O r al a r gum ent w as he ar d i n t hi s ca s e be f or e l aw s t udent s a t t he U ni ver s i t y of M em phi s Cec i l C. H um phr eys 1 S c h o o l o f

L a w. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

A T ME MP H IS 1 

### Fe bruary 19, 200 9 S es sio n FAYE BLACK
v . C IT Y OF M EM P HI S
Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Shelb y County No. 52438 TD Rita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2007-02562-COA- R3-CV - Filed August 13, 2009

This is a wrongful death case against a municipa lity. In 1987, the plaintiff’s tee nage son w as shot
a ndkil le d b y a

po lic e of fi c e r. Th e plaint if

f sue d the of

fi c e r andthemun ic ipa lit y, a sse rt ing c la ims
un de r b othfe de ra l a nd st ate law. Y e ars of pr oc e e din gs a ndde la y e ns ue d. By 2 00 5, the on ly
rema ining claims were state law c laims against the municipality. The parties f iled cross-motions for summary judgment. T h e trial c ourt grante d summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of judgment in the amount of $130,000, the ma ximum damage
awa rd under the Tenne ssee Governmental Tort Liability Ac t. The plaintiff filed separ ate motions for inter est and costs. The muni cipality stipulated that if the court enter ed a judgment it should be in the amount of $130,000, but argue d that the plaintiff wa s prohibited from re covering interest or costs in addition to the $130,000 judgment beca u s e such an awa rd would exc eed the statutory damage cap. T he plaintiff a rgued that the municipality’s misconduct prolonged the case and drove up c os ts, a nd that the c ou rt ha d au tho ri ty to aw ard c os ts in ord e r to sa nc tio n the mun ic ipa lit y f or thi s misconduct. The tria l court ente red a judgment for the plain t i ff i n t he amount of $130,000, but denied the pla intiff’s motions for interest a nd costs, finding that the Governmental Tort Liability Act pre cl u d ed an award of discr etionary c osts in excess of the statutory cap on damages, a nd did not
a wa rdsa nc tio ns . T he plaint if f a pp e a ls, arg uin g th a t th e c ou rt has auth ority to a wa rdsa nc tio ns in
e xc e ss o f the statut ory da ma ge c ap. W e a ff ir m, fi nd ing that th e tria l c ou rt ’s or de r d oe s n ot i nd ic a te a finding that sanc tions against the municipality were war rante d.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t ; J udgm e nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d

H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he Court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J. , joined.

Ernest L. Ja

rre tt, Detroit, M i ch i g an, and Mitzi H. Spell, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the Plaintiff/Appellant Faye Black-2-

He nry L . K le in, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the De fe nd a nt/Ap pe lle e City of Me mph is
OP IN ION

F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
On Dec ember

31, 1987, Plaintiff/Appellant Faye Black ( “Ms. Black”) was employed as the resident mana ger of the Palomino Motel on Summer Avenue in Me mphis, Te nnessee . As such, she liv e d at th e mot e l w ithhe r six te e n- ye ar- old so n, Ma rc us No rris. On that day, yo un g M arc us wa s in the br e e z e way o f the mot e l w itha BB g un , s ho oti ng a t di sc ard e d s od a c a ns

. Appar ently a p er s o n s t anding at a bus stop near the motel saw Marc us and re ported to the Me mph is Po lic e De pa

rt me nt that th e re wa s a

“ man w itha

gu n” on the mo tel gro un ds . Memph is police off icer John Dolan wa s dispatched to the Palomino Motel to investigate.
Ms. Black, in the motel office , noticed Of fice r Dolan in his police c ar in the motel parking lot , o bs e rv ing he r s on Ma rc us , s o s he c a me ou t of the of fi c e . O ff ic e r D olan e me rg e d f

ro m hi s vehicle w ith his police weapon and called out to Marc us to come out of the br eez eway, throw down his we apo n, a ndraisehis ha nd s. W hat ha pp e ne d ne xt wa s in dis pu te fo r ma ny ye ars

