Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

September 1985

NTIS order #PB86-182961
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600586

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Foreword

President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative has kindled a national debate over the roles of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses,

and arms control in U.S. national security policy. It has also underscored the important ramifications of U.S. military space policy.

At the requests of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, OTA undertook an assessment of the opportunities

and risks involved in an accelerated program of research on new ballistic missile

defense technologies, including those that might lead to deployment of weapons

in space. Debate over the relevant political, military, and technical issues has been

hotly contested by participants with widely varying assumptions and points of

view. OTA has not attempted to resolve the debate, but rather to try to clarify

the issues and enhance the level of discourse.

This report examines both the “why” and the “what” of ballistic missile

defenses. Why would we want ballistic missile defense weapons if we could have

them? Would the advantages of deploying them outweigh the disadvantages?

What technologies are under investigation for BMD applications? How might those

applications serve our strategic goals? These policy and technology questions interact with one another in complex ways: what seems technologically possible conditions perceptions of policy options, while policy choices shape technological

pursuits.

Closely related to BMD technology issues are questions about the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Whether or not the United States

decides to deploy BMD systems in space, the other military uses of space will

continue to be of national importance. How might the United States deal with

the potential threat of current and future Soviet anti-satellite weapons to U.S.

military space activities? After consultation with the staffs of the requesting committees, OTA decided to prepare a companion report, Anti-Satellite Weapons,

Countermeasures, and Arms Control. The relative role each of those elements (the

weapons, the countermeasures, and arms control) plays will be strongly affected

by the course followed in the development and deployment of space-based BMD

systems.

OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the many individuals, firms,

laboratories, and government agencies who assisted its research and writing for

this report.

#

.

.

Director

.
Advisory Panel on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

Guyford Steve, Chairman

President, Universities Research Associates

Solomon Buchsbaum

Executive Vice President

AT&T Bell Labs

Ashton Carter

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

Robert Clem

Director of Systems Sciences

Sandia National Laboratories

Sidney D. Drell

Deputy Director

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

Daniel J. Fink

President

D. J. Fink Associates, Inc.

Richard Garwin

IBM Fellow

Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Noel Gayler, Admiral, USN (Ret.)

American Committee on East-West Accord

Colin Gray

President

National Institute for Public Policy

George Jeffs

President

North American Space Operations,

Rockwell International

General David Jones, USAF (Ret.)

Former Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Robert S. McNamara

Former President of the World Bank

Michael M. May

Associate Director-at-Large

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

H. Alan Pike

Program Manager, Space Stations

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.

Frederick Seitz

President Emeritus

The Rockefeller University

Robert Selden

Associate Director for Theoretical and

Computational Physics

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Marshall D. Shulman

Director

Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of

the Soviet Union

Columbia University

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith

President

Consultants International Group, Inc.

Sayre Stevens

Vice President

System Planning Corp.

Maj. General John Toomay, USAF (Ret.)

Consultant

Seymour Zeiberg

Vice President

Research and Engineering Operations

Martin Marietta Aerospace

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The views

expressed in this OTA report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment. Participation on the Advisory

Panel does not imply endorsement of the report.

iv
OTA Project Staff on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Security and Commerce

Karas, Project Director

Peter Sharfman, International

Thomas H.

Michael Callaham

Richard DalBello

Gerald Epstein

Anthony Fainbergl

Robert Rochlin2

Alan Shaw

Program Manager

Contractors

Fredrick Drugan William Green Brian McCue

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson

ISince February 1985.

‘On detail from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Workshop on Soviet Military Doctrine and BMD (December 1984)

Raymond Garthoff Stephen Meyer

The Brookings Institution Center for International Studies

Daniel Goure Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Science Applications International Corp. Harriet Fast Scott

David Holloway Edward Warner

Center for International Security and The RAND Corp.

Arms Control

Stanford University

Participating Members of Advisory Panel

Marshall D. Shulman

Sayre Stevens

H. Guyford Stever
Contents

Chapter Page

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Introduction... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3. Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4. Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

5. BMD Capabilities and the Strategic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

6. Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability, and Arms Control Issues . . .119

7. Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......139

8. Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...197

9. Alternative Future Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

IO. Alternative R&D Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239

Appendix

A. Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty. ..., . . . . . . . . . .......263

B. Texts of the 1982 ABM Treaty, Its Agreed Interpretations,

and Its 1976 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272

C. Effects of BMD Deployment on Existing Arms Control Treaties . .283

D. Defense Requirements for Assured Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...285

E. Defense Capability Levels and U.S. Strategy Choices . .............290

F. BMD and the Military Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292

G. Studies of the High Frontier Global Ballistic Missile Defense I. .. ....294

H. Excerpts From Statements on BMD by

Reagan Administration Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............297

I. List of Reagan Administration Statements on BMD, . . . . . . . .. ...308

J. Articles by Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative. . .............310

K. Excerpts From Soviet Statements on BMD ., ., . . . . . . ..........312

L. References on Strategic Nuclear Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...,316

M. References on Soviet Strategic Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..320

N. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . .321

vi;
Chapter 1

Executive Summary
Page

The

The

Presidential Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BMD R&D Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arms Control.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alternative BMD Research Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soviet BMD Research and Comparison With U.S. Research . . . . . . . . . . . .

Issues for R&D Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

‘7.

8.

Maintenance of the ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Requirements for Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . .

R&D/Deployment Coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Research and Development of Offensive Forces . .

Relations With Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Deployment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

&it&ion 1:

Criterion:

Criterion:

Criterion:

Criterion:

Criterion:

Potential Role in U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Crisis Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arms Race Stability and Arms Control.

Diplomatic Stability . . .

Feasibility . . . . . .

cost . . . . . . . . . . .

Concluding Remarks. . . . . . . . . .

Debated Issues . . . . . . . . . . .

OTA Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table

Table No.

I-I. Hypothetical Multi-Layered

... .

. . . . .

. . . . ,

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

..,. . . . . . . . . . .

BMD System. . . . . . .

3

4

4

5

6

7

9

12

12

13

13

14

14

15

15

15

16

17

20

22

23

24

28

31

31

32

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 1

Executive Summary

THE PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGE

President Reagan’s speech of March 23,

1983, renewed a national debate that had been

intense in the late 1960s but much subdued

since 1972. Wouldn’t the United States be

more secure attempting to defend its national

territory against ballistic missiles while the

Soviet Union did the same? Or would it be

more secure attempting to keep such defenses

largely banned by agreement with the Soviet

Union?

The President posed the question,

What if free people could live secure in the

knowledge that their security did not rest

upon the threat of instant retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept

and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before

they reached our own soil or that of our

allies?’

Calling upon the U.S. scientific community "

. . . to give us the means of rendering these

nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, he

announced that he was

. . . directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and

development program to begin to achieve our

ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed

by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave

the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves.

After that speech the President ordered

studies to explore further the promise of ballistic missile defense, and in 1984 the Department of Defense established an organization

to expand and accelerate research in ballistic

‘Transcript of televised speech, Mar. 23, 1983. For text of

relevant passages, see app. H.

missile defense technologies. This research

program was called the “Strategic Defense

Initiative” (SDI).

If there were a national consensus on the

role, if any, ballistic missile defense (BMD)

should play in our national strategy, assessing the likelihood of attaining the necessary

capabilities at an acceptable cost would be difficult enough. There is extensive controversy

over the potential of various BMD technologies and the possibilities for applying them

in affordable weapons systems that would be

effective against a Soviet offensive threat which

includes countermeasures to our defenses. But

there is also extensive controversy over whether various levels of ballistic missile defense capability, if attainable, would be desirable. A

fair assessment of the technological possibilities must weigh them against a range of strategic criteria which are themselves matters of

controversy.

This report is intended to illuminate, rather

than adjudicate, the BMD debate. It provides

more questions than answers. But the questions will remain relevant in the years to come,

because their answers will affect national policies with or without ballistic missile defense.

For the short term, the important questions

have to do with what kind of research the

United States should conduct on BMD and

with how future BMD technical possibilities

affect current offensive force planning and

diplomatic activities. For the longer term, the

important questions have to do with what

kind of BMD we could reasonably expect to

deploy, whether we would want to, and what

the consequences might be.
4

THE BMD R&D DEBATE

The near-term debate over BMD research

and development (as opposed to deployment)

has focused on the following issues in particular:

1.

2.

3.

What are (or should be) the central goals

of the U.S. BMD research and development program;

The feasibility of reaching those goals;

The relationship between this research

and arms control negotiations with the

Soviet Union.

Participants in the debate over ballistic missile defense hold differing views on:

●

●

●

●

Soviet motivations, intentions, and capabilities;

Whether current U.S. nuclear strategy

and nuclear forces are now, and will continue to be, adequate to deter Soviet

threats and aggression;

The past role and future prospects of

arms control in contributing to U.S. national security;

How optimistic or pessimistic one should

be about the technical feasibility of rendering nuclear ballistic missiles “impotent and obsolete. ”

These differing views have shaped the debates

both about BMD research and about BMD deployment.

Goals

Strategic Defense Initiative Goals

Few are comfortable with a situation in

which U.S. security depends heavily on our

threatening mass destruction with nuclear

weapons. Fewer still are comfortable with the

vulnerability of the U.S. population to Soviet

nuclear attack. President Reagan’s speech appeared to offer a way of eventually escaping

this condition. Although some people have interpreted some of President Reagan’s statements to mean that he envisions development

of a virtually perfect defense of the U.S. population against all types of nuclear attack, pursuit of defenses able to protect the U.S. population and that of its allies in the face of a

determined Soviet effort to overcome them does

not appear to be a goal of the Strategic Defense

Initiative program.2

Rather, some of the President’s language

and many subsequent policy statements indicate that the Administration envisions a more

complex scenario that might eventually lead

to deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals with

which the United States and the Soviet Union now threaten one another. The steps in this

scenario are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

A research program to seek ballistic missile defenses that would be cheaper to deploy than the offensive weapons needed

to penetrate them.

A decision in the early or mid-1990s to develop such defenses for deployment near

the end of the century.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union for

agreed mutual deployment of defenses

coupled with reductions in offensive

weapons. In this transition stage, the

threat of nuclear retaliation would play

a still important, but presumably declining, role in deterring Soviet threats and

aggression.

An ultimate stage in which ballistic missile defenses, air defenses, and negotiated

reductions of offensive weapons to extremely low levels have eliminated the

ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy one another’s societies with nuclear weapons.

Administration officials have stated, however, that negotiating with the Soviets does

not mean giving the Soviets a veto over a U.S.

decision to deploy BMD. In their view, if

defenses become cheaper than the weapons

they must intercept, the Soviets ought to see

the rationality of the U.S. negotiating scenario. But if the Soviets refuse to negotiate, — —‘According to the Department of Defense “Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985”:

The goal of the SDI is to conduct a program of vigorous research focused on advanced defensive technologies that may

lead to strategic defense options that could:

• support a better basis for deterring aggression;

● strengthen strategic stability;

● increase the security of the United States and its allies; and

● eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles.

The SDI seeks, therefore, to exploit emerging technologies

that may provide options for a broader-based deterrence by turning to a greater reliance on defensive systems.
. —

U.S. security would increase anyway because

(a) Soviet ballistic missiles would be less capable of achieving military objectives than

they had been in the past; and (b) if the Soviets

and the United States spent equal amounts

on strategic forces, the assumed cost advantage of the defense would lead to a continuing decline in ability of the Soviet offensive

forces to penetrate U.S. defenses.

Although the pursuit of this scenario appears to be the central purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative, other goals have also

been ascribed to it. These include:

●

●

●

maintaining an ability to deploy U.S. ballistic missile defenses promptly in case

the Soviets should “break out” of the

ABM Treaty;

hedging against Soviet unilateral development and deployment of advanced ballistic missile defense technologies by gaining an understanding of what is feasible

(U.S. responses could include comparable

defenses, more offensive weapons, offensive countermeasures, or all three);

developing new technologies which may

or may not be applied ultimately to BMD,

but which could have other military and

civilian applications.

Other Perspectives on Goals

The differing views of BMD debate participants cited above lead to support for differing research goals or different placements of

research emphasis. Some approve of the SD I

long-term goals but believe that there should

be greater emphasis on moving toward nearterm deployment of land-based and spacebased BMD systems. Others question the SDI

goals on strategic or technical grounds. They

suggest that the United States should emphasize technology development and hedging

against Soviet BMD potentials and that moving toward a deployment decision in the foreseeable future should not be a goal. Those who

stress maintaining a base for quickly deploying BMD to deter or respond to a Soviet ABM

Treaty break-out tend to favor research emphasis on “terminal” defenses, designed primarily (or, in some cases, exclusively) to protect U.S. ICBM silos and probably using nuclear warheads. A description of how various

BMD research goals might present congressional choices for alternate research and development programs is presented in a later

section.

Technical Feasibility

A second major focus of the debate over

BMD is technical feasibility–the likelihood

that the research will lead to the development

of BMD systems that could achieve Administration goals. There are at least two layers

of technical issues involved in this part of the

debate. One is whether particular technology

performance levels (for example, those of sensors, pointing and tracking systems, computers, chemical lasers or electromagnetic rail

guns) could be scaled up and integrated into

effective weapons systems. The second layer

of technical issues is whether the weapons systems could operate effectively against determined Soviet efforts to counter them. Proponents of the SD I believe that the technologies

are sufficiently promising to be worth intensive research. In addition, they point out that

for many years the Soviets have been conducting research in advanced BMD-related technologies (such as lasers) and that the SDI as

a research program would be justified if on no

other grounds than hedging against possible

Soviet progress in these areas.

Skeptics argue that offensive nuclear weapons are so likely-unless offenses are tightly

constrained in number and quality-to continue to dominate defensive weapons that pursuing the SDI goals is not justifiable. They

question whether Soviet research into advanced BMD-related technologies is likely to

lead to actual defensive systems that U.S. missiles could not penetrate. They believe that the

best hedge against such Soviet programs is

continuing or accelerating work on U.S. offensive penetration aids. They may support

continued U.S. research on BMD, but they are

concerned about the potential consequences

of certain SD I demonstration experiments.
6

Arms Control

Most BMD systems based on advanced

technologies could not be developed, tested,

or deployed under the ABM Treaty regime.3

One issue is whether or not our program of

BMD research will be compatible with the

ABM Treaty. A more fundamental issue, however, is whether or not the ABM Treaty continues to be compatible with our national interest.

Differing views on the nature of the United

States-Soviet strategic relationship come to

the fore most strongly in debates over the interplay between the Strategic Defense Initiative and arms control.

Supporters of the SDI tend to argue from

the

●

●

following perspective:

The Soviet Union has been relentless—

and at least partly successful-in its pursuit of strategic nuclear superiority over

the United States. In particular, the

Soviets have obtained a “first strike’ capability against U.S. land-based ICBMs.

In the future, the Soviets might conceivably find means of detecting and destroying U.S. missile-launching submarines as

well. The Soviets can be expected to exploit such advantages by attempting to

intimidate the United States and its

allies.

Past arms control agreements have not

successfully limited the Soviet offensive

buildup. In particular, the ABM Treaty

and the companion Interim Offensive

Agreement, contrary to U.S. hopes, led to

no significant Soviet offensive restraint.

Instead, behaving as if nuclear war would

be like other wars, only bigger, the Soviets have deployed far more weapons

than they need for deterrence.

‘While laboratory research into any type of BMD system is

permitted under the treaty, there are severe limitations on field

testing and development of ABM systems. Only fixed, landbased systems can be developed or tested, and only one specified fixed, land-based system can be deployed. See app. A.

The SDI has already caused the Soviets

to return to arms control negotiations

which they had previously walked out of.4

The best prospect for future arms control

agreements lies in persuading the Soviets

that their “first strike” ICBMs will become obsolete in the face of U.S. defenses,

and that the most promising way of adding to Soviet security is negotiating the

reduction of both U.S. and Soviet offensive weapons while both sides emphasize

defenses. Failing such persuasion, a competition in which defensive weapons had

an economic advantage over offensive

weapons would be more in the U.S. interest than the current situation because in

the long run it should reduce net Soviet

offensive capabilities.

Given the asymmetries between the societies and the strategic objectives of the

United States and Soviet Union, the arms

control process as it has been conducted

to date may never be to the net benefit

of the United States. On the other hand,

BMD may permit pursuit of a common

interest in the “assured survival” of each

society.

Many critics of the SDI have another perspective:

● Given the continuing mutual abilities of

the United States and the Soviet Union

to destroy one another’s societies with

several kinds of nuclear delivery vehicle

(ICBM, SLBM, cruise missile, bomber),

the Soviets do not have and cannot reasonably hope to obtain an exploitable

strategic nuclear advantage. Even the

narrower possibility of destroying most

U.S. land-based ICBMs in their silos is so

fraught with uncertainties that the Soviets would be irrational to try it. Moreover, there are other potential means,

‘The official position of both the United States and the Soviet Union is that the ongoing Geneva talks are new negotiations and do not represent a resumption of the previous ones.
7

such as mobile basing, to increase the survivability of the ICBM leg of the nuclear

triad.

● While certain issues of Soviet compliance

with past arms control agreements need

to be resolved, by and large those agreements have kept Soviet offenses below

the levels they might otherwise have

reached. The ABM Treaty successfully

limited Soviet deployment of anti-ballistic

missile launchers and spared the United

States the need to build countering offensive and defensive weapons. Abandonment of the Treaty could lead to a more

costly and more dangerous arms race.

● Rather than having driven the Soviets

back to the negotiating table, the SDI

might instead have merely provided them

a face-saving way to reverse their previous decision—which they now regret-to

stay out of arms control talks until newly

deployed nuclear weapons were removed

from Europe. Even though negotiations

have resumed, we should believe the

Soviets when they say that U.S. BMD research and deployment would lead them

to seek and deploy more offensive weapons and countermeasures rather than to

agree to offensive reductions. Negotiations offer a better chance of reducing the

net Soviet offensive threat to the United

States than does ballistic missile defense.

Whatever value SDI does have in encouraging arms control can best be realized if we agree to constraints on BMD

technology development, for example by

clarifying or extending provisions in the

ABM Treaty, in exchange for Soviet agreement to deep cuts in offensive forces.

● Over the longer term, the best hope for

avoiding nuclear war lies not in new kinds

of military strategy or technology, but

rather in maintaining a stable balance of

invulnerable retaliatory forces until the

political relationship between the two superpowers can be considerably improved.

ALTERNATIVE BMD RESEARCH PROGRAMS

The issues facing Congress in the near term

concern the U.S. research program on technologies for strategic defense. There is general

agreement that these technologies merit investigation. Support for BMD research, however,

does not necessarily imply support for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Possible BMD research

programs can differ greatly from the SDI in emphasis, direction, and level of effort. Moreover,

research programs having different perceived

and intended purposes—even if they have similar technical content—can have very different

consequences.

Decisions to be made by Congress this year

and in the years to come will have a major impact in either ratifying or re-directing major

changes which have been initiated in the U.S.

BMD research program and in U.S. arms control policy by President Reagan’s Strategic

Defense Initiative:

Urgency. —Research under the SDI is intended to proceed at a “technology-limited”

pace to permit a decision to be made at the

earliest possible date on whether to enter fullscale engineering development; entering such

development would clearly be inconsistent

with ABM Treaty constraints. The pre-SDI

program had no such mandate for an early decision on maintaining or abandoning the ABM

Treaty.

Visibility.--The SDI has much higher visibility and a much higher level of Presidential at-
8

tention than the previous program of research

in BMD-relevant technologies. The decision to

spotlight BMD has already been made, and

its consequences are already being felt. These

consequences certainly include a decision by

the Soviets to at least explore their options

to respond to the increased probability of a

U.S. BMD deployment.

Direction. -Under the SDI, emphasis has

shifted away from fairly well-understood, or

“mature,” technologies, which generally include use of nuclear-armed interceptors, towards non-nuclear defenses which would use

much more speculative but potentially more

powerful technologies.

Budget. —Over the next decade, much more

is to be spent on BMD research than would

have been allocated in the absence of the SDI.

In the proposed FY 1986 budget, the BMD

funding level was more than twice its projected FY 1986 level under the pre-SDI program. Subsequent increases under SDI are to

be even greater, and by FY 1990 are projected

to be over eight times the FY 1984 funding

level.

Arms Control Policy.–Instead of the pre-SDI

approach of seeking deep reductions of offensive forces along with maintenance of the

ABM Treaty ban on defenses against ballistic missiles, current arms control policy seeks

“greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and

an enhanced ability to deter war based on an

increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. “b

Different approaches that can be taken towards ballistic missile defense research proceed

from different sets of basic assumptions about

the value and feasibility of BMD, and from

differing assessments of the consequences of

pursuing BMD research. Three such approaches

can be distinguished and are presented below.

These approaches differ primarily in emphasis and urgency, rather than in which technol-

‘Quoted from “The U.S. Strategic Concept, ” enunciated by

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze in an address before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Mar. 28, 1985.

(Emphasis added.)

ogies are to be studied. Most BMD-relevant

technologies would be investigated, at some

level, in all three.

The first approach is the SDI as proposed

by the Reagan Administration. The second approach would proceed to BMD deployment

faster than the SDI would be able to, and the

third approach would conduct BMD research

and development at a slower rate than the

SDI. Each of the last two approaches is further broken down into two suboptions which

differ in the emphasis given to existing versus

near-term technologies (in the second approach) or near-term versus far-term technologies (in the third). The five research suboptions are defined as follows:

1. SDI approach.–Vigorously investigate advanced BMD technologies with the intent to

decide in the 1990s on whether or not to enter full-scale engineering development and

subsequent deployment. This approach assumes that while technology now within the

state of the art is not good enough to be worth

deploying today, the potential of advanced

BMD technologies is sufficiently promising

that a technology-limited effort (i.e. a program

limited by what is technologically feasible

rather than by funding constraints) is warranted to develop that potential. It also assumes that if successfully developed, such

technologies could make possible a national

security regime (weapons systems and arms

control) preferable to the current one.

2a. Early deployment approach.–Emphasize

early and incremental deployment of currently

available BMD technology. This approach

places high strategic value on the modest

levels of defensive capability which could probably be obtained today. Although the ABM

Treaty permits the United States to defend

some ICBMs with a single, highly constrained

defensive deployment, most early deployment

proposals go beyond these constraints and

could not be pursued under the existing treaty

regime.

2b. Intermediate deployment approach.–Emphasize research on BMD technologies advanced

beyond those available today but which, un-
9

like many SDI technologies, might be applicable to deployments in the early to mid1990s. This approach assumes investigations

of longer-run technologies should not delay deployments in the nearer term.

3a. Funding-limited approach.–Investigate

advanced BMD technologies at a funding level

well below that requested for the SDI and with

a much-reduced sense of urgency. Like the

SDI, this approach would focus on advanced

technologies that may eventually make a highly capable defense possible. Unlike the SDI,

however, it does not assume that we will know

in a few years whether we can achieve that

goal. The program would not aim towards

facilitating a development decision at a particular time, nor would it include tests or demonstrations which might raise questions of

compliance with the ABM Treaty.

3b. Combination approach.–Balance research in advanced BMD technologies with

the development of near-term deployment options which would include “traditional” BMD

technologies (nuclear-armed, radar-guided interceptors) of the sort specifically mentioned

in the ABM Treaty. This program, conducted

at a funding level well below that requested

for the SDI, would aim to deter Soviet abandonment of the ABM treaty; to hedge against

future Soviet BMD developments; to prevent

technological surprise; and to investigate the

long-term potential of advanced BMD technologies. Like the funding-limited approach, it

would not include demonstrations or development work which might raise questions of

compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Important issues that will be relevant to a

decision among these alternative research approaches are discussed below. First, however,

note is taken of Soviet BMD research.

SOVIET BMD RESEARCH AND COMPARISON

WITH U.S. RESEARCH

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have conducted research and development

activities in BMD since before the ABM

Treaty was signed. Both have acquired considerable experience with the “traditional”

BMD technologies, such as nuclear-armed,

radar-guided interceptors, of the sort specifically mentioned in the ABM Treaty. However,

although the level of Soviet “traditional” BMD

technology probably does not exceed our own,

the Soviets, with a working BMD production

base, are almost certainly better equipped in the

near-term to deploy a large-scale, “traditional”

BMD system than we are.

The Soviets have deployed and maintained

an ABM system around Moscow utilizing

“traditional” BMD technologies. They have

also extensively upgraded and modernized

that system. Ever since the United States

decided that its own, similar system was not

effective enough to justify maintaining it, the

Moscow ABM has been the world’s only operational ABM system. According to the Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power, 1985, the Soviets are “developing

a rapidly deployable ABM system to protect

important target areas in the U. S.S.R.. ” That

report concludes that “the aggregate of [their]

ABM and ABM-related activities suggests

that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM

defense of its national territory. ”6 Officials of

the CIA, however, have said that they do not

judge it likely that the Soviets would in fact

move to such a deployment in the near term.7

These officials point out that while the Soviets

could expand their presently limited ABM

system by the early 1990s,

In contemplating such a deployment . . .

[they] will have to weigh the military advan-

‘Both quotations from Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1985, p. 48.

‘Unclassified testimony of National Intelligence Officer

Lawrence K. Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear forces of the Senate

Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of

the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985.
10

tages they would see in such defenses against

the disadvantages they would see in such a

move, particularly the responses by the

United States and its allies.

One of the functions of a U.S. BMD research

program is to deter or respond to a near-term

Soviet ABM Treaty breakout. A U.S. response

to such a situation would most likely consist

Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense

ABM-IB Complex

ABM Silo Sites Under Construction .:

Roads -------- .

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense

map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, Galosh

neW silo-based high-acceleration interceptors, top right.

of deployment of a near-term U.S. defense, deployment of offensive countermeasures that

would ensure that our strategic forces could

penetrate Soviet defenses, or some combination of the two. Should a defensive response

be desired, a research approach which prepared options for near-term deployment would

be needed.
11

Photo credit: U.S. Army

The Missile Site Radar (background) of the Safeguard ABM System was designed to refine the data received from the

long-range Perimeter Acquisition Radar, track the attacking ICBM reentry vehicles, and fire Sprint and Spartan interceptor

missiles (in cells, foreground), to intercept them. Though this site was permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty and its

1974 protocol, the United States decided that its limited capabilities did not justify the cost and deactivated

the system in 1976.

Offensive countermeasures intended to penetrate, counter, or evade the Soviet defense are

at least as important in deterring or responding to a Soviet defensive deployment as U.S.

defensive options are. Offensive countermeasure research would accompany any of the

BMD research options above. In addition to

providing capability against Soviet defenses,

an offensive countermeasures research program must be an integral portion of any research and technology development program

studying BMD so that possible counters to

U.S. defenses can be anticipated.

The Soviets are also vigorously developing

advanced technologies potentially applicable

to BMD,8 in addition to modernizing the

“traditional” system they have deployed

around Moscow. However, the quality of that

work is difficult to determine, and its significance is therefore highly controversial. It has

been estimated that the total Soviet effort in

directed energy research is larger than that in

the United States. However, in terms of basic

technological capabilities, the United States

8

Soviet Military Power, 1985, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
12

clearly remains ahead of the Soviet Union in key

areas required for advanced BMD systems, including sensors, signal processing, optics,

microelectronics, computers and software. The

United States is roughly equivalent to the

Soviets in other relevant areas such as directed

energy and power sources. The Soviet Union

does not surpass the United States in any of

the 20 “basic technologies that have the greatISSUES FOR

1. Maintenance of the ABM Treaty

est potential for significantly improving military capabilities in the next 10 to 20 years”

which were surveyed by the Under Secretary

of Defense for Research and Engineering.g

9The FY 1986 Department of Defense Program for Research,

Development, and Acquisition, Statement by the Under Secretary of Defense, Research, and Engineering, 99th Cong., 1st

sess., 1985, p. II-4.

The five research options cited above each

have different implications for the ABM

Treaty. Administration policy is that the SDI

approach is intended to remain within Treaty

bounds until a decision is made to develop

BMD systems for deployment. However, proposed technology experiments raise technical

questions concerning compliance with Treaty

constraints on BMD development and testing.10 Moreover, the sense of urgency and the

high visibility imparted to the SDI also raise

political questions concerning the degree to

which the United States is committed to maintaining the ABM Treaty regime. Early or Intermediate deployment would probably imply

abandonment of the Treaty, though intermediate deployment might allow time for attempts

at reaching agreement with the Soviet Union

on Treaty revisions to permit limited deployments. The funding-limited and combination

approaches would relax the urgency of BMD

research, easing the political questions; to the

extent that technology demonstrations were

de-emphasized, the technical questions of

treaty compliance would be relaxed as well.

Advocates of these approaches would strive

not to damage the Treaty regime before we

had identified a preferable alternative which

we had confidence could be attained.

10 In app. A of this report, OTA points out that if one accepts

the Defense Department’s current interpretation of key terms

of the ABM Treaty, one may also reasonably accept the conclusion that the current SDI program will be Treaty compliant; however, applying a different interpretation to key Treaty

terms could lead to the opposite conclusion,

R&D PROGRAMS

The United States can plan for revision of

or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, or it can

attempt to make the Treaty more effective.

The middle course–trying to bolster the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty in the short

run (thereby preventing short-term Soviet

BMD testing and deployment) while explicitly

and publicly preparing to decide whether to

abandon it in the future-maybe the most difficult to implement. If we choose to maintain

the Treaty in the near term, an important issue for Congress to consider is how we can carry

out our BMD research program so that it does

not either prematurely compromise the ABM

Treaty by encouraging Soviet exploitation of

technical ambiguities, or stimulate the Soviets

to begin deploying BMD and enhanced offensive

forces at a time more advantageous to them

than to us. If we were to allow the ABM Treaty

regime to erode, and then find at the end of

our BMD research program that the new

BMD technologies did not fulfill expectations,

we could end up with the worst of both worlds:

no arms control to limit BMD, Soviet BMD

deployment, no effective U.S. BMD, and, quite

possibly, augmented Soviet offensive forces intended to overcome an anticipated U.S. BMD.

At the same time, current issues of Soviet

non-compliance with the Treaty must be addressed as well. If they cannot be satisfactorily

resolved, the United States in effect would

have adopted stricter standards of compliance

than those observed by the Soviets, which

might put us at a competitive disadvantage.

Congress may wish to review the standards

and the procedures by which U.S. activities
13

are judged to comply with existing treaty

commitments-perhaps by establishing an

independent and nonpartisan commission to

review Soviet BMD activities and to advise

Congress and the President on compliance

questions associated with BMD activities pro

posed by the U.S. Department of Defense.

2. Requirements for Arms Control

In addition to their differing effects on the

ABM Treaty, the alternate BMD research approaches pose different requirements for arms

control.

The role of arms control under the SDI approach would be to facilitate a safe transition

to a state of highly constrained offenses coupled with highly effective defenses. Such a

transition agreement would have to be negotiated before actual deployments began. And

it might need to take effect during the research

and development stages, in order to regulate

offensive and defensive developments. The

negotiability of any such agreement is very

much in question. Nobody has yet suggested

how the problems of measuring, comparing,

and monitoring disparate strategic forces—

problems which have plagued past arms control negotiations—could be satisfactorily resolved in the far more difficult situation where

both offensive and defensive forces must be

included.

By deploying BMD in excess of ABM

Treaty limits without waiting for the establishment of a replacement arms control regime, most early deployment approaches imply abandonment not only of the ABM Treaty

but of the entire arms control process. Not

content with the condition of strategic parity

prerequisite to arms control (or, alternatively,

believing that the Soviets are not willing to

settle for such a state) supporters of these approaches would instead attempt to attain and

maintain a lead over the Soviets in strategic

forces.

Supporters of the intermediate deployment

approach might see the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets over a transition not

to “defense dominance, ” but to agreed force

postures with an increased role for defenses

relative to offenses. On balance, however, if

such an agreement could not be reached, they

would probably see uncoordinated deployments by the two sides as being more in the

U.S. interest than the current ABM Treaty

regime.

Under the funding-limited and combination

approaches, negotiations with the Soviets

which attempted to establish the boundaries

between permitted and proscribed BMD research would be desirable for the purpose of

clarifying activities on both sides. If the prospect of the United States’ developing advanced technologies under the SDI approach

sufficiently concerns the Soviets, Soviet desires for limitations which would have the effect of constraining U.S. research and technology development might give the United States

considerable bargaining leverage. Such an

agreement would almost certainly have to permit laboratory research, which would be extremely difficult to ban verifiably, but it might

constrain more observable activities such as

demonstrations of ABM “sub-components”

and other field experiments which the Department of Defense argues are currently not prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Although it

might be difficult to construct a verifiable and

equitable agreement of this sort, the task

might be easier than reaching agreement on

the mutual introduction of strategic defenses.

3. Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control

At the Spring 1985 U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva, the Soviets emphasized the importance they attach to limiting weapons deployed in or directed at space.

As the companion OTA report, Anti-Satellite

Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, indicates, anti-satellite weapon technologies and BMD weapon technologies are

closely related. Therefore, those favoring uninhibited research on BMD would find arms control measures limiting antisatellite weapon

testing highly constrictive. Indeed, to attempt

to remain compliant with the ABM Treaty,

some technology demonstrations now planned

under the SD I would be conducted as anti-
14

satellite tests. On the other hand, those interested in strengthening the testing limitations

in the ABM Treaty would find anti-satellite

weapon test restrictions a useful tool in further constraining BMD development.

4. R&D/Deployment Coupling

There is an inherent conflict between seeking

the ability to make deployment decisions in the

near term and seeking to keep control over

whether and when such a deployment might be

made. Vigorous U.S. R&D programs could

lead the Soviets to infer an intent to deploy,

and might stimulate them to preempt such a

deployment. Therefore, proposals for a vigorous R&D program should demonstrate the

ability to cope with a Soviet defensive breakout and associated Soviet offensive actions in

a timely way. Offensive countermeasures

would probably contribute more than defensive actions towards our ability to respond to

Soviet defensive breakout.

If our research program is not to be presumed

to be a prelude to deployment, there must be a

clearly perceived threshold which requires a positive decision—not merely the lack of a negative

one—to cross. The limitations posed by the

ABM Treaty provide such a threshold.

Also required, however, is a clear set of decision criteria that must be met before BMD

development continues past the point requiring ABM Treaty renegotiation or abrogation.

As the level of effort devoted to BMD research

increases, a momentum or constituency will

be created that will favor continuing and enlarging the research effort and then moving

from research to demonstrations to deployment. For this reason, it would be easier to

establish decision criteria before a few more

years of BMD research growth had occurred

and before the time comes to make the actual

decision.

5. Technology Experiments

Technology demonstration experiments are

the most expensive and one of the most controversial aspects of a BMD research program.
15

Photo credit U S Departrnent of Defense

Homing Overlay Experiment—Kinetic Kill: Video

recording of telescopic view of impact of homing

vehicle on reentry vehicle target. Debris resulting from

collision is spreading out from center of rectangle.

Demonstrations of BMD technology are

also complicated by ABM Treaty constraints

on developing and testing ABM components

or systems. Experiments that raise treaty

compliance questions run the risk of provoking a Soviet reaction that could eliminate the

option of deferring BMD deployment until

technology had advanced further. One possible way to assess whether this risk is worth

taking might be to require that before such experiments are approved there should be developed both (1) a plausible system architecture

which would use the particular technologies

to be demonstrated and (2) a corresponding

arms control approach. Congress may wish to

satisfy itself beforehand that, if the technologies are proven feasible, such an architecture

and arms control regime appear likely to meet

satisfactorily whatever criteria are established

for proceeding with BMD.

6. Research and Development of

Offensive Forces

In the absence of an agreement to forgo or

drastically reduce them, there will be a role for

U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces for the

foreseeable future. To ensure their effectiveness in the event that the Soviets deploy

defenses, the United States will need to continue its development of penetration aids and

other offensive countermeasures. By minimizing the potential effectiveness of Soviet defense, the existence of such countermeasures

would help deter the Soviets from abrogating

the ABM Treaty or any subsequent agreement limiting defenses.

However, prudence dictates we assume that

any offensive countermeasure that can be developed by the United States could also be

available to the Soviets, and we therefore must

consider what such countermeasures would do

if deployed against our defenses. Development

by either side of powerful offensive countermeasures conflicts with the long-term goal of

minimizing the role for offenses—a problem

which will be exacerbated if defensive technologies have applications in offensive roles (e.g.

attacking satellites or aircraft, or, particularly,

attacking enemy defenses).

7. Relations With Allies

Beyond its effects on the ABM Treaty, the

U.S. BMD research program can have other

foreign policy consequences which should be

taken into account in evaluating options. Most

of our allies support United States BMD research as a counter to Soviet research, and

some have inquired how they can participate

in this research. However, for the most part

they generally have deep reservations about

the wisdom of deploying a strategic defense.

Whether the U.S. BMD research program now,

and any deployment in the future, can be conducted so as to avoid endangering the cohesion

of our alliances is an important issue.

8. Technology Transfer

The ABM Treaty prohibits the “transfer to

other states” of “ABM systems or their components, ” or of “technical descriptions or blue

prints” worked out for their construction.

These provisions prohibit the signatory nations from using their allies to circumvent

ABM Treaty constraints. As a result, allied
16

participation in a treaty-compliant research

program would have to be limited to research

which had not reached the “system” or “component” level. More of a problem for research

at this stage would be restrictions which the

United States itself might impose, as it does

now, on the transfer of military technology to

its allies for fear that such technologies may

eventually reach the Soviet Union.

In some discussions of BMD research or deployment approaches it has been suggested

that the United States might intentionally

transfer BMD technologies to the Soviet Union to prove that the United States did not

seek military superiority. Any such transfer

would raise two very significant issues: If BMD

plans or devices are transferred, potential adversaries might be able to study them to discover vulnerabilities, enabling them to circumvent or destroy our own such components. If

technological capability is transferred, rather

than specific devices, the American advantage

which had enabled us to develop that technology first would necessarily be compromised.

Furthermore, many BMD-relevant technologies

have applications in other military areas that

we may not want to help the Soviets develop.

Approaches towards BMD which assume that

we can and should maintain technological

supremacy over the Soviets would not be consistent with transfer of U.S. BMD technology

to them.

DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Decisions about BMD should be made in the

light of their overall impact on U.S. national

security. National security depends on more

than military capability. It is also affected by

such factors as Soviet perceptions and actions,

arms control, the cohesion of our alliances,

national unity and resolve, and economic

strength. It is beyond the scope of this report

to attempt to define or measure national security or to explore the merits of alternative approaches to enhancing it. Instead, we address

the narrower question of how a decision to deploy BMD might affect our national security.

One way to approach this question is to establish a set of criteria that BMD deployment

would have to meet to some degree in order to

produce net benefits for national security.

Most participants in the current debate

would probably agree on what criteria to apply in making a U.S. decision about whether

to deploy BMD. But there is considerable disagreement over how stringent each of these

criteria should be and what relative weights

should be assigned to each. There are also

strong disagreements about both the strategic and the technical prospects for satisfying

them.

We label the criteria:

1. Potential Role in U.S. Nuclear Strategy

2. Crisis Stability Effects

3. Arms Race Stability Effects

4. Diplomatic Stability Effects

5. Feasibility

6. Cost

The national debate over BMD in the years

to come is likely to center on the application

of these criteria. It is possible that the Soviets,

who maintain a vigorous BMD research and

development program, will choose to “break

out” or “creep out” from the ABM Treaty before the United States has decided whether to

deploy BMD itself. Soviet judgments about

the relation of their BMD deployments to the

above criteria could be quite different from

U.S. judgments. But a U.S. decision about

how to respond to Soviet BMD deployments

would still need to take these criteria into

account.
17

Criterion 1: Potential Role in

U.S. Nuclear Strategy

BMD should enhance the effectiveness of

current U.S. national strategy or permit the

adoption of a new and better one. And things

should not get much worse before they get better: the transition to an improved strategy

should not make the world significantly more

dangerous than it is now. On the other hand,

if one believes that current strategy in the absence of BMD is likely to lead to a worse situation for the United States, then one might

settle for a BMD deployment which simply

kept things from getting as bad as they might

otherwise have. In addition, the BMD deployment should be no more costly or risky than

alternative means, if they exist, of achieving

the same strategic goals.

For analytic purposes, OTA has postulated

five levels of ballistic missile defense capabilities (including none at all) and, where appropriate, of air defenses. In this part of the discussion we do not consider the feasibility or

cost of obtaining and sustaining those levels

of protection against Soviet offensive weapons (these are discussed in this summary

under Criteria 5 and 6). Rather, we simply attempt to explore some of the strategic implications of those levels if we and the Soviets

could both achieve and sustain them. (Analysis in chapter 5 of this report also addresses

asymmetrical situations—cases in which one

side or the other has a higher level of defense

capability. For the most part, however, we assume that, in accordance with stated U.S. policy, the United States does not seek superiority over the Soviets and will not permit

Soviet superiority over the United States.)

These postulated levels are:

No Additional Strategic Defense.–No defenses

against ballistic missiles beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty; passive and air

defenses comparable to current levels.

Level 1: Protection of Some ICBMs.–Defenses

able to assure the survival of a useful fraction

of U.S. land-based ICBMS, but which would

offer little or no protection to cities.

Level 2: Either/Or.–Defenses–including

BMD and air defense—able to ensure the survival of most land-based ICBMs or a high degree of urban survival against a follow-on (or

simultaneous attack), but not both.

Level 3: Most ICBMs, Some Cities.—Defenses

that could intercept enough Soviet missile and

and air-breathing weapons to deny the Soviets

the ability to destroy most U.S. land-based

ICBMs in their silos but could not deny them

the ability to destroy many U.S. cities if all

their offenses were concentrated on cities.

Level 4: Extremely Capable.–Defenses which

would permit the Soviets to destroy, by any

means, few if any targets in the United States.

They could not be confident that they could

destroy any U.S. cities.

The Soviets might, of course, have comparable levels of defensive capabilities. The combination of U.S. and Soviet capabilities would

determine what nuclear strategies were available to the United States.

The stated goal of the Administration’s

Strategic Defense Initiative is that the early

stages of BMD deployment should make the

existing U.S. deterrent strategy more effective, while later stages would allow us to move

to a different strategy.

The following discussion summarizes the potential implications for U.S. nuclear strategy

of each of the five BMD capability levels

postulated above.

No Additional Strategic Defense

Some argue that in the absence of ballistic

missile defenses, U.S. nuclear forces will be

less and less able to support current U.S. nuclear strategy, which has been called a “countervailing strategy. ” It attempts to deter the

Soviet Union from nuclear attack or threat of

attack on the United States or its allies by persuading the Soviets that U.S. nuclear counterattacks would, primarily, lead to unacceptable

damage to valued Soviet assets (punishment),

and, secondarily, would cause such Soviet attacks to fail in their gee-political objectives

(denial). Although the United States would
18

first attempt to repel a Soviet non-nuclear attack with conventional forces, it holds out the

possibility to the Soviets that their aggression

could escalate into a nuclear conflict. Thus the

United States seeks not only to deter a nuclear

attack on itself, but to obtain “extended deterrence” by making the Soviets fear that

other kinds of aggression could lead to nuclear

escalation.

In 1985, the Department of Defense estimated that the Soviet SS-18 ICBMs could

destroy 80 percent of the U.S. Minuteman

ICBMs in their protective silos.11 Some argue

that this vulnerability of the U.S. land-based

missile force could, under some conditions,

offer the Soviets an incentive to launch a

preemptive nuclear strike against the United

States. Even if the Soviets did not wish to

launch a preemptive attack, however, they

might believe that their ability to destroy a

high proportion of U.S. land-based intercontinental missiles gave them a basis for nuclear

blackmail against the United States or its

allies.

Others argue that the Soviets are highly

likely to remain deterred from such strikes by

the threat of retaliation from thousands of

U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on alerted

bombers and submarine-launched ballistic

missiles. Moreover, they argue, the probability of success of a necessarily high-precision

attack on the U.S. Minuteman force is subject

to many uncertainties, including the possibility that the U.S. might launch its missiles before Soviet missiles could reach them.

Level 1: Defense of Some ICBMs

To the extent that the Soviets have confidence in the success of an attack on U.S. landbased missiles, on U.S. command and control

facilities, and on some other military targets,

even relatively modest levels of BMD performance could reduce that confidence and thereby

enhance U.S. deterrence.

11The ,soviet9 have other accurate missiles that rnigM rtise

that estimate, and as they add still more accurate missiles to

their arsenal, the estimate could go up further. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Mih”tzuy Power, 1985, p. 30.

At the same time, given the kinds of offensive missile forces the Soviet Union and the

United States now have, modest levels of Soviet

BMD performance would reduce the net number of ballistic missile warheads reaching the Soviet Union in a U.S. retaliatory attack. (See

chapter 5 of this report for a detailed explanation.) This reduction in the total effective

size of the U.S. retaliatory force may be

thought worthwhile when weighed against the

advantages of preserving at least some landbased ICBMs in addition to the SLBMs and

bomber weapons and of having a partly protected command and control system.

On the other hand, in the view of those who

think that the probability of Soviet success in

a disarming first strike is already sufficiently

uncertain, the uncertainty that BMD could

add to Soviet military planning would do little or nothing to enhance deterrence. In addition, if the survivability of land-based ICBMs

and command and control facilities were the

only goal of U.S. defenses, then there might

be other, less costly, means of achieving that

goal, such as making the ICBMs mobile (and

thus difficult for the Soviets to target) and increasing the redundancy and mobility of communications nodes and command centers.

Another goal might be to deter Soviet limited nuclear strikes against various kinds of

military targets in the United States or a theater of war abroad, particularly in Europe. Depending on how they were configured, low to

moderate levels of BMD might offer some protection to such targets. But, unlike multiple,

relatively hard-to-destroy targets like missile

silos, these other military targets would, as a

whole set, still be highly vulnerable to a determined Soviet attack using many hundreds

of nuclear weapons. The presence of BMD

would force the Soviets to use more missiles

than otherwise would be necessary, thus raising the threshold of violence and perhaps increasing the Soviet perception of risk of large

scale nuclear retaliation from the United

States. At the same time, the presence of Soviet BMD would similarly narrow the range

of U.S. limited options for using nuclear ballistic missiles.
—.—

19

Modest levels of nationwide ballistic missile

defense might protect the United States and the

Soviet Union against relatively small missile attacks from other nuclear missile powers. On the

other hand, small nuclear powers interested

in nuclear weapons as instruments of terrorism may not rely on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles, but might use, for example,

small aircraft or boats to smuggle their weapons into superpower territory. For the near future, however, it is the Soviets, not we, who

face Chinese, French, and British nuclear missiles. From the point of view of U.S. allies Britain and France, Soviet BMD could degrade the

credibility of their own nuclear deterrent forces.

If, on the other hand, the United States were

able to provide them with effective missile

defenses of their own, they might or might not

consider that to be a fair trade.

Yet another benefit of even limited nationwide BMD capabilities would be the probable

interception of accidental or unauthorized

launches of very few ballistic missiles.

Level 2: Either/Or

(Defenses–including BMD and air defense

—able to ensure the survival of most landbased ICBMs or a high degree of urban survival against a follow-on or simultaneous attack, but not both.) If the United States and

the Soviet Union both had this level of defense

capability, both Soviet and U.S. strategic planners would face still greater uncertainties. For

example, in planning a first strike on the

United States, the Soviets would have to consider not only how the U.S. ICBM silos might

be defended, but also how U.S. defenses might

be allocated between silo (and other military

target) defense and city defense. They would

have to be careful to retain sufficient offensive

capability to threaten many U.S. cities after

they had attacked U.S. silos.

A Soviet first strike followed by a U.S.

retaliation could have a wide range of outcomes. The Soviets would have little ability

to determine in advance what the actual outcome would be. Depending on how the United

States had allocated its defenses and how the

Soviets allocated their offenses, the Soviet

strike might destroy nearly all, some, or virtually none of the U.S. land-based ICBM force.

As a result, a U.S. retaliatory attack, on the

other hand, might or might not be large and

well-coordinated enough to penetrate Soviet

defenses. Depending on how one measures

‘‘success’ in a nuclear strike, the Soviets

might emerge “better” or “worse” off than

they would have been if neither side had had

defenses. However, at this level, a significant

and extremely dangerous possibility is that the

Soviets might calculate that a first strike

against U.S. retaliatory forces combined with

Soviet defenses could keep damage from a U.S.

retaliatory strike to a relatively low level. If the

Soviets similarly calculated that the United

States could strike first and defend successfully

against their retaliation, that would be an additional incentive for the Soviets to attack preemptively.

The very wide range of possible outcomes

of a strategic nuclear war under these circumstances, and the difficulty of predicting which

might occur, should reinforce military conservatism on both sides. But, particularly during a crisis, as the uncertainties of striking

first go up, so do the potential gains, in terms

of reducing the other side’s ability to retaliate. And, perhaps more important, the potential risks of waiting for the other side to go

first also increase.

Level 3: Defense of Most ICBMs, Plus Some

Cities

(Ballistic missile and air defenses that could

unconditionally deny the Soviets the ability

to destroy most U.S. land-based ICBMs in

their silos but could not deny them the ability to destroy many U.S. cities if all their

offenses were concentrated on cities). At this

level of defense capability on both sides, neither the Soviets nor the United States could

have confidence in almost any plausible plan

for attacking military targets, no matter how

they allocated their warheads.12 Both sides

“Some might argue, though, that several hundred or a thousand nuclear weapons reaching key strategic command and con-
20

would still be able to do considerable damage

to many “soft” civilian or military targets

(though perhaps markedly less than if neither

had defenses”), but each would have to expect

comparable retaliatory destruction imposed

by the other. Soviet decisions to challenge U.S.

interests would not be reinforced by any possibility that the Soviets could improve their

military position by a preemptive strike on

U.S. offensive forces.

At this high level of defense capability, both

sides would also want very capable air defense

systems, in order to deny any attempts to accomplish significant military ends with nuclear weapons delivered by bomber or cruise

missile. Substantial civil defense capabilities

might further reduce the level of casualties

predicted.

At a such high level of BMD capability on

both sides, the Soviets might also perceive a reduced risk that conventional or tactical nuclear

war would escalate to strategic nuclear war. Insofar as the risk of escalation to nuclear war

had discouraged the Soviets from aggressive

acts, they might now be more tempted to use

or threaten to use military force. On the other

hand, U.S. leaders might be more willing to

commit conventional or tactical nuclear forces

to block Soviet aggression if they believed that

escalation to a war that would damage U.S.

territory were unlikely. ”

—

trol nodes would be a plausible military accomplishment. But

if sufficient survivability measures had been incorporated in

the command and control system, weapons penetrating the

BMD system might not accomplish much.

1%ome might argue, though, that several hundred nuclear

weapons reaching cities would be comparable in horror to several thousand.

lt should be noted that some policy analysts believe that

the United States relies too much on the extended deterrence

thought to be provided by nuclear weapons. In their view, more

emphasis should be placed on conventional forces adequate to

repel aggression as the primary means of deterring threats or

aggression. Some holding this view believe that nuclear weapons should be used only to deter the use of nuclear weapons

by threatening punishment. In this latter view, any nuclear firststrike attack by either the Soviet Union or the United State,

assuming either current levels of nuclear delivery capability or

much lower levels, would be irrational because the cost would

be out of proportion to any conceivable gain. In other words–

again, in this view—there is already little or no military utility

to nuclear weapons, and ideas of “nuclear war-fighting” are unrealistic. Thus BMD deployment at “Level 3“ would have no

significant value for U.S. national security.

Level 4: Extremely Capable

(Defenses that would permit the Soviets to

destroy few or no U.S. targets; they might be

able destroy some U.S. cities, but their military planners could not have confidence in

their ability to do so). The previous hypothesized levels of defense capability all retain a

key element–many say the key element–of

today’s situation: the threat of massive nuclear destruction should the Soviets attack us.

At this high level of capability, however,

denial of Soviet ability to inflict damage on

the United States would supplant retaliation

as the key element of U.S. security. The survival of U.S. society as a whole would no

longer depend on the rationality of Soviet decisions, but on the inability of the Soviet Union to inflict mortal damage upon us. If we believed that the Soviets had virtually no chance

of delivering any nuclear weapons at all on

U.S. cities or those of our allies, we might do

away altogether with threats of retaliation. If,

on the other hand, we believed that there was

at least some risk of their being able and willing to do so, we might want to retain some residual (albeit low-confidence) retaliatory capability.

In either case, the threat of nuclear retaliation would play a much smaller role in U.S.

security policy than it does today. As the Administration’s long-range scenario for the Strategic Defense Initiative implies, this level of

protection could probably only be reached by a

combination of defense deployments and negotiated deep reductions of offenses. The principle of “extended deterrence” would have been

abandoned, but in an international climate in

which the superpowers had negotiated vast reductions in their nuclear offensive capabilities

toward one another, they might also be able

to negotiate reductions in the conventional

and nuclear threats to U.S. allies. We return

below to the question of BMD and arms control negotiations, as well as to questions of

technical feasibility and cost.

Criterion 2: Crisis Stability

The deployment of BMD should not increase

incentives to launch a strategic nuclear first
21

strike in a crisis situation. Preferably, such incentives should be decreased. The motive for

a Soviet decision to escalate a crisis to a central nuclear war might not be to gain a clear

political or military objective: instead, it may

be to reduce what they fear could be a severe

loss.15 In time of crisis we would not want the

Soviet leadership to calculate that its least bad

option was to start a nuclear war. We would

not want our own force posture to lead them

to believe either that they could gain in some

way by striking first or that the United States

would be likely to preempt. (The issue is not

whether U.S. policy would actually allow a

preemptive U.S. attack, but whether the Soviets might fear that possibility.)

No Additional Strategic Defense.—Those who

believe that vulnerability of the U.S. landbased ICBM force and U.S. command and control facilities might offer the Soviets an incentive to launch a preemptive nuclear attack see

this vulnerability as crisis-destabilizing. It is

also possible that the growing accuracy of U.S.

missile warheads that could attack Soviet missiles might induce the Soviets to believe they

must “use or lose’ their vulnerable weapons

under some circumstances.

Others argue that current crisis stability is

relatively high and likely to remain so as long

as both sides continue to maintain thousands

of relatively survivable warheads on submarines and bombers.

Level 1: Some ICBMs.–Insofar as ICBM vulnerability is a destabilizing factor, the ability

on both sides to defend some ICBMs should

be crisis-stabilizing. Again, if protection of

retaliatory capabilities were the only goal for

a BMD system, it should be compared in costeffectiveness to other means of achieving the

same end. On the other hand, those who see

crisis stability as high and likely to remain so

are likely to view defense of ICBMs as unnecessary for that purpose.

“Many factors would go into a decision to escalate a crisis

to strategic nuclear war. Calculations about the likelihood that

the other side might launch a preemptive attack and about the

disadvantages of waiting for it to do so would be only one set

of such decision factors. In this report we treat only the even

more limited question of how BMD (or its absence) might affect such calculations.

Level 2: Either/Or.–(Defenses–including

BMD and air defense—able to ensure the survival of most land-based ICBMs or a high degree of urban survival against a follow-on (or

simultaneous attack), but not both.)

As indicated above, there would be a far

more serious potential for crisis instability if

both sides had a “Level 2“ strategic defense

capability. That the Soviets would be less certain that an attack on U.S. ICBMs would succeed ought to be a stabilizing factor. On the

other hand, at “Level 2“ there would be at

least the possibility-not previously available—that a first strike combined with defenses could keep damage from a retaliatory

strike to a relatively low level. Worst of all,

it is possible that both sides could arrive at

a highly unstable situation in which each

might perceive a chance of assuring its own

survival by striking first, and only by striking first.

Level 3: Most ICBMs, Some Cities.—If both

sides had ballistic missile and air defenses that

could unconditionally deny the other side the

ability to destroy most U.S. land-based ICBMs

in their silos, but could not deny them the ability to destroy many of one’s cities if all the

offenses were concentrated on cities, crisis stability should be quite high. The advantages

of attacking first should be marginal, the

threat of retaliatory destruction still substantial.

Level 4: Extremely Capable.–At a level of defense at which few or no military targets and

few or no cities could be destroyed, a strategic nuclear crisis would seem to be out of the

question. An aggressor calculating that he

might in some way deliver a few weapons on

enemy territory would have to contend with

the risk that the victim could retaliate on a

similar level. Nor could a first strike do anything to reduce such residual retaliatory capabilities.

Importance to Crisis Stability of BMD System

Survivability

One criterion for a BMD system which

many Administration officials have cited is

system survivability-the ability of the sys-
22

tern to perform at desired levels despite direct

attack on its components. We may take it for

granted that neither side would bother to deploy a BMD system which could obviously be

rendered ineffective by enemy attack. Rather,

the question would be about the degrees of

confidence on each side regarding the continuing survivability of its own and the other

side’s defensive systems.

If one side or the other had a BMD system

that was itself vulnerable, preemption would

leave the attacked side defenseless and the attacker at least partially defended against

retaliation-even if the victim of attack

launched ICBMs before they could be destroyed.

If both sides had vulnerable BMD systems,

the net result of simultaneous successful attacks on both systems could be to leave the

two sides in an offensive stand-off similar to

the one existing now. However, an extremely

unstable situation would arise if each sides’s

space-based BMD system were vulnerable to attack, but only from the other’s BMD system.

Each would have powerful incentives to “use

or lose” his system, to attack before the other

side did. The one that struck first might substantially disarm the other side.

Criterion 3: Arms Race Stability and

Arms Control

Related to, but separate from, the issue of

crisis stability is the issue of arms race stability. What incentives would BMD deployment by one side offer the other to agree to

negotiate arms control measures limiting or

reducing those forces? On the other hand,

what incentives would BMD deployment by

one side offer to the other side to increase its

offensive or defensive forces in a way which

would induce the first side to further increase

its own forces?

There is a degree of paradox associated with

the uncertainties that BMD deployment could

introduce in the calculations of the two sides.

On the one hand, increased uncertainty about

the likelihood of successful attacks could increase crisis stability by making the aggressor less willing to gamble on a favorable outcome from a first strike. On the other hand,

in the face of growing uncertainty about the

effectiveness of its military forces, each side

will have an incentive to try to reduce that uncertainty by deploying additional offensive

and defensive weapons and countermeasures.

BMD deployments at any level would be

much less likely to destabilize the strategic nuclear competition if they could be coordinated

in advance by explicit agreement between the

United States and the Soviet Union. If the

Soviets could be persuaded that U.S. defenses

hold the potential for rendering offenses obsolescent by making them less and less able

to reach their targets, then the Soviets might

have an increased incentive to try to negotiate mutual reduction of U.S. and Soviet offenses. Moreover, if both sides could agree for

other reasons on the desirability of reducing

offenses and increasing defenses, then the incentive of a favorable “cost-exchange ratio”

of defenses over offenses would not be necessary. Or, to put it another way, a favorable ratio could be negotiated: decreasing offenses

would make defenses more effective. A “race”

between offenses and defenses would be circumvented.

An arms control agreement for phasing in

BMD would have to establish acceptable

levels and types of offensive and defensive capabilities for each side and means for verifying them adequately. It would have to specify

offensive system limitations that prevented either side from obtaining a superior capability

to penetrate the other’s defenses. It would

have to specify the BMD system designs for

each side that would not exceed the BMD capabilities agreed to. It is important to note,

however, that no one has as yet specified in any

detail just how such an arms control agreement

could be formulated.

Without such an agreement, as the United

States and the Soviet Union began to deploy

BMD, each might easily suspect the other of attempting to gain military advantage by seeking

the ability to destroy most of the opponent’s
23

land-based missiles and then use defenses to

keep retaliatory damage to a very low level. If

either side feared that its retaliatory capabilities were about to be lost or greatly reduced

relative to those of the other side, there would

be an incentive to add offensive capabilities

and defensive capabilities at the same time.

Those additions, in turn, could look to the

other side like the pursuit of a “first-strike capability” and stimulate further reactive offensive and defensive deployments. The potential

interactions could be extremely complex, depending as they would on the actual deployments made by each side, the effectiveness of

those deployments as perceived by the other

side, and the future deployments each side

anticipated that the other would make. Landbased ICBMs, sea-based SCBMs, bombers,

cruise missiles, and air defenses would all affect strategic stability—positively or negatively.

We do not yet know at what point the Soviets might decide that their best chance of

avoiding military inferiority was to abandon

their offense and stress defense. Would they

do so after calculating in advance that offensive responses would be economically futile,

or only after a considerable acceleration of the

strategic arms competition had proved the

fact through experience? Thus far, they have

repeatedly declared that their reaction to the

SDI will be to augment their offensive forces

and pursue countermeasures. Most observers

seem to believe that these (along with Soviet

BMD deployments) are the most likely initial

Soviet reaction to possible U.S. BMD deployments. 16

But there is much disagreement about when,

if ever, the Soviets might reverse their decision and agree to deep offensive reductions.

“Some believe that the Soviets would actually deploy countermeasures to 13MD such as penetration aids before increasing already planned levels of offensive weapons. Others believe

that in any case the rate of growth of Soviet offensive forces

is already so high that prospective US. BMI) deployments

would have little effect on that rate. Yet another argument is

that since the Soviets have heavily emphasized other forms of

strategic defense (e.g., air defense and passiive defenses), they

may be more willing than they admit to shift to an emphasis

on ballistic missile defenses.

Some argue, for example, that even if increments of offense were more expensive than

corresponding increments of defense, the Soviets would still add offenses. In the long run,

of course, if the United States stayed in such

an arms race, the Soviets would find themselves with declining offensive capabilities.

But, for the near term before any BMD deployment, if the Soviets perceive the likelihood

of U.S. BMD deployment later on, then they

are likely to remain unwilling to agree to offensive arms reductions.

Criterion 4: Diplomatic Stability

Relations with other nations benefit from a

degree of mutual understanding of each other’s

intentions and from some predictability of action. While it is clear that many kinds of military deployments will affect our international

relationships, we would do well to try to introduce changes in ways that minimize adverse effects on our overall relations with foreign nations.

The deployment of BMD would have significant effects, positive or negative, on our relations with our allies, with our adversaries,

and possibly with other countries. Moreover,

the manner in which we carried out a deployment decision could also affect our diplomatic

relations. As Presidential arms control advisor Paul Nitze pointed out in a speech in London in March 1985,

President Reagan has made clear that any

future decision to deploy new defenses

against ballistic missiles would be a matter

for negotiation.

This does not mean a Soviet veto over our

defense programs; rather, our commitment

to negotiation reflects a recognition that we

should seek to move forward in a cooperative

manner with the Soviets . . .

Before negotiating such a cooperative transition with the Soviet Union, we would consult fully with our allies. ”

1‘Speech before International Institute for Strate@c Studies,

op. cit.
24

The Administration has made a frequently

restated commitment to develop defenses that

would defend U.S. allies as well as U.S. territory.

Proponents of BMD argue that deployment

could enhance U.S. diplomatic relations in at

least two ways. First, if U.S. deterrence of a

Soviet nuclear attack on the United States

were enhanced, our allies should feel more secure about our commitment to fight if they are

attacked since it might be less dangerous for

us to do so. Second, if their territory were also

protected against Soviet missiles, our allies

should feel directly more secure from the Soviet threat. This might be especially true if the

deployment of BMD led to mutual deep reductions of offensive nuclear forces. Some would

argue, however, that even defense of NATO

military targets against Soviet missiles would

strengthen allied feelings of security by enhancing deterrence of Soviet attack. Third, a

new strategic relationship with the Soviets, in

which we had negotiated a transition to a

“defense dominant” world, might lead to a

healthier relationship both between the United

States and its allies and between the Western

allies and the Soviet bloc. As Paul Nitze put it,

Clearly, were we able to move cooperatively

with the Soviet Union toward a nuclear-free

world, that would presuppose a more cooperative overall relationship than exists at

present–one in which efforts to establish a

conventional balance at lower levels should

be fruitful.18

On the other hand, skeptics about the diplomatic promise of BMD make the following

sorts of predictions:

● The likely Soviet response to U.S. BMD

deployment, prospective and actual, would

be to add offense rather than negotiate

offensive reductions; thus, the idea of a

negotiated transition to a safer world or

indeed of any offensive arms reductions

at all in the context of BMD deployments

is probably unrealistic.

● If a “defense dominant” situation had

made escalation of conflict to nuclear war

181 bid., p. 6.

●

●

●

between the United States and the Soviet

Union much less likely, most of the effects

of U.S. “extended deterrence” would be

lost. Either the likelihood of Soviet conventional aggression might increase, or

large additions to Western conventional

forces might be necessary, or both.

European allies of the United States may

correctly believe that BMD cannot protect them as well as it could the United

States, particularly in view of their proximity to Warsaw Pact territory and the

variety of shorter-range nuclear delivery

means available to the Soviets; thus, they

may see U.S. and Soviet BMD as tending to decouple their defense from that of

the United States and, conceivably, make

Europe a “safer” sphere of conflict for the

Soviets.

Soviet BMD might render the British and

French nuclear deterrent forces ineffective, thus leading those allies to oppose

the U.S. initiative in upsetting the strategic equation.

Many national leaders see the ABM

Treaty as the keystone of East-West arms

control; if the United States leads the way

to abandonment of that Treaty regime,

U.S. allies may question whether the

United States is serious about arms control and may seek to distance themselves

from the United States. In addition, signatories to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may also see U.S. and

Soviet abandonment of the ABM Treaty

as abandonment of the arms control process (a process the nuclear powers committed themselves to in the 1970 treaty) and

be more inclined to develop their own nuclear weapons.

Criterion 5: Feasibility

There are two important levels of technical

feasibility. First, it must be feasible to apply

the technologies under consideration in working components of a BMD system. Second, it

must be feasible to make the components work

together effectively as an operational system

in the face of attempts of the adversary to

overcome that system.
General Issues

Whether new ballistic missile defense technologies could lead to the kind of defense we

would want depends both on the potential of

the technologies and on the kind of defense we

would want.

●

●

●

●

Levels of BMD performance intended to enhance deterrence by increasing the uncertainty of the Soviets as they calculate the

risks and benefits of a strike on U.S. ICBM

silos and command and control facilities

might be attained with technologies now

fairly well-understood.

Levels of BMD performance intended to assure complete denial of military objectives

(such as destruction of most U.S. missile

silos) to Soviet ballistic missiles would require major technological advances.

Levels of BMD performance intended to offer substantial protection to U.S. cities and

other “soft” targets against nuclear attack

would require still more extensive advances. These higher levels of BMD capability (such as clearly denying military

utility to ballistic missiles or substantially

protecting cities) will almost surely require a multi-layered, multi-weapon BMD

system. Therefore, lower levels of BMD

capability might be attained if a few technical developments prove fruitful, while

higher levels will require that more key

technologies become available together.

A strategic defense which could assure the

survival of all or nearly all U.S. cities in the

face of unconstrained Soviet nuclear offensive forces (missiles, bombers, cruise missiles, other means of attack) does not appear feasible. As we have seen, current

Administration policy envisages pursing

the goal of assured survival through a

combination of defensive weapons and negotiated deep reduction of Soviet and U.S.

offensive weapons.

A wide variety of technologies could, in principle, be developed to produce components for

a multi-tiered ballistic missile defense system.

Candidate technologies for kill mechanisms include various types of lasers, kinetic energy

vehicles (self-propelled or projectile), and particle beams. No known physical law stands in

the way of developing such components and assembling them into a layered system intended

to intercept ballistic missiles and their warheads

in the boost-phase, the post-boost (reentry vehicle separation) phase, the midcourse, and the

reentry phase. Physical laws do limit the potential performance of some kinds of components, however. For example, neutral particle

beams cannot penetrate the atmosphere, and

thus could not intercept missiles while they

were still in the atmosphere.

For most of the new ballistic missile defense

technologies, much research is still necessary

to determine whether the physical principles

involved can be affordably applied in working

weapon systems. Many of the technologies being considered for BMD still require improvements in performance of orders of magnitude

(factors of ten) before they can be used in weapons. Systems for boost phase, post-boost

phase, and midcourse BMD are likely to require many satellites in orbit, satellites which

must be highly reliable while relatively inaccessible to maintenance.19

Massive improvements in computer speed,

reliability, durability in a hostile environment,

and software capabilities would be required.

Current research gives cause for some optimism about meeting the hardware requirements, though most analysts agree that generating the necessary software would be a

monumental task.

Space-based BMD systems would require a

much more capable space transportation system than the United States now has, and

would probably require a substantial lowering

of space launch costs. This requirement would

be less stringent, however, in the case of systems employing ground-based lasers.

Another issue is the susceptibility of sensors

to defeat by various countermeasures. Their

19However, some system designs might require fewer than

others. For example, those using ground-based lasers, or those

using weapons “popped up” from the ground, would require

fewer satellites than those using entirely space-based weapons.
26

sensitive nature, necessary for long distance

detection, makes them vulnerable to various

kinds of temporary or permanent blinding.

They would have to be designed to operate

against a background of nuclear explosions.

Making decoys look like targets and making

targets look like decoys may spoof sensor systems. Space-basing makes the the sensors potentially vulnerable to antisatellite weapon

attack.

For all space-based BMD system components,

survivability against directed energy, nuclear,

or kinetic energy weapon attack is a major issue. For example, space mines might be

planted to tail sensor satellites or battle stations. As the companion OTA report, AntiSatellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and

Arms Control, indicates, there are many potentially effective means of interfering with or

destroying space systems, as well as many potential countermeasures for dealing with those

means. Whether the means of protecting satellites will be adequate to ensure the survivability of particular space-based BMD systems

will depend in part on the kind of system

deployed20 and in part on future Soviet antisatellite capabilities. Insufficient information

is now available to resolve the survivability

question.

The Soviet Union will have about as long to

develop offensive countermeasures to defensive

systems as the United States does to develop

the defensive systems, and vice-versa. No one

can confidently predict today whether defensive technologies will dominate offensive delivery technologies in the future. It is clear

that a U.S. BMD research program should devote considerable effort to exploring BMD

countermeasures, both to determine whether

defense at the desired level of effectiveness is

feasible and affordable, and to hedge against

Soviet BMD advances.

‘For example, many sensors, redundantly distributed among

numerous satellites in a variety of orbits, could increase overall system survivability.

Components and Systems

In the absence of officially proposed BMD architectures (system designs) and in the absence

of specific weapon designs, it is impossible to

estimate BMD feasibility and costs. The Strategic Defense Initiative Program is charged

with doing research to find out whether current technologies can be scaled up to the necessary performance levels and then whether

they can be applied in engineering effective,

reliable, and affordable weapons. How much

Congress will choose to invest in this research

program will depend in part on its judgment

about the benefits and risks considered in this

report and on its beliefs in the premises and

predictions of differing policy advocates.

It is possible, however, to give a general conception of the likely ultimate feasibility and

costs by conveying a feeling for the requisite

scale of a highly capable, multi-layered BMD

system. OTA has postulated a BMD system

architecture purely as an illustration of the

kinds of tasks involved in deploying a very ambitious BMD system. We definitely do not predict that the example we have hypothesized will

ever be proposed or built, nor do we assert that

the technologies assumed for it are more or less

promising than any others. The example is

given (see table l-l) to illustrate that deploying a large-scale, multi-tiered BMD system

would be a formidable, complex, and expensive job.

A highly capable BMD system designed

along the lines of our postulated example

would pose the following challenging requirements:

● A boost-phase defensive layer effective in

the face of proliferation and countermeasures. The boost phase interception of ballistic missiles must be highly effective to

keep the tasks of the succeeding defensive

layers manageable. Soviet deployment of

many additional rocket boosters appears

possible in the very near term. Rocket

boosters which finish burning very quickly

and upper stages which dispense their

separate reentry vehicles very rapidly appear feasible to deploy in significantly less
System level

Level 1

Terminal Defense

(defense of hardened sites using

endoatmospherlc rockets to Intercept

reentry vehicles (RVs) as they approach their targets)

Level 2

Light Midcourse and Terminal

Defense

(addltlonal layer added with some

interceptIon capability in midcourse

and some ability to discriminate RVs

from decoys in space to reduce burden

on terminal layer, some area defense)

Table 1-1 .—Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System

System elements Descriptio n Comment s — . . . —

Early warning satellites,

ground-based radar:

airborne optical sensors

ground-based battle management computers.

fast endoatmospheric Interceptors.

Level 1 plus

exoatmospheric homing Interceptors, range

hundreds of km;

pop-up b IR sensors (possibly satellite-based

Instead),

self-defense capability for space assets.

Warning of launch provided by high-orbit satellites

RVs detected and tracked in region of ground targets by ground radar and airborne sensors, ground

computers assign Interceptors to RVs, kill assessment permits reassignment of defense interceptors; atmospheric Interception used, air effects

used to discriminate between RVs and decoys —

As in level 1 for terminal defenses: longer range

Interceptors added which can Intercept some RVs

above atmosphere, providing some area defense,

this requires some discrimination capability, furnished by passive IR pop-up sensors, launched

towards cloud of decoys and attacking RVs; the

new layer reduces the burden on the terminal layer

Homing either infrared (IR) or radar, interceptors should be relatively inexpensive, since many needed, may be

nuclear or nonnuclear

Passive IR sensors used for crude discrimination and possibly kill assessment: data base of Soviet RV and decoy

signatures needed, sensors must be

able to function in a hostile nuclear environment.

Level 3

Heavier Midcourse Layer Level 2 plus’

(effective midcourse layer added, ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) imaging on

giving realistic two-layer system, satellites;

with each layer highly effective)

highly capable space-based battle management system;

space-based kinetic energy weapons,

effective self-defense in space:

significant space-based power.

Satellite-based ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) used to Ladar imaging rapid with resolution

image objects; discrimination provided by compar- good to 1 meter or less for adequate

ing images with data base of Soviet RV and decoy discrimination and birth-to-death trackcharacteristics, RVs attacked by in-orbit kinetic- ing of RVs, kinetic weapon homing

energy weapons, which also defend all space- capability good to less than a meter

based components of system; this level has fully

developed terminal and midcourse layers, but no

boost or post-boost phase defense.

Level 4

Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers Level 3 plus: This level adds a boost- and post-boost-phase Extremely capable battle management

(boost-phase Intercept added to kill ground-based high-tntensity lasers (either layer, consisting of very bright ground-based laser system needed; kill assessment required

boosters or post-boost vehicles be- excimer or free electron); beams directed to their targets by orbiting mirrors; for boost phase as well as midcourse

fore RVs and decoys dispersed)

space-based mirrors for relay and aim;

sensing by infrared sensors, imaging by ultra-violet

Iadar: battle management to handle all Iayers doinq

high resolution tracking and Imaging in discrimination, kill-assessment, and target assign--

boost phase; ments and reassignments. Boost- and post-boostself-defense for all phases phase layers may be combined, since post-boost

phase could be shortened to 10 seconds or so.

Level 5

Extremely Effective Layer Level 4 plus: More interceptors are added in terminal and mid- Essentially same as Level 4, but more

(Level 4 with better capability; more terminal and exoatmospheric inter- course layers; electromagnetic launchers used for of it and higher reliability; newer techmeant to permit only minimal ceptors; boost, post-boost and midcourse intercepts; high nologies used as they become available.

penetration to targets by enemy capacity space power needed; all systems, includRVs) electromagnetic launchers for midcourse

and boost-phase intercepts:

ing battle management must be extremely reliable.

large capacity space-based power;

all systems extremely reliable.

a

Kill assessment refers to the process of determining whether a struck target has been effectively disabled

bpop-up components are ground-based assets which are launched into space for action upon warning of an enemy attack

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
28

time than the defensive systems they

would be designed to counter. Boost-phase

defenses need to be effective against both.

Sensors and computers able to discriminate

rapidly between decoys and reentry vehicles in the midcourse phase (as the objects

separate from the post-boost vehicles, and

before they reenter the atmosphere). Techniques now fairly well understood for

making reentry vehicles and decoys “look”

like one another to various sensor systems will make target discrimination one

of the most challenging tasks for midcourse interception systems.

Sensors that can function nearly continuously under attack and against a background of nuclear detonations.

A system of battle management computers

and software of very high complexity. A

control system will be required to be able

to track thousands-possibly hundreds of

thousands-of objects simultaneously, as-

●

●

●

●

●

sign weapons to attack the correct targets, account for targets destroyed, and

assign other weapons to missed targets.

This task will require extremely large,

complex computer programs of very high

reliability.

Communications links among sensors, battle management centers, and weapons that

can function reliably in the face of jamming

attempts, attack, and interference from nuclear detonations.

Space-based power supply systems, each of

ten or more megawatts, with high reliability, quick response, and affordable maintainability.

Means of protecting space-based BMD assets from a wide range of possible means

of attack.

Ground-based exoatmospheric (late midcourse layer) interceptors that are inexpensive because they must be numerous.

Ground-based interceptors for the final (terminal) layer that are-inexpensive because

they must be numerous.

Not only do issues of technological feasibility need to be resolved, but so do issues of

operational feasibility. That is, the developed

components must be combined into an integrated, reliable system that could operate effectively and maintain that effectiveness over

time as new countermeasures appeared. Such

a system could never be fully tested operationally-as indeed strategic offensive nuclear systems have never been. But we would want to

have high confidence in the effectiveness of a

defensive system to consider steep reductions

in our offensive retaliatory forces.

Criterion 6: Cost

Another part of the decision about investment in BMD research depends on a weighing of potential benefits and risks against ultimate costs. If some of the research can lead

only to the demonstration of the technical feasibility of systems so costly that the nation

would never want or be able to pay for them,

then the decision on whether to do the research

would be different than if the expected costs
were commensurate with the expected benefits. Everyone can agree that a multi-tiered

BMD system with significant space basing

would be very expensive, but how expensive

depends on many unknowns.

Besides illustrating the need for the kinds

of technical developments described under Criterion 5, examination of our hypothetical system also indicates how the presence of so

many unknown factors makes realistic cost

estimates impossible now. It does not demonstrate that deploying a large-scale BMD system would be either affordable or too costly.

However, the burden of proof is on those who

maintain that BMD can be affordable and display a favorable cost/exchange ratio with offenses to provide credible estimates of eventual

system costs.

Important issues of cost include the following:

●

●

Allocation of Defense Department research

funds. The first six years of the Strategic

Defense Initiative are scheduled to consume a total of approximately $33 billion

in defense research funds. Succeeding

years before a development decision may

bring yet higher annual costs. These

should be weighed against opportunity

costs in other areas of defense research.

Allocation of national technical research re-
30

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense

Artist’s conception of space-based sensors on a

surveillance and tracking satellite.

●

sources. The supply of specialized scientists, engineers, and research facilities is

not highly elastic in the short term. BMD

research would divert some of these national resources from other important

tasks. On the other hand, BMD research

might produce substantial “spin-off” results which could lead to advances in technologies applicable to other civilian or military purposes. Over the long term, the

research might also stimulate training of

additional scientists and engineers.

Allocation of military procurement funds.

BMD procurement could absorb funds

needed for other military programs, such

as ground, naval, or air forces. On the

other hand, under some scenarios, BMD

might reduce the need for expenditures on

offensive nuclear forces and even on conventional forces.

●

●

Allocation of industrial resources. In the

procurement stage, BMD deployment

might divert engineering and manufacturing resources from other production. On

the other hand, it might contribute to an

industrial base for other activities, such

as commercial development of space.

Total costs. The total system costs for

BMD will remain difficult to predict for

some time. Also difficult to determine are

the potential effects of BMD on other U.S.

military needs. For example, a BMD deployment which led to negotiation of deep

reductions in offensive forces would eventually allow shifting expenditures away

from strategic offenses. In the short run,

however, until the cost-exchange ratios in

the offense-defense competition on both

sides became clear, increased expenditures might be required to maintain offensive forces on a par with those of the Soviet Union.

Defenses intended to protect substantial

parts of the United States’ and its allies’ populations would also require a highly capable

air defense system, since making ballistic missiles obsolete would not in itself suffice to assure population survival. Effective population

defense might also be judged to require large

civil defense expenditures as a complement to

the active missile and air defenses.

A change in U.S. strategy which placed

greater emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities

for deterring aggression against U.S. allies

might require costly enhancements of our air,

sea, and land conventional forces and those of

our allies. An alternative, however, which

could reduce rather than increase the cost of

such forces might be substantial conventional

arms control, particularly in the NATO-Warsaw Pact arena.

We referred earlier to the concept of the

“cost-exchange ratio” between defense and offense. That is, increments of defense should

cost less than the corresponding increments

of offense that they must neutralize. If so, then

the offense would have a strong disincentive

to try to keep up with the defense. We also

need to estimate at what point the Soviets
31

would decide to concede such a reality and offenses was such that the combined cost of

stop trying to maintain offensive capabilities. overcoming existing Soviet offenses and counHowever, a favorable cost-exchange ratio tering their response to our defenses was affordwould not suffice if the defense system as a able. Just what the cost-exchange ratio needs

whole were too expensive to deploy. One goal to be would depend on how willing the Soviets

of research should be to identify a BMD system might be to try to outspend us to maintain

whose base cost and cost-exchange ratio with their offensive capabilities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Debated Issues

The question of the role of ballistic missile

defense in U.S. national security is complex.

However, national debate has tended to polarize between support of and opposition to the

SDI.

Both proponents and opponents agree on

two major points:

The United States should adopt whatever

BMD posture will be most likely to minimize the risk of nuclear war.

The United States should be carrying out

some research on BMD technology. -

The strongest disagreements regarding SD I

center on two related issues:

How likely is it that technology will reach

a point where it would be desirable to deploy BMD? This disagreement partly reflects differing guesses about the future

cost and rate of technological progress.

More significantly, however, it reflects

differing views about how valuable BMD

would be for our national security, and

how effective a BMD system must be for

the benefits of deployment to outweigh

the risks.

Should the research program be carried out

with the vigorous commitment that characterizes the SDI? The central idea of the

SDI seems to be an ardent belief that a

program of urgent, centrally directed, and

generously funded research and development would have a good probability of

bringing us within a few years to the point

where we would be justified in deciding

to deploy a high-technology ballistic missile defense system. The central concern

of SD I opponents, apart from skepticism

that such a system could be effective and

affordable, is that the technology development may be much more likely to

destabilize the superpower strategic balance and set off an arms race than to

justify a decision to deploy. For this reason they favor a less urgent, less expensive, and less prominent research program,

mainly to hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs and as a means

of deterring the Soviets from abandoning

the ABM Treaty by providing the United

States with an adequate response if they

do.

Proponents of SDI are not all of one mind.

However, they stress some or all of the following:

1.

2.

The most important national goal we can

have is assured survival; that is, President Reagan goal of a world in which

“free people could live secure in the

knowledge that their security did not depend on the threat of instant retaliation

to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our soil or that of

our allies. ” This goal may be attainable,

particularly if the development of

defenses induces the Soviets to agree on

reductions of offensive forces, and therefore it is worth pursuing vigorously.

Even if we cannot achieve assured survival, a strategic policy that relies to a significant extent on strategic defenses

would be better for the United States
32

3.

4.

than our existing policy of deterring aggression only by the threat of retaliation

by our offensive nuclear forces.

The strategic balance has gradually been

shifting against the United States, and

developing and deploying ballistic missile

defenses (with or without accompanying

arms control measures limiting strategic

offensive forces) offers the best opportunity to reverse this trend.

Many of the new ideas proposed for ballistic missile defense are now ripe for intensive research and development. If the

United States develops these technologies

vigorously, we can expect major improvements in potential BMD capabilities.

There are grounds for believing that

defensive technologies may improve so

much faster than offensive technologies

that it will become cheaper to deploy

defenses than to deploy offensive countermeasures to overcome the defenses. This

would give the Soviets a powerful incentive to agree to reduce offensive arms and

concentrate on building their own defensive systems. If the Soviets exploited

these BMD technologies and we did not,

our security might be severely jeopardized.

Opponents of SDI argue some or all of the

following:

1.

2.

Assured survival is so extremely improbable in the forseeable future as to be irrelevant as a national goal. If it could be

attained at all, it would require drastic reductions and stringent limitations of all

offensive nuclear arms even if very effective defenses could be deployed. But since

the vigorous pursuit of defensive capabilities now would make such offensive arms

control much less likely to be attained, we

should pursue offensive arms control first

and defensive deployments afterwards, if

at all.

Ballistic missile defenses that are highly

effective, but not adequate to provide assured survival, could create dangerous instabilities. Developing them would set off

an offensive/defensive arms race. Furthermore, defensive deployments could pro3.

4.

tide great incentives to preempt in a crisis

by holding out the possibility of “victory"

to the side launching a massive first strike

and defending against the presumably

less effective retaliatory second strike. If

deployed BMD systems were themselves

vulnerable to attack, the incentive to

strike first could be even greater.

The buildup of Soviet strategic forces in

recent years, while certainly undesirable,

has not reduced the U.S. ability to deter

a Soviet attack. The continuing Soviet

buildup does not pose a serious threat to

the credibility of our deterrent. A U.S.

strategic defense would not improve the

strategic balance. Modernization of our

strategic forces and vigorous efforts to

make the arms control process effective

would be far more likely than BMD to improve U.S. security.

While nobody can predict with certainty

the results of future research, it is highly

unlikely that we could develop BMD systems which could not be overcome by affordable Soviet countermeasures. Therefore, the SDI is not the most fruitful area

in which to concentrate our limited resources for military R & D. While research on BMD is necessary, an overly

vigorous U.S. BMD program would be

likely to stimulate a buildup of Soviet

offensive forces, which would preclude

meaningful offensive arms control measures and make it harder to maintain the

survivability of our retaliatory forces.

OTA Findings

I.–Both the capability of a BMD system to

defend the United States, and the strategic

value to the United States of any given BMD

capability, depend on the interaction of all the

kinds of the defenses actually deployed with all

the kinds of offensive threat against which they

must actually defend. In the past, the enormous

destructive power of nuclear weapons has meant

that offensive strategic technologies have had

a large and fundamental advantage over defensive technologies. Unless this imbalance between
3 3

the offense and defense disappears, strategic

defenses might be plausible for limited purposes,

such as defense of ICBM silos or complication

of enemy attack plans, but not for the more ambitious goal of assuring the survival of U.S. society. This imbalance might be changed either

by political decisions of both superpowers to

reduce the kinds and levels of offensive deployments to capabilities much less than available

technology permits, or by development and deployment of defensive systems able to overcome whatever offenses could be developed

and deployed in the same period. While it is

certainly possible that defensive technological development could outpace the development of offensive weapons and countermeasures to defenses, this does not appear very

likely.

2.–Assured survival of the U.S. population

appears impossible to achieve if the Soviets are

determined to deny it to us. This is because the

technical difficulties of protecting cities against

an all-out attack can be overcome only if the

attack is limited by restraints on the quantity

and quality of the attacking forces. The Reagan Administration currently appears to share

this assessment.

3.—If the Soviets chose to cooperate in a transition to mutual assured survival, it would probably be necessary to negotiate adequately verifiable arms control agreements on reducing

present and restricting future offensive forces

and on the manner, effectiveness, and timing of

defensive deployments. OTA was unable to

find anyone who could propose a plausible

agreement for offensive arms reductions and

a cooperative transition that could be reached

before both the Soviets and the United States

learn more about the likely effectiveness and

costs of advanced BMD technologies. Indeed,

such a transition could hardly be planned until engineering development was well advanced

on the actual defensive systems to be deployed.

Even then, adequate verification would be difficult. Without such agreement on the nature

and timing of a buildup of defensive forces, it

would be a radical departure from previous

policies for either side to make massive reductions in its offensive forces in the face of the

risk that the other side’s defenses might become highly effective against the reduced

offenses before one’s own defenses were ready.

Such a transition would be more appealing to

both sides if BMD technologies could be developed which cost less to deploy than the

offensive countermeasures needed to overcome them than it would be if the historic and

current advantages of offense over defense

persist. In essence, the question is whether a

vigorous U.S. program to develop BMD, and the

prospect that both sides might deploy effective

BMD, will make the Soviets more willing than

they have been in the past (or now say they are)

to agree to deep reductions of strategic offensive forces on terms acceptable to the United

States.

4.—There is great uncertain y about the strategic situation that would arise if BMD deployment took place without agreement between the

United States and Soviet Union to reduce offensive forces as defensive forces grew. Until the

actual offensive systems (including ICBMs,

SLBMs, bombers, and cruise missiles) and

defensive systems (including BMD and air

defenses) were specified and well understood,

no one could know with confidence whether a

situation of acute crisis instability (i.e. striking first could appear to lead to “victory”)

could be avoided. A fear on either side that the

other could obtain such a first strike capability could lead both sides to buildup both their

offenses and their defenses. Such build-ups

would make it even more difficult to negotiate a cooperative transition from offense dominance to defense dominance.

5.–The technology is reasonably well in hand

to build a BMD system that could raise significantly the price in nuclear warheads of a Soviet

attack on hardened targets in the United States;

such a system, if combined with a re-basing of

U.S. ICBMs, could protect a substantial fraction of those U.S. land-based missiles against

a Soviet first strike. However, it is not clear

whether BMD would be the best way to provide missile survivability, nor is it clear

whether the combination of a U.S. program

protecting ICBMs and the Soviet response--

perhaps expansion of their Moscow defense to
34

other Soviet cities—would on balance strengthen

or weaken our deterrent.

6.–It is impossible to say at this time how effective an affordable BMD system could be. To

answer this question requires extensive research on sensor, command and control, and

weapons technologies; and on system architecture (including survivability and computer

software); on counter-counter-measures. Credible cost estimates based on this research will

also be necessary.

7.–The decision whether to push ahead vigorously with the SDI or to scale back the Administration proposal involves a balancing of

opportunities against risks, in the face of considerable uncertainty. The SDI offers an opportunity to substantially increase our nation’s

safety if we obtain great technical success and

a substantial degree of Soviet cooperation. The

argument that sufficiently great U.S. technical success would force the Soviets to cooperate in their own security interests is logically

compelling, but there can be no assurance that

the Soviets would actually behave as we think

they should. The SDI carries a risk that a vigorous BMD research program could bring on

an offensive and defensive arms race, and a

further risk that BMD deployment, if it took

place without Soviet cooperation, could create

severe instabilities. Whether BMD deployed

in the face of intense Soviet efforts to counter

it would enhance U.S. security depends on a

judgment that decreased Soviet confidence

that they could destroy targets in the United

States or on allied territory would, in Soviet

minds, outweigh their increased confidence

that targets in the Soviet Union would survive

because of their own BMD.

8.–Whatever type of BMD research program

the United States decides to pursue, it would be

prudent to carry out that research in such a way

as to minimize Soviet incentives to decide to deploy their own BMD beyond the limits set by

the ABM Treaty before the United States has

completed the research necessary to make our

decision. This might be done by unilaterally

restraining our BMD research. We would have

greater influence over Soviet actions, however,

if we reached agreement with the Soviets regarding disputed interpretations of the ABM

Treaty-including the boundaries of permitted

research-and regarding the conditions under

which future BMD deployments would be

desirable. Such an agreement would also reduce Soviet incentives to buildup their offensive forces in order to overcome anticipated

U.S. defenses. However, it must be recognized

that acting to deter a Soviet decision to deploy BMD may require limiting and slowing

our own BMD research.
Chapter 2

Introduction
Contents

Page

The Strategic Defense Initiative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Studies Following the President’s Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Organization of the OTA Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Chapter 2

Introduction

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

President Reagan’s speech of March 23,

1983, proposed a major shift in U.S. nuclear

strategy. For at least 25 years, since the earliest Soviet deployments of Intercontinental

Ballistic Missiles, the United States has relied

on the threat of retaliation to deter Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. During the

1960s both sides worked on developing weapons that were intended to defend against

ICBMs. In the United States, a debate also

arose over whether such defenses were feasible and desirable. Would the United States be

more secure attempting to defend its national

territory against ballistic missiles while the

Soviet Union did the same? Or would it be

more secure attempting to keep such defenses

largely banned by agreement with the Soviet

Union? In 1972 President Nixon chose the latter by signing the SALT I ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, and the Senate consented

by ratifying it.

In his speech President Reagan said that

even if current arms reduction negotiations

with the Soviets were to succeed,

. . . it will still be necessary to rely on the

specter of retaliation—on mutual threat . . ,

Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to

avenge them? , . . What if free people could

live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant

U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that

we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own

soil or that of our allies?’

He held out the prospect, then, for a substantial change in U.S. nuclear strategic policy.

With this change, the United States would

move away from its current deterrent posture

against the Soviet Union, which stresses offensive counter-threats to deter potential Soviet

aggression. Instead, deterrence would empha-

‘Ronald Reagan, televised speech of Mar. 23, 1983.

size preventing Soviet ballistic missiles from

reaching their targets at all.

The President called upon

. . . the scientific community in our country,

those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn

their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means

of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent

and obsolete. z

He did add a caution to his proposal:

. . . defense systems have limitations and

raise certain problems and ambiguities. If

paired with offense systems, they can be

viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and

no one wants that.

He nevertheless announced that he was

. . . directing a comprehensive and intensive

effort to develop a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our

ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed

by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave

the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves.3

Studies Following the

President’s Speech

Presidential National Security Study Directive 6-83 (NSSD 6-83) called for the Defense

Department to study and report on how such

a research and development program might

best be shaped. The Defense Department established two groups of consultants to study

ballistic missile defense (BMD). The most

prominent of these, a “Defensive Technologies

Study Team” prepared a study on “Eliminating the Threat Posed by Nuclear Ballistic Missiles. ” That committee of 50 defense scientists

and engineers was chaired by Dr. James C.

Fletcher, former NASA administrator, and be-

‘Ibid.

‘Ibid,

37
38

came known as the “Fletcher Panel. ” The

Fletcher Panel produced a technology research

and development plan (with “fiscally constrained” and “technology-limited” alternatives), the aim of which was to

. . . allow knowledgeable decisions on whether,

several years from now, to begin an an engineering validation phase that, in turn, could

lead to an effective defensive capability in the

21st century.4

The Department of Defense also created a

second panel to carry out NSSD 6-83: the Future Security Strategy Study Team, headed

by Fred S. Hoffman, which produced a report

entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense and U.S.

National Security. ” Saying that “A combination of technical and strategic uncertainties

makes it impossible to say when or whether

we can reach the ultimate goal” of fully defending our people against nuclear ballistic

missiles, the Hoffman Panel paid particular attention to how “defenses might also reinforce

deterrence” by increasing the uncertainties

faced by nuclear attack planners.5

The Strategic Defense Initiative

Organization

Following these studies and the acceptance

of their major findings by the Secretary of De-

*As paraphrased in “The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study, ” Department of Defense, March 1984,

p. 4.

5A third group, an Interagency Working Group headed by

Franklin C. Miller of the Defense Department, also produced

a BMD-related report on “Future Security Strategies. ” (The

executive branch has denied Congress access to this report. )

fense and the President, early in 1984 the Defense Department began to establish the BMD

research program under the rubric ‘Strategic

Defense Initiative Program. ” In March, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed

Air Force Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson to head this program. In April, the

Secretary chartered the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and appointed Lt. General Abrahamson as its Director. This Organization was charged with undertaking

. . . a comprehensive program to develop key

technologies associated with concepts for defense against ballistic missiles. The technology plan identified by the Defensive Technologies Study and the policy approach outlined

in the Future Security Strategy Study will

serve as general guides for initiating this program . . . The SDIP will place principal emphasis on technologies involving non-nuclear

intercept and destruction concepts. The basic

approach will be to consider layered systems

that can be deployed in such a way as to increase the contribution of defenses to deterrence and move the United States toward its

ultimate goal of a thoroughly reliable defense . . . The program shall protect U.S. options for near-term deployment of limited ballistic missile defenses.6

Caspar Weinberger, Memorandum on “Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Charter, ” Apr. 24, 1984.

ORGANIZATION OF THE OTA STUDY

The national debate about ballistic missile

defense technologies will take place in the context of larger issues of national security strategy. On the one hand, BMD development and

deployment would be carried out to fulfill the

requirements of a U.S. national strategy. The

answer to the question of whether we can build

a BMD system depends on how good a BMD

system we need. How good a system we need

depends on what our national strategy would

require the the system to do. On the other

hand, the emergence of new BMD-related technologies has suggested to many that new

strategies, once infeasible, may become available. President Reagan’s call for a Strategic

Defense Initiative stemmed both from a dis-
.— —

3 9

satisfaction with our existing national strategy and from the belief that changes in strategy might be made technically feasible. Thus

the issue of what is technologically possible

is embedded in a debate about what is strategically desirable and practical.

The absence of a national consensus about

what our strategy ought to be makes difficult

the question of what kind of BMD capabilities,

if any, we should pursue. Differing strategic

perspectives lead to disagreements over

whether particular levels of BMD capability,

integrated into an appropriate, U.S. nuclear

strategy, would:

make nuclear war less likely or more

likely;

ameliorate the effects of a nuclear war

should it occur or not;

lead to more effective international agreements to limit offensive arms or to a

greatly accelerated arms race.

Estimates of which of these results BMD

deployments might produce depend in part on

difficult judgments about what kind of strategic relationship the United States should try

to sustain with the Soviet Union.

But those strategic judgments depend at

least in part on technical estimates of the potential effectiveness of strategic defenses.

Such technical estimates will be based partly on projections of levels of technological

achievement (what kinds of system could we

build?) and partly on projections of potential

Soviet strategic and technological responses.

Thus the questions, “What kind of ballistic

missile defense, if any, would we want if we

could have it?’ and ‘‘What kind of ballistic

missile defense can we have?” feed back upon

one another. Since we cannot afford to carry

out research on every kind of weapon that may

be technically possible, our research on BMD

should be guided by our strategic objectives.

But decisions about our strategic objectives

should be informed by what is technically possible, so research may lead to new strategic

objectives.

This study tries to bring light to the debate

by clarifying both the strategic and the technological issues. It begins by reviewing current U.S. nuclear strategy and the reasons for

the absence of a role for ballistic missile defense in that strategy. It outlines some strategic ideas that various advocates have offered

for altering the current strategy, but does not

attempt to choose among those ideas. That

choice is left to the reader.

Second, the report assumes, for the sake of

discussion, that various levels of BMD capability might be available to the United States

and the Soviet Union, and examines how one

would go about analyzing the ways such capabilities might serve various strategic goals.

Third, it explores some of the possible consequences for crisis stability, arms race stability, and arms control that BMD might have.

Fourth, it reviews the technologies being researched for their applicability to BMD tasks.

Fifth, it reviews some of the alternative overall BMD research program objectives that

Congress may wish to consider. The approach

of this study, then, is to try to assist Congress

in understanding the potential implications,

both long- and short-term, of the new BMD

technologies.

Chapter 3 of this volume briefly reviews some

historical background to the current BMD debate, recalling the nature of the earlier technologies and the strategic assumptions behind

the national decision in 1972 to agree by treaty

with the Soviet Union to forgo their deployment. It also reviews the debates since the

ratification of that treaty over whether the decision was, in retrospect, a wise one or not. Finally, it attempts to delineate the differences

in politics and technology between the current

era and the one in which the earlier decisions

about BMD were taken. The information in this

chapter should be useful for understanding how

it is that U.S. nuclear strategy today does not

contain a role for BMD and why some proponents now argue that it should.

This study first analyzes not the question,

“Could we build a BMD system?, ” but there-
40

lated questions “Why would we want one?”

and “How capable would it have to be?” To

set the stage for these questions, we start in

chapter 4 with a review of the principles of current U.S. nuclear strategy and of some proposals

for altering that strategy that have appeared in

public debate. The chapter also explores some

of the implications of such changes in strategy, particularly for our commitments to allies. The United States might want BMD to

enhance its current nuclear strategic posture,

which consists of trying to deter Soviet aggression through a mix of threatening retaliatory punishment and being able to deny the

Soviets the goals of such aggression. For reasons explained in chapter 3, current U.S. strategy relies on nuclear offensive forces, protected only by passive means, and not on

active defenses against ballistic missiles.

Successfully building and sustaining relatively low levels of BMD capability might, in

various ways, strengthen the current nuclear

strategic policy. Reliance on considerably

higher levels of strategic defense, however,

would amount to a substantial alteration in

existing policy. We would come to rely much

more on simply denying the Soviets the damage they might intend with their nuclear ballistic missiles and rely much less on our threat

of retaliation to deter them. With extremely

high levels of defense against all forms of Soviet nuclear delivery vehicle, we could even

consider largely abandoning the threat of nuclear retaliation against the Soviets. (If we

could, on the other hand, build a highly effective defense while retaining a highly effective

offense against Soviet territory, we might regain the strategic superiority over the Soviets

which we possessed for the first 15 years or

so of the nuclear age.)

Chapter 5 tries to indicate what must go into

a persuasive analysis of how various postulated

levels of BMD performance might either enhance the current nuclear deterrent posture of

the United States or promote movement to a

different strategy. Because any move to a new

strategy will necessarily start with modifications of our current strategy, the chapter devotes the majority of its discussion to the

question of how the additions of BMD to that

strategy might be expected to work. Deterrence, whether relying on the threat to deny

military successes or on the threat of punishment, rests on the perceptions and calculations

of the one deterred on the outcome of a conflict that he might consider starting. Calculations about the outcome of a nuclear war

would be affected by the presence of ballistic

missile defense on both sides. The chapter examines the strategic implications of several

levels of defense capability, ranging from none

at all to extremely high.

Whether BMD can make a satisfactory contribution to U.S. strategic goals depends on

a great deal more than whether certain levels

of technical performance can be achieved

against postulated offensive threats. If certain

kinds of BMD looked technically feasible,

there would still be several important questions we would want answers to before we

decided on deployment. In particular, we

would want the addition of BMD to enhance

international stability in a crisis, not increase

the incentives presented to either side to initiate nuclear conflict. Chapter 6 describes some

conditions for crisis stability and looks at some

ways in which BMD might either enhance it or

weaken it.

For BMD to be effective in serving our national strategy, it must not stimulate offensive responses on the part of the Soviets that

leave the United States exposed to a more severe nuclear threat than it was before. Nor

should BMD deployment lead to an arms race

of offense against defense on both sides that

was so costly that we could not or would not

want to sustain it. Instead, we would want to

see BMD contribute to arms race stability. In

some hypothesized cases, BMD leads not just

to arms race stability, but to new possibilities

for arms control. Some argue, on the other

hand, that moving toward BMD could erode

the current strategic arms control regime

while lessening the prospects for future agreements. Chapter 6, then, also discusses arms race

stability and arms control in relation to BMD.
41

Chapter 7 introduces the technologies which

might form the basis for new ballistic missile

defense systems in the coming two or three decades. Potential countermeasures to weapons

using these technologies are also identified.

The interplay of defenses, countermeasures,

and counter-countermeasures cannot be discussed in detail, because many concepts are

classified. But the chapter does attempt to

give an idea of the nature of the problem. Because most of these technologies are in a relatively undeveloped state, Congress will not

likely be faced in the near future with full-scale

BMD deployment decisions. Rather, it will

have to judge how public money should be

spent on BMD research in the next few years.

Chapter 8 describes an imaginary design for

a multi-layered BMD system. The purpose of

this hypothetical construct is not to predict

what kind of BMD system the United States

might actually choose to deploy after the current research program is completed. Rather,

it is used as a means of illustrating the kinds

of technological problems that must be solved,

the kinds of feasibility issues that will arise, and

the kinds of cost factors that will have to be considered if the decision to build a large-scale ballistic missile defense is to be taken.

Once we had defined the future strategic

condition we would like to be in, and once we

had chosen the technologies we believe should

be applied to BMD, we would have to see a

plausible path from our present condition to

the future one. And we would like to have

some assurance that there were feasible ways

of maintaining that condition once it was

reached. We would want to have some confidence that the transition to the new situation,

as well as the new situation, would make nuclear war less likely, not more likely.

Chapter 9 presents alternate descriptions of

how the transition from our present strategic

nuclear posture to one incorporating significant

strategic defenses might take place—or might

be avoided. Beginning with the strategic evolution envisaged by Administration proponents of the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, it examines a variety of cases, looking

at different imaginable outcomes both of BMD

development and deployment and of nondeployment. It attempts to present the premises, values, and conclusions of those advancing such viewpoints. This exercise should

serve as useful background to the current debate over BMD research and development.

Chapter 10 examines the general goals and

shape of the current BMD research program, its

implications, and possible alternatives to it. The

chapter does not attempt to define the details

of such alternate programs, but the differences

in purpose and shape that might underlie

them. It attempts to relate such alternatives

to the strategic context established in the

earlier chapters. Even though no deployment

decisions are now before Congress, eventual

goals must at least be considered at the time

research and development programs are undertaken. The decision to find out what is feasible implies some ultimate goals. How the research is carried out and at what levels will

be affected by those goals. Moreover, even a

research program can have important national

and international consequences.

Since many of the BMD-relevant technologies could lead to space-based weapons systems and components, issues concerning antisatellite (ASAT) weapons are closely related

to ballistic missile defense issues. Because of

special Congressional interest in some of the

nearer term issues around ASAT, and in consultation with the staffs of the requesting committees, OTA undertook a subsidiary study

of ASAT issues. In the resulting companion

report, Anti-satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, OTA has attempted

to make clear the implications of ASAT and

BMD for one another. Decisions about one

cannot be rationally made without considering implications for the other.
Chapter 3

Ballistic Missile Defense

Then and Now
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

The U.S. ABM Program to 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Soviet ABM Program to 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Salt I: The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on

Offensive Strategic Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Provisions of the SALT I Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Implications and Aftermath of SALT I....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

The Current Ballistic Missile Defense Debate. . . . . ., ....... . . . . . . . . . 55

Strategic Nuclear Forces: The ICBM Vulnerability Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Technological Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Soviet BMD Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ........ 59

Political Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

What is New? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Figure

Figure No. Page

3-1. U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces, 1970-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Chapter 3

Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now

INTRODUCTION

This chapter briefly reviews events and decisions of the 1960s and early 1970s which explain why the United States does not now

have ballistic missile defense. It pays particular attention to the rationale of the Johnson

and Nixon Administrations for ultimately declining to deploy large-scale ballistic missile

defense and instead agreeing with the Soviets

to severely limit it. The chapter also describes

the positions of those who subsequently supported or questioned the desirability of U.S.

adherence to that agreement.

With that debate over values and premises

as background, the chapter then recounts some

of the factors that produced the renewal of the

public debate over what is now generally called

“BMD,” for “Ballistic Missile Defense. ”

THE US. ABM PROGRAM TO 1969

In the late 1950s, the U.S. Army repeatedly

sought authorization to begin producing an

anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system called the

Nike-Zeus. 1 The Army’s goal was a nationwide defense against Soviet ICBMS. Derived

from the air defense missile, the Nike-Hercules,

the Nike-Zeus interceptor would have been

directed by ground-based radars toward incoming Soviet missile reentry vehicles (RVs).

When within range of the reentry vehicle, the

nuclear weapon aboard the interceptor would

explode, destroying the RV. The Eisenhower

Administration resisted Army urgings of

Nike-Zeus deployment, though the Army continued to win substantial support in Congress

for BMD deployment.

The Kennedy Administration was unconvinced that the Nike-Zeus system—with its

relatively slow rocket booster, mechanically

steered radar, and limited computational capacity—would perform adequately against

‘The following survey of early BMD developments drawn

from Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is

Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York:

Harper Colophon, 1972), pp. 184-196; David N. Schwartz, “Past

and Present: The Historical Legacy, ” Ballistic Missile Defense,

Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds. ) (Washington,

DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 330-349; and J. P.

Ruina, “The U.S. and Soviet Strategic Arsenals, ” SALT: The

Moscow Agreements and Beyond, Mason Willrich and John

B. Rhinelander (eds. ) (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp.

34-65.

foreseeable Soviet ICBM threats. Moreover,

Secretary of Defense McNamara’s systems

analysts concluded that it would cost the

United States considerably more to offset Soviet missiles than it would cost the Soviets to

deploy them. In addition, trying to limit damage to the U.S. population with ABM made

even less sense without an extensive civil defense program, which seemed an unlikely prospect.’ The 1963 Defense budget authorized research on a new BMD system, to be called the

Nike-X. The new system would employ faster

burning rockets (later called Sprint), electronically steered phased-array radars, and new

computers, and would intercept incoming reentry vehicles just after they entered the atmosphere (making it easier to sort out genuine

warheads from decoys).

In 1965 the U.S. Army began to develop

another interceptor, the Spartan, which would

detonate a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere, where it would generate intense X-rays

that might be expected to knock out several

incoming reentry vehicles at once. While the

Sprint rocket had a limited range of about 25

miles, the Spartan had one of several hundred

miles.

—

‘See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 321-324.

45
46 ——— —

By the end of 1966, pressures on the Johnson Administration to deploy the Nike-X had

grown strong. Evidence that the Soviets were

deploying an ABM system had become unambiguous. Over Administration objections, Congress had voted money to begin U.S. deployment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended

to the President that the United States deploy,

as a first step, the Spartan as an area defense

of the whole United States and the Sprint to

defend 25 cities with later expansion to cover

52 cities. This system was intended to reduce

casualties in the event of full-scale nuclear war

with the Soviet Union.

After hearing arguments for and against deployment in December 1966, President Johnson requested money in the fiscal year 1968

budget to permit deployment in January 1967,

but postponed an actual decision pending attempts to interest the Soviets in limiting

ABMs. The Secretary of Defense continued to

believe that although the Nike-X might be

somewhat effective against current Soviet

missiles, that effectiveness would be shortlived. McNamara explained to Congress in

March 1967:

. . . the Soviets have it within their technical

, and economic capacity to offset any further

Photo credit U.S. Army

Army Nike-Zeus ABM interceptor in test firing. Derived

from the Nike-Hercules air defense missile, the NikeZeus with its nuclear warhead was designed to intercept

incoming ballistic missile reentry vehicles at altitudes

of about 100 nautical miles. The Eisenhower and

Kennedy Administrations, doubting the systems likely

performance against foreseeable Soviet ICBM threats,

did not support its deployment.

damage limiting-measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to

maintain their deterrent which casts such

grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy,

sophisticated missile attack they could

launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all

we would accomplish would be to increase

greatly both their defense expenditures and

ours without any gain in real security to either sides

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were recommending deployment of a system that at least promised to be effective against current Soviet

‘U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 874.
47

Photo credits: U.S. Army

Interceptor missiles deployed as part of the Safeguard ABM System (deactivated in 1976) defending Minuteman ICBM

silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota (see photo, p. 51). The Sprint (on left) was designed as part of the Nike-X ABM

program. The nuclear-armed Sprint accelerated rapidly to intercept incoming reentry vehicles after they had entered

the atmosphere, making it easier to discriminate them from decoys. The Spartan (on right) was to operate above the

atmosphere, where intense X-rays from its nuclear warhead were intended to knock out several reentry vehicles at once.
48

ICBMs, but McNamara proposed only to pursue the development, test, and evaluation of

Nike-X. He also proposed that the United

States initiate negotiations with the Soviet

Union designed to limit the deployment of an

anti-ballistic missile system. During the first

half of 1967, the State Department and the

White House attempted without great success

to interest the Soviet Union in such negotiations.

On September 18, 1967, Secretary McNamara

gave a speech in which he first explained his

reasons for opposing ABM deployment, then

announced that the United States would deploy a partial ABM system.4 The rationale he

offered for deployment, however, was intended

to lessen congressional pressures for a largescale system. The proposed U.S. ABM would

not attempt to protect U.S. cities against a

large Soviet missile attack, but instead would

offer a shield against the much smaller threats

of a potential Chinese ICBM fleet or an accidental Soviet attack. Even so, the Nike-X

system to be deployed—called “Sentinel”-

closely resembled the first stages of a system

designed to defend against Soviet missiles.

As the United States prepared to deploy its

ABM system, it also continued to attempt to

engage the Soviets in negotiations to limit

ABMs as well as offensive strategic arms. In

the summer of 1968 the two countries agreed

in principle to begin such negotiations, but the

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August

made them politically impossible. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) finally began under the Nixon Administration in November 1969.

Meanwhile, during 1968, senatorial and pub

lic opposition to the ABM deployment began

to develop. To the surprise of ABM advocates,

who had expected people to welcome deployment of a system to defend them and who had

expected opposition from cities not included

on the initial deployment list, ABM opponents

were able to mobilize opposition from groups

‘For an explanation of the apparent paradox, see Morton

Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 1-7 and 297-310.

living near the proposed deployment areas.

When the Nixon Administration took office

in January 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin

Laird suspended the Sentinel deployment and

ordered a review of the ABM program. In

March 1969, President Nixon announced plans

to deploy a somewhat different system, to be

called “Safeguard.” The announced purpose

of the Safeguard system was to defend not cities, but ICBM silos. Nixon had accepted the

McNamara reasoning, explaining:

Although every instinct motivates me to

provide the American people with complete

protection against a major nuclear attack, it

is not now within our power to do so. The

heaviest defense system we considered, one

designed to protect our major cities, still

could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S.

fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an opponent like

the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrents

Although the Spartan (exoatmospheric) missiles were no longer to be located near large

cities as with Sentinel, the Safeguard system

would still offer a thin area defense as well as

‘U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents

on Disarmament, 1969 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1970), p. 103.

Photo credit: U.S. Army

The 12-story Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) was

built in northeastern North Dakota as part of the

Safeguard ABM System. It was to detect and track

attacking ballistic missile reentry vehicles at longrange until they were close enough to be handed over

to the shorter range Missile Site Radar pictured below,

p. 51. When the Grand Forks ABM site was deactivated

in 1976, this PAR became part of the NORAD missile

early warning system.
49

a site defense of ICBMs. The Safeguard proposals set off rounds of hearings in Congress

and considerable public debate.G The Safe-

‘For the contrast between the Sentinel and Safeguard

proposals, see Herbert F. York, “Military Technology and National Security, ” Progress in Arms Control? Readings From

Scientific American (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979), pp.

45-56.

guard program narrowly missed being held up

by Congress when the Senate defeated a delaying amendment in a 50-50 tie.’

‘Stanford Arms Control Group, International Arms Control

issues and Agreements, 2d ed., Coit D. Blacker and Gloria

Duffy (eds.) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984),

p. 225.

SOVIET ABM PROGRAM TO 1970

The pressures—political and strategic-on

the Johnson Administration in 1967 to begin

deployment of an ABM system were strengthened by reports of Soviet ABM deployments.8

Some argued that the Soviet Talinn air defense

system, with its SA-5 interceptors, might be

“upgraded” to ABM capability (earlier, it had

been argued that the Talinn system was designed as an ABM system)9 In 1964, during

their annual May Day military display, the

Soviets had paraded a larger interceptor missile, the Galosh, through Moscow. They had

‘For more detailed descriptions of Soviet ABM programs, see

Sidney Graybeal and Daniel Goure, “Soviet Ballistic Missile

Defense (B MD) Objectives: Past, Present and Future, ” Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center, contract No.

DASG-60-79-C-0132, U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense, proceedings of a symposium held at the Center for Science and International Affairs,

Harvard University, Nov. 1-2, 1979, pp. 69101; Sayre Stevens,

“The Soviet BMD Program, ” Ballistic Missile Defense, Carter

and Schwartz (eds. ), op. cit., pp. 330-349; and John Prados, The

Soviet Estimate (New York: The Dial Press, 1982), pp. 151-171.

‘See Prados, op. cit., pp. 160-166.

also begun to deploy the necessary radar systems (the so-called “Hen House” early warning radar and the “Dog House” battle management radar) and a ring of Galosh launch

sites around Moscow.

As late as 1967, it may have appeared that

the Galosh system, with its long-range, nuclear-armed interceptors, would be extended

to other cities as well. During that year, however, only six of eight prepared sites around

Moscow were under active construction. By

1969 the Soviets had halted construction of

two more sites. In 1969 and 1970 they installed missiles at four sites with 16 launchers

each. The Galosh system deployment stopped

at 64 launchers, and even for the defense of

Moscow the number was clearly inadequate

to deal with the impending deployment of U.S.

ballistic missiles with multiple, independently

targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), or even

to deal with a determined attack with singlewarhead missiles.

SALT I: THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

ON OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS

The controversies over the deployment of

the U.S. Safeguard ABM system and over the

degree of progress in Soviet ABM developments took place as the Nixon Administration

prepared its positions for entering strategic

arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

After its own review of the issues, the Nixon

Administration ended up agreeing with the

Johnson Administration that it was highly

desirable to attempt to limit ballistic missile

defenses. By the time the negotiations began,

the Soviets had apparently come to the same

conclusion (after having resisted the idea in

early talks with the Johnson Administration).

Provisions of the SALT I Agreements

ABM Treaty

The texts of the SALT I agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union were completed at Helsinki in May 1972.
50

The centerpiece of those agreements was the

treaty on”. . . The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic

Missile Systems."10 Each side agreed “. . . not

to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the

territory of its country and not to provide a

base for such a defense, and not to deploy

ABM systems for defense of an individual region. . .“ with certain very limited exceptions.

The exceptions were that each side could deploy 100 ABM launchers within a 150-kilometer radius of its national capital and another

100 within a 150-kilometer radius of an area

containing ICBM launchers. These provisions

allowed the Soviets to keep the system they

were building around Moscow and it allowed

the United States to keep its first Safeguard

installation in North Dakota.11

In 1974 the two sides agreed in a protocol

to the treaty that each would be limited at any

one time to one of the two areas provided for

in the treaty. In practical terms, that meant

that the Soviets would retain the system

around Moscow and the United States would

keep its system in North Dakota. The United

States judged that the minimal effectiveness

of its North Dakota installation did not justify

the cost, and deactivated it in 1976. The Soviets, though allowed 100 ABM launchers

around Moscow, at first kept the system at

64 and later reduced it to 32. More recently,

they have begun to upgrade and expand it,

possibly to the full 100 allowed launchers.

The ABM Treaty was to be of unlimited duration: the parties agreed that the defense of

most of their national territories against strategic (long-range) ballistic missiles would be

banned until one or both decided to abrogate

or seek to amend the treaty. In order to keep

the treaty up to date, a review was provided

‘°For the full text of the treaty and associated agreed and

unilateral statements, see app. B.

1lFor a detailed analysis of the ABM Treaty Provisions, see

George Schneiter, “The ABM Treaty Today, ” Ballistic Missile Defense, Carter and Schwartz (eds, ), op. cit, pp. 221-250;

John B. Rhinelander, “The SALT I Agreements, ” SALT: The

Moscow Agreements and Beyond, Willrich and Rhinelander

(eds.), op. cit., pp. 125-159; and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings, OTA-BP-ISC-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, May 1984), pp. 33-34.

for every 5 years. In addition, the treaty created a Standing Consultative Commission

where the two sides could discuss not only

matters of compliance with the treaty, but

“possible proposals for further increasing the

viability” of the treaty, “including proposals

for amendments. ” It also stated that each side

had the right to withdraw from the treaty,

with 6 months’ notice, “. . . if it decides that

extraordinary events related to the subject

matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. ”

The two parties agreed that “in order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy

ABM systems . . . in the event ABM systems

based on other physical principles . . . are created in the future, specific limitations on such

systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance” with the provisions for the Standing Consultative Commission and for amendments.

Interim Agreement

When they signed the ABM Treaty, President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev also

signed an “Interim Agreement . . . on Certain

Measures With Respect to the Limitation of

Strategic Offensive Arms. ” This agreement

froze the number of kind-based ICBM launchers on each side and set ceilings on the numbers of SLBM launchers each could deploy (up

to the limits, land-based ICBM launchers

could be “traded in” for SLBM launchers). The

Interim Agreement on offensive forces expired

in 5 years, although the two sides continued

to observe it as SALT II negotiations extended on for 7 years.

Implications and Aftermath of SALT I

Points of view on the original desirability and

subsequent success of the ABM Treaty vary

widely. Supporters of the treaty believe that

the treaty enhanced U.S. security, though they

differ in the degree of dissatisfaction they feel

with the offensive limitations agreed upon in

SALT I and SALT II. Some critics of continued adherence to the ABM Treaty do not quarrel with the original idea of the agreement, but
51

Photo credit U.S. Army

The Missile Site Radar (background) of the Safeguard ABM System was designed to refine the data received from the

long-range Perimeter Acquisition Radar, track the attacking ICBM reentry vehicles, and fire Sprint and Spartan interceptor

missiles (in cells, foreground), to intercept them. Though this site was permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty and its

1974 protocol, the United States decided that its limited capabilities did not justify the cost and deactivated

the system in 1976.

believe that subsequent U.S. policy overly neglected U.S. BMD research while too gently

tolerating possible Soviet violations of the

agreement. Other critics tend to believe that

the very premises under which the treaty was

entered into were erroneous.

Supporters

Supporters of the ABM Treaty believe that

the agreement was basically “stabilizing,” in

the senses both of “arms race stability” and

“crisis stability. ” Proponents of limiting BMD

have argued that anti-missile defenses would

“destabilize” the offensive arms race by stimulating the opponents to build up their offensive forces in order to try to overcome the

enemy defenses. Recall Secretary McNamara’s

belief in the “. . . virtual certainty that the

Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent. . .“

and President Nixon’s conclusion that BMD " might look to an opponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the

Soviet deterrent. ” This reasoning led, conversely, to the idea stated in the ABM Treaty

that limiting ABMs would be a “substantial

factor” in curbing the offensive arms race.

Ballistic missile defense, said ABM Treaty

supporters, might also induce “crisis instabil-
52

ity ” by affecting the structure of incentives

before the two sides in a confrontation. Nobody seriously believed in 1972 that a BMD

system could limit the damage from a nuclear

war to “acceptable” levels, and thus make the

possessor of a BMD system less afraid of nuclear war. However, even a less capable BMD

system might offer an incentive to attack first

if its owner believed that nuclear war had become inevitable and that damage could be kept

acceptably low only if the other side’s forces

had first been substantially weakened by a

“counterforce” blow. An even more subtle destabilizing effect of owning a BMD system

might be to induce in the other side the expectation that one intended to strike first, and

therefore gave him an incentive to preempt

that first strike by going first himself. Such

reasoning that ABMs might increase the risk

of nuclear war, then, led to the premise in the

ABM Treaty preamble that limiting ABMs

would decrease it.

Some supporters of the treaty agree that its

effects on limiting the offensive arms race are

difficult to discern. As one observed in 1974,

To the great disappointment of many of

the strongest supporters of the ABM Treaty,

its conclusion has not resulted in the noticeable slowdown in strategic offensive weapons

programs that would have been expected according to the action-reaction theory. Even

U.S. MIRV programs, which had been specifically rationalized as being required to

penetrate possible Soviet ABM defenses, are

proceeding without change. It has become increasingly clear that strategic weapons programs have the bases for their support in a

multiplicity of interests and that, once underway, expedient and changing rationales will

be used to sell them. ’2

It is difficult to identify an offensive strategic weapons program on either side which was

stopped by any provision of either the SALT

I or the SALT II agreements. During the early

and mid-1970s the United States more than

doubled the deliverable strategic nuclear warheads in its arsenal (though the total nuclear

‘

zGeorge W. Rathjens, “Future Limitations of Strategic

Arms, ” Willrich and Rhinelander (eds.), op. cit., p. 228.

weapons inventory and the size of individual

strategic warheads dropped from the 1960s).

Much of the numerical increase came in the

form of submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM) warheads, which were too inaccurate

to threaten Soviet ICBM silos, but which were

also invulnerable to a Soviet preemptive first

strike. The Soviets, meanwhile, had built a

lead in numbers of SLBM and ICBM launchers and in the carrying capacity of the missiles

in those launchers. In the mid to late 1970s,

the addition of multiple reentry vehicles to

their large ICBMS multiplied their strategic

warhead count severalfold. That large force,

coupled with increased accuracy of the reentry

vehicles, appeared to threaten a substantial

portion of the U.S. ICBM silos (see figure 3-

1). By most static measures of strategic nuclear force, the Soviets were taking a lead.13

On the other hand, we have no way of knowing whether the offensive competition might

not have been even more vigorous than it was

if each side had been attempting to guarantee the penetration of its forces against substantial ballistic missile defenses on the other

side. The only way of testing that proposition

would have been to forgo the treaty. In any

case, we have at least avoided the costly

deployment of BMD systems which, many

would argue, would have provoked offensive

countermeasures and would have been technically ineffective at the same time.

Supporters of the ABM Treaty also see it

as a significant step in a larger process of arms

control negotiation between the United States

and the Soviet Union. SALT I led to SALT

II, SALT II was to lead to SALT III, and so

on. The SALT process seemed to be one sign

of a recognition by both sides that cooperative action to reduce the likelihood of nuclear

war is desirable. Abandonment of the ABM

Treaty, would, conversely, signify to some a

retreat from that recognition.

Supporters of the ABM Treaty agree that

Soviet violations of the treaty must be dealt

with firmly if the treaty and the arms limita13Cf. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power,

1985, pp. 25-41.
53

—

Figure 3-1 .— U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces, 1970.1984

Delivery systems

United States

3,000

2,500 —

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

1970 1975 1980 1984

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

Soviet Union

“

o o

” ~ ~

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

1

Nuclear weapons

United States

12,00C

10,OOC

8,000

6,000

Bombs/ASMs/ALCMs

I I

1970 1975 1980 1984

4,000

2,000

0

Soviet Union

1

1970 1975 1980 1984

U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear warheads both increased in the 1970s and 1980s, but the composition of forces on the two sides differed.

The United States maintained a substantial fraction of its warheads as bombers and air-to-surface missiles while it added many multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to its SLBM force. The Soviets added SLBM warheads, but concentrated on deploying many,

relatively large, warheads on increasingly accurate ICBMS.

SOURCE Congressional Research Service
54

tion process are to survive. Some argue that

such firmness should have been exercised

much sooner. But they argue that the chances

of successfully enforcing Soviet compliance

would be much better in the context of a clear

U.S. intent to strengthen arms control rather

than in a context of public threats to abandon

the arms control process.14

The policy of every Administration since

1972, including the present one, has been that

adherence to the ABM Treaty has been, on

balance, in the national security interest of the

United States. The Reagan Administration

has stated that Strategic Defense Initiative

research will be carried on within the limits

of the treaty. There are, however, critics of the

treaty within the Administration. The following section offers a range of critical views of

the ABM Treaty, but does not describe current Administration policy.

Critics

Various critics of the ABM Treaty disagree

with the proponents on almost every count.

Some believe that SALT I slowed the pace of

the U.S. strategic force modernization programs since 1972 while the deployments of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs in the same period

could hardly have been higher even in the presence of U.S. BMD and the absence of the modest offensive limitations in SALT I and SALT

II. They point out that many in the United

States had hoped in vain that SALT I would

prevent the Soviets from acquiring the ability to threaten destruction of substantial numbers of U.S. land-based ICBMs in a preemptive nuclear strike. In a unilateral statement

attached to the ABM Treaty; the United

States declared its belief that:

. . . an objective of the follow-on negotiations

should be to constrain and reduce on a longterm basis threats to the survivability of our

respective strategic retaliatory forces,

Moreover, the Jackson Amendment to the

joint resolution of approval of the SALT I In-

“Cf. Michael Krepon, “Both Sides Are Hedging, ” Foreign

Policy, No. 56, fall 1984, pp. 153-172.

terim Agreement (H.J.R. 1227, Sept. 30, 1972)

stated that Congress considered that:

. . . the success of the interim agreement and

the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon

the preservation of longstanding United

States policy that neither the Soviet Union

nor the United States should seek unilateral

advantage by developing a first strike potential15

Critics of the ABM Treaty argue that seeking first strike potential is exactly what the

Soviets have been doing. In their view, the

Soviets have always rejected the notion that

they should be deterred by the U.S. retaliatory

capability. Instead, the Soviets believe they

should actively pursue the capability to fight

and win a nuclear war with acceptable losses

to the Soviet economy, society, political regime, and military forces. In this view, Soviet

war plans call for a preemptive first-strike

against U.S. land-based ICBMs, bombers on

the ground, and submarines in port. Extensive

Soviet air defenses and civil defense would protect key Soviet industrial, political, and military targets from a weakened U.S. retaliatory

strike.

Critics of the ABM Treaty believe that, although Soviet ballistic missile defenses could

limit damage to the Soviet Union even further,

the Soviets nevertheless decided to forgo them

because they feared that U.S. technology

would produce a greatly superior BMD system. Now that they have used the treaty to

slow U.S. BMD developments while pushing

ahead with their own, they may soon be ready

clandestinely or openly to deploy BMD systems, which, though not perfect, would complement their damage-limiting strategy. Indeed, in this view, evidence of Soviet cheating

on the ABM Treaty (as well as other arms control agreements) suggests that the Soviets are

already set on that course. ” Many treaty

critics believe that, lulled into a false sense of

“Stanford Arms Control Group, op. cit., 249.

“For a discussion of Soviet cheating and recommended U.S.

responses to it, see Colin Gray, ‘‘MOSCOW Is Cheating, ” Foreign Policy, fall 1984, pp. 141-152.
55

security by the SALT agreements, the United

States failed to make necessary efforts in air

defense, civil defense, ballistic missile defense,

and offensive force modernization. Some go so

far as to conclude that the resulting asymmetry in U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities

. . . virtually guarantees that in case of a nuclear war the U.S. will suffer defeat and probably suffer annihilation as a functioning society while the Soviet Union and its system

will survive and with sufficient power intact

to establish the world hegemony that its

leadership has always considered its ultimate

due. ’7

In these circumstances, far from enhancing

crisis stability, the ABM Treaty has contributed to increasing Soviet incentives to nuclear

risk-taking:

the U.S. lack of strategic defense considerably reduces the credibility of U.S. deterrence in Soviet eyes and may facilitate a

Soviet belief in safe expansion. As a result,

in crisis situations the Soviets may consider

themselves less restrained than the United

States and act accordingly .18

In this view, then, arms control has led to

naive inaction on the part of the United States

and the attainment of strategic superiority by

the Soviet Union. What the United States

should do is pursue nuclear war-fighting capabilities, including offensive counterforce capabilities, air defense, civil defense, and ballistic missile defense, that will give it a credible

“theory of victory” with which to deter Soviet

aggression. 19

Others argue that while limiting ballistic

missile defense may have been a reasonable

policy when the available technology was more

primitive, new technologies call for new policies. They say that at the very least, the addition of ballistic missile defenses could enhance

the current U.S. deterrent posture. And some

suggest that defenses might permit a dramatic

change in strategy from offensive to defensive

emphasis.

We return in chapter 4 to the question of

what it might take to deter the Soviets.

“Michael J. Deane, Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy (Miami, FL: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980), p.

114.

‘

g Ibid,

19Cf. Colin Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory

of Victory, ” International security, vol. 4, No. 1, summer 1979,

pp. 54-87.

THE CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE

Strategic Nuclear Forces:

The ICBM Vulnerability Issue

As the Soviets added MIRVed missiles to

their ICBM force during the late 1970s, the

Defense Department was predicting that the

growing numbers of more accurate Soviet

ICBM warheads would place the U.S. landbased ICBMs at increasing risk of destruction

in a preemptive strike. By the early to mid1980s, some argued, the United States would

have entered a “window of vulnerability” in

which 90 percent or more of its land-based

ICBMs could be destroyed within minutes.

There has been considerable debate, though,

over how significant this problem is and what

to do about it. Some argued that the Soviets

would have open to them the possibility that

they could launch a preemptive strike on U.S.

ICBMs and on U.S. bomber bases (as well as

on many missile carrying submarines in port),

leaving the U.S. President with only the less

accurate SLBM weapons to retaliate, perhaps

mainly against Soviet cities. Since this choice

would then bring about the destruction of U.S.

cities in counter-retaliation, the argument

went, the President would have a strong incentive to withhold retaliation and capitulate

to whatever Soviet demands followed the Soviet strike. Given this theoretical first-strike

capability, the Soviets would be inclined to

attempt nuclear intimidation of the United

States and might succeed without ever having to fire a missile.
56

Critics of this point of view argued that:

1.

2.

3.

the Soviets could, for various reasons,

have little confidence that they could exe

cute this partially disarming first strike

successfully; 20

a “surgical” strike against U.S. missile,

bomber, and submarine bases is not possible—millions would be killed and the

Soviets could not count on U.S. restraint

in retaliation; and

U.S. SLBMs and bombers would be capable of damaging a great variety of

Soviet military, political, and economic

targets-the President would not be limited to retaliating against urban populations.

The Carter and Reagan Administrations

took positions which implied that the ICBM

vulnerability issue was important but not urgent. The Carter Administration proposed deploying a new ICBM, the MX, which would

be based deceptively among multiple protective structures so as to raise the price in warheads of a Soviet attack to unacceptable

levels. The fully deployed system was scheduled to restore relative invulnerability to landbased ICBMs in about 1989.

Rejecting the Carter Administration’s multiple protective structure basing mode, the

Reagan Administration first explored alternate “survivable” basing modes, then referred

the ICBM issue to a “President’s Commission

on Strategic Forces, ” chaired by Brent Scowcroft. The Scowcroft Commission recommended

20Some argue that imputations of the required degrees of accuracy to Soviet reentry vehicles are, for various technical reasons, not justifiable and that the Soviets would be foolish to

have confidence in a theoretical, basically untestable, capability. In addition, Soviet ICBMs could not attack U.S. ICBMs

without giving U.S. bombers enoughwarning to become airborne. Furthermore, the Soviets must take into account the possibility that U.S. ICBMs would be launched on warning, escaping before the Soviet ICBMs arrived. For many years it has

been U.S. policy to have a capability to launch on warning. Although we have no declared policy to do so, the possibility that

we might is a part of our deterrent posture. See U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, MX missile Basing, OTAISC-140 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

September 1981), for a discussion of the technical requirements

for launch-on-warning. (On the other hand, some argue that an

attack of shorter range, submarine-launched missiles producing nuclear detonations above the U.S. missile fields could pin

the missiles down until the Soviet ICBMs arrived.)

the deployment of 100 MX missiles in fixed,

presumably vulnerable, silos now occupied by

Minuteman missiles. It also recommended development of a small, possibly mobile, ICBM

that might reduce the ICBM vulnerability

problem sometime in the early 1990s.21 At various times during the course of debate over

ICBM vulnerability, ballistic missile defense

had been suggested as a measure for protecting the missiles.22 The Scowcroft Commission

21Report of the President Commission on Strat+p”c Forces

(April 1983), reprinted in U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Armed Services, Defense Department Authorization and Oversight, Hearings on H.R. 2287, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984 and Oversight

of Previously Authorized Programs, Part 2 of 8 Parts, Strategic Programs, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 33-62.

~tFor a discussion of the technical issues, see U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, MX Missile Basing, op. cit.,

pp. 109-143.

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force

Artist’s concept of a new small intercontinental ballistic

missile (SICBM) now under research and development

by the U.S. Air Force. In this design, the missile would

be about 46 feet long and weigh about 30,000 Ibs. It

would deliver a 1,000 lb payload at ranges in excess

of 6,000 miles. The President’s Commission on Strategic

Forces, appointed by President Reagan and chaired by

Brent Scowcroft, recommended deployment of a small,

possibly mobile ICBM that might alleviate the ICBM

vulnerability problem in the early 1990s.
—- .

57

— —

concluded, however, that the vulnerability of

the Minuteman and MX silos

. . . in the near term, viewed in isolation, is

not a sufficiently dominant part of the overall problem of ICBM modernization to warrant other immediate steps being taken such

as closely spacing new silos or ABM defense

of those silos.23

Some proponents of ballistic missile defense,

however, disagree. They say that the immediate goal of pursuing ballistic missile defense

should be to reduce or eliminate the “military

utility” of Soviet ICBMs, which, presumably,

means their ability to destroy a large number

of ICBM silos as well as other hardened military targets. Indeed, the defense of ICBMs became the major focus of U.S. BMD research

through the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Technological Developments

“Conventional” BMD

In the years since the signing of the ABM

Treaty, the United States has continued research on ballistic missile defense technology.

Although some work was conducted on “exotic” technologies with possible long-term application, the major focus was on systems that

might be deployed within a few years in response to a Soviet “breakout” from the ABM

Treaty. The systems to which most attention

was paid were designed primarily to partially

defend hard targets, such as ICBM shelters,

against ‘‘counterforce attacks. The goal

would not be to protect every single shelter

perfectly but to try to assure the survival of

adequate retaliatory forces after a Soviet first

strike by raising the “price” of successful attack on U.S. ICBMs to levels the Soviets

would not want to pay. (’‘Price” here is measured as either a percentage of available Soviet

missile forces or the financial and political cost

of deploying additional forces. )

The Army Ballistic Missile Defense Program Office developed some subsystems for

a successor to the Sprint missile component

of the old Safeguard system: the Low Altitude

Defense System, or LoADS. The LoADS would

——— 23 —

1 bid., p. 51. For further discussion of the Scowcroft Commission findings, see ch. 6 of this report.

Photo credit: US Army

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Army developed the

Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS) as a successor

to the Sprint ABM interceptor and its associated

Missile Site Radar (see photos above, pp. 47 and 51).

It would have used small, possibly mobile, short-rang e

phased-array radars and computers to direct small ,

nuclear-armed missiles to intercept incoming reentr y

vehicles after they had entered the atmosphere. Because

nuclear explosions would occur so close to the ground,

these weapons would have been suitable for protecting

only hardened targets such as ICBM shelters.
58 —

use small, possibly mobile, short-range phasedarray radars and computers to direct small

missiles carrying nuclear warheads to incoming enemy reentry vehicles after they had entered the atmosphere. Because nuclear explosions would occur so close to the ground, these

weapons would have been suitable for protecting only hardened targets such as ICBM

shelters. 24 The Army has also worked on an

endoatmospheric (inside the atmosphere) nonnuclear kill missile for the LoADS, but has not

established its feasibility.2K

The Army has also been developing a nonnuclear exoatmospheric (above the atmosphere) interceptor. A sensor and kill vehicle

(which collides with the incoming reentry vehicle) were demonstrated in a test of the Homing Overlay Experiment held in the summer

of 1984. A full-blown system with many such

interceptors would probably use missile-borne

or airborne optical (long-wave infrared) sensors

to detect and track the numerous incoming

reentry vehicles, and would need to be able to

discriminate between warheads and decoys.

The Army has argued that while either the

LoADS or the high-altitude system could work

well standing alone, they could be even more

effective if deployed together in a “layered”

defense. 2e

Newer Technologies Potentially

Applicable to BMD27

Those who advocate greater efforts now in

BMD research and development argue that

technical advances since the early 1970s point

the way to solving many or all of the techni24Such systems are apparently not being considered under the

Strategic Defense Initiative.

‘

sSuch low-altitude nonnuclear interception could still not assure protection of soft targets like cities because the incoming

warheads could be salvage-fused-i. e., designed to detonate at

the moment of impact with the interceptor.

26See William A. Davis, Jr., “Current Technical Status of U.S.

BMD Programs, ” U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

*’Much of the basic material comes from the unclassified version of the DOD Defensive Technologies Study, submitted to

Congress March 1984, and from a recent paper by James

Fletcher, the leader of that study (James C. Fletcher, “The Technologies for Ballistic Missile Defense, ” Issues in Science and

Technology, fall 1984).

cal problems that made BMD less attractive

when the ABM Treaty was signed.

Technological limits of the late 1960s and

early 1970s made it seem that BMD systems

could be of only limited effectiveness and that

it would likely be less costly to improve the

ability of offenses to penetrate defenses than

it would be to build the defenses in the first

place. The systems under development were

limited to ground-based interceptors that

would operate during the last few minutes of

the offensive trajectory, in the terminal phase,

and in late midcourse. Guidance would have

been provided by large radars located at or

near the interceptor launchers. The radars, vulnerable to attack, would themselves have been

prime targets for the offense. Proliferation of

the radars would have been difficult because

they had to be large and expensive.

The speed and capacity of available computers limited the ability of the radars to operate successfully in a complicated environment

and of automated battle management systems

to handle large attacks. It would have been

very difficult to discriminate targets from

decoys or other penetration aids. This problem would have forced either the commitment

of very large numbers of interceptors to kill

comparatively few targets, or the delay of any

attempt at intercept until the incoming warheads entered the atmosphere, where discrimination becomes easier. Either would have

put a substantial strain on data handling and

weapon resources. This situation limited the

range at intercept, and therefore the area each

site could protect, forcing up requirements for

numbers of interceptors.

Guidance and warhead technology had not

yet made it feasible to consider trying to use

nonnuclear warheads to destroy missile reentry vehicles. Nuclear explosions threatened

collateral damage problems which further limited the region over which the intercept could

take place.28 They also posed the risk of blackout of the radars once the first intercept was

“Again, if the incoming warheads were salvage-fused, the collateral damage might be greater from the the intercepted warhead than from a nuclear interceptor.
59

made. Analyses showed that the cost of relatively easy countermeasures—e.g., adding to

the offensive forces or even just adding crude

decoys–would be less than the cost of building the BMD systems.

For some, technical advances of recent years

suggest solutions to the problems previously

limiting the promise of ballistic missile defense. The advances are, for the most part,

more embryonic than mature. They will have

to be further proven, and in many cases vastly

scaled up from present performance levels,

before they can be designed and engineered

into working BMD weapon components. Nevertheless, advocates of greater investment in the

development of these technologies believe they

offer the promise of building weapons with

nonnuclear kill mechanisms; weapons that

could attack missiles in their boost and

midcourse phases; sensors, computers, and,

especially, software for high-speed, highvolume target tracking and discrimination;

and computers and software for high-capacity

battle management. The new technologies are

discussed in detail in chapters 7 and 8.

Soviet BMD Activities

Meanwhile, in the early 1980s, Soviet BMD

developments were giving U.S. officials some

cause for concern. According to the Department of Defense document, Soviet Military

Power, 1985, since 1980 the Soviets have been

upgrading the Moscow ABM system from 64

launchers to the 100 allowed by the ABM

Treaty:

When completed, the new system will be

a two-layer defense composed of silo-based

long-range modified GALOSH interceptors

designed to engage targets outside the atmosphere; silo-based high acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the

atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements.

The silo-based launchers may be reloadable.

The first new launchers are likely to be operational this year [1985], and the new defenses

could be fully operational by 1987.29

In addition, “the Soviets have developed a

rapidly deployable ABM system for which

sites could be built in months rather than

years. ” Soviet early warning and tracking radars, including one site under construction

which violates the ABM Treaty, could support

an “ABM deployment to protect important

target areas in the U. S. S. R.” in the next 10

years. Another hypothesized addition to such

a system would be the SA-10 (under deployment) and SA-X-12 (under development) surface-to-air missiles which “may have the potential to intercept some types of U.S. strategic

ballistic missiles. ”3°

According to the Department of Defense report, then, the Soviets are “developing a rapidly deployable ABM system to protect important target areas in the U. S. S. R.” The report

concludes that “the aggregate of [their] ABM

and ABM-related activities suggests that the

U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense

of its national territory. “31 Officials of the CIA,

however, have said that they do not judge it

likely that the Soviets would in fact move to

such a deployment in the near term.32 These

officials point out that, while the Soviets could

expand their presently limited ABM system

by the early 1990s,

In contemplating such a deployment . . .

[they] will have to weigh the military advantages they would see in such defenses against

the disadvantages they would see in such a

move, particularly the responses by the

United States and its allies.33

‘

gSoviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1984), p. 48.

‘“I bid.

“Ibid.

‘

zUnclassified testimony of National Intelligence Officer

Lawrence K. Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear forces of the Senate

Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of

the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985.

33Prepared testimony of Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K.

Gershwin, ibid.
60

Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense

The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in the map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, Galosh

anti-ballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high-acceleration interceptors, top right.

The Defense Department also reports that

the Soviets are working on ground-based

lasers for ballistic missile defense, although

“initial operational deployment is not likely

in this century.“34 They also have a “vigorous

“The CIA says:

We are concerned about a large Soviet program to develop

ground-based laser weapons for terminal defense against reentry vehicles. There are major uncertainties, however, concernprogram underway for [ground- and spacebased] particle beam development and could

have a prototype space-based weapon ready

for testing in the late 1990s.”35 The CIA, on

ing the feasibility and practicality of using ground-based lasers

for BMD.

Testimony of Gates and Gershwin, prepared testimony, ibid.

361 bid., p. 44.
61

.

—.

Photo credit: US. Department of Defense

Artist’s concept of large phased-array early warning and missile tracking radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk in

the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government has judged this radar to violate the ABM Treaty because of its siting,

orientation, and capability.

the other hand, estimates that the “technical

requirements are so severe” that there is a

“low probability” that the Soviets will test

such a prototype before the year 2000.36 The

Soviets are also reported to be working on particle beam weapons.

Soviet BMD developments, then, lead some

to project either of two threatening possibilities, One is that the Soviets might decide formally (or at least overtly) to abandon the ABM

Treaty and rapidly deploy ballistic missile

defenses that gave them a strategic advantage

over the United States before it could respond

adequately. This possibility is sometimes referred to as a “break out” from the treaty. The

second threatening possibility is that the

Soviets might “creep out” of the treaty. That

is, they might feign adherence to the ABM

Treaty but gain a significant unilateral ballistic missile defense capability through treaty

violations and through technical advances in

systems (e.g., theater ballistic missile defenses)

nominally permitted by the treaty.

Political Developments

Decline of Detente

In 1972, when the Nixon Administration

signed the SALT I agreements, U.S. policy

toward the Soviet Union was one of detente,

in which the United States was attempting to

ameliorate its adversarial relationship with the

Soviet Union through various cooperative arrangements, including but not limited to arms

control. According to one of the architects of

this policy, a “network of agreements” was

meant to provide “incentives and penalties”

that might “moderate Soviet behavior. “37 Although arms control negotiations between the

two superpowers continued through the 1970s,

during the same period U.S.-Soviet cooperation declined and conflict increased. The So36Testimony of Gates and Gershwin, Op. cit.

“Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little,

Brown & Co., 1982), p. 246.
62

. — ——

viet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 led

the Carter Administration to withdraw the

signed SALT II treaty from senatorial consideration. The Reagan Administration came to

office with a stated intent of correcting what

it saw as the undue softness of previous Administrations toward the Soviets and serious

neglect of U.S. military strength. Harsh Soviet reaction to political liberalization in Poland and Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner that had strayed over Soviet air space did

not improve Soviet standing in U.S. eyes.

Decline of Arms Control

During his 1980 election campaign President Reagan emphasized that the SALT II accords signed by the Carter Administration

were “fatally flawed. ” In office, he decided not

to request Senate confirmation of them (while

promising not to violate them.) He declined to

pursue ratification of two other previously negotiated agreements, the Threshold Test Ban

Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Treaty. A view that seemed to be widely held

within the Reagan Administration was that

previous arms control agreements had resulted in substantial net advantages to the Soviet Union, and that only a determined U.S.

program of “strategic modernization” would

persuade the Soviets to agree to equitable limitations.

Although discussions were begun with the

Soviets on strategic and intermediate-range

nuclear force limitations, no progress was

made. Some argued that the Soviets actually

had no wish to reach an equitable agreement,

but wished only to score propaganda points

against the United States, to divide the NATO

alliance, and to prevent deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles

in Western Europe. Others argued that while

Soviet bargaining intentions and tactics were

WHAT

If President Reagan meant to set a bold

precedent with his March 23d speech, he succeeded. The Strategic Defense Initiative Procertainly open to question, the Reagan Administration, manned in key positions by people

hostile to arms control, did not negotiate seriously. 38

With the debatable, or at least ambiguous,

success of previous arms control arrangements

and the lack of apparent progress toward new

limitations, there has been a growing public

concern about the eventual outcome of the

strategic arms race and a general desire for nuclear arms reduction agreements.39

By the time of President Reagan’s speech

of March 23, 1983, several conditions held:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

the competition in strategic offensive nuclear weapons continued;

there was considerable skepticism in the

Administration and in Congress that

arms control could do much to contain the

Soviet military threat to the United

States;

the near-term potential for mutually beneficial negotiations with the Soviets

seemed slim;

there was deep suspicion toward the Soviet Union inside the Administration and

widely shared by the U.S. public;

advocates of ballistic missile defense for

the United States were arguing that new

technologies had put effective defenses

within sight;

the Department of Defense was concerned

about Soviet BMD developments; and

there was strong public feeling that something should be done to curb the nuclear

arms race.

‘“Cf. Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in ”Nuclear Arms Control (New York:

Knopf, 1984),

‘See Jamie Kalven, “A Talk With Louis Harris,” The Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982, pp. 3-5. See

also, Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, “The Public Mood,”

Foreign Affairs, fall 1984, pp. 33-46.

IS NEW?

gram is probably the first major national

weapons research program which was begun

with a public Presidential appeal for a national
commitment. The Initiative has made BMD

once again a central issue of national debate

over defense policy. But there are striking

technical and political differences between the

new debate and the old one.

In the late 1960s, the Nixon Administration

policy was (until the ABM Treaty was negotiated) to propose immediate deployment of

fully developed, currently available systems.

The costs and capabilities of these systems

were understood reasonably well. The likely

countermeasures (multiple reentry vehicles

and other penetration aids) had also been invented and, by the time of the signing of the

ABM Treaty, tested in the United States.

There was wide (though certainly not complete)

agreement that when the Soviets adopted

these countermeasures the proposed U.S. BMD

system would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.

Today, while there are those who advocate

early BMD deployment using near-term technology, the SD I focus is on BMD systems

which are still only conceptual, based on technologies that are yet to be developed or matured. Similarly, the likely countermeasures

are mostly conceptual, and their effectiveness

and cost remain speculative.

Some experts consider these technologies to

be promising, not only for “enhancing deterrence, ” but perhaps ultimately for protecting

most U.S. cities and population from the

threat of nuclear destruction. Most experts

agree that at least some research should be

done on them. Although some argue for early

deployment of BMD based on currently available technology, the debate now centers mainly

on what kind of research to pursue, at what

funding level, and for what ends.

Nevertheless, the SDI cannot be adequately

characterized as “just a research program to

find out what is possible. ” The President has

called for a national commitment of scientific

and technological resources to find effective

defenses against ballistic missiles. The proposed research program envisages a steadily

rising level of expenditures and a series of “experiments” to demonstrate capabilities that

could lead to engineering development

sions in the early 1990s and deployment

sions in the late 1990s. Just where the

63

decidecilines

are between research on the one hand and development on the other is not entirely clear:

if the research is highly successful, there will

be pressures for moving to the early stages of

development. Then, if early development is

highly successful, there will be pressures for

deployment. And whether or not decisions to

deploy BMD systems are ever made, a U.S.

research program may affect Soviet weapons

decisions and U.S.-Soviet political relations.

The political environment today differs from

what it was when the United States decided

to exclude ballistic missile defense from its

strategic posture. Although the country was

still in a bitter war with a Soviet ally (the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam) in 1972, the

Nixon Administration had embarked on a policy of detente with the Soviet Union, acting

on the assumption that a judicious mixture of

competition and conflict was possible. Arms

control was seen as a possible tool both for reducing the risk of fatal conflict between the

two sides and for establishing political bonds

which might ameliorate the causes of conflict.

Detente, seen by many as a failed policy, has

been discarded by the United States and arms

control has come under increasing suspicion

and criticism. At the same time, public fears

of the consequences of unrestrained arms competition have grown. Although in 1985 the

United States and the Soviet Union embarked

on a new series of arms control talks, no one

expected early progress.

Another significant difference between the

BMD debate before 1972 and the one now is

that then the ABM Treaty did not exist, and

today it does. In the late 1960s, the United

States entered into negotiations with the

Soviets intending to persuade them that forgoing BMD would be mutually advantageous;

in 1985, the announced U.S. intent is to persuade them that having BMD would be mutually advantageous. Although the Secretary of

Defense and other Administration officials

have expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty,

the Administration has not yet chosen to seek
64

revision of it, let alone abandon it. It has

stated that SDI research will be conducted

within treaty constraints. The ABM Treaty

is widely seen in the United States, among the

NATO allies,40 and perhaps in the Soviet Union, as the most significant arms control agreement between the superpowers. Its abrogation

by either side would symbolize to many abandonment of the serious pursuit of arms control and resignation to a largely unconstrained

nuclear arms race.

An important consideration in pursuing

BMD, even at the research and development

level, is when and how the ABM Treaty-would

40See David Yost, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance, ” International Security, vol. 7, No. 2, fall 1982,

pp. 143-174.

have to be modified or abrogated and what the

consequences of such changes would be for

U.S. national, NATO alliance, and U.S.-Soviet

politics. On the other hand, those who see

mainly disadvantages to the treaty believe

that any risks in its abrogation or attempted

modification are far outweighed by the risks

(e.g., as militarily significant Soviet violations)

of continued U.S. adherence to it.

Protagonists in the U.S. debate over BMD

disagree about how central the ABM Treaty

should be in the debate. But most can probably agree that the question of the survival

of that particular treaty is subsidiary to the

primary issue of whether BMD deployed by

the United States and the Soviet Union would

lead to a safer world.
Chapter 4

Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear

Strategy, and BMD
Contents

Page

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....., . . . . . . .+ 67

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Deterring the Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Bolt-From-the-Blue First Strike. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Escalatory Confrontation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Threats of Aggression and Aggression Against

U.S. Allies and Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Current U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Countervailing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Strategic Stability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

U.S. Force Requirements and Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

The Strategic Balance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Current U.S. Attitude Towards Active Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Common Criticisms of U.S. Nuclear Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Maintaining Current Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Alternative U.S. Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Potential Contributions of Ballistic Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Current (Countervailing) Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Retaliation-Only. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Prevailing ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Defense Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Chapter 4

Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear

Strategy, and BMD

OVERVIEW

Depending on how the policies and forces of

the United States and the Soviet Union changed

to accommodate it, the introduction of ballistic missile defenses into our military posture

could well represent a major shift in national

strategy. Alternatively, it might only be an incremental adjustment. To understand the role

that BMD can play in national strategy, we

must first understand what our present strategy is. We can then ask whether or how ballistic missile defenses might address some of

the problems that have so far been identified

with our strategy-or whether it might enable

adoption of a strategy significantly better

than the present one.

This chapter provides that background. After a brief summary of current U.S. nuclear

strategy, it discusses what possible Soviet actions that strategy seeks to deter. The chapter goes on to describe our current strategy

in greater depth and presents a discussion of

some of the problems with our strategy that

critics have identified. The chapter concludes

by identifying possible evolution of or replacements to our strategy, paying particular attention to the roles that ballistic missile

defenses might play.

INTRODUCTION

The overall strategic objective of our current

nuclear strategy is, and consistently has been,

to avoid nuclear attack on this nation while

preserving other national interests. To accomplish this, our strategy has attempted to

achieve three major goals:

●

●

●

deter the Soviets from nuclear attack on

the United States by convincing them

that the outcome would be unacceptable

to them;

convince the Soviets that we will attempt

to preserve our national interests by

means short of nuclear war, but that attacks on those interests might well lead

to nuclear war; and

terminate nuclear war, if it cannot be

avoided, at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms most favorable to us.

We strive to deter nuclear attack by fostering a perception among the Soviet leadership

that they would suffer unacceptable losses in

a nuclear war, and that under no circumstances would such a war leave them better

off in terms of achieving their geopolitical objectives than they otherwise would have been.

For this strategy to be credible, we must also

foster the perception among the Soviets that

we are not only willing to fight a nuclear war

if necessary, but that nothing they could do

could make us incapable of doing so. However,

we also do not want our forces to be structured

in such a way as to give the Soviets increased

incentive to strike first in a crisis. We therefore strive to balance potential war-fighting

capability against crisis stability.

In the event of attack, U.S. strategy incorporates two broad elements. We would seek

to deny the Soviets success in achieving the

goals motivating such an attack, and we would

threaten retaliation. The perception of these

capabilities contributes to deterring attack;

the possession of these capabilities is intended

to make possible the termination of hostilities

67
68

on favorable terms if they cannot be avoided.

These elements apply both to deterring a

Soviet first strike and to deterring and responding to subsequent Soviet actions. This

discussion stresses “intending” to terminate

hostilities, rather than successfully doing so,

because it is by no means obvious that any

plan for initiating even limited use of nuclear

weapons can avoid the destruction of the societies of both parties to the conflict.

We would accomplish these elements, denial

of success and retaliation, with offensive and

passive defensive means. We deny the Soviets

success in attacking military installations by

means of a variety of passive measures such

as hardening them and making them redundant (e.g., ICBM silos), dispersing them (e.g.,

air and naval forces), and hiding them (e.g.,

ballistic missile submarines). We do not attempt to deny success to attacks on our cities, on economic targets, or on “soft” military

targets. We threaten retaliation by maintaining survivable offensive forces that are capable on balance of riding out attack and then

reaching and destroying Soviet military and

civilian assets. In short:

●

●

●

The survival of the United States depends

on rational behavior of the Soviet leadership. We seek to deter them from attacking, but if they intend to destroy the

United States and suffer the consequences,

we cannot prevent them from doing so.

Deterrence rests primarily on offensive

forces. We rely more heavily on the threat

of retaliation than we do on denial of

success.

We rely on the use of passive defenses,

not active ones, for the survivability of

our offensive forces.

DETERRING THE SOVIETS

The principal target of U.S. nuclear strategy-the Soviet Union-is obvious. The mechanism by which that strategy works, however,

is not simple. From what actions do we want

to deter the Soviet Union? How does the deterrent mechanism operate? These questions

are the subjects of a vast literature;1 the problem can only be outlined here. In general, there

are three broad, and to some extent overlapping, categories of Soviet behavior the United

States would like to deter:

●

●

●

A surprise, “bolt from the blue, ” strategic nuclear attack intended to disarm the

United States and, conceivably, remove

it as an international competitor to the

Soviet Union.

Initiation or threatened initiation of nuclear war against the United States as an

escalation of an ongoing crisis, conventional war, or theater nuclear war.

Threats of or acts of military aggression

against U.S. allies or against countries

I See app. M for references to a representative sampling.

whose conquest the United States would

see as challenging vital U.S. interests.

Exactly what one believes the United States

must do-to deter the Soviet Union from the

kinds of behavior listed above depends on

one’s perceptions of Soviet motivations, strategy, and military capabilities. However, determining Soviet intentions is a controversial procedure, and U.S. Sovietologists offer a wide

range of interpretations of Soviet views. Before examining current U.S. strategy in any

detail, we will first explore this diversity of

opinion.

It arises, in part, from apparent contradictions in Soviet statements and writings on the

subject. Examination of actual Soviet nuclear

force deployments helps narrow the controversy somewhat, but still does not persuasively resolve the debated questions to everyone’s satisfaction. A recent OTA workshop2

‘OTA workshop of Soviet military strategy and policy, held

Dec. 12, 1984; summary to be made available separately from

this report.
.—

suggested that the conflicting statements of

Soviet strategic doctrine emanate from two

overlapping, but distinguishable spheres: the

“sociopolitical” and the “military-technical.”

The former consists of propositions of the

following kinds, which are often heard emanating from the highest levels of Soviet political

leadership, and often from high military

leaders as well:

●

●

●

●

●

●

The Soviet Union will not be the first to

use nuclear weapons.

Nuclear war with the United States would

be mutual suicide.

It is impossible to keep a nuclear war

limited.

Soviet nuclear policy is defensive and

retaliatory in nature.

A rough parity of nuclear forces now exists between the Soviet Union and the

United States.

The Soviet Union does not seek nuclear

superiority.

On the other hand, many contemporaneous

Soviet military writings on operational levels,

the “military-technical” arena, stress such

strategic principles as:

●

●

●

●

●

It is important to seize the offensive at

all levels of warfare.

Getting in the first blow (preemptive attack) can decide the outcome of a nuclear

Nuclear warfare might be contained

within a particular theater of operations.

A combination of offensive attack and

strategic defense (e.g., air defense and

civil defense) could limit damage to the

Soviet Union from a nuclear war.

The Soviet Union would prevail in a nuclear war.

Analysts of Soviet military policy agree that

both of these bodies of doctrine co-exist in Soviet writings, as indeed they do in U.S. writings. However, there is disagreement on which

would take precedence under what circumstances. When it actually comes to running

risks of engaging in nuclear war with the

United States, which precepts are Soviet decisionmakers most likely to follow?

Examining actual Soviet nuclear force deployments seems to some analysts to support

the notion that the “military-technical” set of

doctrines has been given considerable operational application.3 The Soviets have built a

large land-based ICBM force which appears

capable of destroying the bulk of the U.S. landbased ICBM force in a first strike. Their antisubmarine warfare programs seek the ability

to threaten our sea-based deterrent. They have

a massive air defense system and a large civil

defense program. Although they have deployed no nationwide ballistic missile defense

capability (which would be prohibited by the

1972 ABM Treaty), they appear to continue

preparations to be able to do so.

On the other hand, other characteristics of

the Soviet strategic posture, especially when

viewed in the light of the relevant U.S. strategic capabilities, suggest that Soviet leaders

should and do give some credence to the “sociopolitical” set of propositions above. Even

in a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack, the Soviet Union cannot expect to escape a devastating retaliatory blow against a wide range of

military, economic, and political targets. This

follows for a number of reasons:

●

●

Only one-quarter of U.S. strategic nuclear

warheads are deployed on land-based

ICBMs which are thought to be at risk

to Soviet preemption; the rest are on bombers and submarines. In normal times,

half the submarines are invulnerable at

sea and many bombers are poised for

rapid take-off. If nuclear forces were in a

“generated” posture, such as in a crisis

when a preemptive strike could be anticipated, even more submarines would be

at sea and more bombers would be on

alert, widely dispersed, and ready for

quick take-off.

Although the Soviet air defense system

is impressive, the U.S. Defense Department believes that structural and electronic upgrades to current U.S. bombers,

One such analysis is done by Stephen Meyer, “Insight From

Mathematical Modeling in Soviet Mission Analysis, Part I I,”

a report done under contract MDA-903 -82-K-O1O7 with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
70

Figure 4-1.— U.S.S.R. ICBMs

USSR ICBMs

METERS

30

20

10

0 II

Ss-11

II ... -.——. —- M O D —

1 ~ 3

Ss-13

II

MOD

2

SS-16

I

NLJMf3ER DE PL C)YE~ 100 4?0 60 Unde!ermmod

SS-17

1

MOD

3

150

tikUfiiAD-S- 1 1 :1 MRVS 1 1 4 MIRVS

MAX RANGE (KM) 11000 13 00(-) 10600 9.400 900 0 10,000

LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot t-lot Ho! Cold col d

SS-78

[

M O D

4

308

10 MIRVS

1100 0

Cold

SS-19

M O D

3

360

6 MIRVS

10,000

Hot

SS-X-24

SS-X-25

h

In Neafmg

Development Deployment

up I() 10 MIRVS 1

10 (.)00 10500

col d cold

The Soviet iCBM arsenai. The Soviets have built a large land-based ICBM force which appears capable of destroying the bulk of the U.S. landbased ICBM force in a first strike.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense.

Photo credit: U.S. Navy

The U.S.S. Ohio, first of the Trident ballistic missile

submarines. About half of U.S. strategic nuclear

warheads are deployed on submarine-launched ballistic

missiles aboard Poseidon and Trident submarines. In

normal times, about half of these are hidden under

water; during a “generated” alert, still more would

be sent to sea.

● Although the Soviet civil defense program is-large, it remains a matter of controversy in the United States as to how

well it could actually protect Soviet political and economic assets against U.S.

strategic forces.4

The Soviets have also taken measures to

protect their own nuclear forces from a nuclear

strike. They have hardened their ICBM silos

to withstand high overpressures; they have a

large submarine-launched missile force; they

appear to be developing a mobile land-based

ICBM. Such survivability measures can be interpreted as maintenance of a secure “thirdstrike” reserve force which would be protected

from a U.S. retaliatory attack and which therefore could be used to deter the United States

from retaliating.5 However, the survivability

measures can also be viewed as providing an

current and advanced cruise missiles, the

B-lB bomber, and use of new bomber

technology will continue to assure penetration of those defenses for the foreseeable future.

‘Two contrasting views are given by Leon Goure, “War Survival in Soviet Strategy” (Washington, DC: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1976); and U.S. Central Intelligence

Agency, “Soviet Civil Defense,” Director of Central Intelligence,

N178-1OOO3, July 1978. See also note 8, below.

'Some argue that if the United States calculated that after

it retaliated the Soviets would be left with a larger reserve of

nuclear weapons, a U.S. President would be even more hesitant

about retaliating.
71

9

Photo credits U S Air Force

‘

( Air-breathing,” means of delivering U.S. strategic

nuclear weapons. Top left, air-launched cruise missiIe

being launched from Air Force B-52 bomb bay. Top

right, B1-B bomber, Advanced Technology Bomber

(ATB) design, right, still highly classified. According

to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The

B1-B is designed to penetrate Soviet defenses well into

the 1990s. The strategic modernization program also

calls for the development of an ATB with stealth

characteristics. Plans call for the ATB to deploy in the

1990s to neutralize an increasingly sophisticated Soviet

air defense system. ” [United States Military Posture

for FY 1986, p. 25.]

invulnerable retaliatory force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on an attacker,

which would support a strategy of deterrence.

Many U.S. Sovietologists believe that the

concept of strategic preemption to limit damage (if not to completely decide the outcome

of the conflict) is an important element in Soviet military doctrine and force deployments.

There is less agreement about the conditions

under which the Soviets might choose to exercise a preemptive option.6

Returning to the three general categories of

Soviet actions the United States would like to

deter, we can see how differing interpretations

of Soviet nuclear strategy lead to differing

assessments of what deterrence requires of

U.S. nuclear forces.

Bolt-From-the-Blue First Strike

The requirement to absorb such an attack

and still retain the capability to deliver an un6

Sovietologist Raymond Garthoff argues from Soviet military and political writings that: 1) Soviet doctrines of strategic preemption cover only certain narrow cases, with a launch

on warning or launch under attack being more likely; and 2)

a decision to preempt, and therefore to start a nuclear war,

would be suicidal because such a war would be disastrous for

both sides. (cf. “Mutual Deterrence, Parity, and Strategic Arms

Limitation in Soviet Policy, ” Chapter 5 of Soviet Military

Thinking, Derek Leebaert (cd.) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 92-124. Another analyst concludes:

The Soviet leaders have been forced to recognize that their relationship with the United States is in reality one of mutual vulnerability to devastating nuclear strikes, and that there is no immediate prospect of escaping from this relationship. Within the

constraints of this mutual vulnerability they have tried to prepare for nuclear war, and they would try to win such a war if it

came to that. But there is little evidence to suggest that they

think victory in a global nuclear war would be anything other than

catastrophic.

(David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 179.)

On the other hand, still other analysts argue that:

There is a regrettable tendency in the West to view the Soviet Union almost entirely in “mirror image” terms . . . The simple fact of the matter is that U.S. and Soviet concepts of the

benefits of “victory” and its relative costs reflect philosophical

and societal parameters that are in no way symmetrical . . . The

data available suggest, in fact, that the Soviet leadership, in the

pursuit of its hegemonical objectives, may be prepared to incur

losses in societal and human values that would be “unthinkable, ” at least in cold blood, within Western polities, but which

in Soviet eyes are bearable, viewed, for instance, in relation to

the total Soviet military and civilian casualties in World War II.

Jacquelyn K. Davis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra’anan, “Soviet Strategic-Military Thought and Force Levels: Implications for American Security, ” in Jacquelyn K. Davis, et

al., The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense (Cambridge,

MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1980), p. 25.

Yet another analyst argues that emphases in Soviet strategic doctrine have varied over time but always according to the

dictates of Soviet political leadership when it takes a stand.

Currently, he argues, “ . . . the primary rationale for all Soviet

nuclear options is now retaliation-the inhibition of American

escalation. ” James M. McConnell, “Shifts in Soviet Views on

the Proper Focus of Military Development, ” World Politics,

April 1985, p. 337.
72 —

acceptable retaliatory strike to the Soviet Union has been a fundamental determinant of the

U.S. strategic posture. Although this is the

scenario most analysts agree is the least likely,

it is also one of the most stressing; the chances

of its occurring could well increase if we were

to ignore this case and, as a result, become

dangerously vulnerable to it.

In this scenario, the Kremlin leaders sit

down one day and decide that a world without the United States as a major power would

be a more comfortable one for the Soviet Union, and that they have the means of bringing that world about at acceptable cost. Alternatively, they decide that they face some

intolerable trends (perhaps the disintegration

of their position in Eastern Europe, or economic collapse at home) and that only a victory over the United States can rescue them.

They would presumably estimate that a surprise attack on the United States could disarm it sufficiently so that it might prefer negotiations to retaliation and that, at worst,

whatever retaliatory damage the United

States could inflict would be an acceptable

price for the defeat of the United States.

Some have argued that the Soviets might

attempt a more or less surgical strike on U.S.

land-based missiles (and perhaps bombers),

leaving only the less accurate submarinelaunched U.S. missiles available for retaliation.

Since the present generation of these missiles

is not accurate enough to destroy Soviet reserve ICBM silos or other very hard targets

(e.g., command bunkers or shelters for the Soviet political and military leadership), the

United States might be deterred from retaliating at all, hoping to spare its cities from a Soviet “third strike”; instead, U.S. leaders would

be forced to sue for peace on Soviet terms.

Aside from the operational uncertainties Soviet military planners would face, this scenario

minimizes several considerations.7 First, an attack on U.S. land-based strategic forces would

inevitably lead to the deaths of millions of

Americans. The Soviets would be imprudent,

to say the least, to believe that the United

States would fail to retaliate. They also need

to consider that the United States maintains

the option of launching its land-based ICBMs

on warning of attack, leaving only empty silos

to await the Soviet first strike. In addition,

although currently less accurate than landbased missiles, U.S. SLBMs are aimed at a

wide variety of military, political, and economic targets-targets presumably chosen to

be those the Soviet leadership would least like

Photo credit; U.S. Navy

‘On Soviet planning uncertainties, see Benj amin S. Lambeth,

“Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner,” International Security, vol.7, winter 1983, pp. 139-166. See also Stanley Sienkkwicz, “Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis, ” World Politics, vol. XXXII, October 1979, pp.

90-110.

U.S. Navy Trident C-4 SLBM in test launch. The C-4 is

more accurate than its predecessor, the Poseidon

SLBM, but not as accurate as the D-5 (Trident 11) SLBM,

which, when it becomes operational in the late 1980s,

is expected to be nearly as accurate as

land-based ICBMs.
73

—

to lose. Finally, surviving U.S. bombers and

cruise missiles could accurately attack Soviet

hard targets.

Moreover, there is no consensus in the

United States about just what levels of national loss the Soviet leadership might be prepared to suffer to obtain various objectives.’

The question becomes even more complicated

when one moves from a scenario in which the

Soviets deliberately choose to begin a nuclear

war (as would result from bolt-from-the-blue

attack) to scenarios in which the Soviets are

only running a risk of nuclear war.

Escalator Confrontation

What might deter the Soviet Union from

risking nuclear confrontation remains extremely controversial. But suppose the risk

has been taken. The Soviets may have miscalculated U.S. willingness to escalate a conflict,

thus miscalculating the risk of war involved

in some act of aggression. It is also possible

to imagine scenarios in which the Soviets either do not believe the United States to have

made a deterrent commitment, or do not believe that their own actions constitute what

others would see as aggression. Varying perceptions of Soviet motivations lead to varying degrees of willingness to postulate such

scenarios. In any case, the situation postulated

here is not that the Soviets have decided in

advance that victory at a reasonable price is

achievable, nor that they believe the consequences of a nuclear war to be acceptable.

Rather, it is that they believe (and think that

the United States probably shares the belief)

that past miscalculations and the pressure of

events have made central nuclear war imminent and quite possibly inevitable. The question is whether they would launch a preemptive strike on the United States or whether

they would wait and take the chance either

that the United States would not strike, or

that they could launch their own forces upon

detection of U.S. attack.

“’4A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine, ”

Strategic Review, vol. 10, fall 1982, pp. 36-63.

In this case, compared to the “bolt-from-the

blue” scenario, the Soviet calculus of risk is

different. They do not necessarily believe that

a nuclear war will be to their strategic advantage. They assume that the United States will

retaliate devastatingly if struck; moreover,

they have some doubt as to whether the

United States, expecting a Soviet strike, will

wait for it. If the Soviets were absolutely certain that strategic nuclear war was inevitable,

they would presumably see no choice but to

launch a preemptive strike. Although the Soviet Union might suffer grievous damage from

a U.S. retaliation, that damage might be reduced at least marginally by the combination

of Soviet counterforce strikes and defensive

measures.

Suppose, however, that the situation remained at least somewhat ambiguous. The

Soviets would be confronting a U.S. strategic

force in a high state of alert: many submarines

in port might have been sent to sea; additional

alerted bombers might have been dispersed to

many airfields; in the expectation of imminent

attack, U.S. land-based ICBMs might be prepared to be launched under warning of attack

so as to escape a Soviet disarming strike. Attacked by this augmented retaliatory force,

Soviet civil defense and air defense capabilities

might not go far in preventing damage.9 The

‘It is possible that greater immediate damage could be done

to the Soviet Union as a result of having civil defenses. Evacuation of Soviet cities could be interpreted as a signal that the

Soviets were considering a preemptive strike, so the United

States might respond by “generating” its strategic forces, or

putting them in a high state of alert. In a generated posture,

U.S. forces would be less vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

Therefore, it is conceivable that more Soviets would be killed

by U.S. retaliation which had been bolstered as a result of Soviet evacuation than would die in U.S. retaliation for a ‘‘boltfrom-the-blue” attack that the Soviets mounted without evacuating their cities and therefore without warning the United

States of their plan.

One study estimated that a retaliatory second-strike attack

by U.S. forces in their “day-to-day” posture against Soviet nuclear forces, other military targets, and industry would kill 60

to 64 million Soviets, over the short term, if they did not evacuate cities but instead took protection in the “best available”

shelter. If the Soviets successfully evacuated 80 percent of their

urban population and caused the United States to generate its

forces, a U.S. retaliatory strike would kill 23 to 34 million

Soviets. However, that total would rise to to 54 to 65 million

if the evacuated population were targeted. The study did not

consider long-term effects, and no analysis was made to determine the feasibility of implementing such an evacuation suc-
74

Soviets would face the difficult choice of in the late 1950s and early 1960s by deploylaunching an attack which assured great dam- ing hundreds of medium- and intermediateage to themselves, or taking a chance that a range nuclear missiles that could at least reach

strategic exchange could still be avoided but Western Europe.)

at the same time risking even greater damage But during the 1960s, the Soviets began to if the gamble on U.S. restraint failed. It is acquire their own ICBMs, stationed in silos widely believed that this is the kind of scenario that would be hard for the United States to which is the most likely to lead to a nuclear knock out in a quick first strike. By that time,

war. the United States had added thousands of tacThreats of Aggression and Aggression

tical and “theater” nuclear weapons to NATO

forces. In a strategy of “flexible response, ” the

Against U.S. Allies and Interests United States would answer Soviet aggression

The extension of U.S. nuclear forces to deter against attack on NATO allies as well as

against attack on the United States proper,

called “extended deterrence, ” provides the

greatest challenge to U.S. nuclear strategy.

This commitment to United States allies is

central to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

The Parties agree that an armed attack

against one or more of them in Europe or

North America shall be considered an attack

against them all; and consequently, they agree

that, if such armed attack occurs, each of

them, in exercise of the right of individual or

collective self-defense recognized by Article 51

of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with

the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North

Atlantic area.10

In the 1950s, when the Soviet Union had

very little capability for a nuclear attack on

the United States, it was more or less plausible for the United States to threaten nuclear

punishment for aggression against its allies.

(The Soviets attempted to compensate somewhat for this asymmetry in nuclear deterrence

cessfully. “In fact, ” the study noted, “it is highly questionable whether the United States or the Soviet Union could

effectively achieve this [civil defense] posture. ” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “An Analysis of Civil Defense

in Nuclear War, ” December 1978, figure 13, pp. 11 and 12.

‘The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, signed on Apr. 4, 1949

in Washington, DC, The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty—

Proceedings, Department of State Publication 3497, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1949).

at whatever level seemed necessary-including

first use of nuclear weapons—to repel the attack. Given the Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in many categories of conventional

force, it was widely assumed that NATO

would have to resort to nuclear counterattack

at a fairly early stage. Such nuclear counterattacks might lead to termination of the conflict before it escalated to central nuclear

war-but then again they might not. Thus,

U.S. strategy in NATO held out the ultimate

prospect, if not the immediate threat, that the

US. assured destruction capability might still

be called into play.

At the same time, the United States would

have to reckon with the risk that escalation

of a European war might lead to assured

Soviet-inflicted destruction of the United

States. As Henry Kissinger told a European

audience in 1979:

The European allies should not keep asking

us to multiply strategic assurances that we

cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we

should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization. *

The Soviets might not believe that the

United States would really run such a risk in

order to defend Europe.

Extended deterrence, therefore, poses an inherent dilemma which U.S. nuclear strategy

has not fully solved: to the extent that U.S.

strategic nuclear forces are believable as

“NATO’s ultimate deterrent, ” their use in

that role risks the United States’ own destruc-

*Henry A. Kissenger, “NATO Defense and the Soviet

Threat, ” Survival, November/December 1979, p. 266.
75

tion. To the extent that such use is not believable, those forces cannot effectively deter attack on NATO. The prospect of inviting Soviet

retaliation directly against the United States

for use of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe looks as repugnant to some Americans as

its converse of confining a superpower-initiated nuclear war to European soil looks to

some Europeans.

The reasoning behind “flexible response” is

that it is credible to threaten the possibility,

but not the certainty, of escalation to general

nuclear war. In a situation where escalation

might or might not occur, with that possibility not necessarily under the direct control of

either side, what would otherwise have been

an unbelievable threat might acquire credence.

Strategist Thomas Schelling describes the role

of uncertainty, “the threat that leaves something to chance,“ in this situation:

The brink is not, in this view, the sharp edge

of a cliff where one can stand firmly, look

down, and decide whether or not to plunge.

The brink is a curved slope that one can stand

on with some risk of slipping, the slope [getting] steeper and the risk of slipping greater

as one moves toward the chasm . . . One does

not, in brinkmanship, frighten the adversary

who is roped to him by getting so close to the

edge that if one decides to jump one can do

so before anyone can stop him. Brinksmanhip involves getting onto the slope where one

may fall in spite of his own best efforts to save

himself, dragging his adversary with him.ll

The threat of first use of nuclear weapons

by NATO depends either on the assumption

that any nuclear use may lead to uncontrolled

escalation, making the threat of a NATO nuclear response an effective deterrent to both

conventional and nuclear aggression, or on the

assumption that NATO can maintain “escalation dominance” on the Warsaw Pact, preventing the use of nuclear weapons beyond the

level that NATO chooses to use them. Soviet

deployments of tactical, theater, and intermediate-range nuclear forces, in conjunction

“Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 199. “Children,” says Schelling, “understand this perfectly. ”

with their central strategic forces, are sufficient to deny NATO high confidence in imposing escalation dominance on the Warsaw Pact.

Therefore, measures have been taken to tighten

the perceived “coupling” between Europe and

U.S. central strategic forces to bolster the

United States ‘ “extended deterrent. ”12

For example, the recent deployment by the

U.S. of intermediate-range Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles

(GLCMs) in Europe was undertaken in part

. —

‘*This and the following paragraph draw on Robert S.

McNamara’s arguments in “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions, Foreign Affairs, fall

1983, p. 59.

Photo credtt U.S. Air Force

Test firing of U.S. Air Force Ground-Launched Cruise

Missile (GLCM), This mobile missile is being deployed

in Europe partly to respond to NATO fears that the

United States might be unwilling to use nuclear forces

based at sea or in its own homeland in

defense of Europe,
76

to respond to NATO fears that the United

States would be unwilling to use nuclear forces

based at sea or in its own homeland in defense

of Europe. These European-based systems, in

addition to the submarine launched ballistic

missiles which the United States had already

assigned for NATO use, were intended to

strengthen the connection between conventional and tactical nuclear forces, on one hand,

and American central strategic forces, on the

other. In striking Soviet territory, they might

precipitate a Soviet retaliatory strike on

American territory which in turn might generate a U.S. central strategic attack. The

Soviets, no longer perceiving a “firebreak” between conventional aggression (which might

result in NATO first use of tactical nuclear

weapons) and central strategic exchange,

would be deterred from making the initial conventional attack.

In calculating whether to challenge the

United States in areas where the United

States appears to have a military commitment, the Soviets must weigh the gains they

hope to achieve (or losses they hope to avoid)

against a calculated risk of nuclear war. They

cannot know with certainty what the United

States’ responses will be. Therefore, they must

estimate the probability of various U.S. reactions. It might be that what they predict to

be the most likely outcome is the one they

seek. Alternatively, there might be a less likely

result which was nevertheless so desirable that

the Soviets would judge their overall risks to

be tolerable, considering the possible gains.

They might even act to minimize the most

favorable outcome obtainable by the United

States rather than to maximize their own benefit (should those cases differ).

The United States, similarly, cannot know

exactly what the Soviets will do. It therefore

can only do its best to make sure that aggression is a very unattractive choice for the

Soviets no matter how the Soviets make their

decisions.

Some argue that if the extended deterrent

is to be truly credible, the United States must

be able to greatly erode the Soviet assured destruction capability, either by preemptive

counterforce attacks on Soviet missiles, by incorporating significant defenses (civil, air, and

ballistic missile), or both. As Colin Gray has

put it,

. . . if U.S. strategic nuclear forces are to be

politically relevant in future crises, the American homeland has to be physically defended.

It is unreasonable to ask an American President to wage an acute crisis, or the early

stages of a central war, while he is fearful of

being responsible for the loss of more than 100

million Americans. If escalation discipline is

to be imposed upon the Soviet Union, even in

the direst situations, potential damage to

North America has to be limited . . .13

On the other hand, if the Soviets wish to

avoid such “escalation discipline, ” they have

a strong incentive to try to assure the penetration of their forces through such U.S. defenses—to see to it that the United States does

not come to believe that damage can be

limited.

Colin Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a Theory of Victory, ” International Security, vol. 4, No. 1, summer 1979, p. 84.

CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY

Current U.S. nuclear strategy is a balance retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger listed

between attempting to minimize the risk of nu- the five highest priority national security obclear war, on the one hand, and attempting to jectives of the United States in his Report to

prevent the coercion or intimidation of the the Congress for Fiscal Year 1984. The three

United States and its allies, on the other.” Sec- that directly concern strategic nuclear weap- —

refusal to run any risks would amount to giving the Soviet rulers

“Henry Kissinger wrote in 1957 that “ . . . the enormity of a blank check . . . “ (cf. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

modem weapons makes the thought of war repugnant, but the (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 7).
ons are quite similar to the formulations of

previous administrations:

●

●

●

To deter military attack by the U.S.S.R.

and its allies against the United States, its

allies, and other friendly countries; and to

deter, or to counter, use of Soviet military

power to coerce or intimidate our friends

and allies,

In the event of an attack, to deny the

enemy his objectives and bring a rapid end

to the conflict on terms favorable to our interests; and to maintain the political and

territorial integrity of the United States

and its allies.

To promote meaningful and verifiable mutual reductions in nuclear and conventional

forces through negotiations with the Soviet

Union and the Warsaw Pact, respectively;

and to discourage further proliferation of

nuclear weapons throughout the world.15

The strategy adopted to achieve these objectives is based on three major principles,

stated in the same report, that are also a continuation of longstanding policies:

• First, our strategy is defensive. It excludes

the possibility that the United States

would initiate a war or launch a preemptive

strike against the forces or territories of

other nations.

● Second, our strategy is to deter war. The

deterrent nature of our strategy is closely

related to our defensive stance. We maintain a nuclear and conventional force posture designed to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would

be too high to justify an attack.

● Third, should deterrence fail, our strategy

is to restore peace on favorable terms. In

responding to an enemy attack, we must

defeat the attack and achieve our national

objectives while limiting—to the extent

possible–the scope of the conflict. We

would seek to deny the enemy his political

and military goals and to counterattack

with sufficient strength to terminate hostilities at the lowest possible level of damage

to the United States and its allies. ”

—— 15Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (referred to as DOD

FY84 Annual Report), Feb. 1, 1983, p. 16.

16 Ibid,, p. 32 (emphasis in original).

77

— —

While catastrophic failure of this strategy

would be clear, its success is hard to quantify.

“We can never really measure how much aggression we have deterred, or how much peace

we have preserved, ” wrote Secretary of Defense Weinberger. “These are intangible–

until they are lost. ”17

Countervailing Strategy

In 1980, after having conducted a comprehensive review of U.S. strategic policy, President Carter issued Presidential Directive 59

which formally codified a “countervailing”

strategy. As described by Secretary Brown in

his Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1982,

the countervailing strategy is based on two

fundamental principles:

The first is that, because it is a strategy

of deterrence, the countervailing strategy is

designed with the Soviets in mind. Not only

must we have the forces, the doctrine, and

the will to retaliate if attacked, we must convince the Soviets, in advance, that we do. Because it is designed to deter the Soviets, our

strategic doctrine must take account of what

we know about Soviet perspectives on these

issues, for, by definition, deterrence requires

shaping Soviet assessments about the risks

of war . . . . We may, and we do, think our

models are more accurate, but theirs are the

reality deterrence drives us to consider . . . .

The second basic point is that, because the

world is constantly changing, our strategy

evolves slowly, almost continually, over time

to adapt to changes in U.S. technology and

military capabilities, as well as Soviet technology, military capabilities, and strategic

doctrine. 18

In particular, countervailing strategy intends to make clear to the Soviets that:

. . . no course of aggression by them that led

to use of nuclear weapons, on any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict, could lead

to victory, however they may define victory.

Besides our power to devastate the full target system of the U. S. S. R., the United States

—17 Weinberger, DOD FY85 Annual Report, Feb. 1, 1984, p. 8.

‘

8 Harold, Brown, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the

Congress, Fiscal Year 1982, Jan. 19, 1981, p. 38 (emphasis in

original).
78

would have the option for more selective,

lesser retaliatory attacks that would exact a

prohibitively high price from the things the

Soviet leadership prizes most–political and

military control, nuclear and conventional

forces, and the economic base needed to sustain a war.19

Seeking to incorporate flexibility and encompassing many options and target sets, the

countervailing strategy continues to be the basis for U.S. strategic nuclear policy .20

Strategic Stability

American nuclear strategy has placed high

priority on strategic stability. Most often, the

term “stability” used alone has stood for crisis stability, which describes a situation in

which, in times of crisis or high tension, no

country would see the advantages of attacking first with nuclear weapons as outweighing the disadvantages. Crisis stability depends

on the force structures and doctrines of both

sides and on each side’s perception of the

other. The lower the degree of crisis stability,

the greater the risk that a power would preempt

if it perceived that it were likely to be attacked. This is not to argue that it is U.S. policy to consider a preemptive strike, but Soviet

perceptions of such a possibility might increase a Soviet inclination to preempt under

some circumstances. President Reagan’s Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft

Commission) stated that:

, . . stability should be the primary objective

both of the modernization of our strategic

forces and of our arms control proposals. Our

arms control proposals and our strategic arms

programs . . . should work together to permit

us, and encourage the Soviets, to move in

directions that reduce or eliminate the advan-

—.—— —

‘

g

Ibid., p. 39.

201n 1982, Secretary Weinberger told the Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations that Reagan Administration policy “does

not change substantially or materially the policy set out” in

P.D. 59, and that “the essential strategic doctrine set out in

P.D. 59 remains. ” (“U.S. Strategic Doctrine, ” hearing before

the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th

Cong., 2d sess., Dec. 14, 1982, p. 99. See also an insert for the

record outlining nuclear policy differences between the Carter

and Reagan Administrations on p. 100.)

tage of aggression and also reduce the risk of

war by accident or miscalculation.21

Another type of stability is arms race stability, in which there are minimal incentives

for the United States and U.S.S.R. to continually update or expand their strategic arsenals

in order to compensate for developments by

the opposite side. The assumption underlying

the concept of arms race stability is that deployments on one side may lead the other to

counter-deployments which in turn stimulate

new deployments by the first.

U.S. Force Requirements and Posture

According to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, present U.S. countervailing strategy

places five specific requirements on strategic

nuclear forces:22

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

—— ——

Flexibility: “ . . . A continuum of options,

ranging from use of small numbers of

strategic and/or theater nuclear weapons

aimed at narrowly defined targets, to

employment of large portions of our nuclear forces against a broad spectrum of

targets. ”

Escalation Control: “ . . . We must convince the enemy that further escalation

will not result in achievement of his objectives, that it will not mean ‘success, ’

but rather additional costs. ”

Survivability and Endurance: “ . . . The

key to escalation control is the survivability and endurance of our nuclear forces

and the supporting communications, command and control, and intelligence (C3

1)

capabilities.

Targeting Objectives: “We must have the

ability to destroy elements of four general

categories of Soviet targets. ” These are

strategic nuclear forces, other military

forces, leadership and control, and the industrial and economic base.

Reserve Forces: “Our planning must provide for the designation and employment

“April 1983 Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (referred to hereafter as the Scowcroft Commission Report I), p. 3.

“Ibid., pp. 40-41.
79

of adequate, survivable, and enduring reserve forces and the supporting C3

1 systems both during and after a protracted

conflict.

To attempt to satisfy these requirements,

the United States maintains a triad of strategic offensive weapons systems consisting of

long-range bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These

systems carry thousands of nuclear warheads

in ballistic missile reentry vehicles, bombs,

cruise missiles, and short-range air-to-ground

missiles. There are thousands more nonstrategic nuclear warheads including those in artillery shells, bombs carried by tactical air

forces, short- and medium-range rockets, and

intermediate-range rockets and cruise missiles.

However, weapons considered nonstrategic by

the United States, such as the Pershing II

intermediate-range ballistic missile, can reach

Soviet territory and are considered to be strategic by the Soviets.

Characteristics such as survivability, basing, penetration modes, range, yield, accuracy,

time of flight, independence from enemy warning systems, and ease of command and control distinguish the various strategic weapons

systems. U.S. administrations have put high

value on maintaining this diversity in nuclear

forces. The triad, wrote the Scowcroft Commission, serves several important purposes:

First, the existence of several strategic

forces requires the Soviets to solve a number

of different problems in their efforts to plan

how they might try to overcome them. Our objective, after all, is to make their planning of

any such attack as difficult as we can . . .

Second, the different components of our

strategic forces would force the Soviets, if

they were to contemplate an all-out attack, to

make choices which would lead them to reduce

significantly their effectiveness against one

component in order to attack another . . .

The third purpose served by having multiple components in our strategic forces is that

each component has unique properties not

present in the others , ..23

Submarines, the Scowcroft Commission

noted, can remain hidden for months at a time.

Bombers can be launched upon warning without being irrevocably committed to an attack,

and they have very high accuracy against a

variety of targets. ICBMs “have advantages

in command and control, in the ability to be

retargeted readily, and in accuracy. This

means ICBMs are especially effective in deterring Soviet threats of massive conventional

or limited nuclear attacks, because they could

most credibly respond promptly and controllably against specific military targets and

promptly disrupt an attack on us or our allies. ”24

The countervailing strategy does not require

that the U.S. force structure mirror that of the

Soviets or vice versa, provided that the overall military capability of the United States is

not allowed to become inferior to that of the

Soviet Union, in either reality or appearance.

“Indeed,” wrote Secretary Brown, “in some

sense, the political advantages of being seen

as the superior strategic power are more real

and more usable than the military advantages

of in fact being superior in one measure or

another. ’25

The Strategic Balance

Soviet strategic nuclear forces in fact do not

mirror those of the United States. In particular, the Soviet allocation of warheads among

types of delivery vehicles is quite different

than that of the United States. The final report of the Scowcroft Commission discussed

the asymmetry between U.S. and U.S.S.R.

strategic forces, along with the problems of

comparing the two:

In the United States the strategic advantages of diversity, our own military tradition

as an air and naval power, plus a certain

amount of interservice competition, produced

strong strategic bomber and submarine

forces, as well as a land-based ICBM force. . .

Soviet strategic forces developed along very

different lines , . . Geography and history

23 Scowcroft Commission Report I, pp. 7-8.

“Ibid., p. 8.

“Brown, DOD FY82 Annual Report, p. 43.
80

—

have made Russia a continental land power,

with a tradition of heavy emphasis on massive

artillery forces. As might have been expected

under such circumstances, the development of

Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been heavily oriented toward ICBM weapons . . .

The result of all these differing traditions

and technical capabilities is strategic forces

which are very dissimilar. In addition, each

strategic force component has its own strengths

and weaknesses, which tend to be different

from those of the other components. This, in

turn, makes force structures very difficult to

compare and each side tends to stress certain

aspects of the force posture of the other as

more menacing.26

In comparing the strategic nuclear capability of the United States with that of the Soviet

Union, both Carter and Reagan Administrations agreed that “the era of U.S. superiority

is long past. “27 However, they differed significantly in their interpretations of what followed. The Carter Administration held that

“parity–not U.S. inferiority–has replaced

[U. S.] superiority, and the United States and

the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strategic nuclear power. ”28 Two years later, on the

other hand, the Reagan Administration maintained that “the Soviets have acquired a margin of nuclear superiority in most important

categories. ’29 Both Administrations undertook strategic modernization programs to redress what were seen at least as adverse trends

in the military balance, if not adverse situations.

Current U.S. Attitude Towards

Active Defenses

BMD is currently not included in the U.S.

strategic posture, while air defenses are minimal (but being upgraded). Previous U.S. Administrations have agreed that a condition in

which both the United States and the Soviet

Union refrained from instituting nationwide

*’March 1984 Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission Report II), Mar. 21, 1984,

p. 4.

“Brown, op. cit., p. 43.

“Ibid., p. 43.

29Weinberger, DOD FY84 Annual Report, p. 34.

ballistic missile defenses was preferable to one

in which either (and therefore most likely,

both) attempted to do so. That situation was

codified in 1972 by ratification of the ABM

Treaty. The single BMD installation permitted the United States by the 1974 Protocol

to the ABM Treaty was decommissioned in

1976 after it was determined that the limited

benefit provided by such a highly constrained

system did not justify the expense of maintaining it. Extensive air defenses in the absence of effective BMD were similarly held not

to be worthwhile.

Like its predecessors, the Carter Administration viewed the ABM Treaty as being “to

the benefit of strategic stability and deterrence. “3° The reasoning leading to this assessment found nationwide defenses to be destabilizing in that they call into question the

ability of nuclear weapons to threaten destruction of assets that a potential attacker values

highly. Defenses were not judged to be costeffective in that they would merely force the

Soviets to increase their offensive forces to

maintain whatever level of damage expectancy

had previously been thought sufficient–

increases which would cost less than our defenses.

During the Carter Administration, BMD research permitted by the ABM Treaty was actively pursued as a hedge against possible Soviet developments. It focused on point defense

capabilities for hardened targets, particularly

MX missiles deceptively deployed in Multiple

Protective Structures, and on nonnuclear destruction of ICBMs outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The preferential defense possible with

MPS basing of MX made BMD a logical

choice for responding to Soviet warhead proliferation beyond the SALT II limits.

The Reagan Administration differs from

previous ones in its conception of the role that

defenses might play in future nuclear strategy

and in its planning for BMD research and development. It has initiated a broad-ranging investigation into the role of and possibilities for

‘“Brown, op. cit., p. 51.
81

strategic defense. It has not, however, adopted

a doctrine incorporating such defenses. Its position is that such a decision should await the

completion of a BMD research and technology

development program which could take at

least 10 years. 3 I At that time, a future President and Congress could decide whether to

proceed to develop, test, and deploy one or

more BMD systems. Meanwhile, the United

States and the Soviet Union in 1982 “each

reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and

objectives of the Treaty, ”32 and President Reagan has further made clear that U.S. BMD research will be “consistent with our obligations” under that Treaty .33

-— ——— —--——

31Time estimates given by Administration representatives

vary. Ambassador Paul Nitze estimated that it will take “at

least ten years” to determine whether sufficiently capable ballistic missile defenses can be built [quoted by Walter Pincus

in ‘‘Decade of Study Seen for ‘Star Wars’, The Washington

Post, Apr. 27, 1985].

‘

z

Joint communique issued at the conclusion of the 5-year review of the ABM Treaty, reported in ‘‘SCC Completes Review

of ABM Treaty, ” Daily Bulletin (U.S. Mission, Geneva), Dec.

16, 1982 (quoted by George Schneiter in “The ABM Treaty

Today, ” chapter 6 of Ballistic Missile Defense, Ashton B. Carter

and David N. Schwartz (eds. ) (Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institution, 1984), p. 236.

33 President Reagan’s speech on Military Spending and Defense Technologies, Mar. 23, 1983.

Under President Reagan, the Department

of Defense has initiated the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), a comprehensive program “to develop key technologies associated

with concepts for defense against ballistic missiles” whose ultimate goal is “to eliminate the

threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles and

increase the contribution of defensive systems

to U.S. and allied security. ”34 Although the

SDI research and technology development

program is intended to comply initially with

the restrictions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the

development, testing, or deployment of BMD

systems investigated under the SD I would require modification of or withdrawal from that

treaty. The SDI differs substantially from previous BMD efforts in that: 1) it shifts emphasis from near-term, almost proven technologies

to relatively high risk but conceivably higher

payoff ones; and 2) it significantly increases

both the funding and attention given to BMD

research. Nuclear strategies incorporating

BMD systems of the sort to be investigated

under the SDI could be quite different from

this nation’s current strategy.

“Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Charter, Apr. 24, 1984.

COMMON CRITICISMS OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

This nation’s strategic nuclear doctrine has

continually evolved, but it has not been dramatically changed in the last 20 years.35 Despite this consensus, various analysts have

suggested either further modifications or major revisions to it to redress perceived weak-

‘

5 Desmond Ball “Targeting for Strategic Deterrence” (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 43, 1983), discusses the evolution of U.S. strategic nuclear targeting policy over the last 40 years. He finds that

although the numbers of targets and the packages of targeting options available to the President have changed dramatically over that period, the actual character of those targets has

remained remarkably consistent. He argues that those changes

that have occurred in targeting policies and plans are the result of many factors, including the changing nature of Soviet

targets. better U.S. intelligence about those targets, and

changes in U.S. force capabilities, and that changes in avowed

U.S. national security policy have been “perhaps one of the least

important” of those factors.

nesses. In many cases, differing recommendations stem from differences in fundamental

premises and values. They may also arise from

different predictions of future capabilities and

intentions. Much of the strategic debate,

therefore, is really a debate about which assumptions more closely reflect (or will reflect)

reality.

Few are pleased that the U.S. deterrent posture relies heavily on threatening the use of

weapons of mass destruction. What is debated

is not whether deterrence by threat of nuclear

retaliation is a good thing, but whether there is

a viable and preferable alternative. Some analysts believe that existing strategy, although

imperfect, is the best available under the circumstances. They argue that it should in essence be continued, perhaps strengthened in
82

various ways or carried out (with the aid of

arms control agreements) at substantially

smaller force levels. Others who basically

agree with the premises underlying current

strategy foresee difficulty in maintaining its

viability in the face of continual technological evolution, particularly on the part of the

Soviet Union. Some of the latter see a potential role for ballistic missile defense in enhancing the U.S. deterrent posture.

Still others hold fundamentally different assumptions than those on which current strategy is based. Their concern is to modify existing strategy in accordance with a different

set of premises.

Maintaining Current Strategy

Technological evolution influences strategy

both by changing what is seen as possible

(“technology push”) and what is viewed to be

necessary (“requirements pull”). On the “technology push” side, for example, many believe

that we now have the potential to develop ballistic missile defenses which are considerably

more capable than could be considered years

ago. Such advances have been one of the major motivations for the requesting of this report, and they will be discussed in further detail in chapters 7 and 8.

Technology is also advancing in areas other

than ballistic missile defense, and contributes

to the “requirements pull” that some believe

will mandate changes to our strategy. In particular, Soviet ability to harden and make mobile elements of their land-based strategic

forces, and their efforts towards hardening

command and control facilities and other targets, all serve to degrade the ability of U.S.

forces to place these targets at risk. In addition, although there is as yet no reason to believe that the Soviets will ever be able to reliably detect U.S. ballistic missile submarines

when on patrol, it cannot be ruled out that

some as-yet-unknown technology might someday threaten SLBM invulnerability .30 Space

— ——

“Advances in technology may make it harder, rather than

easier, to locate submarines. Admiral James D. Watkins, the

Chief of Naval Operations, has stated that “ . . . when people

systems today are able to enhance the effectiveness of terrestrial forces, and this ability

will no doubt be accentuated in the future.

Combined with political factors such as the Soviet ability to proliferate military forces taken

with what is perceived to be U.S. reluctance

to do the same, these actual and possible technological trends lead some analysts to question whether the “countervailing strategy”

can be maintained without significant change

into the indefinite future.

Proposals for change vary. Some include

defenses; others do not. Some would emphasize U.S. technological strengths to maximum

advantage in the military competition between

the United States and the U. S. S. R., including

uses in areas (e.g., ballistic missile defense)

now closed off by mutual agreement. Others

would incorporate active defenses in our strategic posture but would not otherwise introduce major changes to U.S. strategy. Still

others would eschew active defense, preferring

to retain the ABM Treaty as one of a number

of means to manage the overall military competition via arms control and other political

and diplomatic measures. The specific means

by which defense could augment our present

strategy or support a transition to another are

discussed below and in the following chapter

(chapter 5). Discussions of how such transitions might evolve are presented in chapters

6 and 9.

Alternative U.S. Strategies

In addition to those advocating modifications to current strategy, there are those who

differ with basic assumptions central to that

strategy and who therefore offer alternatives.

Three such alternatives are presented below.

One group believes that current strategy

does not sufficiently recognize what they see

as the inherent opposition between minimizing the risk of nuclear war, on the one hand,

and preparing to fight one, on the other. There

ask, ‘Aren’t the oceans getting more transparent, ’ we say, ‘No

way, they are getting more opaque, ’ because we’re learning more

about them all the time. ” The Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1985,

p. A10.
83

.

fore, they see that the balance mentioned previously between war-fighting capability and

crisis instability is swinging dangerously

towards instability, and that weapons systems

that could improve the ability to fight a nuclear war could also make such a war more

likely to occur. Alternatively, they may believe

that existing plans for prosecuting a nuclear

war overestimate the probability that those

things which the war would be defending

would survive the war at all. These analysts

recommend that the United States pursue a

strategy which we will label “retaliation only.”

A second group of strategists believes instead

that present strategy does not sufficiently recognize the essential equivalence between deterring war and preparing to fight war. Moreover,

existing strategy does not offer a coherent picture of what it would consider victory, and it

cannot be expected to effectively deter an opponent who, it is argued, would have a very

clear conception of his strategic objectives in

war. These strategists advocate adopting

what might be called a “prevailing” strategy.

Finally, there are strategists who think that

this country should not and need not accept

having its continued survival contingent on

the decisions of others. They argue that no

matter how strong our deterrent strategy can

be made, should it fail (whether due to accident, miscalculation, or just poor design), the

results would be catastrophic. They moreover

argue that we have, or will have, the means to

develop defenses (possibly augmented by stringent offensive force limitations) which can remove, or substantially reduce, the ability of

others to destroy this country. Discussion of

such “defense dominant” strategies concludes

the alternatives presented below.

Retaliation-Only

“Retaliation-only” strategists question

whether any military utility at all can be derived from nuclear weapons which justify the

risks inherent in planning to use them in battle, short of retaliating against nuclear attack.37 Although their prescriptions for change

37They therefore differ from the current “countervailing”

strategy, which requires some measure of war-fighting capadiffer, they are based on a fundamental premise similar to that stated by Robert McNamara:

I do not believe we can avoid serious and

unacceptable risk of nuclear war until we

recognize-and until we base all our military

plans, defense budgets, weapon deployments,

and arms negotiations on the recognition—

that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless—

except only to deter one opponent from

using them.38

Accordingly, “retaliation-only” strategists

adopt the principle of “no first use” of nuclear

weapons, which in some versions would be

stated publicly and in others would be left silently ambiguous.39 Starting with that premise, retaliation-only strategists can go in two

different directions. In the first, a variety of

nuclear weapons with flexible targeting options would be retained in order to display the

capability of responding in kind to any level

of nuclear attack. There would be no immediate requirement to reduce the number of warheads existing today (although should Soviet

forces be reduced, U.S. forces could be reduced

accordingly.) However, nuclear forces under

this strategy would differ qualitatively from

today’s forces in that weapons would not be

given prompt hard-target kill capability—a capability needed in order to conduct a successful preemptive attack on enemy nuclear forces.

Attacks on a wide variety of military forces

would still be possible under such a strategy

using those weapons having slow hard-target

kill capability. This strategy would therefore

—— -.—

bility for escalation control. On p. 40 of his Annual Report for

Fiscal Year 1982, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown emphasized two points which he had made “repeatedly and publicly”:

First, I remain highly skeptical that escalation of a limited nuclear exchange can be controlled, or that it can be stopped short

of an all-out, massive exchange.

Second, even given that belief, I am convinced that we must

do everything we can to make such escalation control possible,

that opting out of this effort and consciously resigning ourselves

to the inevitability of such escalation is a serious abdication of

the awesome responsibilities nuclear weapons, and the unbelievable damage their uncontrolled use would create, thrust upon us.

“Robert S. McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions, ” Foreign Affairs, fall

1983, p. 60 (emphasis in original).

“Of course, even a public statement leaves some ambiguity–

no matter what our doctrine, it would remain physically possible to use nuclear weapons in a first strike, and the Soviets

would have to worry about this possibility.
84

— — — —

be able to maintain some degree of war-fighting potential, but would significantly lessen

the degree to which that potential could be

used (or would appear capable of use) in a first

strike.

In the second variation, often called minimum deterrence, only those weapons which

would be needed to threaten a number of highvalue targets—cities, for example-would be

retained. The number and nature of those targets would be selected to threaten enough destruction to deter a potential attacker from initiating a nuclear strike. Opinions differ as to

the exact size of “minimum,” but no definition of a minimum deterrent would require

thousands of warheads on a multiplicity of delivery vehicles.

What would be essential in either version

would be that the nuclear weapons that were

retained include (in the first case) or constitute

(in the second) an invulnerable, second-strike

force. The size of this force would be determined in the first case by being able to retaliate for whatever form of attack had been executed initially, and in the second by being

able to destroy with high confidence that set

of targets judged to provide minimum deterrence. To the extent that the retaliatory weapons were vulnerable, or to the extent that a

potential attacker posessed defenses, the

second-strike force would either need to expand in size or increase its invulnerability and

penetrativeness in order to maintain a minimum deterrent threat.

Should the Soviets acquire defenses so effective that even this minimum deterrent

retaliation could not be executed with high

confidence, and were the United States unable to penetrate, evade, or neutralize these

defenses effectively, then the fundamental

premise of promising nuclear retaliation for

nuclear attack could not be assured, and strategies based primarily on the threat of retaliation would no longer be viable. On the other

hand, if the United States and the Soviet Union had equal offensive and defensive capabilities (and if the survivability of offensive forces

did not depend on defenses), retaliation might

still be credible. However, uncertainties in

each side’s evaluation of the opposing side’s

defense might make assuring an equivalent

retaliation difficult.

Since a “retaliation-only” strategy explicitly

denies use of nuclear weapons in response to

conventional attack, some other way of fulfilling U.S. defense commitments to its NATO

allies must be found (e.g., augmentation of conventional forces in Europe). Furthermore, a

“minimum deterrence” strategy, presumably

using far fewer weapons than are presently in

the U.S. arsenal and probably embodying a

much more limited repertoire of nuclear responses, must ensure that all opponents remain firmly convinced that any use of nuclear

weapons will be met with a retaliatory response. If retaliatory threats are not credible,

then potential attackers may gamble that

retaliation might not be carried out and they

may not be deterred successfully.

One suggested implementation of a “retaliation-only” deterrent strategy40 (similar to

minimum deterrence as described above in its

force employment policy but not necessarily

in the size of its arsenal) would eliminate all

tactical and theater-level nuclear weapons. It

would retain only an invulnerable, secondstrike force of central strategic weapons which

would not be given the combination of yield,

accuracy, and quantity needed to pose a threat

to the retaliatory capability of the other side.

Their survivability would be critical, and it

could be enhanced by deploying them in a

redundant manner similar to that of the present triad. Flexibility in responding to nuclear

attack could be maintained, in that the attacked nation would have options ranging

from delivering a single retaliatory weapon to

launching its entire strategic arsenal.

Critics of “retaliation-only” strategists believe that there may not be effective alternatives to the threat of first use to deter attack

on NATO, that such strategies (in particular

‘“Richard L. Garwin, “Reducing Dependence on Nuclear

Weapons: A Second Nuclear Regime, ” Nuclear Weapons and

World Politics, 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations (New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1977), pp. 83-147.
85

the “minimum deterrence” approach) would

not credibly deter attack since potential adversaries might not believe the United States

would actually carry out its retaliatory threats,

and that such strategies do not provide sufficient opportunity to terminate hostilities on

favorable terms should deterrence fail.

Prevailing

A quite different proposed change to current

doctrine would push in the opposite direction

from the recommendations of “retaliationonly” strategists, towards the formulation of

more credible plans for the use of nuclear

weapons in wartime. These strategists believe

that, in a world where adversaries possess nuclear weapons and may well believe in their

military utility, it is not sufficient for the

United States merely to seek to deny the

enemy his political and military goals should

war break out. Credible deterrence requires

that we plan in the event of war to “secure the

achievement of Western political purposes at

a military, economic, and social cost commensurate with the stakes of the conflict. ”41

Where some see the uncertainties inherent

in estimating outcomes of nuclear war to be

so great, and the potential damage so devastating, that there is little to be gained in trying now to affect the nature of a post-war

world, a “prevailing” strategy focuses specifically on the conduct of a nuclear war, and is

based on consideration of how such a war

might end. It would agree with the countervailing school (and the “no prompt hard-target

kill” option of the “retaliation-only” school)

that

. . . the deterrent effect of our strategic forces

is not something separate and apart from the

ability of those forces to be used against the

tools by which the Soviet leaders maintain

their power. Deterrence, on the contrary, requires military effectiveness.’z

41 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Planning, Philadelphia Policy Papers (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), p. 2.

‘

z

Scowcroft Commission Report I, p. 7.

However, to change from the current strategy towards a prevailing one, the United

States

must set its planning sights considerably

beyond developing a defense posture that will

simply deny victory to the enemy. To prevail

in stressful circumstances the United States

must be able to defend itself against nuclear

attack.43

Credibility that deterrent threats would actually be carried out would result not so much

from flexibility in strategic planning or response options as it would from the “Soviet

belief, or strong suspicion, that the United

States could fight and win the military conflict and hold down its societal damage to a

tolerable level. ”44 As a result, such credibility

that we would use nuclear weapons to retaliate would be greater than it is in our current,

undefended posture.

Clearly, determining “tolerable” levels of

damage “commensurate with the stakes of the

conflict, ” in addition to predicting potential

levels of attack, will be needed in order to

specify the defensive capability required by

such a strategy. Effective air defense, civil defense, and ballistic missile defenses would all

be required were defending a major portion of

population and economic and industrial infrastructure to be a high priority. Offensive force

requirements for such a strategy would depend on the set of targets in the Soviet Union

(their number, hardness, and location), and

would depend critically on the level to which

these targets were defended.

“Prevailing” strategists directly address the

problem of extended deterrence by recommending sufficient damage-limitation capability (passive defense, active defense, or preemptive attack) to make believable the threat that

the United States would use central strategic

forces in circumstances other than responding

to nuclear attack. If the Soviet Union were

convinced that a defended United States believed it could use tactical or even strategic

— —

“Gray, op. cit., p. 2.

“Ibid., p. 3.
86

nuclear weapons in defense of NATO Europe

without leading to unacceptable devastation

of the United States, the Soviets might be

more likely to believe that conventional attack

against NATO would lead to the use of nuclear

weapons against the Soviet Union.

One essential factor in establishing defense

requirements for a prevailing strategy is determination of how much damage to the United

States can be tolerated in pursuit of those objectives that strategic nuclear forces will be

employed to attain or preserve. Another is the

degree of U.S. military superiority such a

strategy would require, and whether such a

strategy would be viable without it. From

1945 until the early 1960s, U.S. strategic superiority was such that this country had the

capability to adopt a “prevailing” strategy;

adopting one today in the light of existing Soviet forces poses an entirely different set of

challenges.

Critics of “prevailing” strategies argue that

the United States has no guarantee of being

able to attain or maintain the degree of military superiority necessarily to implement

them, and that these strategies are equivalent

to destroying the Soviet “deterrent,” which

the Soviets have the will and the technology

to prevent.

