July 12, 2016

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 1 

South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and 

What’s Next?

Caitlin Campbell, Senior Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs

Nargiza Salidjanova, Senior Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade

Key Findings

 The arbitral tribunal adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea ruled 

overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, determining that major elements of China’s claim—including 

its nine-dash line, recent land reclamation activities, and other activities in Philippine waters—were 

unlawful.

 Predictably, China reacted negatively to the ruling, maintaining it was “null and void.” China may take 

assertive and inflammatory steps to defend its position.

 The extent to which China abides by the ruling in the long term, and to which the international community 

supports and seeks to enforce the ruling, will have consequences for the utility of international law as a tool 

to ensure the peaceful, stable, and lawful use of the seas going forward.

Background

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague released the ruling of the arbitral tribunal 

constituted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)* on the case initiated by the Philippines in 

2013 regarding China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea.1 At the center of the dispute is China’s ninedash line, a vague depiction by China of its claim encompassing about 90 percent of the South China Sea.2 Since 

around 2009, China has steadily increased its efforts to consolidate its position in the South China Sea with varied 

tactics, including using its military, coast guard, and maritime militia †to harass foreign ships; exploring and 

extracting resources in disputed areas; and, starting in 2013, constructing artificial islands and basing military and 

civilian assets there.

 

* Both China and the Philippines have ratified UNCLOS. The United States has not. 

† China has the world’s largest maritime militia, a quasi-military force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to China’s People’s 

Liberation Army. They are trained to participate in a variety of missions, including search and rescue, reconnaissance, deception operations, 

law enforcement, and “rights protection,” which often entails activities like harassing foreign vessels in China’s claimed waters. Andrew 

Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia is a Military Force in all but Name,” War is Boring (Blog), July 9, 2016. 

https://warisboring.com/chinas-fishing-militia-is-a-military-force-in-all-but-name-58265cbdd7d#.6t8u2b104. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2 

Figure 1: Map of the South China Sea

Source: Economist, “Joining the Dashes,” October 4, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21621844-south-china-seas-littoral-stateswill-fight-museums-archives-and. 

Economically, diplomatically, and militarily outmatched by China, the Philippines turned to legal arbitration. The 

Philippines’ case, comprised of thousands of pages of arguments and documents, asked the court, among other 

things, to (1) declare whether China’s claims based on the nine-dash line are invalid under UNCLOS; (2) declare 

whether certain land features in the South China Sea are rocks, islands, or low-tide elevations;*and (3) declare 

whether China has interfered with the Philippines’ right to exploit resources within the Philippines’ claimed waters.

3

Over the past three and a half years, China has expended resources and energy to discredit the Philippines’ case and 

the legitimacy of the proceedings, arguing that it would “neither accept nor participate in the arbitration.”

4

In the 

months leading up to the ruling in particular, Beijing began a campaign of diplomatic warfare5to solicit support 

from other countries for its position, and suggested in mid-June that 60 countries had pledged support to China’s 

position,

6

though in reality only ten countries made public statements to that effect.† 7 The Chinese government and 

government-affiliated entities also placed advertisements and editorials in overseas media outlets, including the 

United States’ Washington Post8and San Francisco Chronicle,

9

the UK’s Telegraph,10 and Australia’s The Age,

11

supporting Beijing’s stance on the arbitration. At a think tank event in Washington, DC one week before the ruling, 

 

* The distinction, as defined by UNCLOS, between an island, rock, and low-tide elevation is important because each type of feature generates 

a different amount of maritime territory. Islands, which must be above water at high tide and be capable of sustaining human habitation or 

economic activity of their own, can generate exclusive economic zones out to 200 nautical miles. (An exclusive economic zone is a 200-

nm zone extending from a country’ coastline within which that country can exercise exclusive sovereign rights to explore for and exploit 

natural resources, but not full sovereignty.) Rocks, which are defined as being above water at high tide but unable to sustain human 

habitation or economic activity, only generate a 12-nm territorial sea. Low-tide elevations are land features which are submerged at high 

tide. Unless they are located within the territorial sea of another island or mainland coastline, they do not generate any maritime territory.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “Article 121: Regime of Islands;” UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “Part 2: Territorial Sea 

and Contiguous Zone;” and UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “Part 5: Exclusive Economic Zone.”

