Marine Accident Report

Grounding of the Small

Passenger Vessel Finest

Sandy Hook, New Jersey

January 4, 2001

National 

Transportation 

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

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SAF E T Y

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E PLURIBUS UNUM 

NTSB/MAR-02/03

PB2002-916403

Marine Accident Report

Grounding of the Small 

Passenger Vessel Finest

Sandy Hook, New Jersey 

January 4, 2001

NTSB/MAR-02/03

PB2002-916403 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7493 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted Septembwer 17, 2002 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2002. Grounding of the Small Passenger Vessel Finest Sandy

Hook, New Jersey January 4, 2001. Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-02/03. Washington, DC.

Abstract: About 1930 on January 4, 2001, the domestic high-speed vessel Finest, with 258 passengers, 5

crewmembers, and one company official on board, ran aground outside the channel to the Shrewsbury

River, Sandy Hook Bay, while en route from New York City, New York, to Highlands, New Jersey. The

Finest refloated at 0007 on January 5, after the tide changed, and proceeded to Sandy Hook Bay Marina,

where it docked at 0026 and discharged its passengers. No one on board the vessel suffered any injury, and

the vessel sustained no damage. One person on board had to be evacuated from the vessel by helicopter for

medical treatment of an allergic reaction unrelated to the accident.

The major safety issues in this report are the adequacy of the navigational procedures and navigational aids

in the Shrewsbury River and the appropriateness of alcoholic beverage service after an accident. 

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board makes one safety recommendation to the

U.S. Coast Guard and three to New York Fast Ferry Services.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

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may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2002-916403 from:

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(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Marine Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Senior Deckhand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Deckhands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Vessel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Waterway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Operational Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Toxicological Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Survival Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Passenger Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Passenger Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Lifesaving Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

High-Speed Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Waterways Analysis and Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Navigational Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Marine Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Adequacy of Navigational Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Crewmember Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Adequacy of Navigational Aids in the Shrewsbury River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appropriateness of Alcoholic Beverage Service After an Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix 

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
iv Marine Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

COI Certificate of inspection

EBL electronic bearing line

GPS global positioning system

MLLW mean lower low water

NVIC Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular

NYFF New York Fast Ferry 

SHBM Sandy Hook Bay Marina

VRM variable range marker
v Marine Accident Report

Executive Summary

About 1930 on January 4, 2001, the domestic high-speed vessel Finest, with 258

passengers, 5 crewmembers, and one company official on board, ran aground outside the

channel to the Shrewsbury River, Sandy Hook Bay, while en route from New York City,

New York, to Highlands, New Jersey. The Finest refloated at 0007 on January 5, after the

tide changed, and proceeded to Sandy Hook Bay Marina, where it docked at 0026 and

discharged its passengers. No one on board the vessel suffered any injury, and the vessel

sustained no damage. One person on board had to be evacuated from the vessel by

helicopter for medical treatment of an allergic reaction unrelated to the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the grounding of the Finest was the failure of the vessel master to use appropriate

navigational procedures and equipment to determine the vesselís position while

approaching the Shrewsbury River channel. Contributing to the cause of the grounding

was the lack of readily visible fixed navigational aids. Also contributing to the cause of the

grounding was the failure of New York Fast Ferry to require the use of installed navigation

equipment and to set guidelines for operations in adverse environmental conditions. 

The major safety issues in this report are as follows:

ï Adequacy of navigational procedures; 

ï Adequacy of navigational aids in the Shrewsbury River; and

ï Appropriateness of alcoholic beverage service after an accident. 

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board makes one safety

recommendation to the U.S. Coast Guard and three to New York Fast Ferry Services.

1 Marine Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

At 1805 on January 4, 2001, the twin-hulled (catamaran), water-jet propelled,

domestic high-speed vessel1 Finest (figure 1), with five crewmembers and one company

officer on board, departed the East 34th Street Terminal in the borough of Manhattan, New

York, New York, after loading 66 passengers. The vessel, which was owned and operated

by New York Fast Ferry (NYFF), proceeded down the East River to Pier 11, the Wall

Street loading point, where, at 1825, the Finest boarded an additional 192 passengers.

The Finest then departed for the Sandy Hook Bay Marina (SHBM) in Highlands,

New Jersey, with a draft of about 6 feet. The crewmembers included a master, a senior

deckhand, and three deckhands. After maneuvering the Finest away from Pier 11, the

master turned over the conn (steering and speed control) to the senior deckhand and

remained in the wheelhouse.

According to the crewmembers, the Finest was midway between the VerrazanoNarrows Bridge and Sandy Hook Point (figure 2) when a passenger came to the pilothouse

and stated that he was having trouble breathing and might be suffering an allergic reaction.

The passenger asked that the crewmembers arrange for medical assistance to meet the

vessel when it docked at the SHBM. The master called two crewmen to the bridge and had

1 The Coast Guard defines vessels such as the Finest, which can attain speeds of 30 knots or more with

a full complement of passengers, as domestic high-speed vessels. U.S. Coast Guard, Navigation and Vessel

Inspection Circular (NVIC) 5-01, Guidance For Enhancing the Operational Safety of Domestic High-Speed

Vessels (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, April 23, 2001).

Figure 1. The Finest
Factual Information 2 Marine Accident Report

them escort the passenger to an auxiliary room near the vesselís disembarkation station so

he could be the first person off the Finest when it arrived at the SHBM. 

At 1916, the senior deckhand radioed Coast Guard Station Sandy Hook on VHFChannel 16 asking that the Coast Guard arrange to have medical assistance at the SHBM.

The Coast Guard, in turn, contacted the Highlands Police Department, which dispatched

police officers and notified local medical personnel to standby at the marina. By 1920, the

responders were in place at the SHBM, awaiting the arrival of the Finest.

Figure 2. Area of operation for the Finest

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1. E 34th STREET TERMINAL, 

 MANHATTAN

2. PIER 11 (WALL STREET), 

 MANHATTAN

3. SANDY HOOK BAY MARINA

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BROOKLYN

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VERRAZANONARROWS

BRIDGE

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MAN.

NY

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2

3

LEGEND
Factual Information 3 Marine Accident Report

As the Finest passed buoy 17, about 1/2 nautical mile2 west of the northern end of

Sandy Hook Point, the master observed an ice field inside Sandy Hook Bay that extended

from Sandy Hook peninsula about 1 mile into the bay. The vesselís normal trackline to the

SHBM would have taken the vessel through the ice field. After passing buoy 17 and

Sandy Hook Point, the senior deckhand, in accordance with the masterís orders, changed

to a southerly course toward the Atlantic Highlands breakwater. The new trackline ran

parallel to the western edge of the ice field and allowed the vessel to operate outside of the

ice. (See figures 3 and 4.)

2 All distances given are nautical miles, except where noted otherwise. A nautical mile equals 6,080

feet versus 5,280 feet for a statute mile. 

Figure 3. Accident site.

SCALE IN MILES

0 1/2

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(ICE FREE)

TRACK FOR

"FINEST"

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HIGHLANDS

APPROXIMATE TRACK OF "FINEST"

"17"

SANDY HOOK CHANNEL

MASTER

RELIEVES

MATE

SHREWSBURY RIVER

SANDY

HOOK

BAY

MARINA

CG

STATION

2

3 4

5

6 7

9

LEGEND

2 - 9 SHREWSBURY RIVER

CHANNEL BUOYS
Factual Information 4 Marine Accident Report

After the Finest passed Sandy Hook Point, the two buoys (Nos. 2 and 3) marking

the approach to the Shrewsbury River channel were within the range of the vesselís radar,

but the master could not locate them by radar. The master took over the conn about 2 1/2

miles past Sandy Hook Point and continued southbound, operating the vessel at a speed of

about 34 knots. The master and the senior deckhand estimated that when the vesselís

position was between a 1/2-mile and 1 mile from the Atlantic Highlands breakwater, the

master began to turn the vessel to the east. The master said that before the Finest entered

the ice field, he had the deckhands secure the electrical generators, which required the

mateís radar to be turned off. The masterís radar, however, ran off the shipís battery supply

and continued to operate. 

At the point of entering the ice field, the approximate distance to the position of

buoy 2 was 6/10 mile. The master continued into the ice field and approached the

estimated position of buoy 2 at a speed of about 32 to 34 knots. According to the master,

Figure 4. Section of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration navigation chart No. 12401, showing channel course 

line, location of grounding site and SHBM. Water depths indicated are 

in feet at mean lower low water.

Approximate

Location of

Grounding

Intended Track

Sandy Hook

Bay
Factual Information 5 Marine Accident Report

he continued to look for the approach buoys visually and by radar. When the vessel was

approximately 3/10 mile from buoy 2, he began reducing his speed to about 25 knots. The

master made one final attempt to locate the buoys by having the deckhand go on the

bridge wing to obtain a visual sighting. After the deckhand reported that he could not see

the buoys, the master made a right turn toward the marina based on a visual observation of

the marinaís lights and a radar observation of the marina. 

After completing the turn, he reduced his engine speed to about 10 knots.

Moments later the vesselís forward motion was stopped and the master thought that he

was stuck in the ice field. At 1929, the master called the Coast Guard Station Sandy Hook

for assistance to get his vessel through the ice. After repeated attempts to free the vessel

using engine maneuvers, the master realized that the Finest had grounded. It was

determined later that the Finest was about 300 yards east of the channel. At 1939, the

master advised the Coast Guard that his vessel was aground. With the vesselís generators

secured, the public address system was inoperative. Using a portable radio to

communicate with the deckhands, the master directed them to walk through the two

passenger cabins and advise the passengers of the situation.

When it became apparent that there would be an extended delay in refloating the

Finest, the two deckhands with engineering experience improvised a means of providing

cooling water to the electrical generator in the port engineroom. This restored full

electrical service to the vessel in about 1 hour, including the public address system and the

heating, ventilation, and cooling systems. The master also instructed the deckhands to

inspect the hull voids to ensure that the vessel was not taking on water. Their inspection

revealed that there were no hull penetrations or flooding. 

After the grounding, the passengers were given access to an ìopen barî by the

vesselís management. The alcohol service continued for roughly an hour. According to the

master, the vesselís management, in consultation with the Coast Guard, then stopped the

alcohol service because of concerns about passenger control in the event of evacuation.

According to the Coast Guard report of this accident, the alcohol service 

presented a safety concern that now had to be factored into the planning. We

wanted to avoid a situation where we now had inebriated passengers to rescue.

This became a grave concern, and if it became necessary, prohibited the USCG

from using helos [helicopters] or other assets if feasible.

At 1957, a 47-foot motor lifeboat from Coast Guard Station Sandy Hook was

dispatched and reached the area at 2015. The Coast Guard coxswain reported that the

channel had 100 percent ice coverage and the buoys in the entrance to the channel were

not visible. He used radar range and bearings to determine the channelís location and

concluded that the Finest was clearly to the east of the channel. He slowly edged toward

the Finest but could not reach it because of the shallow water.

When advised by Coast Guard Station Sandy Hook that the motor lifeboat was

unable to reach the Finest and that there were 264 persons on board, Coast Guard

Activities New York assumed control of the Coast Guard response and diverted the Coast
Factual Information 6 Marine Accident Report

Guard tug Line from a patrol in the Hudson River to offer assistance to the Finest.

Activities New York also contacted the First Coast Guard District in Boston requesting

helicopter support in the event air evacuation of the passengers became necessary.

The two closest Coast Guard Air Stations, at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and

Atlantic City, New Jersey, each had one helicopter on alert duty, and the First Coast Guard

District directed them to proceed to the area. Each Air Station was directed to recall

another crew to provide additional helicopters. By about 2300, four Coast Guard

helicopters were on standby at Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn, New York, about 12 miles

from the grounding site. The helicopters remained at the field until the Finest was safely

moored.

When the grounding prevented the Finest from arriving at the dock, NYFF

company personnel and a police officer from the Highlands, New Jersey, Police

Department got underway on the small commercial tug Marcie that had been moored at

the SHBM, about 1/2 mile from the grounding site. However, because of the shallow

water, the Marcie grounded about 100 feet from the Finest and was unable to offer

assistance. The New York City Police Aviation Unit responded to the Highlands Police

Departmentís request for the evacuation of the ill passenger. A hoist-equipped helicopter

was dispatched and a crewman with a stretcher was lowered to the rooftop of the Finest.

The passenger was hoisted from the Finest and taken to a local hospital, where he was

treated for an allergic reaction and released.

The Line arrived on scene at about 2345. It could get no closer than 75 feet from

the Finest because of the shallow water. By then, the smaller tug Marcie had been able to

plow its way alongside the Finest. However, there was insufficient water depth for the

Marcie to maneuver and free the Finest from its strand. 

The Finest was refloated by the incoming tide at 0007 on January 5. The vessel

proceeded under its own power, arriving at the SHBM berth at 0026. There was no hull

damage to the Finest and no pollution resulted from the accident. At 0035, the Coast

Guard MLB was ordered to return to its station, and the four Coast Guard helicopters were

released at 0040 to return to their respective air stations.

At the postaccident interview, the master stated that he typically used visual line of

sight to set the course from buoy 17 to the river channel buoys. However, if the buoys

were not sighted visually, the SHBM presented a distinct target on his radar, and the

master would adjust his course toward the marina until the buoys were located visually.

After visually locating the buoys, the final approach into the river channel and marina

would be accomplished by following the buoys in the channel. He further stated that he

typically navigated using the radar as a checkóìlooking back and forthî between the

radar and visual observations. The master said that, on the run during which the accident

occurred, he followed his typical procedure and navigated primarily by using the radar and

visual observations to estimate his position offshore and then using the lights of the marina

as a specific visual reference for making the turn into the channel. When the master was

asked if he knew of a feasible alternative to navigating to the marina without the use of

buoys, he replied that he did not. The master said that during the afternoon trip to New
Factual Information 7 Marine Accident Report

York, the approach buoys to the river had been visible. On the evening ferry run, however,

the ice obscured all the buoys.3

 The master had never before made an approach to the

river when all the buoys were obscured. When the master was asked, if faced with the

same circumstances in the future, what could he have done differently to avoid grounding

the vessel, he recommended that the Coast Guard break up the ice or have a range4

installed. He also recommended that the company have an alternate landing site.

Injuries

No passengers or crewmembers sustained any injuries.

Damage

Inspection of the two hulls showed no damage or flooding. The weekend after the

grounding, the cooling water systems for the main engines were partially disassembled to

remove accumulated sand that had been ingested during the grounding. The following

Monday, January 8, the Finest began a normally scheduled run from New Jersey to New

York. During that trip, the engines overheated whenever they were operated at a high

speed. After discharging passengers in New York, the remaining morning runs were

cancelled, and the crewmembers spent the day cleaning out the engine cooling systems

once again. 

Personnel Information

Small passenger vessels carrying more than six passengers for hire may not be

operated without a valid Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection (COI), which is issued by

the Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, for the zone. The COI, among

other conditions, stipulates the minimum staffing requirements. When determining the

number and competencies of the crewmembers, the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection,

considers many factors, including the size of the vessel, its route, the type and horsepower

of the vesselís propulsion machinery, the number of passengers, the type and location of

lifesaving equipment, and the hazards peculiar to the route and service. According to its

COI, the Finest was required to carry a specific complement of crewmembers based on the

number of passengers. (See table 1.)

3 To prevent their being damaged, the buoys were designed to roll under an ice floe and then right

themselves when the ice breaksoke up or melted. 

4 Bowditch defines range as being when two or more objects are in line. When used with beacons, an

observer having the two in line is said to be on the range. Ranges are used to indicate a safe route or the

centerline of the channel. Bowditch, Nathaniel, The American Practical Navigator, 1995 ed. (Bethesda,

Maryland: Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, 1995): 812.
Factual Information 8 Marine Accident Report

According to the COI,

When underway on the navigable waters of the United States, the vessel must be

under the direction and control of an individual qualified to serve as a pilot. The

requirement for a pilot may be met by a first class pilot or a master or mate. When

using a master or mate to serve as pilot, the individual must:

Be at least 21 years old;

Maintain current knowledge of the waters to be navigated by having made one

round trip within the past 60 months; and

Have 4 round trips over the route. If the route is to be traversed during darkness,

then 1 of the 4 round trips used to qualify must be made during darkness. 

At the time of the grounding, the vessel crewmembers included a master, senior

deckhand, and three other deckhands. According to the Companyís Vessel Operating

Manual, the duties of the crewmembers were as follows:

Master Total responsibility for the operation of the vessel and the safety of the

passengers, crew and the overall condition of the vessel.

ìNavigatorî (Senior Deckhand) Assist with the operation of navigational

equipment, act as lookout when required and operation of deck gear. 

ìStewardî (Deckhand) Operation of the Service Bar Including Its Stocking,

Maintenance and Sales Transactions. Also responsible for passenger saloon

cleaning and proper garbage removal from vessel.

ìEngineerî (Deckhand) Operation of the main and auxiliary machinery, its daily

startup and shut down and logs. 

Table 1. Required Crewmember Complement for the Finest

Number of

Passengers Required Crewmembers*

1ñ149 One master, two deckhands

150ñ299 One master, one licensed mate, two deckhands

300ñ350 One master, one licensed mate, three deckhands

*The licensed mate can be substituted with a senior deckhand, designated in writing by the master and qualified in 

accordance with policy contained in NVIC 1-91, ìRecommended Qualifications for Small Passenger Vessel 

Deckhands.î
Factual Information 9 Marine Accident Report

Master

The master, age 30, held a license as ìMaster Near Coastal Steam or Motor Vessels

of Not More than 100 Gross Tonsî and held a radar observerís endorsement. He had been

in the maritime industry since 1990, serving on fishing, towing, and small passenger

vessels. He had previously worked as a master for another ferry company in New York.

The master had completed, in 1997, a Coast Guard-approved Basic Radar and Simulator

Course, which covered radar theory, observation, operation and use, interpretation and

plotting, advanced radar plotting, collision avoidance, and navigational exercises. Before

becoming master, while serving as a mate on a high-speed vessel, the master received onthe-job training under the supervision of another master. The master of the Finest stated

that it took 3 months of training on the singlestick jet control system for him to become

proficient in its use. The companyís port captain observed the master on several check

rides before he was made the master on the Finest. However, the NYFF had no piloting or

radar training requirements or formal evaluation of these skills, and none were required. 

The master joined the NYFF in September 1999 as a deckhand and was promoted

to master in the spring of 2000. Although he had previously worked on another ferry, he

had no previous experience on high-speed vessels before being hired at the NYFF. The

master had been off duty the week before the grounding and stated he was well rested. He

reported that, on the day of the grounding, he had followed his normal schedule and felt

well rested. 

Senior Deckhand

The senior deckhand, age 28, held no license, nor was he required to be licensed.

On October 10, 2000, he had been qualified as a senior deckhand by the master, as

permitted by the vesselís COI and NVIC 1-91. The NVIC recommends that a deckhand

have 30 days of experience on board the vessel and 30 hours at the helm under the

supervision of a master or mate in order to qualify as the senior deckhand. The senior

deckhand had joined the company in August 2000. His previous maritime experience was

as a boatswain mate in the Coast Guard, serving both on large cutters and at small boat

stations.

Deckhands 

Three other deckhands were on board. The second deckhand was the designated

engineer and held a license as a ìMaster Inland Steam or Motor Vessels of Not More Than

100 Gross Tons,î although he was not required to have a license. Another deckhand was

assigned to serve as engineer and held a license as a ìMaster Near Coastal Steam of Motor

Vessels of Not More Than 50 Gross Tons.î He, too, was not required to have a license.

The last deckhand was assigned to the service bar to provide concession duties and did not

hold a Coast Guard license. All of the crewmembers reported that, on the day of the

grounding, they had not done any unusual work and that they had followed their normal

schedules, which included taking naps in the afternoon. 
Factual Information 10 Marine Accident Report

Vessel Information

The Finest is an aluminum catamaran ferry built in 1996 by Derecktor Shipyards,

Mamaroneck, New York. Its overall length is 127 feet, with a beam of 33 feet. It was

powered by twin diesel water jet drives and had a maximum speed of about 38 knots. The

Finest had a capacity of 349 passengers, which could be carried in two cabins. One cabin

was on the main deck, and the other was on the upper deck. A concession stand was on the

main deck in the center of the vessel. The vessel’s draft varied from 3.6 feet to 6.6 feet

forward and 4.9 feet to 5.9 feet aft, depending on the load condition. The NYFF is a

wholly owned subsidiary of Lighthouse Fast Ferry, Inc. 

The Finest’s COI permitted the vessel to operate on a route described as “Limited

Coastwise, Atlantic Ocean not more than 20 miles from a harbor of safe refuge between

Montauk Point, New York and Cape May, New Jersey.” 

The Finest’s navigation and communications equipment included the following

items:

• Two VHF-FM marine band radios;

• Two 3-centimeter radars, one automatic radar plotting aid equipped;

• One PinPoint electronic chart plotter;

• One Global Positioning System (GPS) with a differential GPS;

• One autopilot;

• One digital gyro compass; and

• Six portable FM business band radios.

The main propulsion cooling systems on the Finest had been modified to allow for

operation in the ice. However, the cooling water system for the two electrical generators

had not been modified and frequently became clogged when operating in ice. It was,

therefore, a routine practice for vessel personnel to secure the generators when in an ice

field. The engine’s computerized monitoring system, the emergency lighting, the PinPoint

chart plotter, and the 3-centimeter radar used by the captain operated on the 24-volt D.C.

circuit and remained operational when the generators were secured because there was a

battery backup system for the 24-volt system. The public address system, the second radar

with the automatic radar plotting aid, and the heating, ventilation, and cooling systems

required 120-volt power supplied by either one of the two generators; therefore, they were

not operational while the vessel was in the ice. 

The public address system was operated from the steering station on the bridge and

in postaccident testing was found to be loud and clear in both cabins. Communications

between the crewmembers was via portable radios on the FM business spectrum.
Factual Information 11 Marine Accident Report

Waterway Information

The Finest operated in New York Harbor from the East 34th Street terminal in the

East River to the SHBM terminal in the Shrewsbury River, an overall distance of 23

nautical miles. The route included passage through the Upper Bay through the Narrows

into the Lower Bay of New York Harbor to Sandy Hook Bay. A vessel entering Sandy

Hook Bay from the north will pass buoy 17, which is located 0.4 miles west of the

northern tip of the peninsula. It was a direct course line from buoy 17 to the Shrewsbury

River channel approach buoy number 2, a distance of 3.5 miles. 

The channel into the Shrewsbury River was 100 yards wide and began at buoy 2

about 0.6 miles north of the New Jersey mainland shore. The depth in the channel

approaching Sandy Hook Bay Marina is 13 to 17 feet at mean lower low water (MLLW).5

Immediately to the east of the channel is a shoal where the depth is 2 feet at MLLW. 

At the time of grounding, the tide was ebbing6 and its level was 0.7 feet above

MLLW; the tide dropped to a low level of 0.2 feet above MLLW at 2125. The Finest was

refloated at 0007 on January 5, when the flood tide reached 1.8 feet above MLLW.

Ice coverage of the bay and river varies from year to year depending upon the

winter temperatures. Ice coverage this year had begun developing two weeks before the

night of the grounding. The prevailing west wind for the previous two days had blown all

the ice in Sandy Hook Bay to the east side of the bay. 

The Light List Volume I, Atlantic Coast, lists the buoys in the Shrewsbury River

with the caution that, ìBuoys in river are maintained from April 15 to December 1 unless

otherwise noted.î The buoys in the river are replaced as needed in the winter with smaller

unlighted buoys that are less susceptible to ice damage. This replacement had occurred the

week before the accident. On January 3, the Coast Guard had issued a Broadcast Notice to

Mariners7

 advising that aids to navigation on the Shrewsbury River may be off station or

missing. They further warned, ìMariners are advised not to rely upon navigational aids to

affix their position.î 

Operational Information

On the day of the accident, the NYFF operated two domestic high-speed vessels

from Highlands, New Jersey, to Manhattan, New York City, New York. The combined

daily ridership was approximately 2,000 passengers. The company reported a 6 percent

5 MLLW is the chart datum (reference point) for charted depths used in this area of the coast and is the

average of the lower of two daily low tides. At most states of the tide, the mariner has at least the water depth

as marked on the navigation charts. Tide tables use the same reference as the navigation charts.

6 An ebbing tide is when water is going out (North in this case) and the water level is decreasing. A

flood tide is the reverse: water coming in and water level increasing.

7 A Broadcast Notice to Mariners is transmitted by the Coast Guard as an advisory to all mariners on

VHF-FM radio every 6 hours in the area that is affected by the information. 
Factual Information 12 Marine Accident Report

increase in annual ridership to 297,775 passengers from the Highlands site for 2001, as

compared with 2000. Highlands, New Jersey, is located on the Shrewsbury River in

Monmouth County, New Jersey, one of the fastest growing counties in the state, and many

of its residents commute daily to New York City for work.8 High-speed vessel service

from Highlands began in 1996 and supplemented bus and rail service into Manhattan. (See

Waterways Analysis and Management section). 

The NYFF has expanded operations to Keyport, New Jersey, and is scheduled to

commence service from Perth Amboy, New Jersey, to Manhattan in the fall of 2002. The

company also has plans to expand high-speed vessel service to Stamford and Bridgeport,

Connecticut, to Manhattan, LaGuardia Airport, and Jersey City, New Jersey.9 

Meteorological Information

The weather at the time of the accident was reported10 to be partly cloudy, with

visibility greater than 10 miles. Winds were from the west at 10 knots and had been

westerly for the preceding 48 hours. Air temperature was 31o F, and it had been below

freezing for more than 4 days.

Toxicological Testing

At 0128 on January 5, a Coast Guard boarding team from Coast Guard Station

Sandy Hook arrived at the SHBM to conduct a postaccident test for alcohol of the master.

The alcohol (breathalyzer) test was administered to the master at 0130 on January 5,

approximately 6 hours after the grounding, with negative results. The president of NYFF

then took the master and the 5 crewmembers to a local hospital for postaccident drug

screening and had them tested for the following five drugs or classes of drugs: marijuana,

cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine (PCP), and amphetamines in compliance with 46 CFR part

16. Those results were also negative.

8 Information obtained on June 18, 2002, from the home page for ìMonmouth County Economic

Development<http://www.visitmonmouth.com/econdev/facts.asp>.

9 Electronic Maritime Newsletter, ìRecord Year for New York Fast Ferryî (April 26, 2002).

10 From Newark Airport, 14 miles to the Northwest.
Factual Information 13 Marine Accident Report

Survival Factors

Passenger Evacuation

The passenger with the allergic reaction was the only passenger evacuated while

the vessel was aground. The passenger had been taken to a waiting area in the aft end of

the vessel. The remaining passengers were kept on board in anticipation that the incoming

tide would refloat the vessel. The president of NYFF stated that he had discussed with

Coast Guard Activities New York the possibility of arranging for a tug and shallow draft

barge if passenger evacuation became necessary. 

Passenger Information 

There were 258 passengers on board at the time of the grounding. Passengers are

boarded with tickets purchased beforehand, but names and other identification are not

recorded routinely. The passenger count is developed from the collection of tickets as the

passengers board and is recorded in the vesselís log. On this trip, 66 passengers boarded at

the E. 34th Street pier and 192 boarded at pier 11. After the grounding, passengers were

asked to provide a business card or their names on a piece of paper to one of the

crewmembers. Safety Board investigators interviewed eight passengers by telephone, all

of whom described the situation after the grounding as calm. The passengers also reported

that the first announcement came 45 minutes after the grounding. Before that, they said,

they had felt the vessel come to a stop, and some passengers recalled deckhands walking

through the cabins telling passengers that the vessel was aground. All of the passengers

said that more updates should have been given as the event unfolded.

Lifesaving Equipment

The Finest was required to carry 354 adult lifejackets, 36 child lifejackets, and 3

inflatable buoyant apparatus for 250 people.11 The equipment was on board, accessible,

and in good condition. 

Other Information

High-Speed Vessels

High-speed vessels, often called fast ferries, are a relatively new form of

commuter transportation in the United States. High-speed vessels are the result of

technological advancements in wave piercing multi-hulls as well as improvements in

diesel engine designs. In 1999, the Coast Guard, in partnership with the Passenger Vessel

11 In accordance with Title 46 CFR Part 117.200, vessels on a Limited Coastwise without overnight

accommodations are required to carry Inflatable Buoyant Apparatus for 67% of the total persons that can be

carried in accordance with the COI. 
Factual Information 14 Marine Accident Report

Association, of which the NYFF is a member, recognized the need to address safety and

training issues that were unique to high-speed vessels in domestic trade and chartered a

working group of Coast Guard and industry people to develop voluntary risk mitigation

measures in the areas of training, operations, and bridge equipment. Navigational safety

was the primary consideration in defining high-speed vessels. According to the working

groupís findings, ìInternational studies have concluded that the primary risk associated

with high-speed vessel operations is risk of collision.î12 The working group also

developed guidelines for crewmember training that were designed to ensure that

crewmembers are prepared ìto safely handle all aspects of vessel operations, both routine

and non-routine.î13

Waterways Analysis and Management System

In 1992, the Coast Guard conducted a Waterways Analysis and Management

System review of the Sandy Hook Bay and tributaries, including the Shrewsbury River.

The review was conducted to determine if changes in traffic patterns in the waterways

warranted changes in navigational aids. A Local Notice to Mariners solicited comments

from area waterway user groups, but no comments were received. However, in response to

a Coast Guard questionnaire, the user groups stated that Shrewsbury River navigational

aids were difficult to locate while entering the channel because of background lights and

the size of the aids. In addition, two commercial companies had sent letters to the Coast

Guard in the mid-1980ís requesting better navigational aids in the river entrance. The

correspondence was included in the review. 

The review concluded that commercial operators had been able to transit the

Shrewsbury River during the winter months with almost no navigational aids. However,

the review acknowledged that although navigation into the Shrewsbury River was

possible with inadequate or missing navigational aids, the situation was ìunsafe.î14

As a result of the review and because of the requests from commercial operators,

buoys 2 and 3 were replaced by fixed lighted structures with dayboards.

15 However,

during the winter of 1993 and 1994, the beacons were rendered inoperable by ice storms,

and the buoys were returned. The fixed structures were never returned, and the smaller

unlighted buoys were in use on the night of the grounding.

Navigational Procedures

Piloting in restricted waters requires frequent determination of a vesselís position

because the situation can change rapidly, requiring frequent course changes while

12 NVIC No. 5-01, Enclosure, 5.

13 Ibid, 6.

14 U.S. Coast Guard Activities New York, Waterways Analysis and Management System (WAMS)

Review (1992).

15 According to the Light List, 26, a dayboard is ìthe daytime identifier of an aid to navigation

presenting one of several shapes (square, triangle, rectangle) and colors (red, green, white, orange, yellow or

black).
Factual Information 15 Marine Accident Report

transiting channels, rivers, or bays, or adjusting to avoid other vessels in congested

waterways.16

A navigator17 should use all available information and make decisions based on a

complete evaluation of the situation.18 A vesselís position can be determined by use of the

following navigational aids:

ï Visual navigational aids, such as buoys and beacons in conjunction with

nautical charts;

ï Electronic navigational aids, such as radio detection and ranging (Radar),

LORAN (long range navigation), and differential GPS;19 and

ï Electronic chart display and information systems and electronic nautical charts

with GPS interface. 

Navigational aids vary with the type of vessel, the conditions of the waterway, and

the navigatorís experience. However, it is accepted and documented in navigation

textbooks that a prudent mariner does not rely on one single aid. Navigators must be aware

of the vesselís position, maintain a lookout for other vessels, determine if the risk of

collision exists, and adjust course as the situation dictates. To successfully accomplish all

of these tasks, the navigator must rely on multiple sources of navigational information. 

One simple method of radar navigation is accomplished by using the radarís

variable range marker (VRM) and electronic bearing line (EBL) to establish the vesselís

position. The VRM is an adjustable range ring that rotates or sweeps around the center of

the radarscope. The EBL is a radial straight bearing line emanating from the center of the

radarscope that can be adjusted and rotated around the radarscope to determine bearings to

echoes.20 The EBL can be aligned to a specific known target, and the VRM can be set so

that the range ring coincides with the target. The result is the bearing and distance to the

target which, when plotted on a chart, gives the vesselís position. The navigator can take

multiple ranges, bearings, or combinations of both to accurately determine the vesselís

position. 

Radar VRMs can also be used to warn a navigator that a vessel is approaching a

danger area. From a nautical chart, the navigator would determine the closest distance or

range to a point of reference (land or a navigational aid) that the vessel could proceed to

16 Robert Watson-Watt, The Use of Radar at Sea, 4th ed. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,

1976): 127.

17 The navigator is the person who is directly responsible for the operation of the craft. In this analysis,

the ìnavigatorî is used when referring to the mariner, either master or mate/senior deckhand, who is conning

the vessel. A navigator is not the same as the navigational officer who would be responsible for maintenance

of navigational equipment and charts. 

18 Bowditch, 1. 

19 GPS stands for Global Positioning System, which is a satellite-based system that enables users to

determine exactly where they are in terms of longitude and latitude. 

20 Echo is the indication on a radarscope representing a target, such as land or another vessel. It is also

referred to as a return, blip, or pip. Bowditch, 750. 
Factual Information 16 Marine Accident Report

before endangering the vessel. The navigator would set the VRM equal to the distance that

he got from the chart. When the range ring is tangent to the point of reference, the vessel is

at the point that an alteration of course should be made. The range ring would warn the

navigator not to approach closer than the preset range. 

Another simple method of electronic navigation utilizes differential GPS in

conjunction with an electronic chart. This method provides a high level of reliability and

accuracy. The Finest had both a differential GPS and an electronic chart (PinPoint Plotter),

but at the postaccident interview the captain stated that the PinPoint Plotter was not

operational because the electrical generators had been shut down because the vessel was

operating in ice. However, based on manufacturersí data and subsequent information from

the companyís port captain, it was determined that the PinPoint chart display and GPS

systems were DC powered and, therefore, operable without the shipís generators and

available for use on the night of this accident.

Marine Transportation System

In 1999, following an assessment of the U.S. marine transportation system, the

Department of Transportation submitted a report to Congress that summarized ìthe

adequacy of the Nationís marine transportation system (including ports, waterways,

harbor approach channels and their intermodal connections) to operate in a safe, efficient,

secure, and environmentally sound manner.î The marine transportation system consists of

waterways, ports and their intermodal connections, vessels, vehicles, and system users.21

The report predicted that domestic waterways will experience rapid growth in commercial

ferry transportation as a result of the congested land transport systems and that

recreational use of the marine transportation system will increase by 65 percent over the

next 20 years, to more than 130 million annual users.

21 Information obtained on June 18, 2002, from the marine transportation system home page titled ìAn

Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System, A Report to Congress, September 1999

<www.marad.dot.gov/publications/MTSreport>.
17 Marine Accident Report

Analysis

General 

This analysis first identifies factors that can be readily eliminated as causal or

contributory to the grounding. The report then discusses the following safety issues that

were identified during this investigation:

ï Adequacy of navigational procedures; 

ï Adequacy of navigational aids in the Shrewsbury River; and

ï Appropriateness of alcoholic beverage service after an accident.

Exclusions

The vesselís propulsion and steering equipment were operating properly and had

no bearing on the cause of the grounding. Although the generators had to be shut off once

the vessel was in the ice, the loss of the mateís radar did not contribute to the grounding

because the masterís radar, GPS, and chart plotter were available for use and were

sufficient to allow the master to safely navigate his vessel under the circumstances.

Securing the generators upon entering the ice during the approach to the SHBM was

reasonable and had no impact on the safety of the passengers or the navigation of the

vessel. Visibility and currents did not have any bearing on the accident. The emergency

response was timely. A New York City Police Aviation Unit helicopter evacuated an ill

passenger, and Coast Guard and local emergency responders stood by in the event further

assistance was needed. While alcohol testing of the master was conducted within about 1

hour of the vesselís arrival at the dock, the elapsed time between the grounding and testing

was about 6 hours. This time delay was attributed to the vessel being aground in the ice

and unreachable; accordingly, it was not practical to have conducted the testing any sooner

than it was. Because the results of the test were negative and because the masterís

behavior and performance postaccident were uniformly professional and appropriate for

the circumstances, the use of alcohol was most probably not a factor in this accident.

Nevertheless, because of the long delay in testing, the possibility of alcohol impairment

cannot be completely eliminated.

In addition, postaccident drug testing was conducted on the crewmembers and

results were negative. The crewmembers had the opportunity to rest for 5 hours before

getting underway from New York for the evening run and had been on duty for only 3 1/2

hours before grounding. The crewmembers also stated that they were well rested.

Therefore, fatigue was not likely an issue. Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that

major equipment failure, visibility, currents, fatigue, and drugs were not factors in this

accident.
Analysis 18 Marine Accident Report

Accident Analysis

The domestic high-speed vessel Finest, with a complement of 5 crewmembers,

258 passengers, and one company official, was en route from the borough of Manhattan,

New York City, New York, to Highlands, New Jersey, when it grounded in Sandy Hook

Bay on the approach to the Shrewsbury River entrance channel. The master had diverted

his vessel to pass clear of an ice field that covered his normal route to the channel and

made an approach with the channel buoys obscured by the ice. The masterís turn into the

channel entrance was based on his visual observations of the SHBMís lights. The vessel

grounded about 300 yards east of the channel. No injuries or deaths resulted from this

accident; however, one person on board had to be evacuated from the vessel by helicopter

for medical treatment of an allergic reaction unrelated to the accident.

Adequacy of Navigational Procedures

Crewmember Actions

On a typical approach to the SHBM, the navigator would set the vesselís course for

the Shrewsbury River channel after passing buoy 17 and Sandy Hook Point. He would

look for the channel buoys visually and attempt to locate the buoys on his radar. The

SHBM also presented a distinct target on the radar. The navigator could set the vesselís

course in the approximate direction of the channel buoys and the SHBM. Because the bay

was sufficiently deep and broad, the navigator would not be required to maintain a precise

trackline until nearing the entrance to the channel. After the navigator had sighted the

entrance buoys visually, he would make course adjustments into the channel using the

buoys as reference. The distance from buoy 17 to buoy 2 (at the entrance to Shrewsbury

River) is 3 1/2 miles. At 30 knots, it would take less than 8 minutes for the vessel to travel

from buoy 17 to buoy 2. 

On the trip during which the vessel grounded, the master chose to deviate from his

normal approach to avoid an ice field. Instead of a direct course (165o true) from buoy 17

to the channel, the master headed the vessel in a southerly (180o true) direction toward

Atlantic Highland breakwater and made the approach to the Shrewsbury channel from the

west. To enter the channel, the master had to make a 90o starboard turn without the use of

the buoys as references. (See figures 5 and 6.) However, he had sufficient electronic

navigation equipment available to him to have executed the maneuver safely.

At the point of entering the ice field, the approximate distance to the position of

buoy 2 was 6/10 mile. The master continued into the ice field toward the estimated

position of buoy 2 at a speed of about 32 to 34 knots and continued to look for the

approach buoys visually and by radar. When the vessel was approximately 3/10 mile from

channel approach buoy 2, the master began reducing his speed to about 25 knots. He made

one final attempt to locate the buoys by having the deckhand go on the bridge wing to

obtain a visual sighting. The master then made his turn toward the SHBM based on a

visual observation of the SHBMís lights and a radar observation of the SHBM.

Attempting this maneuver at such a high speed was not prudent.
Analysis 19 Marine Accident Report

Figure 5. The radar presentation as the vessel proceeds on a southerly trackline (180O) 

toward Atlantic Highlands breakwater. The vessel is at center of the presentation. The 

dashed line is the vesselís heading line

Figure 6. The radar presentation after the vessel turns left to the east toward Sandy 

Hook Peninsula and begins approaching the channel.

180°

090°

Atlantic Highlands 

 Breakwater Sandy Hook Bay 

 Marina 

Vessel heading line 

Sandy Hook 

Peninsula

090°

180°
Analysis 20 Marine Accident Report

At the postaccident interview, the master was asked, if faced with the same

circumstances in the future, what could he have done differently to avoid grounding the

vessel. He recommended that the Coast Guard break up the ice or have a range installed.

He also recommended that the company have an alternate landing site. When asked if

there was an alternative to using the buoys to enter the marina, he stated that he did not

know of an alternative.

There were alternative methods of navigation that the master could have used to

safely navigate the vessel into the marina. He could have set his radarís VRM to a range of

1/2 mile to serve as a danger marker. (See figure 7.) As he approached Sandy Hook

Peninsula on his trackline, the distance to the land would close or decrease and would be

readily apparent on the radarscope. When the distance to land was 1/2 mile, the range ring

would appear to be tangent to the land mass and the vessel would be at the turn point. (See

figure 8.) If the vessel continued toward the land without changing course, the range ring

would pass over the land, indicating that the distance was less than the 1/2 mile from the

vessel and that, as a result, the vessel would be approaching shallow water. 

The master could have also determined the true course line of the channel and

adjusted his EBL to display either the true or relative bearing from his easterly heading.

(See figure 9.) At the point that the EBL was aligned into the marina, while the VRM

became tangent with the land mass, the master would know that the vessel was at the point

where it was safe for it to head toward the SHBM. (See figure 10.) 

Figure 7. The VRM is set at the range that the vessel should be when it is to make the 

turn to the right toward the SBHM.

VRM 

090°
Analysis 21 Marine Accident Report

Figure 8. The radar presentation after the vessel turns to right toward the SHBM.

Figure 9. Electronic bearing line is set to the bearing that the vessel will have to change 

to when turning into the channel.

162o 

EBL 

090°

162o 
Analysis 22 Marine Accident Report

The master could also have used a prominent shoreline point to obtain a fix based

on the range and bearing to that point. The Atlantic Highlands breakwater light would

have provided a prominent mark for the master to fix the vesselís position. Yet another

option that the master could have employed to determine the vesselís position was to use

the PinPoint chart plotter with the appropriate GPS input. Had the master used radar range

and bearing, or the GPS with the PinPoint chart plotter, he could have established the

vesselís position and navigated into the marina without incident. 

The master had a radar, GPS, paper chart, and electronic chart available to use to

establish the vesselís position. The Safety Board concludes that the master could have

successfully made the transit into the Shrewsbury River by using the navigational

equipment that was available to him.

The master had never made an approach into the channel when all of the buoys

were obscured by ice. On the trip before the grounding, buoy 2 was the only aid visible.

Moreover, the master had adequate warning from the Light List and Broadcast Notice to

Mariners that the possibility existed that ice might obscure all of the buoys. The master

had traveled the route for months prior to the night of the grounding. He had ample

opportunity to use alternate forms of navigation with the equipment available to him. 

Because he did not have an alternate plan before entering the ice field, the master

should have taken precautions by devising a plan before approaching the channel. As

discussed earlier, his radar could have provided him with the information necessary to

Figure 10. The VRM is tangent to Sandy Hook Peninsula and the EBL is tangent to the 

SHBM, indicating that the vessel is at the position to change course into the channel.

EBL 

VRM 

162o 

090o 
Analysis 23 Marine Accident Report

establish his position. However, the master continued at the service speed of 32 to 34

knots until he had entered the ice and proceeded to the channel entrance without

establishing his position. He relied on visually locating the obscured buoys up until the

vessel made the final turn toward the marina. 

A vesselís position can be established by plotting22 information that is determined

by radar. The range and bearing plot to a distinctive landmark or fixed navigational aid is

an effective tool for establishing a vesselís position. However, information from the radar

must be transferred onto a nautical chart that, depending on the proficiency of the

navigator, can take 30 to 60 seconds. In pilotage waters, the situation can change rapidly,

and the navigator may only be able to use the chart as a guide and not have the time to

transfer the radar information to the chart. A vessel traveling at 30 knots advances at 1/2

mile per minute. Therefore, if the master had attempted to establish his position by

plotting the radar information without slowing down, the vessel would have traveled

beyond the turning point and been in shallow water before the master would have been

able to assess and react to the information and turn the vessel. Further, the existing

conditions, including nighttime operations, the presence of ice, the lack of floating aids to

navigation, and the unfamiliarity of the master with the attempted turn maneuver all

demanded a more cautious approach to the turn point at the entrance to the Shrewsbury

channel. Prudence should have dictated that the master approach the turn at a slower

speed. The Safety Board, therefore, concludes that the master was going too fast to permit

him to safely approach the entrance to the Shrewsbury River channel under the prevailing

conditions. 

Because it would have taken some time to plan and execute his approach, the

master should have reduced speed once he could not locate the buoys visually or identify

them on radar. After reducing his speed, the master should have determined his position

by plotting a radar range and bearing or by using GPS and the electronic chart.

Maintaining speeds in excess of 25 knots and relying on visual observations with only

limited use of other navigational aids, is not prudent when attempting to turn into a narrow

channel in a situation in which the vesselís position is not established. 

The master had completed a radar course that included instructions in radar

navigation. However, proficiency in radar navigation is a skill that is developed from

hands-on experience. The principles can be introduced in a classroom environment or with

a simulator, but the radar must be used in routine conditions so that the navigator can call

upon the skill when needed as circumstances change. The master did not use the PinPoint

chart plotter and did not consider using it on the night of the accident. The chart plotter,

radar, buoys, and fixed structures are all navigational aids that should be used, when

appropriate, by the prudent mariner. The master of the Finest, by his actions and answers

to interview questions, indicated that he relied primarily on buoys and visual observations

to navigate. He used the radar solely as an extension of his eyes for early warning. The

observations he took from the radar were approximations and not measured bearing or

ranges. The Safety Board concludes that because the master of the Finest did not routinely

22 Plotting is defined as drawing lines and points to represent certain conditions graphically, as on a

nautical chart, to represent the position and progress of a vessel.
Analysis 24 Marine Accident Report

train on or use all the available navigational equipment in routine conditions, he may not

have been prepared to use the equipment on the night of the grounding when conditions

were nonroutine. 

The Coast Guard and the high-speed small passenger vessel industry have

approached the issue of operational safety of high-speed vessels as ìpartners.î The

partnership hopes to improve safety by relying on a voluntary versus a regulatory

approach. The Coast Guard has issued NVICs that serve as guidelines to the industry to

improve safety. In theory, the company, in turn, by joining in the partnership, is supposed

to improve the safe operation of its vessels through voluntary action without having

burdensome regulations imposed upon it. One such improvement would be to ensure that

people are capable of using all the navigational equipment on the ship. 

The company hired the master and was responsible for ensuring that he was

prepared to use all of the equipment available to ensure a safe operation. Before the master

was promoted, the companyís port captain made a few check rides with the master.

However, the company did not evaluate the master in the use of the on-board navigational

equipment. The company also did not make subsequent evaluations of the master to

determine if he was proficient in the use of all the available navigational equipment. If the

NYFF had ensured that the master as well as senior deckhands operating in the capacity of

navigator were trained on and used the installed navigational equipment to proficiency, the

grounding would not have occurred. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the NYFF

should establish and implement requirements that vessel masters and crewmembers with

navigational responsibilities use to proficiency all installed vessel navigation equipment

and institute procedures to periodically monitor their performance.

The NYFF did not have any standard operating requirements for the navigation of

its vessels in adverse environmental conditions. In the Safety Boardís opinion, the safe

navigation of company vessels is as much a responsibility of the company management

officials as it is the master of the vessel. To discharge its responsibility, the company

should establish minimum operating standards for conducting navigation watches and for

specifying actions to be taken by vessel operating crewmembers during periods of adverse

environmental conditions. At a minimum, company officials should specify the minimum

frequency of navigation fixes and the maximum speeds of advance during adverse

conditions and require the use of electronic navigation equipment whenever the

environmental conditions deteriorate to reduce visibility from any cause or result in any

condition, such as ice, that precludes the use of visual aids to navigation. Had the NYFF

enforced such operating standards for some time before this accident, the master would

have been required to proceed at a slower speed and would have been acclimated to the

use of the electronic navigation equipment provided. Had this occurred, this accident

might have been avoided. Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that the lack of

vessel operating standards for navigation in adverse environmental conditions played a

decisive role in the vesselís grounding. The Safety Board, therefore, believes that NYFF

should establish and implement vessel operations standards for navigation in adverse

environmental conditions, including fog, snow, heavy rain, and ice.
Analysis 25 Marine Accident Report

Adequacy of Navigational Aids in the Shrewsbury River

The Coast Guard concluded in its 1992 Waterways Analysis and Management

System study that while it was possible for vessels to navigate in the Shrewsbury River

without navigational aids, to do so was ìunsafe.î Commercial operators in the river had

requested larger fixed aids for the Shrewsbury River Channel, and, in 1993, the Coast

Guard installed two beacons at the position of buoys 2 and 3. The beacons were damaged

during a winter storm and replaced with buoys. The lighted buoys in the Shrewsbury River

channel are replaced in the winter by smaller unlit buoys, which are less susceptible to ice

damage. These smaller buoys, however, can be moved off station or forced under the ice,

thereby leaving the channel inadequately marked. On the evening of the grounding, all of

the channel buoys were obscured by ice. Without the aids, the master used visual

observations of shore lights to make the final turn, something he did not normally do, and

went aground. 

Beacons would be visible on radar and give the navigator a precise reference point

to use in navigating regardless of conditions. (See figure 11.) Radar, especially in fog, is

critical for determining the risk of collision. Because radar is used for collision avoidance

and, at the same time, can be used for navigation, the importance of maintaining a radar

watch cannot be overstated. Beacons that can be quickly identified by radar assist the

mariner by allowing him to navigate and maintain a watch for other vessels at the same

time.

Figure 11. The radar presentation with beacons in place marking the channel.

VRM 

090o 

162o 
Analysis 26 Marine Accident Report

Small passenger vessels were crucial to the evacuation of Manhattan on September

11, 2001. Because of their speed, in a time of disaster, high-speed vessels could evacuate

large numbers of people from New York City. The potential use of high-speed vessels in

such circumstances makes the provision of reliable navigational aids all the more critical.

The Safety Board considered whether the placement of ranges would help vessels

transit the channel. However, ranges are ineffective in conditions of reduced visibility.

Beacons that are permanently installed at the entrance to a channel, however, will not be

hidden by ice and can also be identified by radar in fog. The Safety Board concludes that

the safety of navigation in the Shrewsbury River channel would be enhanced by the

installation of navigational aids that are available for use in all conditions of visibility.

Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should install beacons to

augment or replace buoys at the entrance to the Shrewsbury River Channel. 

Appropriateness of Alcoholic Beverage Service After an 

Accident 

After the grounding, shoreside vessel management initiated an ìopen barî as a

means of compensating the passengers for the delay. This gesture included all items at the

snack bar, including alcoholic beverages. Complimentary beverage service is a relatively

common action in the food service industry as compensation for poor or interrupted

service. However, unrestricted alcoholic beverage service could have created a serious

problem in this situation. According to the Coast Guard report of this accident: 

It presented a safety concern that now had to be factored into the planning. We

wanted to avoid a situation where we now had inebriated passengers to rescue.

This became a grave concern, and if it became necessary, prohibited the USCG

from using helos [helicopters] or other assets if feasible.

The Safety Board concurs with this assessment. Had evacuation by any means

been necessary in the dark and the ice-choked waters, the operation itself would have been

hazardous to passenger safety. Adding inebriated persons and the resulting loss of motor

skills and impaired judgment would have created an unnecessary and serious threat to the

safety of the rescuers as well as those they were trying to rescue.

Throughout the small passenger vessel industry, efforts aimed at customer

satisfaction and appeasement must be balanced against the risk to passenger safety.

Continued service of alcoholic beverages after an accident creates a potential crowd

management problem. While this problem has not been identified in previous Safety

Board investigations, the Safety Board feels that it is an important safety issue. These

vessels may carry many hundreds of passengers with crews of varying size, depending on

what their certification requires. For example, the Finest was certified to carry up to 389

passengers with six crewmembers, including a master and mate (or senior deckhand).

Because the master and mate are responsible for controlling the vessel, that would leave

only four deckhands to manage nearly 400 people during an emergency. With a ratio of
Analysis 27 Marine Accident Report

deckhands to passengers of nearly 1 to 100, it would take very few inebriated passengers

to overwhelm the ability of the crewmembers to maintain control. This is especially likely

because the deckhands on the Finest had no training in crowd control management. 

The situation on the Finest is not unique. All small passenger vessels face the

potential of having to deal with an emergency in which the ratio of crewmembers to

passengers is very low, in many cases much lower that 1 to 100. Similarly, most

deckhands on small passenger vessels are not trained in crowd control management. This

raises serious concerns about the ability of such crewmembers to maintain control of

inebriated passengers during emergency situations. The Safety Board concludes that

serving alcoholic beverages in emergency situations that may require passenger

evacuation or other forms of passenger management is not a prudent action. Therefore, the

Safety Board believes that NYFF should establish a company policy requiring the

cessation of alcoholic beverage service during emergency situations and that policy should

be included in its vessel operating manual.
28 Marine Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Major equipment failure, visibility, currents, fatigue, and drugs were not factors in

this accident.

2. The master could have successfully made the transit into the Shrewsbury River by

using the navigational equipment that was available to him.

3. The master was going too fast to permit him to safely approach the entrance to the

Shrewsbury River channel under the prevailing conditions.

4. Because the master of the Finest did not routinely train on or use all the available

navigational equipment in routine conditions, he may not have been prepared to use

the equipment on the night of the grounding when conditions were nonroutine.

5. If New York Fast Ferry had ensured that the master as well as senior deckhands

operating in the capacity of navigator were trained on and used the installed

navigational equipment to proficiency, the grounding would not have occurred.

6. The lack of vessel operating standards for navigation in adverse environmental

conditions played a decisive role in the vesselís grounding.

7. The safety of navigation in the Shrewsbury River channel would be enhanced by the

installation of navigational aids that are available for use in all conditions of visibility. 

8. Serving alcoholic beverages in emergency situations that may require passenger

evacuation or other forms of passenger management is not a prudent action.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the grounding of the Finest was the failure of the vessel master to use appropriate

navigational procedures and equipment to determine the vesselís position while

approaching the Shrewsbury River channel. Contributing to the cause of the grounding

was the lack of readily visible fixed navigational aids. Also contributing to the cause of the

grounding was the failure of New York Fast Ferry to require the use of installed navigation

equipment and to set guidelines for operations in adverse environmental conditions. 
29 Marine Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety

Board makes the following recommendations:

To the U. S. Coast Guard:

Install beacons to augment or replace buoys at the entrance to the

Shrewsbury River channel. (M-02-18)

To New York Fast Ferry:

Establish and implement requirements that vessel masters and

crewmembers with navigational responsibilities use to proficiency all

installed vessel navigation equipment and institute procedures to

periodically monitor their performance. (M-02-19)

Establish and implement vessel operations standards for navigation in

adverse environmental conditions, including fog, snow, heavy rain, and ice.

(M-02-20) 

Establish a company policy requiring the cessation of alcoholic beverage

service during emergency situations and include that policy in your Vessel

Operating Manual. (M-02-21) 

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

CAROL J. CARMODY

Acting Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member 

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: September 17, 2002

31 Marine Accident Report

Appendix A 

Investigation

The U.S. Coast Guard notified the Safety Board of the accident on the evening of

January 4, 2001. Although no injuries and no damages resulted from the accident, the

Safety Board decided to investigate because a large number of passengers were at risk

and, had the situation unfolded differently, there was the potential for serious

consequences. The Safety Board dispatched an investigative team from its Washington,

D.C., headquarters on the morning of January 5. The team arrived on scene that same

morning and commenced the investigation. Investigators examined the vessel and

conducted interviews of the crewmembers and company officials. The on-scene

investigation was completed on January 9, 2001.

The Safety Board investigated the accident under the authority of the Independent

Safety Board Act of 1997, according to the Safety Boardís rules. The designated parties to

the investigation were the U.S. Coast Guard and New York Fast Ferry.