J-A26029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMAL WASHINGTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 194 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004885-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 08, 2024

Jamal Washington appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction 

Relief Act petition, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. He claims his appellate counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise a due process challenge to a finding of 

accomplice liability. We affirm.

The trial court previously set forth the following facts:

On the evening of January 3, 2017, Marcella Vance watched 

movies with her cousin, Jessica Kidd, and her paramour, the 

decedent Darryl “Kwan” Curtis, in the back room of her 

apartment located at 8039 Erdrick Street in Northeast 

Philadelphia. Vance shared the apartment with her 

roommate Nashieta [Noland], who was present in the front 

room with her paramour, [Washington]. At approximately 

8:30 p.m., Vance left the apartment to drive Kidd home. 

Shortly thereafter, both Noland and [Washington] left the 

apartment, leaving the decedent alone inside.

Between 7:52 p.m. and 8:24 p.m., [Washington] received 

multiple phone calls from [an] individual named Robert 

Thorogood and co-defendant Andrew Holder. At 8:24 p.m., 

[Washington] called Holder. Holder, who was wearing a 
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global position-tracking electronic monitor while under the 

supervision of state parole, travelled to the area of 8039 

Erdrick Street. There, he and an unidentified individual met 

[Washington], and all three walked together in the 

apartment, which Holder entered at 9:35 p.m., armed with 

a pistol. Inside, Holder searched a safe inside Noland’s room 

and encountered the decedent inside Vance’s bedroom. 

There, he shot and killed the decedent.

Detective Thorsten Lucke, an expert in both video 

surveillance recovery and cell phone data extraction, 

recovered video surveillance recordings from private 

residences at 8052 and 8045 Erdrick Streets, along with 

video recorded from a church located at the corner of 

W[e]lsh and Erdrick Streets. Surveillance footage recovered 

from the corner of Erdrick and W[e]lsh Streets depicted two 

vehicles make a left-hand turn from W[e]lsh Street onto 

Erdrick, in the directions of the apartment. The camera 

located at 8052 Erdrick Street captured video of 

[Washington], Holder, and another individual walking down 

Erdrick Street at 9:32 p.m. towards the decedent’s location, 

before disappearing from view. At 9:34 p.m., the cameras 

at 8052 Erdrick Street recorded [Washington] speaking on 

a cellular device while walking back towards Welsh Street, 

away from the crime scene. At 9:38 p.m., both cameras 

captured Holder, armed with a pistol, running away from the 

murder scene with the unidentified individual. Holder’s 

positive identity was captured as he ran past the camera 

located at 8052 Erdrick Street at 9:39 p.m.

Vance, who had dropped Kidd off at her home before 

purchasing dinner and cigarettes at other locations, called 

the decedent at 9:48 p.m. but received no response. Upon 

entering the apartment less than fifteen minutes later, 

Vance discovered the decedent’s body lying in a pool of 

blood in the back bedroom. After attempting to give CPR, 

both Vance and her upstairs neighbors called 911. 

Philadelphia Police Sergeant Conway and Officer Theodore 

Brown answered a radio call for an unresponsive male. The 

decedent was pronounced dead at the scene at 10:19 p.m.

Forensic pathologist Dr. Lindsay Simon performed the 

decedent’s autopsy and determined that the cause of death 

was a single gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of 

death was homicide. The projectile entered the decedent’s 
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head above the right eyebrow, traveled through his skull 

and brain, before exiting behind the left ear, causing 

immediate incapacitation and death. There was no soot or 

stippling discovered on the body to determine the distance 

of the shooter.

. . .

Detective Lucke completed a call detail record report on the 

cellular device attributed to [Washington] on June 7, 2017, 

which revealed a series of phone calls between his device 

and those attributed to Holder and Thorogood. At 7:53 p.m., 

Thorogood placed a call to [Washington], lasting fifteen 

seconds. At 7:54 and 7:57 p.m., Holder left voicemails with 

[Washington], who responded with an outgoing call to 

Holder at 8:24. [Washington] and Holder next 

communicated at 9:21 p.m., before the instant shooting. 

[Washington] next placed several calls to Holder between 

9:40 p.m. and 9:41 p.m., and again between 10:01 p.m. 

and 10:09 p.m. that evening. In total, Washington’s device 

recorded twenty-six communications between devices 

associated with [Washington] and Holder, all of which 

occurring within the time frame immediately before and 

after the murder.