† These countries are Afghanistan, The Gambia (which formally restored diplomatic ties with China in March 2016 after severing diplomatic 

relations with Taiwan in 2013), Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Togo, and Vanuatu. Center for Strategic and 

International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Arbitration Support Tracker, June 15, 2016. http://amti.csis.org/arbitrationsupport-tracker/.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 3 

China’s former top diplomat Dai Bingguo remarked that the ruling would amount to “nothing more than a piece of 

paper.”12

Through diplomatic pressure and economic leverage China has also succeeded in preventing other South China Sea 

claimants from rallying in opposition to China’s activities or in support of the legal arbitration process. Members 

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—five of whom have claims in the South China Sea—have 

failed to endorse a joint plan of action. The June 2016 meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers ended in discord after 

they issued and then retracted a joint communique expressing concerns over recent developments in the South China 

Sea—allegedly due to Chinese pressure.13

The Ruling: Key Takeaways

The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 479-page ruling14 was overwhelmingly favorable to the Philippines’ position, 

ruling several elements of China’s claims in the South China Sea unlawful. Key findings of the ruling include:

 China’s claims to historic rights and resources within its nine-dash line have no legal basis.15

 None of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are an island capable of generating a 200-nm

exclusive economic zone.

*16

 China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering with Philippine oil exploration activities, 

prohibiting Philippine fishing vessels from operating, failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from 

operating, and conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore 

for and exploit natural resources.†17

 China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm 

to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.18

China is legally bound by the tribunal’s ruling by virtue of its ratification of UNCLOS.19 The extent to which, 

and how, the tribunal’s ruling might be enforced is an open question, however; the Philippines and others may 

be able to pursue a range of legal options to punish China should it fail to abide by the ruling,

20 or open 

negotiations to resolve the matter.

China’s Response

China’s immediate reaction to the ruling was to release two statements: a notably subdued Government statement 

that reaffirmed its “territorial sovereignty and maritime rights” in the South China Sea and expressed its desire to 

“resolve the relevant disputes peacefully” without making explicit reference to either the Philippines or the 

arbitration proceedings,21 and a much more hardline statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring that 

 

* The tribunal ruled that China’s claimed features are either rocks (capable of generating a 12-nm territorial sea) or low-tide elevations 

(incapable of generating maritime territory). Notably, it ruled that of the seven features on which China has conducted land reclamation, 

four are rocks (Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Gaven Reef [North]), and three are low-tide elevations (Subi Reef, 

Hughes Reef, and Mischief Reef). PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal 

Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and 

the People’s Republic of China, Award, July 12, 2016, 174. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf.

† The tribunal did not rule on the merits of the individual claimed features themselves (i.e., whether these claimed features belong to China 

or the Philippines). However, having found that some of China’s claimed features (Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Reed Bank) 

located within the Philippines’ claimed exclusive economic zone are low-tide elevations and do not overlap with any Chinese exclusive 

economic zone, the tribunal ruled that these features are Philippine features located in a Philippine exclusive economic zone. Permanent 

Court of Arbitration, Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration, July 12, 2016, 10. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4 

the ruling is “null and void and has no binding force.”22 China’s state-affiliated press simultaneously released a slew 

of articles condemning the ruling.23

It is unclear whether or how the ruling will prompt a change in China’s behavior in the short or long term, but it can 

reasonably be expected that China will not depart from the position it has held since 2013: it will not acknowledge 

the authority of the arbitral tribunal or abide by the ruling.24 China likely will respond swiftly and assertively to 

demonstrate its disregard for the ruling and its displeasure with the Philippines for initiating the case.25 Potential 

responses could include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following:

Increasing PLA, China Coast Guard, or Maritime Militia Presence in Disputed Areas: China may seek to use the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the China Coast Guard, or the maritime militia to “show the flag” in its claimed 

waters, either with patrols or staged exercises. Increased harassment or intimidation of Philippine or other vessels 

by either the China Coast Guard or the maritime militia, a frequent occurrence in recent years,26 is also possible. 

