J-A31042-17

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.R.J.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.P., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1742 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0001013-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0003316-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M.C.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.P., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1744 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0001014-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0003317-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2018

Appellant, B.P. (“Father”), files this appeal from the orders entered May 

2, 2017, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas by the Honorable 

Joseph Fernandes, granting the petitions of the Philadelphia Department of 

Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his 
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minor children, L.R.J.P., born in August of 2007, and J.M.C.P., born in 

December of 2011, (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

1

 Father further appeals the orders entered 

May 2, 2017, changing the Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant 

to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.

2 After review, we affirm the trial 

court’s orders.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history, 

in part, as follows:

The family in this case became known to DHS on June 8, 2014, 

when DHS received a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report 

which alleged that the Children’s then sixteen-year-old brother

(“Sibling 1”) forced his sister (“Sibling 2”) and her friend to 

perform oral sex on him. . . The Children, at the time, were living 

in a home with Mother, Father, Sibling 2, and two brothers

____________________________________________

1 By separate orders entered the same date, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of T.T. (“Mother”) with respect to the Children. 

Mother filed appeals at Superior Court Docket Nos. 1664 EDA 2017 and 1666 

EDA 2017, which this Court consolidated. We shall address Mother’s appeal 

in a separate decision. 

2 Father, however, failed to preserve a challenge related to the goal change 

by failing to raise the issue in the statement of questions involved section of 

his brief and by failing to present argument related thereto in his brief. As 

such, we find that Father has waived any claim regarding the goal change. 

See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising them 

both in the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and statement 

of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those 

issues); In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 

24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 

2010)) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim 

with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
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(“Sibling 3” and “Sibling 4”). . . . In January 2015, DHS received 

a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report alleging that the 

Children’s sibling (“Sibling 5”) disclosed that Father was physically 

abusive to Mother; that Father last abused Mother in August 2014 

and Sibling 5 intervened; that Father attacked Sibling 5 when he 

intervened; that Father had a history of hitting the Children and 

their siblings; and that Sibling 5 lives with his father and spends 

weekends at Mother and Father’s home. The report was 

substantiated.

On November 5, 2015, DHS visited [the home] and learned that 

there was no gas service in the home; that the refrigerator did not 

function properly; that the home was dirty; and that there was

insufficient food in the home. . . . On December 18, 2015, DHS 

filed urgent dependency petitions for the Children, Sibling 3, and 

Sibling 4. On December 24, 2015, the Children were adjudicated 

dependent. The court ordered DHS to supervise, but cautioned 

parents that the [C]hildren would be placed if parents did not 

comply with all of the court’s orders. The court ordered

[Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)] to assist with a house 

cleaning service and exterminator for the family; to provide beds 

and bedding for the family; to order a refrigerator; to conduct 

pop-up visits; parents to comply with safety plans and all social 

workers. The court also [o]rdered . . . Father to complete a 

[Parental Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”)]; and . . . Father to be 

referred to the [Clinical Evaluation Unit “CEU”)] for forthwith drug 

screens, assessments, and random screens.

At a review hearing on March 22, 2016, CUA testified that the 

home had been exterminated and cleaned and that the new bunk 

bed and refrigerator were provided. The court found that the 

Children, Sibling 3, and Sibling 4 were not safe in . . . Father’s 

care, discharged supervision, and ordered all four children to be

committed to DHS . . . . Father [was] granted weekly supervised 

visits . . . . Following phone calls with . . . Father, the Children’s 

negative behaviors would increase. CUA testified that there were 

concerns during supervised visitation, as Father would 

inappropriately whisper things to the Children behind the cover of 

a newspaper. The court ordered all visitation to be supervised at 

the agency, line of sight and line of hearing. The court also 

ordered no more phone calls between the parents and the Children 

until further order of the court, and . . . Father [was] ordered not 

to contact the foster parents directly. . . .

On July 1, 2016, at a permanency review hearing, the court found

. . . Father to be minimally compliant with [his] respective [Single 
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Case Plan (“SCP”)] objectives. . . . The court ordered Father to 

be re-referred to [Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”)] for 

consultation and evaluation; to be re-referred for domestic 

violence counseling; to be referred to Menergy; to comply with 

the PCE scheduled for July 19, 2016; and to comply with all 

services and recommendations. The court found that Father was 

a grave threat to the Children and suspended his visitation with 

the Children based on testimony regarding Father’s failure to 

participate in the Children’s trauma treatment and Father’s 

attempt to influence the Children by saying inappropriate things 

to them about the case during visits. . . . 

On October 26, 2016, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights and change the permanency goal for 

the Children from reunification to adoption. At the time, the 

Children had been in care for eight months at the start of the 

termination trial and fourteen months at the conclusion. The 

Children have been active with DHS for twenty-six months.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 7/25/17, at 1-3.

The trial court held hearings on the petitions on November 14, 2016, 

February 1, 2017, February 16, 2017, March 10, 2017, and May 2, 2017. In 

support thereof, DHS presented the testimony of the following: Dr. William 

Russell, a forensic psychologist; Jennifer Rollins, CUA case manager 

supervisor; Jessica Spurgeon, the Child Advocate Social Worker; and 

Dominique Bibbs, a CUA case manager. In addition, Father testified on his 

own behalf. Mother was present and testified on her own behalf as well. 

Following the hearing, on May 2, 2017, the trial court entered orders

involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and orders changing the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. On May 31, 2017, Father, through appointed 

counsel, filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors 
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complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which 

this Court consolidated sua sponte on June 22, 2017.

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Whether the [tr]ial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)?

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of [Father], under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 5.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47 

A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” 

Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed 

merely because the record would support a different result. Id.

at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized our 

deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 

Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free 
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to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even 

if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis 

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).
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In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long 

held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination order pursuant to 

subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).
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We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are 

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long 

period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, 

may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the instant matter, in finding the evidence supported grounds for 

termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court concluded as 

follows:

Father failed to take affirmative steps to place himself in a position 

to parent the Children. Father was unable to remedy the causes 

of his incapacities to meet the Children’s safety, medical needs, 
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and their physical and emotional well-being. The Children need 

permanency, which Father cannot provide. Father is unable to 

take immediate custody of the Children. DHS met its burden 

under [Section] 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act and termination 

under this section was also proper.

T.C.O. at 15.

Father argues, however, that he took steps to remedy his inability to 

care for the Children by working on his objectives, and DHS failed to meet, by 

clear and convincing evidence, the test set forth in In re: Geiger, 459 Pa. 

636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975). Father’s Brief at 17. Father states that his 

objectives were parenting, stabilizing mental health, and housing. Id. at 16. 

Father maintains that he was in mental health treatment through Community 

Mental Health, completed “Healthy Relationships” domestic violence class, and 

completed the “Menergy” domestic violence program. Id. at 16-17. 

A review of the record supports the trial court’s determination of a basis 

for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). At the hearing on November 14, 

2016, Dominique Bibbs, a CUA case manager, testified that Father did not 

have visitation with the Children at the time of the hearing because there were 

concerns about Father’s interaction with the Children. Notes of Testimony 

(“N.T.”), 11/14/16, at 25. Ms. Bibbs further testified Father indicated that he 

does not need to attend “Menergy” because he did not abuse Mother; rather 

he just poked her in the forehead. Id. at 74. 

William Russell testified that, during the parenting capacity evaluation 

interview, Father minimized the actual sexual abuse of Sibling 2, and its 
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impact on the Children. N.T., 2/16/17, at 20. Dr. Russell further testified that 

Father projected all of the blame for the housing deficiency onto Mother. Id.

at 22. Dr. Russell stated that Father contradicted himself during the clinical 

interview. Id. at 22. Dr. Russell supported this claim by asserting that Father 

stated that he was unable to provide supervision and care for the Children 

because of his busy work schedule, yet also claimed he coached a basketball 

team and helped at a soup kitchen. Id. at 22. Dr. Russell opined that Father 

is unable to provide safety and permanency to the Children. Id. at 23. 

Jennifer Rollins testified that Father was discharged from Community 

Counseling for noncompliance during the period of August 2016 until 

November 2016. N.T., 3/10/17, at 10. 

Father testified that while he is at work, Mother cares for the Children. 

Id. at 27. Father stated that his work is the primary reason for his not being 

home. Id. at 35. Father further testified that his job has been flexible with 

him, and that the conflict between parenting classes and Menergy precluded 

him from completing his parenting classes. Id. Father admitted that the 

repairs on his home have not been completed, and the furniture is still in 

storage. Id. at 36.

Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion that Father’s repeated 

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Children to be 

without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical 

and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. 
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Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id. As noted 

above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree 

with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) before 

assessing the determination under Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

at 384. 

We next determine whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M. a/k/a 

L.C., Jr.], 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below, evaluation 

of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 

324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 
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evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted) (citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 

2008))) (internal citations omitted). 

In the case sub judice, in holding that termination of Father’s parental 

rights favors the Children’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b) of the 

Adoption Act, the trial court stated:

Father’s visits with the Children were suspended due to him posing 

a grave threat to the Children. Father was having inappropriate 

conversations with the Children about the case during visits. At 

times, Father would hide behind a newspaper to avoid the agency 

worker that was supervising the visit. After visits, the Children 

would have behavioral issues in the foster home and at school, so 

much so that the foster parents would have to leave work during 

the day to go to their school. Father’s visits were therefore 

suspended in July 2016. The Children have not exhibited any 

significant behavioral issues since contact with Father stopped. 

Prior to the suspension of visits, Father had supervised visits at 

the agency, for which he was always late. Father claimed his work 

schedule and public transportation caused his tardiness. The 
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Children were always excited to see Father during visits, but did 

not have much time with him due to his lateness. Only [L.R.J.P.]

asked to see Father since visits were suspended. [L.R.J.P.] has 

adjusted well since his contact with Father stopped in July 2016. 

Neither of the Children have suffered any irreparable harm from 

losing contact with Father. The Children know Father, but there is 

no parent-child bond. Father’s relationship with the Children is 

very attenuated since his visits are suspended. Even when Father 

had visits, Father would spend little time with the Children due to 

his consistent lateness. Father’s visits, when he had them, never 

progressed beyond supervised. [L.R.J.P.] indicated that he wants 

to go home to Mother and Father, but would be okay staying with 

the foster family. The Children have become numb to the 

situation. The Children are placed together in a safe, permanent, 

and pre- adoptive home. The Children appear comfortable in the 

foster home. [J.M.C.P.] recently had a birthday party and Sibling 

2 was invited. The foster mother indicated a willingness to 

maintain the Children’s relationship with their siblings. The foster 

parents meet all of the Children’s needs and go above and beyond 

for them. The Children are treated as part of the foster family. 

The foster parents have a parent-child relationship with the 

Children. The Children have stability, structure, and discipline in 

the foster home and are much calmer. The foster parents also 

provide love, safety, and security for the Children. Both Children 

are receiving mental health therapy, which they attend weekly, 

and have been doing well. The foster parent advocates for the 

Children’s needs. The trial court heard testimony that adoption is 

in the Children’s best interests and that neither of them would 

suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were 

terminated. [ ]DHS[’] witnesses and the Child Advocate’s witness 

were credible. Consequently, the trial court did not err or abuse 

its discretion when it found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

there was no parental bond between Father and the Children and 

that termination of Father’s parental rights would not destroy any 

existing beneficial relationship.

T.C.O. at 19-20 (internal citations omitted).

Father argues that DHS “failed to meet the clear and convincing 

standard under this section.” Father’s Brief at 19. Father notes that Ms. Bibbs 

testified that L.R.J.P. asks to see Father and asks about Father. Id. Father 
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highlights that he took the Children to events at the Wells Fargo Center, that 

he took them out for Halloween, and that he took the Children to birthday 

parties at Chuck E. Cheese’s restaurant. Id. Father avers that “his sons are 

everything to him.” Id.

The record likewise corroborates the trial court’s termination orders 

pursuant to Section 2511(b). Jessica Spurgeon testified that “there is a clear 

parent[-]child relationship between the foster parents and the [Children].” 

N.T, 3/10/17, at 14. Ms. Spurgeon continued the Children are secure in their 

relationship with their foster mother, there is a bond, and the Children 

understand that foster mother is meeting their needs. Id. at 18. Ms. 

Spurgeon opined that adoption would be in the Children’s best interests. Id. 

Ms. Spurgeon concluded that there would be no irreparable harm to the 

Children if Father’s parental rights were terminated because the secure bond 

the Children have with the foster parents would mitigate the harm the 

termination would cause. Id. at 19-20.

Dominique Bibbs testified that adoption is the most appropriate goal for 

the Children. N.T., 11/14/16, at 28. Ms. Bibbs further testified that, while 

there is a bond between Father and the Children, the relationship is not 

beneficial. Id. at 29-30. Ms. Bibbs averred that the Children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 31.

Jennifer Rollins testified that the Children are quite bonded with their 

foster mother, who they have been with since being separated from Mother 
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and Father. Ms. Rollins further testified that the Children know who their 

parents are and the Children love their parents; however, the Childreny have 

become numb to all of the things that they have witnessed. Id. at 52-53. 

Ms. Rollins concluded that the Children deserve stability. Id. at 61.

Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Father’s parental rights 

serves the Children’s needs and welfare. While Father may profess to love 

the Children, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, 

will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. 

As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a 

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” 

Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and 

rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental 

duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or 

her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 

856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). We, therefore, affirm 

the orders of the trial court.

Affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/9/18