Detective Lucke’s analysis further revealed that, in the 

aftermath of the instant shooting, Washington deleted from 

his cell phone all records of his communications with 

[Holder] and Thorogood that evening. Cell phone data 

extraction permitted Detective Lucke to recover some, but 

not all, of their communications.

Detective James Dunlap, an expert in cellular tower 

analysis, reviewed data from towers located at 8046 Erdrick 

Street and .6 miles away from the crime scene on 

Interstate-95, and identified numerous connections

between [Washington’s] device and those towers between 

8:04 p.m. and 9:54 p.m. on the night of the murder. 

Additional connections depicted [Washington’s] device 

making two connections at a tower located at Rhawn Street 

and Roosevelt Boulevard, 1.5 miles away from the crime 

scene. Nine connections between 10:06 p.m. and 10:10 

p.m. show the device travelling along Roosevelt Boulevard 

before making a connection with the tower at 1831 West 
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Allegheny Avenue, which is associated with [Washington’s]

home address at 1931 West Willard Street.

Analysis of the device associated with Holder (215-880-

7871) showed that it connected to the tower associated with 

the crime scene numerous times between 9:25 p.m. and 

10:08 p.m. Analysis of the device associated with 

Thorogood revealed that the device was not in the area of 

the crime scene . . . at the time of the shooting.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 2-4, 6-7 (citations omitted).

Washington and Holder proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court 

convicted Washington of burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. Prior to 

sentencing, Washington filed a motion for extraordinary relief. The trial court 

granted a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count because in the 

criminal information the Commonwealth had only listed murder and robbery 

as the objectives of the conspiracy. The trial court sentenced Washington to 

six to 12 years’ incarceration. 

Washington filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied. This 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, concluding the evidence was 

sufficient to support the burglary conviction under conspiracy and accomplice 

liability theories. Commonwealth v. Washington, No. 876 EDA 2020, 2021 

WL 2105034, at *6 (Pa.Super. filed May 25, 2021). In October 2021, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Washington’s petition for allowance of 

appeal.

In July 2022, Washington filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. The court 

appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. The court issued notice of 
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its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing and, after receiving no 

response, it dismissed the petition. 

Washington raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether the court 

erred in not granting relief on the PCRA petition alleging counsel was 

ineffective.” Washington’s Br. at 7.

Washington claims appellate counsel should have argued that the 

Commonwealth’s failure to include a charge for conspiracy to commit burglary 

was substantially misleading such that a conviction for burglary as an 

accomplice violated Washington’s due process rights. Washington argues that, 

based on the charge in the information, the Commonwealth was limited to 

presenting evidence that Washington was a principal actor in the burglary. He 

contends that because the Commonwealth was unable to establish 

Washington’s presence in the home at the time of the crime, it failed to 

establish he was guilty of burglary. He maintains that imposing liability as an 

accomplice when the information charged the defendant as a principal is a 

fatal variation. He further argues that this is especially true because the 

Commonwealth represented it would not seek to impose accomplice liability. 

Washington notes that the Commonwealth did not charge him with 

conspiracy to commit burglary, as it had with the murder and robbery charges. 

He points out that in its closing the Commonwealth stated it was not a 

conspiracy case and argued that Washington let the co-defendant into the 

apartment. Washington states: “The Commonwealth did not simply fail to 

charge Conspiracy to commit Burglary. They intentionally om[]itted the 
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charge in the Information and presented a theory of the case that was 

completely contrary to the idea that [Washington] conspired to commit 

burglary.” Id. at 18. Washington maintains that his trial counsel’s arguments 

disputing certain facts were to refute the claims of conspiracy to commit 

robbery and murder, and were not indicative that counsel was arguing against 

accomplice liability for burglary. He concludes his due process rights were 

violated “where the Commonwealth significantly misled [Washington] into the 

belief that he would not be facing a theory of accomplice liability and indeed 

refused to present a theory that allowed the possibility of [Washington] merely 

being an accomplice to the burglary.” Id. at 19-20. He claims there was no 

reasonable or strategic reason for appellate counsel to not raise the issue.