The PLA could also respond by deploying fighter jets or other advanced military assets to the Spratly Islands (which 

would violate China’s pledge not to “militarize” the area).27

Engaging in Commercial Exploration in Disputed Waters: China may renew or expand its efforts to prospect for 

hydrocarbons and other minerals in its claimed waters.* China has demonstrated its willingness to escalate tensions 

by twice moving an oil rig into waters near the Paracel Islands—an area also claimed by Vietnam—despite 

Vietnam’s protests.28 China has also reportedly approved plans for a mobile deep-sea platform to explore for 

minerals in the South China Sea.29

Applying Economic Sanctions on the Philippines: China might employ overt or indirect economic sanctions 

against the Philippines, as it did when it restricted Philippine banana imports and banned Chinese travel to the 

Philippines during the Scarborough Reef crisis in 2012.30

Conducting Land Reclamation at Scarborough Reef: China so far has refrained from conducting land reclamation 

at Scarborough Reef, likely due to intense U.S. pressure.† 31 However, Beijing may perceive it to be a way to expand

its physical presence in its claimed waters after being dealt a blow to its legal position. Though the tribunal ruled 

that Scarborough Reef was a rock (rather than an island or low-tide elevation), it did not determine whether China 

or the Philippines has sovereignty over the feature. Further, the tribunal did not deem Chinese fishing activities near 

Scarborough Reef unlawful;

32 Beijing could feasibly use this part of the ruling as a justification for reclamation for 

the purposes of facilitating fishing activities in the area (conversely, since the tribunal deemed fishing by both 

Chinese and Filipino fishermen in the vicinity of Scarborough Reef lawful, this could provide an opportunity for 

conciliation and cooperation between Beijing and Manila). Should China develop Scarborough Reef in the way it 

has developed the other reclaimed features in the Spratly Island chain, it could significantly enhance China’s 

military presence in the South China Sea and establish a military outpost unprecedentedly close to the Philippines, 

effectively creating a “strategic triangle” of occupied islands (the Paracel Islands, Scarborough Reef, and the Spratly

Islands) with the ability to host civilian and military infrastructure.33

Establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea: Since China established an 

ADIZ‡in the East China Sea in 2013, several Chinese officials have suggested that China might create a second 

 

* Estimates of proven and probable oil and natural gas reserves in the South China Sea vary. The U.S. Energy Information Administration 

believes the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Nonauthoritative 

estimates from China are significantly higher: 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. David Tweed, “What Do 

Weak Oil Prices Mean for the South China Sea?” Bloomberg, January 20, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-20/allabout-the-base-oil-drop-won-t-stop-china-in-south-china-sea. 

† The U.S. Navy reportedly observed Chinese ships conducting surveys around Scarborough Reef—possibly in preparation for land 

reclamation—in early 2016. “U.S. Sees New Flashpoint in South China Sea Dispute,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2016. 

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sees-new-flashpoint-in-south-china-sea-1461714183.

‡ An ADIZ is a publicly declared area, established in international airspace adjacent to a state’s national airspace, in which the state requires 

that civil aircraft provide aircraft identifiers and location. Its purpose is to allow a state the time and space to identify the nature of 

approaching aircraft prior to their entering national airspace to prepare defensive measures if necessary. China’s ADIZ regulations deviate 

from international norms by seeking to exert control over both civil and state (including military) aircraft, deliberately creating an 

overlapping area with other countries’ ADIZs and disputed territory, and threatening to use “defense emergency measures” against all 

noncompliant aircraft. Kimberly Hsu, “Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to Enforce East 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 

one in the South China Sea.

