SHARI'A LAW, CULT VIOLENCE AND SYSTEM CHANGE IN EGYPT:

THE DILEMMA FACING PRESIDENT MUBARAK

Stephen C. Pelletiere

April 5, 1994
*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)

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FOREWORD

Egypt is one of the more economically deprived countries in

the world. Societal stress is a major challenge. Few believe that

Egypt will escape the poverty that has for so long oppressed it.

For all its challenges, Egypt is of strategic importance to the

United States, because of its leadership position in the Arab

world. It would be extremely difficult for Washington to

safeguard its interests in the Middle East without support from

Cairo.

Recently, Egypt has been hit with an outbreak of religious

strife that poses a threat to the rule of President Husni

Mubarak. This study looks at the unrest, identifies the forces

behind it, and prescribes steps that can be taken to alleviate

the situation.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

monograph. We feel that it can contribute to serious discussions

on the Middle East situation.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in political science

from the University of California, Berkeley, with an area

specialty in the Middle East. From 1969-71 he studied Arabic at

the American University in Cairo on a Center for Arabic Study

Abroad (CASA) Fellowship. He returned to the Egyptian capital in

1975 on a Fulbright Research Fellowship. Dr. Pelletiere wrote his

doctoral dissertation on Egyptian nationalism and the press

during the pre-World War I period. He taught Middle East politics

at the University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in

Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until

1987, he was an intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the

Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in

1988, and became a full professor in 1991. He has written two

books on the Middle East: The Kurds--An Unstable Element in the

Gulf, and The Iran-Iraq War--Chaos in a Vacuum. He is currently

working on a book on the war in Kuwait.
SUMMARY

This study looks at the system of rule in Egypt and

discusses why it is in such trouble presently. In the eyes of

many, the days of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak are numbered,

because of the mounting violence inside his country.

The study concludes that Mubarak's difficulties stem from

the economy, which is seen to be distributing wealth inequitably-

-it enriches the few, while the masses are driven to make more

and more sacrifices to preserve a deteriorating standard of

living.

Into this disturbed atmosphere has come the powerful Muslim

Brotherhood, which has sparked a religious revival against

corruption that apparently has gotten out of hand. Numerous

religious cults have sprung up, calling for the restitution of

the ancient law of Muhammad, the shari'a. The cultists are taking

action against elements they feel have betrayed Islam.

To date, the religious forces have failed to win support

they need to achieve their aim. However, a further serious

decline in the standard of living could provide the opening they

seek. Ironically, this may happen because of measures being taken

by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is pressing

Mubarak to undertake free market reforms. The reforms would cause

widespread unemployment, something the masses will not tolerate.

The study warns U.S. policymakers that before proceeding

with the reforms, the mood of the Egyptian people, as well as the

religious movement, should be carefully assessed. Signs indicate

the religious forces are split, and--this being the case--it may

be possible to exploit this schism in ways that support the

interests of the United States.
SHARI'A LAW, CULT VIOLENCE AND SYSTEM CHANGE IN EGYPT:

THE DILEMMA FACING PRESIDENT MUBARAK

Introduction.

Egypt's security problem must be seen in context of its

economic plight. The country has been in economic difficulty for

years. However, it is now entering a particularly dangerous

phase, trying to move to a market economy from one that is

state-controlled. This is always hard and is frequently

accompanied by violence, but in Egypt it is doubly difficult

because few countries in the Third World have turned more to

socialism than Egypt.1

An additional complication for the Egyptians is their

demographic situation. Egypt has too many people and not enough

resources to support them. Over 56 million Egyptians live in a

restricted area along the Nile River (in Cairo alone there are

over 16 million).2 Further, since World War II, Egypt has been

moving people out of the countryside (the baladi areas, i.e., the

villages) and into Cairo and Alexandria, the two major cities

where they are finding it increasingly hard to support

themselves.3 Millions are on the dole; if they are not on it

outright, they are subsisting on something akin to it. In the

public sector the mass of civil servants performs essentially

meaningless tasks created to provide them a living.4

Egypt owes its bloated public sector to two factors. First,

it had been the policy of Egyptian governments since World War II

to provide free education through college. Second, anyone who

could obtain a degree was guaranteed a government post.

Practically all government-provided jobs, however, are dead ends.

At the same time, for many Egyptians, until recently, this was

not a problem; to be an effendim, a man of education (if not of

property), was something avidly sought.5 An educated Egyptian

could expect to live in a reasonably tolerable fashion. Given the

current difficulties, however, this is no longer certain.

Recently, conditions worsened to a degree that has become

disturbing. For example, in trying to move the country to a

market economy, Mubarak has focused on the civil service. He

withdrew the commitment to employ degree holders, and seemingly

has abandoned the policy of providing free education through

college. This has caused widespread consternation, raising the

prospect of increased hardship for many.

A general belief about Egyptians is that, of all the world's

peoples, they are the most stoic. However bad things get, it is

claimed, Egyptians will submit without protest.6

 This is a

misperception. Egypt has gone through some violent periods

recently, in which the Egyptians have nearly torn the country

apart. In each case where this has occurred, the regime

subsequently sought to appease the aroused populace. No matter
how dictatorial, no Egyptian leader in modern times has dared

stand against the mob. Some argue that Egypt is on the verge of

another such explosion.

Throughout Egypt there are increasing signs that something

is amiss. The author visited Cairo last September. Three weeks

after he left a gunman walked into the lobby of the hotel near

where he had been staying and fatally shot three guests in the

main dining room.7 Apparently by design, the gunmen targeted

foreigners. This was a shocking incident, but other equally

sensational incidents have occurred, including an attempt to bomb

the Prime Minister on the main thoroughfare in the center of the

capital.8

What is causing the present unrest and what does it portend?

Mubarak claims to be the victim of a plot, masterminded by the

clerics in Tehran.9 Along with this he maintains that the unrest

is controllable, perpetrated by a small group of terrorists. This

may be; however, the killers' activity seems to be symptomatic of

a broad current of unease gripping the country.

Tourists in downtown Cairo, especially those who have

previously visited the capital, probably do not sense the

dangerous social unrest. The city looks more attractive than

ever. The heart of downtown (Tahrir Square) is almost pristine,

which is extraordinary. Under Mubarak's predecessors Nasser and

Sadat, Maidan Tahrir was incredibly dingy; now it is bright and

clean.10

However, one should not attach great importance to the

superficial appearance of downtown. Conditions in the outlying,

medieval quarters of the city are quite bad. Indeed, a sense that

one should avoid these quarters prevails. This in itself is

something new; previously one could walk virtually anywhere in

Cairo without fear.

It appears that Mubarak may be keeping the baladi people out

of downtown, turning it into a tourist area. How the country folk

are induced to stay away is a mystery, but this appears to be

happening. As a consequence the picture one gets--of a society at

peace with itself--most probably is false.

This would explain the seemingly inexplicable acts of

violence that have been occurring--the bombings, the attacks on

tourists, the assassination attempts. It would appear that

tensions, normally kept under control (or at least out of sight),

are no longer containable.

As stated, the study will attempt to prove that Egypt's

security problem is tied to its malperforming economy. Therefore,

we will begin by examining the economy, and to do this we need to

go no further back than 1952 when the last king of Egypt, Farouk,

was deposed.
The Economy.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the country's first republican ruler,11

more than any other brought about Egypt's present plight. Nasser

was known among Egyptians as the ra'is ("boss"), and that

certainly was the way he ruled the country.12 Nasser was ruthless

in implementing his policies. Once set upon a particular course,

he would not be dissuaded from it; effectively he lost his sense

of proportion. To a degree, Nasser behaved this way with the

economy.

In moving Egypt along the path to industrialization, Nasser

sequestered the fortunes of thousands of Egypt's former elite. He

seized vast holdings under the land reform. Indeed it is likely

that Egypt's land reform was the most thoroughgoing in the Middle

East.13

Nasser's motives for undertaking this ruthless confiscatory

program were mixed. On the one hand, he wanted to hold on to

power; by expropriating the ancien regime he rid himself of many

potential enemies. Along with this, however, he sought to improve

the lot of Egyptians by making the country economically

independent; he hoped to convert it to a modern industrialized

society. To do this he had to obtain capital, which he got

(initially, at least) through the forced sequestrations.

The sequestrations worked well up to a point. Ultimately,

however, more capital was needed and there was none to be had;

Nasser had squeezed all that he could from the old elites.14 To

maintain the momentum of his industrialization drive, the

President might then have cut back on subsidies to the poor; he

might have scaled down the large and growing public sector. He

did not do either, because, it is claimed, he held the people in

too high regard.15

It seems likely that something else was operating; Nasser

feared the loss of control. By 1965, when he confronted the

capital shortage, enormous numbers of Egyptians were on the

public payroll. Dependent as they were on the government, they

were unlikely to oppose the ra'is. But who could tell what they

would do, if they were suddenly thrown onto the street.

In any event, Nasser lost the prize that he sought. The

industrialization drive foundered. For a time, failure was masked

due to the 1967 war. But ultimately elements of the population,

primarily the students, rebelled, and shortly after that Nasser

died of a heart attack.

Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, inherited a dreadful

situation. Egypt's public sector was bloated almost beyond

belief, with virtually no resources to keep it up. Moreover,

Sadat had the additional handicap of not being taken seriously by

Egyptians, who scoffed at his pledge to retake land lost to
Israel in the 1967 war. Yet, of course, he did just that. The

Egyptian army's successful canal-crossing was one of the more

astonishing events in modern history.

On the basis of this extraordinary achievement, Sadat

believed that he could reverse the economic decline of decades.

He determined to take yet another daring step; he would remove

Egypt from the socialist camp completely, bringing it into the

free market system.

To do this, he initiated the so-called infitah, or "opening"

to the West. Sadat invited Western capitalists (and others,

particularly the oil sheikhs) to invest in Egypt, offering

various inducements. Then, anticipating a favorable response, he

drafted an ambitious 5-year plan.16 The response, however, did

not materialize (the sheikhs in particular stayed aloof).

Undaunted, Sadat went ahead with his plan, borrowing the

necessary capital from the International Monetary Fund.17The IMF,

as is its wont, lent the money with strings attached. Primarily

it wanted Sadat to dismantle the inflated public sector. He

promised to do so, but in the end did not do it.

From roughly 1973 to 1976, Egyptians lived in a dream world.

Still euphoric over their victory in the Sinai, and encouraged to

believe that the economy was mending, they spent money in a burst

of consumerism after years of deprivation under Nasser. This

acted to relieve tensions, for a while.

However, it began to be apparent that Sadat had practiced a

deception. The economy was barely viable. Money was needed

urgently, and by 1976 the IMF was adamant that reforms must be

made. Sadat tried in 1977 to cut subsidies on basic items, and

the people rioted. So fierce was the rioting the President

appeared never to recover from it. He continued to rule until

1981, but it was a different society that he ruled over. All

economic reform ended, and although Sadat continued to liberalize

in some areas, he more and more relied on his security forces to

run the country (ultimately those same security forces failed to

prevent his assassination). Sadat's successor, Husni Mubarak, was

left to pick up the pieces; the bloated bureaucracy, the society

that could not produce, and hanging over all, the burgeoning

debts to the IMF.

Both Nasser and Sadat had gotten into trouble, basically, by

deceiving the people. They promised to create conditions whereby

Egyptians could influence international politics, and then had

failed to deliver on their promises.18 The people cooperated

until they realized that the dreams were empty. Once appreciation

dawned, they rioted. For Nasser the turning point came in 1968;

for Sadat, 1977.19

President Mubarak Takes Over.
Husni Mubarak did not make the mistake of his predecessors.

He promised nothing, but rather presented himself as a healer.

Indeed he emphasized the very colorlessness of his personality,

and Egyptians seemed to respond.20 They did not want another

visionary, rather someone who would set his sights on what was

obtainable, and who would bring the country along, gradually, but

surely.

For awhile it appeared that Mubarak was doing this. He

perpetuated Sadat's infitah, moving further away from the planned

economy. He reinvigorated the liberalization policy promoted, and

then neglected, by Sadat. To be sure, Mubarak surrendered little

of his own power; he remained the ra'is. But at least on the

surface there appeared to be movement toward a democracy; it

might come later rather than sooner, but it would come, Egyptians

felt.

In one area where changes were desperately needed, however,

Mubarak did nothing. He maintained the compact with Egyptians

whereby the state agreed to employ degree holders, and he

continued the policy of free education through college, which

effectively perpetuated the bloated bureaucracy.

One could argue that this is the policy that has ruined

Egypt. It has certainly destroyed the educational system, there

being no way it could process all of the demands upon it. At the

same time, most Egyptians do not get useful degrees, or at least

ones that they can convert to remunerative employment. The

majority are employed in the civil service, where they have to

work two and three jobs (illegally) to make ends meet. Probably

no people in the world moonlight more than Egyptians.21

Just before the eruption of DESERT STORM, Egypt's economy

was a shambles, hopelessly inefficient, virtually unproductive.

The society subsisted on four main sources of income--Suez Canal

fees, revenue from oil from the Sinai, tourism, and remittances

from Egyptians working abroad.22 Three of these producers were

down. As a consequence, Egypt's deficit was up, and the

international banking community was growing increasingly

concerned.

With nowhere else to turn, Mubarak went back to the IMF for

a standby loan. By now, however, the fund was used to dealing

with Egyptians. Mubarak's appeal was accepted, on condition that

he do what Nasser and Sadat had failed to do--cut subsidies,

privatize the public sector, and impose real austerity. In this

way, it was argued, Egypt might become self-supporting. To be

sure this would cause pain, since an almost certain result would

be widespread unemployment. But, the IMF counselled, out of pain

would come greater prosperity, as the economy began to produce

new industry, and jobs.

Mubarak agreed to follow the IMF's prescription, but before
he could act, DESERT STORM blew up. Mubarak, by joining the

coalition, performed a great service for the West, for which it

was suitably grateful.23 European and American banks virtually

halved Egypt's debts. Some were forgiven outright, others

remitted conditionally. In the latter case, debts are forgiven in

stages. In each stage, Egypt must implement specific measures,

after which a portion of the debt is relieved. Mubarak now had a

strong foundation on which to enact the IMF reform program, and

he has started in this direction. He has reduced, or totally

eliminated, subsidies on a number of basic commodities; he has

substantially lowered the budget deficit, and he has floated the

currency. Perhaps most noteworthy, however, he has ended the

government's commitment to employ degree holders, and is

apparently on the verge of promoting a private school system, to

complement the public schools. All this, however, is as nothing

compared to what he must now attempt, i.e., to privatize the many

publicly run firms in Egypt. This is a tremendous undertaking,

which the President has not begun seriously to address.

In justifying his delay Mubarak has cited the rising

opposition in Egypt. He argues that privatization will cost jobs,

and now--with violence increasing--he fears an explosion. The

President claims that Egypt is the target of Islamic

fundamentalists seeking to establish a religious state. To thwart

them, he says, he must proceed slowly, lest by an injudicious act

he assist their takeover.

The IMF appears to have accepted Mubarak's view, at least

for the time being. It has allowed several deadlines to slip

whereby stages of the reform were to have been accomplished. 

However, the Fund still insists on full compliance, and in recent

months has begun to press Mubarak to get the process moving

again.

This has shifted attention to the supposititious opposition

forces. Who are they? Are they so formidable? Indeed, what

exactly constitutes the opposition in Egypt? To answer this we

need to look at the whole range of opposition in the country,

although, as we shall see, the only significant antigovernment

activity comes from a relatively small segment of the population.

Egypt Under President Mubarak.

President Mubarak's approach to liberalization has been

ambivalent. On the one hand he has perpetuated reforms begun by

Sadat. At the same time he has not surrendered any of his own

power--he remains the ra'is. So it is difficult to see where he

has made an advance in this area.

The keystone of Sadat's liberalization program was the

multiparty system, which he introduced (his predecessor Nasser

had no patience with parties, at least none on the true Western

model).24 The parties that Sadat sanctioned, and which Mubarak
subsequently has endorsed, do not amount to a great deal. To

begin with they were all thoroughly vetted by the government, and

some groups--like the Muslim Brotherhood, for example--were not

allowed to form. The party system, as a consequence, tends to be

vapid. Parties in Egypt do not comprise much more than

personality cliques, groupings of individuals around

semi-charismatic figures.

Moreover, the parties have no programs. Lacking this, they

have no large followings either. It is virtually certain that

none of them could take power, at least not in the form they are

presently constituted.25 Were the government to relax controls

over the parties, and let them reach out to the public, then--

perhaps--constituencies might form, and a robust party system

emerge.

In the meantime, party leaders appear to be content to

function as gadflies. Their favorite tactic is exploiting issues,

which they do in no very effective manner. They do not mount

sustained campaigns which might eventually bring about meaningful

changes. Rather they skip from issue to issue. Opposing Israel is

popular. Opposing Mubarak--directly at least--is not done. This

may account for the general apathy of the Egyptian electorate.26

In a similar fashion the Egyptian press gives the appearance

of being feisty and combative, but it is as insubstantial as the

parties. The press does not hesitate to take on the men around

Mubarak, but rarely will it print anything derogatory of the

ra'is himself.

Thus what one encounters in Egypt (on the secular side, at

least) is a sham opposition, one that goes through the motions of

opposing the regime but is not effective. Egyptians call their

system multipartisme--democracy with all of the forms, but

practically no content. It is possible to write off the civilian

opposition in Egypt as hollow. The religious opposition, however,

has some substance.

The Brotherhood.

The principal component of the religious opposition in Egypt

is the Society of Muslim Brothers. The Brotherhood originated

before World War II. Its ways are devious and not easily

discovered, but there is no doubt that during the Nasser and

Sadat years (and now under Mubarak, as well) the Brotherhood has

been the major opposition force in the country.

The Brotherhood first appeared in the late 1920s as a

response to colonialism.27 Its founder, Hasan al Banna, opposed

the presence in Egypt of Great Britain. He therefore formed a

society of Muslims who would take the country back from the

British by perfecting themselves morally and physically. In

effect, the Brothers established themselves as role models whom
the mass of Egyptians could emulate.

Once in power, the Brotherhood's professed aim was to

reinstitute the shari'a, the legal code of Islam. This code,

which governed the early Muslims, has been virtually superseded

over the years by Western mores. If the shari'a could once more

become the law of the land, Al Banna argued, the glory days of

Islam would be born anew.

Apparently the Brotherhood's message touched a chord because

from 1928 to 1948 its membership soared to well over 500,000.28

Hasan al Banna became a powerbroker in Egyptian politics,

extraordinary since--by Palace decree--the Brotherhood could not

contest elections. (The Brothers adopted a tactic they have

employed to this day, running candidates on other parties'

lists.29 In this way they show their strength.)

Under the monarchy (and this is true at present), the

Brotherhood was an extremely conservative organization. It almost

consistently backed the King. However, on certain issues it would

break with him, as, for example, when he yielded to pressure from

the British. Then the Brothers would take to the streets.30

The issue that first attracted world attention to the

Brotherhood was Palestine; the Society led the Arab world in

rallying to the side of the Palestinians. To be sure, at the time

many Arabs supported this cause, but few put themselves on the

line to defend it.31 The Brothers actually went to what today is

Israel and fought against the Zionists. The literature implies

that because of Palestine the Brotherhood received its first

serious check.32

Throughout 1948, as the Egyptian army fought in Palestine,

at home tensions mounted. There were attempts at assassination,

bombings of public places, and pitched battles against the

police, in many of which incidents the Brotherhood figured

prominently.33 In the summer of 1948 serious anti-foreign rioting

occurred in the capital, and the Jewish quarter was gutted.34

Shortly afterward the Palace ordered a mass roundup of

Brothers, including Banna. In addition, the society's property

was seized, and its records (including its membership rolls)

impounded. The Brotherhood went to court to reclaim legal status,

but the Palace successfully countered this effort. In the end,

the 1952 Revolution rescued the Brothers; the army overthrew the

monarchy. The Free Officers esteemed the Brotherhood for its

early championing of Palestine, and on that basis it was

rehabilitated. For a time the Society was a mainstay of the new

regime. Ultimately, however, it fell from favor with Nasser and

was driven underground.

Nasser turned on the Brotherhood after--he claimed--it had

tried to assassinate him.35 He extirpated it root and branch,

putting thousands into jail. Those who escaped a jail sentence
fled overseas into what appeared in the late 1950s to be

permanent exile.

However, the Brotherhood returned; Sadat revived it. In the

mid-1970s--after he had thrown out the Soviets--Sadat needed

allies against the Nasserists (hard core followers of the former

Egyptian leader, who rejected Sadat's assumption of rule). He

rehabilitated the Brotherhood, inviting its members to return

from exile.

In the late 1970s, the Brotherhood turned against him, after

he had initiated his famous opening to Israel and had journeyed

to Jerusalem. The enraged Sadat followed Nasser's example,

jailing thousands more of the Brothers, and starting a power

struggle that ultimately caused his death by assassination.36 And

now it's back under Mubarak.

The Brotherhood seems to lead a charmed life. Written off as

dead on several occasions, it yet revives. It has immense

resources; many of the Brothers became millionaires working in

the Gulf. They tithe to support the Society and this has provided

the funds needed to push its program.

Since the Brotherhood has never regained legal status in

Egypt, it operates on the edges of the polity. It has developed a

modus vivendi with Mubarak whereby he tolerates, but does not

encourage its activities. This has given it leeway to branch out,

making its influence felt. For example, the Brotherhood operates

hospitals and schools; it funds charities and performs other

works that we will discuss below.

The Brotherhood responded to the Cairo earthquake in October

1992. It set up relief tents and distributed food and blankets,

while the official government relief agencies seemingly were

paralyzed.37 For reasons never made clear, Mubarak's people

barely moved during the crucial initial stage of this emergency.

The spectacle of the religious community taking charge angered

Mubarak, and he subsequently ordered private relief workers out

of the quake area. This provoked major rioting, after which the

President drew back, obviously shaken by the intensity of the

reaction that he had triggered.38

Some say that the earthquake episode caused the Brotherhood

to tip its hand. It showed the government how powerful it had

become, so as to threaten Mubarak's government. That the

Brotherhood has a considerable following cannot be disputed. It

remains to be seen, however, to what ends it means to use this

constituency. The Brothers say that they will never seize power

violently; although they admit that coming to power is their aim,

they say that they will do this peacefully.39

This may be so. Certainly the Society seems peaceful. On the

other hand, activities of the Brotherhood have created a climate

of violence in Egypt, even though this may not have been the
leadership's intent. How, then, has this climate been created?

Tactics of the Brotherhood.

Egypt, prior to 1952, was a largely rural society. Nasser

turned this situation around by enticing masses of villagers into

the capital where he co-opted them into the labor force. They

were the means whereby he intended to build the new society. To

do this he had first to upgrade their capabilities. This was what

universal education was all about--making baladi Egyptians into

superior factory workers, and ultimately technocrats. Nasser

evidently thought this possible since he forbade Egyptians from

taking jobs overseas, fearing to lose them as a valuable human

resource.40

The villagers went along with this, as they continued to

hope for an improvement in their condition. For a time, the

reward of jobs in the bureaucracy was enough; becoming an

effendim was seen as a great achievement. Moreover the villagers'

craving for status suited the regime--it guaranteed order. The

lowest ranks of the effendim deferred to those above, and

ultimately all bowed before the power of the ra'is.41

The change came under Sadat, who began to move the country

toward capitalism. Initially this was seen as sensible, after

socialism had proved so disappointing. Overlooked, however, was

the social disruption that this would cause. Capitalism

encourages a different type of individual than socialism. Egypt

began to witness the appearance of so-called "new men," really

men on the make--private sector entrepreneurs, who, by exploiting

public sector contacts, made fortunes.

The entrepreneurs drew attention by making ostentatious

displays of wealth. In the 1970s in Egypt it was not difficult to

stand out in this way--Egyptians had nothing. To own a car was

extraordinary (a Fiat 500 was the object of intense

admiration).42

As "new men" proliferated they influenced the larger

society. Youths particularly were affected by them, submitting to

the compulsion to dress well--that is to style. Levis, team

jackets, Nike sneakers--anything western was in. At the same

time, few Egyptians could afford this way of life (a cheap

imitation Guicci bag, for example, was priced beyond the reach of

most everyone).

The issue was forced in the universities. The baladi

students could not conform to the new ways, most being of limited

means. To be sure, tuition was free. Nonetheless, every child in

school represented a sacrifice for the family, a substantial one

in most cases.

At this point religious elements within the community (and
we presume the Brotherhood was involved) began manipulating the

situation. Through religious clubs on the campuses, they promoted

the "Islamic way of life."43 Students were urged not to ape the

West; in particular western dress codes were condemned. The

students were encouraged to dress modestly, i.e., Islamically.

Simple shirt and slacks for men, a proper-length dress and head

covering for women.

Many Westernized Eyptians have come to fear the

retrogressive effect that the Islamic movement would have on

youth. In fact, it was clear to anyone who examined the

phenomenon that "Islamicness" was--for many young people--a way

of coping with stresses emanating from the society.

The clubs were active in other areas. For example, they

attempted to alleviate the difficult conditions at the

universities. As stated, the schools were terribly overcrowded.

For this, the professors made little accommodation. If they

lectured to 600 students or 60 it made no difference--they read

their notes from the podium, voices barely audible in the

backmost rows of the lecture halls.44 The clubs xeroxed the

professors' notes and distributed them gratis. They also tutored

students having difficulty. For women students, too, they

provided special services, such as arranging for buses to convey

them to classes, relieving them of having to ride the overcrowded

public transportation.45

In return the clubs asked the youths to become better

Muslims. Much of this was probably well-intentioned. At a point,

however, the clubs went over to the offensive. First they

compelled Muslim-style dress. Then they demanded certain courses

be taught and others dropped from the curriculum, as

"un-Islamic."46 This trend gathered force in Upper Egypt, and in

particular in the university at Asyut, a long-standing stronghold

of religious reaction.

Clearly a kind of fanaticism was operating here. But

fanaticism was not all on the side of the Islamicists. Many

liberal professors, affronted by the militancy of the youth,

struck out against it. A professor, at the sight of a university

woman wearing a veil, snatched it from her, to find himself

surrounded by angry male students threatening to cut off his

hand.47

One assumes that this was a moment of truth. This incident

and others like it must have led the authorities to ponder where

all this was headed. Ultimately, appeals were made to the

government to act. When fights broke out on campus (between

Islamicists and secularists) the police intervened. This led to

arrests and some expulsions which provoked large demonstrations--

with this, the religious issue was taken up in the press.

In the late 1980s, columnists began deploring the Islamic

trend overwhelming Egypt. They exaggerated the seriousness of the
confrontation, for at this point there was no cause for alarm.

The serious violence was yet to come--the attacks on tourists,

the assassinations, the bombings. Such things began happening in

1990, and they came about in the following manner.

Revolt in Upper Egypt.

The Brotherhood-supported Islamic clubs were established all

over Egypt. However they mainly flourished in Upper Egypt. (See

Figure 1.) The area has always been backward, i.e., traditionbound. If anywhere in Egypt there exists the beating, pulsing

heart of ruralness, Upper Egypt is it. Along with this, the

groundwork there was laid for a religious revival. The Muslim

Brothers had moved into Upper Egypt after Sadat invited them back

from exile, and they quickly began to exploit conditions in the

area.

As previously stated, many Brothers were wealthy from

business dealings in the Gulf. Some of them established firms in

Upper Egypt which, they announced, would be run on "Islamic

lines."48 In practice this meant hiring only Muslims, who were

encouraged to live by the shari'a, the legal code of Islam. It

derives from the practice of the Prophet. After he died in 632

A.D., Muhammad's followers sought to emulate his piety by

adopting his lifestyle. Recalling how he had conducted himself in

this or that instance, they set down in writing what was deemed
proper behavior and what sort of activity ought to be shunned.

Given the manner in which it was compiled, the shari'a tends

to be rigorous; it is not something that one lightly sets about

to emulate. Nonetheless, for the Upper Egyptians this seemed not

to present a problem. They easily embraced the shari'a and a

great religious revival developed.

Alongside the Muslim enterprises there also appeared an

informal network of independent imams, who took over many of the

mosques in Upper Egypt. In Egypt, it has long been the

government's practice to co-opt imams by making them public

employees.49 They thus become advocates of the government's line,

acting as kind of grassroots propagandists.

It is a matter of conjecture who pays the "free" imams,

although it is generally accepted that they are supported, at

least in part, by donations from the Brotherhood. The free imams

inveighed against the corrupt lifestyle of the capital, and some

even attacked the President. As stated, activity like this was

not sanctioned--neither in the parliament, nor in the press does

one encounter direct attacks on the ra'is. The effect the

sermonizing of the free imams had on the Upper Egyptians was

considerable.

The imams agitated the villagers; during 1990 the level of

sectarian strife in the provinces escalated remarkably. Muslims

and Christians undertook what amounted to open war against each

other.50 This sort of thing had been going on for centuries in

this part of Egypt.51 However, the outburst was sufficiently

serious that the government intervened. Security forces cracked

down, and this, unfortunately, made things worse.

The peasants of Upper Egypt regard any physical attack on

their persons as an affair of blood. Thus, when the authorities

started hauling hundreds into custody, predictably the police

themselves were assaulted. Initially, this involved solitary

snipings, but soon the villagers began storming police stations

and attacking roving police patrols with Molotov cocktails.52

In all of this there was never a suggestion of a religious

war (jihad), as Mubarak has maintained. The violence was purely

communal, and in nature resembled traditional feuding (with the

unusual element of the police becoming objects of attack).

No one knows what made the unrest in Upper Egypt shift to

the capital, but it may have been related to the assassination of

the speaker of Egypt's parliament in October 1990. This event was

blamed, at the time, on religious extremists, and as a

consequence thousands of suspected individuals were rounded up,

jailed and interrogated.53 If this provoked the tension, the

result was deceptive. A lull ensued, which lasted a year, and

then, in September 1991, fierce rioting erupted between Muslims

and Coptic Christians in Imbaba, another of the medieval quarters
of the city.

The government repeated its earlier performance of rounding

up anyone who appeared even faintly Islamic (i.e., wore a beard

and a galabeya).54 This time, however, there was no deceptive

calm afterward. Tension intensified immediately, and there has

not been a return to peaceful conditions since. Police and locals

are at each other constantly, and here again what appears to be

operating are peasant attitudes (if we can call it that). Most

ghetto dwellers are transplanted Upper Egyptians, who regard

direct action as the only effective means of acquiring

satisfaction for a personal affront. When the police went after

them, they went after the security forces.

In late 1992, assaults on tourists began. Again the initial

attacks occurred in Upper Egypt, by groups claiming to be

retaliating for government abuses--closure of mosques, the

prevention of meetings and Friday prayers, the arrest of Muslims

and the taking of hostages from among their relatives.55

Upper Egypt, a region rich in antiquities, is a source of

revenue to the government from tourism. The government could not

allow attacks on tourists to go unpunished. Once more the police

cracked down, and predictably the level of violence increased

once again.

While this was going on the earthquake (discussed above) hit

Cairo, and due to mishandling of relief work on the government's

part, demonstrations erupted.56 At that, Mubarak ordered

widescale sweeps of Imbaba, Bulaq and other baladi quarters. Some

700 individuals were detained. In the process, neighborhoods were

sealed off and homes systematically ransacked. At this, the

tourist attacks--which until then had been restricted to Upper

Egypt--began to appear in Cairo. In February 1993, there were

three separate assaults on tourist buses near the Pyramids,57 and

also a bomb exploded in a tourist cafe on Maidan Tahrir, killing

two foreigners.58

After this the security forces appeared to lose control.

They invaded a mosque in Aswan in Upper Egypt, killing 21

worshippers, who--the police maintained--were actually

"terrorists." This brought forth a wave of recrimination

throughout the country, as Egyptians maintained such tactics were

unconscionable.59 Then, in April, the police general in charge of

the Aswan region was assassinated,60 and an unsuccessful attempt

was made to kill Egypt's Minister of Information, by snipers who

surprised him outside his home.61 Meanwhile an Egyptian military

court had sentenced 32 Islamic "extremists," seven of them to

hanging.62 In retaliation for this sentencing, an Egyptian army

general was assassinated.63

In August, the Minister of the Interior narrowly escaped

when a bomb exploded in Maidan Tahrir, killing 4 people and

wounded 15.64 And finally, in September, the aforementioned
killings of three foreigners in the Semiramis Hotel and the

attempted assassination of Egypt's Prime Minister occurred.65

These last two incidents followed the executions of seven

Islamicists at the beginning of the summer.66

Western commentators have speculated extensively about these

events, and for the most part have tended to agree with Mubarak--

that is, that he is the victim of a plot to unseat him. The

author does not believe this to be so--at least it was not so in

the beginning.

The events that occurred before 1991 took place in the area

between El Minya and Aswan (see Figure 1). Probably no more than

a handful of communities were involved. The people inhabiting

these communities are extremely provincial, not to say isolated.

It is not credible that such individuals would, on their own, try

to bring down the government.

Practically all of the activity up to 1991 could be seen as

instances of community unrest. That the unrest got so out of

control can in part be attributed to the heavy-handed police

response, driving the natives to greater and greater excesses.

Both Cairenes and U.S. Embassy personnel fault the police for

provoking much of the violence that has occurred.

The key question, however, is what changed in 1993? Clearly

the character of the manifestation did undergo a change at this

time. Until then, the violence was concentrated on police tasked

with keeping order in the governorates. Today, cabinet ministers

are being targeted in the heart of the capital. This would appear

to indicate that the disturbances have become politicized; they

are no longer mere social effervescences. What happened?

Mubarak's answer is to blame Iran, which, he says, began

exploiting the unrest for its own purposes.67 But, that really

conflicts with the evidence. The Upper Egyptians are all Sunnis.

Why would fanatical Sunnis enlist in an international conspiracy

directed by Iranian Shias, whom they could only regard as

heretics?68 Mubarak skims over this aspect of the affair;

neither he nor any of his people address it, even though this

would seem to undercut his theory.

Another area in which Mubarak's theorizing is defective is

where he claims that a single organization is behind the

activity. He calls it the Group, or the Islamic Group (gam'iya

al-Islamiya).69 Originally he claimed the Group supplanted

another organization, al-Jihad, which prior to 1990 was the main

perpetrator of the violence. However, within recent weeks Mubarak

has gone back to blaming al-Jihad and the Group has slipped into

the background.

For some of the worst outrages it does not appear that

either the Group or al-Jihad can be held responsible. Credit has

been taken by small, apparently ephemeral entities. Moreover,
individuals claiming to belong to the mini-groups have attacked

the Group and al-Jihad, so apparently there is rivalry among the

various organizations.70

It seems likely that many groups are involved. This would

account for the government's inability to suppress the violence.

A single, highly organized outfit with branches throughout the

country could easily be penetrated by police. This would not be

the case, however, with many little groups, springing up more or

less spontaneously.

Further, assuming that the guilty parties are all Upper

Egyptians, they have a place of refuge whenever they want it.

They can flee to the old quarters of Cairo dominated by their

kinsmen and hide, with little likelihood of being betrayed.

The author's conversation with security officials in Cairo

appear to confirm this. The officials claim the quarters are

extremely hostile to them. Whenever the denizens perceive that a

surveillance operation is underway, they immediately expose it.

Moreover, penetration of the groups is practically ruled out by

their lifestyle. According to the authorities, the members live

the shari'a and so can spot police agents attempting to mix among

them.

This explains why the Cairo police--in their frequent

sweeps--employ such heavy-handed tactics. They go into the

communities in force, hoping to snare someone they can make

confess; however this rarely happens. Why? Again to quote the

authorities, "These people will not confess, because they view

that as a sin against the faith."

What we are dealing with then (if the author's theory is

correct) are actually two separate tracks of antigovernment

activity. One is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood. It

basically is peaceful. Wealthy and extremely well-connected

Brothers are attempting to take power--through the ballot box, if

they can contrive to do so.71 Once in power, they are determined

to set up a government similar to that of Pakistan.

Alongside this trend is another, much harder to distinguish

because of its obscurity. The obscurer tendency comprises groups

of religious anarchists who on their own--apparently without

prompting from the Brotherhood--have begun resorting to violence.

The groups maintain that under the shari'a they are empowered

(indeed obliged) to correct "abominations" wherever they

encounter them. It is not enough simply to deplore corruption,

they say one must deal with it on the spot.72 Hence, the

anarchists are perpetrating acts of violence, such as the recent

assassinations and bombings and all of the other outrages that

have gone on. This latter element indisputably is composed of

fanatics.73

It has been suggested to the author that the Brotherhood is
directing the anarchists. Supposedly the Society has a secret

apparatus that arranges the violent acts. This is, however,

difficult to accept. The psychology of the "shooters" (as one

U.S. Embassy official described the radicals) is so at variance

with that of the Brotherhood leaders, it seems unlikely there

would be a link. Whatever else, the leaders of the Brotherhood

are men of property, who respect authority as exemplified by the

ulama.74 They would hardly countenance the kind of anarchic

behavior that the "shooters" carry on.

There is probably not a lot of contact between the Brothers

and the anarchists. It is even likely that the two sides fear and

mistrust each other. At least this is the view of some U.S.

Embassy personnel. However, these same officials believe

Washington could accommodate a Brotherhood-dominated regime, were

one to come to power. That may be so, to a point. If it were

possible for the Brotherhood to take power peacefully--without

precipitating a social revolution--it might not be inimical to

U.S. interests. However, that is a big if, and we will have more

to say about it below.

What are the chances of a social revolution actually

occurring? At this stage it does not appear likely. The masses do

not appear to have been persuaded that "Islam is the answer," as

the Brothers avere. They rather appear to be suspicious of the

simplistic nature of the Brotherhood's "program." (The idea that

the shari'a--even assuming it could be enacted--would solve all

of Egypt's problems, does not seem sound to them.)

As for the "shooters", they do not appear to have any

following outside their home communities. In Upper Egypt, the

groups comprise unemployed youth, who spend their time making

trouble for themselves and others.75

The nature of the groups in the capital is more difficult to

assess. It appears that actual cults have developed--small bands

of fanatics, who have made their lives conform to a purist notion

of Islam. Who precisely these people are and the stratum of

society from which they come are difficult to say.76

At the same time, they do not appear to have struck a

responsive chord in the wider polity. In this respect they are

like the Red Brigades. Indeed, there is no indication the

"shooters" are making an attempt to propagandize the masses. As

with the French anarchists of the late 1800s, they are interested

only in "propaganda of the deed."77 It is hard to envision how,

in its present stage, this sort of behavior poses a threat to

Mubarak.

Be that as it may, a qualification is necessary. In the

past, religious forces in Egypt have garnered wide public support

by exploiting economic grievances. This sort of thing is always

possible where discontent is extant. One could argue that this is

the situation Egypt is moving toward. Things are occurring there
that are quite extraordinary. The public reaction to the

earthquake was unusual. Also strange was the attitude of the

collegians to the new Islamicness. And finally, what is one to

make of the appearance of cults in the heart of Cairo?

To the author, all of this betokens trouble, arising from

the strained economic situation and the perception--on the part

of the public--that Mubarak is either unwilling or unable to

provide a remedy. In effect, elements of the population appear to

have written off the regime as ineffective, and are adopting

their own response to events.

The real danger is that, while Egyptians are known to be

long suffering, there are limits to their tolerance; when the

limit is reached they sometimes explode. This happened in 1952,

in 1968, in 1977, and in 1986.78 It could be that we are heading

toward another such eruption now. What conditions, then, might

push Egypt toward an explosion?

Corruption.

Cairenes despair over the present state of rule in Egypt.

The perception is widespread that Egypt is going nowhere. The

President seemingly has no plan to improve the lot of the people.

Moreover, along with the Egyptians, U.S. Embassy officials

similarly complain about the derelictions of the government.

At the same time a small but significant number of Egyptians

like the present system, and have no wish to change it. Moreover,

those who feel this way are strategically placed to see to it

that no changes occur. Since the days of Nasser, an influential

group of private entrepreneurs has existed in Egypt who survive

by working the system.79 Some of their deals are legendary; the

amount of graft involved is mind boggling. Effectively, however,

not only the heavy-rollers deal--corruption exists down to the

most penny-ante level.

Now that Mubarak is contemplating opening the system to

foreign competition--allowing multinational corporations, for

example, to buy into Egypt's economy--the wheeler dealers are

opposed. In line with this, they have allied with government

bureaucrats, who see their power being curtailed should the

transformation occur.

As U.S. Embassy officials describe it, this combination has

hit upon a clever strategy to retard the privatization process;

the bureaucrats are working to rule. To avoid any hint of

corruption (as they carry out the privatization plan), they

insist the process be "transparent." This all sounds good, the

U.S. Embassy personnel say, but it equates to nothing being sold.

Now it appears that Mubarak may have taken a step that will

institutionalize the present stagnation. Under pressure from the
IMF, Egypt, some time ago, devalued its currency. It then

eliminated the varying exchange rates, which had the effect of

firming up the Egyptian pound. Meanwhile Cairo was the

beneficiary of America's gratitude for joining DESERT STORM. At

which point, Egypt appeared--in the eyes of the world--to be more

stable than it had ever been.

The government capitalized on this perception. Egyptians

living abroad (and anyone else who was interested) were invited

to purchase Egyptian treasury bills, using dollars. The bills

return up to 15 percent interest. There has been an outpouring of

subscriptions for these bills, and, as a result, Egypt's foreign

exchange holdings are now the highest in its history; $15-$16

billion. (In 1990 the country was broke and could not service its

debts.)

As a result of the T-bill sales, Egypt has gained leverage

against the IMF. Ordinarily, governments turn to the IMF when

they are strapped for dollars. The fact that Egypt has found a

way of surmounting this difficulty--outside regular IMF channels-

-means that it can hold out against IMF-mandated reforms.

To be sure, the inflow of dollars is a good thing for the

Egypt--it can pay off its debt to the international bankers.

Ultimately, however, the effect of the T-bill sales is nil, since

the regime is merely substituting domestic debt for foreign.

Moreover, there is another complication; as long as wealthy

Egyptians can get 15 percent investing in T-bills, they are

unlikely to invest in native industry, even though there is a

crying need for this investment. Without new industry there can

be no new jobs, and the American Embassy estimates that Egypt

needs 500,000 new jobs a year just to keep up with its burgeoning

population.80 No new jobs, a steadily deteriorating standard of

living, and no way out for the masses (now that the overseas job

market has virtually dried up)--all this is increasing tensions

among the populace.

How to break out of this vicious cycle? In a society such as

Egypt's, there can be no movement unless undertaken by the ra'is. Effectively, everything comes back to the President.

Mubarak may be persuaded there is no point in acting on the

reforms. After all, his closest advisors are opposed. The people

of his class (the T-bill buyers), too, are against them.

Moreover, Mubarak must fear the result if the reforms are

implemented--the loss of jobs, which certainly will generate

unrest. Under the circumstances, would it not be smarter to stand

pat?

If this is the ra'is's view, it bodes no good for the

future. The main problem in Egypt today is drift. Things are

stagnating, with no prospect of useful change. For the populace

this is unacceptable.
In the meantime, however, the T-bill buyers are growing

richer. This lot does not appear to be sensitive to the problems

facing the rest of the population. Quite the reverse. By their

behavior they appear to be oblivious to the widespread unease.81

How long will the masses tolerate a system that seemingly works

against them? Obviously no one knows. They may go along

indefinitely, and, then again, they may not. The author was told

by an Egyptian journalist, "no one knows what is in the peoples'

hearts. They do not complain, until one day--at a special moment-

-they explode." This is a chilling prospect for U.S.

policymakers, especially after the recent depressing experience

with Iran. There is, then, real reason to be concerned about

Egypt's future, and this brings us to consider America's part in

this whole affair.

Recommendations.

The United States needs Egypt for its security in the Middle

East, but it does not need the Egyptian army to help defend the

area. Rather, the United States must consider the tremendous

weight of Egypt, the cultural leader of the Arab world. Were

Egypt (for whatever reason) to turn against the United States,

Washington would find it extremely difficult to maintain its

position in the area.82 It follows that the United States must

remain engaged with the Egyptians. Washington cannot turn away

from Cairo, leaving it to its fate.

There are those who argue against this view, claiming that--

with the demise of the Soviet Union--Egypt is bereft. It must

either go along with what the United States wants and demands of

it, or be left behind in the march of history. That is not a

tenable argument. Egyptians do have an alternative to the West,

namely Islam. The Brotherhood's rallying cry ("Islam is the

solution!") has a certain resonance, especially in Upper Egypt.

If events in the country continue to sour, many more Egyptians

may be expected to embrace the Islamicists' message.

What America has to fear before everything else is a social

revolution, a la Khomeini.83 At present this is a remote

possibility. At the same time, however, there is always the

likelihood of another major riot, which would have a most

deleterious effect on the Mubarak regime. The President's

legitimacy would be further undercut, something the anarchists

would certainly strive to exploit--as they are doing with a

similar situation in Algeria.

In this regard, the United States should be concerned about

the reforms of the IMF. How will the Egyptians react to the job

losses that are bound to ensue? Economists in the United States,

and in Egypt, see dangers ahead. At the same time, however, they

know of no other way to proceed. A country like Egypt, asking to

be included in the world capitalist system, must conform to the

rules whereby the system is run.
Washington should anticipate trouble and try to ameliorate

the conditions that added misfortune will bring. Rather than

subject the Egyptians to "shock therapy" (as was proposed in the

case of Russia) it might be better to initiate programs to

alleviate the more severe effects. The religious forces are

expending considerable resources in the economic area--building

hospitals and doing whatever they can to provide jobs. They

clearly expect to benefit from this.

This raises the question of the Muslim Brotherhood. Recently

Mubarak suggested holding a national dialogue in which he would

attempt to reason with his opposition.84 Together they would try

to agree on a program to bring Egypt through this difficult time.

This is all to the good, but as of this writing nothing indicates

that he means to include the Brotherhood.

Which presents an acute dilemma. If the Brotherhood and the

other religious elements are shut out, this will polarize the

country--secularists vs Islamicists, precisely the situation that

we need to avoid. On the other hand, if the Brotherhood is

included, it may overwhelm the dialogue, given its considerable

popular following.

The Brotherhood is a potent political force and cannot be

excluded. If the reforms proposed by the IMF are essential, then

the whole population of Egypt must get behind them. The

Brotherhood, inasmuch as it represents a major segment of Egypt's

populace, has, or ought to have, a place at the bargaining table.

In the end, U.S. policymakers must see that nothing will be done

on these reforms without compromise. What is it that the

religious community wants and expects of Mubarak, to ensure their

cooperation in pushing the reforms through?

Under normal circumstances, one would hesitate to make any

opening to the religious opposition in Egypt; but these are not

normal times. There is risk in taking this step, but the

alternative is not palatable either--an Egypt torn apart by

domestic unrest.

To sum up, Egypt is passing through a bad period. As a

consequence, openings have been presented to the religious

forces, which they have not really taken advantage of--apparently

because the forces are split. On the one hand is the Brotherhood,

which because of its affluence rejects violence, fearing to let

loose elements that it cannot control. The anarchists, on the

other hand, are too disorganized to present a coherent challenge

to the government, and so the Mubarak regime has been able to

cope with events, although not without some strain.

U.S. policymakers should make the most of this

supposititious split, and, in line with this, seek the

Brotherhood's inclusion in Mubarak's dialogue. The Brotherhood

has been clamoring for official recognition for decades. If it
decides now to go along with Mubarak's offer (presuming one is

tendered), this could move the country in the direction the West

would like to see it go.

At any event, the situation must be monitored carefully.

With Algeria subsiding into civil war, a major upheaval in Egypt

would have the effect of a one-two punch and should be precluded

if at all possible.

ENDNOTES

1. See John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The

Political Economy of Two Regimes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1983, p. 76, "Few developing countries other

than those that are professedly Marxist ever cut so deeply into

their private sector as Egypt."

2. Waterbury in The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, pp. 41, 42,

speaks to this problem. He says that Egypt's 1952 revolution came

about because of overpopulation; there were simply too many

people and not enough resources to sustain them. Moreover, he

says, after 20 years of rule by Nasser the situation had not

markedly improved. There was no significant change in the

country's resource base nor in its basic modes of production. At

the same time, however, the population had risen to 40 million

from 21 million. Waterbury also points out that Egypt's principal

nonhuman resource is its land, of which 3.5 percent is inhabited,

and 15.5 percent is designated habitable. However, the cultivated

portion of Egypt's surface is only 2.4 percent of the total

(23,928 km).

3. Baladi means "native," as in "native son" or "man of the

countryside," i.e., the rural area.

4. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 112, says that 61

percent of all public sector companies in Egypt operate only one

shift a day, 8 percent two shifts, 23 percent three shifts, and

8.4 percent four shifts (this is on the basis of a survey taken

in 1972). Thus, Waterbury concludes that, despite public

endorsement of policies to limit hiring and keep down wages, the

costs of production are spiralling out of control. "Total public

sector employment [is probably] 20 to 30 percent above the

requirements of production."

5. From the Turkish, Afandi, a title of respect, i.e., Sir!

6. Various authors have expressed this view. For example

Fuad Ajami, quoted in Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p. 238. Also see Nathan Brown,

"The Ignorance and Inscrutability of the Egyptian Peasant," in

Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury, eds, Peasants and Politics in

the Modern Middle East, Miami, FL.: Florida International

University Press, 1991.
7. See Mark Nicholson, "Tourism hit by shootings in Cairo,"

The Financial Times, October 27, 1993.

8. See Chris Hedges, "Egyptian Premier Escapes Car Bomb,"

The New York Times, November 26, 1993.

9. See Mark Nicholson, "Egypt fearful of Iran's influence

over Sudan," The Financial Times, December 18, 1991; also, Caryle

Murphy, "Egypt, Algeria Assail Iran for Backing Rebels," The

Washington Post, April 8, 1993.

10. Much of the construction work to revamp the downtown was

done by Egypt's military. For example, they built the Rameses

overpass, which has directed much traffic out of the immediate

downtown area. They also installed the city's telephone lines.

See Mubarak's Egypt, p. 116.

11. Waterbury writes (in The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p.

45) that Nasser was primarily concerned about the poverty of the

Egyptian masses; to him, the problem of overpopulation was

secondary. The President sought to deal with poverty by

redistributing land holdings and other forms of wealth. In this

way, Nasser felt that he could overcome the political apathy and

alienation which afflicted the masses. His solution was to

introduce policies of land reform, state-led industrialization,

and political mobilization.

12. In 1960, foreign correspondent Robert St. John published

a biography of Nasser which he titled The Boss. In the preface he

wrote "The Arabic expression for President is El Rayis. But in

colloquial Arabic the same word, given a slightly different

intonation, El Rayiis, is the equivalent of boss. Stangers

address Gamal Abdel Nasser as Mr. President, but his wife, his

friends, and his subordinates call him the Boss." See The Boss, New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1960.

13. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 61, 67. "The regime .

. . devised the land reform of 1952, which placed a ceiling on

individual landholdings of 200 feddans (Eg.=4200.833 m)." "Some

460,000 feddans were taken over in the 1952 program. . . . In the

second reform of 1961, lowering the ceiling to 50 feddans, over

257,000 feddans were affected."

14. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 81, 82.

By 1965 the public sector had been expanded to its

greatest extent to date, and Egypt's economy as a whole

grew at remarkable rates. Never before had such

investment ratios been achieved. The public sector

accounted for nearly 40 percent of total output, 45

percent of domestic savings, and 90 percent of gross

domestic capital formation....The period 1960-1965

represented the most dynamic phase of state-led

import-substituting industrialization, but a phase that
ran its course in five years. From then on further

accumulation could be financed by a formula combining

the following elements: 1) transfer of more private

assets to public ownership and the nationalization of

profits; 2) the generating of high rates of return and

reinvested profits in existing public sector

enterprises; 3) increased domestic savings, forced or

otherwise; and 4) extended borrowing. Small and

tentative steps were taken along the first path while

only partial success was achieved with respect to the

second. Domestic savings failed to increase as did

exports and foreign exchange earnings. The result was

major economic crisis that could be met only by

retrenchment and increased external borrowing.

15. Robert Springborg cites Waterbury to the effect that, in

the case of Egypt, easy money produced a 'softhearted'

authoritarianism. Neither Nasser or Sadat felt it necessary to

grind significant segments of the citizenry for sustained

savings, which might have made autonomous growth possible. See

Mubarak's Egypt, pp. 5, 6. Also Waterbury in The Egypt of Nasser

and Sadat, p. 84, says that Egyptian planners (in the 1960s)

wanted to advance on all fronts. However, they would not exploit

any sector of society except the upper bourgeoisie. This put an

enormous burden on this one element of the society, and even

though the bourgeoisie were wealthy, there was a limit to what

they could contribute.

16. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 114, 115.

Nineteen seventy-six was a crucial year in enracinating

(sic) Egypt in the inflationary game of printing money.

In that year the investment budget of the annual Plan

was divided into two tranches of &E 798 million and &E

574.4. When the Plan was drawn up, domestic and foreign

funding were in hand to cover the first tranche, but

the second would depend on massive infusion of Arab

credits. It was announced publicly that these were

likely to be forthcoming. At the same time Egypt was

negotiating a standby agreement and stabilization plan

with the IMF. This would have entailed a substantial

reduction in the current account deficit essentially

through the elimination of several consumer goods

subsidies. The net deficit, which stood at over &E 700

million in 1975, would have been reduced to about &E

150 million. Instead, what transpired was that funding

for the second tranche did not materialize, but public

sector companies had gone ahead and borrowed from

Egyptian public sector banks on the assumption that it

would.

17. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 114; ". . . uncovered

borrowing by (Egyptian public sector banks) reached nearly &E 400

million in 1976, and they continued to borrow beyond authorized
limits to the tune of &E 389 million in 1977. Meanwhile . . . the

price subsidies were maintained."

18. Through the Non-Aligned Movement, Nasser hoped to play a

great role in international politics, along with other

non-aligned leaders Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia. The

Non-Aligned Movement effectively died. As for Sadat, he

initially hoped to make Egypt into a great power by defeating

Israel in the 1973 War. The victory was not nearly as clearcut as

it needed to be, and when Sadat attempted to salvage his position

by journeying to Jerusalem, he turned the rest of the Arabs

against him, without really getting the concrete support (i.e.,

financial aid) he needed from the West. Consequently he had

almost nothing to offer his people for their sacrifices.

19. In 1968 students rioted against a plan by the regime to

deal leniently with army officers responsible for the 1967

debacle. There was no large scale participation in the rioting by

the masses. Nonetheless, the fact that the students had rioted

was surprising, as, up until this point, demonstrations against

the ra'is had been unthinkable. It would appear therefore, that

there was considerable resentment against Nasser within the

society. In the 1977 riots, protests were widespread, and

affected all classes of society. The author was in Cairo when

that riot erupted, and was in fact caught up in the disturbances.

20. Egyptians have caricatured Mubarak as "the laughing

cow," after his alleged resemblance to the cow that appears on

the label of a French cheese popular in Egypt. See Mubarak's

Egypt, p. 20.

21. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 221.

. . . secondary and university education have grown

since 1969-70 at over 70 percent per annum. By contrast

public technical institutes that were to have bolstered

the ranks of literate, skilled labor (electricians,

mechanics, typists, etc.) have languished. Secondary

and university education are intimately joined, forming

the track to high prestige employment. Those who have

already followed this path are an important political

constituency, and they want their children to have the

same opportunity....The secondary or university diploma

has been justifiably seen as a free-ticket to high

status employment, above all in the public sector.

22. See The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 203. (Egypt has

oil in the Sinai. It is not a great deal, but it is a revenue

producer and that helps. It would be wrong, however, to assume

that Egypt, as an oil producer, is in the league of the Gulf

states.)

23. The United States, for example, forgave $7 billion in

military loans. Western creditors similarly rescheduled Egyptian
debts through the IMF, but this presumably would have occurred in

any case, since Cairo had applied for help before the crisis

erupted. At the same time, however, it seems justified to suggest

that--had it not been for DESERT STORM--Egypt would not have

gotten as good terms as she did from creditors.

24. Under Nasser, two political organizations functioned as

parties, which would not have been construed as parties in any

Western sense--they were the Liberation Rally and the Arab

Socialist Union. Both were really mobilization corps. There was

never any question that these were Nasser's personal instruments.

25. Information on the parties and press was obtained in

interviews in Cairo in 1991 and 1993.

26. See Mark Nicholson, "Referendum pits Mubarak against

apathy," The Financial Times, October 4, 1993.

27. Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

28. Ibid., p. 328.

29. Ibid., pp. 28, 29.

30. Ibid., p. 42.

31. Ibid., p. 30.

32. The author derives this perception from reading

Mitchell's book. The Brotherhood was heavily involved in street

politics in Egypt in the decade preceding the outbreak of the war

in Palestine. However, the crackdown against it comes immediately

after it involves itself in the Palestine question. Further, in a

memorandum written shortly before his death by assassination

Banna makes this claim (that the society's troubles can be traced

to its Palestine stand). See The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 70.

33. The unrest was due largely to the perception that the

Palace was not actively pursuing the goal of emancipating the

country from the British. Also, the Egyptian army went into

battle against the Israelis with equipment much of which was

defective. This caused a great scandal, and was a factor

influencing the so-called Free Officers to overthrow the King.

The Officers acted belatedly however; for a long time it was

primarily the Muslim Brotherhood that was carrying the fight

against the government. For an account of this activity see The

Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 58-59.

34. The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 63, 64.

35. Throughout its career the Society was alleged to have a

secret apparatus, used for, among other things, the commission of
various violent acts. There does not appear to be any reason to

doubt the existence of this apparatus; however, Banna and other

leaders maintained that it frequently perpetrated deeds of which

the leadership did not approve and of which it was not aware

until after the fact.

36. For background on the period when Sadat was assassinated

see Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury, New York: Random House, 1983;

Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984; Hamid Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in

Egyptian Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies,

Vol. 16, Number 1, March 1984; and Hamid Ansari, "Sectarian

Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion," The

Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, Number 3, Summer 1984.

37. State Department officials have suggested that some aid

was forthcoming from the gama'aat (to be discussed later). If so,

it must have been minimal. Only the Brotherhood has the wealth

and organization to mount an effort such as this.

38. See Chris Hedges, "Egyptian Leader Calls for Patience

After Quake Victims Riot," The New York Times, October 19, 1992;

Tony Walker, "Riot police deployed in Cairo," The Financial

Times, October 19, 1992, and "Protests Erupt in Cairo Over Quake

Aid," The Washington Post, October 18, 1992.

39. For official Brotherhood positions on this see Foreign

Broadcast Information Serevice (FBIS)-NES-90-199, October 15,

1990, "Condemned By Fundamentalist Leader"; FBIS-NES-92-155,

August 11, 1992, "Muslim Brotherhood Official on Establishing a

Party"; FBIS-NES-92-128, July 2, 1992, "Muslim Brotherhood

Official on Jihad Organization"; and FBIS-NES 92-113, January 11,

1992, "Muslim Brotherhood Official Views Algeria, 'Party.'"

Mitchell discusses this point. He says, "...they (the Brothers)

would have been no match for any serious resistence by Egyptian

security forces, with or without the support from other opposing

groups. The capacity for terror is not coterminous with the

capability for revolutionary action which would have involved

sufficient power not only to mount a revolt but to maintain it."

See The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 307, 308.

40. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 204.

41. Under the Turks there existed a hierarchy of titles,

from effendi to bey to pasha.

42. The author, who was a student in Cairo at this time,

remembers his own amazement on seeing a car parked on the beach

at Alexandria with a stereo radio on the front seat.

43. The question of the degree to which the Brotherhood

actually finances activities like this is much up in the air.

Springborg deals with the question effectively. He introduces the

concept of an "Islamic tendency," to which a mass of Egyptians
subscribe, and claims that this tendency is so "dense" that it is

impossible to separate moderate Islamicists (such as the

Brothers) from true radicals (like members of the gama'aat, which

we will discuss below). He says that within the tendency the

adherents practice taqiya (dissimulation), making it difficult to

get essential information about their activities. In the end, one

is reduced to comparing the Brotherhood's known modus operandi

from other times. For example, we have a fairly good

understanding of its actions in the post-World War II era, when--

after it was crushed--much information about it was made public.

At that time, it was actively funding campus religious groups.

See The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 172.

44. Mubarak's Egypt, p. 228.

45. Ibid., p. 48; also interviews the author conducted in

Cairo in 1993. On the particular score of women and buses--Cairo

public transportation was a scandal. Buses were so overpacked

that riders literally hung out the windows. A young woman forced

to insert herself into a situation like this was almost certain

to be molested. Hence, the Brotherhood's offer of private

transportation was a great boon.

46. Ibid., p. 228.

47. Ibid., p. 229.

48. The best treatment of this is in Ibid.,, pp. 46-61.

Springborg gives some examples of the firms which he breaks down

into two types--individual proprietorships, and limited-liability

joint stock companies. The companies appeal to Egyptians looking

for a greater return on their investment than is available though

the public sector. Also, says Springborg, the fact that the

firms advertise as "Islamic" attracts many. Some of the firms are

run by Muslim Brothers. At the same time, Springborg cautions

that it is impossible to say that the Brotherhood is using them

primarily as vehicles for social mobilization. Still, he

believes, this is the case, given the fact that the charge is

repeatedly made, and is apparently believed by the mass of

Egyptians. Springborg notes there are also Islamicist Banks (p.

65). These, however, tend to be much more conservative

institutions than the investment companies and are presided over

by a different element than is involved in the companies.

Mitchell in The Society of the Muslim Brothers also describes the

setup of firms owned and operated by the Brothers. He says (in

1969) there were "some small firms founded, both to relieve

post-war unemployment and to dramatize the viability of 'Islamic

economics.'" See The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp. 36-37,

290-291.

49. See FBIS-NES-92-155, "'Massive' Crackdown on Islamists

in the South described"; also Mubarak's Egypt, pp. 242-243.

50. For background on these clashes see The Egypt of Nasser
and Sadat, pp. 360-3. Also see FBIS-NES-92-148, July 31, 1992.

51. Upper Egypt has long been a stronghold of the Coptic

faith. Under the monarchy, wealthy Copts owned vast tracts of

property there. When Nasser instituted his land reform much of

this land was taken from them and turned over to peasants, many

of whom were Muslims. This naturally exacerbated animosities that

already existed.

52. For discussions of the police-villager relationships see

FBIS-NES-92-126, June 30, 1992 "'Sinful, Bloody' Battle Viewed";

FBIS-NES-92-131, "Fundamentalist Plan to Kill Ministers

Reported." For reports of attacks on police, and the escalating

nature of these attacks see FBIS-NES-91-155, November 25, 1991,

"Islamic Groups, Security Forces Clash 18 Nov"; FBIS-NES-90-103,

May 29, 1990, "Police Vehicle Attacked Four Officers Injured."

This aspect of youths attacking police is quite extraordinary and

bears further investigation. Under ordinary circumstances it

likely would not occur. To be sure, some bolder spirits would

always refuse to be ordered about by anyone (see Eric Hobsbawm,

Bandits, New York: Pantheon Books, 1981, pp. 33, 34). But most

peasants more likely would submit. Why then are we witnessing

this eruption of attacks by peasants on police officers? An

explanation to the author in Egypt makes sense. That is that over

the past decade many Egyptians have served in the military,

either fighting against the Israelis, or as mercenaries of one

sort or another (for example, Egyptians who sought work in

Lebanon drifted into the militias; similarly, expatriate Egyptian

workers in Iraq were drafted into the war against Iran). As a

consequence, many Egyptians today are unwilling to follow

traditional mores of the peasant communities and bow to

authority. This seems plausible, and moreover--as an explanation-

-it tracks with the experience of the Algerians. The revolution

there was triggered by young Arabs who, having served in the

French army during World War II, refused to toady to the colons

on their return home. For a discussion of the Egyptians' attitude

toward revenge, see Nathan Brown in Peasants and Politics In the

Modern Middle East, p. 207.

53. See FBIS-NES-90-198, October 12, 1990, "Assembly Speaker

Al-Mahjub Assassinated in Cairo"; also FBIS-NES-90-208, October

26, 1990, ""Hundreds of Islamist Suspects Released"; and

FBIS-NES-90-224, November 20, 1990, "Islamist Leader Denies Role

in Al-Mahjub Murder." As stated, originally it was believed that

this was the crime of a religious extremist. However, doubt was

cast on this theory by the professionality of the operation,

which seemed to point to contract killers. The speaker had been

involved in various corrupt deals and was becoming an

embarrassment to the government. Along with this, unrest in

Algeria may have led security forces to suspect religious

involvement. In Algiers, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had

almost taken over the government, legally, through the ballot

box, and had been banned, touching off widespread violence. This

prompted a spate of articles in the Western media warning of a
possible Islamic takeover in Egypt as well. For background on

this see the Stephen C. Pelletiere, Mass Action and Islamic

Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, March 20, 1992.

54. Springborg in Mubarak's Egypt, p. 217, notes that in

1986 the Egyptian government authorized the rector of Cairo

University to forbid the wearing of the galabeya, "the

traditional robe favored by male Islamicists."

55. See Chris Hedges, "Attack on Bus in Egypt Kills a

Briton," The New York Times, October 22, 1992. For tourist

attacks in general see FBIS-NES-90-136, July 16, 1990, "Extremist

Arrested After Bombing Restaurant"; FBIS-NES-92-200, "Islamic

Group Briefs Press on Objectives (discusses 'depraved' behavior

of tourists)"; FBIS-NES 92-197, October 9, 1992, "Islamic Group

Claims Train, Boat Attacks." 

56. See Chris Hedges, "Egyptian Leader Calls For Patience

After Quake Victims Riot," The New York Times, October 18, 1992.

57. See "Visitor Attacks in Egypt Spread to Cairo," The New

York Times, February 14, 1993, Section V, p. 3.

58. See "2 Killed and 16 Hurt in Blast At Central Cairo

Coffee Shop," The New York Times, October 27, 1993.

59. See Caryle Murphy, "Mosque Raid Stirs Criticism of

Police," The New York Times, March 12, 1993.

60. See "Senior Official Shot Dead, The New York Times, April 12, 1993.

61. "Gunmen Fire at Egyptian Official," The New York Times, April 21, 1993. The official was the Information Minister,

responsible for television programming, among other things. The

militants regard television as an abomination, and would like to

see programming devoted to spiritual broadcasts.

62. See Caryle Murphy, "Egypt Convicts 32 In Attack on

Tourists," The Washington Post, April 23, 1993.

63. See Caryle Murphy, "Egyptian Ambush Leaves 4 Dead," The

Washington Post, July 19, 1993.

64. See Ibrahim Youssef, "Egyptian Militants Blamed in

Attack on Security Chief," The New York Times, August 19, 1993.

65. See endnote 7.

66. See Chris Hedges, "7 Executed in Egypt In Sharp

Crackdown on Islamic Militants," The New York Times, July 9,

1993.
67. In his visit to the United States last year, to call on

newly elected President Clinton, Mubarak named Iran as the main

culprit in the plot to overthrow his government. See "Mubarak

Cautions Islamic Extremists," The Washington Post, March 5, 1993.

At the same time, both the Egyptian President and others

connected with his regime have also implicated Sudan in the

alleged plot. See FBIS-NES-91-247, December 24, 1991, "Al-Ahram

Editor on Iran-Sudan Cooperation."

68. There are the two main sects of Islam: Sunnis and Shias.

Their rivalry is ancient and based on doctrinal interpretations

that are wide apart. Given this separation, it is highly unlikely

a specifically religious movement--as this certainly is--would

accommodate a basic doctrinal schism like this. It would be as if

President Clinton announced that the FBI had uncovered an

extremist religious movement in the United States comprising

Lutherans of the Missouri Synod who were taking directions from

the Pope in Rome. It's an interesting idea but one would want to

see proof. For a recent discussion of this problem see

FBIS-NES-92-113, June 11, 1992, "Muslim Brotherhood Official

Views Algeria, 'Party'."

69. The history of this term (gam'iya) is interesting. If

one goes back in the FBIS Daily Reports to 1990 one does not find

the word gam'iya used, but rather gama'aat. The first is a

singular form of the Arabic word for "association" or "group."

The second is the plural of another word meaning essentially the

same thing. The first is invariably capitalized in English

translation ("the Group"); the second is not ("the groups"). The

author asked an official of FBIS why the singular form was being

used and was told there was a "concurrence" of opinion on this

(i.e., "the Group"). The author then asked, if the singular form

was used even when the Arabic indicated the plural, and he was

told, "Yes." This is puzzling because Arabic is one language in

which it is impossible to confuse number--a plural usage is

immediately recognizable. In effect, then, we are dealing with

two distinct renderings--up until roughly 1992, we encounter

gama'aat al Islamiya, which translates as "Islamic groups." After

that it becomes gam'iya al Islamiya, "the Islamic Group." We will

discuss this more below. For examples of the earlier usage see

FBIS-NES 90-202, October 18, 1990, "Al Ahrar Column Offers

Advice," ("First: We are all aware that there are extremist

groups among the youth whose extremism stems from their feeling

of political emptiness"); also FBIS-NES 90-068, April 9, 1990,

"Interior Minister on Sectarian Sedition" ("These youths, the

oldest of whom is 17 years. Of course, they are backed by certain

people with a certain way of thinking. They are the ones who call

themselves the Islamic groups."), and FBIS-NES-91-227, December

25, 1991, "Islamic groups, security forces Clash, Nov. 18"

("Islamic groups and security forces clashed in abu Tij village

in Asyut after midnight two days ago.").

70. In addition to the Group and al Jihad, other entities

are the Islamic Front for Liberation, the al Shawkiyun group,
Repudiation and Renunciation, Those Retrieved From the Fire, al

Tabligh, Stop and Ponder, and the Vanguards of Conquest. See

FBIS-NES-90-199, October 15, 1990, "Islamic Group Claims

Responsibility"; FBIS-NES-90-086, May 3, 1990, "14

Fundamentalists Killed"; FBIS-NES-91-155, August 12, 1991,

"'Large Scale' Muslim-Copt Sedition Threatened," and

FBIS-NES-92-044, March 5, 1992, "Suspect Apprehended."

71. See FBIS-NES-92-155, August 11, 1992, "Muslim

Brotherhood Official on Establishing a Party"; FBIS-NES-92-128,

July 2, 1992, "Muslim Brotherhood Official on Jihad

Organization"; FBIS-NES 92-113, June 11, 1992, "Muslim

Brotherhood Official Views Algeria, Party," and FBIS-NES-92-072,

April 14, 1992, "Muslim Brotherhood Successor Struggle Viewed."

72. The author dealt with the groups acting as

self-constituted morals police in his study, Mass Action and

Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms. There he

discussed a particular saying of the Prophet, seized on by the

radicals. It goes as follows: "(Muhammed said) whoever among you

(sees) the abomination/ on him the obligation (to correct it)/ By

hand (i.e. force), or tongue, or heart, and the last is the

weakest." The purport of this is that any Muslim--not just the

religious authorities, but anyone has the obligation to attack

corruption. It justifies vigilantism of the sort that we have

been witnessing in the Middle East most recently, particularly in

Algeria. The authorities in both countries are stymied by their

inability to stop recurring acts of terror. At the same time,

they have been looking for an organized conspiracy. It may be

that--inspired by this injunction--individual Muslims are

carrying out such acts. This would explain the apparent

spontaneity of many of the attacks. Also, it would make it

virtually impossible to stop the violence, since there would be

no way of telling which Muslim would act next. Robert Bianchi,

Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century

Egypt, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 200-204, has

a discussion of the controversy over this saying.

73. According to Egyptian sources, the groups take

unyielding positions on such matters as whether to celebrate the

advent of a certain holy season in the evening or morning, and

whether it is permissible to kill someone who is ignorant of the

faith. There are also instances of their trashing video stores,

entering people's homes and shooting their appliances, and of

threatening plastic surgeons and cosmeticians. All this seems

very extreme, and not the sort of activity disciplined

revolutionaries would engage in. For details see FBIS-NES-90-087,

May 4, 1990, "Al Fayum Killings Detailed; Background Given";

FBIS-NES-91-155, August 12, 1991, "Large Scale Muslim-Copt

Sedition Threatened"; FBIS-NES-92-118, June 18, 1992,

"Confrontation Predicted."

74. The ulama are religious scholars, who traditionally have

pronounced on matters of morals for the Muslim community. The
conservative ulama have always maintained that the average Muslim

on his own is not capable of correcting morals--he has not

sufficient understanding of the faith. The radicals, however,

appear to reject this interpretation (see endnote 72). This

obviously would be a crucial concern for the affluent Muslim

Brothers. As members of the propertied class they would not

condone taking the law into ones own hands, since their standing

depends on upholding the law. The attitude of the Brotherhood

toward those who are perpetrating the violence is problematical.

The Brotherhood's leadership has condemned the violence more than

once. Springborg has suggested that the fact that the leadership

has not been more condemnatory relates to an understanding among

the Islamicists not to quarrel in public. Waterbury adds another

dimension to the argument, claiming that the symbols and themes

employed by the Islamicists are only potent so long as they are

not diluted, i.e., not moderated. It may be, therefore, that the

conservative Brotherhood leaders actually fear moving against the

radicals lest they alienate the mass audience they are trying to

cultivate. In the final analysis, though, the best evidence that

the Brotherhood is not behind the violence is the failure of

Mubarak to move against it. If he believed that the Society was

causing the outrages, he certainly would not hesitate to act. For

Brotherhood condemnations of the violence see FBIS-NES-90-199,

October 15, 1990, "Condemned By Fundamentalist Leader";

FBIS-NES-92-155, August 11, 1992, "Muslim Brotherhood Official on

Establishing a Party"; FBIS-NES 92-128, July 2, 1992, "Muslim

Brotherhood on Jihad Organization." For a discussion of the

Brotherhood's stand on the question of when it is permissible for

a Muslim to act against corruption, see Mitchell, pp. 18, 19.

75. For the youth aspect of this see FBIS-NES-90-202,

October 18, 1990, "Al Ahram Column Offers Advice";

FBIS-NES-90-086, "14 Fundamentalists Killed," (This article is

particularly interesting inasmuch as it talks about two sons

killing their father, after the latter urged them to give up

their violent ways); FBIS-NES-90-068, April 9, 1990, "Interview

Minister on Sectarian Sedition"; FBIS-NES-92-155, August 11,

1992, "Article Views Anti-Terrorism Legislation." That the groups

are made up of nonprofessionals seems to be indicated by a survey

on the various weapons they employ. According to police, weapons

most frequently seized are swords, chains, molotov cocktails, and

nail bombs. These weapons would only be resorted to by

individuals strapped for cash. Moreover, the groups regularly

hold up jewelry stores, and importune recent returnees from the

Gulf for "free will" contributions. If the Brotherhood--with all

its wealth and power--were bankrolling them, presumably they

would not have to carry on in this way.

76. The accounts of radicals seized list agronomists, house

painters, electricians, engineers. See FBIS-NES-90-136, July 16,

1990, "Extremist Arrested After Bombing Restaurant";

FBIS-NES-90-187, March 4, 1990, "Al Fayum Killings Detailed;

Background Given."
77. For a discussion of anarchism in France during this

period see Richard Parry's introduction to his book, The Bonnot

Gang, London: The Rebel Press, 1987. In Parry's account the

similarities between the French experience and the Egyptians' is

striking.

78. The 1986 riot is discussed in Mass Action and Islamic

Fundamentalism.

79. For a discussion of these corrupt dealings see The Egypt

of Nasser and Sadat, pp. 150-188. Waterbury's discussion of the

so-called bayyumiyum is especially revealing. An Egyptian

contractor who has given his name to a particularly sordid kind

of thievery bribed Cairo building inspectors to allow him to add

an extra four stories to a building he was constructing, against

the building code. He might have gotten away with it had he not

tried to economize elsewhere by omitting the building's

structural supports. The whole thing collapsed killing three

people. Also see Mubarak's Egypt, p. 34, 39. The original crop of

these connivers grew up under Sadat, and, with some changes, the

individuals involved have survived into the Mubarak regime. The

author was told in the Embassy that this group was very clever,

and that to stay in business under socialism was just as

challenging as under any form of capitalism.

80. Estimate from the U.S. Embassy.

81. An Egyptian informant told the author that this group

wants to "shut the door" of public education for the poor. "They

have made it themselves," he was told, "and now they want to shut

the door. They say a farmer should always be a farmer; this is a

caste system that they are trying to set up."

82. Were Egypt to go, and along with it Algeria, we could

expect Tunisia and perhaps Morocco to follow suit. A regime in

Cairo, antipathetic to the West, would severely affect the

balance of power in the area. Egypt, Iraq and Iran are the three

most powerful area states--among the Muslims--and all three would

be hostile. The sheer numbers of Egyptians are too intimidating

for weak entities such as the Gulf monarchies to disdain. To be

sure, the monarchies could seek protection from the United

States, but even so they would be highly chary of offending the

Egyptians, who have given them so much trouble in the past.

83. The danger would be that in the process of mobilizing

Egyptians to displace the secular rule of Mubarak, the

Brotherhood would lose control of the situation and find itself

swept aside by a radical takeover, as occurred in Iran. The

United States would then be confronted by a hostile government in

Cairo, dedicated to combatting Israel and the West.

84. For information on the dialogue see "Set for 'national

dialogue'," Middle East International, January 21, 1994.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

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Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Design

Mr. James E. Kistler