UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

PENSACOLA DIVISION 

IN RE SKANSKA USA CIVIL 

SOUTHEAST INC. AND 

SKANSKA USA, INC. AS 

OWNERS OF THE BARGE KS 

5531, PRAYING FOR 

EXONERATION FROM OR 

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 

CLAIM OF UMB BANK, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, in 

its Capacity as Successor Trustee 

of the Santa Rosa Bay Bridge 

Authority (Florida) Revenue 

Bonds, Series 1996, 

ADMIRALTY RULE 9(H)

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3:20-CV-05980 – RV / MJF

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 

ROGER VINSON

CLAIMANT.

THIS PLEADING RELATES TO 

CIVIL ACTION NOS: 

3:20-CV-05980-RV / MJF

3:20-CV-05981-RV / MJF

3:20-CV-05982-RV / MJF

3:20-CV-05983-RV / MJF

3:21-CV-00056-RV / EMT

3:21-CV-00526-RV / HTC

AMENDED CLAIM OF UMB BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS 

TRUSTEE, WITH RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO 

PROCEED IN STATE COURT

COME NOW, Claimant who specifically reserves all defenses asserted herein 

and rights to pursue all available claims in state court, pursuant to the Savings to 

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Suitors Clause, 28 U.S.C. §1333, and/or all state law remedies for resolution of any 

and all issues beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of this Honorable Court in 

Admiralty, and for its Claims against Construction Barges KS 5531, 46007, CBR 

758, KS 6011, 450020,

1 and M-80022 along with the alleged owner of the purported 

vessels, Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc., and Skanska USA, Inc., hereinafter 

(“Skanska”) and avers:

Introduction

1. This Claim is filed by UMB BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, IN 

ITS CAPACITY AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE SANTA ROSA BAY 

BRIDGE AUTHORITY (FLORIDA) REVENUE BONDS, SERIES 1996, 

(hereafter the “Trustee” or “Claimant”). Claimant has suffered and/or continues to 

suffer damages as a result of: (a) the closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge after 

sustaining massive, crippling damage caused by impacts from Skanska’s un-crewed 

and unpowered construction barges, KS 5531, 46007, CBR 758, 450020, and KS 

6011; and (b) the impact of another of Skanska’s un-crewed and unpowered 

construction barges, M-8002, which impacted and damaged the Garcon Point 

 1 As of May 3, 2021, Skanska asserts that, to the best of its knowledge, five

construction barges impacted the Pensacola Bay Bridge. Claimant incorporates any 

additional construction barges that impacted the Pensacola Bay Bridge and 

contributed to its closure that may come to light in the future. 

2 Claimant incorporates any additional construction barges that impacted the Garcon 

Point Bridge and contributed to its closure that may come to light in the future.

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Bridge, requiring its temporary closure. 

2. Skanska owned the construction barges and was using the construction 

barges at issue in this action for the sole purpose of constructing or improving the 

new Pensacola Bay Bridge (such construction and improvements hereinafter 

referred to as the “Pensacola Bay Bridge Project”). Despite Skanska’s obligation to 

secure or remove its construction barges during the storm, Skanska allowed the 

barges to remain in close proximity to the Pensacola Bay Bridge and the Garcon 

Point Bridge during a slow moving but strong hurricane that made landfall on 

September 16, 2020. Of the 55 total un-crewed and unpowered construction barges 

staged around this construction site, at least 27 broke free and 23 were pushed by the 

forces of wind and waves to all points around the compass from the bridge 

construction sites and either struck structures, such as the Pensacola Bay Bridge and 

Garcon Point Bridge, or ultimately ran aground in the Pensacola and Escambia Bay 

area.3

 

3. The Trustee seeks compensation from Skanska for the foreseeable 

losses suffered by the Trustee, which include a significant disruption to and 

substantial losses in toll revenue derived from the Garcon Point Bridge. The losses 

are due to Skanska’s failure to secure its construction barges, which caused physical 

 3 Emergency Field Authorization, Field Authorization Number: 0324977-014-

EE/17, October 20, 2020. [Doc. 60-2].

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damage to both the Pensacola Bay Bridge and the Garcon Point Bridge, requiring 

the indefinite closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge and temporary closure of the 

Garcon Point Bridge. The Pensacola Bay Bridge has been closed since September 

16, 2020. Upon closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge, Governor DeSantis suspended 

tolls on the Garcon Point Bridge, which is serving as a detour route. The suspension 

of tolls over more than six months has resulted in a significant loss of revenue to the 

bondholders. The current estimated date for reopening or partial reopening of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge is no earlier than May 31, 2021. This date is a revised date, as 

repairs were initially expected to be completed by March 2021, and may be revised 

further, extending the losses to the Trustee. 

4. Skanska seeks to avoid or limit its liability by taking refuge in a 

provision of Admiralty law that would exonerate its clear liability or limit Claimant’s 

recovery despite Skanska’s negligence and knowing failure to follow its hurricane 

plan. Claimant asserts that Skanska was directly involved in the negligence, and in 

fact consciously and knowingly disregarded readily available information and its 

own policies and failed to move and secure the construction barges over which it 

had authority and control. Because Skanska’s inaction when it had a duty to act 

caused Claimant’s damage, Skanska is not entitled to the exoneration and limitation 

it seeks, and Skanska must wholly compensate Claimant for the damages it has 

suffered. 

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5. The Pensacola area has been battered by tropical weather since its 

founding as a European settlement. On September 19, 1559, just weeks after Don 

Tristan de Luna y Arellano established Pensacola as the first European settlement in 

the continental United States, a hurricane decimated his settlement. Since the advent 

of named tropical storms and hurricanes, Pensacola has found itself within or 

affected by the following storms: Baker, Florence, Flossy, Debbie, Irene, Hilda, 

Ethel, Eloise, Frederic, Elena, Juan, Alberto, Erin, Opal, Danny, Helene, Barry, 

Hanna, Ivan, Arlene, Dennis, Ida, Cindy, Nate, Gordon, Michael, and Cristobal. 

Don Tristan de Luna did not have access to modern weather forecasting; Skanska 

did, yet it chose to ignore it. 461 years after the hurricane that destroyed de Luna’s 

settlement, and exactly 16 years after Hurricane Ivan, Hurricane Sally brought yet 

another wave of destruction to Pensacola. However, this time, the destructive forces 

of the September 16, 2020 Hurricane Sally were exacerbated by the negligence and 

gross negligence of Skanska. Now Skanska seeks exoneration from the 

consequences of, and limitation to, its own liability and the damages associated with 

its own corporate negligence and gross negligence. Claimant opposes Skanska’s 

attempts and makes these claims to recover the full measure of its own economic 

damages.

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6. Claimant sets forth specific information about its losses due to the 

closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge, including, but not limited to, recovery for all 

damages available under applicable law, including economic damages, such as loss 

of revenue and income, loss of business value, and incidental expenses that each 

would not have otherwise been incurred but for Skanska’s conduct described herein.

7. Further, also as a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s negligence, 

Claimant suffered, and continues to suffer, losses due to the direct impact of 

Skanska’s construction barge with the Garcon Point Bridge. This includes (a) the 

temporary closure of Garcon Point Bridge until the Florida Department of 

Transportation (“FDOT”) completed its inspection of damage to its spans from an 

impact with Skanska-owned construction barges, and (b) the suspension of the 

collection of tolls owed to Claimant for vehicle traffic on the Garcon Point Bridge.

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8. Claimant is a national banking association maintaining its principal 

place of business in Kansas City, Missouri, acting in its capacity Trustee of the Santa 

Rosa Bay Bridge Authority (Florida) Revenue Bonds, Series 1996. Pursuant to the 

Final Judgment Removing and Replacing Trustee dated September 7, 2016 and 

attached hereto as Exhibit “A” (“Final Judgment”), Claimant was appointed as the 

Successor Trustee of the Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority (Florida) Revenue Bonds, 

Series 1996 (as described in greater detail below). 

9. In its capacity as Trustee as described herein, Claimant has the standing, 

power and ability to prosecute this action, all as set forth in greater detail below. 

Under Section 9.04 of the Resolution (as hereinafter defined) and the common law 

of Florida, the Trustee is empowered to file this action and to seek any and all 

remedies that may be available at law or in equity.

10. Skanska USA Civil Southeast Inc. (“Skanska Southeast”) has its 

headquarters at 295 Bendix Rd., Suite 400, Virginia Beach, VA 23452, with its 

principal place of business located at 2600 Maitland Center Parkway, Suite 250, 

Maitland, Florida 32751. It is registered to do business in the State of Florida, and 

its registered agent is located at Corporation Service Company, 1201 Hays Street, 

Tallahassee, Florida 32301.

11. Skanska USA, Inc., owns 100% of the stock of Skanska USA Civil, 

Inc., Skanska USA Civil Inc., owns 100% of the stock of Skanska USA Civil 

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Southeast Inc. (collectively “Skanska”). 

12. At the time of the incident, Skanska was engaged in the construction 

and improvement of the Pensacola Bay Bridge. The construction barges that caused 

the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s closure were owned by Skanska and were being used by 

Skanska in connection with the construction of the Pensacola Bay Bridge. 

13. Skanska regularly conducts business within Florida, and is engaged in 

substantial activity within Florida, including the design and construction of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge.

The Construction Barges

14. Skanska owns multiple, unpowered and un-crewed construction barges 

used solely (or repurposed) as work platforms for construction-related purposes on 

the Pensacola Bay Bridge Project, including the construction barges KS 5531, 

46007, CBR 758, 450020, KS 6011 and M-8002. Skanska used these construction 

barges to stage construction equipment and to support construction tasks on the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge Project. These construction barges were not “vessels” as that 

term applies to 46 USC § 30505 of the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act and 

Supplemental Rule F.

15. Skanska, as the owner, has identified, through the filing of several 

Complaints for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, 23 construction barges 

that were used in the Pensacola Bay Bridge Project that impacted and damaged the 

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Pensacola Bay Bridge, Escambia County Fishing Pier, Garcon Point Bridge, and 

surrounding public, private and federal properties. 

The Construction Project to Replace the Pensacola Bay Bridge

16. United States Route 98 (US 98), the longest US road in Florida, is an 

east-west United States highway that was originally established in 1933 as a route 

between Pensacola and Apalachicola, Florida. Since 1933 it has been extended 

significantly. At the time of these events, US 98 extended from Meadville, 

Mississippi in the west, to Palm Beach, Florida in the east. The overwhelming 

majority of the 964-mile-long US 98 is built on dry land. 

17. Approximately 3 miles of US 98 (concurrently known as State Road 

289) traverses Pensacola Bay between Bayfront Parkway in Pensacola, Florida and 

Fairpoint Peninsula in Gulf Breeze, Florida. US 98 is the sole, direct connection for 

traffic between the cities of Pensacola and Gulf Breeze. 

18. Before 1931 there was no bridge connecting Pensacola and Gulf 

Breeze. The original three-mile Thomas A. Johnson Bridge, a narrow, two lane 

structure, was opened on June 13, 1931. This bridge was replaced by the Sen. Phillip 

D. Beall, Sr., Bridge, a single, wider, four lane structure on October 31, 1960, which 

carried four lanes of US 98 motor vehicle traffic across Pensacola Bay for six 

decades. 

19. At the time of these events, Skanska was engaged in a construction 

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project to replace this three-mile bridge. The bridge replacement project was 

undertaken in a manner that would maintain the free flow of motor vehicle, 

pedestrian and bicycle traffic between Pensacola and Gulf Breeze throughout the 

construction of the new bridge. At the time of Hurricane Sally, Skanska had opened 

a new, single span containing 4 lanes of two-way motor vehicle traffic and one 

pedestrian/bicycle path, and had undertaken the demolition of the sixty-year-old 

Beall bridge. Therefore, all direct traffic between Pensacola and Gulf Breeze became 

dependent upon this newly built span. 

20. Skanska used construction barges to support the construction and 

demolition activities required by the Pensacola Bay Bridge Project, and the use of 

these construction barges bears no relationship to traditional maritime activity. 

When referring to Skanska’s loose construction barges, an FDOT engineer 

explained:

This would have been the result of barges from an active construction 

project. I’m copying the construction project team so they can address 

with the citizen. 

See Sept. 17, 2020 Email from FDOT to Project CEI, ex. 1 to Claimant’s Reply in 

Support of Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 51-1, pg. 2-3]

Garcon Point Bridge

21. Throughout the 1980s and part of the 1990s, local leaders in the Florida 

panhandle explored the possible construction of a bridge in Santa Rosa County, 

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Florida that would connect U.S. Highway 98 (on the south) to Interstate 10 (on the 

north). The bridge would cross East Bay – a large section of Pensacola Bay – and 

was envisioned to (a) help reduce traffic on U.S. 98 through Gulf Breeze, Florida; 

(b) help reduce traffic on the U.S. 98 bridge; and (c) serve as an additional hurricane 

evacuation route. It was ultimately determined that the bridge – later commonly 

known as the Garcon Point Bridge – would be constructed by or under the 

supervision of the Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority (the “Authority”).