34 Though it is unclear whether the PLA has the capabilities in place to enforce an ADIZ 

in the South China Sea, it is possible China would establish one anyway for geopolitical, rather than operational, 

reasons.35 In such a case, the ADIZ’s utility could largely be symbolic, signaling China’s resolve and rejection of 

the ruling.*

China’s actual enforcement of an ADIZ—which would necessitate a more capable intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance network and the presence of radar systems and advanced military aircraft on its reclaimed land 

features36—could pose tactical, logistical, and operational challenges: a potential uptick in dangerous mid-air 

encounters between Chinese and foreign aircraft; uncertainty for foreign government, military, and commercial 

pilots who need to navigate crowded airspace with several overlapping air traffic authorities; and the expansion of

China’s ability to collect intelligence on U.S. and other forces in the region. Moreover, some of the infrastructure 

and platforms useful for the enforcement of an ADIZ could have military applications in a South China Sea 

contingency.

37

Withdrawing from UNCLOS: Chinese officials and state-affiliated media have in recent years advanced an 

argument that China’s position on the South China Sea disputes is fully in line with international law, and that the 

arbitral tribunal’s proceedings constitute a violation, or are outside the jurisdiction, of UNCLOS.38 As the ruling 

drew near, Chinese diplomats reportedly suggested to their counterparts in Southeast Asia that China was 

considering withdrawing from UNCLOS if the ruling was unfavorable to China.39 However, taking this step does 

little to advance China’s actual interests (and more likely undermines them).

40

Implications

In the short term, the ruling and China’s rejection of it will heighten tensions in the region and strain China’s 

relations with its neighbors, the United States, and any other country that publicly supports the ruling. The longterm implications of the ruling are likely to be much more significant, with potentially far-reaching consequences. 

Implications for International Law and China’s Relations with the Region

China’s initial reaction aside, if the ruling fails to alter China’s behavior in the longer term, it would send a signal 

to the rest of the world that adherence to international law is optional. † This would degrade the viability of 

international maritime law as a tool to ensure the peaceful, stable, and lawful use of the seas.

‡ 41 This may be the 

most significant long-term consequence of China’s response to the ruling; it also directly contradicts the United 

States’ oft-stated goal of preserving peace through the promotion of a “rules-based order” in the Asia Pacific.

42

Considered alongside China’s increasingly aggressive and risk acceptant behavior in recent years,43 it is becoming 

 

China Sea Claims,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 14, 2014. 

http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20ADIZ%20Staff%20Report.pdf; Xinhua (English edition), “Announcement of 

the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.,” November 23, 2013. 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm. 

* Though an ADIZ does not serve as an expression of territorial sovereignty, the size and shape of a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea 

could serve to indirectly refute specific elements of the ruling that China opposes. Michael Pilger, “ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East 

China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, March 2, 2016, 8. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ADIZ%20Update_0.pdf.

† China is known to employ “lawfare,” the use or manipulation of legal tools or standards to legitimize or otherwise advance its interests, in 

domestic and international settings. Kristien Bergerson, “China’s Efforts to Counter U.S. Forward Presence in the Asia Pacific,” U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 15, 2016, 8.

http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report%20on%20China%20Countering%20US%20Military

%20Presence%20in%20Asia.pdf. 

‡

It will be particularly damaging if China manages to establish an influential coalition of likeminded countries to join it in opposing the 

ruling, though this does not seem likely.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 6 

clear that the reputational costs of flouting international law have not been sufficient to deter China from advancing 

its interests in the region in ways that undermine stability. 

Nevertheless, in the wake of the ruling it will be more important than ever for the United States, the ASEAN 

countries, and other like-minded countries to make a public, concerted effort to affirm the ruling and express the 

important role international law plays in maintaining peace and stability in the maritime commons. A key test will 

be whether these countries, and ASEAN in particular, can deliver a unified response in support of the ruling; as 

noted earlier, in the past China has successfully sought to ensure ASEAN remains divided and unable to uniformly 

push back against Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.44

The Role of Taiwan

Taiwan, which has claims in the South China Sea similar to mainland China, also rejected the ruling, though on 

slightly different grounds than China: Taipei argues that the tribunal’s designation for Taiwan (“Taiwan Authority 

of China”) is incorrect and “demeaning to the status of [Taiwan] as a sovereign state” and that the ruling is not 

binding on Taiwan since it was excluded from the proceedings.45 Taiwan opposed in particular the tribunal’s finding 

that Itu Aba (called Taiping Island by Taiwan)—the only feature controlled by Taiwan in the Spratly Islands—is a 

rock, rather than an island. Itu Aba is the largest feature in the Spratly Islands, which some observers thought had 

a strong chance of being designated an island by the tribunal.46 Prior to the ruling, Taiwan had taken some positive 

steps to clarify its claims in the South China Sea in accordance with UNCLOS and initiated efforts to reduce tensions 

and establish coordination and cooperation mechanisms with other claimants.47 Taiwan has an opportunity to further 

clarify its position now that the tribunal has invalidated the nine-dash line.

