Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 233 / Monday, December 6, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 75621 

ii. Consistency With Rationale for 

Section 431.35 

The next matter that the FAA 

addressed was whether granting a 

waiver in this case would be consistent 

with the safety rationale underlying 

section 431.35. In the preamble to the 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 

the FAA explained that, when it was 

drafting section 431.35, it decided to use 

a single aggregate risk threshold for a 

mission involving the launch and 

reentry of a reentry vehicle. Commercial 

Space Transportation Reusable Launch 

Vehicle and Reentry Licensing 

Regulations, NPRM, 64 FR 19626, 19635 

(Apr. 21, 1999). However, the FAA also 

acknowledged that there could be 

circumstances where it would be 

appropriate to separate launch from 

reentry risk, such as where different 

operators were involved and could be 

apportioned allowable risk thresholds, 

or where intervening events or time 

made reentry risks sufficiently 

independent of launch risks as to 

warrant separate consideration. Id. 

Here, the health check of Dragon, a 

different vehicle than the Falcon 9 

launch vehicle, that will take place once 

Dragon is in orbit is an intervening 

event that makes the launch risk 

associated with the launch of Falcon 9 

independent of the reentry risk 

associated with the reentry of Dragon. 

The health check will permit SpaceX to 

reevaluate Dragon’s condition after the 

launch has taken place, and to make a 

fresh determination about whether 

Dragon should be permitted to reenter. 

If, after conducting a post-launch health 

check of Dragon, SpaceX finds safety 

concerns associated with reentry, 

SpaceX will be able to issue a command 

to disable Dragon’s reentry. As such, 

because the reentry of Dragon is based 

on the results of an in-orbit health check 

that will be conducted independently of 

the launch, the risks associated with the 

launch of Falcon 9 and reentry of 

Dragon are sufficiently independent to 

warrant separate consideration in this 

case. 

Evaluating these risks separately, the 

Ec for the launch of Falcon 9 is 19 × 

10¥6, which is within the 30 × 10¥6

limit imposed by section 431.35(b)(1)(i). 

Likewise, the Ec for the reentry of 

Dragon is 28 × 10¥6, which is also 

within the 30 × 10¥6 limit that the FAA 

applies to launch hazards. Accordingly, 

the FAA has determined that granting a 

waiver in this case would be consistent 

with the safety rationale underlying 

section 431.35. 

iii. Other Factors Impacting the Waiver 

Decision 

Dragon’s mitigation measures were 

another factor that influenced the FAA’s 

analysis with regard to whether a waiver 

would jeopardize public health and 

safety and safety of property. As stated 

above, the Dragon capsule employs 

numerous risk mitigation measures to 

reduce the risk to the public from the 

launch of Falcon 9 and reentry of 

Dragon. 

The FAA has taken particular notice 

of the way in which Dragon’s electrical 

power system (batteries), flight 

computer, and propulsion system will 

reduce risk to the public. For instance, 

Dragon has more than four times the 

propellant needed for a safe reentry in 

the target area. The additional 

propellant increases the probability that 

Dragon will land in its nominal target 

area instead of a population center. 

Dragon also has three parachutes, which 

decrease risk to the public because only 

one of these parachutes is necessary for 

a low impact landing. The additional 

parachutes reduce the chance that 

Dragon will crash into the ground while 

attempting to land. 

SpaceX has also designed the Dragon 

reentry vehicle to vent propellants in 

the case of an aborted or off-nominal 

reentry. This mitigation measure greatly 

reduces the risk to the public because it 

allows Dragon to safely dispose of 

hazardous propellant materials if 

something should go wrong with the 

mission. 

As a result of Dragon’s mitigation 

measures, as well as the other 

considerations discussed above, the 

FAA has determined that granting a 

waiver in this case would not jeopardize 

public health and safety or safety of 

property. 

B. National Security and Foreign Policy 

Implications 

The FAA has identified no national 

security or foreign policy implications 

associated with granting this waiver. 

C. Public Interest 

Two of the public policy goals of 

Chapter 701 are: (1) To promote 

economic growth and entrepreneurial 

activity through use of the space 

environment; and (2) to encourage the 

United States private sector to provide 

launch and reentry vehicles and 

associated services. 49 U.S.C. 

70101(b)(1) and (2). Here, granting this 

waiver is consistent with the public 

interest goals articulated by Chapter 

701. 

A goal of the COTS program’s mission 

is to ultimately develop the capability to 

resupply the International Space 

Station. SpaceX’s demonstration launch 

of Falcon 9 and reentry of Dragon is a 

step toward achieving that goal. This 

demonstration launch is important in 

light of the fact that the U.S. 

Government is ending the Space Shuttle 

Program and NASA plans to rely upon 

its COTS Program to develop a robust 

domestic commercial space 

transportation capability. This 

capability will provide the United States 

with the ability to resupply the 

International Space Station. As such, 

granting SpaceX’s waiver request will be 

consistent with Chapter 701’s policy 

goals by: (1) Promoting SpaceX’s 

entrepreneurial activity in the space 

environment; and (2) encouraging a 

private U.S. company to develop and 

launch a launch vehicle (Falcon 9) and 

a reentry vehicle (Dragon). 

Summary and Conclusion 

A waiver will not jeopardize public 

health and safety or safety of property 

because: (1) The risk associated with the 

launch of Falcon 9 and the risk 

associated with the reentry of Dragon 

are each under an Ec of 30 × 10¥6; and 

(2) the Dragon capsule employs 

numerous risk mitigation measures 

including an in-orbit health check. The 

waiver also will not jeopardize national 

security and foreign policy interests of 

the United States. A waiver is in the 

public interest because it furthers the 

statutory goals of Chapter 701. For the 

foregoing reasons, the FAA has waived 

the restriction that the combined risk to 

the public from the launch of Falcon 9 

and reentry of Dragon cannot exceed an 

expected average number of 0.00003 

casualties (30 × 10¥6) from debris. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on November 

30, 2010. 

Kenneth Wong, 

Commercial Space Transportation, Licensing 

and Safety Division Manager. 

[FR Doc. 2010–30402 Filed 12–3–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 431 

Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation; Waiver of Autonomous 

Reentry Restriction for a Reentry 

Vehicle 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of waiver. 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with RULES
75622 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 233 / Monday, December 6, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

1Even though Dragon is a reentry vehicle and not 

a reusable launch vehicle, 14 CFR 435.33 

incorporates and applies section 431.43 to all 

reentry vehicles. 

2SpaceX stated that autonomous reentry would 

only be used in off-nominal circumstances, and the 

regulation prevents autonomous reentry only for 

nominal circumstances, thus rendering a waiver 

unnecessary. This interpretation of the regulation 

conflicts with the regulation’s requirement that an 

operator only initiate reentry by command as 

described in the preamble to the proposed rule. 

There, the FAA expressed its concern that 

authorizing reentry of totally autonomous vehicles 

would not fulfill adequately its public safety 

responsibility. Without active control, those 

systems and conditions necessary for safe reentry 

would not be verified before reentry was initiated 

Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch 

Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations, 64 FR 

19626, 19645 (Apr. 21, 1999) (Reentry NPRM). 

Because it was the FAA’s intent that the regulations 

ensure human control capability upon reentry, 

SpaceX’s petition is a request for a waiver. 

SUMMARY: This notice of waiver 

concerns two petitions for waiver 

submitted to the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) by Space 

Exploration Technologies Corp. 

