers down stairs. Copy?” “Roger” 

9:20:55 PAPD Police Desk radio, PA Channel W – PAPD begins a roll call for personnel 

 accountability check. 

9:21:48 10-84, Ladder 35, (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

 log and CD12/CD15) 

9:22 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: Battalion 7 is on 43rd

floor of WTC in B stairway. 

9:22 NYPD – ESU requests mobilization of off-duty personnel (NYPD, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:22:07 10-84, Engine 76, (2 WFC, hydrant hookup, Siamese connections on Vesey Street) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:22:15 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 7 Chief” 

“Battalion 7, Go” “The emergency service cops want to back you up. Can you tell them 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 211

where you are?” “They got a ...?... with them?” “We’re on the 43rd floor. We’re in 

stairway B.” 

9:23 EMS – Tour 1 Chief arrives and establishes EMS liaison at Incident Command Post on 

 West Street. Division 3 Chief arrives at West Street Incident Command Post. Tour 1 

 Chief transfers responsibility to Division 3 Chief. Assistant Chief of EMS Ops moves to 

 Incident Command Post at West Street (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:23 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 233 (post collapse operations) 

 Ladder 104 (post collapse operations, collected BF-4 riding lists from abandoned 

 apparatus) 

 Ladder 161 (post collapse operations, Staging area West and Chambers Street) 

9:23 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 274 (ordered to pick up air cylinders from Mask Service Unit, arrived at WTC 1 

 at time of collapse) 

9:23:08 FDNY radio dispatcher advises Field Comm that 100 people are overcome in Building #1 

 on the Northwest and Southwest corners of the 103rd floor. Also the dispatcher reports 

 that Ladder 3 reports numerous injuries in the stairwell from the 35th floor on up. (FDNY 

 World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:23:27 10-84, Ladder 11, (WTC 2, upper floors operations, fatalities) 

9:23:33 10-84, Ladder 2, (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

9:23:51 10-84, Engine 40, (Reported to Command Post WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

9:24 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater - Battalion 7 is on the 48th

floor of WTC 2. 

9:24 EMS – Second staging area is established at West and Chambers Streets 

 Vesey Division established at West and Vesey Streets (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 

 2002) 

9:24:17 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “59, 15” “Go ahead ...9” 

“Just got a report from the, ah, director of Morgan Stanley. ...?...they’ve taken the brunt 

of the stuff. There are a lot of bodies, said that the stairway is clear all the way up 

though.” “Alright 10-4 Scott. What floor are you on?” “48, right now.” “Ah, 10-4, 

we’re coming up behind ya.” 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:24:20 10-84, Ladder 114, (Reported to Albany and West Streets, arrived just post collapse of 

 WTC 2) 

9:24:22 10-84, Engine 278, (post collapse operations) 
Attachment 2 

212 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:24:45 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Advise that other bodies are coming 

down and that people are on the street. There’s a lot of debris. If there’s a way to get the 

people off the street and out of the courtyard.” “Roger. What’s that location ...?” “The 

middle courtyard between five and one, that I came across first, and I believe it’s on, on 

the side of One to my left. I’m still in the building; people are coming down from 64.” 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:25:02 10-84, Ladder 131, (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, while in Marriott WTC 

 2 collapsed, when exiting Marriott WTC 1 collapsed, all injured 

9:25:03 10-84, Engine 279, (WTC 2 operations, hydrant hookup West and Liberty, fatalities) 

9:25:10 FDNY Brooklyn dispatcher advises Manhattan dispatcher that people are trapped in 

 World Trade Center Building #5 on the 80th floor. Manhattan is unable to raise Field 

 Comm but is able to relay message to Division Chief 11 (DC 11). FDNY World Trade 

 Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:25:38 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “7 Alpha to 7” “Go ahead 

 Steve” “Yea Chief, I’m gonna stop on 44 K?” “Take your time.” “10-4” 

9:26 NYPD – ESU units set up at Vesey and West Streets and prepare to enter towers. 

 

9:26:27 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “TC, A One” “Go ahead A One” 

 “Have the units respond to the fire command desk immediately.” “Roger” “All units 

 respond to the Fire Command Desk and meet up with A One, (Devona?)” 

9:27 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 264 (Staging area at Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, post collapse operations) 

 Engine 311 (stretched lines from Marine 1 to 85 West Street, from up inside of 85 West 

 Street extinguished fires on roof of 90 West Street) 

 Ladder 133 (Command Post at West and Chambers Streets, to Command Post at 

 Broadway and Vesey Street, 3 WTC) 

9:27:35 10-84, Division Chief 11 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:28:11 10-84, Battalion Chief 10, (Command Post, West and Vesey Streets) 

9:28:12 10-84, Ladder 16, (Command Post at 2 WFC, fatalities) 

9:28:16 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “TC Two to TC Desk” “Go ahead 

 Two” “Do you have EMS, and EMS unit available, an injured person who has some 

 minor burns and, ah, injuries due to a falling elevator.” “What’s the location of 

 that...?...A20?” (Note: The above transmissions were followed by static and mixing of 

 radio signals.) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:28:41 10-84, Engine 44, (West and Vesey Streets, ordered to maintain street control, assisted 

 Marine 1 with water supply) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 213

9:28:48 10-84, Engine 47, (WTC 1, upper floors operations) 

9:28:52 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 7 Ladder One 

Five OV” “OV” “...?...Try to contact...The lobby, find out what bank of elevators 

terminates below the 75th floor. That’s the bank we’re gonna want to use.” “10-4” 

9:28:58 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “TC Two. Do you have a triage area?” 

 “Standby let me ask. Let me find out that location.” “Roger, just advise when you find 

 out where there will be a triage.” 

9:29 FDNY - Recall of off-duty firefighters and officers is issued (FDNY, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:29 (E) EMS - Casualty Collection Point (CCP) established in lobby of 3 World Financial Center 

 at West and Vesey Streets. EMS - WTC 7 Division established (FDNY, McKinsey & 

 Company, 2002) 

9:29:11 FDNY dispatcher advises Field Comm that people are trapped in World Trade Center 

 Building #2 on the 82nd, 83rd, and 84th floors. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident 

 Summary notes, 2001) 

9:29:15 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater– (Note: This exchange took 

place over about a 3 minute period.) “Battalion 7 to Branch Commander, Tower 2, South 

Tower, K” “Battalion 7 to Field Comm, K” “7 Alpha ...?...Battalion 7, Orio, we’re in 

the North Tower, Tower 2. The North Tower.” “Correction, Battalion 7, it’s the South 

Tower, Tower 1, Branch Commander, K” “...?...Battalion 7, do you want me to relay?” 

“Yea, Steve tell, ah, the people of Palmer we got reports of there’s more planes in the 

area. We may have to back down here.” “10-4, 7 Alpha to 7” 

9:29:27 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Where are you?” “B stairway.” “We’re 

 walking down from 51. We are going to do the best we can, but we do have a medical 

 emergency. We have on individual who cannot walk down. Has asthma.” “We are on 

 the 11th floor working, working our way up.” 

9:30 – 9:39 About 9:30 in WTC 1, several firefighters moving up the stairwell carrying heavy 

 equipment report chest pain. (New York Times) 

9:30 a.m. An Assistant Fire Chief recalled that the WTC 1 building conditions were poor and made 

 the decision that the building was no longer safe. (FDNY interview #2, winter 2003) 

9:30:07 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “S4, 63, I’m in the B stairway. Who needs 

help ...?” “We are in B staircase, 51st floor heading down. We have two people with a 

medical emergency, elderly people that cannot walk down.” “...?... What tower?” 

“That’s Tower 1 staircase B.” “Tower 1 staircase B. That’s a copy.... Someone’s in 

route.” 

9:30:19 10-84, Engine 22, (WTC 1, upper floors operations, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:30:24 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?... to all, everybody turn your phones 

 off ...Make sure they turn off their phones off.” 
Attachment 2 

214 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:30:35 10-84, Ladder 119, (post collapse operations, operated Tower on 5 WTC) (FDNY Box 

 Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:30:37 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “A One, WTC.” “A One.” “Be 

 advised EMS is setting up triage in the lobby of Building Two.” “Roger. I got that.” 

 FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:30:49 10-84, Ladder 113, (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, on way to WTC 2 when 

 it collapsed, then to 3 WTC) 

9:30:51 10-84, Battalion Chief 41 /BC 31, (Command Post at WFC 3, Command Post at 

 Marriott) 

9:31:00 10-84, Ladder 102, (post collapse operations, evacuated Brooklyn Battery Tunnel) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:31:28 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “A One, WTC.” “A One.” “Roger. 

 We’ve received reports of, ah, people trapped in Two World Trade Center, eighty- 

 seventh and eighty-ninth floor.” “Roger, I copy where.” 

9:31:29 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Did you bring any of the radios for the fire 

commander? Did you bring any red bags with the radios for the fire department? ... Did 

you bring” “No. Is it safe to go into the building?” I haven’t returned to the building. Is 

it safe to go inside?” 

9:31:32 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five to One Five 

Roof” “One Five Roof” “We’ve got reports of another incoming plane. May have take 

cover. Stay in the stairwell.” “10-4” 

9:31:35 10-84, Engine 235, (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

 log and CD12/CD15) 

9:32 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: Battalion 7 is on 55th floor 

of WTC 2. 

9:32 a.m. An Assistant Fire Chief is in lobby of WTC 1 makes a radio call and orders that all units 

 come down to the lobby. (No response was received from this order, it was unheard or 

 ignored.) (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002 and FDNY Interview #2, winter 2003) 

 Firefighter Danny Suhr is killed soon after his Brooklyn Engine Company 216 arrives at 

 the scene, hit by a person that fell from WTC 2. (FDNY CD12/15) (New York Times, 

 website) 

9:32:01 FDNY Engine 317 states that someone from the Port Authority advises not to use the 

elevators on the 44th floor because they are about to come down. (FDNY World Trade 

Center Incident Summary notes, 2001.) 

9:32:02 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater– “One Five to One Five 

Roof. That plane is ours. I repeat it’s ours. What floor are you on Scotty?” “54” 

“Alright, keep making your way up. We’re behind ya.” “10-4” 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 215

9:32:05 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Don’t let...Don’t let no body come down 

... here. Back em up. Back em up. Back it up all the way up, everybody. Get 

everybody back.” “87 to 85” “Where are ... back up. ...Back up. Go back ... back up. 

All units back up.” 

9:32:12 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Be advised the concourse is flooding, 

 flooding with water. There is a lot of water in the concourse.” “We are aware of that. 

 We are aware of that.” 

9:32:23 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Orio” “Go ahead” 

“What floor should we try to get up to, Orio?” “I’m up to five, five. We need to find a 

...? ..., a stack of elevators that terminates below the ... (radio static, signal drop 

out)...up. K” “Below what floor?” “Below 76. The fires 78 ... (radio static, signal 

dropout) ...terminate below 76” “Alright.” 

9:33:02 10-84, Engine 238, (WTC 2, ordered to search upper floors, building collapsed while unit 

 was in stairway, fatality) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:33:15 10-84, Engine 281 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:34:19 10-84, Engine 216, (WTC 2, first firefighter fatality at the WTC, killed by human falling 

 from Tower 2. The only fatality for this unit.) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15)

9:34:29 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “A One, WTC” “A One” “I want all 

 responding units to come to this desk, from the various commands to report to this desk, 

 One World Trade Center, Fire Command Desk.” 

9:34:39 FDNY dispatcher lists to Field Comm the following floors in the World Trade Center 

 Towers to check: 

 Building #1: 68, 82, 83, 88, 89, 92, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106 

 Building #2: 47, 73 west south side, 80 north west side, 82, 83 room 8300, 104 east 

 south side, 105 east south side. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 

 2001). 

 

9:34:50 10-84, Engine 212, (approaching WTC 2 from CP at collapse.) (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:35 FDC (NYPD, First Deputy Commissioner) orders no roof rescue to be attempted (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:35:18 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W, “TC One, Desk” “Ahead One.” Please 

 be advised from the Mayor’s office. Be advised that another plane hit in this area. 

 Copy?” (Note: There was a communication from unit 815 that immediately followed the 

 above before the acknowledgement.) 9:35:55 – “Roger. Understand the Mayor’s office; 

 another plane is in the area.” 

9:37:02 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “...?... AD4? .... World Trade Desk.” 

“Go ahead.” “You, ah, hear from ...?... yet?” “That’s a negative.” “Roger, ah, try to 
Attachment 2 

216 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

find out what ...?... cell phone number, beeper number is. The last I saw they were 

...?... three niner ... ?... I didn’t get the whole transmission.” “Alright, Stand By. 

9:37:16 10-84, Engine 214, (Command Post at WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:37:36 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “All World Trade Center units to the 

Command Post All World Trade Center units evacuate everybody over the land bridge on 

West Street to the Financial Center. Do not. Repeat. Do not; send people out into the 

Concourse on the side street, on land bridge to the Financial Center.” 

9:39 2nd alarm for Brooklyn Battery Tunnel (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:39 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater - Battalion 7 ten to fifteen 

injured civilians are being sent down to the 40th floor to be evacuated by elevator 

9:39 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Squad 41 (operations unknown, fatalities) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and 

 CD12/CD15) 

9:39 (E) WTC 2, Floor 51, Two Fire Marshals headed up the stairs after the second plane hit 

 WTC 2 and encounter a burned survivor from the 78th floor. One Fire Marshal takes the 

 women down, and the other Fire Marshal continues up the stairs. (New York Times, 

 website) 

 33 Manhattan firehouses responding (12 of the 33 responding with multiple units), 18 

Brooklyn firehouses responding (2 of the 18 responding with multiple units) (New York 

Times, website, timeline) 

9:39:06 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five to One Five 

OV” “One Five OV” “Tommy, listen carefully, I’m sending all the injured down to you 

on the 40th. You’re going to have to get them down to the, ah, to the elevator. There are 

about 10 to 15 people coming down to ya.” “OK, 10 civilians coming down. One Five 

OV, I’m on the 40th right now, Lou.” “Tommy, when you take people down to the lobby 

try to bring an EMS crew back.” “Definitely.” 

9:39:23 10-84, Engine 201, (WTC 2, operations unknown, WTC 2 post collapse, fatalities) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:40 - 9:49 Chief at WTC 7 is told that WTC buildings could collapse, and he dispatches someone to 

 tell the chiefs on West Street. (FDNY Interviews # 45 and #46, winter 2004) 

 Another 5th alarm is broadcast. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 Four companies dispatched to WTC 2 from the Marriott 3 WTC are led to WTC 1 by 

 mistake. (FDNY Interviews # 47 and # 53, winter 2004) 

9:40 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 162 (post collapse operations WTC 1 and WTC 2, operations at WTC 7, hydrant 

 at Church and Vesey Streets, stretched line to WTC 7) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 217

9:40:12 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X reports victims jumping from the upper floors 

of the buildings. 

 

9:40:24 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Eight Hundred, World Trade” “Go 

 ahead Eight Hundred.” “Be advised, OEM is relocating out of the lobby of Building 

 Number One over to the World Financial Center, relocating the Fire Desk.” 

9:40:40 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Base...?... We have the stage on fire 

 at the main plaza. The stage is on fire on the ground level at the main plaza.” 

9:40:43 FDNY dispatcher advises Field Comm check World Trade Center Building #2, floors 93 

 and 103. FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:41 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater - Hazmat 1 on 48th floor of 

WTC 2 in B stairway. 

9:41 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion 32 (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets) 

 Engine 219 (post collapse operations, established water supply at West and Liberty 

 Streets, stretched hoselines and extinguished ground level fires) 

 Engine 228/205 (responding through Brooklyn Battery Tunnel when WTC 2 collapsed) 

 Engine 280 (Ordered to Battery Tunnel staging area, conducted evacuation of tunnel) 

9:42 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: Battalion 7 is on 69th floor 

 of WTC 2. 

9:42:06 10-84, Engine 229, (at Command Post 1 WFC on West Street when WTC 2 collapsed, 

 supplied Tower Ladder 146 and 58) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:42:39 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “WTC. Be advised the triage center, 

according to EMS is set up in Building ...?...” “Roger, copy that.” “...?... four, Captain 

Whitaker. Be advised that the triage center is at Victoria’s Secret, copy, Victoria’s 

Secret, Building four.” “A One copies where.” 

9:42:44 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 9 to Battalion 

7” “K, Battalion 9” “Orio, I couldn’t find a bank to bring me up any higher. I’m on the 

40th. What can I do for you?” “You’re going to have to hoof it up. I’m on 69 now, but 

we need a higher bank.” “What stairway you in Orio?” “Stairway B, Boy, Boy.” 

9:42:52 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “We have people out here that want to 

volunteer to help. Where can I send them?” “Right now, just send everybody away from 

the World Trade. We are not letting anybody come close to it. So, ... with that.” 

9:43:04 10-84, Engine 220, (Command Post West and Liberty Streets, approaching WTC 2 at 

 collapse, extinguish fire on 9th floor of Gateway Plaza, assisted with water relay from 

 Marine 1 to Vesey and West streets) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15)

9:43:26 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Bill, I’m at the Financial Center. I’m at the 

 fire command station. If you want to send them over here, they have a secure hard line.” 

 “10-4” 
Attachment 2 

218 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:44 a.m. (E) The Office of Emergency Management operations center inside WTC 7 is evacuated. 

 (FDNY, interview 24, winter 2004) 

9:44:06 10-84, Engine 41 

9:44:20 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “FS1, go ahead Mike.” Bill have them walk 

across the bridge ... is at the top of the bridge. He’ll tell them exactly where to go.” 

“Alright. That’s a 10-4 Mike. They haven’t evacuated the fire command over here.” “In 

Building 2 or 1?” “Building 2.” “That was the last word so ah we have a spot here if 

that’s what they want to do.” “10-4” 

9:44:24 10-84, Battalion Chief 12, (Marriott, supervised operations at Command Post, fatalities) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:44:37 Box 0050, location of Alarm Box, West and Albany Streets (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

 log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 240 

 Engine 201 

9:45 NYPD – Command and Control Center activated at One Police Plaza. (NYPD, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:45 (E) Three companies are still on 40th floor of WTC 2 evacuating civilians. (New York 

 Times, website, timeline) 

9:45:08 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “This is Troy. Tell him we’re sending 

 people down evacuating on Stairway A, in A Tower, Stairway A.” “Stairway A, that’s a 

 copy.” 

9:45:39 10-84, Ladder 104, (post collapse operations, collected BF-4 riding lists from abandoned 

 apparatus) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:45:50 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One five to Battalion 7” 

“Go ahead, One Five.” “Where are ya Chief?” “74” “Ah, we’re making our way behind 

you we took our coats off.” 

9:45:58 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “63, this is security officer on 78 Sky 

Lobby” “...Where is this?” ”78 Sky Lobby, 78 Sky Lobby” “That’s a copy. Are you 

OK?” “Yes, I am. Yes I am. What do you want me to do?” “Is it possible ... Copy” 

“Sector 4 to Evelyn” “Nancy, be advised, I have someone 1 World Trade Center 78th

floor Sky Lobby. Do you Copy?” Sorry say it again.” “1 World Trade Center 78th floor, 

windows. Do you copy?” “Is that where you’re at now?” “That’s a negative. I’m at 

Fulton and Broadway. I need someone to respond over there to ....Copy.” 

9:46:24 FDNY Field Comm Unit advises the FDNY Chief of Department at the WTC Incident 

 Command Post that an additional 5th alarm is requested to respond to West and Vesey 

 Streets. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 2001) 

9:46:36 Box 0050, location of Alarm Box, West and Albany Streets (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

 log and CD12/CD15) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 219

 Engine 228 

 Engine 219 

 Engine 280 

 Ladder 114 

 Ladder 113 

9:47 5th alarm (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:47 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Battalion 21/32 (Command Post West and Liberty Streets) 

9:47:00 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: - “Battalion 7 to Battalion 

9” “Battalion 9 to Battalion 7” “...?... These stairway walls have been compromised on 

73 and 74. No smoke or fire problems, K.” “OK, 10-4” 

9:47:44 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five to Battalion 7” 

“Go ahead, Ladder One Five” “What do ya got up there Chief?” “I’m standing in Boy 

stairway on the 74th floor, no smoke or fire problem. The walls are breached so be 

careful.” “Yea, 10-4, I saw that on 68. We’re on 71. We’re coming up behind ya.” 

“OK, ...? ... six more to go.” “Let me know when you see fire.” 

 

9:47:50 Box 0050, location of Alarm Box, West and Albany Streets (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

 log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion Chief 32 

9:47:59 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “TB Four, WTC. Where’s the 

command post? Be advised Vesey and West they can’t move to the Financial Center --- 

...?... no condition on the street out there.” “Right.” “CD Four ...?... (Note: 

Transmission was not clear.) “A One from WTC.” “A One.” “Roger, ... ? ... That’s 

just a heavy traffic condition, it’s like a parking lot on Vesey and West.” “Roger, I 

copy.” 

All five FDNY rescue companies have arrived, 1 from Staten Island. Many companies 

are now reporting to staging areas across from the WTC. 33 Manhattan firehouses 

reported at the scene (12 of the 33 responding with multiple units), 22 Brooklyn 

firehouses with 5 of the 22 responding with multiple units, 2 Queens firehouses, 1 Bronx 

firehouse, and 1 Staten Island firehouse. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

9:49:27 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “S2, Please convey to Doug that ... is on his 

way down.” “.... Could you repeat that?” “S2 to S1 ....” “George, slow down I can’t 

understand you.”...”Doug or Anesto Butcher has to talk to ... Its imperative.” 

9:49:37 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five to One Five 

OV” “One Five OV” “Tommy, have you made it back down to the lobby yet?” “The 

elevators screwed up.” “You can’t move it?” “I don’t want to get stuck in the shaft.” 

“Ah Tommy, its imperative that you try to get down to the lobby command post to get 

some people up to forty. We got injured people up here on 70. If you make it to the 

lobby command post, see if they can somehow get elevators past the 40th floor. We’ve 

got people injured all the way up here.” “What’s going on with this thing?” “Ah, go 

Chief” “Yea Chief, I’m on the 55th floor, got to rest. I’ll try to get up there as soon as 

possible.” “10-4” 
Attachment 2 

220 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

9:49:49 10-84, Ladder 161, (post collapse operations, Staging area West and Chambers Street) 

(FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:50 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: Firefighter reports to 

Chief that he is on the 55th floor and must stop to rest. 

9:50:37 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Be advised. I’ve got L1 and Sector 1 one 

going to the hospital. Copy. So am I.” 

9:50:55 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “S5, Fire Department needs a resuscitator, 

Building 1, 19th floor B corridor. (pause) “Anybody copy?” (Note: There is no 

response to this call.) “S5 to Command Post” “Go from Command Post” “Building 1, 

19th floor resuscitation needed.” 

9:51:03 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five to Battalion 7” 

“Battalion 7” “What floor you on Orio?” “Stairway on 75. Go to the South stairway and 

continue up.” “10-4” 

 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

9:51:14 10-84, Engine 240, (At staging area West and Albany Streets when WTC 2 collapsed, 

stretch hoselines, relayed water from Marine 1, extinguished fire at 90 West street.) 

 10-84, Ladder 114, (Box 0050, post collapse of WTC 2, West and Albany Streets) 

9:52 NYPD radio transmission, SOD Channel, NYPD helicopters report by radio that “large 

pieces” are falling from WTC 2. (NYPD interviews # 21 and # 23) 

9:52:11 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Anybody see the 

Highway 1 car? Highway 1 car. We need it for an escort to the hospital for a fireman.” 

9:52:43 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 7 to Battalion 

7 Alpha” “Freddie come on over. Freddie come on over by us.” “Battalion ...?... We 

got, Ladder One Five, we’ve got two to three pockets of fire. We should be able to knock 

it down with two lines. Rad, Radi, Radio that. 78th floor, numerous 10-45 Code Ones.” 