New Leadership in the Philippines

The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs offered an initially subdued response to the ruling, noting that it was 

“studying” the ruling and called on “all those concerned to exercise restraint and sobriety.”48 Philippine Secretary 

of Foreign Affairs Perfecto Yasay remarked that “The Philippines strongly affirms its respect for this milestone 

decision as an important contribution to ongoing efforts in addressing disputes in the South China Sea.”49 It is 

unclear how the new administration of President Rodrigo Duterte will respond to the ruling. During his presidential 

campaign, Mr. Duterte made several inflammatory and contradictory remarks about how his administration would 

handle the South China Sea dispute with China: he alternately asserted he would personally ride a jet ski out to 

defend the Philippines’ claimed islands and strike a deal with China to resolve the dispute.50

Potential Future Cases

China’s compliance with the arbitral tribunal’s ruling notwithstanding, other countries—particularly Vietnam*—

that have competing maritime claims with China may be encouraged by the tribunal ruling to initiate their own 

cases against China. This would be a positive development insofar as it would provide some authoritative clarity 

on the other competing claims in the region, and could be a useful way to apply additional pressure on China.51

 

* Vietnamese officials have suggested Hanoi, too, might pursue legal measures in defense of Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea. 

Though it did not explicitly support the Philippines’ case, in 2014 Vietnam submitted a formal “statement of interest” to the Permanent 

Court of Arbitration expressing its hope that the tribunal take Vietnam’s “legal rights and interests” into account in its decision, and 

rejecting China’s nine-dash line claim. Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks by MOFA Spokesperson Le Hai Binh on the South 

China Sea Arbitration Case,” December 11, 2014. http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns141212143709; Rosemarie Francisco and 

Manuel Mogato, “Vietnam PM says Considering Legal Action against China over Disputed Waters,” Reuters, May 22, 2014. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-china-idUSBREA4K1AK20140522. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 7 

Disclaimer: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was created by Congress to report on the 

national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the 

People’s Republic of China. For more information, visit www.uscc.gov or join the Commission on Facebook.

This report is the product of professional research performed by the staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to supports its deliberations. Posting of 

the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed 

by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. 

security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an 

endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of 

the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report.

Endnotes

1 PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

Award, July 12, 2016. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-

English.pdf.

2 David Lague, “Analysis: China’s Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea,” Reuters, May 25, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-sea-boundary-idUSBRE84O07520120525. 

3 Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, “Notification and Statement of Claim,” January 22, 2013; Center for Strategic and 

International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Arbitration on the South China Sea: Rulings from The Hague.” 

http://amti.csis.org/ArbitrationTL/. 

4 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in 

the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, December 7, 2014. 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml; Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Arbitration between the 

Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China: Arbitral Tribunal Establishes Rules of Procedure and Initial Timetable, 

August 27, 2013. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2165479-phl-prc-press-release.html; and China’s Embassy to the 

Philippines, 2013 No. 039, February 19, 2013. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2165478/phl-prc-china-note-verbale.pdf. 

See also: Julian Ku, “A Guide to Countering Chinese Government Spin on the Fairness of the South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal,” 

Lawfare (Blog), June 20, 2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/guide-countering-chinese-government-spin-fairness-south-china-seaarbitration-tribunal. 

5 Amy Searight, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016).

6 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on June 14, 2016, June 14, 

2016. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1372136.shtml. 

7 Center for Strategic and International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Arbitration Support Tracker, June 15, 2016. 

http://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/. 