22. The Authority was created in 1992 by legislative act now codified in 

Part IV of Chapter 348, Florida Statutes (the “Act”). Under the Act, the Authority 

was granted broad powers to construct the Garcon Point Bridge, establish tolls, issue 

bonds and make covenants for the benefit of the holders of such Bonds (as defined 

below), including fixing, establishing and collecting tolls and entering into a leasepurchase agreement with FDOT. 

23. On or about January 10, 1996, to finance the construction, operation 

and other costs associated with the Bridge, the Authority issued the Santa Rosa Bay 

Bridge Authority (Florida) Revenue Bonds, Series 1996 in an initial aggregate 

principal amount of approximately $95 million (the “Bonds”) pursuant to Resolution 

No. 96-1, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “B” (the 

“Resolution”).

24. The Authority – through the issuance of the Bonds – undertook a capital 

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markets offering and sold the Bonds publicly to obtain the funds necessary to 

construct the Bridge. The Bonds (and thereby the bondholders who purchased the 

Bonds) were to be repaid over time from the toll revenues collected on and from the 

Garcon Point Bridge.

25. The Authority pledged to the Trustee all gross revenues from the 

Garcon Point Bridge and imposed a lien upon such revenues to secure the repayment 

of the Bonds. Section 5.01 of the Resolution provides as follows:

SECTION 5.01. PLEDGE OF GROSS REVENUE. The Authority 

hereby pledges and imposes a lien upon the Gross Revenue and any and 

all other monies on deposit in the Funds and Accounts, including, 

without limitation, the investment earnings thereon, to secure the 

payment of the principal of, redemption premium, if any, and interest 

on the Bonds and the performance by the Authority of its other 

obligations under this Resolution, which payments shall be made in the 

order of priorities and in the manner provided herein, and which lien, 

in the case of any Outstanding Junior Bonds, is junior and subordinate 

to the lien thereon of any Outstanding Senior Bonds.

26. Simultaneously with the issuance of the Bonds and pursuant to the Act, 

the Authority and FDOT entered into a Lease-Purchase Agreement (“LPA”) 

providing for the operation and maintenance of the Garcon Point Bridge. A true and 

correct copy of the LPA is attached hereto as Exhibit “C”. In the LPA, the Authority 

granted to FDOT exclusive possession and use of the Garcon Point Bridge and, in 

return, FDOT agreed to operate and maintain the Garcon Point Bridge and collect 

and remit to the Trustee all tolls derived from the Garcon Point Bridge. 

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27. Using funds generated by the sale of the Bonds, the Garcon Point 

Bridge was constructed. The Garcon Point Bridge opened for use in 1999 and has 

operated continuously thereafter, promoting the welfare, safety, comfort and 

convenience of residents and visitors throughout that region of Florida.

28. The Authority, FDOT, and the general public have all benefitted from 

the Garcon Point Bridge, the construction of which was possible only through the 

investment of the bondholders.

Claim Synopsis

29. The destruction and closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge from 

September 16, 2020 until the date of this claim, and beyond, caused (a) significantly 

increased usage of the Garcon Point Bridge, and (b) the suspension of tolls on the 

Garcon Point Bridge by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, thus depriving the Trustee 

of either the historical or actual toll revenue from motorists using the Garcon Point 

Bridge. 

30. Claimant seeks damages for past and future damages as a result of 

Skanska’s negligence. Because the Pensacola Bay Bridge has not yet been repaired 

and reopened, and the toll for the Garcon Point Bridge remains suspended, 

Claimant’s economic losses are continuing and will continue in the future beyond 

the claim deadline until such time as the Pensacola Bay Bridge is repaired and fully 

operational at the pre-Hurricane Sally level of traffic flow and the toll suspension 

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for the Garcon Point Bridge is lifted and tolls have been reinstated. Importantly, the 

value of this claim exceeds the aggregate value of all barges that Skanska alleges 

struck both bridges. During the March 18, 2021 status and scheduling conference, 

the Court expressed a preference of completing discovery in two separate phases. 

Specifically, the first phase of discovery would focus on issues relevant to 

jurisdiction and the limitation of liability actions. Thereafter, following a trial on 

these limited issues, the parties would turn to discovery relating to claimants’ 

damages. To the extent that claimant’s damages are continuing, the calculations and 

underlying documentation will be the subject of the damages phase of this litigation. 

Assuming the Pensacola Bay Bridge will fully reopen by Memorial Day, the Garcon 

Point Bridge tolls would have been suspended for 225 days. The past economic 

losses sustained by claimant are approximate and quantified from September 16, 

2020 until the date of the claim deadline at approximately 35,000,000.00. Claimant 

reserves the right to amend these figures at a later time, based on further analysis

and additional data, and adding additional losses from the date of filing to the date 

tolls are re-initiated.

31. As the design-build general contractor that chose to bid on FDOT’s 

contract for the replacement of the Pensacola Bay Bridge, Skanska necessarily 

understood the importance of the Pensacola Bay Bridge to Claimant.

32. Claimant seeks recovery for all damages recoverable under applicable 

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law, including but not limited to economic damages consisting of, without limitation, 

loss of revenue and income and incidental expenses that would not have otherwise 

incurred but for Skanska’s conduct described herein. Claimant also seek attorney’s 

fees and costs.

33. Skanska’s negligence in failing to remove and/or secure its construction 

barges prior to the arrival of the storm conditions associated with Hurricane Sally 

caused this damage. At all material times, Skanska knew or should have known that 

failing to secure or move its construction barges from the Pensacola Bay Bridge 

construction site before Hurricane Sally approached the local coastline and 

ultimately made landfall on September 16, 2020 posed an unreasonable risk of 

damage and destruction to the surrounding communities, governments and citizens 

of Escambia and Santa Rosa County, Florida, and the United States of America, 

including the Garcon Point Bridge. 

34. Florida law applies to this case. Under Florida’s “significant 

relationship test,” courts apply the tort law of the state that has the most significant 

relationship to the cause of action. In this case, the cause of action arose in, and 

Petitioner is a citizen of, the State of Florida. Skanska’s conduct at the center of 

Claimant’s cause of action relates to the construction of a new bridge and the 

destruction of an existing bridge comprising the central transportation artery and 

hurricane route for the Pensacola, Florida region that was built pursuant to a contract 

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between a Florida-based construction firm and a State of Florida agency. 

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The Construction Project and Skanska’s Duty

35. The Florida Department of Transportation, FDOT, oversees, among 

other things, the construction of roads and bridges in the State of Florida. 

36. On July 29, 2016, Skanska was awarded the construction contract by 

FDOT to build and design the new bridge over Pensacola Bay. The project consists 

of two separate bridge spans standing side by side. 

37. Skanska began construction on the Pensacola Bay Bridge Project on or 

about September 19, 2016. The project site was not limited to the portion of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge over the bay. In fact, the project site traversed over land 

across portions of Gregory Street, Bayfront Parkway, and 17th Avenue in Pensacola 

as well as Gulf Breeze Parkway in Gulf Breeze. 

38. FDOT entrusted Skanska with every aspect of this project. As set forth 

in the Design Build Specifications, published on March 8, 2016, pg. 74-75, Skanska, 

as the contractor, agreed to take charge and custody of the work, and take every 

necessary precaution against damage to the work, by the action of the elements or 

from any other cause whatsoever, until the Department’s final acceptance of the 

work. Skanska expressly agreed to rebuild, repair, restore, and make good, all 

damage to any portion of the work occasioned by any of the above causes before 

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final acceptance of the Contract.

39. Skanska also expressly agreed to:

. . . provide all safeguards, safety devices, and protective equipment and 

take any other needed actions as it determines, or as the contracting 

officer may determine, to be reasonably necessary to protect the life and 

health of employees on the job and the safety of the public and to protect 

property in connection with the performance of the work covered by 

the contract.

See Executed FDOT Contract at pg. 76, ex. 4 to Claimant’s Reply in Support of 

Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 51-5, p. 77]. By expressly agreeing to these provisions, 

Skanska acknowledged that it owed a duty to the public, including Claimant. 

40. In or around September 2019, Skanska completed the western 

(“southbound”) segment of the bridge project and two lanes of traffic were able to 

freely move across the Pensacola Bay Bridge heading both north and south by 

sharing this segment. 

41. Upon completion and activation of the western segment in a temporary 

two-way configuration, Skanska began demolishing the existing, and up until that 

instant, operational, Pensacola Bay Bridge in order to build the new eastern 

(“northbound”) segment. 

42. To facilitate demolishing the old bridge and building the eastern 

(“northbound”) segment of the Pensacola Bay Bridge, Skanska utilized 

approximately 55 floating work platforms to hold equipment and materials for 

construction. These included the Skanska owned construction barges KS 5531, 

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46007, CBR 758, 450020, KS 6011, and M-8002.

43. The Final Request for Proposal, at p. 63, from FDOT required the 

Design-Build Firm, here Skanska, to submit an Incident Management Plan that 

included “emergency preparedness and recovery plans as well as traffic management 

and evacuation due to hurricanes, tropical storms, fires, winter/ice system and other 

events.” Skanska prepared an incident management plan required by FDOT that 

was specific to tropical weather systems, like the one that became Hurricane Sally, 

which Skanska titled “Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan.” [Doc. 16-1, pp. 2-16]

44. The Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan included provisions for the 

construction barges that Skanska was using as floating work platforms from which 

Skanska and its employees and/or contract workers conducted construction 

activities. The Plan required Skanska personnel to secure the project site that 

includes the Pensacola Bay Bridge, and secure all marine based equipment, 

including the construction barges, to safe harbor. The Plan applied project-wide, 

including to portions of the worksite over land. 

45. Under the Plan, there were four conditions that required different 

actions to be taken by Skanska personnel in the event of a tropical weather system. 

As Hurricane Sally approached ahead of its September 16, 2020 landfall, Condition 

Three became the applicable condition. Under Condition Three (which is specified 

as sustained winds of 50 knots or 58 mph or greater expected within 72 hours/3 

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days), Skanska was to cease all routine activities which might interfere with securing 

operations, commence securing and stow all gear and portable equipment, begin to 

secure any cranes on site, and move all construction barge mounted cranes and 

material barges to the East Bay. No part of the Plan called for the construction barges 

to be secured near the construction site. As Hurricane Sally approached Pensacola, 

Skanska failed to follow this Plan, choosing instead to continue working as late as 

Monday, September 14, 2020.

46. Despite clear warnings about the coming storm, Skanska kept its 

construction barges on site during this time to allow it to continue the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge construction work. Skanska made the decision not to navigate these 

construction barges upon the navigable waters of Pensacola and Escambia Bay to a 

safe site for securing despite the requirements of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan to 

do so.

Claimant’s Damages Are the Foreseeable Result of a Bridge Outage

47. Any reasonable design-build firm in Skanska’s shoes would have 

foreseen the consequences of a Pensacola Bay Bridge outage if the Hurricane 

Preparedness Plan was not followed.

48. Design-build general contractors, including Skanska, must rely on data 

relating to the region’s economic and anticipated growth in order to design and build 

a roadway project that will accommodate present and future needs. To this end, 

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FDOT commissioned numerous studies, such as Project Development and 

Environmental (PD&E) studies, to provide the design-build firm guidance to 

improve traffic safety, emergency evacuation efficiency, accommodate future traffic 

density while minimizing impact on the surrounding environment. Skanska relied 

on these studies when designing and building the Pensacola Bay Bridge. 

49. Design-build firms, such as Skanska, must rely upon historical and 

projected traffic density and volume data in order to prepare for and construct a 

roadway sufficient for the surrounding community’s needs. This includes the annual 

average daily traffic (AADT) for the Pensacola Bay Bridge, which, as of 2011, was 

approximately 55,000 vehicles. FLORIDA DEP’T OF TRANSP., PENSACOLA BAY 

BRIDGE REPLACEMENT PD&E STUDY, at 3-1 (July 18, 2011), 

https://www.santarosa.fl.gov/DocumentCenter/View/268/Pensacola-Bay-Bridge---

Project-Development-and-Environment-PDE-PDF. Skanska relied upon this data 

set when designing and building the Pensacola Bay Bridge.

50. Skanska, as a design-build firm, relies on diverse data sets beyond 

traffic data to design and build a bridge that fits a community’s needs. FDOT also 

provided Skanska with “socioeconomic data, historical population data, and local 

sources such as the Chambers of Commerce or Economic Development Council 

Information,” which included:

• Historical Escambia Population Data

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• Historical Santa Rosa Population Data

• Pensacola Bay Bridge Historical Traffic Data

• US 98 east of Gulf Breeze Historical Traffic Data.

