alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. William Henry MULDROW, a/k/a William Cooper, a/k/a Willie, a/k/a Fred Washington, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 06-4401.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Aug. 22, 2007.

Decided: Sept. 4, 2007.

Joseph J. Gigliotti, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Emily N. Glatfelter, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

*178Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William Henry Muldrow, a/k/a William Cooper, a/k/a Willie, a/k/a Fred Washington, pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base and a quantity of oxycodone, in violation of § 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). He was sentenced to 235 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Muldrow contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing must demonstrate a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(b); *United States v. Bowman,*348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir.2003). This court closely scrutinizes the Rule 11 colloquy and attaches a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate. *United States v. Puckett,*61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir.1995); *United States v. Lambey,*974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir.1992).

Here, the transcript of the Rule 11 proceeding demonstrates compliance with the Rule and supports the district court’s finding that Muldrow’s guilty plea was counseled, knowing, and voluntary. Muldrow argues on appeal that it was his implicit understanding that he would be incarcerated for twelve to fourteen years. The record clearly discloses, however, that the court ensured that Muldrow understood that the parties jointly recommended a sentence of 235 months, the sentence he ultimately received. To the extent that Muldrow contends that he did not understand the sentence expressed in months, rather than years, the district court stated that it conducted “an extensive Rule 11 colloquy” and determined that Muldrow’s decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary. *See Lambey,*974 F.2d at 1394 (applying strong presumption of validity to plea if Rule 11 colloquy proper).

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Muldrow failed to meet his burden of showing a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Muldrow’s motion to withdraw his plea and therefore affirm his conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-24-00140-CV 

 

LAMPASAS DRUG COMPANY, LTD. 

D/B/A CATTLES PHARMACY, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

JULIA SANTAMARIA, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 27th District Court 

Lampasas County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 23150, Honorable John T. Gauntt, Presiding 

July 23, 2024 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Appellant, Lampasas Drug Company, Ltd. d/b/a Cattles Pharmacy (“Lampasas”), 

appeals from the trial court’s Order Overruling Defendant’s Objections to Chapter 74 

Expert Report of Sergei Grando, M.D.

1

 We dismiss the untimely appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.

We previously remanded this cause to the trial court to rule on Lampasas’ Rule 

306a motion for additional time to file a notice of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(a); TEX.

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the 

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. 
2

R. CIV. P. 306a.5. On remand, the trial court issued an Order Denying Rule 306a(5) 

Motion and findings and conclusions of law. According to these findings, the trial court 

signed the Order Overruling Defendant’s Objections to Chapter 74 Expert Report of 

Sergei Grando, M.D. on February 6, 2024. The order was delivered electronically that 

day to all parties, including Lampasas’ counsel. Consequently, Lampasas’ notice of 

appeal was due twenty days thereafter, by February 26, 2024. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (permitting interlocutory appeal), 74.351(b); TEX. R. APP.

P. 26.1(b), 28.1(b) (concerning accelerated appeals). Lampasas did not file a notice of 

appeal until March 25, 2024, after the fifteen-day extension period. See TEX. R. APP. P.

26.3.

A timely notice of appeal is essential to invoking our jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 25.1(b), 26.1; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Tex. 1997). 

Notwithstanding that the Texas Supreme Court has directed us to construe the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure reasonably and liberally so that the right of appeal is not lost by 

imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of those rules, we 

are prohibited from enlarging the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case. See 

Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616–17; TEX. R. APP. P. 2 (providing that we may not suspend a 

rule’s operation or order a different procedure to alter the time for perfecting an appeal).

Accordingly, we reinstate the appeal, grant Appellee Julia Santamaria’s 

previously-filed motion to dismiss, and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.2 

The appeal is dismissed.

Per Curiam

2 We also deny Lampasas’ pending motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal.
# L_2021369EN.01001301.xml

| 19.10.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 369/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.10.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 369/13

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/1824

of 18 October 2021

amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 42(4) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 19 October 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 (1), establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 19 October 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 (1), establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC).

| (2) | A new financial reference amount for the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022 should be established. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A new financial reference amount for the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022 should be established.

| (3) | Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Article 16(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 is replaced by the following:

‘2.   The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure of the ESDC during the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022 shall be EUR 1 975 752,04.