8

“Manila has No Leg to Stand On,” China Watch (Washington Post), June 2, 2016. 

http://chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/2016/06/manila-has-no-leg-to-stand-on/. 

9 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, San Francisco Chronicle Publishes Chinese Consul-General’s Article on South China Sea, June 14, 

2016. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1372285.shtml. 

10 Zhang Yunbi, “Philippines Push Seen as Threat to Peace,” China Watch (Telegraph), April 26, 2016. 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/politics/12209157/south-china-sea-philippines-threat.html. 

11 John Fitzgerald, “Australian Media Deals are a Victory for Chinese Propaganda,” The Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy 

blog), May 31, 2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/guide-countering-chinese-government-spin-fairness-south-china-sea-arbitrationtribunal. 

12 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Speech by Dai Bingguo at China-US Dialogue on South China Sea between Chinese and US Think 

Tanks, July 5, 2016. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1377747.shtml. 

13 Ankit Panda, “ASEAN Foreign Ministers Issue, Then Retract Communique Referencing South China Sea,” Diplomat, June 15, 2016. 

http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/asean-foreign-ministers-issue-then-retract-communique-referencing-south-china-sea/. 

14 PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 8 

Award, July 12, 2016. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-

English.pdf. 

15 PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

Award, July 12, 2016, 117. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-

English.pdf.

16 PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

Award, July 12, 2016, 260. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-

English.pdf.

17 PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

Award, July 12, 2016, 286, 297, 318, 397, 415, 435. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-

Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf.

18 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration, July 12, 2016, 10. 

http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf. 

19 Jerome A. Cohen, “Like it or not, UNCLOS Arbitration is Legally Binding for China,” East Asia Forum, July 11, 2016. 

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/11/like-it-or-not-unclos-arbitration-is-legally-binding-for-china/. 

20 Mark E. Rosen, “After the South China Sea Arbitration,” Diplomat (Japan), June 21, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/after-thesouth-china-sea-arbitration/. 

21 Government of the People’s Republic of China, Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial 

Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea, July 12, 2016. 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379493.shtml. 

22 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 

July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines, July 

12, 2016. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml. 

23 Xinhua (English version), “President Xi Says China Rejects Any Proposition, Action Based on S. China Sea Award,” July 12, 2016. 

http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0712/c90883-9085068.htmlhttp://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0712/c90883-9085068.html; China Daily (English 

edition), “Inherently Biased and Unjust ‘Piece of Paper,’” July 12, 2016. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-

07/12/content_26063420.htm; and Wang Xiaohui, “S. China Sea Arbitration: A US-led Conspiracy behind the Farce,” People’s Daily 

(English edition), July 12, 2016. http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0712/c90000-9085051.html. 

24 Greg Poling, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016).

25 Greg Poling, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016).

26 Todd Crowell, “A Coast Guard Arms Race,” Real Clear Defense, May 23, 2016. 

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/05/23/a_coast_guard_arms_race_109386.html; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. 

Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” CNA, March 7, 2016, 3. http://www.andrewerickson.com/2016/03/chinas-maritime-militia-ourmost-extensive-detailed-analysis-yet/. 

27 Greg Poling, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016); Andrew Shearer, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and 

Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016).

28 Reuters, “China Rebuffs Vietnam Criticism of Oil Rig Move,” April 8, 2016.

29 Bloomberg, “China Is Planning a Massive Sea Lab 10,000 Feet Underwater,” June 7, 2016.

30 Andrew Higgins, “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute,” Washington Post, June 10, 2012. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of-south-china-seadispute/2012/06/10/gJQA47WVTV_story.html; CNN, “Island Spat: China Suspends Philippine Travel,” May 10, 2012. 

http://travel.cnn.com/shanghai/life/china-travel-suspension-437031/. 

31 Demetri Sevastopulo, Geoff Dyer, and Tom Mitchell, “Obama Forced Xi to Back Down over South China Sea Dispute,” Financial 

Times, July 12, 2016. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c63264a4-47f1-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab.html#axzz4ECRJFKMu; Amy Searight, “The 

South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 

DC, June 20, 2016); War on the Rocks (Blog), May 2, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/successful-signaling-at-scarboroughshoal/; and Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. Sees New Flashpoint in South China Sea Dispute,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 

2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sees-new-flashpoint-in-south-china-sea-1461714183. 

32 PCA Case No. 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

Award, July 12, 2016, 315-318. http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-

English.pdf.

33 Yoji Koda, “Japan’s Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea,” Asia Policy 21 (January 2016). See also: Zach Cooper and 

Jake Douglas, “Successful Signaling at Scarborough Shoal?” War on the Rocks (Blog), May 2, 2016. 

http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/successful-signaling-at-scarborough-shoal/. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 9 

34 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on January 4, 2016,” 

January 4, 2016; Edward Wong, “China Says It Could Set up Air Defense Zone in South China Sea,” New York Times, May 31, 2015. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/world/asia/china-says-it-could-set-up-air-defense-zone-in-south-china-sea.html; and Xinhua 

(English edition), “Full Text: An Interview on China’s Construction Activities on the Nansha Islands and Reefs,” May 26, 2015. 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/27/c_134272694.htm; and Jim Gomez, “Envoy Says China Has Right to Set another Air 

Zone,” Associated Press, December 2, 2013. http://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/china-has-right-set-another-air-zone-envoysays. 

35 Michael Pilger, “ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United 

States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2, 2016, 7. 

http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ADIZ%20Update_0.pdf. 

36 Michael Pilger, “ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United 

States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2, 2016, 7. 

http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ADIZ%20Update_0.pdf.

37 Michael Pilger, “ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United 

States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2, 2016, 11-12. 

http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ADIZ%20Update_0.pdf.

38 Stefan Talmon, “Denouncing UNCLOS Remains Option for China after Tribunal Ruling,” Global Times (English edition), March 3, 

2016. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/971707.shtml; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Position Paper of the Government of the 

People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 

December 7, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml

39 Kyodo (Japan), “China Indicates it May Exit U.N. Sea Convention if South China Sea Ruling Disappoints,” June 21, 2016. 

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/21/national/politics-diplomacy/beijing-indicates-may-exit-u-n-sea-convention-south-chinasea-ruling-disappoints/#.V2qFYbsrLRZ. See also: Stefan Talmon, “Denouncing UNCLOS Remains Option for China after Tribunal 

Ruling,” Global Times (English edition), March 3, 2016. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/971707.shtml.

40 Tara Devenport, “Why China Shouldn’t Denounce UNCLOS,” Diplomat (Japan), March 24, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/whychina-shouldnt-denounce-unclos/. 

41 Justin Nankivell, “Navigating Unsettled Waters: Introducing the Maritime Awareness Project” (National Bureau of Asian Research, 

Washington, DC, April 14, 2016). 

42 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2016, April 26, 2016, iii. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf; U.S. 

Department of Defense, Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 21, 2015, 2, 32. 

http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF; 

U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, March 4, 2014, 11. 

http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global 

Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 3, 2012, 2-3. http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf; 

White House, Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, November 17, 2011. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; and Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 

October 11, 2011. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. 

43 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2016, April 26, 2016, i. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf;

Michael J. Green et al., “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, January 2016, 33. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf. 

44 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 440-441.

45 Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC Position on the South China Sea Arbitration, July 12, 2016. 

http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&s=5B5A9134709EB875. 

46 J.R. Wu and Faith Hung, “Taiwan Rejects Ruling on South China Sea Island of Itu Aba,” Reuters, July 12, 2016. 

http://uk.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-ruling-taiwan-idUKL4N19Y2TU. 

47 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 504-506.

48 Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2016. 

http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/9900-statement-of-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-2. 

49 Michael Peel and Jeevan Vasagar, “Asian Nations Welcome South China Sea Ruling,” Financial Times, July 12, 2016. 

https://next.ft.com/content/27665358-482d-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab. 

50 Economist, “Change of Command in the Philippines: Talk Duterte to Me,” July 9, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21701719-

deciphering-new-presidents-tough-guy-language-talk-duterte-me. 

51 Amy Searight, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and Countermoves” (Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, DC, June 20, 2016).