“What floor you on Orio?” “7 Alpha to lobby command post.” “One Five to Battalion 

7” “Go ahead One Five” “Chief, what stair are you in?” “South stairway Adam, South 

Tower” “Floor 78.” “10-4, numerous civilians injured. Two engines up here.” “10-4, 

we’re on our way.” (Note: 10-45 code one represents civilian fatalities) 

9:53:48 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 6, Battalion 6 

reports, there’s a sky lobby available at the 44th floor that will serve the floors above. Do 

you copy that? K” 

9:53:53 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “(XO ?) Martinez inside 2 World Trade 

Center with NYPD.” “... Advise me is everyone OK and what is your 20?” Please be 

advised I got eighteen passengers stuck on the 78 Sky Lobby elevator trying to get them 

out. We need EMS over here on the double, 2 World Trade Center.” “... Sky Lobby is 

that an elevator entrapment, sir.” “That’s a 10-4 the firefighter got eighteen passengers 

stuck. They are going to get them out, they’re burned.” 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 221

9:54:05 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “7 Alpha to Lobby 

Command Post. Chief Palmer reports on the 78th floor numerous 10-45 Code Ones. We 

got an isolated pocket of fire and need at least two hand lines up there. K” 

9:54:29 Box 2033, location of Alarm Box, Vesey Street 100 feet West of West Street (FDNY 

Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Battalion 45 (Staging area at Queens Midtown Tunnel, to Command Post at West and 

Vesey Streets, 6 WTC post collapse operations) 

 Battalion 46 (Staging area at Queens Midtown Tunnel, to Command Post at West and 

Chambers Streets, operation at Verizon Building) 

 Battalion 49 (Staging area at Queens Midtown Tunnel, to Command Post at West and 

Vesey Streets) 

Engine 294 (approaching WTC 1 when it collapsed, rescued people from 6 WTC) 

Engine 258 (reported to West and Chambers Streets, in route to Command Post at West 

and Vesey Streets when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Engine 259 (apparatus parked at West and Chambers street, in route to Command Post at 

West and Vesey street when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Engine 260 (reporting to Command Post at West and Vesey streets when WTC 1 

collapsed) 

Engine 261 (reporting to Command Post at West and Vesey streets when WTC 1 

collapsed) 

Engine 262 (reporting to Command Post at West and Vesey streets when WTC 1 

collapsed) 

Engine 312 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Engine 325 (post collapse operations) 

Ladder 115 (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Ladder 116 (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Ladder 128 (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Ladder 136 (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Ladder 138 (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

Ladder 163 (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

9:54:40 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 7 to Ladder 

One Five” “One Five” “I’m gona need your firefighters Adam stairway to knock down 

two fires. Get a ...?... house line stretched. We can get some water on it and knock it 

down. K” “Alright, 10-4, were coming up the stairs. We’re on 77 now on the B stair. 

We’ll be right to ya.” 

9:55 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: Ladder 15 is on 78th floor, 

in B stairway, WTC 2, “trapped in here, we’ve got to, ah, put some fire out to get to ya.” 

9:55 (E) NYPD – 40 ESU officers at Command Post (NYPD, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

2 ESU Teams in WTC 1 

2 ESU Teams in WTC 2 

1 ESU Team in WTC Plaza 

9:55 3rd alarm dispatch staging area (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

9:55 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

 Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

Engine 241/224 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets, extinguished fires on street) 
Attachment 2 

222 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

Engine 246/224 (post collapse operations 5 WTC, hydrant hookup on Broadway and 

Church Streets, water relay to E 503, operated hoseline on street level fires at Church and 

Liberty Streets) 

Engine 284/207 (post collapse operations, hoseline stretch from Marine 1 to Vesey 

Street) 

9:55:46 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five OV, One Five” 

‘Orio, we’re on 78, but we’re in the B stairway, trapped in here, we’ve got to, ah, put 

some fire out to get to ya.” 

9:55:58 Box 2033, location of Alarm Box, Vesey Street 100 feet West of West Street, (FDNY 

 Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 35 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets, 6 WTC post collapse) 

 Engine 50 (post collapse operations) 

 Engine 64 

 Engine 68 (post collapse operations) 

 Engine 83 (post collapse operations) 

 Engine 94 (post collapse operations) 

9:55:17 10-84, Engine 228, (responding through Brooklyn Battery Tunnel when WTC 2 

collapsed) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 

9:56:05 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Fifteen Roof to Fifteen” 

“Go ahead Fifteen Roof” “Recommend that ya go to the South stairs, the A stairs.” “Ah, 

 10-4, we’re going to knock down some fire over here in the B stairway. We’ll meet up 

with ya.” “Get over to the A stair and help Chief Palmer.” “10-4, roof” 

9:56:36 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “A Tower is not completely evacuated. I 

think they are on the way down in each stairway. People are still coming out.” 

9:56:55 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Battalion 9, I need ya on 

the floor above 79. We have access stairs going up to 79. K” “Alright, I’m on my way 

up Orio.” 

9:57 a.m. Dozens of firefighters have gathered at the WTC 2 lobby command post awaiting orders 

to go up in the tower. (New York Times) 

9:57:07 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “Fifteen OV to Fifteen” 

“Go ahead Fifteen OV, Battalion 7 Operations, Tower 1.” (Note: these communications 

are actually in the South Tower, Tower 2) “Trapped in the elevator in the elevator shaft. 

Your gona have to get a different elevator. We’re chopping through the wall to get out.” 

“Radio Lobby Command with that. Tower 1.” 

9:57:27 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...FS2 to (90 Mike?)” “If you can copy 

this, I’m responding to over to A Tower Fire Command.” “We are trying to get in touch 

with them from the 22nd floor command center, but we don’t know how to operate the 

other set of equipment.” “S2 to 77... Try to get up to the 22nd floor, A Tower command 

center.” 

 

9:57:51 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater - Amplitude of Channel 30 

repeater drops to zero. 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 223

9:57:57 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “...?...78 Sky Lobby, 2 World Trade 

Center. I got people coming out the elevator banks.” 

9:59 a.m. WTC 2 building collapse. (FEMA 403) 

 FDNY Field Com unit is destroyed (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 West Street Incident Command Post is destroyed. FDNY, ICP personnel take shelter in 

nearby structures. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

 Marriott Hotel, 3 WTC – Some firefighters in the lobby and directing evacuations on the 

upper floors are killed in 3 WTC when WTC 2 collapses. Others are trapped. (FDNY 

World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001) 

 WTC 1, some firefighters up inside the building as high as the 36th floor hear an urgent 

order over their radios to evacuate. It is heard over the command radio channel. Multiple 

companies start down the stairs. (FDNY interviews #16, #39, #41, winter 2004) 

 33 Manhattan firehouses (12 of the 33 multiple units assigned), 27 Brooklyn firehouses 

(6 of 27 multiple units assigned), 2 Queens, 1 Bronx, 1 Staten Island. (New York Time, 

website, timeline) 

9:59:51 Box 2033, location of Alarm Box, Vesey Street 100 feet West of West Street, (FDNY 

Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 84/16 (Command Post West and Vesey Street, post collapse operations) 

 Engine 224 

 Engine 231/24 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets when WTC 1 collapsed) 

 Engine 271/6 (left Command Post at West and Vesey streets when WTC 1 collapsed, 

supplied water to standpipe Siamese at Verizon Building, extinguished fires around 

Verizon bldg.) 

