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### MEMORANDUM OPI NIO N No
. 04
- 08 -0 00 91 -C V D an i e l R o y LOP EZ and Antonia R. L opez, I ndividually and as Repre sentatives of the Estate of D aniel Roy L opez J r., Ap pe lla nts
v . F ORD MOTOR COMP ANY ,

Appellee Fr om the 229th J udicial District Court, Starr County , Texas

Trial Court No. DC-04- 254 Honora ble Alex W illiam Gabert, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: Marc h 11, 2009 AFF I RMED Da nie l Ro y L op e z an d A nto nia

R. L op e z, in div idu a lly and a s r e pr e se ntativ e s o f t he Es ta te of Da niel Roy L opez J r., appe al the take -nothin g j u d gm ent re ndere d in favor of For d Motor Com pa ny a ft e r a jur y tr ia l. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.0 4
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND Th e L op e zes su e d F or d a ft e r t he ir so n Danie l L op e z Jr. wa s k ill e d in a tr a ff ic a c c ide nt w hil e dri v i n g a Fo rd p i cku

p t ru ck
. T h e j u ry fo u n d aga i n s t t h e L o p ez es o n t h ei r m an u fa ct u ri n g an d d es i gn defe ct claims and it assig ned eig hty perc ent of the responsibil ity for the de ath to the dec edent. The trial court rende red judgme nt on the verdic t on J une 13, 2007. On J uly 11, 2007, the L opezes filed a motion for new

trial on t h e gro u nd of “juror misconduct and e rror ,” alleg ing one of the juror s mistakenly

signe d the ver dict form. On August 24, 2007, the L opezes filed a supplemental motion for ne w trial, cla iming juror misconduc t on the g rounds of an improper outside influence . The trial court de nied both motions after he aring evidenc e and argument. The L opezes appe al, ar g uing a new trial should have be en g rante d beca use of juror

err or and jury

misconduct. D I S CUS S I ON I n their first issue, the L opezes argue the trial court should have g rante d their orig inal motion for n ew t ri al beca

use one of

the jurors mistakenly

signe d the ver dict, resulting in an “e rror ” or “irre g ularity in jur or voting” that constitutes jur or misconduct. We r eview the trial court’s or der on a motion for new

trial for a

buse of discret i o n. Ph ar o v . Ch am be rs C ou nty , 922 S.W .2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996). Whether jury misconduct occur red is a question of fac t f

or the trial c ourt. Go lde n E ag le Archery , Inc. v . Jack

son , 24 S. W
. 3 d 3 6 2 , 3 72 (Tex. 2000). I n the abse nce of finding s of fa ct, we
a ssume the tr ia l c ourt

ma de a ll f

ind ing s in su pp or t of its de c isi on to de ny the mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. Id. I f there is conflicting evidenc e on the issue, we defe r to the trial cour t’s finding
. Ph ar o , 922 S.W .2d at 948. The ve rdict wa s signe d by ten jurors. Juror Elmira Alanis’s sig nature appea red f irst on the
ve rd ic t f or m. Wh e n th e ve rd ic t w a s re tur ne d, the fo re pe rs on re a d th e ve rd ic t a lou d in op e n c ourt
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- 3- No ob je c tio ns we re ra ise d. At

the L op e zes ’ r e qu e st, the tr ia l c ourt po lle d th e jur

y . B e g inn ingwi th Mr s . A l an i s , t h e t r i a l c o u rta s k e d w h e t h e r t h e v e r d i c tr e a d

b y t h e p r e s i d i n g j u r o r

w a s h e r v e rd ic t. Mrs. Alanis and nine othe rs answe red “ y es.” After the jury was poll ed, the tria l court ac cepte d the verdic t. At the hea

ring on the motion for new trial, Mrs. Alanis testified on direc t examination s he thought the f

irst question in the charg e — whe ther ther e wa s a design defec t in the door of the pic kup truck — should be a

nswere d “y es.” She stated she sig ned the ve rdict bec ause she thought she “wa s signingfor mistrial.” On cross-e x amination, howeve r, Mrs. Alanis c oncede d she under stood at the time that te n votes wer e nece ssary to suppor t a verdic t a

nd that the ver dict she sig ned answ ere d “no” to q ue sti on numbe r on e . She te sti fi e d “ I wa s un de r pr e ssu re I did n’ t wa nt to sig n and a t the e nd

Ijus t signe d. Ig ot the paper and I signe d it.” Mrs. Alanis testified s he “was t he last one to de cide,” but when she did, she was the f irst person to sig n the ver dict. Mrs. Alanis ac knowledg ed beingin the courtroom whe n the ver dict was a nnounced. She a lso reca lled being asked by the t rial judg e whe ther she ag r e e d

w it h th e v e r d ic t a

n d an s w e r in g “ y e s . ” O nr e d ir e c t e xa mi n a ti o n , th e L o p e ze s ’ a ttorney asked he r whe ther the ve rdict re flec ted her “ultimate dec ision.” Mrs. Alanis responde d, “No, I was very confuse d and I was very – I , Iwas unde r pre ssure. I , Iwas like – y eah, I had a lot of pr essure and, uh, I just signed it.” Mrs. Alanis’s testimony

was c onflicting : she t es t i fi ed she thoug ht the answe r to question
numbe r o ne sh ou ld b e “ y e s” and sh e be lie ve d s he wa s “ sig nin g fo r a mis tr ia l;” ho we ve r, sh e a lso te sti fi e d s he un de rs too d th e ve rd ic t c on ta ine d a “ no ” vo te to q ue sti on on e and that sh e ne ve rt

he le ss “dec ided” to sig n t h e v er d i ct . The trial c ourt rea sonably could have found that Mrs. Alanis’s sig natur e on

the ve rd ic t f

or m a c c ur a te ly

re fl e c te d h e r v ote. A ne w t ri a l is no t w arr ante d me re ly0 4
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- 4- beca use a juror

had doubts or misg ivings a bout her vote. See State v . Finch , 349 S.W .2d 780, 782-83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1961, no writ). We hold the trial court did not abuse i t s d i s cr eti on by denying the motion for new tria l. I n th e ir se c on d is su e , the L op e zes c on te nd the tr ia l court a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyingthe ir supplemental motion for newtrial. The or igina l motion for new trial, a lleg ing j uror misconduc t beca use of Mrs. Alanis’s vote, was timely filed within thirty day s of the judg ment. The supplementa l motion, allegingfor the f

irst time juror misconduct due to an improper outsi de influence, wa s filed more than thirty

day s after

the trial cour

t signe d the judg ment. The motion was untimely
. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 3 29 b( b) ; Mo rit

z v . P re iss , 121 S.W .3d 715, 720 (Tex. 2003)
. A trial court ha s discretion to consider an untimely

supplemental motion for newtrial while the c ourt reta ins plenary power . Id. “[B]ut if the trial court denie s a new trial, the belated motion is a nulli ty and supplies no basis for consideration upon appeal of g rounds which we re r equire d to be set for th in a timely

motion.” Id. Be cause the untimely

motion did not prese rve a ny issue for a

ppellate r eview, w e over rule the L opezes’ sec ond issue and af firm the trial c ourt’s judg ment. See id.

C OSTS As a g ener al rule, the appellant pa y s the cost to prepa

re the appellate rec ord and this cour t
awa rds the pre vailing pa

rty the appe llate costs incurr ed by that party
. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 34.6(c ) (3); 43.4. Howe ver, w e may tax costs ot herw ise for g ood cause
. See R. 4 3. 4; see, e .g. , Castil lo v. Am. Garme nt Finishers Corp. , 9 65 S.W. 2d 64 6, 65 5- 56 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 98 , n o p e t.) . In th is
case , the L opezes reque sted a partial rec ord, consisting of the motion for new tria l hear ing a nd the portions of the t ri al p ro ce edings that occ urre d afte r the jury retire d to deliberate. When Ford subsequently

reque sted the re porter pr epar e “a ll other portions of t he re porter’ s rec ord, including0 4
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- 5- opening statements, closing statements, and a ll trial testimony , toge ther with exhibi ts,” the L opezes moved to require For d to pay the cost of the a dditional parts of the re cord. After a hear ing on the motion, the trial court orde red For d t o p ay fo r pre paration of the additions, impli edly finding the desig nated a dditions to the rec ord we re unne cessa ry to the appea l. See R. 34.6(a)( 3). F ord paid the court re porter a

nd the re cord of

the trial w as pre pare d and filed. In its brief, F ord re quests we tax the cost of the r ecor d, as we ll as all other costs of this appe al, ag ainst the L opezes. The pa rtial repor ter’s rec ord re quested by

the L opezes containe d all that was ne cessa ry for us to dispose of this appea l. Had appe llants successf ully shown that only

nine jurors ha d endorse d the verdic t, a s they argued in their first issue, we w ould have r emande d the ca use. No re view of the trial rec ord would have been ne cessa ry . And, as F ord succ essfully argued both in the trial court a nd
on a pp e a l, t he L op e zes ’ i ssu e c la imi ngan imp ro pe r ou tsi de inf lue nc e on the jur y wa s n ot r a ise d in a timely motion for new tria l and therefor e was not prese rved for appellate review. No review of the
r e p o rt e r ’ s r e c o r d

w a s n e c e s s ar

y. We have considera

ble di scre tion in taxi ng costs on appea l. See Rec ognition Commc’ns, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass’n , 154 S.W .3d 878, 894-95 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2005, pe t. de nied). Although the trial court’ s order

that For d pay the cost to pr epar e the additional parts of the rec ord does not aff ect our powe r to ta x costs differ ently , see R. 34.6(c) (3), we ag ree with the trial court’ s finding that the portions of the record Ford requested were unnece ssary . Acc ording ly , we find g ood cause to depar t from the g ener al rule a

nd, in the i ntere sts of j ustice, we order For d to bear the cost of the portions of the re po rt e r’ s r e c or d it

re qu e ste d. We t a x all oth e r c os ts i nc ur re d b y F or d in thi s a pp e a l a g a ins t
a pp e lla nts
. Steven C. Hilbig , J ustice