“Our standard of review from the denial of post-conviction relief ‘is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by 

the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.’” Commonwealth 

v. Ligon, 206 A.3d 515, 518 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

Washington challenges the effectiveness of his direct appeal counsel. 

Counsel is presumed effective until a petitioner has proven otherwise. Id. at 

519. A petitioner may prevail on an ineffectiveness claim only where the 

petitioner pleads and proves that “(1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable 

merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis 

designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that 

there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s 
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error.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127, 1138 

(Pa.Super. 2017)). 

A person is an accomplice of another in the commission of an offense if, 

with the intent of promoting or facilitating the offense, the person solicits such 

other person to commit it or aids, agrees, or attempts to aid such other person 

in planning or committing it. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c). A defendant may be 

convicted as an accessory, even though only charged as a principal, if the 

defendant is on notice that the Commonwealth may pursue a theory of

accomplice liability. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 588 (Pa. 

1998). A defendant has sufficient notice where the evidence suggests 

potential liability under an accomplice liability theory, the defense was 

prepared to argue against accomplice liability at trial, or the defendant was 

tried jointly with a co-defendant. See Commonwealth v. Harper, 660 A.2d 

596, 599 (Pa.Super. 1995) (discussing case law). However, a person cannot 

be held liable as an accomplice if the Commonwealth “misled” the defense or 

expressly rejected proceeding on an accomplice liability theory. Id. at 599-

600.

In Harper, the Commonwealth did not seek an accomplice liability 

instruction until after closing arguments, and the court gave the instruction.

This Court held that to determine whether a defendant had sufficient notice of 

the possibility of liability as an accomplice, courts must “carefully review the 

record to determine whether [the defendant] had sufficient notice of the 
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potential for an accomplice theory despite being charged as a principal and 

whether [the defendant] was misled by the Commonwealth.” Id. at 599.

This Court held the defendant there had sufficient notice because the 

evidence suggested the possibility of accomplice liability. The Court reasoned

that although the Commonwealth had focused on the defendant as the 

shooter, the witnesses had also testified to observing two people being 

involved in the shooting. Id. It noted that the only thing that could be 

“remotely characterized as the Commonwealth’s ‘misleading’ the defense is 

the prosecutor’s failure to request the accomplice charge prior to closing,” and 

that was not a sufficient basis to justify refusal of the instruction. Id.

Here, the PCRA court concluded:

Far from misleading [Washington] or expressly rejecting 

proceeding on an accomplice liability theory, the 

Commonwealth’s case at trial focused on how [Washington]

orchestrated the burglary of his paramour’s home with 

Holder. On the night of the burglary, despite informing his

paramour that he was returning home, [Washington]

remained in the vicinity of the residence and contacted 

Holder. Holder travelled across the city to meet with 

[Washington] before [Washington] escorted Holder and 

another unidentified individual to the burglary site. At trial, 

trial counsel argued against accomplice liability by disputing 

that . . . [Washington] escorted Holder to the house and

argued that the Commonwealth had no evidence that his 

phone calls that night were criminal in nature. 

Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective because the 

Superior Court held that the evidence was sufficient to 

sustain the conviction under accomplice liability theory.

Commonwealth v. Jamal Washington, 876 EDA 2020, 

*10-12 (Pa.Super. May 25, 2021) (unreported 

memorandum).
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Trial Court Opinion, Dec. 22, 2022, at 7-8.

The record supports the PCRA court’s finding that the underlying claim 

was meritless. Washington was tried with a codefendant and the evidence 

showed that multiple people participated in the crime. Further, although the 

Commonwealth in its closing stated that it was not a case of conspiracy to 

commit burglary, its discussion of accomplice liability did not stop there. It

clarified that it was “a multifaceted situation. They went in there with the 

intention of taking whatever was in the safe, and they went in there with the 

intention of robbing Daryl Curtis.” N.T., Dec. 4, 2019, at 51.1 Washington had 

sufficient notice that he could be held liable for burglary as an accomplice, and 

the Commonwealth did not mislead him.

Order affirmed.

Date: 2/8/2024

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1 On direct appeal, this Court further found the evidence sufficient to support 

conspiracy liability for the burglary conviction. Washington does not discuss 

this finding in his PCRA petition or appellate brief.