MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

February 1, 1994
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the Director of Research by calling

commercial (717) 245-4086 or DSN 242-4086.
iii

FOREWORD

The Honorable Leonard Sullivan, a former Assistant Secretary

of Defense, maintains that the disorder in the post-cold war

world must be addressed in radically new and innovative ways. Old

alliances, structured for containment, will not be adequate in a

world where the challenges may be more appropriately addressed by

police forces than by traditionally structured military forces.

This sweeping analysis suggests that, in the future,

regional security apparatuses (RSAs) will be needed to deal with

problems which issue from specific socio-cultural and economic

conditions rather than from ideology or the pursuit of

traditional national interests by the superpowers. Mr. Sullivan

maintains that the United States can use its advantage in

technology as a part of its approach to meeting the many

challenges posed by "the new world disorder."

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

study as a contribution to that growing body of analysis dealing

with the post-cold war world.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Honorable LEONARD SULLIVAN, JR., is a Washington-based consultant

on national security matters. He spent 12 years in the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, serving three years as Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation). Mr.

Sullivan consults for various think tanks, and is active in the

Atlantic Council of the United States and the Washington

Institute of Foreign Affairs. His articles have appeared in Armed

Forces Journal, Foreign Policy, Atlantic Community Quarterly, and

the American Defense Annual. He frequently lectures at the senior

service colleges and is an honorary faculty member at the

Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
v

SUMMARY

Cold war concepts of superpowers, alliance systems, nuclear

deterrence and the accompanying military structures have lost

their relevance. The problems and challenges of this diverse and

disordered world might be better addressed by paramilitary or

nonmilitary forces than by military institutions and forces

structured and accoutered for traditional interstate conflict.

History may, indeed, record the 1990s as the beginning of

the end of the supremacy of the nation-state as it has existed in

western civilization since the French Revolution. Some states,

like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, have

already dissolved into a number of ethnically-based nations.

Germany and Yemen, on the other hand, have forsaken artificial

political structures imposed by cold war necessities to unite

into single nations.

Indeed, the world of the 21st century is most likely to

experience further upward drift in sovereignty in which regional

authorities enforce global laws of conduct over generally

subnational organizations pursuing criminal activities.

The alternative to the United States as the world's

policeman imposing a Pax Americana Technocratica is to establish

a number of regional security apparatuses (RSAs). These RSAs will

be charged with the collective enforcement of international laws

and standards as well as those specific to the regions involved.

Many of the technologies compelled and developed during the cold

war may be useful when employed by appropriately structured RSA

forces operating within new systems devised to meet a variety of

challenges.
1

MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL SECURITY1

New Disorders Do Not Match Old Orders.

The disorders afflicting the world in the aftermath of the

oppressive global cold war will require the serious, long-term

attention of the civilized world. Virtually every region of the

world is experiencing some form of disorder which detracts from

inter- and intra-regional stability and diminishes aspirations

for both personal and collective prosperity. These disorders

simply cannot be dealt with effectively by security systems

designed primarily to perpetuate and petrify a tense equilibrium

between two antithetical, but supposedly equally legitimate,

approaches to politics and economics.2

Cold war concepts of superpowers, superpower blocs,

competing intra-regional military alliances, rigid "vital

interests," nuclear deterrence, and bilateral arms control have

lost their relevance. Even such well-ingrained distinctions as

"the West"3 as a meaningful entity with its "special

relationships," and the blind sanctity of "internal affairs" as

an excuse for ignoring inhumanity, have lost their credibility.

Prompt evolutionary change is essential to deal with the new

forms of danger which now challenge the more generally accepted

rules of human behavior.

There has probably never been a period when more governments

on Earth have codified what is right and what is wrong, or when

there were more organizations operating beyond those established

norms and standards. These improprieties run the gamut from

humanitarian, ethnic, military, and political, to economic,

trafficking, and environmental. Limits of acceptable conduct are

defined extensively by various government-ratified covenants,

treaties and agreements adopted through various formally

recognized organizations either global (U.N., World Bank),

functional (OECD, GATT, IAEA)4 or regional (NATO, CSCE, APEC,

ASEAN).5 Absent a clear-cut "red-blue" superpower ideological

contest, however, the world is ill-prepared and uncertain how to

react to conflicts between civility and incivility, conformity

and nonconformity, morality and legality, majorities and

minorities: Bosnia is but the most obvious and shameful case in

point.6

Controlling Crimes Versus Winning Wars. Most new world

disorders do not relate well to the current capabilities of the

world's military forces, designed to fight each other in huge

set-piece battles backed up by thousands of nuclear weapons. In

fact, many current disorders would be better handled by

paramilitary or nonmilitary forces. Many are really extensions on

a larger scale of previously domestic disorders: they are (or

started out as) crimes deserving legally accepted police actions

rather than the more macho but impersonal wars between military
2

forces. Unchecked, some of these crimes have clearly grown out of

control, and surely do not honor the extensive codes of

professional military conduct (outlawing rape, torture,

starvation, civilian attack, and hostage-taking).

It also seems clear that in resolving many of these

disorders, the objective cannot be to defeat the criminal

element, but only to control the level of violence and

destruction to some level of international social tolerance.

Ethnic/religious strife appears to be as endemic to the new world

as are American casualties due to drunk driving, street crime,

and drug use.7

 The issue is whether it can be contained within

tolerable levels, such as the decades of Irish and Palestinian

violence, or whether it is allowed to escalate to levels that

arouse the international conscience, such as genocide in

Cambodia, displacement of the Kurds, three-way mayhem in the

former Yugoslavia, or the wanton generation of refugees in

Lebanon.

There is also the question of increasing ambiguity about the

level of authority responsible for these organized

transgressions. Nations and/or allies tend to declare and conduct

war against other nations and/or alliances on a

government-to-government basis. Today's disorders may be

government directed (Sadam Hussein vs. the Kurds, or Yugoslavian

Serbs vs. Bosnian Muslims), but they are as often subnational

extremists (the Hezbollah vs. Israel, or the Irish Republican

Army vs. the United Kingdom); or renegade multinational

"corporations" (Latin American drug cartels, or BCCI-like banks).

Current security arrangements and forces are ill-equipped to deal

with nongovernmental crime, and to shift focus from being

anti-national to being pro-victim. Concepts of the inviolability

of "internal affairs" are slowly giving way to concepts of

"enforced humanitarianism," not only at the national level

(protection of minorities, child labor laws) but at the family

level as well (marital rape, children's rights).

Even the matter of arms control has clearly outgrown the

initial concepts of limiting nuclear arms and balancing the size

of opposing superpower conventional forces in Europe. There are

residual concerns over the possible mishandling of the major

nuclear arms inventories in the remnants of the Soviet Union, and

agreements on retargeting were reached in January during

President Clinton's trip to Moscow. However, the focus of concern

has now shifted to the "proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction" throughout the less-developed world.8 The old arms

control treaty framework is irrelevant in this case, as are the

highly formalistic verification regimes. Moreover, the

signatories to the START and CFE treaties bear little relation to

the new "players" (donors or recipients) in global arms

proliferation, such as China. It is also far from clear in many

instances whether the suppliers' governments are unaware of, or

tacitly or actively involved in, the transfers.
3

Furthermore, the cold-war definitions of "proliferation" and

"weapons of mass destruction" are subject to change. It could

well be argued that rockets and artillery used against

defenseless civilian populations in places like Beirut, Sarajevo,

and South Lebanon should qualify as mass destroyers, even though

they did not recently proliferate from some far-off heinous

supplier, and even though the destruction takes months rather

than minutes to inflict. In fact, the wanton use of large caliber

and automatic weapons in the pursuit of clearly illegal political

activities is as unacceptable as the excessive use of firearms

(and semi-automatic weapons!) in petty crimes and drug

trafficking. International standards of conduct are being set,

and international inspection and enforcement must follow if our

common values are to be upheld.

One is reminded of the origins of the colloquial term "rule

of thumb." In 18th century America, it was deemed by the courts

unacceptable to thrash one's wife with a cane larger in diameter

than one's thumb. This was clearly an early, but not unique,

effort at arms control, if not peacekeeping. Perhaps the

civilized world should now deem it unacceptable to slay one's

enemies with a firearm of caliber greater than one's thumb.

Controlling the trafficking, possession, and use of arms

exceeding that rule could become a major responsibility for

emerging security forces. In this way, we might keep disorders

from exceeding our tolerance threshold.

Economics and Environment. In a different regime, there is

certain to be increasing international concern for environmental

transgressions, most of which are indifferent to arbitrary

national boundaries. Sooner or later, physical international

responses will become justified to control some form of

atmospheric pollution (such as Chernobyl-like fall-out, ozone

depletion, or acid rain) or resource abuse (such as preemption of

river waters or overkill of protected species), or even the

spread of communicable diseases (in humans, animals and insects).

Violations of economic agreements will continue to

precipitate armed struggles as well, from product dumping (e.g.,

China's opium wars) to fishing rights (e.g., Iceland's fishing

fleet vs. the British navy in the 1970s). As economic

"interdependence" continues to grow, and economic competition

replaces ideological competition as a central focus of national

governments, the "book of rules" is bound to grow, and so will

the temptations to circumvent it. The OECD is only now defining

"corrupt practices" in international commerce.9 "Trade wars" may

break out again, and violence over the abuse and exploitation of

workers may arise. Illegal trafficking in various commodities

from drugs and arms to workers and babies already occupies the

time of law enforcement agencies worldwide.

In a new world otherwise fascinated by remarkable

opportunities for growth in economic and political prosperity,

these disorders will have to be discouraged and controlled by new
4

mechanisms unlike any already extant: new authorities, new

formations, new training, and new equipment. New "rules of

engagement" will also be required that prevent the hesitant

application of force that can turn any operation into "another

Vietnam quagmire," or that prevent major nations like the United

States from participating.

Unfortunately, the emphasis will remain on "control" rather

than "discouragement"--i.e., on crime punishment rather than

crime prevention. One rare exception is the work of the IAEA in

trying to enforce the U.N.'s nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

through mandatory inspections. The difficulty of this task is now

being demonstrated in Iraq and North Korea. Moreover, the

approach is only valid where the host government controls the

operation. One cannot imagine an International Illegal Drugs

Agency being able to conduct inspections of drug-producing

facilities in Colombia or Burma.

Renewed Upward Drift in Sovereignty. Following the cold war

there is a renewed or accelerated upward drift in sovereignty.

More and more proud national prerogatives, from traffic signs and

passport design to area codes and interest rates, are being taken

over by international or global bodies. The shrinking, more

interdependent world is accepting greater standardization and

regulation of behavior and practices as means of sharing

increased humanity, security, and prosperity.10 Progress in the

European Community,11 APEC, and ASEAN cannot be ignored. At the

same time, there is more virulent and desperate resistance from

groups that wish to reject homogenization and return to the

supremacy of local cultures. The fractionalizing of Eastern

Europe is surely cause for concern, but the existing and solid

framework of the CSCE limits the vulnerability of the smaller

states. The struggle between "good" and "bad" is now often

evidenced as a conflict between supranationalism and

subnationalism.

"Globalization" trends in trade, finance, and business are

further eroding national sovereignty.12 International banks and

the large and spreading international corporations, as well as

the International Labor Organization, clearly recognize few

national boundaries. Collectively, they provide a major stimulus

for development and homogenization of the global workforce. The

adoption of international work (and quality) standards has

totally changed the nature of manufacturing, and vastly hastened

the internationalizing of technology development and application.

Many major products no longer have a meaningful "country of

origin." This has been highlighted in the global automobile and

electronics industries, and in the U.S. attempts to "punish"

Chinese business practices without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan.

These global business and finance trends have not been

overlooked by the criminal elements which have themselves

internationalized. They freely pursue trans-border illegal

activities, from bank fraud and money laundering to illegal
5

trafficking in drugs and arms, benefiting from the lack of

standardization of criminal law or its enforcement. Individual

nations cannot deal with international crimes beyond their

borders, but the U.N. cannot cope with dozens of simultaneous

warfighting infractions (13 as of January 1, 1993), to say

nothing of the dozens of continuously ongoing lesser crimes.13

In fact, history may well record the collapse of the cold

war as the beginning of the end of the supremacy of the

nation-state as the key structure in political, economic, or

societal development and stability. Some larger nations have

already begun to crumble in Eastern Europe and Asia, while some

of the arbitrarily divided states (Germany, Vietnam, Yemen, and

soon Korea) are reunifying. Furthermore, as the power of the

state declines relative to the influence of some of the illegal

operators, national governments can no longer be held responsible

for the crimes committed within their legal boundaries. Two

current examples include the major drug cartels in Colombia,14

and the usurpation of Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah elements

supported from Syria and Iran. Law enforcement must clearly

operate against criminal elements, and not just criminal or

"rogue" governments.

New Collective Security Mechanisms Will Evolve.

Internationalism and interdependence are clearly on the

rise, continuing, if not accelerating, the virtual shrinkage of

our planet. The notion of one (or two) superpower(s) with

catholic interests and concerns is no longer credible. There will

be no Great White Policeman of the World;15 no Global Bobby. Yet

there is a growing and inescapable demand to enforce

globally-adopted codes of individual and group conduct and

behavior. The new world must pursue universal human interests

guided by universal human values.

Clearly, nations will have to learn to act together to

preserve their agreed common values. The egocentric cold war

concept of committing national resources/treasure only to support

"vital national (self-)interests" is being supplanted by a

concept of "obligatory community service" to support global

values and enhance assurance of regional stability and

prosperity. In fact, such global values may flow from both supraand subnational organizations as well as from classic national

governments. International business conglomerates and relief

agencies have special demands at one end of the spectrum. Various

exploited minorities and the several nationless tribes (Kurds,

Palestinians, Montagnards, etc.) require protection at the other.

Current Security Institutions Dated. The concept of

interlocking regional U.S. military commands covering most of the

world seems anachronistic in a world without superpower struggle,

and with vastly reduced military budgets. Nothing could better

reinforce the empirical notion of "policeman of the world" than
6

to have permanent unilateral "precinct stations" all over the

world. The U.S. "unified commands" for the Southern Hemisphere

(SOUTHCOM), and for the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean regions

(PACOM), will also need to be restructured to better represent

today's threats and today's divisions of responsibility.

Many lesser conflicts are being addressed by U.N.

peacekeeping forces after truces have been arranged.

"Trucekeeping" might be more apt. Bigger violations have been

handled by ad hoc arrangements, including the short-lived Suez

War, the U.S.-led Vietnam War, and the response to Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait. Sometimes larger powers have dealt with the

problems unilaterally--and quite awkwardly (Grenada, Falklands,

Panama). But there is growing resistance to the unilateral use of

military force, particularly to enforce unilateral diktats,

ambitions, or standards. Based on the newfound atmosphere of

cooperation in the post-cold war U.N. Security Council, authority

is shifting towards global approval/ endorsement of ad hoc

coalition responses for both prevention and punishment of

breeches of worldwide standards of conduct.

The costs to both the "criminal" and the enforcers must

reflect the severity of the misdemeanor or felony. Often, the

"punishment" (or persuasion) may simply be fines or other

sanctions to express displeasure but not exacerbate the

recklessness of the violator. Policies and procedures for

deterring, ameliorating or terminating unacceptable behavior will

certainly have to be "legal," not wanton. Unlike bipolar wars,

the "guilt" will have to be correctly "balanced" between

government and nongovernment instigators, (or, say, between the

supplier, the deliverer, and the demander in drug or arms

trafficking). Furthermore, both the breadth and severity of the

"crime" will have to be viewed through the culture of, and

resolved through the languages of, the afflicted region.

Additionally, use of excessive force ("brutality") against

persons or property will have to be avoided: neutralization and

incapacitation will replace death and destruction. Deliberate

overreaction needs to be discouraged. The "enemy" (criminals)

will often be protected by citizens' "rights," and their offenses

are as likely to be illegal businesses (drug/arms trafficking) as

violent crimes (hostage taking). Operations will have to respect

the constraints of responding within legal limits to offenders

who recognize no such constraints. Frequently, the offenses

cannot be eliminated, but only brought under acceptable control.

Global Gospel: Regional Enforcement. The notion of passing

directly to the U.N. all aspects of international law enforcement

requires a huge and unrealistic leap of faith. It is one thing

for the U.N. to be the major source of the Global Code of Ethics.

It is quite another matter to expect so large a political

committee to provide the instruments for its implementation.

There is no successful case of global management of any single

highly complex operation (business, relief) without the use of
7

divisional or regional implementers. Even the Catholic Church

with its highly centralized focus on rule-making depends on

regional and subregional structures for "enforcing" its fiats.

The ability to manage dozens of diverse operations worldwide

almost certainly requires some intermediate levels of authority

and accountability.

It seems to me inescapable that the world will gradually

evolve a set of regional security apparatuses (RSAs) legitimately

authorized to enforce broadly (if not globally) accepted laws and

standards, while respecting the mores and peculiarities of the

region(s) involved. This report looks at some of the likely

procedures, characteristics, and authorities of RSAs tailored to

the needs of the coming century. Management and control,

operational procedures, and unit equipage of often ad hoc

coalition forces will be very different than we had come to

expect, and train for, in the NATO/Pact scenario. However, they

might well evolve from the increasingly anachronistic regional

unified command structure of the U.S. military.

RSAs, then, would be primarily charged with the collective

enforcement of international laws and standards within the

community (i.e., "behave or be penalized"). This is very

different from the recent military alliances for collective

security (like NATO and Warsaw Pact) formed to deter or wage

intercommunity wars with goals of "destroy or be destroyed." RSA

actions would draw more from civil police work (or CIA/DEA

"special operations") than from military missions like

counteraggression, deep strike, or antisubmarine warfare. In

essence, an RSA would reflect growing notions of "regional

sovereignty" over common, inseparable intraregional infractions

and disorders, and provide the mechanisms required to assure

reasonable, albeit certainly not total, compliance.

In this respect, RSA "forces" would be extensions of

domestic peacetime law enforcement agencies. Using such forces

would by no means be a "last resort" option as with military

forces. Many of their functions would be continuously exercised

to maintain intraregional "law and order." Moreover, casualties

would be inevitable and should become as accepted as losses "in

the line of duty" among the law enforcement agencies (LEAs).

Questions about whether such operations are "worth dying for" (as

now raised regarding Somalia) would be inappropriate.16

RSA Procedures and "Battlegrounds." Initial RSA responses

might simply involve more pro-active diplomacy, followed by

on-site inspections, and then by economic or political sanctions,

if needed. More serious violations might draw boycotts,

isolation, impoundage, or property forfeiture. In more acute

cases, population control, leadership "persuasion," arrests, or

even "SWAT team" actions against specific targets might be

authorized--once the offender has been legitimately "indicted."

The "battlefields" are far more likely to be
8

urban/suburban/industrial areas rather than deserts, jungles, or

hedge rows, and the "targets" are more likely to be gangs,

governmental functions or industrial facilities than military

formations. Understanding, influencing, or, if necessary,

controlling the urban/industrial "anatomy" (infrastructure) will

be far more important than pinpointing and blasting enemy units

in the field. There is no body of expertise in this area

equivalent to that developed, say, to warn of--and react to--an

impending Warsaw Pact armor attack across the "inner- German

border" of yesteryear.17

There will frequently be a clear premium on acting swiftly

before a situation becomes unmanageable. However, the procedures

for instigating reactions are likely to be cumbersome at best and

the context in which the disorder originated may be quite obscure

at the outset. In any event, RSAs would perforce be permanently

staffed and should not require any awkward last-minute transfer

of assignment or control (a la NATO). They would be primarily

supported, however, by units drawn on demand from participating

members that have been cross-trained and equipped for RSA

operations.

RSA actions would probably be authorized (like warrants) by

some fully legitimate international body (or court), based on

some "finding" (declaration of emergency) or "indictment" (viz,

U.N. resolution) derived from some regional "prosecutor"

(security council?). The initial alert might come through some

crisis control center (a la CSCE), and confirmed by some sort of

fact-finding procedure: either a cooperative inspection mission

(like Red Cross in Azerbaijan or IAEA in Iraq), or a

noncooperative intelligence gathering program (such as "regional

technical means" or on-site "witnesses").

One Hypothetical Scenario. Consider a purely hypothetical

future scenario for East Balkan trauma in an era when a suitable

pan-European regional security apparatus (ERSA) has evolved

(presumably from NATO's remnants) under the general control of a

politically stronger CSCE of 60-odd nations (perhaps merged with

the Council of Europe), then embodying its own security council,

perhaps an outgrowth of the Western European Union (WEU) and/or

the new Forum for Security Cooperation.18 Assume that Moldovan

nationalists, supported by Romanian extremists, have begun to

brutalize the remaining resident Russian minority with increasing

ferocity, in clear violation of the recently adopted Code of

Conduct. A particularly nasty incident ravages a small village,

and Russia brings the issue into the CSCE crisis control center,

claiming that humanitarian precepts of both the U.N. charter and

the CSCE Code have been violated for the nth time by criminal

activities at or below the Moldovan national level.

The CSCE security council might then demand an on-site

inspection, but be denied by the Moldovan government-- implying

official collusion. The council might then declare an alert,

tasking its ERSA to gather indisputable intelligence for judgment
9

at the CSCE Review Conferences prior to presentation of the U.N.

satellite imagery, combined with testimony from covertly

extracted survivors, which might convince the U.N. Security

Council to promulgate a U.N. Resolution condemning (i.e.,

indicting) Moldovan nationalists and their Romanian supporters

for their criminal actions. The resolution could authorize

suitable ERSA nonmilitary responses, to be escalated under ERSA

operational command, but only if serious infractions continue.

The ERSA might then design and implement a program of stringent

economic sanctions, including the severing of vital economic,

financial and communications links with Romania.

At the same time, covert intelligence gathering operations

would be authorized in and around Kishinev, using ERSA special

teams from Russia and Ukraine. As a precautionary move, high-tech

special forces (perhaps drawn from 9-nation WEU multinational

units) would be readied for neutralization operations against a

special list of civil infrastructure "targets." The ERSA might

also assure that the Russian minorities are provided with various

equipments to insure direct encrypted reporting of further

violations. Some might also be provided special training in

target designation techniques.

Subsequent covert confirmation of such violations could lead

to authorization by the CSCE of escalated ERSA intervention in

accordance with the original U.N. resolution. Following suitable

warnings from the CSCE security council concerning the

consequences of official support for the crimes of the Moldovan

nationalists, certain essential infrastructure functions such as

communications, finance, transport, and electric power might

mysteriously begin to malfunction. Shortly thereafter, with

reluctant Moldovan government acquiescence, ERSA might mount a

joint special forces operation that successfully captures (for

trial) some--and disperses the rest--of the leadership of the

offending nationalist movement. Discussion of the elements of

such a regional security apparatus follows.

RSA Command Structure and Operations.

The preceding scenario depicts an evolving one-time ethnic

outburst requiring specific and unique reactions. However,

certain RSA responses should be automatic and not require fresh

political consensus. Just as a local fire department does not

need a go-ahead from its local council to respond to a fire

within its district, RSA activities should be internally

generated in response to recurring disorders (such as drug

trafficking, money laundering, or arms control violations).

Certain continuous enforcement/regulatory functions could well

gradually shift from national to supranational institutions: an

EC customs service; an ASEAN coast guard; a CSCE conventional

arms control service; or a Caribbean drug enforcement agency, for

instance.
10

Command of each RSA would surely be civilian, not military,

and would most likely rotate between major nations of the region

as decided by some regional implementing charter or treaty.

Deputies and "J-staff" would surely include both military and

civil law enforcement groups adjusted to reflect the major

current threats in that region. For instance, a European RSA

under CSCE might be designed to focus on ethnic strife and forced

migrations, whereas a Latin American RSA (under an invigorated

OAS?)19 might focus on financial chicanery and drug trafficking.

Clear "connectivity" to all regional governments, law enforcement

agencies and military would be needed. The skills and prowess of

the military in communications, transport and logistics, and

intelligence would surely be essential.

The question of operational command of composite military

forces is not yet settled. There is a natural reluctance to place

major U.S. units under foreign control, and strong resistance to

allowing command to drift upwards to inexperienced individuals--

or committees.20 This argument was settled by firm U.S.

leadership in the joint military reaction to the Iraqi invasion

of Kuwait, and in the initial U.S. response to starvation in

Somalia. On the other hand, the recent squabbles between NATO and

the U.N. over the control of military operations into Bosnia, and

the difficulties being faced by the current U.N. control of

military activities in Somalia indicate the impracticality of

U.N. operational command. This is one sound reason for inserting

RSAs as regional operational commands between the global arbiters

of behavior, and the hands-on resolution of specific strife-prone

disputes.

RSAs will have to include access to respected, seasoned

regional military commanders with forces familiar with the

territory and its inhabitants. Ideally, a high-ranking military

deputy to the RSA director/commander would have some military

units (possibly rotating) seconded to his operational control at

all times, and would be responsible for their joint training,

readiness, and logistic support. The NATO notion of individual

country logistic support for joint forces would be clearly

unacceptable for forces expected to fight rather than posture

emptily in front of nuclear arsenals. Logistic problems among ad

hoc U.N. peacekeeping units are, unfortunately, legendary.

Each RSA could also provide a FEMA-like mobilization core

for assembling and deploying community responses to natural

(earthquake) and manmade (reactor meltdown) disasters,

environmental crises, or even plagues and pestilences. The

apparatus should be authorized to commandeer relevant assets,

such as transport and hospital facilities, and assure the

necessary regional logistic access through overflight, landing,

and docking rights. It should also be prepared to provide

"cultural advisory units" to help incoming strangers cope with

language and dialects, local mores and taboos, etc. (The British

provided Middle East desert-experienced NCOs to U.S. units

deployed to the Persian Gulf in DESERT SHIELD.)
11

RSA units might also augment inadequate (or reestablish

interrupted) national capabilities that threaten regional

stability. In roles reminiscent of "strike-breaking," special

units might, say, assume control of dysfunctional air traffic

control centers, reopen shut down pipelines, or bolster local

customs (anti-smuggling) capabilities. In rare incidents,

illegitimate or rogue governments (viz, Iraq) may need to be

deposed (an option certain to grow in acceptability through some

regional impeachment process). In others, the aim may be to

reestablish a functioning government where anarchy holds sway

(viz Somalia, or much earlier, the Dominican Republic). The

burdensharing of RSA costs could also involve trading

"contributions in kind": just as the United States provides LEA

training, say, to many developing countries, those countries

could provide translators for U.S. intelligence efforts.

Since RSA problems would run the gamut of civil law

enforcement and disaster relief agencies, RSA "reaction forces"

could well be mobilized from national civil agencies with

"reserve" roles in RSA activities (such as the U.S. Coast Guard

vis-a-vis our Navy). This dual-hatting could well be extended to

other federal agencies from Border Patrol and Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms, to Federal Aviation Agency and Customs Service.21

Mobilization would incur relaxation of various peacetime

statutory limitations, and bring into play new command and

control systems. One can conjure up diverse combinations of

French customs agents, British frogmen, Canadian Mounties, German

submarine units, and U.S. ATF agents, say, in the enforcement of

CSCE-dictated economic and arms sanctions against expanded Irish

terrorism. The possibilities are endless.

Military Functions. In some scenarios, the military roles

might exclude combat forces but extensively engage intelligence,

transport, and combat support personnel (from surveillance,

communications and engineers, to civil affairs, medical,

decontamination, and graves registration units). It is not

anomalous that military units will sometimes respond to

nonmilitary crises, such as disaster relief, while some

unauthorized military activities, such as Chinese missile

exports, may be countered by nonmilitary sanctions. Some military

commanders still resist being distracted from their readiness to

execute their "core missions" (like preparing for the re-birth of

the Evil Empire?), but others believe that "plowshare missions

hone the sword" by providing otherwise unavailable training and

experience, particularly in the joint arena.

Combat military units would range from infantry or military

police for peace- and trucekeeping activities, to elite

helicopter units to recapture an airfield, neutralize a port,

interdict smugglers, free prisoners, or shut down a central

telephone. Likewise, night-capable, side-firing gunships can

discourage urban artillery harassment or illegal resupply of

sanctioned commodities. Larger "enabling forces" might sometimes
12

be needed to "kick open the door."

In most cases, "de-equipping" the offender's air and

air-defense forces, navy, or main army units--if deemed

necessary--would be a relatively simple (or even clandestine)

operation. Assurance of air supremacy would be key to conducting

highly specialized military operations with low collateral

damage. Elimination of ragtag submarine forces among Third World

countries should be a matter for regional/global arms control

initiatives, but could also be carried out expeditiously by RSA

elements.

Over the longer haul, multinational manning of certain

specific military units and functions should be feasible. In this

case, the extensive use of jointly manned units in the U.S.

forces defending the Republic of Korea might serve as the model:

Korean "KATUSAs"22 are host-country military personnel serving in

U.S.-led and U.S.-manned units. With increasing budgetary

stringency, even U.S. forces assigned to NATO have incorporated

"host nation support" units and staff augmentation. In fact,

NATO-owned AWACs surveillance aircraft supporting the air

exclusion zones over Bosnia are multinationally manned. While

certain combat units might better keep a national identity, there

seems little reason to avoid multinational combat support and

service support units. Base, depot, and troop support; air

defense, transport, medical, communications, equipment

maintenance, fuel handling, and many other essential logistic

tasks clearly can be shared with host countries' military and

civil assets.

In addition, there is no inherent reason why some supposedly

"unique" U.S. capabilities should not be manned internationally.

U.S. amphibious ships could certainly carry other nations' marine

forces. U.S. aircraft carriers could have several nations'

aircraft aboard, and use multinational crews. U.S. airlift assets

could include RSA-indigenous pilots, aircrews, and ground crews

from countries with their own modern national airlines. NATO has

demonstrated the practicality of a multinational headquarters, at

least during peacetime, and the WEU has some limited experience

in multinational command of naval units deployed into the Persian

Gulf and the Adriatic Sea.

One of the most essential characteristics of effective RSAs

will be absolutely reliable, secure, multichannel communications

throughout their regions, connecting not only the military units,

but the political infrastructure, and the various law enforcement

authorities. This is one enormous advantage of existing U.S.

unified and specified command structures-- and of NATO as well.

These noncombat functions can surely adopt shared manning during

noncrisis periods, and shared augmentation during high crisis

times.

Intelligence and Alerting Systems. Another particularly key

aspect of RSAs would be their resident and augmentable
13

intelligence capabilities.23 They must have continuous

information on ongoing suspicious activities within their member

states, most likely supplied by internal law enforcement

agencies, but already frequently shared through international

links such as Interpol. These efforts must clearly be augmentable

with or without approval of the local jurisdiction harboring the

potential disorder. Intelligence must be both shareable with, and

collected independently by, the RSA members. U.S. intelligence

("sterilized," if necessary), could often make major

contributions to the RSAs--on demand. Holding supersecret and

sacrosanct the relevant outputs from U.S. "national technical

means" is yet another archaic and needless practice from the cold

war era.

Good, reliable, unambiguous, early intelligence would be

vital to sound collaborative RSA leadership and to its timely and

authoritative response. An RSA could voice the alert, prepare the

"indictment," assure swift and relevant responses, and set the

rules of engagement. Early publicity on disorders and egregious

violations of internationally accepted behavior can attract the

spotlight of regional/global concern and possibly nip them in the

bud and prevent their uncontrollable expansion. Bosnia/Serbia and

Somalia are both relevant examples of woefully untimely joint

reactions, based at least in part on the reluctance of some

countries that should be sharing the leadership role.

Just as U.S. forces use a "DEFCON" (defense condition)

ladder to symbolize alert status (DEFCON 5 is "all quiet"; DEFCON

1 a "major attack imminent"), and our intelligence community uses

"WATCHCONs" to prioritize focus on certain trouble spots, the

RSAs might use a "SUSCON" (suspicion condition) ladder to

mobilize various resources such as intelligence gathering in

response to various alerting systems (from CNN to escaped

prisoners). "Big Brother" would then be authorized to watch

closely only when suitably provoked, and then to perform on-site

inspections if deemed appropriate.

Extra-Regional Support and U.S. Role. While most RSAs should

be comprised of and managed by regional resources, "outside"

contributions may be required on demand from the U.S. or other

extraregional powers. Ancient animosities may make it impossible

for some members to participate in rectifying their own regional

disorders. Germans are not very welcome in Serbia; Egyptians are

not very welcome in Somalia; and so on. Special capabilities not

held by regional members might be needed, ranging from airlift to

precision air strikes, or from extinguishing oil well fires to

cleaning up nuclear fallout.

A hopefully diminishing role will be forthcoming for an

overextended United States. The failure of Europeans to grasp the

leadership of their own continent is a tragic psychic remnant of

cold war expedience, exhibited yet again in the Balkan crisis.

Latin American recalcitrance seems to have deeper roots. Only the

Asians seem relatively undisturbed by a declining U.S.
14

dependence. But on occasion, the imprimatur of U.S. assistance

may be needed to assure regional action in any part of the world.

Support of global civility by participating in regional security

efforts--as a strong, honest broker--could well become a major

factor in U.S. force planning and design.24

Most important, albeit most elusive, however, is the

continuing need for the United States to express its outspoken

support for the ideal of global morality and the clear need to

extend and enforce international law and order. The world seems

to need some sort of "secular pope" who personifies global

standards of behavior, and, like it or not, most of the civilized

world looks toward the United States to provide that function,

even though presidential elections and U.S. congressional

priorities seldom relate to it. When the United States drags its

feet, progress in much of the world-- particularly Europe--slows

down.

New Operational Domains.

There are some significant new technological opportunities

that can be available to RSAs. Some capabilities are already

fielded with special units and forces, others are in use by LEAs,

some are awaiting a statement of need. They can be put together

very effectively, in the hands of well-trained troops, to provide

a new operational domain between hollow threats and passive

declaratory policies on the one hand and full-scale ground force

intervention or old-fashioned bombing on the other.

Nothing herein suggests that such operations would be

without risk, casualties, collateral damage, or some innocent

victims. Law enforcement and special forces operations are

certainly not "immaculate warfare," although they can be far more

discriminating than has been possible in the past. Nor is it

claimed that results would be immediate rather than cumulative.

In fact, the goal cannot be to "win decisively," but rather to

better balance and gradually reduce the violence to levels

apparently acceptable in other unsettled parts of the world--such

as Ireland, Israel, South Africa, or Washington, DC.25

The lower the intensity of the "war," and the more it

approaches a "law enforcement" operation, the more the overall

mission emphasis must change. Relatively greater focus must be

placed on developing reliable, unambiguous intelligence, even if

it takes substantial time, and less on the immediate destruction

of some convenient target set. More emphasis is needed on clearly

identifying targets that should not be destroyed--from cultural

symbols to friendly political elements. Ultimately, law

enforcement operations involve the gathering and presentation of

irrefutable evidence of the crime committed and the arrest of its

perpetrators ("target acquisition"), while "target destruction"

is replaced with the exercise of justice through the established

court systems. This requires military and para-military forces to
15

adopt new and different standards of discipline and conduct that

are publicly judged (viz, the Rodney King police brutality case).

This new operational domain includes several new objectives

that are unfolding in situations like the Gulf, Somalia, and the

Balkans: the first is to use (para) military forces in the

enforcement of economic sanctions; the second is to cap the upper

limit of destructive power of the weapons used (such as tanks and

artillery); and the third is to generate confidence destroying

measures (CDMs) to persuade offenders and their followers

(whoever and wherever they are) that they are no longer in charge

of their own future, and that their unacceptable goals are not

achievable.

Concepts of Nonlethal "Persuasion." SA operations could

involve very innovative approaches to nonlethal "persuasion" to

alter abberant behavior patterns. The cold war catch word

"deterrence" may have little application against tribal/ethnic

zealotry, or the urge to accumulate arms. Terms "nonlethal

warfare" (slippery foam?) and "psychological warfare" (surrender

leaflets?) are generally disparaged. However, there is a potentially applicable nascent artform (popularized on the TV show

"Mission Impossible"), in which offenders are persuaded by

unexpected and/or uncontrollable events to either mend their

ways, lose their illegal holdings, or "self-destruct."26

Such CDMs may become acceptable forms of persuasion at the

national level as they are at the local level against hijackers,

and hostage takers. Their purpose is to reduce the assurance of

the perpetrators or their followers that their actions or cause

can produce the desired results. Against drug dealers, it might

be to interfere with their financial transactions. Against

terrorists, it might be to cause repeated premature detonation of

their devices. Against arms smugglers, it might be repeated

"accidental" loss of cargos at sea. Against violent subnational

movements, it might be dissention within the leadership caused by

suspicions of disloyalty. Among aberrant national governments, it

might be to convince their publics that their leaders can no

longer keep their national infrastructure operating at tolerable

levels.

In this regard, RSAs could eventually have to accept the use

of very specialized high-tech covert activities, just as law

enforcement agencies do, and develop realistic procedures for

their authorization.27 In particular, such operations could be

instrumental in minimizing harm and inconvenience to "innocent

bystanders" caught up in regional disorders. They could also

differentiate between destruction and disabling of key facilities

or "targets," thus hastening the restoration of normalcy and

lowering the clean-up costs. In many cases, such operations could

markedly reinforce the will and stature of an indigenous

resistance movement--if so desired.

The ability to use "dirty tricks" could become a significant
16

element in CDMs, and its acceptability will eventually have to be

in some way approved, at least in general, by regional or global

authority. Disorders driven by greed, paranoia, fanaticism, and

rivalry are all susceptible to exploitation in one form or

another. Such vulnerabilities can be exacerbated by ignorance,

fear, and/or distrust of modern high technologies. Fledgling

Third World national infrastructures generally depend, for

instance, on foreign operation and/or support: an exploitable

opportunity for nonlethal persuasion. Each RSA would benefit from

having its own "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS)--to resurrect

a term and capability used successfully in World War II (and

which was eventually transformed into the CIA).

Economic Sanctions. Economic sanctions and political

exclusion, established forms of persuasion, have been generally

unsuccessful as currently practiced. Little rigorous and

professional analysis has been applied to improving their

effectiveness or developing alternatives. Military practitioners

understand the target sets that assure the functioning of heavy

weapon systems like artillery, barrage rockets, and tanks. But it

is by no means clear that Western strategists have developed

clear and rational taxonomies for enforcing economic sanctions.

In fact, it is not clear they have decided to prosecute the

providers or shippers as well as the receivers of proscribed

commodities. Furthermore, the gamut of economic infrastructure

"targets" surely must extend beyond transportation equipment and

facilities to civil communications and financial institutions.

Similarly, CDMs should include interruptions of (or at least

distrust for) seemingly essential domestic services and economic

support systems like public media and news sources, telephones,

and urban transport. Many of these "target sets" are well-suited

to influence by modern technology, but generally have been of

little military interest.

Leadership Management. Various combinations of the

capabilities outlined above are bound to give rise to renewed

consideration of means for altering the leadership of rogue

states and tribes short of the classic notions of "decapitation"

(like the abortive raid against Qaddafi). I believe it quite

likely, for instance, that if a decision had been made to "arrest

and remove" (kidnap?) Noriega from power in Panama as a covert

operation rather than a full fledged military campaign, modern

technology would have permitted it to be successfully carried

out--primarily by nonmilitary forces, using military supporting

assets. Similar choices may have been available in the

well-intended but clumsy Grenada caper. Such unconventional

operations may become more politically acceptable as criminal

elements expand the viciousness of their acts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues.

While fear of retaliation may continue to bar actions

against national leaders (i.e., assassination), the same qualms

probably do not prevent actions against other classes of
17

"international criminals." It is, in fact, a primary option among

domestic law enforcement agencies everywhere--once an "arrest

warrant" has been obtained. Such parallels should be extended to

regional security efforts, if they can be demonstrated to be

practical and useful. The U.N. forces' pursuit of the Somalian

"warlord" Aideed is a case in point. Not only were elements of

U.S. special operations forces unsuccessful in capturing him

during a 3-month pursuit, but the U.N. command subsequently

decided he was no longer a criminal!28

Leverage For the Good Guys. These approaches depend in

varying degrees on the growing gap between the higher

technologies and greater wealth of the RSAs and those available

to the offenders (not always true in the drug war!). Many can

benefit from human cooperation from within the contested area.

Indeed it should be possible to give such resistance movements

enormous new leverage in the passing of intelligence and the

application of power. Some require substantial "air superiority,"

others require only that the good guys control the night

airspace. Many are also less effective in bad weather, but

together, they can lower substantially the offenders' options and

freedom of activity.

The theme behind many of these developments is to allow the

"enforcers" to shift away from "we can bomb you back into the

Stone Age, with precision and from over the horizon" (or "reach

out and touch someone, anytime, anywhere" as the Air Force likes

to say) towards something more like: "we know what you're doing;

you can run, but you can't hide." In essence, our forces must

become omniscient, not omnipotent.

New Technological Opportunities.

The following section discusses briefly some emerging

capabilities in a variety of areas pertinent to the three tasks

previously described in this new operational domain (economic

sanctions, damage limiting, and CDMs). Note that many of these

capabilities can and should be introduced as part of contingency

preparations for subsequent actions. Note also that these new

capabilities do not obviate the continuing need for excellent

"main force" units.

Many of these technologies had their origins in the

frustration of the Vietnam war, but have since proved themselves

in the "wars" against drug traffickers, mafia, and terrorists,

and in limited operations such as Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf.

Others not mentioned here are doubtless used only by special

agencies in covert operations. Others still languish for lack of

suitable priority and funding.

In the United States and elsewhere, the relatively

inexpensive research, development, technology, and engineering

efforts required to enhance law enforcement capabilities,
18

including arms control, should supplant some of the vast sums

still spent for obsolescent major war weaponry.

Area and Traffic Surveillance. "Realtime," daytime,

clear-weather satellite photographic coverage is, of course,

outstanding, and now becoming more easily distributed to

operational and tactical headquarters. A variety of photorecce

aircraft, and unmanned drones, ground- or air-launched, are

available to gather more detailed tactical information when

weather permits. Infrared surveillance satellites, developed to

detect ICBM missile launches, are believed to have some value in

detecting tactical ballistic missile launches, but are probably

not adequate to detect artillery and barrage rocket fire.

There are many devices for detecting and locating electronic

emanations across the full radio frequency spectrum. The ability

to analyze their signals and generate suitable jamming responses

is a matter of course. Generating an accurate "electronic order

of battle" over a few days or weeks is routine, if the assets and

their early use are authorized.

The United States has been perfecting airborne radars to

detect moving ground traffic for 30 years.29 The latest

prototype, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

(J-STARS), was used successfully to detect main avenues of

advance (and retreat) for Iraqi main force units without entering

Iraqi airspace. Coverage is day/night/all- weather, but may be

somewhat reduced by mountains (depending on orbit location).

JSTARS did help detect and track Iraqi missile transporters

approaching or leaving their launch sites, and on occasion

vectored orbiting fighter aircraft.

JSTARS was not conceived to monitor legal or illegal

economic traffic (rail, road, inland water, sea), but it should

be able to develop reliable traffic patterns of any kind over

time--and can be used prior to hostilities. With 12-hour

on-station times, it should also be able to monitor significant

truck traffic at border-crossing points, but the side-looking

radars cannot reliably distinguish vehicle types unless the

targets are suitably "tagged."

In the main, however, the evolving spectrum of likely

disorders cannot be dealt with from airborne or orbital stations.

Human intelligence, gathered first hand on the ground in the

troubled areas, will be key to understanding the conflict and

developing carefully tailored solutions. In this respect, many of

the technology items listed below enhance the capabilities for

exploiting "humint" and other clandestine operations.

Target Identification and Synthesis. High resolution

satellite photography can generally distinguish vehicle types. If

cued as to where to focus (e.g., "near Vlasenica"), it can surely

detect prison camps, artillery parks, and mass gravesites.

Accuracy should be good enough for preparing "indictments" of
19

illegal activity, showing buildups of suspect targets over time,

assessing strike damage, and, of course, developing up-to- date

maps of crucial urban and industrial areas. Coupled with modern

digital computer photo processing, these photos can provide the

basis for generating 3-D models (at any scale) for attack

profiles, training, and missile terminal guidance. Satellites are

of dubious use for real-time target designation.

Modern ground-based phased-array radars also make practical

the detection of incoming artillery and mortar rounds, with

almost instantaneous computation of their launch point. Providing

these truck-sized units and their small, skilled crews is step

one in stopping urban artillery sieges. Installing, calibrating

and bunkering them before hostilities would improve

effectiveness, and possibly provide some deterrence value as

well.

Urban/Economic Target Analysis. Although the military

mindset is accustomed to singling out obvious targets of

immediate military value, the highly regimented intelligence

organizations have little experience in diagnosing urban and

economic infrastructure for less than destructive purposes.30

This is not a problem in technology, of course, but in choosing

analysts and priorities. For instance, a cadre of former mayors,

businessmen, city planners, or financial managers would develop

totally different anatomical views of urban areas than would a

set of bomber pilots. This is an area where preparation time

could make a vast difference, and broaden the range of suitable

"targets of persuasion." Such efforts require and deserve the

ability to "mobilize" pertinent personnel and assets for short

periods of time.

Rapid manipulation of huge diverse data bases is key to

dissecting criminal infrastructures, and identifying relevant

regional and global linkages. New digital processing techniques

for photographic images can vastly improve the generation of new

maps of unfamiliar regions (including the urban anatomy of

infected cities). They can aid in reaction force planning and

training. One 10-inch optical disc can easily store (and display

at any scale with 4-digit coordinates) every available map of the

Balkans from the National Geographic down to local road and

street maps, and compare them with available aerial photographs,

given a modest compilation leadtime of a few weeks. Simpler

versions of these capabilities are already available commercially

as aids for travelers and tourists.

Using optical scanners and computer mapping, I would

estimate that every telephone number in New York City could be

converted to its 4-digit coordinates by "reading" phone book

addresses! Electronic systems can doubtless sort out normal and

unusual (legal or illegal?) electronic fund transfers, telephone

calls, border crossings, or container shipments.

Target Selectivity and Monitoring. The ability to single out
20

specific structures (bridges, tunnels, locks, docks, buildings,

TV/radio towers, and power distribution points) for special

lethal or nonlethal attention has improved greatly. Although

reliability is surely not 100 percent, many newer weapon delivery

systems do now achieve operational records over 80 percent of

hitting an aimpoint within about 10 feet (day or night). These

include terminally-guided mortar and artillery shells, armed

helicopters, PGM-laden high-performance aircraft, side-firing

gunships, and stand-off cruise missiles, first tried in Vietnam

in the early 1970s.31 Accuracy and selectivity improve as

opposition drops--and with increased use of trained ground

spotters familiar with the area.

While mountainous and foliated regions offer the defender

certain undeniable advantages, they also create certain

vulnerabilities. These include canalizing traffic; increasing

dependence on roads, bridges, and tunnels; and limiting warning

time of an incoming strike, or other covert operation.

Dead-of-night sweeps by attack helicopters or aircraft at low

altitude down narrow valleys in response to JSTARS alerts could

be quite awesome, particularly if only very specific targets were

engaged, captured, or lifted away! Rugged, foliated terrain also

provides excellent cover for special operations, as Yugoslav

partisans demonstrated during World War II.

The ability to keep certain classes of targets under

continuous surveillance has also improved vastly in recent years.

A variety of remote read-out sensors is now routinely available

(even to homeowners) to provide alerts of intrusion, motion,

vibration, heat, smoke, noise, magnetic metals, or

what-have-you.32 Most require on-site installation, of course.

Properly and covertly installed, there should be relatively

little difficulty in knowing when a bridge is being crossed, an

artillery firing position is occupied, a loading dock is being

used, a storage site vacated, a palace or bunker visited, an

apartment (or a telephone) is being used, a lock has been broken,

and so on. Tiny concealed and sensor-activated TV cameras can

provide unambiguous proof of occupancy and activity. (Ask the

former mayor of Washington!). Such sensors can now be routinely

linked to communications satellites. Pre-hostility insinuation of

a few dozen high-tech undercover agents could make potential

trouble spots much easier to control subsequently.

Target Designation and Location. The unambiguous designation

of a particular point against which to aim a weapon, or a

parachute drop for that matter, is also becoming routine. A

variety of hand-held (and I assume remotely deployable) and

digitally-encoded laser designators are now available, giving a

lone forward observer the ability to call in anything from

artillery shells to 5000-pound bombs. Laser reflecting paints and

various types of beacons can also enhance target prominence. Some

were invented to locate downed aircraft and pilots, others are

used routinely to improve air traffic control performance.
21

The ability to take photographs or TV tapes clandestinely

has improved greatly. Individual TV pictures can be printed out

in hard copy with portable devices like facsimile machines.

Handheld photos transmitted by fax machine can improve confidence

in the designation of individual targets, or even be used for

subsequent photomatching missile guidance. Photographic evidence

of individuals and specific crimes are obviously useful in

identifying ring leaders for "indictment"--or passport inspection

at border points.

Virtually anyone who wants to, from camper or boatsman to

soldier or pilot, can know where he is in absolute worldwide

coordinates within a few tens of feet. This is how U.S. forces

navigated the Arabian deserts, how coastal drug traffickers

establish underwater caches for subsequent diver recovery, and

how U.S. trucking firms keep track of their vehicles. This is

also how one-way cruise missiles can navigate to their "dump

point," and covert agents can reach a predetermined extraction

point.

Target Tracking and Seeking. One emerging capability largely

ignored by the military is that of "tagging" targets in order to

track them when they move, as biologists track migratory animals,

birds, and, with the Navy's help, whales.33 The LEAs, on the

other hand, have learned to use various kinds of beacons or other

markers by which to follow critical items. A famous Drug

Enforcement Agency caper attached beacons to barrels of chemicals

sold to drug dealers through a New Jersey "sting" operation, and

then tracked the barrels (intermittently) by satellite to their

arrival in a Bolivian jungle cocaine factory, which was

subsequently raided by a "joint" paramilitary force.

Other automated marking systems are used to identify

railroad cars in transit, stolen money, merchandise not paid for,

cleared personnel, and so forth. Many of these techniques can be

used in monitoring economic sanctions, or tracking commodities to

unknown destinations. The first commercial devices for police

tracking of stolen automobiles is now on the market for a few

hundred dollars.

Most of these marking systems obviously require access to

the "target" for marker installation. Again, for tracking illegal

products, arms, or even bullet-proof sedans, such access should

be available at some time either openly or clandestinely. In

fact, installation by the manufacturer could become a condition

for initial sales and resales. Such devices may eventually

provide routine verification of arms control pacts, or aid in

limiting arms proliferation. They will also lead to

nontransferrable "smart passports," "smart license plates," and

"smart containers," by which to screen out a few suspects from a

large continuous peacetime flow of travelers and goods.

Homing devices now employ a variety of seekers that enhance

their accuracy manyfold. Homing on small beacons is now routine
22

in searching for downed pilots, military or civil. Homing on

illegal radio broadcasters is used routinely to enforce

communications rules and standards. Homing on effluents from

various illegal activities or environmental violations is

practical. Weapon seekers range from radar-seeking missiles to

destroy radars, to infrared and optical seekers that allow a

pilot to remotely steer the missile to its aimpoint. While most

still require relatively clear air, nighttime is as acceptable as

daytime.

Target Tainting. Technologies also permit the "doctoring" of

various commodities and things so that they no longer serve their

intended purposes--or stop working on command. Ammunition can be

doctored to explode on command, by handling, or prematurely on

firing. Fuels can be polluted to gum up or stop engines. Vehicle

engines can be remotely commanded to stop running. Some drugs

might be given frightening or embarrassing nonlethal side

effects. Again, access is required, but is more plausible in the

environments foreseen. Preparation time, of course, can be

extremely useful--if not essential.

Such tainting can also extend to making certain areas

untenable through mining or dusting with other chemicals. Some

techniques may be particularly useful for enhancing "resistance"

movements, while others may be more applicable to the enforcement

of economic sanctions. Chemicals can be developed to taint

illegal commodities or identify their handlers and users (as now

used to "label" bank robbers). Built-in or covertly added

disabling systems can make illegally obtained weapons and

equipment inoperable. Some "golden key" systems are believed to

be used in sensitive weapon systems sold to dubious Third World

adventurists, and could be added to vital high-tech components of

various urban and national infrastructure elements (from air

traffic control radars and telephone switching centers to payroll

computers--and money counters!).

Sensory Enhancement. One of the most successful technologies

to derive from the Vietnam war has been night vision devices

which essentially let people see under conditions with virtually

no visible light. Western military and law enforcement agencies

commonly use such devices, as do various categories of criminal

elements.34 Equally important, many of the newer devices work

almost as well through many types of fog, smoke and even dust

storms, providing enormous advantages to their users. In fact,

man-made dust storms (created, say, by helicopter rotor wash) or

smoke can help balance uneven odds.

Virtually all the human senses can now be augmented.35 New

biotechnologies will almost certainly lead to improved olfactory

sensors for detecting the presence of drugs, explosives, and even

aliens in confined spaces (like containers, automobile trunks,

and sealed truck bodies). New techniques are already being

fielded for detecting dangerous chemical aerosols (e.g., poison

gases). Utilization and effectiveness of animal sensors (such as
23

dogs' noses) can doubtless be expanded for tracking smugglers,

finding the remains of crime victims, and searching for illegal

commodities. Combining sensors and modern computer technologies

will almost certainly make possible new nonintrusive means for

detecting liars and guilt, overhearing remote conversations, and

pinpointing the origins of gunfire.

Decoys and Deception. Decoy equipments and false clues of

subversive activities (empty gun packages, supply parachutes,

beached rubber boats, etc.) can be proliferated to saturate

defenses and destroy confidence. Many new technologies used in

the entertainment industries have possible applications.36

New computerized digital processing of photographic/TV

information can also prey on the common belief that "seeing is

believing"; photographic "evidence" can be synthesized of

compromising behavior by political or religious leaders. Various

religious taboos and ethnic biases can be exploited in many

creative and very subtle ways.

New telephonic devices can clearly be manipulated for

psychological purposes. The ubiquitous fax machine, for instance,

is remarkably susceptible to creating doubt and suspicion. Its

output is easy to read (not even an envelope to steam open), and

the sender's identity and location can be masked (the sender's

"stationary" cannot even be checked for authenticity). The

greater the criminals' paranoia, the more likely they are to

react to bogus materials designed to cast doubts on, say,

personal or organizational loyalties.

Communications Management. Satellites make it possible for

relatively small transmitters to connect with the rest of the

world. Modern electronics allows "digital burst" transmissions

which rapidly transfer essentially secure data. Lap top computers

and fax machines permit very sophisticated exchanges either

through existing communications channels, or completely outside

them. In a relatively unsophisticated background environment, one

can be virtually assured of being able to keep in extensive

contact with friendly forces of all kinds--anywhere.

While friendly communications can be extensive and secure,

the extant communications of the offenders, both civil and

military (drug dealers and Iraqis notwithstanding), are likely to

be quite vulnerable to intercept.37 Particularly if there are

opportunities before difficulties grow to "get into the systems,"

it is quite likely that the offenders can be placed at a

substantial disadvantage. Those offenders, as mentioned earlier,

should include outsiders who collude with violators of economic--

or military--sanctions. Those who sign up in international fora

to impose sanctions on a neighbor must be willing to have their

promises tested, and if necessary, supervised and enforced by

international authorities.

The surveillance of military communications is somewhat more
24

difficult, but after 40 years of learning about Soviet military

equipment, it is unlikely that friendly forces would be unable to

eavesdrop on any forces equipped by them, or by any other

obsolescent equipment. Almost certainly, computer-driven

electronic financial transactions can be intercepted. They have

become a virtual necessity for international commerce and

banking. They should, if transparent, be an important source of

information on illegal transactions concerning arms or economic

trade.

Communications are an important source of national and

business confidence. The ability to "get into" any or all of

these systems and sow confusion or doubt could provide a very

significant "nonlethal" confidence-destroying measure. Airborne

and ground equipment exists to overpower existing radio and TV

stations and insert one's own programs. Endless "dirty tricks"

can be played by getting into or simply using the host country's

telephone system. Automatic switching systems are complex enough

to present significant problems if damaged (or altered). Mail

service can be disrupted. Electric power distribution can be

upset. Interfering with or stopping electronic financial

transactions could certainly cause widespread concern.

Weapon Range and On-Station Time. Other technological

advances have made possible far greater "stand-off" range in the

delivery of high accuracy ordnance against a variety of discrete

targets. The general class of air-, ground-, and sea-launched

cruise missiles (including from submerged submarines) offer

substantial (albeit not yet perfect) opportunities to retaliate

very quickly and with great surprise against violations of

established behavior from distances of several hundred miles.

These missiles do not need "air superiority" to very selectively

remove elements of a military, economic, or governmental

infrastructure.

The advent of airborne tankers, improved engine efficiency,

and the "weaponizing" of long-endurance transport aircraft make

it possible to maintain weapons "on-station" for hours at a time-

-all night, if desired. Shorter-range helicopter units can

sometimes establish temporary forward ground refueling stations.

Striking back quickly at various infractions (and before the

target disperses) can be key to deterring their continued or

expanded use.

U.S. special forces now operate very capable fifth

generation AC-130 side-firing gunships with extensive night

vision capabilities. Given air superiority, these units can orbit

trouble areas all night and return devastating, adjustable,

large-bore automatic cannon fire very selectively. They can shoot

armor-piercing rounds, as well as others. Developed initially for

the war in Vietnam (urban defense, and resupply interdiction),

AC-130s were an important component of the JUST CAUSE night

operations against Panama City as well as in DESERT STORM. They

could be particularly valuable (together with other sensors) in
25

interdicting illegal shipments, applying economic and urban

"persuasion," and alleviating artillery and mortar sieges. The

C-130 airframe is standard throughout western forces, but its

attack equipment is not! C-130s could, however, readily be manned

and maintained internationally.

Precision-guided munitions can now be delivered without

involving aircraft as the often-vulnerable, sometimes

time-consuming "middlemen." Ground-based artillery and

longer-range missiles can remain "on-station" at the ready

essentially indefinitely. U.S. attack submarines and surface

combatants also carry high-precision cruise missiles with ranges

over 700 miles, and can stay on station for months. Although the

failure rate on these cruise missiles appeared unfortunately high

in the retaliatory strikes against Saddam Hussein's military

installations, reliability improvements as well as on-site target

designators can greatly enhance their effectiveness and

discreetness.

Night Operations. Denying the free use of the night to the

offender seems key to "leveling the battlefield" for the

enforcers. Night operations not only inspire awe and disadvantage

the offender, but they can also reduce collateral damage and

civilian casualties in the workplace. Giving the appearance of

vastly superior intelligence, and assiduously avoiding needless

damage or violence, are both important ingredients in regaining

the upper hand. JUST CAUSE provided our first large-scale

(25,000-man) quasi-military operation against an urban target

(since the U.S. operation into the Dominican Republic)--and it

was kicked off at 2:00 AM! DESERT STORM operations were conducted

around the clock. Virtually all U.S. forces and law enforcement

agencies are fully equipped and trained in night operations.

Personnel Insertion/Extraction. A variety of new

technologies are improving the ability to insert and extract

individuals (or equipment) deep within contested territory.

Modern aerodynamics, accurate navigation, night vision devices,

acoustic suppression, and "stealth" radar reduction can be

combined to provide assured (if limited) access, essentially

wherever desired. Covert operations, like "dirty tricks," can

become an important element in limiting the extent and impact of

illegal operations of any kind. "Night visitations" (a very

successful Viet Cong tactic) as an alternative to permanent

"occupation" may deserve further consideration.

High-Tech Special Forces. Many RSA missions would still

involve the relative routine application of existing capabilities

for peacekeeping, disaster relief, election monitoring, and the

like. A variety of military and civil assets are available for

their conduct. The more difficult scenarios involving more

zealous and ardent criminal elements require the development of

major new capabilities. Technology can make many of these

practical.38
26

Technology can be applied in ways that certainly limit (but

surely do not eliminate) the need for long-term commitment of

vulnerable ground forces within the disordered zone. In

particular, the effectiveness of internal/underground resistance

movements can be magnified enormously, in many cases without

arming them. Nowadays, it is virtually impossible to deny

clandestine communications (via satellite) from within a

beleaguered area. Covert insertion and extraction of people and

things are routine in a benign air threat environment. Many

high-tech "targets" can be rendered inoperable without destroying

them. Other targets can be designated and pinpointed for very

precise attack within minutes or hours by stand-off weapons

launched from behind a hill or from hundreds of miles away. Very

small beacons, remotely operated, can provide unambiguous

aimpoints for very large homing weapons (or guided parachute

drops). It is not inconceivable that if these technologies had

been available to various European resistance movements during

World War II, many months of high intensity, high casualty war

could have been avoided.

In a different area, the successful enforcement of economic

sanctions could provide a major instrument (and future deterrent)

for RSA. It is clearly within the technological state of the art,

particularly as practiced by U.S. LEAs, but not by main unit

military forces as currently configured. Violations of economic

sanctions involve commodities of some sort, their providers and

recipients, and various transfer links in between; a range of

appropriate actions can be developed against each. Twenty-first

century blockades and sieges may be crucial to restoring local

law and order. Little if any rigorous research, analysis, or

development has been conducted in these areas. It is

inconceivable to claim we can field an effective "Star Wars"

antimissile system, but cannot stop the illegal flow of usable

fuel oil to Serbia (or of chemical or nuclear warheads for that

matter), either at the source, in transit, or at intermediate and

final destinations.

High technology can also be used effectively to deny the

battering of urban areas and their populations as happened so

tragically in Beirut and is now being repeated in Sarajevo.

Counterbattery radars can accurately pinpoint the launch site of

artillery, rocket and mortar fire, and airborne surveillance can

often track the subsequent retreat of the attackers to their

defensive positions and storage sites. Remote sensors can provide

excellent indicators when known firing sites are occupied. A

variety of very precise weapon systems operable at night and even

in inclement weather can be used in a benign air environment to

destroy such capabilities and force the attacker to use a lower

level of harassment.

The successful application of capabilities such as those

outlined above will require the formation and training of new

kinds of high-tech (possibly covert) special units--military,

paramilitary, or law enforcement agency--quite possibly
27

multinational in the longer term. Designing, training, and

equipping such units requires substantial creativity. The legal

ramifications deserve substantial thought, and command and

control of ad hoc multinational units needs special technical

attention. In any event, the popular vision of "special forces"

as snake eating, swamp swimming, throat slitting renegades will

have to be replaced with (or at least expanded to include) a new

generation of high-tech science fiction heros capable of

employing the full range of emerging technologies to defeat the

persistent forces of evil.

Conclusion.

Post-cold war disorders more closely resemble crimes than

wars, and seldom pit government against government in

high-intensity combat. The crimes are generally gross violations

of the growing body of international law, but not wars that can

be won in the military sense. They must be countered by a

combination of military, paramilitary, and civil agencies

applying a variety of political, economic, and physical

sanctions. The question is whether such global laws and

conventions will be enforced by global, regional, or national

authorities. Neither global responses by the U.N. nor unilateral

responses by individual nations (including the United States) are

appropriate. The best alternative is to evolve RSAs capable of

maintaining law and order within "acceptable" levels of

(inevitable) violence, using a new combination of "high-tech"

civil and military resources specifically tailored to deal with

these categorially different circumstances.

Altogether, the development of versatile RSAs for Europe,

the Middle East, Latin America, and the Asia/Pacific region

presents some fascinating alternatives to the now obsolete

functions of NATO--and many unilateral roles and commands

currently peculiar to U.S. forces. The United States would do

well to encourage the formation and implementation of regional

security apparatuses and to apply some of its now surplus

technological creativity to augmenting their inspection, law

enforcement, and paramilitary capabilities and to enhancing their

effectiveness. The gradual transformation of both NATO and the

U.S. Southern and Pacific Commands into RSAs would make excellent

test cases.

ENDNOTES

1. This is a somewhat updated and expanded version of a

paper published as Ridgway Viewpoints No. 93-8, Matthew B.

Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of

Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs,

Pittsburgh, PA, Fall 1993.

2. The need for post-cold war institutional changes was

first raised by this author in an Atlantic Council Occasional
28

Paper, Organizing for Change: An Essential Part of Comprehensive

Security and Western Prosperity, March 1989.

3. For challenges concerning the continued "legitimacy" of

"the West," see Jerome Paolini, "Institutional Aspects of

European Security After the Cold War: From Western Security

Interblocking to Institutional Evolutionism," paper from Institut

Francais des Relations Internationales before conference on

"Multilateralism and the Conduct of Western Diplomacy," December

2, 1992, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security

Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA.

4. OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development; GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA

- International Atomic Energy Agency.

5. NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization; CSCE -

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; APEC -

Asia/Pacific Economic Council; ASEAN - Association of Southeast

Asia Nations.

6. For others sharing this view in The Washington Post, see,

James Adams, "NATO as Play-Doh," April 4, 1993; Jeane

Kirkpatrick, "Our First Great Post-Cold War Failure," June 27,

1993; and George Zarycky, "Unparalleled International Cowardice,"

July 25, 1993.

7. The United States apparently accepts an annual

"peacetime" death rate of over 40,000 people in automobile

accidents, half due to drunk drivers; 109,000 forcible rapes; and

almost 24,000 murders and manslaughters (two-thirds by firearms).

58,000 people were treated for gunshot wounds at a cost of almost

$2 billion. Police agencies alone employ 750,000 uniformed and

civilian personnel at a cost approaching $4 billion; 127 police

officers died in the line of duty. (Statistics for 1992 from the

1994 World Almanac.)

8. For discussion of relevant new arms control issues, see,

Summary of Proceedings of the Defense Nuclear Agency Conference

on Arms Control and Verification Technology (ACT), June 1-4,

1992, Kaman Sciences Corporation, December, 1992.

9. See summary of the fourth report of OECD's Financial

Action Task Force on money laundering, OECD Letter, Vol. 2/8,

October 1993. OECD policy recommendations on bribery in

international trade and investment and on biotechnology

development safety are also forthcoming.

10. Recognition of this upward drift in sovereignty can be

found in such diverse places as the open borders between the

"five swans" of the Nordic Council, and in the new constitution

of independent Tajikistan.

11. For an assessment of the "unstoppability" of European
29

integration, see Anthony Morris, Europe 2000: Union or

Fragmentation, Occasional Paper No. 14, Jean Monet Council,

George Washington University Forum in European Studies, July

1993.

12. Issues of diminished sovereignty have been highlighted

by critics of both the North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA) and the globally more important General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay Round. One reasoned article on

the dangers is by Clyde Prestowitz, "How America Could Give Away

the Store in the Next Big Trade Treaty," The Washington Post,

November 28, 1993.

13. The growing number of U.N. peacekeeping operations is

summarized by CIA analyst Frederick H. Fleitz, "(EURA/UN)

Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993" (and notes thereto),

October, 31, 1993.

14. For a full discussion of the growing international drug

trade, see Phil Williams, "The International Drug Trade: An

Industry Analysis," Ridgway Viewpoints No. 93-6, Matthew B.

Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of

Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs,

Pittsburgh, PA.

15. See James Schlesinger, "American Arrogance," The

Washington Post, December 5, 1993.

16. Imagine how foolish it would seem if the Congress

demanded that the President certify that eliminating crime in the

District of Columbia was a "vital national interest," or if the

City Council demanded that Mayor Kelly eliminate all serious

crimes in the District by a certain date, or pull out all law

enforcement personnel to avoid casualties.

17. In an interview with Rick Atkinson, Lieutenant Colonel

Lee Gore, commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain (!) Division's

aviation task force, noted that "in my manual, urban warfare is

covered in a paragraph." Pilots have learned that "you cannot

hunt individuals with a helicopter in the city." "U.S. to Leave

Somalia with its Guard Up: Officers Say Lessons Learned in Perils

of Urban Combat, Foreign Command," The Washington Post, December

8, 1993.

18. See Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The CSCE Forum for Security

Cooperation: The Opening Gambits," NATO Review, June 1993, p. 23.

19. OAS - Organization of American States.

20. See transcript of speech by President Clinton at the

United Nations General Assembly, "U.S. Committed to Making U.N.

Vision a Reality," September 17, 1993.

21. The stark differences between warfighting and crime
30

fighting were first brought home to this author by the law

enforcement agencies while chairing a year-long interagency

Defense Science Board task force study, Detection and

Neutralization of Illegal Drugs and Terrorist Devices, 1987,

(never declassified).

22. KATUSA - Korean Assigned to U.S. Army.

23. In a remarkable rationalization, Caleb Baker explains

that "the failure to snare an individual foe doesn't boil down to

a lack of capability. Rather the SOF mission was limited by

Executive Order, and complicated by inaccurate and untimely

intelligence, a lack of clear command and control, and

unfamiliarity with the foe's home turf." "Manhunt for Aideed: Why

Rangers Came Up Empty-Handed," Armed Forces Journal

International, December 1993.

24. See transcript of speech by Madeleine Albright, U.S.

permanent representative to the United Nations, "The United

States Will Use Diplomacy When Possible--Force When Necessary,"

National War College, September 23, 1993.

25. The rate of violent deaths in Washington, DC, is 78 per

year, per 100,000 inhabitants. At the height of Escobar's

criminal activities in Medellin, the death rate reached 389 per

hundred thousand; "Colombia's Violent Culture More Durable than

Escobar," The Washington Post, December 5, 1993.

26. Devices to disorient human senses and inhibit human

movement have been sought unsuccessfully for many years. Our new

dependence on high-tech electronic systems may prove considerably

more vulnerable than our remarkably adaptive and redundant human

bodies.

27. The long overdue capture (and demise) of Colombian drug

kingpin, Pablo Escobar, by Colombian authorities resulted from a

successful trace of several phone calls using high-tech equipment

provided by the DEA; Douglas Farah, "Escobar Killed in Medellin,"

The Washington Post, December 3, 1993 (an ideal case study for a

Latin American RSA).

28. For an indication of the frustration of U.S. Rangers who

failed to capture Aideed in Mogadishu, see, "Mission Incomplete,

Rangers Pack Up," The Washington Post, October 21, 1993. "We're

not cops, and we're having to adopt warfighting technology for a

fugitive hunt in a city of about one million," said one unnamed

officer.

29. Airborne radars for detecting enemy aircraft have been

used by the Navy since World War II. The latest incarnations

(Navy's E2C and Air Force's E3A) are currently in use in the war

against drugs, and in the enforcement of sanctions against

Bosnia. Airborne radars for detecting moving ground targets have

been used by the Army (OV-1) since the mid-1960s. The latest and
31

still developmental, E-6 (JSTARS), proved remarkably successful

in DESERT STORM. Commercial airships may soon appear for urban

traffic monitoring. All benefit greatly from advances in

electronics and computers.

30. The need for greater military focus on urban warfare has

been repeatedly stressed in Defense Science Board studies in the

1970s and 1980s, and the issue surfaced again after both the JUST

CAUSE operations in Panama, and the DESERT STORM operations in

Kuwait and Iraq.

31. The impact of introducing PGMs into the war in Vietnam

is discussed by Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force's

Setup in Vietnam, College Station: Texas A&M Press, chapter 5.

32. A broad range of ground sensors originally developed

under a crash program for the Southeast war (under the cover of

the Defense Communications Planning Agency (DCPG)), were

subsequently adapted and have been extensively used in Israeli

border defenses for almost two decades.

33. Use of tags was first suggested by this author to

enhance the subsequent detectability of enemy armored vehicles

once they penetrated the "inner German border." "The Initial

Defense of Fixed Borders: From Psychosis to Armored Sunroofs,"

Armed Forces Journal International, 1988.

34. Initial development of night vision devices was

accelerated for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s;

25 years later, scores of devices are offered on the open market.

"Save on the Widest Range of MIL-SPEC Night Vision Products,"

full-page ad in Armed Forces Journal International, November

1993.

35. Human sensory enhancement using "smart hats" was

proposed prematurely by this author in the late 1960s to enhance

the effectiveness of military scouts operating in the jungle

terrain of Southeast Asia. Enormous progress in electronic

miniaturization now make such prospects practical.

36. Decoys and deception were clearly used by both sides

during the U.N./Iraq conflict in 1991; it is not clear to this

author which side used them more effectively, even though the

overall outcome was never in doubt.

37. See note 27.

38. Ken York, "Army Special Operations Command Pushes the

Technology Envelope," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1993, provides an interesting listing of USSOCOM's

technology priorities--supporting several of this author's

suggestions.
32

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple