United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Readiness, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

November 1995 STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Improvements in C-5

Mission Capability Can

Help Meet Airlift

Requirements

GAO/NSIAD-96-43

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-265876 

November 20, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Under the new national military strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD)

must be capable of rapidly deploying armed forces to respond to

contingency and humanitarian operations around the world. Military

strategic airlift aircraft provide the capability to fly the critical, early

arriving troops and cargo for overseas deployments. Since DOD is

increasingly relying on the C-5 aircraft as its primary airlifter, we assessed

the reliability and mission capability of the aircraft and DOD’s current plan

for modifying the C-5.

This review was requested by the Honorable Earl Hutto, former Chairman,

Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services. We

are addressing this report to you as the current Chairman of the House

Subcommittee on Military Readiness.

Background The Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC) has 104 C-5, 199 C-141, and

16 C-17 strategic airlift aircraft in its fleet. It also has 54 KC-10 and 448

KC-135 tanker aircraft, which can carry cargo. The C-5 aircraft, the largest

airlifter, can carry 73 troops and 36 standard cargo pallets or outsize cargo,

such as tanks and helicopters. The Air Force received its C-5A models

from 1969 to 1973 and its C-5B models from 1986 to 1989. The C-5B model

incorporates over 100 reliability and maintainability changes from the

previous model and has substantially higher mission capable rates.

The C-5 has been used more than planned since Operation Desert Storm in

response to various contingencies as well as shortages of C-141 aircraft

and delays in C-17 deliveries. AMC developed a plan to guide the

modernization of the C-5 aircraft into the next century and help ensure

that the C-5 remains a viable mobility asset. AMC officials believe this

modernization effort is important to address concerns regarding the aging

aircraft and improve the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

In addition to being a major command of the Air Force, AMC is a

component of the U.S. Transportation Command, a unified command that

provides air, land, and sea transportation for DOD. As a component, AMC is

responsible for providing global airlift services and air refueling

operations. AMC developed a mission capability rate goal for the C-5 fleet of

75 percent, which means that C-5s must be able to perform one of their

major missions 75 percent of the time.1

 Mission capability is a standard

used on all military aircraft that allows for easier comparisons among

aircraft. Although Air Force planners count on increasing aircraft mission

availability in wartime by adding more maintenance personnel and

deferring some maintenance inspections, little can be done to increase the

spare parts initially available for each plane. Peacetime mission capability

rates, especially as they are affected by adequate spare parts availability,

are therefore good predictors of likely wartime aircraft mission capability.

AMC currently estimates that C-5 aircraft can attain a 14.6 million ton miles

per day airlift capability, which would represent almost one-half of the Air

Force’s total military aircraft airlift capacity.

Results in Brief DOD is counting on the C-5 to deliver almost half of the cargo carried by

military aircraft in wartime, but its mission capable rates have generally

been below AMC’s 75 percent goal over the last several years. In addition,

C-5 mission capable rates are considerably below those of other military

airlift aircraft, including the C-141, KC-10, and KC-135. In recent years,

between one-quarter and one-half of the C-5 total not mission capable time

was due to the lack of spare parts. Officials from the C-5 manufacturer

believe that improving the C-5 spares processes, particularly by scheduling

repairs of spare parts based on their impact on mission capability, could

substantially improve the mission capable rate.

The C-5 mission capable rate could also be improved if the Air Force

conducted a readiness evaluation similar to one recently completed for the

B-1B aircraft. That evaluation found that the B-1B’s mission capable rates

could increase if spare parts support were to improve. Air Force officials

attribute the substantially improved mission capable rates recently

achieved by the B-1B fleet (an increase of 9 percentage points) primarily

to improved spares availability.

1

We use mission capability in this report as the primary indicator of the C-5’s ability to deliver cargo.

We recognize that mission capability rates are not a perfect measure of an aircraft’s ability to perform

its mission. For example, an aircraft may be classified as mission capable but may break down during

preflight checks, thus rendering the aircraft not mission capable.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

The Air Force has not prioritized proposed C-5 modifications according to

which one would contribute most to improving mission capability. As a

result, decisionmakers cannot fully assess the impact proposed

improvements could have on overall aircraft mission capability or total

airlift capability.

Improving the C-5 spares program and reprioritizing C-5 modernization

initiatives would increase C-5 mission capable rates. If peacetime C-5

mission capable rates could be raised to the current AMC goal of 

75 percent, DOD could gain an additional 1.3 million ton miles per day of

C-5 wartime airlift capability—the equivalent of 10 C-17s. As a result, DOD

could come closer to meeting military airlift requirements.