FDOT also provided Skanska with “Socioeconomic (SE) Data Development” to 

identify the “Pensacola Bay Bridge area of influence” within the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge PD&E Report, which accounts not only for population growth but also 

employment growth. Id. at 4-6 (graphic provided below). Skanska relied upon this 

data set as well when designing and building the Pensacola Bay Bridge.

51. Skanska further understood that the project was undertaken because the 

existing bridge, recognized as a “critical link for commuters and freight 

transportation,” was deemed structurally deficient and in need of replacement. 

Pensacola Bay Bridge PD&E Study at 4. Skanska knew early on that should the 

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Pensacola Bay Bridge become unavailable, the nearest detour route was the Garcon 

Point Bridge, a toll road whose toll revenue is pledged toward the repayment of the 

Bonds that funded the construction of the Garcon Point Bridge. Skanska’s 

negligence has caused increase traffic on the Garcon Point Bridge, all while forcing 

the suspension of the toll revenue belonging to the Trustee (for the benefit of the 

bondholders).

52. In understanding that the nearest detour route around the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge would require use of the Garcon Point Bridge, a reasonable design-build firm 

would have fully appreciated that any negligent or deliberate conduct that resulted 

in the closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge would require the use of a 27-mile detour 

over, in part, the Garcon Point Bridge. A reasonable design-build firm would also 

realize the closure would result in liability for tolls (a) paid by commuters that would 

not have otherwise crossed the Garcon Point Bridge but for the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge’s closure, or (b) that were suspended to relieve economic pressures on 

commuters who would not otherwise use the Garcon Point Bridge or promote public 

safety and limit traffic delays due to the slowing or stopping of vehicles at the Garcon 

Point Bridge toll plaza.

53. FDOT underscored to Skanska the importance of the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge to the region by including a $35,000 a day penalty in the design-build contract 

to apply upon the closure of any one of the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s four lanes. See 

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ex. D to Claimant’s Motion to Dismiss, Letter from FDOT to Skanska (Oct. 22, 

2020).

54. A reasonable design-build firm would also understand the region’s 

history, including that on January 14, 1989 a tug-driven barge knocked out a center 

span column of the bridge it was contracted to replace, prompting a bridge outage 

and economic disruption. Bill Kaczor, “Barge Knocks Three-Mile Bridge Out of 

Commission,” AP, January 14, 1989 at 

https://apnews.com/article/5ace2bcffd3bdcd9c8376fedb32d1bca. Skanska 

understood or should have known that an outage in 2020 would carry far worse 

economic devastation in light of the region’s growth over the past 30 years.

55. Finally, the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s closure following its September 

2020 destruction came many years after Skanska began work alongside the previous 

bridge as well as the southbound span that was fully open prior to Hurricane Sally. 

For every day since 2016, Skanska was a literal first-hand witness to the traffic that 

traversed the Bay in either direction. Skanska itself used the Pensacola Bay Bridge 

to travel between the Pensacola and Gulf Breeze landmasses. 

56. Skanska fully understood the disruption that would follow an outage 

severing the central artery connecting Pensacola with Gulf Breeze and Pensacola 

Beach. Understanding the stakes, Skanska repeatedly asked FDOT to limit its 

liability across five separate bid questions. See ex. 4 to Claimant’s Reply in Support 

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of Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 51-4 at SKAN-PBB-0000070 (Question 13428), SKANPBB-0000072 (Question 13434), SKAN-PBB-0000077 (Question 13867), SKANPBB-0000085 (Question 14229), and SKAN-PBB-0000086 (Question 14230). 

FDOT denied each request. See, e.g., id. at SKAN-PBB-0000072 (Question 13434) 

(“Please place a cap on liquidated damages and overall liability.” “No.”). 

Claimant’s damages were necessarily foreseeable to Skanska: Skanska had foreseen 

them enough to try to escape future liability due to any closure of the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge. When the state did not agree to limit liability, rather than forego the near 

$400-million-dollar construction contract, Skanska agreed to the state’s terms with 

full awareness of what consequences would apply should the Pensacola Bay Bridge 

close due to its negligence.

The Evolution of Tropical Storm and Hurricane Sally

57. A tropical wave/disturbance organized into Tropical Depression 

Nineteen over the extreme northwest Bahamas about 80 miles east-southeast of 

Miami during the late afternoon of Friday, September 11, 2020. The system then 

crossed the extreme southern end of the Florida Peninsula Friday night (across the 

Everglades) emerging into the Gulf of Mexico around Marco Island, FL early 

Saturday morning September 12, 2020. By 2:00 PM EDT that afternoon the 

depression was upgraded to Tropical Storm Sally. Computer models were already 

indicating Sally would intensify into a significant hurricane and pose a major threat 

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to the northern Gulf of Mexico. A Hurricane Watch was issued at 5:00 PM Saturday 

by the National Hurricane Center (NHC) for a swath of the Gulf Coast from

southeast Louisiana to the Florida Panhandle.

4

 

58. Upon discovering a tropical depression or tropical storm, the NHC 

issues public advisories every three hours throughout each 24-hour period. 

59. On the afternoon of Friday, September 11th, the NHC published a 

model of potential paths then-Tropical Depression Nineteen could take. Nearly 

every potential path would have subjected Pensacola to at least some level of 

tropical-storm winds. 

60. At or around 11:00 p.m. on Friday, September 11th, the NHC issued a 

storm track projection showing that Tropical Depression Nineteen could impact a 

portion of the Florida Panhandle. Skanska knew or should have known of this 

forecast. 

61. As of 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, September 12th, Tropical Depression 

Nineteen had strengthened into Tropical Storm Sally—the eighteenth named storm 

of the 2020 hurricane season. At that time, Tropical Storm Sally was located 

approximately 35 miles southeast of Naples, Florida. 

 4 The weather forecast information contained in this and subsequent paragraphs was 

obtained from the National Hurricane Center with the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), located at 

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2020/SALLY.shtml. 

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62. As of 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, September 12th, a tropical storm watch 

was extended westward from the Okaloosa/Walton County Line to the 

Alabama/Florida Border.

63. As of 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 13th, Skanska had knowledge 

of the likelihood of hurricane-force winds that would impact the northern Gulf Coast 

region, including the Florida Panhandle. Skanska took no action to secure its 

construction barges, and it even continued working on the Pensacola Bay Bridge. 

64. At or around 10:08 p.m. on Sunday, September 13th, the NHC released 

a model showing the projected path Tropical Storm Sally was likely to take. This 

model showed Pensacola, Florida within the cone of uncertainty.

65. As Tropical Storm Sally moved westward across the very warm waters 

of the Gulf of Mexico it slowly gathered additional organization and intensity 

Saturday and Sunday, becoming Hurricane Sally at 11:00 AM the morning of 

Monday, September 14th about 175 miles southwest of Pensacola. It then meandered 

erratically over the next 24 hours in the Gulf waters southeast of the mouth of the 

Mississippi River (south of Mobile, AL) before settling on a track to the northeast 

heading toward the coastline between Mobile Bay and Pensacola. Computer models 

had anticipated this turn to the right and a Hurricane Warning was issued for the 

Pensacola area, including all of Pensacola Bay, at 4:00 PM CDT Monday afternoon.

66. Hurricane Sally intensified to Category Two status with peak sustained 

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winds of 100 MPH at 4:00 PM Monday. The storm fluctuated in intensity (dropping 

back to Category One strength at 1:00 AM Tuesday morning September 15 and 

weakening down to 80 MPH peak sustained winds by the afternoon) while 

meandering erratically (moving at 3 MPH or less) Monday evening and through the 

morning of Tuesday September 15th before making a final turn to the right in the 

early afternoon and settling on a very slow (2 MPH) northeasterly track toward the 

coast by 4:00 PM on Tuesday afternoon. In spite of the erratic movement, computer 

model forecast guidance remained consistent in predicting landfall just west of 

Pensacola, and NHC kept Pensacola within the Hurricane Warning zone the entire 

time.

67. As of 4:00 p.m. on Monday, September 14th, the NHC issued a public 

advisory notification, stating that Hurricane Sally had strengthened, and that lifethreatening storm surge, hurricane-force winds, and flash flooding was likely along 

portions of the northern Gulf Coast starting Monday evening and continuing 

Tuesday.

Skanska’s Senior Executives Failed to Appropriately Respond to the Danger

68. Notwithstanding these warnings, and in direct violation of the guidance 

and direction set forth in the Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan, on Sunday, 

September 13th Skanska continued to work on the Pensacola Bay Bridge from 7:30 

a.m. to 2:49 p.m.

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69. As of 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 13th, Tropical Storm Sally had 

traveled north, and the NHC advised that life-threatening storm surge, hurricaneforce winds, and heavy rainfall was expected along portions of the northern Gulf 

Coast starting on Monday. The next day, on September 14, 2020, Skanska Project 

Executive, Thomas J. DeMarco, wrote in a letter [Doc. 16-2, p. 2] to Brett Pielstick, 

P.E. of Eisman & Russo, that on September 13th, 2020, the National Weather Service 

issued a Tropical Storm Warning for the project area due to potential Tropical Storm 

Sally. The Skanska Project Executive’s letter was sent in order to serve as Skanska’s 

preliminary request for an extension of Contract Time and additional compensation 

for additional costs incurred due to the expected delay that was sure to result from 

the anticipated impact of the storm. Despite acknowledging in this letter Skanska’s 

duty to engage in advanced preparation to secure material and equipment any time 

the Project is within the potential path of a tropical storm, Skanska failed to take the 

necessary and mandated actions necessary to secure its materials and equipment. By 

Skanska’s own Project Executive’s account, written before the storm, the 

responsibility, duty, and subsequent failure, to secure the bridge construction 

equipment always fell within Skanska’s knowledge and privity. In other words, 

while Skanska’s leadership found the time to request additional money and 

construction time in light of the Hurricane Sally forecast, Skanska failed to 

undertake the necessary preparations to secure the work site. 

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70. The decisions to not move the construction barges and to not comply 

with its own Hurricane Preparedness Plan was made by Skanska’s shoreside senior 

executives with full knowledge of the likelihood of damage to the bridge. 

71. FDOT instructed Skanska to shut down and prepare for Hurricane Sally 

more than three days before the storm made landfall, an instruction that Skanska 

deliberately and intentionally ignored, and failed to adhere to adequately or at all. 

[Doc. 16-3]

72. Throughout the weekend beginning on Friday, September 11th and up 

to the morning of Monday, September 14th, Skanska conducted business-as-usual 

construction operations on the Pensacola Bay Bridge instead of preparing for the 

storm. Despite its Hurricane Preparedness Plan, Skanska had not initiated the action 

necessary to relocate any of its 55 construction barges from the construction site. 

These un-crewed and unpowered construction barges were left in place as Hurricane 

Sally crawled westward, deeper into the Gulf of Mexico and toward Pensacola.

Skanska Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known of the Danger

73. Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan [Doc. 16-1, p. 3] 

provided a recitation of general hurricane information including: “Beyond the eye, 

counterclockwise winds bring destruction to coastlines and islands in their erratic 

path. The position of the storm given by the National Hurricane Center is always the 

eye of the storm. High winds and heavy rain may extend up to 200 miles from the 

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eye. Hazardous conditions may arrive 6-10 hours before the eye makes landfall.” 

74. Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan [Doc. 16-1, p. 7] 

expressly addressed “Cranes Barges / Material Barges and Heavy Weather 

Mooring.” This plan addressed the “time needed to move major barges” and 

emphasized that “30 hours at a minimum needs to be dedicated to moving the 

material barges and crane barges to the hurricane location in the East Bay” and 

provided a chart that described the number of tugboats and time needed to move 

specific types of construction barges. The facts establish that there was more than 

enough time to move these construction barges as required under the Plan. 

75. In terms of track, Sally was a very well forecast hurricane. As early as 

Saturday afternoon September 12th, 84 hours prior to landfall, the Pensacola area 

was either directly adjacent to or within a Hurricane Watch area. By Monday 

morning at 10:00 AM, 43 hours prior to landfall, the Watch was upgraded to a 

Hurricane Warning. Forecasters watching the weather system consistently predicted 

that the Sally weather system would, at some point in its westward travel, make a 

turn to the north. As the storm approached the central Gulf Coast, its movement 

slowed to a crawl and became erratic for a time and nearly stalled southeast of the 

mouth of the Mississippi River. On Monday and early Tuesday, NHC Forecasters 

were confident that computer model guidance showing a turn to the right would 

occur, moving the storm toward the Alabama coast just west of Pensacola. The very 

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slow movement of Sally, less than 3 MPH for the three days prior to landfall, 

provided additional time for residents of the Florida Panhandle to prepare. This 

same preparation time reprieve was afforded Skanska, but Skanska’s senior 

leadership intentionally and deliberately chose to ignore the looming threat in favor 

of continued work and pursuit of profits. 

