ETHNIC CONFLICT:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

Major General William A. Stofft

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

March 14, 1994
*******

The authors would like to thank the following for their

helpful comments and recommendations: Ambassador Daniel H.

Simpson; Colonels Karl Farris, Bruce B. G. Clarke, and Elizabeth

L. Gibson; Lieutenant Colonels Joseph R. Cerami and William T.

Johnsen; and Drs. Michael G. Roskin and Donald E. Schulz.

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717)

245-4400 or DSN 242-4400 or (717) 245-3108 or DSN 242-3108.
FOREWORD

Ethnic conflict is an ascendant phenomenon replacing

ideology as a social force most likely to promote violence and

regional instability. The ferocity of ethnic violence and its

potential for escalation increase the political pressures for

U.S. leadership and collective engagement. The U.S. Army has a

direct interest in ethnic-based conflicts because land power is

the dominant means for intervention through coalition

peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

For these reasons, the Army War College was tasked to

identify potential Army requirements for responding to

ethnic-based, regional conflicts. This study pinpoints specific

patterns of ethnic conflict, and cautions that each may confront

military planners with unique circumstances and requirements.

Political and military strategies must be tailored to fit a broad

spectrum of ethnic conflict. Specific Army requirements are

discussed, the most important being a thorough understanding of

the complex political environments of ethnic conflict before

committing our forces.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT

Major General, U.S. Army

Commandant
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM A. STOFFT is the Commandant of the U.S.

Army War College. He graduated from the State University of South

Dakota in 1959, with a Bachelor of Science Degree in History

Education and a commission in Armor. He also holds a Master of

Arts Degree in History from New York University and has completed

the program for Senior Executives in National and International

Security at Harvard University. His military education includes

the Armor Basic and Advanced Courses, the Airborne Course, the

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army

War College. He is the coeditor of the book, America's First

Battles, 1776-1965, Kansas University Press. His early career

included such assignments as company command at Ft. Hood, Texas;

deputy province senior adviser, Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam; assistant professor of history, U.S. Military Academy;

and instructor in the Department of Strategy, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. His later

assignments were as Commander, 16th Training Battalion, Ft. Knox,

Kentucky; Director, Combat Studies Institute, and then Assistant

Deputy Commandant at the Command and General Staff College. In

March 1985 he was selected for Brigadier General and appointed

the Chief of Military History on the General Staff in Washington,

DC, a position he held until July 1989. For the next two years

General Stofft was the Army's Director of Management in the

Office of the Chief of Staff. His tenure as Commandant of the

U.S. Army War College began in August 1991.

GARY L. GUERTNER is the Chairman of the Department of National

Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. Prior to this

position, he was Director of Research at the College's Strategic

Studies Institute. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political

Science from the University of Arizona and a Ph.D. in

International Relations from the Claremont Graduate School. A

former Marine Corps officer and veteran of Vietnam, Dr. Guertner

has also served on the staff of the U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency and as a Professor of Political Science at

California State University, Fullerton. He is the editor and an

author of The Search For Strategy: Politics and Strategic Vision, Greenwood Press, 1993, and has written books and articles for

numerous professional journals.
ETHNIC CONFLICT:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

History is littered with the wreck of states that tried

to combine diverse ethnic or linguistic or religious

groups within a single sovereignty.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Introduction.

Ethnic conflict is an elemental force in international

politics and a major threat to regional security and stability.

Ethnicity as a source of conflict has deep historic roots. Many

such conflicts lay dormant, suppressed by the Soviet empire or

overshadowed by the ideological competition of the cold war. Both

protagonists in the cold war demonstrated unwarranted optimism

about their ability to defuse ethnicity and ethnic conflict.

Marxists believed that ethnicity would give way to "proletarian

internationalism." Social class and economic welfare would

determine both self-identity and loyalty to political

institutions that would transcend ethnic identification or

religious affiliation.

Western democracies assumed that "nation building" and

economic development were not only vital components in the

strategy to contain communist expansion, but that capitalism,

economic prosperity, and liberal democratic values would also

create free societies with a level of political development

measured by loyalty to the state rather than to the narrower

ethnic group. Instead, the goals of assimilation and integration

within the larger context of economic and political development

are being replaced by violent ethnic corrections to artificially

imposed state boundaries. The Balkan and Transcaucasian

conflicts, for example, are ancient in origin and have as their

object the territorial displacement of entire ethnic groups. Such

conflicts by their nature defy efforts at mediation from outside,

since they are fed by passions that do not yield to "rational"

political compromise. They are, as John Keegan describes in his

most recent study of war, "apolitical" to a degree for which

Western strategists have made little allowance.1

The demise of European communism and the Russian empire has

unleashed this century's third wave of ethnic nationalism and

conflict. The first came in the wake of the collapsing Ottoman,

Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires which came to a climax

after World War I; the second followed the end of European

colonialism after World War II.

