UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4922

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

OSWALD MILES, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:10-cr-00382-FL-1)

Submitted: April 5, 2012 Decided: May 15, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Oswald Miles, Jr., pled guilty to possession of stolen 

ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (2006). The 

district court departed above the Guidelines range pursuant to 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 4A1.3, p.s., 5K2.21, p.s. 

(Inadequate Criminal History Category; Dismissed and Uncharged 

Conduct) (2010), and imposed a sentence of forty-one months’ 

imprisonment. Miles appeals his sentence, arguing that the 

district court procedurally erred in several respects in making

the departure. We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse 

of discretion standard, which includes both procedural and 

substantive reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007). The same standard applies whether the sentence is 

“inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines 

range.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 

2009). The district court “has flexibility in fashioning a 

sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need only “set 

forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that it has 

considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for 

its decision. United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 364 

(4th Cir.) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 

(2007)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011). 
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Guidelines § 4A1.3(a)(1) provides that, “[i]f reliable 

information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history 

category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the 

defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the 

defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be 

warranted.” Miles contends that the district court committed 

procedural error in departing based only on his prior 

convictions, set out in the presentence report, without 

considering any other “reliable information” concerning the 

seriousness of his criminal record. His position is not 

supported by the language of § 4A1.3 or its commentary. Miles’ 

prior convictions constituted reliable evidence because they 

were “established by . . . interaction with the legal system[.]” 

United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 351 (2d Cir. 2005) 

(holding that defendant’s alleged sexual relationship with 

teenage boy as evidenced by internet chats was not “reliable 

information” for § 4A1.3 departure). 

The district court found that Miles’ multiple 

convictions, beginning at a young age, indicated a propensity to 

further criminal conduct which was not reflected in his criminal 

history category. Moreover, the court found that other admitted 

criminal conduct was not accounted for, specifically, his crimes 

against the two underlying victims of his current offense. We 
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conclude that the court identified a sufficiently reliable basis 

for the departure.

Next, Miles claims that the district court failed to 

follow correctly the incremental approach set out in § 4A1.3 and 

case law for departures above criminal history category VI, see

United States v. Dalton, 477 F.3d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 2007),

because the court moved from offense level 11 to level 13 

without addressing the adequacy of level 12. However, in Dalton

we held that “[s]ection 4A1.3’s mandate to depart incrementally 

does not, of course, require a sentencing judge to move only one 

level, or to explain its rejection of each and every intervening 

level.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

By finding that offense level 13 produced a sentencing range 

that allowed a sentence that the court decided was sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary to account for the seriousness of 

Miles’ offense and the likelihood that he would commit future 

crimes, the court implicitly rejected offense level 12 as 

inadequate to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a). 

Finally, Miles suggests that the district court failed 

to explain adequately its reasons for the extent of the 

departure. However, the sentencing judge need only “set forth 

enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his 

own legal decisionmaking authority.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 
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(quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). We are satisfied that the 

district court’s explanation for the sentence did not constitute 

procedural error.

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the Court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED