N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
KEVIN JAM ES LISLE,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt,
v. E. K. M C DANIELS; e t a l .,

De fe nda n ts-Appe lle e s. No. 13-16921 D.C . No. 3:10-c v-00064-LR

H-VPC
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da Larry R . Hic ks, Distric t Judge , Pre s iding Subm itte d De c e m

be r 30, 2016 ** San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : THOM AS, C hie f Judge , a nd HAW K INS and M c K EOW N, C irc u it Judge s. Ke vin Ja m e s Lisle , a

n inm ate at

Ely State Prison (“ Ely ” ), a

ppe a ls the distric t c ourt’ s gra

nt of sum m ary judgm e nt in fa

vor of the de fe nda

nts a s to Lisle ’ s due proc e s s a nd e xc e ssive forc e c la im s, a nd its de nia l of Lisle ’ s re que s t for a 

# FIL ED MAR 07 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).pre l im ina

ry injunc tion re ga

rding his tra

nsfe r to a diffe re n t c e l l. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C
. § 1291. W e re vie w a distric t c ourt’ s sum

m ary judgm e nt de c ision denovo, N e v . De p ’t of C orrs. v . Gre e ne , 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th C ir. 2011), a

n d its de n i a l of a

pre lim ina

ry injunc tion for a

n a buse of disc re tion, Me le ndre

s v . Arpaio , 695 F.3d 990, 999 (9th C ir. 2012). W e a ffirm
.

I Lisle ’ s c la im

re ga rding his High R

isk Pote ntia l (“ HRP” ) status be twe e n 1996 a nd 2001 is ba

rre d by the sta

tute of lim ita

tions. In Ne va da , the sta

tute of lim ita tions for § 1983 ac tions is two ye ars. S e e Ne v . R e v. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e ); Mc Inty rev . Bay e r , 339 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th C ir. 2003). Lisle argue s tha

t his due proc e ss c l a im s involve c ontinuing viola tions, whic h
are n ot subje c t to thesta

tute of lim ita

tions. A c ontinuing viola tion c a n be
e sta blishe d e ithe r through “ ‘ a se rie s of re late d a c t s, one or m ore of whic h fa lls within thelim ita

tions pe riod,’ ” or by

“ a sy ste m ic polic y or pra c tic e of disc rim ination” tha

t e xists both be fore and during the lim ita t ions pe riod. G utow

sk y v . C ounty of Plac e r , 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th C ir. 1997) (c ita tion omitte d ). A “ m e re

‘ c ontinuing im

p a c t from pa st viola

t ions is not ac tiona

ble .’ ” K nox v . Dav is , 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th C ir. 2001) (e m pha sis om itte d ) (c ita

tion omitte d). Eve n if Lisle ’ s HR

P status be twe e n 1996 a

nd 2001 is a

c ontinuing viola

tion, it c e a se d to be
2a

c ontinuing viola

tion whe n it wa s re m o v e d on M arc h 22, 2001, a t whic h point the sta tute of lim ita

tions be ga

n to run. The re fore , Lisle ’ s due proc e ss c la im a s to his HR

P stat us be twe e n 1996 a

nd 2001 is ba

rre d by the sta

tute of lim ita

t ions. II Lisle ’ s due proc e ss c la im s a s to his plac e m e nt in theC onde m ne d M e n’ s Unit (“ C M U” ) and c urre nt HR P status fa il be c a

u se the de fe n da

nts a re e ntitle d to qua lifie d im

m unity . Vie wing the fa c ts in thelight m ost fa v ora ble to the pla intiff,
we m ust de te rm ine whe the r Lisle ’ s fa c t ua l a lle gations “ m ake out a viola tion of a
c onstitutiona

l right,” and whe the r that right “wa s ‘ c le arly e sta b lishe d ’ at the tim e of de fe nda

nt[s’ ] a lle ge d

m isc onduc t.” Pe arson v . C allahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (c iting Sauc ie r

v . K atz , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). W ith re ga rd to Lisle ’ s C M U pla c e m e nt, the de fe nda nts did not viola

t e his due proc e ss rights. B e c a

use a ll prisone rs se n t e nc e d to de ath a

re house d in the C M U, c o nside ring Lisle ’ s c onvic tion a n d de ath se nte n c e , his C M U pla c e m e nt doe s not im p ose “ a t y pic a l a nd signific ant ha

rdship.” Sandin v . C

onnor , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). W ith re ga rd to his HR