The third wave of ethnic-based conflict may transform

international politics and confront the United States with new

security challenges.2 The extent of the historic transformation

underway since the cold war will be determined by the interplay
of many trends, some cyclical like ethnic conflict, and some

historically unique. Cyclical trends include the violence that

follows failed empires and states, economic scarcity,

environmental degradation, epidemics, mass migrations, and even

ethnic cleansing.

Historically unique trends which make the post-cold war

world unpredictable include global transparency and

communications, mobility, proliferation of military technology,

including weapons of mass destruction, and the potential scope of

environmental changes caused by the unprece- dented assaults from

population growth, industrialization, pollution, climatic change,

and the emergence of new, virulent diseases. Any one of these

trends is capable of producing synergistic effects that

fast-forward systemic collapse in the Third World, reducing the

radius of trust and loyalty to ethnic kinsmen, tribe, clan, or

religious group.

The United States and its allies are confronted with

intractable zones of hostility in failed, fragmenting states that

resemble the anarchy of the pre-nation-state system. Failed

states are inevitably altered by what Martin van Creveld

describes as the legal monopoly of armed force being wrested from

official hands by warring factions that create an environment in

which the distinctions between war and crime are lost in a rising

tide of violence and anarchy.3 Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Peru,

Sudan, Chad, and Liberia are all dramatic cases.

These trends are not indicators of an inevitable dark age of

ethnic conflict. They are, however, warnings to both our military

and civilian leadership that we face an unprecedented number of

conflicts ranging from high-tech forces emerging from the

"military-technical revolution" to primitive inter-clan, urban

warfare. The primary interest for the U.S. Army is to protect our

national interests when they are at risk from these trends.

Implications for Military Strategy.

Emerging patterns of ethnic conflict are forcing Americans

to reexamine long held principles. Self-determination, for

example, seemed morally clear and compelling in President

Wilson's "Fourteen Points" designed to formalize the liberation

of small states from European empires after World War I. These

same principles were equally compelling when Roosevelt applied

them to European colonial empires at the end of World War II.

The third wave of ethnic conflict confronts policymakers

with more complex patterns, patterns that idealist policies based

on self-determination cannot resolve. What, for example, is a

reasonable unit of self-determination? Is it every ethnic group

that wants a sovereign territorial state? Where does the

proliferation of states end? How does "reunion" take place if the

process was to begin to reverse itself? Are U.S. interests better
served by support for the integrity of existing states or their

fragmentation? How is support for the status quo squared with our

political history and contemporary world view?

Thinking about these challenges begins with the National

Security Strategy. A specific national security goal of the

United States is the promotion of democracy and human rights

abroad. These objectives require political and economic

strategies based on the recognition that not all ethnic conflict

is synonymous with a desire for separatism or secession. Regional

stability may be underwritten by support for civil rights

movements or for greater autonomy for ethnic groups within an

existing state. How another sovereign state shares political and

economic power within its own borders is not a problem for U.S.

military leaders until efforts to achieve peaceful integration

and assimilation erupt into violence, terrorism, insurgency, or

patterns of repression that threaten to destabilize an ally or a

region in which the United States has a clear interest at risk.

(Appendix A illustrates the spectrum of ethnic conflict and

corresponding military roles and missions.)

The line between appropriate U.S. political support for

stability and peaceful resolution of ethnic-based civil conflict,

on the one hand, and a military strategy to deal with

ethnic-based regional instability, on the other, needs to be

drawn with some degree of clarity concerning U.S. interests as

well as specific patterns of ethnic conflict that U.S. military

forces might confront. Understanding patterns of ethnic conflict

is an essential starting point for military strategy, because

each case varies in its causes, potential for escalation, and

probability of successful intervention. Military strategy and

operational plans must be tailored to counter specific enemy

capabilities and centers of gravity. Such an understanding also

provides good historic indicators for the intractability of

conflict, the potential for domestic and international support,

and the degree to which military instruments can achieve desired

goals at acceptable costs.

Patterns of Ethnic Conflict.

The academic literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict is

extensive and controversial. This study uses Donald Horowitz's

working definition of ethnicity—a narrow self- identification and

basis for affiliation, loyalty, and action, but elastic enough to

embrace groups differentiated by race, color, religion, language,

regional origin, tribe, or nationality.4

 This section addresses

those patterns of ethnic conflict that are the most threatening

to regional stability:5

• Communal violence

• Repression of ethnic enclaves
• Irredentism and retrieval

• Separatist movements

Communal Violence. Communal violence is the result of an

ethnic mosaic or intermingling of groups, often through centuries

of conquests, migrations, and dislocations. Ethnic groups can be

distributed in such a mishmash that it is difficult to discern a

discrete territorial unit which nationalities or ethnic groups

inhabit. Many of the groups evidencing this pattern have

literally lived side-by-side (usually in a segregated fashion)

with one another for dozens of generations. Nowhere is this

better typified than in India, where one commonly finds a Muslim

"side" of a village and a Hindu "side" of a village. Jerusalem,

as well as Sarajevo, each with its respective "ethnic" or

"religious" quarters typifies this distribution pattern, as did

Beirut. Each of these cities can attest to the volatile mix of

ethnic groups that can lead to intense violence. These types of

societies are given to periodic and virulent outbursts of

conflict.

The Bosnia example is made more complex and tragic because

it is surrounded on two sides by newly independent states (Serbia

and Croatia) seeking to lop off large segments of its territory.

 Bosnia combines at least three patterns of ethnic conflict—

communal violence, repression of ethnic enclaves (variously by

all three parties), and irredentism or retrieval of adjacent

enclaves of ethnic kinsmen by Croatia and Serbia. As discussed

below, these complex patterns are vital parts of the strategic

landscape that must be understood and accounted for by

strategists who must decide whether or how to apply military

forces.

Repression of Ethnic Enclaves. Enclaves are most often

created through the process of imperial exhaustion. The collapse

of empires and the emergence of newly independent states usually

lead to the creation of "pockets" of stranded co-ethnics in

territory no longer under a former imperial power's control.

Ethnic populations living within enclaves have both contemporary

affiliations to, and historic claims upon, the territory which

they inhabit within their host state.

Host state repression of enclaves may take the form of human

rights abuses committed against stateless minorities (Azeris in

Armenia, Kurds in Iraq or Turkey, and Baluchis in Pakistan, for

example). More often, however, threats to large ethnic enclaves

have the potential for escalation because these enclaves have

patron states near or contiguous to the borders of repressor

states. Examples that could or have flared up include Hungarians

in Slovakia, Russians in newly independent republics of the

former Soviet Union, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Moslems in

Bosnia, a tragic battleground on which nearly every pattern of

ethnic conflict is visible.
Azerbaijan provides an instructive lesson for newly

independent republics of the former Soviet Union not to

discriminate against their Russian "minority." Armenia is

attempting to claim an enclave of ethnic Armenians in

Nagorno-Karabakh by capturing a corridor linking the two. The

reclamation of an enclave generally means the reclamation of

non-ethnic/non-nationals, automatically leading to the creation

of an entirely new enclave. In such a situation, the reclaiming

state may have to accede to some sort of guarantee towards the

rights of the newly created minority population, or engage in the

types of large-scale "population transfers" which occurred at the

end of World War I and World War II.

More extreme "solutions" are at work in Bosnia where one

finds many "islands" of Serbs that are distributed in an

enclave-like fashion (as well as the communal mosaic described

above). The Bosnian Serb nationalists in concert with the Serbian

military have sought to "reclaim" these enclaves throughout

Bosnia, again through the establishment of, in their own words,

"corridors." Implicit in the creation of these "corridors" is the

recognition that one will have to "reclaim" individuals who are

not co-ethnics, which would lead to the creation of new enclaves.

The Serbians, however, rather than live with this condition, have

engaged in a process (in ethnic doublespeak) of "ethnic

cleansing." This is a benign word for expulsion from one's

homeland or, in the extreme form, a "final solution"—genocide.

The use or establishment of "corridors" to make enclaves

territorially contiguous is not without historical precedent. The

so-called "Polish Corridor" connected the Baltic Coast with

Poland during the period between World War I and World War II.