Mission Capable

Rates Are Below

Standard

Mission capable rates for AMC C-5 aircraft averaged just under 68 percent

from July 1994 to June 1995.2

 These rates have been declining since

Operation Desert Storm, when AMC achieved mission capable rates of

75 percent or higher. In addition, the C-5 mission capable rates were

considerably below comparable airlift and tanker aircraft during the same

period, as shown in table 1.1. For example, AMC C-5 mission capable rates

averaged over 5 percentage points below those of the troubled C-141

aircraft, which is gradually being retired. Factors accounting for the

relatively poorer C-5 mission capable rates included inadequate spare

parts support, higher complexity associated with a large aircraft, and the

generally poorer reliability characteristics of the older C-5A model aircraft.

Table 1.1: Mission Capable Rates for

AMC Aircraft From July 1994 to

June 1995

Figures in percent

Aircraft

Mission

capable

rate

C-5 67.9

C-141 73.2

KC-10 88.7

KC-135 85.5

Lack of Spares Affects

Mission Capable Rate

C-5 aircraft are classified as not mission capable when they are either

undergoing maintenance or lack spare parts. Between 25 and 50 percent of

all not mission capable problems in recent years have been due to a lack

of spare parts, as shown in figure 1.1.

2

During this same period, the mission capable rate for the entire Air Force C-5 fleet, including Reserve

and National Guard aircraft, averaged about 65 percent.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

Figure 1.1: Percent of C-5 Not Mission Capable Rates Attributable to a Lack of Spare Parts From October 1992 to June 1995

Oct. 92 Feb. 93 June 93 Oct. 93 Feb. 94 June 94 Oct. 94 Feb. 95 June 95

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent

Lack of spare parts Undergoing maintenance

AMC has established a goal that the total not mission capable supply

(TNMCS) rate should not exceed 7 percent for its operational C-5 fleet.

Although the TNMCS rate has shown some improvement in the last few

years, it still remains considerably above AMC’s goal, as shown in figure 1.2.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

Figure 1.2: AMC C-5 TNMCS Rates From October 1991 to June 1995

Oct. 91 Apr. 92 Oct. 92 Apr-93 Oct. 93 Apr. 94 Oct. 94 Apr. 95

6

9

12

15

18

Percent

AMC goal

AMC TNMCS

Air Force officials said that the C-5 has historically not received enough

spare parts primarily because spare parts procurement was budgeted and

allocated based on the number of programmed flying hours. Also, the Air

Force funds C-5 spares based on a projected 12.6-percent TNMCS rate. Since

the C-5 has been exceeding the number of planned flying hours each year,

fleetwide TNMCS rates have been even higher than 12.6 percent; in fiscal

year 1994, for example, the rate was about 16.5 percent.

Air Force personnel are sometimes able to work around spare parts

shortages by taking parts from one aircraft and using them for another

(referred to as cannibalization). According to a recent C-5 Program

Management Review, cannibalization tends to decrease the life expectancy

of aircraft systems and consumes vast amounts of labor that could better

be employed elsewhere. AMC’s goal is one cannibalization action a month

per aircraft. Figure 1.3 shows that AMC C-5 aircraft cannibalization actions

have remained at a level well above the AMC standard for several years.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

Figure 1.3: Cannibalizations Per AMC C-5 Aircraft From October 1992 to June 1995

Oct. 92 Feb. 93 June 93 Oct. 93 Feb 94 June 94 Oct. 94 Feb 95 June 95

0

2

4

6

8

10

Number of cannibalizations per aircraft

AMC standard

To address the spare parts problem, the Air Force changed its calculation

method for fiscal year 1994 to recognize that the C-5 has been flying more

than its number of programmed hours. Also, for fiscal year 1994, the Air

Force allowed some high-priority weapon systems, such as the C-5, to

receive more spare parts funding than lower priority systems. These

changes may have partly accounted for the improved TNMCS rate during

fiscal year 1995. However, neither change had helped improve the

cannibalization rate.

For fiscal year 1996, the Air Force has proposed raising C-5 spares funding

to a level designed to achieve a 7.5-percent TNMCS rate rather than the

current 12.6-percent goal. Air Force officials expect raising the spares

support level will add about $4.6 million to annual C-5 spares costs.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

A Readiness Evaluation

Could Lead to Higher C-5

Mission Capability Rates

The C-5’s mission capability rates could increase if the Air Force were to

conduct a readiness evaluation similar to the operational readiness

assessment conducted for B-1B bomber aircraft. That assessment,

conducted by the Secretary of the Air Force at the direction of the 1994

National Defense Authorization Act, was to determine if the B-1B could

sustain a 75-percent readiness rate, about 18 percentage points higher than

it was achieving at that time. The Air Force Operational Test and

Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) was enlisted as an independent agent to direct

the test and report on the assessment activities. An AFOTEC official

estimated the total costs of conducting the assessment was about

$2.2 million.

During the B-1B operational assessment, AFOTEC used the results from a

test wing to project that the B-1B fleet could achieve mission capable rates

of 75 percent by better managing spare parts repair cycles and making

better use of existing spares with few new assets. AFOTEC also found that

these changes would increase annual program funding by $11 million to

$12 million over and above funds already committed for various

improvements, initiatives, and spare parts. AFOTEC’s findings were

evaluated by the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation Agency as well as by

us.3

 Both evaluations supported AFOTEC’s conclusions.

After the assessment was completed, the test wing’s mission capable rate

rose to 84 percent, and the entire fleet mission capable rate rose to

66 percent. According to the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation Agency,

the primary reason the mission capable rate increased was better spares

support—that is, more spares available at the test location and faster

turnaround at the intermediate or depot levels. Leadership attention and

the significance of the test were important motivating factors, but the

mission capable rate could not have been raised without spare parts

improvements. Maintenance downtime was reduced when spares were

immediately available, and more spares lessened the chance that parts

would have to be cannibalized.

One of the major factors accounting for better B-1B spare parts support

was the use of the Distribution and Repair in Variable Environments

(DRIVE) model. DRIVE manages repair requirements by prioritizing repairs

based on their effect on mission capable rates. Current systems, including

the one used for the C-5, prioritize repairs based only on the amount of

time the part has been in the repair process. In addition, a 1992 Rand

3

B-1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment

(GAO/NSIAD-95-151, July 18, 1995).

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

report advocated using the DRIVE model to emphasize the effect of repairs

on mission capability rather than relying on more traditional indicators.4

The Air Force mandated use of the DRIVE system at its depots in

January 1994, but the system has not yet been implemented by the San

Antonio Air Logistics Center, the C-5 depot.

Although the C-5 and B-1B are different aircraft with different missions,

we believe a C-5 readiness evaluation could yield similar results to those

experienced during the B-1B evaluation. For example, both aircraft have

had historically low mission capable rates and poor spare parts support.

Also, before the B-1B test, Air Force officials did not think the mission

capable rate for the B-1B could be raised nearly as high as the evaluation

later demonstrated. However, the officials are now projecting a fleetwide

increase in B-1B mission capable rates of 15 percentage points. Air Force

airlift officials have stated that improvements to the spares process would

have little impact on C-5 mission capability. However, we think

improvements similar to the B-1B spare parts process changes could be

applied to the C-5 spares process as well.

Officials from the C-5 manufacturer stated that improving the C-5 spares

process by analyzing parts that most affect mission capable rates, similar

to the DRIVE model philosophy, and improving the spare parts pipeline

could result in a 40-percent reduction in TNMCS rates. That reduction would

increase the mission capable rate fleetwide by about 6.6 percentage points.

An increase of this magnitude would give DOD an additional 1.3 million ton

miles a day of cargo-carrying capability—the equivalent of 10 C-17 aircraft.

AMC officials identified several difficulties in reducing TNMCS rates for the

C-5 aircraft by 40 percent. Officials noted that the practical requirement to

maintain an aircraft at each of the two active bases for cannibalization

constitutes a significant portion of the TNMCS rate. They further noted that

aircraft undergoing refurbishment or unit inspections also contribute to

the TNMCS rate. Notwithstanding this position, we note that if AMC achieved

its 7-percent TNMCS goal, it would have accomplished about a 40-percent

reduction in the TNMCS rate—which C-5 manufacturer officials projected.

4

DRIVE (Distribution and Repair in Variable Environments): Enhancing the Responsiveness of Depot

Repair, Rand Corporation, 1992.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

C-5 Modernization

Plan Needs

Reprioritization

AMC established a C-5 modernization plan to increase mission capability

rates and reduce personnel requirements and life-cycle costs. According to

AMC officials, modification initiatives are generally prioritized based on

potential reliability and maintainability improvements to the aircraft as

well as cost. The resulting priorities are later modified and updated by

various reviewing officials. AMC’s top 10 proposed modifications, at the

time of our review, and our estimate of their impact on mission capability,

are shown in table 1.2. Many of these modifications will not be funded

until at least the year 2000 and completed several years after that.

Table 1.2: Impact of Top 10 Proposed

Modifications to the C-5 Aircraft Dollars in millions

Priority Modification Cost

Our estimate of

increase in mission

capability rate

1 Autopilot replacement $263.2 0.5

2 Engine turbine improvement 355.0 0.7

3 Engine vapor barrier 5.0 0

4 Floor corrosion prevention 6.2 0

5 Courier compartment flooring 86.1 0

6 Cabin outflow drain pan 1.3 0

7 D-sump lube line 0.6 0.1

8 Smart engine diagnostics 9.0 0.3

9 Nose landing gear door 0.3 0.1

10 Hydraulic valve replacement 2.2 1.1

Total $728.9 2.8

Even though we were able to calculate potential mission capable rate

increases for each of the top priority modifications, AMC has not analyzed

how much the modifications would contribute to increasing mission

capability. Until AMC does that analysis, decisionmakers cannot consider

the impact that the proposed improvements could have on mission

capability or total airlift capability. Also, if AMC considered mission

capability increases as a key factor in prioritizing planned C-5

modifications, the current order of priorities would most likely change.

However, we recognize that AMC might have to consider other factors, such

as safety considerations, when it prioritizes modifications.

We identified the 10th-priority modification—hydraulic valve

replacement—as being relatively low in cost but having the most potential

for increasing aircraft mission capability. Failures associated with the

C-5’s hydraulic system are one of the leading causes of reliability

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

problems. The hydraulic valve replacement is designed to eliminate surges

when opening selector valves on the landing gear, cargo doors, and ramps.

Because this modification was only recently identified as one of the top 10

priorities, it has not been scheduled for funding. However, AMC estimated

that the modification could be funded as early as fiscal year 1997.

The C-5 manufacturer estimates that failures in hydraulic system

plumbing, mounting fixtures, and components should decrease by

two-thirds to three-fourths when the hydraulic valve modification is

completed. More importantly, the 1.1-percentage point potential increase

in C-5 mission capability resulting from the modification would provide

DOD with an additional 0.18 million ton miles per day of cargo-carrying

capability—equating to 1.4 C-17 aircraft.

In comparison, the two top priority modifications—autopilot replacement

and engine turbine improvement—would likely only increase mission

capability a little at a relatively large cost. Other high-priority efforts, such

as floor corrosion prevention and courier compartment flooring, are

improvements that would not result in any potential increase in aircraft

mission capability.

DOD has not been providing adequate funding to meet the original schedule

for proposed C-5 improvements. For example, two major upgrades to

improve the C-5’s reliability, the malfunction detection analysis and

recording system and the main landing gear actuator, were first identified

in fiscal year 1985 and scheduled to be completed by fiscal year 1994.

However, funding delays have stretched these modifications by 4 years to

fiscal year 1998. According to our 1992 report,5

 one of the major factors

contributing to the C-141’s recent severe problems was inadequate funding

to implement necessary modifications. AMC stated in its 1995 Air Mobility

Master Plan that not completing scheduled improvements would degrade

capability and increase operating costs.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Air Force to (1) conduct a readiness evaluation to determine how C-5

peacetime mission capability can be improved and the costs of such

improvements and (2) assess the impact of proposed aircraft

modifications on C-5 mission capability and then reprioritize the proposals

according to the results of the assessment.

5

Military Airlift: Structural Problems Did Not Hamper C-141 Success in Desert Shield/Storm

(GAO/NSIAD-93-75, Dec. 29, 1992).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

We also recommend that the Secretary direct the Commander in Chief,

U.S. Transportation Command, to include in strategic mobility planning

the potential increase in airlift cargo capability made possible by a higher

C-5 mission capable rate.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with our report (see app. I). DOD stated that it has

initiated some actions that would satisfy the intent of our recommendation

that the Air Force conduct a readiness evaluation. These actions include

conducting a 1994 logistics demonstration project to improve and

streamline the C-5 management structure and policies for handling spare

parts and repairing components, as well as incorporating lessons learned

from the B-1B operational readiness assessment to better manage the C-5

program. Although these actions are good first steps, DOD must ensure that

they are fully implemented. In particular, DOD needs to use the DRIVE

model, which was successfully demonstrated during the B-1B assessment,

to allocate C-5 spare parts and prioritize their repair.

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Air Force assess the impact

of proposed aircraft modifications on mission capability and reprioritize

the modifications accordingly. DOD noted that the San Antonio Air

Logistics Center was developing a computer model that will be able to

quantify the effects of proposed aircraft reliability improvements on

mission capability. DOD expects this model, scheduled for completion in

July 1996, to help improve the method for prioritizing C-5 modifications.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Transportation

Command’s strategic mobility planning include the potential increase in

C-5 cargo capability resulting from a higher mission capable rate. DOD

stated that the potential cargo capability increase would not translate

directly into increases in cargo delivered to a theater of conflict because of

the limited airfield infrastructure (including ramp space, refueling

facilities, and material handling equipment).

Although potential increases in cargo capability identified in our report

may not translate directly into cargo delivered to the theater under some

scenarios, the potential capability still exists under more unconstrained

scenarios with many available airfields or fields with areas large enough to

accommodate substantial numbers of C-5 aircraft. To maximize potential

C-5 cargo deliveries, DOD should consider using C-5 aircraft in the more

unconstrained scenarios. DOD bases many of its conclusions about a more

capable C-5 aircraft on studies of buying additional quantities of a new

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

C-5D aircraft, which has not yet been developed. These conclusions could

be substantially different if DOD looked at current quantities of more

capable existing C-5A and C-5B aircraft. Therefore, we continue to believe

DOD should consider the implications of more capable existing C-5 aircraft

in its modeling efforts and decisions on the mix of future aircraft.

Scope and

Methodology

We conducted our review at AMC, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; 436th

Airlift Wing, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; C-5 System Program

Director’s Office, San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base,

Texas; Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, Marietta, Georgia; and

Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C. We interviewed various officials

at these locations and reviewed pertinent regulations, guidance, and

reports pertaining to the subject areas. We also interviewed officials

regarding the B-1B readiness assessment and DRIVE model at the Air Force

Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New

Mexico; Air Combat Command Headquarters, Langley Air Force Base,

Virginia; and Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base, Ohio.

To calculate potential aircraft availability and mission capability increases,

we relied on Air Force and C-5 manufacturer estimates of increases in

mission capable hours attributable to the proposed changes. We added the

mission capable hours attributable to those improvements to the 1994 total

fleet mission capable hours and calculated a revised mission capable rate.

We used the revised mission capable rate to calculate a new aircraft

utilization rate, which we used to recalculate a C-5 million ton mile per day

cargo contribution. We divided increases in the C-5 cargo contribution by

the currently estimated AMC million ton mile per day contribution of a C-17

to determine the equivalent number of C-17s.

We conducted our review from August 1994 to August 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of

your Subcommittee and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of

the Senate Committee on Armed Services, House Committee on National

Security, and Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy; the

Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commander in Chief,

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
B-265876 

U.S. Transportation Command; and the Director, Office of Management

and Budget.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me at (202) 512-5140. The major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Contents

Letter 1

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 16

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 28

Tables Table 1.1: Mission Capable Rates for AMC Aircraft From July

1994 to June 1995

3

Table 1.2: Impact of Top 10 Proposed Modifications to the C-5

Aircraft

9

Figures Figure 1.1: Percent of C-5 Not Mission Capable Rates Attributable

to a Lack of Spare Parts From October 1992 to June 1995

4

Figure 1.2: AMC C-5 TNMCS Rates From October 1991 to

June 1995

5

Figure 1.3: Cannibalizations per AMC C-5 Aircraft From October

1992 to June 1995

6

Abbreviations

AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center

AMC Air Mobility Command

DOD Department of Defense

DRIVE Distribution and Repair in Variable Environments

TNMCS total not mission capable supply

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO’s comment

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2-6.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 2, 7-8.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3, 9-10.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Now on p. 10.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 11.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is our comment on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter

dated October 23, 1995.

GAO Comment 1. DOD stated that it could not substantiate the additional 1.3 million ton

miles per day of capability that we reported the C-5 aircraft could provide.

Our calculation was based on the 40-percent improvement in total not

mission capable supply (TNMCS) rate projected by the C-5 manufacturer.

We discussed how we calculated utilization rates and million ton mile

contributions in the Scope and Methodology section. We used standard Air

Mobility Command (AMC) formulas in those calculations. In addition, as

noted in the report, if AMC met its own 7-percent goal for TNMCS, it could

achieve the 40-percent TNMCS reduction projected by the C-5 manufacturer.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Robert Eurich

James Murphy

Kansas City Field

Office

Gregory Symons

Claudia Saul

Norman Trowbridge

(703080) Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-43 Strategic Airlift
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