 Engine 305/3 (reporting to Command Post at West and Chambers Streets when WTC 1 

collapsed) 

 Engine 307/5 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets when WTC 1 collapsed) 

 Engine 310/55 (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets, evacuated Fire Department 

and civilians from Command Post, WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:00 NYPD – All ESU personnel ordered out of WTC buildings. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

Company, 2002) 

10:00 10-84, Battalion Chief 46, (Staging area at Queens Midtown Tunnel, to Command Post at 

West and Chambers Streets, operation at Verizon Building) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch 

log and CD12/CD15) 

10:00 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, (FDNY Box Alarm 

Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 14 (post collapse operation) 

10:00 – 10:09 Surviving Chiefs work to recover command and additional units are arriving. 
Attachment 2 

224 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

 WTC 1 - A firefighter, possibly from Ladder 3, reports over the radio a collapse on a 

floor in the 60’s. It is the highest floor reported as being reached in the building. (New 

York Times, website, timeline) 

10:00:52 Marine 6 reports collapse of south tower (FDNY, Manhattan Dispatch Radio Channel) 

10:02:20 FDNY reports that civilian calls for assistance when he gets trapped inside a fire truck as 

 a result of the building collapse. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes, 

 2001) 

10:03 (E) EMS – Casualty Collection Point transfers to lobby of the Embassy Suites at North End 

 and Vesey Streets. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

10:04 (E) EMS – Primary staging area is designated at West and Chambers Streets. (FDNY, 

 McKinsey & Company, 2002) 

10:06 Box 0320, (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Engine 160 (post collapse operations, supplied water to two Tower Ladders operating on 

WTC 7) 

10:06 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, (FDNY Box Alarm 

Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

 Ladder 78 (post collapse operations, Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, 

extinguish street level fires on Broadway, supply water to Tower Ladder 15 on Liberty 

Street) 

10:06:01 10-84, Engine 271/E 6, (left Command Post at West and Vesey streets when WTC 1 

 collapsed, supplied water to standpipe Siamese at Verizon Building, extinguished fires 

 around Verizon bldg.) (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) 

10:06:04 10-84, Engine 282, (stretched and operated hoselines to extinguish debris fires) (FDNY 

Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD 12/CD15) 

10:06:05 Second Notification 4. Police operations 212-37 (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log) 

10:07 Mutual aid requested from Westchester County. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

10:07 a.m. NYPD helicopters hovering near WTC 1 to check its condition radios, “About 15 floors 

down from the top, it looks like its glowing red.” Aviation 14, radioed at 10:07 a.m. 

“It’s inevitable.” Seconds later, another pilot (Aviation 6) reported: “I don’t think this 

has too much longer to go. I would evacuate all people within the area of that second 

building.” (New York Times) 

 NYPD helicopters: Aviation 6 warns that WTC 1 collapse is likely, and advises 

immediate evacuation. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company) 

 34 Manhattan firehouses (12 of the 34 reporting multiple units), 28 Brooklyn firehouses 

(6 of 28 reporting multiple units), 5 Queens firehouses, 1 Bronx firehouse, 1 Staten Island 

firehouse. (New York Times, website, timeline) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 225

10:07:39 10-84, Engine 284, (post collapse operations, hoseline stretch from Marine 1 to Vesey 

Street) 

10:08 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack Ladder 

124/5 (post collapse operations) 

10:08 NYPD – Chief of Department orders that no traffic is allowed to enter Manhattan. 

(NYPD, McKinsey & Company) 

10:08:25 Box 0031-3, location of Alarm Box, Broad and Beaver Streets, Explosion smoke in 

clinic-1. 

 Engine 14 

 Ladder 17 

 Records show no 10-84 for these units arriving at Box. The next record for the units after 

they acknowledge the assignment messages are 10:58:34 for Ladder 17 and 14:40:21 for 

Engine 14 indicating that they are available. 

10:09 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 227 (Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, post collapse operations) 

10:09:06 10-84, Engine 84 /E 16, (Command Post West and Vesey Street, post collapse 

operations) 

10:09:13 10-84, Engine 249, (post collapse operations, victim rescue and fires extinguished using 

hand extinguishers) 

10:09:16 10-84, Battalion Chief 46, (Staging area at Queen Midtown Tunnel, to Command Post at 

West and Chambers Streets, operations at Verizon Building) 

10:09:21 10-84, Battalion Chief 45, (Staging area at Queens Midtown Tunnel, to Command Post at 

West and Vesey Streets, 6 WTC post collapse operations) 

10:09:22 Box 0050, location of Alarm Box, West and Albany Streets 

 Ladder 43 (post collapse operations, WTC 1 stairway B) 

10:09:29 10-84, Ladder 116, (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:10 –10:19 Fire Chiefs in front of Marriott 3 WTC work to reestablish operations. Surviving 

firefighters in 3 WTC try to find their way down from upper floors while others try to 

free people trapped in the lobby. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

10:10:33 10-84, Ladder 136, (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:10:58 10-84, Engine 262, (reporting to Command Post at West and Vesey streets when WTC 1 

collapsed) 

10:11:38 10-84, Ladder 138, (Command Post at West and Vesey when WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:11:42 10-84, Engine 35, (Command Post at West and Vesey Streets, 6 WTC post collapse) 
Attachment 2 

226 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

10:12 NYPD – All emergency vehicles are ordered to pull back to Vesey and West Streets. 

(NYPD, McKinsey & Company) 

10:12 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 518 (post collapse operations, stretched hoselines and operated in WTC 7) 

 Ladder 148 (post collapse Command Post operations, Broadway and Vesey streets) 

10:12:04 Box 0019-1, location of Alarm Box, 17 Battery PL, West and Washington Streets, 

Elevator Shaft Fire 

 Engine 202 

 Ladder 59 

10:12:18 Box 8000-1, location of Alarm Box, St. George Ferry Terminal U/L Opp Pbserv Tower 

 Engine 164 

 Engine 157 

 Engine 156 

 Engine 166 

 Engine 155 

 Engine 162 

 Ladder 84 

 Ladder 83 

 Ladder 85 

 Marine 9 

10:13:07 Box 0080-5, location of Alarm Box, Nassau and Fulton Streets, Smoke in Store 

 Engine 236 

 Ladder 47 

10:13:14 10-84, Engine 94, (post collapse operations) 

10:13:31 Box 0053-2, location of Alarm Box Trinity and Cedar Streets, Trapper 

 Engine 210 

 Ladder 58 /L 20 

10:14:02 10-84, Engine 305/E3, (reporting to Command Post at West and Chambers Streets when 

WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:14:55 10-84, Engine 64 

10:15 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Engine 236/15 (responding to scene when WTC 1 collapsed, stretched handlines from 

building standpipes and extinguished street level fires) 

10:15 (E) WTC 1 floor 19 – Evacuating firefighters and other witnesses find a large group of 

firefighters in no apparent hurry to get out. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

 Units from the outer northern boroughs arrive at the scene and escape having casualties. 

They are the first to search for survivors. 35 Manhattan firehouses (13 of the 35 

reporting multiple units), 28 Brooklyn (6 of 28 reporting multiple units), 7 Queens 

firehouses, 6 Bronx firehouses (1 of the 6 reporting multiple units), 1 Staten Island 

firehouse. (New York Times, website, timeline) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 227

10:15:03 10-84, Ladder 43, (post collapse operations, WTC 1 stairway B) 

10:15:12 10-84, Engine 83, (post collapse operations) 

10:15:13 10-84, Engine 68, (post collapse operations) 

10:15:25 10-84, Engine 276 /E211, 

10:18:42 10-84, Engine 50, (post collapse operations) 

10:19:35 FDNY dispatcher advises Engine 228 acting that a firefighter is trapped in the Marriot, 

bell area. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes) 

10:19:56 Box 0064-1, location of Alarm Box, Greenwich and Liberty Streets, Deutsche Bank on 

22 Floor – Floor Fell 

 Engine 309 /E 33 

 Ladder 146 /L 11 

10:20 – 10:29 A few companies reach the WTC 1 lobby where they find destruction. Some companies 

are delayed. Firefighters climb into the Marriott Hotel 3 WTC to answer Mayday calls 

from trapped personnel. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

10:20 NYPD – Aviation 14 states the WTC 1 is leaning. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company) 

10:20 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack 

 Ladder 58/20 (Arrived at Cedar and Church Streets, WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:21:28 10-84, Ladder 148, (post collapse Command Post operations, Broadway and Vesey 

 streets) 

10:21:50 10-84, Ladder 47, 10-33 odor of smoke 

10:22 Recalled firefighters arriving with assigned units 

10:22:18 10-84, Engine 160, (post collapse operations, supplied water to two Tower Ladders 

 operating on WTC 7) 

10:23 Mutual aid request issued to Nassau County with directions on staging areas. (FDNY, 

 McKinsey & Company) 

10:23:36 10-84, Engine 246 /E235, (post collapse operations 5 WTC, hydrant hookup on 

Broadway and Church Streets, water relay to E 503, operated hoseline on street level fires 

at Church and Liberty Streets) 

10:24 a.m. Dozens of people trapped in a stairway in WTC 1 on and above the third floor were 

directed out by a firefighter that had broken through an office wall with an ax. The 

firefighter opened a hole through the wall to the mezzanine and the street. He lighted the 

path with his flashlight. He stayed behind to direct others out of the building and did not 

exit with people that had been trapped. (New York Times interview with Ms. Susan

Frederick. “9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan”) 
Attachment 2 

228 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

 Final count of firehouse units reporting before the WTC 1 collapse: 

 35 Manhattan firehouses (13 of the 35 reporting multiple units), 30 Brooklyn (6 of 30 

reporting multiple units), 7 Queens firehouses, 7 Bronx firehouses (1 of the 7 reporting 

multiple units), 1 Staten Island firehouse. (New York Times, website, timeline) 

10:24 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 247 (Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, post collapse operations, 

hydrant hookup and supply of hoselines to Tower Ladders) 

 Engine 318/279 (post collapse operations, Staging area at West and Chambers Streets, 

hose stretch from Marine 1 to Vesey Street) 

 Ladder 107/105 (post collapse operations) 

10:24:26 Box 0063-7, Broadway and Liberty Streets, People trapped in basement. 

 Engine 61 /E 18 

 Ladder 3 

10:26:29 Marine 9, Acknowledged MDT, (tied up at Vesey and Hudson River, drafted water, 

supplied numerous 3 1⁄2 inch hoselines to relaying pumpers, tower ladders and manifolds) 

10:27 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Battalion 58 (Coordinated staging area at Brooklyn Bridge) 

10:27:11 10-84, Engine 227, (Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, post collapse 

operations) 

10:28:02 10-84, Ladder 78, (post collapse operations, Command Post at Broadway and Vesey 

Streets, extinguish street level fires on Broadway, supply water to Tower Ladder 15 on 

Liberty Street) 

10:28:11 10-84, Engine 236, 10-33 odor of smoke 

10:28:16 10-84, Ladder 58 /L 20, (Arrived at Cedar and Church Streets, WTC 1 collapsed) 

10:29 a.m. WTC 1 building collapse. (FEMA, 403) 

10:30 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Squad 61 (searched subway station at Church Street (#1Line), searched 5 WTC found 

one victim and removed to EMS, searched 130 Liberty Street and debris area. 

10:30:08 10-84, Engine 318 /E279, (post collapse operations, Staging area at West and Chambers 

Streets, hose stretch from Marine 1 to Vesey Street) 

10:30:30 Engine 289 reports major collapse of both towers. 

10:32:12 10-84, Engine 228, (responding through Brooklyn Battery Tunnel when WTC 2 

collapsed) 

10:32:30 10-84, Engine 247 /E240, (Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, post collapse 

operations, hydrant hookup and supply of hoselines to Tower Ladders) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 229

10:33:20 10-84, Ladder 85 (post collapse operations, Command Post at Broadway and Vesey, 

operated Tower Ladder between 4 and 5 WTC) 

10:33:56 10-84, Engine 155, (search of 5 WTC, supplied hose lines to debris pile of WTC 2, 

hooded up of serviceable hydrant at Church and Murray Streets and relayed water to 

E 229) 

10:35 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

Engine 290 (search of debris piles) 

10:37 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 254 (reported to Command Post at West and Chambers Streets, search collapse 

area) 

 Ladder 153 (reported to Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, searched 5 

WTC, buildings on Liberty Street and debris pile, setup Tower Ladder stream on fire at 

Bankers Trust Building) 

10:38 EMS – Brooklyn Bridge Division established and Brooklyn Bridge Casualty Collection 

Point established. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

10:38:32 10-84, Engine 309 /E 33, (reported to Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, 

stretched 3 1⁄2 inch hoselines from command post to Marine Companies at pier, stretched 

supply lines from Marine 2 to E 209 and E 279, stretched supply lines to manifolds and 

Tower Ladders, searched collapse area) 

10:40 (E) EMS – Staging and treatment area established at Harrison and Greenwich Streets. 

(FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

10:42:51 10-84, Engine 157 (Command Post at West Street, stretch hoseline, fight street fires) 

10:45 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 514 (hooked up to hydrant in front of 80 West Street, stretched 3 1⁄2 inch supply 

line to Tower Ladder 114 in front of 90 West Street, supplied water to Tower Ladder 15 

in front of 90 West Street, supplied water to standpipe of 85 West Street, searched 

collapse area) 

10:45 (E) FDNY Chief arrives at One Police Plaza Command and Control Center. (FDNY, 

McKinsey & Company) 

10:46:09 10-84, Battalion Chief 58, (Coordinated staging area at Brooklyn Bridge) 

10:48:26 FDNY Engine 24 calls “Mayday” two members trapped in the promenade. (FDNY 

World Trade Center Incident Summary notes) 

10:49 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Engine 309/33 (reported to Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, stretched 3 1⁄2 

inch hoselines from command post to Marine Companies at pier, stretched supply lines 

from Marine 2 to E 209 and E 279, stretched supply lines to manifolds and Tower 

Ladders, searched collapse area) 
Attachment 2 

230 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

10:50 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 206 (hooked to serviceable hydrant at Nassau and John Streets, relayed water to 

 E 221 that was supplying a Tower Ladder, stretched and operated hoselines at Liberty 

Street debris fires) 

10:50:50 FDNY Engine 33 advises that the water pressure is lost in lower Manhattan and requests 

a fireboat to augment the water supply. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary 

notes) 

10:50:56 10-84, Engine 61/E 18 

10:51:36 Box 2033, location of Alarm Box, Vesey Street 100 feet West of West Street-1, 

 Marine 4 

10:52:17 Marine 4 Acknowledged RSEP 

10:52:17 10-84, Engine 290 

10:52:24 10-84, Ladder 83 (post collapse operations, Command Post at West and Chambers 

Streets, stretched hoselines at various fires, search debris piles) 

10:52:02 Box 0064-8, location of Alarm Box, Greenwich and Liberty Streets, People Buried 

 Engine 286/E 10 

10:53:52 FDNY personnel request help to rescue civilians trapped, also FDNY members appear to 

be trapped on the West South of Tower #1. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident 

Summary notes) 

10:54:58 10-84, Engine 166 

10:55 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Engine 248 (reported to Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, assisted Field 

communications by laying out phone lines between command posts, search of buildings) 

10:59 (E) EMS – Dispatch is unable to contact chiefs. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

 Division 2 Deputy Chief prepared to assume command at Brooklyn Bridge 

11:00 (E) EMS established liaison at new Incident Command Post at West and Chambers Streets. 

(FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

11:00 NYPD – 9-1-1 calls rerouted through backup emergency call network 

11:00 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Squad 270 (searched collapse area) 

11:10:21 10-84, Engine 206, (hooked to serviceable hydrant at Nassau and John Streets, relayed 

water to E 221 that was supplying a Tower Ladder, stretched and operated hoselines at 

Liberty Street debris fires) 

11:11:02 Box 0320-1, location of Alarm Box, Brooklyn Bridge 

 Engine 227 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 231

 Engine 276/E 211 

 Engine 241/E 224 

 Engine 249 

 Engine 282/E 204 (stretched and operated hoselines to extinguish debris fires) 

 Engine 284/E 207 

11:11:33 10-84, Engine 276/E 211 

11:12:38 10-84, Engine 248, (reported to Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, assisted 

Field communications by laying out phone lines between command posts, search of 

buildings) 

11:13:28 Box 0320-1, location of Alarm Box Brooklyn Bridge 

 Engine 515 

 Engine 246/E 235 

 Engine 519 

 Battalion Chief 41/BC 31 

 Battalion Chief 42/BC 32 

 Ladder 148 

 Ladder 119 

11:13:51 10-84, Engine 515, (reported to Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, stretched 

hoselines and conducted operations at 3 WTC, Marriott, conducted search of collapse 

area) 

11:15 (E) Assistant Chief of EMS Ops and Tour 1 EMS Chief are in route to One Police Plaza to 

establish inter-agency communications. 

11:16:52 Box 0320-1, location of Alarm Box, Brooklyn Bridge 

 Engine 152 

 Engine 160 

 Ladder 78 

11:19 Box 0320, 

 Engine 155 (search of 5 WTC, supplied hose lines to debris pile of WTC 2, hooded up to 

serviceable hydrant at Church and Murray Streets and relayed water to E 229) 

 Engine 156 (reported to Command Post on Broadway and Vesey Streets, search building 

at Liberty and West Streets, supplied hoselines, and supplied water to Tower Ladder 84 

 Engine 164 (search of building on Liberty Street, searched debris pile) 

 Ladder 84 (reported to Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, search of 5 WTC, 

operated Tower Ladder at Church and Vesey Streets on 5 WTC and WTC 7 

11:21 EMS – Forward staging area established at West and Chambers Streets. (FDNY, 

McKinsey & Company) 

11:25 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets, 

 Battalion 37 (reported to staging area at Brooklyn Bridge, operated Command Post at 

Broadway and Vesey Streets) 

11:30 (E) NYPD – Chief of Department returns to One Police Plaza. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

Company) 
Attachment 2 

232 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

11:30 (E) EMS presence established at One Police Plaza. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

11:38 Recalled firefighters on city buses awaiting deployment. (FDNY, McKinsey & 

Company) 

11:42 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Ladder 47/6 (search and rescue operations, standpipe hookups and stretch hoselines 

11:48 EMS – contact between One Police Plaza and dispatch established. (FDNY, McKinsey & 

Company) 

11:50 EMS – New Jersey side ferry terminal staging and treatment area established. (FDNY, 

McKinsey & Company) 

11:58 EMS Command conducts roll call for chief location and sector operations. (FDNY, 

McKinsey & Company) 

12:00 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Engine 321 (supplied building Siamese at 130 Greenwich Street, supplied and operated 

multiversal on debris, search operations) 

12:05 NYPD – Verizon building at 140 West Street flooded 

12:07 EMS – West Broadway and Chambers Street staging area is moved to Chelsea and Piers 

Division as a result of a gas leak. (FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

12:10 (E) EMS three new locations for Casualty Collection Points: Javits Center, Brooklyn Navy 

Yard, and the Yankees minor league stadium at Staten Island. (FDNY, McKinsey & 

Company) 

12:15 (E) EMS resources staged at Broadway and Reade Streets with 100 Academy personnel. 

(FDNY, McKinsey & Company) 

12:26:13 10-84, Ladder 7, (WTC 2, operations unknown, fatalities) 

1:04:54 10-84, FDNY? FC Field Com 1 

1:29 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack 

 Ladder 17/15 (Tower Ladder stream into 4 and 5 WTC 

1:29:53 Battalion Chief 37 reports that eight bus loads of firefighters are located at the Manhattan 

Bridge 

1:30 NYPD – Communications Division switches to emergency control stations 

1:40 Box 0300, 

 Engine 153 (stretched and operated hoselines at fires on Liberty Street, supplied Tower 

Ladder 79) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 233

1:46:25 Battalion Chief 32 reports from Manhattan Bridge that busses are over Bridge to staging 

area at City Hall Park 

2:00 Division 3 Chief assumes EMS command at West and Chambers Streets 

2:00 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Ladder 117/3 (assisted with hoseline stretches and searched for victims) 

2:02 Box 9998, location of Alarm Box, WTC special box assignment for the attack 

 Battalion 26/7 (search and extinguish pockets of fire) 

2:09:47 Box 0050, location of Alarm Box, West and Albany Streets 

 Engine 210 

 Engine 202 

2:18:11 Box 2023, location of Alarm Box, Rector PL and South End Ave, 

 Ladder 135/L 5 

2:45 (E) NYPD – Verizon provides portable cellular units. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company) 

2:45:36 10-84, Ladder 135/L 5, (reported to Command Post at West and Liberty Streets operated 

Tower Ladder on debris piles and 90 West Street) 

2:49:11 Box 2023-1, location of Alarm Box, Rector PL and South End Ave 

 Ladder 146/L 11 

2:55:44 Box 0050, location of Alarm Box, West and Albany Streets 

 Engine 252 

3:09 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Ladder 79/131 (operated tower Ladder at Greenwich and Liberty Streets, search of debris 

pile) 

3:16:20 Box 2023-1, location of Alarm Box, Rector PL and South End Ave 

 Ladder 117/L 3 

3:17:36 10-84, Engine 230, (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets, operations unknown, 

fatalities) 

3:20:52 10-84, Engine 236/E15, (responding to scene when WTC 1 collapsed, stretched handlines 

from building standpipes and extinguished street level fires) 

3:44:53 10-84, Ladder 117/L 3, (assisted with hoseline stretches and searched for victims) 

3:53 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Engine 511/6 (members responded to recall and manned a reserve apparatus, stretched 

3 1⁄2 inch supply line from Liberty and Church Streets to Liberty and Nassau Streets and 

hooked up to hydrant and supplied water to the site, searched the collapse area) 

4:00 (E) NYPD – Verizon facility at 140 West Street fails due to flooding. (NYPD, McKinsey & 

Company) 
Attachment 2 

234 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

4:46:31 10-84, Battalion Chief 32, (Command Post at West and Liberty Streets) 

5:00 Box 8087, location of Alarm Box, WTC 2 lobby at Command Desk, 

 Ladder 165/18 (reported to West and Vesey Street Command Post, operated at N.Y. 

Telephone Building basement fire) 

5:20:33 WTC 7 building begins to collapse. (FEMA 403) 

5:21:10 p.m. WTC 7 building complete collapse. (FEMA 403) 

5:21:11 FDNY Field Comm 1 reports major collapse of World Trade Center Building #7. 

(FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes) 
 Chronology of Emergency Responder Operations 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 235

Chronology Reference Documents: 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data 

Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations, FEMA 403, Federal Insurance and 

Mitigation Administration, Washington, DC, May 2002. 

Fire Department City of New York, List of Box Alarms for the World Trade Center on September 11, 

2001. The record includes: Box Alarm Location, Unit ID and Assignment Time, Unit ID and Arrival 

Time. 

Fire Department City of New York, Compilation of Unit CD 12/CD 15 Forms on File with FDNY, 

records include Unit ID, Responded to Box/Time, and Names of Deceased per Unit. 

McKinsey & Company, Fire Department City of New York, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, August, 

2002. 

McKinsey & Company, New York Police Department, Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and 

Response, August 2002. 

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Tape of FDNY Channel 30 Repeater, World Trade Center 

(Citywide in-building) from 08:45 until 09:58. 

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Tape of WTC Police Desk #1, Channels 002 – 039, from 

07:05 until 09:56. 
Attachment 2 

236 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

This page intentionally left blank. 
NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 237

Attachment 3 

LISTING OF PORT AUTHORITY, NYPD, AND FDNY COMMUNICATIONS

Port Authority, NYPD and FDNY Communications 

The NIST received duplicates of many radio and telephone channels. The tapes listed below cover a wide 

range of times. All recordings cover at least from 8:45 a.m. to 9:58 a.m. The remainder of the 

communications can be placed in two categories as follows; 7:05 a.m. to 9:58 a.m. and 7:05 a.m. to 

6:00 p.m. 

Central Police Desk - Police Command Ch 2 to 39 – Each one of these recordings is 198 

minutes long. 

CPD Ch. 002 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 003 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 004 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 005 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 006 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 007 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 008 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 009 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 010 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 011 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 012 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 013 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 014 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 015 - SPEN 1 State Police Emergency Network.wma 

CPD Ch. 016 - Radio SPEN 2 State Police Emergency Network.wma 

CPD Ch. 017 - Radio (Ch. A) PA Area Wide.wma 

CPD Ch. 018 - Radio (Ch. W) LT Police.wma 

CPD Ch. 019 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 020 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 021 - Phone 911 Emergency.wma (note: recording was blank) 

CPD Ch. 022 - Phone 911 Emergency.wma (note: recording was blank) 

CPD Ch. 023 - Phone SGT's Desk - 201-216-6800.wma 

CPD Ch. 024 - Phone Clerk - 201-216-6800.wma 

CPD Ch. 025 - Phone TTY NY- 201-216-6800.wma 

CPD Ch. 026 - Phone Clerk Extra - 201-216-6800.wma 

CPD Ch. 027 - Phone TTY NJ - 201-216-6800.wma 

CPD Ch. 028 - Phone Absence Control Line 1 - 201-216-6988.wma 

CPD Ch. 029 - Phone Absence Control Line 2 - 201-133-6988.wma 

CPD Ch. 030 - Phone 800 number SGT's Desk - 201-216-6858.wma 

CPD Ch. 031 - Desk TTY number 3.wma 

CPD Ch. 032 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 033 - CPD.wav Not assigned 

CPD Ch. 034 - CPD.wav Not assigned 
Attachment 3 

238 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

CPD Ch. 035 - Phone 201-963-7247 Assignment Line 800-776-8580.wma 

CPD Ch. 036 - Phone 201-963-7248 Assignment Line 800-776-8580.wma 

CPD Ch. 037 - Phone 201-963-7249 Assignment Line 800-776-8580.wma 

CPD Ch. 038 - Phone 201-659-3028 Toll Rob 800-TOLL-ROB.wma 

CPD Ch. 039 - Phone 201-216-6794 Drug Tip 800-828-PAPD.wma 

PATH Police Command - Ch 02 to 31 – Recordings vary in length from 106 minutes to 193 

minutes. 

PATH Ch. 02 - Phone Desk Right.wma 

PATH Ch. 03 

PATH Ch. 04 

PATH Ch. 05 

PATH Ch. 06 - SGT. desk.wma 

PATH Ch. 07 - Tour Commander.wma 

PATH Ch. 08 - Report Room.wma 

PATH Ch. 09 - Juvenile Room.wma 

PATH Ch. 10 - Reserve Room 216-6078.wma 

PATH Ch. 11 - Phone Desk Left.wma 

PATH Ch. 12 - Jersey City Fire Department.wma 

PATH Ch. 13 - Jersey City Medical Center.wma 

PATH Ch. 14 - Jersey City Police.wma 

PATH Ch. 15 - NYPD.wma 

PATH Ch. 16 

PATH Ch. 17 

PATH Ch. 18 

PATH Ch. 19 - Conference Room 1.wma 

PATH Ch. 20 - Conference Room 2.wma 

PATH Ch. 21 - Radio (R2) Train Master.wma 

PATH Ch. 22 - PD Wall (Desk Area).wma 

PATH Ch. 23 - Court Office 1.wma 

PATH Ch. 24 - Court Office 2.wma 

PATH Ch. 25 - Court Sgt.wma 

PATH Ch. 26 - Radio (R1) Train Master.wma 

PATH Ch. 27 - Radio (R30) Communications.wma 

PATH Ch. 28 

PATH Ch. 29 

PATH Ch. 30 

PATH Ch. 31 

WTC Police Desk 1 - Ch 002 to 039 – Each one of these recordings is 171 minutes. 

Ch. 00WTC 2.wav 

Ch. 003 WTC.wav 

Ch. 004 WTC.wav 

Ch. 005 WTC phone 435-8456 clerk.wav 

Ch. 006 WTC phone 435-8462 clerk.wav 

Ch. 00WTC 7 phone 435-2135 TC.wav 

Ch. 008 WTC phone 435-3541 desk left.wav 

Ch. 009 WTC phone 435-3541 desk center.wav 
 Listing of Port Authority, NYPD, and FDNY Communications 

NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation 239

Ch. 010 WTC phone 435-3541 desk right.wav 

Ch. 01WTC 1 phone 435-8460 conf. room.wav 

Ch. 01WTC 2.wav 

Ch. 013 WTC phone 435-3519 office.wav 

Ch. 014 WTC direct line FDNY.wav 

Ch. 015 WTC direct line NYC EMS.wav 

Ch. 016 WTC phone 435-7666 floor warden.wav 

Ch. 01WTC 7 direct line fire command WTC 1.wav 

Ch. 018 WTC direct line fire command WTC 2.wav 

Ch. 019 WTC.wav 

Ch. 020 WTC.wav 

Ch. 02WTC 1 phone 435-2133 police reserve rm..wav 

Ch. 02WTC 2 phone 435-2131 SHO desk.wav 

Ch. 023 WTC phone 435-2948 desk.wav 

Ch. 024 WTC radio Ch. A.wav 

Ch. 025 WTC radio Ch. B.wav 

Ch. 026 WTC radio Ch. W.wav 

Ch. 02WTC 7 radio Ch. X.wav 

Ch. 028 WTC radio Ch. Y.wav 

Ch. 029 WTC radio Ch. Z.wav 

Ch. 030 WTC FDNY radio.wav 

Ch. 03WTC 1.wav 

Ch. 03WTC 2.wav 

Ch. 033 WTC.wav 

Ch. 034 WTC.wav 

Ch. 035 WTC.wav 

Ch. 036 WTC.wav 

Ch. 03WTC 7.wav 

Ch. 038 WTC.wav 

Ch. 039 WTC.wav 

Newark International Airport - Police Command - Ch 02 to 39 

EWR Ch. 002 

EWR Ch. 003 

EWR Ch. 004 

EWR Ch. 005 

EWR Ch. 006 

EWR Ch. 007 

EWR Ch. 008 - Phone 733-7525 - Newark PD.wma 

EWR Ch. 009 - Phone PL234846 - Eliz PD.wma 

EWR Ch. 010 - Phone PL92866- Newark FD.wma 

EWR Ch. 011 - PL234881 - Eliz FD.wma 

EWR Ch. 012 - Phone PL230333 - AFA.wma 

EWR Ch. 013 

EWR Ch. 014 - Phone PL234979 - REMCS.wma 

EWR Ch. 015 - FAA Tower Crash Alarm.wma 

EWR Ch. 016 

EWR Ch. 017 

EWR Ch. 018 - PNPD PVL - OSNA660-650.wma 
Attachment 3 

240 NIST NCSTAR 1-8, WTC Investigation

EWR Ch. 019 - Phone 589-6321 - PNPD.wma 

EWR Ch. 020 - Phone 589-0292 - PNPD.wma 

EWR Ch. 021 - Phone 961-6666 - Line 3.wma 

EWR Ch. 022 - Phone 961-6666 - Line 4.wma 

EWR Ch. 023 - Radio - EWR Command - 800Mhz.wma 

EWR Ch. 024 - Radio - EWR ARFF - 800Mhz.wma 

EWR Ch. 025 - Radio - EWR TAC 1 - 800Mhz.wma 

EWR Ch. 026 - Radio - Central Police Desk - 800Mhz.wma 

EWR Ch. 027 - Radio - EWR Detectives.wma 

EWR Ch. 028 - Police Desk left phone - 961-6230.wma 

EWR Ch. 029 - Police desk phone center - 961-6230.wma 

EWR Ch. 030 - Police CAD desk phone - 961-6230.wma 

EWR Ch. 031 - Police Desk right phone - 961-6230.wma 

EWR Ch. 032 - Phone 961-6666 - Line 2.wma 

EWR Ch. 033 - Phone 961-6666 - Line 1.wma 

EWR Ch. 034 

EWR Ch. 035 

EWR Ch. 036 - Radio Ch. Z - Operations & Terminals.wma 

EWR Ch. 037 

EWR Ch. 038 - Radio - Ch. X - Facility Maintenance.wma 

EWR Ch. 039 - Radio - Ch. B - Maintenance.wma 

NYPD WTC Communications 

NYPD Special Operations Division (SOD), Tape 1, 08:46 – 09:33 

NYPD Special Operations Division (SOD), Tape 2, 09:32 – 10:18 

NYPD Special Operations Division (SOD), Tape 3, 10:18 – 11:04 

NYPD City wide 1 radio, Tape 4, 08:40 – 09:27 

NYPD City wide 1 radio, Tape 4b, 09:27 - 10:12 

NYPD City wide 1 radio, Tape 5c, 10:12 - 11.59 

NYPD City wide 1 radio, Tape 5d, 10:59 – 11:46 

NYPD Division 1, Tape 6, 08:45 – 9:30 

NYPD Division 1, Tape 7, 09:29 – 10:15 

NYPD Division 1, Tape 8, 10:14 - 11:00 

FDNY WTC Communications 

FDNY Manhattan dispatch channel, 154.25 MHz