This corridor, however, created a German enclave in East Prussia

that was forcefully reunited by Hitler. At Yalta, this former

German enclave became part of the Soviet Union, and today is

Kaliningrad, the only noncontiguous portion of Russia, separated

by Lithuania. Clearly, ethnic enclaves have and will continue to

be a source of regional instability.

Closely related to the enclave problem, but with greater

potential for conflict are those patterns where national

boundaries divide ethnic groups between two sovereign states.

Irredentism and Retrieval. Irredentism is one state's

attempt to claim or reincorporate contiguous territory occupied

by ethnic kinsmen (Russians in Kazakhstan, Somalis in Ethiopia,

or Tajiks in Afghanistan, for example). Irredentas are caused by

territorial boundaries which for a host of reasons have been

imprecisely drawn. In Europe, irredentas were often created in

the aftermath of major power conflict, such as the two World

Wars. Hitler, for example, used irredentist pretexts to

incorporate Austria and the Sudetenland. In the Third World,

irredentist claims are most often attributable to the capricious

fashion in which the boundaries for colonial empires were

delineated.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, a whole new array of

real and potential irredentas has been spawned. The Soviet Union

was loathe to launch irredentist or other ethnic-based claims for

fear of riling ethnic tensions both within and without the USSR.

The same is no longer true of the new nationalist regimes created

with the Soviet empire's fall. Nationalists in newly independent

republics feed their counterparts in Russia, many of whom are

prepared to mobilize Russians to retake the lost empire.

Ethnic-based claims reinforced by repression anywhere against the

25 million Russians living in the newly independent republics are

likely, along with economic chaos, to resonate as the most

effective rallying call for extremists.

Regional conflict stemming from new irredentist-retrieval

patterns is not limited to the former Soviet Union. We find

ourselves in a period of profound international transformation in

which nationalist, including irredentist, claims will be more

frequent than during the more stable bipolar period of the cold

war. As one leading expert has warned:

Irredentism has been a by-product of transition and

uncertainty in the international order. Irredentist

propensities may lie dormant for years and then erupt

when interstate arrangements are destabilized. The

latent and overt phases of irredentism are therefore

closely connected to occurrences in the international

arena in general and regional politics in particular.6

Secessionist Movements. Separatist or secessionist movements

are not always ethnic-based or motivated, but they nearly always

result in or are affected by some degree of ethnic conflict. The

former Soviet Union, for example, did not fragment along purely

ethnic lines. Indeed, as discussed above, each new state is

confronted with ethnic conflicts within. The last act in this

great drama has yet to unfold, and ethnic conflicts will play a

major role in determining the former Soviet empire's continued

fragmentation or forceful reunion by revanchist Russian

nationalism.

Historically, most ethnic-based secessionist movements are

spawned by failures in integration and assimilation. Eventually

convinced that they are unable to compete in an undivided state

and often, in effect, colonized by civil servants and

administrators from other regions, and subject to uncongenial

policies on language and other important symbolic issues, such

groups are apt to seek independence. More often than not, they do

so heedless of the economic costs. If the region is economically

backward, as the Slovakian Republic (a good, but atypical example

of peaceful separation), the southern Sudan, the southern

Philippines, the former East Pakistan, and the hill country of

Burma, secession very likely means a loss of subsidies from the

center. One reason people living in such regions nonetheless

choose secession is that their political and ethnic goals
outweigh the economic benefits that come with the undivided

state. Another reason is that the political and economic

interests of their elites lie with independence. Rather than be a

minority political leader in a heterogeneous larger society,

independence makes it possible to be at the center of things.

Rather than be a very junior civil servant, if other groups have

longer traditions of education and have produced many more senior

civil servants, independence makes it possible to "jump the

queue."7

Two specific cases of secessionist movements are worth

noting because of their potential impact on regional stability

and military strategy. The first is the violent but successful

independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. This secessionist victory

sets a precedent that may contribute to a domino effect

throughout Africa where some degree of regional stability had

been achieved by the acceptance of colonial borders, no matter

how arbitrarily they may have been drawn.

The second example of ethnic-based separatism is illustrated

by stateless minorities who form recognizable enclaves divided by

two or more states. The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey or the Baluchis

in Pakistan and Afghanistan are examples. The Kurds are

especially challenging because their fate has already prompted an

ongoing humanitarian relief and enclave security mission in

northern Iraq. In Turkey, the Kurds have the potential for

destabilizing not only a region, but also a U.S. ally that plays

a strategic role in both Europe and the Middle East.

Separatist movements in general demonstrate the paradox

confronting U.S. national security strategy. Political, economic,

and military strategies must be carefully coordinated throughout

the interagency process to avoid what may seem in some regions of

the world to be paradoxical, if not contradictory, U.S.

objectives. The "enlargement of democracy," as the follow-on

strategic objective replacing the containment of communism, will

produce both the desire for self- and group-expression and the

electoral vehicles by which to promote separatist ambitions.8

This is why the administration has clearly stated that the

national security strategy of the United States is not to embark

on an idealistic, global crusade. Selectivity and discriminate

military intervention are guides to both our involvement in

ethnic conflicts and our parallel efforts to enlarge democracy.

Moral commitments are not multiplying while military resources

decline. The guiding principle is the degree of risk to a clearly

identifiable U.S. interest. We know how to say no to

intervention, and we will encourage others, including the United

Nations, to say no as well.9

Implications for the Army.

The patterns of ethnic conflict described here will continue

to erupt in human rights violations, terrorism, insurgency, civil
conflict, territorial disputes, and open warfare. These produce

economic dislocations, refugees, and mass migrations which

contribute to the domino effects that can engulf an entire

region.

Our ability to affect the root causes of centuries-old

ethnic conflicts is marginal. Few ethnic conflicts in the world

pose direct threats to U.S. security. As the last global

superpower, however, the United States plays a leading role in

the promotion of collective security and the protection of human

rights. Moreover, there is reason to believe that domestic

political pressures for U.S. participation in multinational

efforts to alleviate the consequences of ethnic conflict will

grow as the result of global transparency and the technological

capability for virtual real-time coverage of violence everywhere

in the world. Violence is no longer remote or abstract. Ethnic

violence and human suffering are viewed in our living rooms every

night. This raises two major questions for the Army leadership:

(1) Under what conditions should they recommend that U.S. forces

participate either unilaterally or in coalition to contain or

terminate an ethnic-based conflict? and (2) What specific

military requirements are needed for the wide range of operations

that ethnic conflicts may require?

Under What Conditions Should Military Force Be Introduced?

Military leaders can play a vital role in the interagency

decision-making process. This process should clearly assess U.S.

interests, objectives, risks, and costs of intervention. The

risks of military intervention in ethnic-based conflicts are

high. Ethnic conflicts are deeply rooted, and, in some cases,

intractable. They may be driven by emotional rather than material

interests. Economic and political incentives may neither satisfy

nor suppress the combatants. The risk of escalation is high

especially when ethnic combatants have patron states in the

region. Escalation may also include terrorism directed against

the United States. Military objectives and centers of gravity

will be difficult to identify, difficult to attack, or lie

outside imposed political constraints.10

This last point is central in civil-military decisionmaking.

Civilian leadership identifies the broad political objectives and

acceptable levels of cost and risk. Military leadership is

responsible for a military strategy that can achieve political

objectives. Reconciling the two requires a clear delineation of

political constraints and a clear assessment of military

objectives and centers of gravity that must be attacked to

achieve both military and political objectives. If centers of

gravity, the most vital military targets, lie outside the

political constraints imposed on the nation's leadership,

military intervention is unlikely to succeed. Figure 1

illustrates this relationship. Typical political constraints on

military intervention against ethnic (or any other) conflicts

include:
• Lack of support of Congress and the American people;

• An inability to terminate conflict quickly at reasonable

costs;

• No clearly definable end state;

• Lack of political cohesion and compromise to hold and

field a coalition force;

• Limited U.N. mandate;

• Avoiding military targets that may lead to escalation,

unacceptable risks, and costs;

• Minimal collateral damage, especially noncombatant

casualties; and,
• Media coverage and global transparency.

The various patterns of ethnic-based conflict described

earlier can make the reconciliation of political constraints and

effective military targeting against centers of gravity

difficult. Typical centers of gravity include:

• Military forces, generally land forces;

• Political-military leadership;

• External political/economic/military support;

• Popular support for ethnic combatants.

This list is by no means inclusive and may not apply to all

ethnic-based conflict. It does, however, serve as an example for

matching patterns of ethnic conflicts with centers of gravity

that must fit within the political constraints imposed on our

forces. If external political, economic, or military support is a

center of gravity (Serbia's support of Bosnian Serbs, for

example), then regional escalation of a conflict must be an

acceptable risk. If land forces are the center of gravity, then

the United States must be prepared for a level of effort,

including American casualties, required to destroy or degrade

those forces. If popular support for ethnic combatants is a

center of gravity, then economic and other targets that are

punitive to noncombatants must be acceptable.

The difficult reconciliation process between political

constraints on war and centers of gravity is vital to the

formation of effective military strategy if military force is to

be the principal means for conflict termination. Reconciliation

is equally important whether in war—situations in which military

force is the principal means to achieve national objectives—or in

operations other than war—situations in which military force is

subordinate. In either circumstance, specific Army capabilities

are required.

What Army Requirements Are Needed to Respond to Ethnic

Conflicts? As this analysis has stressed, ethnic conflicts stem

from deep historical roots. They ultimately require political

solutions. The use of military force can never achieve a lasting

solution. The best that military force can accomplish is to

temporarily contain violence and contribute to an environment

that permits the establishment of political conditions or

institutions that lead to a more permanent solution. Even given

this "limited" objective, military contributions to the

resolution of ethnic conflicts may require the commitment of

considerable forces, resources, and lives.11

Under current domestic and international political

conditions, the Army leadership can make several operational
assumptions about their role in responding to ethnic conflicts.

First, with the possible exception of humanitarian relief

operations, U.S. involvement will not be unilateral. A growing

consensus in the post-cold war world is that in regional

conflicts, if military force is to be used it should be applied

collectively—that collective uses of military force can be

legitimate means to just ends.12 By contrast, unilateral

interventions establish precedents that lead to more bold,

potentially destabilizing behavior by other governments. Russian

demands for unilateral peacekeeping in their "near-abroad" is one

example. The assumption of this monograph is, therefore, that

U.S. participation in ethnic conflicts will be virtually

synonymous with participation in multilateral peacekeeping and

peace-enforcement operations. This does not suggest that, as

Desert Storm illustrated, all peacekeeping or peace-enforcement

operations are the result of ethnic conflict.

Second, military commitments will be limited to peacekeeping and to low- and mid-intensity peace-enforcement

operations. But low- and mid-intensity operations are likely to

be land combat dominant, requiring decisive capability to bring

conflicts to an early end before public support erodes. Decisive

capability, both numbers and firepower, also provides a potent

deterrent effect on local populations from which hostile forces

might otherwise draw support.

Third, a broad range of noncombat operations will be

required. As discussed below, these requirements may come in

competition with the readiness requirements for the "nearly two

simultaneous" major regional contingencies prescribed in the

Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review and in the new National

Military Strategy.

These operational assumptions give rise to several specific

requirements for the Army:

• The ability to deploy trained and ready forces on short

notice.

• The ability to rotate forces from protracted peacekeeping

operations to meet major regional contingencies.

• The opportunity to train with and the ability to operate

in a multinational force structure.

• Sufficient forces to meet anticipated peace support

missions while maintaining the ability to execute major regional

contingencies (MRCs). As discussed below, this severely

challenges specialized units such as civil affairs, psyops,

engineers, military police, and medical.

• Interagency coordination from planning through execution,

especially with nongovernment agencies (NGOs), a potential force

multiplier in medical and humanitarian relief missions.
• Healthy Foreign Area Officer and strategist programs and

language skills for effective regional liaison—over the long

haul.

• Tailored leader development and training programs to

include:

-- The nature of peacekeeping operations

-- Root causes and patterns of ethnic conflicts

-- Regional orientations

-- Negotiating skills for officers and NCOs

-- Thorough understanding of Rules of Engagement.

The most significant shortfall for the Army is combat

service support—medical, engineers, military police, civil

affairs, and psyops, of which there are insufficient numbers to

support peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and major regional

contingencies. Three solutions are possible: (1) restructure the

reserve component to provide additional support capabilities and

access to those units in peacetime, (2) add more "specialized

units" to the active force, or (3) as the President's National

Security Advisor, Tony Lake, has done, declare a clear priority:

We will never compromise military readiness to support

peacekeeping. Nor would we hesitate to end our

engagement in a peacekeeping operation if that were

necessary to concentrate our forces against an

adversary in a major conflict.13

Declaring priorities does not make the United States an

unreliable partner in collective security. It means that

peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations are, by definition,

burden-sharing enterprises. The United States will honor its

commitments and share the burdens of world order. It cannot,

however, under current fiscal constraints, carry so large a

percentage of the collective security burden that other interests

are risked as the result of overcommitment. Peacekeeper's fatigue

is a threat to readiness if a declining U.S. force structure is

confronted by frequent or protracted deployments.14

Two specialized leader development requirements cited above

also deserve emphasis here. One is the importance of negotiation

skills. Officers and NCOs will be in close contact with combatant

and noncombatant groups in situations where decentralized

diplomacy and on-the-spot negotiating skills can defuse a

volatile situation, saving American, allied, and noncombatant

lives.