. Ms. Bla c k s a id that she yelled to the of

fice r that the boy wa s her son and the gun was a toy, and she maintaine d that Marc us threw down the BB gun and r aised his hands, as he had been direc ted to do. Offic er D olan contende d that Marc us did not thr o w down the BB gun, but instead pointed it in the office r’s dir e c tio n. Of

fi c e r D olan s ho t Ma

rc us , a ndMa

rc us la te r d ie d f

ro m hi s w ou nd s.
Th is p ro mpt e d y e ars of

lit igatio n inse ve ra l c ou rt s, cri mi na l a ndc ivi l, s ta te a ndfe de ra l. Offic er D olan was trie d in the Shelby County C riminal Court on charge s arising out of the shooting
a ndwa s a c qu itt e d. Af

te r the c ri min a l tria l, M s. Bla c k f ile d s uit a ga ins t O ff

ic e r D olan a ndthe City of Memphis (“the City”) in Shelby County Circuit Court, asserting both federa l law and state law
c la ims

. Because Off

icer Dolan and the City both maintained that Of fice r Dolan shot Mar cus in selfdefe nse, thi s n ec es sitated that the Plaintiff secur e testimony from various experts on, int e r a lia , proper law enf orce ment prac tices and w hether the incident could h av e o cc u rre d in the manner described by Off

icer Dolan. The physical evidence inc luded the shotgun fire d by Offic er D olan, the
rec overe d shotgun pellets and shells, the clothing that Marcus w as we aring whe n he wa s shot, and a boar d from the Palomino Motel that had some of the spray pattern from Offic er D olan’s shotgun. The physica l evidence was in the pos session of t he C ity and was reportedly subject t o a court order requiring that it be r etained. A t some point during the pendenc y o f t h e proc eedings, the physica l
e vid e nc e wa s d isc ard e d o r de str oy e d; the City c la ime d tha t this oc c ur re d by a c c ide nt o r o ve rs igh t. Although the appellate rec ord does not inc lude the order of the trial judge at that time, Judge Robert L. “Butch” Childers, Judge Childers appar ently believed the City’s explanation for the destruction of the physica l evidenc e. At any rate, t he los s of t he physica l evidence resulted in conside rable delay and complications, as well as additional expe nse, as Ms. Blac k sought a lternate ways to prove her
case . Ms. Black later nonsuited her claims against the City, pursua nt to an agre ement with the City. She continued to pre ss forwa rd i n her civil lawsuit against Officer Dolan. In October 1992, the juryThe $130, 000 m axi m um dam age awar d i s ba s ed on t he appl i ca bl e ca p i n pl ac e at t he t i m e of t he s hoot i ng. 2 See T

. C

. A

. § 2 9 -20 -40 3 (20 0 0 & Su p p

. 20 0 8 ).
-3- in the civil lawsuit returne d a ver dict against Off icer Dolan, and on November 4, 1992, a judgment
was e ntere d on the ver dict, awa rding Ms. Black $495,000 in c ompensatory damage s for he r fe dera l law cla ims and $420,000 for he r state law claims. In light of the awa

rd against Offi ce r Dolan, on Mar ch 12, 1993, Ms. Black re -filed he r lawsuit against the City, again asse rting claims based on feder al and state law. Shortly thereafter, on Apr il 8 , 1 9 9 3 , th e Ci ty r e mo v e d th e c a s e to th e U n it e d St a te s D is tric t Co u r t f o r the We stern District of Tenne ssee. The City m aintained that Office r Dolan f ired in appa

rent self -def ense, and that the shooting wa s legally justifiable. Voluminous discove ry ensued, w ith a plethora of disputes over doc uments and discovery expense s. In the interim, two of Ms. Blac k’s expert w itnesses died.
In 1998, the fe dera l district court dis m i s s ed M s

. B lack’ s state law c laims and grante d the City’s mot ion for summary judgment as to the fede ral law claims. Ms. Blac k appea led, and in May 2000, the United States Court of Appe als for the Sixth C ircuit aff irmed the district court’s grant of
su mma ry jud gme nt a s to the fe de ra l la w c la ims , bu t r e ve rs e d th e dis mis sa l of thestate la w c la ims

. Se e Bla c k v . Ci

ty of Me mph is , N o. 98 -6 50 8, 20 00 W L 6 87 68 3 (6th Cir . May 19 , 200 0) . T he c a se wa s e ve ntu a lly re ma nd e d to the She lby Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt

. On June 29, 2005, Ms. Black f iled a motion for def

ault judgment or in t h e al t er native for summary judgment. On J u l y 7 , 2 005, the City filed a motion to dis miss or in the alternative f or summary judgment. Appar ently, at t his point, the C ity’s position changed; instead of claiming that Of fi c e r D olan s ho t Ma

rc us in se lf

-d e fe ns e , it a sse rt e d that, u nd e r M s. Bla c k’ s v e rs ionof the fa c ts, Offic er D olan’s ac tions am o u nted to an intentional tort, for w hich the City was not liable. On August 8 and 9, 2005, the trial c ourt hea rd ora l argume nts on the pending motions, at which time the
c ou rt de nie d M s. Bla c k’ s mo tio n f or a de fa ult jud gme nt andthe City ’s mot ionto d ism iss . O n A pril 13, 2007, the trial court filed a memorandum opinion, de nying the City’s mo t i o n fo r s ummary judgment and gra nting summ ary judgment in fa vor of Ms. Black.

Ms. Black then filed motions for e ntry of j udgment, for taxation of i ntere st, and for taxation of costs. Ms. Black sought a judgment in the amount of $130,000, the maximum damage awa rd that can be rec overe d against a governme ntal entity such as the C ity under the Tenne ssee Gove rnmental Tort Liability Act (“G TLA”)

. Ms. Black also sought inte re s t fr o m the original filing date of the 2 la ws uit , c os ts t ota lin g $ 188, 69 6. 76 , a ndtr a ve l e xp e ns e s to ta lin g $ 1, 06 0. 75 . I n r e sp on se , th e City stipulated that, if the court enter ed a judgment it should be in the amount of $130,000. It ar g ued, ho we ve r, that Ms . Bl a c k w a s p ro hib ite d f ro m r e c ov e ri ng e ith e r int e re st o r c os ts b e c aus e thi s w ou ld
c aus e the tot a l a wa

rdto e xc e e d th e GT LA ’s da ma ge c a p. Th e tria l c ou rt

e nte re d a jud gme nt f

or Ms. Black in the amount of $130,000 on May 11, 2007. It took the m otions for taxation of i ntere st and
c os ts u nd e r a dv ise me nt. On July 10, 2007, the trial court held a hea ring to addre ss Ms. Bl ack’ s motions for taxation of intere st and costs. At the hea ring, Ms. Black ar gued that the City enga g ed i n misconduct that-4-

war rante d sanctions and that the GTLA did not prohibit the court from awa rding sanctions over

and above the statutory cap on damages. He r counse l insist ed that the City violated a c ourt order
re qu ir ing pr e se rv a tio n o f the ph ys ic a l e vid e nc e fr om Of fi c e r Do la n’ s crimi na l tria l, an d th a t th e City
e ng a ge d indil a tory ta c tic s th a t pr olo ng e d th e c a se a nda sse rt e d f ri vo lou s, ba d f

a ithde fe ns e s.
At the c on c lus ionof

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l ju dg e iss ue d a n o ra l ruli ng . Sh e state d inpa rt :
I think we’ve been he re a long time on this a nd I wa nt to start out by saying if Ms. Black would have taken the sta nd today I’m sure she would have told me, and I kno w i n s t i n ctively, that no amount of money c ould compensate her f or what ha pp e ne d to he r s on . I kn ow that w ith ou t he r s a yin g th a t. Th is i s o ne of

the mos t e gr e gio us situatio ns that th is C ou rt ha s se e n c ome through this courthouse, or anywher e else for that matter, a nd the Court is not happy with what has ha

ppened pr ocedur ally. Ho w e v e r , th e Co u r t h a s lo o k e d h ig h a n d lo w f o r a n y th in g to s a y anything differ ently than what the City has ar gu ed , wh i ch is that there is an a bsolute cap. There are case s upon case s upon case s wheretrial courts ha ve bee n reve rsed when they’ve awa

rded discr etionary c osts which makes the awa rd more than the GTLA cap. * * * The de struction of the e vidence , in light of the Court’s order that the evidenc e be pre serve d is - - I don’t know how that was explained away, but obviously Judge Childers was convinc ed. He hear d the proof, I didn’t, and that’s all now a matter of
re c or d. Th e Cou rt

c a n’ t do a ny thi ng abo ut that. I don’t know whether i t would have been more appropriate at that tim e that there be some kind of sa nctions against the parties, I don’t know, but, once a gain, that’s not anything befor e this Court at this ti me. In mentioning “ca ses” reve rsing an aw ard of costs in exce ss of the GTLAstatutory damage cap, the trial court wa s appar ently ref erring to the Cit y’s memora nda filed in res ponse to Ms. Black’s motions, i n which the Ci ty citedShaf fe r v . She lby Coun ty , No. W2000- 02215-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 54389 (T enn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2002) and Cox v . Ande rso n Coun ty Highway De pa rtm e nt , No. E1999-01697-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 250126 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2000). Those case s hold that dis c re tio na

ry c os ts m a y n ot be a sses se d a ga ins t a go ve rn me nta l de fe nd a nt w he n d oin g s o w ou ld
cause the awa

rd to exc eed the GTLA damage c ap. See Shaffer , 20 02 W L 54 38 9, a t *1 0; Cox , 2000 WL 250126, at *8–9. In its ora l r uling the trial court denie d Ms. Black’s motions for intere st and
c os ts. On August 24, 2007, the t rial court enter ed it s order of final judgment, awa rding Ms. Black $130,000, and denying he r motions for taxation of inter est and costs. The order of final judgment state d inpa

rt :
1. The e xpenses incur red on be half of Plaintiff and the claim for taxation of interest ar e re asonable , howeve r, in light of existing c ase law, the maximum Pl aintiff is entitled to recove r is limit ed to $130,000.00 under the Tennessee G overnme nt Tort-5-

Liability Act, theref

ore, Plaintiff is not enti tled to rec over any additional sums for interest, costs or othe rwise. 2. Ne ith e r the City no r i ts c ou ns e l a c te d in ba d f a ithin the de fe ns e of

thi s case

. Ms. Black filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on September 14, 2007, which wa s denied. Ms. Black then filed a

timely notice of appe al.

I S S UE S ON A P P E AL On appe al, Ms. Black ra ises two issues for our r eview. First, she contends that the GTLA does not prec lude a trial court from imposing sanc tions ove r and above the GTLA’ s cap on damages under e ither the c ourt’s inhere nt authority or Rule 11 of t h e T ennesse e Rules of Civil Procedure

. Alternatively, she contends that the gove rnmental de fendant, in th i s case the City, waived the pr ote c t i o n o f t h e G T L A ’ s s t a t u t o r y c ap o n d a m a g e s f o r t h e p u rp o s e s o f a l l o w i n g t h e tr i a l c o u r t to awa rd discre tionary costs and/or inter est by engaging in c onduct that unnece ssarily prolonged the
c a se a nddr ov e up Ms. Bla c k’ s c os ts.

A N A L Y SIS
As a thre shold issue, before ad d ressing whether the GT LA pre cludes a trial court f

rom imposing sanctions on a governmental def endant ove r and a

bove the statutory c ap on dama ges, we must asce rtain whether the trial court indicated that an a war d of sanc tions would be warr anted if the GT LA didno t pr e c lud e a ny a wa rdov e r the $1 30 ,0 00 statut ory c ap o n d a ma ge s.
In the trial court’s oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing on Ms. Blac k’s motions, the trial judge clea

rly expre sses a de sire to awa rd intere st and costs over and above the GTLA’ s statutory
c ap o n da ma ge s, a ndfr

us tr a tio n th a t th e c a se s in te rp re t th e GT LAa s p re c lud ing su c h a n a wa rd . T his sentiment is reiterated in the t ri al court’s final judgment, in which it stated that existing case law pr e ve nte d it

fr om a wa

rd ing Ms. Bla c k h e r c os ts.

Ho we ve r, in i ts o ra l ruli ng a nd in its fi na l or de r, the tr ia l c ou rt a dd re sse d d isc re tio na ry c os ts and sanc tions separately. While the tria l court cle arly wanted to awa rd Ms. Black her

costs, the trial
c ou r t ’ s s t a t e m e n t s d o n o ti n d i c a t e a n i n c l i n a t i o n t o s a n c t i o n t h e C i t y f o r a n y a l l e g e d m i s c o n d u c t. Ms. Black relies on comments made by the trial court in its oral ruling that the ca se “is one of the most egregious situations that this C ourt has see n,” and “ the C o u rt is not happy with what has ha pp e ne d p ro c e du ra lly .” Ho we ve r, in c on te xt, the re is no i nd ic a tio n th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e in the se rema rks is ref erring to alleged sanctionable conduct by the City. Indee d, the trial judge’s re fer ence to the “ e gr e gio us situatio n” c ome s a ft e r an ex pres si on of sy mpa thy fo r M s. Bla c k f

or he r t e rribl e loss, and can be seen as a chara cterization of the s ituation that led to the shooting of her son. The trial court’ s ref

ere nce to be ing “not happy with what ha s happene d proce dural l y ” co uld be a ref ere nce to any number of compli cations i n this proce durally complex case , only some of which can be attributed to the City.B e c a u se w e h a v e d e te rm in e d th a t th e trial c o u rt d id n o t i n d ic a te th a t i t fo u n d th a t sa n c tio n s a g a in st th e C ity 3

w er e w ar r ant ed, w e d o no t reac h t he i s s ue of w het her t he G T L A pre cl ud es a t r i al court f r om aw ar di ng s anct i on s over
an d ab o v e th e statuto ry ca p o n d am ag es.

T h e statute p ro v i d es in p erti n en t p art as fo l l o w s: 4

A gove r nm ent al e nt i t y or t he i ns ur er of s uch gover nm ent al e nt i t y s hal l n o t be he l d l i abl e f or a ny ju d g m e n t i n e x c e ss o f th e li m its o f liab ili ty se t fo rth in § 2 9 -2 0 -4 0 3 , u n le ss th e g o v e rn m e n ta l en tit y has e xpr es s l y w ai ved s uch l i m i t s

. The wai ver of s uch i m m uni t y or s uch l i m i t s of l i ab i l i t y by a gover nm en t al e n t i t y s hal l onl y be va l i d i f s uch w ai ver i s e xpr es s l y c ont ai ned i n t he pr ovi s i ons or endo r s em ent of a pol i cy or c on t r act o f i nsur ance aut ho r i zed b y t hi s ch apt er t o cov er i t s l i abi l i t y un der (c o n tin u e d ...)
-6- Ho we ve r, in i ts r e mark s, the tr ia l c ou rt e xp re ssl y a dd re sse s M s

. B l a c k ’s re qu e st f or sa nc tio ns , defe rring to Judge Childers’ prior order on the destruction of the physica l evidence . The trial judge then muses that she did not know “whe ther it would have been mor e appr opriate at that time that the re be so me kin d o f s a nc tio ns ,” a nda dd s th a t th e iss ue wa s n ot b e fo rethe c ou rt a t th a t time . T hu s, the t ri al co u rt d eclined in its oral r uling to award sa nctions. In its final judgment, the trial court expre ssly found t hat “[n]either the C ity nor i ts counsel acted in bad faith in the def ense of this case.” The two primary bases for M s. Black’s request for sanctions were (1) the destruction of t he physica l
e vid e nc e wh ile it w a s in the c us tod y o f the Ci ty , and (2) a ft e r m a int a ini ng a n a lle ge dly ba d f a ith defe nse that Offic er Dolan acte d in se lf-def ense, thus f

orcing Ms. Black to secur e expe nsive expe rt te sti mon y o n p oli c e pr oc e du re s a nd ho w the sh oo tin g oc c ur re d, on ly a ft e r m a ny ye ars didthe City fi na lly wi thdra w that posi tio n. Th e se a c tio ns , Ms. B la c k c on te nd s, un ne c e ssa ri ly dro ve up he r c os ts. The loss of the physica l evidence was addressed in the trial court’s or al ruling, and the a lleged bad faith def ense w as addr essed in its fina l or der. Ms. Blac k’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the jud gme nt a ga in r e c ou nts the City ’s a lle ge d mis c on du c t a nd arg ue s that it wa rr a nte d sa nc tio ns

. Th is mot ionwa s d e nie d b y th e tria l c ou rt a s w e ll. Ta

ke n a lto ge the r, we mus t f indthat the tr ia l c ou rt

did not awar d sanctions bec ause it found that an awa rd of sa nctions was not war rante d.

A trial court’s decision re garding whe ther to aw ard sanctions is reviewe d on appea l under
a n ab u s e o f

d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d ar d , a n d t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n i s a f f o r d e d g r e a tw e i g h to n ap p e a l. Stig all v . L y le , 119 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omit ted). A tria l court does not abuse its discretion unless it “applie[ s] an incor rec t le gal standar d, or re ache [s] a decision which is against logic or re asoning that cause[s] an i n j u stice to the party complaining.” He nry v . Goin s , 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting Sta te v . Ste v e ns , 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn. 2002) ).

On app e a l, M s. Bla c k a dd re sse s th e Ci ty ’s alle ge d mi sc on du c t a t le ng th, tho ro ug hly de sc ri bin g h ow it p ro lon ge d th e c a se a nddr a ma tic a lly inc re a se d h e r c o sts . W hil e we aresy mpathe tic to M s. Bla c k’ s p os iti on , w e are re qu ir e d o n a pp e a l to de fer t o th e tria l c ou rt ’s br oad di scr e tio n in determining whether to impose sanctions on a party. Se e Stig all , 119 S.W.3d at 706. Based on the
rec ord bef

ore us, we cannot say that the t rial court abused its discretion in dec lining to s anction the City. The trial court’s de cision on this is sue is aff irmed. 3 Ms. Black next ar gues that the City should be deeme d to ha ve construc tively waived its right to p ro te c tio n u nd e r the GTL A’ s st a tut ory d a ma ge c ap b y e ng a gin g inc on du c t th a t un ne c e ssa ri ly prolonged the c ase and drove up he r costs. In support of her argume nt she cites Section 29-20- 404, 4(

. . . cont i nued) 4

t h i s ch ap t er.

T

. C

. A

. § 2 9 -20 -40 4 (a) (20 0 0 ).

-7- wh ic h a llo ws a

go ve rn me nta l e nti ty t o e xp re ssl y w a ive the GTL A’s lia bil ity lim its . T he statut e specific ally require s an expr ess waive r bef ore a governme ntal entity c an be held liable for damages in e xc e ss o f the statut ory c ap. Ms. Bla c k c ite s n o au th ority to su pp ort he r a rg ume nt that a governme ntal entity can be deeme d to have c onstructively wa i v ed i ts protection under the GTLA damage cap. T his argument is without merit.

C ONCL US I ON
The de cision of the trial court is a ffirme d. The costs of this appeal a re ta xed to the Appe llant Faye Black, and her sur ety, for w hich exe cution may issue if nec essary.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. K IRBY, JUDGE