P status, Lisleis only

c onstitutiona

l ly e n title d to

“ som e notic e of the c ha

rge s a ga inst him

and a n opportunity

to pre se nt his vie ws,”
3a s we ll a s to pe riodic sta t u s re vie ws. Se e He w itt v . He l ms , 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983), ov e rrule d in part on othe r grounds by

Sandin , 515 U.S. a

t 472. Theprison offic ia ls provide d Lisle with both, the re b y satisfy ing the re quire m e nts of due proc e s s. Lisle ’ s HR

P status wa s re insta

te d in 2002 be c a

use he a ssa

ulte d a fe llow inm a te , whic h is a c rite rion liste d for HR P status in Ely

State Prison Ope ra tiona l Proc e d ure 434. Lislewa s a

ware of the re quire m e nt tha t he m ust re m a in disc ipline fre e for at le a st one y e ar to a void HR P c la ssific at ion. He a lso re c e ive d se ve ra l pe riodic re vie ws a fte r his HR P status wa s re insta

t e d, with prior verba l or writte n notic e for e a c h. M o re ove r, Lisle c ould re que s t a nd re c e ive a

sta t us re vie w he aring
a t a ny tim e unde r Ope ra tiona l Proc e dure 501. Thus, Lisle ’ s a lle ge d

fa c ts do not “m a

k e out a viola tion of a c onstitutiona

l right,” an d the de fe nda

nts a re e ntitle d to qua l ifie d im m unity for Lisle ’ s due proc e ss c la im s re ga

rding his pla c e m e nt in C M U a nd c urre nt HR

P status. Ac c ordingly , the distric t c o urt prope rly

grante d sum m ary judgm e nt a s to the se c la im s. III The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt a s to Lisle ’ s e xc e ssive forc e c la im . In a n E ighth Am e ndm e nt e xc e ssive forc e c la im , the que stion is whe the r the forc e re sulte d in the unne c e ssa ry and wa nton inflic tion of
4pa in or suffe ring. Hudson v . Mc Millian , 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). The “ c o re judic ia l inquiry is . . . whe the r forc e wa s a pplie d in a

good-fa ith e ffort to m a inta in or
re store disc ipline , or m a lic iously and sa distic a lly

to c a use ha rm . ” Id. at 7. In
re solving tha

t que stion, c ourts c onside r (1) the e xte nt of the injury suffe re d by the inm a te , (2) the ne e d for a pplic a tion of forc e , (3) the re lationship be twe e n the ne e d
and the am ount of forc e use d, (4) the thre at re a sona bly pe rc e ive d by

the
re sponsibleoffic ia ls, a

n d (5) any e fforts m a de to te m

pe r the se v e rity

of a forc e ful
re sponse . Id. In this c a se , it is unc onte ste d tha t a n a rgum e nt a rose be twe e n

Pla intiff a

nd a gua rd a bout wha t ty pe of le g sha c kle s should beuse d . Pla intiff a dm its tha t he turne d towa

rd the gua rd and did not c om

ply with orde rs. He doe s not c onte st the fa c t tha t the gua rd pe rc e ive d a

thre at or tha

t the gua rd trie d to te m

pe r the situa

tion by orde ring him

ba c k to his c e ll. Pla intiff did not suffe r injury . The re fore , the distric t c o urt did not err in its Hudson ana ly sis. W he the r Lisle should ha

ve be e n give n la rge r sha c k le s is a

dispute d fa c t; howe ve r, the c la im is ba se d on e xc e ssive forc e , not on thec hoic e of sha c kle s. IV

5The distric t c ourt did not a buse its disc re tion in de ny ing Lisle ’ s m otion for a pre l im ina ry injunc tion for c onduc t unre lat e d to the unde rly ing la wsuit. Lisle ’ s othe r c onte ntions a

re e ithe r unpe rsua sive or ina p propria te for re vie w.

AFFIRM E D.

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