76. Rather than implement the Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan mandate 

to “secure all marine based equipment to safe harbor [Doc. 16-1, p. 3],” Skanska’s 

senior leadership deliberately chose to leave its construction equipment—including 

55 construction barges—in the vicinity of the Pensacola Bay Bridge prior to and 

during Hurricane Sally. Consequently, Skanska’s construction equipment, including 

construction barges, crashed into and damaged Pensacola Bay Bridge and Garcon 

Point Bridge.

77. Skanska failed to secure its construction barges used in construction of 

the Pensacola Bay Bridge and 27 of Skanska’s 55 work platforms broke free. All 

27 of the loose construction barges (nearly half the number Skanska employed for 

the entire project) were uncontrolled, unpowered, and propelled by the vagaries of 

wind and waves throughout Pensacola Bay and its environs. The shifting wind 

direction associated with the counterclockwise spin of Hurricane Sally is evident 

from the aftermath. Skanska’s unpowered construction barges were quite literally 

cast in all directions and struck shorelines from Naval Air Station Pensacola, to 

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Warrington, to downtown Pensacola, to Milton, to Bagdad and to Gulf Breeze. 

78. FDOT has confirmed that Skanska “failed to take adequate precautions 

to prevent the damage that resulted from Hurricane Sally.” [Doc 16-3, p. 2] In fact, 

FDOT stated that Skanska “had advance knowledge of an approaching hurricane . . 

. but did not comply with its own Hurricane Preparedness Plan.”

79. Skanska’s failures occurred at the corporate level. Skanska’s Hurricane 

Preparedness Work Plan is an emergency response plan submitted by Skanska to 

FDOT as required in the contract between Skanska Southeast and FDOT. The 

decision of Skanska to implement or activate the Hurricane Preparedness Plan is 

made by an officer with responsibility over the project whose position is no lower 

than vice-president level. The Hurricane Preparedness Plan is applied project-wide 

to protect the entire Skanska operation including facilities at the base of operations, 

miles from the Pensacola Bay Bridge, regardless of whether any portion of the site 

is on or around navigable waterways. 

80. Skanska, despite having the opportunity to do so, deliberately chose not 

to adequately secure, let alone move, its construction barges positioned near the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge Project. 

81. Skanska had previously moved its construction barges in preparation 

for storm threats. As it had done previously, Skanska could have moved each of its 

construction barges before Hurricane Sally made landfall. Skanska knew of possible 

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tropical storm-force winds (at minimum) beginning, at the earliest, on September 

11th, yet it chose to do nothing. Skanska’s Hurricane Preparedness Plan provides 

that “each [work platform] only takes two hours to move.” [Doc 16-3, p. 2] Skanska 

had ample notice and time to move all of its work platforms to safe harbor. 

82. Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan contained plans 

that, if followed, would have avoided the destruction that required the closure of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge and the temporary closure of the Garcon Point Bridge, 

including securing “loose materials and equipment prior to the hurricane” and “all 

marine based equipment to safe harbor.” [Doc. 16-1, p. 3].

83. Under the plan, there were four “conditions” that required different 

actions to be taken by Skanska personnel in the event of a tropical weather system. 

As Hurricane Sally approached, Condition Three became the applicable condition. 

Under Condition Three (which is specified as “[s]ustained winds of 50 knots or 58 

mph or greater [winds] expected within 72 hours/3 days”), Skanska was to “[c]ease 

all routine activities which might interfere with securing operations,” “[c]ommence 

securing and stow all gear and portable equipment,” “[b]egin to secure any cranes 

on site,” and for “barge mounted cranes and material barges,” they “will be moved 

to the East Bay.” [Doc. 16-1, p. 7] No part of the Plan called for the construction 

barges to be secured near the construction site. 

84. As Hurricane Sally approached Pensacola, Skanska failed to follow this 

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plan. In fact, according to an October 22, 2020 Letter sent from FDOT to Skanska, 

the Department stated:

Despite Skanska’s assertions to the contrary, Skanska failed to take 

adequate precautions to prevent the damage that resulted from 

Hurricane Sally, Skanska had advance knowledge of an approaching 

hurricane, but did not comply with its own Hurricane Preparedness 

Plan. The plan provides that each barge only takes 2 hours to move, 

but not all barges were moved or taken to safe harbor after Skanska 

became aware of imminent 58 MPH or greater wind speeds. Records 

from the jobsite show that Skanska was performing work in the area, 

i.e., driving pilings, on Sunday, September 13, 2020 from 7:30 A.M. to 

2:49 P.M. CDT, despite a tropical storm warning being issued that 

morning at 4:00 A.M. Records from the following day show that 

Skanska was finishing work on a footer on State Road 30. [Doc 16-3, 

p. 1]

85. In the same October 22, 2020 FDOT letter quoted above, the 

Department also set forth its own account of Skanska’s activities that “undermines 

Skanska’s assertion that 58 MPH or greater winds were not predicted until 11:11pm 

on Tuesday,” [Doc. 16-3, p. 3] adding:

A review of the advisories show that a tropical storm warning was first 

declared Sunday at 4:00 A.M., with maximum sustained winds of 60 

MPH reported at 10:00 A.M. Instead of moving the barges, Skanska 

chose to continue driving piles and even worked the following day in 

finishing work on a footer on State Road 30. 

By the time the first barge broke loose Tuesday at 6:00 P.M., fifty-six 

(56) hours had elapsed from the first report of maximum sustained 

winds of 60 MPH; thirty-two (32) hours had elapsed from the 

declaration of a hurricane warning 10 miles west of the bridge; and 

twenty-six (26) hours had elapsed from the bridge being included in the 

hurricane warning. Skanska had ample time to properly safe harbor the 

barges. Its own plan reflected a total of 48 hours to move all the barges, 

which would have been accomplished if the barges were moved upon 

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the first report of sustained maximum winds of 60 MPH. [Doc. 16-3, p. 

3-4] 

86. The timeline of event reflects that Skanska decided to continue 

construction rather than secure its construction equipment, in blatant disregard of its 

Hurricane Preparedness Work Plan.

87. In doing so, Skanska made a conscious and deliberate decision to 

prioritize avoiding liquidated damage penalties from construction delays over and 

instead of ensuring the safety of surrounding property. In fact, Skanska spent 

preparation time seeking additional compensation and contract time in anticipation 

of the very storm for which it failed to remove and secure its construction barges.

88. Skanska knew or should have known of the crucial need to remove and 

secure Skanska construction barges so as to not jeopardize the Pensacola Bay Bridge 

itself and surrounding property, including the Garcon Point Bridge. 

89. This was not Skanska’s first encounter with bad weather, including 

hurricane conditions, while constructing bridges, and Skanska knew of the risk and 

accepted the duty and the need to take appropriate precautions.