The financial reference amount to cover the expenditure of the ESDC for subsequent periods shall be decided by the Council.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 18 October 2021.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 of 19 October 2020 establishing a European Security and Defence College, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2016/2382 (OJ L 348, 20.10.2020, p. 1).

1

---
# L_2014026EN.01004101.xml

| 29.1.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 26/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.1.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 26/41

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2014/41/CFSP

of 28 January 2014

implementing Decision 2011/137/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP of 28 February 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya (1), and in particular Article 8(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 28 February 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/137/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 February 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/137/CFSP.

| (2) | One entity should be removed from the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex IV to Decision 2011/137/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

One entity should be removed from the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex IV to Decision 2011/137/CFSP.

| (3) | Decision 2011/137/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Decision 2011/137/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following entity is deleted from the list of persons and entities set out in Annex IV to Decision 2011/137/CFSP:

Libyan Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB).

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 28 January 2014.

For the Council

The President

G. STOURNARAS

---

(1)  
  OJ L 58, 3.3.2011, p. 53.

1

---
#### § 58.420 Hoops, forms and followers.

The hoops, forms, and followers shall be constructed of stainless steel, heavy tinned steel or other approved materials. If tinned, they shall be kept tinned and free from rust. All hoops, forms, and followers shall be kept in good repair. Drums or other special forms used to press and store cheese shall be clean and sanitary.
#### Jack Sorman, Respondent, v. Miss Elliette, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Order entered December 11, 1960, denying the motion by defendant, Miss Elliette, Znc., to vacate a default judgment entered against said defendant, unanimously reversed, on the law, on toe facts and in the exercise of discretion, without .costs and without disbursements and the application to open the default is remanded to Trial Term, Tart I to “ Le heard and determined *by the*justice who presided in the calendar part at this time the cause was assigned” (See Rules of ,Supreme Court, New York and_Bronx Counties, § 660.5, subd. [c], par. [3L cl. [i]; 22 N5TCRR 660.5 [c] j)3] [i]). Upon such renewed application, mfovant should submit a further affidavit of merit, and may submit any other atfftdavits, if so advised. In *Kahn*v. *Kinder*(33 A D 2d 903) this court called attention to the Rules of Supreme Ccvirt, New York and Bronx Counties, ab-jve cited, and the necessity of complying with them even when a ease .has Ve'en assigned to a “blockbuster” part. Cobsequently, the application to open the default herein should have been decided by the Justice who presided in the calendar part at the time the cause was assigned. In reversing and remanding we do not indicate any view as to the merits of the application. Concur—McGivern, J. P., Markewich, Steuer and Bastow, JJ.
§ 59.10 General administrative provisions. ( a ) *Reporting by packers and importers.* A packer or importer shall report all information required under this part on an individual lot basis.
( b ) *Reporting schedule.* Whenever a packer or importer is required to report information on transactions of livestock and livestock products under this part by a set time, all covered transactions up to within one half hour of the reporting deadline shall be reported. Transactions completed during the one half hour prior to the previous reporting time, but not reported in the previous report, shall be reported at the next scheduled reporting time.
( c ) *Regional reporting and aggregation.* The Secretary shall make information obtained under this part available to the public only in a manner that: ( 1 ) Ensures that the information is published on a national and a regional or statewide basis as the Secretary determines to be appropriate;
( 2 ) Ensures that the identity of a reporting person or the entity which they represent is not disclosed; and
( 3 ) Market information reported to the Secretary by packers and importers shall be aggregated in such a manner that the market reports issued will not disclose the identity of persons, packers and importers, including parties to a contract and packer's and importer's proprietary information.
( d ) *Adjustments.* Prior to the publication of any information required under this part, the Secretary may make reasonable adjustments in information reported by packers and importers to reflect price aberrations or other unusual or unique occurrences that the Secretary determines would distort the published information to the detriment of producers, packers, or other market participants.
( e ) *Reporting of activities on weekends and holidays.* Livestock and livestock products committed to a packer, or importer, or purchased, sold, or slaughtered by a packer or importer on a weekend day or holiday shall be reported to the Secretary in accordance with the provisions of this Part and reported by the Secretary on the immediately following reporting day. A packer shall not be required to report such actions more than once on the immediately following reporting day.
( f ) *Reporting methods.* Whenever information is required to be reported under this part, it shall be reported by electronic means and shall adhere to a standardized format established by the Secretary to achieve the objectives of this part, except in emergencies or in cases when an alternative method is agreeable to the entity required to report and AMS.
#### Busby *v.*The State.

*Indictment for Larceny.*

1. *Larceny; constituents of offense; instructions to the jury.*— Where on a trial for larceny the evidence- shows that the defendant, without the knowledge or consent of the owner, with whom he had been playing, took some shirt buttons from the latter’s pocket, and as he was going away from the defendant said that he would leave the buttons at a certain place where the owner could get them by paying a stipulated sum, a charge is erroneous and is properly refused as being calculated to mislead and confuse the jury, which instructs the jury, that “While larceny includes a trespass, in that it involves felonious intent and fraud or secretiveness' in effecting it; and the knowledge of another’s ownership and the intent to deprive him of it are not equivalent of these elements.”

Appeal from the City Court of Mobile.

Tried before the Hon. O. J. Semmbs.

The appellant was. indicted, tried and convicted for the offense of grand larceny.

On the trial of the cause the evidence showed that while at a shop of one Vincent Peres, the defendant, Willie Busby, caught hold of said Peres and took from his pocket three stud buttons, and that the same were taken from said Peres without his consent and without his knowledge. -There was evidence introduced tending to show that the taking of said buttons was open and in the presence of witnesses, and that said Peres and the defendant were playing with each other a few minutes before the takingand immediately after the time the buttons were taken, and before the defendant moved away, he said to Peres “that he would leave the buttons at his, Busby’s wife’s house, and he, Peres, could get them by leaving twenty-five cents with her, which he owed the defendant,”

*454The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charge, and separately excepted to the court’s refusal to give the same as asked : “While larceny includes a trespass, in that it involves felonious intent and fraud or secretiveness, in effecting it; and the knowledge of another’s ownership and the intent to deprive him of it, are not equivalent of these elements.” The refusal of this charge is the only question presented on this appeal.

C. W. Tompkins, .for appellant.

William C. Fitts, Attorney-General, for the State,

cited *ITiggs v. State,*113 Ala. 36.

COLEMAN, J.

The defendant was indicted and convicted of the offense of grand larceny. The only exception reserved upon the trial was that of the refusal of the court to give the instruction to the jury which appears in the statement of the case. As framed the instruction is not clear, and considered in connection with the facts of the case, was calculated to confuse the jury. We presume, the pleader intended to embody the principle supposed to be asserted in *Lunsford v. Dietrich,*93 Ala., top of page 571, but the phraseology of the instruction requested, and its connection, fails to carry the same meaning, and the principle was no.t applicable. The true rule applicable to the case of appellant is stated in *Higgs v. The State,*113 Ala. 36.

There is no error in the record.

Affirmed.
§ 51.1417 Serious damage. *Serious damage* means any specific defect described in this section; or an equally objectionable variation of any one of these defects, or any other defect, or any combination of defects, which seriously detracts from the appearance or the edible or marketing quality of the individual pecan. The following defects shall be considered as serious damage: ( a ) Adhering hull material or dark stains affecting an aggregate of more than 20 percent of the individual shell;
( b ) Broken shells when the missing portion of shell is greater in area than a circle one-fourth inch in diameter;
( c ) Dark discoloration of the skin which is darker than dark amber over more than 25 percent of the surface of the kernel;
( d ) Decay affecting any portion of the kernel;
( e ) Insects, web, frass, or the kernel shows distinct evidence of insect feeding on the kernel;
( f ) Internal flesh discoloration of a dark shade extending more than one-third the length of the kernel beneath the ridge, or an equally objectionable amount of dark discoloration in other portions of the kernel;
( g ) Kernel spots when more than three dark spots on either half of the kernel, or when any spot or the aggregate of two or more spots on one of the halves of the kernel affects more than 10 percent of the surface;
( h ) Mold, on the surface or inside the kernel, which is plainly visible without magnification;
( i ) Rancidity when the kernel is distinctly rancid to the taste. Staleness of flavor shall not be classed as rancidity; Note 1 to § 51.1417 ( i
):
Rancidity refers to the tendency of the oil in a pecan kernel to become tainted as a result of oxidation or hydrolysis. Industry measures to determine the tendency of a kernel to become rancid include testing the kernel's peroxide and free fatty acid values. Peroxide values should be less than 5 mEq/kg and free fatty acids acid value should be less than 1 percent. These analyses are not performed in determination of grade.
( j ) Undeveloped kernels which are blank (complete shell containing no kernel); and
( k ) Worm holes when penetrating the shell.
Documents in Support of a 

Significant New Use Rule for 

Premanufacture Notice (PMN) P-14-0875 

Docket ID Number 

EPA-HQ-OPPT-2015-0220 

EPA SANITIZED Page 1 of 16
 Table of Contents 

1. Sanitized SAT Report for P-14-0875 

2. Sanitized Engineering Report for P-14-0875 

3. Sanitized Exposure Report for P-14-0875 

EPA SANITIZED Page 2 of 16
 

Sanitized SAT Report for P-14-0875 

 

EPA SANITIZED Page 3 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 4 of 16
POTW removal (%) = 0-25 via sorption and biodeg

Time for complete ultimate aerobic biodeg = wk

Sorption to soils/sediments = low

PBT Potential: P1B1

*CEB FATE: Migration to ground water = moderate

 Health:

 Health Summary: Absorption is good all routes, based on analogs. There 

are concerns for irritation to the eye, skin, lung, and mucous membranes, based on and 

concern for dermal sensitization based on submitted test data. Also concern for systemic 

developmental toxicity based on preliminary results of an OECD 422 study in rats with a 

NOAEL of 30 mg/kg for systemic effects and 100 mg/kg for developmental toxicity.

 Test Data: (-) ip mouse micronucleus assay; rat dermal LD0 = 2000 

mg/kg; rat oral LD50 >300 and <2000 mg/kg; (-) in an in vitro Membrane Barrier Test for 

corrosion; (+) for skin sensitization in a mouse local lymph node assay as low as 2.5% ai; 

moderate skin irritation in rabbits

 Ecotox:

Test Organism Test 

Type

Test End 

Point

Predicted Measured Comments

fish 96-h LC50 24 NAD NAD = not adequate

daphnid 48-h LC50 2.9 NAD NAD = not adequate

green algal 96-h EC50 2.3 NAD NAD = not adequate

fish _ chronic value 1.3 0.437

daphnid _ chronic 

value

0.25 4.1

algal _ chronic 

value

0.77

Sewage Sludge 3-h EC50

Sewage Sludge _ Chronic 

Value

_

Ecotox Values Comments: Predictions are based on SARs for ; SAR 

chemical class = log Kow = 2.27 (EPI), 1.40 (M); S > 10 g/L (P); 

solid with mp = -9 C (M); pH7; effective concentrations based on 100% active ingredients and 

mean measured concentrations; DW hardness <150.0 mg/L as CaCO3; and DW TOC <2.0 

mg/L;

For detail data review of acuted studies on please refer to attachment in 

PMN Gold below.

Ecotoxicity Test Data Results for 

EPA SANITIZED Page 5 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 6 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 7 of 16
 

Sanitized Engineering Report for P-14-0875 

 

EPA SANITIZED Page 8 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 9 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 10 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 11 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 12 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 13 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 14 of 16
 

Sanitized Exposure Report for P-14-0875 

EPA SANITIZED Page 15 of 16
EPA SANITIZED Page 16 of 16
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40075

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ERSKINE WILLIAM BONE,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:94-CR-56-2

- - - - - - - - - -

October 23, 1996

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Erskine William Bone appeals the sentence he received

following his guilty-plea conviction to possession of a listed

precursor chemical with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. 

Bone argues that the district court erred by using U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1, instead of § 2D1.11, to consider the appropriate amount

of drugs attributable to him in calculating his offense level. 

He also argues that the district court denied him a reduction in
No. 96-40075

- 2 -

his offense level for acceptance of responsibility.

The district court did not clearly err in its calculation of

the amount of drugs attributable to him, see United States v.

Puig-Infante, 19 F.d. 929, 942 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.

Ct. 180 (1994), and did not clearly err by denying Bone a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v.

Thomas, 12 F.d. 1350, 1372 & n.39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 1861, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2119 (1994).

AFFIRMED.