IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION 

J.P., 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. 

 Defendants. 

 

 Civil Case Number: 

4:20-cv-00317-AW/MAF 

 

DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 

 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant 

United States of America moves to dismiss this lawsuit for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted and requests this Motion be set for hearing on 

August 25, 2020. In support thereof, Defendant states as follows: 

BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

1. On June 16, 2020, Plaintiff “J.P.” filed the above captioned suit against 

Defendant United States of America, Officer Jimmy Highsmith, Warden T.A. Jones, 

Warden Craig Coil, SIS Officer Ronald Proffitt, Officer Geoffrey Brown, Officer 

Manuel Pulido, and Nakamoto Group, Inc. [ECF No. 1]. 

2. At present, the undersigned attorneys represent Defendant United 

States of America only. 

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3. In footnote one of the Complaint, Plaintiff states “these initials, and all 

initialized references to inmate victims of sexual assault at FCI Tallahassee, are 

pseudonyms used to protect the subject’s identities for personal safety reasons. 

These persons have legitimate fears of retaliation from correctional officials and/or 

present or former inmates for making public allegations regarding correctional 

officers.” [ECF No. 1, p. 1]. 

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint includes serious allegations of sexual assault at 

FCI-Tallahassee. 

5. The pseudonyms used in the Complaint, in addition to J.P., are “T.D.,” 

“James,” “S.P.,” and “K.L.” [See e.g., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 50, 80, 103, 104]. 

6. This case is substantially related to J.C. v. United States, et al., Case 

No. 4:20-cv-00283-AW/MAF. Both Plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel 

and have sued identical Defendants in each case. 

7. Beginning in June 2020, counsel for Defendant United States and

counsel for Plaintiff J.P. discussed the issues with their client J.C. proceeding 

pseudonymously in her lawsuit. 

8. Accordingly, Defendant United States filed a Motion to Dismiss,

substantively identical to the Memorandum of Law incorporated below. [Case No. 

4:20-cv-00283-AW/MAF, ECF No. 15]. Plaintiff J.C. filed a competing Motion to 

Proceed Pseudonymously. [Id. at ECF No. 14]. This Court is set to have a hearing 

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on those Motions on August 25, 2020. [Id. at ECF No. 25]. 

9. On July 6, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel represented that “they have been 

authorized to immediately provide you with the full name of J.P., who has been 

released, is no longer in a half-way house, is home, and is comfortable that she will 

not be subjected to the type of retaliation that is a fact of life inside.” [Id. at ECF 

No. 19-3, p. 2]. 

10. To date, Defendant United States has not been provided with Plaintiff 

J.P’s identity. 

11. Relatedly, Defendant United States filed a Motion to Consolidate the 

J.C. matter with the above captioned matter, for discovery purposes only. [Id. at 

ECF No. 28] 

12. Due to the overlapping issues with pseudonyms in both Complaints, 

and the pending Motion to Consolidate, Defendant United States requests this 

Motion also be heard at the August 25, 2020, hearing, given the Court’s decision is 

likely applicable to both lawsuits. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. Standard of Review 

“To survive a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

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(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In evaluating such 

a motion the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and resolve 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 

187 F. 3d 1271, 1273 at n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the Complaint must contain 

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and 

will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of further factual 

enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). A 

plaintiff must “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that 

allow courts “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

II. Eleventh Circuit Case Law Demonstrates Plaintiff Cannot Proceed

Anonymously 

“Generally, parties to a lawsuit must identify themselves in their respective 

pleadings.” Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties; the title of other 

pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other 

parties.”). The Eleventh Circuit stated that this requirement “serves more than 

administrative convenience . . . . It protects the public’s legitimate interest in 

knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties.” Frank, 951 

F. 2d at 322 (citation omitted). 

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There are only limited circumstances in which a party may file suit 

anonymously. Indeed, binding Fifth Circuit case law categorized three situations 

where a party may proceed anonymously: 1) a plaintiff seeking to anonymously 

challenges governmental activity; 2) prosecution of the suit would compel plaintiffs 

to disclose information “of the utmost intimacy;” and, 3) a plaintiff would be 

compelled to admit his own intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking 

criminal prosecution. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981). Later, the 

Eleventh Circuit clarified that the “ultimate test permitting a plaintiff to proceed 

anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs 

the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial 

proceedings” and directed courts to consider other factors such as whether the 

plaintiff was a minor, whether they were threatened with violence, and whether a 

plaintiff’s “anonymity posed a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the 

defendant.” Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011); Frank, 

951 F. 2d at 323. 

To put all doubts aside, the Eleventh Circuit has already ruled squarely on this 

issue—whether incarcerated inmates alleging sexual abuse by correctional officers 

can proceed anonymously. See Doe v. Sheely, 781 Fed. App’x 972, 973 (11th Cir. 