Defense Dominance

The “countervailing,” “retaliation-only,”

and “prevailing” strategies described so far

are characterized by the policies they recommend for employing offensive forces. Although

there are also differences between them in the

roles that defenses play, it is primarily the role

of the offense that distinguishes them. In contrast, defenses supplant, more than they augment, offensive forces in “defense-dominant

strategies. President Reagan’s speech of March

23, 1983, and his Strategic Defense Initiative,

have greatly stimulated discussion about the

feasibility of attaining such a long-term goal.

However, since a defense-dominated world is

“too distant a technical prospect to be a very

active player in the U.S. strategy debate as

yet, “

4s there is not so widely developed a body

of strategic thought on this alternative as

there is concerning some of the others.

Proponents of “defense-dominant” strategists see defenses as lessening both the probability of nuclear war and the damage that

would be done by such a war, should it occur.

They also see such strategies as being moral,

in that defending through active defense is

preferable to defending through terrorism—

the ultimate mechanism by which deterrence

through threat of retaliation operates. In a

“defense-dominant” world, the probability of

war would be lessened since the attacker, less

certain of achieving his objectives, would be

less likely to attack in the first place. Two factors would lessen the attacker’s confidence in

success. For one, it would be much more difficult to destroy all his intended targets,

directly frustrating his objectives. Probably

more importantly, though, he would not be

able to plan an effective attack since he would

not know in advance which warheads will

penetrate the defense. Defenses will contribute uncertainty to an attack in addition to

defeating part of it. In addition, if war nevertheless were to break out in a “defense-dominant” world, its consequences might be less

severe than they would be in any of the other

cases described here.

In a way, “defense-dominant” and “retaliation-only” strategists share a common goal:

a world in which the only plausible use for a

strategic nuclear weapon is in retaliation for

the use of another. However, adherents of the

“reliation-only” strategy believe that we are

already in such a world although our offensive

strategy does not recognize it, and that BMD

might destabilize the situation; supporters of

the former believe that the Soviet Union, at

least, finds “military utility” in ballistic missiles and that only BMD can ensure that all

sides will perceive the use of nuclear weapons

as truly and clearly irrational for all sides.

Moreover, they argue, at the very highest

451 bid., p. 3.
—

87 —

levels of defensive capability, even an irrational decision by the Soviets would not lead

to the destruction of U.S. society. Indeed, if

defense dominance became total, we could consider strategy of “assured survival” in which

retaliation became unnecessary because we

had confidence that no Soviet nuclear attack

of any kind could succeed.

However, to the extent that defenses on

both sides lessen the utility and the probability of preemptive nuclear attack, they will interfere with any other roles assigned to offensive strategic forces. This is, after all, the

point. In particular, if conventional attack on

Europe is deterred by the ultimate threat of

escalation to central strategic exchange, then

lessening the effectiveness of strategic forces

may lessen their deterrent value, possibly increasing the likelihood of conventional war in

Europe. A “defense-dominant” strategy, like

a “retaliation-only” one, must solve the problem of deterring conventional attack without

nuclear weapons.

Unless a defense can be deployed which is

so effective that the Soviet nuclear arsenal becomes irrelevant, the Soviet response will be

the key to the success of a “defense-dominant’

strategy. Such a strategy will either attempt

to force the U.S.S.R. to unilaterally avoid

strategies which the United States believes to

be particularly dangerous, or it will seek cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to be

implemented in a coordinated, mutual manner.

The degree to which the Soviet Union, and

other nuclear powers, would cooperate in a

transition to a defense-dominated world is

therefore crucial. The Soviets will choose to

cooperate in such a transition either if they

conclude that such a world is preferable to the

present situation, or if they decide that defensive measures will prove to be so cost-effective

that they recognize the futility of offensive/

defensive competition.” In either case, they

might be expected to be amenable to regulating the defensive buildup and controlling

offensive arms.

Critics of “defense-dominant” strategies argue that it is by no means clear that defensive

technologies capable of supporting such strategies can be developed, that such strategies

raise the risk of both preemptive nuclear attack and conventional war, and that nobody

knows how a coordinated transition to defense-dominance could ever be carried out.

“Cost-effectiveness is not the only criterion on which the

Soviets will base their decision to cooperate in a defensive transition. Others include total resource base, total defensive system affordability, ability to redirect civilian resources to the

military, and relative utility of offensive forces vs. defensive

forces for geopolitical ambitions. Internal Soviet politics and

interservice rivalries may also play a role.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Current (Countervailing) Strategy nically feasible, there are several roles that

The overall contribution that defenses can defenses might play in a strategy similar to

the current one: make to current strategy depends on whether

the benefits of implementing defenses are seen ●

to outweigh the advantages to the United

States of having the Soviet Union refrain from

building defenses or adding to offenses.

Should that be the case, and should defenses

able to provide those benefits prove to be techBMD might enhance deterrence by increasing the difficulty a potential attacker

would have in achieving military objectives, strengthening “deterrence by denial. Defenses would also introduce uncertainty into attack plans, lessening the
88

—

●

●

●

attacker’s confidence in achieving his

goals as well as reducing his ability to do

so.

“Deterrence by retaliation,” the underpinning of our current posture, might be

strengthened by protecting our own retaliatory forces against preemptive attack.

Our ability to project military power

abroad, or alternatively our ability to prevent adversaries from doing so, would

also be enhanced were our conventional

military forces defended against preemptive nuclear attack.

Certain deployments of BMD might raise

the threshold of nuclear war by removing

the military utility of small nuclear attacks, and they might also protect against

small accidental or nonsuperpower attacks.

To the extent that assets including, but

not limited to, military forces could be

defended, our retaliatory threats might be

more credible because we might be perceived as having less to lose should our

retaliation provoke further attack.

All of these benefits, of course, become liabilities when the tables are turned and we face

Soviet defenses: a rational decision requires

the two to be balanced off against one another.

Stability issues, in particular, are discussed in

greater detail in chapter 6.

Since the United States and the U.S.S.R.

have different nuclear doctrines and force

structures, it might be that similar defensive

capabilities would confer asymmetric benefits

to the two sides. For example, since our strategy “excludes the possibility that the United

States would initiate a war or launch a preemptive strike, ”47 making a first strike more difficult might seem to confuse Soviet plans more

than U.S. ones.

However, in addition to depending on one’s

conception of Soviet attack plans, any such

analysis must take the problem of extended

deterrence fully into account. To the extent

that strategic nuclear weapons lose their military utility, they lose their power to affect the

47Weinberger, DOD FY 1984 Annual Report, p. 32

likelihood or outcome of a conventional war

in Europe. If the superpowers are able to defend themselves better than Europe can be defended, 48 nuclear war in Europe might become

more likely rather than less. Soviet nuclear

weapons aimed towards Western Europe

would retain a degree of effectiveness lost to

those fired back in retaliation. On the other

hand, effective homeland defense of the United

States might strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. Any net assessment requires consideration of the relative effectiveness of U.S. and Soviet defenses against their

respective offensive threats.

Further complicating BMD’s effect on extended deterrence are the independent French

and British nuclear forces. At present consisting of SLBMs, intermediate-range nuclear

missiles (IRBMs), and a few bombers, they are

far less extensive than the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. More because of their small size

than because of the reasons discussed in the

previous footnote, the French and British nuclear forces would be more easily negated than

the superpower arsenals, further stressing the

extended deterrent demand on the U.S. central strategic forces.

48There are reasons both for why this should and should not

be the case. Since the short- and intermediate-range ballistic

missiles threatening Europe arrive at their targets traveling

more slowly than ICBM warheads, they might be more easily

destroyed by terminal defenses. On the other hand, since a

shorter-range missile reenters the atmosphere at a steeper angle than does an ICBM, the vertical component of its velocity

(its rate of descent) is comparable to that of an ICBM. Therefore, the time from when atmospheric effects begin to separate

warheads from decoys to time when the weapons arrive on target is about the same for a shorter range system as it is for

an ICBM. As a result, screening out the decoys and intercepting the actual warheads in their terminal phase will not necessarily be easier for shorter range systems. Furthermore, the total flight time of a shorter range missile, and consequently the

period during which it might be destroyed in midcourse, is much

less than that of an ICBM. Those short-range systems never

exiting the Earth’s atmosphere will not be vulnerable to certain directed-energy weapons at all. Tactical and theater-range

systems are likely to be less extensively MIRVed, lessening the

advantage of destroying them in boost phase. In addition, delivery systems other than ballistic missiles (e.g., bombers, cruise

missiles, artillery, or even covertly placed mines) can more easily

be used against European targets than against the superpowers,

so defense systems other than BMD would need to be compared

as well as BMD effectiveness in order to determine whether

Europe were better or worse defended than the superpowers.
89

. .——. .—

Chapter 5 looks at the relationship between

strategic objectives for BMD and the capabilities of BMD systems.

Retaliation-Only

In practice, most adherents to the “retaliation-only” school of strategy see only a limited

role for ballistic missile defense in “retaliationonly” strategies. This point of view probably

stems from a concern that the introduction of

defenses into the strategic equation could lead

to dangerous instabilities for crises or for the

arms race in general. If each side were intent

on maintaining substantial offensive capabilities, defenses would only be tolerable to the

extent that the United States could be assured

that its retaliatory capabilities were not undermined. Defenses consistent with this principle, for example defending retaliatory forces,

would be acceptable and possibly beneficial.

However, comprehensive, areawide defenses

would be not be compatible with preserving

retaliatory capability unless the net effectiveness of the offenses on both sides were approximately equivalent.

Ballistic missile defense could serve a similar role in a world which went much further

towards nuclear disarmament. Even if possession of nuclear weapons should be renounced,

the possibility of building them cannot be

eliminated. One vision of a nuclear-free world49

would have nations retain their weapons design and production facilities as a hedge

against sudden development of nuclear weapons by other states. To guard against surprise

attack, these facilities would be protected by

active defenses.

Prevailing

Defenses are necessary to make a “prevailing” strategy viable. However, they are not

sufficient. In order to impose escalation dominance, it would very likely be necessary that

overall U.S. capability, offensive and defen49Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1984).

sive, be superior to that of the Soviet Union.

The success of a “prevailing” strategy, then, depends on the ability of the United States to

maintain this superiority. Defenses in a “prevailing’ strategy would protect strategic

offensive forces, deny the Soviets success in

their attack plans, and lessen “self-deterrence”

by which U.S. leaders would be unwilling to

use U.S. strategic offensive forces for fear of

incurring unacceptable retaliation. However,

Soviet defenses would limit the effectiveness

of those offensive forces, and they would complicate the extended deterrence problem as discussed in the “Current Strategy” section

above.

Defense Dominance

Defenses are not only necessary but also preeminent in these strategies. Going beyond enhancing the “denial” aspect of deterrence as

we now know it, a ‘‘defense-dominant’ strategy relies on defenses while the role of offenses

is greatly reduced. Neither side could count

on achieving any military objectives by using

ballistic missiles. Attacks intended only to do

general societal damage, although possible

with all but extremely capable defenses, would

be highly irrational. If defenses could be

brought to a high enough level of performance,

even the capacity to do societal damage might

be greatly reduced. Then, U.S. survival would

not depend on Soviet rationality, but would

be assured by our ability to intercept even an

irrational attack.

Imposing a “defense-dominant strategy on

an uncooperative adversary requires an extremely high level of defensive capability. Reagan Administration officials have suggested

that effective U.S. defenses might offer the

Soviets incentives to reduce their offensive

forces. Against increasingly constrained offensive forces, any defense would be more effective.

In chapter 5, we look more closely at how

various levels of BMD capability, if technically feasible, might play roles in U.S. nuclear

strategy, current or prospective.
Chapter 5

BMD Capabilities and the

Strategic Balance
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

The Components of Strategic Defense Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

The Role of BMD in Strategic Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Operating Modes for BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Current Strategic Forces and Possible Future Developments . . . . . . . . . . 98

How BMD Might Affect the Strategic Balance . ......................101

The Current Strategic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....101

Possible Future Development of the Offensive Balance . ..............102

What Might We Want BMD to Defend? . ..........................103

Levels of Strategic Defense Capability. . ...........................107

The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defense Levels on

the Strategic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......110

The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defenses on U.S. Strategy Choices .. ....114

Conclusion ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .........................116

Table

Table No. Page

5-l. Levels of Defense Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...108

Figures

Figure No. Page

5-1. Notional Reliance of U.S. Security on protection

and Threat of Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

5-2. How Ballistic Missile Defense Affects U.S. Ballistic Missile

Retaliatory Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........106

5-3. How Strategic Defense Might Affect the Strategic Balance . ........110

5-4. How Strategic Defenses Might Affect U.S. Strategy Options. . ......115
Chapter 5

BMD Capabilities and the

Strategic Balance

INTRODUCTION

Since the President’s March 23, 1983, speech

there has been much discussion of the strategic implications of the steps along the way to

his goal. In that speech he announced his “. . .

ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed

by strategic nuclear missiles,” while recalling

the need to “. . . remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and preserving a

solid capability for flexible response. ”l He also

warned that the pairing of offensive and defensive systems “can be viewed as fostering an

aggressive policy. ”

Among those who see potential value in developing BMD there are some who argue that

only a realistic prospect of defending the U.S.

population against an all-out Soviet attack can

justify both a major change in strategic direction and the massive program that developing and deploying BMD would entail. In their

opinion, the United States has little or nothing to gain-and perhaps much to lose—by

building less effective defenses. As they see

it, in an attempt to reach the President’s goal

the U.S. strategic position may worsen before

it gets better, since the Soviets also can be expected to build defenses. Other supporters of

BMD maintain that the United States can

benefit from any level of strategic defense and

that U.S. security will improve as the strategic balance moves from offense-dominance

toward defense-dominance. Critics of the President Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program maintain that his ultimate goal is unattainable and that little could be gained by

building lesser levels of defense.

‘Relevant sections of that speech reproduced in app H.

Almost all observers agree that reaching or

approaching the President’s goal would require a lengthy and complex transition period.2

They do not all agree that we can be sure that

the transition could ever be completed. But

whether partially effective defenses are viewed

as transitional stages or as the most we can in

practice achieve, it is important to understand

the strategic implications of various levels of

U.S. strategic defense and Soviet strategic defense. This chapter discusses how various levels

of U.S. and Soviet defense capability might affect the strategic balance as well as the choice

of strategy available to the United States. Of

particular interest are the implications for a

transition from a condition of offense-dominance

to one of defense-dominance.

To understand how U.S. and Soviet strategic defenses can affect the strategic balance,

it is necessary to be able to specify what each

defense can accomplish against the other’s offense. Saying that we have a BMD system

that can destroy some number of Soviet reentry vehicles (RVs), or that it has a given leakage rate, tells us little by itself. What it could

accomplish would depend on how many ballistic missile weapons the Soviets had, what

other nuclear delivery systems they had, how

they attacked, and how we defended.

We cannot specify now what offensive and

defensive weapons systems the two sides will

deploy in future decades. What we can do, for

the sake of analysis, is postulate various levels

‘In the President’s March 23, 1983, speech he predicted that

it will take year, probably decades, of effort on all fronts. For

a discussion of the Administration’s scenario for the transition,

see ch. 9.

93
94

of effectiveness for strategic defenses. These strategic defense capability: the major compolevels might or might not be achieved in the nents of strategic defense (BMD, air defense,

face of the other side’s offensive measures. But civil defense, etc.); basic modes for operating

assessment of the BMD issue requires analy - BMD; and the structure and possible evolusis of the strategic implications of various de- tion of strategic offensive forces. In the secfense capabilities if we could have them. ond part we specify illustrative levels of deThis chapter is divided into two parts. The fense capability and discuss their implications.

first examines and explains factors that affect

THE COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE CAPABILITY

The Role of BMD in Strategic Defense

Defense–reducing the damage an opponent

can do in an attack—can be divided into three

broad categories: passive defense, active defense, and preemptive destruction. Even if the

Soviet Union struck first and the United

States retaliated, the United States could attempt to defend against follow-on strikes by

preemptive destruction of Soviet weapons not

employed in the first strike.

Active defenses such as BMD and air defense seek to prevent launched weapons from

reaching their intended targets, either by destroying them or by disrupting their operation. If the goal of the defense is to prevent all

weapons—or the great majority of them—from

reaching their targets, both BMD and air defense would be required. If, on the other hand,

the goal is only to reduce the number of weapons reaching their targets, or to reduce the number of arriving weapons that have properties

unique to ballistic missiles, then BMD alone may

be sufficient.

Ballistic missiles are unique in their ability to

kill targets at intercontinental ranges promptly

—within 30 minutes or less of launch. Because

of their accuracy, ICBMs can kill hard targets

promptly, and it is likely that in the future

SLBMs will also have that capability. Bombers

and cruise missiles can kill hard targets, but

it takes them much longer to reach their targets. Assuming that bombers and cruise missiles can be detected hours before they reach

their targets, being able to defend against ballistic missiles would mean having hours rather

than minutes to take steps such as getting

command authorities to safety, activating civil

defense procedures, and deciding to launch a

retaliatory strike. Today, ballistic missiles are

the largest part of the Soviet strategic nuclear

threat against the United States.

An alternative to reducing the number of

weapons reaching their targets is to reduce the

effectiveness of each weapon. This might be

accomplished by passive defense techniques.

We currently use some passive defenses to

protect elements of our strategic forces. ICBM

silos are hardened to reduce the effectiveness

of nuclear weapons detonating nearby. Submarines are hidden in the open ocean to preclude

the Soviets successfully barraging their deployment areas with nuclear weapons. Bombers,

their tankers, and airborne command posts

can be sent aloft so that very large areas would

have to be barraged to destroy them. Civil defense applies similar techniques–dispersal

and sheltering—to protecting civilians. Civil

defense cannot protect the buildings and other

structures within the cities.

Passive and active defenses can be alternative means to reach the same ends, or they can

be combined. In general, the more ambitious

the goal the more likely it is that some combination of both would be required. For example, consider population defense. The U.S. population is not evenly distributed over the

United States, but is highly concentrated in

cities. These cities are soft targets. A few nuclear weapons delivered in any way against a

major population center would kill millions of

people. City defense would therefore require
95

both BMD and air defense. That defense would

have to be extremely capable to ensure that

no weapons got through, especially if the

Soviets launched many at each city they attacked. One reason an attack would kill so

many people is that the population is concentrated, unprotected, in a small area. Even with

highly effective active defenses, it would probably also be necessary to use civil defense to

reduce the number of people killed by the few

weapons that might reach the target. Civil defense alone would probably be of limited value

against a large attack, since destruction could

be spread over a large area. Active defense

would have to be extremely good to protect

against that attack. However, together the

two types of defense might be much more effective than either alone.

Operating Modes for BMD

Depending on its design, a BMD system

may operate in one of several different modes.

The simplest operating mode might be called

“random subtractive. ” In this case the defense

would shoot at as many enemy reentry vehicles (RVs) as possible, with no attempt to distinguish among them.3 Random subtractive

defenses can be characterized by a kill probability (i.e., the probability that any given RV

is stopped by the defense), or, alternatively,

by a “leakage rate” (the probability that any

given RV gets through the defense). The kill

probability is the same regardless of where the

RV is aimed. It would depend on the size of

the attack and the time over which it occurs.

At the other extreme is the “completely

preferential” defense. A completely preferential defense shoots only at selected RVs, and

can select them for maximum effect. A completely preferential defense can determine

where all the RVs in an attack are aimed and

can allocate its weapons so that all the RVs

aimed at selected targets are destroyed, thereby

saving those targets. This kind of defense

3Reentry vehicles carry the nuclear weapons. They are dispensed from ballistic missiles above the atmosphere, and are

designed to shield the weapons from the effects of reentry into

the atmosphere. A random subtractive defense would probably

attempt to distinguish RVs from decoys.

would maximize the ability to save targets. In

reality, a completely preferential defense

would be very difficult—if not impossible—

to achieve. Nevertheless, the idea is a convenient analytical tool because it represents

the best that any defense could do.

A more likely situation would be “semi-preferential” defense. A semi-preferential defense

would also shoot only at selected RVs, but the

defense capability allocated to defend any particular target would be determined before the

attack. To operate semi-preferentially the defense would have to be able to determine where

individual RVs are aimed, but unlike a complete preferential defense it would not have to

determine where they are all aimed before it

begins firing. A semi-preferential defense

would be less efficient than a completely

preferential defense: some targets would be

over-defended while others might be underdefended. When the defender has a semi-preferential defense, the attacker and defender

play a double-blind game. Each allocates its

weapons according to how it thinks the other

will. This introduces an uncertainty into predictions of the outcome beyond the uncertainty stemming from ignorance of the precise

capabilities of the offensive and defensive

weapons. However, if the attacker knows how

well each target is defended, or if he can destroy some of the defensive system with his

RVs or other weapons, some of the advantage

of a semi-preferential defense is lost because

the attacker knows exactly how many RVs to

allocate in order to overcome the defense and

achieve his attack goal.4

‘Although semi-preferential and completely preferential

defenses can increase the number of assets (ICBM silos, for example) surviving a large-scale attack, neither can necessarily

provide enduring survival. If the offense can exhaust the defense and determine which targets were not destroyed in the

first strike, it can reattack those targets in a follow-on attack.

A determination of targets surviving the first strike might be

made by visual (or photo) reconnaissance. It has been suggested

that it could be done more rapidly with space-based sensors that

can accurately locate nuclear detonations, or by fitting warheads

with devices that broadcast their location just prior to detonation. In planning his follow-on strike, the attacker would want

to have some estimate of his opponent remaining defense capability.
Photo credits: U.S. Air Force

Test reentry vehicles being loaded on “MX” or

“Peacekeeper” nosecone indicate general scale

and appearance of “RVs” referred to in this

and other chapters.

Artist’s concept of the missile, right, shows in cut-away how multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)

are positioned on upper stage (post boost vehicle, or “PBV”) of the rocket.

The key to a preferential (or semi-preferential) defense is the ability to destroy any RV

that is shot at with near 100 percent confidence. This ability might come from highly capable interceptors or from using a less capable defense to shoot several times against each

of the selected attacking weapons. In this latter case, a random subtractive defense might

kill more attacking weapons than a preferential defense, but would save fewer of the targets from destruction.

Distinctions between random subtractive

and preferential defenses are most important

for light and moderate defenses. Defenses that

can destroy in excess of 90 percent of an attacker’s RVs are likely to be random subtractive. If the defense were composed of highly

capable interceptors each of which had close

to a 100 percent probability of killing any RV

that was shot at, it would be unlikely that the

defender would only build enough interceptors

to destroy 90 percent or 95 percent of the attacker’s force. It is more likely that he would

build more than enough interceptors to kill all

of the attacker’s RVs. If, on the other hand,

the single shot kill probability were substantially less than 100 percent, but the defender

had enough shots to assure a very high kill

probability against 90 percent of the attacking RVs, he could achieve a kill probability

almost as high against all of the attacker’s

RVs. Shooting at all of them would simplify

his battle management problem but not concede any targets to the attackers

—-———-—-

6For example, assume that the attacker has 10,000 RVs and

the defender can shoot a total of 81,000 times with a.4 kill probability per shot. If he elects to shoot nine times at each of 9,000

RVs he can achieve a .99 kill probability against each RV and

expect to kill 8,9,10 RVs. If he elects to shoot eight times against

each of 10,000 RVs, he can achieve a .98 kill probability, which

is not substantially different, and can expect to kill 9,800 RVs.

If, on the other hand, he has only 8,000 shots rather than 81,000,

by shooting eight times at each of 1,000 RVs, he can be reasonably sure of saving some targets. If he shoots randomly,

he will kill more RVs, but he is unlikely to save many targets

if several RVs are used against each.
97

BMD Operating Modes

Random subtractive defense. The defense cannot distinguish among RVs, and therefore attacks them randomly. This shows one possible outcome. All the silos are destroyed. It is possible, although not very likely, that all the RVs aimed at one silo would be shot, thereby

saving the silo.

Semi-preferential defense. The defense can determine the targets of the individual RVs, but cannot determine where all the RVs are going

before some of them reach their targets. The defender decides in advance of the attack how many shots to defend each silo with. In this

case he has not allocated enough, and the silos are destroyed. If the attacker had decided to use fewer RVs against each defended silo,

those silos would have survived.

-. . , . , .! .L - J- ’--J- .

Completely preferential defense. The defense can determine where all the RVS are aimed before it has to snool, In 1nls case ~ne aelenuer

elects to use all his defensive capability to ensure that the leftmost silo survives .

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
98

Defenses exact an “attack price. By reducing the effectiveness of the attacker’s weapons, they force him to use more weapons to

achieve his attack goal. The attack price can

be raised both by destroying weapons and by

forcing the attacker to waste weapons because

he does not know in advance which of his

weapons will be destroyed. When the attack

price exceeds the number of weapons the attacker has available, survivability increases

and the attacker’s confidence in achieving his

attack goals decreases. One advantage of

semi-preferential defenses (assuming the attacker does not know the defense allocation

and cannot destroy the defense) is that the attacker does not know which targets he will

have to attack with additional weapons and

how much defense each target will have. Hence,

the attack price may be substantially higher

than the number of RVs the defender can actually destroy. Furthermore, some targets

may survive at almost any level of attack.

Completely preferential defenses, if they could

be achieved, could ensure the survival of at

least some targets.

Current Strategic Forces and Possible

Future Developments

The value of future strategic defenses to the

United States would be highly dependent on

the nature of future offensive forces, but it is

difficult to predict with any confidence what

those offenses would be. Moreover, the nature

of future defenses is at least as uncertain as

the nature of the offenses they will oppose.

This section discusses current strategic forces,

near-term modernization programs, and the

problems of predicting future forces.

The United States and the Soviet Union

both have a variety of strategic nuclear delivery systems. Although both use the same

types of weapons, there are important differences between the ways the two sides structure their forces. In the future, both will be

able to make the same types of force improvements. However, if history is any guide, we

can expect the two sides to exploit their opportunities in different ways. Projecting force

structures more than a few years into the future is highly speculative.

Current Forces and Near-Term Trends

U.S. strategic offensive forces consist of

about 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs); 600 submarine launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs); and 325 long-range bombers carrying gravity bombs, short-range attack missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles

(ALCMs).’ The strategic command, control,

and communications (C3) system manages these

forces. In addition to offensive weapons, we

have limited strategic defenses—small air defense and passive defense of strategic forces.7

Soviet strategic forces include the same major elements, but with different emphases.

Roughly three fourths (about 6,000) of our ballistic missile warheads are deployed on SLBMs,

and we try to keep a large fraction of these at

sea at all times. The Soviets, by contrast, have

about two-thirds of their ballistic missile weapons mounted on 1,400 ICBMs, and they tend

to keep a smaller fraction of their ballistic missile submarines at sea during peacetime.8 Furthermore, most of the Soviet firepower is concentrated on fewer than half of their ICBMs.

While no U.S. ICBM currently has more than

3 warheads, more than 80 percent of the Soviet ICBM warheads are on missiles with 6 to

10 warheads each.9 Soviet ICBM silos are generally thought to be harder (i.e., more resistant

to nuclear attack) than U.S. silos. ’” The U.S.

strategic bomber force is a substantial leg of

the triad of offensive forces, and is now being

equipped with air-launched cruise missiles

(ALCMs). Soviet bomber forces appear to play

a less prominent-although probably increasing—role.

Both nations’ offensive forces are undergoing modernization. The United States is now

building the 10 warhead MX ICBM, the B-1

‘United Stat-es Military Posture FY1986, Organization of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 19-33.

‘Ibid., p. 33.

‘Soviet Military Power, Department of Defense, 1985, p. 29.

‘Ibid., p. 29.

10Ibid., p. 29.
99

bomber, the ALCM, the submarine-launched

cruise missile (SLCM), and the Trident I (C-4)

SLBM. A small single warhead ICBM–possibly for mobile deployment—an “advanced

technology” bomber, an advanced ALCM, and

the Trident II (D-5) SLBM are in various

stages of development. The D-5 will have

longer range and higher accuracy than the C4.11 The Soviets have in development a single

warhead ICBM and a 10 warhead ICBM—

both believed to be for mobile deployment–a

new SLBM, a long-range bomber similar to the

B-1, and several cruise missiles. They are

building a new class of ballistic missile submarine, as well as a new variant of their existing long-range bomber, the BEAR.12

The Soviets have put much more emphasis

on strategic defense than the United States

has. In the aftermath of the ABM Treaty and

its protocol, the Soviets chose to build and

maintain the one ABM site permitted, a limited ballistic missile defense of the Moscow

area. They have emphasized both homeland air

defense and civil defense. The Organization of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates that Soviet

strategic air defenses consist of 6,300 radars,

9,600 missile launchers, and 1,200 interceptor

aircraft, including six new types of aircraft deployed since 1975. ’s The United States saw no

purpose in maintaining an operational BMD

as constrained by the treaty, and little purpose

in building extensive defenses against bombers as long as we had no defense against Soviet missiles. The U.S. air defense system consists of about 100 radars and 300 interceptor

aircraft. Both radars and aircraft are currently

being upgraded with modern equipment. ”

A coordinated nuclear strike requires a functioning command system that can communicate with the forces and exercise control.

According to the Organization of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff:

—

‘ ‘DOD ,4rm~al Report to the Con~ess Fisca) Year 1986, p. 52,

14So\’iet Military Power, Department of Defense 1985, pp.

29-36.

‘ ‘United States llifit~’ Posture F1’1 986, organization of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 33.

“Ibid., pp. 31-33.

The Soviets expect to be able to communicate with their forces during a strategic nuclear exchange and to direct all operations.

Toward this end, the Soviets have constructed

hardened, deep-underground facilities for

their primary military authorities. The Soviets have developed air- and ground-mobile

systems that can serve as alternate command posts if primary sites are destroyed.

Soviet systems emphasize survivability, redundancy, and flexibility and provide extensive internetting of communications from the

high Soviet command to lower echelons. ”

The U.S. and Soviet C3 systems have many

features in common. However, recent unclassified publications have reported that parts of

the U.S. system are soft, few in number, and

easy to locate.16 In a nuclear attack the C3 system would be a prime target.

Projecting Forces Into the Future

According to the Administration, decisions

to begin full-scale development of a BMD system might be made in the early to mid- 1990s.

These decisions could be expected to produce

initial deployments during the first decade of

the next century. More extensive and more

technologically advanced systems could be expected to follow according to a time scale

roughly marked in decades.

The strategic offensive forces that those

defenses face could be very different from today’s. By 2005, almost all currently deployed

forces would have been replaced, and many of

those now in early production or in development would be in the process of replacement.

By 2020, most systems deployed by the turn

of the century would have been replaced.

While we can predict with moderate certainty

the rate at which individual units will be

replaced, it is much more difficult to predict

how different those replacements will be.

While we may have some confidence that we

can predict many of the technical options for

future forces, we cannot confidently predict

I j~nit~ s~a~s ~i~”tm Posture FYI 986, organization of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 28.

“Detailed information that could allow one to distinguish major differences between U.S. and Soviet C’ systems is classified.
100

which will prove workable and which will not,

which will be exploited and which will not. The

offenses faced by future strategic defenses

could be very much different from today’s

forces (although they need not necessarily be),

and the serious pursuit of strategic defenses

will influence the nature of the offenses.

Offensive forces might evolve in response to

actual or anticipated BMD developments in

three general ways: proliferation of weapons;

changes in the mix of weapons in the force; and

improvements or changes in existing weapon

types.

An obvious, “brute force” response to defense is to build more offense. The Soviets

have said that that is what they would do. Ballistic missile warheads can be proliferated by

adding more boosters, or by increasing the

number of warheads carried by each booster.

Between 1980 and 1984 the Soviets built 875

ICBMs, 950 SLBMs, and 2,175 theater-range

ballistic missiles, an average of 800 new ballistic missiles per year.17 Much of this production has apparently gone to replacing existing

missiles as they age. However, this production

rate indicates a capacity to increase their force

levels and to modernize by incorporating countermeasures. The Soviet SS-18, their largest

ICBM (currently restricted to 10 warheads under the terms of the SALT II Treaty), is reported to have eight times the throwweight

of the U.S. Minuteman III.18 Under the terms

of SALT II the United States reserves the

right to deploy Minuteman III with seven

warheads, the maximum number with which

it has been tested.19 This indicates considerable room for expansion in the number of

weapons carried by the SS-18.20

Another possible response to BMD development would be to reemphasize weapons

that BMD might be effective against and to

increase the role of other weapons. If these

other weapons were less effective, less threat17Soviet Military Power, 1985, p. 38.

‘

a U. S,-Soviet Mifitary Balance, John Collins, Elizabeth Ann

Sevems, Congressional Research Service, 1980, Book II, p. 123.

lgFir9t aw~ statement to paragraph 10, Article IV.

‘Whe SS-19, which currently carries up to six RVS, has almost

half the throwweight of the SS-18. See Collins, op. cit.

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense

Artist’s concept of Soviet BEAR bomber launching cruise

missile, One possible effect of BMD deployments might

be to lead the Soviets to emphasize bombers and cruise

missiles for delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. Higher

levels of strategic defense protection for the United

States would require effective air defenses

in addition to BMD.

ening, or less destabilizing in a crisis than

ICBMs, then building BMD would have accomplished something. However, the nature

of the strategic relationship would have

changed. The Soviets might emphasize bombers and cruise missiles. They currently have

two types of bombers in production (including the BACKFIRE, whose range is a matter

of controversy), and one in flight test. They

have four cruise missiles in development, including two large missiles that are probably

for long-range operation.21 Another possibility might be the deployment of shorter range

ballistic missiles on submarines and other platforms close to the United States. Finally, less

conventional weapons might be used, such as

orbital bombing systems (now prohibited by

the Outer Space Treaty), and very high-speed

aerodynamic vehicles that are launched on ballistic missile boosters but stay within the

atmosphere.

Technology may offer a variety of methods

to improve the ability of ballistic missiles and

their warheads to penetrate defenses. It may

also offer counters to those countermeasures.

ZISoviet Mih”t~y Power, 1985, p. 35.
101

In some cases the countermeasures will win

and in others they will be overwhelmed by the

counter-countermeasures. However, without

knowing in advance what the countermeasures

and counter-countermeasures are likely to be,

evaluating the effectiveness of the defense will

be difficult.

While it is important to understand the

range of options the Soviets would have available to them, it would probably be erroneous

to assume that they could and would exploit

all of them to the fullest. Soviet efforts would

be limited by the resources they could allocate

to strategic forces and by their rate of success

in new developments. They might also be limHOW BMD MIGHT AFFECT

Assessments of the value to the United

States of acquiring BMD rest on comparing

what the strategic balance might be like if

BMD were built to what it would be like without BMD. In order to make this assessment,

we would like to know:

1.

2.

3.

how the balance is currently assessed and

how it might evolve in the continued absence of BMD;

how we might use various levels of BMD

if we had them; and

what the balance might be like if the

United States and the Soviets had various levels of BMD.

These topics are the subject of this section.

The Current Strategic Balance

U.S. strategic planning is based in part on

a “worst case” massive Soviet strike on the

United States. While other scenarios are certainly conceivable, this one is considered to be

the most stressing to our forces. In overview

the scenario is simple. The Soviets launch a

large strike against a full range of militarily

important targets in the United States, withholding some of their forces as a strategic reserve. The strategic reserve could have many

purposes, but a primary one would be to reited by arms control agreements. This range

of available options, however, implies a broad

range of uncertainty about future forces.

The value of BMD to the United States may

also be affected by technical advances that

offer ways to improve the ability of potential

targets to survive a ballistic missile attack.

Mobility and hardening of ICBMs and other

potential targets are obvious examples, but

others may emerge. While these developments

will not directly affect the ability of a ballistic missile defense to destroy enemy missiles,

they may reduce the payoff for doing so, and

therefore affect the potential value of BMD.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

tain a threat to our cities as a deterrent to the

United States retaliating against Soviet cities. A major purpose of the first strike would

be to limit our ability to retaliate. Therefore,

they would attack our ICBMs, bomber bases,

and ballistic missile submarine bases. They

would also attack the C3 system in an effort

to “disconnect” the surviving forces, or “decapitate” the United States. Attention has primarily focused on an attack on U.S. ICBMs,

which the Soviets would attack with their own

ICBMs.

Whatever U.S. forces survived could be used

in a second strike against a full range of targets in the U.S.S.R. The Soviets might then

use some part of their reserve forces in a

follow-on strike, to which we might respond,

and so on. Any attempt to construct a detailed

scenario and predict its outcome would be very

uncertain. No one really knows how well systems would operate in a nuclear conflict, let

alone how military and civilian leaders would

act. There are wide differences of opinion on

basic issues like whether Soviet leaders are

likely to be bold or conservative, and what it

takes to deter them from attacking. (See chapter 4.)

Today, deterrence of a Soviet strike rests on

the Soviets believing that there is a high prob-
102

ability that if they struck, thousands of U.S.

nuclear weapons would reach targets in the

U.S.S.R. in a retaliatory strike. Deterrence is

aided by many factors that limit Soviet confidence in their ability to achieve their first

strike goals, including limiting U.S. retaliatory

capability.

Although analysts disagree over the credibility of this deterrent and its continued credibility into the future, everyone would agree

that thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons would

survive—primarily on submarines at sea, but

also on bombers that are launched successfully

and on those ICBMs that survive the attack.

Analysts disagree on such issues as whether

enough of our C3 system would survive to support timely employment of those weapons,

how effective SLBMs can be, how many bombers would survive the first strike and the Soviet air defenses, and whether the United

States would actually retaliate knowing that

the Soviets had a large reserve force.

Some argue that the degree to which the

Soviets could be confident that they could destroy a large part of our ICBM force has been

vastly overestimated. They point out that the

Soviets do not really know how capable their

weapons are or how hard our silos are, and cannot be sure that we would not launch our

weapons when we detect a massive ICBM

launch. As they see it, this uncertainty would

contribute to deterrence. In this view, the

Soviets would only launch a nuclear strike as

a desperate act, not as a rational instrument

of policy.

Others argue that Soviet capabilities may

be even greater than official estimates state.

They assess a Soviet capability to accomplish

militarily useful missions and to limit damage

to themselves through offensive strikes and

various defensive measures. As they see it, the

Soviets plan for the possibility of a nuclear war

as they would plan for any war, taking account

of the risks and opportunities. Once in a nuclear war, they would attempt to achieve certain objectives. In this view, the Soviets would

attempt to fight and win a nuclear war, if necessary, despite the risks and uncertainties.

As chapter 4 discussed, some Soviet actions

and statements are consistent with a first

strike posture, while others are consistent with

a retaliatory posture. Whether or not they expect to attack first, it would be imprudent for

them to ignore the possibility that the United

States might strike first. The Soviets are likely

to be highly suspicious of developments that

appear to increase their vulnerability to a U.S.

first strike.

As these differences of view illustrate, assessing the outcome of a nuclear exchange (or

assessing the credibility of our deterrent) is uncertain. Combining many uncertain factors

leads to a wide range of possible answers.

Different predispositions lead different analysts to draw very different conclusions from

the same range of answers. Some point out

that planners, wishing to be safe and plan conservatively, will make the least favorable assumptions. A U.S. or Soviet planner would be

likely to assess the adversary as more capable than he assesses himself. Others point out

that wars are often won by bold, decisive,

actions.

Possible Future Development

of the Offensive Balance

It is extremely difficult to project forces decades into the future. Whether in the absence

of defense the strategic balance would become

more or less favorable to the United States

than it currently is depends on the results of

several competing developments. Therefore,

not unexpectedly, some analysts foresee the

U.S. position improving while others think it

will worsen. Soviet ICBMs may become more

accurate, reliable, responsive, and numerous.

On the other hand, their targets may become

more difficult to destroy. Mobility, proliferation, and hardening can all be applied to making U.S. ICBMs and C3 components more survivable. Improvements in SLBMs may give

them capabilities similar to those of ICBMs.

Soviet air defenses may improve, but U.S.

bombers and cruise missiles are becoming

more capable. Submarines may become harder

or easier to find and destroy. On the other
. .

103

hand, some kinds of targets in the U.S.S.R.

may become more difficult to find and destroy,

reducing the value of U.S. retaliatory forces.

What Might We Want

BMD to Defend?

We could build BMD to defend either military assets— such as ICBMs and other weapons and our strategic C3 system—or our cities (or both). We might defend our military

assets in an effort to improve our ability to

absorb a first strike and retaliate, or to reduce

Soviet confidence that their first strike could

destroy their chosen target set. We might defend our cities to shift the basis of our security away from the threat of retaliation.

The capability to protect our cities would

mean a major shift in our strategy away from

retaliation and toward assured survival. However, we could not abandon retaliation until

defenses gave us confidence that they could

assure a high degree of protection. Protecting

cities requires an extremely capable defense.

Opinion differs as to how many nuclear explosions in populated areas in time of war would

lead to unacceptable or intolerable damage.

However, that number would be at most tens

of weapons out of an attack measured in thousands. A defense that let through no more than

1 percent of the attack—and perhaps far less

than that—would be required before the basis

of our strategy could shift away from retaliation.

Protecting military assets puts less stringent requirements on defense than protecting

cities does, since, for example, losing a few

ICBMs would mean much less than losing a

few cities. If we could protect enough of our

retaliatory forces that it would no longer be

worthwhile for the Soviets to attack them, we

might change the strategic balance in a major way. Our security might depend somewhat

less on the threat of retaliation, since there

would be less reason for the Soviets to attack

in the first place, but we would still need a

retaliatory capability. Protecting our military

forces to this degree would still require very

capable defenses, but not as capable as those

required to protect cities. At lesser levels of

defense, our security would still rely heavily

on the threat of retaliation. (If offenses could

be reduced by negotiation to extremely low

levels, much less capable defenses would be

required to produce the same results. See chapter 6.)

The implications of various levels of defense

for the dependence of our security on retaliation and protection are shown schematically

in figure 5-I. We could completely abandon our

reliance on threatening retaliation only if our

defense were nearly “perfect.” To do so at

lower levels of defense would risk giving the

Soviets an important advantage: they could

threaten considerable damage to the United

States with no risk of nuclear retaliation. Even

a few nuclear weapons penetrating our defense

could devastate several cities. At what point

reliance on retaliation and reliance on protection would be equal is, of course, debatable,

but it would have to be at a very high level

of defense. A defense that allowed even a few

percent of a large Soviet attack to reach our

cities would provide little security directly

through protection, although it might contribute to deterring the attack.

Some observers argue that the Soviets would

be deterred from attacking U.S. cities if it were

to cost them about 100 weapons for each

Figure 5-1 .—Notional Reliance of U.S. Security on

Protection and Threat of Retaliation -

High

aJ

v

s

=

&l

Low

Retaliation

Protection

O % 100%

Strategic defense capability

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
104

weapon that reached its target. If the United

States were to abandon the threat of retaliation under these circumstances it would have

to decide that this high cost would be sufficient to deter attack under all circumstances—

that the Soviets would not attack even if we

could not retaliate against them. To others, it

seems likely that we would still have to rely

heavily on the threat of retaliation for deterrence even if defenses were highly capable.

Similarly, a defense that could preclude a

meaningful attack on our military forces

might aid deterrence by removing a major incentive for the Soviets to strike in time of crisis, but deterrence of an attack on our cities

for whatever reasons would have to rely primarily on a threat of retaliation. Some argue

that if the Soviets could not achieve some military objective-e. g., limiting damage to themselves—they would be much less likely to start

a nuclear war.

Less capable defenses, although they could

not prevent the Soviets from destroying large

portions of our retaliatory forces, might still

have a role by protecting some of those forces.

Defending the forces could directly increase

the number surviving the attack. Defending

cities might indirectly increase the number of

forces surviving the attack, since in order to

maintain some minimum threat to our defended cities, the Soviets would have to reserve more weapons for that role leaving fewer

available to attack our forces. The more weapons surviving the attack, the more we have

available to retaliate with. However, if the

Soviets also have defenses, their defenses will

reduce the number of U.S. weapons that survive

and penetrate to their targets. Thus, whether or

not BMD enhances the U.S. retaliatory force will

depend on the capabilities of both U.S. and Soviet defenses. Clearly, all other factors being

equal, for a given level of Soviet defense we

have a greater retaliatory capability if we defend our forces than if we do not, but it is not

necessarily true that our retaliatory capability is greater if both have defenses than if neither does.

This can be illustrated as follows. Consider

a Soviet first strike that includes an attack on

our ICBMs. For a given U.S. defense capability used to defend ICBMs, the greatest number of U.S. ICBM RVs would survive a Soviet

attack if the defense could operate completely

preferentially. With completely preferential

defenses the United States would be able to

allocate the defense in response to the actual

attack. Therefore we would be free to arrange

our defense to achieve the greatest number of

surviving RVS.

22 Furthermore, if our defense

were completely preferential, the Soviets’ best

tactic would be to attack all the silos with the

same number of RVS.

23 In this case, the number of RVs the defense could save from destruction would be the number of RVs residing in the silos the defense has the capacity

to protect. The fraction of the silos that could

be protected would be simply the fraction of

the Soviet RVsaimed at the silos that the defense could destroy. If, for example, the defense could destroy 25 percent of the attacking RVs, it would preferentially destroy all the

RVs aimed at 25 percent of the silos and save

25 percent of the silos. The number of U.S.

RVs available to retaliate with would be the

number of ICBM RVs the defense saved plus

the number of SLBM RVs at sea. The number of U.S. RVs that survived the attack and

penetrated to targets in the U.S.S.R. would

be the number that survived minus the number the Soviet defense had killed.

“If they were to attack some silos more heavily than others,

we could defend the more lightly attacked silos and save a

greater number from destruction. For example, if they attacked

1,000 silos with 4,000 RVs, 4 per silo, and we could defend

preferentially against 1,000 RVs, we could save 250 silos from

destruction. We would destroy the 1,000 RVs aimed at those

silos, If they attacked 500 silos with 2 RVs each and 500 silos

with 6 RVs each, we could destroy the 1,000 RVs aimed at the

first 500 silos, and save all of them. As long as the defense was

completely preferential we could always defend the most lightly

attacked silos first. Therefore, their best tactic would be to attack them all uniformly.
105

Illustration of the Effect of Defending ICBM Launchers on Retaliator Capacity

Illustration of the Effect of Adding BMD

$3 “ ‘

$’

. . . +

;:; With BM D

w

-Each side's ;r-.> BMD can kill

.

., ~. 4,000 RVs

IF 2,240 ICBM RVs 

survive

*1,,

.,

Note: Each symbol represents 500 RVs

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

Therefore, the number of U.S. RVs that

could survive and penetrate is given by the expression: -

(U.S. ICBM RVs) x (Soviet countersilo

(U.S. RVs

RVs intercept) destroyed

+ U.S. SLBM by Soviet

Soviet RVs that attack U.S. ICBM silos) RVs at sea) defense)

The expression is independent of how the

Soviet defense is operated. If the U.S. defense

were not completely preferential, fewer RVs

would survive and penetrate.

A specific example can illuminate the meaning of this expression. If the Soviets attacked

our 1,000 undefended ICBM silos with 5,000

SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM RVs, they would probably destroy almost all of them. We could

retaliate with our surviving SLBM RVs, perhaps 4,500. In the absence of Soviet BMD,

almost all of these would reach their targets.

If both sides had BMD capable of destroying

1,250 RVs, our preferential defense could pro-
106

tect 250 silos from destruction. Assuming we

had a total of 2,800 ICBM RVs, 700 ICBM

RVs would survive in addition to the 4,500

SLBM RVs.24 However, of the 5,200 RVs surviving, the Soviet defense would destroy

1,250, and only 3,950 would reach their targets. Thus in this case, equal defenses on both

sides would increase the number of U.S. RVs

surviving the attack, but reduce the number

that survive and penetrate to their targets.

This is indicative of a general trend.

As long as the number of RVs the Soviets

attack our silos with exceeds the number of

U.S. ICBM RVs–which is quite possible with

today’s forces—adding defense to both sides

in equal increments will decrease the number

of U.S. RVs that survive and penetrate the Soviet defense.25 As the expression shows, under these circumstances the number of surviving RVs added by the U.S. defense (the top

line of the expression) will be less than the

number of Soviet RVs the U.S. defense can destroy, and therefore less than the number of

RVs lost to an equal Soviet defense. Thus,

while defending U.S. ICBMs and other assets

may aid deterrence, for example by increasing

the uncertainties the Soviets face in planning

an attack, it may well decrease our available

retaliatory force if the Soviets also have

defense.

Figure 5-2 shows the number of surviving

and penetrating U.S. RVs for three cases: U.S.

and Soviet defenses equal; U.S. defense double the Soviet defense; and Soviet defense dou24We could have 2,800 RVs by replacing 100 Minuteman III

missiles with 100 MX. The force would be:

Missile Type Number RV/missile Total RVS

MX 100 10 1,000

Minuteman III 450 3 1,350

Minuteman II 450 1 450

Total 1,000 2,800

It is likely that under these circumstances the United States

would defend MX silos first, defend MM III only after all MX

had been defended, and defend MMII only after all MX and

MMIII had been defended. This would produce considerably

more than 700 RVS surviving if the Soviets attacked all silos

uniformly. However, it is also likely that the Soviets would anticipate that the United States would allocate its defenses in

this manner and would allocate its attack accordingly.

*’The OTA staff is indebted to Glenn Kent of RAND for calling this to our attention.

Figure 5-2.—How Ballistic Missile Defense Affects

U.S. Ballistic Missile Retaliatory Capability

I I

1,000 2,000 3,0 0

U.S. defense capacity in Soviet RVs killed

Assumptions:

— 5,000 Soviet RVs shoot at U.S. ICBMs carrying 2,800 RVs

— U.S. has 4,500 SLBM RVs at sea1

— U.S. defends completely preferentially

— Not shown: U.S. bomber forces—survivability will be

affected by U.S. BMD and Soviet air defense

1 Modernizing U.s. Strategic Offensive Forcesr Congressional Budget Office,

May 1983,

ble the U.S. defense. The figure assumes the

replacement of 100 Minuteman IIIs with MX,

for a total of 2,800 U.S. ICBM RVS. The

Soviets attack with current SS-18 and SS-19

missiles, about 5,000 RVs. If the Soviet defense equals the U.S. defense in number of

RVs it can destroy, larger defenses mean fewer

U.S. RVs penetrating to their targets. This

problem might be redressed by a defense

asymmetry favoring the United States. However, in this case it would require a U.S. advantage of approximately two to one. Similarly,

a major Soviet advantage in defense could result in large reductions in U.S. ballistic missile retaliatory capability. Unless the U.S.

defenses could be operated completely preferentially, the number of surviving and penetrat-
.—

——..—— —— . . ——— —

107

————— .

ing U.S. RVs would be less than the number

shown in the figure.26

Any reduction in U.S. ballistic missile retaliatory capability would have to be evaluated within the context of the total U.S.

retaliatory force, including air-breathing weapons, and what it could accomplish. Opinions

vary widely about the significance of various

size reductions in numbers of retaliatory RVs

for the U.S. deterrent and the ability to respond to a first strike.

Whether one believes that having defenses

on both sides—when the result would be a reduction in the number of surviving and penetrating U.S. RVs—would aid deterrence, detract from deterrence, or have little or no effect

on deterrence will depend on certain underlying attitudes and assumptions, as discussed

below (see pp. 111-112). For example, some believe that the assets that the U.S. defense

might protect—including but not limited to

ICBM RVs–would be much more valuable

than the RVs lost to Soviet defenses. Others

believe that only a few surviving and penetrating RVs are sufficient to deter and that additional retaliatory forces beyond that small

number add little to our deterrent. Neither of

these groups would be likely to view the reduction in U.S. retaliatory capability as being

significant for deterrence.

Levels of Strategic Defense Capability

This chapter specifies strategic defense in

terms of its “net defense capability. ” Net defense capability is what the defense can do,

taking into account all its characteristics as

well as those of the other side’s offense. It will

depend on a number of factors, including the

opponent offense, the components of the defense, and the basic mode of operation of the

defense. In many cases, the same net defense —

“Under these same conditions–Soviet ICBM RVs outnumber U.S. ICBM RVs–adding equal defenses on both sides would

increase the number of Soviet 1 CBM RVS that would survive

a U.S. first strike and penetrate U.S. defenses. Put another way,

it would decrease the ability of the United States to limit damage to itself by a first strike. OTA is not suggesting that the

United States has a first strike posture, or that we should develop one.

capability can be arrived at in several ways.

Since we are dealing with a time in the indefinite future for which we can predict neither

offenses nor defenses with any certainty, we

do not specify the architecture of the defenses

or address the feasibility of obtaining them.

Ballistic missile defense alone could not provide a complete strategic defense of either the

United States or our NATO Allies. Weapons

other than ballistic missiles are part of the

threat. Furthermore, passive defense techniques—e.g., civil defense—are potentially

available either to augment active defenses

(i.e., BMD and air defense) or to provide alternative means to the same defensive goals. This

section is a general discussion of strategic defense. However, this report, like the current

national debate, focuses primarily on BMD

and on defense of the United States against

ICBMs and SLBMs.

Drawing on the considerations discussed in

the preceding section, we can identify five

levels of protection against nuclear weapons

to aid in understanding the implications of

U.S. and Soviet defenses. These are listed in

table 5-l. These are not absolute levels of defense, but rather net defense capability. The

defensive system that the United States re -

quires to achieve level 1, for example, maybe

larger or more capable than the defensive system the Soviets would need to achieve th e

same level. Given the imbalance in ICBMS,

this would certainly be true today. Further -

more, the defense required to achieve a given

level can change as the offenses change. The

defense that the United States requires t o

achieve level 1 in 1995 may be very different

from the defense required to achieve level 1

in 2015. Negotiated reductions of offensiv e

forces could raise the defense level withou t

changes in the defense systems. Increases or

qualitative improvements in the offense could

lower the defense level.

In the offense-dominated region, the strategic relationship would remain basically as it

is today. Although by adding defense we might

make it more difficult for the Soviets to attack

our military assets, the addition of defense
108

Table 5-1 .—Levels of Defense Capability

Region Level Description

Offense-dominated O no defense

1 “some ICBMS”* A defense capable of ensuring the survival of a useful

fraction of the ICBMs, but not capable of

protecting cities

Transition 2 “either/or” A defense (including BMD) that can ensure the

survival of most ICBMs or a high degree of urban

survival against a follow-on (or simultaneous)

attack, but not both

Defense-dominated 3 “most ICBMs/some A defense that ensures a high level of survival of

cities” military targets. Massive damage can only be

obtained by concentrating the entire offense

against cities

4 “extremely capable” Ensures a high level of urban survival against a full

attack. The attacker cannot have high confidence

that any cities can be destroyed

● Terms in quotes are a shorthand used to identify the levels

NOTE For simplicity the chapter often divides targets Into ICBMs and cities There are, of course, many other types of targets that might be attacked,

but discussing them all in each case would greatly expand the text ICBMs are representative of strategic military targets (although by no means

an accurate model of them all) “Cities” IS typically used as a short hand for people, economic assets, and social structure A level 1 defense,

for example, might be used to defend the C3 system rather than the ICBMs

could preclude neither a militarily useful strike

nor the destruction of our cities. Similarly, the

Soviets would still know that we could absorb

a first strike and be able to devastate them.

Thus in this region, the offenses (including

retaliatory capability) dominate the strategic

balance. In an offense-dominated situation, the

value of strategic defenses to the United

States would have to be judged on the basis

of how well they supported our ability to absorb a first strike and retaliate (or supported

Soviet perceptions that they could not prevent

us from doing so), weighing the effects of our

defenses against the effects of any Soviet

defenses. In deciding whether defenses are

worthwhile in an offense-dominated posture—

other than as a part of the transition to higher

levels of defense–it would be necessary to

weigh whatever they might contribute to our

retaliatory capability against the cost of building the defense. It would also be important to

compare the effort to build such a defense with

alternative ways to achieve survivability of

our deterrent.

In the defense-dominated region, defenses

would severely limit the ability to use offenses.

At level 3, the probability that the attacker

could cause any useful level of damage to military targets would be so small that he would

be limited to attacking cities. He could not

hope to use his offensive forces to reduce the

other’s ability to retaliate. For a level 3 defense, air defense would certainly be needed

in addition to BMD. At level 4, the defender

would approach a condition of assured survival, but widespread civil defense would

almost certainly have to play a prominent role

along with BMD and air defenses.

If one side had level 3 or level 4 defenses and

the other had no defense or very little defense,

the side with the heavy defense could have a

very significant advantage. It could attack the

other and do a very good job of defending

against any retaliatory attack. The level 3 defense, which could not preclude major urban

damage from a full-scale strike, might be able

to defend almost completely against a retaliatory strike by a force that had been significantly reduced by a preemptive strike. From

the perspective of the weaker side this could

be a very dangerous situation: its ability to

deter an attack by the other could be seriously
109

in doubt. The stronger side might have the

forces to adopt a prevailing strategy. However, some observers believe that the probability of completely defending against the retaliatory strike would have to be very high before

the stronger side could be said to have an exploitable advantage.27

Because of all the uncertainties in predicting the outcome of a nuclear attack, it would

be difficult for the defender to know with great

confidence that he had indeed achieved a level

4 defense. A small number of weapons leaking through the defense would spell the difference between assured survival and widespread

destruction. Two different sublevels–4A and

4B—can be identified. At level 4A the attacker

has only low confidence that his strike against

the defender’s cities will cause unacceptable

destruction. He would arrive at this assessment by making “offense-conservative’ assumptions, giving the defense the benefit of

the doubt. At this level, the low prospect of

success would contribute to deterrence, but

the defender—making “defense conservative”

assumptions —would probably want to maintain his retaliatory threat. If he did not, the

attacker would have little to lose by attacking despite his low expectation of success. At

level 4B, the defender would be confident that

his criteria for “assured survival” were met.

He could then abandon his retaliatory threat.

That level of confidence could probably only

be achieved with a defense system believed effective even under the most conservative assumptions about enemy offenses.

The transition region encompasses those situations in which neither the offenses nor the

defenses clearly dominate. The attacker would

be much less confident of accomplishing most

of his attack goals than he would be when

offenses dominate, and the defender would be

much less confident in his ability to deny the

attacker major attack goals than he would be

when defenses dominate.

—.

‘-Some strongly disagree with the assessment that this situation would provide the attacker with an exploitable advantage,

They argue that unless the defense were perfect, the attacker

could not be sure that no nuclear weapons would reach his territory. The possibility’ that he might suffer some retaliation

would still be a powerful deterrent,

A level 2 defense might operate semi-preferentially. The defender could choose to use

this defense to defend his military assets or

his cities, and the attacker would not know its

allocation in advance. Other types of defenses,

such as short-range fixed terminal defenses,

lack this flexibility and could not be used to

produce a level 2 defense. Building these other

types of defenses might avoid the problems

of the transition region. However, building a

dominant defense would be more difficult with

a defense that could not react flexibly to an

attack.

With a level 2 defense the defender may be

able to protect a great number of his assets,

but he cannot come close to protecting them

all from a full strike. In particular, he might

save most of his ICBMs from destruction, but

he could not protect his cities at the same time.

Alternatively, he might sacrifice his ICBMs

while gaining a high degree of urban survival,

providing the attack on his cities was sufficiently limited. (The attacker might limit his

attack on cities in order to increase his chances

of destroying military targets he thought to

be defended.) The defender might, however, do

a good job of protecting against a strike conducted with much less than the full offensive

force, such as a retaliatory strike with a force

that had been seriously reduced by a first

strike. Perhaps the most important characteristic of the transition region is that if one side

has a level 2 defense–and especially if both

do–there is a wide range of possib]e outcomes

of a nuclear exchange. Furthermore, the outcome would be especially difficult to predict

in advance because it would depend on how

each side chose to allocate its weapons, and

each would allocate its weapons based at least

in part on how it thought the other would allocate. 28

-—.— — . — ——

“The outcome would depend on: the mode of operation of the

defense; whether the defense were limited in capacity or engagement rate; whether the attacker elected to attack all at once,

or to attack only military targets in a first strike and keep reserve forces to threaten cities with a follow-on strike; how much

defense the defender allocated to cities and how much he allocated to military assets; how the defense was distributed among

military targets: how good the attacker’s and defender’s intelligence estimates were regarding each other’s capabilities and

plans; how the attacker distributed his attack among and within

target sets: etc.
110

Achieving a level 2 defense would probably

require defenses against air-breathing weapons as well as BMD. We would not be able to

defend our cities against a follow-on attack if

we could not defend against bomber forces.

If we had a level 2 defense and we knew how

the Soviets planned to attack, we might deny

them success in destroying some target sets,

but they would be successful against others.

Even if we didn’t know their plans, we might

guess correctly enough to accomplish this. If

they knew our defense plans, they could guarantee success against some target sets, but

others would survive. If neither knew what the

other intended to do, it would be very difficult

to predict the result, except in the situation

in which the Soviets concentrated their attack

very heavily against a limited number of targets in order to ensure that they killed those

targets while conceding the survival of the

rest.

This situation could introduce great uncertainty into Soviet attack planning, and that

uncertainty ought to enhance deterrence. If

the Soviets kept a large reserve in order to be

able to threaten our cities, they would have

to reduce their attack on our forces. However,

if we used our defenses to protect our forces,

their counterforce strike might accomplish

nothing. On the other hand, if they attacked

our forces very heavily but we reserved our

defenses to defend our cities, they might find

themselves without a credible threat to our

cities.

If the Soviets had a level 2 defense, it might

appear to us to be part of a first strike posture,

because if they could significantly reduce our

forces by a first strike, they might be able to

achieve high, or even total, success in defending against our “ragged” retaliation. Clearly,

we would be alarmed by this prospect.29 (Indeed, we would be alarmed by indications that

the Soviets thought they had such a capability, even if we thought that in reality they did

not.) Similarly, if the United States had a level

2 defense, the Soviets might suspect the United

29 

. —

Some believe that the Soviets could not be highly confident

in their ability to do this, and would be effectively deterred.

States of seeking a first strike posture.

Whether or not we intended ever to strike

first, this situation would be a very uncomfortable one for the Soviets.

If we and the Soviets both had level 2 defenses, our defenses might reduce the confidence of the Soviets that they could in fact

successfully strike first, but we could not necessarily preclude it. Because of the uncertainties each side faced in planning its offense and

defense, the broad range of possible outcomes

might well include a successful Soviet first

strike.

The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defense

Levels on the Strategic Balance

Figure 5-3 illustrates schematically how different levels of U.S. and Soviet defense capability might affect the strategic balance.

Figure 5-3.—How Strategic Defense Might Affect

the Strategic Balance

4

3

2

1

0

0 1 2 3 4

Soviet defense level
111

If one side had a level 4 capability and the

other had a lesser defense, the side with level

4 might have a clear advantage. It could cause

heavy damage to the other, which in turn

could do very little in retaliation. The greater

the disparity, the more the options the stronger

side would have. If one side had a level 3 defense and the other had level 1 or less, the

stronger side might have a strong capability

to attack the other and defend successfully

against the retaliatory attack. The level 3 defense, which would let enough of a full-scale

counter-city attack through to cause significant damage, might be much more capable

against a retaliatory strike that had been reduced by a counterforce strike. Opinions differ as to whether this would constitute an exploitable advantage. If the other had a level

2 defense, the stronger might be able to do

this, but not necessarily. As discussed in the

preceding section, if one side had a level 2 defense, and the other had either level 2 or less,

it may be able to attack successfully. However, it would be much less sure of its ability

to do so than it would be if it had a level 3

defense.

We would, of course, wish to avoid situations in which the Soviets had (or thought they

had) an exploitable advantage. Both situations

of approximate parity and those in which the

United States would have an advantage could

be acceptable, except to those who believe that

the United States should strive to achieve a

clear advantage over the Soviets. However, if

the transition to a mutually defended world

is to be a managed, cooperative one, it is unlikely that the Soviets would agree to let situations of clear U.S. advantage emerge. If the

evolution were not cooperative, we should expect that the Soviets would do everything in

their power to prevent a U.S. advantage.

Therefore, the regions of primary interest lie

along the diagonal of the square in figure 5-3,

where the two sides have equal defense capability. However, as discussed earlier, situations

of equal levels of defense capability on the two

sides are not necessarily situations of equal defense systems. If equivalent defense systems

were added to today’s offensive forces, it would

result in unequal levels of defense capability.

Offense-Dominated

The differences among the four offense-dominated situations shown in figure 5-3 (the

United States having level O or 1 and the

Soviets having level O or 1) are a matter of

some controversy. The root of that controversy is found in differing assessments of the

current situation and its evolution in the absence of BMD deployments.

Some believe that the current situation is

acceptable, and likely to remain so—or improve–in the foreseeable future. Others think

that the current situation is acceptable, but

that the trends are adverse. In this view,

sooner or later the strategic balance could become dangerously disadvantageous to the

United States. Still others believe that the

trends are disadvantageous and the balance

has already tilted against us. These groups will

differ in their assessments of the four offensedominated situations.30

Those who believe that the current strategic balance is acceptable and likely to remain

so believe that the Soviets know it is highly

likely that were they to attack, thousands of

U.S. nuclear weapons would survive and would

be launched back at them. In this view the

damage that those thousands of weapons could

do would be so overwhelming that hundreds or

even a few thousand more or less would make

little difference, This damage would far outweigh anything the Soviets might hope to gain

by attacking. Those holding this position see

nothing in the future that would erode this situation, and some developments that reinforce

it.

Those who see the current situation as eroding, point to Soviet developments that increase their ability to destroy our forces and

our ability to use them, as well as active and

passive defensive measures that decrease the

effectiveness of our weapons against important

targets. Some state that the Soviet leadership

has a different value system than the United

— — 30Yet another group finds the entire situation in which our

security rests on a threat of retaliation to be unacceptable, and

therefore may care little about changes that affect our ability

to retaliate.
112

States does and therefore would not be as

strongly deterred by certain threats as would

the United States. Some fear that the Soviets

would expect a U.S. President, faced with a

threat to more than half the U.S. population

from a Soviet follow-on strike, to be deterred

from responding to a first strike.

From this perspective, a Soviet first strike

might destroy most of our ICBMs, bombers

and tanker aircraft, and all submarines in port.

Soviet anti-submarine warfare before and after the strike might destroy some of the submarines at sea. The strike might also destroy

most of our leadership and its strategic communication system, making a coordinated response impossible. Most important would be

this decapitation and the loss of the ICBMs

which are uniquely prompt and capable of killing hardened targets. In this view, Soviet

defensive measures—including civil defense

and similar passive defenses—would effectively protect their leadership and its communication system, as well as reduce civilian

casualties and protect important war-related

industrial capacity. These defenses would raise

the price of attacking important targets to

such a high level that our remaining forces

would be incapable of covering the intended

target set. Some who hold this position see

current Soviet offensive and defensive developments as exacerbating the situation to an

alarming extent.

If this is the case, a level 1 defense could perform a valuable function for the United States

even if the strategic balance remained strongly

offense-dominated. If used to defend our command, control, and communication system (C3

)

it might reduce or eliminate the Soviet ability to decapitate the United States. It could

contribute to the survival of ICBMs and

bombers. Denying the Soviets high confidence

that they could decapitate the United States

and eliminate the ICBMs would more than

compensate for the decrease in the ability of

U.S. weapons to reach their targets due to similar Soviet defenses. (However, if the Soviets

had “level 1“ defenses and we did not, it would

make a bad situation that much worse). Some

of those holding this point of view argue that

a combination of limited active defense and

strong passive measures (such as mobile ICBM

basing) could make it more or less impossible

for the Soviets to achieve any militarily significant goal with a first strike. In effect, a

level 3 defense might result from strong passive measures and the synergism between active and passive defenses. They see this as

strongly enhancing deterrence by eliminating

a major incentive for the Soviets to strike.

Those who believe the current balance is

acceptable concede that a Soviet first strike

would reduce the number of weapons the

United States could retaliate with. But they

think that the Soviets could only have very

low confidence in their ability to decapitate the

United States. In this view, neither United

States nor Soviet defenses would make much

difference as long as the balance remained

offense-dominated. Some also point out that

unless the structure of U.S. and Soviet offensive forces changes in a major way, deploying

similar defenses on both sides is likely to result only in a decrease in U.S. retaliatory capability, which they see as reducing deterrence.

Whether or not those holding these two

points of view would agree that building level

1 defenses would be worthwhile as a step to

more capable defense, they disagree fundamentally over the value of having a level 1

defense. Those who see the current strategic

balance as unsatisfactory or as eroding in

dangerous ways see level 1 defenses as enhancing deterrence. Those who see the current strategic balance as satisfactory fear that level 1

defenses on both sides could harm our deterrent posture.

If one believes that having a level 1 defense

would be useful, two other important questions need to be addressed. First, how much

would the level 1 defense be worth? Second,

are there less costly—or otherwise more attractive—ways to achieve the same benefit?

For example, would passive measures suffice?

Defense-Dominated

If both sides had level 3 defenses, each

would have an assured retaliatory capability.
— —

The strategic relationship would be one often

referred to as ‘‘mutual assured destruction.

Each side would have the ability to inflict

widespread damage on the other, but could not

prohibit the other from doing so in return.

Nuclear weapons would pose the ultimate

threat against populations and societies, but

would have little or no use as a military tool.

If both had level 4 defenses, the strategic balance would approach one of “mutual assured

survival.

Whether a condition of mutual assured destruction is desirable, and whether that condition would differ from the present situation

(or the future in the absence of strategic defense) are both issues of contention. A related

issue is whether or not passive measures that

increase the survivability of important assets

could bring this situation about without investing heavily in BMD and air defense. As

discussed above, most observers believe that

the United States now has the ability to assure destruction of the U.S.S.R. in retaliation

for a strike on the United States, and many

believe it is likely to retain that capability into

the future. Others believe the opposite.

Few would argue that assured survival is

not preferable to assured destruction. The issue is whether assured survival is attainable

by the technological approaches being pursued

under SDI. The basic question the SD I program is supposed to answer is: how capable

a strategic defense can we produce and what

would it cost to get that defense? Answers to

these questions do not as yet exist, and probably will not for a number of years. Later chapters discuss the types of BMD system capabilities that might be used to support assured

survival.

It is difficult to define specifically what assured survival is. Some would argue that survival is assured only if the probability that one

or more weapons will reach the United States

is very low ( or, alternatively, that there is high

confidence that no weapons can be expected

to penetrate the defense). Others argue that

survival is assured if society survives and the

economy recovers in some number of years.

In this case, the United States might survive

despite the detonation of tens of weapons. (Appendix D illustrates how urban destruction

might be related to the effectiveness of strategic defense.)

If our defenses could keep the probability

very low that even one nuclear weapon would

reach the United States, our security would

be largely independent of the level of Soviet

defense. If we could expect tens of weapons

to reach the United States, the level of damage we could inflict on the U.S.S.R. would be

relevant. If we could “survive” that level of

destruction, but the U.S.S.R. could go undamaged, they might have a significant political

advantage.

Assured survival would probably be impossible to achieve if the Soviets were determined

to deny it to us. By improving or adding to

their offense, they could increase the number

of weapons penetrating to the United States,

forcing us to increase our defense, and so on.

Another basic problem would be the difficulty

of knowing with high confidence how well our

defense would actually perform against their

offense, since it could never be tested and we

could never know in great detail the working

of their offensive weapons. Many who advocate assured survival envisage it being

achieved by agreements that limit offensive

levels far below defensive capabilities.

The Problem of Transition

Both the offense-dominated region and the

defense-dominated region are regions of crisis

stability. Neither side would have the ability

to damage the other with a first strike and defend completely against the retaliatory strike.

Therefore, neither has an incentive either to

try it or to take action to prevent the other

from doing so.31 However, in order to reach the

defense-dominated region, the strategic balance is likely to pass through the transition

——31Some maintain that in the absence of U.S. defenses the

Soviets might be able to strike the United States in such a way

that the United States would be either unable or unwilling to

respond, despite the fact that the Soviets could not prevent a

large number of weapons from penetrating if we did retaliate.
114

region in which each side may have the capability to strike the other and defend completely

(or nearly so) against the retaliatory strike. In

this region there would be great uncertainty

in predicting the outcome of a nuclear exchange, because it would depend strongly on

how each side allocated its offense and defense.

Each could be very mistaken in its assessment

of how the other would make its allocations;

therefore each could have a very different

assessment of the outcome of an exchange.

While we would not necessarily fare worse

in a nuclear exchange under these circumstances than if there were no defenses—indeed

we might fare considerably better—we might

fare worse. The Soviets might be able to strike

first and defend completely against our retaliatory strike. In one view, the expanded uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets regarding

the outcome of a nuclear exchange would aid

deterrence. In another view, the possibility

that the Soviets could strike first and suffer

no damage, a possibility that does not exist

if the offenses dominate, would undermine deterrence. 32 The knowledge by each side that the

other might be able to strike and suffer no

retaliation has important implications for stability.

The problem of passing through this transition region has been described as follows:

A third potential source of instability could

arise during that phase of a transition when

strategic defenses would be capable of effective area defense against an offensive threat

that had been degraded by a previous first

strike. Assuming that a comprehensive defense cannot spring forth fully formed, like

Athena from the head of Zeus, both superpowers are likely to pass through such a transitional phase unless precautions are taken

well in advance. The possibility that they

might pass through such a phase (roughly)

simultaneously makes this situation potentially even more dangerous. The premium for

striking first, and the penalty for waiting,

—— -..

32Some believe that while the United States currently has the

weapons to retaliate for a first strike, the Soviets may believe

that the United States lacks the will to retaliate.

could be powerfully destabilizing factors—

particularly during an acute crisis.33

Precautions to avoid instability might include measures other than active defense that

could reduce the ability of both sides to launch

a first strike and defend successfully against

the retaliation. Passive defense to reduce the

effectiveness of a first strike might be one such

measure. A shift in both sides’ arsenals to

much greater emphasis on air-breathing weapons might be another. Because of their slow

speed, bombers and cruise missiles pose less

of a massive first strike threat than ballistic

missiles do, provided they can be detected

when they are still far from their targets.

Longer warning time provides more time to

get bombers safely aloft and to launch a

retaliatory strike.

Some implications of this transition problem are explored more fully in chapter 6.

The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defenses

on U.S. Strategy Choices

In chapter 4 we discussed at some length

both our present countervailing strategy, and

three suggested alternatives-a “retaliationonly” strategy, a “prevailing” strategy, and

a strategy based on defense dominance. If the

defense were to dominate, two strategies

would be possible. If our defense were extremely capable, we may be able to adopt an

“assured survival” strategy. Otherwise, defense dominance could enforce a “retaliationonly’ strategy by limiting any strike to urban

targets only. This section discusses which

strategies are available to us for the various

combinations of U.S. and Soviet defense capability that are shown in figure 5-3.

A retaliation strategy would require that

some number of U.S. weapons survive a Soviet first strike and penetrate to their targets.

It is beyond the scope of this report to calculate the number required, and indeed advocates of this strategy differ on the retaliatory

.

“Keith B. Payne, “Strategic Defenses and Stability, ” Orbis,

summer 1984, p. 217.
115 —— — —- .

capability required to make the threat of retaliation credible. If we can absorb the first strike

and inflict great damage on the Soviets, we

can have a retaliation strategy.

Countervailing would require more capability than retaliation only. In order to countervail, we must be able to execute a strike that

will deny the Soviets their goals, or inflict

damage beyond the value of whatever the Soviets might hope to gain. Countervailing would

require more surviving and penetrating RVs

than retaliating would, and it would probably

require more specific capabilities to deliver

those RVs against military targets. In the absence of Soviet defenses, neither countervailing nor retaliation would require U.S. strategic defense. However, U.S. defense might

contribute to the extent that it helped assure

that a sufficient number of weapons could survive. On the other hand, neither of these strategies would be viable if Soviet defenses could

prevent the required number of RVs from surviving and penetrating to their targets.

In order to prevail, we would have to be able

to defeat the Soviets while keeping our losses

at a “tolerable” level. prevailing would require

even greater capability in the force that survives and penetrates than countervailing

would. Perhaps more significantly, it would

also require a substantial defense of the

United States in order to keep our losses

“tolerable.” The conditions for adopting a prevailing strategy are probably the most stringent, since it would require both that we

achieve a high level of protection against Soviet attack and that we have substantial capability to penetrate Soviet defense. Conditions that would support a prevailing strategy

would also support a countervailing or retaliation-only strategy. Conditions that would

support a countervailing strategy would also

support a retaliation-only strategy.

An assured survival strategy would require

an even higher level of U.S. defense capability than prevailing would. An assured survival

strategy would not require a retaliatory capability, so it could tolerate Soviet defenses that

kept the number of penetrating U.S. RVs very

low.

Each of these strategies would generate requirements for the capabilities of U.S. offensive forces and (in the case of prevailing and

assured survival) for limits on the amount of

damage the Soviets could inflict on the United

States. These, in turn, would be determined

at least in part by U.S. and Soviet defense capabilities. Thus, which strategies the United

States could adopt are dictated by the defense

levels on both sides. For example, a Soviet defense that prevented attack of military targets

(i.e., level 3 or 4) would generally limit the

United States to a retaliation-only strategy.

Similarly, with a level 1 defense we could not

limit the damage to ourselves to a “tolerable”

level, and therefore could not have a prevailing strategy. Figure 5-4 shows which strategy

choices would be permitted by various combinations of U.S. and Soviet defenses. Appendix E explains how this figure was generated.

From this figure, we can make the following observations:

Figure 5-4.—How Strategic Defense Might Affect

U.S. Strategy Options

U.S. strategy options

A A A A A

4

P P P

p?a R

3 P

b

P

b

c R R?c

2 P?b

c ? R R?c

1 c c R R R?c

o c R R R

R?C

o 1 2 3 4

Soviet defense level

A - Possible assured survival

P -Option for prevailing, countervailing, or retaliation-only

C - Option for countervailing or retaliation-only

R - Retaliation-only

? - Unclear

a U S has a possibly large advantage but little capability for attack of

military targets.

b Opt Ion for prevailing only if U S. strikes first

Ability to retaliate IS in question.

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment
116

—

For the United States to have the option of

a prevailing strategy, we would need a level 3

or 4 defense while the Soviets had a substantially less capable defense.34 If we had a level

4 defense we could prevail even if they struck

first. However, if we had a level 4 defense it

seems highly unlikely that they would strike.

If we had a level 3 defense we could prevail

only if we struck first; if the Soviets struck

first our level 3 defense would not limit damage to a tolerable level, but if we struck first

it would. Developing the option for a prevailing strategy requires that our defense deployments substantially outpace Soviet offense deployments, and that our offense deployments

limit the capability of Soviet defenses.

For the United States to have a countervailing strategy, as we now do, the Soviet defense

——-— —— —

“Or possibly a level 2 defense if the Soviets have no defense.

must be at level 2 or less. Enough Soviet defense

precludes the existing U.S. strategy regardless

of U.S. defense. This is one reason that BMD

is opposed by some who see the existing strategy as the least dangerous option. Furthermore, countervailing requires that the U.S. defense level not be less than the Soviet defense

level. We cannot fall substantially behind in

an offense/defense arms race and maintain our

current strategy.

A retaliation-only strategy is always possible

unless the Soviets have level 4 defense. However, if the Soviets were to reach level 3 and we

did not, we would be threatening retaliation

from a position of inferiority. The combination

of a Soviet first strike and the Soviet defense

might limit our retaliation to a very low level

(or even preclude it), but our defense would not

be sufficient to keep the Soviets from inflicting

great damage on the United States.

CONCLUSION

Opinions will differ over whether the levels engineering a cooperative negotiated transiof defense capability discussed in this chap- tion. Since some defense deployments can proter are worth striving for. Other important fac- vide incentives to compete as well as incentors will also influence decisions on the value tives to cooperate, arms race stability will also

and desirability of attempting to reach these bean issue. Finally, cost and feasibility must

defense levels. As the discussion of the tran- be taken into account. These subjects are adsition region pointed out, crisis stability will dressed in subsequent chapters.

be an important issue, as will the problem of
Chapter 6

Crisis Stability,

Arms Race Stability,

and Arms Control Issues
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................119

Crisis Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............119

The Current Situation and Future Prospects. . ......................121

Effects of BMD Deployment on Crisis Stability. . ...................123

BMD Deployment and Arms Race Stability. . ........................128

Responses to BMD Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..129

Defense Plus Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............131

Additional Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........132

BMD Deployment and Arms Control . .............................133

The Importance of a Negotiated Transition. . .......................133

Working Out the Details . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........134

Potential Effects of the Absence of a Negotiated Transition . .........135

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................136

Table

Table No. Page

6-1. Missile Production: U.S.S.R. and NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...130
Chapter 6

Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability,

and Arms Control Issues

INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapters discussed how adding ballistic missile defense to U.S. forces

might affect U.S. strategy. This chapter will

address the relation of BMD deployments to

three other force posture issues: crisis stability, arms race stability, and arms control. Crisis stability is the degree to which strategic

force characteristics might, in a crisis situation, reduce incentives to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Arms race stability involves

the effect of planned deployments on the scope

and pace of the arms race. Arms control has

been pursued in the past as a way of trying

to enhance these two kinds of strategic stability. If the United States and the Soviet Union

decide in the future to deploy new BMD systems, new arms control agreements may be

even more important for avoiding serious instabilities, particular during transitional

stages.

CRISIS STABILITY

It is widely believed that a nuclear war

would be most likely to occur as the result of

escalation of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation during a severe crisis. Such a crisis could result

from a deliberate act of aggression by the Soviet Union against the United States or its

allies, but it could also arise from a dispute

triggered by some third-country actions which

involve the perceived vital interests of the superpowers. The likelihood that such a crisis

would result in nuclear war not only would depend on the political and military situation at

the time, but might also be influenced by the

nature of the strategic forces deployed beforehand by each side. In addition, crisis instability can also motivate arms race instability by

inducing remedial arms acquisitions by one

side or the other. Hence, in deciding whether

to develop and deploy a new weapon system,

an important question is whether the new system will add incentives or disincentives for

using nuclear weapons in a crisis. Before we

address this question with respect to various

kinds of BMD deployments, the general nature of crisis stability will be described.1

A decision to initiate a nuclear attack would

depend on several factors, including the circumstances leading up to the crisis, the personal attributes of the leaders, their perception of each country’s military capabilities and

vulnerabilities, their perception of their adversary’s incentives and intentions, and the doctrines of the two countries regarding nuclear

strategy. Most specialists believe these doctrines differ between the two countries in important ways. For example, the U.S. contingency plans for first use of nuclear weapons

contemplate a possible ‘‘flexible response’ to

Soviet aggression; i.e., a relatively small-scale

initial use of nuclear weapons with the hope

of avoiding escalation to a large-scale nuclear

‘See app. L for a list of references on crisis stability and other

aspects of strategic nuclear policy.. App. M lists references to

a range of views on Soviet strategic policy.

119
120

exchange.2 As noted in chapter 4, the declared

policy of the United States precludes a preemptive strike.3 The issue here, however, is not

whether American leaders would continue this

policy in future crises, but whether the Soviets

would believe that they would.

On the other hand, Soviet doctrines for dealing with crisis contingencies are thought by

many analysts to include the option of launching a massive preemptive attack against all

targetable U.S. nuclear forces (ICBM silos,

bomber bases, command and control sites,

etc. ).4 The Soviets also place greater reliance

than we do on civil defense and air defense to

help reduce the damage from a nuclear attack.

The Soviets have declared that they will not

be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it remains possible that, faced with the prospect

of defeat in a nonnuclear conflict they consider

of vital importance, the Soviets would decide

to initiate a limited nuclear attack. However,

if they believed that the escalation process was

likely to lead to a full-scale U.S. attack, they

might decide to preempt with a massive strategic attack.

Whatever the current Soviet doctrine really

is, future crises could face Soviet leaders with

decisions on whether to initiate a nuclear attack. In each case, the Soviet leader would

have to balance his perception of the risks of

striking first against his perception of the

risks that the United States might strike first.

The smaller he judged the chances of avoiding nuclear war altogether, and the larger he

judged the advantages of striking first rather

than second, the more incentive he would have ——— ..—

‘For a detailed discussion of how command and control vulnerabilities could severely limit U.S. options in a crisis, regardless of declaratory policies and doctrines, see Daniel Ford, The

Button: The Pentagon Strategic Command and Control System, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). {Also published

in The New Yorker, Apr. 1 and 8, 1985. )

‘For example, the FY 1984 annual report of the Department

of Defense states:

Our strategy excludes the possibility that the United States

would initiate war. The United States would use its military

strength only in response to aggression, not to preempt it. Once

an aggressor had initiated an attack, however, the principle of

non-aggression would not impose a purely defensive strategy

in fighting back.

Caspar W. Weinberger (Annual Report of the Secretary of

Defense to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984, Feb. 1, 1983, p. 33.)

‘See discussion of Soviet strategic doctrine in ch. 4.

to strike first. Hence crisis stability can be increased by force structures that minimize the

difference in the results of striking first or second (e.g., by deployment of retaliatory forces

that are invulnerable to a first strike). Minimizing this difference for both sides would reduce a Soviet leader’s incentive to strike first

in two ways. It would not only reduce his perception of the advantages of striking first, but

would also reduce his fear that the United

States had a strong incentive to strike first.

The analysis below is not intended to imply

symmetry between the way American and Soviet leaders would make such decisions, nor

is it intended to examine all of the factors that

would be involved. It will focus on only one

of those factors: how such decisions might be

influenced by the nuclear force structures on

each sides Crisis stability is not absolute; it

is a matter of degree. It is determined by how

great a net disincentive for either side to strike

first arises from the force structures of both

sides.e

Weapon systems are considered destabilizing if in a crisis they would add significant incentives to initiate a nuclear attack, and particularly to attack quickly before there is much

time to collect reliable information and carefully weigh all available options and their consequences. In the current U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, crisis stability is enhanced to

the extent that each side possesses substan5It is quite possible that a leader’s perception of the degree

of crisis stability at a particular time could influence his willingness to risk actions that might cause a crisis to arise.

6

Some analysts prefer to define strategic stability more

broadly than as comprising crisis stability and arms race stability only, For example, Colin S. Gray has proposed a concept

of stability which requires that Western governments acquire

plausible “prospects of both defeating their enemy (on his own

terms) and ensuring Western political-social survival and recovery. ” See Colin S, Gray, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered, ”

Daedalus, fall 1970. Gray suggests that any NATO force structure short of that, such as the current force structure, may be

insufficient to deter Soviet attack. He argues that a stable strategic balance is one that would permit the United States to:

Initiate central strategic nuclear employment in expectation of

gain . . . Seize and hold a position of ‘escalation dominance,’ [and]

Deter Soviet escalation, or counterescalation, by a potent threat

posed to the most vital assets of the Soviet state and by the

ability of the United States to limit damage to itself.

Obviously this concept precludes mutual U.S. and Soviet strategic deterrence, which Gray refers to as “strategic stalemate. ”
121

tial retaliatory forces that are invulnerable to

a first strike. Specifically, the retaliatory weapons and their associated command and control

chain must be survivable, and the weapons

must be able to reach their targets. On the

other hand, weapon systems with a substantial capability to attack the other side’s retaliatory forces, such as large numbers of highly

accurate MIRVed ICBMs, detract from crisis

stability.

There are different views regarding the applicability of the above analysis to future Soviet behavior in a crisis. It may be that in the

future Soviet leaders would be sufficiently deterred from a preemptive strike if most Soviet

cities, industrial facilities, and “soft” military

targets remained as vulnerable to a retaliatory

strike as they now are. Alternatively, it may

be that a successful Soviet strike against U.S.

ICBMs only would oblige the United States

to choose between surrender and the mutual

suicide of a U.S. second strike against Soviet

urban-industrial targets followed by a Soviet

“third strike” against U.S. cities and industry. Moreover, if the Soviet leaders thought

a preemptive strike could destroy most of the

U.S. ICBMs, and thus reduce the expected

damage to such “hard” targets as Soviet missile silos and military and political command

bunkers, their tools of control and power, they

might decide to risk the loss of Soviet cities

and strike first.7

It should be recognized that neither country’s strategic nuclear forces are structured to

maximize crisis stability, since both sides plan

their forces to try to satisfy several other strategic policy objectives as well—objectives

which may compete with the crisis stability

objective. For example, both superpowers have

developed ‘‘counterforce’ capabilities, designed to reduce damage to themselves if deterrence should fail, and to provide war-fighting ability to try to limit hostilities and

“prevail” in a nuclear war. Moreover, their

ability to use nuclear forces serves to deter

them from conventional attacks on each other,

7This option would presumably become less attractive as U.S.

SLBM accuracy improved.

on their rival’s allies, or in Third World areas

susceptible to superpower confrontation. Views

of strategic analysts differ on the relative importance of these competing policy objectives

for each side, depending on their different assumptions as to, for example, the motivations

and policies of the adversary and the feasibility of controlling the course of a nuclear war

after it starts.

Moreover, force deployments are sometimes

a response not so much to national strategic

needs as to strong domestic political pressures

to increase military budgets, develop and

exploit new weapon technologies, or deploy

weapon systems primarily because the adversary is doing s0.

8

The Current Situation and

Future Prospects

The U.S. SLBM force is generally considered stabilizing to the extent that a Soviet

leader would not think that a Soviet preemptive strike could destroy many of the U.S.

SLBMs at sea and thereby prevent massive

retaliation from them.9 Conversely, to the extent that fixed-base U.S. ICBMs are perceived

as relatively more vulnerable to attack, they

tend to reduce crisis stability somewhat because of at least some uncertainty on each side

as to the importance the other side attaches —

‘For general discussions of such pressures, see: Gordon

Adams, The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 198 1); Andrew

Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New

York: Random House, 1983); Miroslav Nincic, The Arms Race:

The Political Economy of flfih”tar~ Growth (New York: Praeger

Publishing, Inc., 1982); Marshall D. Shulman, “The Effect of

ABM on U. S,-Soviet Relations, ” ABM: An E\raluation of the

Decision to lkplohv an Anti’ballistic Missile System, Abram

Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner (eds.) (New York: Harper& Row,

1969); Adam Yarmolinsky, “The Problem of Momentum, ” I bid.;

Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington, KY:

University Press of Kentucky, 1977).

For discussions of the effects of such pressures on the Strategic Defense Initiative, see: !l’illiam D. Hartung, et al., The

Strategic Defense Im”tiati\,e: Costs, Contractors and Consequences (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985); and

Fred Kaplan, “The ‘Star Nrars’ Tent Holds Many Players, ” 130ston Globe, Mar. 17, 1985.

‘Views differ on the degree to which this Soviet perception

would be affected by the possible vulnerability of the communication links between the submarines and the national command authority.
122

to such Vulnerability .’” As just noted, the

views of U.S. commentators differ as to whether

the Soviets would think the damage from U.S.

ICBMs would be a significant addition to the

overwhelming damage they would suffer from

a full-scale SLBM retaliator-y attack. This

damage will extend to hard targets as well

when the United States deploys its highly accurate Trident II SLBMs.

There are reasons to believe that current

U.S. and Soviet strategic force structures are

at least for now fairly stabilizing (although

they include some elements that detract from

crisis stability). Despite their considerable

counterforce capabilities, each side has the

ability to inflict ‘devastating retaliatory damage after a full-scale first strike by the other

side. Therefore, in a crisis neither leader would

rationally perceive that the advantage in firing first outweighed the imperative to make

every possible effort to avoid nuclear war altogether, and both leaders would have available the option of taking time to attempt to

de-escalate the crisis.

The need to maintain adequately invulnerable retaliatory nuclear forces for decades to

come is often cited by those who advocate BMD

deployment to protect U.S. ICBM silos. ” It

is therefore relevant to review briefly the degree to which our current retaliatory forces are

secure against attack, and the prospects for

the future.

Presidential Science Advisor George Keyworth II has stated, “. . . our submarines, while

10There is considerable controversy as to how many U.S.

ICBMs would actually survive a Soviet preemptive attack,

given the inherent uncertainties in missile accuracy, missile

reliability, and coordination of such an unprecedented, untested,

and massive operation. See, for example, Matthew Bunn and

Kosta Tsipis, ‘*Ballistic Missile Guidance and Technical Uncertainties of Countersilo Attacks, Report No. 9, Program in

Science and Technology for International Security, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, August 1983;

Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, “The Uncertainties of a

Preemptive Nuclear Attack, ” Scientific American, November

1983; Les AuCoin, “Nailing Shut the Window of Vulnerability” Arms Control Today, September 1984; J. Edward Anderson, “First Strike: Myth or Reality, ” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, November 1981; John D. Steinbruner and Thomas

M. Garwin, “Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia, ” International Security, summer 1976.

“Some of these advocates also attach importance to maintaining a prompt hard-target kill capability.

as survivable today as ever, could well be

threatened in coming years by the incredibly

rapid advances we’re seeing these days in data

processing technologies. ”12 According to President Reagan’s Commission on Strategic Forces

(the Scowcroft Commission), “. . . ballistic missile submarine forces will have a high degree

of survivability for a long time. “13 (The Commission also recommended starting research

on smaller submarines, each carrying fewer

missiles than the Trident, as a hedge against

possible Soviet progress in anti-submarine

warfare.) Admiral James D. Watkins, the

Chief of Naval Operations, has been quoted as

follows: “. . . when people ask ‘Aren’t the

oceans getting more transparent?’ we say ‘No

way, they’re getting more opaque . . .' So the

ability to track submarines-we don’t see that

as being a threat to our forces until the turn

of the century or later, depending on what kind

of breakthroughs we might find at the end of

this decade or into the next decade."14 According to press reports, Congress has asked the

Central Intelligence Agency to carry out a

comprehensive study of submarine detectability. 15

The following testimony on this subject was

given June 26, 1985, to two Senate subcommittees by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director

for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency:

The Soviets still lack effective means to

locate U.S. ballistic missile submarines [SSBNS]

at sea. We expect them to continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare

(ASW) technologies as potential solutions to

the problems of countering U.S. SSBNs and

defending their own SSBNs against U.S. attack submarines. We are concerned about the

energetic Soviet ASW research and technology efforts. However, we do not believe there

is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will

be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that

“Speech June 23, 1984, at the University of Virginia.

‘

3Report of the President Commission on Strategic Forces,

chaired by Brent Scowcroft, Apr. 6, 1983. The recommendations in this report were endorsed by President Reagan on Apr.

19, 1983.

lThe Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1985, p. A 10.

) TheWashington Post, June 6, 1985, p A 1.
could pose any significant threat to U.S.

SSBNs on patrol. ”

The Scowcroft Commission’s report empha -

sizes that the U.S. secure retaliatory deterrent

does not depend on our SLBMs alone, but on

the synergistic capabilities of the triad o f

SLBMs, ICBMs, and long-range bombers. ”

For example, if the Soviets should decide to

attack U.S. bomber bases and ICBM silo s

with simultaneous detonations, many of our

bombers would have been alerted by detection

of the first Soviet missile launch and woul d

have escaped before their bases were struck.

1 8

If, on the other hand, the Soviets chose t o

launch their close-in SLBMs against our bomber

bases at the same moment as they launche d

their ICBMs, hoping thereby to reach ou r

bomber bases before the bombers had time to

escape, we could launch our ICBMs after the

bomber bases were hit but before the Soviet

ICBMs could reach our ICBM silos. Thi s

would be launch after attack.

19 Of course, neither side can be sure that the other would not

launch its ICBMs on warning that the othe r

side’s ICBMs were in flight.

2 0

Soviet strategic forces currently posses s

considerable survivability, albeit with les s

redundancy than U.S. forces. The U.S.S.R. has

missile-carrying submarines on sea patrol. It

has such a large number of ICBM warhead s

that a substantial number could be expecte d

to survive a U.S. attack on them .

—

“Unclassified prepared testimony before a joint session of

the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of

the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June

26, 1985.

) ~To further reinforce the suryrivability of the I CB M Portion

of the triad in future years, the Scowcroft Commission recommended development of a small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM.

It also recommended continued modernization of the U.S. bomber and air-launched cruise missile force.

‘“Under crisis conditions, more bombers than usual would

probably be in a state of alert.

IWiews differ on the degree to which vulnerability of the U.S.

IC13M command and control chain could affect this scenario.

See Daniel Ford, op. cit.

“

)

See Richard I.. Garwin, 4’I.aunch Under Attack to Redress

hlinuteman l’ulnerabilit~r’?” International Securit~’, winte r

19’79 80, pp. 117-139.

123

Effects of BMD Deployment on

Crisis Stability

Whether various kinds of BMD deployment

would tend to increase or decrease crisis stability depends on:

the types and levels of BMD deployment

on each side (e.g., whether the BMD is deployed to defend cities, strategic forces,

or conventional forces);

the types and levels of air defense and

civil defense on each side;

the types and levels of offensive strategic forces on each side (including those deployed in response to the defensive deployments);

the survivability of each side’s defensive

and offensive systems;

the perceptions (correct or not) of the top

leaders of each side as to the capabilities

of each side’s offensive and defensive

forces;

the perceptions (probably very uncertain)

of the top leaders of each side as to how

the other side would allocate its offenses

and defenses as between cities and strategic forces.

It is necessary to assess not only whether,

on balance, a particular BMD deployment

would do more to increase or to decrease crisis stability, but also whether the net effect

of the BMD deployment on crisis stability

would be significant in comparison to the effects of the offensive force structures. The

analysis of crisis stability with BMD is far

more complicated than is the case in the absence of BMD. For reasons discussed below,

we conclude that the net effects that various

types and levels of BMD deployment would

have on crisis stability are far too complex to

analyze adequately within the scope of this

study.

Accordingly, the following discussion will

not attempt to reach detailed net judgments.

Rather, it will use the examples of BMD capability presented in chapter 5 to illustrate

some ways in which certain types of BMD deployment could tend to increase or decrease
124

crisis stability, and to indicate why a realistic analysis would have to be highly extensive

and complex. As in chapter 5, we assume in

these examples comparable levels of BMD capability on both sides unless stated otherwise,

and we assume that the postulated level of

BMD performance is technically attainable

and sustainable in the face of the adversary’s

countermeasures and offensive augmentations. For the time being we disregard questions

of technical feasibility and cost.

Level 1: Defense of Some ICBMs

Insofar as the vulnerability of ICBM silos

or other hardened, redundant military targets

is a destabilizing factor, the ability on both

sides to defend some of these kinds of targets

should be crisis-stabilizing.21

ICBMs have unique properties that some

believe make them especially valuable. Currently, they are the only intercontinental-range

weapons with enough accuracy to destroy

hardened targets within 30 minutes (as opposed to several hours for bombers). Since

they are based on national territory, they are

potentially the easiest strategic weapons to

maintain in an alert status and to communicate with reliably. (As other weapons evolve,

these advantages may erode.) In typical analyses, it is usually assumed that a Soviet first

strike would be carried out in large part to destroy as many of the U.S. strategic forces as

possible, especially the ICBMs and their command chain. The U.S. Department of Defense

estimates that currently part of the Soviet SS18 ICBM force alone could destroy more than

80 percent of the U.S. ICBM silos.22 Thus,

judged solely by its effect on the ability of the

Soviets to confidently destroy U.S. ICBMs in

a first strike, U.S. BMD of missile silos could

have a stabilizing effect.23

*’Some argue that the ability to disrupt a Soviet missile attack on the U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (C’) system would greatly strengthen deterrence of a Soviet first strike. But unless that Cs system is redundant and

attack resistant (in the way that the system of 1000 Minuteman missile silos is), modest levels of BMD protection may not

do much to improve its survivability.

‘

z

Soviet Military Power, U.S. Department of Defense, 1985,

p. 30.

23A comparable effect might be achieved with a less vulnerable ICBM basing mode.

Views differ on how significant the stabilizing effect would be. On the one hand, those

who believe that the threat of retaliation by

U.S. SLBMs and bombers might not, for various reasons, deter the Soviets from attacking our ICBMs also believe that the survivability of our ICBMs is an important element

in assessing crisis stability. If defenses for

ICBMs also increased the potential survivability of the U.S. strategic command and control system, then the credibility of the U.S.

ability to retaliate against a Soviet attack

might also be somewhat increased. On the

other hand, those who believe that the threat

of retaliation by U.S. SLBMs and bombers

would suffice to deter a Soviet attack on our

ICBMs also believe that the uncertainty of

success that BMD could add to deterrence of

such an attack would be marginal or nil.

It must be remembered, however, that surviving U.S. forces would have to face Soviet

defenses against a retaliatory attack. As noted

in chapter 5, as long as the Soviets were willing and able to expend more nuclear warheads

attacking our missiles than we have warheads

on those missiles, the net effect of symmetrical defenses on both sides would be to reduce

the total size of the potential U.S. retaliation.24

Thus it is not clear that the uncertainties introduced by BMD into Soviet offensive planning would outweigh the fact that they could

still use offenses and defenses to reduce the

U.S. retaliatory potential.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union

are currently taking measures other than

BMD deployment to reduce their ICBM vulnerability, such as hardening silos and control

bunkers and developing mobile ICBMs. Insofar as these measures are effective for the

United States, Soviet offenses will have a reduced “first-strike” capability. Depending on

what the ICBM survivability measures are,

defenses may also then be a less significant

potential element in the protection of ICBMs.

“This would be true unless Soviet defenses were strictly dedicated only to defending targets the United States would not

be attacking in a retaliatory strike–i.e., empty Soviet missile

silos.
—

125

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force

Artist’s concept of U.S. “MX” or “Peacekeeper” ICBM to be deployed in silos now housing Minuteman missiles. The

Minuteman silo will not be hardened above current levels, but better protection for the new missile will result from the

new shock isolation system and the launch canister that holds the missile before launch. This mode of deployment

would not appear to substantially reduce the estimated Soviet ability to destroy U.S. land-based ICBMs in a first strike.

In the future, new techniques promising to make silos up to 20 to 25 times “harder” than current levels may

offer more protection.

Level 2: Either/Or

(Defenses–including BMD–able to ensure

the survival of most land-based ICBMs or a

high degree of urban survival against a followon (or simultaneous attack), but not both.) As

indicated in chapter 5, there would be a far

more serious potential for crisis instability if

both sides had a “Level 2“ strategic defense

capability. It ought to be a stabilizing factor

that the Soviets would be less certain that an

attack on U.S. ICBMs would succeed. On the

other hand, at “Level 2“ there would be at

least the possibility–not previously available—that a first strike combined with defenses could keep damage from a retaliatory

strike to a relatively low level. Worst of all,

it is possible that both sides could arrive at

a highly unstable situation in which each could

have a chance of assuring its own survival by

striking first, and only by striking first. This

situation could occur even if the Soviets and

the United States had approximately equiva-
126 —— ———-

lent defensive capabilities. Under that circumstance, uncertainties on each side about the

actual capabilities of the other could be especially high and could intensify mutual suspicions.

We would like to be able to discern the net

effect on crisis stability of deploying BMD on

both sides, and to identify potential areas of

instability to be avoided as defensive and

offensive forces evolve on both sides. This

would depend partly on speculation as to how

future leaders on both sides would weigh various factors when making decisions. It is possible, however, to throw some light on this important issue by assessing a large number of

possible cases. That assessment would require

a detailed specification of the defensive and

offensive capabilities and the options they provide each side, as well as an exploration of the

tactical choices each has in allocating its defense and offense under representative circumstances. In addition, because crisis stability

depends so much on perception, it would be

important to consider how each side might

think the other would use its defense.

Level 3: Effective Defense of Most ICBMs,

Some Cities

If both sides had ballistic missile and air

defenses that could unconditionally deny the

other side the ability to destroy most landbased ICBMs in their silos, but could not deny

them the ability to destroy many of one’s cities if all the offenses were concentrated on cities, crisis stability should be quite high. The

advantages of attacking first should be marginal, the threat of retaliatory destruction still

substantial. 25

Level 4: Extremely Capable Defense

At a level of defense at which few or no military targets and few or no cities could be destroyed, there would be little incentive to

strike first. An aggressor calculating that he

might in some way deliver a few weapons on

*

s

This situation would be equivalent to one in which neither

side had defenses and both sides had deployed most of their

offensive nuclear forces in an invulnerable basing mode.

enemy territory might have to contend with

a risk that the victim might be able to retaliate on a similar level. Striking first would

probably not reduce such retaliatory capabilities. Hence crisis stability, strictly defined,

would be high. But other kinds of strategic instability could arise from the possibility of nuclear weapons smuggled into U.S. cities with

no assurance the the United States could

retaliate against such an attack.

Special Cases

City Defense or ICBM Defense.—As shown

in chapter 5, defenses that could be allocated

to defending either retaliatory forces or cities

would lead to a complex range of possible outcomes of a nuclear exchange. Defenses able to

defend only retaliatory forces should be relatively stabilizing; they would not raise the

prospect of a first strike against missiles followed by an effective defense against a “ragged

retaliation. Defenses able to defend only cities but leaving retaliatory forces unprotected

would be destabilizing, because they would

place a premium on striking the unprotected

forces, thus increasing the incentive to use

those forces before they were destroyed.

The latter situation may not be purely speculative. The U.S. BMD debate has focused

mostly on far-term deployments of BMD systems based on advanced technologies. However, if the Soviets were to deploy BMD, they

might well elect to begin with extensive deployments of ground-based rocket interceptors

of the types they have already deployed

around M OSCOW.

26 Each interceptor deployment would be restricted to defending a definite area. Using such technology would oblige

the Soviets, in peacetime, to choose among

defending their cities (as the system now deployed near Moscow does), defending their

ICBM silos, or defending both. If the Soviets

chose to defend only cities, whatever inclinations they had before toward preemptive strategic attack could be strengthened: they would

have the incentive described above to use

rather than lose their ICBMs.

“Soviet Military Power, 1985, op. cit., pp. 46-48.
—

127

— —— —- .———— -

Asymmetric Defenses.—If the Soviet Union

had BMD and air defenses that were substantially more effective than those of the United

States, crisis stability would be reduced. In

this case, the Soviets might calculate that by

striking first, they could sufficiently penetrate

U.S. defenses to weaken the U.S. retaliatory

response, and then use their own BMD to deal

with that response.

Conversely, a substantial U.S. advantage in

BMD and air defense capability could cause

the Soviets to fear that the United States is

more likely to strike first. They might fear

such an attack particularly if they believed

U.S. defenses to be able to intercept nearly all

the Soviet weapons that could survive a U.S.

first strike, thus largely avoiding Soviet retaliation. Fearing this, the Soviets might calculate that a Soviet preemptive attack could possibly reduce the ultimate damage that the

Soviet Union might suffer, or at least draw

down U.S. defenses to the point where remaining Soviet forces could threaten a subsequent

high damage attack on the United States. The

latter threat, they might calculate, could also

induce U.S. leaders to restrain their retaliation

for the initial attack.

Alternatively, if the Soviets could be per -

suaded that U.S. policy would not permit a

U.S. preemptive strike, whatever the appar -

ent incentives, then a U.S. advantage in defense capabilities should contribute to sta -

bility .

BMD System Survivability.-One criterion for

a BMD system which many Administration

officials have cited is system survivability—

the ability of the system to perform at desired

levels despite direct attack on its components.

We may take it for granted that neither side

would deploy a BMD system which could obviously be rendered ineffective by enemy attack. Rather, the question would be about the

degrees of confidence on each side about the

continuing survivability of its own and the

other side’s defensive systems.

Ambassador Paul Nitze has said, “The technologies must produce defensive systems that

are survivable; if not, the defenses would

themselves be tempting targets for a first

strike. This would decrease, rather than enhance, stability. ”27 This point has also been

stressed by other Administration spokesmen.

Whether an attack on a defensive system

were part of an ICBM attack or not, it could

leave the attacked side defenseless. The attacker, on the other hand, would be at least

partially defended28 against retaliation-even

if the victim of attack launched ICBMs before

they could be destroyed. Whether anti-BMD

attacks could be prevented from escalating to

attacks on silos or cities is difficult to predict.

If both sides had vulnerable BMD systems,

the net result of simultaneous successful attacks on both systems could be to leave the

two sides in an offensive stand-off similar to

the one existing now. However, an extremely

unstable situation would arise if each side’s

space-based BMD system were vulnerable to

attack from the other’s BMD system and only

to that system. Each would then have powerful incentives to “use or lose” his system, to

attack before the other side did. The one that

struck first might substantially disarm the

other side.

It is also important that the capabilities of

a BMD system not be subject to degradation

from an attack by ballistic missiles or airborne

nuclear weapons. A nuclear first strike could

be better planned, coordinated, and executed

than a retaliatory strike. Even if both sides

began with comparable BMD capabilities, the

premium on preemptive attack would be high

if a first strike had a much higher probability

of penetrating enemy defenses than did the

retaliation.

Automatic Command and Control.–A spacebased BMD system, especially one targetted

against missiles in their boost phase, would

have to have some form of automated command and control if it is to respond in time

to engage its targets. There are arguments

- —

“Speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council on Feb.

20, 1985.

‘“Some believe that there would be virtually no strategic

advantage in having a defense of cities that is only partially

effective.
128

that this would be a source of instability, and

other arguments that it might be stabilizing.

If the automated system malfunctioned, or

if some unanticipated situation arose for which

the system had not been programmed, the system could respond in a way that set off a fatal chain of action and reaction in the strategic forces on the two sides. Or, automation

might be a stabilizing factor, because having

an automated system forces planners to think

in advance about what situations the system

might have to respond to, and how they would

want it to respond. Even if the system were

not automated, leaders would still have to respond to the same situations in a very short

time, and therefore they should have developed their responses beforehand. However,

while many contingencies could be imagined

and programmed into the system, there would

be some practical limit on the number which

would be feasible to include.

Transition Periods.–At present, when each

side has thousands of offensive nuclear warheads and essentially no defenses (“offense

dominance”), the mutual threat of retaliation

provides a relatively high degree of crisis stability. Conversely, if each side were able to obtain virtually perfect defenses against all types

of nuclear weapon delivery, there would be a

very low probability that even a single nuclear

weapon could reach its target, and the situation (“assured survival”) would also be relatively stable. But, as the analysis of “Level

2“ of BMD capability in chapter 5 suggests,

the transition from the current situation to one

of defense dominance could require passing

through an interim stage which might be very

unstable. Since that interim period might last

for many years, there could be a serious risk

that a crisis would arise during that period.

BMD DEPLOYMENT AND ARMS RACE STABILITY

The strategic nuclear force postures of the

United States and the Soviet Union are shaped

by both internal and external factors. The internal factors may be political, bureaucratic,

economic, and technological. The chief external factor for each side is the other side’s force

posture, both current and forecast: the adversary’s forces may present threats to counter,

incentives to reduce disparities, or opportunities to seek strategic advantage. One issue to

consider in deciding to deploy a weapon is

what kind of reaction it is likely to evoke from

the other side. If a deployment on one side is

likely to lead to a responding deployment on

the other side which is in turn likely to induce

a still higher level of deployment on the first

side, the first side’s deployment might be seen

as “destabilizing” the arms competition.

A destabilized arms competition might not

necessarily be a bad thing for U.S. national

security. For example, if we and the Soviets

entered into a competition in defensive strategic systems (e.g., BMD) but the deployments

on the two sides did not lead to offensive increases, the race in defensive systems might

be self-stabilizing. That is, if each side could

reach a high degree of protection against the

other’s offenses, the competition might wind

down. Alternatively, we might see it to be in

our advantage to begin an arms race if we were

sure we would “win” at acceptable cost. That

is, if superior technology, for example, could

give us a permanent strategic advantage over

the Soviets, we might want to engage them

in a race which would give us long-lasting escalation dominance over them and might even

force them into expenditures so heavy as to

draw away from their conventional armed

strength.

On the other hand, a destabilized strategic

arms competition could prove both costly and

indecisive. We could spend billions on new

weapons but find that our strategic position

relative to the Soviets was about the same as

or worse than when we started. Moreover, the

ongoing competition could lead to deploy-
129

ments on one side or both that reduced crisis

stability as well. In general, past strategic

arms control agreements with the Soviets

have (at least on the U.S. side) been intended

to add at least some stability to a continuing

competition.

As noted in chapter 3, many are dissatisfied

with the results of arms control thus far. In

one view, the strategic arms competition is already unstable, due largely to Soviet initiatives over the past decade. In this view, the

Soviet deployment of many accurate ICBM

warheads threatens the survivability of the

ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and of the

command and control system which would direct a U.S. retaliatory attack. In addition, Soviet air defenses, civil defense activities, and

sheltering of key leadership facilities would

lessen the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory

attack. A Soviet breakout from the ABM

Treaty would further weaken the deterrent effect of the U.S. threat of retaliation. Responding to Soviet activities, the United States is

increasing the accuracy of its own ICBMs and

SLBMs, improving its bomber force, and accelerating BMD research. Thus, in one view,

the possible destabilizing effects of future

BMD deployment on the arms race will have

to be considered in the context of the instabilities which will exist in any case.

Responses to BMD Deployment

One can imagine a variety of Soviet responses to U.S. BMD deployments (and viceversa). Some of these responses might be

stabilizing, others more destabilizing. In rough

order of increasing destabilization, the range

of imaginable Soviet responses follows.

Negotiation

If the Soviets could be persuaded to negotiate the transition to a world in which ballistic missile defenses played an important strategic role, the process might be a stable one.

Each side would agree to reduce offensive nuclear capabilities, or at least not to increase

them, while building up defenses. The stable

conclusion would be that each side’s offensive

threat to the other would be reduced and neither felt compelled to try to negate the other

side’s defenses.

Tacit Stabilization

If the United States began to deploy BMD

unilaterally and the Soviets followed suit,

there might still be a stable competition. Each

might find the reduction in its own offensive

capabilities against the other acceptable because the other’s was also proportionately reduced. A situation similar to the negotiated

one above might be reached, but as the result

of mutual unilateral calculations rather than

joint decision.

Maintenance of the Offense

The Soviets might decide that it was worthwhile to try to maintain or restore their offensive capabilities by countering the U.S. BMD

system. As Presidential arms control advisor

Paul Nitze has said:

New defensive systems must also be cost

effective at the margin, that is, it must be

cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to

overcome the defense. If this criterion is not

met, the defensive system could encourage a

proliferation of countermeasures and additional

offensive weapons to overcome deployed defense,

instead of a redirection of effort from offense to

defense.29

There are several ways the Soviets could try

to maintain offensive capabilities, and some

of these ways could lead to a destabilizing

arms race. In fact, the Soviets have explicitly

announced that they intend to preserve their

offense capabilities in the face of any U.S. defense.30 Possible means of maintaining the of-

“Paul H. Nitze, Speech to the Philadelphia J$’orld Affairs

Council on Feb. 20, 1985. F;mphasis added.

3~lFor examp]e, SoIlet General Nikolti Chervov told reporters

that to counter U.S. efforts in space, “. we will have both

an increase in offensive strategic weapons, and correspondingly

we will take certain defensif’e measures. (The 11’ashington

Post, tJune 9, 1985. p. 14-1.)
130

fense, which are not at all mutually exclusive,

include:

Deployment of Passive Countermeasures.—

Such countermeasures as decoy weapons, deception of BMD sensors, or altered ballistic

missile flight characteristics could require the

U.S. to respond with additional BMD system

components or with technological changes in

the BMD system If corresponding increments

of U.S. defense were less costly for the United

States to add than the increments of offensive

countermeasure were for the Soviets to add,

this measure might not be destabilizing—or

not for long. The Soviets ought to see that

there would be no point in a continued offensedefense competition, because no gains in capability would be possible. On the other hand,

if the cost-exchange ratio between defense and

offense were somewhat ambiguous, the two

sides might go through many expensive rounds

of offensive and defensive countermeasure before the futility of further counteractions was

obvious. A competition involving defensive

systems and offensive countermeasures could

be costly, though probably not as costly as one

involving defenses and additional offensive

weapons. If weapons were cheaper than countermeasures (per warhead penetrating the defense), than one would probably just add

weapons.

Active Countermeasures: Attacking the Defense.—If the Soviets believed that vital components of a U.S. BMD system were vulnerable to attack, they might deploy weapons

designed to weaken or disable the BMD system. We have noted in the first section of this

chapter the potential for crisis instability if either side had plausible chances of a successful attack on the other’s BMD system. A part

of the cost-exchange ratio calculation for a decision to deploy a BMD system would be an

assessment of the cost of defending the system as opposed to the cost of attacking it. Unless the Soviets were persuaded early on that

the survivability of the U.S. BMD system

could not be seriously threatened within the

limits of Soviet resources, a costly race of deployments of anti-BMD weapons and antianti-BMD weapons might result.

Increasing the Numbers of Offensive Weapons.—Again, the cost-exchange ratio between

increments of defense and of offensive countermeasures would have to favor the defense if

the race were not to go on expensively, indecisively and indefinitely. It is also possible that

the Soviets might decide to try to maintain

some level of net offensive capability even at

a cost higher than the corresponding U.S. defenses. If, on the other hand, the United States

were willing to match Soviet expenditures, the

Soviets in the long run would see their net

offensive capability decline. In the meanwhile,

however, additional Soviet offensive weapons

could be destabilizing in another way: if the

United States perceived the additional Soviet

weapons as upsetting the balance of U. S.-

Soviet offensive forces, the United States

would have an incentive to respond with offensive additions of its own.

Circumventing the Defense.—If defenses

clearly had the advantage over ballistic missiles, the Soviets might try to compensate for

their declining strategic nuclear offensive capabilities by deploying other means of delivTable 6-l.— Missile Production: U.S.S.R. and NATOa

Soviet missile production rates in the 1980s indicate a substantial capability to respond to U.S. BMD deployments with additional

offensive missile deployments, should the Soviets choose that option. — — —

U.S.S.R. NATO

Missile type — — 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984

ICBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............250 200 175 150 100 0

LRINFb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 100 100 125 150 70

SRBM S

C ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., .. ....300 300 300 350 350 0

SLCMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 750 750 800 800 850 665

SLBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ... , .. 200 175 175 200 200 80

a

revised to reflect current total production Information Includes United Slates, excludes France and Spain

—

bLRINF--Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

CSRBM—Short Range Ballistic Missile.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

132 — . . — — —

other side’s current and future BMD capabilities or of the cost-exchange ratios. As was illustrated in chapter 5, the side with inferior

defenses could see its situation as so disadvantageous as to call for substantial efforts to

catch up, regardless of cost. But if the defensive and offensive capabilities of the two sides

are not well understood by both, one side or

both might see the other as having–or seeking—an advantage.

Additional Observations

A Problem of Timing

If the current BMD research and development program demonstrated in a few years

that BMD deployments could lead to a safer

world, the United States would certainly want

to alter the current treaty regime banning all

but very limited BMD deployments. But we

would want to avoid a breakdown of that regime before the research and development program is concluded. This might be true for at

least two reasons.

First, the Soviets appear to have maintained

a technology base for a large-scale deployment

of current-generation BMD systems, and in

the short run of a few years they might attain

a noticeable advantage in BMD deployments

over the United States. This could lead to the

kind of crisis instability discussed in the first

section of this chapter.

Second, it is possible that the U.S. BMD research program may show that effective BMD

is not feasible and should not be deployed.

But, if in the meantime the ABM Treaty regime limiting BMD had been abandoned, the

United States might consider it necessary

nevertheless to deploy additions to its offense

to counter Soviet BMD, and perhaps to deploy

defenses as well, just to maintain the current

strategic balance.

could defend ICBMs or cities but not both

would be potentially destabilizing. If the

United States did not decide to pursue high

levels of BMD capability, but had the limited

objective of a defense of its land-based ICBMs,

there would still be potential arms race instabilities. The United States would have to be

very careful to configure the BMD system so

that its purpose was unambiguously the localized defense of hardened targets. Otherwise,

the Soviets might see the system as the core

of a much broader defense, and take anticipatory countermeasures to maintain their own

offensive threat. The United States would

have to react accordingly, increasing its defensive forces, its offensive forces, or both.31 Nor

might the United States feel secure if the

Soviets were to respond to a U.S. missile-site

defense by expanding and spreading the system now deployed around Moscow. Designed

to protect selected regions rather than just Soviet missile silos, such an expanded system

would degrade the retaliatory threat residing

in the ICBMs that the United States was

defending. An expansion of U.S. offenses,

defenses, or both might be taken in response.

Instabilities With Either/Or Defenses

We noted in chapter 5 and in the first section of this chapter that special instabilities

may arise if both sides have what we call

“Level 2“ defense capabilities—the ability to

protect most ICBM silos, or many cities, but

not both. The danger is that one side may perceive the other to have the possibility of

launching a very effective first strike against

the other’s retaliatory force and then defending very effectively against a “ragged” retaliation. Such perceptions would lead to very

great pressures to remove the possibility of

such a strike by increasing offenses to restore

the credibility of the retaliatory deterrent.

Limited BMD Systems 3] Since it takes several years to develop and deploy major

As was noted in chapter 5 and again in the weapon systems, each side tends to plan and build its systems

first part of this chapter, BMD systems which

on the basis of what it thinks is the largest deployment the other

side might be able to field several years in the future.
133

The

BMD DEPLOYMENT

Importance of a

Negotiated Transition

Administration officials have stressed the

importance of a substantially favorable costexchange ratio between defense and offense as

an incentive for the Soviets to agree to negotiate the reduction of offenses.32 Some believe

that without such an incentive—i.e., without

clear evidence that ballistic missiles are being

made economically obsolete by defenses—the

Soviets may never agree to deep offensive reductions. On the other hand, it should be noted

that if the United States and the Soviet Union

could agree that it was desirable to reduce

offenses and increase defenses, then a favorable cost-exchange ratio would not be a prerequisite to moving in that direction. Mutual

offensive reductions could be the main instrument for increasing the effectiveness of defenses: the less formidable the offensive threat,

the less capable the defenses would need to be.

Recently, Administration spokesmen have

emphasized the importance of negotiating

with the Soviet Union about the transition to

a strategic relationship in which BMD plays

a significant role. As Presidential national

security advisor Robert McFarlane said,

There is a relationship between reductions

of offensive systems and the integration of

defensive systems because of the potentially

destabilizing effect of either side achieving

a first-strike capability through possession

of both. So our policy must be to first establish agreement between ourselves and the

Russians on the value of defensive systems.

Once we have reached agreement on that,

then we must establish a path for the integration of these defensive systems into the force

structure that will be stable.33

3ZAS noted earlier, there are likely to be large uncertainties

in calculating such ratios, and the two sides may well assess

them differently.

?3A~ interviewed in IJ. SJ. News and World Report, Mar. 18,

1985, p. 26. In a similar statement, Kenneth Adelman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said

in February 1985:

\$’e must scrupulously guard against a vicious cycle of defensive efforts—even research for defense-spurring the other side

on to more offensive weapons in order to saturate prospective

AND ARMS CONTROL

There is a degree of paradox associated with

the uncertainties that BMD deployment could

introduce in the calculations of the two sides.

On the one hand, increased uncertainty about

the likelihood of successful attacks could increase crisis stability by making the aggressor less willing to gamble on a favorable outcome from a first strike. On the other hand,

in the face of growing uncertainty about the

effectiveness of its military forces, each side

will have an incentive to try to reduce that uncertainty by deploying additional offensive

and defensive weapons and countermeasures.

In the absence of coordinated structuring of

defenses and offenses on the two sides, the

United States would have to anticipate and

adapt in advance to a wide range of potential

Soviet responses. Even if the cost-exchange

ratio between defense and offense favored the

defense, the transition period could bring a

costly arms competition until the effects of the

cost-exchange ratio asserted themselves.

Arms control has been one measure pursued

by the United States to try to enhance crisis

stability and arms race stability .34 Crisis stability may be enhanced if the United States

and the Soviet Union can negotiate force

structures or mutual procedures (e.g., the hot

line) which might reduce incentives in a crisis

to strike. Slowing the arms race may be possible if the two can agree to limit weapon deployments which might accelerate the competition. Arms limitations can also add a certain

amount of predictability to the force structure

planning on each side, reducing the steps each

defenses, and so on, and so on. That snowball effect would undercut stability and weaken deterrence.

That risk can be reduced and managed through the kind of

overall strategic discussions Secretary Shultz launched in

Geneva last month and that Ambassador Kampelman will take

up further when the arms talks begin again next month. This

type of exchange with the Soviet Union–an in-depth dialog

about critical strategic relationships, strategic concepts, strategic stability-is indispensable to an effective SDI approach.

(Speech before the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, Feb. 13, 1985.)

34 For a discussion of the objectives of arms control, see National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control: Background

and Issues (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985),

pp. 4-6.
134

might feel compelled to take in anticipation

of what the other might do in the future.

A negotiated transition to a U.S.-Soviet

strategic relationship in which BMD plays an

important role would be an arms control arrangement intended, like earlier ones, to enhance strategic stability. The two sides would

first need to agree in principle that there

should be such a negotiated transition. According to Secretary of State George P. Shultz:

As our [BMD] research proceeds and both

nations thus gain a better sense of the future

prospects, the Soviets should see the advantages of agreed ground rules to ensure that

any phasing in of defensive systems will be

orderly, predictable, and stabilizing. The

alternative-an unconstrained environment–

would be neither in their interest nor in

ours. 35

Soviet acceptance of such ground rules may

not come easily. The public position of the

Soviet Union thus far is that BMD deployments (beyond what is now allowed by the

ABM Treaty) would evoke an offensive response and make arms control impossible. (See

appendix K for various Soviet statements on

this subject.)

We do not know whether the Soviet public

position is purely propaganda posturing intended solely to undercut the Strategic Defense Initiative. There is general agreement

that at least the initial Soviet response to U.S.

BMD deployments would be to try to restore

their own offensive capabilities. The United

States might decide to deploy BMD because

it believed that it would make further offensive deployments by the Soviets futile. What

is difficult to predict is when or whether the

Soviets might arrive at the same conclusion.

Until they did, they might engage in a substantial offensive build-up.

Once agreement in principle to a negotiated

transition had been arrived at, the stages of

the transition would have to be defined. The

ultimate goal may be to reach a state in which

greatly reduced offenses are believed to be

highly unlikely to penetrate very effective

defenses. Before that stage is reached, area-

‘

5 Speech in Austin, Texas, Mar. 28, 1985.

sonable intermediate stage would be one in

which defenses could prevent offenses from effectively attacking military targets, even

though cities might still be vulnerable. A stage

to be avoided, however, is one in which the Soviet Union, for example, might be able to use

offensive missiles to weaken the U.S. retaliatory force, then defend very well against a

‘‘ragged’ U.S. retaliation. (See discussion

above, p. 125 and in chapter 5). In that stage

it would be very difficult for the United States

to agree to further offensive reductions when

it already feared the possibility of the Soviets

defending successfully against a U.S. retaliation.

To avoid that and the other kinds of instabilities discussed in this chapter, the two sides

would need to agree on the orderly accumulation of comparable ballistic missile defense

(and, possibly, air defense) capabilities. They

would need to agree on comparable, mutually

acceptable, offensive capabilities. Without

such agreed levels of capability, each side

might see the other as having or seeking military advantages.

Working Out the Details

As with past agreements on offensive and

defensive arms, agreements on acceptable

levels of offensive and defensive capabilit y

would probably have to be translated int o

agreements on some specifications of th e

weapons systems each side could deploy. T h e

current ABM Treaty, for example, specifies

what kinds and numbers of components of a

BMD system, are acceptable. This agreement

was possible in part because the BMD systems of the two sides were roughly similar in

principle and because the permitted BMD deployments kept actual capabilities almost

negligibly small.

Agreements to phase in increasingly higher

levels of BMD capability together would be

far more challenging. One problem seen in previous arms control negotiations could be particularly severe: that of asymmetries in the

forces on the two sides. The United States and

the Soviet Union have in the past found it

difficult to agree on what mixes of ICBMs ,

SLBMs, and aircraft on the two sides con -
135

stituted equivalent nuclear offensive forces. At

least in the early transition stages, force asymmetries could remain a serious problem. As

long as the number of ballistic missile warheads that the Soviets could use to attack U.S.

missile silos exceeds the number of U.S. warheads in those silos, equal defense capabilities

would not have equal strategic significance.

Equal defenses would reduce the net number

of U.S. retaliatory weapons surviving a Soviet

first strike and penetrating Soviet defenses

(see chapter 5).

Different technical approaches to BMD and

different levels of technological accomplishment would also complicate calculations of

equivalence. Moreover, those differences

would exacerbate the problem of assuring adequate verification that one side or the other

did not have significantly more capable defensive systems. Although President Reagan has

suggested the possibility of the United States

sharing BMD technologies with the Soviets,36

many are skeptical that this would or should

ever happen. They point out, for example, that

the more the Soviets knew about the details

of a U.S. BMD system, the easier it would be

for them to devise effective countermeasures

to overcome it.

The two sides might also have difficulty

agreeing on which approaches to BMD are

acceptable. The Strategic Defense Initiative

is currently emphasizing nonnuclear defenses.

The kind of system the Soviets have deployed

and are currently best prepared to expand uses

nuclear warheads. In the longer term, however, perhaps the two sides’ technological approaches to BMD problems might converge.

If the two sides were to reach the ultimate

stage of deeply reduced offensive missiles and

“1 n replying to a statement that the proposed U.S. SD I program is seen in hloscow as an attempt b}’ the United States

to regain strategic superiorit~ b~ making the Soliet Union vulnerable to a first strike, Secretar~. of Defense Caspar fl’einberger

said:

hl~ response is that i> not only totall~ wrong, I)ut it conclusliel}r pro\ cd to he wrong I)i t hl~ f ‘resident”~ offer to share th i+

w)th t h[~ world If w (, ran got it, [ f w t> w antt,(i a war-v.’] nning capability t hr(]ugh tlu> nl(’an<, W(I It ouldn ”t h{, L tilking alx)ut +hari ng I [ wIt h t hr M orld

(A 13(’ h’e~work tele~’i~ion program ‘ ‘The [’ire Unleashed.

June 6, 1 W;. )

aircraft and highly effective defenses, yet

another potential problem would still have to

be considered. That is, some residual uncertainties would likely remain about Soviet capabilities and intentions. They might be suspected of working on or actually achieving

some effective countermeasure to a key part

of our defensive shield. There would always

be the possibility of smuggled nuclear weapons, secretly implanted in U.S. cities. The

United States, for its part, might have no comparable retaliatory threat. This situation

would leave the United States open at some

point to Soviet nuclear blackmail.

Potential Effects of the Absence

of a Negotiated Transition

The deployment of BMD in the absence of

a negotiated transition would mean, in effect,

that the United States and the Soviet Union

would have abandoned the ABM Treaty but

not replaced it with a new arms control regime

for BMD. The potential diplomatic and broader

arms control consequences of such a course deserve consideration.

Offensive Arms Limitations

Negotiations on offensive arms limitations

without regulation of defensive deployments

could be extremely difficult. Unless each side

was absolutely convinced that it could not afford to deploy offenses that would counter the

other’s defenses, it would have a strong incentive to increase, rather than decrease, offensive arms levels.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

To the degree that arms competition adds

to tension in the U.S.-Soviet relationship (some

would argue that the arms competition is

solely a result, not a cause, of the tension between the two political systems), a BMDoffense competition could make U.S.-Soviet

agreements in other areas more difficult.

U.S.-Allied Relations

To the extent that U.S. allies see the ABM

Treaty (or would see its successor) as central
136

to an arms control process that they wish to

sustain, and to the extent that they saw the

United States as responsible for its abandonment, U.S.-allied relations could be strained.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Some nonnuclear-weapon states that signed

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty take seriously the obligations assumed in that accord

by the nuclear-weapon states to try to make

further progress in nuclear arms control. If

they saw abandonment of the ABM Treaty

(without replacement by a new arms control

regime) as a major step away from that promise, then their adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be called into question. (This

risk is discussed further in appendix C.)

In sum, there appears to be a broad and, cumulatively, compelling set of reasons to support recent Administration emphasis on the

importance of a negotiated transition to U. S.-

Soviet BMD deployments, should a deployment

decision be made. For either side to proceed

to deployment of BMD outside the context of

an arms control arrangement effectively governing offensive and defensive arms on both

sides could lead to serious strategic instabilities. Whether such a negotiated transition is

possible remains to be seen. But because both

sides plan strategic forces several years in advance, the negotiations would probably have

to begin during the research and development

stage, not in the stage of first BMD deployments. Indeed, any decision about BMD deployment should take into consideration the

realistic prospects for such negotiations. The

relationship between research and development and arms control is discussed in chapter 10 of this report.

CONCLUSIONS

A complete analysis of the potential impact

of BMD deployments on crisis stability would

have to include, inter alia, a large and complex

exploration of the potential outcomes of nuclear exchanges between the Soviet Union and

the United States given various levels and

kinds of offense and defense on the two sides.

Such an exploration would require highly sophisticated “exchange model” calculations to

simulate the possible impact on outcomes of

such factors as:

●

●

●

●

asymmetries in the offensive and defensive force structures of the two sides;

uncertainties on each side about the offensive and defensive capabilities of the other

side;

varying degrees of ability on each side to

defend certain types of targets “preferentially” (see chapter 5); and

the differences made by the size of attack

and rate of attack defended against on the

numbers of warheads each side could intercept.

Such an analysis would require extensive

computing resources and many hundreds of

“runs” of the model. Carrying out this analysis would not prove that the net consequences

of deploying various levels of BMD would be

positive or negative. But it would be one contribution toward such assessments and might

help to avoid particularly unstable relationships between the force structures on the two

sides. Potential crisis instabilities may not

only be risky in themselves, but may induce

arms race instabilities, as one side or the other

adds new forces in an attempt to remedy what

they would consider to be a dangerous strategic disadvantage. Moreover, exploration of

the strategic implications of various levels of

offense and defense would be an important

preparation for attempting to negotiate with

the Soviets on a transition to a world of increased defenses and reduced offenses.

Congress may wish to see that credible and

thorough strategic analyses have been performed well before it must decide whether to authorize BMD programs beyond the research

stage.
Chapter 7

Ballistic Missile Defense

Technologies
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...139

Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........................139

Technological Prediction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......140

Organization of This Chapter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...140

BMD Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....141

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........141

Weapon Kill Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................146

Sensors and Data Processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............159

Power and Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...168

Countermeasures . . . .

Countermeasures to

Countermeasures to

Countermeasures to

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Sensors and Discrimination . ...................170

Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ÿ• . ............172

Overall System Performance. . ..................174

Relationships Between Countermeasures

Tables

Table No.

7-l. Constellation Size

7-2. Constellation Size

Figures

Figure No.

Given

Given

Assumptions

Assumptions

7-1. Multilayered Space Defense . . .

7-2. Compensating for Atmospheric

7-3. Long- and Short-Wave Infrared

7-4. Onboard Signal Processing. . . .

..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Page

in Text . . . . . . . . . ..........185

in Text . . . . . . . . . ..........185

. . .

Distortion

Detection

..,. . . . . .

Page

. . . . . . . . . ,.,,. . . . . . . . . . . 142

With Adaptive Optics ....151

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Chapter 7

Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

INTRODUCTION

This chapter and chapter 8 describe the technologies applicable to ballistic missile defense

and point out some of the uncertainties that

further research may hope to resolve. Ballistic missile defense technologies and ballistic

missile defense policies, of course, are interdependent. BMD policy choices, the subject of

the preceding chapters of this report, are constrained by the state of our technology. At the

same time, however, policy decisions influence

technological advances by providing (or withholding) resources and incentives to extend

our knowledge and capabilities.1

Feasibility

The overall feasibility of ballistic missile defense technologies involves a set of related issues which become increasingly harder to answer definitively. Scientific feasibility-whether

or not something is physically possible—is obviously necessary for any BMD concept, but

it is by no means sufficient. Technical and economic feasibility questions go on to ask

whether a device permitted by the laws of nature can actually be built at a reasonable cost

within a reasonable amount of time. Assuming that a system can be designed and built

according to specifications, operational feasibility issues address the questions of whether

it can actually be deployed, tested, maintained, and operated with a high degree of confidence.

Overriding all of these considerations is the

issue which forms the crux of the BMD technical debate: any effective BMD system must

be “robust,” in that it must operate and endure

against a reactive adversary intent on defeating it. The dynamic competition between offensive and defensive technologies-among measures, countermeasures, and counter-counter-

‘For example, technology in the area of pollution control has

primarily been driven by policy decisions.

measures—forces the successful development

and implementation of BMD technologies to

be far more than a purely technological accomplishment, such as reaching the moon or splitting the atomic nucleus. The moon and the nucleus did not hide, run away, or shoot back.

Evaluating the robustness of a prospective

defensive system requires making assumptions about the motivations and relative technical skills of the two sides. It also requires

a clear conception of the system’s intent. Is

a successful defense one which can defeat a

given threat and deters threat growth? Or is

it one which can defeat the threat and provokes

growth, forcing the Soviets to spend a lot of

money?

Failure to take full account of the offensedefense competition can lead to what has been

called the ‘‘fallacy of the last move, in which

some action is evaluated as if the strategic

competition were frozen immediately afterwards. However, although the concept of a

“last move” in the competition between offense and defense does not make sense, the

starting point of such a competition is well defined. Massive, diverse, and highly effective

offensive forces dominate the strategic relationship today. From that starting point, advanced defensive technology and advanced offensive technology will evolve together, in the

absence of political agreements to regulate

that competition. If both offenses and defenses

evolve at comparable rates, the present dominance of the offense will clearly be maintained.

Economic questions are as important as technical ones, since the outcome of a technological competition depends in part on who is better able to pay for it. These economic questions

are discussed further in chapter 8.

If it turns out that offensive technologies

have developed so far along their learning

curve that their rate of continued technical

progress slows, evolving defensive technolo139
140

gies might make progress in eroding the great

distance currently existing between the two.

The relevant question is whether it is likely

that an arms development competition will

close that gap. To say that the time is ripe for

offense dominance to give way to defense dominance either prejudges the outcome of this technological competition, or assumes that a political agreement will be reached which will ensure

that defenses catch up and overtake offenses.

Technological Prediction

Even aside from the all-important question

of effectiveness against a reactive opponent,

predicting future technical feasibility is a difficult business. Experts can have hunches and

gut feelings, and they can make elaborate technical calculations. However, firm answers cannot be obtained without experimentation. No

one, regardless of technical credentials or creative ability, is an expert when it comes to predicting the future. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has called attention to Albert

Einstein’s 1932 observation that “there is not

the slightest indication that [nuclear] energy

will ever be obtainable.”2 Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adelman has similarly recalled the warning that

Admiral Leahy, President Truman’s Chief of

Staff, gave the President in 1945: “The [atomic] bomb will never go off, and I speak as an

expert in explosives. “3 Adelman warned that

technical critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative “may well turn out to be just as shortsighted in retrospect as many of their predecessors have been in hindsight today. ”

In the context of the time, however, Einstein

was correct. The “indications” that nuclear energy might be obtainable had yet to be discovered. If a major effort to develop nuclear power

had been undertaken before basic research had

revealed the phenomenon of heavy element fission, it might have focused on the wrong end

of the periodic table and floundered for years.

‘Speech before the Foreign Press Center, Dec. 19, 1984.

Quoted by Ambassador Adelman in “SDI: Setting the Record Straight, ” speech before the Baltimore Council on Foreign

Affairs, Aug. 7, 1985.

When the “experts” do make mistakes, they

err in both directions. Just as breakthroughs

have been made which were previously predicted to be impossible, other foretold inevitabilities have never come to pass. For example,

General David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board

of the RCA Corp., claimed in 1955 that “[I]t

can be taken for granted that before 1980

ships, aircraft, locomotives and even automobiles will be atomically fuelled.” John von Neumann, the father of the modern computer and

a member of the Atomic Energy Commission

stated the following year that “[a] few decades

hence, energy may be free-just like the unmetered air.”*

One way to attack the question of predicting the feasibility of a given technical accomplishment (setting aside the question of reactive opponent) is to specify a time limit. Is a

Boeing 747 airliner feasible today? Of course—

it has been in service for more than 15 years.4

Would it have been feasible in 1940? No–

unless 30 years were allotted at that time for

its development, including some unanticipated

and rather fundamental inventions that made

it possible, and provided that large expenditures were allocated for producing and operating its predecessors.

A more relevant measure is to ask whether

progress can be accelerated significantly by

a crash (“technology-limited’ program. Perhaps a 747 could have been developed by 1955

or 1965 if doing so had been a compelling national priority. However, attempting to build

one before all of the required technologies had

matured to their 1970 levels would probably

have produced a very different airplane at

much greater expense.

Organization of This Chapter

This chapter introduces the technological

components which might contribute to future

*AI1 quotes in the preceding three paragraphs can be found

in The Experts Speak: The Definitive Compendium of Authoritative Disinformation, by Christopher Cerf and Victor Navasky, a joint project of The IVation magazine and the Institute

of Expertology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

‘Pan Am introduced the Boeing 747 airliner to commercial

service with a flight from New York to London on Jan. 22, 1970.
141

ballistic missile defense systems. It reviews

the characteristics of many of the relevant

technologies and outlines the key uncertainties concerning those technologies’ potentials.

Readers who do not wish to immerse themselves in technological details are invited to

concentrate on the sections labeled “Issues,”

with the descriptions preceding those sections

used as reference material. In addition, the following chapter (chapter 8) summarizes some

of the major issues of technological feasibility.

This chapter also examines how the technological building blocks need to be put together,

and it introduces some of the systems issues

relevant to integrating the pieces into a coherent whole. It does not attempt to predict exactly how each of the technologies will evolve,

and it compares different contenders for some

given task to each other only in a general way.

The chapter was prepared with access to

classified materials. For the most part, those

classified data concerned schedules, budgets,

and technical matters too detailed for this discussion. A few relevant classified details and

concepts are discussed in a classified annex.

BMD TECHNOLOGIES

Overview

BMD Concepts

Ballistic missile defense systems as described

by the ABM Treaty and as primarily pursued

prior to 1980 consisted of ground-based interceptors of various ranges supported by groundbased radars. These systems would attempt

to intercept ballistic reentry vehicles (RVs) as

they descended toward the United States, either prior to or just after they reentered the

Earth’s atmosphere. Current BMD concepts

posit systems that can intercept ballistic missiles and their RVs at all stages of their flight,

from shortly after launch to just prior to detonation.

Layered Defenses

The basic concept is to use layered defenses,

which provide the defense with several opportunities to attack the incoming warheads. Early layers would reduce the number of warheads

that later layers would have to handle; later

layers would “mop up” those that get through

the early layers.

It has become convenient to discuss defensive layers which are associated with each

phase of a ballistic missile’s flight. Since the

missile has different properties in each phase,

different defensive components are associated

with the different phases.

The first opportunity to engage the missile

would be in its boost phase, when the ICBM’s

booster motor is burning. A second layer might

operate in the post-boost phase after the

booster has dropped away, leaving a postboost vehicle (PBV or bus) which aims the individual warheads at their targets and lets

them go. Decoys and other defense penetration aids can also be dispensed by the PBV

during this phase. The post-boost is followed

by a midcourse phase of up to 20 minutes in

length during which the RVs and decoys coast

towards their targets; the last phase is the terminal or reentry phase, lasting less than a minute, which starts when the RVs reenter the

Earth’s atmosphere and the lighter decoys

burn up.

Operation of each layer is controlled by a

battle management system, which also coordinates between the layers and provides overall supervision and control.

Properties of the Phases

Boost Phase.– During boost phase, the hot

gases in the booster’s exhaust produce a large,

easily detected infrared signal, or signature,

especially as the rocket rises above the clouds

and the denser layers of the atmosphere. For

current missiles, the boost phase lasts 3 to 5

minutes.5 However, not all this period is avail5

See J. C. Fletcher, “The Technologies for Ballistic Missile

Defense, ” Issues in Science and Technologu, fall 1984, p. 15.
142

Figure 7-1 .—Multilayered Space Defense

Each of the phases presents specific opportunities to the corresponding defensive layer. The phases are boost, post-boost,

midcourse and terminal.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

able for the defense to attack the boosters. The

defensive system must first detect the launch,

determine that there is actually an attack in

progress, decide to engage the boosters, and

allocate defensive weapons platforms to the

boosters. How much time this would take depends on how automated the system would be

and how quickly decisions could be made. In

particular, requiring that human intervention be

necessary before the defense can commence firing imposes extreme time constraints on command and control procedures.6 Possibly, a succession of alert conditions could be established

‘Requiring human decisionmaking could pose even more severe problems in terms of platform self-defense, when only a

very short time may be available to characterize and engage

attacking weapons before they come within lethal range.

which, under day-today conditions, would require human intervention before boost-phase

defenses could engage an attack (leaving surprise attacks to be handled by later layers),

but which in times of crisis would permit the

defense to engage boosters autonomously if

an attack were detected. Such a procedure, of

course, would increase the incentive for surprise attack.

Successful engagement in the boost phase

can provide a high degree of leverage-i. e., the

destruction of one booster results in the destruction of all its RVs and decoys. There is

also another sort of leverage involved–the

boosters are much more vulnerable than the

RVs, providing another advantage to attacking the boost phase.
143

One consequence of the high leverage of

boost-phase defenses is that small errors in

boost-phase BMD performance are magnified

to become larger errors in the later phases.

Each missile that survives the boost phase

may ultimately produce hundreds of objects

(RVs and decoys) that must be tracked, discriminated, and attacked by later layers. Because effective discrimination is vital to the

success of the midcourse layer, successful midcourse defense maybe tightly linked to the

success of the boost phase.

By their nature, boost-phase defenses have

little ability to defend selectively. While a

booster is burning, it may be possible to determine where it came from, wherein general

it is headed, and what kind of missile it is.

However, until the individual RVs are released

by the PBV, their specific targets cannot be

determined. Therefore, boost-phase defenses

cannot effectively conduct preferential defense, in which limited defensive resources are

concentrated on defending only some sites at

the expense of permitting attacks on others
144

to continue unimpeded. In this manner, a limited defensive capability can be used to save

a greater number of sites than would be possible with a random allocation of defenses (see

discussion of preferential defense in chapter

5).7

Even without the ability to conduct preferential defense, a boost-phase defense which

eliminates some fraction of an attack can deny

the offense the ability to conduct a highly

structured attack which requires warheads to

arrive at specified targets in a precise order.

Such an attack would be much more difficult

to carry out if some fraction of the offensive

boosters were intercepted by the boost-phase

layer. A structured attack, intended to blind

or destroy components of the defensive system, might make it easier to penetrate later

defensive layers. Therefore, the inability to

conduct such an attack might make those later

layers more effective.

Post-Boost Phase.—The post-boost phase

may last as long as 6 minutes, but it could be

much shorter. As this phase progresses, the

PBV dispenses RVs and decoys and therefore

loses value as a target. Therefore, leverage is

high at the beginning of the post-boost phase

and low at the end. Although the individual

RVs on each PBV are relatively “hard” (difficult to destroy with certain types of defensive weapons), the PBVs themselves might be

‘‘softer, adding to the leverage of the postboost phase. However, if a PBV is disabled

without disabling the RVs still attached to it,

those RVs may still have to be handled by

later defensive layers.8

The post-boost defense has more time to get

ready than the boost-phase defense (since it

can get ready during the boost phase), and it

——-.—

‘Only redundant targets, where the loss of many or most can

be tolerated, are logical candidates for preferential defense.

ICBM silos are perhaps the best example, since only a small

fraction of them still carry enormous destructive potential.

8RVS which have not been properly dispensed by the PBV

will not be accurately aimed, although they may nevertheless

be armed and left on a trajectory which will take them somewhere within the borders of the country being attacked. If their

mission requires high accuracy, such RVS will have been rendered ineffective; if their mission merely requires that they reach

some region of the country and detonate, they may still be able

to accomplish their task.

may have more total time to engage each individual target. However, targets must be engaged early in the post-boost phase to achieve

best results. As in the case of boost-phase

defenses, small errors in post-boost performance can have larger consequences in the later

phases. Unlike boost phase, however, the performance of the post-boost phase depends on

when targets are killed as well as on how many

are killed. Since targets become less valuable

as time goes on, uncertainties in timing will

affect overall post-boost-phase performance.

Selectivity in the post-boost-phase defense–

the ability to conduct preferential defense—is

similar to that of the boost phase.

Midcourse Phase.—Most of an RV’S flight

time is spent in the midcourse, the period between release from the bus and reentry into

the Earth’s atmosphere. This period lasts

about 20 minutes for ICBM RVs; it may be

much shorter for SLBM RVs. Although there

is much more time to find and engage targets

in the midcourse than in the earlier phases,

there is also much more to do. Before a target can be engaged, it must be discriminated

from decoys and possibly from debris; imperfect discrimination capability will result in

shooting at objects that are not really targets

and in withholding fire on objects that should

actually be attacked. To kill the 10 RVs carried on one SS-18 in boost-phase, the defense

must find and destroy one target in the few

minutes that the boost phase lasts. To kill the

same number of RVs in midcourse, the defense

must sort through possibly hundreds of objects in order to find and destroy the 10 RVs

in 20 minutes. The rate of activity required in

midcourse could, therefore, be the same or

higher than in the boost phase. Of course, in a

massive launch, the number of targets and decoys would be thousands of times larger.

Leverage is low in the midcourse, but midcourse defense does have the potential for being selective. Destinations of individual RVs

can be determined once the RVs have separated from the bus.

Terminal Phase.–The terminal (or reentry)

phase is very short. If hardened targets are

defended, defensive intercepts can occur at
145

fairly low altitudes, since hardened targets by

definition are designed to survive nearby nuclear explosions. However, if soft targets are

to be protected, intercepts must take place at

a higher altitude. g As few as tens of seconds

would be available between the time reentry

began (or more accurately, the time that atmospheric effects begin to sort out decoys

from RVs) and the time that terminal interceptors would have to be launched in order to

destroy the RV at a sufficiently high altitude.

However, the terminal defense would have almost 30 minutes to get ready to engage the

RVs. Time pressures would be minimized if

earlier phases had identified and tracked those

RVs which they failed to destroy, and were

able to “hand off” this trajectory information

to the terminal defense. This tactic assumes

good discrimination and kill effectiveness in

the earlier layers.

Advantages and Disadvantages of

Layered Defenses

Multi-1ayered defenses have the potential for

performing much better than single layer defenses. First, several layers of moderate effectiveness which combine to produce a total defense of high effectiveness will, in general, be

easier to design and build than a single layer

having the same resultant effectiveness. Second, multi-layered systems, in theory, are

more robust than single-layered systems, especially if each layer employs different technologies and different designs. In that case, offensive developments which degrade one layer

might not severely affect later layers. Third,

the presence of early layers—the boost and

post-boost layers–reduces the burden on the

later layers. The number of objects the midcourse defense has to handle is cut in half if

the early layers kill half of the missiles. Finally, building several layers allows the designer

to take advantage of whatever unique advantages each layer provides. For example, a multi-layered defense could have both the leverage of the boost-phase defense and the selec-

‘Even if the defensive interceptor is nonnuclear, the attacking warhead may be salvage-fused to detonate if intercepted.

Therefore, intercepts must take place higher above soft targets

than they need to above hardened ones.

tivity of the midcourse. A single layer defense

could have only one or the other.

However, there are drawbacks as well as advantages to layered defenses. The most obvious problem is that four layers are likely to

cost more than one layer—especially if the layers are completely independent—although perhaps less than a smaller number of layers

which were as effective as the total of the four.

Second, the degree to which the layers can

combine to produce high effectiveness will depend on how independent the layers are. To

take an extreme example, if all layers depend

on the same sensor system and that sensor

system fails, all the layers will fail. The same

holds true for battle management algorithms

or other shared resources. The leakage rates of

the individual layers of a layered defense can be

multiplied together to give the total leakage rate

only if the individual layers are totally independent and share no common elements. Otherwise,

leakage through early layers may not be fully

compensated for by later layers.

The robustness of the system against the

loss (or severe degradation) of one layer will

depend on how much capacity is built into the

system to compensate for that loss. The layers

must be able to take advantage of the other

layers without being overly dependent on

them. For example, if boost and post-boost defenses permit twice the expected number of

objects to reach midcourse, and if that in turn

substantially degrades the midcourse defense’s ability to sort objects, the midcourse

may let through not only the additional RVs

but also many of the ones it would otherwise

have intercepted.

In practice, it will be impossible to know in

advance exactly how effective any layer will

be; there will probably be large uncertainties

in predicting how well it will work against an

actual attack. Those uncertainties, however,

will be viewed differently by the two sides.

From the defensive point of view, extra capacity will be required in each layer in order to

hedge against the possibility that it (or the

other layers) will not perform as well as anticipated. From the offensive view, however, uncertainties will make it more difficult to de-
146 —.

stroy (or penetrate) the defense with high

confidence.

The significance of a degradation in capability will depend on the goal of the defense.

It makes little difference whether an ICBM

silo defense is 40 or 50 percent effective. If one

were only interested in providing a survivable deterrent, rather than defending populations, these concerns regarding the vulnerability of one of several layers would be

relatively unimportant. However, the difference between a 90 percent effective city defense and a 99.9 percent effective city defense

is a hundredfold increase in the number of

weapons reaching U.S. cities; this could make

the difference between the survival and the destruction of our civilization.

Individual Tasks of Each Layer

Each layer must perform the following

tasks:

●

●

●

●

●

Surveillance and Acquisition: Attacks

must be detected, and the number, location, and probable destination of all

threatening objects must be determined.

Discrimination: Actual missiles, busses,

and warheads must be distinguished from

nonthreatening decoys and other debris.

Pointing and Tracking: Targets must be

tracked with whatever precision is required by the weapon designated to destroy that target, and that tracking information must be communicated to the

defensive weapon.

Target Destruction: A defensive weapon

must deliver sufficient energy to a target

rapidly enough to destroy it.

Kill Assessment: Those targets that have

been successfully destroyed-must be identified and distinguished from survivors.

In addition, if it can be determined why

a targeted warhead was not destroyed (incorrect pointing, for example), this information can be used for a subsequent

attack.

The above tasks all involve processing either

information or energy. Sensors collect signals

or radiation emitted by or reflected from targets. These are processed to yield information

about the individual targets. Sensor and data

processing technologies are therefore crucial

to an advanced ballistic missile defense. When

targets have been identified and assigned to

weapons systems, energy stored in the weapons must be converted to a form which can be

delivered to the target in sufficient quantity

rapidly enough to destroy it. Various types of

directed-energy (beam) weapons and kineticenergy (projectile) weapons have been proposed

for this role.

Technological candidates for sensors, processors, and weapons are described in this chapter. The battle management issues involved

in coordinating and integrating these “building blocks’ into a complete, functioning system are also discussed, along with possible offensive responses or countermeasures. Some

of the logistical issues involved in constructing and operating such a system are noted as

well. Further discussion of the feasibility and

operational issues is presented in chapter 8.

Weapon Kill Mechanisms

Introduction and Types of Kill

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization is investigating the feasibility of many

types of weapons. The type that has been publicized the most, possibly because it appears

to be the most exotic, is the directed-energy

weapon. Although this class of weapon is only

one potential facet of the SDI, it could possibly become the centerpiece of some of the defensive layers. The advantage of such weapons is clear: killing energy is delivered at or

near the speed of light, and, for typical BMD

distances, arrives at the target in less than a

tenth of a second.

Concepts under investigation in this area include several types of laser and particle beam

weapons. For weapons purposes, the relevant

criteria used to determine the usefulness of the

different technologies mostly concern their

ability to neutralize targets in a small amount

of time (seconds, at the most). Another consideration is the capability for kill assessment
after the target has been engaged. This latter Impulse kill does not achieve its goal by

question depends in part on the target; it may heating the target, but by depositing energy

be a booster rocket stage, a post-boost vehi- in a powerful pulse on its surface. A mechanicle, or an RV. Enemy satellites could also be cal shock wave is driven through the target,

targets. collapsing it.

There are three types of kill mechanisms by

which directed-energy systems can act: 1)

functional kill, 2) thermal kill, and 3) impulse

kill.

The functional kill mechanism, pertinent to

particle beam or microwave weapons, prevents

an offensive weapon from operating correctly

without necessarily destroying it. Subatomic

particles with kinetic energies of a few hundred million electron-volts’” (MeV) can penetrate at least several centimeters of dense

materials, or tens of centimeters of typical aerospace materials. Therefore, sensitive electronic components deep inside the target can be

altered or destroyed. However, it may not be

immediately apparent to an outside observer

that a kill has occurred. A kill of this sort may

be referred to as a “soft, “ i.e., initially unobservable, kill.

To disable boosters by thermal means, a

nominal range of 1 to 100 kilojoules of energy

deposited per square centimeter (kJ/cm2) of

target has been taken as an estimate in the

literature. This energy must be delivered

quickly–if the time needed to deliver a lethal

amount of energy is very long (hundreds of

seconds or more), the heated area of the booster may have time to conduct away much of the

energy being directed at it and may then not

fail. The actual value of a lethal energy dose

for a given target depends on many factors,

including material, surface properties, and mechanical stress. This energy will raise the surface temperature of the target sufficiently to

weaken or deform it, allowing internal forces

to cause a catastrophic failure. The ability of

a given technology to effect a thermal kill depends on the power levels attainable, the focusing ability of the weapon, and the distance

from the target.

IOAn ~]ectron.~.olt is the mount of energy an electron ~~ Pick

up from a l-volt battery.

Lasers

A laser is a device which produces a coherent beam of electromagnetic radiation at a

well-defined wavelength. Coherence means

that all the waves of radiation are in step,

crest-to-crest and trough-to-trough, and maintain this alignment over time. When they

strike a surface, the effects are greater than

would be the case for incoherent radiation. The

intensity of incoherent radiation is limited by

the temperature of the object producing that

radiation; there is no such limit to laser radiation. The radiation may be in the infrared,

visible, ultraviolet, or X-ray regions of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Lasing occurs when more of the lasing material’s molecules (or atoms) are in an “excited” higher energy state, and fewer in a lower energy state, than is normally the case.

When an excited molecule drops back to a lower energy state, it emits radiation at a precisely defined wavelength. This radiation stimulates other molecules to do exactly the same

thing. They drop back to the same lower state,

emitting radiation in step with the original radiation and having the same wavelength. This

effect quickly spreads throughout the lasing

materiaI (the lasant), and a laser beam is

produced. Mirrors are usually placed at each

end of a resonant cavity which contains the

lasant. They reflect the radiation back and

forth in order to stimulate further emission

along a very narrow range of angles.

A major task is to arrange the molecules of

the lasant so that there is a “population

inversion’ ‘—i.e., so that there are more molecules in an excited state than in a state of

lower energy. A suitable lasant must be found,

and the energy needed to “pump” it—i.e., to

raise its molecules to the upper laser state—

must be provided. There are several ways to

provide the energy for this purpose. Some
148

lasers use chemical energy (in the form of a

chemical reaction which produces molecules

in an excited state); others use electrical

energy. The characteristic wavelength produced depends on the material used as a lasant, and it is determined by the difference in

energies between the upper and lower states.

The effectiveness of a laser as a beam weapon depends on the rate and amount of energy

which can be delivered per unit area on a target. This quantity is determined by the laser

power, the distance to the target, and the degree to which the beam can be focused on the

target. Effectiveness also depends on the retarget time.

All electromagnetic radiation, even focused

radiation, eventually spreads out with distance. This spreading, known as diffraction, results in a beam which becomes less intense as

it travels out from its source; the maximum

possible intensity of a laser beam (assuming

the greatest possible degree of focusing) falls

off as the square of the distance from the laser. The amount of diffraction depends on both

the wavelength of the radiation and the diameter of the mirror, with the minimum possible spreading angle in radians” being equal to

about 1.2 times the ratio of the wavelength of

the radiation to the diameter of the laser aperture. 12 This angle of spreading is an ideal limit,

assuming perfect optics and perfect focusing.

An important consequence is that the smaller

the wavelength, or the larger the laser mirror

diameter, the less spreading occurs. To reduce

diffraction, and therefore to reduce the beam

size on target and deliver more energy per unit

area, wavelength should be minimized and

‘

] One radl~n is an angle of 360/2 ~ (about 57.3) degrees. It

is defined as the angle subtended by that portion of the circumference of a circle having a length equal to the circle’s radius.

12 Ashton Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space,

background paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April

1984), p. 17, takes the spreading angle to be 1.2 times the wave

length divided by the mirror diameter. It is noted that the full

angle subtended by the null ring of the Airy disk diffraction

pattern requires a multiplier of 2.4. However, most of the energy

is contained within a diameter only half as big; therefore, 1.2

is taken as the multiplier. This assumption is favorable to the

laser technology, since not all of the beam’s energy is contained

within this angle; the lethality of the actual beam will thus be

slightly less than the estimates in this section.

mirror size should be maximized.13 Of course,

in choosing these parameters, one is limited

by physical and engineering constraints.

Smaller wavelengths, while allowing smaller

mirrors for the same amount of spreading, also

impose more stringent tolerances on the quality of the optics used. The size of the irregularities in the optics must be much less than one

wavelength of the radiation used.

Aiming radiation at a moving target thousands of kilometers away requires highly accurate tracking and pointing. Typically, a

beam spot of roughly a meter in diameter is

envisioned for attacking today’s missiles in

the boost phase. To hit a target with an error

of tenths of a meter at a distance of thousands

of kilometers (km) requires aiming accuracy

of about a tenth of a microradian. This is

equivalent to hitting a television set in Los Angeles with a beam fired from directly over New

York City.

In order to complete a thermal kill, the beam

has to dwell on the target long enough to deposit a lethal amount of energy. Tracking accuracy must therefore be maintained over that

interval. During one second, an ICBM may

travel from 1 to 7 km (depending on when it

is engaged) and can sweep through an angle

(as observed by the laser weapon) of up to

about 3,000 microradians.

Chemical Lasers:

Description. –Chemical lasers use the

energy from a chemical reaction between two

fuels to produce laser radiation. The most mature chemical laser technology for highpowered lasers is the hydrogen fluoride (HF)

or the deuterium fluoride (DF) laser, in which

hydrogen (deuterium) and fluorine combine to

form hydrogen (deuterium) fluoride. Relatively

high levels of power have already been

produced in this type of laser, although a major scale-up from these levels is still needed

— — — 13 For exmple, the minimum diffraction UIgh? for a wavelength (in the infrared) of 3 microns (millionths of a meter), using

a perfect mirror 10 meters in diameter, would be 3.6 x 10-7

radians, or 0.36 microradians. Even this small angle, however,

would result in a beam spot of about 1 meter diameter at a distance of 3,OOO km.
149

before power levels necessary for BMD can be

obtained. The HF (DF) wavelength is 2.7 (3.8)

microns (millionths of a meter). Other chemical lasers at different wavelengths are under

consideration, such as oxygen-iodine (1.3

microns wavelength), iodine fluoride (0.65 and

0.72 microns), and nitrogen oxide (0.24

microns).

For illustrative purposes, we can look at potential requirements for an HF laser. As mentioned above, the diffraction phenomenon sets

a lower limit on angular spreading. Approaching this limit requires a significant technical

effort; for illustrative purposes, the following

example assumes that this theoretical limit

can be attained in practice.

The beam from an HF laser with a 10-meter

diameter mirror would have a minimum angular spread of 1.2 x 2,7 x 10 ‘/10 = 0.32 microradians. At a distance of 1,000 km, therefore,

a spot size of about 0.3 meters diameter would

be produced. A laser of 20 megawatts (MW)

output power would have an intensity of 25

kW/cm2 at this distance. A watt is a joule per

second. Therefore, exposures of 0.04 to 4 seconds would be required to reach the level of

1 to 100 kJ/cm2

. At a distance of 2,000 kilometers, exposures four times as long would be

required. At 100 kilometers, the required times

would be 100 times shorter.14

The length of time required to deliver a lethal amount of energy is inversely proportionalto the power of the laser, if the other parameters are held constant. Thus, if a 20 MW laser

were to be replaced by a 40 MW laser of the

same wavelength and mirror diameter, the required dwell time would be cut in half.

“The device parameters used here are only intended as examples. Although relatively powerful H F lasers have been constructed and operated, none has yet come close to a 20 MW

rating. The largest telescope mirror in the United States, at

the Mt. Palomar observatory, is 200 inches (5.08 m) in diameter;

a telescope using a 10-meter diameter mirror is currently being designed by astronomers at the University of California.

The diameter of the Space Telescope mirror is 2.5 meters. No

mirrors of this size have yet handled megawatts of electromagnetic radiation. There are, however, no obvious technical bars

to prevent either the laser or the mirrors from being developed.

We could also increase the diameter of the

mirror to extend lethal range. By doubling the

mirror diameter to 20 meters, the spreading

angle is reduced by a factor of 2, and the delivered intensity increases by a factor of 4.

Therefore + the lethal range of a laser weapon

grows as the laser power and as the square of

the mirror diameter.

Issues.—Several technical questions must

be resolved in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the chemical laser approach. The required laser power levels must be approached

closely enough to assure that no significant

engineering problems will prevent scaling up

to the full required power. Mirrors of the required dimensions and quality must be constructed and tested at high power levels. The

total system of the required power, optical

quality, and physical size must be robust

enough for transport to on-orbit position. The

atmospheric absorption of HF infrared radiation does not permit ground-basing (although

this is not necessarily true for other wavelengths under consideration). Finally, the

physical characteristics of the system should

permit the installation of many units in orbit,

given the transport shuttle capabilities likely

to be available within two decades or so. To

deal with Soviet countermeasures making

their boosters more resistant to attack, it

would be necessary to increase greatly brightness levels over those needed to counter existing Soviet ICBMs. Such devices would be

several orders of magnitude beyond present

capabilities, and would require reducing the

laser wavelength, increasing laser power, increasing the size of the optics, or some combination of the three.

Excimer Lasers:

Description. –Another promising area of laser research is the excimer laser. An “excimer”

is an excited dimer, or two-atom molecule, typically consisting of a noble gas (e.g., argon,

krypton, xenon) atom and a halogen (e.g., chlorine, fluorine) atom. In an excited state, these

two atoms can form a bound molecular system. When the molecule drops to a ground

state, it rapidly disassociates into two separate
150

atoms: noble gases do not form stable molecules in the ground state. The excited population of excimer molecules is produced by a

pulsed electrical discharge process, rather than

by a continuous chemical reaction. The light

produced, therefore, occurs in pulses. After the

pulse of laser radiation is produced, the process repeats with a new electrical discharge,

leading to another “pumping” of excited dimer

molecules. Relative to HF lasers, excimer lasers have the advantage of a shorter wavelength (typically 0.3 to 0.5 microns in the near

ultraviolet to visible region of the spectrum),

which greatly reduces the size requirements

on mirrors. As a result, however, the optical

requirements for mirror uniformity are that

much more stringent.

The reduced requirement on mirror size, if

such mirrors can be made, is a significant advantage over longer wavelength options. The

fact that the wavelength is only about onetenth that of infrared lasers means that, for

a given range, the mirror’s diameter need only

be one tenth that required for chemical lasers.

The area, then, would only be one-hundredth

as large. Since the thickness of a mirror, including its support structure, can be kept

fairly constant over a substantial range of diameters, its weight will be approximately pro

portional to its area. Excimer laser mirrors,

then, with one-tenth the diameter, may weigh

only on the order of one-hundredth as much

as HF laser mirrors with the same capability.

To see the advantage of the shorter wavelength laser, consider the hypothetical example of placing a laser in geosynchronous orbit

where it could always see all of the Soviet missile fields. The distance of effectiveness would

have to be about 40,000 kilometers. At that

range, an HF laser would require a perfect mirror of about 130 meters in diameter to keep

the beam size down to 1 meter in diameter at

the target. This is infeasible for the foreseeable future. However, an excimer laser would

require a mirror of the order of “only” 15 meters in diameter for the same size beam spot.

Placing any sort of a BMD-capable laser in

geosynchronous orbit may, however, be impractical. Instead, a ground-based laser might

be aimed at one or more mirrors in geosynchronous orbit. This scheme would have the obvious advantage of utilizing a ground-based

power source, allowing continuous operation

for long periods of time and reducing the

weight placed into geosynchronous orbit.

There would have to be several lasers, since

cloud cover could render some of them useless

at a given moment. The geostationary relay

mirrors would reflect the beams from the

ground lasers onto smaller battle mirrors in

low-earth orbit, which, in turn, would track individual targets and redirect the laser beam

to them.15 The geostationary relay mirror

would have to be much larger in diameter and

much more complicated if it were to attack

boosters directly without the help of lower orbit battle mirrors. Using the battle mirrors,

the relay mirror need not track individual targets at all. A constellation of battle mirrors

would be needed so that enough of them could

always be on station to deal with missiles

launched from all possible launch sites. Note

that this scheme is impractical for long wavelength lasers since the required mirror sizes

are so large.

Even at short wavelengths, a very powerful laser would be needed in order to travel

through the atmosphere and bounce off several mirrors while retaining its lethality. (The

additional spreading introduced by making

the beam travel out to geosynchronous orbit

and back can be compensated for by making

the relay mirrors sufficiently large in diameter.) A very large quantity of power (hundreds

of megawatts) would have to be available on

short notice to each of the ground-based lasers.

In order to compensate for atmospheric distortions, a technique known as “adaptive optics” is being developed. A pilot laser beam

15Relay mirrors could be in lower orbit than geosynchronous,

and could therefore be somewhat smaller than they would have

to be if they were in geosynchronous orbit. However, since mirrors in lower orbit would not remain over the same spot on the

ground, enough would be required so that one or, preferably,

more would always be in a position to relay the laser beam to

an appropriate battle mirror. In addition, if the relay mirror

orbits were too low, more than one bounce would be required

to direct the beam from a ground laser to a battle mirror on

the other side of the Earth.
.-.

Figure 7-2.—Compensating for Atmospheric

Distortion With Adaptive Optics

Probe beam Output beam

Detector Main Laser

Phase information from an incoming probe beam reveals

atmospheric distortion. Large ground-based laser beam is

distorted in the opposite sense to cancel out the atmospheric

effects.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

sent from the space mirror would be detected

at the ground-based laser. Information from

the beam would reveal the pattern of phase

shifts caused by atmospheric distortions. As

a result, corrections could be applied to the

beam generated by the ground laser, possibly

by distorting a mirror at many points over its

surface, in such a way as to compensate for

the atmospheric effects. Atmospheric disturbances typically occur over times which are

on the order of tenths of a second, during

which time the pilot beam can travel through

the relevant part of the atmosphere (the 20 km

nearest the surface), the main laser beam can

be corrected for the distortion, and the beam

can propagate back out through the atmosphere, all before the disturbance changes significantly. As atmospheric distortions change,

the optics would automatically compensate.

Issues. –To determine the feasibility of this

ground-laser/space-mirror approach, the adaptive optics method of compensating for atmospheric distortion must be examined for high

power levels over long distances. The ability

to compensate for atmospheric effects in the

151

presence of such an intense beam has not yet

been demonstrated. Mirrors of the required

size and robustness, and satisfying the exacting tolerances, must be constructed. They

must withstand intense laser beams without

distorting significantly or failing. Unlike the

HF case, only a few very large ones need be

made. However, many more smaller battle

mirrors, each with a diameter of about 5 meters, would be needed. With countermeasures

by the offense, this number could increase

further.

A possibly significant problem for this system, as well as any other directed-energy system, is the need to retarget from one object

to another in 1 second or less. This requirement may be quite difficult to meet; greater

retargeting times would not rule out given

weapons systems, but could imply the need for

far larger constellation sizes (see section on

System Architecture, p. 179 ff.). If only small

retargeting angles are needed for a single satellite, fast retargeting may be easier to attain;

this possibility is under investigation.

Another issue to be resolved is the ability

to produce excimer lasers of the power levels

required. Current excimers are several orders

of magnitude smaller than requirements for

SDI applications. Large amounts of power will

have to be delivered in short pulses. The required power levels will depend on the results

of research in the various fields. Excimer

lasers tend to have a high weight-to-output

power ratio, which would make them more

problematic for space-basing. This would not

affect a ground-based mode, where weight is

less of a consideration.

Free-Electron Lasers:

Description. –When the paths of charged

particles are bent by a magnetic field, they

emit radiation. The recently developed freeelectron laser uses this principle in an innovative way to produce laser radiation. A beam

of electrons is passed through a periodicallyvarying magnetic field. The radiation produced can provide an intense coherent beam.

In the free-electron laser, the interaction of the

electrons and the magnetic field replaces the
152

excited energy levels of a lasant as the source

of coherent radiation. The wavelength, which

depends on the periodicity of the magnetic

field and on the electron energy, can be changed

as desired by varying either one. Such a laser

operating in the visible could be ground-based,

using space-based reflectors to reach targets

beyond the horizon (see previous section).

High energy efficiencies could also permit the

possibility of space-based lasers.

In addition to the advantages of good beam

quality and high energy efficiencies which are

obtainable, the free-electron laser also has the

advantage of being able to use a relatively mature technology: that of the particle accelerator.

issues.—The process is potentially more

energy efficient than other schemes, and it has

the significant advantage of frequency tunability. The technology is in its infancy, although progressing rapidly, and much research

effort is needed to determine its potential for

application as a directed-energy weapon. The

SD I program is investigating whether power

levels can be scaled up by many orders of magnitude at useful wavelengths. It is also studying, as in the case of excimer lasers, whether

window and mirror materials can be developed

which are capable of withstanding the intense

laser beam while maintaining the required optical quality.

X-Ray Lasers:

Description. —Like the free-electron laser, Xray lasers are relatively new. The “pumping”

of the lasant material to an excited state would

be accomplished by intense sources of radiation,

such as a nearby nuclear explosion, an optical laser, or some other source. Should a nuclear explosion be used to pump an X-ray laser, that laser could be lethal to a target even

if the energy conversion process were very inefficient since the energy produced in just a

small nuclear explosion is still very large. The

U.S. Department of Energy is investigating

the feasibility of developing nuclear-pumped

X-ray laser weapons; however, it has classified

virtually all details of this research other than

its existence.

An advantage of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser weapon would be that it would have the

potential for killing many targets using multiple beams, providing high leverage and countering attempts to saturate the defense. A disadvantage of such a weapon would be that it

could be fired only once—the explosion that

powered such a weapon would very shortly afterwards destroy it. Such a weapon would not

be able to assess damage and fire again, although a second weapon could certainly do so.

There are natural limits on the distance to

which X-rays can propagate within the atmosphere, where they are rapidly absorbed. Since

an X-ray laser used for a boost-phase defense

must therefore wait for a booster to climb

higher than the minimum altitude to which the

X-rays can reach (which depends on parameters such as X-ray intensity, wavelength, and

incident angle), the time available for the defense to act is reduced.

A conceivable mode for use of X-ray lasers,

assuming that they would be developed as

weapons, is the pop-up technique. The relative

ly low weight of such a weapon system could

contribute to the desirability of such an architecture. The lasers could be deployed on specially developed submarine-launched missiles.
153

When the defense receives notice of an attack,

it could launch its pop-up weapons to an altitude sufficient to attack one or several ICBM

boosters or post-boost vehicles after they have

risen above the minimum engagement altitude. In such a system, the weapons would not

have to be deployed in space, avoiding a serious vulnerability problem faced by space-laser

or ground-laser/space-mirror schemes. Also,

deploying nuclear-pumped weapons on submarines, rather than in space, would avoid violating the Outer Space Treaty (see appendix C).

Other military applications of this technology

may be possible, but are beyond the scope of

this report.

Issues.–The first question to be resolved is

whether the X-ray laser can be developed to

the point of use as a weapon. The efficiency

of the conversion process and the possibility

of achieving adequate levels of brightness are

major issues. If a pop-up mode were to be investigated, secondary systems-related questions would also arise. Since the X-ray lasers

would have to be popped up after a Soviet

launch, their boosters would have to be substantially faster and more rapidly accelerating than the Soviets’, which would have a head

start. This means that the pop-up would have

to burn much more fuel per unit payload

weight than its target. A system would have

to be developed with an almost instantaneous

response time, including high-quality communications links between the orbiting satellite

sensors and the submarines. Further, a submarine, which might only be able to fire one

rocket at a time with a delay between successive launches, could become a “sitting duck”

once it had revealed its location by firing. The

practicality of a global scheme involving popup X-ray lasers of this type is doubtful.

Particle Beams:

Description. —Unlike electromagnetic radiation, which consists of pure energy, beams

of subatomic particles consist of bits of matter. They can be protons, electrons, neutral

atoms, heavy ions, or more exotic types. They

are accelerated to velocities approaching the

speed of light by electric fields in particle

accelerators. Accelerators for diverse types of

particles exist in various sizes all over the

world. They are used for fundamental research

in the areas of solid state, nuclear, and, above

all, high energy physics. It is known and

understood how to produce and accelerate all

manner of atomic and subatomic particles. The

challenge for weapons purposes is to produce

beams of very high intensity which are also

extremely collimated-i. e., which are narrow

and have a small spreading angle, so that the

particles move in very nearly parallel paths.

Accelerators producing such beams must be

light enough to be placed in space economically, and they must be very reliable.

In order to accelerate particles with electric

fields, one must use charged particles. However, over long distances, a charged beam will

bend in the Earth’s magnetic field, presenting formidable difficulties in targeting. Inhomogeneities in the Earth’s field can render it

virtually impossible to direct a beam at a target spot of a meter size, or so, at the distance

of thousands of kilometers.

Preliminary experiments in laboratories

have led to some hope that for low-Earth orbit

altitudes, it maybe possible to use a charged

beam by means of the following mechanism.

A laser first ionizes a straight path through

the rarefied near-space environment. Then, an

electron beam is fired along this channel, with

the positively charged gas ions providing an

electrostatic restoring force which compensates for the bending forces of the Earth’s

magnetic field. Demonstrating the ultimate

practicality of such a scheme requires further

resolution of a number of issues.

A less exotic solution is to produce a neutral beam, unaffected by magnetic fields, which

will travel in a straight line and be more easily

directable to a target. To make a neutral hydrogen beam, for example, a large number of

hydrogen ions is created by attaching an extra

electron to neutral hydrogen atoms. The

charged ions (H - ) are then accelerated by

electric fields, and, after exiting the accelerator, are neutralized by one of a variety of techniques. The extra electron can be knocked off

by passing the ion beam through a small amount

of matter, for example, or it can be stripped
154 —

off by means of appropriately tuned laser radiation. In either case, a set of neutral hydrogen atoms is again produced. Now, however,

they are traveling together in very large numbers at nearly the speed of light.

This beam of neutral particles contains a significant amount of energy, can penetrate several centimeters into virtually any material,

and can penetrate typical aerospace materials

to a depth of tens of centimeters. Because of

this penetrating power, neutral particle beams

may be difficult to countermeasure. The hydrogen atom’s electron is quickly stripped off

as the atom enters the target. The bare proton

which remains deposits its energy more or less

uniformly along its path through the material,

with a slight enhancement in the small region

where it finally comes to rest. If the beam

strikes electronic circuits, such as those in

guidance systems, they can be fatally altered

or destroyed, rendering the target “stupid”

and unable to function in its programmed way.

An energy deposition of some tens of joules

per square centimeter could be sufficient to destroy unprotected electronics in a target. The

deliverable energy requirements for this type

of weapon, therefore, are considerably less

stringent than in the case of lasers, where 1

to 100 kJ/cm2 (10 to 1,000 MJ/m2

) may be required. At higher levels of neutral particle

beam energy deposition, objects can be melted

and explosives detonated.

Such a weapon, however, can work only outside the atmosphere: even a small amount of

air will strip off the electrons, resulting in a

beam of charged protons. These will be bent

by the Earth’s magnetic field and will also be

scattered by collisions with atmospheric molecules. As a result, the beam will not be effective against targets below about 100 km.

Issues.-The energy of each particle in a particle beam is not a serious problem. Energies

of several hundred million electron-volts are

usually discussed in this context, which are

well within the limits of current capabilities

for the particles in question. In fact, the largest accelerators today are able to reach energies a thousand times higher, although at lower intensities.

Individual particle energy, however, is only

one of the parameters that determines a particle beam’s effectiveness as a weapon. Another is the beam current, which is proportional

to the number of particles per second in the

beam. The beam current (in amperes”) multiplied by the energy of each particle (in electronvolts) gives the total beam power (in watts).

The brightness of a particle beam, which determines the power that can be delivered per

unit area at a given distance, depends on the

beam power and additionally on how tightly

the beam can be focused. At present, particle

beams are closest to the required level of

brightness of all the directed energy options

generally discussed for SDI.

One problem with a particle beam weapon

will be kill assessment. A beam intensity sufficient to disable its target electronics may not

be sufficient to produce external effects which

are immediately observable. This drawback

might impose severe problems regarding targeting decisions if neutral beams are to be

used in such a “soft,” functional kill mode. To

provide externally observable effects, brightness levels perhaps a thousand times greater

might be required, unless the guidance system

of a booster or post-boost vehicle were struck

in such a way as to cause obvious trajectory

modifications.

A related problem is tracking the beam. If

the beam misses the target, it will be very difficult to know where it went; even if it strikes

the target, it may not be visible at “soft” kill

intensities. “Open-loop” pointing, in which one

measures the direction of the beam as it exits

the accelerator with great precision, is a possible solution, but it remains to be demonstrated.

A further problem would be presented if the

electronic components of beam weapon targets

were hardened against radiation. Circuits

using gallium-arsenide (GaAs) technology

could be as much as 1,000 times more resistant to radiation than commonly existing cir-

—

“Neutral beams, which are not charged, technically carry no

electrical current. The intensity of a neutral particle beam in

amperes is the electrical current that the beam would carry if

each particle in it had the charge of one electron.
155 — —

cuits based on silicon technology .17 Such hardening could increase resistance to ionizing

radiation by a factor of up to 1,000, stressing

further the energy delivery requirement of a

particle beam weapon. The system hardness,

however, may not be increased by the same

large factor as the component hardness.

Another serious issue is whether an accelerator can be constructed which will be light

enough to permit many to be placed in orbit,

and which will retain the ability to function

reliably after long periods of dormancy. While

current Earth-bound accelerators approach

the necessary beam intensities, they are large

and heavy and also require maintenance and

repair at irregular intervals. Space-qualified

equivalents would need to be much lighter,

much more reliable (since they would be harder

to fix), and like other space-based assets, protected against attack.

Kinetic Nonnuclear Kill

Boost, Post-Boost, and Midcourse Phase:

Description. –A classic method of destroying a target is simply to hit it with another

object having a large velocity relative to the

target. This method utilizes kinetic energy, or

energy of motion, and has been used for a good

many millenia in forms such as rocks, catapults, arrows, and bullets. Missiles and RVs

travel at high speed, typically several kilometers per second; they can be killed quite effectively by colliding with something else moving at a significantly different velocity. The

problem lies in arranging the collision-in

reaching the missile or warhead and hitting it.

This technique could be implemented by a

constellation of space-based battle stations,

each containing a large number of small rock-

— — — 17G~u~ ~wfide (GAs) ij42chno10gy shows promise for m~-

ing circuits which are faster, as well as much more radiationresistant, than circuits based on silicon technology. It is therefore a topic of intense research interest by the Department of

Defense as well as by private industry. GaAs technology will

likely be considerably more expensive than equivalent silicon

circuits, primarily because silicon technology has had the benefit of decades of intensive research. However, it will probably

become the technology of choice for many applications requiring speed or radiation-resistance.

ets or electromagnetically launched projectiles. Satellite sensors would detect a launch

and would hand tracking information over to

the battle station. The rockets would be assigned to, aimed at, and launched towards

their targets. When close enough, homing detectors on the projectiles would be used to direct them to their targets. The kill could be

by means of striking the target directly or by

detonating an explosive near it, sending fragments into it. (Outside the atmosphere, of

course, an explosion does not produce a shock

wave, so the fragments would be necessary for

a kill.)

For attacking boosters, the bright infrared

signal from the rocket plume serves as a target for a short-wave infrared homing device;
156

however, the projectile will probably need to

correct for the distance between the booster

body and that portion of the exhaust plume

flame or engine nozzle which emits most

brightly in the infrared. For post-boost vehicles or RVs, short-wave infrared sensors could

not be used since the PBVs (except during

short bursts of their rocket motors) and RVs

would be at much lower temperatures than the

boosters and would radiate much weaker signals at longer wavelengths. Cooled, long-wave

infrared detectors could be used during the

post-boost and midcourse phases, but other

sensing devices might be required because the

relatively cool targets may not be readily detectable by infrared means against the background of the Earth. Short- and long-wave infrared detectors, along with other sensors, are

discussed further in the following section on

sensors (p. 159 ff.).

Issues.–A major question is whether the

space-based rocket could reach the booster before burnout. Basing at altitudes of about 400

kilometers has been discussed. Soviet SS-18

rockets burn out in about 300 seconds at an

altitude of about 400 km. If the satellite platforms carrying the interceptor rockets were

based at an orbital altitude of about 400 km,

an interceptor could travel horizontally for up

to 300 seconds to reach a booster if it could

be launched at the same time that the booster

was. If the platform is based at a higher altitude, the interceptor will have to shoot down

to reach the booster and will not have as far

a horizontal range.

If the interceptors had a burnout velocity

of 10 km/sec,18 each could travel about 3,000

km in 300 seconds, giving them a useful range.

A terminal velocity this high for a chemical

rocket would imply a very small ratio of payload weight to fuel weight; this would be compensated for, in part, by multi-staging, but the

need for a low-cost lift capability to place the

interceptors and their fuel in orbit would nevertheless be manifested.

18 For comparison, a satellite in low-Earth orbit travels at

about 8 km/sec.

If the length of the boost phase were reduced, interceptor ranges would be correspondingly reduced. The MX missile burns out

in about 180 seconds. The Soviets are currently testing an MX-like ICBM (the SS-X-24) which

would therefore effectively shorten the maximum interceptor range from that attainable

against an SS-18. A fast-burn booster would

reduce the effective range still further.

Another issue for infrared homing devices

involves the ability of such detectors to function in the upper atmosphere. Since friction

with the atmosphere will heat the skin of the

interceptor rocket, any infrared detector will

have to look out through a very hot window.

Windows which do not emit much infrared radiation even when heated to high temperatures will be required. If homing interceptors

cannot be made to operate in the atmosphere,

it will become necessary to wait until boosters

have left the atmosphere before intercepting

them. Alternatively, interceptors might dispense with homing sensors, being guided by

commands sent from other satellites better able

to track the boosters (“command guidance”).

Homing outside the atmosphere has already

been demonstrated in a test configuration. The

Homing Overlay Experiment conducted by the

U.S. Army in June 1984 demonstrated the ability to find a cool target outside the atmosphere

against the cold background of space, and to

home in on it accurately enough to collide with

it. Similar technology is utilized by the U.S. Air

Force’s air-launched ASAT weapon.

Interceptors could attain higher velocities

using a developing technology: the electromagnetic railgun. An intense magnetic field

is used to impart large velocities to electrically

conducting projectiles; the conductor can be

formed by ionizing a substance which might

be an insulator in its normal state. Speeds of

greater than 20 km/sec or more are envisioned.

Such techniques would appear promising because they could greatly extend the range of

interceptors based in space. However, attaining such a high velocity by the time the projectile has left the gun requires accelerations hundreds of thousands of times that of gravity.
157 ———

Problems to solve, besides the actual proof of

principle at these high velocities, are the development of large power sources, power delivery in short pulses, good recoil momentum

compensation so as not to degrade pointing

capabilities, and the development of materials and guidance systems of very low mass

which can survive the rapid accelerations

needed. The ability to refire rapidly and accurately would also have to be developed.

Terminal Phase:

Description.–In the terminal intercept

phase, kinetic-energy interceptors could be

very high acceleration rockets located near the

sites to be defended. If nonnuclear, they would

kill by striking their targets or by detonation

and fragmentation near the target. Phased-array radars (electronically steered and able to

shift rapidly from one target to another) would

track RVs and decoys and give pointing information to the interceptors, which would then

home in on their targets with radar or infrared

sensors.

Another possible technique is the “swarmjet” proposal. A large number of small rockets

is fired in the direction of an incoming RV

towards a region 50 m in diameter at a range

of 1 km from the defended site. If properly

timed, the swarm would have a high probability of destroying the RV. Since intercepts take

place close to the ground, decoys will have already burned up during reentry and will not

be a problem. However, the attacking warhead

may be salvage-fused to detonate when intercepted, and since intercepts will take place

relatively close to the defended object, a

“swarmjet” defense would only be suitable for

defending hardened targets able to survive a

nearby nuclear explosion.

Issues. –The ability of a nonnuclear homing

device to kill an RV outside the atmosphere

has been shown. However, in addition, either

the interceptor or (more likely) the overall battle management system must be able to discriminate between decoys and RVs (see discussion on discrimination, p. 162 ff. ). For intercepts deep within the atmosphere, the atmosphere itself will screen out decoys.

Cost-exchange issues will be very important.

For a given hypothetical defense system, the

cost of large numbers of interceptor vehicles

will have to be compared to the cost of additional incoming RVs1. Crucial to the cost calculations is the defensive system’s footprint,

i.e., the size of its defended area. The larger

the footprint, the fewer systems are needed.

Overall, the state of the art of terminal interceptors, with the associated sensors and

battle management systems, is closer to practicality than many other BMD technologies.

However, these technologies at present are

best applied to hardened targets. Discrimination is easier because intercepts can be delayed, and a far smaller volume of space would

have to be covered. Near-term technology may

be capable of defending hardened targets

against a significant fraction of incoming RVs.

However, the detonation resulting from the

first intercept (in case the target were salvagefused, giving a nuclear explosion upon impact)

could make subsequent intercepts difficult.

These problems could be mitigated by hardening sensors and by providing high levels of

redundancy.

Interceptors would themselves have to be

placed in hardened sites in order to remain

operational in the case of a nearby nuclear explosion. The survival of some fraction of the

targets could thus probably be assured, unless

a very large number of RVs per target were

attacking.

Soft targets, however, would be more difficult to defend. As has been stated, the higher

intercept altitudes needed to protect soft targets make discrimination harder and also require defending a much larger volume.

Nuclear Kill:

Description. –The discontinued U.S. Safeguard ABM system used a nuclear warhead

to kill incoming RVs. Such a system was desirable when homing systems could not approach closely enough to kill by impact or by

explosion and fragmentation. The Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS), which used nuclear-armed interceptors for protecting hard
158

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense

Launched in November, 1984 from White Sands Missile

Range, New Mexico, as part of the Small Radar Homing

Technology (SRHIT, pronounced “S-R-hit”) Program.

A novel steering steering system is being used.

targets, had been under development until it

was recently reemphasized under SDI. In

principle, nuclear-armed missiles, representing

a mature technology, could soon be operationalas elements of a terminal defense. Although

major uncertainties still remain concerning the

operation of such a system in the presence of

many nuclear detonations, improved sensors,

radar tracking, and communications would resuit in a more effective system now than could

have been built in the early 1970s. These improvements would make nuclear interceptors

a possible fall-back position for terminal defenses, in case serious impediments develop

in adapting nonnuclear kill technologies for

that purpose. For example, maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) might be able to evade

interceptors to the extent that a nonnuclear

kill vehicle could not approach within lethal

range. The greater kill radius of a nuclear warhead might compensate for inability to achieve

a close approach.

There could also be uses for nuclear kill

against space-based defenses. Space mines, or

weapons placed in orbit with the purpose of

detonating on command to destroy enemy battle stations or to neutralize satellite sensors,

could be nuclear-armed. They could also be salvage-fused so that, once within lethal range

of a potential target, they could destroy that

target even if attacked themselves.

In terms of killing attacking missiles or

RVs, nuclear kills maybe less desirable, since

they might not destroy more than one target

at a time but could complicate other defensive

actions by damaging or blinding elements of

the defensive system.

Issues.—When using nuclear interceptors in

the terminal phase, difficulties could arise

from collateral damage or blinding of the defense’s own radar tracking system and communications. Such use implies the need for

hardened electronics, robust radar tracking,

and effective battle management to minimize

collateral damage. Homing systems that

would permit use of very small nuclear weapons could mitigate some of these effects, par-
159

ticularly for exoatmospheric interception. If

incoming missiles are salvage-fused, however,

the environment would be stressful to defensive battle management whether or not the defenses use nuclear-armed missiles. It should

be remembered that an advantage of nuclear

kill is that the technology is essentially currently available.

Sensors and Data Processing

Advances in sensors and in data processing

technology-in the ability to acquire and manipulate information–have had at least as

much to do with the resurgent interest in ballistic missile defense as have advances in

weaponry. In addition to their key roles in

BMD technologies, sensors and data processors probably have greater general application

than advanced weapons concepts in other military (and of course in civilian) applications.

All of the functions of a BMD system, save

target destruction, involve primarily sensors

and processors. As sensors acquire more and

more data and incorporate greater amounts of

processing directly within the sensing components, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate these two functions. Perhaps a better

breakdown would be sensors (including processing), and other data processing activity,

such as battle management or command and

control. Battle management will be discussed

in a later section on “System Architecture”;

the following discussion will concentrate on

the data acquisition and manipulation performed by the sensors of a ballistic missile defense system.

Sensors can further be broken down into surveillance and acquisition sensors, whose primary function is to notice threatening objects

and determine their approximate location, and

higher resolution sensors, which investigate

these objects in much greater detail.

Surveillance and Acquisition

There are a number of technological candidates for performing surveillance and acquisition functions. They are distinguished in this

section by the phase in which they would most

appropriately be used. (Sensors used for discrimination, as opposed to surveillance, are

discussed in the next section. Seep. 162 ff.).

Boost Phase. –The hot gases exhausting

from an ICBM booster motor emit hundreds

of kilowatts at short- and medium-wave infrared (SWIR and MWIR) wavelengths of a few

microns. This radiation can be detected by sensors at great distances. Both the United

States and the Soviet Union now obtain early

warning of ballistic missile launch by sensing

the infrared radiation from these exhaust

plumes; U.S. early warning satellites are at

geosynchronous orbit 36,000 km above the

Equator, while their Soviet counterparts travel

in highly elliptical orbits which are at even

higher altitudes when over the United States.

The launch detection sensors characterize

the approximate size and trajectories of the

ICBM attack in order to “hand off” the suspected targets to systems having higher resolution, which can examine the objects and aim

at the threatening ones. In addition, some discrimination can be done at the earliest stages

of detection, depending on the spatial and

spectral resolution of these early warning sensors and the image processing software used

with them. If the infrared sources are not moving, or are not moving towards defended areas,

then they do not pose a threat.

If a boost-phase layer is present in the defense system, it will only have a few minutes

after launch detection in which to destroy the

climbing boosters. Once infrared sources are

detected and are identified to be ICBMs, the

detection sensors will “hand off” their tracks

to the pointing and tracking sensors associated with each weapon system.

Post-Boost and Midcourse Phases.—Surveillance requirements become considerably more

difficult in the post-boost and midcourse

phases because the objects to be detected are

no longer necessarily associated with conspicuous infrared sources. By the end of the boost

phase, all the ICBM booster stages have burnt

out and dropped off, leaving the post-boost vehicle. The PBV then dispenses reentry vehicles and decoys, changing course slightly to
160

aim each weapon individually before letting it

go.”

The PBVs, decoys, and deployed RVs can

be detected by their own radiation, rather than

that emitted by their hot exhaust gases. Objects more or less at room temperature emit

long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) radiation having wavelengths mostly near 10 microns. (By

comparison, the Sun is hot enough to shine in

the visible portion of the spectrum, with wavelengths primarily near 0.5 microns. Rocket exhaust, which is cooler than the surface of the

Sun but is still much hotter than the PBVs,

RVs, and decoys, emits radiation primarily in

the short- and medium-wave infrared wavelengths of a few microns.)

LWIR radiation can be detected by sensors

which are cooled to near absolute zero in order

to prevent their own radiation from swamping the signal.20 Such sensors can search for

objects already in space (deployed warheads,

satellites, decoys, or debris) without having to

observe a launch, and they can provide independent backup for the launch surveillance

systems.

In addition to detecting deployed warheads

which may have escaped launch detection, a

BMD system must do space surveillance in order to keep track of threats to itself. Before

launching nuclear weapons against terrestrial

targets, the offense may choose to attack the

defensive system directly in order to damage

or disable it. Therefore, the BMD system must

keep track of satellites which could attack

from a long range (those suspected of holding

nuclear warheads or directed-energy weapons),

objects which need to approach closely in order to attack (ground-based interceptors, or

space-based nonnuclear ones), and satellites

called space mines which, if allowed by the defense, could constantly trail system compo-

‘The PBV itself intermittently fires small rocket motors to

maneuver. These rockets emit detectable short- and mediumwavelength infrared radiation, but only when firing. Their radiation is not nearly as bright as that produced by boosters.

20Putting such sensors in space systems requires long-lived

(at least several years), lightweight, and low-power cryogenic

refrigerators capable of keeping them at their operating temperature.

nents and detonate on command, destroying

both themselves and the BMD component.

LWIR sensors are useful for such space surveillance systems. Any object in space for a

long enough period of time will reach a steady

temperature when the rate at which it absorbs

energy (either from the Sun or radiated up

from the Earth) equals the rate at which it

emits LWIR radiation. The amount of absorbed

power, which tends to heat the object up, depends on the surface properties and the surface area of the object; the amount of radiated

power, which tends to cool the object down,

depends on its surface properties, its size, and

its temperature. For example, the average

temperature of the Earth itself is set by the

balance between absorbed sunlight and emitted

LWIR; a similar process goes on for all satellites.

In addition, any equipment on a satellite

that uses electrical power will dissipate heat,

further raising the satellite’s temperature. Although modifying the satellite’s surface properties can lessen the amount of LWIR power

radiated at a given wavelength, doing so would

also increase the object’s reflectivity at those

wavelengths.21 Emission and reflection cannot

be minimized simultaneously, and lessening

one will increase the other.

As stated above, the Earth itself is a powerful LWIR emitter. It will be hard for LWIR

surveillance sensors to pick out satellites when

seen against this background. Therefore,

space-based LWIR surveillance systems will

look away from the Earth, spotting objects

against the cold background of space. Loworbiting satellites can only be detected from

space by looking just over the Earth’s horizon.

————.—.— 21A highly reflective surface only absorbs a small fraction of

the power striking it. However, since the ability of an object

to emit power at a given wavelength is directly proportional

to how well it can absorb that wavelength, a reflective object

does not emit well, either.

A piece of metal left out in the sun will heat up, even though

it is highly reflective, because it radiates even less power in the

infrared than it absorbs in sunlight. The infrared power emitted by an object increases rapidly as the object gets hotter (doubling the temperature above absolute zero increases emitted

power by a factor of 16), so the metal heats up until it can radiate away as much power as it absorbs.
SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Another problem may arise from the infrared backgrounds generated by nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere. Such effects

are only partially understood and may remain

mysterious in the absence of experimental nuclear tests in the atmosphere. These would, of

course, violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

However, tests involving other sources of ionization are being carried out, in conjunction

with computer simulations, to provide more

extensive knowledge on what might happen

in the upper atmosphere under such conditions.

Other techniques are available to do space

surveillance. The U.S. Air Force at present

uses both radar and optical observations to

monitor objects in space from the ground. Due

to interference from the atmosphere, LWIR

sensors cannot be used efficiently on the

ground. Airborne observations are, however,

feasible.

Terminal Phase.–Reentry vehicles and decoys which survive the defenses long enough

to reenter the atmosphere enter the terminal

phase of a BMD system. Since reentry vehicles can be salvage-fused to detonate if they

are attacked, interception must take place at

a high enough altitude if “soft” targets below

are not to be destroyed.22 Surveillance systems

‘This “keep-out distance” depends on the yield of the weapon

and the hardness of the target. At sea level, a 1 megaton weapon

will produce overpressure of 2 pounds per square inch, which

structures might survive with repairable damage, at a distance

of 13 km (8 miles) from the blast.
162

that could operate in the terminal phase include ground-based radars and airborne optical

and infrared detectors. LWIR detectors, located on airplanes to provide mobility and to

minimize atmospheric interference, can detect

reentry vehicles which have not yet started to

reenter the atmosphere, helping exoatmospheric interceptors to destroy them. Once the RVs

have begun reentry, they heat up and start to

glow, permitting shorter wavelength infrared

and visible detection for endoatmospheric interception.

Issues.–The technology of SWIR and MWIR

sensors is fairly mature. Additional software

and on-board processing capability will have

to be developed to do image processing. The

requirements for surveillance and acquisition

sensors and processing are not anticipated to

stress the state of the art as much as other

required BMD technologies will.

LWIR technology is not as far advanced as

shorter wavelength sensor technology. As

wavelength requirements increase, the task

becomes more difficult since new detector materials must be developed and since the systems must operate at temperatures near absolute zero, However, LWIR space surveillance

systems have been designed, and the technologies involved have been under investigation

for a number of years. The data processing requirements of post-boost and midcourse phase

surveillance sensors are also stressing but may

not present major technical problems if computer science continues to progress over the

next two decades at the same rapid rate which

has been evident so far.

Radar technology of the sort applicable for

terminal defense is well advanced; radars have

been investigated for decades. Of particular

interest is making such radars small and

cheap, so that they can be proliferated (deployed in large number) to deny the offense

the ability to blind the terminal defense by destroying a single, high-value radar. The wavelength at which radars can operate has decreased steadily as technology has progressed.

More recently, advances in infrared technology have steadily increased the accessible infrared wavelengths. At present, the wavelength bands for which the two technologies

can be utilized are starting to overlap, at

wavelengths on the order of a millimeter.

Surveillance and acquisition sensors also

have wide application beyond BMD. Space

surveillance systems would be useful either to

verify an anti-satellite arms control agreement, should one be concluded, or to support

an ASAT weapon system, should such an agreement not be entered into.23 Such systems also

may have potential for permitting surveillance

of terrestrial targets such as airplanes, but

they would need to contend with the highly

significant additional problem of distinguishing the target from its surroundings.

High-Resolution Sensors

Surveillance sensors are clearly necessary.

However, in most cases they will not be sufficient. In addition to finding suspicious objects,

a defensive system must also determine whether

they are threatening or benign, aim weapons

at the dangerous ones, and determine whether

they have been destroyed. These functions of

discrimination, pointing and tracking, and kill

assessment, respectively, will require additiona1, higher-resolution sensors. The computational capability which can be built into these

high-resolution systems could make it possible to extract useful information from the

weak and/or noisy signals which they will be

detecting.

Discrimination. —Each layer of a defensive

system must be able to differentiate between

objects which are missiles or warheads and objects which are decoys designed to fool the defense into treating them as if they were missiles or warheads. If the defense is unable to

distinguish between the two, its job is orders

of magnitude more difficult.

If the defense is to be able to discriminate

effectively, it must utilize multiple phenomenology—repeated observations of the same ob23 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Antisatellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, OTAISC-281 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

September 1985), the companion report to the present volume,

for a detailed discussion.
163

—

jects using different sensor systems and different physical principles–and it very likely

will need high resolution sensors. Although decoys which duplicate one particular observable (radar cross section, temperature, size, etc.)

of an actual warhead can be made relatively

easily, it becomes progressively harder and

harder to mimic more and more characteristics simultaneously. If enough parameters are

to be duplicated, in principle it will cost as

much to build a highly accurate decoy as it

would just to add another RV.24 Note, however, that the process of making decoys look

more and more like warheads, or simulation,

may not be as effective as making warheads

look more and more like decoys, or anti-simulation. These techniques will be discussed further in “Countermeasures,” below (p. 170 ff.).

It is possible, in principle, to decoy ICBM

boosters. Discriminating true ICBMs from decoys could be done if accurate data on the origin, trajectory, and characteristics of each

launch could be obtained by the boost-phase

surveillance sensors. These operations require

primarily data processing capability and would

not necessarily require high resolution. The effort needed by the offense to defeat such a discrimination scheme would depend on how much

data the defense were able to collect on each

launch (and on how well the offense knew what

the defense was looking at). Note that if a

booster decoy were launched from a pad which

did not have some of the characteristics of an

ICBM launchpad, real missiles might then be

placed on similar pads to guarantee them a

free ride through at least the first defensive

layer. This is an example of anti-simulation.

If ICBMs are able to penetrate the boostphase system, each can begin to deploy tens

of warheads and/or hundreds of decoys. The

remaining layers, then, may have to contend

with thousands of warheads and hundreds of

thousands of decoys and other pieces of debris.

The defensive task is lessened if it is able

to maintain “birth-to-death” tracking of all ob24It is assumed in this example that adding RVs to defeat

the defensive system is prohibitively expensive. If not, the offense presumably would have done just that and would not have

worried about decoys in the first place.

jects. On the one hand, the independence of

the different layers will be compromised if

later layers rely completely on the earlier ones

to detect and discriminate warheads. However, if earlier observations are used to enhance later ones, instead of to replace them,

independent observations of the same object

can be compared.

One technique which might make discrimination easier would be direct observation of

objects as they are deployed off of the PBVs.

In principle, it might be possible to see balloon decoys being inflated or to notice some

characteristic PBV behavior which indicates

that a weapon, rather than a decoy, has just

been deployed. Objects correctly determined

at deployment to be decoys could therefore

safely be neglected by later layers.

Imaging the RVs and decoys requires high

resolution. However, the same diffraction phenomenon that limits how tightly a laser beam

can be focused also limits the the angular resolution with which images can be resolved. Examining an object with 30 cm resolution (about

1 foot) from 3,000 km away requires an angular resolution of 0.1 microradian. To attain

such resolution in the long-wave infrared

wavelengths (about 10 microns) which are

emitted by such objects, a telescope 120 meters in diameter would be required!

One way to mitigate the diffraction problem

is to utilize prior information about the target. If the target’s true appearance is already

known, and only its precise location is required, the additional knowledge about its appearance makes it possible to calculate diffraction effects and remove them from the sensor

image. This process could yield a more precise

location than would be otherwise obtainable.

On the other hand, if it is not known what the

target looks like, as would be the case before

it had been identified, this technique would not

be applicable.

The only other way to minimize diffraction

is go to shorter wavelengths. Reducing the

wavelength in the above example by a factor

of 50, changing the 10 micron wavelength

long-wavelength infrared radiation to 0.2 mi-
164

cron ultraviolet radiation, permits the same

resolution to be obtainable from a mirror 50

times smaller in diameter. However, since the

objects to be observed do not emit brightly at

these shorter wavelengths, an active system—

one which illuminates the target-must be

used. A laser radar, or ladar, lights up the target with a low power visible or ultraviolet laser

beam while a telescope observes the reflected

light. If the laser beam scans sequentially over

the telescope’s field of view, the laser need not

illuminate that entire field at once, minimizing the required power. The wider the ladar’s

field of view, the less precisely it needs to know

where to start looking for a target.

Under certain conditions, antennas which

are physically small can have the effect of very

large ones, providing high resolution at long

wavelengths. Microwave wavelengths on the

order of a centimeter, a thousand times longer

than LWIR, would require an antenna equivalent to one 120 km long to achieve the 0.1

microradian resolution discussed above! However, very long antennas can be synthesized,

in effect, if the antenna is moving. Processing

together the echoes of signals emitted at different positions along the antenna’s path can

yield a resolution equivalent to that of a stationary antenna which is as long as the path

of the moving one. Such synthetic aperture radars (SARs), when based on satellites typically

moving at velocities of about 8 km/see, might

be applicable in high resolution imaging systems. A similar technique for achieving high

resolution takes advantage of motion of the

target, rather than of the antenna. Such inverse synthetic aperture radars (ISARs) can examine objects which are rotating or tumbling,

although they cannot obtain optimal resolution on objects which are vibrating or otherwise arranged to shake.

The price paid for the higher resolution of

active sensors is that they cannot operate

without revealing themselves, thus warning

the offense and giving it an opportunity to

spoof, blind, or otherwise interfere with the

sensors. To help prevent this, again at the cost

of increasing complexity, the defense can separate the transmitter from the receiver(s). In

a multistatic system, the receivers would be

passive and might be able to operate without

revealing their location. The transmitter, of

course, would be highly visible, and the targets might still be able to know when they are

under observation. However, their ability to

interfere with the observations might be complicated if they did not know where the individual receivers were.

Pointing and Tracking.–Once the targets

have been detected and identified, weapons

must be trained upon them and fired. Pointing and tracking requirements, of course, will

differ for each type of weapon. Kinetic-kill vehicles having the ability to home in on their

targets need only be pointed closely enough

for their on-board sensors to acquire the target. On the other hand, laser beams (except

those which kill in one pulse) must be held on

a single spot on the target until damage is

achieved. Depending on the laser, this can require localizing a beam to the order of tens of

centimeters at distances of up to thousands

of kilometers, or angular resolutions of less

than tenths of microradians. To obtain this

resolution in the presence of diffraction, either

shorter wavelength active sensors or detailed

knowledge of the target itself (or both) would

be required.

Part of the pointing problem is determining

how far off the beam is if it misses the target.

Although by far the majority of a high-quality

laser beam’s energy will fall within a well-defined central area, there will be radiation outside that main part. Even if the main beam

does not strike the target, there will still very

likely be enough radiation reflecting off the

target for the pointing and tracking sensor to

see and use to direct the main beam to the

target .26

“Even though a laser beam travels at the speed of light (it

is light), that speed is not infinite and the laser must be aimed

ahead of where the object actually is at the time the laser fires.

For a target 3000 km away, the target will have moved between

50 and 100 meters (depending on its velocity) in the 0.01 second that it will take the beam to reach it. Since the laser sees

the target by observing light which took another 0.01 second

to arrive at the laser, the target’s actual position at the time

the laser is fired is another 50 to 100 meters ahead of where

it appears to be at that time.
165 ——

It is harder to determine the position of a

neutral particle beam in the vicinity of a target. The angle at which the beam leaves the

weapon can be measured by probing the beam

with a weak laser tuned near a frequency

which will be easily absorbed by some of the

hydrogen atoms in the neutral particle beam.

How well the laser will be absorbed depends

on its exact wavelength as seen by the beam

atoms, which in turn depends on the particle

beam’s velocity and its angle with respect to

the laser beam.

However, since the effects of a neutral particle beam on a target are for the most part

less visible than the effects of a laser beam (the

target will not reflect beam atoms back to a

sensor which can see them directly, for example), putting the beam precisely on target may

be more difficult than it would be for a laser.

(Kill assessment for a neutral particle beam

in the functional kill mode is correspondingly

more difficult; see below. ) The problem is lessened, however, since a neutral particle beam

will likely be wider than a laser beam and

therefore will not need to be so accurately

pointed. A possible method of detecting

whether the beam has struck the target would

be to look for secondary radiation emitted

from the target object. This possibility is being investigated.

Homing kinetic-kill vehicles are the most

straightforward; they keep the target continuously in sight, correcting their course until impact. The sensors aboard these vehicles can

be passive, detecting radiation from the target; active, illuminating their targets and detecting the reflected light; or semi-active, in

which the vehicles would home in on reflected

radiation which was originally beamed at the

target by another source. These sensors would

have difficulty in distinguishing between closespaced objects, as for example in the case of

several balloons tethered to an RV at a distance of a few meters.

Kill Assessment.– Determining whether or

not a target has been destroyed depends on

the type of weapon and on the defensive phase.

An ICBM killed in boost phase will either explode or veer visibly off course, being easily

detectable in either case. Kinetic kills in midcourse, whereby a projectile hits a target with

a closing speed of several kilometers per second, will also be easily seen. However, since

many pieces of what had been the target will

continue along in more or less the original target trajectory, the battle management system

must keep track of all fragments large enough

to confuse subsequent sensors and weapons.

The visibility of laser kills in midcourse depends greatly on how badly the target has

been damaged. If the target flies apart, its destruction will be easily discernible. However,

damage which might not be easily visible may

nevertheless disrupt the RVs heat shield so

badly that it will not survive reentry. Such an

RV, not recorded as killed, may draw additional fire from later layers even though it no longer poses a threat. Further, RVs which appear

to fly apart could be merely programmed to

jettison parts under attack, even though they

may not be killed. This is analogous to submarines releasing oil to make attackers think

they have succeeded.

Neutral particle beams used in the functional (“soft”) kill mode may present the most difficult problems for kill assessment. Since neutral particle beams (NPBs) penetrate into their

targets rather than depositing all their energy

on the surface, damage can be done to the interior which may not be visible from the outside at all. Successful NPB attacks in the

boost and post-boost phases might cause boosters or PBVs to act erratically and possibly to

destroy themselves. However, the case of RVs

is different. There is now no guidance on RVs,

so the accuracy of an RV would be unaffected

by a “soft”- kill. Although the detonation

mechanism could be damaged, RVs which have

been successfully disabled in midcourse might

not be distinguishable from live ones. An RV

incorrectly assessed as live might waste resources as later layers kill it over again, and

an RV incorrectly assessed as dead will do a

great deal of damage if it is allowed to pass

through later stages to detonate on target.

Therefore, to attack RVs with NPBs, the hard

kill mode, which would provide visible evidence of destruction, would be required. The
166

use of NPBs in a high current, hard kill mode

is being investigated.

Issues.—The discrimination problem is one

of the most challenging technical tasks required of a ballistic missile defense. Even if

some successful techniques are developed,

they will remain successful only so long as the

offense does not counter them by developing

decoys which are not susceptible to them.

The techniques for high-resolution sensing

described in this section are not so far developed as the surveillance and acquisition sensors described earlier. They are extremely

computation-intensive and will depend on substantial advances in real-time processing capability.

Pointing and tracking systems capable of

operating in a BMD system, particularly in

the presence of a hostile enemy, have never

been built. Systems having some of the required characteristics, however, do exist

today. NASA’s Space Telescope, utilizing a

technology level which represented the stateof-the-art characteristic of the time its design

was finalized, will be able to lock onto a point

target with an accuracy of less than 0.05

microradians-on the order of hitting the “S”

in a San Francisco stop sign from Washington.

Developing the required kill assessment

techniques may be even more challenging. Not

much effort has been devoted to this area until recently. Before much progress can be made

in assessing whether an object has been destroyed by a given weapon, a better understanding of that particular kill mechanism

may be required.

The pointing ability of candidate weapons

systems, and the ability of sensors to assess

their effects, will likely influence a decision on

the ultimate feasibility of those weapons as

much as the technical progress made on the

weapons themselves.

High-Speed Processing

Many of the systems described above require extensive computational capability. Some

of these computations, such as those required

for synthetic-aperture radars, will be ones we

already know how to do, except they will need

to be done faster. Others, such as those required for interpreting images and making decisions based on those interpretations (e.g.,

“the first twelve objects in this field of view

are decoys”) will require development of new

mathematical techniques and new processing

concepts, in addition to high-speed processors.

Advances in both hardware and software will

be required; they are discussed both immediately below and in that portion of the “System Architecture” section concerning Battle

Management (p. 188 ff.).

Hardware:

Description. –Data processing technology

has steadily evolved at a rapid rate (figure 7-

4). Although we have not reached the end of

this technological evolution, we are now approaching some physical (rather than technological) limits. Processing speed is limited both

by the rate at which individual computations

can be done, and by the time it takes the intermediate results to move throughout the processor. The former can be improved somewhat

by utilizing higher speed materials and circuit

elements, but the latter is limited by the speed

of light. Shrinking the overall size of circuits

by moving their elements closer together mitigates that problem to some extent, but we are

also approaching physical limits on miniaturization of components. Both these approaches

are under investigation in DOD’s Very High

Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program.

When individual processors approach fundamental limits to their speed, further improvements in processing capability can be made

by tying many processors together and doing

many calculations at once. Such parallel processing is most effective for problems which

lend themselves readily to being broken down

into many independent pieces. There is considerable interest in developing parallel processors, and perhaps even more in inventing

techniques to utilize these processors efficiently for a wide range of applications.

Another technique for very high-speed signal processing is the use of analog devices. In
167

Figure 7-4.—Onboard Signal Processing

10G

1G

100M

10M

1M

100K

10K

I K

.

I K 10K 100K I M 10M 100M IG 10G 100G

Memory (bits)

The past and projected future development of speed and memory size capabilities in signal processing, including

on board satellite processors.

SOURCE: TRW

such a device, the data to be processed are not beam. Certain manipulations of that physical

represented as a stream of numbers, as they system (e.g., shining that laser beam through

would be in a digital processor, but rather are a pinhole) are equivalent to performing calcurepresented directly by some physical quan- lations on the data which that physical systity such as the intensity of part of a laser tern represents.
168

To give an example, a digital processor

would determine the time required for a ball

to fall a certain distance by solving the equations of motion for an object in a gravitational

field and calculating the answer. A very simple analog approach to that problem would be

to drop a ball and time it.

In this example, the computer would calculate the ball’s trajectory much more rapidly

than the ball could fall. However, for some specific applications, an analog calculation can be

much faster than the corresponding digital

one, with the greater speed usually coming at

the expense of accuracy. When the calculation

is amenable to analog techniques, and when

great precision is not required, analog processing (called optical processing when the physical system is a light beam) offers tremendous

speed advantages.

Issues.–Although hardware requirements

for BMD processing will require technical advances beyond the present state of the art, no

technological barrier yet identified appears

likely to preclude development of sufficiently

capable processors to do those tasks that a

BMD system would need to do. In addition

to operating rapidly enough, BMD processors

will have to be able to operate in an environment where many nuclear weapons could be

detonating in space. These bursts produce

high levels of charged particles and other radiation which will severely disrupt the operation of circuits which are not radiation-hardened. Use of gallium arsenide (GaAs) instead

of silicon holds out promise for making circuits

which are both fast and radiation-hard, although these circuits would not be as small

as more radiation-sensitive ones.

Reliability is also a key criterion for space

system hardware. There is considerable interest in developing fault-tolerant processors

which are able to detect and compensate for

failures without significantly degrading system performance. The Department of Defense

is actively investigating both radiation-hardened and fault-tolerant devices.

Software:

Description. –The task of programming a

BMD system will be extremely challenging.

Part of this task is developing and implementing specific algorithms which will be needed

by individual components of a BMD system.

Some of these tasks, such as those involving

image processing, will require significant development. In several cases, full utilization of

hardware advances (such as parallel processors) will be contingent upon equivalent advances in software techniques.

Other software development tasks involve

not so much the implementation of specific

tasks but rather the coordination and integration of the different tasks done by various

components. These battle management issues

are complicated by the sheer size of the job,

the number of different contingencies which

must be anticipated, and the inability to debug the programs under realistic conditions

so that they can be relied upon to function adequately the first time.

issues.–The issues involved in developing

and testing BMD software are discussed primarily in the section on “Battle Managemerit, ” p. 188 ff.

Power and Logistics

The details of the problems associated with

the placement, supply, and upkeep of a spacebased missile defense system depend largely

on the details of the system to be employed.

Here, we shall only outline the problems and

the requirements for various of the possible

technological options mentioned above. In no

way should this outline be considered a complete treatment of the problems which must

be dealt with, although the requirements listed

should be considered a bare minimum for the

successful deployment of a usable system.

Space Power

Description. –Large amounts of power will

be required for each battle station, particularly
.

169 — —

if particle beams, electromagnetic railguns, or

free-electron lasers are used. The demand for

power may be on the order of tens of megawatts or more. For comparison, this power demand is roughly equivalent to that of a town

with a population of at least a few thousands.

For some projected applications, large quantities of power must be delivered in short

surges.

Past space-based power supplies have ranged

from a few watts to several kilowatts. The

SP-1OO project, representing an intermediate

stage of development for high power spacebased systems, is intended to develop a nuclear reactor of 100 kilowatts or more. In general, solar power may not be practical for demands in excess of tens of kilowatts, or for

large surge requirements. Possibly, one power

technology, most likely nuclear, would be used

for the continuous source, and another method,

perhaps stored chemical energy, could be used

for the surges.

Issues.–The requirements for multimegawatt power systems in space pose engineering problems which are difficult, but within

the limits of foreseeable technology. Requiring large surges would provide additional

problems for power conditioning.

Minimizing the frequency of maintenance

problems is also a serious issue, and one which

could become dominant in developing the appropriate power supplies and conditioning. Extremely high reliability would have to be attained, considering the need for many battle

stations. The Fletcher Panel wrote of requirements for a 10-year maintenance-free reliability standard for space-based computer and

software systems. Placing similar demands on

power sources would be a difficult problem.

Since such high reliability is not cost-effective

for Earth-based applications, where maintenance can readily be performed, it has not yet

been developed and there is little experience

to draw on. There are no obvious reasons why

such reliability would be impossible, although

new testing procedures may have to be developed.

Photo credit General Electric Co.

SP-1OO Space Power Nuclear Reactor: Artist’s concept

of a deployed nuclear-powered electric generator in

space. Power levels are designed to be in the

neighborhood of 100 kW. The reactor is at the lower

left of the drawing. Fingers pointing backwards from

the reactor are heat radiators.

Space Logistics

Description.–Whichever weapons options

may eventually be chosen, an enormous amount

of mass will have to be placed in Earth orbit.

Placing objects in geosynchronous orbit, of

course, is more expensive than putting them

in lower orbits. The Fletcher Panel declared

the necessity for a new heavy-lift launch vehicle for space-based platforms of up to 100

metric tons. The space shuttle has a capacity

of up to 30 metric tons for orbits of 200 km
170

altitude or so, and less than this at higher altitudes. Additionally, there will be a need for

a space transport which can travel between orbits. This would provide means of moving personnel and objects from a space station base

to individual system components for the purposes of maintenance and testing. Some deployments might also require such a vehicle.

The mirrors in a laser-based system, as an

example, would have to be checked periodically

for operability. This would involve removing

protective covers and testing the mirrors’ performance with lasers. After testing, some

maintenance might be required. Other weapon

components would also have to be periodically

tested and maintained, as would the computer

hardware and software.

Altogether, the cost and effort of a spacebased system does not end with deployment.

Even in the absence of hostile action, there will

have to be constant activity in space, occasionally with human presence, to maintain a working system. The threat of attacks on the system

would require the erection and maintenance

of defenses. It is also possible that vehicles

used for deployment may have to have the capability of defending themselves. Alternatively, they would have to be defended by specifically designed protective satellites already in

space. A significant fraction of the total payload to be launched from Earth in the early

stages could be shielding. Further into the future, it is possible that near-Earth asteroids

could be mined for shielding, reducing the requirements for lifting payloads from the surface of the Earth.

Issues.—The feasibility of developing some

high-reliability multi-megawatt power system

in time for the deployment of space-based

BMD assets needs to be demonstrated. Power

conditioning for burst mode operation must

also be shown to be feasible if such surges are

required by the chosen weapons option. The

total cost of placing various possible systems

in orbit will have to be estimated. For this, it

will be necessary to estimate the cost per space

platform and the needed constellation size. In

addition, the feasibility and estimated cost for

component testing, maintenance, and repair

must be determined for each candidate system. Finally, estimates will have to be made

of the level, cost, and feasibility of self-defense

needed for a space-based system. For further

discussion of testing and reliability issues, see

the section on “Testing, Reliability, and Security,” p. 190 ff.

COUNTERMEASURES

Countermeasures to Sensors cate targets in the boost, post-boost, and midand Discrimination course phases. In the terminal phase, infrared,

visible, and microwave wavelengths would be

Blinding used to locate targets and to discriminate beSensors used in ballistic missile defense rely tween decoys and real RVs. In addition, comprimarily on electromagnetic radiation of di- munication links could function at various radio, microwave, and possibly optical frequencies. verse frequencies. Short-wave infrared radiation emanating from the booster exhaust plumes A generic problem with sensors is the fact

is used in the boost phase. Post-boost-phase that they must be very sensitive in order to

interception will rely on more sensitive infra- perform their tasks of locating and tracking

red detection at longer wavelengths, since the objects, often small ones, at distances of thoutarget will not be as hot and its emissions will sands of kilometers. At the same time, they

be less intense. There is also the possibility of must be able to resist attempts by the offense

using radar or ladar (a technique which uses to disable or confuse them—an easier offensive

laser light in a way analogous to radar) to lo- task than destroying them outright.
.

171

— ——..

Defensive capabilities can be compromised

by neutralizing the abilities of the sensors to

perform their tasks. If a sensor can be overloaded with energy, particularly at frequencies

to which it is sensitive, it may be disabled. The

condition may be permanent-here referred to

as “blinding”- or temporary. If temporary,

say for a period of seconds or minutes, the

phenomenon may be referred to as “dazzling.

Blinding or dazzling will be effective if the sensor is thereby unable to give correct position

and/or velocity information for its targets to

the needed accuracy.

There are a number of ways in which blinding or dazzling may be induced. However, sensors could be hardened against some of these

effects by a variety of means.

One possible blinding technique could be the

occasional nuclear detonation of an RV by the

offense by salvage-fusing when attacked, by

active battle management, or by preprogrammed plan. One characteristic of a nuclear

explosion is the very intense electromagnetic

radiation it produces at all frequencies, from

gamma rays down to long wavelength radio

waves. Additionally, a nuclear explosion in the

upper atmosphere causes ionization glows

over a range of infrared wavelengths. These

glows may extend for substantial distances

and persist for many seconds, possibly masking signals from potential targets.

The intense radiation from a fireball could

cause problems for sensors. The first problem

is one of overloading or even blinding the detector. This possibility could apply to all types

of sensors, from visible and near-visible light

detectors to radio and radar devices. Secondly,

when the nuclear explosion is not as close, the

background signal from the explosion might

divert the “attention” of the sensor (depending on how “smart” it was).

However, there can be costs to the offense

of employing these tactics. In addition to the

chance that defensive sensors may be hardened to resist them, the offense must contend

with the risk that detonating nuclear explosions during the midcourse phase could “unmask” its own decoys for a substantial distance around the explosion. There is also the

possibility that some of the offense’s own assets could be damaged.

Large nuclear explosives would be useful to

the offensive forces during the terminal phase.

When exploded high in the atmosphere, they

would disturb the ionospheric layer, thus causing communication difficulties and making

tracking and intercept more difficult for minutes. Exploded above the atmosphere, they

would create large electromagnetic pulses,

which could destroy electronics which are not

adequately hardened and would threaten large

power grids and power interconnections with

destruction or disablement. Defense battle

management and C3

I might be threatened.

Nuclear weapons, judiciously used, could be

a simple, brute force way of fooling or disabling some sensors. The offense decides when

to use them and how many to use. Its only limitation is to avoid collateral damage to its own

hardware.

Spoofing and Hiding

Another method of defeating sensors is the

use of misleading signals, or the use of decoys,

by the offense. This is commonly called “spoofing. ” For example, the characteristics of the

rocket plume could be changed so that a homing sensor which compensates for the distance

from the plume to the vulnerable parts of the

booster would do so incorrectly, sending the

weapon into space, rather than into the target. The defense’s response to this strategy

could be to use the infrared emission from the

plume only for the initial target acquisition,

and to use ladar to illuminate directly that

part of the booster to be attacked. Shielding

of the plume has also been discussed, although

this would present engineering difficulties if

all directions were to be covered.

In the midcourse phase, the key problem defined by the Defensive Technologies Study

Team is the difficulty of discriminating between RVs and decoys. It is by no means clear

that the possible future methods of discrimination that have been proposed and analyzed

by the Fletcher Panel will be successful. Fur-
172

ther work, both theoretical and experimental,

is necessary before an informed judgment on

this point can be made.

An often discussed problem for discrimination would be the possible tactic of using aluminized mylar balloons to surround both RVs

and decoys. Balloon-type decoys could be very

light, and could be included in payloads in

quantities far in excess of 10 per RV. When

a balloon is placed around the RV, the warhead is made to resemble a decoy—an example of the concealment technique called antisimulation. Also, shrouds such as balloons or

other configurations may be placed around,

but not centered on, the RVs. This would make

a kill more difficult for some kinetic-energy

weapons, since the position of the RV target

inside may not be known with sufficient precision.

A decoy could be given signatures which

would closely match real RVs for several sensing methods, a technique known as simulation.

There may be from 10 to 100 decoys per RV,

causing an immense bookkeeping problem. Up

to hundreds of thousands of objects could be

involved.

A variety of measures has been suggested

to overcome this problem.” One possibility

would be to observe the deployment of the

RVs and decoys with ladar during the postboost phase, if the offense permitted such observations. The changes in post-boost vehicle

velocity upon each deployment could be observed, providing a clue to the mass of the object deployed: RVs will be much more massive

than decoys. Another tactic might be to attempt to discriminate between RVs and decoys by observing emission from an object at

several electromagnetic wavelengths, and by

inferring temperature from the radiated electromagnetic energy spectra. Prolonged observations may be needed to perform discrimination

using this technique, since the rate of temperature change would be the discriminant.

Many other possibilities for discriminating

between RVs and decoys also exist, as well as

‘

e

See discussion on “Discrimination,” p. 162 ff.

countermeasures which would make the discrimination task more difficult. Some discussion of these items is presented in the classified annex to this chapter.

Countermeasures to Weapons

Hardening

Some simple passive countermeasures to laser weapons have been suggested. One involves rotating the booster, so that the laser

spot must illuminate a larger area. This would

work if the period of rotation of the booster

were not much longer than the necessary laser dwell time for a kill, and it would force the

offensive laser to be increased in power in order to compensate. Such a countermeasure

would not work in defending against a pulsed

laser, which would deposit its energy in a time

much less than the period of rotation of the

booster.

Resistance to continuous-wave (non-pulsed)

lasers could be increased by coating boosters

with ablative shields which evaporate when

heated, protecting the booster underneath.

The booster would suffer some loss in throwweight, but could gain some laser protection.

Post-boost vehicles could be hardened against

attack, although the weight penalty could

prove serious. The possible degree of attainable hardening is an issue to be investigated.

RVs are hardened by design, since they must

survive the high temperatures and decelerations of reentry. This does not mean that they

are immune to attack, even by lasers, but that

the energy required for a kill would be substantially greater than in the case of a booster.

Kinetic-energy weapons are the weapons of

choice for midcourse and terminal phases. Hardening against such weapons does not seem

a feasible option. Particle beams would also

be difficult to protect against without a great

cost in weight. However, in this case, kill

assessment could be a serious problem unless

a hard kill mode were used.

Evading—Fast Burn

Another much-discussed countermeasure is

the use of fast-burn ICBMs by the Soviet
173 —-— — ———. — —

Union. The current SS-18s burn out in about

300 seconds at an altitude of about 400 km.

The boost-phase defense then has nearly 300

seconds to reach each target. If the length of

the boost phase were to be reduced by one half

(to approximately that of the U.S. MXs), the

defense’s job would be severely complicated.

The Soviets are currently testing their equivalent to the MX, the SS-X-24. If boosters are

developed which burn out in the atmosphere

(say, at 60 to 80 km) in 50 seconds or so, as

the Fletcher Panel asserted is possible, some

boost-phase defensive techniques would be

seriously compromised, if not rendered unworkable. These are the particle beam, and,

probably, the X-ray laser, both of which might

not penetrate to the required altitude without

losing the ability to kill.

The effectiveness of homing vehicles could

also be impaired by fast-burn boosters, which

would require the vehicles to enter the atmosphere. Their infrared homing sensors might be

blinded by atmospheric heating of the windows through which the sensors must look.

Since fast-burn boosters burn out both at a

lower altitude and in a shorter time, homing

vehicles would also have the problem of traversing a greater distance in less time. These

problems could be circumvented to a degree

if sufficiently accurate targeting were possible after the burn-out of the booster, and before deployment of the RVs during the postboost phase. One would have to rely on far

more sensitive infrared sensors which were capable of finding their targets against the background of the Earth. The homing technology

could be strained by this requirement. Alternatively, command guidance of the homing vehicle could be used, whereby the homing vehicles are steered by commands transmitted

from other satellites.

All possible systems would face the enormous problem of dealing with a boost phase

lasting only one-sixth to one-half as long as

the current base case time of 300 seconds. If

a 1 second dwell time were necessary on average for a kill, each satellite involved in the battle would be able to handle 50 to 150 boosters,

instead of the 300 that each could have handled in the full 300 seconds. The first effect

would be to multiply the requirements for the

size of the defense constellation by a factor of

between 2 and 6.27 Additionally, the problems

of battle management would be severely exacerbated, with more permutations of tracking, target assignment, and kill assessment to

accomplish in a shorter time. Again, cost-exchange arguments will have to resolve the issue of whether the offense finds it cheaper to

double its fleet, or the defense finds it cheaper

to compensate by increasing its constellation

size.

The fast-burn booster would also severely

strain the capabilities of pop-up weapons.

Since the weapons would be placed on missile

submarines several thousand kilometers from

the ICBM fields, they would have to travel farther in less time than their quarries. This is

because the weapons would have to rise high

enough to clear the Earth’s curvature before

they would have straight line paths to their

targets. Even if both hunter and hunted were

launched simultaneously (which is clearly not

possible), the defensive weapon would have to

travel farther in the same period of time. Moreover, weapons unable to penetrate below a certain point in the atmosphere must rise high

enough so that not only the target, but also

the entire line of sight between the weapon and

the target, is above the minimum altitude.

These difficulties are mitigated if the pop-up

weapons are able to detect and destroy the targets after boost phase is over, without the

clear infrared plume signals.

The defense could therefore counter a fastburn booster by improving post-boost-phase

detection and kill. The offense could counter

again by deploying the post-boost vehicle in

much shorter times than is now the case.

In the terminal phase, there is less than 1

minute available for intercept. Countermeasures in this phase, besides the use of nuclear

——.———.

“For some possible types of constellations. constellation size

would grow by a smaller factor than that by which the boost

phase were decreased. In those cases, constellation size would

grow by less than the factor of 2 to 6. See section on “Constellation Size, ” pp. 179-186.
174

weapons mentioned earlier, would include the

introduction of maneuverable reentry vehicles

(MaRVs). Such warheads would engage in a

preset series of zig-zag motions to avoid interceptors which would be unable to match the

evasive maneuvers in the time required. Small

movable fins or other aerodynamic techniques

might be used. Counters to this tactic could

involve the use of kill mechanisms (probably

nuclear) with larger radii of lethality.

Countermeasures to Overall

System Performance

Saturation

There are a number of ways to saturate defense systems. For example, in the terminal

phase, a preferential offense could overcome

defenses if the defender’s object is to protect

cities. The aggressor could concentrate many

RVs on a few cities. If the defense wishes to

protect all its cities, not knowing which of

them will be attacked, it is forced to deploy

defenses at all of them, resulting in the requirement for significantly more defensive forces.

If it were considered acceptable to permit the

destruction of some cities, the defensive requirements could be relaxed.

For defensive systems which are substantially less than 100 percent successful, one possible countermeasure is simply to increase the

number of warheads. It should be remembered

that the Soviet SS-18s probably have a capacity of at least 18 and perhaps 30 warheads

each, well beyond the currently tested 10.28

Therefore, a doubling of Soviet RVs could be

relatively inexpensive.

For a 50 percent effective defensive system,

a simple response of expanding the SS-18 capacity could restore the previous strategic balance, as far as soft target defenses (which were

not “preferential defenses”) are concerned.

This would be the case unless a significant portion of the defensive capability were in the

—

‘8See, e.g. B. W. Bennett, How to Assess the Survivability

of U.S. ICBMS (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1980), p. 70;

W. J. Perry, Nuclear Arms-Ethics, Strate~, Politics, J. Woolsey (cd.) (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), p. 90; Strobe Talbott, Endgame (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 265.

boost phase, in which case more boosters

might have to be added by the offense to overcome the defense. If hardened targets were

defended preferentially, some of them could

be protected against attacks of many RVs;29

if the defenses operated randomly, some seven

or eight RVs per target would still provide

high kill assurance for nearly all of the targets.

One possible offensive counter strategy would

therefore be to aim RVs at soft targets instead

of hardened ones. Should the offense counter

the defense by adding warheads, the cost of

adding a significant number (although perhaps

not enough to regain high confidence of killing preferentially defended targets) is likely

to be far less than the cost of deploying a 50

percent effective defense. Moreover, the offensive response would require much less time to

implement than the defensive system would.

If a defensive system were 80 percent effective, the needed response by the offense to accomplish the same expected damage on soft

targets (again, not defended preferentially)

would be to multiply the number of warheads

by 5. For preferentially defended hardened targets, it would be more difficult for the offense

to assure the same expected level of damage.30

There will clearly be some point of defensive

efficiency where the offense will not find it economical to respond merely by increasing warhead and missile production. An estimate of

the cross-over point requires knowledge of the

cost of other countermeasures which would be

possible, as well as of the defensive system.

Saturation could occur particularly during the

midcourse phase, where penalties to the offense

are small for producing a large number of decoys. These can be cheap and light. It cannot

be emphasized too strongly that the ability to

discriminate in this phase is essential to the

feasibility of the whole space-based BMD concept. The quality of midcourse discrimination

determines the difficulty of constructing credible decoys.

‘

g

Even so, preferential defenses can be defeated if the offense

is able to determine which warheads did not detonate on target, and is then able to retarget additional warheads on those

targets.

30See, however, the preceding footnote.
175

Evading—Circumvention

Circumvention of space-based BMD could

take several forms. A heavy reliance on cruise

missiles or other air-breathing delivery systems, for example, would force the construction of a parallel air defense system in addition to a space-based missile defense. It is

conceivable that some elements of a spacebased system would be useful in such a defense, but they would be unlikely to be sufficient. An air defense could possibly be technically feasible, but would not be perfect in

defending soft targets, and would be expensive. Full analysis of air defense is beyond the

scope of this study.

Depressed trajectory missiles launched from

submarines could pose difficulties for BMD

systems. If the missiles were launched near

U.S. territory, the shortened flight times could

significantly strain defensive timelines.

Vehicles could be developed which never

leave the atmosphere, but glide immediately

after booster cut-off. They would bypass the

post-boost and midcourse phases (unless those

phases employed atmosphere-penetrating

weapons). They might, however, be vulnerable

to certain types of boost-phase defense and

could be vulnerable to terminal defenses.

The boost phase might be avoided entirely

by pre-positioning nuclear weapons in orbit.31

Such weapons, if permitted to be launched and

to remain in space, would bypass all but the

terminal layer and perhaps the later part of

the midcourse layer of a BMD system. The

warning time for nuclear attack would be reduced from the 25 minutes or so of an ICBM

flight (or 7 to 10 minutes of an SLBM) down

to only a few minutes for reentry. In order to

be viable, such weapons would have to be survivable against attack, especially since their

emplacement in orbit could be considered an

extremely provocative act. Although the missions and technologies of orbiting nuclear

“Any basing of nuclear weapons in space would explicitly violate the outer Space Treaty of 1967, However, there is no reason to suppose that the OST would necessaril}r be an~’ sturdier

than the 1972 ~1 BM Treat~, which would already ha~re been

a casualt~’ of an~ space-based 13 LI I) regime,

weapons for ground attack would be quite different from the mission and technologies of a

space-based BMD system, some of the survivability techniques necessary for the latter

might be applicable as well to the former.

The introduction of bombs into the United

States by suitcases, commercial routes, or diplomatic pouches could be accomplished and,

for all we know, may already have been done.

Techniques for screening such devices by neutron interrogation and radiation detectors are

mature technologies and would be easy to use

at designated ports of entry. To cover all possible entry routes, however, including deserted

coastlines, forests, and deserts along our borders, would be expensive and impractical.

Suppression

With the exception of pop-up weapon concepts, directed- and kinetic-energy weapon

scenarios all postulate a large number of spacebased stations, which must function continuously in order to be effective. The assets contained in these satellites maybe high-powered

lasers, delicate optical mirrors, a fleet of homing rockets, electromagnetic launchers, or particle accelerators. These assets have varying

degrees of sensitivity to disruption when subjected to external attack. They would probably

have to be shielded as a defensive measure. Required shielding weights could reach up to

many tons for each defensive satellite station.

Further in the future, as noted earlier, it may

be possible to use material mined from nearEarth asteroids for shielding purposes. This

would eliminate the need for putting enormous

weights into orbit from the Earth’s surface.

Even the best shield, however, would probably be useless against a nearby nuclear detonation (within a few kilometers or so). A serious threat to any set of satellites is therefore

the concept of space mines. A salvage-fused

space mine could be emplaced, if unopposed,

within kill range of any ballistic missile defense satellite. Presumably, this would occur

during the deployment period. The mines could

already be in orbit when the defensive battle

stations were deployed, and could then be
176 —

moved into position trailing those stations.

The cost of a small nuclear (or conventional)

device would likely be much less than that of

a defensive satellite station for any system being discussed, so the cost-exchange would appear to favor the offense.

A defense against this tactic might need to

rely on previously stationed defender satellites, which would be able to destroy the space

mines before they approached within lethal

range of their targets. The difficulty is, that

these defender satellites could also be space

mined: the technology for the mines could be

developed in the near term, and there is little

reason to suppose that, once the United States

began positioning a layer of defender satellites, the Soviet Union would be unable to

launch (or redeploy from higher orbit) its

mines. The defenders would then have to be

able to defend themselves against the mines.

The issue revolves then around the ability

of mines (an easier and more accessible technology) to disable the defender satellites (anew

technology) as they are being deployed for the

first time, at a favorable cost-exchange ratio.

They must be able to do this at a stage when

there may be far fewer defenders than mines.

Another important issue is the willingness of

either side to initiate hostilities by attacking

a suspected mine in peacetime.

Defense satellites or battle stations could

also defend themselves by means of kinetickill vehicles (KKVS), attacking whatever objects approached. A reply could then be to exhaust the kill vehicles by means of cheap decoys, and then to send in a real mine for the

kill. A counter-reply could be to use cheap

KKV decoys.

The number of sensing and battle station

satellites would be far less than the number

of warheads and decoys. Therefore, a directedenergy technology, even if not very effective

against an offensive assault, could be deadly

when used by the offense against inadequately

hardened defensive space assets, provided they

could be found. There is always the possibility that these weapons could be more effective

for offenses than for defenses. This is because

satellites travel in known and predictable

paths, and because beam weapons act nearly

instantaneously. An attacker can choose the

moment to strike, and can take a very long

time to plan the logistics and battle management. Battle management problems for an offensive attack on sensing satellites would be

minor compared to those of a defender against

a ballistic missile attack, when decisions must

be made in only a few seconds. Since the place

and time of the attack on satellites would be

up to the offense, to a large degree, the offensive forces could possibly even use land-based

lasers to kill some satellites. To accomplish

this, the offense would have to act when the

sensors were exposed, and might only be able

to deaden a few satellites in a constellation.

However, for an attack to succeed, it maybe

sufficient to punch a “hole” in the constellation and to attack through the breach. A robust defensive system architecture would have

to be resilient against such an attack.

The defense would have to develop means

to hide and disguise its satellites, if possible,

and decoys would have to be deployed. The

sensing satellites and decoy satellites would

have to be proliferated to complicate attacks

on them. The extra satellites could be deployed

in a dormant mode in different orbits from the

active sensing satellites, ready to change orbit and come on-line when needed. Careful

study would be needed to determine whether

the cost-exchange arguments would favor the

offensive or defensive forces in such a scenario.

As OTA’s companion report on Anti-Sate]-

lite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms

Control indicates, a number of advanced technologies have the potential to be used in future anti-satellite weapons which could be

highly effective against current generations of

satellites. Several countermeasures which

could make satellites more difficult to attack

are also under investigation; presumably,

space-based components of a BMD system

would employ such countermeasures (cf. p. 186

ff.).
Once an entire defensive constellation has

been deployed, attacking parts of it could be

rather difficult. A system intended to handle

tens of thousands of targets, or more, might

be more easily able to handle a few in selfdefense. In principle, in the mid- to far-term,

it might be possible that ground-based directed energy stations could damage the sensors of space assets. However, if a complete

constellation were in place, defensive countermeasures could be taken. These include redundancy, the use of battle assessments by bystander members of the constellation, and

counterstrikes by the defense to avoid further

damage, as well as maneuvers, decoys, and

anti-simulation techniques.

While the system is being deployed, components may be vulnerable. It is quite conceivable that the adversary would try to destroy

the first few satellites as they were being

placed in orbit. A complete system could require many scores of stations, and deploying

it would take a substantial amount of time.

Therefore, the opportunity will probably exist to attack when few stations are deployed.

This could be accomplished with space mines

which could already be in orbit, or by groundlaunched missiles, possibly nuclear-tipped.

A defense against this countermeasure

would be to have a smaller deployed system

already in orbit, which could defend the battle stations, as noted above. Another counter

might be to threaten retaliation for any hostile act against the newly deployed stations.

A full analysis of such deployment battle scenarios would have to be based on more detailed

deployment plans and weapons choices which

have not yet been made.

Relationships Between

Countermeasures

Offensive countermeasures usually provide

some penalty which must be considered in

177

evaluating the interaction of the defense and

the offense. Possible countermeasures to one

part of a defense system may increase vulnerability to other parts. A few examples might

be of some interest:

•

●

●

●

●

The fast-burn rocket avoids several types

of defensive weapons, and it puts a severe

strain on the defense by reducing the time

available to attack and kill boosters and

post-boost vehicles before the deployment

of RVs and decoys. The throwweight penalty may be relatively small. However,

the post-boost vehicle and decoys cannot

usefully deploy within the atmosphere, so

some period of vulnerability in the postboost phase cannot be eliminated.

Offensive responses which modify the

timing of launches (for example, which

launch all at once to put maximum stress

on the defense) can interfere with structured attack plans, which then make the

terminal layer more effective.

Nuclear weapons as suppression or blinding agents could disable one’s own space

assets during a nuclear engagement, and

thus prove harmful to the offense.

Decoys can imitate RVs better if they

contain small thrusters, for example. These

would behave more like real RVs upon reentry. However, the thrusters are heavy,

and thus a throwweight penalty would be

incurred. Simple decoys, such as balloons

which mimic the optical properties of an

RV, might not also mimic other signatures such as radar cross section. More

sophisticated decoys would have to be

used which duplicated as many signatures as the defense measured.

Likewise, hardening of the boosters or

any other component by heat-countering

ablative coatings may increase survivability against some weapons, but would

reduce available throwweight for real

warheads.
178 — .

COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES

The discussion immediately above, pointing

out the costs to the offense of implementing

countermeasures, is closely connected with the

problem of counter-countermeasures. Possible

offensive responses to a defensive system may

themselves be countered by modifications to

the defense.

Counters to all possible countermeasures do

not now exist. Ideas have been suggested for

some, but it is far too early to determine

whether many have any validity at all. They

cannot, however, be ruled out. The “fallacy of

the last move, ” described in the introduction

to this chapter, is just as invalid when used

to show that countermeasures will always be

found as it is when used to neglect the existence of countermeasures at all.

It is misleading to treat the countermeasure/counter-countermeasure competition as a

game in which each side moves in turn. In

actuality, a proposed defensive deployment

must try to anticipate possible countermeasures before they are made. Defensive counters

to obvious offensive responses, such as increasing the number of warheads per booster, proliferating decoys, and attacking space-based assets

of the defense, must clearly be available before

a decision to deploy the defense is justified in

the first place. Similarly, the most effective

offensive countermeasures will be the ones

which anticipate and frustrate possible defensive reactions.

Some counter-countermeasures can be implemented after deployment has been made.

Since neither side can anticipate nor prepare

for all possible counters by the other, each side

can hope to at least confuse the other by attempting to keep its own moves secret while

at the same time trying to discover what its

opponent is doing. If one side can successfully

keep the other from knowing which of a number of possible approaches it might take, it

might be able to force the other side to prepare a number of possible countermeasures

while preventing it from implementing any of

them.

The eventual outcome of this competition

will depend on whose intelligence cycle time is

shorter. The defense will win if the interval between the time it discovers that the offense

is preparing a particular countermeasure and

the time when it can neutralize that countermeasure is less than the time the offense requires to discover that its counter has been

defeated, discard it, and prepare another. On

the other hand, if the offense can constantly

keep the defense one step behind, the offense

will win. Note that if the defense is required

to be 99 percent effective, the offense need

only manage to penetrate the defense with a

few per cent of its warheads in order to “defeat” the defense (e.g., to cause the defense to

fail in achieving its defensive goals). In general, no clear outcome of the offense-defense

competition can be predicted.

Examples of counter-countermeasures have

been given already in this chapter. If the defense can develop a method to measure the

mass of objects in space, the offense will not

be able to use light decoys. If the defense is

able to develop extremely effective post-boost

and midcourse phase defenses (which would

require effective discrimination or else extremely rapid weapons), it would not need to

use a boost-phase layer and fast-burn boosters

would be less useful. (However, the post-boost

phase can also be speeded up, and the duration of midcourse phase can be adjusted somewhat by changing trajectory. ) If the offense

hopes to overwhelm a defense by executing a

massive, simultaneous launch, defensive weapons which operate best when many boosters

are available at once will be more effective.
179 —

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

The building blocks of a strategic defense

have to be integrated into a coherent, organized system if they are to constitute a useful defense. The system architecture specifies

the design of such a system. It denotes what

sorts of components are to be included, how

they are to be based, and how they will interact. The system architecture is driven by the

objectives of the system and by the effectiveness of each of its parts. Cost and schedule factors also influence the system architecture, as

do operational constraints imposed by those

who will eventually be asked to manage and

maintain any deployed BMD system.

Many of the elements required to specify a

BMD system architecture are not available at

present, such as a clear specification of system objectives (which must include an estimate of the threat such a system will face) and

estimates of the effectiveness of various components. Further off still are estimates of the

costs and times at which various levels of capability might be deployed. Extensive research not yet conducted must be undertaken

to provide this information. In its absence, this

study will review some aspects of a BMD system which any candidate architecture must

specify. These are:

●

●

●

Size: the defensive system must be big

enough, taking the expected threat into

account, to satisfy its objectives.

Survivability: the defensive system must

be able to survive attacks upon itself.

Battle Management: various components

of the system must accomplish their individual missions and must also interact

with the rest of the system. Due to the

overall complexity of such a system, the

way in which its pieces are to act and interact must be considered at the time the

system is designed. Moreover, the defensive system must be able to operate with

a minimum of human intervention.

Constellation Size

One factor influencing the total cost of systems utilizing space-based weapons is the

number of weapons platforms, or constellation

size. This number by itself is no more important than other features of the defense, including the as-yet unknown unit cost of the satellites, their vulnerability to attack, and their

resistance to potential countermeasures. Furthermore, weapons platforms are only one of

the types of space- and ground-based components that a BMD system would require, and

the number of weapons platforms needed might

or might not accurately reflect the total system complexity.

Nevertheless, calculations of the number of

space-based weapons platforms needed to perform boost-phase intercepts have attracted

considerable attention because they provide

one way to investigate how variations in the

quality of system components, or in the demands put upon them, affect the required

quantity of those components.

There is no “correct” constellation size. These

calculations can only be done assuming hypothetical defensive capabilities and offensive

threats, and different sets of assumptions will

lead to different numbers of satellites. However,

the way in which constellation size depends

on various parameters can be determined. If

values for these other parameters are assumed, the corresponding number required of

defensive satellites can then be found.

Constellation size depends most directly on

the number of missile boosters the defense

must handle in a given amount of time. Either

increasing the number of missiles or decreasing the available time will serve to increase the

rate at which missiles must be destroyed, forcing the defense to grow. Other important factors influencing the size of a defensive constel-
180

lation are weapon brightness (for directedenergy weapons), retarget or “slew” time, constellation altitude, threat size, and threat distribution. No simple formula relating number

of defensive satellites to the offensive launch

rate will be valid over the entire ranges of

these other factors.

Weapon and Target Characteristics

The effectiveness of a defensive weapon, together with the vulnerability of its target, determines how long (and with what likelihood)

it will take the weapon to destroy the target

at a given distance. These individual kill times,

divided by the total length of time available,

determine the number of targets that each defensive weapon can destroy.

Directed-energy weapons are characterized

by brightness, or how much power they can

concentrate into a specified angular range.

Since the maximum possible intensity of such

a weapon on a target falls off as the square

of the distance between the two, the time required to kill a target goes up as the square

of that distance. The kill time also depends on

the target hardness-how much energy per

unit area is necessary to destroy it. Although

targets may be very sensitive to attack in certain critical spots, target hardness represents

the intensity necessary, on average, to destroy

the target without taking advantage of these

“Achilles heels. ”

Kill time, then, is proportional to the target

hardness J and the square of its distance R,
-—

181

To increase the number of targets that can

be killed in the available time, a directed-energy weapon must either increase its brightness or decrease its slew time; the more targets each weapon can kill, the fewer weapons

are needed. Note that reducing the brightness

of a directed-energy weapon by a factor of 2 has

exactly the same effect on kill time as doubling

the hardness. Both are equivalent to doubling

the number of targets (to the extent that slew

time is negligible—i.e., if a second target were

put next to each existing one and the weapon

could switch instantaneously from one to the

other).

Kinetic-energy weapons have a different set

of characteristics from directed-energy weapons.

They can kill only those targets close enough to

be reached by projectiles in the available time.

Increasing either the projectile velocity or the

available time of engagement increases the range

of each weapon and lessens the total number required. Hardness is less relevant for kinetic kill;

a 1 kg projectile colliding with a booster at a relative speed of 10 km/sec carries the energy equivalent of a heavy tractor-trailer rig traveling at

140 miles per hour.

Altitude

Raising their orbits takes the defensive satellites farther away from the boosters. For

directed-energy weapons where the total kill

time is not dominated by the retarget time,

increasing the altitude will significantly decrease each satellite’s total kill rate. At the

same time, however, satellites in higher orbits

can see farther, putting more boosters in their

field of view at any given instant. Depending

on which effect is more important, increasing

the altitude can either increase or decrease the

total number of defensive satellites required.

(One of the two example constellations presented at the end of this section gets bigger

at higher altitudes; the other gets smaller. )

Depending on the target distribution and

orientation, an optimum altitude can be calculated to maximize the constellation’s kill

rate. However, other considerations (e.g., orbital lifetime or satellite survivability) are

often more important, so nonoptimal altitudes

will in all likelihood have to be used.32

Orbit

In addition to altitude, the angle of a satellite’s orbit with respect to the Equator (its inclination angle) affects how efficiently a satellite can cover a launch site. The satellite orbit

most effectively covering a site at a given latitude has an orbital inclination equal to that

latitude. For example, a satellite in polar orbit (inclination 90 O) will pass over the poles

(latitude 90°) on every orbit and can cover

high-latitude sites efficiently. However, it will

pass over a different portion of the Equator

on each orbit as the Earth rotates underneath,

and will therefore not often be in a position

to cover a particular site at low latitudes. Conversely, a satellite in equatorial orbit passes

over every point on the Equator on each orbit, but has no coverage of higher latitudes at

all.

Orbital inclination is not very important for

long-range weapons at high altitudes, which

are able to attack boosters far from the point

on the Earth’s surface which is directly beneath the defensive satellite.

Mission

Obviously, a boost-phase system expected

to destroy all enemy missiles at launch must

be more capable than less ambitious systems

which accept some leakage. However, there

are more subtle effects of system mission upon

system capability. A mission requirement

specifying certain orbital inclinations can impose a penalty if those inclinations are not optimal for other mission requirements.

“The chosen altitude must be high enough so that residual

atmospheric drag will not cause the orbit to decay too quickly

(above about 300 km); survivability considerations might mandate an altitude significantly higher than that (1,000 km or

more). The greater altitude would provide increased warning

time in event of direct-ascent attack and might lessen the threat

posed by other types of ground-based weapons.
182

Figure 7-5 .—Orbital Inclination

(c)

Equatorial orbits (a) give no coverage of northern latitudes. Polar

orbits (b) concentrate coverage at the north pole. Inclined orbits

(c) are more economical,

SOURCE: Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space,

background paper prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984,

One example would be requiring a boostphase defense to counter submarine-launched

missiles as well as land-based ICBMs. The

number of extra satellites to counter SLBMs

need not be much more than the number needed

only for ICBMs because most of the additional

capability (in terms of weapons platforms)

needed to counter SLBMs comes “for free. ”

In a system sized to handle the existing Soviet land-based ICBMs, only a small percentage of the defensive satellites will be within

range of those missile fields at any one time.

The rest will be somewhere else. Those others

which are over the oceans can counter SLBMs

if they are in a position to see them. In order

to cover possible Arctic Ocean deployment of

Soviet SLBMs (which would have to be able

to break through the polar ice cap), at least

some of the defensive satellites must be in polar orbit. These satellites will be less effective

against land-based ICBMs than they would

be if they were in less inclined orbits which did

not waste time going over the poles.33

Target Distribution

In the example immediately above, the capability to handle SLBMs came at almost no

cost because SLBM launch areas are far from

ICBM silos. Those satellites which would handle the SLBMs in an attack would probably

be different from the ones handling the ICBMs,

so both jobs could be done simultaneously.

Similarly, should the Soviets add additional

ICBMs in areas so far away from their existSince not all the missiles on a sub can be fired at once, and

since the subs are more widely dispersed than missile silos, the

rate of submarine-based missile launches per unit area of the

ocean will be smaller than the corresponding rate of ICBM

launches per unit area in a missile field. Therefore, SLBM

launches should be easier for a boost-phase defense to handle.

This becomes less true for higher altitude constellations, where

each satellite defends against launches from a wider area and

more satellites are in a position to shoot simultaneously at

ICBMs and SLBMs. Moreover, these statements apply for

simultaneous SLBM and ICBM launch. Should the Soviets be

able to time SLBM launches so that they occur under defensive satellites which have already been depleted in countering

ICBMs, the SLBMs would not be intercepted. However, the

orbital arrangement of defensive satellites can mitigate this

problem to some extent by ensuring that satellite coverage areas

overlap.

Midcourse systems will have a harder job defending against

SLBMs than against ICBMs, since normal SLBM flight times

are shorter than those of ICBMs. SLBMs flying depressed

trajectories can arrive on target even faster than those on more

usual flight paths.
183

— — .

ing missiles (and from SLBM launch areas)

that the defensive satellites needed to counter

the increase were not already being used to attack existing boosters, no additional defensive

capability would be needed to handle the increase.

However, targets which are close together

are more difficult for the defense to handle

than targets which are dispersed. Should additional missiles be added near existing ones

(or near each other, if there are enough of

them), new defensive satellites would have to

be added to counter the increase. Boosters located in the same general direction from a defensive weapon can be considered “near each other”

if that weapon requires about the same amount

of time to target and kill each of them. For

directed-energy weapons that operate by “thermal kill, ” this will be the case if the kill time

for each booster in a group is dominated by

retarget time (e.g., the time required for the

beam to switch between targets is large compared to the amount of time the beam must

dwell on each target) or if the dimensions of

the missile field are smaller than the orbital

altitude of the weapon. Note especially that

missiles within existing ICBM missile fields

are already ‘‘close together’ by these criteria.

Deployment in a closely-spaced basing mode

such as that proposed for the MX missile

(“dense pack”) would be much closer together

than required to be considered near each

other. 34

Examples

parameters, or very similar ones, have recently

been discussed fairly extensively in the literature.36

The second case utilizes extremely bright

lasers generating 25 MW of power at a wavelength of 0.25 microns. These lasers have 25-meter diameter mirrors. The greatly reduced

wavelength, in particular, yields a very large

increase in brightness, since it permits the radiation to be focused to a much smaller spot.37

An increase in brightness by a factor of 911

over the first case is thus obtained (B = 2.1

x 1 0

23 w/sr).

A booster 4,000 km away could be irradiated

with an intensity of 1.5 kw/cm2 in the first case

and 1,300 kw/cm2 in the second one. If that

booster had a hardness of 10 kJ/cm2, the value

taken for these examples, it would be destroyed in 7 seconds (ignoring retarget time)

in the first case and in 8 milliseconds (similarly

ignoring retarget time) in the second.

These hypothetical cases have been selected

only for the purpose of demonstrating how constellation sizes vary as system parameters are

changed. The actual parameters chosen do not

represent an optimized system design, nor

does their use imply that either system could

or would be constructed. By way of reference,

the first case uses space-based lasers which are

much more capable than any existing groundbased ones; the second case requires great advances in optical capability beyond those needed

for the first case.

Perfect optics is assumed, so that the beam

spreads at the minimum diffraction-limited angle. Absorption by the atmosphere, in particular absorption by the ozone layer which would

severely affect the second case, is neglected.

be at the center of a sphere and aimed at some small portion

of that sphere’s inside surface, the weapon’s brightness is given

by the amount of power {in watts) the weapon can beam into

a given angular range (in steradians). Brightness increases either if power increases or if the width of the beam (the beam’s

solid angle) decreases.

‘For a summary of references, see Richard L. Garwin, “How

Many Orbiting Lasers for Boost-Phase Intercept?’ Nature, vol.

315, May 23, 1985, p. 286.

37 Brightness is proportional to the square of the ratio of mirror diameter to wavelength.
184

For the purposes of this example (unless otherwise noted), Soviet boosters are assumed to

have been replaced with hypothetical MX-like

boosters having a burn time of 180 seconds and

the 10 kJ/cm2 hardness figure given above.

Such boosters would probably be more difficult for the defense to destroy than most existing Soviet boosters, but they also would be

much easier to destroy than boosters that the

Soviets could develop in the time it took the

United States to deploy such a defensive system. In addition, it was assumed that a spot

at least 15 cm in diameter would be required

to destroy a booster. If the laser was capable

of focusing to a smaller spot than that, its

beam, in effect, was blurred to be 15 cm wide

on target. Only boost-phase engagements are

presented here. The effective engagement time

is 150 seconds since we assume that the defense

requires 30 seconds to identify and assess the

attack and to prepare to fire. No limitation was

imposed on the resources available (e.g., power

and fuel) on each station; the number of kills

each satellite could make was limited only by

the number of targets in view and the available time.

For most cases, Soviet missiles were assumed

to be located at 12 sites having the approximate

locations of Soviet ICBM fields. Each hypothetical launch site was given 117 boosters for a total of 1,404, approximating the size of the

present Soviet ICBM force. Many cases were

also run for a doubled threat where each site

had 234 missiles. Defensive satellites were

placed in 600 inclined orbits, maximizing their

coverage of Soviet missile fields. The lasers

were credited with being equally effective

against surfaces at any orientation.

Examples were also run for satellites in polar orbits and for a Soviet force concentrated

at a single site—the most stressing case for

a boost-phase defense. As was mentioned above,

a “single site” does not necessarily indicate

a high density of boosters. In these examples,

distributing all Soviet boosters over an area the

size of the State of Ohio effectively puts them

in a single site. One run took a more realistic

angular dependence for laser lethality which,

in effect, made it easier for a laser to kill a missile firing broadside at it than firing straight

down on its nose cone.

Some examples, run for both laser brightnesses, assumed that the Soviets would use

“fast-bum” boosters which burned out in 80

seconds, rather than 180. A 30 second delay

for identification and assessment was taken

for these cases, as for the others.

The computer model used was provided by

Christopher Cunningham at the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory. A constellation of defensive satellites is specified by laser brightness, beam divergence (which depends on the ratio of mirror diameter to laser

wavelength), altitude, retarget time, number

of satellites, and orbital placement. For each

set of conditions, the offense was assumed to

launch at the moment when the defensive satellites were in the worst position to handle the

attack, and the minimum defensive constellation size capable of destroying all the missiles

under those circumstances was found. Constellations were not augmented to provide spares

to account for satellites which would be out

of service due to attack or maintenance. The

following two tables present the results of the

computer simulations for the two cases.

Observations

The most useful information derivable from

the above tables is the relationship showing

how minimum constellation size varies with

orbital altitude and with retarget time. This

variation is less sensitive to individual assumptions than is the actual size of the constellations, which could be increased or decreased by taking different values for other

parameters. We draw the following conclusions

for the first example:

1. The number of satellites needed in the

constellation varies linearly with the

threat size. The only exception is for very

low altitude constellations (300 km) having retarget times substantially less than

1 second and attacking widely distributed boosters. In this case, the number

of satellites increases less rapidly than

the number of boosters. Even in this
185

Table 7-1.—Constellation Size Given Assumptions in Text

20 Megawatt Laser/10 Meter Mirror/2.7 micron

Booster Hardness 10 kj/cm2

Altitude . . . . . . . . . . 300 km

Retarget time . . . . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 1 sec 3 sec

Threat size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 88 192 396

2,808 . . . . . . . . . . . 120 143 368 777

Altitude ., . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 km

Retarget time ., . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 1 sec 3 sec

Threat size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . . . . 108 * 117 192 336

2,808 . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 224 384 667

● —Base case

Altitude . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000 km

Retarget time . . . . . . . 0 sec 1 sec 3 sec

Threat Size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 357 440

2,808 . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

Excursions about base case (noted with asterisk above):

Base case (Distributed launch, 1,000 km altitude) 108

Fast burn (80 sec), 1,000 km altitude, O sec slew 3 0 6

Fast burn (80 sec), 1,000 km altitude, 1 sec slew 588

Fast burn (80 sec), 300 km altitude O sec slew 176

“Single site” launch, 1,000 km altitude 180

“Single site” launch, 1,000 km altitude, double threat 352

“Single site” launch, 300 km altitud e 132

“Single site” launch, 300 km altitude, doubled threat 234

“Single site launch plus fast burn, 300 km altitude, O sec slew 352

Table 7-2.—Constellation Size Given Assumptions in Text

25 Megawatt Laser/25 Meter Mirror/O.25 micron

Booster Hardness 10 kj/cm2; Atmospheric Absorption Ignored

Altitude . . . . . . . . . 1,000 km

Retarget time . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec

Threat size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . . 10 15 25 6!3

2,808 . . . . . . . . . 14 27 42 128

Altitude . . . . . . . . . 3,000 km

Retarget time . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec

Threat size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . 6 9 16 40

2,808 . . . . . . . . . 9 16 27 75

Altitude . . . . 10,000 km

Retarget time . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec

Threat size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . . 5 8 10 26

2,808 ., . . . . . . 9 13 20 49

Altitude . . . . . . . 15,000 km

Retarget time. . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec

Threat size:

1,404 . . . . . . . . 6 8 11 26

2,808 ., . . . . . . 10 14 22 49

“Single site” launch, 3,000 km altitude, O sec slew .7

“Single site” launch, 3,000 km altitude, O sec slew, double threat 12

“Single site” launch, 15,000 km altitude, O sec sle w 7

Fast burn, 3,000 km altitude O sec slew

Fast burn, 3,000 km altitude, O sec slew double threat 24

“Single site, ” fast burn 3,000 km alt , 0 sec slew 16

“Single site, ” fast burn, 3,000 km alt , 0 sec slew, double threat 25

2.

3.

case, the constellation size varies nearly

linearly with the threat size for a “single site” launch.

For the particular parameters chosen for

hardness, boost time, etc., the constellation size must be at least 100 satellites

for altitudes of 1,000 km and above.

Grouping boosters at a “single site” increases constellation size by about 60

percent. If the threat is doubled by placing the additional boosters at a “single

site, ” the defensive constellation should

more than double (except, possibly, for

the low altitude, low retarget time case).

By grouping the added boosters together, they become even harder to kill than

if boosters were doubled at their existing locations.

For the second (superbright) example, we

find

4.

5.

6.

7.

the following:

The altitude is much less important than

the slew time in determining constellation size. The limit on the kill rate appears to be determined by the slew time,

which, when longer than 0.25 second, is

much longer than the time needed to kill

an individual target. The number of targets each satellite can kill is then limited,

not by laser brightness, but by the time

needed to retarget. In this regime, defensive constellation size scales linearly with

threat size.

For some of the particular parameters

chosen here, constellation sizes can be

very small.

For retarget times at or below about 0.25

second with distributed launch, the defensive constellation size scales less than

linearly with the threat size. In this regime, however, the difference in absolute

number between the actual scaling and

linear scaling is not very big.

For very high altitude constellations, the

entire Soviet Union is effectively a “single site, and constellation size varies essentially linearly with the threat even for

zero retarget time.
186

Further Notes.–For cases where constellation size increases linearly as threat size

increases—most of the ones examined here—

the use of fast burn increases the constellation

size in inverse proportion to the time of engagement. For the dimmer laser system, putting all the Soviet boosters in one place increases the required constellation size by

two-thirds, since fewer defensive satellites are

in a position to attack boosters and more are

therefore needed. However, depending on their

attack plans, the Soviets may not want to

“group” their boosters. Although such a

grouping would still be large enough that it

would not necessarily be any more vulnerable

to attack than their existing booster distribution is, the Soviets would lose the ability to

conduct certain types of structured (precision-timed) attacks. Because of flight time variations in reaching targets when the launch occurs simultaneously from one limited region,

one could not simultaneously strike widely

separated targets with a simultaneous launch.

For the brighter system, there is less advantage

to grouping boosters. The satellites have

longer range, and exact booster placement

does not matter as much.

Although not shown in the table, placing the

defensive satellites in polar orbit increases the

constellation size by less than 20 percent over

the inclined orbit case for the lesser brightness

system. Modeling the laser effectiveness by including the effects of the angle between the laser beam and the booster surface also makes less

than 20 percent difference.

The results given in these tables do not apply to kinetic-energy weapons, where the important parameters are the velocity of the driven

projectiles, and the rapidity of fire. A separate

analysis would be needed to determine the behavior of constellation size in those cases.

Survivability

If the defensive system is itself vulnerable

to attack by the offensive force, the offense

can penetrate it by diverting part of its resources to attacking the defense directly, permitting the remainder to continue unimpeded.

Therefore, such defenses themselves have to

be effectively invulnerable to attack. Paul

Nitze, chief arms control adviser to President

Reagan, stated criteria for BMD which included the requirement that

The technologies must produce defensive

systems that are survivable; if not, the defenses would themselves be tempting targets

for a first strike, This would decrease rather

than enhance stability. ”

General Abrahamson, director of the SDIO,

similarly has recognized that

. . . the key functional components of a defensive system must be made survivable against

attack. This problem is particularly keen for

defensive space assets.”

Some scientists have stated that a defense

should not rely on space-based weapons platforms since they would be very difficult to defend. Discussing ballistic missile defense systems with a House subcommittee, Dr. Edward

Teller emphasized that

I am not talking about orbiting space laser battle stations. I am talking about third

generation weapons and other instruments

that pop up into space when the time to use

them has come.40

“We need eyes in space, ” continued Dr. Teller, but once they are there, “our eyes are sensitive and our eyes are in danger. ”

However, other opinions have been quite the

opposite. In an interview, Presidential Science

Adviser George Keyworth remarked without

elaborating that as a result of recent advances,

“We possess the technology today to deal very

effectively with survivability of space assets.” 41 General Abrahamson, with a slightly

different emphasis, stressed functional surviv-

‘%peech before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, Philadelphia, PA, Feb. 20, 1985.

“J. A. Abrahamson, “The Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Defense/84, August 1984, p. 8.

‘“Defense Department Authorization and Oversight Hearings

on H.R. 2287, Research and Development Subcommittee, House

Committee on Armed Services, Apr. 28, 1983, H. A.S.C 98-6,

Part 5 of 8, p. 1357.

4! Inter}, iewed in Sejpnce and Government Report June 1,

1984, p. 5.
—.. -.

187

ability of space systems rather than individual survivability:

An analogy can be drawn by comparing

[satellites] to the evolutionary use of military

aircraft during World War 1 . . . The fact that

extremely delicate and vulnerable airplanes

became legitimate military targets did not

end their utility in World War I, nor in any

conflict since. Both sides quickly learned how

to make their airplanes survivable . . . Although these [survivability measures] did not

eliminate an enemy’s ability to concentrate

forces to destroy a given airplane, squadrons

were so constructed that missions could be

accomplished in the face of losses of large

numbers of individual airplanes. All these

tactics and technologies are applicable to

spacecraft survivability . . .42

Nevertheless, ensuring the survivability of

space systems or space functions—in the presumed presence of a highly capable enemy

BMD system, and in the highly stressing environment of nuclear war-is as challenging a

task as it is crucial. After all, many of the technological advances required to destroy ballistic

missiles could also be effective against satellites,

and in many cases satellites prove much easier

to destroy. Satellites in orbit today are more

fragile than ballistic missile boosters, which

in turn are easier to destroy than reentry vehicles. Satellites of the future need not be so

fragile, but hardening them will impose costs

and may interfere with their function. Sensor

satellites in high orbits may be concealable,

at least for a while; concealing battle station

satellites in lower orbits would be quite difficult and such satellites would be even more

difficult to conceal if they carried extensive

shielding.

Furthermore, the presence of orbiting BMD

components greatly increases the incentive for

the other side to develop highly capable ASATs

to negate those components. The defense must

constantly maintain full capability to defeat

an attack; depending on defensive system design, the offense may need only to “punch a

hole” through the defense in order to challenge

4

’Abrahamson, op. cit., p. 9 (emphasis added).

its effectiveness seriously. The offense can

choose both the time and the place of the attack, and might have the advantage of surprise.

Passive and active measures can both be

used to improve space system survivability.

Some relevant technologies are given below;

none are applicable in all cases, and all impose

costs and/or are themselves vulnerable to

countermeasures. Much more information on

these techniques and technologies can be

found in chapter 4 of OTA’s companion study

of Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures,

and Arms Control. See also the section earlier

(p. 175) on “Suppression” as a countermeasure to BMD.

Passive Measures

Hiding: Satellites can be made more difficult to detect. For example, they could

be miniaturized or stored in a tightly

folded configuration and deployed only

just before use, or they could be hidden

either in very distant orbits or very close

ones, where they might be hard to detect

against the Earth’s background.

Deception: Satellites can be simulated

with decoys or hidden in clouds of aerosols or chaff.

Maneuvering: Satellites can evade attackers.

Hardening: Satellites can be made resistant to attack.

Proliferation: Satellites can be replicated,

and damaged satellites can either be replenished with on-orbit spares or reconstituted from the ground.

Active Measures

●

●

●

Jamming: Satellites can interfere with the

sensors of attackers by overwhelming or

saturating them.

Spoofing: They can fool attackers by emitting or broadcasting deceptive signals.

Counterattack: Highly capable BMD

weapons can be trained on attackers; alternatively, armed defensive satellites

(DSATs) can be provided to escort and defend other satellites.
188 ——— . —

Secrecy

No matter what combination of active and

passive measures is utilized, protecting satellites from a hostile and responsive opponent

will be an interactive process. (See section on

“Counter-Countermeasures,” p. 178.) In a

competition where different techniques and

measures may suddenly be introduced, it becomes very important for each side to keep its

opponent from learning in advance what it is

doing. It is equally important to learn as much

as possible about what the opponent is doing.

Security therefore becomes especially important in ensuring survivability. However, it will

be more important to protect those items which

the opponent cannot easily find out for himself, such as battle tactics or the locations of

“hidden” satellites, than it will be to protect

those things that will become obvious when

a system is deployed. That one or another of

the techniques under “active measures” or

“passive measures” above is intended to be

used in a defensive constellation should not

be particularly sensitive; exactly how that

technique is to be implemented and under

what circumstances it is to be used would be.

However, any system that relies solely on

keeping some particular piece of information

secret has a catastrophic failure mode should

that information be revealed.

Survivability-Summary

Overall, the Fletcher Committee concluded

that

Survivability of the system components is

a critical issue whose resolution requires a

combination of technologies and tactics that

remain to be worked out.43

From what OTA has been able to determine,

examining data on both an unclassified and

a classified basis, the “technologies and tactics” required to resolve system survivability

issues still “remain to be worked out. ” Either

the work done so far has been so highly clas43 —

The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies

Study (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of the

Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, March 1984),

p. 5.

sified that OTA has not been granted access

to it, or else it has not materially affected this

conclusion. It is likely that Congress would require assurance that those survivability issues

have indeed been satisfactorily addressed before agreeing to fund a full-scale development

system.

Battle Management

Definition

Battle management is concerned with the

allocation of resources. A ballistic missile defense system consists of a number of sensors

and weapons, each having a finite amount of

available power or fuel. Engagements against

attacking ICBMs take place in a region of

space and an interval of time determined by

geometry, weapon capability, and the attacker’s strategy. The defensive components (sensors and weapons) which provide coverage of

that region have to do their jobs within the

available time. The battle management system—the set of rules specifying the operation

of and the relationships between system components, and the computers which process

those rules—must ensure that the overall defensive mission is accomplished successfully.

This job is a demanding one. The first major conclusion of the Defensive Technologies

Study Team subpanel on Battle Management,

Communications, and Data Processing was

that:

Specifying, generating, testing, and maintaining the software for a battle management

system will be a task that far exceeds in complexity and difficulty any that has yet been

accomplished in the production of civil or military software systems.44

44B8ttJe ~aagement, communications, and Data procing, B. McMillan, Panel Chairman, vol. V of Report of the Study

on Elixm”nating the Threat Posed by Nuclear Ba.lh”stic Missiles,

J, C. Fletcher, Study Chairman (Washington, DC: Department

of Defense, Defensive Technologies Study Team, February,

1984), p. 4. This volume will be referred to as the DTST Report, vol. V. Unlike the other six volumes of the DTST report,

vol. V is entirely unclassified. Distribution is limited to U.S.

Government agencies or as directed by the Assistant for

Directed Energy Weapons, OUSDRE/ADE W, The Pentagon,

Washington, DC, 20301.
189

Hardware

Although the hardware required for BMD

battle management also exceeds the present

state of-the-art, the panel recognized that “the

basic technology is evolving rapidly and is

likely to be available when needed. ”45 In addition, the panel found that technology exists

today to transmit data between system components at the rates which a BMD system

would require.

Battle management functions are done both

within a given defensive layer and across different layers. Each layer must perform acquisition and tracking, target discrimination and

classification, and resource allocation. Across

layers, the defensive system must provide

overall surveillance, specify rules of engagement, delegate control, coordinate between

layers, trade off defending Earth targets

against defending itself, and furnish current

assessments of the state of the defense system and the battle. This last function includes

selecting relevant portions of a much larger

set of data and presenting it to the command

authority.

Software

The subpanel of the DTST estimated that

for the system to monitor 30,000 objects (not

a highly conservative number; values of 100,000

and 300,000 were also considered), it would

need to maintain a track file of about 6 million bits of information, or about 200 bits per

track. This amount of data is about the same

as would be contained on 350 double-spaced

typed pages, and could be transmitted within

a second at the data rates considered by the

panel.

The software required, however, was estimated to be three to five times more complex

than what was the largest similar existing military software system-that controlling the

Safeguard ABM system developed in the late

1960s and early 1970s. That project, constituting just the terminal and late midcourse layers

of a BMD system, required over 2 million lines

of computer programming, leading the DTST

——.— —

“Ibid., conclusion 4, p. 6.

to estimate that over 10 million lines of code

might be required for the BMD systems which

they investigated. More recent estimates have

gone considerably higher.

Such a software system “will be larger, more

complex, and have to meet more stringent controls than any software system previously

built, ”46 reported the subpanel. No one person

will be able to comprehend or oversee the entire system and developing such a system will

itself likely require the development of automated programming techniques. Computers

will not only be needed to create the final

BMD program but will also have to subject

it to exhaustive reliability testing. One analyst47 has expressed the view that, in the absence of “extensive operational testing in realistic environments, ” it would be essentially

impossible to produce error-free software of

the size and complexity required. This argument claims that it would be impossible otherwise to be sure that all catastrophic design

flaws had been eliminated, even if automated

programming techniques were applied.

Decentralization and Survivability

The data processing requirements for a system of this complexity must be distributed

among the system elements. This decentralization serves both to minimize the amount of

data which must be passed from component

to component as well as to enhance survivability by eliminating indispensable elements.

Having a surveillance sensor, for example,

process each raw image locally and transmit

only the position of a target to a weapon,

rather than transmitting the entire sensor field

of view, cuts down greatly on the transmitted

data rate and lessens the risk that the system

could be paralyzed by failure of a central processor. With such a decentralized architecture,

the Fletcher subpanel concluded that:

. . . it appears possible to design a battle management system having a structure that can

survive battle damage as well as other parts

of the BMD system do.48

“Ibid., p. 45.

“Herbert Lin, “Software for Ballistic Missile Defense, ” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, July 1985).

48DTST Report, vol. V, op cit., conclusion 9, p. 9.
190

Command and Control

Given the short times and the large number

of individual tasks which need to be done in

a ballistic missile defense engagement, the system must be designed to run as much as possible without human intervention. Command

and control of such a system must also be

highly reliable. The Fletcher subpanel declared

that:

No BMD system will be acceptable to the

leaders and the voters of the United States

unless it is widely believed that the system

will be safe in peacetime and will operate effectively when needed.49

Even if the weapons utilized are incapable of

causing mass destruction should they be fired

in error, the activation of a defense system

(like the placing on alert of strategic nuclear

forces today) would almost certainly be noticed by the other side, and could instigate or

escalate a dangerous crisis situation. This danger might be mitigated by the adoption of

mutual confidence-building measures by the

United States and the Soviet Union.

Testing, Reliability, and Security

These last issues of reliable control exist

today with respect to strategic offensive nuclear forces. However, the Fletcher subpanel

highlighted them because of the “unprece4gIbid., p. 6-7.

dented complexity” of the BMD mission and

because these issues bear directly on the design of the battle management system itself.

Another problem existing today, but aggravated in a BMD system, is the inability to test

it under realistic circumstances. ‘‘There will

be no way, short of conducting a war, to test

fully a deployed BMD system, ” wrote the subpanel. They concluded that:

The problem of realistically testing an entire system, end-to-end, has no complete technical solution. The credibility of a deployed

system must be established by credible testing of subsystems and partial functions and

by continuous monitoring of its operations

and health during peacetime.50

In addition to reliability, a battle management system must obviously resist attempts

at penetration or subversion. This requirement

mandates that extreme attention be given to

overall system security. However, the subpanel realized that:

There is no technical way to design absolute safety, security, or survivability into the

functions of weapons release and ordnance

safety. Standards of adequacy must, in the

end, be established by fiat, based upon an informed consensus and judgment of risks.51

OTA concurs with these conclusions of the

Fletcher subpanel. — — SoIbid., conclusion 6, P.

5] Ibid., conclusion 7, p.

7.

8.

NON-BMD APPLICATIONS

The same characteristics of BMD technologies which enable them to intercept and destroy ballistic missile attacks will also provide

the capability to accomplish other military

missions, including offensive ones. If not designed into the defensive system from the beginning, these other military missions may not

be effectively performed; however, the technologies used to construct BMD systems

might nevertheless also find use in different

systems better suited to these other missions.

To understand fully the possible implications of deploying a BMD system, it is important to recognize the additional, non-BMD,

contributions that BMD technologies could

make to our strategy. Perhaps more importantly, we must understand what capabilities

we might, de jure or de facto, have to concede

to the Soviet Union, were we to decide that

a mutually defended world was preferable to

a mutually vulnerable one.
191

What Is “Offense? ”

No military system easily lends itself to being characterized as strictly “offensive” or

“defensive.” A system’s capabilities, such as

overwhelming destructive power in the case

of a nuclear weapon, can provide some clues.

But in the final analysis, it is a weapon’s use

which becomes offensive or defensive, and

even that is not unambiguous. A nuclear

weapon used in an unprovoked attack on

another country is an offensive instrument;

one used to deter such an attack plays a defensive role. When a retaliatory weapon is actually used, the distinction becomes very difficult to make.

Ballistic missile defense technologies, which

would not only be incapable of causing mass

destruction but which would be able to prevent it, could be characterized as being primarily defensive. But there are also offensive roles

in which they could be used—some inherent

in any defensive system and others for which

technologies developed for BMD might be well

suited for, even if a BMD system itself did not

seek to fulfill them. Some offensive roles, such

as use to support a first-strike attack by blunting what would be a ragged retaliation, have

been mentioned earlier in this report (cf. chapter 6) and will not be discussed further. Other

aspects, however, will be presented in the following discussion.

Inherent Capabilities

Ballistic missile defense systems involve the

precise application of power at long range. Depending on the characteristics of the sensors

and weapons systems, the targets of that power

might be many things other than ballistic

missiles.

ASAT

Any BMD system will need to protect its

space-based components against potential

A SAT attack and will almost certainly require

ASAT capability to defend itself. Since the

same technologies applicable to boost-phase

and midcourse defense can be adapted for

ASAT, and since ASAT attack is a potent

BMD countermeasure, the BMD mission and

the ASAT mission are closely coupled. The

connection is discussed elsewhere in this report (e.g., “Suppression,” p. 175 ff.) and in the

companion volume to this report, Anti-Satellite

Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control.

Anti-Aircraft

Those BMD weapons able to penetrate the

atmosphere would be able to attack targets in

the atmosphere if those targets could be located. Neutral particle beams and X-ray

lasers, which cannot penetrate the atmosphere

to low altitudes, could not be used in this role.

Neither could kinetic-kill vehicles unless they

could be made to function through reentry.

Visible lasers, however, could attack aircraft

targets in the absence of clouds.

Perhaps the more difficult part of the antiaircraft mission will be finding the targets. Detecting an aircraft against a warm and cluttered Earth background is harder than spotting a satellite against the cold and relatively

empty background of space. Cruise missiles,

being smaller, will be even harder to find; application of “stealth” technology complicates

the task still further.

Nevertheless, technology that is potentially

capable of detecting aircraft from space is now

under investigation. One of the objectives of

the Teal Ruby sensor, a focal-plane mosaic array containing on the order of 100,000 infrared

detectors which is scheduled to be deployed

by the Space Shuttle, is to “provide proof of

concept of stepstare mosaic for aircraft detection and tracking”52 from space. Devices based

on that technology could be powerful surveillance tools, and in conjunction with

atmosphere-penetrating weapons could be effective against airplanes.

Attacking airplanes which are over the territory of another country is at present very difficult. If that task were made easier, it could

“Rockwell International Satellite Systems Division diagram.
have profound strategic implications. Crucial

U.S. command and control functions are now

conducted aboard airborne command posts,

which are mobile and difficult to find. These

planes supplement ground facilities, which at

present are vulnerable to nuclear attack.

Should these aircraft also become vulnerable

to Soviet attack, the command and control

structure of our nuclear forces would be seriously weakened and would have to be redesigned.

A BMD system does not have to be able to

attack aircraft. However, should one be developed, the advantages of also providing it with

anti-aircraft capability may be compelling.

Precision Ground Attack

Weapons which penetrate into the atmosphere can also attack targets on the ground.

There are at present lots of other ways to destroy terrestrial targets, so ground attack missions might not be an attractive option for a

ballistic missile defense. Furthermore, ground

targets would probably be easier to protect

than ICBM or satellites from the types of

damage that a ballistic missile defense-capable

system could inflict. It may therefore be the

case that space-based weapons systems would

be grossly inefficient for attacking targets on

Earth. However, such a system might provide

the ability to do so with essentially no warn-
793 ————

ing, which no existing weapon can do; more- may not be the best for ballistic missile deover, even if the system is deployed for other fense, they would probably be difficult to ban

reasons, some amount of ground-attack poten- under an arms control regime which allowed

tial might nevertheless be present. Although space-based BMD weapons.

the optimal weapons for space-to-earth attack

CONCLUSION

There is a wide variety of technologies which

could, in principle be assembled to form a spacebased BMD system. Candidate technologies for

kill mechanisms include various types of lasers,

kinetic-energy weapons, and particle beams. No

physical law would prevent the construction

of a workable system, consisting of boost

phase, post-boost phase, midcourse, and reentry phase layers. Each technology, however,

is limited by physical laws. These limitations

complicate, but do not eliminate, the possibility of a working system based on that technology. Such problems relate, for example, to:

the limitation on the distance traveled in the

time available, due to finite velocities (kineticenergy weapons); inability of the energy-delivery device to penetrate the atmosphere effectively (particle beams, X-rays, possibly kinetic

energy); the curvature of the Earth (pop-up

systems).

For all of the methods envisioned, much research is necessary to determine scientific, engineering, and economic feasibility. All methods

except the X-ray laser and very bright optical

or ultraviolet lasers with very low slew times

require a large number of space-based satellites

with high performance reliability and with access for maintenance. To the extent that sensor

satellite requirements exceed those for spacebased weapons platforms, all systems will require large numbers of satellites. In general, the

higher the attainable power, and the faster the

retargeting time (for directed-energy weapons),

the fewer battle stations are needed. Great improvements in computer speed, reliability, and

durability are needed to achieve a workable

system. Current research in computer hardware development gives cause for some optimism in that area. However, even greater advances are required in software capabilities.

A new space shuttle with about three times

the capacity of the present one may have to

be developed for most options. An alternative

would be to reduce greatly the cost of placing

material in orbit using the shuttle or something with roughly the same payload capability. If Soviet attack during the deployment

phase is considered likely, this shuttle should

be able to defend itself during and after insertion into orbit, or it must be defended by satellites already deployed.

The defensive systems discussed are yet to be

proven, and are very far from being developed

and deployed. In a number of essential particulars, improvements in performance of several

orders of magnitude (factors of 10) will be

needed.

Operational issues, rather than technical ones,

may come to determine questions of technical

feasibility. These operational issues are of two

sorts—the ability of a defensive system to anticipate and cope with offensive countermeasures, and the confidence which defensive planners can have in a strategic defense which

cannot be tested under fully realistic conditions.

An issue to be resolved is the susceptibility

of sensors to defeat by various countermeasures.

Their sensitive nature, required for long-distance detection, also renders them vulnerable

to various levels of blinding. Another general

counter-tactic is the emplacement of space

mines, which can be used against sensor satellites or battle stations. For each technology

there are many possible countermeasures, both

active and passive, which can be taken by the

offensive forces. Some are simple and straightforward, even with today’s technology. Others

are more complicated and would require great
194

effort, perhaps comparable in magnitude with countermeasures, there may well be counterthe technology they would counter. countermeasures which are feasible. The evenDefensive systems, if deployed 10 to 20 years tual outcome of the contest between measures,

from now, will have to deal not only with to- countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures

day’s countermeasures, but also with those cannot be predicted now.

which will exist 10 to 20 years hence. For these
Chapter 8

Feasibility
Contents

Hypothetical BMD

Introduction . . . .

Terminal Defense

System

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Light Midcourse and Terminal Defense

Heavier Midcourse Layer . . . . . . . . .

Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers .

Extremely Effective Defense .

Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Earth-Based Assets. . . . . . . . .

Space-Based Assets. . . . . . . . .

Feasibility Questions . . . . . . . . .

Technological Feasibility . . . .

Operational Feasibility . . . . . .

costs . . . . . . . .

Table

Table No.

8-1. Hypothetical

Figure

Figure No.

8-1. Boost-Phase

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Multi-Layered

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BMD System. . . . .

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With Ground-Based Lader. . .

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,., . .

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Page

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Chapter 8

Feasibility

HYPOTHETICAL BMD SYSTEM

Introduction

As a way of illustrating the scope and the

nature of the technical and operational feasibility issues, this chapter hypothesizes an imaginary system architecture. Since an official

proposed architecture does not yet exist, the

following system is presented as a structure

which is at least plausible enough for illustrative purposes. We do not suggest or predict

that all or even any of its parts can or will actually be proposed or built.

The example described is not intended to be

definitive or exhaustive. We suggest it to convey a feeling for the nature of the problems

to be resolved in planning a workable BMD.l

Several levels of effectiveness are hypothesized. Consonant with conservative strategic

planning, we assume, in outlining the system,

that it must deal with Soviet force modernization and Soviet countermeasures (a “responsive threat’ ‘). It is conceivable that future

levels of the Soviet offensive threat, rather

than increasing, could decrease as a result of

negotiation, in which case the hypothesized

architecture would be more effective than

otherwise.

The hypothetical BMD architecture is treated

as a nested set. That is, the first system, consisting of one layer of terminal defense, is the

simplest and most readily achievable; the second incorporates and extends the first by adding another layer; the third incorporates and

extends the second, and so on, through the

fifth system. The reader is also referred to the

discussion of a layered defense in chapter 7.

It is imaginable that an entire architecture

could be deployed in this order. The first system could be realized soonest; the others might

‘cf. J.C. Fletcher, “Technologies for Strategic Defense, ” issues in S’cience and Techno~ogy, vol. 1, h’o. 1, fall 1984, for a

similar exercise.

be added in succession, if and when the required technology is developed. There is a

rough correspondence between the elements

of this set of systems and the four levels of

defense capability described in chapter 5. The

first system might have the capability of chapter 5’s Level 1. The second or, more likely, the

third system might have roughly the capability of Level 2; the fourth system is meant to

have the capability of Level 3, and the fifth

system is meant to have the capability of

Level 4.

The first layer of defense hypothesized is a

terminal defense for hardened sites. The defense is not structured to defend large areas

or soft targets, but rather has as its purpose

the defense of a significant fraction of U.S.

missile silos and hardened command and control sites. The purpose would be to provide the

United States with the assured survival of a

significant fraction of its land-based retaliatory force in the face of a Soviet ICBM attack,

and thus bolster the other legs of our “triad”

in deterring a Soviet first strike. This layer

might not be very effective against a responsive threat without the presence of other

layers, and, by itself, would not follow the path

of current Administration policy, which is to

develop methods of defending populations, not

weapons.

The second level adds a layer with some midcourse capability to the terminal defense. This

begins to provide some area defense and is also

intended to assure the survival of a larger fraction of the U.S. retaliatory force. Any reentry

vehicles (RVs) destroyed or decoys discriminated during the midcourse phase will correspondingly reduce the stress on the terminal defenses. A structured attack may be

disrupted by this capability, and the overall

number of targets presented to the terminal

layer might be significantly reduced.

197
198

The third level adds a significant midcourse

capability. The fourth level incorporates boostphase and post-boost-phase layers, intended

to give an effective layered defense with low

overall leakage.

The fifth level illustrates the magnitude of

the requirements of a near-perfect ballistic

missile defense. It improves capabilities for all

layers, and augments terminal defenses to try

to make the total leakage extremely small,

having as its goal the neutralization of all incoming warheads. This level of defense would

logically require that all other practical means

of nuclear weapons delivery could be similarly

neutralized. Otherwise, the aggressor would

use those alternate delivery strategies and the

advantage of this level over the fourth one

would vanish.

Each section of this chapter lists a series of

technical requirements to be met in order for

the given system to be effective. Some of these

requirements could be met today or in the near

future. For example, endoatmospheric nuclear

interceptors have been developed for years and

would likely be able to reach significant performance levels (defending hardened targets)

within a short period of time. Appropriate

communication systems with survivable links

are likewise highly developed and should be

available very soon.

The technologies for satisfying most requirements, however, are not nearly as mature as

in the above examples. One class of requirements consists of those which appear feasible,

but need to be scaled up in magnitude, capability, or both. These are generally considered

to be midterm prospects. A hardened system

of passive sensors, adequate for some target

discrimination and able to survive in a nuclear

environment, could probably be developed

with known technology. However, such a system would probably require many years of development and testing. Similarly, homing

kinetic-energy weapons, which are relatively

inexpensive and fast (5 to 8 km/sec), can

almost certainly be developed, but would also

require a number of years of development before effective deployment became possible.

Another class of requirements includes

those technologies which still need substantial research effort in order to demonstrate feasibility. Among these would be space-based

particle beams of sufficient brightness, pointing capability and kill assessment capability;

lasers powerful enough for boost-phase kill;

and space-based mirrors of many meters in diameter, which could aim laser beams with

great accuracy in less than a second. In general, as the layers in the hypothetical system

become more numerous and more complex, the

corresponding requirements tend to need

longer term development. For some requirements, there is general agreement on whether

they could be available in the near term, in the

midterm, or are still to be demonstrated, but

for others, experts may disagree on the prospects for success and on the time needed for

development.

There is another type of requirement which

is more difficult to assess, namely, the capability of a subsystem to respond effectively to

an adversary’s countermeasures. The survivability of a system in a nuclear environment

or under direct attack is especially difficult to

gauge at this stage, particularly in the absence

of a well-defined architecture and of a welldefined threat.

In addition to the development of the appropriate technology, other requirements to be

met include questions of reliability and maintenance of the system’s components. Discussion of these matters can be found in chapter

7, pp. 169-170 and p. 190.

Terminal Defense

This layer of defense would have to intercept incoming RVs in the last 30 to 60 seconds

of flight as they reenter the atmosphere. Detection and tracking of targets in the earlier

phases of their trajectories is required, but little discrimination would be possible before

atmospheric reentry.

The elements

defense system

of the hypothetical terminal

would consist of:
— --— Table 8.1 .—Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System

System level

Level 1

Terminal Defense

(defense of hardened sites using

endoatmospherlc rockets to Intercept

reentry vehicles (RVs) as they approach their targets)

— —

Level 2

Light Midcourse and Terminal

Defense

(additional layer added with some

Interceptlon capability in midcourse

and some ability 10 discriminate RVs

from decoys in space to reduce burden

on terminal layer, some area defense)

Level 3

Heavier Midcourse Layer

(effective midcourse layer added

giving realistic two-layer system,

with each layer highly effective)

Level 4

Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers

(boost-phase Intercept added to kill

boosters or post-boost vehicles before RVs and decoys dispersed)

——-—— -—

Level 5

Extremely Effective Layer

(Level 4 with better capability.

meant to permit only minimal

penetration to targets by enemy

RVs)

System elements

Early warning satellites

ground-based radar

airborne optical sensors,

ground-based battle management computers

fast endoatmospheric Interceptors

Level 1 plus

exoatmospheric homing Interceptors range

hundreds of km,

pop-up b IR sensors (possibly satellite-based

Instead),

self-defense capability for space assets

Level 2 plus

ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) Imaging on

satellites,

highly capable space-based battle management system

space-based kinetic energy weapons

effective self-defense in space,

significant space-based power

Level 3 plus

ground-based high Intensity lasers (either

excimer or free electron

space-based mirrors for relay and aim:

high resolution tracking and imaging in

boost phase,

self-defense for all phases

Level 4 plus

more terminal and exoatmospheric inter -

ceptors,

electromagnetic launchers for midcourse

and boost-phase intercepts

large capacity space-based power,

all systems extremely reliable

—

Description

Warning of launch provided by high-orbit satellites.

RVs detected and tracked in region of ground targets by ground radar and airborne sensors ground

computers assign Interceptors to RVs kill assessment a permits reassignment of defense interceptors atmospheric interception used, air effects

used to discriminate between RVs and decoys

As in level 1 for terminal defenses longer range

Interceptors added which can intercept some RVs

above atmosphere, providing some area defense.

this requires some discrimination capability, furnished by passive IR pop-up sensors, launched

towards cloud of decoys and attacking RVs, the

new layer reduces the burden on the terminal layer

Satellite-based ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) used to

image objects, discrimination provided by comparing images with data base of Soviet RV and decoy

characteristics, RVs attacked by In-orbit kineticenergy weapons, which also defend all spacebased components of system, this level has fully

developed terminal and midcourse layers, but no

boost or post-boost phase defense

This level adds a boost- and post-boost-phase

layer, consisting of very bright ground-based laser

beams directed to their targets by orbiting mirrors,

sensing by Infrared sensors, Imaging by ultra-violet

Iadar, battle management to handle all layers doing

discrimination, kill assessment, and target assignments and reassignments Boost- and post-boostphase layers may be combined, since post-boost

phase could be shortened to 10 seconds or so

More Interceptors are added in terminal and midcourse layers. electromagnetic launchers used for

boost post-boost and midcourse Intercepts, high

capacity space power needed all systems including battle management must be extremely reliable

Comments

Homing either infrared (IR) or radar, interceptors should be relatively inexpensive, since many needed, may be

nuclear or nonnuclear

—

Passive IR sensors used for crude dis -

crimination and possibly kill assessment data base of Soviet RV and decoy

signatures needed, sensors must be

able to function in a hostile nuclear environment

—

Ladar Imaging rapid with resolution

good to 1 meter or less for adequate

discrimination and birth-to-death tracking of RVs, kinetic weapon homing

capability good to less than a meter

Extremely capable battle management

system needed, kill assessment required

for boost phase as well as midcourse

Essentially same as Level 4, but more

of it and higher reliability newer technologies used as they become available
200

●

●

●

●

●

Ground-based radars, for sensing RVs

and decoys as they approach.

Several thousand fast acceleration interceptor rockets with infrared (IR) or radar

homing capability; nonnuclear kill capability would be preferable; in case nonnuclear kill could be defeated by offensive

countermeasures, or were too expensive,

small nuclear warheads would be substituted.

Early warning satellites to give notice of

attack launch.

Use of air-based infrared sensors to track

incoming RVs and decoys at large distances.

A battle management system, consisting

.

of computers, sensors, and communication links, which would take data from

tens or hundreds of sensors aboard satellites and on the ground, and register the

reentry of the attacking objects in the upper atmosphere; it would calculate track

files for thousands of such objects, and

use atmospheric effects (e.g., deceleration)

to discriminate between RVs and decoys

in the upper atmosphere. The system

would assign particular interceptors to

targets identified as RVs, would determine whether or not the RVs were killed,

and would revise target assignments accordingly. It would also present real-time

information to command authorities on

the progress of the battle.

Several of these elements are now available

or could be shortly. Geosynchronous early

warning satellites have been in dependable use

for many years. Ground-based radar technology, capable of multi-object discrimination

using atmospheric effects, now exists, for intercepts taking place at sufficiently low altitudes. In the face of an attack using nuclear

precursor explosions, however, such radar

could be blacked out or otherwise put out of

operation in the early stages of the assault.

The development of aircraft-based infrared

sensors could provide a more survivable and

flexible backup for the ground-based radar.

Another possibility, one within current capabilities, involves the use of hardened, disposable radars. Normally buried for protection,

a few would expose themselves to attack in order to perform their tracking tasks. Those destroyed by early nuclear explosions would be

replaced by others, which would rise from

bunkers following the destruction of their siblings. These radars would have to be rather

inexpensive, since many of them would be

needed. Survivability would be provided by

their numbers and distribution as well as their

protective shelters.

Fast interceptors with nuclear warheads

have already been developed. In order to minimize control and command problems when

nuclear weapons are used, to reduce collateral

damage to one’s own hardware and to reduce

the chances of blinding or dazzling one’s own

sensors, it would be preferable to use homing

interceptors with nonnuclear kill devices.

To defend an area 100 km in radius, rockets

would have to attain the speed of several

km/ec in a matter of 10 seconds or so. This

should be achievable with current technology.

One could imagine, for the sake of argument,

a defense of 10 such areas, in order to assure

some level of retaliation by U.S. ICBMs in response to a Soviet first strike. To defend

against an attack of 5,000 RVs (about half of

today’s Soviet strategic inventory), with the

aim of assuring the temporary survival of a

significant fraction of U.S. silos, a preferential defense could be used. If one were to suppose that Soviet RVs were aimed, in a random

distribution, at 1,000 U.S. silos, one would anticipate 5 RVs per silo. The defense then could

pick a fraction of silos to defend and assign,

say, three interceptors to each RV aimed at

those silos, while allowing other RVs to penetrate. The number of interceptors to be used

would then depend on how many silos would

be preferentially defended. The interceptors

could be mobile, making it more difficult for

the offense to target them. Radar units could

also be mobile.
-—

207

A terminal defense could be used in conjunction with multiple protective shelter basing

(MPS), as was once proposed for MX missile

siting.2 Since an extensive national debate at

that time resulted in the rejection of such a

plan, MPS is not considered as an option in

this hypothetical architecture. However, its

application, together with a terminal defense,

would provide great leverage if one were to

defend missiles preferentially. As described

above, in the case of preferential defense, some

sites are defended and others are not, while the

information on which sites are defended is concealed from the adversary. In this manner, a

small number of interceptors could protect a

smaller number of missiles from a much larger

attack.

The following technical requirements need

to be met for such a terminal defense system

to operate successfully:

●

●

●

●

●

Ž

Effective homing devices; if infrared (IR),

they must avoid being swamped by the

strong infrared signal emanating from the

nose of the interceptor, which is heated

by its rapid passage through the atmosphere; if IR or if radar they must be able

to function in an environment where many

nuclear explosions may be occurring.

A communication system with survivable

links between its component units, able

to operate in an extremely hostile nuclear

environment.

A battle management system able to survive and function while under nuclear

attack.

Battle management sensors and computer which can discriminate accurately

between decoys and RVs at an altitude

high enough so that interceptors can be

launched in time to reach the RVs.

Battle management systems able to assign interceptors to targets within fractions of a second per target.

If ground-based radars are not sufficiently effective, air-based infrared sen2

For an extensive review of MPS in the MX context. cf. U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “MX Missile Basing, ” OTA-ISC-140 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 198 1).

sors able to operate successfully in a hostile nuclear environment; important in

this context is the problem of “redout”:

“scintillation,’ or bright electromagnetic

radiation, caused by a nuclear explosion

in the upper atmosphere, which masks infrared signals from targets and could dazzle or neutralize sensors.

The development of a relatively inexpensive homing interceptor with fast acceleration; a nuclear-tipped warhead could be

necessary as a backup if a reasonably inexpensive nonnuclear kill device could not

be developed.

in reacting to a defensive system which uses

only terminal defenses, the Soviets could apply countermeasures which are well within the

realm of today’s technology, They could simply proliferate RVs with relative ease. The

marginal cost-exchange ratio between offensive RV and defensive interceptor might or

might not favor the interceptor. It is not obvious which side would win the economic battle on this level, or whether a cost exchange

analysis alone would be the determining factor in this competition.

Another countermeasure would be the development and deployment of more sophisticated penetration aids, which could fool the

defensive battle management system into

thinking that many more RVs are attacking

than actually is the case. A variant approach

would be to try to make the RV appear to be

a decoy. The objective would be to saturate

the defenses, and to reduce the time available

for the defense to commit and intercept. The

lower the intercept altitude, the harder it

would be to simulate an RV’s behavior without making a decoy as heavy as an actual RV.

Yet another Soviet option would be a structured attack, where the incoming RVs, possibly fused to detonate when attacked (salvagefused), would come in waves. The first wave

would detonate at high altitudes, blinding the

defenses long enough to permit subsequent

waves to penetrate closer to the target. Following waves would repeat this process and,

eventually, in this ‘‘laddering down, the tar-
202

gets would be reached and destroyed. The penalty of this technique to the offense is that several RVs would need to be expended per target.

Its resources are correspondingly drained. The

defense can extract a high price for each defended target, thus perhaps saving nondefended

targets through attrition of the offense’s RVs.

If the Soviets were to pursue this option, they

could be expected, therefore, to make a serious effort to increase greatly the number of

warheads.

A further countermeasure would be for the

offense to use maneuverable reentry vehicles.

This would greatly stress homing capabilities

for nonnuclear kill vehicles. However, the defense could then counter with nuclear warheads, which would reduce the need for high

precision homing.

In general, the technology needed for the

terminal defense system is either available or

could be available within the short term. However, the overall operation of such a system

in an environment of multiple nuclear detonations is not well understood. The system described above would be far more robust in the

face of possible short-term threat responses

if supplemented by other layers.

Light Midcourse and Terminal Defense

While the requirements of the previous system could probably be met in the near term,

this system and the following ones require

technology which is somewhat further off.

This additional layer could probably be added

relatively quickly after the deployment of the

previous one. Most of the technological requirements in this section should be achievable in the near to midterm.

In addition to the terminal phase described

above, this level of the hypothetical system

would add a set of hundreds of ground-based

infrared homing interceptors, based near the

borders of the United States, which are capable of exoatmospheric interception. These interceptors would have a range of many hundreds of kilometers. Their long range would

make possible some level of area defense in

EXO-ATMOSPHERIC A

HOMING KILL

WITH FLYOUT

VEHICLE

SHROUD

\

PROPULSION

● LIGHT WEIGHT

● LOW COST

Photo credit: US. Army Strategic Defense Command

Exoatmospheric Reentry Intercept Subsystem (ERIS):

Sketch of proposed concept fo r

exoatmospheric interceptor .

addition to the defense of a few hard sites. This

layer of the system would be intended to break

up structured attacks and could relieve some

of the stress from the large number of RVs and

decoys which could otherwise confront the terminal defense system. The hard-target defense

would therefore be more solid, and, by use of

preferential defensive tactics, some soft targets could also be afforded some protection.

One possibility for a sensor system would

be the deployment of perhaps 100 satellites,

each equipped with sensors, which would have

some ability to observe the deployment of decoys and RVs from the post-boost vehicle, possibly aiding in discruminating between the two.

Perhaps a more survivable and cheaper alternative could be a set of pop-up sensors, to be

launched on notice of a massive attack, which

would serve the same purpose.

The sensors might be based on a passive infrared system which could be used to measure the infrared emissions of targets. Measurements at several different wavelengths

might make decoying or deceptive simulations

more difficult. This level of capability might

be effective against certain types of simple decoys. Information on track files for targets

identified as real would have to be transmitted

to ground stations by links robust enough to

be secure in a stressful nuclear environment.
——.

The ground stations would relay the information to battle management computers, which

would then assign targets to interceptors.

In order to build such a defense, the following requirements must be met:

long-range interceptors with very rapid

acceleration and exoatmospheric capability at relatively low cost per unit;

passive infrared sensors which can observe characteristics of objects in midcourse with some ability to distinguish

simple decoys from RVs;

a data base of Soviet RV and decoy signatures at various wavelengths which can

permit one to distinguish between the

two;

algorithms (rules incorporated in battle

management decisionmaking) capable of

accurate and rapid discrimination between RVs and decoys, using the data

available from the sensors used in the

system;

communication links between sensors in

space and stations on the ground which

can function in a hostile nuclear environment, through redundancy or other

means;

the development and deployment of a constellation of satellites or pop-up rockets

carrying the passive IR sensors;

a sensor system capable of rapid return

to effective operation, following nuclear

detonations within the fields of view of individual elements;

means of defending the satellite-based

sensors (if used) from attack; and

some kill assessment capability, with the

ability to relay the information to ground.

The effectiveness of this system could be severely impaired by countermeasures employed

to reduce the ability of the sensors to discriminate between decoys and RVs. Such countermeasures could include the use of chaff, aerosols, or other concealment strategies. It is

also important to emphasize that the sensor

system would have to be robust enough to return to operation rapidly if dazzled by nuclear

detonations. This is because targets may be

203

salvage-fused, or may be programmed to detonate at appropriate times in order to confuse

defenses. The homing devices on the interceptors may not need to be as robust as the battle management sensors, in this respect, since

only those explosions within the narrow field

of view of a given interceptor’s homing system would be of concern.

Heavier Midcourse Layer

To the terminal layer and light midcourse

layer, one might add a space-based midcourse

defense layer. The weapons of such a layer

could supplement the ground-based exoatmospheric interceptors described in the previous section. More sophisticated space-based

sensors might substitute for the infrared sensors of the previous system.

Such a layer would greatly relieve the stress

on the terminal layer for three reasons: first,

the total number of objects to be tracked and

attacked in the terminal phase would be reduced; second, structured attacks intended to

defeat the defense could be disrupted; and

third, the more capable midcourse system

would be better able to help discriminate between decoys and real RVs than the system

described in the previous section. This information would be used by the midcourse layer

and would also be passed on to the terminal

layer. For this level of midcourse defense, the

weapons could be space-based kinetic-energy

nonnuclear kill vehicles, which are more mature than directed-energy weapons.

To function effectively, a midcourse system

would have to be able to discriminate decoys

from RVs. An ultraviolet (UV) imaging laser

system might be used, with units based on a

constellation of about 100 satellites. The exact number of satellites would depend on the

angular resolution achievable and the altitudes

of deployment. These would then replace the

less capable sensors in the previous midcourse

system. The laser imaging could be substituted for or augmented by a radar imaging

system, located on the same satellites. The acquisition and tracking of the enemy targets,
204

from post-boost vehicle (PBV) stage until

atmospheric reentry, might be accomplished

by a long wave infrared detection system. The

sensor system would aim for birth-to-death

tracking of RVs and decoys. The decoys would

be identified by shape or other cues which

might be detected during deployment from the

PBV. Battle management computers must be

able to calculate and store a track file for each

object, frequently updating this file, and to

hand off data on RVs and decoys, that are not

intercepted in this phase, to the terminal defenses for interception there.

During the midcourse phase, the defenses

would try to kill as many identified RVs as

possible, and to unmask or negate decoys as

well. We might postulate a kinetic-energy kill

system as a moderately near-term option.

Reentry vehicles would be quite difficult to kill

with optical lasers since they are already hardened to survive the stresses of reentry. Neutral particle beams might be possible candidates for kill systems, but kill assessment

would be a serious problem (see chapter 7). The

technology for practical space-based accelerators will likely not be available in the nearterm, particularly in view of the fact that beam

intensities would have to be greatly increased

from the present state of the art to assure hard

(i.e., visible) kills. However, long-term development of such a capability is possible.

More plausible for the near term are kineticenergy carrier satellites, with large numbers

of chemically powered two-stage rockets

mounted on each one. These would orbit the

Earth in a constellation whose size would depend on the acceleration and terminal velocity of the interceptors. The rockets would

accelerate rapidly to 5 to 8 km/sec. They would

have long wave infrared homing devices capable of detecting emissions from reentry vehicles. The homing devices would need to have

cryogenically cooled detectors so that the infrared radiation given off by the sensor itself

would not overwhelm the signal from the RV.

The interceptors would destroy the target by

colliding with it or by approaching closely

enough so that a fragmentation charge could

disable it. The kill vehicles would receive initial guidance information from the more capable infrared tracking system located on the

sensor satellites; their own homing devices

would take over when they approach their

targets.

Technical requirements for this kind of system include the following:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Kinetic-energy weapons with a homing capability of within 10 to 20 cm, and which

are relatively inexpensive, since tens of

thousands may be needed (depending on

the threat size and the acceleration and

velocity capability of the rocket interceptor).

The launching satellites must be able to

defend themselves against attack.

High-speed imaging resolution (less than

0.1 sec per image) of less than a meter at

ranges of 3,000 km, in order to discriminate RVs from decoys as they are deployed from the PBV.

A data base of decoy signatures and RV

signatures which would aid in discrimination.

Tested algorithms for accurate discrimination based on target signatures at various infrared (and possibly other) wavelengths and based on other cues (balloon

inflation, PBV accelerations during deployment, etc.).

Computing capability to calculate track

files for tens of thousands of objects or

more.

Accurate kill assessment based on UV or

other imaging information after apparent

hits are achieved.

Battle management capability to reassign

vehicles to new targets within seconds or

less, based on constantly updated kill

assessments and PBV observations. For

this and the following systems it may be

desirable to deploy redundant battle management computers both in low-Earth orbit and in orbits beyond geosynchronous,

in order to aid in survivability.

The ability to defend the weapons and

satellite-based sensors from a precursor

attack.
Ž Sufficient and reliable space-based power

sources to supply energy for the sensing

satellites.

An important issue is whether it is possible

to image effectively the deployment of RVs

and decoys from the post-boost vehicles, in the

face of countermeasures achievable with current or near-term technology. More discussion

of these questions may be found in the classified annex to chapters 7 and 8.

Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers

A boost-phase defense might be added to the

system described in the previous section. Effective boost-phase interception would have

enormous leverage: for every kill, at least one

and perhaps tens of RVs in addition to hundreds of decoys would be eliminated from the

attacking force, thereby greatly reducing the

stress on the succeeding layers of the BMD

system.

For a boost-phase system, we hypothesize

a set of ground-based excimer or free-electron

lasers, with a constellation consisting of a

small number of large geosynchronous orbit

relay mirrors and a large number of low-orbit

“battle” mirrors. Excimer or free-electron

lasers were chosen over particle beams, X-ray

devices, and chemical infrared lasers because

of their ability to penetrate the atmosphere all

the way to the ground. A ground-based sys-
206 —

tern is easier to supply with power: it obviates

the need for space-based power for the weapons of this layer.

The laser beams would be generated on the

ground at a number of stations and be sent

to the geosynchronous mirrors. From there,

they would be directed to those low-orbit battle mirrors which are nearest the targeted

boosters. These mirrors, in turn, would direct

the beams onto the targets. If optically perfect, the geosynchronous mirrors would probably need an effective diameter of about 30

meters, given a laser wavelength of 0.5 microns (the requirement of a large diameter

could be lowered by reducing the wavelength

somewhat). The low-orbit mirrors, if optically

perfect, would need to be about 5 meters in

diameter. Hundreds of megawatts of electriPhoto credit: Department of Defense

Designed for use with high-powered lasers, this device

aims, stabilizes, and focuses a laser beam to selected

aimpoints. It will be used to gain experience in

integrating a high-power laser with a

precise beam director.

cal energy would be required to power the

ground-based lasers.

In addition, adaptive optics would be needed

to compensate for beam distortions introduced

during passage of the radiation through the

atmosphere. In one such technique, a pilot laser beam near the geosynchronous satellite

would give information on atmospheric distortions along the path to the ground laser. The

ground laser mirror would then be mechanically distorted in such a way as to compensate

for the atmospheric effects on the laser beam.

Initial acquisition of the attacking boosters

would be provided by a geosynchronous shortwave infrared satellite system, using technology similar to current U.S. capabilities. More

precise tracking needed for attack by the large
ground-based laser could be provided by ladar

(laser-based radar, referred to in chapter 7) systems mounted on the low-altitude sensor satellites.

In order to keep the number of mirrors from

reaching well into the hundreds, slew times

(time required to change pointing from one target to another) will probably have to be on the

order of 1 second or less.

Technical requirements for this system

include:

the development of laser beams of sufficient brightness to destroy rocket boosters after traveling from the ground to geosynchronous orbit, back to a low-orbit

mirror, and then to the booster;

the development of many high optical

quality, 5-meter diameter mirrors capable

of being deployed in orbit while maintaining their geometry to a small fraction of

a wavelength (visible or near UV), robust

enough to maintain high optical quality

in a hostile nuclear environment, and able

to switch from target to target in a second or less;

the development of a few 30-meter mirrors, with the same optical and physical

capabilities as the smaller mirrors (except

for the retarget rate, which could be

slower);

battle mirrors inexpensive enough so that

the offense cannot overwhelm the boostphase system by merely adding more

boosters: if doubling the number of boosters

(or decoy boosters) requires a near doubling of the number of mirrors and associated subsystems, the cost of the mirrors

and their subsystems cannot be much

more than the cost of the boosters;

defensive capability to protect mirrors

and space sensors against attack, including more subtle attacks designed to deteriorate the quality of the mirrors;

the ability to track a booster by means

of ladar to an accuracy of 10 to 20 cm at

a range of thousands of kilometers;

adaptive optics for high-intensity laser

beams to compensate for atmospheric tur207 — —

Figure 8-1.— Boost-Phase Intercept With

Ground-Based Laser

Beam from ground-based laser in the United States reflects off

relay mirror in geosynchronous orbit to battle mirrors in low-Earth

orbit, Battle mirrors redirect beam to ICBMs. (Geosynchronous

orbit is shown to scale relative to the size of the Earth. )

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

●

bulence–some atmospheric distortions

will be caused by the passage through the

atmosphere of the powerful laser radiation itself, and thus proof of ability to

compensate must be accomplished at

power levels approaching those used in

the actual weapon;

power supplies able to provide extremely

large amounts of power on short notice

to the ground-based lasers;
208

●

●

●

A

communication systems to link the mirrors and lasers involved with the battle

management system; the links must be

able to function in a hostile nuclear environment;

overall battle management software to coordinate functions of each defensive layer;

and

some kill assessment is necessary for both

booster and post-boost vehicle. In the latter case, damage may be more difficult to

ascertain, yet it is important to do so. If

a PBV is unable to deploy its RVs to their

targets, it may still be able to reach the

defender’s territory with one or more live

RVs. This cluster would have to be handled by subsequent layers of the defense.

future offensive countermeasure could be

a fast-bum booster with a fast post-boost deployment phase. In the system described

above, one could, in principle, not only attack

the booster, but also attack the post-boost vehicle as it dispenses RVs. Therefore, against

current systems having long boost and postboost phases, hundreds of seconds could be

available to the defense after booster burn out

to destroy at least some of the RVs before they

separate from the PBV. The offense could

deny most of this advantage by using fast

burn boosters and a rapid dispensing technique. The period for neutralization of the

booster and the PBV could be reduced from

today’s 700 seconds or so to only some 50 seconds (assuming that the defense needs some

20 seconds to prepare to act and to begin engaging the offensive missiles). The offense

would be penalized in terms of throwweight

(on the order of 10 to 20 percent) and possibly in terms of accuracy as well.

Attacking during the PBV phase might be

more difficult than attacking during the boost

phase, since the PBV is much more difficult

to find than the booster. Fifty seconds total

engagement time would greatly stress the

boost-phase/post-boost-phase intercepts, and

would, at the least, greatly increase the quantity of defensive space assets needed.

Extremely Effective Defense

This system is intended to provide a nearly

perfect defense against ballistic missiles. It

would be designed with the object of preventing all incoming warheads of a massive attack

from reaching their targets. In practice, since

no system is likely to function perfectly on its

first use, some leakers might be expected, although it would be hoped that they would be

very few in number. Rationale for including

this ambitious case is given in chapter 5.

For an attack of 20,000 warheads, which assumes more than a doubling of the Soviet strategic force in response to deployment of a U.S.

BMD, the leakage rate would have to be no

more than one- or two-tenths of a percent,

equivalent to an overall system efficiency of

above 99.8 percent. To accomplish this, all of

the above systems would have to work at a

high level of effectiveness. If one assumed that

all four layers (including the ground- and

space-based midcourse layers) were totally independent of each other (including independence of the sensors and battle management computers on which each of the layers rely), this

could be accomplished via an 80 percent effectiveness for each layer. If one layer failed significantly, however, the others would have to

be considerably more efficient, in order to

maintain the extremely low leakage rate.

In addition to the elements contained in the

previous system, this one would add a larger

fleet of terminal and midcourse interceptors.

These would have long-range capability and

be relatively inexpensive. In principle, the

same interceptors which were briefly described

above would be appropriate, if highly proliferated. Other options for improving the effectiveness of the various layers could include improved sensors for midcourse discrimination

and electromagnetic launchers for midcourse

phase and possibly boost-phase intercept.

These may be longer term options, depending

on when the needed technologies are developed. The “conventional” kinetic-energy weap-
ons driven by chemical rockets are effective

if they can reach their targets, but they generally do not travel more quickly than 5 to 8

km/see. Further, time constraints on the period

of acceleration (at most, a few hundred seconds) could make chemical rockets less desirable than electromagnetically launched projectiles. These could accelerate far more rapidly

to faster speeds, thus possessing a greater

range. Systems based on them may be more

survivable than laser systems because of the

vulnerability of space-based optical components; hence their possible advantage for

boost-phase intercept.

Since the offense could preferentially attack

certain targets, and since the defense would

not necessarily know ahead of time which targets would be more heavily targeted, the requirement for very low offensive penetration

is quite onerous. If one assumes that the first

two layers (boost-phase and early midcourse,

including PBV) are 80 percent effective, the

last two layers must deal with some 800

leakers. It would be desirable for each interceptor to cover large areas of the United

States so that one can defend against the eventuality that one area might be more heavily

attacked than its neighbors. Long range would

mean that interceptors assigned to neighboring areas could come to the help of those areas

whose own defenses were in danger of depletion. As an alternative to long range, many

more interceptors could be deployed. The exoatmospheric interceptors could be designed to

have ranges of many hundreds of kilometers.

If each rocket could defend the whole continental United States (CONUS), perhaps only 1,000

to 2,000 would be necessary.

The terminal defense interceptors would

have a range of only 100 kilometers. Some 400

basing sites might be needed to protect the entire CONUS. Perhaps about 10 interceptors

(amounting to a total of 4,000) might be placed

at each site. Each site of comparable value

should be defended to roughly equal levels, to

avoid inviting attack by providing an “Achilles

heel” of less well-defended sites. If one assumes that the long-range interceptor layer is

80 percent effective, only 160 leakers penetrate

through to the terminal defense. Although

most sites would be confronted with only O or

1 RVs, some would have to deal with 2, 3, or

even 4, just because of statistical fluctuations

in actual defense effectiveness. Conservatively, one would want to assign at least 2 interceptors per RV, so 10 interceptors per

defended area is a safe minimum, assuming

that any structure in the offensive assault is

completely broken up by the earlier defensive

layers.

In relying on 4,000 interceptors, the assumption is made that the previous defensive layers

are each independently effective to a level of

at least 80 percent.

In sum, for a nearly leak-proof defense, several

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

vital needs must be satisfied:

A high level of boost-phase intercept effectiveness must be attained, in the face

of all countermeasures, including the relatively straight-forward ones of fast-burn

boosters, rapid PBV deployment, and

warhead proliferation.

An excellent discrimination capability between light and precision decoys on the

one hand, and RVs on the other, during

the midcourse phase; this must be accomplished in the face of various concealment

techniques, some of which are relatively

well understood at the present.

The sensors must function nearly continuously in the face of a massive attack and

in a nuclear environment.

The space-based assets must defend

themselves or must be defended by other

assets against concerted attack.

The communication links must function

effectively in the face of attempts to interfere, concerted attack, and in a nuclear

environment.

In addition to the above conditions, since a

near-perfect system is envisioned, other means

of nuclear delivery must be countered to a high

degree of assurance. This means that an air

defense system would have to be added to handle air-breathing threats (bombers, cruise missiles), and measures would have to be taken

to protect against the introduction and em-
210 —

placement of nuclear weapons within U.S. would mean that the system would fail. For

borders by surreptitious means. It may also defenses less ambitious than this one, for exbe necessary to consider the application of sig- ample, for the previously delineated systems

nificant civil defense measures. above, some small failures among the above

five conditions could be tolerated. However,

Since a nearly flawless system is postulated even for such nonperfect systems, a significant

for this level of defense, any deviation from failure in any one category could seriously deperfection among the above conditions above grade the entire system effectiveness.

SURVIVABILITY

For any BMD system, both space- and

Earth-based assets should be able to survive

attacks on them. Survivability is a function

of the mission of each asset and of the mission of the system as a whole, the threat faced

by the system, and the effective redundancy

of each asset in the system architecture. The

system survivability depends on the details

of the architecture and of the threat. Some discussion of the problems involved is given in

chapter 7, p. 170ff and p. 186ff in sections on

survivability and countermeasures. It should

be noted that the definition of the needed level

of survivability depends on the policy decision

regarding the system’s mission; i.e., is it to be

90, 95, or 99 + percent effective?

Earth-Based Assets

Ground-based assets consist of communication links, command and control posts, groundbased interceptors, terminal radars, groundbased sensors, ground-based laser sites, and

power supplies. For the purposes of this discussion, airborne sensors are considered Earthbased.

These assets must survive long enough to

do their job: to provide defense at their assigned levels. Ground-based interceptors might

be made survivable by proliferation (many can

be deployed) and mobility. Smaller terminal

radars can be proliferated, made mobile (deployed on trucks which are assigned to rove

defined areas, possibly at random, to avoid being targeted) and shielded. A disposable system has already been mentioned. Larger radars can be hardened to a degree, and higher

operating frequencies can be chosen in order

to provide greater resistance to blackout effects that are caused by nuclear explosions.

Narrow beams can be used to make radars

more jam-resistant.

Communication links can be made highly redundant, and can often be direct laser links,

or other narrowly focused line-of-sight links.

These are nearly impossible to jam and would

be resistant to stress in a nuclear environment.

Electronics can be hardened to survive electromagnetic pulses, which may be induced by

nuclear explosions above the atmosphere.

Command and control posts might also be

made highly redundant, and different basing

modes (mobile and stationary) could be utilized.

Airborne sensors might achieve survivability by maintaining uncertainty as to their

exact locations, and by taking appropriate

hardening measures. Ground-based sensors

must be made highly redundant and must be

defended against intense radiation from nuclear explosions.

Ground-based laser sites pose a particular

problem, since they would be large, expensive,

and therefore difficult to proliferate. They

would, in principle, have to be provided with

heavy terminal defenses, since they would be

the object of strikes early in the engagement.

Some would certainly survive the beginning

of the engagement. If, as would be likely, they

would be attacked simultaneously with many

other military assets, they could participate

in early battles: they could shoot at the first

wave of attacking RVs for up to about 15 minutes before the first ones reach them. How-
.

211

ever, they would certainly be high priority targets and would very likely be attacked in the

first wave. To guard against easy attack by

cruise missiles, they should be located far inland, so that the cruise missiles could be detected and destroyed before they were able to

reach the laser. Note that a cruise missile attack might, if detected, give the defense system warning even before the launch of the offense’s ICBMs takes place. This might tend

to discourage such an attack.

Sufficient survivability could probably be

provided to most Earth-based assets by means

of redundancy, hardening, and mobility. This

does not mean that these system elements

would be indefinitely survivable; it does mean

that they could survive long enough so that

they could perform their tasks when called

upon.

Space-Based Assets

There are two broad categories of spacebased assets which must be protected in order to assure the survivability of the spacebased components of the BMD system: sensors and weapons.

Defense of space-based assets, particularly

of sensors, is more problematic than in the

Earth-based case. Since satellites follow predictable trajectories (unless they are constantly maneuvering), the offense may target

them relatively easily. Knowing in advance

where they will be at a given time, the offense

has a long time to prepare an attack against

them and might even be able to do some damage before a large-scale outbreak of hostilities.

Ground-based directed-energy weapons could

damage sensors which are looking at or near

them (the sensors might be observing such

weapons for intelligence purposes, or might be

observing nearby missile fields). The sensors

would be particularly susceptible to damage

if the lasers operated at a frequency in the

band used by the sensors. Possible countermeasures are being investigated, including

redundancy of sensing satellites to mitigate

against potential losses.

During engagements, space-based sensors

are vulnerable to blinding or temporary blinding (dazzling) by nuclear detonations. Sensor

hardening and proliferation of sensors are

again possible hedges against degradation of

the system as a whole.

Sensors and weapons could also be vulnerable to direct attacks by the adversary. These

attacks could include nuclear attack, kinetic

energy or laser attack, or attacks on the integrity of mirrors by radiation, physical or

chemical means. These attacks could be delivered by direct-ascent rockets or by space-based

assets. Direct-ascent interceptors, armed with

nuclear weapons, could be hardened against

the BMD system to levels that would not be

economical for ICBMs and might survive a

counter-attack by the defense for long enough

to get within lethal range. Attacks against

space-based BMD assets could be made after

the whole space-based BMD system is deployed, or at the very beginning of BMD deployment. In the latter case, the BMD system

is at its most vulnerable stage, since it might

not yet be able to defend itself adequately. It

should be noted that such an attack could be

considered an act of war and would be risky

to the attacker for that reason. However, the

attacker night view the prospect of his adversary having a ballistic missile defense of even

moderate capability to be a serious enough

threat to its national security that the risk

would be justified. In any case, the possibility of an attack at this stage must be reckoned

with.

In the case of BMD weapons stations, some

defense could be provided by massive shielding. These stations would probably be too

large, and orbits too low to be effectively concealed. Regarding sensor stations, although

shielding is a possibility, concealment is a

more likely option. One vulnerability of sensors is that during an engagement they have

to function, and in order to function they must

be exposed. Moreover, sensor satellites carrying large optical components will have to be

large and will therefore be difficult to hide or

decoy.
212

The case of space-based mirrors, which are

used to relay radiation from space- or groundbased lasers to their targets, is somewhat

different from other weapons from the point

of view of survivability. During peacetime, the

mirrors can be covered by protective shields

against both enemy attack and small meteorites. It is reasonable to suppose that these

shields will have to be removed from time to

time for testing and maintenance. The mirrors

would probably be extremely delicate, if only

because of the very high reflective quality and

the high optical precision needed to function

properly and remain effective when highpower laser beams are reflected from them.

Protection strategies against enemy activities

could include hiding by various means. Also,

shields could be in place most of the time.

Since the surface coatings could be vulnerable

to attack by certain chemicals (possibly including rocket fuel), the covers should be well

sealed.

In almost all cases of attack by approaching rockets or mines, a “shoot back” tactic

would be preferable to purely passive defenses.

Either the battle station or satellite which is

being attacked, or previously positioned defender satellites (emplaced during the early

stages of deployment of a BMD system) could

act in this self-defense role. Note that such a

shoot-back policy would require at least the

implicit declaration of a “keep-out zone” surrounding each asset to be defended.3

Such an assertion of sovereignty would require the institution of a regime unlike any

9Asserting sovereignty over a region of space would appear

to violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty which declares

that “Outer Space . . . is not subject to national appropriation

by claim of sovereignty . . .“ See “Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements” (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982), p. 52.

now existing, including that now in effect on

the high seas. Under that regime, maritime

powers are free to station naval forces within

lethal range of each other during peacetime.

The use of kinetic weapons for shoot back

is one likely defense strategy. To be effective,

they would have to have a lethal range greater

than that of the attacking force. Other BMD

kill technologies which have been discussed

could also have a lethal capability against battle stations. In determining whether it is feasible to provide sufficient defenses of one’s

own space assets, particularly during early

phases of deployment, a complex analysis of

several factors is required. These factors include system cost of defense versus offense;

attack and defense tactics; decoy, hiding, and

deception tactics; hardness of defense systems; and offensive capabilities.

In the absence of a BMD system architecture, it is difficult to assess accurately the ability of a BMD system to defend its space assets. It would appear, however, that when only

a few space assets have been deployed, a certain advantage would lie with the offense.

Then, the offense can concentrate its efforts

on a small number of defense targets. Assaults

can be made repeatedly until one attacker

leaks through the defenses to kill its target.

The offense might be deterred from attacking the BMD space assets for the same reason that neither side will launch a first-strike

nuclear attack on the other in the absence of

defenses: the threat of retaliation and all-out

nuclear war. However, the attacker might calculate that his adversary would not risk

mutual annihilation in response to the destruction of a few (possibly only one) satellites, and

may conclude that the risk of not attacking

a BMD system in its early stages of deployment are greater.
— .

. . .

213—

FEASIBILITY QUESTIONS

Technological Feasibility

Virtually all observers have acknowledged

that the technical questions bearing on the

eventual feasibility of a successful BMD are

complex and cannot be answered until further

research has been accomplished. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization argues

that the purpose of its research is precisely to

answer questions of technical feasibility: before the research is done, there will not be

enough information to make a determination.

However, there are various technical issues

which appear to present the greatest challenges. These have been listed in the preceding

discussion of a hypothetical defense system.

The principal outstanding technical problems in the development of a multi-layer ballistic missile defense system, with a large fraction of its assets based in space, areas follows:

the feasibility of developing a boost-phase

intercept system robust enough to be effective when confronted with plausible

countermeasures;

the ability of the system to discriminate

between decoys and RVs in midcourse,

when confronted with plausible countermeasures;

the development of inexpensive groundbased interceptors, meeting required specifications for midcourse exoatmospheric

intercept;

the development of affordable terminal interceptors for high endoatmospheric intercept;

the resistance of sensors to blinding, dazzling, or spoofing in a hostile nuclear environment;

the development of very large and complex software packages which can be

trusted as sufficiently reliable to enable

the United States to make major changes

in defense strategy without having been

tested under battle conditions;

the ability to retarget both sensors and

(in the appropriate case) directed-energy

●

●

●

●

●

●

weapons in times of the order of 1 second

or less;

the ability to deliver the required amount

of energy for a kill within the time allotted by the parameters set by a responsive

offense. These parameters include number of boosters and RVs, the length of

time they are vulnerable to attack during

their flight, and their hardness, which enables them to resist attack;

the ability of the system to defend itself

against a concerted attack when fully deployed;

the ability of the system to be deployed

without being destroyed during the early

stages of deployment, when the full system is not available for defense;

the development of computer hardware

with 10-year maintenance-free reliability;

the development of robust power systems

which can deliver many megawatts, which

are equally maintenance-free and which

can deliver large power pulses; and

the ability of the BMD system to operate in a hostile environment which may

include many nuclear explosions—an environment which is currently poorly understood and which would be difficult to

duplicate experimentally.

Within each of these categories lies a myriad

of precise technical issues to resolve: for example, the degree to which an ablative shield

can protect a booster from attack; the resolution achievable using UV laser imaging; the

amount of infrared radiation produced by a nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere; the

difficulty of building a 5 (or more) meter diameter space-deployable mirror which is optically good to a small fraction of a wavelength.

In addition to the above technical conditions, the system should be able to be developed and deployed at an affordable cost.

Several of the above technical issues involve

the battle of countermeasures versus countercountermeasures and so on. No meaningful
214

analysis can stop at a predetermined level;

otherwise the predicted outcome would be

prejudged. To determine which side, offense

or defense, is likely to prevail in any particular facet of this contest requires a careful and

detailed analysis.

At this stage, it is too early to predict the

likelihood of success in the above areas. However, failure to satisfy even one of the above list

of requirements could render many versions of

the space-based BMD concept impractical. It is

clear that although substantial progress has

been made to date, most BMD technologies require major advances in the state of the art before their feasibility can be assessed.

After another year of research, at the end of

fiscal 1986,2 years of the SDI research program

will have elapsed. At this point, which is a good

fraction of the time along to the much discussed

decision point on further development in the

early 1990s, it may be possible to have some idea

of the rate at which important technical milestones are being met. An interim progress report

might then contain significant indications of the

viability of many important facets of the SDI

project. Such a report would provide a vital input to decisions and directions regarding research funding beyond this point.

A major question is the degree to which defensive measures can outstrip offensive countermeasures in general. If one argues that the

United States can maintain a 5-to 10-year technological advantage over the Soviet Union, the

question reduces to: will current defensive technologies suffice to defeat countermeasures

which are 5 to 10 years behind the state of the

art? If the answer is not in the affirmative, or

if the United States cannot achieve and maintain this level of technical advantage, the prospect of reaching a regime wherein U.S. defenses

can reach and keep superiority over Soviet

offenses will be dim. In such a case, U.S.-Soviet

cooperation towards a mutual deployment of

BMD defenses would be essential to their successful deployment, their effectiveness, or both.

The Soviets would have to be persuaded that a

stepwise transition to a BMD regime would be

in their interest and preferable to engaging in

an arms race with the United States.

Operational Feasibility

In addition to the matter of the technical

feasibility of each of the components of a proposed BMD system, there is the problem of

the operational feasibility of the system as a

whole.

Assume that a BMD system that meets desired technical specifications can be constructed

and deployed. The system would be have to

be in a state of readiness for many years; that

is, it would have to spring into action from a

state of dormancy on very short notice. Perhaps a few days would be available, but any

system requiring days of warmup would be

useless against surprise attack—indeed, it

could increase the incentive to conduct one.

When called upon to act, some components

may not be operating, since a 100 percent reliability is probably unattainable. This difficulty

is countered by providing sufficient component and system redundancy. The degree of

redundancy is set to counter the measured unreliability of the system.

Suppose, for example, it is calculated that

10 boost-phase intercept battle stations (one

does not know in advance which 10) out of a

constellation of 100 would be called on to participate in a battle, and suppose further that

the reliability of each of these stations is 90

percent over a 10-year period. On the average,

about one station would have to be serviced

each year. If servicing is planned on a once-ayear basis, there will be times when one or perhaps two satellites are out of operation. This

would imply a need for a 10 percent (or possibly 20 to 30 percent) increase in the number

of satellites, to provide spares. These would

need to be available to guard against the case

where the nonoperating satellite may be one

of the 10 that are needed to participate.

It is important to note that the number of required spares depends on the subsystem size, the

number of elements of the subsystem which
215

would have to participate in the battle, and,

above all, on the reliability of the subsystem.

Similar arguments can be adduced for each

subsystem and each layer of the BMD: the satellite sensors, ground-based sensors, and all

weapons systems, power supplies, computing

elements, etc., must have high levels of reliability in order to avoid large increases in systems sizes. For many parts of the whole, the

90 percent maintenance-free reliability for 10

years would be desirable.

To maintain reliability, the system would

have to be monitored and tested constantly,

a job which would require much ground- and

space-based effort. Some human intervention

might be needed in both cases. Testing and

subsequent repairs would be a permanent and

constant feature of a large space-based BMD

system.

A totally different question, and a more serious one, arises from the fact that the whole

BMD system would never have been tested

in a realistic battle environment before it

would have to operate at a high level of effectiveness. Without launching a massive rocket

attack to test the system, replete with nuclear

explosions in space and in the atmosphere, the

synergistic effects of the hostile environment

will not be well understood. Failures of more

than one layer in this “common mode” could

drastically reduce the effectiveness of the system as a whole.

As one example, the immense battle management system, including 10 million or more

lines of software code, would have to function

reliably the first time it is tested under full battlefield conditions. Large computer programs

generally require much time and testing to

debug. The question is whether simulated testing would be adequate and trustworthy enough

for the reliance which would be placed in it.

As another example, it is not certain how

much scintillation will occur in the upper

atmosphere as a result of nuclear explosions

there. The uncertainty includes the wavelengths, the intensities, and the duration of the

scintillation. The resistance of radars, sensors,

and sensitive optical surfaces to nuclear explosions in space and in the upper atmosphere

is uncertain. Since these effects may be difficult to study in the laboratory or in underground nuclear tests, this uncertainty may not

be resolvable in the absence of extended upper atmospheric testing.

The electromagnetic pulse induction in

ground- and space-based systems, which is

caused by nuclear explosions in space, is similarly not fully understood. The resistance of

space-based power supplies and power conditioning systems to the various types of radiation from nearby nuclear explosions may be

difficult to determine. Nuclear effects may protide significant problems to the defense in this

context. The ability of a system to withstand

a concerted attack may not be known in advance and the outcome of such an attack could

be highly dependent on the tactics used by

each side.

cost s

General

Questions of cost are even more elusive at

this point than questions of technical feasibility. Before the architecture of a system is defined, it is impossible to give a reasonable and

credible estimate of total system costs. Estimates have ranged from tens of billions of dollars to $1 trillion and more,’ not including

operational and maintenance costs. Not surprisingly, BMD advocates tend to estimate

lower numbers than opponents. Nearly all

credible observers concede, however, that the

system would require a very large investment.

The SDI Organization, recognizing the large

uncertainties in current cost estimating, has

formed a cost estimating working group. The

‘E.g., see D. O. Graham, High F’rontier: .4 New National

Strategy (Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1982), p. 9; Z.

Brzezinski, R. Jastrow, and M. M. Kampelman, “Defense in

Space is not ‘Star f$’ars’, ” I’Vew York Times Magazine, Jan. 27,

1985; J. Schlesinger, National Security Issues Symposium,

1984, “Space, National Security and C’I, ” Mitre Document

M85-3, October 1984, p. 56; Department of Defense document

presented to Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator

Pressler, Apr. 24, 1984.
216

group is investigating possible new and better cost estimating techniques since the magnitude and novelty of the SDI may demand

new estimating tools.5 In addition to cost estimates, cost-exchange analyses will also be performed.

Cost-exchange analyses will be essential to

demonstrating the attractiveness of the system. If it costs the offense less to counter a

defense than it costs the defense to deploy one,

it is generally not advantageous to proceed

with the defense. On the other hand, suppose

the offensive countermeasures cost less than

the defenses, but suppose, additionally, that

the United States has far greater economic resources which it can devote to the effort than

the U.S.S.R. In that case, it could pay the

United States to continue with the defense,

even though it would be more costly than the

cost to the Soviets of offsetting our move.

On the other hand, even a defense which the

United States considered to be cost-effective

might not be sufficient in itself to bring about

a transition to defense dominance. First, Soviet calculations of cost-exchange ratios may

not coincide with our own. Second, they might

redirect their offensive forces along different

delivery modes, concentrating on ones which

could most cheaply penetrate defenses. This

could change the assumptions inherent in

some of the U.S. cost-exchange calculations.

More importantly, cost may not be a major

determining factor for the Soviets in policy

planning. They may be capable of spending

more on offense than the United States spends

on defense because of inflexibilities in their

economic structure, because they are more

easily able to direct their economy towards

military expenditures, or because they may

consider the benefits of maintaining their

offensive capability to be of paramount national importance, thus justifying to themselves levels of expenditure that the United

States would consider to be inordinate.

— — —

‘Information contained in a speech by Lt. Gen. James A.

Abrahamson at the annual meeting of the American Institute

of Aeronautics and Astronautics, April 1985, reported in Military Space, Apr. 15, 1985.

Indeed, the United States already considers

Soviet expenditures on their offensive forces

to be inordinately large. Secretary of Defense

Weinberger has stated, “Whatever the reasons,

the Soviets believe that their colossal military

effort is worthwhile, notwithstanding the price

it imposes on the Soviet society and its troubled economy.’”

It is difficult to do cost-effectiveness analyses on systems which are on the cutting edge

of future technologies for another reason: technological obsolescence. The unpredictable nature of technological progress leads to unpredictable shifts, probably major ones, in both

costs and effectiveness. It is possible that no

analysis which assesses systems more than a

very few years in advance will have much validity.

One additional point worthy of mention is,

that in working out cost exchanges between

offense and defense, one must account for the

fact that both the United States and the

U.S.S.R. are starting from a situation where

they have little or no effective defense, but

very effective offenses. The funds for this level

of offense have already been spent. The funds

to deal with this level of offense by defensive

means have not. Therefore, a massive defense

expenditure would be needed initially just to

counter existing offenses. Cost-exchange ratios at the margin are meaningful in themselves only beyond this point, when offensive

additions and countermeasures are met by defensive additions and countermeasures.

Total System Cost

Rather than present an independent estimate for system cost, this report will point out

the requirements which must be met in order

to devise a credible estimate.

It is possible to make some simple costexchange arguments regarding limits on what

a system or a part of a system should cost. The

following brief discussion is only illustrative,

and subject to the reservations noted above

C.. Weinberger, DOD FY85 Annual Report (Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, 1984), p. 26.
217

concerning cost-exchange concepts in the context of BMD.

Suppose one plans a boost-phase intercept

system consisting of 100 battle stations. In

chapter 7, it was found that, for satellite altitudes of 1,000 km or more and slew times of

0.25 seconds or more, the number of battle stations required increases nearly linearly with

the number of boosters. If one were to aim for

a 30:1 kill ratio of booster to deployed battle

station, this implies that a battle station

should not cost much more than 30 times the

cost of a booster. If it did, the offense could,

in principle, force the defense to spend much

more on staying ahead of the offense than the

offense would have to spend in keeping up

with the defense by the simple expedient of

building more boosters. A cost of $50 million

per booster would mean that the defense could

spend $1.5 billion per battle station, and still

keep up with the offense in the cost-exchange

race. A $200 million cost per booster would imply that the defense would have to keep its

battle station cost below $6 billion per station

to stay in the running. This would mean that

a total system cost of $600 billion would still

be cost-effective.

This crude argument includes many simplifying assumptions, but it maybe useful as

an aid to understanding the nature of costexchange studies.

There are ways of making rough direct cost

estimates, rather than defining allowed upper

limits, as above. One could estimate the fuel

costs needed to place a given payload in orbit, or one could use other crude “order of magnitude” assumptions to make simple calculations. However, none of these techniques

satisfactorily accounts for technological improvements, or, a fortiori, possible technical

breakthroughs. The conclusion stands that it

is too early to make useful estimates.

A cost analysis for a BMD system would

use several tools and techniques.

First, a work breakdown structure would be

made. This is a list of items needed to design

and construct the system. Research, test and

evaluation, maintenance, procurement, and deployment are all elements of the breakdown.

As time goes on, broader categories of items

are further broken down into more specific

elements.

Second, cost estimating relationships are

used. These are equations which use past history for estimating costs of elements in the

project being investigated. One difficulty in

making such estimates for highly innovative

projects, such as BMD, resides in the fact that

many of the estimates may depend on totally

unknown or unanticipated future results of

basic research. Another problem arises from

the uncertainties in extrapolating costs from

items in a historical data base to similar future items. For qualitatively different technologies, the accuracy of estimates derived from

historical analogs may be poor.

A third tool is the use of learning curves.

These are used in predicting cost reductions

per unit resulting from gains in experience and

volume of production.

Also, planning factors are used to predict

costs. They are arithmetic factors used in making cost estimates based on general past experiences. One example would be to use the

ratio of development costs to investment costs

for similar programs in predicting the development cost of a new project, when the investment cost is known. This is similar to the use

of cost estimating relationships noted above,

but even more general and subject to error.

It is apparent that in order to use any of

these tools for estimating the cost of a BMD

system, the architecture and the technologies

to be used will have to be defined.

The burden for providing cost estimates

should be on those who maintain that an effective BMD will be affordable, including

those who define potential system architectures. If one argues for the commitment of

large sums of money to research in one particular area at the expense of others, with the

intent of making deployment options available, one should provide a cost estimate for

the eventual deployments envisioned. Clearly,

if the end product appears to be prohibitively

expensive, this indication would discourage de-
218

cisions to fund the expensive large-scale re- or more alternative system architectures. At

search which might lead to this undesirable present, it is safe to say that, if, indeed, a

result. space-based BMD system is defined which apIn conclusion, attempts to provide a realis- pears to be feasible; it will likely be considertic and defensible cost estimate for an effec- ably more expensive than any other weapons

tive BMD system must await the presentation program yet developed.

of a realistic and defensible suggestion for one
Chapter 9

Alternative Future Scenarios
Contents

Page

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........221

Alternative Future Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............221

The SDI Policy Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......221

Early BMD Deployment Policy Approach. . ........................227

Intermediate BMD Deployment Policy Approach . ..................229

Silo Defense Policy Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....230

A Non-BMD Policy Approach . . . . . . . . ............................232
—

Chapter 9

Alternative Future Scenarios

INTRODUCTION

Thus far we have examined the possible applications of ballistic missile defense to various strategic purposes and the potential effects of BMD deployments on crisis stability,

arms race stability, and arms control. We then

examined the technologies that might be applied to ballistic missile defense. In this chapter we attempt to give the flavor of the current debate over BMD by presenting the

positions of some major policy advocates. We

pay particular attention to the idea of transition—of how and with what consequences we

might move toward a world where BMD plays

an important strategic role. We also look at

ways that the world might evolve if the United

States does not take the initiative in deploying BMD. For each picture of the future, we

identify what appear to be the major assumptions upon which that picture rests. What are

the key outcomes of U.S. action (or inaction)

that each picture posits? What events are assumed to occur along the way to the predicted

outcomes? We leave it to the reader to choose

which assumptions seem most plausible.

The policy approaches reviewed here are the

following:

1. The Strategic Defense Initiative approach,

as defined by various Administration

spokesmen;

2. An approach advocating the earliest pos3

4

5

sible deployment of space-based and

ground-based BMD, as described in the

writings of representatives of the “High

Frontier” organization and others;

An “intermediate deployment” approach

advocating deployment of BMD by the

mid-1990s, using technology not yet

available;

A “missile-silo-mainly” approach, advocating defenses with the limited objective

of defending the U.S. land-based retaliatory force, with other targets defended

only collaterally;

An approach aimed at strengthening the

current regime banning most ballistic

missile defense through current, and possibly additional, arms control measures.

After describing in this chapter the differing views of various policy advocates on

longer-term objectives for BMD deployment,

we will turn in chapter 10 to the immediate

problem facing Congress: how to orient the

U.S. BMD research program this year and in

the years to come. These current decisions w-ill

be influenced by views on longer-term objectives.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SCENARIOS

The SDI Policy Approach Science Adviser to the President, Paul H.

Nitze, Special Adviser to the President, Lt.

The goals of the Strategic Defense Initiative General James A. Abrahamson, Director of

have been explained extensively in a pamphlet, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization,

The President Strategic Defense Initiative, and other Administration officials.1

issued January 3, 1985, by the White House;

in an April 1985 Report to the Congress on

the Strategic Defense Initiative; and in arti- ‘Relevant excerpts from these sources are presented in app.

H. A list of statements and articles on BMD by Administra- cles and speeches by George A. Keyworth, II, tion spokesmen appears in app. I,

221
222 —

According to these Administration spokesmen, progressive BMD deployment would be

accompanied by mutual U.S.-Soviet reductions in offensive weapons. This would lead

first to enhanced deterrence, and ultimately

to basing national security primarily on defense. The effectiveness of the defenses would

be enhanced by the reductions in offenses. Administration statements postulate the United

States moving to a future defensive strategy

in four phases, along the following lines:

1. Research Phase

As described by Reagan Administration

officials, the SDI approach begins by launching “a broad-based, centrally managed research effort to identify and develop the key

technologies necessary for an effective strategic defense. This phase, which has already

begun, is expected to include a progressive series of BMD subsystem demonstrations of

evolving technical capabilities. Each of these

demonstrations would display a technological

advance which would be militarily meaningful but which would not violate any arms control treaty provisions.

In view of the undiminished U.S. commitment to the security of its allies, the SDI research program will not confine itself to exploring BMD technologies with potential

against ICBMs and SLBMs; it will also carefully examine technologies with potential

against shorter-range ballistic missiles, such

as those currently targeted against Western

Europe. U.S. allies have been invited to participate in the SDI research program.

Principal emphasis will be placed on technologies involving nonnuclear kill concepts.

Research on nuclear directed-energy weapons

will also be undertaken in order to develop an

understanding of the potential of this technology and as a hedge against Soviet work in this

area. 2

This research phase might last until some

time in the 1990s, when the President and Con-

‘Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative,

Department of Defense, April 1985, p. 3.

gress could assess the results of the BMD research program, and then decide whether to

begin full-scale engineering development of a

complete BMD system. The criteria for such

a decision would, of course, be determined by

the President and Congress at the time the decision is made. As presently envisaged by

Administration spokesmen,3 however, this decision would not be made unless there were

high confidence that the proposed system

would be:

●

●

●

●

effective in substantially reducing the

counterforce capability of current and

projected Soviet intercontinental, sealaunched, and theater nuclear forces;

sufficiently survivable itself against preemptive attack;

cost-effective on the margin; i.e. able to

counter an increment in offensive countermeasures at a cost substantially less

than the cost of the offensive increment;

and

able to contribute to improving the stability of the overall strategic balance at

each stage of deployment.

Meanwhile, the mutual understanding that

both sides were seriously pursuing strategic

defense systems would force Soviet planners

to rule out an effective first strike as a realistic future option, and would provide U.S. and

Soviet arms control negotiators with a common limited strategic objective, retaliation, by

which to discuss possible build-down of offensive nuclear arsenals.

2. Systems Development Phase

If a decision were made to go ahead, prototypes of all the required BMD components

would be designed, built, and tested during the

systems development phase. Meanwhile, the

United States would seek Soviet agreement

to phased deployment of defensive capabilities

by both sides. Arms control proposals might

include mutually agreed schedules for intro-

——.

‘See The President Strategic Defense Initiative published

in January 1985 by the White House, Ambassador Paul H.

Nitze’s speech of Feb. 20, 1985, and Ambassador Edward L.

Rowny, “America’s Objective in Geneva, ” New York Times,

Apr. 29, 1985.
—

—

ducing the defensive systems on both sides,

associated schedules for reductions in offensive ballistic missiles and other nuclear forces,

confidence-building measures, and agreed constraints on devices designed specifically to

attack or degrade the other side’s defensive

systems. The Soviet leaders should respond

cooperatively to these proposals. If they did

not, the United States would have to decide

whether to proceed to the next phase anyway.

On this issue, Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary

of Defense for Policy, has written:

3.

The more the offensive armaments can be

reduced by agreement, the easier and cheaper

the job of providing effective defenses. Yet,

to be realistic about Soviet motivations, we

must seek to develop and deploy systems

that can provide effective defenses even without such reductions. The United States is

now pursuing new technologies that hold

promise for success on the “hard road” as

well. Thus, we make it all the more probable

that the Soviet leaders will join us some day

on the easy road of cooperation.4

Transition Phase

During this period, operational BMD systems would be deployed by the United States

and the Soviet Union on an incremental, sequential basis, going up the scale of increasing capability levels suggested in chapter 5.

Each added BMD system increment, in conjunction with effective and survivable offensive systems, would enhance deterrence by

making each side’s land-based nuclear forces

more survivable, thus reducing the incentives

for a preemptive first strike. The United

States could also deploy BMD and air defenses to defend preferentially a limited set of

either conventional military systems or populations, in the United States or overseas. At

the same time, as the United States and the

Soviet Union deployed BMD systems that

progressively reduced the value of ballistic

missiles, it is hoped that deep reductions in

“’Nuclear Strategy: Can There Be a Happy Ending?” Foreign Affairs, spring 1985, p. 825.

223

the numbers of ballistic missiles on each side

could be negotiated and implemented.5

While hardened military assets could be successfully defended by these transitional BMD

systems, cities would still be hostage to mutual deterrence. This fact would be crucial to

stability during the transition years. But if

ICBM silos were defended, the retaliatory arsenals needed for attacking cities would not

have to be nearly as large as those needed to

launch or survive a preemptive strike. Moreover, during this period BMD deployments

might save lives and limit damage in the unlikely event –planned or accidental–that a

small number of nuclear missiles were launched

despite effective defenses.

During the transition period, conventional

military forces might have to be improved and

expanded, especially in Europe. Our defense

posture would move toward much heavier reliance upon conventional, nonnuclear forces,

and correspondingly less reliance on using our

nuclear forces to deter conventional attacks

on ourselves and our allies. This strengthened

role for conventional forces would need to be

supported by restoration of technological

leverage. At the same time, second- and thirdgeneration BMD technologies would begin to

become available, which could in time reduce

the effectiveness of strategic nuclear weapons

to the point that cities could become viable

candidates for defense if offensive nuclear

forces were limited to low enough levels.

Most explanations of the SDI policy approach by Administration officials tend to emphasize a scenario in which the Soviet Union

agrees to deep reductions in all kinds of offensive nuclear forces. In this view, a fully effective nationwide defense of the United States

and its Allies could not be achieved without

deep reductions in Soviet offensive forces.’ So-

‘According to Ambassador Paul Nitze, “We would see the

transition period as a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets.

Arms control would play a critical role. We would, for example, envisage continued reductions in offensive nuclear- arms.

(Speech in Philadelphia, Feb. 20, 1985.)

‘See statement by SD I Director, It. General James A. Abrahamson, Science, Aug. 10, 1984, p. 601,
224

..— — -—— —

viet unwillingness to accept such reductions

would therefore preclude a successful transition to the final phase described below.

Administration officials argue, however,

that in that case the United States should still

deploy cost-effective BMD systems (if they

can be developed) to enhance the deterrent

value of U.S. ICBMs and bombers. If the

Soviets keep striving to overcome these U.S.

BMD systems with offensive countermeasures

and deployment of larger offensive forces, the

United States should try to develop and deploy more capable BMD systems. If the Soviets also build up full-scale BMD systems of

their own to intercept U.S. missiles, the United

States should build offensive forces capable

of overcoming the Soviet BMD systems. In

both cases, the United States would hope that

its superior technological talents and industrial resources would permit it to stay ahead.

4. Final Phase

During this period, both countries would

complete deployments of highly effective,

layered BMD systems to protect their own

and their allies’ populations, as well as their

military assets. Ballistic missile force levels

would “reach their negotiated nadir. ” If similarly effective defenses had been developed by

this time against cruise missiles, bombers, and

other means of nuclear attack, such defenses

could also be incorporated.

Ballistic missile and air defenses that might

look less than 100 percent effective in the context of an offensive exchange involving tens

of thousands of warheads could be expected

to perform better against an attack by only

tens or hundreds of warheads. Strategic defense could therefore make possible a world effectively disarmed of nuclear weapons, yet still

retaining national sovereignty and security.

Thus, by the end of the final phase the United

States would achieve President Reagan’s ultimate goal of “eliminating the threat posed by

strategic nuclear missiles. ” Our present reliance on offensive retaliatory forces to deter a

nuclear attack would be replaced by reliance

on a combination of defensive weapons and of

deep mutual reductions in offensive nuclear

forces.

Critical Assumptions for the SD1

Policy Approach

The SDI policy approach appears to be

based on the following assumptions:

Assumption 1. –There is a reasonable prospect

of BMD technological developments meeting the

Administration criteria of effectiveness, costeffectiveness at the margin, and survivability.

Effectiveness.-It is assumed that the BMD

systems will be effective and that possible Soviet responses to prospective U.S. BMD systems will not negate the effectiveness of those

systems. The technical requirements for such

effectiveness are discussed in detail in chapters 7 and 8.

Cost-effectiveness at the margin.--lncrements of Soviet offense are assumed to be

clearly more costly than corresponding increments of U.S. defense. Increments of U.S. offense will presumably also be more costly than

corresponding increments of Soviet defense.

(But if the latter were not the case, then

Administration policy would be all the more

likely to succeed, because continuing an offensive competition would be even more disadvantageous to the Soviets.)

If this assumption held, the Soviets would

have a strong incentive to negotiate the mutual reduction of offensive forces. (As noted

in chapter 6, though, the incentive may still

not be sufficient. ) Otherwise, in the transition

phase the Soviets might well continue to attempt to counter U.S. defenses with offenses

instead of seeing futility in further offensive

additions. 7 However, this criterion may be

very difficult to apply in practice. First, costs

may not be understood that well at the time

that a decision is to be made. Secondly, the

answer may vary greatly depending on the re7

Indeed, the full Administration scenario would seem to imply that the Soviets, too, must find a defensive system with

a favorable cost-exchange ratio vis-a-vis U.S. offenses; otherwise, the United States would find itself tempted to pursue strategic superiority by adding offenses as well as defenses.
225

quirements placed upon the system, and the Assumption 3.–The current ABM Treaty relevel of confidence with which those require- gime can be sustained until the United States is

ments must be satisfied. prepared to make a BMD deployment decision.

on the other hand, if both sides decided that

a transition to defense dominance was desirable, they could agree to reduce offenses despite

unfavorable cost-exchange ratios between offense and defense.

Survivability.– See chapter 6 for a discussion of the importance of BMD system survivability to maintaining crisis stability.

Administration officials have emphasized that

meeting this criterion would be particularly

critical to a decision to deploy BMD.

Assumption 2.–The strategic program as a

whole will be affordable for the United States.

It should be noted that there is also an assumption that defenses will be affordable up

to the margin of trade-off between the offense

and the defense: i.e. that the initial investment

in defense necessary to achieve the desired effectiveness against the predicted responsive

Soviet offensive threat will be acceptable to

the United States. Since the Soviets already

have an offensive force, their initial investment in offense has been made. The total U.S.

investment in defenses to counter that threat

has to be considered, as well as subsequent increments of defensive improvement to counter

increases in the threat.

Moreover, the costs of the transition stage–

in which defensive systems are being purchased, offensive systems are being maintained and improved, and conventional forces

may be needing augmentation—must also be

considered. It should be noted that particularly in the early stages, even before any U.S.

BMD deployments have taken place, Soviet

anticipatory offensive responses are highly

likely. These could, in turn, appear to require

counter-balancing U.S. offensive deployments.

The SDI approach appears to assume that

the necessary research and testing for a U.S.

deployment decision can be conducted within

what both sides agree are the confines of the

ABM Treaty (or that the Soviets will agree to

necessary amendments). Otherwise, if the

Soviets came to believe that the United States

was violating the Treaty, they might not postpone their own BMD deployment decision until the United States was ready to make one.

The SDI approach also appears to assume that

even if no treaty violations (or amendments)

are necessary to the U.S. decision, the Soviets

will be willing to wait for a U.S. decision and

then negotiate the transition to defenses on

both sides, rather than move ahead unilaterally with their own deployment because they

believe the United States will do so soon.

Judging from published U.S. Department of

Defense descriptions of the current Soviet

BMD program, the Soviets are now in a position to field a large-scale, ground-based system of BMD interceptors sooner than the

United States could (although such a system

could almost certainly be overcome by existing U.S. offensive forces). Should the Soviets

begin such a deployment, however, the United

States might nevertheless feel compelled to respond with hasty offensive “fixes” and investment in U.S. BMD systems with only shortterm value.

Such a Soviet move could be particularly undesirable if U.S. research should show that

technology will not in fact permit defenses as

effective as those now hoped for. We could find

ourselves in a costly offensive-defensive arms

race with little hope for decisive dominance of

the defense—the situation the ABM Treaty

was intended to preclude.

Another issue is whether we and our allies This assumption about the short-term viacould afford the additional conventional forces bility of the ABM Treaty is not necessarily esthat would probably be needed to preserve the sential for the long-term SDI scenario, but if

military balance in Europe when Soviet BMD it were to prove incorrect, the transition to

deployment diminished the credibility of nu- defenses could be more difficult and pose

clear deterrence of conventional aggression. greater risks of instability.
226

Assumption 4.—Arms control agreements can

be formulated and negotiated that will permit

graduated, mutual, deep offensive reductions and

defensive deployments that are crisis-stabilizing

and arms-race-stabilizing.

This assumption has three components: a

U.S. desire for such agreements, a corresponding Soviet desire, and the ability of both sides

to overcome the technical difficulties in reaching such agreements.

Many analysts believe that if the Soviets

should conclude that the United States is

likely to abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy

a nationwide BMD system, they would be

highly unlikely to agree to offensive force reductions. a Offensive arms control may therefore be difficult during this stage, because the

Soviets would almost surely start to increase

their offensive nuclear forces in order to

counter the U.S. BMD system and maintain

their offensive force capability. This appears

to be a major problem confronting the U.S.

negotiators in Geneva.

The SD I scenario assumes that technological developments will eventually persuade the

Soviets of the futility of trying to maintain the

military effectiveness of ICBMs. If this assumption proves incorrect, the demands placed

on the BMD technology for effectiveness, costeffectiveness, and survivability could be much

higher. The ultimate goal of negotiated offensive reductions might come later rather than

sooner, if at all.

Even with a mutual desire to negotiate a

stabilizing transition to defensive deployments, the difficulties in working out such an

agreement should not be underestimated. Experience with past U.S.-Soviet arms control

6

For example, the Hoffman Panel of experts, appointed by

the Department of Defense to assist in planning the SDI program, concluded that the Soviets would be likely to respond

to U.S. BMD deployment “with a continuing build-up in their

long-range offensive forces. ” (Fred S. Hoffman, et al., Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security, unclassified

summary report, October 1983, p. 11. ) Participants in the OTA

Workshop on Soviet military doctrine and policy also judged

that the first Soviet responses to U.S. BMD deployments would

be to try to maintain the effectiveness of their offenses. For

Soviet statements on this point, see app. K. References to

studies of Soviet strategic policy are listed in app. M.

negotiations has demonstrated that asymmetries in offensive force structures and in

strategic doctrines, Soviet secrecy, and other

factors have made the process of reaching

agreement highly arduous. Agreement on a

transition involving a fundamental change in

strategic goals and drastic changes in force

structures, and adequate verification thereof,

would be much more complex.9 For these reasons it might prove to be far more difficult to

reach U.S.-Soviet agreement on increasing

defensive and decreasing offensive deployment levels than it would be to agree to reduce

offensive levels with BMD essentially banned.

Assumption 5. –The loss of the “extended deterrent” threat of U.S. offensive forces could be

compensated for by either conventional force improvements or diplomatic measures to reduce the

Soviet threat to U.S. allies.

For those early stages of BMD deployment

intended to enhance deterrence by increasing

the survivability of U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities, this assumption would not come

into play. But as long-range offensive nuclear

weapons became less effective on both sides,

the possibility of escalation of theater conflicts

to nuclear war would serve as less of a deterrent to Soviet aggression. The United States

would presumably seek alternate means of reducing the Soviet conventional and theaternuclear threats to U.S. allies and interests.

Assumption 6.–Political fallout from any U. S.-

Soviet disputes over the SDI will be manageable.

Already, the Soviets have stepped up their

allegations of America’s aggressive intentions

to develop a first-strike capability, to undermine strategic stability, and to increase the

danger of nuclear war. They have accused the

United States of planning to abrogate the

ABM Treaty and thus destroy any hopes for

progress in strategic arms control.

Whether Soviet efforts to lay the blame on

the United States for derailing arms control

efforts will gain widespread credence, particularly in Western Europe, remains to be seen.

..—— —

The requisite elements of such a negotiated transition are

discussed in ch. 6.
227 —

If they succeed, neutralism might become a

stronger political movement in many NATO

countries, and might well become government

policy in several.

The SDI scenario assumes that there will

not be unacceptable damage to the North Atlantic Alliance from neutralist tendencies or

from European beliefs that a defensive system

capable of really protecting Western European

cities from nuclear attack is less attainable

technically, financially, and politically than

one for the United States. It also assumes that

the British and the French would not be excessively alarmed by the prospect that loss of

the ABM Treaty and subsequent Soviet BMD

deployment would undermine their own nuclear deterrents.

Opposition from U.S. allies would not necessarily preclude deployment, but the Administration has stated that consultation with our

allies would play an important part in a deployment decision.

Early BMD Deployment

Policy Approach

Proponents of this approach propose that

the United States begin immediately to deploy

ballistic missile defenses as rapidly as possible, using presently available U.S. technology.’” Their goals are to enhance the current

basis of deterrence by using defense to complicate Soviet targeting and to provide some

measure of protection to U.S. society should

deterrence fail. Complicating Soviet targeting

would enhance deterrence by increasing the

uncertainties in the minds of Soviet planners

regarding the outcome of planned strikes

‘“Examples of this approach are described in Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy (Washington,

DC: High Frontier, Inc., 1982); Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A Strategy for National Sum”val (New York: Tom Doherty

Associates, 1983); Daniel O. Graham and Gregory A. Fossedal, A Defense That Defends (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair,

1983); and Angelo Codevilla, “Understanding Ballistic Missile

Defense, ” Journal of Contemporary Studies, winter 1984, pp.

19-35. This last article differs from the others in recommending early deployment of spacebased chemical lasers, as opposed

to the space-based kinetic kill vehicle constellation of *’High

Frontier. ” Most of the following discussion refers to the “High

Frontier” proposals.

against the U. S., especially of strikes designed

to achieve decisive military advantage. Their

program highlights space-based BMD as a

“technological end-run” around Soviet military capabilities, largely by utilizing superior

U.S. computer miniaturization technology.

In order to create such a space-based BMD

system quickly, the “High Frontier” organization recommends use of “essentially off-theshelf” technology, and describes an illustrative system which would be designed to intercept Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, MRBMs, and

IRBMs in their boost and post-boost stages.

Its 1982 report estimated such a BMD system to be deployable within 5 or 6 years at a

cost of about $13 billion.11

That first-generation BMD system would be

followed about five years later by a secondgeneration system, perhaps using laser or particle beams to attack missile warheads in their

midcourse stage as well as earlier.

The advocates of the High Frontier approach emphasize, however, that these spacebased BMD systems should be reinforced with

a series of “collateral actions” as follows:

●

●

●

✍

point defense of U.S. ICBM silos, using

a ground-based system such as the Low

Altitude Defense System (LoADS) interceptors with nuclear warheads or the

SWARMJET nonnuclear, high-velocity

interceptor rockets, either of which they

believe could be deployed within 2 years.

a greatly enhanced civil defense program,

which they believe could save a great

number of lives and “protect enough essentials of our agricultural and industrial

assets to give reasonable hope for the recovery of national power and our modern

standard of living. ”

mobile, high-performance, manned military “spaceplanes” to inspect and maintain U.S. satellites and, eventually, conduct

“an active defense of U.S. installations in

space.

“Department of Defense officials disagree with these estimates; see app. G.
228

●

●

●

●

. —

a manned space station for testing BMD

system elements, first in low orbit and

later in geosynchronous orbit.

comprehensive anti-bomber defenses,

increased anti-submarine warfare deployments,

substantial strengthening of U.S. offensive strategic forces, including bombers,

ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, because the need for offensive retaliatory

forces would remain.

While this policy approach has some similarities to the Reagan Administration’s SDI

approach, it differs in several important

respects. First, it is based on the belief that

a BMD system using current technology

would be sufficiently effective to justify its deployment at this time. Second, it does not hold

out an ultimate goal of near-perfect defense of

cities, but explicitly advocates deployment of

only partially effective defenses on the ground

that these are better than none.12 Third, the

writings of its proponents do not suggest that

it could lead to arms control agreements for

deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces. On

the contrary, they envisage a hostile Soviet

response to U.S. adoption of this policy, resulting in an intensified arms race between the two

superpowers, a race they believe the United

States would win by making full use of its industrial and technological superiority:

If. . . we move strategic systems onto a

fast-track, high-priority model the Soviets

will have two or three years, not decades, to

respond to our latest defense. And, as they

begin to devise countermeasures and build

the hardware to perform them, we will already be deploying the next round of strategic defenses—high energy lasers, particle

beam weapons, and so on.13

In commenting on this prospect, Daniel O.

Graham argues, “The tasks the U.S.S.R. will

face if High Frontier becomes a reality require

high technology on a prodigious scale. The So121n A Defense ‘lYMt Defends, op. cit., Graham and Fossedal

state: “In fact there will never be a perfect defense, not against

the bullet, against the tank, against nuclear weapons. What can

be done is to complicate an attacker’s calculations, blunt his

forces, and save millions of lives” (p. 121),

‘

gGraham and Fossedal, op. cit., p. 115.

viet economy, already severely strained, may

well be unable to meet these requirements for

high technology without disintegrating.’’” He

cites reports that indicate that Soviet “military expenditures are already approaching, if

not exceeding, ‘the objective limits’ beyond

which the U.S.S.R. cannot go without serious

damage to the economy as a whole, including

the reproductive [sic] base crucial to the very

existence of Soviet military might. “15

Critical Assumptions for the

Early Deployment Policy Approach

This policy approach appears to be based on

the following assumptions:

Assumption 1.–U.S. technology is now adequate to support prompt deployment of a functional, survivable, space-based BMD system.

In the view of some Defense Department

officials, the High Frontier estimates for costs

and construction times for such a system are

unrealistic.16 Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, Director of the SDI Organization, has testified before the House Armed Services Committee that while many of the components

that the High Frontier proposal might utilize

were available, their integration into an effective and survivable weapons system would require much more study .17 Administration officials say, in short, that several years of

research are needed to assess the validity of

the assumptions critical to the early deployment approach.

“High Frontier (1982), op. cit., p. 86.

“Ibid., p. 162,

“The 1982 High Frontier report (op. cit., p. 71) estimates a

total cost of about $20 billion over 5 years and about $35 billion through 1990. Department of Defense studies estimated

that a comparable deployment would cost from $50 to $75 billion or more, according to testimony on the DOD authorization before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Mar. 23,

1983 (p. 2668). The DOD witness, John L. Gardner, indicated

reservations about the survivability of such a system, and

stated:

Before we would recommend a significant undertaking on a system like the High Frontier we believe that significantly more work

would have to be done in the examination of that system from

the viewpoint of its survivability and considering the kinds of

responsive threats that might come at that system from the Soviet Union, were they to conclude that it represented a military

threat.

See also app. G.

“Testimony of Feb. 21, 1985. See app. G.
229

A Background Paper done for OTA contains increased credibility of U.S. willingness to use conan analysis of the “High Frontier” proposal ventional force.

for 432 satellites carrying l-km/see intercep- According to the High Frontier literature, tors. It demonstrates that the concept would

have meager coverage of Soviet ICBM fields.18 There would be a realization that the U.S.

Assumption 2. –The cost of such a deployment was beginning to break out of the paralytic

bonds imposed by the concept of Mutual Ascould be relatively low. sured Destruction . . . there would be a resThis assumption is based partly on the idea

that Congress and the Administration would

be willing to allow the program to proceed on

a‘ *fast track’ without existing procedures for

competitive bidding and administrative review, and that these procedures waste large

sums of money. While such an approach might

speed progress in some areas, views differ as

to whether the costs would be reduced significantly.

Assumption 3.–Crisis instability will be avoided

because technically superior U.S. defenses will reduce Soviet incentives to execute a preemptive attack under any plausible circumstances.

See chapter 6 for a discussion of crisis stability issues. Full success of the early deployment scenario seems to require U.S. strategic

superiority from the beginning; otherwise, the

United States could beat a dangerous strategic disadvantage for a considerable period.

Partial success, however, might depend only

on the increase in uncertainty posed by BMD

to Soviet military planners.

Assumption 4.–Arms race instability will be

manageable because the Soviets will not be able

to afford to match U.S. technical superiority.

The long-run affordability of this policy approach seems to depend on its unaffordability for the Soviets. But if the Soviet economy

cannot be forced into collapse, this approach

requires that the United States be able to

maintain an indefinite lead in the defenseoffense competition.

Assumption 5.–The loss of the “extended deterrent” threat of US. offensive forces in the face

of Soviet BMD could be compensated for by the

.

toration of the badly shaken European confidence in U.S. ability and resolve to actually

use its power to preserve the Free World. 19

Assumption 6.—Political fallout from any U. S.-

Soviet disputes over the BMD plans and deployments will be manageable.

See the discussion of SDI assumptions

above.

Intermediate BMD Deployment

Policy Approach

The near-term strategic objectives of the

Early BMD Deployment approach—enhancing the deterrence of a Soviet attack upon the

United States by increasing Soviet uncertainty in their ability to accomplish military

objectives in such an attack, along with providing some measure of protection to U.S. society should deterrence fail-are also sought

by some who, unlike Early Deployment advocates, do not believe that existing BMD technology is adequate. Supporters of an “Intermediate BMD Deployment’ approach believe

that U. S. BMD deployment should not wait

for the feasibility of long-term, highly effective BMD concepts to be demonstrated. However, they would not advocate that deployments start immediately. Instead, they would

support U.S. deployment of BMD in the

“intermediate-term’ ‘—say by the mid- 1990s—

of the best system that could be deployed at

that time.

Advocates of “early deployment” approaches

hope to deploy BMD so rapidly that the

Soviets will be unable to counter it before it

becomes effective. “Intermediate deployment” supporters do not expect to avoid So-

‘“Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space,

OTA Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984, pp.

——

“Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy, op. cit.,

34-35, p. 88.
230

— —

viet countermeasures, but believe that the added uncertainty that Soviet planners and

weapons designers will face against even a partially effective U.S. defense will enhance deterrence. Except for their difference in timing,

the rationales and underlying assumptions of

the “early deployment” and “intermediate deployment” approaches are similar.

Critical Assumptions for the Intermediate

BMD Deployment Policy Approach

The critical assumptions of the Intermediate Deployment Approach closely resemble

those already discussed under the Early Deployment Approach. However, the first assumption in that approach must be modified

slightly, and one more added.

Assumption 1.–In the “intermediate-term” (mid

1990s), US. technology will be adequate to support

deployment of a functional, survivable BMD

system.

Such a system might eventually include

space-based components, but would probably

start out with ground-based terminal and perhaps midcourse interceptors. Nonnuclear interceptors would probably be desirable, but if

adequate performance and confidence could

not be attained with nonnuclear technologies,

nuclear interceptors would be required.

Assumption 2.–Deterrence of Soviet nuclear attack does not depend critically on the number of

U.S. warheads that would penetrate Soviet defenses in retaliation.

Although an intermediate deployment of

ballistic missile defenses by the United States

would confuse Soviet attack plans and increase the uncertainties they would face in

conducting a nuclear attack upon the United

States, deployment of a Soviet defense in the

same time frame, using systems evolved from

the current upgrade of the Moscow system,

would lessen the ability of the United States

to conduct a retaliatory strike. In chapter 5,

it was shown that even if the United States

and Soviets deploy equivalent defenses, it is

quite possible that in the event of a Soviet first

strike, more U.S. retaliatory warheads would

be intercepted by Soviet defenses than would

have been saved by U.S. defenses. In other

words, fewer U.S. retaliatory warheads would

reach the Soviet Union if both had such defenses than if neither did. Advocates of “intermediate-term” BMD deployment acknowledge

this possibility, but believe that the uncertainties introduced into Soviet attack plans by

U.S. defenses would more than compensate for

whatever success Soviet defenses might have

in intercepting our retaliatory strike.

Silo Defense Policy Approach

A third variant of a policy approach favoring U.S. BMD deployment differs from those

described above in that it calls for defense primarily of ICBM silos. The major purpose of

such a BMD system would be to enhance the

survivability of the land-based leg of the U.S.

deterrent triad, While in some configurations

it might offer a low level of partial protection

to some soft targets like cities, it would not

be intended as just the first stage of a more

ambitious defense. A defense primarily of missile silos would enhance the current basis of

deterrence by increasing the U.S. forces expected to survive a Soviet first strike, raising

the cost to the Soviets of attempting to destroy those forces, and possibly complicate So

viet targeting.

Proponents of this approach believe it would

serve several strategic objectives:

●

●

●

●

It would constitute a hedge against possible future vulnerabilities that might

arise for the SLBM and strategic bomber

forces.

It would reduce the incentive to rely on

a launch-on-warning strategy for U.S.

ICBMs, thereby improving crisis stability.

By adding to the uncertainties the Soviets

would face when contemplating a possible preemptive strike, it might discourage

such a strike.

It would introduce a “firebreak” against

limited nuclear attacks by the Soviets, requiring any effective Soviet attack to use

thousands of weapons, thereby running

a higher risk of heavy U.S. retaliation

than would an attack of only a few.
— .

231

—

These objectives are shared by SDI proponents for the early stages of BMD deployment. But proponents of limited BMD primarily for missile-site defense argue that their

approach would lessen pressure on the Soviet

Union to increase its offensive forces to maintain its assured retaliatory deterrent capability.

Proponents of the Silo Defense policy approach believe that advances in BMD technology have made the technical feasibility of effective hard-point silo defense more promising

than it was in the early 1970s. They believe

that significant progress has been made toward coping with problems which were particularly troublesome then, such as decoy discrimination and defense of acquisition and

guidance radars.

This policy approach does not envision a

transition to a fundamentally different U.S.

nuclear strategy. Rather, it proposes to deal

with a problem in current strategy-the vulnerability of part of the retaliatory force to

preemptive attack by Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, it would probably require a carefully

managed arrangement with the Soviets to

achieve its goals without introducing undesired instabilities into the strategic relationship.

Some advocates of silo defense see it as leading to a defense-oriented world, and argue for

a “defense protected build-down’ ’( DPB), saying that:

An orderly transition to a defense-oriented

world . . . can be achieved by combining deployment of defensive weapons with a concomitant and compensating reduction of

offensive weapons. 20

They argue that a world free of the threat

of nuclear destruction is an illusion, but that

the level of destruction of which retaliatory

weapons are capable might be reduced.

“’Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus, “Stabilizing

Star Wars, ” Foreign Policy (No. 54), spring 1984, p. 165. For

an earlier argument that limited defenses could permit reduced

offensive forces, see G. E., Barasch et al., *’Ballistic Missile Defense: A Potential Arms-Control Initiative, ” Los Alamos National I.aboratory Paper LA-8632, UC-2, issued January 1981.

On the other hand, another advocate of

limited BMD deployments has argued that the

benefits of limited defense are sufficient in

themselves and that BMD would not make

deep reductions in offensive arms more likely:

Since there are no foreseeable circumstances in which either side will feel secure

without maintaining an assured destruction

capability, the ABM [deployment] would

make it unlikely that either side would be interested in negotiating reductions to low

levels. 21

This analyst does believe, however, that the

Soviets might agree to modify the ABM

treaty to permit limited defenses.

Critical Assumptions for the Silo Defense

Policy Approach

This policy approach appears to be based on

the following assumptions:

Assumption 1.–BMD for missile silo defense

can be effective in the face of increased offensive

forces and countermeasures.

Effective BMD for silo defense would have

the effect of raising the cost (in terms of attacking reentry vehicles) of destroying each

missile silo, but would not make the task impossible if there were no constraints on offensive forces.22

Assumption 2.–BMD is the most cost-effective

means available for protecting U.S. retaliatory capabilities.

If a system intended primarily to defend

missile silos is not considered to form the core

of a more ambitious defense, then the costeffectiveness of the alternatives becomes a

larger consideration. For example, mobile or

other deceptive basing modes for ICBMs

should be considered. Depending on the predicted size of the Soviet threat, such basing

modes might be the first step to take, rather

“Jan Lodal. “Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy, ” Daedalus,

fall 1980, p. 170.

“Testimony of Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Hearing before the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, Nov. 10, 1983, H. A.S.C. 98-21, p. 20.
232

than BMD.23 Since defended U.S. ICBMs

would probably have to attack defended Soviet targets, the trade-offs in U.S. retaliatory

effectiveness need to be considered carefully.

Arms control negotiations to reduce the Soviet counterforce threat should also receive full

consideration.

Assumption 3.–The Soviets would not respond

to limited U.S. BMD deployments with a largescale BMD system intended to defend urbanindustrial targets as well as ICBM silos.

Such a Soviet response would place pressure

on the United States to expand our defenses,

offenses, or both, just to stay in the same relative strategic position. Some advocates of

limited BMD argue that the Soviets would see

that, given the likelihood of effective U.S.

countermeasures, trying to build very effective defenses would be futile. But the defensive system the Soviets are best prepared to

deploy might not be best suited to ICBM silo

defense. Should the Soviets deploy a system

which looks to the United States like the base

for a larger defense of Soviet territory,” the

United States may decide to respond by building a larger offensive force. This in turn could

stimulate larger Soviet offenses and defenses.

Others argue that the Soviets could be engaged in negotiations to define the kinds of

defenses both sides could live with. The best

way for the two sides to assure one another

of the limited nature of their BMD deployments may be for them to agree to a modification of the ABM Treaty specifically to

permit carefully defined silo defenses. This

assumes that the Soviets, who have deployed

a defense of Moscow but never utilized the

ABM Treaty provision allowing them to defend silos, could be persuaded to seek a silo

defense.

——-—..-—— 2gOn various possible basing modes and the potential of

preferential BMD for missile bases, see ch. 3 in U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, MX Missile Basing, OTAISC-140 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

September 1981).

ZiIn a tmic~ “prudent worst-case” analysis, *ost ~Y largsscale Soviet BMD deployment would probably look like that.

Assumption 4.–Neither side will perceive the

limited BMD system deployed by the other as the

core of a more extensive damage-limiting defense.

A tacit or a negotiated agreement to build

larger, but still limited, BMD systems maybe

difficult to formulate. A highly-localized (site)

defense by ground-based interceptors would

appear to be the least ambiguous type of deployment, but might not be nearly as effective

as a system with more than one layer of defense. One side or the other might not be willing to settle for a BMD with only a single terminal layer. But systems with more than one

layer may appear to give one a “breakout” potential for a much more ambitious defense.

Assumption 5.–Neither side will respond to the

other’s limited BMD system with greatly augmented offenses.

Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, has argued that a defect in setting

only limited goals for a BMD system is that

the Soviets are likely to devote considerable

effort to countering it, whereas the promise

of increasingly effective defenses would cause

them to see the futility of trying to maintain

offensive capabilities.25

Augmented Soviet offenses could cause the

United States to deploy additional defenses

and offenses, which in turn could stimulate

further Soviet deployments.

A Non-BMD Policy Approach

Most opponents of BMD believe that, at

least for the foreseeable future, U.S. policy

should be to strive to continue the current situation in which neither the United States nor

the U.S.S.R. deploys BMD, and offensive

arms development and deployment are limited

by agreement.26

“See, for example, his testimony before the Subcommittee

on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Committee on Armed

Services, U.S. Senate, Feb. 21, 1985.

“comprehensive descriptions of this viewpoint appear in Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, The Reagan Strate@”c Defense Im”tiative: A Technical, Political, and

Arms ControJ Assessment (Stanford, CA: Center for Interna-
In view of the factors which threaten the

continued viability of the ABM Treaty,27 most

people who advocate preservation of the treaty

believe that steps should be taken to strengthen

it.z’ Their views are described in the following

sections. Since there are many ideas on how

this can best be done, the descriptions below

include a range of proposals drawn from many

sources. While this approach is generally consistent with the main strategic policy objectives of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, it also includes new measures to

further those objectives in coming years.

Advocates of this policy approach agree

with SDI advocates that we should not count

on the threat of assured destruction to prevent

a nuclear catastrophe forever. However, they

do not believe that the solution to this problem can be found primarily in new military

technology. Instead they believe that in the

near term the best hope lies in early steps to

improve strategic stability through arms control agreements, as described below. (Their

views on ways to reduce the long-term risks

inherent in threats of nuclear retaliation are

discussed subsequently.)

Under this approach, the United States

would make a set of related proposals to the

Soviet Union which could include some or all

of the following elements:

—— . —

tional Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1984);

and Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W. Kendall, The Fallacy of Star 14’ars (New York: Random House,

1984). A list of articles by critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative, including former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown,

Clark Clifford, Robert McNamara, and James Schlesinger, appears in app, J.

“For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Thomas K.

Longstreth, ,John E. Pike, and John B. Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Pro@ams on

the ABM Treat~’ (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Save

the ABM Treaty, March 19851.

“For example, in a speech on Nov. 29, 1984, Senator Edward

Kennedy said:

. .. developments in both [the United States and U. S. S. R.] already

place the [ABM] Treaty in serious jeopardy. Of particular concern is the development of advanced air defenses that may have

a ballistic missile capability. We are now hearing charges and

countercharges of Treaty violations. The trends suggest that the

superpowers are approaching a point where they must either take

concrete measures to renew the Treaty, or risk its abrogation.

Congress must act on its own to prevent the Administration from

misusing Star Wars to provoke the Soviet Union into abrogating the ABM agreement. We should prohibit the funding of any

weapons research or development which could violate that treaty.

●

●

●

233

— .

Preserving and strengthening the ABM

Treaty:

—by strong endorsements of its long-term

importance by the senior officials of

both countries;

–by resolving compliance issues in the

bilateral Standing Consultative Commission;

–by exploring ways to clarify, modify or

supplement the Treaty to eliminate

troublesome ambiguities or loopholes

indicated by events since the Treaty

was signed and by new technological

developments; 29

–by keeping the U.S. and Soviet BMD

research programs at a level and scope

no greater than needed to hedge against

one another’s BMD technology developments. This could include maintaining realistic deployment options and exploring new technologies within the

bounds of the ABM Treaty .’”

Negotiating a verifiable agreement to ban

testing and deployment of anti-satellite

weapons and all space-based weapons.

Such an agreement would also reinforce

the ABM Treaty by eliminating a potential loophole: the testing of devices for potential BMD use under the guise of ASAT

testing.

Negotiating mutual, verifiable limitations

on offensive nuclear forces, designed not

only to reduce their numbers substantially, but also to decrease counterforce

capabilities and strengthen survivability

“For a development of this approach, see Drell, Farley, and

Holloway, op. cit. These authors conclude:

Cooperative action could counter the corrosive effects of unilateral ABM activities which will ine~’itabl~ cause disputes arising out of deliberate or unintentional divergences in interpretation of the Treaty. More important, it could reinforce confidence

that the two nations see the purposes and value of the ABM

Treaty in consistent ways, and that each is determined to act

separately and jointly toward the fundamental aim of avoiding

nuclear war.

3The nature of such a research program is discussed in Sidney D. Drell and Thomas H. Johnson (eds. ), Strategic Missile

Defense: Necessities, Prospects, and Dangers in the Near Term,

report of a workshop at the Center for International Security

and Arms Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Apr.

1985). Also printed in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater

Nuclear Forces, Mar. 19, 1985,
234— —— —

of retaliatory forces on both sides.31 This

proposal could include bans on all nuclear

missile flight tests and on all nuclear

weapon tests.32 It would also be logical to

supplement it with limitations on air defense and on anti-submarine warfare.

Among the proponents of this general policy approach, there is a wide spectrum of views

regarding the long-term prospects for avoiding nuclear war, either between the United

States and the Soviet Union, or between other

countries. Some believe that after (but only after) offensive forces have been reduced to a

sufficiently low level, deployment of effective

nationwide defenses against nuclear attack

would help to enable all the countries involved

to agree to do away with nuclear weapons altogether.33 Others believe that for the foreseeable future the most promising way to prevent

nuclear war is to maintain a small but invulnerable nuclear retaliatory force in the hands

of at least the United States and U. S. S. R., and

perhaps Britain, France and China as well.34

Still others believe that only by improving political relationships between nations or by

evolving strong translational institutions can

we hope to banish the long-term threat of nuclear holocaust.35

“This would be consistent with the conclusion of the Scowcroft Commission that “The central purpose of our arms control efforts should therefore be to enhance U.S. security by increasing strategic stability. (Second report of the President

Commission on Strategic Forces, Mar. 21, 1984, p. 3.)

32Proponents of this approach believe that a missile flight test

ban would be particularly valuable in preventing the Soviet Union from increasing its destabilizing counterforce capabilities;

e.g., by developing more accurate land-based ICBMs, highly

accurate SLBMs that could destroy U.S. ICBM silos, or

depressed-trajectory SLBMs that could reach U.S. bomber

bases before the bombers could escape. See Les AuCoin,

“Freeze,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1984;

and “Nailing Shut the ‘Window of Vulnerability’, Arms Control Today, September 1984. Other arms control advocates propose allowing certain kinds of missile modernization in order

to reduce vulnerabilities of both sides’ offensive forces. See, for

example, Harold Brown and Lynn E. Davis, “Nuclear Arms

Control: Where Do We Stand?” Foreign Affairs, summer 1984.

33 For an elaboration of this concept, see Freeman Dyson,

Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 73

ff. and 280 ff.

“see, for example, Richard L. Garwin, “Reducing Dependence

on Nuclear Weapons, in David C. Gompert, et al., Nuclear

Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

35See, for example, Burns H. Weston (cd.) Toward Nuclear

Disarmament and Global Security.\’: A Search for Alternatives

Critical Assumptions for the Non-BMD Policy

Approach

This policy approach appears to be based on

the following assumptions:

Assumption 1.–The risks of continuing a strategy of deterrence by assured retaliation, stabilized

by arms control measures, are less than the risks

of introducing BMD into the strategic arms competition.

Advocates of this approach maybe unhappy

about the U.S. need to rely on assured retaliation to deter Soviet attack, but they do not

see a plausible alternative. This assumption

is based in part on an assessment that over

the next two or three decades we can have

higher confidence in our ability to maintain

adequately survivable and effective retaliatory

forces than in our ability to build BMD systems effective enough to provide “defense

dominance. It is also based on the view that

the Soviets are more likely to agree to maintaining and stabilizing the current strategic

relationship than they are to agree to shifting

to a defense-oriented strategic relationship.

Most BMD advocates disagree with one or

both of these views.

Assumption 2. –It is possible to arrive at, and

maintain in force, mutually acceptable, adequately

verifiable arms control agreements which will

satisfy both sides that neither is deploying significant BMD systems or has a significant lead in

BMD break-out capability.

Given the questioned record of Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements,

and given misgivings on each side about new

technological developments on the other side,

this may be a challenging condition to fulfill.

Some of the critics of arms control believe

that it is dangerous to try to cooperate with

the Soviet Union. They believe that the Soviets use arms control negotiations solely to

attempt to weaken the West. They think any

effort to seek mutually advantageous agree-

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Randall Forsberg, “Confining the Military to Defense as a Route to Disarmament, ”

Wor]d Po~jCv Journ~, winter 1984; and Robert S. woito TO

End War; A New Approach to International Conflict (New

York: Pilgrim Press, 1982).
ments between the superpowers is doomed to

failure, because Soviet hostility to the United

States will forever dominate any relationship

between them. In this view, the Soviets might

enter into additional arms control agreements

with the United States mainly to limit U.S.

progress on BMD while the Soviets prepare

to abrogate the treaty, openly or clandestinely,

in their own time.

Other observers have a more complex view

of Soviet motivations, but nevertheless see

significant problems in seeking new arms control agreements. Even given the political will

on both sides, there are technical obstacles to

effective agreement, especially in the case of

space-based or space-attacking weapons. For

example, the distinctions between anti-satellite weapons and sensors and potential BMD

weapons and sensors is becoming more difficult to draw.

Assumption 3,–A U.S. research program which

hedges against Soviet break-out from such arms

control agreements will either deter such breakout or provide the United States with an appropriate offensive or defensive response to it.

Many advocates of the non-BMD policy approach assume that the Soviet Union has not

already made a firm decision to break out or

“creep out” of the ABM Treaty, and that such

a U.S. research program could help to deter

them from doing so. Some believe the United

States could reduce this risk further by developing prototype BMD systems within the

bounds of the ABM Treaty, as the Soviets

have done, as well as by maintaining a strong

capability to overcome potential Soviet BMD

systems

offenses,

On the

235

with penetration aids, enhanced

and other countermeasures.

other hand, BMD proponents argue

that U.S. BMD research languished under the

ABM Treaty regime until the Strategic Defense Initiative began. They contend that a

lack of intent to deploy a system might remove incentives for adequate funding for

BMD research. A Soviet break-out from an

arms control regime limiting BMD could then

leave the United States at some disadvantage,

at least temporarily.

Assumption 4. –The Soviets can be persuaded

to enter into and comply with offensive arms control limitations which would reduce the threat of

preemptive nuclear attack, thereby reducing current U.S. incentives to deploy a defense of ICBM

silos.

This assumption may not be critical to preserving the non-BMD regime, but offensive

arms reductions would be useful, particularly

in making continued BMD limitations acceptable in the United States. During the SALT

I period and on into the SALT 11 period, the

Soviets continued to add to and improve their

ballistic-missile borne hard-target-kill capabilities. The have shown little interest in negotiating away those weapons which the United

States finds most destabilizing. Some argue

that the current U.S. interest in developing

BMD may induce the Soviets to take a serious interest in offensive missile reductions if

they believe BMD can be headed off in that

way, but seeking such a trade-off does not appear to be current U.S. policy.

Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...239

BMI) R&D Options.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...240

Hedges Against Near-Term Soviet ABM Treaty Breakout . ...........241

Soviet BMD Research and Comparison With U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....243

Alternative It&D Program Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........244

Approach 1: The Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . .244

Approach 2a: Early Deployment . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . ,245

Approach 2b: Intermediate Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247

Approach 3a: Funding-Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..248

Approach 3b: Combination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . .248

Alternative R/&D Program Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........249

Technical Attributes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....249

Economic Attributes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........250

Political Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......,..251

Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Issues Concerning Choice of Research Approach . . . . . . . . . . . ..256

Issues Concerning Preparation of Deployment Options . . . . . . . ..,...258

issues Pertaining to any BMD Research Program . . . ...........259

Table

Table No. Page

10-1. Correlation Between the Near-Term Research Approaches Discussed

in This Chapter and the Longer-Term Policy Approaches

Discussed in Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240
Chapter 10

Alternatives R&D Programs

INTRODUCTION

In previous chapters, this report has addressed the potential contributions and liabilities of ballistic missile defenses, and it has

primarily discussed the long-term issues associated with developing and deploying BMD.

However, technologies now within the state

of the art are capable of providing only limited

BMD capability. More effective BMD systems cannot be developed without further research and technology development.

This chapter discusses research programs

to investigate the possibilities for acquiring

more advanced BMD systems. It presents a

number of different potential strategies for

pursuing BMD research, describes some characteristics by which alternative R&D programs can be compared, and outlines some of

the issues Congress must face in the nearterm.

There is general agreement that BMD technologies merit investigation. Support for BMD

research, however, does not necessarily imply

support for the Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI). Possible BMD research programs can differ greatly from the SDI in emphasis, direction,

and level of effort. Moreover, research programs

having different perceived and intended purposes—even if they have similar technical content—can have very different consequences.

Decisions to be made by Congress in the

very near future and in the years to come will

have a major impact in ratifying, or in redirecting, major changes which the Reagan

Administration has initiated in the U.S. BMD

research program. These changes include:

● Urgency: Research under the SD I is intended to proceed at a “technology-limited’ pace to permit an informed decision

to be made at the earliest possible date

on whether to enter full-scale engineering

development. Proceeding past that point

would clearly be inconsistent with ABM

Treaty constraints. The pre-SDI program

had no such mandate for an early decision

on maintaining the ABM Treaty.

Visibility: The SDI has much higher visibility, and a much higher level of Presidential attention, than the previous

program of research in BMD-relevant

technologies. The decision to spotlight

BMD has already been made, and its consequences are already being felt. These

consequences certainly include a decision

by the Soviets to at least explore their options to respond to the increased probability of a U.S. BMD deployment.

Direction: Under the SDI, emphasis has

shifted away from fairly mature technologies, which generally include use of nuclear interceptors, towards nonnuclear

defenses which would use much more

speculative but potentially more effective

technologies.

Budget: Over the next decade, much more

is proposed to be spent on ballistic missile defense research than would have

been allocated in the absence of the SDI.

Large budget increases start with the

$3,722 million fiscal year 1986 request,

which is almost four times the fiscal year

1984 total and is more than twice what

would have been spent within the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1986 under

the pre-SDI budget. Subsequent increases

proposed for the SDI are even greater,

and by fiscal year 1990 are projected to

reach a level over eight times the fiscal

year 1984 total.

Arms Control Policy: Instead of the preSDI approach of seeking deep reductions

of offensive forces along with maintenance of the ABM Treaty ban on defenses

against ballistic missiles, current arms

control policy seeks “greatly reduced

239
240

levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced

ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses

against offensive nuclear arms.”1

BMD R&D Options

Near-term decisions by Congress will determine our approach to BMD research. These

near-term decisions will not completely determine our longer term policy approach, in part

because many factors influencing long-term

policy are not under our direct control (e.g.,

Soviet activities and U.S. progress in technology development). However, decisions made

in the short term can significantly affect, or

rule out, options for long-term policy. The research options discussed below correspond

roughly to the long-run policy approaches discussed in chapter 9, as is shown in table 10-1.

Different approaches that can be taken towards ballistic missile defense research proceed

IQuoted from “The U.S. Strategic Concept, ” enunciated by

Paul Nitze in “The Objectives of Arms Control, ” address before the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London,

Mar. 28, 1985. (Emphasis added.)

from different sets of basic assumptions about

the value and feasibility of BMD and from

differing assessments of the consequences of

pursuing BMD research. Three such approaches

can be distinguished and are presented below.

These approaches differ primarily in emphasis and urgency, rather than in which technologies are to be studied. Most BMD-relevant

technologies would be investigated, at some

level, in all three.

The first approach is the SDI as proposed

by the Reagan Administration. The second

approach would proceed to BMD deployment

faster than the SD I would be able to, and the

third approach would conduct BMD research

and development at a slower rate than the

SDI. Each of the last two approaches is

further broken down into two suboptions

which differ in the emphasis given to existing

versus near-term technologies (in the second

approach) or near-term versus far-term technologies (in the third). The five research suboptions are defined as follows:

1. SDI approach: Vigorously investigate

advanced BMD technologies with the

Table 10.1 .—Correlation Between the Near-Term Research Approaches Discussed in This Chapter and the LongerTerm Policy Approaches Discussed in Chapter 9

Long-term policy approach (ch. 9)

Near-term R&D . . —. .-

approach (ch. 10) SDI Early deployment

1. SDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compatible Must add near- -

term deployment

Intermediate Non-BMD,

deployment Silo defense arms control

Must commit to Eventually EventualIy

deployment becomes becomes

incompatible incompatible

2a. Early deployment, . . Not very Compatible

compatible

2b. Intermediate

deployment . . . . . . .Conditionally Need to add nearcompatible (see term deployment

note b below)

3a. Funding-limited . . . . Would delay but Incompatible

not rule out

3b. Combination . . . . . . . Would delay but Incompatible

not rule out

Compatible but (see note a below) Incompatible

not optimal

Compatible (see note a below) Incompatible

Incompatible Eventually Compatible

becomes

incompatible

Incompatible Compatible Compatible

aBoth early development and intermediate deployment R&D approaches might be compatible with a “silo defense” long-term policy approach, since defending hardened

targets such as missile silos, a technically easier task than defending other types of target, could probably be Implemented earlier than other types of BMD. However,

to the extent that the early and intermediate deployment R&D approaches are Intended to support widespread area defenses, probably including boost-phase weapons,

those R&D approaches may be incompatible with the “silo defense” policy approach in which defenses would be limited to specific sites, and where the appearance

that nationwide area defenses were being implemented would be avoided. b

If the technologies slated for initial deployments in the "intermediate term” research approach cannot be successfully developed, or If their development triggers

offensive countermeasures which render the defense largely Ineffective, pursuit of the long-term “SDI” policy approach would be greatly complicated or prevented

Successful deployment of intermediate term technologies, on the other hand, could then be followed by pursuit of more capable BMD technologies and would be

compatible with the goals of the Iong term SDI policy approach This path would take longer and would cost more than pursuit of the “SDI" research approach from

the beginning, which would not necessarily Include deployments in the intermediate term
2a.

2b.

3a.

intent to decide in the early 1990s on

whether or not to enter full-scale engineering development and subsequent deployment. This approach assumes that

while technology now within the state

of the art is not good enough to be worth

deploying, the long-term potential of

advanced BMD technologies is sufficiently promising that a “technologylimited” (i.e., not constrained by lack of

funds) effort is warranted to develop

that potential. It also assumes that if

successfully developed, such technologies could make possible a national

security regime (weapon systems and

arms control) preferable to the current

one and to other alternatives.

Early deployment approach: Emphasize

early and incremental deployment of

currently available BMD technology.

This approach places high strategic

value on the modest levels of defensive

capability which can probably be obtained with existing technology. Although the ABM Treaty permits the

United States to defend some ICBMs

with a single, highly constrained defensive deployment, most early deployment

proposals go well beyond these constraints and could not be pursued under

the existing treaty regime.

Intermediate deployment approach: Emphasize research on BMD technologies

which are beyond the present state of

the art, but which, unlike many SDI

technologies, might be applicable to deployments in the early to mid-1990s.

This approach assumes that investigation of longer run technologies should

not delay deployments in the nearer

term.

Funding-limited approach: Investigate

advanced BMD technologies at a funding level well below that requested for

the SDI and with a much reduced sense

of urgency. Like the SDI, this approach

would focus mainly on advanced technologies that may make a highly capable defense possible. Unlike the SDI,

however, it does not assume that we will

241

3b.

know in a few years whether we can

achieve that goal. The program would

not aim towards facilitating a development decision at a particular time, nor

would it include tests or demonstrations

which would raise questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Combination approach: Balance research

in advanced B-MD technologies with the

development of near-term deployment

options which would include “traditional” BMD technologies (nucleararmed, radar-guided interceptors) of the

sort specifically mentioned in the ABM

Treaty. This program, conducted at a

funding level well below that requested

for the SDI, would aim to deter Soviet

abandonment of the ABM Treaty, to

hedge against future Soviet BMD developments, to prevent technological surprise, and to investigate the long-term

potential of advanced BMD technologies. Like the funding-limited approach,

it would not include demonstrations or

development work which would raise

questions of compliance with the ABM

Treaty.

These research options will be described and

discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Hedges Against Near-Term Soviet

ABM Treaty Breakout

One of the functions of a U.S. BMD research

program is to deter or respond to a near-term

Soviet ABM Treaty “breakout” (sudden initiation of nationwide BMD deployments) or

“creepout” (gradual implementation of nationwide BMD capability without overt Treaty

abrogation). A U.S. response to either of these

actions would most likely consist of deployment of a near-term U.S. defense, deployment

of offensive countermeasures which would ensure that our strategic forces could penetrate

Soviet defenses, or some combination of the

two.

Near-Term U.S. Defensive Deployment

The SDi approach has largely discontinued

investigation of “traditional” BMD technol-
ogies in favor of nonnuclear technologies

which would make intercepts at altitudes high

enough to protect soft targets as well as hardened ones.2 Although protecting soft targets

with nonnuclear interceptors is technically

much more demanding than defending only

hardened targets with nuclear interceptors, advocates of the SD I approach are confident that

the technical requirements can be attained

within a few years if required. In principle,

“traditional” BMD technologies could be restored to the SDI as a hedge against inability

to develop other near-term defensive options.

However, doing so would require reevaluating

SDI's emphasis on nonnuclear technologies,

and it would also require additional funds if

work on other BMD technologies were not to

be impeded.

The early deployment and intermediate deployment approaches would not wait for a

Soviet breakout before deploying defenses.

Different versions of these approaches would

stress differently the deployment of “traditional” BMD technologies as opposed to nonnuclear ones which have yet to be demonstrated but are nevertheless thought by some

to be capable of providing high-confidence deployment options.

The funding-limited approach would deemphasize near-term defensive deployments, concentrating on longer term research which

could lead to a highly capable defense. It

stresses offensive countermeasures (see below), rather than near-term defensive counterdeployments, to respond to near-term Soviet

breakout. The combination approach would be

intended to deter a near-term Soviet breakout

by putting more emphasis on improving our

ability to deploy a near-term U.S. defense, in

addition to developing offensive countermeasures. This approach would pursue research and

development of “traditional” BMD technologies (within ABM Treaty constraints) to eliminate the technical risks of depending on yet-

‘Even if a defensive interceptor does not use a nuclear warhead, a nuclear explosion can result if the attacking warhead

is salvage-fused to detonate when intercepted. Therefore, nonnuclear interceptors (as well as nuclear ones) must intercept at

high altitude if soft targets are to be defended.

to-be demonstrated near-term defensive technologies.

Offensive Countermeasures

The U.S. response to Soviet breakout need

not be limited to defense. Offensive countermeasures intended to penetrate, counter, or

evade Soviet defenses are at least as important

in deterring or responding to a Soviet defensive

deployment as U.S. defensive options are. Offensive countermeasure research would accompany any of the BMD research options above.

The U.S. program responsible at present for

developing offensive BMD countermeasures

is the Air Force’s Advanced Strategic Missiles

Systems (ASMS) Program.’ These countermeasures include maneuvering reentry vehicles, which evade terminal BMD interceptors

by flying unpredictable trajectories, and other

penetration aids which would help U.S. warheads defeat Soviet defenses. According to the

fiscal year 1982 Arms Control Impact Statement on the ASMS Program,

Maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) and

penetration aid R&D is expected to provide

a high-confidence, low-risk option for timely

deployment on current or future ballistic missile systems if needed to offset improved rapidly deployable nationwide Soviet ABM

defenses (which would violate the ABM

Treaty).

* * *

The present MaRV and penetration aids

programs are a hedge against the possibility

of such a situation . . .4

3

The U.S. capability to penetrate existing Soviet defenses was

not mentioned in the White House January 1985 pamphlet on

The President Strategic Defense Initiatitve. That pamphlet

asserts that the Soviets will be able to deploy a nationwide

ABM defense system within the next 10 years. Should they

decide to do so, it continues, “deterrence would collapse, and

we would have no choices between surrender and suicide’” (p. 4).

Although any defense deployable by the Soviets in the next

10 years would certainly complicate U.S. targeting, the available offensive countermeasures technologies make it extremely

unlikely that we could be forced to choose between 4 ‘surrender

and suicide. ”

‘Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Itnpact Statements, Statements Submitted to the Congress b~’ the President Pursuant

to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act,

printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and

Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives and Senate

respectively, Joint Committee Print, 72-434 (), LJ .S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1981, p. 28.
243 ——

Such offensive countermeasures, of course,

would no longer be required were the United

States to agree to eliminate its offensive arsenal. However, defenses good enough to permit eliminating offensive nuclear forces are

not envisioned for the foreseeable future, even

by proponents of strategic defense.5

In addition to providing the United States

with options to respond to Soviet defenses, investigation of potential offensive countermeasures to BMD systems must also be an

integral portion of our own defensive research.

Defensive technologies which can be shown to

be easily countered will not be as promising

as those for which countermeasures cannot be

found so readily.

Offensive countermeasure research options

differ in their choice of which defense technologies are to be countered and in how far countermeasure and penetration aid research

should be taken into advanced development,

production, and deployment. Unlike defensive

research, there are no treaty constraints banning testing and development of offensive

countermeasures. 6

Soviet BMD Research and

Comparison With U.S.

“Traditional” BMD Technologies

The United States and the Soviet Union

have conducted research and development

activities in BMD both before and after the

— —

‘When asked by Senator Sam Nunn whether they could (‘envision our having a [defensive] system that would avoid the necessity of deploying our offensive forces, ” Reagan Administration officials Dr. Robert Cooper (Director of the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency), Dr. Richard DeLauer

(Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering), and

Dr. Fred Ikle (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) responded

negatively. They held out the hope that such a condition might

someday be achieved, but said that at present there can only

be an “optimistic view that that will be possible at some time

in the future. ” — “Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate, on Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, ” S. Hrg. 98-724,

Part 6, Strategic Defense Initiative, Mar, 8, 1984, pp. 2924-2925

and 2939.

‘However, testing offensive countermeasures which involved

nuclear detonations in the atmosphere or in space would violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty and possibly the Outer Space

Treaty.

ABM Treaty was signed. Each has acquired

considerable experience with “traditional”

BMD technologies, such as the nuclear-armed,

radar-guided interceptors of the sort specifically mentioned in the ABM Treaty. However,

although the state of Soviet “traditional” BMD

technology probably does not exceed our own,

the Soviets are almost certainly better positioned in the near-term to deploy a limitedcapability ballistic missile defense system than

we are.

The Soviets have deployed and maintained

an ABM system around Moscow utilizing

“traditional” BMD technologies. They have

also extensively upgraded and modernized

that system. Ever since the United States

decided that its own similar system was not

effective enough to justify maintaining it, the

Moscow ABM has been the world’s only operational ABM system.

In addition to the Moscow system permitted

under the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have built

a large radar in Siberia which violates the

siting restrictions on such radars in the ABM

Treaty. Furthermore, according to the DOD

publication Soviet Military Power, 1985, the

Soviets are “developing a rapidly deployable

ABM system to protect important target

areas in the U.S.S.R. That report concludes

that “the aggregate of [their] ABM and ABMrelated activities suggests that the U.S.S.R.

may be preparing an ABM defense of its

national territory. ’ CIA officials, however,

have testified before Congress that they have

not judged it likely that the Soviets would in

fact move to such a deployment in the near

term. 8 They point out that while the Soviets

could expand their presently limited ABM

system by the early 1990s,

In contemplating such a deployment . . .

[they] will have to weigh the military advantages they would see in such defenses

against the disadvantages of such a move,

“130th quotes from Sot’iet Militm~’ Pow-er, 198,5, p. 48.

‘Testimony of National Intelligence officer I.awrcncc K,

Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Ser\’-

ices Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate

Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985.
244

—

particularly the responses by the United

States and its Allies.9

Advanced Technologies

The Soviets are also undertaking a vigorous

research program in advanced BMD (laser and

particle beam) technologies. ’” It has been estimated that the total Soviet effort in directedenergy research is larger than that in the

United States. However, the quality of that

work is difficult to determine, and its significance is therefore highly controversial. In large

part, we are limited to observing what goes

into their efforts (e.g., the amount of floor

space at various Soviet research laboratories,

the observable activity at test sites) and what

does not come out (e.g., absence or cessation

of publication on topics known to be under in-

‘Written testimony of Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K.

Gershwin, op. cit.

‘

n

Soviet Mifitary Power, 1985, U.S. Department of Defense,

pp. 43-44.

vestigation, indicating that the activity has

been classified).

In terms of basic technological capabilities,

however, the United States remains ahead of the

Soviet Union in key areas required for advanced

BMD systems, including sensors, signal processing, optics, microelectronics, computers,

and software. The United States is roughly

equivalent to the Soviets in other relevant

areas such as directed energy and power

sources. According to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Research and Engineering, the Soviet Union does not surpass the United States

in any of the 20 “basic technologies that have

the greatest potential for significantly improving military capabilities in the next 10 to

20 years.’’”

. . —

“The FY 1986 Department of Defense Program for Research,

Development, and Acquisition, Statement by the Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, 99th Cong., 1st

S%SS,, 1985, pp. 11-3 and 11-4.

ALTERNATIVE R&D PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

The alternative R&D program options presented in this chapter are described in terms

of basic rationales and objectives, rather than

in terms of which technologies would be investigated at what level. The overall effects of

conducting BMD research depend on much

more than the technical content of the research

program-a point which will be returned to below in the section which describes “Political

Attributes” (p. 251).

Approach 1: The Strategic

Defense Initiative

The goal of the SDI is to advance the state

of the art of BMD-relevant technologies to the

point where an informed decision could be

made on whether to enter full-scale engineering development and subsequent deployment

of ballistic missile defenses. The program focuses on resolving those critical technological

issues on which a highly effective defense system might rest but which at present are not

adequately understood.

The SDI is based on the “technology-limited” research plan formulated by the Defensive Technologies Study Team (DTST), or

Fletcher Panel. It is therefore intended to

proceed as rapidly as possible, with further

progress waiting not for more money but for

previous results. Funding requests reached the

DTST technology-limited profile with the fiscal year 1986 request.12

The SDI research program is intended to

comply with all U.S. treaty obligations. However, tests that have been viewed as being ambiguous with respect to treaty compliance are

proposed.13 At any rate, if the research is successful, it would lead to systems for which development and testing would clearly be inconsistent with ABM Treaty constraints.

In addition to developing key BMD technologies, SDI is directed by its charter to “protect U.S. options for near-term deployment of

12Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985;

p. 4.

‘gSee app. A.
245

limited ballistic missile defenses. "14 These options are either to be implemented or held in

reserve as a hedge against Soviet defensive

breakout. SDI is also specifically instructed

to “place principal emphasis on technologies

involving nonnuclear intercept and destruction concepts. ” As a result, development of

“traditional” nuclear-armed, radar-guided interceptor technologies has been almost completely discontinued. Research on nuclear directed-energy weapons continues in order to

understand their potential and to hedge against

Soviet developments in that area.

SDI activities have been grouped into five

program elements: Surveillance, Acquisition,

Tracking, and Kill Assessment; DirectedEnergy Weapons; Kinetic-Energy Weapons;

Survivability, Lethality, and Key Technologies; and Systems Concepts/Battle Management Technology (see box). Each program is

designed to advance the technology base, to

conduct demonstrations that experimentally

validate the technology, and to provide direction to focus the technology development on

those critical issues which must be resolved

before feasibility can be determined.15

SD I also attempts to encourage innovation

in the U.S. scientific community to aid in identifying new approaches. The Directed-Energy

Weapons program element, for example, has

set aside 1.5 percent in fiscal year 1985 (1.7

percent is requested for fiscal year 1986) to

support high risk, highly innovative approaches

which would not otherwise be undertaken.

SDI is soliciting advanced technology proposals for these funds from small businesses

and the academic community.

Approach 2a: Early Deployment

Advocates of the early deployment of strategic defense systems attach a high strategic

value to the modest levels of effectiveness that

can be provided with presently available BMD

technology. They believe that early and incre14Caspar Weinberger, “Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Charter, ” Apr. 24, 1984.

1’Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985;

p. 23.

mental deployments are required to address

serious problems with existing U.S. strategic

capability, and that delaying such deployments until more research has been done may

be dangerous. They believe that the ABM

Treaty prohibiting such defenses is not in the

best interests of the United States, and in embarking on this approach would withdraw

from or abrogate it. Although BMD systems

effective enough to counter a responsive Soviet threat are not available at present, early

deployment advocates are confident that U.S.

technological superiority will enable it to prevail should an offensive v. defensive military

technology competition ensue.

The research and development program supporting an early deployment approach would

have two largely distinct aspects. In the first,

those technologies now within the state of the

art would have to be engineered into operational status and deployed; in the second, more

advanced and presumably more capable concepts would have to be investigated in order

to increase defensive capability and to counter

responses by the Soviets.

There are many forms that early deployment of BMD technology could take, and their

cost and effectiveness depend on what technologies are utilized, what targets are defended, and the nature of the Soviet response.

Some have advocated that hardened targets

be defended with “traditional” technologies

of the type developed prior to the ABM Treaty

in 1972, or with more recently proposed nonnuclear, low-altitude interceptors. Others have

proposed deployment of space-based chemical

infrared lasers or kinetic-kill vehicles. Of these

technologies, we have significant experience

only with the “traditional” ones, and even

their performance in an environment of many

nuclear detonations is poorly understood.

The most publicized proposal for early BMD

deployment is the one presented by High

Frontier. 16 That study recommended nearterm deployment of both a terminal defense

of hardened targets and a space-based boost-

“Daniel Graham, High Frontier: A IVew National Strategy

(Washington, DC: High Frontier, Inc., 1982).
246

SDI Program hacdptioma (reproduced from Report to the Congress on the strategic Defense Initiativ@ 198!$, pp. 2$20

The Shuveihnce, Acquib.itim, !Ikacking, and

KiZIAssemmmt (..ATTL4) Rrogram Element includes a mixture of some of the most and ieast

mature technologies being developed by the

SDIO. It inciudes tdlldOgy base efforts to

support surveillance, acquisition tracking, and

kill assessment that provide: 1) data on the observable from ballistic missiles and their warheads; 2) new radar and optical sensors capable of obtaining detailed imagery of warheads

and warhead deployment; and 3) on”board signal and data processing capable of performing

necessary computations right at the sensor. The

experiments include three general classes: boostphase surveiiiance, midcourse tracking, and

terminal-phase trding and discrimination.

Spacebased surveillance exptdmenta are pianned

for the early 1990s to demonstrate survivable

means of detecting and tracking boo@ers from

VSry high aititudes m space. Other space-based

sensor expedme nts are to be conducted in the

same time frame to explore our abiiity to track

tens of thowmnds of objects during midcouree

flight. Such platforms m~y ~thnately include

active sensors to aid in dwruninatiom A censor experhnent wiil determine the feasibmty Of

USi!l~ O@iCd s8MQI’s to aid in tfU@3t diSWhllinatiom A terminal imagfng radar ~“t

is planned to *nstra* rapidiy avolving

ground-based radar capabil%iea.

7!!40”Lhr@t@dl?hzeqy w

T

(17!!ly) RF@

gz’am E.knant is advaneingt 0 $lt&&@-the-art

h the technologies fw+ 1) hig&powerQd lwwr

and particie beam generation; 2) optics and sensors fa correcting and Contmdting the high

power beam; 3) lar~ lightweight mfrrors and

lightweight magnets for focudng the beam on

the target; 4) Precision acquisition, tracking,

and pointing to put and hold the beam on taP

get; and 5) fire cmitrol to capitaiiaQ on thaw

unique fmturea of dirw%ed mar w

such as the ability to measureZTContm tha

energy deihnmd @ the target. The IH!BW techmbgy program includes major

the Subcomponent

~~at

level h tha * mU!8pt$ elm

rently

ground-based lasers,

being ~ ---

spmdmsed partials

u

beams, and nucleardriven directed energy.

These concepts are candidates for boost and

postiboost phase intercept and for discrimination functions in the other phases. In addition,

seiected subcomponents for these concepts will

be integrated in on-the-ground experiments de

signed to teat interface approaches and resolve

technical issues arising from the integration.

The work on nuclear-driven directed energy is

largeiy pursued by the Department of Energy

and is designed to establish its technical feasibility. Equally important, the work ensures that

the U.S. understands the potential impact of

these emerghg concepts if they were to be used

against it by an adversary. It should be reiterated that emphasis in the SDI program is be-

* @v~ ~ nomuckw weapons for defense.

The Kinetic lih.wgy W-pas (KEW) l?rogram Mem4nt is a collection of reiated research

that wouid make use of the very high velocity

of a small mass to render a baliistic missile or

its warhead ineffective. The KEW program contains some of the more mature technology be-

*investigated in the SDI. Efforts include interceptors and hypervelocity gun systems for

boos@haseintercept, midcoureeintercept, terminal intarcept, and defense of space piatforms.

Both spsbased and ground-based kinetic kill

vehieks (KKv) am being investigated The techthrusts for the spacebased ~iWhld8

2%43

&

into a high performance multiple kill

(MKV), ti controilguidance, and -x

pro@#on. Ground-launched interceptor studies

involve both am- and end~atmospheric kill.

Both ~pace- and ground-based electromagnetic

(EM) gtm investigations are included. Space

bawd EM gun investigations include critical

technologies such as high~g propulsion, high-g

COmpact structures, longmmge high resolution

tracking, and multiple MKV tracking. AU ex-

_ts* bS designed and conducted to

conform to ABM Treaty constraints.

*ti’V41bti*@ Leth&*ty, and Key T&-

1?akqphs @!L~ I?rOgram Element provides

crithd supporting R&T [research and technolqgy~ Understanding the vulnerability of balb

tie m&Mes to the various kill mechanisms is

~al to assessing their effectiveness

tit-ent and remxmsivelv hardened tar-
247 — ——. -———

gets. Survivability to mission completion, particularly of any defense space assets, is fundamental if defensive options are to be viable.

Economical space transportation, on-orbit logistics and maintenance, kilowatt/megawatt sources

of power, and multi-megajoule energy storage

and conversion are potentially key needs in an

affordable defense deployment.

Lethality and target hardening efforts will

provide the basic theory underlying kill mechanism/target interactions, the resulting damage

and response of the target to damage, and fundamental limitations in hardening countermeasures. The survivability problem includes substantial technology development, particularly

in the case of space-based components. It also

includes identification and assessment of innovative survivability hardware and tactics and

evaluations of the survivability of conceptual

designs. Space transportation, logistics, and

space power efforts are designed to take advantage of existing DoD and NASA definition efforts and to expand them into the definition

phase and satisfaction of the more demanding

requirements of a defense-in-depth.

The Systems Concepts/Battle Management

Program Element is designed to allow intelliphase area defense (Global Ballistic Missile

Defense System I) which would use rocketpowered kinetic-kill vehicles. More effective

space-based defenses (GBMD II) would be deployed when developed.

Since High Frontier provided a candidate

system architecture, including cost estimates

and timelines, more detailed analyses can be

done on that system than can be performed

for other concepts. However, studies by several

groups have shown that High Frontier severely

underestimated the cost and overestimated the

capability of the GBMD I system. These studies

are discussed in appendix G.

Approach 2b: Intermediate

Deployment

Intermediate deployment supporters, like

those favoring early deployment, disagree

with the SD I premise that a decision to deploy

gent choices among competing approaches to

defense architectures and to develop the technologies necessary to allow eventual implementation of a highly responsive, ultra reliable, survivable, endurable, and cost-effective battle

management/command, control, and communications (C3

) system. Threat analyses, mission

analyses, conceptual design of defensive architectures and performance requirements definition, and system evaluation for all levels of

a layered defense against ballistic missiles will

be performed. The battle management/C3 efforts

will provide the tools, methods, and components

1) for development and eventual implementation of the system and 2) to quantify risk and

cost of achieving such a system.

Innovative Science and Technology (IS&T)l

encourages the innovation of the U.S. scientific community to aid SDI research in identifying new approaches. To this end, the Strategic

Defense Initiative Organization is soliciting

innovative, advanced technology proposals

from small businesses and the academic community.

‘Deleted material was a cross-reference to another section of the

SDI Report to Congress not cited above.

nearer term BMD should be contingent on the

successful development of longer term, advanced BMD technologies. They believe that

strategic benefits of BMD can be realized in

the intermediate-term even without confidence

that long-term, highly effective systems can

subsequently be deployed. Unlike early deployment supporters, however, backers of intermediate deployment do not believe that deployments should be started now, but rather

that those BMD technologies which could lead

to deployments in the early to mid-1990s be

pursued. They believe that existing technology is inadequate, and they may also seek to

leave open the possibility of discussing and negotiating defensive deployments with the

Soviets before deployment starts.

The technologies investigated by an intermediate deployment R&D program would be

similar to those studied in an early deployment

program. In both programs, technologies
248

slated for initial deployments would have to

be brought into operational status at the same

time that more advanced technologies were investigated.

Approach 3a: Funding-Limited

A BMD research program might share the

SDI program’s focus on advanced defensive

technologies that in the long run may make

a thoroughly reliable defense possible, without also sharing the SDI program’s premise

that we can know in a very few years whether

we have any assurance of reaching that goal.

A funding-limited approach would conduct a

systematic program of laboratory research on

technologies which might have potential for

leading to highly capable defenses, and it

would investigate most of the topics which the

SDI proposes to study. This research, however, would not proceed as rapidly as it would

under the SDI; it would investigate the potential of these technologies without preparing to

decide in the near term whether to exploit that

potential.

Adherents of such an approach would want

to maintain the ABM Treaty in the near term.

Should a new approach to effective national

defense be successfully developed–whether

by breakthroughs in defensive technology

which made defense-dominant strategies clearly

viable, or by implementing constraints in

offensive forces so stringent that existing

defensive technology could bring about defense dominance-the ABM Treaty would

have to be reexamined, and the United States

would have to consider an arms control/weapons acquisition approach that integrated offensive and defensive forces. However, advocates

of the funding-limited approach would expect

such an eventuality to occur well into the future, if at all. Although they might disagree

on exactly which criteria should be met before

moving defensive research into full-scale engineering development, they would agree that

such a decision either should not or cannot be

made as early as the SD I approach implies.

In the meantime, the intent of this approach

would be to signal that the United States supports the ABM Treaty and wants to deter the

Soviet Union from rejecting its own ABM

Treaty commitment. The prominence of U.S.

BMD research would be reduced from what

it would have (and has already had) under the

SDI approach, and that research would take

on a character more similar to other military

R&D programs. Field testing and major technology demonstrations which appeared to be

aimed more towards developing a BMD system than towards researching technology

would be deferred.

A Soviet near-term ABM Treaty breakout

would be deterred primarily by the development of U.S. offensive countermeasures. Unilateral Soviet BMD deployment in the long

run would be discouraged by the prospect that

the U.S. funding-limited program could be accelerated if the Soviets were to abandon the

ABM Treaty regime.

Approach 3b: Combination

The combination approach would balance

serious study of advanced BMD technologies

with the development of high-confidence, nearterm options to deploy BMD systems based

on “traditional” technologies. The advanced

technologies would be investigated to understand their potential, especially if used against

us, and to prevent technological surprise, so

that no unanticipated Soviet technological developments would permit them to threaten an

ABM Treaty breakout in a way we could not

counter. In addition, study of advanced BMD

technologies could advance their applications

in other military (and possibly civilian) uses.

Near-term deployment options, developed

within ABM Treaty constraints, would help

to deter a near-term Soviet defensive breakout, and they could provide a response if that

contingency occurred. Perhaps more importantly, a prototype “traditional” BMD system

would also provide a test-bed for offensive

countermeasures which we might have to deploy against nationwide Soviet defenses of the

sort already deployed around Moscow.

Like the funding-limited approach, the combination approach would be intended to
249 —

strengthen rather than to threaten the exist- that it might or might not be desirable to moding ABM Treaty regime in the near term; it ify the ABM Treaty and our overall strategic

would therefore defer tests or technology dem- arms control approach in the future to incoronstrations which appeared to pose questions porate defensive systems, depending on how

of compliance with the ABM Treaty. In the BMD technology develops and how the U. S.-

long run, advocates of both the combination Soviet strategic relationship evolves.

and the funding-limited approaches believe

ALTERNATIVE R&D PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS

The alternative R&D programs differ in a

number of individual characteristics which can

be grouped into three categories:

Ž Technical attributes characterize which

technologies are to be investigated and

which deployment options are to be made

available. Each of the alternative R&D

programs would produce deployment options, but those options differ widely in

what they would consist of, how effective

they would be, and how long they would

take to implement.

● Economic attributes include most directly

the cost of a given R&D approach, but

also include an R&D program’s impact on

other activities which compete with it for

the same resources (financial, material

and facilities, and technical talent).

● Political attributes include the effects that

a U.S. program to investigate BMD technologies might have on other countries’

actions or relationships with us, and the

constraints such a program might place

on arms control possibilities, They also include the effects that such a program

might have on ourselves. In both cases,

perceptions may have a greater political

impact than either announced intentions

or demonstrated capabilities.

Technical Attributes

The technical outputs of a BMD research

program will be advances in BMD-relevant

technologies which might provide options for

deploying ballistic missile defenses. Nearer

term options using technologies which are now

fairly mature can be developed with relatively

high confidence; much more speculative but

potentially more powerful technologies might

also be developed, but at present there is much

less confidence that those technologies will

lead to BMD options. If they do, those options

would be longer term ones.

None of the alternative R&D approaches described here would abandon research on technologies relevant to long-range BMD concepts. However, the approaches do differ in the

relative emphasis put on near-term options as

opposed to the longer term ones. The SDI approach stresses longer range options. Even

though the SDI maintains an active effort in

technologies it considers near-term, SD I officials have stated that it could be counterproductive to deploy near-term technologies

without also demonstrating that even more effective longer term technologies are feasible

and can later be deployed. 17 The experimental

technology demonstrations included within

the SD I program are not intended to be engineering prototypes of operational BMD components, but they must nevertheless be relevant to the mission and advanced enough to

provide a meaningful basis for determining

their utility in BMD applications.

Although the early deployment approach

calls for investigation of longer term possibilities, unlike the SD I it stresses primarily the

development of available technologies for nearterm deployment. The intermediate deployment approach similarly stresses technologies

for intermediate-term deployment. The fund-

.—.

17For exanlp]e, ~lenera] .4 braham sons testimon~r beiore the

Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Ser\rices, Feb. 21, 1985.
250

—

ing-limited approach would emphasize longer

term options; the combination approach would

develop near-term deployment options in addition to conducting longer range research.

Related to the choice between near- and farterm options is the balance that should be

struck between basic research, on the one

hand, and development geared towards more

immediate application, on the other. The

appropriate balance for a given technology depends on the status of the research, the perceived promise of its applications, and the urgency of the task. The first of these depends

on the results of the research to date; the latter two also depend in part on the overall approach taken towards BMD research and development.

Prematurely advancing a research program

into the development and testing phase can

have two major disadvantages: the technologies under investigation can get frozen at an

immature level, and the greater expenses of

advanced development and testing can absorb

resources which would otherwise be devoted

to improving the basic technologies or finding better ones. On the other hand, failing to

advance a program into development and testing at an appropriate stage delays possible

application of newly developed technologies

should it become necessary or advantageous

to do SO.

Economic Attributes

cost

One obvious characteristic for comparing

R&D programs is their respective costs. BMD

research will generally yield more results with

higher funding until either: 1) the nation’s

R&D capacity cannot efficiently absorb additional resources, or 2) research reaches a technology-limited funding level. Although some

of the approaches discussed above will be

clearly more expensive than others, in most

cases it is not possible to associate a given

level of expenditure with a particular approach;

most of the approaches are compatible with

a range of funding levels.

The SDI approach, intended to proceed at

a technology-limited pace, will be the most expensive of the research-only approaches—the

definition of “technology-limited’ means that

additional money will. not speed up the research, and that therefore budgets larger than

those requested for the SDI will not necessarily yield greater results. Furthermore, the

SDI approach calls for substantial year-toyear increases, since each year’s progress is

intended to make possible increasing amounts

of follow-up research in subsequent years.18

Adding deployment to research would, of

course, cost more than research alone. However, limited deployments of existing technologies may be less expensive than ambitious

research of more advanced technologies, so approaches which include deployment—the early

deployment and the intermediate deployment

approaches—would not necessarily cost more

than the SDI approach. 19

The funding-limited approach would probably cost considerably less than the SDI, although in principle it could be carried out at

almost any level of funding short of the SDI's

technology-limited level. Such a program

would also be amenable to a growth rate much

slower than that of SDI, in that much followon research made possible by technical progress

to date would be deferred.20 The combination

approach would likewise be compatible with

a wide range of funding levels; annual increases would probably also be modest.

Impact on Other R&D

Just as important as the total amount of

money which is spent on a research program

‘

8 Budget requests for the SD I in fiscal year 1986 and future

years are presented in app. F, along with the projected requests

which the SD I Organization has estimated would have been

made for the previously existing 13MD programs had SD I not

been formed.

l~T]le High Frontier study, advocating early BMD deployment, is discussed in app. G. That study contains cost estimates, but others believe that the estimates given for its first

space-based deployment should be considerably higher.

*“A hypothetical range for such a program might be $1.5 to

$2.0 billion per year, with annual increases at, or a few percent

above, the inflation rate. The modest annual increases, more

so than the funding level for any individual year, distinguish

the funding-limited approach from the SD I approach.
251

— ————

is the way in which it is spent, and in particular the things on which it is not spent. Choices

made at the research and development stage

constrain the range of possible outcomes, and

the opportunity costs of forgoing certain investments in order to make others can have

a great impact on future BMD developments

as well as on other areas. Since resources such

as R&D facilities and talent are limited, other

military and civilian R&D will suffer to the extent that they are unable to compete against

BMD research for those scarce resources. True

opportunity costs are difficult to measure,

since what would actually have been accomplished had some given amount of money been

invested elsewhere cannot be predicted in

detail.

“Spinoffs” in a sense are the opposite of opportunity costs—they might be described as

“opportunity benefits” which have applications in areas other than those of direct interest for BMD research. Spinoffs may be more

important in the long run than a research program’s direct applications. However, they seldom constitute a justification for pursuing a

defined objective that cannot otherwise be

supported.

By nature serendipitous, spinoffs are even

harder to predict than opportunity costs.

However, some generalizations can be made.

The more broad-based and basic a research

program is, the wider its results are likely to

be applied; the further advanced its development, the less its results are likely to be utilized outside of their intended application. For

example, basic laser physics has applications

throughout the civilian economy as well as in

many defense areas; a multi-megawatt, spacequalified chemical laser would have little utility outside a BMD or ASAT system.21

Estimates of the impact that a vigorous

BMD research and technology development

program might have on the civilian sector vary

widely. An editorial in an aerospace industry

“Plus whatever role it might have for other purposes of war

such as space-to-air (e. g., anti-aircraft) or space-to-ground attack, as discussed in the “Non-BMD Applications” section of

ch. 7.

trade journal notes that “there is a school in

industry that takes the view that even if the

U.S. falls short of its defensive strategy goals,

the research program will be the biggest stimulant to technology in this country since the

Apollo program. “22 Others are of the opinion

that BMD research will be so specialized to

military applications that spinoffs for the civilian sector would be better described as

“dripoffs.” 23

Political Attributes

The technical and the political aspects of a

BMD research program, although related, are

quite distinct. The Strategic Defense Initiative, for example, is much more than a cataloged set of technology development programs.

Officially described as “The President Strategic Defense Initiative, ’24 it receives unprecedented attention from the highest levels of

government. It has been described by the Secretary of Defense as “the only thing that offers

any real hope to the world, ’25 and it is meant

to set the groundwork for a fundamental shift

in national strategy. It featured prominently

in the 1984 Presidential election campaign,

and it has become the focus of an ideological

battle fought in the public pronouncements

and private negotiations of the United States,

the Soviet Union, our NATO allies, and other

nations. Although more difficult to quantify

than the technical or even the economic attributes of BMD research and development, the

political aspects are nonetheless important

and very real.

— .

Zzwilliam Gregory, “Spark for Technology, ” A t’iation 11’eek

and Space Technology, May 27, 1985, p. 11.

23 For example, Lewis Branscomb, vice-president and chief

scientist of IBM, and Dieter von Sanden, until recently head

of the communications division of Siemens, Germany’s largest

electronics company, as quoted in ‘‘The Diplomatic Round’ by

John Newhouse, The New Yorker, July 22, 1985, p, 49,

“White House pamphlet, The President Strategic Defense

]nitiatiw?, January 1985, GPO : 19850-465-450 : QL 3 (emphasis added).

“Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; inter~riewed on

ABC TV’s “This Week With David Brinkley” (quoted in Cass

Peterson, *’U.S. W’on’t Abandon ‘Star Wars’, ” The }{’ashington Post, Dec. 21, 1984).
252

Political Impact on Others

One way in which other countries will respond to our research will be by anticipating

its possible outcomes. They cannot predict,

any more than we can, how successful our research program will be or what future Congresses and Administrations will decide. They

must instead consider a range of possibilities—and their reactions may start long before we have decided on or initiated BMD deployment.

Our policy pronouncements, implicitly as

well as explicitly stated, will also affect their

decisions. Their actions will be based on their

perceptions of what we might do—perceptions

which depend on their analyses of American

political processes as well as their estimates

of American technological capabilities. Decisions to be made by both the Soviet Union and

our NATO allies regarding force modernization (conventional and nuclear), arms control

strategy (see the following section), alliance relations, and international affairs will depend

in part on their estimates of our own future

decisions.

Reactions can be stimulated to some extent

even when no clear link is drawn between a research program and BMD deployment. However, the likelihood and gravity of allied and

Soviet responses will generally depend on how

strongly the U.S. BMD research program appears to lead to deployment. In this respect,

the SDI approach presents an ambiguous set

of signals. It is intended to proceed as rapidly

as possible26 towards the decision point on

whether to enter full-scale development and

subsequent deployment, but it is explicitly not

committed to crossing that threshold. Regardless of U.S. statements, however, the Soviets

may believe that a decision to deploy BMD

has already been made provided the technology development proceeds favorably; it would

be surprising if they have not already started

to analyze their possible options for responding to U.S. defensive deployments.

“E. g., at a “technology-limited” pace.

Adoption of an early deployment or intermediate deployment research strategy makes

the connection between research and deployment explicit, and either one would certainly

be expected to stimulate prompt Soviet reactions. On the other hand, the funding- limited

and combination approaches, by relaxing the

sense of urgency and minimizing the extent

to which technology experiments challenged

ABM Treaty restrictions, might lessen much

of the political impact that would be generated

by the other approaches.

Nothing in this section is intended to suggest that the United States should abandon

a course of action judged to be in its own best

interest because other parties-either allied or

adversarial-might misinterpret our purposes.

In determining what is in our best interest,

however, the reactions of others must be taken

fully into account.

Effect on Arms Control

The political impact of the U.S. BMD research program will perhaps be most strongly

felt in the area of arms control, where alternative approaches to BMD research can have

very different implications. The most direct

effect on arms control of conducting BMD research concerns the compatibility of that

research with the ABM Treaty. Most BMD

systems or components based on advanced

technologies cannot be developed, tested, or

deployed under the ABM Treaty regime.27

Since the distinction between technology development and component development is

highly controversial, the SD1 approach raises

questions concerning the compatibility of certain technology experiments with Treaty constraints on development and testing.28 Moreover, with its sense of urgency and its high

visibility, the SD I also raises political questions concerning the degree to which the

“While laboratory research into any type of BMD system

is permitted under the ABM Treaty, there are severe limitations on field testing and development of ABM systems. Only

fixed, land-based systems or components can be developed or

tested, and only one specified fixed, land-based system can be

deployed. See app. A.

‘These compliance issues are specifically addressed in app. A.
United States is committed to maintaining the

ABM Treaty regime. If the Soviets perceive

that this U.S. commitment has indeed diminished, the probability that they will act in compliance with the Treaty is reduced.

Although the United States is permitted a

very limited BMD deployment under the

ABM Treaty, many advocates of the early deployment approach find value in going beyond

Treaty constraints and favor abandonment of

the Treaty. The intermediate deployment approach, by deferring deployment for a number of years, provides some time for negotiations between the United States and the

U.S.S.R. which could lead to ABM Treaty

modifications to permit more extensive, but

nevertheless limited, defensive deployments.

However, should such an agreement be impossible to reach by the time deployments could

be made, intermediate deployment advocates

(like early deployment supporters) would probably favor abandoning the Treaty and proceeding with BMD deployments.

On the contrary, advocates of the fundinglimited and the combination approaches would

strive not to damage the Treaty regime, at

least not until we had identified a preferable

alternative that we had confidence could be attained. In their view, mutual U.S. and Soviet

adherence to the ABM Treaty would be worth

the restrictions that such compliance might

impose on our exploitation of BMD technologies. These approaches would relax the urgency of BMD research, easing the political

questions; to the extent that technology demonstrations were deemphasized, the questions

of treaty compliance would be relaxed as well.

Possible effects of the alternative BMD research approaches on arms control go beyond

their impact on the ABM Treaty. These effects

on other aspects of arms control are highly

controversial, and they may arise even before

the ABM Treaty issues do.

Supporters of the Sill approach say that the

Strategic Defense Initiative has already succeeded in bringing the Soviets back to the bargaining table to discuss offensive arms, and

that meaningful reductions in nuclear arsenals

253

can be obtained only after the Soviets come

to believe that effective defenses will make

offensive forces less useful.

The role of arms control under the SD I approach would be to facilitate a safe transition

to a state of highly constrained offenses coupled with effective defenses. However, making BMD deployment contingent on prior

agreement with the Soviets in effect gives

them a “veto” over U.S. BMD deployment,

which the Reagan Administration has emphatically stated will not be permitted. This results

in an inherent paradox: U.S. BMD developments will continue even if the Soviets refuse

to negotiate a cooperative transition, but such

a cooperative agreement is necessary if the

long-term SDI goals are to be attained. Moreover, such an agreement would certainly have

to be negotiated before deployments start if

those deployments are to be regulated in an

orderly manner.

The feasibility of any such transition agreement is still very much in question. In addition to regulating offensive and defensive deployments, it might have to regulate offensive

and defensive development and testing as well

in order to restrict preparations for prohibited

deployments. Nobody has yet suggested how

the problems of measuring, comparing, and

monitoring disparate nuclear forces, problems

which have plagued past arms control negotiations, could be satisfactorily resolved in the

far more difficult situation in which both offensive and defensive forces are to be closely regulated.

Critics of the SD I point out that the SDI,

rather than having driven the Soviets back to

arms control negotiations, might instead merely

have provided them with a face-saving excuse

for reversing their previous decision to walk

out—a decision they now regret. The Soviets

now say that reductions in their offensive

forces will be impossible as long as force increases might be needed to counter a U.S. defense. These statements may be only propaganda, but they may also accurately describe

the initial Soviet reaction to a U.S. defensive

deployment. A logical response by the Soviets
254

to a U.S. near-term defense would indeed be

the addition of penetration aids and other

offensive countermeasures, the proliferation

of nuclear warheads, or both. Although the

U.S. defensive deployments that such a Soviet

decision would anticipate might not be initiated for a number of years, if ever, the consequences of that Soviet decision for the military balance and for arms control prospects

would start to be felt immediately. Potential

early Soviet reactions therefore affect our

choice of near-term BMD research approach,

as well as our longer term policy decisions.

By deploying BMD in excess of ABM

Treaty limits without waiting for the establishment of a replacement arms control regime, most early deployment approaches imply abandonment not only of the ABM Treaty

but of the entire strategic arms control process. Not content with the condition of strategic parity prerequisite to arms control, or alternatively believing that the Soviets are not

willing to settle for such a state, supporters

of this approach would instead attempt to attain and maintain strategic supremacy. intermediate deployment approaches may provide

time for negotiation before BMD deployments

start. However, should negotiations not be

pursued, or should they not be satisfactorily

concluded, proceeding to deployment anyway

could denote abandonment of the strategic

arms control process.

Many supporters of the funding-limited and

the combination approaches believe that longterm improvement of the political relationship

between the United States and the Soviet Union, assisted by arms control agreements,

would be the most promising way to reduce

the risk of nuclear war. They oppose the SDI

approach as focusing all U.S. efforts on arms

control and conflict avoidance into a single,

dubious direction. By lessening the emphasis

placed on BMD research, their approaches

would leave open other arms control options,

such as the ones described in chapter 9. On the

other hand, if some SD I supporters are correct in asserting that only U.S. defenses can

compel the Soviets to agree to force reductions, then these alternative approaches to

offensive arms control will not succeed.

Under the funding-limited and combination

approaches, negotiations with the Soviets

which attempted to establish the boundaries

of permitted versus proscribed BMD research

would be desirable for the purposes of clarifying activities by both sides. If the prospect of

the United States’ developing advanced technologies under the SDI approach sufficiently

concerns the Soviets, U.S. proposals for constraining BMD research and technology development by clarifying or extending provisions

of the ABM Treaty might have considerable

bargaining leverage. Such an agreement would

almost certainly have to permit laboratory research, which would be extremely difficult to

ban verifiably, but it might constrain more observable activities such as demonstrations of

ABM “subcomponents” and other field experiments which the Department of Defense argues are currently not prohibited by the ABM

Treaty (see appendix A). Although it might be

difficult to construct a verifiable and equitable

agreement of this sort, the task would appear

easier than reaching agreement on the mutual

introduction of strategic defenses.

Political Impact on Ourselves

A multibillion dollar U.S. program to study

ballistic missile defense technologies will have

a political impact not only on other countries,

but also on our own subsequent policy decisions. Creating any large institution also generates constituencies which benefit from that

institution’s continued existence. This is especially true if the institution, like the Strategic

Defense Initiative Organization, exists primarily to spend money for a particular purpose.

However, quantifying this “institutional momentum” is difficult and controversial. Complex decisions are rarely documented with

itemized breakdowns specifying how influential each input criterion was.

Should ballistic missile defense research be

greatly accelerated, it would become one of our

largest military programs. While some point

to precedents for terminating large military

programs, such as the cancellation of programs for the DynaSoar lifting body, the

Manned Orbiting Laboratory, and the nuclearpowered airplane, others question how easily
255

Photo credit: Westinghouse

Westinghouse EMACK electromagnetic launcher during

assembly and test, February 1982. BMD research

conducted with experimental apparatus of this size,

easily contained within a building, would be very

difficult to control under an arms control agreement.

Congress and the executive branch would be

able to terminate a future BMD program, even

if the technology advances did not meet initial expectations or requirements.29

Since the full effects of “institutional momentum” are poorly understood, it is difficult

to predict precisely how much each of the

alternative research programs will suffer from

it. Relevant factors, however, might include

total program budget and the number of people supported by it, along with less tangible

items such as visibility and level of attention.

The more high-level interest there is in a program, and the more money and prestige that

has been committed to it, the harder it will be

to make decisions which revise or reverse

earlier ones without “losing face. ”30

‘

gDuring a floor debate on the MX missile, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark. ) told the Senate that he had been “trying to

think . . . when the last time a weapons system was defeated

here. Weapons systems have gotten where they are just like

Rasputin–you cannot kill one. ” (Congressional Record, Mar.

20, 1985, p. S 3269.) $oAlong these lines, one observer has noted that “the program

manager who will admit that 5 years of research and more than

$20 billion have been wasted on an unworkable system probably has yet to be born. ”

–William E. Burrows, “Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security, ” Foreign Affai>s, spring 1984, p. 855.

4 n . ”

. . - —

* .;+”

- +“ .

/’ I

/

Photo credit U S Air Force

Artist’s conception of the existing U.S. High Energy

Laser System Test Facility (H ELSTF) at White Sands

Missile Range, New Mexico.

Photo credit: U S Department of Defense

U.S. Defense Department drawing of the Soviet directedenergy research and development site at Sary Shagan

proving ground.

Compliance with arms control agreements regulating research, field development, and testing using facilities of the

size shown here would be more easily verified than agreements attempting to regulate activities within laboratories.
256

ISSUES

Other chapters of this report have dealt primarily with issues concerning ballistic missile

defense deployment, for which decisions are

at least several years off (unless the early

deployment approach is adopted). Before then,

Congress will need to address issues concerning the U.S. program for BMD research and

technology development.

One set of issues concerns our choice of overall approach to pursuing BMD research.

Another group involves specifically those

BMD research programs which would prepare

options for deployment, or which were intended to permit a decision as to whether deployment options were sufficiently promising

to enter full-scale engineering development. A

final set of issues pertains to any research and

technology development program in areas relevant to ballistic missile defense.

Issues Concerning Choice

Research Approach

The ABM Treaty

Most BMD systems based on advanced

technologies which would be investigated by

the alternative R&D programs discussed

above could not be developed, tested, or deployed under the ABM Treaty regime. One issue is whether or not our program of BMD research is compatible with the ABM Treaty.

A more fundamental issue, however, is whether

or not the ABM Treaty continues to be compatible with our national interest. One’s attitude

towards that Treaty, or more precisely one’s

attitude towards the concepts of national security which it embodies, will in large part determine which of the BMD research approaches

described above one would choose.

Our current choices are to plan for revision

of or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, to attempt to make it more effective, or to attempt

to find a middle ground. That middle ground–

bolstering the effectiveness of the ABM

Treaty in the short run (thereby preventing

near-term Soviet BMD testing and deployment) while explicitly and publicly preparing

to decide whether to abandon it later, when

we are ready—may be the most difficult to

attain.

The testing of new technologies on both

sides could, in a few years, undermine the confidence of each that the other was not on the

verge of abandoning the Treaty. Therefore,

maintaining the BMD limitation regime may

require new treaty provisions or other forms

of agreement to reduce technical ambiguities

(see discussion above on “Effect on Arms

Control”).

If the Treaty regime is to be sustained, questions of Soviet compliance must be resolved

(see discussion of Soviet work on “traditional”

BMD technologies, p. 243).

On the other hand, if we decide to revise or

withdraw from the ABM Treaty to permit

U.S. BMD deployments, our goals should be

well-defined and our course of action wellplanned. There may be a serious timing problem in carrying out a research program which

will not violate the ABM Treaty, but which

will give us enough information to decide with

confidence that BMD deployment can meet

our criteria. If we were to allow the ABM

Treaty regime to erode prematurely, and then

learn from our BMD research that the new

BMD technologies will not fulfill our requirements, we could end up with the worst of both

worlds: no arms control to limit Soviet BMD,

no effective U.S. BMD, and, quite possibly,

proliferated Soviet offensive forces intended

to overcome an anticipated U.S. BMD.

An important issue for Congress to consider

is how we can carry out our BMD research program so that it does not either prematurely compromise the ABM Treaty through technical ambiguities, or stimulate the Soviets to begin

testing and deploying BMD at a time more

advantageous to them than to us. At the same

time, charges of Soviet noncompliance with the

Treaty must be addressed as well. If they cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the United States

would effectively have adopted stricter stand-
257

ards of compliance than those observed by the

Soviets, which would put us at a competitive disadvantage.

Congress may wish to review the standards

and the procedures by which U.S. and Soviet

activities are judged to comply with existing

treaty commitments—perhaps by requiring

the establishment of an independent, nonpartisan commission to review Soviet activities and to advise Congress and the President

on compliance issues associated with tests proposed by the Defense Department.

Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control

In the 1985 U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva, the Soviets emphasized the

importance they attach to limiting weapons

deployed in or directed at space. As both this

report and its companion Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control indicate, anti-satellite weapon technologies are

closely related to BMD weapon technologies.

Therefore, those favoring uninhibited research

on ballistic missile defense would find arms control measures limiting anti-satellite weapon testing to be highly constrictive. Indeed, to attempt

to remain compliant with the ABM Treaty,

some experimental technology demonstrations

proposed under the SD I will be conducted as

anti-satellite tests. On the other hand, those interested in strengthening the testing provisions

in the ABM Treaty would find anti-satellite

weapons test restrictions a useful tool in further

constraining BMD development.

Offensive Weapons Arms Control

The long-term objective of deploying defenses–enabling deep reductions to be made

in offensive forces by lessening their utility—

directly conflicts with one of the most probable near-term reactions to a defensive deployment—strengthening offensive forces to overwhelm defenses. This strengthening might

take the form of adding penetration aids or

other countermeasures, deploying additional

offensive weapons, or both. Although these

changes might turn out to be a waste of resources if the defense could overcome them at

lesser cost, the final cost-exchange balance

might not be evident in the early stages of deployment, let alone in the research stage. The

effect that our choice of BMD research approach

can have on future arms control possibilities is

highly significant, as was discussed in the section above on “Effect on Arms Control.”

Near-Term Soviet Breakout Potential

Each of the research approaches needs to account for the possibility of a Soviet breakout

or ‘‘creepout from the ABM Treaty. The

major issues in deterring or responding to a

Soviet defensive breakout are how important an

ability to deploy “traditional” nuclear-armed

BMD technologies would be, whether more advanced but still near-term technologies could be

relied on, or whether offensive countermeasures

alone would suffice. The SDI approach relies

on a combination of U.S. ability to penetrate

Soviet defenses and an ability to deploy as-yetuntested nonnuclear defense options; it has

largely discontinued investigation of the “traditional” ballistic missile defenses of the sort

once deployed by ourselves and now deployed

by the Soviets. The early and intermediate

deployment approaches handle the threat of

Soviet breakout essentially by preempting it.

The funding-limited approach would emphasize offensive countermeasures to counter a

near-term breakout; this approach also holds

out the option of accelerating research in advanced technologies up to a technology-limited

pace in response to Soviet defensive deployments. In addition to offensive countermeasures and the prospect of acceleration, the

combination approach would maintain options

to deploy a near-term U.S. defense in response

to Soviet near-term breakout.

Long-Term Soviet Breakout Potential

The Soviets will almost certainly continue

their investigations of advanced BMD technologies. All the U.S. research approaches described here require as a minimum that sufficient U.S. research be done to understand

Soviet capabilities. (Some approaches go well

beyond that.) The level of U.S. research in longterm BMD technologies should depend on a decision as to whether understanding potential
258

Soviet developments is deemed sufficient, or

whether the existing U.S. advantage in advanced BMD technologies can and should be exploited. It should also depend on evaluating

the likelihood that valuable capabilities will

be forgone by the United States if it does not

pursue a more active BMD research program.

Giving up what might be valuable options

could disadvantage the United States even if

the Soviets do not develop those options

either.

Issues Concerning Preparation of

Deployment Options

R&D/Deployment Coupling

There is an inherent conflict between seeking

the ability to make deployment decisions in the

near term and seeking to keep control over

whether and when such a deployment might be

made. Vigorous U.S. R&D programs could

lead the Soviets to infer an intent to deploy,

and might possibly stimulate them to preempt

such a deployment. Therefore, proposals for

vigorous R&D programs should demonstrate

the ability to cope with a Soviet defensive

breakout and associated Soviet offensive actions in a timely way. Offensive countermeasures probably contribute more than defensive

actions towards our ability to deter or respond

to Soviet defensive breakout.

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has the primary responsibility

both for directing BMD research and technology development, and for making the case to

Congress and to the public that this R&D effort deserves support. It will be the principal

source of information about the quality, cost,

and adequacy of the technologies which are

thought to be ready for full-scale engineering

development, but at the same time it will have

a large psychological and organizational stake

in an affirmative answer to the deployment

question. This may create a problem when the

time comes for the Secretary of Defense, the

President, and Congress to decide whether

BMD deployment is appropriate.

There is nothing unusual about this situation, which occurs to a greater or lesser extent

when all Department of Defense programs

reach their major development milestones.

However, even if not peculiar to the SDI, this

potential problem may be more acute in the

case of SDIO because of the novelty of the

technologies involved, the lack of a base of historical experience to serve as a benchmark, the

possibility that a “streamlined” program will

bypass some of the stages of review that most

Defense Department programs must pass

through, and the unusual amount of political

prestige which both proponents and opponents of SDI will have staked in advance upon

the outcome.

If our research program is not to be presumed

to be a prelude to deployment, there must be a

clearly perceived threshold which requires a positive decision—not merely the lack of a negative

one—to cross. The limitations posed by the

ABM Treaty provide such a threshold.

Also required, however, is a set of clear decision criteria that must be met before BMD

development continues past the point requiring ABM Treaty renegotiation or abrogation.

As the level of effort devoted to BMD research

increases, a momentum or constituency will

be created that will press for continuing and

enlarging the research effort, and then for

moving from research to demonstrations to deployment. For this reason, it would be easier to

establish clear decision criteria before a few more

years of BMD research growth have occurred,

and before the time comes to begin the actual

decision process.

Cost Estimates

It is not possible to estimate the cost of

BMD deployments in the absence of either a

system architecture or cost estimates for candidate system elements. However, reliable

overall cost estimates must exist before an informed development decision can be made. Cost

information, required to determine whether a

possible BMD deployment will be affordable,

is part of any realistic system design. It is not

possible to optimize a system unless there is

some way to measure whether a given approach is better or worse than another; the cri-
259 —

terion usually utilized for this purpose is minimum cost for various levels of effectiveness.

Any research program leading up to a development or deployment decision must have as a

principal priority the determination of credible

cost estimates for various levels of defensive capability. Those managing such a program must

be able to show whether any proposed defenses

can be both affordable and cost-effective.

Relative Pace of Technology and

Systems Studies

In an investigation of advanced ballistic

missile defense intended to produce deployment options or to facilitate development decisions, technology development and systems

studies must proceed in parallel. Without

some understanding of technological potential,

effective systems cannot be designed. However, without some conception of how it might

be applied, technology development may not

be effective and may not even be meaningful.

Such a research program needs to decide how

to correlate technology development with system studies, and needs to develop a policy regarding how far either should be allowed to

progress should unforeseen problems crop up in

the other.

Technology Transfer

The ABM Treaty prohibits the “transfer to

other states’ of ‘ABM systems or their components, ” or of “technical descriptions or blue

prints” worked out for their construction.31

These provisions prohibit the signatory nations from using their allies to circumvent

ABM Treaty constraints. As a result, allied

participation in a treaty-compliant research

program would have to be limited to research

which had not reached the “system” or ‘component” level. Allied participation would also

be affected by restrictions which the United

States itself might impose, as it does now, on

the transfer of military technology to its allies for fear that such technologies may eventually reach the Soviet Union.

‘

l Article IX and Agreed Statement G, ABM Treaty. (See app.

B.)

In some discussions of BMD research or deployment, it has been suggested that the

United States might intentionally transfer

BMD technologies to the Soviet Union to

prove that the United States did not seek military superiority .32 Any such transfer would

raise very significant issues. If BMD plans or

devices are transferred, potential adversaries

might be able to discover vulnerabilities, enabling them to circumvent or destroy our own BMD

systems. If technological capability is transferred, rather than specific devices, the American advantage which had enabled us to develop

that technology first would necessarily be compromised. Furthermore, many BMD-relevant

technologies have applications in other military

areas that we may not want to help the Soviets

develop. Approaches towards BMD which assume that we can and should maintain technological supremacy over the Soviets would

not be consistent with transfer of U.S. BMD

technology to them.

Issues Pertaining to any

BMD Research Program

Technology Experiments

Technology demonstration experiments are

the most expensive and one of the most controversial aspects of a BMD research program.

Demonstrations may be useful to measure

technical progress or to provide public evidence that the technology effort in general is

succeeding. Moreover, demonstrations are

sooner or later needed to determine whether

some system components are feasible. On the

other hand, advancing our understanding of

basic principles and technologies may be

preferable to demonstrating the existing state

of the art. There is a risk that demonstrations

may “lock in” suboptimal levels of technology

and divert resources which would otherwise

go towards developing improved options.

Demonstrations of BMD technology are

particularly complicated by ABM Treaty constraints on developing and testing ABM components or systems. Experiments that raise

“For example, see footnote 36, ch. 6.
260

—

treaty compliance questions run the risk of

provoking a Soviet reaction that could eliminate the option of deferring BMD deployment

until technology had advanced further. One

possible way to assess whether this risk is

worth taking might be to require that before

such demonstrations are approved, there

should be developed both a plausible system

architecture that would use the particular

technologies to be demonstrated and a corresponding arms control approach. Congress

may wish to satisfy itself beforehand that, if

the technologies are proven feasible, such an

architecture and arms control regime appear

likely to meet satisfactorily whatever criteria

are established for proceeding with BMD.

Diversion of Other R&D Efforts

Acceleration of BMD programs affects

other military R&D by changing the emphasis of some of those other programs to support the BMD mission. Many BMD programs

had originally been pursued for other applications, such as tactical weaponry (particle

beams and lasers) or space surveillance (longwave infrared detection). For example, a system designed to provide early warning of missile launch would be similar in many ways to

a system providing coarse pointing information to BMD boost-phase weapons. However,

the two will not be identical. If plans to upgrade early warning satellites are subsumed

within a longer range effort to develop a BMD

tracking system, the original early warning

mission may suffer. The alternative, however,

would probably be duplication of effort.

Even R&D in nominally unrelated areas can

be affected if it competes with BMD research

for limited resources, such as highly trained

personnel or specialized technical facilities,

which cannot be readily increased in the short

run.

foreign policy consequences which should be

taken into account in evaluating options. Most

of our allies support U.S. BMD research as a

counter to Soviet research, and some have inquired how they can participate in this research. However, for the most part they have

deep reservations about the wisdom of deploying a strategic defense. Whether the U.S. BMD

research program now, and any BMD deployment in the future, can be conducted so as to

avoid endangering the cohesion of our alliances

will be an important issue.33

Research and Development of Offensive Forces

There will be a role for U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces for the foreseeable future

in the absence of an agreement to forgo or

drastically reduce them. To ensure their effectiveness in the event that the Soviets deploy

defenses, the United States will need to continue its development of penetration aids and

other countermeasures against defenses. By

minimizing the potential effectiveness of Soviet defenses, the existence of such countermeasures would help deter the Soviets from

abrogating the ABM Treaty or any subsequent agreement limiting defenses.

However, prudence dictates that we should

assume any offensive countermeasure that can

be developed by the United States could also

be available to the Soviets, and we therefore

must consider what such countermeasures

would do if deployed against our defenses. Development by either side of powerful offensive

countermeasures conflicts with the long-term

goal of minimizing the role for offenses—a

problem which is exacerbated if defensive

technologies have applications in offensive

roles (e.g., attacking satellites or aircraft, or

particularly attacking enemy defenses).

Allied Relations ssAlli~ce i9sues in Pmticulm are discussed in Paul E. G~-

Beyond its effects on the ABM Treaty, the lis, Mark M. Lowenth-d, and Marcia S. Smith, “The Strategic

U.S. BMD research program can have other Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Strategy, Congressional Research Service Report No. 85-48 F, Feb. 1, 1985.
Appendixes
Appendix A

Ballistic Missile Defense

and the ABM Treaty

Introduction

This appendix examines the provisions of the

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,] the limitations

these provisions place on development, testing,

and deployment of ABM systems, and the sometimes conflicting interpretations that have been

applied to the key elements of the treaty. In addition, this appendix discusses the SDI program (as

presented in the fiscal year 1986 authorization request) and the issues that this program raises with

respect to ABM Treaty compliance.2 Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and Soviet ballistic

missile defense programs are not discussed.3

This appendix concludes that if one accepts the

Defense Department’s current interpretation of

key terms of the ABM Treaty, one may also conclude that the current SDI program is treaty compliant. Applying a more restrictive interpretation

to key treaty terms could have the opposite result.

Treaty Overview

Purpose

The ABM Treaty is an agreement of unlimited

duration between the United States and the Soviet Union which places restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. The purposes of this treaty,

‘J’rea( } Ile( w een the [Jn]ted States of .Amer]ca and the LJnion of Soviet Soclztl!st Republics on the limitation of Ant.i-Llallistic M lssile S}. stems, whl{h tnterecl into forct’ Oct. 3, 1972 App. B contains the full

texts of tht ‘1 reaty, it> agreed Interpret at,ions, and its 1976 Protocol.

‘The Reagan Administration’s ~icv on compliance of the S1)1 program with the ABhI Treaty IS described in detail on pp. B-1 to R-9 of

Report to (/](> (’ongrts~ {)n the Strategic I)efc~nse lnitiati~e. 198,5, issued b} [ hr I )epart n>t~nt of I)efense in April 198,5

other ~iews on thi< Iwue are discussed in.

●

●

w

●

Ahram Cha}e~, Antonla C’hayes, and I+; liot Spitter, “Space \$’eapons and 1 ntvrnat ional 1,aw, l)aedalus, summer 1985.

Thomas K lmng~treth. John E Pike, and .John B Rhinelander, ‘I’he

impact of [ ‘.S and S’()}iet Balllstic Missile Ikfense Programs on

th( .4B.$f Treatj I \f’a+hin@,on, 1){’: National (’ampaign to Sa\re the

A13\l ‘1 rpaty, h! zirch 1985)

A Ian B Sherr, I,rgal ls,sues of the ‘‘S’t~r It’ars ‘“ Defense l+ogram

(Host on, !lI,l” l,aw’1’er’s Alhance for Nuclear Arms Control, Inc ,

,Jum 19N41

f{. ,Jeffrc\ Smith, “ ‘Star \f’ars’ Tests and the AR\l ‘1’reatv, ”

Science, .~ul~ 5, 1985, pp. 29-31

‘F’or two diiferent wews on these subjects, see: Sotiet Jfilitzq Power,

19A:3, (; s I)(,partment of I )efense (W ashingtnn, I) C’: U.S. Go\wmmcnt

Printin~ offlct. April 19H5): an[i Imngstrefh, et al., op. cit. So\iet F3hf I)

rese,wch is ul<o discuswd brief]} in chs. :} and 10 of this study.

as stated in Article I, are to “limit anti-b~listic

missile (ABM) systems, ”4 and to prevent either

party from deploying “ABM systems for a defense

of the territory of its country. ”5 Although the

treaty does allow limited ABM deployments, such

deployments are restricted so that they could neither provide a nationwide ABM defense nor serve

as the basis for deploying one. The effect of the

ABM Treaty is to leave essentially unimpaired the

penetration capability of either side’s ballistic missile forces.

Major Provisions

Article III of the ABM Treaty prohibits all

ABM deployments except those which are explicitly permitted. This article, as amended,’ allows one

fixed, land-based ABM site in each country to be

located either at the nation’s capital or at an ICBM

field. No more than 100 interceptor missiles and

100 launchers can be deployed at the allowed site.

If the national capital is chosen as the ABM site,

no more than six radar complexes—each having

a radius of no more than 3 kilometers-are allowed.

A site to defend ICBM fields may have 2 large

ABM radars and 18 smaller ABM radars, These

provisions were designed to accommodate existing U.S. and Soviet ABM systems.

The United States originally elected to deploy

its ABM system at the ICBM field at Grand

Forks, North Dakota. This system is no longer

operational, although the acquisition radar is still

used for early warning purposes. The Soviets

elected to deploy their ABM system around Moscow. This system is operational and is being modernized within the limits of the treaty.

Article IV permits testing, at designated test

sites, of certain systems not deployable under Article III. However, systems permitted at test sites,

as well as deployments, are severely constrained

by Article V, in which “each party undertakes not

to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-

‘[ bid., Article I (1).

‘Ibid., Article 1 (2),

‘originally., the treaty had allowed each side one A B M site to defend

its capital and another site to defend one ICB M field The treaty was

amended by a 1976 Protocol to allow only one ABM site on each side.

263
264

based, or mobile land-based. ” Only fixed, landbased systems can be developed or tested, and

only the fixed, land-based systems specified in Article III can be deployed. The second part of Article V prohibits launchers capable of firing more

than one interceptor as well as launchers capable

of being rapidly reloaded. Agreed Statement E, approved by U.S. and U.S.S.R. delegation heads at

the same time that the treaty was signed, makes

clear that Article V prohibits development, testing, or deployment of ABM interceptor missiles

carrying more than one independently guided

warhead.

Giving non-ABM systems ABM capabilities is

prohibited in Article VI(a), as is the testing of nonABM systems “in an ABM mode.”7 Part (b) of Article VI restricts ABM battle management radars

by requiring early warning radars to be on the

periphery of the country and oriented outward.

Agreed Statement F excludes radars used “for the

purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for

use as national technical means of verification”

from the location and orientation restrictions in

Article VI(b).

Article XII prohibits interference with verification of the treaty, both by banning interference

with the national technical means used for verification and by prohibiting “deliberate concealment

measures” which would impede verification by national technical means.

Article X1X1 establishes the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to handle questions relating to treaty compliance, to consider possible

amendments, and to consider proposals for further

limiting strategic arms.

Agreed Statement D reaffirms the parties’ intentions not to deploy ABM systems or components except those specifically allowed in Article

111. The Statement notes that ABM components

based on “other physical principles” and capable

of substituting for interceptors, launchers, or

radars would be “subject to discussion” in the

Standing Consultative Commission. “Specific limitations” on such new systems and their components would require amendment of the treaty. In

the absence of amendment, Article III of the

Treaty would prohibit the deployment of such new

components. Article V would prohibit their development, test or deployment if they were to be

space-, air-, sea-, or mobile land-based.

‘Although the treaty does not define “non-ABM systems, ” these

could include air defense systems, anti-tactical ballistic missile systems,

strategic offensive missiles, or anti-satellite weapons.

Definitions

Ballistic missile defense involves a complicated

and rapidly evolving set of technologies. Recognizing this, the drafters of the ABM Treaty tried

to use language that was precise enough to effectively limit then-existing ABM systems, yet flexible enough to constrain technologies which might

be developed in the future. This attempt to control potential ABM systems unavoidably introduces an element of ambiguity. The treaty language discussed below has been the focus of

continued legal and technical scrutiny since the

ABM Treaty was drafted; however, recent interest in advanced ABM systems has caused these

discussions to take on increased significance. The

relationship between these terms and the current

SDI research program is discussed in the following section.

The drafters of the ABM Treaty recognized that

ambiguities would arise, particularly with regard

to new technologies (the so-called “other physical

principles” mentioned in Agreed Statement D),

but they assumed that such ambiguities would be

dealt with in the context of the SCC or through

treaty amendment. The reason for this assumption

is a practical one. Treaty language is the expression of the agreed expectations of the parties. Put

simply, a treaty means what the parties have

agreed that it means. Unilateral determinations of

compliance-although essential to the domestic

political debate–do not bind other parties. To the

extent that such determinations are inconsistent

with the expectations of other parties to a treaty,

then the basis of the treaty is eroded. This issue

of compliance is, of course, separate from broader

considerations such as the U.S. determination of

the present and future value of the ABM Treaty.

“ABM Systems”

Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an antiballistic missile system as “a system to counter

strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in

flight trajectory. ” This definition is followed by

the words “currently consisting of” and then a list

of three items: ABM interceptor missiles, ABM

launchers, and ABM radars. However, the treaty

is not restricted to these specific systems. This

subject is discussed in greater detail below.

The ABM system definition is limited to strategic weapons. Systems to counter tactical missiles are not covered at all. It is important to note

that the treaty defines an ABM as a system to

counter strategic weapons. It does not say “sys-
265

tern designed to counter, ” as the Soviets would

have liked, nor does it read “system capable of

countering, which was the United States’ preferred wording. The United States was concerned

that, by upgrading surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),

the U.S.S.R. would be able to deploy a considerable ABM capability. The Soviet Union, on the

other hand, was concerned that it would be forced

to classify some 10,000 SAMs as ABM interceptors.’ The current treaty language is, therefore, a

compromise between the Soviet and U.S. positions. The treaty lists the components of a thenexisting ABM system but is silent on the question

of how to characterize future technologies as ABM

systems or components. Neither the U.S. “capabilities” test nor the Soviet “intentions” test is

sanctioned by Article II of the Treaty.9

Some of the problems caused by the lack of a

clear definition in Article II are solved by the prohibition in Article VI against giving non-ABM systems ABM capabilities. As a result, all systems

which are ABM-capable, whether or not they were

designed for that purpose, are either considered

ABM systems under Article 11 or else are in violation of Article Vi(a), which prohibits giving

ABM capability to non-ABM systems.

Testing “in an ABM Mode”

Although Article VI prohibits the testing of nonABM components “in an ABM mode, ” the ABM

treaty does not define these terms. The United

States, in a unilateral statement attached to the

treaty, provided its interpretation of this phrase.10

By the U.S. definition, a launcher was tested “in

an ABM mode” if it was “used to launch an ABM

—

‘U.S. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, Arms Control in

Space: W’orkshop Proceedings (h”ashington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office. May 1984), OT.A-BP-ISC-28, p. 33.

Whe compromise language of the treaty does not resolve this still current and controt”ersial issue. The Report to Congress on the Strategic

I)efense lnitiati~,e, 1985, op. cit., states on p. B-2 that “Compliance [with

the .AB\l ‘1’rcat~j must be based on objective assessments of capabilitiefi which support a single standard for both sides and not on subjective judgments as to intent which could lead to a double standard of

compliance. ” (Emphasis added. )

‘“(h Apr. 7, 1972, the LJ. S. Delegation made the following statement:

‘1’~, clarlfy our mterpretatlon of “tested m an ABM mode, ” we note that

wc w (Iulci consldcr a launcher, mlsqlle or radar to he ‘tested m an ABI$l

mode If, for example, an~, of the followlng events occur ( I ) a launcher is

used to Iaunrh an AH hl ]nterreptor rrussdc, (21 an mterrx=ptor missile 1s

fhght test~d a~amst a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characttrlitlc+ of u str~tegrr balhqt)c mlssde fhght trajectory, or is fhght tested

In con~unctlon w)th the te~t of an A B hl interceptor m]ssde or an ABM ra.

dar at the >ame test range, or ]~ fhght tested to an altitude mcons]s~wtt

with mterceptlnn of targets aga]nst which ar defenws are deployed, [,1)

a radar makes measurvrnents on a cooperatl~ e target > ehlcle of the kmd

referred to ]n Iten) 12) aho~ e during the reentry port)on of Its trajector)

or mak(. s n)eawr(, ment~ ]n conjunction with the test of an ,.\BNl intercep.

tor m]s~de or o A Blwf radar at the same test range Radars used for purposes <urh a~ range ~afety or ]n.trumentatlon would be exempt from appl]cat!on of these cr]teria

interceptor missile”; a missile was “tested in an

ABM mode” if it was “. . . flight tested against

a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with

characteristics Of a strategic ballistic missile flight

trajectory . . . ’; and a radar was tested “in an

ABM mode” if it “makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle [with a strategic ballistic

missile flight trajectory] . . . or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test

range.

In 1978, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in the SCC regarding the

interpretation of the phrase “in an ABM mode’ ’;ll

however, the text of the 1978 Agreed Statement

remains classified.

“Development”

Because the path between research and deployment of any sophisticated weapon system is long

and complicated, considerable effort has gone into

determining precisely what is meant by the

treaty s ban on specific types of ABM development. Perhaps the clearest definition of the words

“development” and “develop,” as referred to in

Articles IV and V of the ABM Treaty, was provided by Gerard C. Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM Treaty. In testimony before the

Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972, Ambassador Smith stated:

The obligation not to develop [ABM] systems,

devices or warheads would be applicable only to

that stage of development which follows laboratory development and testing. The prohibitions on

development contained in the ABM Treaty would

start at that part of the development process

where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by

both sides that the prohibition on ‘development’

applies to activities involved after a component

moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would

pose problems for verification by National Technical Means is an important consideration in reaching this definition. Exchanges with the Soviet

Delegation made clear that this definition is also

the Soviet interpretation of the term ‘development’.12

—. ———

‘‘U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, SALT II Treaty: Background Documents; “Miscellaneous Agreements Relating to the Standing Consultative Commission” forwarded from J, Brian Atwood, Department of State, to Senator Frank Church, Nov. 13, 19’79.

‘tSenate Armed Services Committee, July 18, 1972.
266

.—. .- -

ABM “Component”

The limitations of the ABM Treaty apply to

“ABM systems or their components” and, under

the terms of Agreed Statement D, to future systems and components which might be substituted

for these. This raises two related questions. First,

how does one distinguish between an ABM component, the testing or deployment of which is prohibited, and a subcomponent or adjunct, the testing or deployment of which is allowed? Second,

how does one determine whether a system, component, or subcomponent is capable of substituting for a missile, a launcher, or a radar? The treaty

language and the Agreed Statements which accompany the Treaty are silent on this point.

It is the Defense Department position that the

entire SDI research program as submitted in the

fiscal year 1986 authorization request is treaty

compliant. In its 1985 Report to Congress on the

Strategic Defense Initiative, DOD acknowledges

that Ambassador Smith’s definition of “developmerit, ” combined with the limitations of Article

V, would prohibit the “field testing” of “ABM systems” and “components,” or their “prototypes”

and “breadboard models, ” which are other than

fixed land-based. ” However, the Defense Department maintains that the experiments currently

planned for the SDI program “are designed to

demonstrate technical feasibility that can be

established without involving ABM systems or

components or devices with their capabilities. ’14

DOD is arguing that since they are testing subcomponents and not components, and since the

specific systems they are testing cannot be substituted for an ABM missile, launcher, or radar,

then this research is allowed under Ambassador

Smith’s interpretation of the Treaty.

Others disagree with DOD’s interpretation.

They argue that this line of reasoning ignores the

history of the treaty negotiations which clearly

suggests that the individual parts of an ABM system need not perform the complete range of battle functions to be considered an “ABM component, ” A report by the National Campaign to Save

the ABM Treaty recently made the following argument:

[The] early Nike-Zeus [U.S. ABM] system had

not one or two, hut four separate types of radars,

for target acquisition, decoy discrimination, target tracking and interceptor tracking. Under . . .

13Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiatit’e, 1985, op.

cit., p. B-4.

“Ibid., p. B-2,

[the DOD] . . . interpretation of the difference between a “component” and an “adjunct,” all of

these radars would be considered to be adjuncts

to one another, and none of them would be considered to be a component.15

The debate on this issue reflects disagreement

as to whether the classification of something as

an ABM system or component should be based

solely on its capabilities in isolation, or whether

other factors should be examined, such as its capability when combined with other devices or the

apparent intentions of the parties (whethe r

declared or evidenced by a clear pattern of activities). DOD is arguing that one looks to the capabilities of the tested systems alone to determine

whether they can substitute for ABM systems or

components; if they can, then they are banned by

the Treaty, if they cannot, then they are allowed.

Others maintain that this view is too restrictive.

They argue that although capabilities are important, one must also examine the apparent intended

application of a technology. Standing alone, individual technologies may have no ABM capability;

however, in combination, they may have a significant ABM potential.

In addition, the tested capabilities of specific

systems may not always be an adequate measure

of potential. Lack of ABM capability may result

from true technological limitations, or from

“treaty compliant” design features that could be

easily altered (e.g., putting on wheels, inserting a

few additional electronic devices, or readjusting

some control parameters). The distinction between

these two cases must ultimately be made by the

other side with the help of its national technical

means of verification. It is unlikely that either side

will be content to rely on the word of the other that

a given experiment is treaty compliant; presence

or absence of ABM capability must be manifested

in ways which are amenable to verification. According to the report of the National Campaign to

Save the ABM Treaty:

The clear intention of Article V was to limit the

development of new types of ABM technology at

the earliest possible stage, that is, at the time that

they would become detectable by national technical means. 16

1l.ongstreth, et al., op. cit , p. 29.

“’Ibid,, p. 30.
267

U.S. Research Programs

and the ABM Treaty

The SDI Program

The purpose of this section is to examine specific elements of the current U.S. BMD research

programs and to determine whether they raise important questions of ABM Treaty compliance.

However, there is no simple formula for deciding

what is and what is not banned by the 1972 ABM

Treaty. Previous sections have examined the language of the treaty and described the controversy

surrounding such terms as “ABM system, “component, ” and “capable of substituting for. ” As this

discussion makes clear, the inherent limitations of

language and the rapid pace of technology make

it impossible to develop clear, unambiguous, and

objective standards by which to measure all possible research programs. As noted earIier, the general conclusion of this appendix is that if one

accepts the Defense Department’s current interpretation of key treaty terms, one may also reasonably accept the conclusion that the current SD I

program is treaty compliant. Applying a different

interpretation to these key terms could have the

opposite result.

With these caveats in mind, it is useful to examine the actual elements of the SD I program.

Current SD I program plans call for 15 major experiments designed to demonstrate technologies

which may eventually have ABM applications.

Three of the experiments will examine sensor technologies, four will involve directed-energy technologies, three will study kinetic-energy technologies,

and five will involve the testing of fixed, groundbased ABM components.

Sensor Programs:

Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS).–

BSTS is a space-based experiment to demonstrate

technology for upgrading the current satellite

early warning system. If successful, the experiments will permit a decision to proceed with similar but more advanced technologies for ABM purposes. BSTS will be capable of performing early

warning functions; however, DOD asserts that it

“will be limited in capability so that it cannot substitute for an ABM component. In particular, it

will not be given the capability to process launch

detection data in real time. For this reason, DOD

claims that this system does not violate Article

V(1) of the ABM Treaty which bans the development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM

components. 17

“Report to Con~res~ on the .Strategic Ikfensf’ Initiative. 1 %5, op

cit., p. B-6.

DOD is correct in arguing that the currently proposed BSTS system would be limited to an early

warning role. However, the issue of BSTS Treaty

compliance stems not only from the system’s capabilities, but also from the changing nature of

early warning systems. When the ABM Treaty

was drafted, early warning satellites were not considered to be ABM components, or part of an

ABM system, because the satellites had limited

capabilities and BMD weapon systems had not yet

been conceived which could use the boost-phase

data these satellites produced.18 BSTS, like its

predecessors, is an early warning system; however,

unlike its predecessors, BSTS might eventually

contribute to the effectiveness of a layered ABM

system. Assuming the existence of BMD weapons

which could use BSTS data to provide acquisition

and tracking information, BSTS would have to be

given closer scrutiny than it would if it could only

serve as an advanced early warning system.

Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS).–

Originally designed as an upgrade to the groundbased Spacetrack satellite tracking network, SSTS

will demonstrate the space-based technology necessary to track and identify objects already in

space. 19 SSTS technology, if perfected, could be

used to support the U.S. ASAT weapon or to provide information for midcourse ABM interceptors.

DOD maintains that the SSTS program is ABM

Treaty compliant because the “capabilities of any

demonstration satellites will be significantly less

than those necessary to achieve ABM performance

levels or substitute for an ABM component."20

If developed as originally conceived—i.e., as a

component of our satellite tracking network—

SSTS would probably not have raised serious

ABM compliance issues even though such a system could have supplied information useful to

BMD research. However, now that SSTS is part

of the SDI program, DOD’s assessment that it is

not an ABM component will probably need to be

periodically reexamined as more specific information on testing procedures and system capabilities

becomes available.

Airborne Optical Adjunct (AOA).–The AOA experiment will demonstrate the technical feasibility of using optical sensors on an airborne platform

for BMD applications. As part of its feasibility

demonstration, AOA will observe ballistic missile

IRJ?arly warning radars, on the other hand, being similar in capability to .AB M battle management radars, are specifically limited by the

Treaty.

1 ~SS,lIS t ~ack5 and ident ifie5 objects in space; BSTS identifie s

launches and objects entering space.

‘

(

’ Jieport to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985, op.

cit., p. B-7.
268

tests at agreed ABM Test Ranges. DOD maintains that because of limitations on sensor and

platform performance, the AOA could not substitute for an ABM component and therefore does

not violate the ban in Article V(1) against developing air-borne ABM components.

Clearly, if AOA were designated as a “component” rather than as an “adjunct,” the planned

tests “in an ABM mode” would violate Article V(1)

of the ABM Treaty. Here, as in other SDI programs, the distinction between an adjunct or subcomponent and an ABM component depends less

on objective determinations of capability than on

how one defines those terms.

Directed-Energy Programs:

ALPHA/LODE/LAMP. –ALPHA is a groundbased laser designed to explore the potential of

chemical lasers in space-based BMD applications.

LODE (Large Optics Demonstration Experiment)

and LAMP (LODE Advanced Mirror Program) are

experiments to demonstrate critical beam control

and optics. In the late 1980s, the LODE/LAMP

mirror is to be integrated with a high-power chemical laser using LODE beam control technology.

DOD reports that “All of these tests are underroof experiments using devices incapable of

achieving ABM performance levels.” 21

The ALPHA/LODE/LAMP series of tests, if

conducted in the laboratory, would seem to be consistent with the generally accepted view that the

ABM Treaty’s prohibitions on development only

apply “to that stage of development which follows

laboratory development and testing. ”

Acquisition, Tracking and Pointing (ATP).–For

the near term, ATP22 experiments will concentrate

on ground-based, laboratory-level experiments on

the technology required for space- and groundbased weapon sensors. In the future, “the measurement of booster plumes from space is a distinct

possibility, “23 as are “experiments with passive

sensors in the Shuttle bay. ”24 The Shuttle may also

be used in follow-on experiments “to explore pointing and tracking technology. “26 It is DOD’s position that “If conducted these experiments will use

technologies which are only part of the set of technologies ultimately required for an ABM compo-

———

2fIbid.

IiThe ATp Prowam is a replacement for the now-canceled TA~~N

GOLD tracking telescope. Originally. TAI.ON GOLD was to have flown

on the Shuttle to test the technology necessary to ensure that a laser

was properly aimed at its target.

1sRePort t. Coneess on the Strategjc Defense Initiative, 19$5, oP.

cit., p. B-6.

“Ibid., p. B-i’.

*

b Ibid.

nent. These devices will also not be

achieving ABM performance levels. ”

As long as the ATP tests remain in

capable of

the laboratory there would be no violation of the ABM

Treaty. The proposed space-based tests would violate Article V(1)’s prohibition against testing

space-based ABM components if they were considered as “components” or as being able to substitute

for ABM components. Administration officials

have argued that these are generic experiments investigating pointing and tracking technologies

which would have many applications and could not

substitute for ABM components.

Integration of High-Powered Laser and Optical

Devices.–The Defense Department eventually

plans to integrate ALPHA/LODE/LAMP, ATP,

and perhaps other laser and optical subsystems

into one “experimental device. ” This “experimental device” will be used for “ground-based testing against ground-based static targets. ” DOD

claims that these “important subsystems . . . (separate or in whole) are not ABM components or prototypes. ” This position rests on three arguments:

1) this “experimental device” is not capable of being based in space; 2) the power, optics, and laser

wavelength are not compatible with atmospheric

propagation at ranges useful for ABM applications; and 3) tests are not planned against missiles

or their elements in flight.

This argument rests on the assumption that the

“experimental device” in question here, although

more than a subsystem or adjunct, is still less than

a component or prototype. The ultimate credibility of this assumption probably cannot be assessed

until more precise information becomes available

on the nature of the “experimental device” and its

tests.

Ground-Based Laser Uplink. -These experiments will use a ground-based laser to examine the

effects of the atmosphere on beam propagation.

DOD maintains that the tests are treaty compliant because “the testing mode and capabilities are

below the power level and beam quality required

for a ground-based laser ABM weapon, and testing will not include strategic ballistic missiles or

their elements in flight. ”26

’

The testing of ground-based lasers at agreed

ranges would not violate the terms of the ABM

Treaty. The testing of mirrors in space to redirect

the beam of a ground-based laser would raise compliance questions.

—

‘“-Ibid.
269 —-——.—.————

Kinetic-Energy Programs:

Space-Based Kinetic-Kill Vehicles.–This program will be designed to prove the feasibility of

rocket-propelled projectile launch and guidance. If

successful, this technology might be used as an

anti-satellite weapon or to defend against such

weapons. In a more advanced form, space-based

kinetic-kill vehicles might have applications as

ABM interceptors. To attempt to ensure that this

program does not violate the ABM Treaty, DOD

intends to limit the performance of the demonstration hardware to satellite defense missions. Testing may include “intercepts of certain orbital targets simulating anti-satellite weapons. ”

The ABM Treaty does not ban anti-satellite

weapons or weapons used for satellite defense, unless those weapons are tested “in an ABM mode, ”

or could substitute for ABM systems or components. However, it should be noted that the trajectory of a ballistic missile in flight-although not

orbital-resembles in many ways that of a satellite. Anti-satellite weapons and other “gray area”

systems will be discussed in a later section.

Land-Based Electromagnetic Railgun. -This

program will demonstrate the capability to launch

unguided and guided projectiles from an electromagnetic accelerator know as a “railgun.” DOD

claims that test devices will not be ABM components, will not be tested “in an ABM mode, ” and

will not have ABM capabilities.

Testing a railgun in the laboratory or in a fixed,

ground-based mode at an ABM test range would

not violate the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Space-Based Electromagnetic Railgun. -This

program would investigate the feasibility of spacebased railgun operation. DOD claims that the program would “demonstrate a capability to defend

against anti-satellite interceptors and will also permit a decision to be made on the applicability of

more advanced technology for ABM purposes. ”

However, ‘‘specific performance parameters . . .

will be established to satisfy Treaty compliant

guidelines. ”

As with space-based kinetic-kill vehicles, spacebased railguns might be tested as ASAT weapons

or satellite defense weapons without violating the

ABM Treaty. However, as discussed below, the

distinctions between ASAT and BMD technologies and applications become less clear as the systems become more capable,

ABM Systems or Components:

Fixed, Ground-Based ABM Launchers.–SDI

also plans to conduct tests of “ABM components”

at designated ABM test ranges. Two such tests,

the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor

(HEDI) and the Exoatmospheric Reentry-Vehicle

Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS), will demonstrate

the capability to intercept strategic ballistic missile warheads within and above the atmosphere.

Since such tests will be at agreed test ranges,

using fixed, ground-based launchers which cannot

be rapidly reloaded, and since each interceptor missile is not intended to deliver more than one independently targetable warhead, these two programs are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Terminal Imaging Radar (TIR). –TIR is a radar

that will be tested “in an ABM mode. ” This radar will be used to discriminate between reentry

vehicles and transfer this information to interceptor missiles. DOD has announced that since the

TIR tests will be conducted at a designated ABM

test range from a fixed, land-based platform, they

are treaty compliant.

If TIR were mobile, testing it “in an ABM

mode” would violate Article V(1) of the Treaty. As

this and similar technologies are developed, it will

be necessary to distinguish between those systems

which are incapable of operation except when fixed

and land-based and those which are designed to

be fixed and land-based but could operate in a mobile mode with little or no redesign.

Long Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) Probe. –The

LWIR probe appears to be designed to provide a

data base with which to evaluate optical system

sensors, It is conceivable that this technology

might also eventually substitute for current ABM

radars. Even if operated as a “pop-up radar, ” systems based on the LWIR probe would not seem

to violate Article V(1)’s prohibition against sea-,

air-, space-, and mobile land-based ABM systems

and components. In any case, since DOD plans to

conduct the LWIR tests from fixed, land-based

launchers at agreed test ranges, this program does

not seem to raise treaty compliance issues.27

Integrated Demonstration. -DOD will eventually wish to test the HEDI and ERIS interceptors

with the Terminal Imaging Radar and associated

command, control, and communication systems to

perform terminal defense engagements. If conducted at agreed test ranges with fixed, groundbased launchers and radars, and assuming no rapidly reloadable launchers or multiple independently guided warheads, then such tests would be

allowed under the treaty,

“Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiatiire, 1985, op.

cit., p. B-$).
270

Other “Gray Area” Programs

In addition to the questions raised by current

and proposed BMD programs, research into antisatellite weapons, anti-tactical ballistic missiles,

and large phased-array radars also pose ABM

Treaty questions. In certain cases, parts of these

technologies could also function as components or

adjuncts to BMD systems; in other cases, research

essential for non-ABM systems will supply information critical to BMD research.

Anti-Satellite Weapons.–There is great overlap

between BMD and ASAT technologies. In general,

even a poor anti-ballistic missile could be an excellent ASAT. The trajectory of a missile reentry

vehicle while outside the atmosphere—peak altitude on the order of 1,000 km and velocity slightly

suborbital-is similar to that of a satellite. The Soviet GALOSH ABM system was not designed as

an ASAT but may have ASAT capability for satellites in orbits similar to ICBM trajectories. The

U.S. miniature homing vehicle ASAT weapon

evolved from a design originally intended for midcourse BMD.

Conversely, since technologies investigated for

ASAT may also be useful in a BMD role, aggressive ASAT development could aid in the development of advanced BMD systems. Technology development ostensibly for advanced ASAT systems

might provide a loophole for undertaking BMD research which might otherwise be considered a violation of the ABM treaty.

Developing an ASAT system which had BMD

capability, or upgrading one to give it BMD capability, would be a violation of either Article V

or VI of the ABM Treaty. Nonetheless, since information valuable to ABM research could be obtained from tests “in an ASAT mode” even before

an ABM capability was achieved, ASAT weapon

development could help to erode the ABM Treaty.

Large Phased-Array Radars. -Another relevant

connection between ASAT systems and the ABM

Treaty involves the large phased-array radars required for ASAT space surveillance and battle

management. Space-track radars may be hard for

an adversary to distinguish from the early-warning radars and ABM battle management radars

which are currently limited by the ABM treaty.

In addition to their space surveillance and tracking role, such radars can also provide early warning of missile and bomber attack and would be essential components of any ABM system. Such

systems may also be used to observe missile tests

in order to assist verifying compliance with treaty

obligations.

Agreed Statement F in the ABM Treaty exempts space-track radars, and radars used for national technical means of verification, from the siting restrictions on ABM and ear!y-warning radars .

ASAT development will certainly stimulate development and deployment of space monitoring radars and sensors. To the extent that the distinction between an early warning radar and a space

track radar is ambiguous, confusion can result

which raises additional ABM Treaty compliance

questions.

Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles.–Since the

ABM Treaty prohibits defenses only against strategic missiles, anti-tactical ballistic missiles

(ATBM) systems are not prohibited. Anti-tactical

ballistic missiles were not included in the ABM

Treaty because the United States wished to protect SAM-D, a surface-to-air missile then under development. 28 Since the treaty was signed, the

Soviets have developed and deployed a weapon

similar to the original SAM-D.

Aggressive ATBM development and deployment might affect the continuing viability of the

ABM Treaty. Missiles deployed under the rubric

of anti-tactical ballistic missiles could have an impact on the penetrativity of both sides’ SLBMs.

Eventually, ATBM systems could become so capable as to completely undercut the provisions of

the ABM Treaty which prevent the development

and deployment of systems to defend against

ICBMs.

SDI and the Allies

Under Article IX of the ABM Treaty, the United

States and the Soviet Union each agree not to

“transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their

components limited by [the ABM] Treaty. ” Agreed

Statement G of the Treaty declares the intention

of the signatories that Article IX’s provisions

should extend to “technical descriptions or blue

prints specially worked out for the construction

of ABM systems and their components . . . “

The Reagan Administration has stated its intention to “proceed with cooperative research with

the Allies in areas of technology that could contribute to the SDI research program. ”29 However,

the Administration has assured Congress that

“SAM-D was intended to have some capability against short-range

tactical ballistic missiles as well as against aircraft. However, as SAMD developed (changing its name to ‘Patriot’), its anti-tactical missile

capabilities were not pursued.

“Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985, op.

cit., p. A-4.
271

such research will be “consistent with existing international obligations including the ABM

Treaty, “3° and that “the United States will not

seek to arrange for the Allies to do for the United

States what it cannot do under the Treaty. ”31

Attempts to define the precise nature of Article IX’s prohibitions encounter many of the difficulties already discussed (e. g., how to define an

‘“Ibid,

~’ Ibid.

ABM system or component or how to characterize advanced ATBMs). The ABM Treaty does not

constrain cooperative laboratory research efforts.

The Treaty would, however, prevent joint development, testing, production, or deployment of

ABM systems or components, including those—

e.g., fixed, land-based launchers and interceptors–which the United States, acting alone, could

legally develop, test, produce, and deploy.
Appendix B

Texts of the 1972 ABM Treaty,

Its Agreed Interpretations,

and Its 1976 Protocol*

Treaty Between the United States of America and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972

Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972

Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972

Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972

Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating

consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a

substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a

decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as

well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive

arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further

negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the

nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,

nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt

other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of

its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM

systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article I I I of this

Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic

ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and

deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

*Taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 edition, pp. 139-147 and 162-163.

272
273 —

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching

ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of

a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those

which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

Article Ill

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty

kilometers and centered on the Party’s national capital, a Party may deploy: (1 ) no more

than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor

missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar

complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more

than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and

fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more

than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor

missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in

potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date

of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo

launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than

the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM

radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article Ill shall not apply to ABM systems or their

components used for development or testing, and located within current or

additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen

ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or

components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to

modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test,

or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of

ABM launchers,

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and

their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:
274

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles,

ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or

their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile

attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented

outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM

systems or their components may be carried out.

Article Vlll

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas

specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this

Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest

possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to

transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or

their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would

conflict with this Treaty.

Article Xl

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic

offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this

Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a

manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of

verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which

impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of

this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction,

assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the

Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the

framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and

related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
275

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers

necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical

means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on

the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM

systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability

of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the

provisions of this Treaty;

(9) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting

strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate,

Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures,

composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall

enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of

this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year internals thereafter,

the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw

from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of

this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to

the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall

include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having

jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional

procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange

of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United

Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian

languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET

OF AMERICA SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

President of the United

States of America

General Secretary of the Central

Committee of the CPSU
276

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the

United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic

Missiles

1. Agreed Statements

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the

Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added);

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON

THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which maybe deployed in

accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article Ill of the Treaty, those non-phased-array

ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system

deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in

watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array

ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for

purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[c]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered

on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing

ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred

kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their

components except as provided in Article Ill of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the

event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components

capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars

are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components

would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in

accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
277

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty

develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for

includes obligations not to

the delivery by each ABM

interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product

of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three

million, except as provided for in Articles Ill, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the

purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of

verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US

and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints

specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components

limited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during

the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article Ill of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment

area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following

statement: “The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment

area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment

area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less

than thirteen hundred kilometers. ” In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its

ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of

the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that “the limitations provided for in Article Ill

shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing,

and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. ” We believe it would be

useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is

our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM

components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at

White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test

range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars

of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of

ABM test ranges. We Interpret the reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed test
278 — —

ranges” to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges

without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional

ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common

understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM

radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the

reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed” test ranges was sufficiently clear, and

that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(I) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not

to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components.

On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment

of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM

launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked

for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S.

side’s interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common

understanding on this matter.

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial

implementation of the ABM Treaty’s Article Xlll on the Standing Consultative

Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on

offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement, ’ agreement establishing the SCC will

be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the

following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation

desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT

Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired

consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the

U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is

prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the

obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the

date of signature of these two documents.

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

‘See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between

the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept.

30, 1971.
279

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning

observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would ilke to

make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and

acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after

they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the

absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with

ratificatlon or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations

by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement.

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to

achievlng agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms,

following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain

measures with respect to the Iimitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S.

Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to

constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivabiIity of our

respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also Indicated that

the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an

agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both

sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of

more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more

complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years,

U.S. supreme Interests could be Jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a

basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US. does not wish to see such a

situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It IS because we wish to

prevent such a situation that we emphasize the Importance the U S. Government

attaches to achievement of more complete Iimitations on strategic offensive arms.

The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional

consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the

U.S. position.

B Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article I I of the Joint Text Draft uses the term “tested in an ABM mode, ” in defining

ABM components, and Article VI Includes certain obligations concerning such

testing We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this

phrase, First, we would note that the testing previsions of the ABM Treaty are

intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty,

and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify

the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by

setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, whiIe

prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent

testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for
280

non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of “tested in an ABM mode,” we

note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be “tested in an ABM

mode” if, for example, any of the following events occur (1) a launcher is used to

launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a

target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic

missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM

interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an

altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are

deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the

kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes

measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM

radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or

instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement

to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not

set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting

Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far

more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect

and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM

potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such

radars by surface-t-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.
281

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on

the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975

Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976

/instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976

Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976

Entered into force May 24, 1976

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile

Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation

of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems

will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent

agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided

in Article I I I of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their

components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or

its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by

Article Ill of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in

accordance with Article II of this Protocol.

2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of

America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its

capital, as permitted by Article Ill(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not

deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental

ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article Ill(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the

components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an

ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article Ill of the

Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord
282

with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the

year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2,1978, or during any year which

commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of

the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only

once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to

dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of

ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area

centered on its capital, as permitted by Article Ill(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union

would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the

area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area

containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article Ill(b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components

and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article Vlll of the

ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article Ill

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be

complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In

particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area

selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the

Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional

procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of

instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the

Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3,1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages,

both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. 1. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Appendix C

Effects of BMD Deployment on

Existing Arms Control Treaties

The arms control treaties which are most

directly relevant to BMD deployment are the 1972

ABM Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the

1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty. ’ The ABM Treaty is discussed extensively in chapters 6, 9, and 10, and in appendix A.

The others are discussed briefly in this appendix.

Outer Space Treaty

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty’ begins:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to

place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on

celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer

space in any other manner . . .

Article IX includes the following provision:

If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it

or its nationals in outer space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of

other States Parties in the peaceful exploration

and use of outer space, . . . it shall undertake

appropriate international consultations before

proceeding with any such activity or experiment.

Depending on the specific nature of a BMD system deployment which utilizes space-based components, there may be a conflict with one or both

of these provisions. For example, Article IV would

prohibit placing in orbit a BMD satellite which

contains a directed-energy weapon that is powered

by a nuclear explosive device.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty3 prohibits each Party from carrying out any kind of

nuclear explosion in outer space, in the atmos-

‘The texts of these treaties and histories of their negotiations appear

in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1982.

“‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, ” which entered into force Oct. 10, 1967. It has over 80 parties, including the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the People’s

Republic of China.

“’Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer

Space, and Under Water, ” which entered into force Oct. 10, 1963 It

has about 100 parties, including the United States and U.S.S.R,

phere, or under water. Although underground nuclear explosions are permitted, it is very unlikely

that the United States or the Soviet Union would

deploy a BMD system which relies on space-based

directed-energy weapons powered by nuclear explosions without having tested them in space.

Thus it is very likely that BMD deployments of

that type would require withdrawal from the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

The Reagan Administration has reported to

Congress that directed-energy weapons driven by

nuclear explosions may require nuclear explosive

devices on the order of 1,000 kilotons or higher.4

This would be far above the 150-kiloton limit imposed by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty’ on tests

of such devices. The Administration also stated

in 1984 that “at this time there is no indication

of a need to test above 150 kt. ”6

Non-Proliferation Treaty

While Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty7

obliges the nonnuclear-weapon parties to refrain

from acquiring nuclear weapons, Article VI obliges

the parties which possess nuclear weapons to” . . .

pursue negotiations in good faith on effective

measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms

race at an early date . . . “ Most of the nonnuclearweapon parties believe that these two obligations

constitute a balanced deal. g In recent years they

have been complaining strongly in international

fora that they have been keeping their side of the

— —

4’4Fiscal Year 1985 Arms Control Impact Statements, ” issued March

1984. U.S. Senate Print 98-149, p. 253,

“’Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear

Weapon Tests. ” This treaty was signed by President Nixon on July

3, 1974. Although it has not been ratified, both Parties have announced

their intention to observe its 150-kiloton limitation pending ratification.

‘Ibid.

“’Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ” which entered into force March 5, 1970. It has about 120 parties, including the

United States and U.S.S.R.

%ee, for example, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, September 1980, pp. 459-

496; Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds. ), International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

1984), pp. 153-159 and 169-172.

283
284

treaty’s bargain, but that there has been insufficient progress toward ending the superpowers’ nuclear arms race.9

From an American viewpoint, the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional countries would

not only constitute a serious threat to U.S. national security, but would also threaten the security of all states. Hence U.S. representatives have

argued, in the U.N. and elsewhere, that mutual abstinence from acquisition of nuclear weapons is in

the self interest of states not now possessing them,

regardless of when or whether the superpowers

succeed in their efforts to halt and reverse their

nuclear arms competition. To date no party has

‘For example, in October 1984 the Nigerian delegate stated to the

U.N. General Assembly, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty will continue

to be a cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime only if all parties assume their responsibilities and obligations with sincerity. As long as

the nuclear Powers continue with their vertical proliferation of nuclear

weapons, [nuclear weapon] threshold States will consider it their right

and duty to keep their options open, and non-nuclear-weapon states will

doubt the wisdom of continued adherence to the Treaty. ”

withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, perhaps because the parties agree with that argument

or because they still hope for progress toward nuclear disarmament.

If the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative should

lead to a U.S.-Soviet agreement to reduce offensive nuclear forces and to amend the ABM Treaty

to permit deployment of nonnuclear defenses on

an agreed schedule, the nonnuclear-weapon states

might well consider that a step toward “cessation

of the nuclear arms race. ” On the other hand, if

either the United States or the Soviet Union

should abrogate the ABM Treaty before a U. S.-

Soviet agreement is concluded on a new strategic

arms control regime, the nonnuclear-weapon states

would probably perceive little hope for progress

toward nuclear arms reductions. In that case,

there would be a substantially increased risk that

some parties would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it would become much more

difficult to persuade additional states to adhere to

it.
Appendix D

Defense Requirements for

Assured Survival

Opinion varies greatly on how much damage the

United States could sustain from a Soviet nuclear

attack and still survive. Opinion also differs on

what is important in determining whether the

United States has survived. Some believe that

what matters is how well society would survive

and reconstitute itself. Others argue that the nation will have survived if it recovers its superpower

status and its economy in some specified number

of years. Still others argue that survival is assured

only if the number of casualties can confidently

be kept below some “limited” number. However,

within this group opinions differ on what that

number is. Some believe that the nation can sustain 10 million casualties or more, while others believe that if the nation suffered hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths in a short period of time

it would be a catastrophe without precedent, and

the nation could certainly not be said to have

survived. 1

This appendix illustrates how the number of casualties might be related to defense capability if the

Soviets were to attempt to maximize U.S. casualties. Most observers would probably agree that an

extremely capable defense would be required to

keep casualties low if the Soviets decided to attack

in an effort to maximize casualties. Because of the

great destructive power of nuclear weapons and

the concentration of U.S. population in major urban areas, a small number of nuclear weapons detonating over populous areas would cause large

numbers of casualties. Planners seeking a defense

to assure survival would most likely make “defense conservative” estimates. They would give

the offense a great benefit of the doubt and estimate the capability of their defense very conservatively in order to minimize the likelihood that

casualties would exceed their expectations.

This appendix illustrates how such worst-case

estimates of casualties might be made and how

they would be related to defense capability. It is

illustrative of an approach to the problem of determining requirements for assured survival. It is

‘Some people believe that even if man~’ tens of millions of Americans

died, society would remain intact (or rapidly reconstitute itself) and the

nation would have survived. Others believe that society can be destroyed even if casualties are relatively low.

not a prediction of casualties that would result

from an attack on the United States. Casualties

need not be as high as shown here, and they might

be considerably lower. We assume that the Soviets

attack to maximize casualties and that no civil defense measures are taken. Different Soviet attack

tactics, evacuation of cities, and preferential defense of the most heavily populated areas might

all contribute to reducing casualties. On the other

hand, long-term nuclear effects spreading far beyond the immediate blast area might increase casualties,

OTA does not predict either that the required

defense levels are achievable or that they are not

achievable.

This appendix presents a rather rudimentary

calculation in order to illustrate the problem. We

recognize that the results can be refined substantially by taking advantage of detailed, sophisticated information on population distribution, aimpoint uncertainties, and nuclear weapon effects.

It is assumed that since the United States has

extremely capable defenses, the Soviets are denied

the capability for a meaningful attack on U.S. military assets, and they hence concentrate their

forces to produce the greatest number of casualties they can. A force of 9,000 RVs, roughly equal

to the current Soviet force, is assumed. Each RV

is assumed to have a 750 kiloton (kt) yield. For simplicity, the attacking weapons are all ballistic missile RVs and the defense is BMD only.

The basic scenario is as follows. The Soviets

know about how capable the U.S. defense is. They

prepare a list of aimpoints such that the first is

the most densely populated part of the United

States, the second is the second most densely

populated part, and so on. They allocate their

weapons against the most populous part of this

list in a manner to be described and do not attack

the rest of the United States.

To illustrate some of the uncertainties in this calculation, four cases have been examined. In two

cases, the worst for the United States, the Soviets

are assumed to know exactly how good the U.S.

defense is, and they allocate their weapons to

achieve an expected one weapon penetrating to

each aimpoint. The number of aimpoints is equal

to 9,000 (1-Pk

, where Pk is the probability that the

285
286

defense kills an RV attempting to penetrate it.’ As

a worst case, we assume that they hit each aimpoint. In actuality, some aimpoints would survive.

In the other two cases, the Soviets only know

roughly how good the defense is, so they target

100 RVs on each of 90 aimpoints. Their hits are

distributed randomly among the aimpoints. In

each case, they begin with the most populous aimpoint and allocate weapons in descending order until all their weapons are allocated.

For each of the two cases described in the preceding paragraph, we use two different kill criteria,

for a total of four cases. In two of the cases, the

Soviets distribute their weapons to produce 3

pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure over the

entire area attacked. In the other two cases, they

distribute their weapons to put 5 psi over the area

attacked. We assume in each case that everyone

living in the attacked area is killed. It is beyond

the scope of this appendix to determine the minimum overpressure that would kill everyone subjected to it, although it seems likely that the answer is between 3 and 5 psi.3 A 1978 ACDA report4

says that 3 to 5 psi would cause total burn out in

‘(1-P~) is the probability that an RV gets through the defense, so

9,000 (1-PJ is the number of RVS they expect to get through the defense. Hence, they aim at that number of aimpoints. An actual calculation of the number of aimpoints would probably be more sophisticated

than this, since some of the intended aimpoints will receive more than

one detonation while others will be successfully defended. The worst

they can do, from the U.S. perspective, is to hit each intended aimpoint.

%me maintain that in either case the number of casualties is likely

to exceed the population of the area attacked, because effects such as

fallout and groundwater contamination, as well as destruction of vital

services, would kill far beyond the blast area.

4

“An Analysis of Civil Defense in Nuclear War’( December 1978.

urban areas. A 1979 OTA report5 estimated that

most of those exposed to 5 psi would be killed immediately or seriously wounded, and that half of

those exposed to 2 to 5 psi would be killed or seriously

wounded. Many of the wounded would eventually

die for lack of care. A 750 kt weapon detonated

at 2,000 feet above the ground would produce 5

psi or more overpressure over about 24 square

miles and 3 psi or more over 50 square miles.

In order to understand how U.S. population is

distributed among the most populous parts of the

nation we examined both the most populous cities and the most densely populated counties and

cities. These are listed in tables D-1 and D-2, respectively. The distributions of cumulative population as a function of total area occupied obtained

from these were reasonably similar, despite the

fact that there were many areas that appeared on

one list but not on the other.

Figure D-1 shows the number of people living

in the most populous parts of the United States.

It is arrived at by summing down tables D-1 and

D-2 in rank order, beginning with number 1. If the

Soviets wanted to maximize casualties, they would

begin by allocating their weapons against the most

heavily populated areas, and work their way up

the cumulative curves until they ran out of weapons. Figure D-2 repeats figure D-1, but also shows

the number of detonations required to produce 5

psi over a given area and the number of weapons

required to produce 3 psi. For example, 40 deto-

‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May

1979), OTA-NS-89

Table D-1 .—Population, Area, and Population Density of the Most Populous U.S. Cities

Population Area Population per

Rank City (thousands) (square miles) square mile

1 New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,072 301.5 23,455

2 Chicago. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,005 228.1 13,174

3 Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,967 464.7 6,384

4 Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,688 136.0 12,413

5 Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,595 556.4 2,867

6 Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,203 135,6 8,874

7 Dallas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 333.0 2,715

8 San Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 320.0 2,736

9 Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 790 324.0 2,437

10 Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 787 80.3 9,798

11 San Antonio , . . . ., ... , . . . . . . . . . . . 786 262.7 2,992

12 Indianapolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701 352.0 1,991

13 San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 46.4 14,633

14 Memphis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 646 264.1 2,447

15 Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638 62.7 10,181

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Populations are

based on the 1980 census.
287

Table D.2.—The Most Densely Populated Counties and Independent Cities

in the United Statess

Population per Area Population

Rank Name square mile (square miles) (thousands)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

New York, NY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kings, NY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bronx, NY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Queens, NY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

San Francisco, CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Philadelphia, PA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hudson, NJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Suffolk, MA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Washington, DC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Baltimore, MD (city) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

St. Louis, MO (city) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alexandria, VA (city) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Essex, NJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Richmond, NY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Arlington, VA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cook, IL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Norfolk, VA (city) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Union, NJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Falls Church, VA (city) . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nassau, NY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Denver CO..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Milwaukee Wl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Charlottesville, VA.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Wayne, Ml.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Richmond, VA (city) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64,395

31,762

28,006

17,411

14,636

12,413

11,993

11,472

10,181

9,793

7,379

6,867

6,696

5,995

5,878

5,485

5,037

4,886

4,830

4,610

4,452

3,997

3,827

3,801

3,650

22

70

42

109

46

136

46

57

63

80

61

15

127

59

26

958

53

103

2

287

111

241

10

615

60

1,428

2,231

1,169

1,891

679

1,688

557

650

638

787

453

103

851

352

153

5,254

267

504

10

1,322

492

965

40

2,338

219

SOURCE County and City Data Book,1983 Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Population Data based on 1980

census

nations would be required to produce 3 psi overpressure over a total area of 2,000 square miles,

and 80 would be required to produce 5 psi over the

same area. The most populous 2,000 square miles

contains about 17 million people.

We can now calculate the expected number of

casualties from an attack on our population, as a

function of the effectiveness of our BMD as measured by the probability that an RV is killed by it,

Pk. In the worst case, the Soviets use all their

weapons against a number of aimpoints equal to

the number of RVs they expect to penetrate the

defense, 9,000( 1-Pk), and their weapons detonate

successfully at all of them. They pick the most

populous aimpoints. This provides an upper bound

on the number of prompt casualties, In the other

case, they allocate 100 of their weapons against

each of the 90 most lucrative aimpoints. In this

case the probability that any aimpoint is destroyed is given by the expression 1-Pk

100. The

number of prompt casualties is this multiplied by

the total population at those aimpoints, which is

about 25 million for 3 psi coverage and about 20

million for 5 psi coverage.

Figures D-3 and D-4 show the results for the four

cases. They show the number of casualties as a

function of the effectiveness of the U.S. BMD system. Figure D-3 shows what the number of casualties would be if one believes that 3 psi is sufficient

to kill almost everyone, and figure D-4 shows what

the results would be if one believes that 5 psi is

necessary.

Basic Observations

If the Soviets were intent on killing Americans,

it would require an extremely capable defense to

keep casualties “low.” A defense that permitted

1 percent of the Soviet weapons through might result in casualties well in excess of 10 million. It

would appear that keeping casualties below 1 million would require a defense that could stop in excess of 99.9 percent of the Soviet attack. While we

would need defenses with these capabilities to be

confident that we could keep casualties low, lesser

(but still quite capable) defenses might result in

casualties much lower than what is indicated in

this worst case analysis. Soviet weapons might not

be so heavily concentrated on a few cities, and populations might evacuate or take other protective

measures, Finally, not everyone agrees that assured survival requires guaranteeing very low expected casualties. By some definitions, the nation

would survive even if millions of Americans did

not.
288

u

.7 Area

Note: Curves have been smoothed”

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment’

120 160

40 80

0

Number of weapons to produce at least 5 psi over entire area 60 80

20 40

0

Number of weapons to produce at least 3 psi over entire area

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
1 I 1

0 ~

I

99.6 99.8 100.0

99.0 99.2 99.4

BMD effectiveness in percent

aSoviets know exactly how capable U S

defense IS and target accordingly

They hit every city they target

I

Soviets know exactly how capable U S. defense is and target accordingly

They hit every city they target

SOURCE’ Office of Technology Assessment

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment
Appendix E

Defense Capability Levels and

U.S. Strategy Choices

This appendix describes how figure 5-4 in chapter 5 was generated from the definitions of defense

levels shown in table E-1 and the requirements to

support the suggested strategies as listed below.

In general, the requirements to underwrite or support any of the suggested strategies-retaliationonly, countervailing, prevailing, or assured survival-are as follows:

. If we can absorb a Soviet first strike and inflict great damage on them, then we can have

a retaliation only strategy.

● If we can absorb a first strike, inflict damage

on the Soviets beyond the value of whatever

they might hope to accomplish and deny them

their goals, then we can have either a countervailing strategy or a retaliation-only strategy.

. If we can defeat the Soviets while keeping our

losses at a “tolerable” level, then we can adopt

either a prevailing strategy, a countervailing

strategy, or a retaliation-only strategy

. If we can survive a Soviet first strike, then

we can have an assured survival strategy.

Retaliating requires that some number of reentry vehicles (RVs) survive a Soviet first strike

and penetrate to their targets. There are different

views on how many RVs must survive and penetrate to support a credible retaliation-only strategy. Countervailing generally requires that more

RVs survive and penetrate, and that we be able

to use those RVs for more than just punishment

attacks. Prevailing would require that still more

RVs be able to survive and penetrate, and that we

be able to use them to attack a variety of important selected targets. Additionally, prevailing, unlike either retaliation-only or countervailing, generates requirements for U.S. defenses to limit

damage to the United States.’ Assured survival

requires even more U.S. defenses than prevailing

does, but it has little or no requirement for RVs

to survive and penetrate.

Each of these strategy choices implies either

limits on Soviet defenses, requirements for U.S.

defenses, or both. These can be put in terms of the

four defense levels.

‘In the absence of Soviet defense, countervailing and retaliation-only

do not require defenses, but do not exclude them either. If the Soviets

have defense, countervailing may require defense.

Table E.1 .- Levels of Defense Capability

Region Level Description

Offense-dominated O no defense

1 “some ICBMs”* A defense capable of ensuring the survival of a useful

fraction of the ICBMs, but not capable of

protecting cities

Transition 2 “either/or” A defense (including BMD) that can ensure the

survival of most ICBMs or a high degree of urban

survival against a follow-on (or simultaneous)

attack, but not both

Defense-dominated 3 “most ICBMs/some A defense that ensures a high level of survival of

cities” military targets. Massive damage can only be

obtained by concentrating the entire offense

against cities

4 “extremely capable” Ensures a high level of urban survival against a full

attack. The attacker cannot have high confidence

that any cities can be destroyed

“Terms in quotes are a shorthand used to identify the levels,

NOTE: For simplicity the chapter often divides targets into ICBMs and cities. There are, of course, many other types of targets that might be attacked,

but discussing them all in each case would greatly expand the text. ICBMs are representative of strategic military targets (although by no means

an accurate model of them all). “Cities” is typically used as a short hand for people, economic assets, and social structure. A level 1 defense,

for example, might be used to defend the C3 system rather than the ICBMs,

290
291

The requirements for assured survival are the

simplest to specify. We would need a level 4 defense regardless of what defense the Soviets built.

Furthermore, if we had a level 4 defense that supported an assured survival strategy, no Soviet defense could undermine that strategy.

Prevailing would require either a level 4 defense,

or, if we were to plan to strike first to reduce the

Soviet offensive forces, a level 3 defense.2 However, this U.S. defense alone would not assure an

option to prevail. If the Soviet defense were sufficiently capable, it could keep us from having

enough RVs surviving and penetrating to support

a prevailing strategy. Level 4 Soviet defenses

would certainly keep us from having a prevailing

strategy. Very few U.S. RVs would reach their targets. A level 3 Soviet defense would keep us from

attacking military targets, which would prevent

us from satisfying the definition of prevailing.

However, if the Soviets had level 3 and we had

level 4, we would have a large, possibly exploitable, advantage. This might be called an opportunity to prevail despite not being able to destroy

military targets. What we would call our strategy

would not be as significant as the large advantage.

If we had a level 3 defense we could strike first

against a range of targets and defend against the

ragged retaliation, thereby limiting damage to ourselves, perhaps enough to prevail. However, if the

Soviets had a level 2 defense, they might prevent

us from destroying enough of their forces to keep

our losses to their retaliation “tolerable. There-

‘If we had level 2 and the Soviets had no defense, we might attempt

to prevail by striking first. In order to defend our cities, we would have

to leave military targets undefended against a Soviet retaliation,

fore, if we had level 3 and they had level 2, prevailing might not be a practical option. We could,

however, countervails since they could not destroy

our retaliatory forces in a first strike.

With the exceptions noted above, a Soviet defense at level 3 or above would limit our strategy

choice to retaliation-only, unless we had a level 4

defense that would support an assured survival

strategy. The only targets we could expect to destroy would be cities. A Soviet level 4 defense

would call into question our ability to retaliate. We

could not be certain that we could inflict great

damage on their cities. Therefore, if they had a

level 4 defense and we did not have assured survival, our only option would be a retaliation-only

strategy, but it might not have much prospect of

being successful. Of course, if we also had a level

4 defense, neither side could be certain of its ability to damage the other, and the Soviets would

have no advantage over us.

Currently, we have a countervailing strategy. If

we add defense and the Soviets have none, we

could certainly continue to have this option. If the

Soviets add a level 1 defense while the United

States has no defense, they could use it to deny

us the ability to retaliate against some military

targets, although we could still attack their cities.

We might no longer be able to countervails, although we could certainly retaliate. A U.S. level

1 defense would restore our ability to countervails

by ensuring the survival of RVs to replace the ones

the Soviet defense might destroy. Higher levels of

Soviet defense, however, could deny us the option

to countervails by protecting a range of military

and civilian targets.
Appendix F

BMD and the Military R&D Budget

Funding Levels

Military research and development currently

constitutes about two-thirds of all Federal spending on R&D. In fiscal year 1985, $34.7 billion of

the $52.0 billion total appropriated by Congress

for R&D went to defense-related activities in the

Departments of Defense and Energy.’

Ballistic missile defense technologies have been

investigated with Department of Defense R&D

funds since the 1950s. BMD funding (including deployment costs) reached its highest level (in real

dollars) in fiscal year 1972. After the ABM Treaty

was signed, overall BMD funding dropped.

In the fiscal year 1984 budget, the most recent

one submitted before the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was formed, just under $1 billion was appropriated for BMD research. According to Defense Department funding projections at

that time, BMD programs within DOD would have

been allocated about $12 billion for fiscal years

1984 through 1989 had the SD I not been formed,

with about $2 billion more to have been spent by

the Department of Energy. Under the SDI funding profile, DOD projections for the same period

totaled $26 billion.’ A more recent projection,

which included an estimate for fiscal year 1990 and

also accounted for congressional action on the fiscal year 1985 request, gave a $33 billion total for

SD I for the seven fiscal years between fiscal years

1984 and 1990, inclusive.3

‘Aggregate figures from table I of Willis Shapley, Albert Teich, and

Jill Pace, Congressional Action on R&Din the FY 1985 Budget ( Washington, DC: R&D Budget and Policy Project of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in cooperation with the Intersociety Working Group, November 1984). The R&D budget as requested

by the President, before being acted on by Congress, is analyzed in

AAAS Report IX: Research and Development, FY 1985 Budget, by the

Intersociety Working Group, 1984. Data for this publication is drawn

from SpeciaJ Amdysis K, prepared by the Office of Management and

Budget, and from Federal Funds, prepared by the National Science

Foundation.

“’Analysis of the Costs of the Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985 -1989,” Congressional Budget Office, May 1984. For plan.

ning puwoses, the Department of Defense annually prepares FiveYear

Defense Plans which project future spending levels. However, the CBO

report based its projections beyond fiscal year 1986 on press reports,

since DOD typically does not provide its *’out-year” projections to

Congress.

‘Departing from usual practice, in 1985 the Office of the Secretary

of Defense (Comptroller) released out-year SD I budget projections to

Congress. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has also compiled a corresponding breakdown of what would have been requested

However, the periods covered by the above estimates are artifacts of the Pentagon’s planning

process. The budget for each fiscal year includes

projections for the four subsequent years as well,

but provides no information beyond that. Ambassador Paul Nitze, special advisor to the President

and Secretary of State on arms control, has estimated that it will take “at least 10 years” (e.g.,

not before 1995) to determine whether a ballistic

missile defense can meet the tests of survivability and cost-effectiveness.4 The program would

take even longer if slowed by unanticipated

difficulties or congressional budget cuts. The total 10-year SD I cost from fiscal year 1984 through

1993 has been estimated to be $70 billion in nominal (uncorrected for inflation) dollars if it were to

proceed on budget and on schedule; delays and

overruns would further increase this totals

Defense Department R&D

Budget Categories

The Department of Defense places R&D programs in five categories ranging from basic research to engineering and operational development. Basic research, category 6.1, is scientific

. —

over that time period had the SD I not been formed. The two budget

requests for fiscal years 1984 through 1990, in millions of dollars, are:

SDI Pre-SDI

Fiscal Year (DOD) (DOD) (DOE)

1984 991 991 NA

1985 1,397 1,527 210

1986 3,722 1,802 295

1987 4,908 2,181 365

1988 6,165 2,699 439

1989 7,300 2,982 505

1990 8,634 NA NA

Total 33,122 12,182 1,814

NA = not available. Note that the aggregate SDl figure is a 6-year sum whereas

the aggregate pre-SDI figure is only over 5 years Fiscal year 1984 and 1985 figures

for the SD I budget represent appropriated, not requested, funds

4Quoted by Walter Pincus in “Decade of Study Seen for ‘Star Wars’, ”

The Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1985.

‘John Pike, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Budget and Program

(Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, Feb. 10, 1985),

pp. 81-83. The FAS projection of $69 billion fell in between a $66 billion estimate by the Electronic Industries Association and an $80 billion estimate by DMS, a private market research firm. Budget estimates

given in constant fiscal year 1986 dollars are 86 percent of the those

cited here, which are in current-year (nominal) dollars.

FAS cites Norman Augustine, President of Martin Marietta Denver

Aerospace, as having frequently noted that defense development

projects typically take one-third longer and cost one-third more than

initially estimated. This factor moves the FAS research and technology development estimate of $70 billion closer to $100 billion.

292
293

study and experimentation directed toward acquiring knowledge in those fields relating to long-term

national security needs. Category 6.2, exploratory

development, refers to research directed towards

solving specific military problems, short of major

development projects. It includes development of

“brass-board” level hardware, intended to validate

design concepts, which need not be to scale and

which do not meet operational specifications.

Advanced development, category 6.3, consists

of projects which have moved into the development of prototypes in field configuration for technical or operational testing. Projects at this stage

are evaluated for their suitability for military use.

Category 6.4 is engineering development, a n d

refers to systems meeting all military specifications for operational use which are destined for

production in the very near term. (If approved for

production, weapons systems leave the R&D budget.)

The fifth category, 6.5, is for management support,

and it funds installations required for general R&D

use (i.e., testing ranges). Operational systems development, or development conducted on systems

which have already been deployed, does not appear

as a”6 category but is funded by line items elsewhere in the budget.

The five program elements constituting the

Strategic Defense Initiative were created by consolidating portions of 27 previous program elements spanning the range from 6.1 to 6.5,6 The

resulting aggregates are therefore difficult to

categorize, and they have been placed by DOD

more or less arbitrarily in category 6.3, advanced

development.

For the Department of Defense as a whole, only

a small fraction of R&D funds (2.5 percent in the

fiscal year 1985 request) was requested for basic

— .

“’Analysis of the Costs of the Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985 -1989,” Congressional Budget Office, May 1984

research programs in category 6.1. Another 6.5

percent was requested for applied research, which

is considered to be category 6.2 plus a portion

“6.3A” of category 6.3 programs in the early

stages of advanced development. The overwhelming majority of DOD R&D funds, 90 percent in

fiscal year 1985, were requested for development

activities in category 6,4 and the remainder of category 6.3, with the final 1 percent being requested

for R&D facilities.7

Department of Energy

Within the Department of Energy, $2.2 billion

was allocated for defense-related R&D programs

in fiscal year 1985. These programs include all development of nuclear weapons, along with other

items such as naval nuclear reactor development.8

(Dual military/civilian nuclear power programs,

such as nuclear power for space systems, are

funded elsewhere in the DOE budget and are not

included in this total.) While the Department of

Energy conducts research relevant to strategic defense, those programs are not formally part of the

Strategic Defense Initiative.

7AAAS Repoti IX, note 1 above, table II-4. These figures are for the

budget requested by the President; similar breakdowns for the budget

as enacted by Congress were not available but would differ only marginally.

“DOE does not use the 6.1 to 6.5 budget categories used by the Department of Defense, and a breakdown of DOE R&D funds equivalent

to the one above for DOD is not available. However, comparing table

I-7 (total defense expenditures of AAAS Report IX (supra, note 1

above) with table I I-4 (Department of Defense expenditures) yields a

somewhat comparable anal~wis. These figures are for the fiscal year 1985

budget as submitted by the President; no such figures were compiled

for the budget as enacted by Congress:

Basic Research $0

Applied Research 0.7 billion

Development 1.3 billion

Facilities O 5 billion

Although this analysis shows that no DOE funds were attributed for

basic research in defense-related programs, $0.9 billion was allocated

for basic research elsewhere within DOE (table I-9 of the AAAS Report).
Appendix G

Studies of the High Frontier

Global Ballistic Missile Defense I

Deployment Costs

High Frontier’ asserted that its GBMD I constellation of BMD satellites carrying kinetic-kill

vehicles could be built using “off-the-shelf” technology and could be “fully deployed in five or six

years at a minimum cost of some $10-$15 billion. "2

However, the Department of Defense obtained

a much higher estimate. Shortly after the High

Frontier report was published, Dr. Robert Cooper,

director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, commented on the High Frontier proposal for a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

. . . The DOD has worked with the High Frontier analysts throughout the development of their

concept and supports the basic Damage-Denial

goal. However, as hardware developers of war

fighting systems, we do not share their optimism

in being able to develop and field such a capability within their timeframe and cost projections.

We have conducted several in-house analyses and

have experienced some difficulties in ratifying the

existence of “off-the-shelf components or technologies” to provide the required surveillance, command and control, and actually perform the intercepts within the orbital and physical conditions

described. Our understanding of the systems implications and costs would lead us to project expenditures on the order of $200 to $300 billion in

acquisition costs alone for the proposed system.3

A year later, John Gardner, Director for Defensive Systems in the Office of the Under Secretary

of Defense for Research and Engineering, described some of the DOD analyses before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed

Services:

We have conducted studies, both in the Army

and in the Air Force, on the High Frontier con-

‘Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier, A New National Strategy ( Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1982).

‘I bid., p. 8. Estimates by High Frontier of the cost of its entire program, including terminal defense, two layers of space-based defense.

improved space transportation, a space station, a high performance

spaceplane, and a satellite power system, total $24 billion in the first

5 years and $40 billion for the first 8 years. The GBMD I portion along,

the first space-based layer, is estimated to cost $10 to $15 billion.

‘Response to question submitted for the record following Dr. Cooper’s

Mar. 10, 1982, appearance before the Subcommittee on Strategic and

Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Hearings on S. 2248, DOD Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Part 7, p. 4635.

cept as we understand it. Generally, those studies

were associated with understanding the concept,

identifying the technical issues and risks; doing

work to optimize the system and estimating the

cost for a deployed system as well as its survivability.

***

While we believe that the technical capabilities

of the system are certainly appropriately described

by the High Frontier, we do have some reservations about the survivability of a system of the

kind that has been described.

***

We have looked at system components in some

detail. I would say that of the various elements

of the system—the spacecraft, the search and acquisition system, and the interception system–I

believe that the judgment is that the highest risk

would exist in the interception system and in the

command and control that would be required to

drive and control the whole system.

***

We have made estimates of the cost of such a

system, using the costing techniques that are common to the Department of Defense for both defensive systems, space launches, and satellite systems. It is on the basis of the cost estimates that

estimates have been made ranging from $50 to $60

billion, and to numbers considerably in excess of

that ...4

R&D Costs

Since the initial High Frontier deployments were

assumed not to require much further technical development, High Frontier estimated that research

and development of the entire GBMD I system

would cost only $1 billions This estimate for developing the entire GBMD I system can be compared with $1.275 billion (in 1982 dollars) that the

Air Force plans to have allocated over the 19 fiscal years from 1972 to 1990 to develop the airlaunched and infrared-guided Miniature Vehicle

‘Hearings before the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 23, 1983,

printed in S. Hrg. 98-49, Part 5, Department of Defense Authorization

for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Senate Committee on Armed

Services, p. 2668-9.

bGraham, op cit., p. 128.

294
295

ASAT weapon. 6 However, the ASAT weapon is

roughly equivalent to the GBMD I kill vehicle

alone,’ and its development would not address the

other requirements of the GBMD I system: the

carrier satellites, the system wide surveillance, acquisition, and kill assessment sensors, overall command and control, battle management software

and hardware, on-orbit transportation and logistical support, and system survivability.

Moreover, technology developed for the MV

ASAT would most likely not be sufficient even for

the GBMD kill vehicle it corresponds to. The

ASAT is designed to find satellites against the

cold background of space; GBMD kill vehicles

must operate looking down against a warm earth.

The booster’s exhaust plume, of course, is much

hotter than either the booster or the earth background, but a booster cannot be killed by attacking its exhaust. Either the kill vehicle will need to

track some part of the booster itself, or it will need

to know where the booster is relative to the exhaust–both of which are more difficult tasks than

locating an isolated satellite with nothing behind

it. In many cases, the kill vehicle would not be able

to reach the booster before burnout, obviating

plume tracking.

Area of Coverage

In a background paper done for OTA,8 Ashton

Carter analyzed the High Frontier GBMD I system. He states that, due to the slow speed (1

km/see) of the individual kill vehicles, they would

not be able to travel very far during the boost

phase of a Soviet ICBM. “[Thousands of satellites

would be needed worldwide for continuous coverage of Soviet ICBM fields, ” wrote Carter. “The

High Frontier concept with only 432 satellites

would therefore have meager coverage of Soviet

ICBM fields. ”9 He noted that in the only example

of boost-phase intercept given in the High Frontier report, ’” the kill vehicle would have been

launched 53 seconds before its target ICBM was

‘From the Dec. 31, 1983 Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Report

(SAR) on Space Defense and Operations (A SAT). Figures are corrected

from the total given in the SAR (in 1977 dollars) to 1982 dollars using

the DOD Air Force RDT&E deflator.

‘According to John Gardner’s testimony, “the space-based component of [the High Frontier GBMD I defense] does postulate the use of

defensive interceptors that take advantage of the technology that is

currently being developed as part of the anti-satellite program. ”

–Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Mar. 23, 1983, p. 2667.

8Ashton Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, background paper prepared under contract for the Office of Technology

Assessment, April 1984.

‘Ibid., p. 35.

‘“Graham, op cit., p. 122.

launched, with no explanation of how the defense

would know in advance when that launch would

occur. Although the High Frontier study also discusses interceptions during the post-boost period,

the kill vehicIe sensors postulated for the initial

deployment (GBMD I) would not be appropriate

for phases following boost phase. Carter’s overall

conclusion was that

It would therefore appear that the technical characteristics of the High Frontier scheme result in

a defensive system of extremely limited capability for boost phase intercept of present Soviet

ICBMs and with no capability against future MXlike Soviet boosters, even with no Soviet effort to

overcome the defense.ll

Overall Capability

On February 21, 1985, 2 years after John Gardner had testified about High Frontier before a Senate Armed Services subcommittee, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Director James A.

Abrahamson appeared before the same subcommittee, Senator Sam Nunn asked Abrahamson

about a recent High Frontier claim that a 95

percent-effective defense could be built using offthe-shelf technology in 5 to 6 years.

Abrahamson did not substantiate that assertion.12 He stated that the kinetic-kill vehicle concept adopted by High Frontier is considered by

SDI to be one of the more mature BMD technologies, and that it could provide part of an initial,

partial capability for boost-phase intercept against

current ballistic missiles. However, later on in his

testimony, Abrahamson indicated that the kinetickill vehicles considered by the Strategic Defense

Initiative would be solid-propelled rockets traveling five to eight times faster than the High Frontier design. Abrahamson also emphasized that it

takes more than a weapons concept to make an

overall ballistic missile defense. The full job requires tracking, surveillance, and command and

control, and is a more complex issue than was implied by the High Frontier publication that Senator Nunn referred to.

In his testimony, Abrahamson highlighted the

basic difference between the High Frontier approach and that being pursued by the SDI. He said

1 Ictiter, Op cit., p. 35. ACCOrding to the Department of Defense, the

Soviets are currently developing an ICBM, the SS-X-24, which is sitilar in many characteristics to the MX. (Soviet Mifitmy Power, 1986.

See pp. 29-30 for data on U.S. and Soviet ICBMS.)

‘~estimony given below is paraphrased from General Abrahamson’s

spoken testimony.
296

that there were two dangerous consequences that

could happen should the United States deploy only

a partial BMD capability and then stop. First, it

might drive the Soviets in precisely the wrong

direction, stimulating them to build up offensive

forces if they thought that they could overwhelm

the defense. Second, if the U.S. system were based

on a single concept, the entire system would be

vulnerable should the Soviets discover a countermeasure to that concept.

Alluding to the survivability problems mentioned about High Frontier by Gardner 2 years

earlier, Abrahamson explained that the SDI did

not yet know enough to be confident that a High

Frontier-type system could not be countered or

easily knocked out. He noted that General Graham

did not have the resources available to him to investigate all the countermeasure problems and the

command and control difficulties. The High Frontier program could be a good start, Abrahamson

said, but he did not know if it would be the best

start. At present, he would not recommend that

the United States proceed to deploy it.
Appendix H

Excerpts From Statements on BMD

by Reagan Administration Officials

The conclusion of President Reagan’s March 23,

1983, speech on Defense Spending and Defensive

Technology.

Weekly Compilation of

Presidential

Documents

Now, thus far tonight I've shared wit h

you my thoughts on the problems of national security we must face together. My predecessors in the Oval office have appeared

before you on other occasions to describe

the threat posed by Soviet power and have

proposed steps to address that threat. But

since the advent of nuclear weapons, those

steps have been increasingly directed

toward deterrence of aggression through

the promise of retaliation,

This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked. We and our allies

have succeeded in preventing nuclear war

for more than three decades, In recent

months, however, my advisers, including in

partlcular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have uncierwor(’d the n~w{’~~lt~ to brt’,ik out of a

(utur~’ th~t relic’~ ~c)l{’1) on c~tfen~l~ t’ rc~talldt ion for our ~(’curlt?

()~er the c~jur~r of thest~ dl~cus~ions, 1‘~ e

become znor( .Ind n]ort d(w p!) conllnced

th~t th(’ hum.in splrlt mu~t b<> (:ipab}cl o f

rl~ln q ~bo~ (> ~it’.il!ng \\lth other n.ition~ ,ind

human beings by threatt’nlng their esistence. F’eelin% this wa]. I belief e JYC> nlu~t

thoroughly examine e~er? opportun lty for

reducing tensions and for lntroclucln g grc’at -

er st~bilit) into the ~trate,qlc calculL]s on

both sides,

one of the most important contributions

we can make 1s, of course, t o lower the

Ie\el of All arms, md p.irtlcularl} nuclea r

arms. \f’e’re ~>ng~ged right now in sc>~ c>ral

negotiations w’lth the So\iet (. ”nlon to bring

about a mutual reduction of w capons. I will

report to ) ou a week from tomorrow m)

thoughts on that ~core But let me just w?’,

I’m totally committed to this course.

If the So\iet L’nlon \\’ill join with us in

our effort to achle~ e major arms reduction,

we will ha~e succeeded In stabilizing the

nuclear balance. Sc\ertheless, it w’111 still be

necessary’ to rel; on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. .4nd that’s A sad

commentary’ on the human condition.

\$’ouldn’t lt b(’ better to WIC li~ es than to

a~enge them;~ .4re we not capable of demonstrating our peuceful intentions by appl}ling all our abilities ~nd our inqenuity’ to

achie~inq a trul> lasting stabillty? I think

we Are. Indeed, we must,

.After careful consult:itlon with my ad\isers, including the Joint (;hiefs of Staff, I

belie~e there- is a way. Let me share with

you a \islon of the future \\hich offers hope.

It is that we embark on a program to

counter the awesome Soy iet mls~lle threat

wrlth measures that are defensi~e Let us

turn to the \ery’ ~trt~nqth~ in technolog}

that spawned our grc’at lndustri~l base And

that ha~e gi~’en us the qualit]’ of life me

enjo)r today.

\T’hat if free people could Ii\e secure m

the knowledge that their security did not

rest upon the threat of instant C’. S. retaliation to deter a So\ iet ~ttack, that we could

intercept and destro} strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or

that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task,

one that may not be accomplished before

the end of this centur). l’et, current technology, has ~ttalned a le~el of sophistication

where it’s reasonable for us to beg-m this

297
298

effort. It will take years, probably decades

of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a

solid capability for flexible response. But

isn’t it worth every investment necessary’ to

free the world from the threat of nuclear

war? We know it is.

In the meantime, we will continue to

pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that

can be ensured only by modernizing o u r

strategic forces. At the same time, we must

take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear

war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.

America does possess—now—the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding

boldly with these new technologies, we can

significantly reduce any incentive that the

Soviet Union may have to threaten attack

against the United States or its allies.

As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely

upon our strategic offensive power to deter

attacks against them. Their vital interests

and ours are inextricably linked. Their

safety and ours are one. And no change in

technology}’ can or will alter that reality. We

must and shall continue to honor our commitments.

1 clearly recognize that defensive systems

have limitations and raise certain problems

and ambiguities.

systems, they can

aggressive policy,

But with these

mind, I call upon

If paired with “offensive

be viewed as fostering an

and no one wants that.

considerations firmly in

the scientific community

in our country, those who gave us nuclear

weapons, to turn their great talents now to

the cause of mankind and world peace, to

give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Tonight, consistent with our obligations of

the ABM treaty and recognizing the need

for closer consultation with our allies, I’m

taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to

define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed

by strategic nuclear missiles. This could

pave the way for arms control measures to

eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek

neither military superiority nor political advantage, Our only purpose--one all people

share—is to search for ways to reduce the

danger of nuclear war.

My fellow Americans, tonight we’re

launching an effort which holds the promise

of changing the course of human history.

There will be risks, and results take time.

But I believe we can do it. As we cross this

threshold, I ask for your prayers and your

support.

Thank you, good night, and Cod bless

you.

Note: The President spoke at 8:02 p.m. from

the Oval Office at the White House. The

address was broadcast live on nationwide

radio and television.

Following his remarks, the President met

in the White House with a number of administration officials, including members

of the Cabinet, the White House staff, and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former officials of past administrations to discuss the

address.

In a speech on March 29, 1985, President Rea- should never be misconstrued as just another

gan said :

l

. . . Two years ago, I challenged our scientific

community to use their talents and energies to find

a way that we might eventually rid ourselves of the

need for nuclear weapons—starting with ICBMs,

We seek to render obsolete the balance of terror—

or Mutual Assured Destruction, as it’s called—

and replace it with a system incapable of initiating armed conflict or causing mass destruction, yet

effective in preventing war. Now, this is not and

‘Speech to the National Space Club, Mar, 29, 1985.

method of protecting missile silos.

. . . The means to intercept ballistic missiles during their early-on boost phase of trajectory would

enable us to fundamentally change our strategic

assumptions, permitting us to shift our emphasis

from offense to defense.

. . . We’re not discussing a concept just to enhance deterrence, but rather a new kind of deterrence; not just an addition to our offensive forces,

but research to determine the feasibility of a comprehensive nonnuclear defensive system–a shield

that could prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.
299

The Administration has not presented in detail

its view of how it thinks the U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic relation would evolve as BMD developments

proceed and efforts are made to manage the evolution. Administration spokesmen have, however,

given broad descriptions of the major parts of that

evolution and the reasons why they believe it to

be plausible. Some of these are excerpted in this

appendix. For a deeper understanding, the reader

should read the sources in their entirety.2

In a statement released January 3, 1985, and

published in a White House pamphlet The President Strategic Defense lnitiative, President Reagan said: 3

. . . The SDI research program will provide to

a future President and a future Congress the technical knowledge required to support, a decision on

whether to develop and later deploy advanced

defensive systems.

At the same time, the United States is committed to the negotiation of equal and verifiable agreements which bring real reductions in the power of

the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To this end, my

Administration has proposed to the Soviet Union

a comprehensive set of arms control proposals. We

are working tirelessly for the success of these efforts, but we can and must go further in trying

to strengthen the peace.

Our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative complements our arms reduction efforts

and helps to pave the way for creating a more stable and secure world. That the research we are undertaking is consistent with all of our treaty obligations, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty.

In the near term, the SD I research program also

responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) effort, which includes actual deployments. It provides a powerful deterrent

to any Soviet decision to expand its ballistic missile defense capability beyond that permitted by

the ABM Treaty. And, in the long-term, we have

confidence that SDI will be a crucial means by

which both the United States and the Soviet

Union can safely agree to very deep reductions,

and eventually, even the elimination of ballistic

missiles and the nuclear weapons they carry. [emphasis added]

The White House publication which accompanied this statement elaborated on the arms control implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative as follows:4

The United States does not view defensive measures as a means of establishing military superiority. Because we have no ambitions in this regard,

deployments of defensive systems would most usefully be done in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable arms control environment

that regulates the offensive and defensive developments and deployments of the United States

and Soviet Union. Such an environment could be

particularly useful in the period of transition from

a deterrent based on the threat of nuclear retaliation, through deterrence based on a balance of

offensive and defensive forces, to the period when

adjustments to the basis of deterrence are complete and advanced defensive systems are fully

deployed. During the transition, arms control

agreements could help to manage and establish guidelines for the deployment of defensive systems.

The SDI research program will complement and

support U.S. efforts to seek equitable, verifiable

reductions in offensive nuclear forces through

arms control negotiations. Such reductions would

make a useful contribution to stability, whether

in today’s deterrence environment or in a potential future deterrence environment in which

defenses played a leading role.

A future decision to develop and deploy effective defenses against ballistic missiles could support our policy of pursuing significant reductions

in ballistic missile forces. To the extent that defensive systems could reduce the effectiveness and,

thus, value of ballistic missiles, they also could increase the incentives for negotiated reductions.

Significant reductions in turn would serve to increase the effectiveness and deterrent potential of

defensive systems.

This prediction has been explained by George A.

Keyworth II, science advisor to President Reagan,

in the following terms:5

Strategic defenses of the type we can reasonably

project–even in their early modes—can be vital

catalysts for arms control . . . In fact, early and intermediate defenses will undoubtedly be imperfect,

and any nuclear weapon that makes it through to

its target will be devastating. While hardened military assets can be very successfully defended by

these transition systems, civilian population

centers will still be hostage to a determined adversary. Critics cite this as a major failing. In fact,

it is crucial to stability during those transition

years, because as long as there is some leakage in

those transition defense technologies, there remains a retaliatory deterrent against first strike.

. . . But we will once again have a common

ground for negotiating real weapons reductions.

After all, realistic, survivable, retaliatory arsenals

do not have to be enormous, not nearly as large

—— —

‘(jeorge 4. Keyworth II, ‘“rrhe (’ase ~’or: An option for a World I)isarmed, ” IS.SU(JS in Sc;ence and Technology , fall 1984. pp. 42-44.
300

In

‘c

tegi

as the arsenals we now require to survive preemptive strikes (or in the Soviet case, to launch them).

With the preemptive option clouded, or even removed, we would have an opportunity to negotiate major arms reductions that would still leave

each side with a strong retaliatory deterrent.

At that point we would have accomplished two

things, two goals that have eluded us for 20 years.

We would have reduced both nations’ perceptions

that the other could launch a successful disarming first strike, and we would have drastically reduced the size of the arsenals.

. . . These options will probably become available

when the strategic nuclear forces we must build

today to maintain our near-term deterrence reach

the limits of their operational lifetimes. We then

have a new option: rather than replace them, let

each side retain only token nuclear forces for their

sole remaining purpose—restricted retaliation.

It is only at this point, in the presence of nearzero arsenals, that arms control begins to have any

real meaning in the minds of ordinary people. Only

when the prospect of final world holocaust reverts

to “mere” catastrophe–that is, when the stockpiles can be measured in the dozens, rather than

in the tens of thousands-can we once again depend on the sun coming up the next day.

Soviet habits, attitudes, and policies are the

product of a thousand years of brutal historical

experience. There is no reason to believe that the

Soviet Union will suddenly become a country that

we would trust to respect the legal requirements

of a near-total disarmament treaty.

. . . Strategic defense provides the option to

break this cycle. Although we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, and although nations will continue

to distrust one another, heavily defended countries

could nonetheless realistically enter into treaties

to reduce nuclear forces to near zero. The scale of

cheating necessary to provide an arsenal capable

of successfully engaging several layers of active

defenses would be so large as to be impractical

within the context of normal intelligence-gathering

capabilities,

Strategic defense therefore provides an option

for a world effectively disarmed of nuclear weapons, yet still retaining national sovereignty and

security, In fact, deployment of strategic defense

is the only way in which the superpowers will be

able to achieve these very deep arms reductions.

another article6 he wrote:

When [the Soviets] look seriously at the loss of

utility of their ICBMs as a preemptive force, they

will have no choice but to admit that the age of

the ICBM as the dominant weapon is passing,

They, and we, will no doubt begin to replace ICBMs

;eorge A, Keyworth II, “l’he Case for Arms Control and the Stra.

c Defense Initiative, ” Arms ControJ Today, April 1985, p. 8.

with other weapons, but in so doing we will be

phasing out the most feared and most destabilizing of the nuclear weapons. This is the key issue

and, to my mind, the strongest reason we have to

pursue the strategic defense initiative. With the

ICBM tarnished and with the need to look to other

options to preserve national security, both the

Soviets and we will have a mutual basis to negotiate reductions in ICBM forces. If ICBMs serve

only to retaliate in case the other side does attack

first, then both sides can consider truly massive

reductions in ICBM warheads. Ten or twenty nuclear weapons are virtually all the retaliatory deterrent that any country needs—and those are the

levels of weapons that arms controls ought to be

aiming for,

On February 13, 1985, the Director of the U,

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenne

Adelman, told the International Institute for St]

tegic Studies:

[If SDI succeeds in making defenses more costeffective than offenses], SDI can then prove a real

incentive to deep reductions in offensive nuclear

systems through arms control. We hope for that

kind of incentive from SDI.

We must scrupulously guard against a vicious

cycle of defensive efforts—even research for

defense–spurring the other side onto more offensive weapons in order to saturate prospective

defenses, and so on, and so on. That snowball effect would undercut stability and weaken deterrence,

That risk can be reduced and managed through

the kind of overall strategic discussions Secretary

Shultz launched in Geneva last month and that

Ambassador Kampelman will take up further

when the arms talks begin again next month. This

type of exchange with the Soviet Union—an indepth dialog about critical strategic relationships,

strategic concepts, strategic stability-is indispensable to an effective SDI approach.

No one has a crystal ball in this complicated

business. We need data to provide a sound basis

for decisions several years off on whether or not

to pursue strategic defensive systems further . . .

[a] managed evolution–one involving the Soviets

and the Allies intimately all along the way—could

lead to a safer world.

***

Most broadly, we will be going ‘back to basics’

in looking at the relationship between offensive

and defensive forces. We will be describing to the

Soviets, in some detail and with some care, the

kind of strategic concept that will guide us in the

period ahead. We envision it as falling into three

phases.

During the first phases, deterrence will continue

to rest almost exclusively on offensive nuclear

retaliatory capabilities. We believe that this can

,s.

th

ra-
be done at greatly reduced levels of nuclear forces

and with full compliance with the ABM Treaty,

and we will seek both. We hope the Soviets believe

and will act likewise. This period could last ten or

fifteen years, or longer or even indefinitely, depending largely on the progress and results of the

on-going SD I research,

The second phase will be one of transition. During this period, and assuming successful development of some effective non-nuclear defensive systems, we would begin to move towards a strategic

posture with ever-greater reliance on defense,

rather than offense. A transition of indefinite duration, this period will help lay the technical and

political groundwork necessary for the ultimate

goal of eventually eliminating nuclear arms completely.

The last period is one with its hallmark being

the complete elimination of nuclear arms. The technical knowledge of how to make these weapons and

the danger of cheating would persist. These risks,

unfortunately, can never be eliminated, but effective defenses would give insurance against them,

The enormous and depressing nuclear threat hanging over the world could be lifted,

These three stages have to evolve gradually and,

as I have said, depend critically upon a cooperative effort between the United States, in consultation with its key Allies, and the Soviet Union.

This theme was elaborated on by Ambassador

Paul H. Nitze in a speech to the Philadelphia

World Affairs Council on February 20, 1985, He

summarized the strategic basis for the upcoming

talks in Geneva as follows:

During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is

a radical reduction in the power of existing and

planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the

stabilization of the relationship between offensive

and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or

in space. We are even now looking forward to a

period of transition to a more stable world, with

greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against

offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition

could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear

arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free

of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which

we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can

agree.

He then went on to say:

It would be worthwhile to dwell on this concept

in some detail. To begin with, it entails three time

phases: the near term, a transition phase, and an

ultimate phase.

The Near Term: For the immediate future—at

least the next ten years—we will continue to base

deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. We have little choice; today’s technology

provides no alternative.

That being said, we will press for radical reductions in the number and power of strategic and

intermediate-range nuclear arms. Offensive nuclear arsenals on both sides are entirely too high

and potentially destructive, particularly in the

more destabilizing categories such as the large

MIRVed [multiple independently-targeted reentry

vehicles] Soviet ICBM [intercontinental ballistic

missile] and SS-20 forces.

At the same time, we will seek to reverse the erosion that has occurred in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty regime—erosion that has resulted from Soviet actions over the last ten years.

These include the construction of a large phasedarray radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia

in violation of the ABM Treaty’s provisions regarding the location and orientation of ballistic

missile early warning radars.

For the near term, we will be pursuing the SD I

research program-in full compliance with the

ABM Treaty, which permits such research. Likewise, we expect the Soviets will continue their investigation of the possibilities of new defensive

technologies, as they have for many years,

We have offered to begin discussions in the upcoming Geneva talks with the Soviets as to ho-w

we might together make a transition to a more stable and reliable relationship based on an increasing mix of defensive systems.

The Transition Period: Should new defensive

technologies prove feasible, we would want at

some future date to begin such a transition, during which we would place greater reliance on defensive systems for our protection and that of our

allies.

The criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of such technologies will be demanding. The

technologies must produce defensive systems that

are survivable; if not, the defenses would themselves be tempting targets for a first strike. This

would decrease rather than enhance stability.

New defensive systems must also be cost effective at the margin-that is, it must be cheap

enough to add additional defensive capability so

that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defense.

If this criterion is not met, the defensive systems

could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures

and additional offensive weapons to overcome deployed defenses, instead of a redirection of effort

from offense to defense.

As I said, these criteria are demanding. If the

new technologies cannot meet these standards, we

are not about to deploy them. In the event, we

would have to continue to base deterrence on the

ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. However, we

hope and have expectations that the scientific

community can respond to the challenge.
302

We would see the transition period as a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets. Arms control would play a critical role. We would, for example, envisage continued reductions in offensive

nuclear arms.

Concurrently, we would envisage the sides beginning to test, develop, and deploy survivable and

cost-effective defenses at a measured pace, with

particular emphasis on non-nuclear defenses. Deterrence would thus begin to rely more on a mix

of offensive nuclear and defensive systems instead

of on offensive nuclear arms alone.

The transition would continue for some time—

perhaps for decades. As the U.S. and Soviet strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals declined significantly, we would need to negotiate reductions in other types of nuclear weapons and

involve, in some manner, the other nuclear powers.

The Ultimate Period: Given the right technical

and political conditions, we would hope to be able

to continue the reduction of nuclear weapons down

to zero.

The global elimination of nuclear weapons would

be accompanied by widespread deployments of effective non-nuclear defenses. These defenses would

provide assurance that were one country to cheat–

for example, by clandestinely building ICBMs or

shorter-range systems, such as SS-20s—it would

not be able to achieve any exploitable military

advantage. To overcome the deployed defenses,

cheating would have to be on such a large scale

that there would be sufficient notice so that countermeasures could be taken.

Were we to reach the ultimate phase, deterrence

would be based on the ability of the defense to

deny success to a potential aggressor’s attack. The

strategic relationship could then be characterized

as one of mutual assured security.

Ambassador Nitze then went on to say:

We would have to avoid a mix of offensive and

defensive systems that, in a crisis, would give one

side or the other incentives to strike first. That

is precisely why we would seek to make the transition a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets. . .

In an interview with U.S. News and World Report printed March 18, 1985, National Security

Adviser Robert McFarlane said:7

Now, there is a relationship between reductions

of offensive systems and the integration of defensive systems because of the potentially destabilizing effect of either side achieving a first-strike

capability through possession of both.

“’Prospects Are Good for Arms Pact-But Not Soon, ” U.S. News

and World Report, Mar. 18, 1985, pp. 24-25,

So our policy must be to first establish agreement between ourselves and the Russians on the

value of defensive systems. Once we have reached

agreement on that, then we must establish a path

for the integration of these defensive systems into

the force structure that will be stable.

In an interview on ABC Network television

broadcast June 6, 1985, Secretary of Defense

Caspar Weinberger said:

We’re working for a program that could be a

thoroughly reliable defense that could indeed give

us the confidence that all of these missiles could

be destroyed. But if we get only a partial result,

it still will be very worthwhile.

In a speech on March 29, 1985, George Keyworth described the goal of the SD I as follows:

Is the SDI the means to protect people or to protect weapons? Protecting people represents no

change in present policy. It simply strengthens—

entrenches—the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Protecting people, on the other hand,

holds out the promise of dramatic change.’

This clear purpose of the President has been

repeated time and time again by Cap Weinberger,

Bud McFarlane, and myself. But the ambiguity

over SDI’s real goal remains. It is fostered by

three main tenets: First is the assertion, embraced

by those anxious to protect both past strategic

doctrine and future nuclear systems, that “strengthening deterrence” must be the primary goal for

SDI. Second is that protecting weapons, especially

ICBM silos, is the nearer-term and most likely goal

for SDI. And third is that defense of European military targets against tactical ballistic missiles is

the most politically attractive near-term goal for

SDI.

If these arguments continue to be used as the

basis to achieve Congressional and Allied support,

I believe the opportunity for strategic change–

and the President’s objective—is lost.

***

Terminal defenses within the SDI also can play

a very real part in an overall “layered” defense,

But attempts to make terminal defense our first

move, within the SDI, does not start us in the

direction of the President’s objective.

Following is the text of a “Fact Sheet” on the

Strategic Defense Initiative, issued by The White

House on June 1, 1985, and published by the Department of State:

—

““l’he President Strategic Defense Initiative, ” remarks to the SDI()

LJniversity Review Forum, Mar. 29, 1985.
303 —— ——— —

Special

Report

NO. 129

The Strategic

Defense Initiative

June 1985

United States Department of State

Bureau of Public Affairs

Washington, D.C.

In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a

future in which nations could live secure

in the knowledge that their national

security did not rest upon the threat of

nuclear retaliation but rather on the

ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI) research program is designed to

determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

The Strategic Context

The U.S. SDI research program is

wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic

Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to

research permitted by the ABM Treaty

which the Soviets have been conducting

for many years, and is a prudent hedge

against Soviet breakout from ABM

Treaty limitations through the deployment of a territorial ballistic missile

defense. These important facts deserve

emphasis. However, the basic intent

behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is

best explained and understood in terms

of the strategic environment we face for

the balance of this century and into the

next.

The Challenges We Face. Our nation and those nations allied with us face

a number of challenges to our security.

Each of these challenges imposes its

own demands and presents its own opportunities. Preserving peace and

freedom is, and always will be, our fundamental goal. The essential purpose of

our military forces, and our nuclear

forces in particular, is to deter aggression and coercion based upon the threat

of military aggression. The deterrence

provided by U.S. and allied military

forces has permitted us to enjoy peace

and freedom. However, the nature of

the military threat has changed and will

continue to change in very fundamental

ways in the next decade. Unless we

adapt our response, deterrence will

become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will increase

dramatically.

Our Assumptions About Deterrence. For the past 20 years, we have

based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic

idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation

against any attack and thereby impose

on an aggressor rests that were clearly

out of balance with any potential gains,

this would suffice to prevent conflict.

Our idea of what our forces had to hold

at risk to deter aggression has changed

over time Nevertheless, our basic

reliance on nuclear- retaliation provided

by offensive nuclear forces, as the essential means of deterring aggression, has

not changed over this period.

This basic idea-that if each side

maintained roughly equal forces and

equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be

maintained- also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the

strategic arms limitation talks (SAI.T)

process of the 1970s. At the time that

process began, the United States con
304

eluded that deterrence based on the

capability of offensive retaliatory forces

was not only sensible but necessary,

since we believed at the time that

neither side could develop the

technology for defensive systems which

could effectively deter the other side.

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Scientific developments and several emerging technologies now do offer the possibility of

defenses that did not exist and could

hardly have been conceived earlier. The

state of the art of defense has now progressed to the point where it is reasonable to investigate whether new technologies can yield options, especially

non-nuclear options, which could permit

us to turn to defense not only to

enhance deterrence but to allow us to

move to a more secure and more stable

long-term basis for deterrence.

Of equal importance, the Soviet

Union has failed to show the type of

restraint, in both strategic offensive and

defensive forces, that was hoped for

when the SALT process began. The

trends in the development of Soviet

strategic offensive and defensive forces,

as well as the growing pattern of Soviet

deception and of noncompliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long term, will

undermine the essential military balance

and the mutuality of vulnerability on

which deterrence theory has rested.

Soviet Offensive Improvements.

The Soviet Union remains the principal

threat to our security and that of our

allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military

capabilities, the Soviet Union’s improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard-target kill

capability, has increasingly threatened

the survivability of forces we have

deployed to deter aggression. It has

posed an especially immediate challenge

to our land-based retaliatory forces and

to the leadership structure that commands them. It equally threatens many

critical fixed installations in the United

States and in allied nations that support

the nuclear retaliatory and conventional

forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression.

Improvement of Soviet Active

Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet

Union has continued to pursue strategic

advantage through the development and

improvement of active defenses. These

active defenses provide the SOViet Union

a steadily increasing capability to

counter U. S. retaliatory forces and those

of our allies, especially if our forces

were to be degraded by a Soviet first

strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the

Soviet Union possesses the world’s only

currently deployed antiballistic missile

system, deployed to protect Moscow.

The Soviet Union is currently improving

all elements of this system. It also has

the world’s only deployed antisatellite

(ASAT) capability. It has an extensive

air defense network, and it is aggressively improving the quality of its

radars, interceptor aircraft, and surfaceto-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early

warning radars. All of these elements

provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today and, with

logical evolutionary improvement, could

provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future.

Improvement in Soviet Passive

Defenses, The Soviet Union is also

spending significant resources on

passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own

forces, military command structure, and

national leadership. These efforts range

from providing rail and road mobility for

its latest generation of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to extensive

hardening of various critical installations.

Soviet Research and Development

on Advanced Defenses. For over two

decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a

wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have

shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet

research and development, including a

longstanding and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program

will address, indicate that these trends

will continue apace for the foreseeable

future. If unanswered, continued Soviet

defensive improvements will further

erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now

almost exclusively on the threat of

nuclear retaliation by offenseive forces,

Therefore, this longstanding Soviet program of defensive improvements, in

itself, poses a challenge to deterrence

which we must adress,

Soviet Noncompliance and

Verification. Finally, the problem of

Soviet noncompliance with arms control

agreements in both the offensive and

defensive areas, including the ABM

Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing

either new. phased-array radar near

Krasnoyarsk, in Central Siberia, has

very irnmediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar,

due to its location, will increase the

Soviet Union’s capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense.

Recognizing that such radars would

make such a contribution, the ABM

Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as

one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty.

The Soviet Union’s activity with respect

to this radar is in direct violation of the

ABM Treaty.

Against the backdrop of this Soviet

pattern of noncompliance with existing

arms control agreements, the Soviet

Union is also taking other actions which

affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their

increased use of encryption during

testing, are directly aimed at degrading

our ability to monitor treaty compliance.

Other Soviet actions, too, contribute to

the problems we face in monitoring

Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet

increases in the number of their mobile

ballistic missiles, especially those armed

with multiple, independently-targetable

reentry vehicles, and other mobile

systems, will make verification less and

less certain. If we fail to respond to

these trends, we could reach a point in

the foreseeable future where we would

have little confidence in our assessment

of the state of the military balance or

imbalance, with all that implies for our

ability to control escalation during

crises.
305

join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both

sides.

In addition to the U.S. strategic

modernization program, NATO is

modernizing its longer range

intermediate-range nuclear forces

(LRINF). our British and French allies

also have underway important programs

to improve their own national strategic

nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI

research program does not negate the

necessity of these U. S. and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and

national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision on how

we might enhance security and stability

over the longer term,

New Deterrent Options. However,

over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity,

and the Soviets’ persistence in that pattern of activity, suggest that continued

long-term dependence on offensive

forces may not provide a stable basis for

deterrence. In fact, should these trends

be permitted to continue and the Soviet

investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and

unanswered, the resultant condition

could destroy the theoretical and empirical foundation on which deterrence

has rested for a generation.

Therefore, we must now also take

steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the

long term, and we must do so in a way

that allows us both to negate the

destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive

forces and to channel longstanding

Soviet propensities for defenses toward

more stabilizing and mutually beneficial

ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is

specifically aimed toward these goals. In

the near term, the SD1 program also

responds directly to the ongo]ng and ext(’r)s]~’(’ SOLIet antlt)all]stic miss]]e effort,

i 11(’IuI i irl~ the ex)sti ng Soviet (ie~Iloy -

r~l~>r~ts ~wrnl]tte(i puder- the .A 13M Tr-~~tj’.

‘1’tl(’ S1 )[ rest’ ar(”h pr{)~rarn provides a

r)(’(’(’ss:irj’ an(i ~)(!werfu] (iet~’rrent to any

I)(JAI’ I ($r II I S( )\r IOL (i(’(o IsI( )n to expand

ral Il(ilj Its ar}t II K{]] ist IC rnlssilt’ (Iapat)ility

t)(’}(~mi ttmt (or}t(’rr)pl:it( ~(i I)y the AB M

‘1’rf’a~y ‘1’hts, 111 Its(’lL’, is a (>r]tlca[ Msk.

[](JW’t’\’(’1”, L})L’ OY’C’rrl(liIlg, Iong-tt’rnl i~lportar](c of S1 )] 1s that it f)fft’rs the

~)1 ,sslt)lllt} ( )f r-ever-sing the (iangerous

III I 1 I [<ir) t rt’n( is (“1 t(’1 i iii )( }L(J 1 I} moving to

a })t[ I (r, rrlfjr(’ stalllc Iwts for (kt,fXrt’f)((’ :Ln(l t )y I Ir(~L.11~ I n~ II(IW and compel1 i t~~ Ir)(x’r)cli(’s I(I t})(’ S()\Ict I Jnion for

s(IrI~ I I IS I L n(’~r( )t lat I n~ r( Y I IIct I( II)S II) (’xI > [ 1 I I g I ) i’t’( ‘ I 1> I i t’ ! i U(’](’; ( 1’ :1!’S[ ‘ 11;1] S

The Soviet Union recognizes the

potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost,

postboost, and mid-course defenses—to

change the strategic situation. In our investigation of the potential these

systems offer, we do not seek superiority or to establish a unilateral advantage.

However, if the promise of SDI technologies is proven, the destabilizing

Soviet advantage can be redressed. And,

in the process, deterrence will be

strengthened significantly and placed on

a foundation made more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missile weapons

and by placing greater reliance on

defenses whicb threaten no one.

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During

the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a

radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear

arms, as well as the stabilization of the

relationship between nuclear offensive

and defensive arms, whether on earth or

in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more

stable world, with greatly reduced levels

of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability

to deter war based upon the increasing

contribution of non-nuclear defenses

against offensive nuclear arms. A world

free of the threat of military aggression

and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate

objective to which we, the Soviet Union,

and all other nations can agree.

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions

of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do

so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to

achieve reductions but will judge these

mechanisms on their abiiity to enhance

the security of the United States and

our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce tbe risk of war.

At the same time, the SD] research

pro~ram is and will be conducted in full

compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the

rt’search yields positive results, we will

consult with our allies about the potential nex~ steps. We would then consult

and negotiate, as appropriate, with the

Sovit’t Union, pursuant to the terms of

the ABLM Treaty, which provide for such

consultations, on how deterrence might

Iw strengthened through the phased intro(iuction of defensive systems into the

force structures of both sides. Th]s con)-

n)ltrnent does not mean that Mrt’ would

gIJ’(> the Smrkts a veto ()\fer the outcome

any rn( )r(’ than t ht’ Sov]ets ha~’e u ~’et( )

otft~ r tJU r current stratcgl( am! I n Ler -

m~wiiate-rangtl pr{)~wams. ( )ur m)mn]ltrnc’ nL in this regard refit’(”ts ( )U r rec( )~n I

t ior) that, If our rtwear(’h jIItJl(is :ipI)to[)riatc results , W’t’ Sh( )lll(i S(wk to

move forward in a stable way. We have

already begun the process of bilateral

discussion in Geneva needed to lay the

foundation for the stable integration of

advanced defenses into the forces of

both sides at such time as the state of

the art and other considerations may

mak% it desirable to do so.

The Soviet Union’s View of SDI

As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long

had a vigorous research, development,

and deployment program in defensive

systems of all kinds. In fact, over the

last two decades the Soviet Union has

invested as much overall in its strategic

defenses as it has in its massive

strategic offensive buildup. As a result,

today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive

defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly

attempt to protect this massive, longterm investment.

Allied Views Concerning SDI

Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the

SDI research program. Our common

understanding was reflected in the statement issued following President

Reagan’s meeting with Prime Minister

Thatcher in December, to the effect

that:

First, the U.S. and Western aim

was not to achieve superiority but to

maintain the balance, taking account of

Soviet developments;

Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;

Third, the overall aim is to enhance,

and not to undermine, deterrence; and,

Fourth, East-West negotiations

should aim to achieve security with

reduced levels of offensive systems on

both sides.

7’hls cwmrnon understanding is also

reflected in other- statements since

then-for example, the principles suggested recently I)y the Federai Reput)]ic

of Germany that:

● The existing NATO strate~q of

flexit)le response must remain fully valid

for the alliance as long as there is no

more effective alternative for preventing

war; and,

● The alliance’s politiml and

st rat~y,nc unitj’ must be safqpardwi.

There must he no zones of different

~ j tyq-(~es of swu rit y i n the al I ian(’e, and

h;uro~w’s se(urit) “must not be dw’~mp!ed

from that of NI lrt h America
306

SDI Key Points

Following are a dozen key points that

capture the direction and scope of the

program:

1. The aim of SDI is not to seek

superiority but to maintain the

strategic balance and thereby assure

stable deterrence.

A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to

secure military superiority for the

United States. Put in the proper context

of the strategic challenge that we and

our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly

not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at

seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and

allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses—defenses that

threaten no one.

2. Research will last for some

years. We intend to adhere strictly to

ABM Treaty limitations and will insist

that the Soviets do so as well.

We are conducting a broad-based

research program in full compliance

with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to proceed beyond research.

The SDI research program is a complex

one that must be carried out on a broad

front of technologies. It is not a program where all resource considerations

are secondary to a schedule. Instead, it

is a responsible, organized research program that is aggressively seeking costeffective approaches for defending the

United States and our allies against the

threat of nuclear-armed and conventionally armed ballistic missiles of all

ranges. We expect that the research will

proceed so that initial development decisions could be made in the early 1990s.

3. We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive options the research may generate. We

will not proceed to development and

deployment unless the research indicates that defenses meet strict

criteria.

The United States is pursuing the

broadly based SDI research program in

an objective manner. We have no preconceived notions about the outcome of

the research program. We do not anticipate that we will be in a position to

approach any decision to proceed with

development or deployment based on the

results of this research for a number of

years.

We have identified key criteria that

will be applied to the results of this research whenever they become available.

Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available

earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options

against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI

research program is not to focus on

generating options for the earliest

development/deployment decision but options which best meet our identified

criteria.

4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be

desirable only if they are survivable

and cost effective at the margin.

Two areas of concern expressed

about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability

and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We

have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and

directly.

Our survivability criterion responds

to the first concern. If a defensive

system were not adequately survivable,

an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at

vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that

such a vulnerable system would not be

deployed and, consequently, that the

Soviets would have no incentive or prospect of overwhelming it.

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will

ensure that any deployed defensive

system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost

more than the additional defensive

capability needed to defeat them. This is

much more than an economic argument,

although it is couched in economic

terms. We intend to consider, in our

evaluation of options generated by SDI

research, the degree to which certain

types of defensive systems, by their

nature, encourage an adversary to try

simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while other

systems can discourage such a counter

effort. We seek defensive options which

provide clear disincentives to attempts

to counter them with additional offensive forces.

In addition, we are pressing to

reduce offensive nuclear arms through

the negotiation of equitable and

verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of

warheads on ballistic missiles to equal

levels significantly lower than exist today.

5. It is too early in our research

program to speculate on the kinds of

defensive systems–whether groundbased or space-based and with what

capabilities—that might prove feasible

and desirable to develop and deploy.

Discussion of the various technologies under study is certainly needed

to give concreteness to the understanding of the research program. However,

speculation about various types of defensive systems that might be deployed is

inappropriate at this time. The SDI is a

broad-based research program investigating many technologies. We currently see real merit in the potential of

advanced technologies providing for a

layered defense, with the possibility of

negating a ballistic missile at various

points after launch. We feel that the

possibility of a layered defense both

enhances confidence in the overall

system and compounds the problem of a

potential aggressor in trying to defeat

such a defense. However, the paths to

such a defense are numerous.

Along the same lines, some have

asked about the role of nuclear-related

research in the context of our ultimate

goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our

current research program certainly emphasizes non-nuclear technologies, we

will continue to explore the promising

concepts which use nuclear energy to

power devices which could destroy

ballistic missiles at great distances. Further, it is useful to study these concepts

to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of similar defensive systems

that an adversary may develop for use

against future U.S. surveillance and

defensive or offensive systems.

6. The purpose of the defensive

options we seek is clear—to find a

means to destroy attacking ballistic

missiles before they can reach any of

their potential targets.

We ultimately seek a future in which

nations can live in peace and freedom,

secure in the knowledge that their national security does not rest upon the

threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore,

the SDI research program will place its

emphasis on options which provide the

basis for eliminating the general threat

posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal

of our research is not, and cannot be,

simply to protect our retaliatory forces

from attack.

If a future president elects to move

toward a general defense against

ballistic missiles, the technological options that we explore will certainly also

increase the survivability of our

retaliatory forces. This will require a

stable concept and process to manage

the transition to the future we seek. The
—— . .—— - - —

307

concept anti pro(’ess must be I)ased upon search program, we will seek to pro{xwi mitments tt~ maintain the forces, hoth

a realistic treatment of not onlj’ U.S. hut in a stable fashion with the Soviet

Soviet forces and out-year prokg-ams,

nuclear and conventional, that provide

( lni~,n today’s tieterrence.

7. U.S. and allied security remains

indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance allied security as

welI as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies

to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

This has been a fundamental par-t of

U.S. policy since the inception of the

Strategic Defense Initiative. We ha~e

made a serious commitment to consult,

and such consultations will precede any

steps taken relative to the SD] research

program which may affect our allies.

8, If and when our research

criteria are met, and following close

consultation with our allies, we intend

to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to

the terms of the ABM Treaty, which

provide for such consultations, on how

deterrence could be enhanced through

a greater reliance by both sides on

new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as

according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And,

in fact, we have already been trying to

initiate a discussion of the offensedefense relationship and stahility in the

defense and space talks underway in

Geneva to lay the fr)un(hition to support

such future possible f’< )nsultati(~ns.

If, at some future time, the ( ~nited

States, in close consultation with lts

all ies, decides to pr(~(wd with (deployment of defensive systems, we intend to

utilize n~echanisms f(~r b’. S, - Sf~v iet u Jns ultat ions ~~r< };i(lwi f< Ir if] tile A BA1

Treaty. Throug}l ~uch n~t(hanlsms, and

taking full act’f~llnt of tht S(}vi(’t IJnion’s

own ex ~~anslve iieft~nsi L’(J system rw

9. It is our intention and our hope

that, if new defensive technologies

prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies)

and the Soviets will jointly manage a

transition to a more defense-reliant

balance.

Soviet propagandists have accused

the (Jnited States of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in

space. This is clearly not true. What we

envision is not an arms race; rather, it is

just the opposite–a jointly marlaged approach designed to maintain, at all

times, control over the mix of offensive

and defensive systems of tx~th sides antj

therx~by increase the confi(ienre of all nations in th(j effectiveness and stability of

the evolving strategic hal;incc,

10. SDI represents no change in

our commitment to deterring war and

enhancing stability.

Successful SDI research and development of defense options would not

lead to abandonment of dt*terrence but

rather to an enhancement of (iet,errence

and an evolution in the w’capons of

deterren(’c through the contribution of

defensive systems that threaten no one.

We would dzter a potrntaal aggressor by

rnukzng zt rleur th.ut u!e could dmy h~ m

the gu~ n.s b m rjht othmw~~se h<)pp /(/

wh~erw rwther than rnerelq thre(zterl in{~

him wtth c~wts {(lrgf~ enough t(I ()?ltw?g}~

those guins.

U.S. polity supports tht’ basic principle that our existing meth(xi of deterrc’n(”e and NAT()’s existin~ st rat~~~” ( )f

flexlble response remain full} \Talid, and

must be fullj’ sup~wrttd, as lt)ng as t ht~re

is n<) mot-e effective alternatik.e for

r~reventing war. Jt is in clear recognition

of this ot)vif)us fact that the ( 1 nited

Stat{’s (.ontlnues t{) pursut> so vi~tlr(}llsiy

its ~ ~wn strat(’~nt’ rn[~{i~~rn)zaf if )r) projq-am

A!l(j so strl lngl~’ su~)~ )( )rts tbt’ f’ff{ )rts ( }f

1 ts :i 1 I It’s t( ) s~lsta i n t tl{’1 r < )W n (’~) m

11. For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain

the Itey element of deterrence. Therefore, we musi maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear

forces.

This point reflects the fact that we

must simultaneously use a number of

tools to achieve our goals today while

looking for better ways to achieve our

goats over tlw longer term It expresses

our h~sic rationale for sustaining the

(J.S. strategic modernization program

and the rationale for the critically

needed national m(dernimtion programs

bc’in~ conducted by the (Jnited Kingdom

and Fr:intw.

12. Our ultimate goaI is to

eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By

necessity, this is a very long-term

goal, which requires, as we pursue

our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by

conventional arms imbalances, both

through conventional force improvements and the negotiation of arms

reductions and confidence-building

measures.

We fully recognize the contribution

nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally

rerog-nize the destructiveness of war by

conventional and chemical means, and

the need both to deter such conflict and

to reduce the danger posed by the threat

of aggression]] thr~)u~h such means. ~

Published hy the IJnlteti States Department

of State . Bureau of Publlc Affwrs

office t)f I’uhl Ic (’(jr~~n~~]r~l{.atl{~r~ . Editor}al

I))vls]tm . W’ash]n~t,~n, D C. . June 1!)8,5

‘1’hls rnaterlal IS In tht~ I)uhl]c don]a]n and may

Iw rt’prf)(iu{,(,(i wit h{)u( [)(,rn)isslon; cltatlon of

tt)ls w)urct, IS a[)l)rt,~l:lt(~(i
Appendix I

List of Reagan Administration

Statements on BMD

Abrahamson, James A., Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Statement before

the U.S. Senate Armed Services Subcommittee

on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Apr.

24, 1984.

Abrahamson, James A., Statement before the U.S.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Apr.

25, 1984.

Abrahamson, James A., Statement before the U.S.

House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, July 26, 1984, and subsequent

responses to additional questions on pages

441-466.

Abrahamson, James A., “The Strategic Defense

Initiative, ” Defense/84, August 1984.

Adelman, Kenneth L., Director, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, “What’s Next for Strategic Stability and Arms Control, ” Speech to the

International Institute for Strategic Studies in

London, Feb. 13, 1985.

Cooper, Robert S., Director, Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency, Statement before

the U.S. Senate Armed Services Subcommittee

on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, May

2, 1983.

DeLauer, Richard D., Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Engineering, “The President’s

Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Statement before

the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Subcommittee on Research and Development, Mar. 1, 1984.

DeLauer, Richard D., Statement before the U.S.

Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 8,

1984.

Department of Defense, Overview of Strategic Defense Initiative: Fact Sheet, Mar. 9, 1984.

Department of Defense, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study, March

1984.

Department of Defense, Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of Technologies and

Policy Implications, April 1984.

Department of Defense, Report to the Congress

on the Strategic Defense Initiative, April 1985.

Ikle, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Nuclear Strategy: Can There be a Happy

Ending?” Foreign Affairs, spring 1985.

Keyworth, George A., II, Science Adviser to the

President, Speech to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, Washington, DC, Oct. 13, 1983.

Keyworth, George A., II, “Reassessing Strategic

Defense, ” Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, Feb. 15, 1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Current Issues, ” Speech to the Brookings

Forum on the Future of Ballistic Missile Defense, Washington, DC, Feb. 29, 1984.

Keyworth, George A., 11, “A Sense of Obligation—the Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Aerospace America, April 1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, Statement before the

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

Apr. 25, 1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “Strategic Defense Initiative: The Rational Route to Effective Nuclear

Arms Control, ” Government Executive, June

1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “Strategic Defense: A

Catalyst for Arms Reductions, ” in Proceedings

of the Third Annual Seminar of the Center for

Law and National Security, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., June 23, 1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “The Case for Strategic

Defense: An Option for a World Disarmed, ” issues in Science and Technology, fall 1984.

Keyworth, George A., 11, “New Technologies: The

Catalysts for Reductions in Nuclear Arms, ”

Speech at the University of Maryland, College

Park, Md,, Sept. 5, 1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “Today’s Big Stick:

Technology, ” Speech to the Air Force Association, Washington, DC, Sept. 17, 1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “The President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Speech to the SDIO

University Review Forum, Mar. 29, 1985,

Keyworth, George A., II, “The Case for Arms Control and the Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Arms

Control Today, April 1985.

Keyworth, George A., II, “Security and Stability:

The Role for Strategic Defense, ” Speech at the

308
—

309

University of California, San Diego, May 1,

1985.

Keyworth, George A., 11, “The President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Speech to the Aerospace Association, May 21, 1985.

Keyworth, George A., 11, “SDI-Where Does the

United States Stand Now?” Speech to the American Security Council Foundation, June 4, 1985.

McFarlane, Robert C., Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs, “Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Speech to the Overseas

Writers Association, Washington, DC, Mar. 7,

1985.

McFarlane, Robert C., Interview, U.S. News and

World Report, Mar. 18, 1985, pp. 25-26.

Nitze, Paul H., Special Adviser to the President

and the Secretary of State for Arms Reductions,

“On the Road to a More Stable Peace, ” Speech

to the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, World Affairs

Council, Feb. 20, 1985.

Nitze, Paul H., “The Objectives of Arms Control, ”

Speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Mar. 28, 1985.

Reagan, Ronald, “Defense Spending and Defensive Technology, ” Speech on nationwide television, Mar. 23, 1983.

Reagan, Ronald, The President Strategic Defense Initiative, White House pamphlet issued

Jan. 3, 1985.

Reagan, Ronald, Speech to the National Space

Club, Washington, DC, Mar. 29, 1985.

Shultz, George, Secretary of State, “Arms Control: Objectives and Prospects, ” Speech to the

Austin, Texas, Council on Foreign Relations,

Mar. 28, 1985.

Weinberger, Caspar W., Secretary of Defense,

News conference on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Mar, 27, 1984.

Weinberger, Caspar W., Speech at the Foreign

Press Center, Washington, DC, Dec. 19, 1984.

Weinberger, Caspar W., Speech to the American

Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, DC,

Apr. 11, 1985.

White House, Fact Sheet on The Strategic Defense

Initiative, issued June 1, 1985, 11 pp.

Yonas, Gerold, Chief Scientist, Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization, “The Reagan Strategic

Defense Initiative, ” Daedalus, spring 1985.

Yonas, Gerold, “Strategic Defense Initiative: The

politics and science of weapons in space, ”

Physics Today, June 1985, pp. 24-32
Appendix J

Articles by Critics of

the Strategic Defense Initiative

Ball, George, “The War for Star Wars, ” The New

York Review of Books, Apr. 11, 1985, pp. 38-44.

Bethe, Hans A., et al., “Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense, ” Scientific American, October

1984, pp. 39-49.

Boutwell, Jeffrey, and Richard A. Scribner, The

Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Arms Control Implications, American Association for the

Advancement of Science, Washington, DC, May

1985, 44 pp.

Brown, Harold, “The Strategic Defense Initiative:

Defensive Systems and the Strategic Debate, ”

Survival, March/April 1985, pp. 55-64. Also

printed in Discussion Paper No. 104, California

Seminar on International Security and Foreign

Policy, Santa Monica, Calif., March 1985.

Bundy, McGeorge, et al., “The President’s Choice:

Star Wars or Arms Control, ” Foreign Affairs,

63:264-278, winter 1984/85.

Burrows, William E., “Ballistic Missile Defense:

The Illusion of Security, ” Foreign Affairs,

62:843-856, spring 1984.

Chayes, Abram, “Treaties and Legal Issues, ”

Speech on ballistic missile defense at Symposium on Space, National Security and C-cubed1, The Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Mass., Oct.

25, 1984. Mitre Document M85-3, pp. 29-32.

Clausen, Peter A., “SDI in Search of A Mission, ”

World Policy Journal, spring 1985, pp. 249-303,

Clifford, Clark, Testimony before the Committee

on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, May 1, 1985.

Drell, Sidney, and Thomas H. Johnson, eds., Strategic Missile Defense: Necessities, Prospects,

and Dangers in the Near Term, Report of a

workshop at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University,

April 1985, 23 pp. Also printed in Hearings of

the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Committee on Armed Services,

U.S. Senate, March 19, 1985.

Drell, Sidney, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative:

A Techm”cal, Poh”tical, and Arms Control Assessment, Center for International Security and

Arms Control, Stanford University, 1984, 142

PP”

Drell, Sidney, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, “Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique

of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative, ” International Security, 9(2):51-91, fall, 1984.

Drell, Sidney, and Wolfgang K.H, Panofsky, “The

Case Against Strategic Defense: Technical and

Strategic Realities, ” Issues in Science and Technology, fall 1984.

Garwin, Richard L., “Countermeasure: Defeating

Space-based Defense, ” Arms Control Today,

May 1985.

Garwin, Richard L., “How Many Orbiting Lasers

for Boost-Phase Intercept?” Nature, May 23,

1985, pp. 286-290.

Garwin, Richard L., et al., The Fallacy of Star

Wars, Random House, 1984.

Garwin, Richard, et al., “Space Weapons, ” Bul]etin of the Atom”c Scientists, May 1984.

Glaser, Charles L., “Why Even Good Defenses

May Be Bad, ” International Security 9(2):92-

123, fall 1984. Abridged version appears in Bulletin of the Atomu”c Scientists, March 1985, pp.

13-16.

Hartung, William D., et al., The Strategic Defense

Initiative: Costs, Contractors and Consequences, Council on Economic Priorities, New

York, 1985.

Hoopes, Townsend, “The Star Wars Proposal, ”

CIV9 Reports, The Committee for National Security, Washington, DC, winter 1985.

Jacky, Jonathan, “The ‘Star Wars’ Defense Won’t

Compute, ” The Atlantic Monthly, June 1985,

pp. 18-30.

Kaiser, Robert G., “A Disarming Lack of Candor, ”

The Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1985.

Krauthammer, Charles, “The Illusion of StmWars, ” The New Republic, May 14, 1984, pp.

13-17.

League of Women Voters, “Space-Age Defense:

Pipe Dream or Protection?” National Voter,

League of Women Voters, Washington, DC,

spring 1985, pp. 1-8.

Longstreth, Thomas K., John E. Pike, and John

B. Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet

Bti”stic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM

Treaty, National Campaign to Save the ABM

Treaty, Washington, DC, March 1985, 99 pp.

310
McNamara, Robert S., and Hans A. Bethe, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War, ” The Atlantic

Monthly, July 1985, pp. 43-51.

McNamara, Robert S., Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, May 1, 1985.

Paine, Christopher, “The ABM Treaty: Looking

for Loopholes, ” Bulletin of the Atonu”c Scientists, August/September 1983, pp. 13-16.

Pike, John, The Strate~”c Defense Im”tiative

Budget and Program, Federation of American

Scientists, Washington, DC, July 1985.

Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., “The Strategic Defense Initiative: Perception vs Reality, ” Physics

Today, June 1985, pp. 34-45.

Rathjens, George, and Jack Ruina, “The Uncertainty of Ballistic Missile Defense, ” DaecfaZus,

summer 1985.

Rathjens, George, “The Strategic Defense Initiative: The Imperfections of ‘Perfect Defense ’,”

Environment, June 1984, pp. 6-13.

Rhinelander, John B., “How to Save the ABM

Treaty, ” Arms Control Today, May 1985.

Schlesinger, James R., Speech on ballistic missile

defense at Symposium on Space, National Security and C-cubed-I, The Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Mass., Oct. 25, 1984. Mitre Document

311

M85-3, pp. 55-62. See also pp. 959-961 in Mr.

Schlesinger’s article “The Eagle and the Bear, ”

Foreign Affaks, summer 1985.

Sedacca, Sandra, and Robert DeGrasse, Star

Wars: Questions and Answers on the Space

Weapons Debate, Common Cause, Washington,

DC, February 1985, 36 pp.

Sewall, Sarah, “Militarizing the Last Frontier: The

Space Weapons Race,’” Defense Monitor, Vol.

12, No. 5, 1983, Center for Defense Information,

Washington, DC, 8 pp.

Sherr, Alan B., Legal Issues of the “Star Wars”

Defense Program, Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear

Arms Control, Inc., Boston, Mass., June 1984.

Stein, Jonathan, From Z1-Bomb to Star Wars: The

Politics of Strategic Decision Making, Lexington Books, 1984.

Stone, Jeremy, “The Four Faces of Star Wars:

Anatomy of a Debate, ” F.A.S. Public Interest

Report: Journal of the Federation of American

Scientists, March 1985,

Articles by Richard L. Garwin, Spurgeon M.

Keeny, Jr., and George Rathjens in Ashton B.

Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds,, Ballistic

Missile Defense, The Brookings Institution,

1984.
Appendix K

Excerpts From Soviet Statements on BMD

The Soviet reaction to President Reagan’s

March 23, 1983, speech was prompt and strongly

negative. Four days after the speech was given,

the Soviet President, Yuri Andropov, denounced

President Reagan’s proposal to develop new types

of BMD systems, Andropov said the idea of defensive measures might seem attractive to the uninformed, but:

In fact, the strategic offensive forces of the

United States will continue to be developed and

upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite line

at that, namely that of acquiring a nuclear first

strike capability. Under these conditions, the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying, with the help of the ABM defenses, the corresponding strategic systems of the other side,

that is, of rendering it unable to deal a retaliatory

strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the

face of the U.S. nuclear threat. . . [It] is only

mutual restraint in the field of ABM defenses that

will allow progress in limiting and reducing offensive weapons, that is in checking and reversing

the strategic arms race as a whole. Today, however, the United States intends to sever this interconnection. Should this conception be converted

into reality, this would actually open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic

arms, both offensive and defensive. Such is the real

purport, the seamy side, so to say, of Washington’s “defensive conception.”*

These themes have been reiterated vigorously

and persistently ever since by Soviet newspaper

commentators, scientists, diplomats, and senior

officials.

In an interview with U.S. News and World Report in April 1984, the Director of the Soviet Institute of Space Research, Roald Sagdeyev, commented on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

as follows:

We have made a detailed analysis. We believe

that even if it would be possible to build such a

system—a very expensive system—it would not

prove to be an absolute shield. Its penetrability

would remain quite high.

It will always be possible–and at a lower cost–

to interfere with such a system or to foil it by increasing the number of attacking weapons,

A space-based defense system would prove to

be extraordinarily destabilizing. When those who

command such a system understand that it does

not provide 100 percent protection, they might be

seduced by the idea of attempting a first strike,

‘FFrom I)ra}’da, Mar. 27, 1983.

Our conclusion is quite pessimistic; It will lead to

a new round in the arms race and will increase the

emphasis on developing first-strike weapons.2

Following are excerpts from an article by

another prominent Soviet scientist, Yevgeny P.

Velikhov, a vice-president of the Soviet Academy

of Sciences:

. . . [The deployment of a BMD system] would

significantly complicate the maintenance of deterrence, making it highly unstable, for it would stimulate the illusion of advantages (damage limitation

and even a chance for surviving nuclear war) associated with a first strike. . . . [I]f both sides possessed space-based [BMD] systems the destabilizing effect would be much greater than if such

systems were available to only one side. In the context of strategic logic (without considering psychological and political aspects) this thinking arises

from the fact that if both sides had these systems,

their impetus for a preemptive first strike would

be greater, since each side could hope to secure an

advantage by striking first.

. . . The development of [space-based antimissile systems] could stimulate an increase in the

arsenals of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear

warheads, for example, strategic cruise missiles,

including sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles

. . . If tests of the space-based systems were to begin, to say nothing of their actual deployment, the

permanent ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972,

would be threatened. . . . It is hard to overestimate

the importance of this U.S.-Soviet Treaty today

for it remains the only ratified and acting agreement in the area of strategic arms limitation, . . .

Abrogation of the ABM Treaty would in turn

undoubtedly lessen chances for reaching mutually

beneficial strategic arms limitation and reduction

agreements in the near future. The stabilizing regime created by the 1972 ABM Treaty could be

strengthened significantly by agreements on the

non-deployment in space of any weapons and the

non-use of force in space.

***

[Space-based BMD systems] would inevitably

become a serious obstacle for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the peaceful uses of space, Yet the potential value of such cooperation is important from

economic, scientific and technological points of

view, because of the many mutually complementary characteristics of the Soviet and U.S. space

programs. Cooperation in this area could be a very

positive factor, politically and psychologically, in

improving U.S.-Soviet relations in general, and in

— — —

2U. S. News and N’orld Report, Apr. 23, 1984, p. 50.

312
strengthening the confidence between the peoples

and the leaders of the two great powers.

The potential impact of a large-scale space-based

anti-missile program on the strategic balance

would be to substantially increase both the risk

of a preemptive strike and the likelihood of wrong

and fatal decisions in crises. Hence even if rough

parity in strategic forces were preserved, strategic stability would be seriously undermined.’

In August 1983 the Soviet Union formally proposed at the United Nations General Assembly a

revised draft treaty on “The Prohibition of the Use

of Force in Outer Space and From Space Against

the Earth.’” The provisions of this draft would ban

space-based weapons, anti-satellite systems, and

military use of manned spacecraft.

Former Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko

issued several statements on ballistic missile defense. Following are illustrative excerpts:

We are resolutely against the development of

broad-scale antimissile defense systems, which

cannot be viewed in any other way than as aimed

at the unpunished perpetration of nuclear aggression. There is an indefinite Soviet-American treaty

on antimissile defense, prohibiting the creation of

such systems. It must be rigorously observed. s

Today, no limitation and, all the more, no reduction of nuclear arms can be attained without effective measures that would prevent the militarization of outer space. . . Using the term “defense”

is juggling with words. In its substance, this is an

. . . aggressive concept. The aim is to try to disarm the other side and deprive it of a capability

to retaliate in the event of nuclear aggression

against it.

To put it simply, the aim is to acquire a capability to deliver a nuclear strike, counting on impunity with an anti-ballistic missile shield to protect oneself from retaliation. . . . [U.S. BMD

deployment not only would mean] the end of the

process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction,

but [it] would become a catalyst of an uncontrolled

arms race in all fields.6

In a lengthy interview on Moscow television

January 13, 1985, then Soviet Foreign Minister

Andrei Gromyko discussed the results of his January 7-8 meeting with Secretary of State George

Shultz. The following excerpts refer to space

weapons:

. . . [It] is impossible to examine either the question of strategic armaments or the question of

intermediate-range nuclear weapons without ex-

‘Yevgenlr P, Velikho\, “Effect on Strategic Stability, ” Bulletin of the

Atomic .’+ientists, hlay 1984.

41J. N. General Assembly Document No. A138 194

‘TASS, Dec 20, 1984.

“’C’hernenko Again L$’arns U.S on Space Plan, ” ,\Tet+ l’ork Times,

Feb. 1, 1985, p. 3.

313

——.. .

amining the question of . . . averting an arms race

in space. In the end the American side agreed to

adopt such a viewpoint. This fact is a positive one.

. . . [Preventing “militarization of space” means]

arms intended for use against targets in space

should be banned categorically and also that arms

intended for use from space against. . . targets on

the ground, in the sea and in the air should be

banned categorically.

***

[If] accords [on preventing militarization of

space] became clear, then it would be possible to

move forward also on questions of strategic armaments. The Soviet Union would be willing not only

to examine this problem of strategic armaments

but would also be willing to reduce them sharply.

. . . And on the contrary, if there were no movement forward in space questions, then it would be

superfluous even to speak about the possibility of

a reduction in strategic armaments.

***

We are told this: After all, the United States

does not have the intention of striking a blow at

the Soviet Union. We tell them: Well, then, it follows that the Soviet Union must rely on your conscience, on the conscience of Washington. Well,

first of all, we are not very convinced that Washington has very great reserves of this merchandise. . . . And second, if we were to mentally trade

places with you, . . . if we were trying to create

such a system, corresponding statements, statements to the effect that: You should rely on our

conscience. Would they be sufficient for you? Silence. Silence.

***

[The] chief barrier that separates the policy of

the Soviet Union from that of the United States

is atomic weapons. . . . [Reaching agreement at the

Geneva negotiations] would therefore undoubtedly

denote a big step forward in matters relating to

improving bilateral Soviet- U.S. relations, especially if one takes account of the fact that both

sides are major powers with broad-ranging international interests.

The June 4, 1985, issue of Pravda contained a

long article on the ABM Treaty by Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General

Staff. Excerpts follow:

The limitation, still more the reduction, of nuclear arms is inconceivable in conditions of the

militarization of space. The creation and deployment in space of strike arms will inevitably lead

to an increase in the quantity of, and to the qualitative improvement of, strategic nuclear arms. . . .

The creation of the large-scale space ABM system

contemplated in the United States has a clear aggressive point: This system is a most important

element in the integrated offensive potential of the
314

side that has created it, undermines strategic

equilibrium, and provides the opportunity for the

United States to deliver a first strike in the hope

that the retaliatory strike against U.S. territory

can be averted.

How is the other side, the Soviet Union, supposed to behave under these conditions? It is left

with no choice; it will be forced to ensure the restoration of the strategic balance and to build up

its own strategic offensive forces, supplementing

them with means of defense. Therefore, any attempts to limit strategic offensive armaments

while creating space strike means are futile.

The military-political significance of the

Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty is extremely great. This

treaty is one of the foundations on which relations

between the sides are based. By signing it the Soviet Union and the United States recognized that

in the nuclear age only mutual restraint in the

sphere of ABM systems will make it possible to

advance along the path of limiting and reducing

nuclear arms, that is, to curb the strategic arms

race as a whole,

. . . If the [ABM Treaty] were to lapse for any

reason, the foundation on which talks between the

sides on nuclear arms limitation could be based

and conducted would disappear. This would effectively mean the collapse of talks and an uncontrolled arms race for decades.

. . . The U.S. Administration’s actions in creating a new class of weapons—space strike means—

are incompatible with the principles forming the

foundation of the ABM Treaty. By proclaiming

the “Strategic Defense Initiative” and embarking

on the practical implementation of a large-scale

anti-ballistic missile system with space-based elements, Washington is effectively working directly

to undermine the treaty.

***

[U.S. leaders] are saying that the U.S. actions

running counter to the treaty can somehow be

legitimized, for instance, by revising this document and making amendments to it agreed with

the Soviet side. . . .

All this is merely an unworthy ploy aimed at

reassuring public opinion. . . . The United States

is working toward changing the meaning of the

Treaty itself and emasculating it of its main

content—the ban on the deployment of an ABM

defense of the country’s territory.

The Soviet Union, of course, will not countenance the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems being transformed into a cover for U.S. policy aimed at ensuring an arms race in the sphere

of space anti-ballistic missile systems.

. . . If space strike arms are banned, and preparations for their creation are halted at the stage

of scientific research work, broad opportunities

will be opened up for a radical reduction of nuclear

arms. The Soviet Union has already proposed a

reduction of strategic offensive arms by onefourth. Given the non-militarization of space, it is

possible to carry out even more profound reductions. . . . For its part, the Soviet Union will persistently seek in Geneva specific, mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible to put

an end to the arms race and carry forward the

cause of disarmament.

In a speech7 in May 1985, Soviet General Chairman Mikhail S. Gorbachev said:

There are no people in the world who are not worried by the U.S. plans to militarize space. This

worry is well grounded. Let us take a realistic view

of matters: the implementation of these plans

would thwart disarmament talks.

Moreover, it would dramatically increase the

threat of a truly global, all-destroying military conflict. Anyone capable of an unbiased analysis of

the situation and sincerely wishing to safeguard

peace cannot help opposing “star wars. ”

In a nationally televised speech June 26, 1985,

Chairman Gorbachev said:

We are prepared to seek accord not only about

ending the arms race, but about the greatest of

arms reductions—right up to general and complete

disarmament. At present, as you know, we are

holding talks with the United States in Geneva.

The task before them, as the Soviet leadership understands it, is to end the arms race on earth and

prevent one in space, We embarked upon the negotiations in order to achieve these aims in practice. But all the indications are that this is precisely what the U.S. Administration, and the

military-industrial complex which it serves, do not

want. The attainment of serious accords evidently

does not enter into their plans, They are continuing to implement their gigantic program of forcing through the production of more and more new

types of weapons of mass destruction in the hope

of achieving superiority over the countries of socialism, and dictating their will to them. The

Americans have not only failed to put forward any

serious proposals in Geneva for curtailing the arms

race, but on the contrary, are taking steps that

make such a curtailment impossible. I am thinking of the so-called “star wars” program to create offensive space weapons. Talk of its supposed

defensive nature is, of course, a fairy tale for the

gullible. The idea is to attempt to paralyze the Soviet Union’s strategic arms and guarantee the opportunity of an unpunished nuclear strike against

our country.

This is the essence of the matter, and one which

we cannot fail to take into account. If the Soviet

Union is faced with a real threat from space, it will

find a way to effectively counter it. Let no one, and

‘TASS, May 27, 1985,
— —

I say this quite definitely, doubt this. For the time

being, one thing is clear –that is, that the American program for the militarization of space plays

the role of a blank wall. barring the way to the

achievement in Geneva of the relevant accords.

By its militarist policy the U.S. Administration

is assuming a grave responsibility to mankind. If

our partners at the Geneva talks continue with

their line of playing for time at the meetings of

the delegations, avoiding a solution of the questions for which they have assembled and using this

time to push ahead with their military programs

in space, on the ground, and at sea, we shall then

of course have t o assess the whole situation anew.

We simply cannot allow the talks to be used again

to divert attention and to cover up military preparations, whose purpose is to secure U.S. strategic superiority}’ and achieve world dominance. In

rebuffing these schemes, I am confident that we

will be supported by the really peace-loving forces

throughout the whole world and that we will be

supported by the Soviet people.

In a letter’ sent July 5, 1985, to American scientists, Chairman Gorbachev said:

. . . on behalf of the Soviet leadership I want to

state in all definiteness that the Soviet Union will

not be the first to make a step into outer space

with weapons. We shall make every effort to convince other countries, and above all the United

States of America, not to make such a fatal step

which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and would give an impetus to the uncontrolled arms race in all directions.

Proceeding from this goal, the Soviet Union, as

you evidently know, has made a radical proposal

in the United Nations organization, tabling a draft

treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in

space and from space against earth. If the United

States joined the vast majority of states that have

supported this initiative, the issue of space weapons could be closed once and for all.

At the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and

space arms in Geneva we are seeking to come to

terms on a full ban on the development, testing,

315

and deployment of space attack systems. Such a

ban would make it possible not only to preserve

outer space for peaceful development, research,

and scientific discoveries, but also to launch the

process of sharply reducing, then eliminating nuclear weapons.

We have also repeatedly taken unilateral steps

which have been called upon to set a good example to the United States. It is for two years now

that the Soviet Union has maintained its moratorium on the placement of anti-satellite weapons in

outer space, and it will continue abiding by it for

as long as the other states will be acting in the

same way. Lying on the table in Washington is our

proposal for both sides to put a total end to efforts

to develop new anti-satellite systems and for such

systems already possessed by the U.S.S.R. and the

United States, including those whose testing has

not yet been completed, to be scrapped. The actions of the American side wilt show already in the

near future which decision the U.S. Administration will prefer.

Strategic stability and trust would, no doubt,

be strengthened if the United States agreed together with the U.S.S.R. in a binding form to reaffirm commitment to the regime of the Treaty on

the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

a treaty of unlimited duration.

The Soviet Union is not developing attack space

weapons or a large-scale ABM system, just as it

is not laying the foundation for such a defense. It

strictly adheres to its obligations under the treaty

as a whole and, in its particular aspects, unswervingly observes the spirit and the letter of that document of paramount importance. We invite the

American leadership to join us in that undertaking, [and] renounce the plans of space militarization that are now in the making, plans which would

invariably lead to the breakup of that document—

the key link of the entire process of nuclear arms

limitations.

The U.S.S.R. proceeds from the premise that the

practical fulfillment of the task of preventing an

arms race in space and terminating it on earth is

possible given the political will and sincere desire

of both sides to work toward attaining that

historic goal. The Soviet Union has such a desire

and such a will. . . .
Appendix L

References on Strategic Nuclear Policy

This list represents an effort to select a representative sampling of the voluminous literature on

this subject. Lawrence Freedman’s book contains

an extensive bibliography.

Books

Allison, Graham T., Albert Carnesale, and Joseph

S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An

Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York:

W. W. Norton, 1985).

Berman, Robert P., and John C. Baker, Soviet

Strate@”c Forces: Requirements and Responses

(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

Blair, Bruce G., Strategic Command and Control:

Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington:

The Brookings Institution, 1985).

Blechman, Barry M., cd., Rethinking the U.S.

Strategic Posture (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger,

1982).

Boutwell, Jeffrey, Donald Hafner, and Franklin A.

Long, eds., Weapons in Space: The Politics and

Technology of Balh”stic Missile Defense and

Anti-Satellite Weapons (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985). (Also published in the spring 1985

and summer 1985 issues of Daeda.Zus.)

Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1983.

Brodie, Bernard, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1966).

Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security

—Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous

World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983).

Brown, Harold, and Lynn E. Davis, Nuclear Arms

Control Choices (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1984).

Carnesale, Albert, et al., Living with Nuclear

Weapons (New York: Bantam Books, 1983).

Carter, Ashton B., and David N. Schwartz, eds.,

BaL%tic Missile Defense (Washington: The

Brookings Institution, 1984).

Chayes, Abram, amd Jerome B. Wiesner, eds.,

ABM (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

Davis, Jacquelyn K., et al, The Soviet Union and

Bti”stic Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980).

Drell, Sidney D., Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, The Reagan Strateg”c Defense Initiative:

A Technical, Poh’tical, and Arms Control Assessment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control,

1984.)

Dyson, Freeman, Weapons and Hope (New York:

Harper and Row, 1984).

Ford, Daniel, The Button: The Pentagon Strate~”c Command and Control System (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1985).

Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear

Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981).

Frei, Daniel, and Christian Catrina, Risks of Um”ntentiond Nuclear War (London: Taylor and

Francis, 1982).

Gallis, Paul E., Mark M. Lowenthal, and Marcia

S. Smith, The Strate~”c Defense Initiative and

United States AU”ance Strategy, Report No. 85-

48-F (Washington: Congressional Research

Service, U.S. Congress, February 1, 1985).

Garwin, Richard L., Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W.

Kendall, The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York:

Random House, 1984).

Gompert, David C., et al., Nuclear Weapons and

World Politics: Alternatives for the Future (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

Graham, Daniel O., High Frontier: A New Natiomd Strategy (Washington: High Frontier,

1982).

Graham, Daniel O., and Gregory A. Fossedal, A

Defense That Defends; Blocking Nuclear Attack

(Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1983).

Gray, Colin S., Nuclear Strategy and Strate~”c

Planning (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research

Institute, 1984.)

Green, Philip, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus, OH: Ohio State

University Press, 1966).

Hartung, William D., et al, The Strate~”c Defense

Initiative: Costs, Contractors and Consequences

(New York: Council on Economic Priorities,

1985),

Herspring, Dale, and Robin Laird, The Soviet

Union and Strate~”c Arms (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms

Race (New Haven, CO: Yale University Press,

1983).

Huntington, Samuel P., cd., The Strate~”c Imperative: New Policies for American Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982).

Jasani, Bhupendra, cd., Space Weapons–The

316
317

.

Arms Control Dilemma (London: Taylor and

Francis, 1984).

Jasani, 13hupendra, and Christopher Lee, Countdown to Space War (London: Taylor and Francis,

1984).

Jastrow, Robert, How to Make Nuclear Weapons

Obsolete (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co.,

1985).

Jervis, Robert, The Illo~”c of American Nuclear

Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1984).

Kahan, Jerome H., Security in the Nuclear Age–

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Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Pat McGowan, eds,,

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CA: Sage Publications, 1982).

Kennan, George F., The Nuclear Delusion (New

York: Pantheon, 1982).

Krepon, Michael, Strate~”c StaZemate: Nuclear

R

t

’capons and Arms Control in American Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984).

Kolkowicz, Roman, and Neil Joeck, eds., Arms

Control and International Securit-v (Boulder,

C(): Westview Press, 1984).

I.ebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War; The

Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

Leebaert, Derek, cd., Soviet Military Thinking

(London: George A1len and Unwin, 1981.

Mandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Question: The

Um”ted States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Martin, Laurence, cd., Strate~”c Thought in the

Nuc]ear Age (Baltimore, MD: ,Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1979).

MchTamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security:

Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and

ROW, 1968).

Nacht, Michael, The Age of Vulnerability: Threats

to Nuclear Stalemate (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985).

National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms ControZ: Background and Issues (Washington: National Academy Press, 1985).

Nincic, Miroslav, The Arms Race: The Political

Economy of MiZitary Growth (New York: Praeger, 1982).

O’Neill, Robert and D.M. Homer, eds,, New Directions in Strategic Thinking (London: George

Allen and Unwin, 1981).

Palme, Olof, et al., Common Securit&y: A Programme

for Disarznament (London: Pan Books Ltd.,

1982).

Payne, Keith B., Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet

Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).

Schneider, William, Jr., et al., U.S. Strate~”cNuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense:

The 1980s and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980),

Smith, Gerard, Doubletalk: The Story of the First

Strate~”c Arms Limitation Talks (New York:

Doubleday, 1980).

Smoke, Richard, National Securit&y and the NucZear Dilemma (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,

1984).

Smoke, Richard, War: Controlling Escalation

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

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Stein, Jonathan B., From H-Bomb to Star Wars:

The Poh”tics of Strategic Decision Making (I.exington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1984

(London: Taylor and Francis, 1984.

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Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Nuclear Negotiation Project, Harvard IJaw School, 1984).

Weinberger, Caspar W., Report of the Secretary

of Defense to the Congress (Washington: Department of Defense, February 4, 1985).

Weston, Burns H., cd., Toward ILTuclear Disarmament and Global Securitwv: A Search for Alternatives (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

White, Ralph K., Fearful Warriors: A Ps~cholog”-

cal Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations (New York:

The Free Press, 1984).

Woito, Robert S., To End War: A New Approach

to International Conflict (New York: Pilgrim

Press, 1982).

Yanarella, Ernest J., The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics,

1955-1972 (Lexington, KY: University Press of

Kentucky, 1977).

Yost, David S., NATO Strateg”c Options: Arms

Control and Defense (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon

Press, 1982).

Articles

Abrahamson, James A., “The Strategic Defense

Initiative, ” Defense/84, August 1984.

AuCoin, Les, “Nailing Shut the Window of Vulnerability, ” Arms Control Toda~~. September

1984.

Ball, Desmond, “Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?”

Adelphi Paper No. 169, International Institute

for Strategic Studies, I.ondon, 1981.
318

Barkenbus, Jack N., and Alvin M. Weinberg,

“Defense-Protected Build-Down, ” Bulletin of

the Atomic Scientists, October 1984, pp. 18-23.

Bethe, Hans A., et al, “Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense, Scientific American, October

1984, pp. 39-49.

Broad, William J., “Allies in Europe Are Apprehensive About Benefits of ‘Star Wars’ Plan, ”

New York Times, May 13, 1985, pp. A-1, A-6.

Brown, Harold, “The Strategic Defense Initiative:

Defensive Systems and the Strategic Debate, ”

Survival, March/April 1985, pp. 55-64. Also

printed in Discussion Paper No. 104, California

Seminar on International Security and Foreign

Policy, Santa Monica, Calif., March 1985.

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Arms Control: Where Do We Stand?” Foreign

Affairs, 62:1145-1160, summer 1984.

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M. Kampelman, “Defense in Space is Not Star

Wars, ” New York Times Magazine, Jan. 27,

1985.

Bundy, McGeorge, et al, “The President’s Choice:

Star Wars or Arms Control, ” Foreign Affa”rs,

63:264-278, winter 1984/85.

Bundy, McGeorge, et al, “Nuclear Weapons and

the Atlantic Alliance, ” Foreign Affav”rs, 60:753-

768, spring 1982.

Burrows, William Il., “Ballistic Missile Defense:

The Illusion of Security, ” Foreign Affa”rs,

62:843-856, spring 1984.

Clifford, Clark M., Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, May 1, 1985.

Drell, Sidney D., and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky,

“The Case Against Strategic Defense: Technical and Strat~gic Realities;’ Issues in Science

and Technology, fall 1984, pp. 45-65.

Drell, Sidney D., Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, “Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique

of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative, International Security, 9(2):51-91, fall 1984.

Forsberg, Randall, “Confining the Military to Defense as a Route to Disarmament, ” World Policy Journal, 1:285-318, winter 1984.

Garthoff, Raymond L., “Mutual Deterrence and

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Garwin, Richard, et al, “Space Weapons, ” Bulletin of the Atom”c Scientists, May 1984.

George, Alexander L., “Crisis Management: The

Interaction of Political and Military Considerations, ” Survival, 26:223-235, September/October

1984.

Glaser, Charles I.., “Why Even Good Defenses

May Be Bad, ” International Security 9(2):92-

123, fall 1984. Abridged version appears in

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1985,

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Gray, Colin S., “Strategic Stability Reconsidered, ”

Daedalus (Journal of the American Academy of

Arts and Sciences), 109 (4):135-154, fall 1980.

Hafner, Donald, “The Strategic Defense Initiative

and Nuclear Deterrence, Daedalus, spring

1985.

Hart, Douglas M., “Soviet Approaches to Crisis

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Howe, Sir Geoffrey, “Defence and Security in the

Nuclear Age, ” Speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London, Mar. 15, 1985.

Ikle, Fred C., “Nuclear Strategy: Can There be a

Happy Ending?” Foreign Affa”rs, spring 1985,

pp. 810-826.

Ikle, Fred C., “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out

the Century?” Foreign Affairs, winter 1973.

Keyworth, George A., II, “A Sense of Obligation—The Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Aerospace America, April 1984, pp. 56-62.

Keyworth, George A., 11, “Strategic Defense Initiative: The Rational Route to Effective Nuclear

Arms Control, ” Government Executive, June

1984.

Keyworth, George A., II, “The Case For Strategic Defense: An Option For a World Disarmed, ”

Issues in Science and Technology, fall 1984.

Krauthammer, Charles, “The Illusion of Star

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13-17.

Kupperman, Robert H., and Harvey A. Smith,

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176:18-23, Apr. 7, 1972.

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Murray, Russell, 2nd, “Consequences of Nuclear

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Rathjens, George, and Jack Ruina, “The Uncer-
tainty of Ballistic Missile Defense, ”

Summer 1985.

319

.

Daedalus, Beyond, ed. by Mason Willrich and John B.

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M85-3, pp. 55-62,

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March 21, 1984.

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Appendix M

References on Soviet Strategic Policy

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Strategk Forces: Requirements and Responses

(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

Davis, Jacquelyn K., et al, The Soviet Um”on and

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Garthoff, Raymond L., “Mutual Deterrence and

Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy, ” Internatiomd Security, 3(1):112-147, summer 1978.

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1980.

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Race (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press,

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Strate~”c Doctrine: Implications for Decision

Making (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction

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Star Wars, ” Bulletin of the Atom”c Scientists,

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Blechman (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982).

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Beyond, ed. by Mason Willrich and John B.

Rhinelander (New York: The Free Press, 1974),

Strode, Dan L., and Rebecca V. Strode, “Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security

Policy, ” International Security, 8(2):91-1 16, fall

1983.

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Statements: A Methodological Analysis, Report

No. CNA-81-O26O,1O, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., December, 1983.

320
Appendix N

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

List of Acronyms

ABM —anti-ballistic missile

ALCM —air-launched cruise missile

ASAT —anti-satellite

BMD –ballistic missile defense

C

3

I —command, control, communications,

and intelligence

CONUS –continental United States

D E W –directed-energy weapon

DSA T –defensive satellite

GLCM –ground-launched cruise missile

ICBM —intercontinental ballistic missile

IR —infrared

IRBM —intermediate-range ballistic missile

K E W —kinetic-energy weapon

K KV –kinetic-kill vehicle

LWIR –long-wave infrared

MaRV —maneuverable reentry vehicle

MIRV —multiple independently targeted

reentry vehicle

MILSAT–military satellite

M PS

MWI R

M X

PBV

RV

SDI

SDIO

SLBM

SLCM

SWIR

UV

—multiple protective shelters, once to

be used for basing MX

—medium-wave infrared

—experimental missile, newest addition to U.S. ICBM arsenal, also

called “Peacekeeper”

–post-boost vehicle

—reentry vehicle

–Strategic Defense Initiative

–Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

—submarine-launched ballistic missile

—sea-launched cruise missile

—short-wave infrared

—ultraviolet

Definitions of Terms

Ablative Shield: A shield that evaporates when

heated, absorbing laser energy and protecting

the object which is behind it from heat damage.

ABM Treaty: A Treaty of 1972, signed and ratified

by the Soviet Union and the United States,

prohibiting development of many types of antiballistic missile systems and limiting deployments on each side to a specified number of

land-based units, which use only rocket interceptors and ground-based radar.

Acquisition: Detection of a potential target by the

sensors of a weapons system.

Active Sensor: One that illuminates a target, producing return secondary radiation, which is

then detected in order to track and/or identify

the target. An example is ladar (cf.).

Adaptive Optics: Optical systems which can be

modified (e.g., by controlling the shape of a

mirror) to compensate for distortions. An example is the use of information from a beam of

light, passing through the atmosphere to compensate for the distortion suffered by another

beam of light on its passage through the atmosphere. Used to eliminate the “twinkling” of

stars in observational astronomy and to reduce

the dispersive effect of the atmosphere on laser

beam weapons.

Air-breathing: Describing a flying weapon that

travels through the atmosphere and uses air in

its propulsion system. Examples are jet aircraft

and cruise missiles. Specifically does not include

ballistic missiles.

Analog Processing: Problem solving in a computer

by means of direct manipulation of the magnitudes of a physical quantity. For example, the

sizes of different voltage pulses may be compared, added, subtracted, etc., in the course of

solving a problem (cf. digital processing).

Anti-satellite Weapon (ASAT): A weapon to destroy satellites in space.

Anti-simulation: Deceiving adversary sensors by

making a strategic target look like a decoy.

Area Defense: An ABM defense covering a large

area. Usually implies the capability to protect

“soft” (i.e. not hardened missile silos or bunkers)

targets.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): A defense system

that is designed to protect territory from attacking ballistic missiles. Usually conceived as

having several independent layers.

Battle Management: The set of instructions and

rules and the corresponding hardware controlling the operation of a BMD system, Sensors

and interceptors are allocated by the system,

and the updated battle results are presented to

the (human) command for analysis and possible

intervention.

Birth-to-death Tracking: The tracking of objects

from the time that they are deployed from a

booster or post-boost vehicle until they are

killed or detonated.

321
322

Bistatic Radar: Radar systems in which the receiver and transmitter are separated.

Blackout: The disabling of radar by means of a nuclear explosion. The intense electromagnetic

energy released generates a large background

that obscures signals and renders many types

of radar useless for minutes or longer.

Boost Phase: The phase of a missile trajectory

from launch to burnout of the final stage. For

ICBMs, this phase typically lasts from 3 to 5

minutes, but studies indicate that reductions to

the order of 1 minute could be possible.

Brightness: In this report, the amount of power

that can be delivered per unit solid angle by a

directed-energy weapon.

Coherence: The matching, in space and time, of the

wave structure of different parallel rays of a

single frequency of electromagnetic radiation.

This results in the mutual reinforcing of the

energy of these different components of a larger

beam. Lasers can produce coherent radiation.

Command Guidance: The steering and control of

a missile by transmitting commands to it.

Common Mode Failure: Refers to a type of system

failure in which diverse components are disabled

by the same single cause.

Constellation Size: The number of defensive weapon satellites placed in orbit about the Earth as

part of a BMD system.

Counter-countermeasures: In this report, measures taken by the defense to defeat offensive

countermeasures.

Countermeasures: In this report, measures taken

by the offense to overcome aspects of a BMD

system.

Cruise Missile: A missile traveling within the

atmosphere at aircraft speeds and, usually, low

altitude, whose trajectory is preprogrammed. I t

is capable of achieving high accuracy in striking a distant target. It is maneuverable during

flight, is constantly propelled, and therefore

does not follow a ballistic trajectory. Cruise missiles may be nuclear armed, but do not have to

be.

Dazzling: In this report, the temporary blinding

of a sensor by overloading it with an intense signal of electromagnetic radiation, e.g., from a laser or a nuclear explosion.

Decoy: An object that is designed to make an observer believe that the object is more valuable

than is actually the case. Usually, in this report,

a decoy refers to a light object, not containing

a warhead, designed to look like a nuclear-armed

reentry vehicle.

Defensive Satellite Weapon (DSAT): A device that

is intended to defend satellites in space by destroying attacking ASAT weapons,

Defensive Technologies Study Team (DTST): A

committee, generally known as the “Fletcher

Panel, ” after its Chair, appointed by President

Reagan to investigate the technologies of potential BMD systems.

Diffraction: The spreading out of electromagnetic

radiation as it leaves an aperture, such as a mirror. The angle of spread, which cannot be eliminated by focusing, is proportional to the ratio

of the wavelength of radiation to the diameter

of the aperture.

Digital Processing: The most familiar type of computing, in which problems are solved through

the mathematical manipulation of streams of

numbers.

Directed-Energy Weapon: A weapon that kills its

target by delivering energy to it at or near the

speed of light. Includes lasers and particle beam

weapons.

Discrimination: The ability of a defensive system

to differentiate decoys or other nonthreatening

objects from targets, e.g., a threatening booster

rocket, post-boost vehicle, or RV.

Early Warning: In this report, early detection of

an enemy ballistic missile launch, usually by

means of surveillance satellites and long-range

radar.

Electromagnetic Radiation: A form of propagated

energy, arising from electric charges in motion,

that produces a simultaneous wavelike variation of electric and magnetic fields in space. The

highest frequencies (or shortest wavelengths) of

such radiation are possessed by gamma rays,

which originate from processes within atomic

nuclei. As one goes to lower frequencies, the

electromagnetic spectrum includes X-rays,

ultraviolet light, visible light, infrared light,

microwaves, and radio waves.

Electron-volt: The energy gained by an electron in

passing through a potential difference of one

volt.

Endoatmospheric: Within the atmosphere; an endoatmospheric interceptor reaches its target

within the atmosphere.

Exoatmospheric: Outside the atmosphere; an exoatmospheric interceptor reaches its target in

space.

Fast-Burn Booster: A ballistic missile that can

burnout much more quickly than current versions, possibly before exiting the atmosphere

entirely. Such rapid burnout complicates a

boost-phase defense.

Fission: The breaking apart of the nucleus of an
323

atom, usually by means of a neutron. For very

heavy elements, such as uranium, a significant

amount of energy is produced by this process,

When controlled, this process yields energy

which may be extracted for civilian uses, such

as commercial electric generation. When uncontrolled, energy is liberated very rapidly: such

fission is the energy source of uranium- and

plutonium-based nuclear weapons; it also provides the trigger for fusion weapons.

Fratricide: The destructive effect of the earlierdetonating weapons in a barrage on those weapons which arrive later.

Functional Kill: The destruction of a target by disabling vital components in a way not immediately detectable, but nevertheless able to prevent the target from functioning properly. An

example is the destruction of electronics in a

guidance system by a neutral particle beam.

Fusion: The fusing of two atomic nuclei, usually

of light elements, such as hydrogen. For light

elements, energy is liberated by this process.

Hydrogen bombs produce most of their energy

through the fusion of hydrogen into helium.

Geosynchronous Orbit: An orbit about 35,800 km

above the Equator. A satellite placed in such

an orbit revolves around the Earth once per day,

maintaining the same position relative to the

surface of the Earth. It then appears to be stationary, and is useful as a communications relay or as a surveillance post.

Hard Kill: Destruction of a target in such a way

as to produce unambiguous visible evidence of

its neutralization.

Hardness: In this report, a property of a target,

measured by the power needed per unit area to

destroy the target by means of a directedenergy weapon. A hard target is more difficult

to kill than a soft target.

Homing Device: A device, mounted on a missile,

that uses sensors to detect the position or to

help predict the future position of a target, and

then directs the missile to intercept the target.

It usually updates frequently during the flight

of the missile.

Impulse Kill: The destruction of a target, using

directed energy, by ablative shock. The intensity of directed energy is such that the surface

of the target violently and rapidly boils off, delivering a mechanical shock wave to the rest of

the target and causing structural failure.

Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR): A type

of radar similar to synthetic aperture radar (cf.),

but which uses information from the motion of

targets in order to provide high resolution.

Ionization: The removal or addition of one or more

electrons to a neutral atom, forming a charged

ion.

Keep-out Zone: A volume around a space asset, off

limits to parties not owners of the asset. Keepout zones could be negotiated or unilaterally

declared. The right to defend such a zone by

force and the legality of unilaterally declared

zones under the Outer Space Treaty remain to

be determined.

Kill Assessment: The detection and assimilation

of information indicating the destruction of an

object under attack. Kill assessment is one of

the many functions to be performed by a battle management system.

Kinetic-Energy Weapon: A weapon that uses kinetic energy, or energy of motion, to kill an object. Weapons that use kinetic energy are a

rock, a bullet, a nonexplosively armed rocket,

and an electromagnetic railgun.

Ladar: A technique analogous to radar, but which

uses laser light rather than radio or microwaves.

The light is bounced off a target and then detected, with the return beam providing information on the distance and velocity of the target.

Laddering Down: A hypothetical technique for

overcoming a terminal phase missile defense.

Successive salvos of salvage-fused (cf.) RVs attack. The detonations of one salvo disable local

ABM abilities so that following salvos are able

to approach the target more closely before being, in turn, intercepted. Eventually, by repeating the process, the target is reached and destroyed.

Lasant: A material that can be stimulated to produce laser light.

Laser: A device that produces a narrow beam of

coherent radiation through a physical process

known as stimulated emission. Lasers are able

to focus large quantities of energy at great distances, and are among the leading candidates

for BMD weapons.

Layered Defenses: The use of several layers of

BMD at different phases of the missile trajectory. Each layer is designed to be as independent as possible of the others, and each would

probably use its own, distinctive set of missile

defense technologies.

Leverage: In this report, refers to the advantage

gained by boost-phase intercept, when a single

booster kill may eliminate many RVs and decoys before they are deployed. This could provide a favorable cost-exchange ratio for the defense, and would reduce stress on later layers

of the defense system.
324

— . .- — —

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The multilateral Treaty

signed and ratified by the United States and the

U.S.S.R. in 1963 which prohibits nuclear tests

in all locations except underground.

Megawatt: One million watts; a unit of power. A

typical commercial electric plant generates

about 500 to 1,000 megawatts.

Mev: One million electron-volts. A unit of energy

usually used in reference to nuclear processes.

It is equivalent to the energy that an electron

gains in crossing a potential of 1 million volts.

Micron: One-millionth of a meter (equivalently,

one-thousandth of a millimeter). Roughly twice

the wavelength of visible light.

Midcourse Phase: The phase of a ballistic missile

trajectory in which the RVs travel through

space on a ballistic course towards their targets.

This phase lasts up to 20 minutes.

Military Satellite (MILSAT): A satellite used for

military purposes, such as navigation or intelligence gathering.

Monostatic Radar: A radar system in which the

receiver and transmitter are colocated.

Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV): One of several RVs on the same

post-boost vehicle that can be independently

placed on a ballistic course towards a target after completion of the boost phase.

Multiple Phenomenology: A system using repeated observations of potential targets by

means of different physical principles and different sensor systems. In the case of sensor systems, the use of multiple phenomenology makes

it more difficult for an adversary to deceive

them.

Multistatic Radar: A radar system with a transmitter and several receivers, all separated.

Optical Processing: A type of analog processing

(q.v.) in which the behavior of light beams,

passed through optical systems, is used in problem solving.

Outer Space Treaty of 1967: A signed and ratified

agreement between the Soviet Union, the

United States, and other nations, forbidding the

basing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in space.

Parallel Processing: The use of different paths in

a computer to work simultaneously on different

calculations needed to solve a single problem,

thus reducing the time needed for the overall

calculation.

Passive Sensor: One that detects naturally occurring emissions from a target for tracking and/or

identification purposes.

Penetration Aid: In this report, a device mounted

on a post-boost vehicle with RVs, that is used

to confuse defenses, It may be a decoy or anything else that renders more difficult the defense’s job of detecting and killing the RVs or

the PBV.

Phased-Array Radar (PAR): A radar with elements

that are physically stationary, but with a beam

that is electronically steerable and can switch

rapidly from one target to another. Used for

tracking many objects, often at great distances.

Pointing: The aiming of sensors or defense weapons at a target with sufficient accuracy either

to track the target or to aim with sufficient accuracy to destroy it.

Post-boost Phase: The phase of a missile trajectory, after the booster’s stages have finished firing, in which the various RVs are independently

placed on ballistic trajectories towards their targets. In addition, penetration aids (cf.) are dispensed from the post-boost vehicle. The length

of this phase is typically 3 to 5 minutes, but

could be drastically reduced.

Power Supply: In this report, a source of energy

for a BMD component. It may be ground- or

space-based, and may range from commercial

electric plants to space-based nuclear reactors.

Preferential Defense: The concentration of (usually limited) defensive assets on a subset of sites

in order to assure the survival of some of them.

Preferential Offense: The concentration of offensive assets on a subset of targets.

Pumping: In this report, the raising of the molecules or atoms of a lasant (cf.) to an energy state

above the normal lowest state, in order to produce laser light. This results when they fall back

to a lower state. Pumping may be done using

electrical, chemical, or nuclear energy.

Redout: The blinding or dazzling of infrared detectors due to high levels of infrared radiation

produced in the upper atmosphere by a nuclear

explosion.

Reentry: The return of objects, originally launched

from Earth, into the atmosphere.

Reentry Vehicle (RV): As used in this report, reentry vehicles are small containers containing nuclear warheads. They are released from the last

stage of a booster rocket or from a post-boost

vehicle (cf.) early in the ballistic trajectory. They

are thermally insulated to survive rapid heating during the high velocities of reentry into the

atmosphere, and are designed to protect their

contents until detonation at their targets.

Responsive Threat: The threat (cf.) after taking
325

into account modernization and BMD countermeasures.

Robust: In this report, describing a system, indicating its ability to endure and perform its

mission against a reactive adversary. Also used

to indicate ability to survive under direct

attack.

Safeguard: A U.S. midcourse and terminal-phase

defense for ICBMs, deployed in 1975 and deactivated in 1976 due to its limited cost-effectiveness.

Salvage-fused: Describing a warhead that is set to

detonate when it is attacked. Usually refers to

a nuclear warhead.

Selectivity: In this report, refers to choosing a subset of targets, either for attack or defense. See

preferential defense and preferential offense.

Semi-active Sensor: One that does not generate radiation itself, but that detects radiation reflected by targets when they are illuminated by

other BMD components. Such devices are used

for tracking and identification and can operate

without revealing their own locations.

Sensors: Electronic instruments that can detect radiation from objects at great distances. The information can be used for tracking, aiming, discrimination, attacking, kill assessment, or all of

the above. Sensors may detect any type of electromagnetic radiation or several types of nuclear particles.

Sentinel: ABM system designed for light area defense against a low-level ballistic missile attack

on the United States. Developed into the Safeguard (cf. ) system in late 1960s.

Shoot-back: In this report, the technique of defending a space asset by shooting at an attacker.

Signature: Distinctive type of radiation emitted

or reflected by a target, which can be used to

identify that target.

Simulation: The art of making a decoy look like

a more valuable strategic target (cf. anti-simulation).

Slew Time: The time needed for a weapon to reaim

at a new target after having just fired at a previous one.

Soft Kill: Same as functional kill.

Space Mines: Hypothetical devices that can track

and follow a target in orbit, with the capability

of exploding on command or by pre-program,

in order to destroy the target.

Spartan: Nuclear-armed long-range midcourse interceptor used in Safeguard/Sentinel systems

(cf.).

Sprint: Nuclear-armed short-range interceptor

used in Safeguard/Sentinel systems (cf.).

SS-18: Largest ICBM in current Soviet inventory,

credited with carrying 10 RVs, but capable of

holding many more.

Stimulated Emission: Physical process by which

an excited molecule is induced by incident radiation to emit radiation at an identical frequency and in phase with the incident radiation.

Lasers operate by stimulated emission.

Structured Attack: An attack in which the arrival

of warheads on their diverse targets is precisely

timed for maximum strategic impact.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): A radar technique that processes echoes of signals emitted

at different points along a satellite’s orbit. The

highest resolution achievable by such a system

is theoretically equivalent to that of a single

large antenna as wide as the distance between

the most widely spaced points along the orbit

that are used for transmitting positions.

Terminal Phase: The final phase of a ballistic missile trajectory, lasting about a minute or less,

in which the RVs reenter the atmosphere and

detonate at their targets.

Thermal Kill: The destruction of a target by heating it, using directed energy, to the degree that

structural components fail.

Threat: The anticipated inventory of enemy weapons. In the context of this report, the inventory

is of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as of decoys, penetration aids, and

other BMD countermeasures.

Track File: Information stored in computer memory containing position coordinates and velocity components of a target. In this report, refers

to such information concerning offensive weapons during their trajectories: e.g., boosters,

RVs, decoys.

Tracking: The monitoring of the course of a moving target. Ballistic objects may have their

tracks predicted by the defensive system, using

several observations and physical laws.

Transition: In this report, the period in which the

world strategic balance would shift from offense-dominance to defense-dominance.

Warhead: A weapon, usually a nuclear weapon,

contained in the payload of a missile.