(SpaceX): A petition to waive the 

requirement that a waiver petition be 

submitted at least sixty days before the 

proposed effective date of the waiver, 

and a petition to waive the requirement 

that SpaceX only initiate reentry of its 

reentry vehicle, the Dragon Spacecraft 

(Dragon), by command. The first 

petition is unnecessary because, as 

explained below, SpaceX demonstrated 

good cause for its late filing. The FAA 

finds that waiving the requirement for 

SpaceX ground operators to initiate 

Dragon’s reentry to Earth is in the public 

interest and will not jeopardize public 

health and safety, safety of property, 

and national security and foreign policy 

interests of the United States. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

waiver contact Howard Searight, 

Aerospace Engineer, AST–200, Office of 

Commercial Space Transportation 

(AST), Federal Aviation Administration, 

800 Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–7927; e-mail: 

howard.searight@faa.gov. For legal 

questions concerning this waiver 

contact Laura Montgomery, Senior 

Attorney for Commercial Space 

Transportation, AGC–200, Office of the 

Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3150; e-mail: 

laura.montgomery@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background: On September 23, 2010, 

SpaceX requested two waivers from the 

FAA’s Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation (AST) for the reentry of 

Dragon, a reentry vehicle, to be 

launched on Falcon 9 flight 002. First, 

SpaceX requested a waiver of 

procedural requirements for waivers set 

forth at 14 CFR 404.3. Second, SpaceX 

requested a waiver of 14 CFR 431.43(e)1

to allow autonomous reentry.2

The FAA licenses, in relevant part, 

the launch of a launch vehicle, and 

reentry of a reentry vehicle under 

authority granted to the Secretary of 

Transportation by 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, 

chapter 701 (Chapter 701), and 

delegated to the FAA’s Administrator 

and Associate Administrator for 

Commercial Space Transportation. 

SpaceX is a private commercial space 

flight company. It entered into a Space 

Act Agreement with the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) as part of NASA’s Commercial 

Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) 

program. The COTS program is 

designed to stimulate efforts within the 

private sector to demonstrate safe, 

reliable, and cost-effective space 

transportation to the International Space 

Station. 

SpaceX’s petition for waiver concerns 

an upcoming demonstration flight that it 

plans to undertake as part of the COTS 

program. At the time of the filing of the 

petition, the launch for that flight was 

scheduled to take place on November 8, 

2010. During the flight, SpaceX’s Falcon 

9 vehicle will launch the Dragon reentry 

vehicle into orbit. Dragon is a reentry 

vehicle whose capability SpaceX plans 

to demonstrate for NASA. Ultimately, 

SpaceX intends to use Dragon to 

transport cargo and people to and from 

the International Space Station. 

Once Dragon is in orbit, a groundimplemented health check will be 

carried out by telemetry. SpaceX has 

designed the Dragon capsule to remain 

in orbit until SpaceX ground operators 

transmit a reentry command. A ground 

operator can issue commands to either 

enable or disable the reentry of Dragon 

based on the health of the vehicle. 

Dragon is also able to conduct an 

autonomous health check. Propellant 

and power levels are the key variables 

used by ground operators in 

determining whether to issue 

commands to reenter or stay in orbit, 

and the same variables would be used 

by the vehicle in its onboard health 

check. The onboard health check is 

designed to check time-dependent 

variables to ensure the health and 

functionality of the propellant, power 

and avionics sub-systems. Based on 

these evaluations, Dragon is able to 

determine whether it is healthy. On the 

ground, the reentry team can read the 

raw data and establish for themselves 

whether Dragon is healthy. Dragon’s 

onboard health check is designed to 

replicate the decision-making process of 

the ground operators with respect to 

time-dependent failures, which are, in 

Dragon’s case, the full depletion of 

power and propellant. If Dragon’s 

communications failed and the vehicle 

passed the onboard health check, 

Dragon would reenter autonomously. 

Once Dragon passes a groundimplemented health check, ground 

operators will issue a reentry command. 

After ground operators issue the reentry 

command, Dragon will wait until the 

point in space at which the reentry burn 

initiation is planned before initiating 

reentry. Dragon will reenter, deploy 

three parachutes and splash down. A 

nominal Dragon reentry splashes down 

in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of 

southern California with some 

propellants on board. 

If an anomaly occurs after the 

issuance of the reentry command, 

ground operators can issue a command 

that disables reentry. SpaceX is 

concerned with what would happen if 

its ground operators were unable to 

communicate a reentry command to a 

healthy Dragon due to failed or disabled 

communications. In this circumstance, 

SpaceX proposes that the FAA permit 

the autonomous reentry of a healthy 

Dragon at the nominal landing location 

in order to maximize public safety. This 

scenario may play out in different ways. 

If ground operators needed more time to 

complete a health check than that 

available during one orbit, they could 

disable reentry by command. Dragon 

would then not reenter, even if its 

autonomous health check would 

otherwise allow it to. If a health check 

proved satisfactory, ground operators 

could re-enable reentry, and Dragon 

would reenter. If Dragon never received 

a command, it could rely on the results 

of its own continuous autonomous 

health check, and, if those results were 

positive, reenter. 

Dragon has several safety features that 

would allow for a safe autonomous 

reentry in the event of a 

communications failure, including: 

(1) The vehicle automatically reduces 

itself to its lowest energy level in the 

case of an off-nominal burn; (2) the 

vehicle has the ability to autonomously 

guide itself to the same pre-determined 

landing site, located more than 780 

kilometers from the coastline; (3) the 

vehicle has the ability to monitor its 

safety-critical systems in real-time; (4) 

the vehicle has over 100% margin on 

both power and propellant budgets; (5) 

the vehicle has a space-grade inertial 

measurement unit (IMU); (6) the vehicle 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 233 / Monday, December 6, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 75623 

has a space-grade flight computer; and 

(7) the vehicle has redundant drogue 

parachutes and dual redundant main 

parachutes. 

Waiver Criteria: Chapter 701 allows 

the FAA to waive a requirement for an 

individual license applicant if the FAA 

decides that the waiver will not 

jeopardize public health and safety, 

safety of property, and national security 

and foreign policy interests of the 

United States and is in the public 

interest. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(3) (2010); 

14 CFR 404.5(b) (2010). 

Section 404.3 Waiver Petition 

Section 404.3(b)(5) requires that a 

petition for waiver be submitted at least 

sixty days before the proposed effective 

date of the waiver. However, this 

section also provides that a petition may 

be submitted late if the petitioner shows 

good cause. Id. (b)(5). 

Here, SpaceX submitted its waiver 

petition on September 23, 2010, which 

was less than sixty days before the 

November 8, 2010 launch date planned 

at the time of the filing of the petition. 

However, in its petition, SpaceX 

explained that it initially interpreted the 

applicable regulations differently than 

the FAA, and was not aware that a 

waiver would be required. Once the 

FAA informed SpaceX that it needed to 

obtain a waiver, SpaceX proceeded to 

apply for the waiver in a timely fashion. 

As such, the FAA has found that 

SpaceX had good cause for submitting 

its waiver petition less than sixty days 

from its launch date. Therefore, 

SpaceX’s late submission does not 

violate 404.3(b)(5), and a waiver of that 

section is unnecessary. 

Section 431.43(e) Waiver Petition 

Section 431.43(e) requires, in 

pertinent part, any operator of a 

reusable launch vehicle that enters 

Earth orbit to issue a command enabling 

reentry flight of the vehicle. It further 

states that reentry flight cannot be 

initiated autonomously under nominal 

circumstances without prior enable. 

14 CFR 431.43(e). 

For reasons described below, the FAA 

waives the requirement of 14 CFR 

431.43(e), and allows SpaceX to 

autonomously initiate reentry flight of 

Dragon in the event that SpaceX ground 

operators lose communication with 

Dragon, and Dragon is healthy. In this 

context, communication loss means 

Dragon fails to send a reentry request to 

SpaceX’s ground operators, or the 

ground operators are unable to send a 

command enabling reentry of Dragon. 

The onboard health check is designed to 

check time-dependent variables to 

ensure the health and functionality of 

the propellant, power and avionics subsystems. 

In deciding whether or not to waive 

the requirement that Dragon’s operator 

issue a command to enable reentry of 

the vehicle, the FAA must analyze 

whether the waiver: (1) Is in the public 

interest; (2) will not jeopardize public 

health and safety or safety of property; 

and (3) will not jeopardize national 

security and foreign policy interests of 

the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(3); 

14 CFR 404.5(b). The FAA will grant 

this waiver because SpaceX satisfies the 

criteria. 

A. Public Interest 

The change proposed by SpaceX is 

consistent with the statutory goal of 

seeking improvements to safety. 49 

U.S.C. 70101(a)(12) and (b)(2)(C). 

Granting SpaceX’s waiver is in the 

public interest because a guided reentry 

is safer than a random reentry, and 

therefore Dragon’s proposed 

autonomous reentry capability enhances 

the overall safety of the mission. 

B. Public Health and Safety 

Although the FAA’s regulation 

prohibits autonomous reentry, a waiver 

is warranted in SpaceX’s case because 

an autonomous reentry of a healthy 

Dragon that has lost ground 

communications is safer than a random 

reentry. The preamble to the Reentry 

NPRM acknowledges that some RLV 

operators were contemplating totally 

autonomous reentry capability, and 

expressed a concern that autonomous 

reentry was not adequately safe. 

Specifically, the FAA was concerned 

about system anomalies or other noncompliant conditions that would not be 

verified before initiation of reentry in 

the absence of active human control. 

Reentry NPRM, 64 FR at 19645. The 

FAA retained flexibility in granting 

waivers to allow the use of autonomous 

systems. Commercial Space 

Transportation Reusable Launch 

Vehicle and Reentry Licensing 

Regulations, 65 FR 56618, 56641 (Sept. 

19, 2000) (Reentry Rule). In requiring 

the capability for human intervention, 

the FAA did not intend to foreclose the 

use of autonomous systems or 

autonomous decision-making. Id. 

SpaceX’s proposed approach addresses 

the concern underlying the regulatory 

requirements and poses less risk than 

that associated with Dragon being left in 

orbit to reenter randomly at some later 

time. SpaceX’s mitigation measures are 

of additional importance to the FAA’s 

decision to grant a waiver. 

The FAA’s reason for requiring 

commanded reentry was to make sure 

that an operator had the chance to verify 

that there were no system anomalies or 

other non-compliant conditions. Under 

SpaceX’s proposed plan, the operator 

would employ two means of detecting 

any such anomalies. Ground operators 

and Dragon’s own continuous 

autonomous health check would both 

perform health checks to determine 

whether conditions prohibited reentry. 

To determine the effect of granting 

SpaceX’s waiver on public safety, the 

FAA performed a risk analysis of 

potential reentry outcomes. The risks of 

leaving the vehicle in orbit or 

attempting a reentry (whether 

autonomous or commanded) are best 

compared by applying conditional 

probabilities, where an undesired event 

is assumed to happen, to each 

possibility. For purposes of comparison, 

in the two cases discussed below, the 

FAA assumes that Dragon fails to expel 

its propellant, and its parachutes fail to 

deploy, resulting in an explosive 

impact. 

In a random reentry scenario, Dragon 

has lost communications and is unable 

to reenter autonomously. The FAA 

assumed a 100% probability of leaving 

the vehicle in orbit with a full 

propellant load. The vehicle would 

continue circling the Earth until it 

reentered randomly due to natural 

orbital decay. The FAA assumed the 

impact probability in a given latitude 

band was equivalent to the dwell time 

of the vehicle in orbit over that latitude 

band. The FAA computed the 

population density as a function of 

latitude by dividing the population 

within each latitude band under Dragon 

by the Earth’s surface area within each 

latitude band. The FAA applied a 

sheltering model based on surveys and 

socioeconomic factors, including 

population density and distribution and 

the types of homes people live in, all of 

which affect expected casualties. The 

conditional risk computed for a random 

reentry produced an expected average 

number of casualties (Ec) of 

approximately 23 × 10¥3.

In an autonomous reentry scenario, 

Dragon has lost communications and is 

attempting an autonomous reentry. The 

FAA assumed a 100% probability of 

reentry burn failure at any time from 

burn initiation to burn cutoff, assuming 

a uniform failure rate. In this scenario, 

Dragon remains orbital for two-thirds of 

its burn. Two-thirds of the conditional 

random reentry risk calculated above 

results in an Ec of approximately 15 × 

10¥3. The remaining risk results from 

an assumed failure during the last third 

of the reentry burn when the vehicle is 

no longer in orbit. This results in a flight 

corridor extending from the Atlantic to 

the Pacific crossing over the continental 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with RULES
75624 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 233 / Monday, December 6, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

1The most recent CPI–U figures are published in 

November of each year and use the period 1982– 

1984 to establish a reference base of 100. The index 

for October 2009 was 216.177, while the figure for 

October 2010 was 218.711. 

United States and Northern Mexico. The 

conditional risk along this flight 

corridor is approximately Ec 13 × 10¥3. 

The FAA multiplied 13 × 10¥3 by onethird, to account for the fact that this 

failure mode is only applicable to onethird of the burn, which results in an Ec

of 41 × 10¥4. The total conditional risk 

associated with an autonomous reentry, 

where a burn failure is assumed, is 19 

× 10¥3. Thus, there is theoretically 20% 

less risk in an attempt to reenter Dragon 

than there is in leaving it in orbit given 

a communications failure. 

Also of importance to the FAA’s 

decision to grant a waiver, Dragon is 

equipped with a number of mitigating 

features. First, the vehicle automatically 

safes itself in the case of an off-nominal 

burn. This means that if Dragon 

conducted its reentry burn, but 

computed that the desired landing spot 

would not be achieved, it would vent 

the rest of its fuel, thereby reducing the 

possibility of explosion or dispersion of 

toxic fumes on impact. Second, the 

vehicle has the ability to autonomously 

guide itself to its planned landing 

location in the Pacific Ocean, some 780 

kilometers from the coastline. This 

internal capability allows Dragon to act 

independently, based on programmed 

instructions and information regarding 

its location, if communications with the 

ground are lost. Third, the vehicle has 

the ability to monitor its safety-critical 

systems in real-time. This means Dragon 

has near-immediate awareness of the 

operability of its on-board systems that 

allow it to operate safely, and this 

awareness enables Dragon to react in 

time to conduct a reentry. Fourth, the 

vehicle has a space-grade IMU and flight 

computer. This means Dragon is 

equipped with a system that provides 

information on where Dragon is, which 

is pertinent to its guidance capabilities, 

and the IMU and flight computer are 

designed and tested to operate in the 

rigorous conditions of space. 

C. National Security and Foreign Policy 

Implications 

The FAA has not identified any 

national security or foreign policy 

implications associated with granting 

this waiver. 

Summary and Conclusion: A waiver 

is in the public interest because it 

accomplishes the goals of Chapter 701 

and decreases risk to the public. The 

waiver will not jeopardize public health 

and safety or safety of property because 

allowing autonomous reentry of a 

healthy Dragon vehicle that has lost all 

communications presents less risk than 

a random reentry. A waiver will not 

jeopardize national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States. For 

the foregoing reasons, the FAA has 

waived the requirement of 14 CFR 

431.43(e) for a commanded reentry, and 

allows SpaceX to autonomously initiate 

reentry flight of Dragon in the event that 

all communication between ground 

operators and Dragon has been lost, and 

Dragon is healthy. 

Issued in Washington, DC on November 30, 

2010. 

Kenneth Wong, 

Licensing and Safety Division Manager. 

[FR Doc. 2010–30399 Filed 12–3–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Copyright Royalty Board 

37 CFR Part 386 

[Docket No. 2010–10 CRB Satellite COLA] 

Cost of Living Adjustment to Satellite 

Carrier Compulsory License Royalty 

Rates 

AGENCY: Copyright Royalty Board, 

Library of Congress. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Copyright Royalty Judges 

announce a cost of living adjustment 

(‘‘COLA’’) of 1.2% in the royalty rates 

paid by satellite carriers under the 

satellite carrier compulsory license of 

the Copyright Act. The COLA is based 

on the change in the Consumer Price 

Index from October 2009 to October 

2010. 

DATES: Effective Date: January 1, 2011. 

Applicability Dates: These rates are 

applicable for the period January 1, 

2011, through December 31, 2011. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Richard Strasser, Senior Attorney, or 

Gina Giuffreda, Attorney Advisor. 

Telephone: (202) 707–7658. E-mail: 

crb@loc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

satellite carrier compulsory license 

establishes a statutory copyright 

licensing scheme for the retransmission 

of distant television programming by 

satellite carriers. 17 U.S.C. 119. 

Congress created the license in 1988 and 

has reauthorized the license for 

additional five-year periods, most 

recently with the passage of the Satellite 

Television Extension and Localism Act 

of 2010, (‘‘STELA’’), Public Law 111– 

175, which was signed into law by the 

President on May 27, 2010. 

Program Suppliers and Joint Sports 

Claimants (collectively, the ‘‘Copyright 

Owners’’) and DIRECTV, Inc., DISH 

Network, LLC, and National 

Programming Service, LLC (collectively, 

the ‘‘Satellite Carriers’’) submitted a 

voluntary agreement proposing rates for 

the section 119 compulsory license for 

the period 2010–2014 and requested 

that the proposed rates be applied to all 

satellite carriers, distributors, and 

copyright owners without holding a rate 

proceeding. See 17 U.S.C. 

119(c)(1)(D)(ii)(I). After publishing the 

proposed rates in the Federal Register 

and receiving no objections, the Judges 

adopted the rates as final in 37 CFR part 

386. 75 FR 53198 (August 31, 2010). 

Section 119(c)(2) requires the Judges 

annually to adjust these rates ‘‘to reflect 

any changes occurring in the cost of 

living adjustment (for all consumers and 

for all items) published * * * before 

December 1 of the preceding year’’ with 

such rates being effective on January 1 

of each year. 17 U.S.C. 119(c)(2). The 

Judges are required to publish in the 

Federal Register ‘‘[n]otification of the 

adjusted fees * * * at least 25 days 

before January 1.’’ Id. Today’s notice 

fulfills this obligation. 

The change in the cost of living as 

determined by the CPI–U during the 

period from the most recent index 

published before December 1, 2009, to 

the most recent index published before 

December 1, 2010, is 1.2%.1 Rounding 

to the nearest cent, the royalty rates for 

the secondary transmission of broadcast 

stations by satellite carriers for private 

home viewing and viewing in 

commercial establishments are 25 cents 

and 51 cents, respectively. 

List of Subjects in 37 CFR Part 386 

Copyright, Satellite, Television. 

Final Regulations 

■ For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, part 386 of title 37 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations is amended 

as follows: 

PART 386—ADJUSTMENT OF 

ROYALTY FEES FOR SECONDARY 

TRANSMISSIONS BY SATELLITE 

CARRIERS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 386 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 17 U.S.C. 119(c), 801(b)(1). 

■ 2. Section 386.2 is amended by 

revising paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and 

(b)(2)(ii) as follows: 

§ 386.2 Royalty fee for secondary 

transmission by satellite carriers. 

* * * * * 


jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with RULES