2019). In Sheely, Jane Doe brought a § 1983 action against a correctional officer 

who sexually assaulted her and the local sheriff who allegedly adopted policies that 

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allowed that assault to occur. Id. at 972–73. The district court denied plaintiff’s 

Motion to Proceed Anonymously, acknowledging that although personal 

embarrassment may attach to disclosure of sexual assault allegations, the Eleventh 

Circuit has held time and again that embarrassment alone is not enough to proceed 

anonymously. See Frank, 951 F. 2d at 324 (“The risk that a plaintiff may suffer 

some embarrassment is not enough.”); Sheely, 781 Fed. App’x at 974 (“The district 

court was entitled to find that although disclosure of the sexual assault would result 

in personal embarrassment, the disclosure did not involve information of the ‘utmost 

intimacy’ as this Court has defined it.”). Accordingly, left with simple accusations 

that harm may attach to Plaintiff Doe, the district court found, and the Eleventh 

Circuit affirmed, that she failed to present any evidence that “she would face bodily 

harm if forced to proceed in her own name[.]” Id. 

Analogous to Sheely, so too does J.P. claim that she, and other witnesses, have 

“legitimate fears of retaliation from correctional officials.” [ECF No. 1, p. 1 n. 1]. 

This broad, unsupported assertion, under binding Eleventh Circuit law, cannot 

support Plaintiff proceeding anonymously in this lawsuit. Defendant Highsmith no 

longer works at FCI-Tallahassee. Since May 10, 2019, he has worked at the Yazoo 

City United States Penitentiary, a male facility located in Mississippi. Further, 

Plaintiff herself has represented that she has been released from federal custody and 

“is comfortable that she will not be subjected to the type of retaliation that is a fact 

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of life inside.” [Case No. 4:20-cv-00283-AW/MAF at ECF No. 19-3, p. 2]. 

Additionally, other named Defendants, including Warden Jones, Warden Coil, SIS 

Agent Proffitt, and Officer Geoffrey Brown have been retired from the Bureau of 

Prisons for years. Plaintiff has not articulated who would actually pose a threat of 

physical harm to her safety, or to any of her witnesses. Compare Jane Doe v. 

Termaine Aldon Neverson, No. 20-10265, 2020 WL 4355554, at *4 (11th Cir. July 

30, 2020) (unpublished) (reversing the dismissal of Ms. Doe’s suit where she 

submitted an example of “a website post about this lawsuit and eight threatening or 

harassing comments”). Without more specific evidence as to how disclosing her 

name will subject her to bodily injury, she cannot proceed anonymously.1

 

Finally, Plaintiff J.P. cannot demonstrate why this is the “exceptional case” 

where a plaintiff may proceed under a fictitious name. See Sheely, 781 Fed. App’x 

at 973 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Defendant United States notes 

that numerous other allegations of sexual assault in a prison environment are 

routinely litigated in the Northern District without plaintiffs resorting to 

pseudonyms. See e.g., Morton v. United States, et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-00177-RHMAF (Hinkle, J.); Alexander v. United States, et al., Case No. 4:19-cv-138-RHMAF (Hinkle, J.); Kernechel v. United States, et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-00078-WS-

 

1

 Further, Defendant United States is unaware of any basis allowing a witnesses to 

use a pseudonym. Indeed, such practice seems akin to trial by ambush. 

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MJF (Stafford, J). Further, it is impossible to see how Defendant United States can 

perform a reasonable inquiry to investigate the allegations in the Complaint in 

accordance with its obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure if it is unable to 

determine the identifying details for such information.2

 Defendant also notes that 

there may be interim measures this Court can enact to reduce Plaintiff’s concerns, 

as appropriate, including, filing motions under seal and/or releasing witness names 

subject to a protective order. 

WHEREFORE, Defendant United States respectfully requests the Court to 

enter an Order, as follows: 

(i) setting this Motion for hearing on August 25, 2020; 

(ii) granting this Motion to Dismiss without prejudice; 

(iii) requiring Plaintiff J.P. to amend her Complaint to file suit in her own 

name and to identify other witnesses in her Amended Complaint; 

(iv) allowing Defendant United States 45 days after the filing of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint to investigate the claims in order to formulate a 

responsive pleading; 

 

2

 Additionally, without disclosure of Plaintiff’s name, the undersigned cannot 

appropriately refer these serious allegations to the United States Attorney’s Office 

Criminal Division. 

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(v) alternatively, requiring Plaintiff to show cause as to why she has 

personal safety concerns, and permitting Plaintiff to file pleadings 

under seal and/or a protective order; 

(vi) and granting any other relief it deems just and proper. 

Respectfully submitted, 

 LAWRENCE KEEFE 

 United States Attorney 

 

 /s/ Marie A. Moyle 

MARIE A. MOYLE, ESQ. 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Florida Bar No. 1003498 

Email: marie.moyle@usdoj.gov 

KATHRYN W. DREY, ESQ. 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Florida Bar No. 142492 

Email: kathryn.drey@usdoj.gov 

MARY ANN COUCH, ESQ. 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Florida Bar No. 0098917 

Email: mary.ann.couch@usdoj.gov 

111 N. Adams Street, 4th Floor 

Tallahassee, FL 32301 

Telephone: 85-942-8430 

Fax: 850-942-8466 

 Counsel for the United States of America 

 

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LOCAL RULE 7.1(F) 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this memorandum contains 1,742 words, per

Microsoft Word’s word count, which complies with the word limit requirements set 

forth in Local Rule 7.1(F).

LOCAL RULE 5.1(F) CERTIFICATION 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Motion has been furnished 

via CM/ECF to all interested parties, this 31st day of July, 2020. 

 

/s/ Marie A. Moyle 

 Marie A. Moyle 

 Assistant U.S. Attorney 

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