ALTERNATIVE WORLD SCENARIOS FOR A NEW ORDER OF NATIONS

Charles W. Taylor

1993
*****

This book is revised and updated edition of Alternative

World Scenarios for Strategic Planning (Taylor, 1988 and 1990)

and is compatible with A World 2010: A New Order of Nations

(Taylor, 1992).

*****

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. Research for this book was completed on June 30,

1993. This book is approved for public release; distribution is

unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this book are invited and should be

forwarded to Commandant, U.S. Army College or to the Director,

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also be conveyed directly

to the author at Box 407 at the above address or by calling

commercial (717) 245-3010, DSN 242-3010, or FAX (717) 245-3820.

Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and

Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN

242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at

rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

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Cover design by Ms. Roberta M. Hill.

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Selected 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies

Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the Strategic Studies

Institute Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage

address is: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm
FOREWORD

This futures book reflects the global trends and events of

the recent past and those of today that are bringing about change

to the world's political, economic, social, technological, and

military environments. The forecasts found throughout the book

are derived from analysis of the open literature and other media,

the author's experience as a futurist, and his own futures

writings.

Since their publication, Alternative World Scenarios for

Strategic Planning (Taylor, 1988/1990) and its follow-on study, A

World 2010: A New Order of Nations (Taylor, 1992) have received

wide usage for strategic planning throughout active and reserve

components of U.S. military. They have also been used nationally

and internationally for long-range planning by business,

industry, academia, and other private and government

organizations. World changes, principally those that have come

about since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of

Soviet communism, and the consequences of these changes that are

unraveling with time, have increased interest in the forecasts of

these studies. Further, greater interrelatedness and involvement

of nations have encouraged long-range planners and other users to

request the author to reassess his earlier writings against this

new global setting and produce an updated set of planning

scenarios as a sequel to A World 2010: A New Order of Nations.

Alternative World Scenarios for A New Order of Nations was

written by Charles W. Taylor as a text and guide for long-range

planners, policymakers, and others. It provides a set of

plausible scenarios against which users can build policies and

decisions while anticipating and judging their consequences

before implementation.

This book was written for the United States Army War College

as a contribution to long-range planning for the Army. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish it.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT

Major General, U.S. Army

Commandant
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CHARLES W. TAYLOR, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College,

is a strategic futurist with the Strategic Studies Institute and

occupies the General Douglas MacArthur Academic chair of

Research. His futures research extends over 25 years and

includes major contributions in the form of narrative long-range

strategic forecasts as well as in methods and designs of

forecasts for studies requested by the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. He is known

internationally for his strategic forecasts and for his

contributions of methods and techniques to the field of

forecasting. He is the author of a number of future studies

including The Technical Report to Forecast 90, A Concept of a

Future Force, The Relationship of Forecasting to Long-Range

Planning, The Pilot Delphi Project (strategic issues to the year

2030), A World 2010: A Decline of Superpower Influence,

Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning, Creating

Strategic Visions, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations, and

others. Mr. Taylor is the originator of the Panel Consensus

Technique, an internationally recognized contribution to

participative decisionmaking, problem solving, and forecasting. 

He is a member of the American Academy of Political and Social

Sciences, World Future Society, Population Reference Bureau,

Association of Electronic Defense, Fellow of the Inter-University

Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Military Operations Research

Society, and The Planning forum.
PREFACE

This book is written to provide decisionmakers,

policymakers, long-range planners, and others interested in the

future a means to compare the consequences of their actions taken

today to plausible, future alternative world environments or

scenarios. Earlier work by the author has provided the four basic

scenarios which are easily monitored for updating. Scenario

updating is a task that is advisable at least every 5 years to

maintain the usefulness of the scenarios. The text presented here

describes the processes and methods for the creation of

alternative scenarios and the use of the Cone of Plausibility

(described in Creating Strategic Visions, Taylor, 1990) to

project the scenarios 10 to 30 years or more into the future. The

text also supports and is based on the following two previous

writings of the author, Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic

Planning (Taylor, 1988 and 1990) and A World 2010: A New Order of

Nations (Taylor, 1992).

Changing trends and the occurrences of associated events

(e.g., the demise of the Soviet Union and decline of Soviet

communism; the rise of democratic governments; environmental

pollution), especially during the last two decades of the 20th

century, have created a new era of forced transition for the

world's modernized industrial nations. For example, the military

of the United States and its defense-oriented industries have

been recast into a reformation of conflict/war-based strategies

to conflict/peace-based strategies. The military is faced with a

forced transition from warfighting missions to missions of peace

maintenance: peace-enforcement, -making, -keeping, and -building.

Military leaders who view security and defense as an integral

part of a strong, but peaceful, economic, and political

infrastructure sustained by superior national military strategies

increasingly will dominate the U.S. defense rhetoric.

Most industries of the military-industrial complex that are

or will be retooling in the late 1990s from defense production to

that of domestic, almost certainly will meet the expected demands

of the largely peace-driven national and global economies of the

future. From a 20th century view, it would appear that once

defense industries have retooled for non-defense production they

very likely will be unable to reverse the process easily. From a

21st century view, scientific innovations and technological

achievements in the century's first decade almost certainly will

have advanced military weaponry and ancillary equipment for

warfighting enough to make most of 20th century warfare

obsolescent. The retrofitting of 20th century weapons platforms

(aircraft, ships, or armored tanks) with 21st century technology

almost certainly would be like putting new wine in old bottles.

Economies of the world's nations very likely will no longer
be bound by an adversarial political-military relationship of the

United States and the former Soviet Union that for nearly 50

years steadily increased defense budgets and national debts.

There is little likelihood that the United States or any other

nation with large budget deficit problems will overcome them.

Expenditures in the so-called peace dividends (former defense

expenditures applied to non-defense programs), will likely reduce

the deficit only gradually, if at all. During the late years of

the 20th century and by 2005 and beyond, nations will have

increasing opportunities to establish free-market economies and

democratic governments and to increase economic growth, all of

which could very likely reduce national debts. Military planners

must prepare for the future under current (1994) budgetary

reductions, which in comparison to past lush years appear even

more austere, through analysis of future world scenarios to

determine the extent of the range and types of future conflicts

that likely will involve the military. They must also analyze the

fit of training, doctrine, and strategy to types of conflict and

match technological advancements with conflict strategies.

For this to be accomplished, futurists must construct or

synthesize descriptive scenarios from probable future world

environments. Planners, in order to identify and understand the

challenges that might exist in the future, should make

projections of trends from the near future (2-5 years) to the

longer range future (20-30 years or more), while evaluating the

impact and interaction of consequences along the way. Trends

would include the economic, social, business and industrial

infrastructures of a nation or the world, as well as science and

technology. This study assists planners and decision makers to

view multiple future environments since a single view or

projection of a future global environment would be deterministic,

i.e., predictive, and would be too chancy.

This study presents four plausible views or scenarios of the

global environment of the future in which the United States might

exist. The study and the scenarios contain many forecasts. Their

purpose is not just to represent one futurist's view of the

future, but to bring together four logical and plausible

scenarios that are useful to long-range planners. The scenarios

are ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, and DELTA. They appear in synopsis in

chapter 3 and in full narrative in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. They

are presented briefly in the paragraphs below with their

descriptive titles.

SCENARIO ALPHA: U.S. Isolationist.

Scenario ALPHA depicts a relatively peaceful world where the

U.S. perception of an external threat is low and the size of its

military force is small. The U.S. leadership and its business
infrastructure in this international environment have turned

toward isolationism. In general, the concerns of the U.S.

leadership and its citizens are directed more toward deficit

reduction and greater budgetary investments in social welfare,

educational, and environmental programs than in programs for

space, science and technology, defense, or foreign economic and

military aid.

A rise of nationalism throughout many nations of the world,

including nations with prior long-term agreements with the United

States, has suppressed U.S. international influence and has

precluded U.S. military presence overseas. Local U.S. community

infrastructures (economies, politics, resources, and

demographics) are inhibiting military stationing, training, and

installation activities.

The U.S. defense budget has plummeted significantly since

the turn of the century. By 2020 the pressures of congressional

environmentalists have forced the closure of many of the

remaining military bases that were not closed around 2005. The

U.S. armed services have been reorganized into a joint/unified

configuration called the General Defense Force (GDF). The

warfighting GDF is made up of Land Defense Forces (LDF), Sea

Defense Forces (SDF), and Air and Space Defense Forces (ASDF).

SCENARIO BRAVO: U.S. World Peacekeeper.

Scenario BRAVO describes a competitive world of economic

trade markets where an undercurrent of external threats and

contentions, both economic and military, to U.S. interests are

perceptibly increasing. Worldwide, U.S. economic and military

assistance agreements are many and are backed by a large U.S.

peacekeeping military force. A tradeoff of nationalism for

economic development and representative government by many

nations worldwide has strengthened U.S. international influence,

preserved U.S. investments, and assured the United States of a

military presence overseas. The presence of U.S. industries, with

their advanced facilities and know-how, is visible and productive

in most nations of the world.

Throughout the continental United States, nearly all local

communities have accepted military service men and women as part

of the community family. Defense budgets are strongly supported

by the American public, as are budgets for welfare, education,

and the environment. The leadership and citizens of most U.S.

local communities underpin and encourage military stationing and

installation investments in their neighborhoods without

conditions.

Over the past decade or so, the leadership in the U.S.
Congresses and the Administrations have advocated a strong

military defense. Sizeable and costly military exercises since

2005 continue to be conducted worldwide, some with Russia, the

leader of a confederacy named the Union of Sovereign Republics

(USR). In BRAVO, the U.S. military budget has increased

substantially since the turn of the century because of an

apparent increase in a USR threat to world peace. Since 2005,

internal ethnic strife and perceived external economic threats

have prompted a more aggressive USR leadership to reinforce its

military forces.

These potential threats have pressured the U.S. Congress,

around 2005, to enact an 18-month National Public Service (NPS)

program that includes all agencies of the federal government and

provides training for all citizen and noncitizen residents. For

the military services, which had been all volunteer, NPS provides

a constant source of trained troops.

SCENARIO CHARLIE: Neonationalism World.

The rise of nationalism worldwide in scenario CHARLIE has

significantly suppressed U.S. political, economic, and military

influence and has eliminated the presence of the U.S. military

forces and most American industries overseas. CHARLIE is a highly

competitive world where economic trade wars, embargoes, and

restrictions abound.

The European Community (EC)* is experiencing an economic

pinch of the nationalistic, worldwide fervor for nations to buy

at home. Since around 2005 the EC has perceived no significant

military threats to itself, its interests, or to the rest of

Europe. With the exception of France and the United Kingdom, all

other EC states have demilitarized. NATO became an empty shell

nearly a decade ago. The EC and NATO, except for one or two

states, essentially, would be unable even to support a

peacekeeping force effectively, alone or within a United Nations

force, or to quell ethnic conflicts in the EC or in neighboring

states. By 2005, nearly all U.S. forces have left Europe except

for a few over-manned caretaker contingents and the U.S. forces

involved in training exercises in the Union of Sovereign

Republics (USR) and the Union of Social Democratic Republics

(USDR), confederacies of the former Soviet Union.

*As of November 1993, the EC has become the European Union (EU).

External threats to the United States or its interests are

more of a challenge to U.S. economic trade and markets than they

are threats to political ideology that would call for the use of

military force. Largely for this reason, the U.S. leadership has

provided substantial budgetary support to social and welfare
programs and far less to defense. The military budget remains low

despite U.S. national political and military leaders advocating a

need for a stronger military. This has constrained U.S. security

to a small, high-tech, elite military force and has reduced the

Defense budget to its lowest level since the 1930s.

A significant portion of the Defense budget is invested into

high-tech weaponry and research and development in general. The

elite U.S. military forces are organized as the National Defense

Forces (NDF). The NDF include all services and are fully capable

of land, sea, air, and space operations.

The general public opinion of military service is high.

However, partly because of population growth and partly because

of military environmental infractions, local U.S. communities do

not want military installations in their back yards. Since the

military needs only to staff a small force, its source of

physically, mentally, and morally fit volunteers for career

service is provided through the Universal Public Service (UPS)

program of 2003.

Since the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the continued U.S.

economic support to Russia and Ukraine (especially), Georgia, and

other republics of the former Soviet Union has given these new

nations status in the new order of nations. Russia, circa 2005,

formed a new confederacy with several other former republics and

has become the leading republic of the Union of Sovereign

Republics (USR). Likewise, Ukraine has become the leading

republic of the Union of Social Democratic Republics (USDR).

SCENARIO DELTA: Muted Multipolar World.

This scenario describes a productive economic world where

U.S. political leadership favors social and welfare investments

over those of defense. DELTA, however, is a scenario where U.S.

local communities increasingly object to military activities at

installations in or nearby their communities. The worldwide

threat to the United States and its interests is generally

perceived by the U.S. leadership to be about the same as it was

in the mid to late 1990s, i.e., more of an economic threat than a

military one and with a constant global demand for the United

States to prove its global leadership.

Since the turn of the century and by 2020, the military

threat emanating from the Union of Sovereign Republics (USR) has

steadily grown. The USR is a new confederacy made up of several

republics of the former Soviet Union, largely Russia, in about

2003. In 2020 the USR is under a coalition leadership that is an

economically aggressive three-party system: democratic,

communist, and socialist. The military threat is greater for the
European Community (EC) and the other confederacies formed from

the former Soviet Union in the first decade of the century than

it is for the United States.

The EC, driven by its need for new global economic markets,

by 2005 is gaining in economic growth while gradually improving

its competitive position globally, especially in the

Asian-Pacific Rim markets. U.S. international economic and

political influence, during the same time, is being strengthened

worldwide by most nations that are making a tradeoff of

nationalism for economic growth and are encouraging U.S. trade

and tourism.

The reduction of the U.S. military during the past several

decades has decreased U.S. presence overseas and reduced the

number of local military installations throughout the United

States. About 2005, the President combined the Army, Navy, and

Air Force into one joint service, primarily to reduce costs and

redundancies. The President and the Congress believe that the

single joint service will be more responsive to global crises

than the services would be separately. The DELTA 2020 military

force, organized as a single, Unified Defense Force (UDF), is a

mix of generalists and specialists. The UDF has light (easily

deployable) high-tech land, air, and sea components for rapid

shock attack.

Since the turn of the century the Defense budgets and

related programs have been increasingly austere in comparison to

past funding of the military in the late 20th century. The

national economic benefits of military assistance programs in the

DELTA world, however, are mutually satisfying to host nations and

to the United States. These arrangements, i.e., overseas

assignments for active and reserve forces, although limited in

number, along with other inducements support voluntary military

enlistment as the only source of recruitment for the joint

service in the DELTA scenario.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Sincere appreciation is extended to the members of the U.S.

Air National Guard (ANG) and its contract agency, National

Security Analysts Incorporated (NSA), who under the leadership of

Major General Philip G. Killey, Director, ANG, participated in a

workshop during the summer of 1992 to recommend changes in the

text of Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning

(Taylor, 1988/1990). These recommendations were used to prepare

the scenarios of this document and for the writing of the ANG's

Long Range Plan 1993.
CHAPTER 1

THE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

This futures study1

 has four objectives. The first is to

establish a standard method for Department of the Army (DA)

agencies to plan for the midrange to the long-range future

through the use of an alternative scenario approach. The second

is to describe four future alternative world scenarios

(environments) that are plausible, realistic, and appropriate for

Army and organizational planning into the 21st century. The third

is to revise and update the scenarios to bring them into

alignment both with world changes that have occurred since they

were published and with the author's recent forecasts.2 The

fourth objective is to adjust the forecasts inherent in the

scenarios to accommodate plausible future environments.

The scenarios in this study have broad utility throughout

the Army and potential use throughout the Department of Defense

(DoD) as well as other government agencies, industries, and

academia. The alternative scenario design described here was used

in 1986 for a long-range stationing study for the Army in 2020.3

The design provides a set of four relevant, interrelated

scenarios for midrange to long-range planning, policymaking or

decisionmaking. Each scenario of the set is multifaceted,

holistic, and internally consistent with a time and topic of

focus, yet interrelated by design with the other scenarios of the

set.

Two time periods are addressed by the scenarios: the years

2005 and 2020. These provide an historical perspective of the

future linking 20th century experiences to 21st century

requirements, allowing planners to posture for an evolutionary

transition of military forces into the 21st century. Further, the

scenarios highlight key underlying conditions that may set in

motion organizational changes, e.g., in national defense during

peacetime. As such, they provide a background for planning

alternative strategic courses of action and for assessing defense

and security policies. Equally important, they provide a

framework for exploring long-term requirements. Moreover, the

alternative scenarios include common parameters that make the

most difference to an organization. Planning begins against these

common parameters. Once these parameters are defined,

organizational subdivisions usually discover unique scenario

differences that contribute to the building of a master plan

against which decisions can be made and policies set forth.

The advantage of the alternative scenario approach is that

it provides a context for planning where a spectrum of trends and
concepts can be considered across a variety of settings.4

 Giving

each scenario a descriptive title provides a shared reference and

common vocabulary for comparisons and discussions among a variety

of scenario users.

METHODS

Scenarios, as they are defined for this study, are

narratives or outlines that depict preselected future

environments at some near or far-off time. They largely consist

of knowable things, conditions, and situations in new

relationships that when projected into the future evoke new

concepts and ideas about change. Although scenarios are neither

predictions nor forecasts in themselves, they define future

environments and provide insights that allow today's planners,

policymakers, or decisionmakers to influence the future.

Scenarios are generally semiqualitative or qualitative and

judgmental. The validity of the scenarios and methods used to

build plausible scenarios can be determined by a consensus of

experts5

 or merely by their acceptance and utility by users. A

four scenario-package approach is described and developed for

this study. It is designed specifically to overcome the

deterministic and predictive approach of single-scenario analysis

and to provide a more conceptual and probabilistic framework that

is plausible.

Within the process of projection there are very distinct

dichotomies of terms that are increasingly being accepted by

futurists in the social sciences. One important dichotomy, I

believe, is the difference between prediction and forecasting.

Prediction, as it is used by some analysts, is a deterministic

view of the future, i.e., it is certainty; e.g., tomorrow, it is

going to rain. Whereas, forecasting is being used increasingly by

futurists as a probabilistic view of the future, i.e., it deals

with chance; e.g., tomorrow, there is a 60 percent chance of

rain. This difference is important to the development of this

book since everyone can predict the future, but no one can

predict the future accurately, except by chance. I have taken

special care to minimize predicting world conditions in 2020.

Moreover, to avoid burdening the reader with numbers, I have made

every effort to forecast the future in nominal forecasting terms.

For example, the above forecast statement would read: tomorrow,

there is a better than even chance of rain. Additionally, I have

provided a table of estimative semantics in the back of this book

as a guide for the reader to use to determine the probability of

the occurrence of trends and events.

The plausibility of the scenarios and the methods created to

develop them were originally validated by a seminar conducted by

scholars of the J.F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard

University and further supported by the Harvard Seminar's
Executive Summary and its "Statement of the Seminar Leader,"

Robert J. Murray.6 Additionally, since the publication of the

Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning in 1988, the

number of government agencies and private industries using the

scenarios for strategic planning supports their acceptance and

utility. World events since 1988 have brought about significant

changes in international affairs. Many of these changes had been

anticipated (e.g., the decline of the superpowers; the turning

inward of the Soviet Union for economic reasons; the turning of

Eastern Europe toward democracy; and the reduction of U.S. forces

at home and abroad) and had been taken into consideration when

the 1988 scenarios were written. The early 21st century world

environment described in Chapter 2, "The Early Decades of the

21st Century," establishes the background for amending and

further developing the scenarios. The scenarios described in this

study are extensions and variations of the Chapter 2 environment

and reflect the international environment of A World 2010: A New

Order of Nations.

The Cone of Plausibility.

The scenarios in this futures study encompass a transition

of trends and events and their consequences of the last decade of

the 20th century and their likely evolutionary change into the

21st century. The planning focus years are 2005 and 2020. The

thought process for this transition, or evolution, forms a

theoretical cone that encompasses the passage of time, i.e., from

the past through today to near or distant tomorrows or futures.

Within the cone, cause and effect relationships that define an

organization's existence, e.g., the Army's, in response to the

external world's characteristics represent trends that can be

tracked from today to any point along a time line into the

future, while discovering new trends along the way. Although use

of the cone does not increase the accuracy of the forecast of the

scenarios, tracking in the cone establishes and reinforces the

validity and believability of the scenarios and the logic of

their development. The process is defined within this theoretical

cone where the logical building of plausible scenarios takes

place; it is called "The Cone of Plausibility."7 The cone is

displayed in Figure 1 and described in more detail in the

addendum to this chapter. The use of this process is a mental

exercise of logic that is graphically expressed as an upright

cone. It is narrowest at a plane called today, its base, since

more is known about today and its immediate future, tomorrow. The

cone broadens as knowable futures become increasingly obscure. As

the cone extends into time less is known, there are no hard data,

and an infinite number of futures exist. Beyond the known futures

is where plausible visions of futures or scenarios must be

created.

Plausible Scenarios.

Scenarios developed within the cone are considered plausible

if they adhere to a logical progression from a starting point to

a selected planning focus plane. Plausibility is observed through

estimates of the consequences and effects of each scenario's

trends and events as they interact holistically with one another.

Moreover, trends and events of each scenario can be tracked

backward or forward in the time cone, e.g. from 2020 through 2005

to the 1990s (or earlier) and back to 2020, as a further test of

plausibility (see Figure 2). This assures a high degree of

compatibility between the past, present, and the future. Ergo,

the trends and events and their likely outcomes are intermeshed

easily with, and provide guidance direction and orientation for,

short-range, midrange, or long-range planning. The process of the

cone of plausibility is appropriate and ideal for use by

forecasters and planners of governmental, industrial, business,

or academic agencies and organizations where logical and

plausible observations of trends and events are required.

Wild Card Scenarios.

Other trends and events and their consequences, when

assembled as scenarios, are considered implausible from today's

perspective and are called "wild card" scenarios. They are

outside of the cone, by definition. They are deviations from the

norm. These scenarios encompass major disruptive, aberrant,

catastrophic, or anomalous trends and events (see Figure 1). The

occurrences of these scenarios, despite variable degrees of

warning, are generally not forecast with a high reliability. Wild

card scenarios, however, can become operative and quite real at

any time, if they do, in fact, occur. When they penetrate the

cone, the scenario environments are profoundly altered. Trends

and events associated with a wild card event become the dominant

drivers of the scenario. They overwhelm the scenario theme. In

this event, they would suspend the logical progression of the

scenarios established within the cone until new recovery

baselines could be determined and new trends and events could be

selected as drivers of the scenarios. Wild cards give the cone of

plausibility its upright position and conical shape. They are

external forces that, theoretically, shape the cone by applying

greater pressure against the cone to occur in the very near

future, i.e., at the base of the cone, than in the outer years.

The process within the cone of building scenarios is a

counterforce to the pressures of the wild cards to disrupt the

logical sequence and flow of the scenarios outward in time. Wild

cards are contingencies. Their occurrence and consequences can be

analyzed any time within the cone and might be called digression

analysis.


Scenario Drivers.

The trends selected to be the drivers of the scenarios in

this study are those that are critical to national and

international issues. The trends that shape or drive the future

of the United States and its relationships with other nations of

the world are the political, economic, social, technological, and

military elements of power. Drivers are plausible trends and

events associated with these elements, and others, that have

varying degrees of dominance and that establish the themes of

scenarios. One of these drivers will be selected, placed at the

top of the list, and will be dominant over all other driver

trends in a scenario. Their interactions create the consequences

that move the scenarios outward in the time cone. Four example

driver themes--technological, political, economic, and

sociological--are depicted in Figure 1 for scenarios called A, B,

C, and D, respectively. Examples of drivers or themes that are

generally most influential for governments and a variety of

businesses and industries are listed at random below:

! Geographic

! Economic

! Military

! Sociological

! Science & Technology

! Demographic

! Political

! Environmental Impact

! Natural Resources

! Community

 National and international political and economic drivers

were used to set the themes of the scenarios for the Army

stationing study. These were selected by the planners and

futurist because U.S. national defense is more sensitive to them

than to most other drivers, as are most businesses and

industries.

Personal experience and research have convinced me that the

use of multiple or alternative scenarios improves forecasting

accuracy.8

 In order to create four scenarios that were close in

relationship to one another, each scenario of the study included

driver trends that were similar to those of the other scenarios.

The dissimilarities give each scenario a different and

distinctive thematic thrust and direction of its environment into

the future. When in holistic combination with other scenario

trends, the driver trends clearly and dramatically distinguish

one scenario from another. Additional discussion of scenario
drivers is contained in Chapter 3.

An optimum number of sets of alternative scenarios created

by the futurist for a study group of planners is four--each set

with four driver statements (see endnote 8). The sets do not

include extremes, i.e., upper or lower limits, best or worst

case, or middle-of-the-road scenarios. None is intended to be the

most or least likely environment or are any forecasts of the

world of 2005 or 2020. Rather, each is intended to describe

possible combinations of future conditions that can be used as

part of a set of considerations for planning or as decision or

policy analysis tools.

Notwithstanding the possible independent use of each

scenario, the four scenarios were designed to be used as a

planning package, where planners and analysts can meaningfully

compare the influence of variables across time in realistic

situations and in an envelope of potential (not predictive)

evolving societal configurations. Use of the scenarios in this

study provides users a means by which they can plan realistically

for different operating climates, restraints, requirements, and

resources for the future. Planners can uncover commonalities and

differences as planning form and structure are derived from their

analysis. From these comparisons, final composite plans can be

developed. The titles of the four basic alternative scenarios are

shown in the cone of plausibility in Figure 3. The scenarios,

each with its set of four driver statements, are displayed in

Table 1. The scenarios have the following identification and

descriptive titles:

! Scenario ALPHA: U.S. Isolationist;

! Scenario BRAVO: U.S. World Peacekeeper;

! Scenario CHARLIE: Neonationalism World; and,

! Scenario DELTA: Muted Multipolar World.

SCENARIO ALPHA: U.S. ISOLATIONIST

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong welfare and

social investment economy.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

lack the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

A rise in world-wide nationalism suppresses U.S. influence and

precludes U.S. military presence overseas.

U.S. local community infrastructures inhibit military stationing

and reduce installation investments.
SCENARIO BRAVO: U.S. WORLD PEACEKEEPER

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong military

defense.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

have the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

Tradeoffs of nationalism for economic development strengthen U.S.

influence and preserve U.S. military presence overseas.

U.S. local community infrastructures underpin military stationing

and installation investments.

SCENARIO CHARLIE: NEONATIONALISM WORLD

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong military

defense.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

lack the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

A rise in world-wide nationalism suppresses U.S. influence and

precludes U.S. military presence overseas.

U.S. local community infrastructures inhibit military stationing

and reduce installation investments.

SCENARIO DELTA: MUTED MULTIPOLAR WORLD

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong welfare and

social investment economy.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

lack the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

Tradeoffs of nationalism for economic development strengthen U.S.

influence and preserve U.S. military presence overseas.

U.S. local community infrastructures inhibit military stationing

and reduce installation investments.

Table 1. Micro-Scenarios with Potential Drivers

for Theme Dominance.

Some notional guidelines for generating appropriate scenarios for

any subject are suggested in Table 2.

! Build on Logic and Plausible Assumptions

! Focus on Relevant Issues and Interests

! Include Valid Trends and Realistic Variables

! Challenge Taditional Notions of Structure

! Keep Free of Disruptive, Aberrant, Anomalous, and

 Catastropic Events (Optional)

! Maintain Internal Consistency and Interrelatedness

! Crete Holistic Visions of the Scenarios

Table 2. Notional Guidelines for

Creating Strategic Scenarios.

STUDY ORGANIZATION

This study is designed to describe a process for the use of

alternative world scenarios for strategic planning purposes by

planners and to provide a set of four scenarios that can be used

throughout the Department of the Army and other government

agencies. The study is presented in seven chapters.

! Chapter 1, The Process, provides an explanation of a

realistic method to derive sets of plausible world scenarios.

! Chapter 2, The Early Decades of the 231st Century, is a

background world environment of the early decades of the 21st

century from which alterntive scenarios can be developed.

! Chapter 3, Scenario Synopses and Attributes, describes how

the four scenarios were finalized for study purposes and provides

a brief synopsis of each of the scenarios for the year 2020 that

can be used as a handy reference by the readers and users of this

study.

! Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 contain detailed describtions for

each of the scenarios, ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, and DELTA, for the

focus years 2005 and 2020, respectively.
ADDENDUM

THE CONE OF PLAUSIBILITY

The cone encompasses the projections of a set of four

plausible scenarios, i.e., external worlds and the responses of

planners to them. They are identified as A, B, C, and D, and

ascend from today to a planning focus plane year of 2020.

Although the scenarios individually vary in strength for a

particular characteristic, the four scenario package creates a

comprehensive political, economic, sociological, and

technological holistic set. Each scenario is shown as a point and

represents an animated environment at each focus plane. Each

scenario ascends along a time line maintaining a continuity

through incremental time periods from today to the 2020 focus

plane.

Within an incremental time period, e.g., five years, any

single trend line may actually be straight, angular, or curved.

Trends also may discontinue and be replaced by new trends or

combined with others. When the audit trails of all trends in a

scenario time increment are combined, the projection, most often,

would appear as a straight line. Each successive time increment

thus approximates a smooth curve, or straight line, over a

thirty-year audit trail of the scenarios. Within any plane there

are galaxies of plausible and possible scenarios built from

clusters of respective cause and effect relationships. The

external world of each scenario on a given focus plane can have

any number of plausible planning responses. The fact that each of

the designated scenarios, A, B, C, and D, works in concert with

the other three captures (mathematically) any other combination

of realistic planning responses on a shared focus plane. Various

military responses, for example, might be force structure

configurations for heavy, medium, and light brigades in

percentage; the number of people; and the number of equipment end

items at various technology levels, respectively.

SCENARIO DRIVERS

The amount of influence that the drivers may have on U.S.

national policies and behavior varies in each scenario. U.S.

courses of actions in planning and decisionmaking respond to the

influence of the drivers to provide a future architecture for

U.S. defense. For example the architecture for the U.S. armies of

the future would include specific force structure of the total

Army, the Army's end strength, technology (weapons systems and

supporting equipment), training strategies, demographic and

population shifts, and installation characteristics. Moreover,

the drivers likely will influence as well how the Army will be

employed in the environment of the future. The drivers also serve

as precursors and catalysts to bring about new trends and events
that become the forerunners for other future world environments.

Each of the basic drivers is given a high probability of

occurring in the four scenarios. The purpose is to establish a

general scenario theme that can be woven into the environment of

each scenario.

The initial scenarios are made up of these basic drivers

expressed as brief statements. The number of basic driver

statements for this study was narrowed by the author to a set of

four relevant and plausible descriptive statements. Each set

shapes the conditions and attitudes for expandable scenarios of

plausible world environments for 2005 and 2020.

The initial scenarios provide useful tools for establishing

a working relationship among experts, planners, and futurists and

their scenario writers. Within the flow of the process of the

cone of plausibility, it is the experts and planners who provide

accurate and relevant input and who will use the final scenarios.

The futurists and scenario writers are the ones who provide the

forecasts and give consistency and a holistic view to the

scenarios. Within the flow of the process, they will gain a

better understanding of the level of detail that must go into the

final scenarios (see Figure 4). Planners or other scenario users

also can participate in the scenario development when the drivers

are expressed as statements. The planners' perceptions and

comprehension of interrelated effects of the scenario drivers

permit them to visualize future possible end states for

long-range projections that can be used as tentative input to the

scenarios. The evolution and plausibility of the scenarios unfold

as the basic drivers are expanded and tracked from a starting

year through an end-state year, e.g., circa 2005-2020.

By using the processes offered by the Cone of Plausibility

the following become available: scenario building, the

possibility of standardizing forecasting within an organization,

and making the methods for forecasting more scientific. Moreover,

the thought process used within the cone tends to stimulate users

toward goal setting, solution finding, and creativity, as well as

uncovering new challenges, all of which build tremendous client

(chief executive officer, president, others) confidence in the

final product (see Figure 5).

ENDNOTES

1. The futures study, A World 2010: A Decline in

Superpower Influence (Taylor, 1986) was used as the base-line

scenario for the development of Alternative World Scenarios for

Strategic Planning (Taylor, 1988, rev. 1990). The 1986 study was

rewritten in 1990-1991 at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse

and republished as A World 2010: A New Order of Nations (Taylor,

1992). This futures study brings the Alternative World Scenarios

study (1988/1990 editions) into agreement with A World 2010: New

Order of Nations.

2. These forecasts can be found in A World 2010: A New

Order of Nations (Taylor, 1992).

3. The credibility of the scenarios (before revision)

contained in this futures study was established originally by a

general officer Study Advisory Group (SAG) during the course of

the study's use in the Long Range Stationing Study (LRSS) for the

Army in 2020 for which the scenarios were designed. They were

approved by the SAG Chairman, LTG Schwarzkopf, and recommended to

the Major Commands for use in their long-range planning. The
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) was

directed by Chief of Staff Memorandum, U.S. Army (CSM 86-15-14, 6

November 1986, Long Range Stationing Plan for the Army) to assist

the LRSS Group (created by the same CSM) during Phase I of the

study by developing plausible alternative world scenarios in

which the Army may be required to operate in the year 2020. The

scenarios created by the author and used by the LRSS Group are

described in revised form in this study. The LRSS Group designed

and developed its long-range stationing model and process by

planning against all four of the original scenarios. The initial

members of the SAG included: LTG RisCassi and LTG Schwarzkopf,

DCSOPS, SAG Chairman (in turn); Mr. Johnson, OASA; LTG Register,

DCSLOG; LTG Heiberg, COE; LTG Jenes, FORSCOM; LTG Forman, TRADOC;

and LTG Burbules, AMC. The disposition of these individuals on

the revised edition of the scenarios was not solicited.

Representatives of the HQ, U.S. Air National Guard and State HQ

members, under the direction of MG Philip G. Killey, Director,

Air National Guard, validated the scenarios during a 5-day

workshop, 1-5 June 1992, and suggested changes in the text to fit

"A New Order of Nations." The scenarios were used for their 1993

Air National Guard Long-Range Plan.

4. All too often, planning is based against a single,

unique scenario that has been derived from a consensus view of a

continuation of current trends. In general, a single view of the

future tends to be deterministic and often shortsighted. A

single scenario cannot be relied upon as a credible projection

for the long range. For short-term planning (e.g., 0-2 years

hence), however, a single, surprise-free scenario approach can be

reasonably accurate, but is considerably less accurate than

planning against a set of alternative scenarios for the same time

period. For midrange planning (2-10 years), drawing out specific

trends and achieving a consensus view becomes increasingly

difficult, unless expert opinions are obtained through the use of

Delphi, cross-impact analysis, or other expert techniques. For

long-range planning (10-20 years), the range of uncertainties,

e.g., regarding the continuity of trends and new trends and their

impact on society, make the single scenario less manageable

unless many assumptions can be agreed upon. The multipleor

alternative-scenarios approach tends to create and accommodate a

more objective future than a subjective one. See Heydinger and

Zentner,"Multiple Scenario Analysis," pp. 65-67, in Morrison,

Renfro, and Boucher, eds., Applying Methods and Techniques of

Futures Research, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1983.

5. For the work here, validity was established by Robert J.

Murray, and others, Harvard University Seminar on U.S. Army

Long-Range Stationing Study, John F. Kennedy School of

Government, Harvard University, October 8-9, 1987. The principal

participants included Mr. Robert J. Murray, Seminar Leader;

Professors Richard N. Cooper, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Ernest R.
May (all of Harvard); Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence (USA

Ret.); and Army participants Colonels Robert B. Adair, LRSS

Director; Stephen F. Rutz, LRSS Deputy Director; John J. Hickey,

Jr., Chairman, Strategy and Planning Department, Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and the author of this

book.

6. The Harvard University Seminar reviewed and evaluated

the original scenarios and issued a report in which the members

validated the scenarios and methodology. They found the original

scenarios to be plausible and the methods sound. An excerpt from

the "Executive Summary" of the Seminar Report states:

@BLOCK QUOTE = . . . The Harvard faculty participants who

reviewed the LRSS agree that it was a useful exercise that can be

extended to other areas of long-range military planning, and they

were particularly impressed with the extent to which some of the

LRSS scenarios challenged widely-held assumptions about the

future structure of the Army. The faculty participants also

found the basic methodology of the LRSS to be sound and the

outlines of its four scenarios to be plausible . . ..

@ENDNOTENOINDT = An excerpt from the "Statement of the

Seminar Leader" states:

@BLOCK QUOTE = . . . This methodology, by examining and

discussing alternative futures, can help planners do a better job

of describing for decision-makers the implications for our

defense posture of alternative world situations. It could help

provide a better context for the Extended Planning Annex of the

Program Objective Memorandum. This methodology appears

sufficiently promising for these larger purposes as to be worth

exploring in detail.

7. A concept of the "cone of plausibility" was originated

circa November 1986, during the early stages of planning for the

stationing study by Stephen F. Rutz, Colonel, USA; Robert S.

McEldowney, Lieutenant Colonel, USA; and Charles W. Taylor,

Strategic Futurist, USAWC. Taylor expanded and clarified the

concept, and redesigned and described the methods to increase

their utility far beyond use in the Department of Defense. A

literature search uncovered only one other similar concept of

scenario plausibility: a U.S. House of Representatives Committee

report: Preworkshop submission by Lynne Hall, "Public Issue Early

Warning Systems: Legislative and Institutional Alternatives,"

October 1982, p. 235. Hall, in private telephone conversation

with the author on December 16, 1987, related that her method of

scenario projection was never published and was a different

concept of the plausibility of future scenarios.

8. In considering how many scenarios to use in a set, the
number, of course, can be unlimited. However, the human mind

would be unable to comprehend the interrelationships of the

near-infinite number of variables. A computer program would be

needed to generate the cross-impact analysis. To reach the

decision as to the number of scenarios I considered the

following: One scenario is predictive or deterministic (no one

can predict the future accurately except by chance). Two

scenarios, usually, are best-case and worst-case futures. Three

scenarios almost always provide a middle-of-the-road scenario

between the best and the worst. Five scenarios or more tend to

become increasingly over-whelming in data and cumbersome to

manage. Moreover, their number encourages ranking, i.e.,

preferred, least likely, or most probable. Ranking is predictive

of the future. Four scenarios, however, are manageable by the

human brain and allow considerable flexibility in the number of

variables that are adequate for logically forecasting future

scenarios appropriate for long-range planning. See Charles W.

Taylor, "Eliminate Future Shock," CHEMTECH, A Magazine of

Chemical Sciences, Technology and Innovation, American Chemical

Society, July 1993, pp.12-15.
CHAPTER 2

THE EARLY DECADES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

A COMMON BACKGROUND

A large number of potential future world environments emerge

from the world as it exists today. Political, economic,

sociological, scientific, and technological trends and events are

rebounding in heavy activity on a global scale. The concepts and

realities of peace and war, rich and poor, love and hate, life

and death are confronting all nations, especially the newly

emerged independent nations of the late 1990s. The latter nations

are seeking self-identity and a destiny of their own in a

situation that is increasingly dominated by global and regional

economics rather than politics, ideology and military force. 

Therefore, it would seem that a common framework or background is

essential for the development of the scenarios created for this

study. Such a framework would be suitable for projections from

the near future (2-5 years) to the longer range future (20-30

years or more). A World 2010: A New Order of Nations (Taylor,

1992)1 (hereafter referred to as A New Order of Nations),

provides an appropriate background scenario for developing the

alternative scenarios of this study.

A New Order of Nations2 is an estimate of the world

environment as it might be around the year 2010. It is based on

the author's projection of the consequences of 20th century

trends and events and new trends as they come into being along

the way. It takes into account the most current strategic changes

in the world's international environment and then forecasts the

probability of strategic outcomes that could occur from about

2000 to 2020. The forecasts in A New Order of Nations not only

provide an adequate starting point for the rebuilding of the

scenarios from the earlier 2010 document, (Taylor, 1986),3 but

also provide a basis for constructing the architecture for U.S.

national security strategy and a fitting defense or security

force for the future. A World 2010: A New Order of Nations is

summarized in this chapter. Detailed data that are less strategic

or are needed for specific usage of the scenarios, e.g.,

projected technological advances or demographic data, can be

compiled from data found in documents in the open literature.

A NEW ORDER OF NATIONS

In the world of 2010 documents, future environments for the

early decades of the 21st century are built upon an evolving

hierarchy of nations as they might exist around the years 2005 to

2020 and beyond. Essentially, in the context of these studies and

in 21st century terms, there are no superpowers,4

 nor are there

nations called Third World.5 All nations are categorized in terms
of their modernization and industrialization. This tends to

create status for each nation in the world community or family of

nations. Theoretically, having status very likely will increase

each nation's self-worth, encourage each to plan and set national

goals, and, finally, allow each an opportunity to pursue a more

self-directed destiny. Not all nations will be able to do these

things by themselves and will look for help from agencies such as

those of the United Nations (U.N.) or like organization, and from

the world's wealthier leader (postindustrial) nations, e.g.,

Europe,6 Japan, or the United States. It is my belief that the

20th century traditional descriptive modifiers for nations, i.e.,

more developed, developing, less developed countries, and the

like, are now and will be inappropriate constructs to describe a

ranking of nations for the world of the 21st century.

Nations of the world are aligning in the direction of a new

order. This is happening primarily because of the increasing

economic and trade relationships and the cultural exchanges in

which nations have been engaging. Moreover, the decline of the

international power positions of the 20th century superpowers--

capped by the fall of the Soviet Union and decline of the Soviet

Communist Party--has encouraged many nations of the world to

assert their individual concerns for, and interests in,

developing their own futures. Imperialism and colonialism, as

they have been known in the past, are unlikely to rise again. 

Moreover, during the period under consideration in this study, it

is unlikely that there will be any nations of the world that will

demonstratively seek to fill the world power gaps created by the

decline of the superpowers. There are few nations that by

mid-21st century would be likely to have a political, military,

and economic infrastructure to do this. All nations of the world,

however, will continue to recognize that the United States most

certainly will remain the foremost leader of the world's nations

throughout the early decades of the 21st century.

The new order of nations in the 21st century can be 

classified into five categories or groups7

 according to their

progress in industrialization and modernization (see Table 3). 

They are postindustrial, advanced industrial, transitioning

industrial, industrial, and preindustrial. This chapter includes

a brief description of each category.

The arrangement of nations in Table 3 was developed to

substantiate the trend that the world is drifting away from

political ideological bipolarity to a world of economic

multipolarity. The broad latitude created in a devolution of

power world allows new economic agreements, alliances, and

partnerships to form. It also allows states to achieve new levels

of economic statehood; even to be carried along by the rest of

the nations of a group. For example, all of the European
POST-INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL

 Australia (incl. New Zealand) China

 Canada Cuba

 Europe (EC) India

 Japan Korea

 United States Malaysia

 Union of Soc. Dem. Rep. Pakistan

Philippines

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL Turkey

 Hong Kong Union of Sovgn. Rep.

 Israel Venezuela

 Singapore Vietnam

 South Africa

 Taiwan

TRANSITIONING INDUSTRIAL PREINDUSTRIAL

 Argentina All other nations of

 Brazil Africa, Asia, Latin

 Chile America, and Oceania

 Costa Rica not listed elsewhere.

 Mexico

Table 3. An Arrangement of Nations in 2010-2020

by Industrialization and Modernization

Community (EC) is categorized as postindustrial, including

Albania, Bulgaria, and most of the east European nations--states

that are unlikely to achieve such a status on their own. They are

symbolically carried along, while being helped by the other

European nations to complete the general notion of this 21st

century arrangement of nations.

Two new nations appear in Table 3 that must be identified. 

My belief is that in order for the republics of the former Soviet

Union to survive in a highly competitive 21st century economic

world, republics with common or like interests and needs will

have to group together as new nations. There exists a possibility

that of the original 15 former republics, 11 of them (excluding

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia) of the former Soviet

Union, will form three new national confederated entities. These

will be tied loosely together by a new commonwealth created

around 2005 that will replace the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS). For the purposes of this study I have created and

named three hypothetical combinations.

! The first nation, a confederation, is the largest in

population and geographic area and is classified as an industrial

country. I have named it the Union of Sovereign Republics (USR).
The common bond that will bring some of the former republics

together in this new democratic confederation is primarily the

retention of much of each republic's sovereignty. This is

something like the relationship of states of the United States to

the Federal government, but less like the European Community (EC)

where the sovereignty of individual European states continues to

be a background issue. The USR leadership is centered in Moscow.

! Another new nation, also a confederation, is about half

the size of the USR in population and geography and is considered

marginally a postindustrial country. This nation I have called

the Union of Social Democratic Republics (USDR). The USDR

includes former Soviet republics that believe they would like to

continue some of the former socialist/communist welfare programs

within a new democratic government. Its seat of government is

Kiev.

! The third new nation, another confederation, is formed

from most of the remainder of the former Soviet republics and

includes the former autonomous areas and ethnic groups. This

group likely will come together as free and independent states. I

have called them collectively the Union of Independent States

(UIS). The UIS is classified as a preindustrial country and

therefore does not appear in Table 3. The seat of government

alternates between Tbilisi and Baku.

Other likely configurations of the former Soviet Union,

e.g., an economic community, will be defined in the appropriate

chapters if needed. Whether there are three, more than three, or

less configurations of the former Soviet Union is not important.

The logic here is that the republics must join together because

individually they cannot survive economically or politically.

ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions of this study allow the development of both

the background and scenario environments during a period of

relative peace that extends into two decades of the new century.

The assumptions encompass war, world economy, and science and

technology. The environments are essentially free of restrictive

world societal events, e.g., any natural or manmade event that

basically would be so pervasive that it would alter the course of

the world. Any such occurrence of catastrophic events affecting

the assumptions listed below would create a destabilized world

environment in which the trends and events in the scenarios, at

most, could not occur or, at least, would be delayed. The

assumptions are:

! Neither general war nor a war between the United States

and any other militarily equal state, nor a war among other major
20th or 21st century powers will occur before the year 2020.

! Neither a worldwide economic collapse nor major world

depression will occur before the end of the 20th century or in

the early years of the 21st century.

! No major scientific or technological breakthrough(s) will

occur that will give one nation the ultimate power of

intimidation over all other nations of the world.

! No natural or manmade catastrophic event will occur that

will alter the arrangement of nations.

TRENDS

 The characteristics of the world environment that are

likely to span the period over the next 30 or 40 years are

derived, for the most part, from trends of the last half of the

20th century. The environment described in A New Order of Nations

addresses a period around the year 2010. It is derived from an

aggregation of the plausible outcomes of seven basic trends

selected for their universal and worldwide influence on almost

all nations. These trends, generally recognized by futurists as

important to the development of future world environments, are

described briefly in this chapter. They are basic strategic

trends that can be used by futurists and planners. These trends

very likely will continue to impact mankind for at least most of

the next century. Moreover, these trends and their consequences

create the framework needed to support a common background for

the scenarios of this study. The trends include the following.

! A New Arrangement of Nations.

Nations of the world continue to align themselves in a new

pattern of international political and economic order. In the

absence of a bipolar superpower dominance based on political

ideology, the world's nations very likely will continue to

experience a devolution of power in the new century, i.e., a more

multipolar world and one that emphasizes economic ideology. The

devolution of global power that likely will evolve will shift

increasingly from the 20th century superpower profile to the new

order of nations. By 2010 to 2020 the centers of international

economic power structure will very likely swing variably from

Washington to Berlin, Paris, Singapore, Tokyo, Kiev, Beijing, and

Moscow. All nations of the world will remain nation states; none

will relinquish sovereignty to any regional or supranational

organization. However, they very likely will be members of

multinational economic organizations that may or may not be

regional. By 2005 new confederacy groups of the former Soviet

republics will have established their right to sovereignty and
statehood and by 2010 will have organized new economic markets.

Although the U.N. remains active, no nation has relinquished its

sovereignty to that supranational body. The distribution of the

new order of nations within each category is displayed in Table

4. Based on advancements in modernization and industrialization

that will come about by 2010 to 2020, some abbreviated statements

of comparative characteristics that describe each category are

shown in Table 5.8

 Approximate Percent of

No. of Nations Nation Status All Nations

 115 Preindustrial 68

 32 Postindustrial 19

 11 Industrial 7

 5 Advanced Industrial 3

 5 Transitioning Industrial 3

 168 Total 100

Table 4. Distribution of Nations by Category,

2010-2020

! Global Population.

Global population continues to increase. Demographers

estimate that by the year 2020 world population will have

increased by greater than 35 percent over the 1990s. Many nations

will have slowed their rate of population growth by the year 2005

while some others very likely will be approaching zero growth by

2020. Still others, where starvation had been prevalent before

the turn of the century, will have gone bankrupt; while others

will have failed in nationhood and no longer exist despite

international aid from the U.N., supranational organizations, and

others. The population growth of other nations, however, although

slightly reduced from that during most of the 20th century, will

continue at a high rate. The increasing population growth in

urban areas will significantly add to societal change as well as

to new urban crime and social strife, much of which very likely

will involve international crime syndicates. Transnational

migrations of large numbers of unemployed, unemployable, and

impoverished peoples to the more industrialized nations after the

turn of the century increasingly will burden these countries also

with crime and strife.

The world's population distribution by the year 2010 is

displayed by category in Table 6. The distribution by 2020

throughout the new order of nations of an estimated 8.0 billion

world population can be extrapolated from Table 7.9

Percent of Population

World Pop. Nation Status (in Billions)

 48 Industrial 3.36

 30 Preindustrial 2.10

 16 Postindustrial 1.10

 5 Transitioning Industrial .37

 1 Advanced Industrial .10

 100 World Population 7.04

Table 6. Distribution of Population

by Category in 2010

! Interdependence.

Interdependence among the world's nations continues to

increase but in new patterns of political, economic, and cultural

arrangements and competition. The growth of interdependence along

with new economic treaties and trade arrangements among nations

between 2005 and 2015 very likely will have caused a general

abandonment of 20th century trade agreements; increases in the

adoption of the free-market and enterprise systems; creation of

an acceptable common currency throughout Europe; and rises in

economic growth for most nations of the world.

 The new order of nations almost certainly will evolve

gradually into a world economy that, for most nations, will

generate greater wealth. The resulting redistribution of the

world's wealth will especially benefit the transitioning

industrial and industrial countries, while simultaneously

lessening the economic influence of the 21st century

postindustrial countries. Inequality in the redistribution,

however, likely will increase in the resource-rich preindustrial

countries--with the rich becoming richer faster than the poor

become rich. Foreign capital investments will be sought by the

transitioning industrial and industrial states from the

postindustrial and advanced industrial countries. Such

arrangements will become increasingly more acceptable, will

create a new capital flow, and will be a positive step toward

increasing free enterprise in these countries. Worldwide economic

stagnation is unlikely in the 2010 scenario.
 1986 1993 2010 2025 

WORLD 4,948.0 5,506.0 7,041.0 8,425.0

POSTINDUSTRIAL 994.7 1,046.1 1,101.3 1,133.8

 North America 267.0 287.0 331.0 371.0 

 Europe (EC) 493.0 513.0 523.0 516.0 

 Japan 121.5 124.8 130.4 125.8 

 Australia & New Zealand 19.1 21.2 24.8 27.1 

 Union of Soc. Dem. Rep. 94.1 100.1 92.1 93.9

 % of world population: 20.1 19.0 15.6 13.5 

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL 65.3 73.8 96.1 112.7

 Hong Kong 5.7 5.8 6.3 6.2 

 Israel 4.2 5.3 6.9 8.0 

 Singapore 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.3 

 South Africa 33.2 39.0 55.9 70.0 

 Taiwan 19.6 20.9 23.8 25.2 

 % of world population: 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3

TRANSITIONING INDUSTRIAL 271.2 292.3 365.5 412.8

 Argentina 31.2 33.5 39.9 44.6 

 Brazil 143.3 152.0 185.6 205.3 

 Chile 12.3 13.5 17.0 19.8 

 Costa Rica 2.7 3.3 4.5 5.6 

 Mexico 81.7 90.0 118.5 137.5 

 % of world population: 5.5 5.3 5.2 4.9

INDUSTRIAL 2,397.1 2,717.7 3,362.1 3,887.3

 China 1,050.0 1,178.5 1,397.8 1,546.3 

 Cuba 10.2 11.0 12.3 12.9 

 India 785.0 897.4 1,166.2 1,379.6 

 Korea 63.8 67.2 80.2 86.9 

 Malaysia 15.8 18.4 26.0 33.5 

 Pakistan 101.9 122.4 190.7 275.1 

 Philippines 58.1 64.1 85.5 100.8 

 Union of Sovgn. Rep. 180.2 185.0 202.3 213.6 

 Turkey 52.3 60.7 81.8 98.7

 Venezuela 17.8 20.7 27.6 32.7 

 Vietnam 62.0 71.8 91.7 107.2 

 % of world population: 48.5 49.4 47.8 46.1

PREINDUSTRIAL 1,219.7 1,397.2 2,102.4 2,866.9

 Africa 549.8 638.0 1,025.1 1,482.0 

 Asia 560.5 616.4 884.5 1,149.4 

 Latin America 119.8 136.0 183.6 223.6 

 Oceania 5.9 6.8 9.2 11.9 

 % of world population: 24.7 25.4 29.9 34.0

Table 7. Projected Population Estimates by New Order
 Classification (in millions).
The resource-rich preindustrial countries very likely will

require economic assistance by 2010 due to poor financial

management, new sources of competition, and because they believe

their resources are beginning to show signs of depletion. Such

economic aid most likely will be provided, in part, competitively

by the industrial countries in return for bilateral, preferential

access agreements and, in part, by the postindustrial nations,

especially the United States, to sustain some vestige of economic

influence. This intense competition for scarce natural resources,

needed by almost all the modernized countries, will keep the cost

of these resources high. The uneven natural distribution of these

resources, found mostly in the single industry preindustrial

countries, makes the resource-poor preindustrial countries even

poorer. Without continued economic aid (emergency and survival)

from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, U.N.

agencies, and charitable organizations in the form of money,

credit, food and other goods, many of the poorer preindustrial

countries will face the prospects of internal upheaval,

bankruptcy and complete collapse and, eventually, disappearance

as nations.10 These nations likely could survive their

increasingly dire situations provided supportive, long-term

economic aid, once given, is continued. The application of

agro-technology likely could provide both food and employment for

their people as well as their survival as nations. The destiny of

these countries will lie more in the elimination of war and

strife than it will in the unavailability of food as a source of

famine and extinction.11

! Social Change.

Sociopolitical changes increasingly are affecting all

nations of the world. Between 2000 and 2005, most of the world's

nations can be expected to have experienced a sociopolitical

reorientation. These changes or experiences very likely will

reflect the new status in the international order of nations as

well as a general relaxation of world tensions. Nations and their

leadership very likely will form new views of, and make

modifications to, political processes and social structures as

new industrial, economic, and technological infrastructures come

into being within most nations. The spread of free enterprise on

a worldwide scale increasingly will promote a rise in capitalism

along with an increase in privately owned and controlled

industries. Moreover, the influence of a free-market system,12

very likely, will encourage a growing preference by many people

for representative government and the recognition of human rights

and social justice.13 Such changes in political and economic

systems that increasingly are occurring in nations of the world

can be described as they relate to each nation's political and

civil freedoms (see Table 8).14 
 Nations Free Partly Free Not Free

 Category No. % No. % No. % No. %

Postindustrial 32 19.0 29 17.3 3 1.8 0 0.0 

Adv. Industrial 5 3.0 1 0.6 4 2.4 0 0.0

Trans. Industrial 5 3.0 4 2.4 1 0.6 0 0.0

Industrial 11 6.5 3 1.8 7 4.2 1 0.6

Preindustrial 115 68.5 37 22.0 37 22.0 41 24.4

 Totals: 168 100 74 44.0 52 31.0 42 25.0 

Table 8. An Estimate of Political Freedom Around 2005 to 2020.

Nations increasingly will be rated by other nations for

political and civil freedoms where a politically free baseline is

a fully competitive electoral process and those elected clearly

rule; where the baseline of civil liberties is where freedom of

public expression for political change is not closed; and where

courts protect individual expression. Also included in Tables 5

and 8 is a partly-free category where there is overlapping of

either political or civil freedoms, and a not-free category where

governments are authoritarian and individual rights and freedoms

are denied. There is a good chance that by 2010 even China will

become partly free as it increasingly recognizes individual

freedoms and blends free enterprise within a controlled economy

and social democracy with communism after the turn of the

century. Through the early decades of the new century, most of

the nations of the world can expect cultural and philosophical

changes that most likely will continue to alter their societies

profoundly. Unless technology can provide remedies, however,

ignorance and apathy are likely to result in new geographical

patterns of pollution in and around the newly industrial

countries (NIC). Paradoxically, a new growth of nationalism can

be expected also to arise in most nations, which very likely will

weaken 20th century world cooperative movements, international

organizations, and alliances. On the up side, the spread of free

enterprise worldwide increasingly will promote a continuing rise

of capitalism and civil and political freedom, while on the down

side, there is a good chance of a rise in terroristic acts that

will alter the progress of some nations.

! Energy Sources.

Reserves of petroleum, primarily, and gases continue to

decrease as sources of energy while the use of coal, nuclear, and

alternative energy sources rises. Sometime before the end of the

21st century, barring any major discoveries of oil in China, in

the former Soviet Union, or from offshore drilling, there is an
even chance that conventional oil reserves of the world could be

moving toward depletion.15 If this trend is valid, then, around

the year 2010, nations of the world can expect that the cost of

pure oil and oil with added extenders very likely will become

increasingly prohibitive for any practical use. The new order of

nations with more industrial countries probably will continue to

depend on oil at least through the early decades of the new

century. The source of oil during this period most likely will be

from several suppliers, such as the 20th century Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), if it remains in existence;

an OPEC-like cartel and splinter cartels; or independent oil-rich

countries. To replace oil as a source of energy production, the

use of coal, gas, nuclear and renewable energy sources almost

certainly will increase substantially over the long term--

especially coal.16

Toward the year 2010, most of the postindustrial, advanced

industrial, transitioning industrial, some of the industrial, and

a few preindustrial countries increasingly will expand or begin

their use of nuclear power as an energy source. Despite legal,

technical, and high-cost setbacks, plus the shutdown of a few

plants because of age, and notable accidents (e.g., the U.S.

"Three Mile Island" incident, the Soviet Chernobyl catastrophe,

and others), there is little likelihood that nations will abandon

existing operational or planned nuclear power plants as the

primary source of energy in the new century. As gas and fuel

prices increasingly rise, nearly all nations will become aware

that fossil fuels, oil and gas supplies very likely will be

approaching depletion during the latter half of the 21st century

leaving many nations dependent on coal and nuclear power for

energy sources. By 2020, about 40 nations (as displayed in Table

9)17 may have acquired or restored nuclear power plants to satisfy

most of their energy needs.

! Science, Technology, and Space.

Science and technology continue to advance rapidly as do

space exploration and use. Most nations of the world by 2010 will

be benefiting from the continuing great strides in the

advancements of science and the achievements of technology. All

nations will be sharing in this progress; even the poorest of the

preindustrial states, although they will continue to receive the

most advanced appropriate technology18 from benevolent nations and

world organizations. By the turn of the century, the transfer of

technology, including technical information and equipment, is

very likely to be unimpeded to all states that have the economic

and societal infrastructures to afford its costs, understand its

complexity, and absorb the societal changes it causes. Some

nations, however, will not be able to understand the complexities

nor be able effectively to absorb and apply 21st century
POSTINDUSTRIAL TRANSITIONING INDUSTRIAL

 Austria Argentina

 Belgium Brazil

 Bulgaria Chile

 Canada Mexico

 Czech Republic

 Finland INDUSTRIAL

 France China

 Germany Cuba

 Hungary India

 Italy Korea

 Japan Pakistan

 Netherlands Philippines

 Poland Union of Svgn. Rep.

 Romania Vietnam

 Spain

 Sweden

 Switzerland

 Union of Soc. Dem. Rep.

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL PREINDUSTRIAL

 Israel Egypt

 Singapore Iran

 South Africa Iraq

 Taiwan Saudi Arabia

Table 9. An Estimate of Nations Possessing

Nuclear Power Plans in 2020.

technology within their societies. Such situations likely will

result in societal frustrations and adverse reactions not just

against the technology, but against its source as well.

As for space, there is a good chance that many nations that

could not afford the benefits of space in the 20th century will

be able to buy portions of satellite and shuttle activities after

the turn of the century. Almost all nations increasingly will

profit from the peaceful commercial and exploratory use of space.

 Several exploratory space programs will be shared in the joint

efforts of the United States and the USR, e.g., a manned Mars

expedition. The cost-benefits of such developments and

activities by 2005 to 2020 most likely will outweigh the

uncertainties and risks of military weapon systems or missile

defense systems in space.

! Weapons Proliferation.
Proliferation of conventional, chemical, biological and

nuclear weapons continues. Despite the reduction of world

tensions, almost every industrial nation will be armed with a

range of conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. Most of

these weapons will have been supplied to them by the EC, the

United States, and China before the year 2005; by several of the

former Soviet republics before and after their reorganization as

new states; and by new 21st century weapons manufacturing

nations. Many nations will continue to purchase or barter for the

latest conventional high-tech weapons, which will be available

from new 21st century arms suppliers. Additionally and more

importantly, by the end of the first decade of the century,

nuclear proliferation will have increased.19

Most nations, except the very poorest, very likely will

demand the most advanced conventional systems they can afford to

buy. They almost certainly will find a broader as well as

different source of arms suppliers available than existed before

the turn of the century. Hence, with this likely increase in the

possession of weapons, the potential for conflict almost

certainly will be high and continue to rise. There is a good

chance that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue

despite the increased number of signatories to the Nuclear

Non-proliferation Treaty. 

Table 1020 is based on the hypothetical criteria that some

nations perceive a need to have nuclear weapons in their

arsenals; some will have a capability of producing their own, and

others will have the means to acquire them surreptitiously. 

Their need might arise from a real or imagined threat, or a

belief that possession of nuclear weapons raises their

international status, or just because their neighbor has them.

Chances are better than even that by 2010-2020 the number of

nations acquiring a military nuclear capability could approach 24

or more. Thus, there is, at most, an even chance that a nuclear

weapons accident, nuclear blackmail, or a limited nuclear

conflict between small nations, e.g., preindustrial and newly

industrialized countries (NIC), will occur within the early

decades of the 21st century. Chances are almost certain that if

proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons is not

halted in the very early years of the century, not only will the

potential for accident or conflict increase, but so will the

direct or indirect involvement of other nations as well.21

Chances are only slightly better than even that the proliferation

of nuclear weapons alone will deter their use.

SUMMARY

This chapter has described a new order of nations that

almost certainly will contribute toward a devolution of

international power. The chapter also provides a base-line world
POSTINDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL

 France* China* Israel**

 Germany*** India** South Africa**

 Japan*** Korea*** Taiwan***

 USDR* Pakistan**

 United Kingdom* USR*

 United States* Vietnam****

TRANSITIONING INDUSTRIAL PREINDUSTRIAL

 Argentina  Egypt** ***

 Brazil  Iran** ***

 Chile  Iraq** ***

Libya*****

Saudi Arabia*****

UIS+

* = Substantial, 1,000 or more

** = Significant, 1,000 or less

*** = Moderate, 500 or less

  = Modest, 100 or less

** *** = Very modest, 50 or less

+ = Number unknown

Table 10. Estimates of Nations Possessing Nuclear Weapons

and Deliver Means in 2010-2020.

scenario for the building of alternative scenarios. More

importantly, this chapter suggests that new patterns of political

and economic competition and cooperation among nations of the new

order very likely will contribute toward a new intensity of

international free trade and competitiveness. Notwithstanding,

many new international relationships and arrangements are likely

to emerge in the early decades of the century. Despite a period

of relative peace and calm, collusion on the part of some

nations, along with some international economic market chicanery

on the part of others, likely will be a common practice during

the early years of the new century. For better or worse, the

superpowers of the 20th century were role models for many

nations. Each had its followers. Each was sought by other nations

for political, economic, or military guidance and support. Even

by 2010, many nations will not have as yet adjusted to the

absence of the competitive leadership of the superpowers. The

devolution of power has brought about new economic and political

relationships among the six postindustrial and all other nations

of the world.

By the turn of the century, the United States will be the

accepted leader of the postindustrial states. And, although by
2010 it likely will find its 20th century international position

of influence somewhat diminished, the United States will remain

the preeminent world leader. However, other postindustrial

states, many of which were once traditional U.S. allies linked

directly by security commitments, very likely will become even

greater competitors for political influence and economic markets

than they were in the past. Moreover, the United States might

find its need for national and economic security occasionally

challenged by these conscientious competitors who are bent on

grasping the international industrial influence previously held

over the past half century by the United States. There is a very

good chance that a few of the industrial and newly industrialized

countries (NIC) will make a rigorous and substantial effort to

fill that gap. The United States very likely will retain its

international position in political and economic influence

through its status as the world's leader in services, information

and knowledge.

The world in the early decades of the 21st century, as

described in this chapter, is a world of a new international

order where many nations, formerly centrally controlled and

communist, have become free societies with free-market economies.

Together, the world of 2010-2020 might appear to be a relatively

peaceful world. However, it is a world where political and

economic stability is fragile; a world that is fraught with

threats of crises, armed conflicts, and possibly wars among,

between, and within nations.

There is a good chance that the USR will be ill content to

remain an industrial country in the new order of nations; while

the USDR and its 20th century rival the United States advance

beyond the USR's national capabilities. The USR leadership very

likely will depend heavily on political and economic agreements

with the European nations and the United States. Moreover, the

USR leadership likely will depend on considerable assistance from

the European Community (EC) in the early years to help them

develop sufficient economic capabilities to become a

transitioning industrial nation. The USR very likely will

continue national introspection to avoid what could be gradual

national fragmentation, dissolution, or a return to state

controlled government. During the next 10 or more years, the USR

will be forced to devote more of its national assets toward

creating and managing a new international image so that it can

maintain a positive USR presence on the world scene. Moreover,

the leadership very likely will reassess the late 20th century

political and economic ideological decisions for a quick change

to a free-market system. A self-imposed USR withdrawal from the

international scene during this readjustment period very likely

would exacerbate a steady decline of its perceived international

image or prompt a resurgence of international aggressiveness.
Well within the first decade of the 21st century, all former

Soviet Marxist support to governments and factions in the Middle

East, Africa, and Latin America will have dried up. There is a

likelihood that a small group of former Soviet Communist Party

and military hard-liners within the UIS will offer some support

to small nations unable to shake the yoke of the past and turn to

democracy. Despite the fading interests in communism, however,

chances are good that Chinese hard-liners will attempt the export

of Chinese communism at the turn of the century to fill this void

in the ideological competition of democracy and communism.

Moreover, before 2005, arms sales of late 20th century high-tech

conventional weapons in these same regions very likely will be

replaced by the sale and transfer of 21st century weaponry. While

the USDR and USR recognize a potential threat from China,

internal political, social and economic development within these

two nations most likely will take priority over any external

military investments or ventures.

To be realistic, futurists, planners, policymakers, and

decisionmakers, whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about

the world's economic, sociopolitical, scientific and

technological, and military environments, must recognize that in

all likelihood many changes in each of these elements will occur

during the next 20 to 30 years. These changes very likely will

direct and redirect the destiny of not only the United States,

but also every nation of the world and those that have yet to

come into existence. Some of these changes have been described in

this chapter. Many others that have not been mentioned may,

however, occur as a consequence of others that have or have not

occurred. Table 11 provides some of the author's insights on some

strategic trends and events that have varying chances of

occurring. They very likely also will have some degree of

influence as to how the world environment of the future, circa

2010-2020, might turn out. Although they are not all mentioned or

discussed in detail in the text of this study, readers may

consider using them as happenings in alternative scenarios for

the development of long-range plans, policies, and decisions.
TRENDS AND EVENTS

Code: Nominal Term Probability

H = High 0.66 and above

M = Medium 0.65 to 0.34

L = Low 0.33 and below

IP = Improbable less than 0.01

 ECONOMIC CHANCES

Competition in world trade H

Regional economic agreements H

Economic interdependence H

U.S. dependence on imports H

Stability of economic agreements H

Commercial use of outer space H

Economic growth for China and the Pacific Rim H

Multiple-source economic assistance programs H

Restrictions on trade H

Near world-wide free enterprise and markets H

Economic growth for most nations H-M

Trade wars and barriers H-M

Economic growth for the Union of Social H-M

 Democratic Republics (USDR)

U.S. and USDR economic cooperation H-M

U.S. and Union Sovereign Republics (USR) M-H

 economic cooperation

European free market enters into agreements with M-H

 China

Economic growth for the USR M

Redistribution of wealth M

Regional single monetary systems M

Debt repayments by former Third World nations M

Cartels control prices and supplies M

Influence of 20th century international M-L

 economic organizations

U.S. and Union of Independent States (UIS) L-M

 economic cooperation

Stability of 20th century economic agreements L

Increase of disparity of economic growth among L

 nations
 SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANCES

Diffusion of international power H

Ad hoc political alliances and agreements H

Rise of nationalism H

Cultural values and life-style shifts H

World-wide population migrations H

National Pursuit of self-directed destiny H

U.S. leader of the postindustrial nations H

Global increase in cultural exchange H-M

Democratization of governments H-M

Increase in social investments H-M

Sociopolitical influence of multinational M-H

 organizations increases

Improved human rights and quality-of-life M-H

Multiple-source sociopolitical assistance M-H

 programs

Increase in political freedom world-wide M-H

European nations move toward a single language M-H

Increase in global educational and cultural M

 exchange

Educational deficit decreasing in industrial M

 nations

Cohesion of political alliances and agreements M

Traditional ideological terrorism decreasing M

New sophisticated, high-tech international M

 terrorists strike global strategic targets

Spread of totalitarian governments L-M

Cohesion of 20th century political alliances L

Influence of 20th century international L

 political organizations

 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CHANCES

Global diffusion of science and technology H

Transfer of technology H

Increase in scientific dialogue and exchange H

Diffusion of nuclear power as energy source H

Increasing research and development investments H

Regional sharing of nuclear energy H-M

Potential for nuclear power plant disaster H-M

Increase in scientific and technological use of M-H

 space

Development of alternative energy sources M-H

Potential for ecological disaster (non-nuclear) M

Disparity in distribution of technology L-M
 MILITARY CHANCES

Diffusion of high-tech weapons H

Ad hoc, short-term defense agreements H

Arms trade and sales H

Nuclear weapons accident H-M

Use of U.S. armed forces for peacekeeping H-M

Cooperative U.S., USDR, and USR in prevention of M-H

 continued nuclear proliferation

Use of U.S. armed forces for warfighting M

Utility of military forces M

U.S. development of new weapons systems M

World-wide arms control and disarmament M

World-wide propensity for armed conflict M

World-wide propensity for low intensity conflict M

Singular use of a nuclear weapon (nation vs. M

 nation)

Retention and availability of U.S. basing, port M

 facilities, and overflight rights

Stability of bilateral defense agreements M-L

World-wide propensity conventional conflict M-L

Use of military assistance programs M-L

Projection of military power M-L

Stability of 20th century collective defense L

 agreements

Military use of outer space L

Weapons in outer space L

Nuclear conflict (no U.S. involvement) L

State-sponsored international terrorism L

Strategic nuclear exchange between U.S. and any L-IP

 other nuclear armed nation

Total war (global) IP

Table 11. The Probable Occurrence of Selected Trends

and Events in a New Order of Nations,

2005-2020

ENDNOTES

 1. This chapter is adapted and summarized from A World

2010: A New Order of Nations (Taylor, 1992). Although the new

order of nations was described in the earlier study, A World

2010: A Decline of Superpower Influence (Taylor, 1986), the

emphasis here is on the new order rather than the declining

influence of the former Soviet Union and the United States. The

purpose of the revisions and updating of the alternative

scenarios is to examine new trends that have come into being and

events that have taken place since the alternative scenarios were
first published in Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic

Planning (Taylor, 1988).

 2. It should be kept in mind that A New Order of Nations

is describing an arrangement or a ranking of the world's nations

by loose categories of industrialization and modernization. A

New Order of Nations is not a "new world order." A new world

order describes a change such as sovereignty changing from the

city-state to the nation-state to a one world government.

 3. Taylor, A World 2010: A Decline of Superpower

Influence, 1986.

4. The concept of the term "superpower" is basically of cold

war vintage. Superpower connotes competitive political ideology

and military strength on a global scale among other nations with

theoretically comparable power. The concept serves little use

internationally in an era of a single superpower. Since the fall

of the Soviet empire, the United States remains the only nation

of the world recognized by all other nations as a superpower. 

The rising of any other nation of the world to challenge this

U.S. position over the next 30 or more years is unlikely. The

United States serves itself and the world best by offering its

leadership qualities than by imposing its position of power.

 5. The concept of the term "Third World" is demeaning. Many

of these nations are becoming industrialized and are referred to

as newly industrial countries (NIC). "Third World" connotes a

group of nations that are unsophisticated, backward, lacking in

knowledge and resources, and unable and unlikely, despite their

struggles to better themselves, to achieve any better. Further,

it suggests that some of these nations are unwilling to make the

sacrifices necessary to build an infrastructure to accommodate

modern industrial statehood. These latter nations are more

willing to demand and take advantage of the benefits they believe

a poor "Third World" state should receive.

6. Europe throughout this study is treated as the single

entity of the European Community (EC) with about 32 to 34

nation-states. It is also treated as the community it very

likely will be after the turn of the century. There is a good

chance that by 2005, and most likely by 2020, the EC will include

both the 20th century nations that made up western Europe, as

well as almost all of the east European nations of the former

Soviet bloc. Chances are better than even that by 2015 the

formation of a truly united European Community (UEC) will exist.

There is little likelihood that any of the republics of the

former Soviet Union will be included in the EC by 2010 or 2020,

except Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. It is also unlikely that

any of the three confederacies, the USR, USDR, or UIS (as

described in this study), will be members of the EC.
 7. See Taylor, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations, pp.

16-21.

 8. The general concept for the development of Table 5 is

an adaptation from Graham T. T. Molitor, "The Information

Society: The Path to Postindustrial Growth," in Communications

Tomorrow: The Coming of the Information Society, edited by

Edward Cornish, 1982, p. 85; and also from Yoneji Masuda, The

Information Society as Post-Industrial Society, 1981, pp. 29-33.

The "Political Freedom" entry in Table 5 is an adaptation from a

series published by Freedom House as a January-February annual

report in Freedom At Issue, now, Freedom Review, entitled, "The

Comparative Survey of Freedom." The annual survey was originated

in 1973 and analyzed and reported by Raymond D. Gastil. It is

now reported by R. Bruce McColm. In this survey, nations are

rated against comparative scales for political and civil

freedoms. A politically free baseline is a fully competitive

electoral process where those elected clearly rule. A civil

liberties baseline is where freedom of public expression for

political change is not closed and where courts protect

individual expression. The survey also includes a partly free

category where there is overlapping of either political or civil

freedoms.

 9. Data adapted from Carl Haub and Machiko Yanagishita,

1993 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference

Bureau, Inc., April 1993.

10. This is adapted from American Council of Life

Insurance, "Collapse of the Global Financial Superstructure," in

its Trend Analysis Program (TAP 23), Washington: Summer Issue

1983, pp. 15-18.

11. Constance Holden, "Simon and Kahn versus Global 2000,"

Science, Vol. 221, No. 4608, July 2, 1983, pp. 341-343.<T>

12. Leon F. Bouvier, "Planet Earth 1984-2034: A

Demographic Vision," Population Bulletin, Vol. 39, 1984, p. 18,

believes that neither "capitalism as we have known it for the

past 200 years and communism as it has developed over the past 65

years" will prevail through the 21st century and that the

`developing nations' demand for a New International Economic

Order will meet with some success during the next 50 years."

13. Ibid. Bouvier, pp. 18-19, projects "democracy, as

distinct from capitalism, will survive and thrive as it ceases to

be bound by capitalist ideology" and assumes the "democratic

world's emerging social consciousness and will spread to include

a greater sharing of the wealth with less advanced nations." 

Additionally, Bouvier suggests that both democracy and communism
may be replaced by Ward's "Sociocracy" (from Bouvier, p. 35;

Lester Frank Ward, Applied Sociology, New York: Arno, 1974,

reprint of original published in 1906, exact edition could not be

located).

14. Neither Gastil nor McColm forecast the probability of

freedom. The comparative surveys present only estimates of the

current year's situation and the progress made toward freedom in

the previous year. The projections for the world 2010 in this

study are based on the author's estimates of the future economic

and political potentials of nations.

15. Theodore J. Gordon, "The Year 2050: Reflections of a

Futurist," The Lamp, an Exxon publication, Vol. 63, Spring 1981,

p. 30. John Gever and others in Beyond Oil: The Threat to Food

and Fuel in the Coming Decades, 1986, believe that world oil

production will peak around the year 2000 and that substitutes

cannot fully offset the decline in petroleum before 2025. They

also believe that U.S. oil and gas virtually will be exhausted by

2020. The actual date of the depletion of oil is not important;

the reason for even mentioning it at all is to emphasize the

point that one day there may not be oil to depend on. The

substitutes and synthetics may not be efficient enough

replacements unless science and technology are provided funds in

the new century to discover and perfect these creations.

16. U.S. Department of Energy, The National Energy Policy

Plan: A Report to the Congress, 1983, pp. 21-23.

17. Adapted from Taylor, A World 2010: A New Order of

Nations, 1992, p. 50.

18. Adapted from Jacques Gansler, "The U.S. Technology

Base: Problems and Prospects," in Margiotta and Sanders, 1985.

19. Arthur F. Manfredi and others, Ballistic Missiles

Proliferation Potential in the Third World, 1986, pp. 5-6. Also

see discussion by Richard F. Grimmett in Trends in Conventional

Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers, 1978-1985.

20. Taylor, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations, 1992, p.

64.

21. Ibid.; Manfredi.
CHAPTER 3

SCENARIO SYNOPSES AND ATTRIBUTES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter includes the final bits of germane information

about the four scenarios and their construction that will enable

long-range planners, policymakers, and decisionmakers to use an

alternative scenarios approach more effectively. At the end of

the chapter there is a listing of attribute values for each 

scenario which, although relative, has been derived from each

scenario environment. The listing is provided for scenario

comparison and analysis.

The first chapter of this study described the general

methods used to develop the scenarios. This included a discussion

on the Cone of Plausibility; the ways to build plausible

scenarios; the purpose for the exclusion of wild cards as events

or trends and from scenarios; and the reasons for needing

scenario drivers to set the theme of each scenario. The second

chapter established a common background projection (i.e., a

foreground) of the world environment to circa 2020 that would be

appropriate for creating the four alternative scenarios described

in the last four chapters of this study. This chapter describes

ways that futurists and planners can develop and complete the

scenarios with sufficient detail to give them greater utility.

Lastly, included in this chapter are synopses of each of the

scenarios and the attribute comparisons that can serve as

reference to readers and users for their continued use of these

scenarios over time and for different applications.

FINALIZING THE SCENARIOS

The process used by the futurist to finalize the scenarios

uses the Cone of Plausibility as do the planners to develop their

responses to the scenarios. The process first involves an

holistic pondering and reviewing of all aspects of each scenario.

It then involves a reevaluation of the logic for and the

derivation of the trends and events within each scenario. The

process also includes a reassessment of the interrelated

consequences of trends and events by the futurist and the

planners together. This can uncover new trends not previously

observed. The finalization stage, most importantly, creates for

the planners images and visions within the context of the micro-,

mini-, and macro-scenarios through a passage of time.

The planners during the process of the Cone of Plausibility

give special attention to the interwoven themes within, between,

and among the scenarios. Finally, they re-observe the dynamics

of cross impacts and changing probabilities of driver trends
within the scenarios and the consequences that create the

strategic environments of the future.

The finalizing process can be described as follows. The

basic drivers or themes for the scenarios are political and

economic elements.1 Using these basic elements and the logic of

the Cone of Plausibility, the futurist creates, side by side, a

set of four basic driver trend statements in each of four

scenarios. They are each a single sentence and as a set they are

called a micro-scenario. From this micro-scenario set, planners

create the initial organizational planning responses for each of

the four sets of future political and economic environments or

scenarios. This is a continuous process for the planners, and, in

the final analysis, they conclude the planning responses against

each of the four scenarios. The purpose of the previous chapter

was to broaden the perception of the future for decisionmakers

and planners by projecting selected, relevant trends some 20-25

years into the future. This enables readers, planners, and users

to envision a common background for creating their scenario

responses while the scenarios are further developed and

reevaluated here and in the remaining chapters.

In this first step, the planners review and update their

responses to the four alternative scenarios in their simplest,

but significant, format--the micro-scenarios. All previous

planners' responses to the alternative scenarios are now recorded

and evaluated as to their fit into an holistic view of or

response to each scenario. For this reevaluation by the planners

of their first impressions of the four scenarios, the futurist

has rearranged the order of the trends to a theme dominance,

i.e., in an order of their dominance of, and influence on,

organizational (e.g., U.S. military) plans, policies, and

behavior. The reason for changing their order is based on the

notion that there are specific trends and events that at any

point in time are foremost in creating a society's behavior. They

tend to preoccupy the society and, often, become deep-seated for

a lengthy period of time. Such trends have a dominant influence

on the direction that most other trends and events likely will

take in the future. For example, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 set

in motion a dominant trend that indicated a long-term shortage of

gasoline. This trend in 1973 was plausible. The long lines at gas

station pumps and the daily increase in the cost per gallon made

it very real. It altered the direction of most other trends and

events, such as noted in the automotive, recreational vehicle,

and tourism industries, for the duration of the embargo and

beyond for some time. A more recent example, the likes of which

have never existed before within this nation, might be the

terroristic bombing in February 1993 of the World Trade Center in

New York City. This event set in motion dominant trends

throughout major U.S. cities affecting long-term security and

protection of public and private property, facilities, artifacts,
and persons, regardless of the frequency of reoccurrences. One

example of possible reoccurrence might be the precautionary

measures likely to be taken for any international sporting event

sponsored within the United States, such as the 1996 Olympics in

Atlanta, Georgia.

When theme dominance is applied to the scenarios at this

point of their development, the scenarios begin to show direction

and body or substance. The rearranged basic driver-trend

statements for the scenarios are displayed in Table 12 (see Table

1 for the transposition). This method of approach to scenario

writing assists in maintaining realism and adds variety in

long-range planning. For example, in scenario BRAVO the worldwide

trend for economic development that strengthens U.S. global

influence and preserves U.S. bases overseas is the dominant theme

that overrides and permeates all other themes within scenario

BRAVO. Whereas, in scenario DELTA that same theme has less

probability of influence and the dominant theme is the trend

concerning the attitude of the U.S. public toward the U.S.

military.

SCENARIO ALPHA: U.S. ISOLATIONIST

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong welfare and

social investment economy.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

lack the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

A rise in world-wide nationalism suppresses U.S. influence and

precludes U.S. military presence overseas.

U.S. local community infrastructures2

 inhibit military stationing

and reduce installation investments.

SCENARIO BRAVO: U.S. WORLD PEACEKEEPER

Tradeoffs of nationalism for economic development strengthen U.S.

influence and preserve U.S. military presence overseas.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

have the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong military

defense.

U.S. local community infrastructures underpin military stationing

and installation investments.
SCENARIO CHARLIE: NEONATIONALISM WORLD

A rise in world-wide nationalism suppresses U.S. influence and

precludes U.S. military presence overseas.

U.S. local community infrastructures inhibit military stationing

and reduce installation investments.

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong military

defense.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

lack the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

SCENARIO DELTA: MUTED MULTIPOLAR WORLD

U.S. local community infrastructures inhibit military stationing

and reduce installation investments.

U.S national political leaders advocate a strong welfare and

social investment economy.

Post-industrial infrastructures, along with specialty industries,

lack the capacity to support industrial surge requirements

adequately.

Tradeoffs of nationalism for economic development strengthen U.S.

influence and preserve U.S. military presence overseas.

 

 Table 12. Scenario Drivers Arranged

in Order of Theme Dominance.

After the dominant and general themes have been established

for each of the four micro-scenarios, the scenarios can be

expanded outward in time through the holistic logic of the Cone

of Plausibility by the futurist. In this process the futurist

rewrites each scenario into an expanded theme form called the

mini-scenario. Examples of the mini-scenarios are in Appendices

A, B, C, and D to this study. These are scenarios of one or two

pages in length that now begin to take on identities distinct

from one another. The scenarios in this form begin descriptions

of logical and plausible futures that might exist toward the year

2020. The planners continue to ponder and reevaluate their

responses within the logic of the cone while under the prompting

of the futurist to look outward in time. The planners then

develop new and additional responses to each scenario based on

the broadened information that now appears in each of the
mini-scenarios. Considering these new responses, the futurist

then writes the final form, the macro-scenario, for each

scenario. Additional insights, perceptions, and historical

perspectives (from 2000 to 2005 to 2020) can now be provided to

the planners by the futurist. This process assures that the

futurist is aware of and addresses all of the major related

concerns of the planners for the time periods of 2005 and 2020.

Planners now, for a last time, review and modify their earlier

responses to the scenarios. The macro-scenarios are presented in

the next four chapters. The planners' responses are included only

in part as examples since they will vary according to the

organizational interests of the planning group, e.g., interests

may be oriented toward industry, education, or national defense.

WORKSHOP RELATIONSHIPS

The workshop relationships between the futurist and the

planners are informal, thereby broadening opportunities for

communication. Such exchanges are firm requirements for the

development of scenarios. Beyond the scenario workshops,

communication can be enhanced by telephonic-computer networking

since the planners and futurist are likely to be remote from each

other. The single most important advantage of close and informal

workshop relationships is that the futurist can envision and

design the scenarios with first-hand knowledge of the planners'

insights, concerns, and problems related to scenario responses.

At the same, the futurist can describe trend and event

consequences and their future implications that are most likely

to challenge the skills of the planners and policymakers.3

 In

those cases where planners or policymakers design the scenarios

instead of futurists, the environments are often written so that

they accommodate planning and policy goals, i.e., they are

skewed, biased, or parochial. The single most important

responsibility of the futurist is to maintain the integrity of

the scenarios once they are completed for the planners' final

analysis and responses.

Upon completion of the above steps, the final scenarios, 

prepared by the futurist, and the final responses, provided by

the planners, are addressed once again in a final workshop. Each

macro-scenario can be assessed by the futurist with the planners

for plausibility, logic, and fit. Assessment criteria are based

on the resource constraints posed by the economic and political

environments that are embodied as variables in each respective

scenario. A synopsis of each of the final four scenarios of this

futures study is presented below. Each synopsis includes the

futurist's forecasts of the scenario drivers and the futurist's

and planners' notional responses4 to each scenario environment.

SYNOPSES OF THE SCENARIOS IN 2020
Some of the differences between the scenarios are readily

apparent by their titles alone. Additional significant

differences are evident within each scenario as a reader peruses

or a planner analyzes its contextual substance. Unless a scenario

is written in great detail, many implicit, cause and effect, or

consequential trends can develop and events occur that fall

within the narrative of the scenarios. The following synopses are

summarized here to aid those who will use the scenarios for

planning or policymaking purposes. For each of the scenarios the

synopses are broadened to include some of the inferential

consequences that are built into the scenarios. The synopses are

set in the context of the year, circa 2020.

Scenario ALPHA: U.S. Isolationist.

Scenario ALPHA describes a relatively peaceful world where

the U.S. perception of an external threat is low and the size of

its military force is small. The U.S. leadership and its business

infrastructure in this international environment have turned

toward isolationism. In general, the concerns of the U.S.

leadership and its citizens in the year 2020 are directed more

toward greater budgetary investments in social, welfare,

educational, and environmental programs than in programs for

space, defense or foreign economic and military aid. For the most

part, the infrastructures of the United States and the other

postindustrial nations individually do not appear to have a

capacity to support a timely major military or industrial surge

in the event of national or global crises.

A rise of nationalism throughout many nations of the world,

including nations with prior long-term agreements with the United

States, has suppressed U.S. international influence and has

precluded U.S. military presence overseas. Increasingly, on the

home front, despite the small number of military forces, local

U.S. community infrastructures (economies, politics, resources,

and demographics) are inhibiting military stationing and training

requirements, as well as other installation activities. Public

indifference to new military investments (especially those

related to weapons and their movement into or out of stations and

through community thoroughfares for testing and training) has

generally hampered any semblance of military preparedness.

The U.S. defense budget has plummeted significantly since

the turn of the century. The pressures of congressional

environmentalists have forced the closure of many of the

remaining military bases that were not closed around 2005. The

U.S. armed services have been reorganized into a joint/unified

configuration called the General Defense Forces (GDF). New

military and other government personnel are acquired through PEP,

a nationwide Public Education Program. Slightly more than about

half of the total U.S. military force is equipped with high-tech,
state-of-the-art, 21st century equipment and weapons. The

warfighting GDF, Land Defense Forces (LDF), Sea Defense Forces

(SDF), and Air and Space Defense Forces (ASDF), overall, are 15

percent heavy (not easily deployed), 50 percent medium, and 35

percent light (easily deployed). Most SDF ships (U.S. Navy) have

been mothballed, since they are outmoded and of mid 20th century

vintage. The remainder are high-tech and staffed by well-trained

career SDF personnel. The ASDF (Air Force), although reduced in

personnel strength, has sufficient highly-trained warfighter

personnel to support its high-tech contingency air and space

craft, weapons, and other equipment. Older 20th century aircraft

have been scrapped or converted to civilian use.

Despite a mild U.S. economic slump and a global recessive

trend, the world's economy continues to experience fluctuating

periods of high and medium growth, yet is invigorated and remains

highly competitive. The European Community, essentially a

singular unit, has abandoned defense expenditures to meet the

heightened demands of economic competition from the Asian-Pacific

Rim markets. The Union of Social Democratic Republics (USDR), a

new confederacy made up of and derived from several former Soviet

Union republics around the turn of the century, has progressed

sufficiently well in economic, political, and social development

to be accepted (marginally) as a postindustrial nation by other

nations in that category. The USDR is highly competitive with the

Union of Sovereign Republics (USR), another confederacy of former

Soviet Union republics, but retains certain grievances against

the USR. The USDR and USR, however, maintain close, supportive

relationships through a temporary Commonwealth of Confederacies

which replaced a previous commonwealth over a decade ago. Both

the USDR and the USR have small, well-structured armies and both

possess nuclear weapons.

Scenario BRAVO: U.S. World Peacekeeper.

Scenario BRAVO describes a competitive world of economic

trade markets where an undercurrent of external threats and

contentions, both economic and military, to U.S. interests are

perceptibly increasing. Worldwide, U.S. economic and military

assistance agreements are many and backed by a large U.S.

peacekeeping military force. A tradeoff of nationalism for

economic development and representative government by many

nations worldwide has strengthened U.S. international influence,

preserved U.S. investments, and assured the United States of a

military presence overseas. The presence of U.S. industries,

with their advanced facilities and know-how, is visible and

productive in most nations of the world. Deindustrialization of

the United States and most of the other postindustrial nations

has occurred since the latter half of the past century. Almost

all of these nations by 2010, however, can still support an
industrial mobilization or even surge requirements quite well in

the event of confrontations or global crises.

Over the past decade or so, the leadership in the U.S.

Congresses and the Administrations have advocated a strong

military defense. Sizeable and costly military exercises are

being conducted worldwide. U.S. military forces are freely

participating in combined land exercises in many regions of the

globe where the U.S. military have never been seen before, e.g.,

in land masses of Asia, China, and, as early as 2000, in the

former 20th century Soviet Republic of Russia. Russia is the

leader of the confederacy of the Union of Sovereign Republics

(USR).

Throughout the continental United States, nearly all local

communities have accepted military service men and women as part

of the community family. Defense budgets are strongly supported

by the American public, as are budgets for welfare, education,

and the environment. The leadership and citizens of most U.S.

local communities underpin and encourage military stationing and

installation investments in their neighborhoods without

conditions. They also share with the U.S. military service men

and women the personal and community enrichment brought about by

an ever increasing foreign military personnel exchange program. 

Such enrichment is further increased through the international

scientific and cultural exchanges that are evident in the BRAVO

world of 2020.

In BRAVO, the U.S. military budget has increased

substantially since the turn of the century. This has come about

since 2005 when a more aggressive USR leadership reinforced its

military forces because of internal, ethnic strife and perceived

external threats. By 2005 the USR's conventional strength, its

residual nuclear capabilities, and its achievements in space

(alone and jointly with the United States), have become

potentially formidable threats to the Union of Social Democratic

Republics (USDR), the European Community (EC), United States,

possibly China, and other nations. The USDR, a marginal

postindustrial nation contiguous with the USR, has increased its

military forces also. These potential threats have pressured the

U.S. Congress, around 2005, to enact an 18-month National Public

Service (NPS) program that includes all agencies of the federal

government and provides training for all citizen and noncitizen

residents. For the military services, which had been all

volunteer, NPS provides a constant source of trained troops. The

U.S. military leadership believes its total force is well

prepared for any eventuality. The total force is 60 percent

high-tech while the warfighting force is 85 percent high-tech. 

The active U.S. military strength in personnel is about half that

of an over-a-million Reserve Component. 
Scenario CHARLIE: Neonationalism World.

The rise of nationalism worldwide in scenario CHARLIE has

significantly suppressed U.S. political, economic, and military

influence and has eliminated the presence of the U.S. military

forces and most American industries overseas. CHARLIE is a highly

competitive world where economic trade wars, embargoes, and

restrictions abound. The European Community (EC) is experiencing

an economic pinch of the nationalistic, worldwide fervor for

nations to buy at home. Since around 2005, the EC has perceived

no significant military threats to itself, its interests, or to

the rest of Europe. With the exception of France and the United

Kingdom, all other EC states have demilitarized. NATO became an

empty shell nearly a decade ago. The EC and NATO, except for one

or two states, essentially, would be unable even to support a

peacekeeping force effectively, alone or within a United Nations

force, or to quell ethnic conflicts in the EC or in neighboring

states. By 2005, nearly all U.S. forces have left Europe except

for a few over-manned caretaker contingents and the U.S. forces

involved in training exercises in the Union of Sovereign

Republics (USR) and the Union of Social Democratic Republics

(USDR).

External threats to the United States or its interests are

more of a challenge to U.S. economic trade and markets than they

are threats to political ideology that would call for the use of

military force. Largely for this reason, the U.S. leadership has

provided substantial budgetary support to social and welfare

programs and far less to defense. The military budget remains low

despite U.S. national political and military leaders advocating a

need for a stronger military. This has constrained U.S. security

to a small, high-tech, elite military force and has reduced the

Defense budget to its lowest level since the 1930s. A

significant portion of the Defense budget is invested into

high-tech weaponry and its ancillary equipment, and research and

development, in general. The general public opinion of military

service is high. However, partly because of population growth and

partly because of military environmental infractions, local U.S.

communities do not want military installations in their back

yards. These communities tend to block military stationing

requirements and are demanding that Congress close more stations

and reduce military installation investments. The congressional

majority also perceives little or no significant threat or a need

for a large military establishment, and supports the interests of

these communities. Since the military needs only to staff a small

force, its source of physically, mentally, and morally fit

volunteers for career service is provided through the Universal

Public Service (UPS) program of 2003.

Since the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the continued U.S.

economic support to Russia and Ukraine (especially), Georgia, and
other republics of the former Soviet Union has given these new

nations status in the new order of nations. Russia, circa 2005,

formed a new confederacy with several other former republics and

has become the leading republic of the Union of Sovereign

Republics (USR). Likewise, Ukraine has become the leading

republic of the Union of Social Democratic Republics (USDR).

Drawbacks in the USR by 2010, such as mismanagement of the

national economy and sociopolitical struggles, including ethnic

strife, have prevented the USR from achieving the status of a

postindustrial state. It remains an industrial country, whereas

the USDR held steadfast to democratic government reforms and

wisely managed its economic affairs. Additionally, the USDR

skillfully averted the ethnic fighting that largely sapped the

progress of its neighbor confederacy, the USR. For these reasons,

the USDR has been marginally accepted by the other postindustrial

states to join them in the management of peaceful world affairs.

Both the USDR and the USR have modern military forces and both

have nuclear weapons.

The elite military forces of the United States are organized

as the National Defense Force (NDF) and include all services. 

The NDF is fully capable of land, sea, air, and space operations.

It is operationally situation-dependent, i.e., organized for

warfighting in any one of the four operations alone, in dual

combinations, e.g., air or space and land or sea, or in a

multi-operational configuration, all four at one time. The NDF is

supported by a large single reserve component (National Guard and

Reserve combined). Both the active and reserve components are

100 percent high-tech equipped and trained. Operational doctrine

and warfighting strategies are highly advanced to match the

capabilities of the elite forces, i.e., any combination of

strategies and operations.

Scenario DELTA: Muted Multipolar World.

This scenario describes a productive economic world where

U.S. political leadership favors social and welfare investments

over those of defense. DELTA, however, is a scenario where U.S.

local communities increasingly object to military activities at

installations in or nearby their communities. The worldwide

threat to the United States and its interests is generally

perceived by the U.S. leadership to be about the same as it was

in the late 1990s, i.e., more of an economic threat than a

military one and with a constant global demand to prove its

global leadership. Since the turn of the century and by 2020, the

military threat emanating from the Union of Sovereign Republics

(USR) has steadily grown. The USR is a new confederacy made up of

several republics of the former Soviet Union, largely Russia, in

about 2003. In 2020 the USR is under a coalition leadership that

is an economically aggressive three-party system: democratic,

communist, and socialist. The military threat is greater for the
European Community (EC) and the other confederacies formed from

the former Soviet Union republics in the first decade of the

century than it is for the United States. The other confederacies

are the Union of Social Democratic Republics (USDR) and the Union

of Independent States (UIS). The EC, driven by its need for new

global economic markets, by 2005 is gaining in economic growth

while gradually improving its competitive position globally,

especially in the Asian-Pacific Rim markets. U.S. international

economic and political influence, during the same time, is being

strengthened worldwide by most nations that are making a tradeoff

of nationalism for economic growth and are encouraging U.S. trade

and tourism.

The reduction of the U.S. military during the past several

decades has decreased U.S. presence overseas and reduced the

number of local military installations throughout the United

States. About 2005, the President combined the Army, Navy, and

Air Force into one joint service, primarily to reduce costs and

redundancies. The President and the Congress believe that the

single joint service will be more responsive to global crises

than the services would be separately. They also believe that a

jointly responsible service will be better able to accommodate

state and local governments and their citizens who are demanding

greater military adherence to Federal laws regarding the

protection of the environment. Local and military community

relationships have been faltering in the DELTA scenario almost

since the turn of the century because of the military's disregard

of the environment and its procrastination in clean up of its

past violations.

Since the turn of the century the Defense budgets and

related programs have been increasingly austere in comparison to

past funding of the military in the late 20th century. The

national economic benefits of military assistance programs in the

DELTA world, however, are mutually satisfying to host nations and

to the United States. These arrangements, i.e., overseas

assignments for active and reserve forces, although limited in

number, along with other inducements support voluntary military

enlistment as the only source of recruitment for the joint

service in the DELTA scenario.

The DELTA 2020 military force, organized as a single,

Unified Defense Force (UDF), is a mix of generalists and

specialists. The UDF has light (easily deployable) high-tech

land, air, and sea components for rapid shock attack. They

complement medium and heavy (less deployable) land, air, and sea

components that have high-tech, light weight, high resistance

armament and 21st century weaponry; some are remotely controlled

robots. The UDF is supported by a component of National Guardsmen

and Reservists who wear the UDF uniform when in active service.

The primary role of the DELTA 2020 military force is defensive,
but it is fully capable of responding to a variety of offensive

missions and situations when needed.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE SCENARIOS IN 2020

When a scenario is in final form, various conditions and

attitudes are created. They reflect the intensity and direction

of the scenario drivers, express the overall character of

composition of the scenario, and vary from one scenario to

another. These are scenario attributes that can be observed or

assumed to exist in the scenario environments. They are variables

that depend on the scenario drivers and, where possible to

quantify, can be expressed as a numerical range. These

attributes are important to the reader and user of the scenarios

since they aid in the understanding of the scenarios. Where the

scenarios bear close similarity in design and content, as is the

case of the scenarios of this report, the attributes can be

compared from one scenario to the next. Table 13, which displays

the attributes that are shared by the alternative world

environments of this report, includes a suggested baseline value,

and a relative value for comparison of the scenarios in the end

year of 2020.5

 Using these suggested data, planners can structure

intermediate scenario snapshots consistent with the basic

scenarios and the attributes which will vary from one time

increment to the next.
SCENARIO ATTRIBUTE BASELINE* ALPHA BRAVO CHARLIE DELTA

Global economy 4% 2% 4.5% 4% 2.5%

 (Growth 2%-5%)

Global nationalism M H L H L 

U.S. global military

 deployment (Forces 500K 0-50 500 105-200 250-300

 deployed 0-500K)

U.S. economy 3% 1.5-2% 2.5-3% 2-2.5% 2-2.5%

 (Growth 1.5-3%)

U.S. trade dependence 12% 10-15% 15-20% 10% 15%

 (10-20% of GNP)

U.S./Allied relation G P G P G 

 ships (Poor to Good)

U.S. Army overseas 250K 0-10 300 10-25 150-200

 (0-300K)

U.S. local acceptance H L M-H L L 

 of military bases

U.S. public image of H L H H M 

 military service

U.S. defense spending 6.5% 5% 9-10% 7-8% 6% 

 (5-10% of GNP)

USDR economic growth 4% 2-4% 3-5% 3-4% 2-4%

USR economic growth 4% 1-3% 2-4% 2-5% 2-4%

 (2-6%)

USDR military growth 2% 1-2% 3-4% 2-3% 2-3%

 USR military growth 2% 1-3% 3-4% 2-3% 2-3%

 (1-4%) 

U.S. perceptions of M L H L-M L-M

 security threat

European Community 

 perceptions of L-M L H L M 

 threat

Nuclear weapons

 proliferation M-L H L M L

 (9-24 nations)

_______________

*Key to ranges: H = high, M = medium, L = low, G = good, P = poor.

Table 13. Comparison of Scenario Attributes for 2020.
ENDNOTES

1. The basic drivers of the scenarios were originally

identified at an initial workshop in 1985 that included members

of the Long-Range Stationing Study (LRSS) team and planners from

the Army Staff, the Major Commands (MACOM), and the Reserve

Component. For the purposes of this study, there appears to be

no reason to change the political or economic elements as the

basic drivers.

2. Community infrastructures include economies, politics,

demographics, resources, religious and other attitudes and

values, and other basic community elements or idiosyncracies

peculiar to a locality that are likely to influence or be

influenced by military activities.

3. See Taylor, The Relationship to Forecasting to

Long-Range Planning, 1982.

4. The numbers in this report for Army responses (i.e.,

numbers and percentages of forces), here and elsewhere, are

notional. They represent the best judgments of the Long Range

Stationing Study planners as responses to the alternative

strategic scenarios. For the purposes of this study update,

there appears to be no reason to change their responses

significantly.

5. Mr. Robert Murray and the other Harvard University, John

F. Kennedy School of Government seminar participants provided

expert and authoritative recommendations and contributions in

their review of the attributes matrix for the original study

published in 1988. The suggested correlations of attribute

values to the scenario environments help to make the scenarios

more plausible and increase their utility. The Seminar's

contribution of a baseline column remains acceptable and thus it

continues to provide planners a starting point for projecting

national interests. What I have updated in the table relates to

the demise of the Soviet Union. Rather than to look only at a

short term of five or so years and project data relative to

Russia, Ukraine, and the other independent former Soviet

Republics or only of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I

have projected to 2020 attributes for economic and military

growth of the USDR and the USR as they are defined in A World

2010: A New Order of Nations (Taylor,1992.)
CHAPTER 4

THE ALPHA SCENARIOS:

U.S. ISOLATIONIST

ALPHA 2005

The United States by the year 2005 continues to evolve as

one of the foremost postindustrial nations of the world. Since

the early 1990s, the U.S. leadership (both the Administration and

the Congress), by popular demand and championed by a politically

active and powerful aging population, has sponsored and achieved

increasingly more social and welfare oriented domestic programs

than programs related to national defense or foreign military

aid. In addition, programs budgeted for environmental protection,

education, and space exploration have gradually surpassed those

for defense programs, which are followed in their turn by lower

budgets for science and technology.

Throughout the United States over the past decade or so, the

distribution of Federal funds has resulted in an increase in

federal, state, and local environmental protection legislation

and regulations. Despite the Department of Defense position that

these regulations are encroaching upon military installations,

the growing political influence of environmentalists has forced

the closure of a number of military installations. The land has

been turned back to the states for state and local use. This

currently popular attitude is not an expression of an

antimilitary sentiment; it does, however, support a growing

public belief that most military activities belong in low-density

population areas. A contributing factor to these attitudes has

been the overcrowding of military bases by forces returning from

overseas bases. Because of the reduced stationing facilities in

the states, 30-40 percent of returning units have been assigned

to the Reserves or deactivated, while troops have accepted

Reserve assignments or mandatory retirement.

Another factor contributing to the public attitude, which

has lessened most communities' need for financial support from

military installations, has been a gradual rising of national

economic growth and employment rate (unemployment is down).

Moreover, problems for military installations are exacerbated

further by the growing U.S. population with its need for living

space and by the increasing number of light specialty and

high-tech industries with their need for industrial parks. Either

or both of these have surrounded and, in some instances,

encroached upon military installations. Increasingly since the

late 1990s, the abundance of job opportunities available in the

high-tech postindustrial U.S. society has resulted in a general

nationwide attitude of disinterest in the military and a greater

interest and awareness in community development by federal and
state governments as well as by the general public.

The Congress, in order to accommodate the growing need for

all citizens to be trained and to develop new skills for the U.S.

postindustrial society, passed in the year 2005, a federally

subsidized, 18-month public educational program (PEP) that is now

completely operational. PEP encourages all interested citizens

and residents over 19 years of age without regard to race, creed,

sex, disability or other orientation, to enroll for the full

program with an option for outstanding trainees on completion to

continue careers in public service in the various federal, state,

or local governments. Competition by the various federal

departments for high-quality PEP trainees is quite keen. The

Defense Department, within this competition, is faced with an

increasingly difficult task of acquiring the caliber of

volunteers it needs for its specialized military programs.

Increasingly, over the past decade, the industrial base of a

number of newly industrializing countries (NIC) has been

expanding. This largely has been the result of a relocation of

many heavy industries. These industries have been chemicals,

steel and iron, automobile production, arms manufacturing, and

building and construction supply businesses from the United

States and other Western nations primarily, as well as from Japan

and some of the East European nations. The new industrial base of

the NIC is increasing employment, raising the overall standard of

living and providing encouraging economic growth, while it also

is creating an increasingly competitive world economy. Many of

the NIC are in various stages of perfecting free-market economies

and democratic societies. For others, the transition from

centrally controlled to free societies has been made easier by

the leadership and management of relocating foreign industries.

Concerned with the need to protect their interests, many of the

NIC have been armed with late, mostly conventional, 20th century

weapons by the arms merchants during that era. Others now are

buying new and affordable high-tech weapons systems from the new

21st century arms merchants. A few, openly or secretly, are

investing also in nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as

chemical and biological weapons to build or increase their

arsenals.

The combined effect of new found economic status (i.e., from

Third World nations to modern, newly industrial nations) and

political power has encouraged a rise in nationalism and

independence within many of these countries. This transition is

accompanied by a cultural strangeness of and unfamiliarity with

new industrial technology and the political/economic power of a

free-market economy. While most of the NIC are currently

considering nationalizing foreign industries, others not only

have already done so, but, selectively, they have also ousted

many foreign technicians. Moreover, some of these same countries
have requested that foreign nations close their military bases,

while others, despite long-term political and military

agreements, have been more aggressive. These countries have

denied overflight and port visitation rights and have reclaimed

the lands of foreign military bases located on their territories.

As a final action, they have demanded remedy for environmental

damage to their countries.

The postindustrial nations, faced with a declining

industrial infrastructure, especially in heavy industry during

the past several decades, still retain a residual industrial

capability. Some of these nations (including the United States),

however, are concerned currently that, if this industrial decline

continues, they likely will lose the capacity to support national

industrial surge requirements should war occur. Subsequent to the

breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the European

Community (EC) increasingly had become disillusioned by the

apparent U.S. turn toward isolationism and the reduced U.S.

economic aid to the former Soviet Union republics. As a result,

most of the EC nations, rather than to return to strengthening

their own war-fighting capabilities that were previously provided

by the presence of U.S. forces during most of the 20th century,

have been encouraging East European participation in the EC. Also

contributing during the 1990s to the EC decision to include these

nations were the following situations: 1) the waning of U.S.

interests in and commitments to NATO; 2) the U.S./Russia mutual

force reductions in Europe in the early 1990s (90 percent of all

overseas U.S. forces have returned to the United States; all

former Soviet forces have returned to the Republics); 3) the

gradual nuclear weapons reductions between the United States and

Russia (which began initially in the late 1980s with the former

Soviet Union); and 4) the increasing world economic and trade

competition. The EC logic is that including these nations would

build their economies, gainfully employ more people, very likely

reduce ethnic conflicts, and create new opportunities for the EC

in the global market.

Russia, the largest and most powerful country and preeminent

force emerging from the former Soviet Union and its temporary

successor, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has

formed new economic alignments with other former Soviet

republics. The Republic of Ukraine, likewise for economic

advantages, has formed the beginnings of a new confederacy. Both

have been increasing their efforts to improve their internal

economic development and place in the world's free market through

these new cooperative agreements with the other like-minded

republics. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, the

subsequent emphasis on economic stability, and the move to reduce

arms, Russia, Ukraine, and the other former Soviet republics

retain formidable military power. They have, however, more aging

and obsolescent weapons than new 21st century systems. Since
East and West Germany united and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in

the early 1990s and the former Soviet forces have been withdrawn

from their countries, a significant military strength in the

former Pact member states no longer exists. The interests of the

former Pact countries are now in pursuing economic development

and in the building of free states.

The CIS and East European economies increasingly are

bolstered by growing economic ties with the EC and the

AsianPacific states. U.S. economic aid and other assistance to

the former Soviet republics have been reduced dramatically or

discontinued. By 2005 Russia and Ukraine, each with their

alignments of other former Soviet republics, are becoming more

economically than militarily adventuresome and unpredictable.

Increasingly, former Soviet republics with like or common

interests are grouping together economically and politically to

form new confederacies under a new administrative commonwealth

that is not unlike the CIS. The CIS was created in 1991 and

became a provisional, administrative body to assist in the

control and disarmament of nuclear weapons and to give some

structure to the dismantling of centrally controlled government

and the transition to free, representative government.

In an effort to maintain international prestige and

visibility on a global scale, Russia is continuing with space

programs planned by the former Soviet Union. The Russian space

ventures--more numerous than those of the United States, Japan,

or the European Community since the successful joint U.S./Russia

Mars landing--offer more favorable world publicity than an

adventurous military undertaking. The ousting of U.S. military

forces from some of the NIC, however, has encouraged the Russian

leadership to seek economic, political, and military ties with

those countries. The NIC, however, are no more interested in a

Russian presence, the presence of other former Soviet republics,

or of any foreign element in their country than they were in that

of the United States.

The combined impact of world and domestic events by 2005

increasingly is thrusting the U.S. defense strategy toward

isolationism and is returning the United States and Russia, again

toward reliance on a strategic nuclear deterrent. All of the U.S.

services have faced force reductions including shrinkage of

installation accommodations. The U.S. Navy (surface, subsurface,

and air) is becoming the bulwark of the U.S. continental defense.

Air Force budgetary and personnel reductions along with

installation closures have resulted in the Air Force being

restructured and reduced in size, leaving its bomber force of

aging aircraft retaining a strategic, albeit deteriorating,

capability. Its strength, however, remains in its strategic

warning and space surveillance capabilities and its limited

strategic defense systems in space.
Subsequent to the overseas force withdrawals, troop and

budgetary reductions, and installation closures of the 1990s, the

military is being challenged increasingly now with the problems

of mission management, identity, and retention of an adequate

defense posture. To meet this changing, relative peacetime world

the U.S. armed services are reorganizing into a joint/unified

configuration, called the General Defense Force (GDF). It is

comprised of the Land Defense Forces (LDF), the Sea Defense

Forces (SDF), and the Air and Space Defense Forces (ASDF). The

GDF in 2005 has been organized into regional commands.

The Land Defense Forces (LDF) include the Active, Reserve,

and civilian components of the Army. The total force is about 50

percent light (rapidly deployable); the Reserve component is

about 75 percent heavy (not readily deployable). The active

Alpha 2005 LDF are comprised of about 500 thousand troops whose

capabilities are oriented toward low-intensity conflict, with

almost all units assigned to unified commands. They are supported

by a Reserve component which includes both Reserve and National

Guard, of about 950 thousand troops and by a civilian component

of about 300 thousand trained personnel. Equipment for the Active

and Reserve component of the LDF in 2005 is about equally

distributed in 21st century high-tech equipment, 1990s vintage

equipment, and older equipment of 1980s vintage that is

obsolescent. The deployment of the LDF in 2005 heavily depends on

civilian facilities for air and seaports of embarkation. The

ALPHA 2005 GDF, i.e., all of the services, for the most part,

uses home-station training with computers and, at the nearest

work station, conducts exercises with simulation devices. Unit

training for the GDF is by simulation conducted at regionally

leased training centers that use about 80 percent contractors as

trainers. Installations, where possible, have multipurpose use

and are about 80 percent contractor operated. Increasing social

investment policies of the Federal Government provide a quality

of life to the GDF which is comparable to that of the general

society. Sustainment of the GDF in 2005, however, is

considerably reduced because of these same social investment

policies. Similar descriptions can be made of the other

reorganized joint/unified services, the Sea Defense Forces (SDF)

and the Air and Space Defense Forces (ASDF).

ALPHA 2020

In the year 2020, the United States, internationally, is

recognized as the foremost economic postindustrial country of the

world. It is faced, however, as it enters the year 2020, with a

mild economic slump, well short of a full recession, where the

general economy is slightly declining and operating partially

below capacity. Increasingly over the past decades the U.S.

political leadership--the Administration and the Congress--has
expanded federal support to improve social welfare programs.

Moreover, the leadership in 2020 is so supportive of these social

programs that the United States is skewed decidedly toward a

social investment economy. Budgetary support of social programs

(which are over 70 percent of the national budget) is followed by

national public education, environmental protection, space,

defense, and science/technology programs. Defense programs have

dropped to an all-time low. Most national strategists believe

that this obsessive national trend in social investments by the

U.S. leadership demonstrates a serious neglect of the other

programs of the nation, especially those involved with national

security. The same trend, however, has been occurring in most of

the other free-world nations as well.

By the year 2020, the growth of the U.S. population (more

than 300 million) in general as well as in and around U.S. cities

(more than 85 percent of the U.S. population are urban dwellers),

especially those cities contiguous to or within a 50 mile radius

of military bases and installations, has complicated the

stationing and activities of U.S. forces. Training and testing

facilities and weapons ranges, which retain 20th century

configuration, are affected most. Throughout the states since the

turn of the century, the military services have been unable to

cope with environmental issues of pollution and resources

conservation (especially water) associated with military

activities. Additionally, such demographic factors as an older,

more conservative electorate along with an ethnic distribution

that is approaching half black, Hispanic, and Asian have brought

about a general change of attitude toward war and international

involvement that rejects both. Increasing affluence and leisure

time of the average American worker also have brought about

activities that are preventing military stationing in close

proximity to high density population areas. The additional U.S.

communities that have achieved economic self-sufficiency since

2005, collectively, continue to inhibit military stationing and

reduce installation investments through lobbies for state and

federal legislation or by outright political activism and

demonstrations.

During the past several decades, most of the nations of the

world have experienced a period of rising economic growth that

has been increasingly challenged by an invigorated, but highly

competitive, world economy. In 2020, however, economic indicators

are showing a global recessive trend. Concerned over their

national economic interest, 60 percent of the nations of the

world (based on 168 nations), except the very poorest, are armed

with early 21st century conventional weapons; 20 percent are also

armed with the latest high-tech weapons and systems, and over 14

percent have nuclear weapons and delivery systems in their

arsenals.
Most of the heavy industries, those that made nations great

during the past two centuries, essentially have disappeared from

the postindustrial states of the United States, Canada, Europe,

Australia, and Japan. They have been relocated in the industrial

states in South, Southeast, and Southwest Asia; China; South

America; and the USR. Most industries remaining in the

postindustrial nations are high-tech oriented and are supported

by an increasing number of light, specialty industries. The heavy

industrial needs of these nations are imported competitively in

the world market. This situation has brought to the forefront the

realization that the postindustrial infrastructures in the year

2020 lack the industrial surge capacity to support national

mobilization plans.

The new international economic status and the regional

positions of prestige and power that began early in the century

for the industrial states (some of which were formerly Third

World nations) continue to nurture a general rise of nationalism

worldwide. This has affected U.S. international political

influence adversely and has resulted in the expulsion of all U.S.

forces from U.S. overseas bases and port facilities, and in a

repossession of the land, regardless of prior agreements with the

United States. Most forces that have returned from overseas have

been retired or have been assigned to the Reserve component and

their units deactivated. World conditions in 2020 make U.S.

reliance on nuclear deterrence more critical than it was at the

turn of the century. The deployment of a limited U.S. strategic

missile defense system in space, however, contributes heavily

toward the U.S. deterrent posture.

The economic progress that almost all nations have made,

along with absence of any major wars over the past 30 years or

so, have outbalanced an armed and militarily competitive world in

furtherance of a peaceful but highly economically competitive

world. The United States, despite a current, although

near-predictable cyclic mild economic slump, remains a prospering

postindustrial state. The new Russian confederacy, the Union of

Sovereign Republics (USR) is an industrial state striving to

increase its internal economic and social development programs

that began with the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The

international trade and economic investment activities of the new

Ukrainian confederacy, the Union of Social Democratic Republics

(USDR), is a postindustrial state. Since the 1990s both states

have become increasingly capitalistic and adventuresome in the

world's markets. An undercurrent of traditional Soviet communism,

however, remains intact in the USR and the USDR, especially in

the USR. The USR also has been burdened with ethnic strife since

the turn of the century. The status of USR military power,

notwithstanding, by 2020 has become increasingly more defensive

than offensive and the export of ideology is tied more to

client-state economic programs than to military programs or
political ideology. Moreover, internal economic growth, the

building of more space platforms, and a limited, strategic

missile defense system in space, as well as the expansion of its

manned Mars station have taken precedence over maintaining a

large and expensive military force. The USR, nevertheless, still

remains a substantial military power in 2020, as does the USDR,

when compared to other nations.

The reorganization of the U.S. armed forces, completed in

2005, that formed a peacetime joint/unified force, the General

Defense Force (GDF), remains adequate for most contingencies

within a one-war strategy. In general, U.S. forces are stationed

in available existing installations that are in low-density

population areas of the United States and that are shared with

other federal agencies. The role of Land Defense Forces (LDF) in

2020 is mainly defensive and complements nuclear deterrence. The

Active Army is comprised of a small (250 to 450 thousand troops),

volunteer, high-tech, multi-mission, rapidly deployable

Professional Defensive Force (PDF) organized in light units. Most

volunteers come from the Public Education Program (PEP) created

by the Congress in 2005. This force is supported by a larger (700

to 800 thousand troops) single Reserve component of the LDF. The

active and reserve forces are supported by highly trained LDF

civilian component (200 to 250 thousand personnel). In general,

the quality of life for the PDF and LDF in 2020 matches the

civilian sector in all respects.

Force structure for the GDF is designed to accommodate a

unified, joint force for warfighting needs. The Active PDF (Army)

component is structured in combat, combat support, and combat

service support-like units. The total force of the GDF includes

about 15 percent heavy (not easily deployed), 35 percent light

(rapidly deployed), and 50 percent medium combat forces. A fifth

of the total force is vehicularized land and air units. The LDF

Reserve component is structured in four regional commands located

in the United States, each with a specific defense mission, but

is considerably less deployable than the PDF. The equipment used

by the PDF and the Reserve is about half late 20th century and

half early 21st century. About one third of the Reserve component

is considered ready. Deployment of forces primarily depends on

post-event, ad hoc alliances with allies providing a major share

of land forces. In the event of a conflict, mobile operational

bases (sea and air) are of utmost importance for the PDF. The

GDF, in 2020, are making greater use of robotics as well as

intelligence and antiweapons provided by advanced space

technology. Additionally, the PDF by 2020 is using home-station

training, existing and available regional training centers, and

leased areas of land for mission training purposes. Operational

training for combat is accomplished through the use of variable

computerized simulations (e.g., virtual reality) and simulators,

which are especially important for training with advanced weapons
systems that have near infinite ranges.

Advocates of a strong U.S. defense are faced with a

postindustrial infrastructure that lacks the capacity to support

mobilization plans. They are confronted also with loss of defense

facilities throughout most of the states. Moreover, they are

opposed by local communities throughout the nation. These

communities are inhibiting military stationing and forcing the

Congress to make more reductions in military installations.

Moreover, behind the apparently peaceful economically competitive

but viable world in 2020, a latent threat to world peace and U.S.

interests exists, especially if nations resort to the use of

military actions rather than the use of economic strategies.
CHAPTER 5

THE BRAVO SCENARIOS:

U.S. WORLD PEACEKEEPER

BRAVO 2005

Over the past decade most of the nations of the world,

especially the newly industrial countries (NIC), formerly the

Third World, increasingly have encouraged the presence of the

United States. This infusion of U.S. industries, businesses, and

its military has nurtured new economic growth in the NIC along

with an orderly transition of many of these nations to modern

industrial statehood. Through its good offices, economic aid, and

industrial leadership, the United States is raising the national

pride of these nations while protecting and furthering U.S. base

and overflight rights. Several of the agreements (e.g., Malaysia,

Mexico, the Philippines) formed since the start of the century

have been less formal than the 20th century treaties and

agreements.

During the past 20 years or so most of the postindustrial

nations (Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, and the United States)

increasingly have experienced deindustrialization. Heavy

industries such as steel, chemical, arms manufacturers, and

construction materials, as well as other types of manufacturing

businesses have relocated to foreign countries, e.g., Korea,

Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Mexico, Venezuela. A few of

these countries have relocated industries also. Although within

the postindustrial nations high-tech and specialty industries

with new products are creating substitute products, sufficient

industrial capacity remains in the postindustrial nations to

support surge requirements, should war appear imminent. The

industrial sectors of the postindustrial nations are well

advanced technologically, especially those of the United States.

The high-tech specialization in the United States is

creating new and innovative products that are robotic and plastic

or the results of genetic engineering. All are improving the

overall national economic scene as well as the quality of life of

the general public. Further, these new industries increasingly

are creating opportunities for additional new industries and

employment. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. public education, under

federal guidelines, has instituted new programs to accommodate

the rapidly changing postindustrial U.S. society. Along with

many new advanced courses related to high technology, there are

courses in speed-learning of foreign languages and cultures

designed to prepare graduates for both government and private

employment. In 2005, as many as a third of the employees of most

major U.S. industries work for their companies overseas for

extended periods of time.
In general, since the late 1990s the political attitude of

both the U.S. Congress and Administration has favored larger

defense budgets. Over the same period, federal expenditures have

also increased for space research and exploration as well as for

science, technology, and education, respectively. Social programs

continue to be the highest budgeted item; such expenditures,

however, have been on a gradual decline since mid-1990. By 2005,

the United States has substantially increased its foreign aid

programs and has been especially generous in economic aid to

former Third World countries (mostly newly industrializing

nations [NIC]) striving to develop the skills needed to achieve

success in industrial statehood. Additional U.S. dollars going to

the NIC are for military assistance programs, most of which

emphasize defensive military training using largely 20th century

arms and early 21st century high-tech systems.

By the year 2005, many nations of the world, including the

newly industrialized nations, have achieved a new economic

prosperity. This growing affluence is commensurate with general

increases in their industrial productivity and trade. Some of

these nations, however, harbor real or perceived fears of their

economic competitors and remain heavily armed with conventional

weapons purchased from the arms dealers of the 20th century.

Others continue to build their weapons inventories with early

21st century high-tech weapons purchases. Some of the NIC are

producing light arms and ammunition, while others are developing

high-tech weapons industries under co-production arrangements

with some of the advanced industrial and postindustrial nations.

Russia and other countries that emerged from the former

Soviet Union of the 20th century became nations of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the 1990s. The CIS

was formed to accommodate the transition from a centrally

controlled government and economy to democracy and a free market

system. The CIS served more as an administrative body than a

governing one and was only loosely associated with its member

states. The new states continued their efforts toward internal

economic development using programs that they began in the 1990s.

At the same time, some of the new states have been able to

generate a modest level of military expenditures. They can easily

purchase arms from available foreign dealers or confiscate

weapons from the disarrayed army of the former Soviet Union.

Although none of these states are considered a military threat to

the United States, collectively they cause some concern to the

nations of Europe. Russia has maintained moderately high

expenditures in weapons programs, especially those related to

military space activities. The conventional threat once posed by

the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact no longer exists.

Since the early 1990s and stemming initially from
U.S./Soviet arms control meetings in the late 1980s, then from

U.S./Russian meetings in the 1990s, Russia and the United States

have made dramatic progress in the bilateral reduction of nuclear

weapons. Accounting, however, for all nuclear weapons possessed

by the former Soviet Union and that once confronted Western

Europe is an unverifiable task. Proliferation of nuclear

weapons, however, has continued and the number of nations

possessing nuclear weapons in their arsenals in 2005 has

increased by 25 percent over those known to have had such weapons

in 1995. Russia's conventional strength, its remaining nuclear

capabilities, and its achievements in space, however, remain a

potential threat to other nations and U.S. interests worldwide.

This potential military threat that appears to be emerging around

2005 reinforces the traditional alertness of the United States to

watch the worldwide political and economic adventuresome

activities of several of the new states of the CIS.

A factor often overlooked as being important to the

effectiveness of a nation's military posture is its societal or

local community attitudes. During the past decade or so, the U.S.

military increasingly has gained an acceptance within local U.S.

communities that is beyond usual economic or political interest.

New military installations have been created relative to

demographic population shifts which assure the military of an

adequate share of needed specialized civilian skills as well as

transportation and resource accommodations. The positive military

attitude toward the preservation of the local community's natural

resources and toward environmental protection further contributes

to the acceptance of the military's presence. This positive

attitude, moreover, extends to the community in other ways also.

For example: Use of nonspecific military training facilities in

2005 is available to local communities (beyond civil defense and

disaster preparedness exercises) for civilian or joint

civilian/military training in such nonmilitary programs as

health, physical fitness and sports activities, and adult

continuing education programs.

In response to the increasing imbalance of racial (whites,

blacks) and ethnic (Hispanic, Asian, Black American, for example)

groups in the U.S. population and the need to inculcate in all

citizens the workings of American democracy, citizenship and

constructive attitudes toward freedom, the U.S. Congress has

passed an 18-month National Public Service (NPS) program for all

citizens and noncitizen residents. The NPS program is currently

in the implementation planning stage. NPS will assure citizenship

for all, reduce welfare rolls, and by 2020, will provide a

constant supply of workers and trainees for almost all federal

agencies including the military services.

In 2005, the U.S. defense posture is highly capable of

reacting to any threat across the broad spectrum of war. The U.S.
strategic defense has been bolstered by successive achievements

during the past decade toward the accomplishment of a strategic

space defense. Overall, however, U.S. defense strategy in 2005

relies less on nuclear deterrent forces and more on conventional

land, sea, and air forces under an unfolding strategic space

umbrella. Since the turn of the century, the U.S. military

services gradually have increased in numbers of personnel,

weapons, and equipment commensurate to U.S. foreign economic and

military assistance programs, which are extensive in 2005. U.S.

forces overseas serve more as a deterrent to local conflicts, as

U.S. soldier ambassadors and as world peacekeeper forces, than

they serve in actual warfighting. Their overseas activities are

nonthreatening and are oriented toward assisting host nations to

maintain a peaceful climate while they grow into free-market

economies, democracies, and industrial statehood. The U.S.

military services are organized under regional unified

commanders-in-chief. In general, they are supported by single

defense programs for logistics, communications, supplies, health,

installation management, and other common functions.

The force structure of the BRAVO 2005 military (all

services) is about 30 percent light (rapidly deployable) and 40

percent heavy (not readily deployable). While the BRAVO

warfighting ground forces are equipped to fight with high-tech

weapon systems primarily, they are still using some residual (and

aging) 20th century conventional weapon systems, including tanks.

The same situation exists for naval and air warfighters. The

Active BRAVO 2005 ground force is comprised of about 800 to 900

thousand troops and is reinforced by a large Reserve component of

1.2 to 1.4 million troops. Both the Active and the Reserve

component are supported by a civilian force of 350 to 450

thousand specialized personnel which includes a variable average

of 25 thousand contract personnel who are primarily engaged in

trial combat-training management and operations and other basic

services. The other military services are also well endowed with

personnel and have contracted many nonwarfighting activities to

the private sector. The 2005 Reserve components can be 50 percent

ready and deployable in about 30 days. The large number of host

nation military support agreements permit reasonably rapid

deployment of U.S. forces worldwide and allow large amounts of

equipment and supplies to be prepositioned and readily available

in selected host nations.

Technology in 2005 readily assists transition from 20th

century weapons and equipment to those of the 21st century.

Training is especially advanced over that of the 20th century

through the use of computerized simulators, robotics,

simulations, and other electronic devices. Most training is with

individual or unit simulators at collective, contract-operated

training centers located regionally within the United States or

in selected overseas host nations. Training, additionally, is
joint or at times combined with host-nation forces. Some

exploratory training using military personnel on manned space

platforms is currently in progress. Planning for earthbound

specialized installations also has been started to accommodate

weapons technology advances for such weapon systems as directed

energy, lasers, electronic magnetic pulse, acoustic, genetic, and

electronic rail guns.

The firmly implanted trends of the BRAVO 2005 world suggest

that over the next decade or so, the United States increasingly

will become more heavily involved in all facets of international

activity than ever before in its history as a nation. Not only

will the United States be the economic mainstay of the newly

industrializing countries (NIC) but it likely will also be the

most advanced and influential leader of the postindustrial

states; a titan among the nations of the world.

BRAVO 2020

Internationally, the United States in the year 2020 is

acknowledged by almost every nation as the foremost

postindustrial state. It is also considered the colossus among

the nations of the world. The United States is the world's model

of national economic stability, growth, and leadership.

Worldwide, the United States is a provider of benevolent economic

and military assistance to selected countries for which

overflight, port visitation, and basing rights as well as trading

advantages for scarce resources are provided in return. Its

international economic, sociopolitical, and moral influence is

unsurpassed by any other postindustrial state. Most importantly,

the United States is recognized by just about every nation as the

most advanced military power of the world.

During the past decade or so, the economies of almost every

nation have grown significantly. This is especially evident in

the nations (republics) that emerged from the former Soviet Union

as independent and in the 1990s became members of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a temporary

administrative body. The inability of the CIS to administer the

republics adequately resulted around 2010 in the independent

republics with like interests banding together for economic and

security reasons to create a new administrative commonwealth of

three new nations. The new commonwealth includes the following

nations:

! the Union of Social Democratic Republics (USDR),

principally Ukraine, a marginally accepted postindustrial nation;

! the Union of Sovereign Republics (USR), principally

Russia, an industrial nation; and
! the Union of Independent States (UIS), principally

composed of former Soviet independent, anomalous and ethnic

groups. The UIS is described primarily as a preindustrial

country.

Despite significant economic advancement internationally in

the past decade or so, the USR remains an industrial state in the

year 2020. The leadership of the USR is, however, showing

increasingly more interest in the internal economic, social, and

political development of its people as a nation than it did in

the past and less attention to any of its former client states of

the past century. The USR, nevertheless, remains quietly willing

and capable of waging violent war if provoked.

By the year 2020 the world economy has become increasingly

brisk and highly competitive. The postindustrial nations include

the United States, Canada, all of Europe, the Union of Social

Democratic Republics, Australia, and Japan. These nations

formerly represented the leading world markets of the 20th

century in heavy industrial products, automobiles, and other

manufactured products. They are now the 21st century world

leaders in high-tech products, services, information, and

knowledge programs and systems. None of the postindustrial

nations show any inclination for military aggressiveness. Former

20th century industrial nations along with newly industrializing

countries (NIC, formerly Third World countries) are supplying the

world with heavy industrial products and most other high-demand

manufactured consumer products. The industrial nations are keenly

competitive in the world markets and are prone to occasional

military aggressiveness short of war with a competitor.

Most nations of the world, except for the very poorest, are

achieving a new economic prosperity that is expanding their

horizons while, at the same time, altering their political and

social infrastructures. The formal bilateral economic and

political/military security agreements and treaties signed by the

industrializing countries and the United States in the 20th

century have been replaced by ad hoc agreements.

The highly competitive world economy along with a broad

transfer of technology have generated an increased frequency of

trade wars and political and economic power competitions.

Notwithstanding, most of the industrial states are trading off a

new growth of nationalism for economic development and investment

as a solution to financial and unemployment problems. Along with

the comprehensive U.S. foreign aid programs and the generous

economic aid of the U.S. Government and its business corporations

over the past decade or so, the former Third World countries have

developed the skills and expertise needed to achieve industrial
statehood. This economic diplomacy, over the years, has

continued to strengthen U.S. international political and economic

influence, has ensured the availability of scarce mineral

resources, and, more importantly, has guaranteed U.S. military

presence and in-country rights overseas.

The achievements of science and the advances of high

technology in the postindustrial states by the year 2020 have

offset the economic loss of heavy industries. Over the past three

decades, the Western countries, the United States especially,

increasingly have been importing steel, building and construction

materials, and certain other heavy industrial and manufactured

products. Until the development of plastic (polymer) munitions

ordinance and lightweight, high-impact armor plate in about 2010,

the United States (for a short time only) imported ammunition for

its military after the U.S. arms manufacturers moved to foreign

countries and owners. Although the trade deficit increased early

in the century, the introduction of new products and replacements

developed by the specialty industries of the Western countries,

e.g., those created in the high-polymer plastics industries, has

reduced the deficit considerably. The continued efforts of

science and technology, coupled with those of the specialty

industries, provide the postindustrial states nearly full

capability to support surge plans for most contingencies

anticipated over the next decade or so.

National pride within the United States is as high as the

economy is strong. Although the U.S. social and welfare program

investment remains the foremost national budget expenditure, by

2020 the defense budget is almost equal to it. This has been

brought about by new federal social programs with cost and

investment responsibility available for optional assumption by,

or shared partnerships with, the state governments or with

industry and the individual reducing the social welfare budget

expenditure to its lowest level in 25 years. The Defense budget

in 2020 has increased substantially above those of the 1990s.

These programs are followed in budget expenditures by national

education, science and technology, environment, and space

research and exploration.

Both the current Congress and Administration, as well as the

general public, support extensive military programs. Almost all

communities throughout the United States have accepted and

approve of the military policy, which began around 2005, of

sharing military facilities wherever and whenever possible. This

program of sharing facilities has allowed an interchange between

the military and the local communities that assists in resolving

economic, resources, environmental, demographic, and attitude and

value problems that are relevant to both military and civilian

societies.
The National Public Service (NPS) program, enacted in 2005,

was fully implemented by 2015. Since that time, the NPS has

provided a constant flow of qualified Americans through 18 months

of training in an agency of the Federal Government. The most

intensive training has been in the military. NPS has provided the

military with qualified trainees, many of whom after NPS training

have chosen to continue a career in the military. NPS has also

bolstered the general economy and has helped to reduce national

unemployment problems.

Most nations of the world, except the very poorest, have

been highly armed by the new weapons merchants of the industrial

states. The number of nations with nuclear weapons and delivery

systems in their arsenals has increased by 25 percent over those

known to have had these weapons in the early years of the

century. This greatly increases the potential deliberate or

accidental use of a nuclear weapon or device. Subsequent to the

breakup of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, nuclear arms agreements

resulting from significantly improved relations between the

United States and the new confederacies (USDR, USR, and the UIS)

have resulted in a significant reduction of nuclear arms when

compared to the 20th century. The inclination to use military

power, however, remains low as the USDR and USR try to establish

economic stability and leverage in world politics.

The Union of Sovereign Republics (USR) has made progress

since the turn of the century in modernizing its internal social

and economic status. It has also made significant strides in its

international diplomatic relations and its status in the world's

free-market economy. The USR, however, remains dissatisfied to be

labeled an industrial state while the United States and the USDR

are recognized as postindustrial nations in the eyes of the rest

of the world. The USR by 2020 is considerably more adventuresome

militarily than before the turn of the century. For the past

decade or so it has provided military arms and training to other

industrial and preindustrial states, while at the same time, it

has become increasingly more adventuresome economically in

foreign markets. Moreover, the USR leadership has not only

encouraged an economic fusion of some East European states with

the European Community (EC), but also is seeking membership

itself. Further, the USR has become involved in somewhat

speculative economic international trade ventures of its own that

are interfering increasingly with U.S. trade relations. The USR,

for what it lacks in economic know-how, remains highly capable of

military intervention worldwide or of waging war despite the

apparent disinclination of its leadership to do so. The army of

the USR, however, is a significant challenge to the U.S. military

and one for which the United States must remain prepared.

The U.S. military maintains a high level of readiness and is

prepared for all foreseeable contingencies. By the year 2020 
technological achievements and innovations have provided an

opportunity for all military services to increase their

warfighting capabilities. Technology, additionally, has increased

the overall requirement for operational training, while at the

same time has displaced a substantial number of military

personnel required to conduct operations. Contracted training

programs for the U.S. forces as well as foreign forces under

military assistance and training programs are mostly accommodated

by simulations and the use of simulators at installations in

continental United States (CONUS) or overseas. These programs

permit a large variety of joint/combined contingency plans

rehearsals. During the year 2020, e.g., a 90-day major

mobilization exercise in Southwest Asia is planned for the

purpose of testing and comparing the reliability of the BRAVO

2020 military/contractor operational training simulations at any

conflict level. Many training activities for the U.S. forces are

performed by civilian contractors who use multi-environmental,

functional training centers in CONUS and abroad, land-based or

afloat. Training programs, as well as weapons and equipment

development, stress environmental safeguards and the preservation

of natural resources. The concept of environmental protection is

incorporated in all activities of U.S. forces with special units

assigned a restoration task.

The BRAVO 2020 world provides the U.S. armed forces--land,

sea, air, and space--an opportunity to build an all-purpose

military force structure and specialized forces for any

contingencies. For example, the U.S. land forces in BRAVO 2020

are organized principally as a large standing Army of

specialized, highly deployable active brigade-size warfighting

units. The Active BRAVO 2020 Army is a large component of about

800 to 900 thousand troops. Combat forces are 40 percent heavy

(not easily deployed), 50 percent medium, and 10 percent light

(easily deployed). The Active force is supported by a Reserve

component--the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army

Reserve (USAR)--approaching 1.6 to 1.8 million troops and a

highly technologically trained civilian component of about 200 to

250 thousand personnel. The total force is 60 percent high-tech.

 Additional support to the Army, especially the ARNG and USAR, is

provided by the National Public Service program of 2005. In

general, the quality of life for BRAVO 2020 Army personnel in all

respects is equal to or better than that of their civilian

counterpart.

Operationally, the BRAVO 2020 Army fully uses space-age

technology and weapons under highly advanced stages of strategic

defense. Twentieth century heavy equipment/ weapons, e.g., tanks,

have been replaced with light, easily transportable systems. Such

systems are sustainable, automated, computerized or robotic, use

near-earth and space transport and platforms, and are BRAVO 2020

Army force multipliers.
The role of the BRAVO 2020 military forces is to support a

"big stick" deterrent strategy which complements the U.S. nuclear

deterrent. Its force structure design is more than adequate for a

broad range of contingencies from major war to small coalition

warfare, to foreign internal defense or localized international

unrest. The U.S. armed forces of BRAVO 2020 also serve other

nations of the world as a peacekeeper in other types of civil

strife through a global presence.
CHAPTER 6

THE CHARLIE SCENARIOS:

NEONATIONALISM WORLD

CHARLIE 2005

The rise of nationalism worldwide in scenario CHARLIE has

significantly suppressed U.S. political, economic, and military

influence and has eliminated the presence of the U.S. military

forces and most American industries overseas. CHARLIE is a highly

competitive world where economic trade wars, embargoes, and

restrictions abound. Despite sincere interests of the United

States to provide assistance to the newly industrializing or

industral countries (NIC), their leaders have turned to

nationalism.

The United States, one of the foremost postindustrial

nations of the world, along with many of its businesses and

industries, have, over the past decade (1995-2005), provided

continuous economic assistance to the NIC for the modernization

of their industrial infrastructure. U.S. military and economic

assistance, however, has been decreasing over the past decade as

20th century U.S. alliances and agreements weakened or were

abrogated and abandoned. In most instances, U.S. forces have been

withdrawn from, or their numbers reduced significantly in the

NIC. The economic growth of many of these countries by the year

2005 has surpassed that of any other previous year. A few of

these countries, concerned with the adverse influence that modern

industrialization, technology, and Western ideas have been having

on their national cultures, have resorted to aggressive acts of

nationalism. They have nationalized several U.S. industries as

well as those of a few other foreign nations, have expelled all

foreign civilians and military, and have reclaimed all U.S.

military bases located in their territories. Several other NIC

are threatening that they also are planning to nationalize

foreign industries. The United States faces the relocation of its

overseas forces, despite its efforts to halt this spread of

nationalism, to alleviate NIC fears of irreversible cultural

changes, or to retain a minimal U.S. military presence. The

personnel in these forces must be moved to off-shore, floating

bases, to other overseas bases that are in U.S. territories,

returned to installations within the United States, transferred

to Reserve status, or discharged from the services.

Complicating the problem of restationing U.S. forces

withdrawn from overseas have been growing trends in U.S. local

communities to block any further increase in the number of

installations and the number of troops at existing installations

or the assignment of any new type of military weapons activities

to these installations. These community attitudes have grown out
of several currently popular trends: an increased concern for

community environmental protection, an infringement of local

community populations on some military installations, and

community economic self-sufficiency. This self-sufficiency has

been brought about by new employment opportunities and an

increased tax base generated by expanding high-tech and

information/services industries. The apparently antimilitary

attitudes of the U.S. communities are not associated with any

international organization nor is the local intent one of

disloyalty. Public support for the military actually is high;

these local communities just do not want the military in their

backyards. Similar attitudes against U.S. overseas and NATO bases

also have existed in Western Europe (as well as in Turkey and

Greece), and South Korea over the past decade or so.

The U.S. political leadership of the Administration and the

Congress faced with these problems is mindful of the need to

maintain a strong national defense posture to counter any

military threat to U.S. interests. Since the turn of the century,

the Administration has convinced the Congress to provide

substantial multi-year defense budgets that have supported the

initiation of comprehensive long-range defense plans. These plans

redesign and strengthen the U.S. military posture through

investments in the research and development of advanced

technological military systems and the field testing of new 21st

century weapons. The long-range plans include the use of space to

support basic military systems for earthbound combat operations,

such as communication, navigation, and logistics (prototype

logistic and staging platforms are already in place). The

Administration also has introduced as part of its long-range

planning a comprehensive program for a federal/state financed

Universal Public Service (UPS) program that, once operational,

will provide trained personnel to almost all federal, state, and

local government agencies, including those of the military.

Overall, these long-range plans will reestablish and sustain the

United States as the leading political, economic, and military

power of the world, despite the weakening effects of the loss of

overseas bases, should such trends continue in the coming years.

The immediate effects of the defense plans will create a

smaller, more effective military force by 2010; one whose

capabilities are enhanced by available technological force

multipliers, such as advanced weapons, mobility, and logistic

systems. These systems, new generation high-tech air and land

weapons, and in-place prototype sea, air, and space platforms

(bases) will enable the military to react to the conflict

contingencies envisioned in the nearto long-range future. These

contingencies, for the most part, are at the lowto mid-intensity

level of the spectrum of warfare.

Over the past several decades, many of the heavy industries,
primarily of the postindustrial nations (United States, Canada, a

united European Community, and Japan), have relocated to foreign

countries where economic conditions and available manpower appear

to be more favorable. The loss of these industries has left these

nations nearly unable to mobilize sufficiently to provide the

production requirements of warfighting. Specialty industries,

such as plastics, however, are only now approaching the

capability to support industrial surge requirements.

Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), increasingly is becoming more of a

shell than an effective collective military alliance. This is

partly due to growing apathy on the part of the European member

nations and declining interest on the part of the United States.

It is also largely due, however, to an absence of any perceived

threat by the Europeans to their individual or collective

sovereignty or to their political or economic systems. The

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet

Union in the late 1980s assured this and was accompanied by

agreed bilateral mutual troop and nuclear force reductions

between Russia and the United States. These changes along with

the demise of Soviet communism have resulted, over time, in the

abandonment of the Alliance, including its armed forces. Only

France and the United Kingdom retained their force structures and

Franceits nuclear systems. By 2005 the U.S. forces that supported

NATO in Europe were reduced to only a caretaker contingent (about

5 percent of the total number of forces there in the 1980s).

European NATO members have not only failed to replace the U.S.

forces, but also have significantly ignored their own commitments

to the Alliance.

Russia, the largest, most powerful confederacy and

preeminent force emerging from the former Soviet Union, resumed a

negotiating position with the United States in the 1990s.

Moreover, it accelerated the bilateral mutual troop and nuclear

forces reductions which began in the late 1980s during the

administration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The CIS was a temporary administrative body that held the newly

independent republics of the former Soviet Union together, but

retained too great a tie with the former system to be truly

representative of the republics.

Seizing the opportunity during the years around the turn of

the century, anti-American, buy European, peace, and

environmental activists' movements have brought about further

degradation of the Western Alliance. Gone also are the close

relationships once held between the United States and Europe. Not

only has U.S. military presence declined in Europe but also has

European-located American industries. By 2010, only about 20

percent of the 1990 level of U.S. owned enterprises will remain

in the European Community. The contingent of U.S. forces along
with the remaining European and French military forces are

believed by the Europeans to be sufficient as a primary deterrent

to war between Western Europe and the fragmented East European

nations or the independent republics of the former Soviet Union.

The Western Europeans, rather than increasing their military

forces, are banking on serious economic overtures that will

encourage the East European nations to join the European

Community (EC). This, the West Europeans believe, will surmount

any military threat.

Over the next decade or so, the most likely conflicts to

occur would be unconventional and insurgencies; less likely would

be conventional, high-tech conflicts; and least likely would be

nuclear conflicts. These estimates are based on the continued

proliferation of conventional/high-tech, and nuclear weapons

during the latter years of the 20th century and the early years

of the 21st century.

Most of the nations of the world, except the very poorest,

have been armed by 20th century arms merchants with that era's

conventional weapons; some, additionally, have acquired late

20th-early 21st century high-tech weapons and missiles; and

others have added chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to

their arsenals. The number of nations possessing nuclear weapons

and delivery systems in 2005 has increased by a third, over those

known to have had such weapons a decade ago.

Subsequent to the independence movements of the former

Soviet republics, temporary political management was given first

to a residual centralized body, then to the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS). The United States provided diplomatic

recognition and economic aid to each republic as it proclaimed

its independence. The specific interests of the United States,

however, were first to assure that a divided Soviet Union was

created and then to make certain that a reduction of the number

of former Soviet nuclear weapons rapidly occurred. To help this

along, the United States entered into nuclear arms reductions

agreements with the CIS and Russia and provided skilled technical

assistance for the dismantlement of these weapons.

The former Soviet republics are not actively involved in any

external conflicts in 2005, although some internal strife of

ethnic origin occurred earlier. The Russian Republic continues to

support some of the former Soviet client states, however, but to

a much lesser extent than it did before commencement of mutual

nuclear arms reductions with the United States in the late 1980s.

Increasingly since that time, the primary interests of the Soviet

then Russian leadership, and subsequently the leadership of the

other former Soviet republics, have been national economic,

political, and social reform and development. Success in making

the transition from a centralized economy and government to a
free-market system and a democratic representative government has

become the foremost driver of these societies. Some republics

recognize that for them to survive in a highly competitive world

economic market there is a need for those with like interests to

pool their assets in a new cooperative confederacy.

The same leadership of these new independent nations,

especially Russia, is demonstrating a cooperative attitude toward

maintaining the incremental bilateral agreements with the United

States. Special attention, in this respect, is given to

inspection of former nuclear sites and verification of dismantled

and destroyed weapons and warheads. Although less inclined toward

military aggressiveness since before the mid-1990s, the republics

of the CIS still retain a conventional military capability. While

this military has been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, it is

contained in several republics, but is somewhat in disarray and

is not perceived as a threat to Europe, the United States, China,

or India.

U.S. military leadership in 2005 is keenly aware of the

existing CIS warfighting capabilities and the conflict potential

of a highly competitive economic world. Moreover, the military

realizes the need to maintain a strong U.S. military posture. It

also believes that the restructuring of each of the services

commensurate to the stationing limitations imposed in the 2005

environment is necessary. Regardless of limitations, U.S.

military leadership believes that the development of new

technologyand space-oriented military strategies will provide a

U.S. warfighting capability that will be an effective worldwide

deterrent to any individual member of CIS or renewed worldwide

collective aggressiveness from former Soviet states.

The U.S. force structure in 2005 continues as three separate

service departments, although logistics, personnel, and

communications for each are now under the single control and

management of the Department of Defense (DoD). Troop transport,

in general, is largely by civilian contract as are base facility

support and medical health care and services. The arrangement

assists the services in being more reactive to worldwide threats

to U.S. interests and to fulfill their primary mission, defending

the United States. When called upon, U.S. forces provide

defensive assistance to former U.S. allies and friendly nations

at a force level commensurate to the threat and with an

appropriate mix of the services to resolve the threat issue or

terminate a conflict as quickly as possible. The force structure

and end strength of the Army, whose mission is ground defense, is

designed to accommodate this strategy of measured force, i.e., a

force tailored to the threat and type of conflict anticipated.

What is happening to U.S. military forces by 2005 can be

described by using the Army as an example.
The Active component (AC) of the Army in CHARLIE 2005 is

about 30 percent light (man intensive and rapidly deployable) and

the Reserve component (RC) is about 40 percent heavy (equipment

intensive and not as readily deployable). This force structure

has evolved as circumstances have forced the United States to

withdraw more than 50 percent of its overseas forces.

Additionally, as a result of this situation, Congress has amended

Title 32 and the RC now combines the National Guard and the Army

Reserve into a single component. This 2005 RC is organized,

equipped, and trained in the same manner as the Active Army. The

end strength of the AC in 2005 is about 350 to 450 thousand

troops and the RC is about 1.1 to 1.2 million. The RC is capable

of rapid mobilization equally from home stations and regional

training centers. The supporting civilian component is about 150

to 250 thousand personnel who are highly trained and integrated

with AC and RC, and are selectively required by contract to stay

in place in the event of war.

To accommodate the national security needs of the

postindustrial United States, manage available manpower, and

furnish appropriate and affordable 21st century training, the

2005 Administration has introduced a National Defense Force (NDF)

plan. When enacted by the Congress and implemented by DoD, NDF

will produce a one uniformed service in the United States. The

NDF is expected to be fully operational within the next decade or

so.

The CHARLIE 2005 Army is organized, equipped, and trained as

small, readily mobile fighting units that are stationed

increasingly in sparsely populated areas in the United States.

The Army is organized to fight in a configuration that stresses

self-containment and self-sustainment under hazardous conditions

for 40 days duration before unit replacement, while individual

replacement is made during combat. Resupply is mostly by air or

sea (surface and subsurface) logistic units, and eventually from

space (platforms or bases) when development is complete. The Army

is equipped with a mix of late 20th century (about 40 percent)

and early 21st century (about 60 percent) material, weapons, and

ancillary systems. Most of the 20th century weapon systems, such

as the tank, are obsolescent and are being phased out of

inventory. Where feasible, about 90 percent of all new equipment

and systems are computerized as well as hardened and shielded.

Increasingly, routine, boring, and hazardous tasks are robotized

(about 75 percent) also, including ground surveillance,

transportation, and decontamination.

Both men and women of the Army increasingly are trained for

combat operations by simulation and simulators under civilian

contracts which use especially designed computerized facilities

that are space savers (e.g., half above/half below ground level)

at regional Army installation training centers. Additionally, the
Reserve Component is involved in exploratory training in the use

of the prototype air, sea, and space logistic and staging area

platforms. The Reserve Component is organized and equipped the

same as the Army AC and both train together at the regional

training centers. Although available land for field training is

becoming increasingly scarce as local U.S. communities become

more critical of Army environmental pollution, a few stateside

locations away from dense populations remain available. A few

overseas locations in friendly countries where U.S. bases still

exist also provide possible additional land where field training

can be conducted.

CHARLIE 2020

The United States over the past decade and a half has been

faced with the withdrawal of all of its military forces from its

overseas bases, including the former NATO countries and those in

the newly industrializing countries (NIC), formerly Third World

countries. Also during this period, with the generous help of

U.S. economic aid and U.S. private corporation advice and

financial assistance, the international status of many of the NIC

has been gradually transformed from preindustrial into

industrial. Many NIC, also during this period, have adopted more

representative, mostly parliamentary, forms of government more

compatible with a free-market economy and the economic growth

they are now experiencing. Believing that, since the beginning of

the century, the influx of Western technology, people, and ideas

has been changing their societies and obscuring their national

identities, most of these nations are now seeking refuge in a

revived nationalism as others had in 2005.

Increasingly, over the past decade or so, many of the NIC

have become more intimidated by, and apprehensive of, the

technological changes that accompany industrialization; freemarket economies; and democracy. They also were becoming more

protective of their cultures and their countries as they turned

to nationalism. Regardless of treaties, military agreements, or

other arrangements with the United States, these nations, which

had previously welcomed American presence, have nationalized

foreign industries, expelled U.S. and other foreign nationals,

and denied overflight and port-visitation rights, and reclaimed

all U.S. military bases on their territories. This rise of

neonationalism worldwide has suppressed U.S. opportunities for

international political and economic influence and is forcing the

United States to rely on its strategic resources stockpiles.

The United States in the year 2020 is the foremost

postindustrial nation of the world. Over the past several

decades, the United States has advocated, supported, and

maintained a strong military defense. Its investments in

technologically advanced military systems, especially those using
the fourth dimension of space, have surpassed any previous

military investments. Such systems have reduced the military

requirement for massive land forces and allowed military

strategists to devise technologyand space-oriented strategies

that will accommodate a 21st century U.S. military force as well

as counter traditional strategies of land warfare. Such

innovativeness is essential to the United States, especially its

military, since nearly all U.S. heavy industries, including arms

manufacturers, have relocated to foreign industrial or

preindustrial nations since 2005. This relocation of heavy

industry has occurred in almost all other Western postindustrial

nations as well as in Japan. A decade ago, this situation had

left the United States and other postindustrial nations in a

transition where their infrastructures appeared unable to provide

military equipment or weapons in the event of a need for

industrial surge. By the year 2020, the U.S. high-polymer

plastics industry has perfected precision designed, lightweight

munitions ordinance and armor plate that can be produced in the

quantities needed for military purposes.

During the past 15 years, the increasing migration of hightech, service, and information workers to the city areas has

brought these cities closer to the creation of east/west and

north/south megalopolises. More communities are expanding

adjacent to military installations in 2020 and more demands are

being made for these installations to close or find other

locations. Forces returning from overseas have been deactivated

and units and individuals have been assigned to the reserves to

reduce the military population around the most congested cities.

The long-range defense plans and the substantial multi-year

defense budgets approved by the 2005 Congress have assisted the

Department of Defense (DoD) to acquire the necessary advanced

technological equipment and weapons needed to maintain readiness

with a minimum of combat forces. They have also assisted DoD in

the development of space systems to support earthbound combat

operations. Additionally, of the prototype space platforms

developed and in place in 2005, the logistic platform is

operational but the troop staging platform is useful only for

small special operations activities. Between the years of 2005

and 2020, the federal and state financed Universal Public Service

(UPS) program has been passed by the Congress and approved by two

thirds of the state governments. UPS is now inducting trainees

for 18 months of service in almost all agencies of federal,

state, and local governments.

Almost all of the nations of the world, except the very

poorest, have been armed with 20th century conventional weapons

and ancillary systems and early 21st century high-tech weapons. A

new generation of arms merchants since the turn of the century

have continued the sale of arms and other military equipment.
These merchants have increased the number of nations possessing

nuclear weapons and delivery means 25 percent over those nations

known to have had them in 2005. Most of the industrial nations of

the world, although achieving moderate to high economic growth,

increasingly are unable to cope with the highly competitive

challenges of the world economy. Although these nations are

dissatisfied with their economies and are disinclined to resort

to war to get the best of economic competition, their possession

of nuclear weapons is a growing concern to peace.

By 2020 a new temporary administrative commonwealth has

replaced the now defunct Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS). The new commonwealth is attempting to continue with

programs of economics and social development to assist three new

confederacies. One is the Union of Sovereign Republics (USR), led

by Russia, and another is the Union of Social Democratic

Republics (USDR), led by Ukraine. The USR and the USDR are

comprised of other former Soviet republics that have similar

interests, principally economic security, that have joined

together to form new nations. The leaders of both of these

confederacies have continued sincere cooperation with the United

States in conventional arms control, nuclear arms reductions, and

in inspection and verification. Moreover, they have maintained a

peaceful attitude toward Western Europe. All of their forces have

been withdrawn from Eastern Europe since 2005. Although the USR

and USDR still retain a conventional military capability, they

are perceived by the West not to pose a threat to Western Europe.

There remains a serious problem, however; not all of the former

Soviet tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and delivery

systems have been accounted for.

The United States and Western Europe believe that an

undetermined number of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and

delivery systems have been secretly sold or given away to other

foreign governments or have been stolen and secretly hidden by

disgruntled, former Soviet military and civilian communists in a

new confederacy. This is the third confederacy of the new

administrative commonwealth and is called the Union of

Independent States (UIS). It is made up of former independent and

anomalous states and ethnic groups of the former Soviet Union

that have joined together to assure that they are represented in

the new commonwealth. The leadership of the three confederacies

are showing little interest in support for former client states

of the former Soviet Union and have traded 20th century

adventuresome military interests for national economic pursuits

in a highly competitive world economy.

Around 2005 the then Administration introduced a bill to

create the National Defense Force (NDF). The purpose of the NDF

was to accommodate the national security needs of a

postindustrial United States, manage available manpower, and
furnish appropriate and affordable management and support for a

21st century military force. The NDF is a one uniformed service

designed to accommodate land, sea, and air/space military

operations. Congress approved the concept and appropriated funds

for the DoD to begin the implementation of the NDF in early 2006.

The National Defense Force (NDF) is the unified warfighting

force of the United States. The Active NDF has dual or multiple

operational capabilities, e.g., air or space and land or sea; and

is rapidly deployable from regional centers located away from

dense populations. The NDF is essentially 100 percent high-tech

and is equipped with high-tech throwaway (biodegradable) combat

weapons, communications, and transport systems, many of which are

robotic. Resupply is mostly by air and space logistic units.

Training, individual and by unit, is predominantly by computer

simulation and simulators that are linked to or are at local or

regional centers. The Active force is supported by a large single

Reserve component, (the National Guard and Reserve combined)

which is organized, equipped, and trained identically to and

combined with the active NDF at regional training centers.

The U.S. Army in the CHARLIE 2020 environment is organized

as the arm of the NDF for land warfare and is comprised of small,

self-contained, highly mobile, light (readily deployed) fighting

units. The Active CHARLIE 2020 Army is a small component of the

NDF with about 200 to 250 thousand troops, 40 percent of which

are organized in light, self-contained, self-sustaining, rapidly

deployable combat units. Additionally, Army combat forces are 10

percent heavy (not easily deployable) and 50 percent medium. The

Active Army is supported by a larger, single Reserve component

with about 1.2 to 1.5 million troops, which is organized the same

as the Active component. All warfighting operations of the NDF

land forces are fully coordinated with air/space, and sea

operations.

The CHARLIE 2020 Army component is supported by a highly

technically trained civilian force of about 100-150 thousand that

is integrated within both the Active and Reserve component and

contractually dedicated to service during war. The mandatory

Universal Public Service (UPS) program provides a rotation of

combat trained men and women who are selectively offered career

opportunities after training. Most services (e.g., installation

management, training, maintenance) are conducted under public

contracts. In general, the quality of life for the Army component

and other NDF personnel is modernized but austere (e.g.,

shipboard style living).

The role of the CHARLIE 2020 military forces, i.e., the NDF

as a whole, is defensive and reactionary to serious threats to

U.S. national security and interests and complements a residual

U.S. nuclear deterrent. The NDF is operationally trained for a
range of contingencies worldwide with a capability to fight a

conventional war strategy including chemical and biological

warfare. The NDF is deployed from strategic locations in space,

sea (surface and subsurface), and air or land from the United

States.
CHAPTER 7

THE DELTA SCENARIOS:

MUTED MULTIPOLAR WORLD

DELTA 2005

In the year 2005, the United States is one of the foremost

postindustrial nations of the new century. It shares the status

of postindustrial with Australia, Canada, Europe, and Japan. The

U.S. economic infrastructure at the start of the 21st century is

predominantly science based and technology oriented. Its economy

supports information, services, and knowledge industries that

employ about 60 percent of the U.S. population. Because the

United States is recognized by other nations as a world economic

leader, its foreign relations are good with almost every nation

whether it has formal agreements or not. This general worldwide

acceptance has strengthened U.S. political, economic, and

military influence and preserved U.S. military presence in almost

all corners of the globe.

By and large, the United States is respected worldwide for

its willingness to provide economic assistance (monetary and

advisory) and information exchange (management and technology) to

other nations, especially nations that are transitioning from

developing countries to modern industrialized nations. These are

the newly industrializing countries (NIC) that look to the United

States as a benevolent leader of world nations.

The United States is also respected for the stature of its

military. Most nations believe that the U.S. military is well

trained, armed with the most advanced weapons and technology of

the 21st century, and highly capable of rapid and efficient

warfighting operations worldwide. Its presence is quite visible

around the world and provides an umbrella of protection for many

small nations. These nations in return ensure that scarce

resources are available to the United States and provide port

visitation, overflight, and basing rights for U.S. forces. The

U.S. military, despite all outward appearances, is making

difficult decisions, however, within the United States regarding

its future. The military must make some hard choices relative to

national security and defense in a multipolar world where

conflict relates more to pricing wars than to shooting wars.

Over the past several decades, as many as 70 percent of U.S.

heavy industries, such as steel, chemicals, and arms

manufacturers, and about 45 percent of the lighter U.S.

manufacturing industries, e.g., automobiles, appliances, and

building construction and fabrication supplies, have relocated to

foreign nations. Most of these industries have remained under

American ownership or have arranged co-production agreements with
or resale directly to foreign business concerns. Notwithstanding

the loss of these industries, almost all sectors of the U.S.

economy are flourishing (at about 2-2.5 percent growth per year)

as are the economies of almost all the other nations of the

world. A comparable relocation of heavy industries has taken

place in other postindustrial countries, i.e., Canada, Europe,

Australia, and Japan. These nations in 2005 still depend on steel

armament for some 20th century military equipment, e.g., armored

vehicles. It has been only during the past decade that the U.S.

plastics (e.g., high-polymers) industries have perfected ordnance

and lightweight, high-impact armor plate. Within about 5 years

the U.S. military very likely will be able to field the new

plastic ordnance and armored equipment. The industrial capacity

of the postindustrial nations to support industrial surge

requirements therefore is marginal, at best.

The U.S. economy in 2005 also supports light fabricating

enterprises that produce automated and robotics products,

electronic and optical specialties, and computer hardware and

software. The fabricating industries employ about 10 percent of

the U.S. population. Two other important industries of the U.S.

postindustrial society are the plastics and the

techno-agricultural industries, which employ about 10 and 5

percent of the population, respectively. In addition to their use

in ordnance and armor plate, lightweight plastics increasingly

are replacing traditional structural building and plating

materials. The technoagricultural industries produce a

significant portion of the nation's food supply and, essentially,

have replaced about 40 percent of the large farms of the past. 

They require less than a third of the land space formerly needed

for late 20th century farming. About a third of the former

farming land is occupied by new housing developments and

high-tech industries; the remainder is now used for pasture

lands, timber, and national parks.

Increasingly over the past two decades or so, there has been

a growing public reaction by local U.S. communities, especially

those that are contiguous to or within 25 miles of military

installations, to the U.S. military's inability to cope with

community environmental protection standards. The public's

response has been directed further against the military's

position that state environmental regulations are encroaching

upon military installations and constraining the military's

readiness in support of national defense. Reaction has been

aimed at the military's lack of remedies for pollution of the air

and the water table. This pollution is presumed to be caused by

military systems and procedures (e.g., disposal of toxic wastes,

transport of potentially toxic and hazardous substances, and

noise). Moreover, response is also directed toward a presumed

disregard of environmental conservation (e.g., wasteful

consumption of natural resources, especially water). Despite the
military's attempts to correct its procedures and decontaminate

the most heavily polluted installations, the public reaction by

2005 has not stirred congressional response. Several states,

however, have enacted environmental protection legislation that

prohibits or severely restricts specific military activities

within their states, such as the disposal of used petroleum,

spent nuclear wastes, and the movement of obsolete chemical,

radiological, and nuclear weapons. This has resulted in the

closure of several military bases and their literal reduction to

fenced-in and guarded toxic waste dumps. Additionally, during

the late 1990s, public reaction to noise generation blocked the

development of several artillery ranges and armored vehicle

training installations.

Concurrent with this increasing and apparently antimilitary

public attitude has been the growing economic independence of

many local communities and the rising affluence of individuals;

neither of which in 2005 needs the economic support of military

installations. Such economic support is now provided by

high-tech, services, and information industries that the local

communities and states have encouraged over the past decade or so

to locate in their areas. The employment and high wage

opportunities offered by these industries have created population

shifts and migrations, which, in turn, have created new housing

developments and communities that gradually will encircle

adjacent military installations. They are the beginning of

potential east-west, north-south megalopolises. Further

complicating the problems for the nearby military installations

are the growing difficulties they are facing in competing for and

attracting the high quality civilian personnel whose skills both

the military and industries need.

Military manpower requirements are made more difficult by

the national population age and ethnic distribution. In 2005,

the average population age in the United States is about 38

years. In general, there are fewer 18-24 year-old youths

eligible for military service. The ethnic distribution in the

United States is approaching 28 percent blacks, Hispanics, and

Asians. More than 50 percent of the available 18-24 years of age

males and females are in this group. This population age and

ethnic distribution can be expected to continue to rise over the

next decade or so. Moreover, these groups increasingly will

become more involved and influential in all aspects of national

life. The U.S. national political leadership (the Administration

and a small majority of the Congress), aware of the increasing

social and economic problems of these groups over the past decade

or so, has increasingly sponsored national social welfare

programs and investments, especially in housing, health, and

education, to raise their standard of living and increase their

contribution and participation in the nation's postindustrial

economy. Following the social welfare investment in the national
budget are space, science and technology, and defense programs.

Although national security and defense are budgeted lower than in

past political administrations, the U.S. defense budget remains

one of the highest per capita investments of any comparable

postindustrial nation.

Almost all the nations of the world, except the very poorest

of the newly industrial countries (NIC), have invested in a

military force armed with 20th century conventional weapons.

Comparable to their perception of threats to their nation, some

have small-to-moderate size military forces, while others have

moderate-to-large forces and are armed additionally with more

modern high-tech weapons of the late 20th and early 21st century.

By 2005, the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons and

delivery means has increased by 20 percent over the preceding

decade. The United States, the new Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS) (a temporary administrative arrangement that came

about after the breakup of the Soviet Union), and Russia are

showing concern over this increase in nuclear proliferation.

The CIS in 2005 is involved in a continuing program to

assist the former Soviet republics in their transition from a

centralized to a free-market economy and raising the standard of

living throughout the commonwealth. The CIS leaders no longer

support client states and are showing no inclination toward 

promoting any new ideology. The CIS is more interested in

economic innovativeness and experimentation than in military

undertakings. Each of the CIS nations, however, retains residual

conventional military capabilities left by the former Soviet

Army, but they are not perceived as a serious threat to Western

Europe. Despite attempts by the European Community (EC) to

create its own military defense during the late 1990s, it still

depends on a limited presence of U.S. forces and a linkage to

nuclear forces as its primary deterrent. An assessment of CIS

strategy by the EC nations suggests that the CIS leadership is

attempting to reduce international tensions for whatever time is

needed for the economies of the Commonwealth and the various

societies of the former republics to acquire postindustrial

statehood. This strategy has tended to be divisive among the new

independent nations that are beginning to group together

according to like needs and interests for their economic

security. Around 2005 new CIS leaders express publically a more

conciliatory air.

The combined impact of world and U.S. domestic trends and

events on the U.S. military over the past decade or so

increasingly has encouraged the Department of Defense (DoD) to

reevaluate U.S. military organization, force structure, and,

especially, where the military will be stationed within the

United States. The mission of U.S. forces in 2005 continues to

be the defense of the United States, its interests, and its
allies. The defense posture for the next decade must continue to

be highly capable of reacting to any threat across the spectrum

of conflict. Since the start of bilateral (U.S./Soviet) nuclear

arms reductions in the late 1980s, U.S. defense strategy by 2005

has relied more heavily on high-tech conventional land, sea, and

air weapons for deterrence than on a nuclear strategy of

deterrence. In the late 1990s new agreements continued to be

made by Russia, a republic of the former Soviet Union and CIS

that controls most of the former Soviet nuclear weapons.

The U.S. force structure has shifted from emphasis on

separate services to joint commands. The total force is about 70

percent heavy (i.e., equipment intensive and not easily

deployable) and about 30 percent light (i.e., man intensive and

easily deployable) and includes specialized land, sea, air, and

space elements. Logistics, communications, personnel, training,

transportation, and installation facilities management and

operations are all under DoD control and most have been placed

under civilian contract arrangements.

A typical end strength of the 2005 U.S. military is the Army

Active component (AC). It is about 700 to 800 thousand troops;

the Reserve component (RC) strength is about 800 to 900 thousand;

and the civilian support is 350 to 400 thousand specially trained

civilians. Most of the training for the AC and RC is under

civilian contract, including services and facilities, and is

conducted both within the United States (60 percent) and overseas

(40 percent). About 70 percent of the RC train on a rotational

basis overseas with the Active forces. Mobilization is mostly

from regional U.S. training centers.

Simulation is used increasingly by all services for training

and new innovative simulators are used at regional training

centers. Multipurpose centers provide similar programs for

concurrent joint service, Active and Reserve, training and are

located in the United States at low-density population areas.

These centers replace the installations that have been closed to

accommodate environmental protection legislation. The Reserve

forces not only train with the Active forces but also are manned,

equipped, and structured similarly to them. Moreover, despite

only a meager budgetary investment in advanced technological

systems, e.g., robotics equipment and high-tech weapons, new

innovative technological equipment and the doctrine and strategy

for their use are equally shared between the Active and Reserve

forces, and, where possible, jointly.

Because of the difficulty in manning the U.S. military,

Active and Reserve, with qualified men and women in the 2005

demographic environment, DoD has considered but ruled out for the

time being the need for compulsory national service based on

marginally acceptable end strengths and the perceived ability of
the military to fulfill its mission. At current strength, the

military services are capable of performing their missions of

land, sea, air and space defense and, further, are nearly capable

of conducting offensive operations across the broad spectrum of

conflict since the requirement for tactical nuclear operations

has been reduced.

DELTA 2020

Over the past decade or so, U.S. communities increasingly

have rejected the presence of military bases contiguous to or

within 25 to 50 miles of major cities. East-west and north-south

patterns of urban sprawl throughout the nation are beginning to

form vast megalopolises that are encircling remaining military

bases and installations.

Many U.S. communities vehemently oppose any increased

installation investments made to accommodate strange and new

weapon systems that might pollute their environment and consume

their resources. Since 2005, additional states have enacted

environmental protection legislation that is so stringent that

many military installations within those states have been forced

to close. Recently, organized groups of citizens, condoned by

state governments, have blocked the addition to, and creation of,

installations for new military systems, troops, and training

programs. These groups believe that any changes in the status

quo of the military would increase the risk of their communities

to additional environmental pollution by military activities or

make them targets of terrorists or of enemy attack in the event

of a major war.

Most U.S. communities are economically viable and have

little need for the economic support provided by military bases.

Politically, most communities are represented by an older

population and one that is approaching 40 percent blacks,

Hispanics, and Asians combined. On the average, the same

representation exists in state and federal governmental bodies.

The political, economic, and social influence and impact of this

near majority on U.S. national and international affairs are

substantial. This impact affects U.S. society in general, but is

especially reflected in the response of U.S. national political

leaders who advocate comprehensive, national social welfare

programs and investments. These programs are followed by

investments in education, space, science and technology, and

defense programs. The defense budget, however, has been reduced

to considerably less than the defense budget of the late 1990s.

The United States is the leading postindustrial nation of

the world. A very large percentage of Americans are employed in

the services, information, and knowledge sectors of the U.S.

economy. Heavy U.S. industries, such as steel and chemicals, as
well as most manufacturers of automobiles, appliances, and

building supplies have relocated to foreign nations from which

the United States imports such needs. Specialty industries such

as plastics (e.g., polymers) and high technology industries

support the U.S. economy, which is flourishing. A comparable

situation exists in the other postindustrial nations of Canada,

Europe, Australia, and Japan. At the turn of the century, most

Western strategic analysts believed that the postindustrial

infrastructures, along with their specialty industries, lacked

the capacity to support national industrial surge requirements in

the event of a major war. The plastics industry has proved this

wrong, since a decade or so ago, it developed plastic ordnance,

and lightweight, high-impact armor plate, and has recently

developed building construction beams.

Worldwide, over the past decade, many nations have traded

nationalism, which had been growing since the turn of the

century, for economic security and development. This has

strengthened U.S. international political, economic and military

influence and has preserved U.S. military presence, bases, and

installations overseas. These countries also welcomed American

businesses, and their managerial expertise in the free market.

Within this arrangement, these nations not only receive financial

assistance from the United States, but also information, services

and training, and most importantly, a security umbrella.

Most nations of the world, except the very poorest, remain

heavily armed with conventional weapons. Others, additionally,

are armed with more modern high-tech weapons systems. The number

of nations with nuclear weapons and delivery systems has

increased by two since the year 2005. The Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), beset with constant economic setbacks,

has been replaced by 2005 by a new temporary administrative

commonwealth. It has three member confederacies: the Union of

Social Democratic Republics (USDR), principally Ukraine; the

Union of Sovereign Republics (USR), principally Russia; and the

third, the Union of Independent States (UIS), which is made up of

a number of independent, anomalous and ethnic groups of the

former Soviet Union. These confederacies are bent on national

economic catch up to enable them to achieve increased competitive

advantage. They have, therefore become more adventuresome

economically than militarily. Militarily, the USR and USDR

leadership, unlike the former Soviet Union, no longer train and

provide arms to client states; increasingly, however, they

involve them in economic experimentation. Although the USR and

USDR conventional warfighting capabilities remain substantial in

2020, they do not pose an immediate threat to the European

Community since their interests, for the time being, have turned

toward continued internal economic development and completing the

transition to democratic government.
U.S. defense programs in the DELTA 2020 world are austere.

The economic benefits and military security that are provided to

host nations by U.S. installations overseas have strengthened

U.S. international political, economic, and military influence.

These overseas installations accommodate U.S. military training

and offer opportunities for the acquisition of additional land to

expand training for U.S. reserve forces as well as U.S. military

assistance programs.

The DELTA 2020 military force structure is organized as a

single Unified Defense Force (UDF) made up of the Army, Navy, and

Air/Space forces in a mix of generalists and specialists. The

Army includes light (easily deployable) Army divisions which

complement heavy (less deployable) Army divisions at a ratio of

about 40:60 for both the Active and Reserve components of the

Army. The UDF of DELTA 2020 has increased the use and activities

performed by contractors. For example, contractors are used for

administration, medical and personal services, and as pilots for

noncombat activities. This has made more personnel available for

the fighting force and, at the same time, has decreased the

deployable combat logistic tail and sustaining base. The Active

military are 75 percent high-tech and are equipped with robotics

systems, modern weaponry and technology, and lightweight plastic

(polymers) transport and fighting vehicles appropriate for land,

sea, and air combat operations. The Army and Air National Guard

and Reserve work closely with the Active components. The Reserve

component is manned and equipped similarly to, and trains

constantly with, the Active component within the UDF operational

training programs. The UDF training programs support a total

force concept where, within the United States, the UDF trains

together as one entity at regional centers. The UDF is manned by

highly educated, goal-oriented men and women of diverse ethnic

origins from an informationand service-oriented postindustrial

society. However--a draft may be needed to provide the required

UDF staffing.

The Active DELTA 2020 Army component provides an example of

the relative size of the other services of the UDF. The Army is

a large component of about 700-800 thousand troops. Its combat

forces are 60 percent heavy (not easily deployable), 20 percent

medium, and 20 percent light (easily deployed). They are

supported by a larger Reserve component of about 800 thousand to

1 million National Guardsmen and Army Reservists who wear the UDF

uniform. Civilian support to the Active Army and Reserve

component includes about 250-300 thousand highly-trained

personnel. The quality of life ranges from spartan during

training to comparability with civilian pay and benefits after

training. The primary role of the DELTA 2020 Unified Defense

Forces is defensive but they are fully capable of offensive

operations when needed. The UDF complements the U.S. nuclear

deterrent and is operationally trained to fight a variety of
conventional contingencies.
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APPENDIX A

ALPHA 2020: U.S. ISOLATIONIST

A MINISCENARIO

During the past several decades, most of the nations of the

world have experienced a period of rising economic growth that

has been increasingly challenged by an invigorated, but highly

competitive, world economy. Most nations of the world, except

the very poorest, are armed with 20th and 21st century

conventional weapons and others with high-tech conventional

weapons and systems as well. Nations with nuclear weapons and

delivery systems in their arsenals have significantly increased

in number since the end of the century.

The economic progress that most nations have made, along

with the absence of any major wars over the past 30 years or so,

has outbalanced an armed and militarily competitive world in

furtherance of a peaceful but economically competitive world. The

United States is a prospering postindustrial state. While part

of the former Soviet Union is an industrial state striving to

increase its economic growth and another part is marginally

accepted as a postindustrial, adversarial relationships with the

United States no longer exist. Currently, both the Union of

Sovereign Republics (USR), the industrial state, and the Union of

Social Democratic Republics (USDR), the postindustrial state,

interests are turned toward internal economic and social

development. They remain formidable military powers. However,

they are becoming increasingly more adventuresome and

unpredictable economically than militarily.

The United States, one of the foremost economic

postindustrial countries of the world, has turned increasingly

toward expansion of its social welfare programs over the past two

decades. The U.S. economy in 2020 is skewed decidedly toward a

social investment economy which comprises a disproportionate part

of its national budget. Social programs are followed by national

education, space, defense, and science and technology programs.

This same trend, however, is occurring in all other free-world

nations as well.

Moreover, most of the heavy industries, those that made

nations great during the past two centuries, essentially have

disappeared from the postindustrial states of the United States,

Canada, Europe, Australia, and Japan, and have relocated in the

industrial states in South, Southeast, and Southwest Asia; China;

South America; and some in North Africa and in South Africa. Most

industries of the postindustrial nations are high-tech oriented

and are supported by specialty industries. Heavy industrial

needs of these nations are imported competitively from the world

market. This situation has brought to the forefront a serious
realization that the postindustrial infrastructures in the year

2020 lack the capacity to support a national industrial surge

program were it needed.

The new economic status and positions of prestige and power

for the industrial states have fostered a general rise of

nationalism worldwide that has affected U.S. international

political influence adversely. It also has resulted in the

expulsion of U.S. forces from U.S. overseas bases and port

facilities and in a repossession of the land, despite any

previous long-term political or military agreements. This has

prompted the USR to pursue economic and friendship ties with many

of these nations.

By 2020, the growth of the U.S. population and its cities,

especially those contiguous to and within the vicinity of

military bases and installations, has confounded the withdrawal

and restationing of U. S. forces within CONUS during the past

decade or so. Environmental issues of pollution and waning

resources, for example, along with demographic factors (e.g., an

aging population, ethnic redistribution) and a general change of

attitude and values of the U.S. citizens toward war and

international involvement, are inhibiting military stationing and

reducing investments in installations.
APPENDIX B

BRAVO 2020: U.S. WORLD PEACEKEEPER

A MINISCENARIO

The world economy in 2020 is brisk and highly competitive.

The United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan, the leading markets

of the 20th century in heavy industrial products, automobiles,

and other manufactured products, are now the world leaders of

high-tech products, services, information, and knowledge programs

and systems. Former 20th century industrial states along with

newly industrialized countries (NIC) are supplying the world with

heavy industrial products and most other high-demand manufactured

consumer products that were formerly produced by the nations

named above. Most nations of the world, except for the very

poorest, are achieving a new economic prosperity that is

expanding their horizons, while altering their political and

social infrastructures. Since the turn of the century, new

economic and security agreements, many ad hoc, have been

replacing eroding 20th century treaties and agreements.

The highly competitive world economy, along with a broad

transfer of technology, has generated an increased frequency of

trade wars and political and economic power competitions.

Notwithstanding, most of the industrial states are trading off a

new growth of nationalism for economic development and investment

as a solution to financial and unemployment problems. This has

strengthened U.S. international political and economic influence

and has preserved U.S. military presence overseas. To most

nations, the United States is the colossus of the world.

By 2020, the achievements of science and the advances of

high technology in the postindustrial states have offset the

economic loss of heavy industries and, coupled with specialty

industries, their infrastructures are capable of supporting an

industrial surge for contingencies should crises arise.

National pride within the United States is high, as is the

economy, and although social investment remains the foremost

national budget expenditure, it is followed by a sizeable defense

budget. Both the current Congress and the Administration as well

as the general populace support extensive military programs. In

general, U.S. community infrastructures (economies, demographics,

resources, attitudes and values, etc.) underpin military

stationing requirements and investments in installations. The

enactment of a universal public service (UPS) program, which

includes the military, not only bolsters the general economy, but

also answers national unemployment problems and aids in melding

the nation. Other areas of high national interest are education,

science and technology, and space programs.

Most nations of the world, except the very poorest, have
been highly armed by the new arms merchants of the industrial

states. The number of states with nuclear weapons and delivery

systems in their arsenals is 40 percent more than those known to

have existed in 1995. Despite some strategic nuclear arms

reductions by the United States, the USR, and the USDR, early in

the new centuryΧthe result of negotiations stemming from arms

control meetings in the late 1980s between the United States and

the former Soviet UnionΧU.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear

capabilities remain high.

The Union of Sovereign Republics (USR), dissatisfied to

remain an industrial state while the United States is an advanced

postindustrial, has embarked on an ambitious plan of internal

economic development encompassing its entire nation. The USR is

now becoming more adventuresome militarily than it had been in

2005 and is beginning to support client states. It has, however,

permitted economic fusion of many East European states with the

European Community. Even so, the USR sector remains highly

capable of waging war if provoked.
APPENDIX C

CHARLIE 2020: NEONATIONALISM WORLD

A MINISCENARIO

Nations of the world by 2020 have increasingly become more

nationalistic, despite an increasing number of nations adopting

free-market economies and representative forms of government

(mostly parliamentary). These conditions have evolved over the

past several decades from a gradual transformation of many

formerly Third World countries that had been modernizing their

societies with the aid of the American government and its private

enterprises. Their international status has been raised from

that of Third World nations to that of modern industrial nations.

Believing that the influx of technology and Western people's

ideas was changing their societies, altering their cultural

values, and obscuring their national identities, many of these

newly industrial countries have sought refuge in a revival of

nationalism. This has occurred despite unprecedented national

economic growth and a higher standard of living for their people

over the past two decades. These countries have nationalized all

industries, expelled all foreigners, civilian and military, and

have reclaimed the real estate of all U.S. military bases and

port facilities. This rise of nationalism worldwide has

suppressed U. S. opportunities for international political and

economic influence.

The United States, the foremost postindustrial nation of the

world, over the past several years politically has advocated

maintaining a strong military defense. Its investments in

technologically advanced military systems, especially those using

the fourth dimension of outer space, have surpassed any previous

military investments of the past three decades. These new

systems have reduced the military requirement for massive land

forces and placed an increasing emphasis and demand for

technologyand space-oriented counter strategies of land, sea, and

air warfare. These advances in the conduct of war have been

essential since in the last century heavy industries, including

arms manufacturers, from the most advanced nations have relocated

in other newly industrial countries.

Postindustrial infrastructures, along with specialty

industries, lack the capacity to support a national industrial

surge in the event of war or serious crises. Complicating this

for the United States, local U.S. community infrastructures

(economies, politics, demographics, resources, etc.) are

inhibiting military stationing capabilities and, through

political action and more drastic measures, are reducing

investments in installations. Military strategists and analysts,

however, have devised force structures and end strengths
compatible with security needs and societal characteristics

without losing sight of military missions. The military,

however, must find alternative training sites or new means to

train warfighters and their supporting forces.

All except the very poorest of nations have been armed by

the arms merchants during the latter years of the 20th century

and the early years of the new century. The number of nations

with nuclear weapons and delivery systems in their arsenals has

increased two-thirds over those known to have them in the 1990s.

Most nations have elected to maintain a military force since they

are experiencing economic growth and want to protect it. Many of

these nations, however, are unable to cope with the challenges of

a highly competitive world economy and are unable to devise the

economic strategies needed to survive.

The Union of Sovereign Republics (USR) is bent on the

industrial modernization of its entire nation. Despite moderate

and incremental bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions with

the United States, stemming from U.S.-Soviet arms control

meetings in the late 1980s, the USR retains a formidable

warfighting capability, yet poses less threat to the European

Community. The USR investments in national economic and social

development, however, have reduced its inclination to support any

client states and have curtailed its adventuresome interests.
APPENDIX D

DELTA 2020: MUTED MULTIPOLAR WORLD

A MINISCENARIO

Over the past decade or so, U.S. communities increasingly

have rejected the presence of military bases and installations

contiguous to, or within 50 miles of, major cities. East-west

and north-south patterns of urban sprawl throughout the nation

form vast megalopolises that are encircling military bases and

installations.

Many U.S. communities vehemently oppose any increased

investments in military installations made to accommodate strange

and new weapon systems that might pollute their environment and

consume their resources. Some states have enacted environmental

protection legislation that is so stringent that many

installations within those states have been forced to close.

Recently, organized groups of citizens, condoned by state

governments, have blocked the addition to, and creation of,

installations for new military systems, troops, and training

programs that they believe would increase the risk to their

community as a target of enemy attack in the event of war. Most

U.S. communities are economically viable and have little need for

the economic support provided by military bases. Politically,

most communities, local, state, and federal, are represented by a

population that is an older age and approaching 40 percent

blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The political, economic, and

social influence of this near majority on U.S. national and

international affairs is substantial. This impact, also, affects

the U.S. society in general but is especially reflected in the

U.S. national political leadership who advocate comprehensive

national social welfare programs and investments. These federal

programs are followed by investments in education, space, science

and technology, and defense programs.

The United States is the leading postindustrial nation of

the world. A very large percentage of Americans are employed in

the services, information, and knowledge sectors of the U.S.

economy. Heavy U.S. industries, such as steel and chemicals, as

well as most manufacturers of automobiles, appliances, and

building supplies, have relocated in foreign nations from which

the United States imports such needs. Specialty industries, such

as plastics and high-technology industries, support a flourishing

U.S. economy. A comparable situation exists in most of the other

postindustrial nations, i.e., Canada, Europe, Australia, and

Japan. Most strategic analysts believe that the postindustrial

infrastructures, along with their specialty industries, lack the

capacity to support national mobilization plans in the event of a

major war or crisis.
Worldwide, over the past decade, many nations have traded

off nationalism, that had been growing since the turn of the

century, for economic security and development. This has

strengthened U.S. international political, economic, and military

influence and has preserved U.S. military presence, bases and

installations overseas. With this arrangement, these nations not

only receive financial assistance from the United States but they

also receive information services and training, and most

importantly, a security umbrella.

Most nations of the world, except the very poorest, are

heavily armed with conventional weapons. Others, additionally,

are armed with more modern high-tech weapons systems. The number

of nations with nuclear weapons and delivery systems is about 40

percent greater since 1995. The Union of Sovereign Republics

(USR), beset with constant economic setbacks, is bent on national

economic catch-up throughout its vast territory to enable it to

achieve postindustrial status and compete with the United States

and its neighbors, the Union of Social Democratic Republics

(USDR) and the European Community (EC). Although the USR

military is less adventuresome militarily, its warfighting

capabilities remain formidable and continue to be a threat to the

free world.
A GUIDE TO ESTIMATIVE SEMANTICS*

NOMINAL AND ORDINAL SCALE FOR DESCRIBING FORECASTS

 NOMINAL ORDINAL (%)

Sure Chance, Certain, In All Likelihood 100

Very Good Chance, Almost Certain, Very High 90-95

Likelihood

Good Chance, Fairly Certain, Most Likely, 75-85

Good Likelihood 

Better than Even Chance, Very Likely, 60-70

Fair Likelihood

Even Chance, Likely, A Likelihood 45-55

Less than Even Chance, Less than Likely 30-40

Small Chance, Hardly Likely, Little Likelihood 15-25

Poor Chance, Unlikely, Very Little Likelihood, 5-10

Probable

Slight Chance, Possible, Improbable 4-<1

No Chance, Not Likely, No Likelihood, 0

Impossible

_______________

* Adapted from Sherman Kent, Intelligence Analyst