Thorough understanding of the rules of engagement is also a
critical part of specialized training for ethnic conflicts. Rules

of engagement have political significance that resonate far

beyond the battlefield. Global transparency, the omnipresent news

media, and the political nature of collective security and

peacekeeping forge an unprecedented convergence of the tactical,

operational, and strategic levels of war in the theater of

operations. A single infantry unit can bring immediate praise or

condemnation from the world community. Similarly, a single

explosive event with "high casualties" (as in Somalia) can cause

U.S. domestic support to evaporate overnight.

Finally—a point that must be widely understood throughout

the defense community—peacekeeping operations generally and

ethnic conflicts in particular are land-power dominant. They will

require the best of our traditional combat skills, and our best

efforts to be open-minded and innovative in an era of declining

resources, ambiguous threats, and additional missions under the

umbrella of "operations other than war."

These requirements do not mean that ethnic conflicts and

peacekeeping operations are the centerpieces of our foreign and

defense policies. Our armed forces' primary mission is to fight

and win wars. Nevertheless, early, collective participation to

contain or dampen ethnic conflicts can protect allies, create

breathing room for fledgling democracies, and contribute to

regional stability. But, the interests of the nation and the

credibility of the Army demand that we thoroughly understand the

complex environments of ethnic conflict before we commit our

forces.

ENDNOTES

1. John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1993, p. 58.

2. The most comprehensive, documented post-cold war study of

ethnic conflict is Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global

View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Washington, DC: United States

Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

3. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York:

Free Press, 1991, pp. 197-207.

4. Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the

Unknown," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College,

Washington, DC, June 23, 1992, pp. 5-6. Horowitz is recognized as

one of the nation's most prolific scholars on ethnicity and

ethnic conflict. One of his most significant warnings is to avoid

using ethnicity and race as synonymous. He calls this the

"figment of the pigment." Groups with identical gene pools can be

parties to conflicting ethnic factions. In Bosnia, for example,

all factions are predominately Slavic in origin.

5. More comprehensive patterns of ethnic conflict are

developed in Tomas A. Hopkins, "Resurgent Nationalism: Ethnic

Group Distribution Patterns and Interstate Relations," paper

presented at the International Studies Association—West meeting,

Phoenix, AZ, November 5-7, 1992.

6. Naomi Chazan, "Irredentism, Separatism, and Nationalism,"

in Irredentism and International Politics, ed. Naomi Chazan,

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991, p. 143.

7. Developed in detail by Donald L. Horowitz, pp. 19-20.

8. The "enlargement of democracy" theme was developed by

Tony Lake. See Daniel Williams, "Clinton's National Security

Adviser Outlines U.S. `Strategy of Enlargement'," The Washington

Post, September 22, 1993, p. A16.

9. A major theme in President Clinton's speech at the U.N.

General Assembly. "Address by the President to the 48th Session

of the United Nations General Assembly," White House Press

Release, September 27, 1993.

10. The authors are indebted to COL Bruce Clarke for the

relationships between political constraints and centers of

gravity. See his "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model,"

Journal of Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 16, 1993, pp. 25-50.

11. This theme is developed by Lieutenant Colonel William T.

Johnsen, Ethnic Conflict in Europe, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming.
12. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Schneffer,

Self-Determination in the New World Order, Washington, DC:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, p. 105. See

also Daniel Williams, "Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits

on Use of U.S. Troops," The Washington Post, February 6, 1994, p.

A24.

13 Tony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," The New York

Times, February 6, 1994, p. E17.

14. This problem was described by Secretary of the Army Togo

West. See Steve Vogel, "Secretary Concerned that Frequent

Deployments Will Run Troops Ragged," Army Times, February 28,

1994, p. 4.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Major General William A. Stofft

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Editor

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Kay D. Preslar

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler