United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to Congressional

Requesters

March 1996 TERRORISM AND

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Threats and Roles of

Explosives and

Narcotics Detection

Technology

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270791 

March 27, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Alfonse M. D’Amato

United States Senate

The ability to detect explosives and narcotics is increasingly important to

U.S. national security. In response to your request, we are providing

information on the first phase of our review, which focused on (1) the

threats of terrorist attacks to civil aviation and of narcotics trafficking in

the United States, (2) strategies developed to meet these threats, and

(3) planned detection technology deployments to combat terrorism and

interrupt the shipment of narcotics. The second phase of our work will

cover technology development and both domestic and overseas

deployment. The third will cover impediments to more widespread

deployment.

As you requested, we limited our efforts to ports of entry into the United

States, including airports. On November 7, 1995, we briefed your staff on

the results of this phase of our work. This report summarizes and updates

the information presented in that briefing.

Background The threats posed by terrorists’ use of explosives and by narcotics

trafficking differ in significant ways. The bombing of an aircraft is still a

rare event, but the consequences are catastrophic. By contrast, narcotics

trafficking is a frequent occurrence and a single shipment has far different

consequences than an aircraft bombing. The Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) is responsible for defining the level of threat to civil

aviation security, based upon assessments from law enforcement and

intelligence agencies, and prescribing countermeasures, but airlines and

airports are responsible for implementing those measures. Unlike aviation

security, narcotics countermeasures are the responsibility of many

agencies at all levels of government. The FAA is developing explosives

detection technology to aid in countering threats to aviation. The U.S.

Customs Service, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Office of

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-270791 

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which coordinates counterdrug

enforcement research and development within the government, are

participating in developing nonintrusive detection technology to aid in

countering narcotics trafficking.

Results in Brief The intelligence community believes that the threat of terrorism within the

United States has increased. Although no specific aviation threat is known,

experts believe that aviation is likely to remain an attractive target for

terrorists. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), terrorist

attacks could come from groups that are difficult to infiltrate and control.

Information was uncovered in January 1995 about plans by such a group

for multiple attacks on specific U. S. flights in Asia. Narcotics trafficking is

a continuing concern. While cocaine has been the primary threat since

1985, heroin is becoming more of a threat. The intelligence community

believes traffickers are presently most active on the Southwest border of

the United States and use vehicles such as cars, trucks, and tractor-trailers

carrying containers to smuggle narcotics.

To counter these threats, the FAA and Customs have developed strategies

that rely on intelligence information; various procedures, such as profiling

and targeting high-risk shipments for examination; and technologies. The

FAA relies on a strategy of “tailored response” to mandate security

procedures commensurate with the level of threat at specific places and

times. The terrorist threat overseas is higher, and therefore, the FAA

mandated more stringent security measures for international flights,

including use of conventional X-ray screening for checked baggage.

Customs’ strategy includes disseminating intelligence on drug trafficking,

targeting high-threat conveyances and cargoes, and using detection

technologies; the current emphasis is on the Southwest border and

particularly on trucks, private vehicles, and their contents.

Concealed explosives and narcotics are difficult to detect using

technologies currently deployed in the United States. Tests of

conventional X-ray screening conducted by the FAA in May 1994 showed

that there is a low probability of detecting a moderately sophisticated

explosive device. Since then, the FAA has certified an advanced automated

explosive detection system, but has not required deployment of that

system. The FAA’s preliminary estimates are that the cost of purchasing

and installing the system at the 75 busiest domestic airports could range

from $400 million to $2.2 billion, depending on the mix of technologies and

procedures. Customs has one truck X-ray system at the Southwest border

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-270791 

for detecting narcotics and plans to acquire others at a total cost of about

$38 million. Its plans for seaports and the use of mobile systems have not

been clearly defined. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and

France, are already deploying advanced technologies intended for

explosives or narcotics detection.

Briefing section I provides more details about threats to aviation and the

role of detection technology to counter terrorism. Briefing section II deals

with the drug trafficking and the technology to detect drugs.

Agency Comments FAA, ONDCP, DOD, Customs, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of

Justice, FBI, and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reviewed the

information in a draft of this report and provided oral comments. They

generally agreed with the facts presented and their suggested technical

corrections have been incorporated where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information for this report, we met with officials from 17

departments and agencies, including the FAA, Customs, and major agencies

in the counterterrorism and counternarcotics communities. In order to

identify the threats of terrorist attacks to civil aviation and of narcotics

trafficking in the United States, we interviewed officials and obtained

documentation primarily from the CIA; the FBI; the FAA; the ONDCP; Customs;

and the DEA. As a part of this effort, we analyzed studies prepared by the

FAA and DEA to identify the greatest vulnerabilities to both ensuring civil

aviation safety and interdicting narcotics. We also reviewed strategies

developed by the FAA and Customs and identified the mix of intelligence,

procedures and technologies needed to defeat their respective threats.

Finally, we met with FAA and Customs officials to discuss their plans to

acquire detection technologies and reviewed their plans to acquire these

technologies. Where possible, we made site visits and observed the

detection technologies actually being used to detect explosives or

narcotics.

We performed this first phase of work between May 1995 and

February 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
B-270791 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen, Senate and

House Committees on Budget, on Appropriations, and on Transportation;

Senate Armed Services Committee and House National Security

Committee; and Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means

Committee; the Secretary of Defense; the Administrators, FAA and Drug

Enforcement Administration; the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; the

Directors, ONDCP, CIA, and FBI; and the Attorney General, Department of

Justice. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning terrorism or drug

trafficking issues, please contact Louis Rodrigues at (202) 512-4841. If you

have specific questions regarding aviation security or FAA programs, please

contact John Anderson, Jr., at (202) 512-2834. Major contributors to this

report are listed in appendix I.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues,

National Security and

 International Affairs Division

John H. Anderson, Jr.,

Director, Transportation and

 Telecommunications Issues,

Resources, Community, and Economic

 Development Division

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Page 5 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and

Role of Explosives

Detection Technology

in Countering

Terrorism

8

Explosives’ Threat to Aviation 8

Terrorism Counterthreat Strategy 10

Planned Explosives Detection Technology Deployment 12

Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and

Narcotics Detection

Technology

14

Narcotics Threat 14

Narcotics Counterthreat Response 16

Customs Counterthreat Framework 18

Planned Technology Deployment for Counternarcotics 20

Appendix I 

Major Contributors to

This Report

22

Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and Role of Explosives

Detection Technology in Countering

Terrorism

GAO Explosives' Threat to Aviation 

Intelligence community's role

Change in pattern of terrorism

Vulnerabilities

Aviation as a target; Asia threat as an 

example

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) evaluates information collected

and analyzed by the intelligence community to establish levels of terrorist

threat and to determine appropriate countermeasures. Based on classified

communications that the FAA received, it issued directives beginning in

August 1995 to raise temporarily the level of domestic aviation security.

Unclassified reporting indicates changes in the pattern of terrorism. The

terrorism threat within the United States is increasing. In 1994, the State

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and Role of Explosives

Detection Technology in Countering

Terrorism

Department reported that attacks by state-sponsored, secular terrorist

groups declined, but attacks increased from radical fundamentalist

groups, who operate more autonomously. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation reported in 1994 that the most important development in

international terrorism in the United States was the emergence of

international radical terrorist groups with an infrastructure that can

support terrorist activities. These groups are more difficult to infiltrate,

and, consequently, it is also more difficult to predict and interdict their

attacks.

Since 1991, the FAA has completed three studies to prioritize the specific

methods that terrorists might adopt to attack aviation and to identify

countermeasures. Although the studies are classified, the unclassified

conclusion has been consistent: the greatest threat is explosives in all

types of concealment. The FAA believes the greatest vulnerability is

concealment of explosives in checked baggage. About 450 million

passengers board domestic flights each year, and the volume of their

checked bags is enormous. On domestic flights, controls over checked

luggage are not as stringent as on international flights. The FAA is funding

the development of technology to screen checked bags, passengers,

carry-on luggage, cargo, and mail.

A recent threat in Asia indicates the potential extent of terrorists’

motivation and capabilities. Information was accidentally uncovered in

early January 1995 about plans for multiple attacks on specific U.S. flights

in Asia. Existing extraordinary security procedures in place at

international airports would not have countered the specific threat;

consequently, the FAA further mandated additional security measures at

specific locations overseas. Officials told us that they rarely have the

advantage of a detailed, verifiable plot to target U.S. airlines and that the

terrorists were aware both of airport vulnerabilities and how existing

security measures could be defeated. Security was returned to

December 1994 levels in most locations following the arrests of the plot

leaders. The threat in Asia has caused the FAA to increase research and

development funding for certain types of screening.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and Role of Explosives

Detection Technology in Countering

Terrorism

GAO Terrorism Counterthreat Strategy

"Tailored response"

Contingency plan

Heightened security

Raising the baseline

The FAA’s counterthreat strategy is to mandate security measures

commensurate with, or tailored to, the level of threat at specific places and

times. The threat overseas is higher than domestically. On all international

flights, the FAA requires U.S. carriers to implement the International Civil

Aviation Organization standards as a minimum, including the inspection of

carry-on passenger baggage and passenger bag match. Bag matching is a

procedure to ensure that a passenger who checks a bag also boards the

flight; if not, the bag is removed. The FAA also requires additional, more

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and Role of Explosives

Detection Technology in Countering

Terrorism

stringent measures—including passenger interviews and 100 percent

checked baggage screening and supplementary carry-on baggage

screening measures—at all airports in Europe and the Middle East, and

many airports elsewhere. Further, the FAA requires, depending on the

destination, various security controls for checked bags on all international

departures by U.S. and foreign carriers from the United States.

For flights within the United States, baseline security measures include the

use of walk-through metal detectors for passengers and X-ray screening of

carry-on luggage augmented by procedures from a written contingency

plan developed by the FAA in coordination with the aviation industry. The

plan describes a wide range of procedures that can be invoked depending

on the nature and degree of the threat. Among these procedures are

passenger bag match and passenger profiling. Profiling is a method of

identifying potentially threatening passengers, who are then subjected to

additional security measures. Profiling reduces the number of passengers

requiring additional security measures.

For domestic flights, the heightened security measures currently in effect

are at their highest level since the Gulf War. They have included

surveillance of airport operations, parking restrictions, and stricter control

over baggage.

Senior FAA officials believe that some security measures that are now

invoked only in higher threat conditions should be incorporated into the

everyday baseline security for domestic flights. However, these officials

told us the costs and impacts of these measures would be significant; for

example, the FAA estimates that incorporating bag matching in everyday

security measures could cost up to $2 billion. They said that standard

cost-benefit analyses would likely reject these measures, and

consequently, they believe a consensus is needed among industry,

Congress, and the executive branch, before they initiate rule-making

procedures to require these measures. Further, they believe that without

consensus the rule making would fail.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and Role of Explosives

Detection Technology in Countering

Terrorism

GAO Planned Explosives Detection

Technology Deployment

Congressional mandate

Status of explosives detection 

technologies

FAA's planned approach 

Costs and impacts of new technology

In the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, Congress directed the FAA

to (1) accelerate explosives detection research and development, which

had been ongoing since 1977, and (2) certify explosive detection systems

prior to mandating their deployment. Congress further set November 1993

as a goal for deploying new security technology and procedures to counter

terrorism. In implementing its certification responsibilities under the act,

the FAA published criteria for explosive detection technology in

September 1993 after an extensive examination of the threat to aviation

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section I 

Threat to Aviation and Role of Explosives

Detection Technology in Countering

Terrorism

and after coordination with other federal agencies and the scientific and

academic communities. The criteria require that a system certified for use

on checked baggage for international flights meet specific performance

requirements, using testing protocols developed by the National Academy

of Sciences, to automatically detect concealed explosives. The FAA

believes that congressional direction to develop performance

requirements and testing protocols in conjunction with the scientific

community contributed to delaying the introduction of new technology.

Conventional X-ray devices, currently used domestically for international

flights, have performance limitations and are dependent on a human

operator’s ability to interpret images for potential threats. These X-rays

performed poorly in a special assessment that the FAA conducted in

May 1994, with five U.S. carriers at four major domestic airports that were

origination points for international flights. This assessment used

moderately sophisticated, simulated explosive devices.

Subsequent to its special domestic assessment, the FAA certified one

automated explosives detection system. The FAA does not plan to mandate

the use of this system until two or more competing systems have been

certified and airport demonstrations have been successfully completed.

Once that happens, the FAA plans a phased-in deployment because of

manufacturers’ constraints on large-scale production and the difficulty of

integrating explosives detection equipment and procedures into existing

baggage handling systems. The FAA expects to mandate the deployment of

certified explosives detection systems beginning no earlier than 1997.

Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, Israel, and Belgium, are

already deploying new advanced automated technologies.

The cost to acquire new technology is uncertain but could be substantial.

The FAA is developing a model to estimate the systemwide costs of a

variety of checked baggage screening methods, including deployment of

certified technology at the busiest domestic airports. Preliminary FAA

estimates are that one-time acquisition and installation costs of the

certified system for the 75 busiest airports could range from $400 million

to $2.2 billion, with continuing annual operating costs of 10 percent or

less. We have not verified these estimates, which will be further refined

through joint efforts between the FAA and the aviation industry. Final costs

will depend upon several factors, including the extent to which passenger

profiling is used. According to FAA officials, profiling reduces the number

of bags screened by about 80 percent.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

GAO Narcotics Threat

Counternarcotics community role

Changes in patterns of narcotics 

trafficking

Vulnerabilities 

Customs relies on intelligence collected and analyzed by the

counternarcotics community as well as that gathered by its field agents,

inspectors, and analysts from investigations and seizures to establish a

general level of threat and to develop profiles for targeting suspected

threats.

The intelligence community believes cocaine has been the primary

narcotics threat since about 1985; however, heroin is becoming more of a

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

threat. Most of the heroin entering the United States comes from

Southeast Asia, Colombia, and Mexico. Crack-cocaine users are

increasingly using heroin to soften the impact of the “crash” that often

follows a crack-cocaine binge. Heroin now comes in a smokable form that

eliminates the perceived risk of AIDS from needles.1

According to the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, the locations and

means of cocaine smuggling have changed over the years because

traffickers have tremendous flexibility. Miami and south Florida had been

the primary locations and aircraft and maritime vessels the means, until

the government’s interdiction efforts caused an increase in trafficking at

the Southwest border of the United States and use of trucks,

tractor-trailers, containers and private vehicles. Intelligence agencies

estimate that 70 percent of cocaine coming into this country enters via the

Mexican border. This region is currently the primary focus of Customs

narcotics strategy.

The job of interdicting narcotics at the Southwest border is enormous. The

United States and Mexico share almost 2,000 miles of border. Customs

operates 38 ports of entry on that border through which daily pass an

average of about 240,000 trucks, cars, and other vehicles, and 640,000

pedestrians. The North American Free Trade Agreement is expected to

increase the flow of trade between the United States and Mexico, thus

increasing the workload for Customs along the Southwest border.

Customs and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) view

containerized commercial cargo transported by trucks and ships as posing

a serious or substantial threat. Cargo inspection technologies are

particularly important because of the millions of containers that enter the

United States through hundreds of land and sea ports of entry. Customs

currently inspects less than 5 percent of these containers. Currently, four

people could be required for up to 8 hours to unload, search, and reload a

single 40-foot container.

1

For additional information on the heroin threat, see our report, Drug Control: U. S. Heroin Program

Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

GAO Narcotics Counterthreat Response

Reducing production

Interdicting movement

Reducing demand

Preventing money laundering

The U.S. response to the narcotics threat has generally focused on the

cycle of drug trafficking from reducing the production of drugs, to

disrupting their movement, to reducing demand, and to preventing money

laundering. Until 1993, the government emphasized interdiction, but now

the emphasis is more on production, demand reduction, and money

laundering.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

The emphasis on reduced production efforts include initiatives to

eradicate crops in the source countries, dismantle cocaine cartels,

interdict drug movements, and provide such things as intelligence and

technical support to major source nations and transit countries. On

November 3, 1993, the President signed a decision directive that

announced a planned shift of emphasis from interdiction to the source

countries. Within interdiction, the directive emphasized more selective

and flexible interdiction programs in the transit zone and near the U.S.

border.

The interdiction efforts include disrupting air routes within source

countries and between transit countries, hardening the ports of entry in

the Southwest, increasing use of technology by Customs, and building

fences by the U.S. Border Patrol.

Demand reduction efforts include both drug treatment and prevention.

Treatment efforts attempt to reduce the number of chronic, hardcore drug

users by focusing on improving the effectiveness of drug treatment

provided in communities, jails, and prisons. Prevention efforts attempt to

reduce demand by keeping new users from entering the pipeline to

chronic, hardcore drug use. These efforts include such things as

advertising campaigns to deglamorize drugs and various community and

school-based programs.

Finally, the government has significantly stepped up its efforts to prevent

the narcotics traffickers from laundering their profits. Money laundering

involves disguising the funds derived from narcotics sales and other

crimes so that they can be used without detection of the illegal activity

that produced them. In October 1995, the President announced that the

executive branch would consider imposing sanctions against nations that

assist with money laundering to prevent them from doing business in the

United States.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

GAO Customs Counterthreat Framework 

Intelligence

Targeting

Technologies

Customs’ counterthreat framework along the Southwest border includes

(1) disseminating intelligence on narcotics trafficking, (2) targeting

commercial and private conveyances, and (3) using narcotics detection

technologies.

Customs is receiving intelligence from such sources as the Department of

Defense (DOD) and DEA on how drugs are smuggled into the United States

from Mexico. Customs will also place interdisciplinary teams at field

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

locations to enhance the collection, exploitation, and dissemination of

intelligence within the Customs intelligence system.

Since Customs cannot examine all shipments arriving in the United States,

it targets high-risk shipments for examination. Customs has had

experience with automated targeting systems and is now developing a

prototype advanced targeting model to operate on a national basis. The

model is being developed with Customs’ own funding and a limited

amount of funding from the Office of National Drug Control Policy

(ONDCP).

Since 1991, DOD has spent over $240 million to develop nonintrusive cargo

inspection systems and counterdrug technologies for Customs, DEA, and

other federal agencies. Recently, DOD funding provided Customs with an

advanced, low energy X-ray system at Otay Mesa, California, to do

nonintrusive inspection of empty cargo containers and trucks. Since 1975,

Customs has developed and procured many smaller technology devices,

including mobile X-ray vans for inspecting break-bulk cargo and hand-held

range finders for detecting false walls in containers.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

GAO Planned Technology Deployment for 

Counternarcotics

Land ports of entry

Seaports

Mobile inspection systems

Systems trade-off study

In June 1995, Customs provided several members of Congress with a

long-term plan for procuring detection technologies that includes placing

12 fixed-site, truck X-ray systems costing about $38 million along the

Southwest border. Customs has one truck X-ray system operating at Otay

Mesa, California, and is using fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 1996 funds to

acquire four more. The remaining seven systems may be procured in fiscal

years 1997 and 1998. The conference report to the Fiscal Year 1996

National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106) urged the Secretary of

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Briefing Section II 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics Detection

Technology

Defense, through normal reprogramming procedures, to use up to

$25 million of the funds for law enforcement agency support, to procure

the X-ray systems. DOD is presently considering its options to use $10 to

$15 million for the purchase of these X-ray systems.

In addition, Customs determined that there were 13 high-threat seaports at

which some cargo container inspection technology is needed. However,

Customs currently has not identified a suitable container inspection

technology for seaports.

DOD is developing mobile inspection systems for Customs. Initially, these

systems were intended for the Southwest border. Since Customs will now

deploy fixed-site, low-energy X-ray systems there, a senior Customs

official stated that the agency has to find new applications for these

mobile systems. He believes possible applications are at airports where

cargo and baggage containers could be inspected by these systems, or at

northern ports of entry.

A contractor is conducting a congressionally mandated study for ONDCP,

estimated to be completed in May 1996, on cost and benefit tradeoffs over

life cycles of various narcotics detection technologies. Preliminary results

indicate that the highest priority should be given to funding development

of intelligent targeting software to identify high-risk shipments for

examination. Additional results indicate (1) low-energy X-rays, such as

those being proposed by Customs for the Southwest border, may be useful

for empty trucks and possibly pallet-sized cargo; (2) some ports of entry

may need high-energy X-ray systems like the one that had been tested at

the now abandoned Tacoma, Washington, facility or the ones deployed in

France, China, and Germany; and (3) nonintrusive inspection systems may

have some benefits for trade compliance. We intend to evaluate the

completed study as part of the second phase of our review, which will deal

specifically with technology development and both domestic and overseas

deployment.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David E. Cooper

Ernest A. Doring

Charles D. Groves

John K. Harper

John P.K. Ting

Resources,

Community, and

Economic

Development

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Gerald L. Dillingham

Matthew E. Hampton

Thomas F. Noone

Marnie S. Shaul

(341459/705128) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100