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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

LAVAROS DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20cv5935-MCR-HTC

MARK S. INCH, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Lavaros Davis, a prisoner proceeding pro se and informa pauperis,

initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF Doc. 1. The matter 

was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for preliminary screening and 

report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 

72.2(C). After reviewing the complaint, the undersign recommends the claims 

against defendants Mark Inch, Walker Clemmons, A. Flores, J. Santiago, Dr. 

Rodriguez, Nurse Sing, and Nurse Jane Dow1 (sic) be dismissed for failure to state 

a claim on which relief can be granted.

1 The undersigned presumes Jane Dow refers to Jane Doe. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) 

currently incarcerated at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution (SRCI) who sues four 

(4) supervisory officials, three (3) medical personnel, four (4) SRCI officers and 

three (3) John Dow (sic) defendants for an “inmate beating” that occurred on August 

6, 2020 at SRCI. ECF Doc. 1 at 7. After screening the complaint, the Court found 

Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force sufficient to be served on the four SRCI 

Defendant Officers and ordered Plaintiff to provide the requisite service copies. 

ECF Doc. 8. 

As stated above, this Report and Recommendation is as to the remaining 

defendants: Mark Inch, Walker Clemmons, A. Flores, J. Santiago, Dr. Rodriguez, 

Nurse Sing, and Nurse Jane Dow (sic). Plaintiff’s complaint contains the following 

allegations as they relate to those defendants and are taken as true for purposes of 

this Report and Recommendation.

After Plaintiff was “unconstitutionally assaulted” by the Defendant officers, 

he was escorted to the medical department in a wheelchair. ECF Doc. 1 at 8. Upon

Plaintiff’s arrival, Nurse Sing and Nurse Jane Dow removed the spit shield from the 

back of Plaintiff’s head and “cleaned the split . . . to stop the bleeding.” Id. at 9. 

Nurse Dow then removed the left side of the spit shield and cleaned the left side of 

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Plaintiff’s head and face. Id. When the nurses finished attending to Plaintiff’s 

wounds, Nurse Sing documented Plaintiff’s injuries on his medical charts. Id. 

Nurse Dow then placed the spit shield back on Plaintiff’s head while she and 

Nurse Sing blocked the camera “to cover up and limit the severity . . . of [Plaintiff’s] 

injuries.” Id. At no point after the attack did Nurse Dow or Nurse Sing report the 

assault to their superiors. Id. at 10. Additionally, Dr. Rodriguez failed to perform a 

brain scan, which would have determined “whether or not [Plaintiff] was bleeding 

in his brain.” Id. at 20. 

As to the supervisory officials, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Inch, 

Clemmons, Flores, and Santiago have “allowed prison officials at [SRCI] to 

establish stat-wide (sic), policies, customs and practices of beating, assaulting

and . . . causing him great bodily harm in violation of the 8th and 14th amendment.” 

Id. at 12. Plaintiff further claims that the supervisory officials were placed on notice 

of the SRCI officers’ conduct based on the numerous grievances and complaints 

filed by Plaintiff and other inmates. Id. at 13. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaratory judgment holding 

the assault violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) an injunction 

“ordering defendants . . . to immediately expunge any and [all] policies . . . that will 

allow Plaintiff to be harmed by officers,” (3) an order directing the SRCI to conduct

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a brain scan on Plaintiff’s head, and (4) $2.5 million dollars in compensatory 

damages as well as punitive damages and any other relief. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is 

required to review his complaint, identify cognizable claims and dismiss the 

complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b). 

When screening Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se 

allegations in a liberal fashion. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). 

Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same standard as Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 

(11th Cir. 1997). The complaint may also be dismissed if the facts, as plead, do not 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 

(2009).

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III. ANALYSIS 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief against all 

defendants “in their individual & official capacities.” ECF Doc. 1 at 1. However, 

absent an express waiver by the State or a valid congressional override, the Eleventh

Amendment bars an action for monetary damages against an official or agency of 

the State of Florida in federal court. See Gamble v. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehab. 

Services, 779 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). A suit against a state employee in 

his official capacity is deemed to be a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment 

purposes. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The State of 

Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity from §1983 suits. See Gamble, 779 

F.2d at 1513–15. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief under section 1983 

against Inch, Clemmons, A. Flores, J. Santiago, Dr. Rodriguez, Nurse Sing, and 

Nurse Jane Dow in their official capacities should be dismissed. 

Also, for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s claims against these seven (7) 

Defendants in their individual capacities should also be dismissed.

A. Supervisor Liability Under § 1983

Plaintiff has named Inch, Clemmons, Flores, and Santiago as defendants in 

this action because they are supervisors to the Defendant officers who allegedly 

assaulted him. Supervisory officials, however, cannot be liable under § 1983 for the 

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates “on the basis of respondent superior or 

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vicarious liability.” Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Instead, supervisory liability may occur “when either (1) the supervisor personally 

participates in the alleged constitutional violation, or (2) there is a casual connection 

between the actions of the supervisor and the alleged violation.” Gray ex rel. 

Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege Inch, Clemmons, Flores, or Santiago personally 

participated in the alleged assault. Thus, for Plaintiff to state a claim of supervisory 

liability against these defendants, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish a 

causal connection between each supervisory defendant and the assault. 

A causal connection can be established when (1) “a history of widespread 

abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged 

deprivation and he fail[ed] to do so”; (2) “the supervisor’s improper custom or policy 

le[d] to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) “facts support an 

inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that 

the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Id. 

The standard by which a supervisor “is held liable in [his] individual capacity is 

extremely rigorous.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). 

Although Plaintiff uses buzz words, such as “policies, customs and practices” 

and “wide-spread,” they are merely labels and conclusions, without any supporting 

facts. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

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(1986)) (noting courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched 

as a factual allegation”); Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 680–81 (explaining conclusory 

allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth). In other words, Plaintiff’s 

allegations of wrongdoing against the supervisory officials are nothing “more than 

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678. 

For example, Plaintiff alleges Inch had “unofficial policies, customs and 

practices of allowing the Defendants (herein named) . . . at the institutional level to 

establish such policies, customs and practices of beatings, assaults, attempted 

murders, injuries causing great bodily harm to Plaintiff . . . .” ECF Doc. 1 at 11. 

While the quoted language comes from one paragraph of his complaint against Inch, 

pages 11–19 of the complaint are replete with similar general and conclusory 

allegations. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege “any facts to support 

such allegation[s]” and, instead, “Plaintiff simply parrots the language of the cases 

which hold that supervisory liability may arise if the supervisor ‘instituted a custom 

or policy which resulted in a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.’” 

Milledge v. Jones, No. 4:15CV577-WS/CAS, 2016 WL 11680219, at *2 (N.D. Fla. 

Nov. 18, 2016) (quoting Gross v. White, 430 F. App’x 527, 531 (11th Cir. 2009)). 

Plaintiff does not identify when any particular policy or custom was put in 

place, who put it in place, or identify anyone else whose rights have been violated 

as a result of the policy or custom. Moreover, Plaintiff only identifies two specific 

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policies. First, he references the practice of having the attorney general’s office 

represent state employees in section 1983 actions, which Plaintiff contends is 

wrongful and shows that the supervisory officials are allowing the “assaults, beating, 

and attempted murders” to continue. ECF Doc. 1 at 12. One of the jobs of the 

attorney general is to defend state officials, particularly when, as here, they are 

named in their official capacities. Thus, this “policy” does not support a 

constitutional violation. 

The second alleged policy is transferring officials accused of assaults to 

another institution. ECF Doc. 1 at 15. Plaintiff, however, does not identify any 

instance where that has occurred. Simply, such threadbare allegations do not meet 

the “extremely rigorous” standard for imposing supervisory liability. See Hall v. 

Smith, 170 F. App’x 105, 108 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[b]ecause Hall alleged 

no factual support for his conclusory statement that the City had a policy or custom 

of grossly inadequate supervision and training of its employees, the district court did 

not err in dismissing Hall’s claims against the City”). 

Similarly, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that the “pattern” of “beating 

and attempted murders of Florida inmates” is “widespread.” ECF Doc. 1 at 13. He 

alleges the excessive force used against him is “not an isolated incident.” Id. 

However, nowhere in Plaintiff’s twenty-eight-page complaint does he state how 

many incidents there have been involving the Defendant officers. Indeed, nowhere 

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in the complaint does he identify even one other incident. “The deprivations that 

constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be 

obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated instances.” 

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

Finally, Plaintiff alleges the supervisory defendants were “placed on notice” 

of the Defendant Officers’ potential for assaulting inmates through “a number of 

grievance[s] and complaints filed by inmates and the Plaintiff over a period of 

months.” ECF Doc. 1 at 13. Such an allegation, however, is insufficient to establish 

the extent of the supervisors’ knowledge or the level of their involvement. Plaintiff 

does not allege that these supervisory officials ever saw the grievances and, even if 

he had, “filing a grievance with a supervisory person does not alone make the 

supervisor liable for the allegedly violative conduct brought to light by the 

grievance.” Thompson v Willis, No. 3:14cv246/MCR/EMT, 2016 WL 5339362 

(N.D. Fla. June 9, 2016); see also Milledge, 2016 WL 11680219, at *2 (finding 

Plaintiff’s grievances insufficient to show that a supervisory official actually knew 

of the incidents which Plaintiff complained). Rather, “[k]noweldge imputed to the 

supervisor ‘must be so pervasive that the refusal to prevent harm rises to the level of 

a custom or policy of depriving inmates of their constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting

Tittle v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994)). 

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Plaintiff alleges no facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that any 

of the supervisory officials knew Defendant Officers were going to assault him. He 

does not identify a single other incident that these supervisory officials were aware 

of involving the Defendant Officers. A supervisor’s failure to act or institute certain 

policies “must be in the face of repeated violations or other indicators signifying a 

strong likelihood that the situation will recur.” Haverty v. Crosby, No. 1:05 CV 

00133 MP EMT, 2006 WL 839157, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2006). 

Finally, given the scarcity of any facts supporting Plaintiff’s claim of 

supervisory liability, the undersigned recommends the claims against Inch, 

Clemmons, Santiago, and Flores be dismissed without leave to amend.

B. Medical Personnel Defendants

Plaintiff alleges Nurse Dow and Nurse Sing failed to report Plaintiff’s assault 

to their superiors and attempted to cover up the severity of Plaintiff’s injuries. ECF 

Doc. 1 at 8–9. Plaintiff further alleges Dr. Rodriquez failed to order a brain scan. 

Reading Plaintiff’s allegations liberally, as this Court must, it appears Plaintiff is 

seeking to hold the nurses liable for failing to report the alleged assault and Dr. 

Rodriguez liable for deliberate indifference to a medical need.2

 Plaintiff’s bare 

allegations, however, are insufficient to establish a claim of deliberate indifference.

2 The undersigned does not read Plaintiff’s complaint as attempting to assert a deliberate 

indifference to a medical need claim against the Nurses, as Plaintiff admits in his complaint they 

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1. Nurse Dow and Nurse Sing 

“A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 

requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently 

serious, a prison official’s act or mission must result in the denial of the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 

(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the prison official must 

subjectively have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind . . . one of deliberate 

indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

means that an official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. “[T]he official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of harms exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

Plaintiff’s complaint is simply devoid of any allegations indicating that Nurse 

Dow or Nurse Sing knew the Defendant officers had used excessive force on him. 

Plaintiff alleges the Defendant officers assaulted him while he was in his cell. Thus, 

the Nurses, both of whom were in the medical department at the time of the alleged 

assault, would not have witnessed the assault. Moreover, although he alleges the 

tended to his injuries, cleaned his spit shield, and made efforts to stop his bleeding. There are no 

allegations that additional treatment was required of the Nurses and that they failed to provide it. 

Regardless, as set forth in section B.2, below, any such claim, at best, would be a dispute over 

medical treatment, which is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Harris v. Thigpen, 

941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). 

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Nurses attempted to “cover up” the severity of his injuries by using their bodies to 

block the camera, without any facts showing the Nurses knew there had been an 

assault, this allegation is purely conclusory. Indeed, elsewhere in the complaint

Plaintiff admits the Nurses identified his injuries on the medical forms, and Plaintiff 

makes no allegation the information they recorded was minimized. ECF Doc. 1 at 

9. 

Plaintiff also admits the Nurses tended to his medical needs and attempted to 

stop the bleeding from the back of his head. This conduct clearly belies any claim 

the Nurses possessed a culpable state of mind. “Failure to report [an] incident does 

not violate the Eighth Amendment absent facts showing that by failing to report the 

incident, [defendants] knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s health 

or safety.” Gifford v. Rathman, No. 1:14-CV-1179-SLB-JEO, 2017 WL 4340454, 

at *26 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2017) (quoting Bullard v. St. Andra, No. 1:17-CV-0328-

MJS(PC), 2017 WL 1398834, *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2017)). 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s failure to report claim fails because there is no allegation 

Plaintiff was harmed because of the failure to report. See Crenshaw v. Lewis, No. 

8:14-CV-1941-T-27AEP, 2016 WL 521531, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2016)

(dismissing for failing to state a claim because Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants 

failed to report that an officer punched Plaintiff failed to show an “objectively 

sufficient serious deprivation of rights”). In other words, Plaintiff was not subject 

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to any additional harm because the Nurses did not further report the assault, even 

had they known an assault had occurred. This allegation, in fact, is similar to a claim 

for failure to investigate, which also does not establish a constitutional violation. 

See Reynolds v. Henry, 69 F.3d 548 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A conclusory allegation of a 

failure to investigate without other non-conclusory allegations. . . does not constitute 

a cognizable claim for violations of Eighth Amendment rights.”).

2. Dr. Rodriguez

The crux of Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Rodriquez is that he failed to order a 

brain scan to determine whether Plaintiff was “bleeding in his brain,” which exposed 

him to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. ECF Doc. 1 at 20

A § 1983 claim may arise when prison officials act with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). To state a claim 

of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must allege facts 

sufficient to show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate 

indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the 

plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d at 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 

2009) (citing Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)). 

Plaintiff, however, has alleged no such facts in his complaint.

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“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307. In the 

alternative, a serious medical need is determined by whether a delay in treating the 

need worsens the condition. Id. In either case, “the medical need must be one that, 

if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (citing Farrow v. 

West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)).

As stated above, Plaintiff alleges he was bleeding from the back of his head, 

and this was cleaned by the Defendant Nurses. This injury, alone, does not show a 

serious medical need. There is nothing about the injury as described by the Plaintiff 

from which a lay person would conclude a doctor’s attention was needed. There is 

no allegation that the injury was one diagnosed as needing treatment. To the 

contrary, Plaintiff alleges the Nurses cleaned the blood and that no further medical 

treatment was provided. While he may contend additional treatment was needed, he 

has set forth no facts showing why additional treatment was needed. 

To establish the second element of his claim, Plaintiff must show Dr. 

Rodriguez both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. 

“[T]he official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also [have] 

draw[n] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added). Plaintiff must 

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prove: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; 

and (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 

F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 

(11th Cir. 2004)). “Conduct that is more than mere negligence includes: (1) grossly 

inadequate care; (2) a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of 

treatment; and (3) medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at 

all.” Id.

Establishing deliberate indifference also requires Plaintiff to show “a 

subjective intent by the public officials involved to use the sufficiently serious 

deprivation in order to punish.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 

2000). Thus, Dr. Rodriguez’s response to Plaintiff’s serious medical need must be 

“poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and not 

merely accidental inadequacy, negligen[ce] in diagnosi[s] or treat[ment], or even 

[m]edical malpractice.” Id. at 1258 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06).

As the Supreme Court has emphasized, not “every claim by a prisoner that he 

has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254 

(11th Cir. 1999). Rather, medical treatment violates the Eighth Amendment only 

when it is “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the 

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conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 

1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has set forth no facts showing Dr. Rodriguez knew Plaintiff was in 

serious risk of harm if he did not get a brain scan or that he disregarded that risk 

through gross conduct. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing a brain 

scan was necessary. The complaint is devoid of any facts showing that the failure 

of a brain scan has caused any additional injuries or exacerbated an existing injury. 

To the contrary, it appears Plaintiff believes he should have had a brain scan because 

“[s]uch hits to the head have been known to cause football players and boxers to be 

paraplegic.” ECF Doc. 20. He does not allege he suffers from such a condition. 

Plaintiff’s mere belief that a brain scan should have been conducted does not 

establish a constitutional violation.

Moreover, while the “the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided 

with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a 

prisoner the treatment of his choice.” Rutledge v. Cain, No. 5:15-CV-42-RV-GRJ, 

2016 WL 5395271, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2016), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. 5:15-CV-42-RV-GRJ, 2016 WL 5349460 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2016) 

(quoting Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988)). In other words, a

“simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the 

inmate as to the [inmate’s] diagnosis or course of treatment” does not give rise to a 

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claim under the Eighth Amendment. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Moreover, “[t]he 

Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner’s choice of a physician, a mode of 

treatment or a place of treatment.” Brownlow v. Chavez, 871 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 

(S.D. Ind. 1994) (citing Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir.1988)).

Although Plaintiff may have believed a brain scan was needed, Dr. 

Rodriquez’s decision not to order a scan does not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation. Thus, the undersigned recommends the claims against Dr. Rodriguez be 

dismissed without leave to amend as an amendment would be futile.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Mark Inch, Warden Clemmons, A. 

Flores, J. Santiago, Nurse Dow (sic), Nurse Sing, and Dr. Rodriguez be dismissed 

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 

granted.

2. Judgment be entered in favor of defendants Mark Inch, Warden 

Clemmons, A. Flores, J. Santiago, Nurse Dow (sic), Nurse Sing, and Dr. Rodriguez 

on all claims. 

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3. The case be remanded to the undersigned for further pretrial 

proceedings.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 14th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be 

filed within fourteen days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.  Any 

different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s 

internal use only and does not control.  An objecting party must serve a copy of 

its objections upon all other parties.  A party who fails to object to the 

magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and 

recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s 

order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.  See 11th Cir. 

Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

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