NO. 07-02-0352 -CR IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L C NOVEM BER 21, 2002

______________________________

DAVID MCKAY, Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 31 ST DISTRICT COURT OF LIPSCOMB COUNTY; NO. 1026; HON. STEVEN EMM ERT, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Before QUINN, REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. Dav id McKay

(appellant) appeals from an order revok ing his comm unity supervision. He had originally been convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly w eapon via a plea bargain and plea of guilty. Pursuant to the plea agreem ent, he was sentenced to five y e ars imprisonm ent. However, the sentence w as suspended, and appe llant was placed on five years probation. Subs equently, the State filed a motion to revoke probation. Appellant pled true to various grounds stated in the m otion and denied the others. The2

trial court granted the m otion, revoked appell ant’s probati on, and sentenced him to five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Departm ent of Crim inal Justice. Appellant timely noticed his appeal, and couns el was appointe d. Appella nt’s counsel then m oved to w ithdraw, after filing a brief pursuant to And er

s v. Cal ifo rn ia , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. C t. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and representing thathe had searched the record and found no arguable groundsfor reversal. The m otion and brief illustrated thatapp ellan t was in formed of hi s r ig ht s to re vi ew th e a pp el la te re co rd an d f il e h is own brief. So to o did w e inform appell ant that any pro se response or brief he cared to file had to be filed by Novem ber 14, 2002. To date, appellant has filed no pro se response or brief. In com pliance with the principles enunciated in An ders , appellate counsel discussed four potential areas for

app eal. Ea ch conc ern ed t he c our ts d ecis ion to re voke his
com munity

supervision. Howev er, in posing the argum ents, counsel also illustrated why each was

without m erit. Moreo ver, we conducted an independent review of the record to determ ine whether there existed reversible error and found none. See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (T ex. Cr i m. App. 1991) (requiring usto con duct an independe nt review ). The re cord illustrated thatno appeal was taken within 30 days f rom the date of appellant’s guilty plea and convicti on complaini ng of error occu rring at that time; thus, we have no jurisd iction
over any pur p or ted error arising from or prior to the plea hearing. Manuel v. Stat e , 944 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1999); see Cooper v. S tate , 45 S.W .3 d 7 7, 83 (T ex. Cr i m. App. 2001). Furtherm ore, finding that any one ground warranting revocat ion existed, the trial court was entitled t o revoke his com munity s upervision. Moore v. State, 6053

S.W.2d 924 , 92 6 (T ex . C rim . A pp. 197 9). He re, app ell ant pled true to two of the four grounds contained in the m otion to revoke. Standing alone, a ple a of tru e is sufficient to support the trial court's order

of revocation. Hatten v. S tate, 71 S.W.3d 33 2, 33 5 n .2 (T ex. Cr i m. App. 2002). Thus, the appellate record contained evidence supporting the decision to revoke probation. Furtherm ore, the punishm ent levied was w ithin the range provided by statute and agre ed to by the parti es. Accordingl y, cou nse l’s m otio n tow ithd raw is granted, and the j udgme nt of the trial court is affirmed. Brian Quinn Just ice Do not publish.