90. Three years prior to Hurricane Sally, on September 10, 2017, Hurricane 

Irma pounded South Florida, making landfall in the Florida Keys as a category 4 

hurricane. Although Hurricane Irma was not projected to impact Northwest Florida, 

Skanska made the decision to move its construction barges, cranes, and other 

equipment from the Pensacola Bay Bridge construction site to “safe haven” locations 

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along Bayou Chico and East Bay on September 7, 2017—three days before 

Hurricane Irma was projected to make landfall roughly 733 miles away from 

Pensacola, Florida.

91. On October 10, 2018, Hurricane Michael made landfall near Panama 

City Beach and Mexico Beach, Florida as a category five hurricane. Skanska made 

the decision to move its equipment from the Pensacola Bay Bridge construction site 

on October 8, 2018 (two days before Hurricane Michael made landfall), despite the 

fact that Pensacola, Florida was not projected to receive a direct hit.

92. These are just two examples of Skanska taking appropriate precautions 

after being notified of a potential threat of tropical storm-force or hurricane-force 

winds and life-threatening storm surges. These instances demonstrate that Skanska 

understood the danger and was more than capable of implementing a hurricane 

preparedness plan that would have preserved the project asset, the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge, as well as other surrounding properties, including the Garcon Point Bridge. 

93. In stark contrast, during Hurricane Sally, Skanska intentionally, 

willfully, and deliberately disregarded its own hurricane preparedness plan and 

intentionally, willfully, and deliberately disregarded the widely known and reported 

probability that Hurricane Sally would, at the very least, deliver tropical-storm force 

winds, if not stronger, to the Florida Panhandle. After all, as early as Friday, 

September 11th, five days before Hurricane Sally was expected to make landfall, 

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Skanska had adequate information to make the decision to move its work platforms 

to a “safe-haven,” as it had done in the past. Instead, the Pensacola Bay Bridge was 

damaged to the extent that it had to be closed to traffic for a period of at least 8 

months, as a result of Skanska’s negligence, willful inaction and deliberate conduct 

to not follow its own hurricane preparedness plan. 

94. These facts leave no doubt that Skanska’s lack of compliance with 

FDOT’s mandate to protect the project site and surrounding properties boils down 

not to a lack of notice, capability, resources, or opportunity, but rather to the exercise 

of will and decision making. 

95. Skanska’s decision not to act came from the highest levels of the 

company and demonstrate that Skanska’s shoreside executives, exercising its 

authority with respect to these Skanska-owned construction barges, failed to act 

reasonably in the face of a clear and present danger, and, instead, acted in willful 

disregard of its own hurricane preparedness plan. 

96. On September 11, 2020, FDOT denied Skanska’s request for additional 

construction contract time and compensation in connection to a prior Hurricane, 

Marco. FDOT had also denied several previous requests for additional contract time 

and compensation for past storms due to Skanska’s “failure to submit proper notice,” 

including Sub-Tropical Storm Alberto and Tropical Storm Gordon. Skanska’s 

similar requests relating to Hurricane Dorian, and Tropical Storms Nestor, Olga, and 

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Cristobal remained pending for months, if not over a year. 

97. Despite the fact that Skanska’s own failures to submit proper notice 

caused the past delay and/or rejection of its requests for additional money and 

contract time after past storm-related delays, Skanska faced Hurricane Sally with the 

mindset that it would not allow any more storm-related delays to impact its business. 

Therefore, Skanska made a conscious decision to forego its hurricane preparedness 

plan. Skanska gambled that Hurricane Sally would not significantly impact the 

region or the project site. If the gamble paid off, Skanska would have minimal, if 

any, expenses, and no time lost to preparations, whereas if it took proper care, the 

cost to Skanska in time and money might have been denied by FDOT anyway. 

Skanska’s gamble left the Pensacola Bay Bridge, Escambia County Fishing Pier, 

Garcon Point Bridge, and surrounding property owners, individuals and business 

unprotected from the massive construction barges, cranes and equipment left uncrewed at the project site.

98. On Monday, September 14th, 2020, amid worsening weather, Skanska 

finally began moving some of its construction barges from the vicinity of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge, demonstrating that Skanska understood the severity of the 

coming storm, and refuting its public claims that it did not have enough notice to 

properly safe harbor the construction barges. However, at least 27 barges were left 

behind to cause destruction to the Pensacola Bay Bridge, the Garcon Point Bridge, 

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and surrounding areas. 

Skanska’s Failure to Act Directly Caused Claimant’s Damages

99. On Tuesday, September 15th, at approximately 6:30 a.m., a Skanska 

construction barge that was being used in the construction of the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge that had not been moved or adequately secured struck the Escambia County 

Fishing Pier adjacent to the Pensacola Bay Bridge. A second construction barge that 

had not been moved or adequately secured struck the Pier shortly after.

100. The same day at approximately 7:30 a.m., a third construction barge 

that had not been moved or adequately secured struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge and 

became lodged beneath the structure. The impact caused visible damage to the 

concrete beams that support the Pensacola Bay Bridge, leading to its closure to all 

traffic. At approximately 4:00 p.m., a fourth construction barge floated free and 

through the Pensacola Bay Bridge. A few hours later, at approximately 6:00 pm, 

another construction barge that had not been moved or adequately secured became 

lodged beneath the Pensacola Bay Bridge. Eventually the span struck by this 

platform was lost and fell into the bay.

101. As of 8:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 15th, 2020, Hurricane Sally 

was located approximately 70 miles southwest of Pensacola, Florida, and it was 

moving at a pace of approximately 2 mph.

102. At 8:15 p.m. on September 15, Ed Hudec, a Construction Engineer with 

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the FDOT, emailed the following message to several Skanska and FDOT Officials, 

including Don Fusco, Skanska USA Civil, President & CEO; Thomas Fulton, Vice 

President of Operations at Skanska and Project Director for the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge Replacement Project; along with Jason Peters, FDOT Director of 

Transportation Operations; Phillip Gainer, FDOT District 3 Secretary; and Kevin 

Russell, Program Manager, FDOT District 3:

As I’m sure you [sic] aware the bridge has been struck twice 

today and the fishing pier once due to Skanska barges that have 

broken loose of their moorings/spuds.

US 98 has been closed since early this AM due to the first barge 

hit. The extent of damage is as of yet undetermined. We need to 

provide answers to the State Secretary’s Office and the 

Governor’s Office as to when the bridge can be reopened to 

traffic.

As of this minute FDOT has received no assistance from the 

Skanska Team to help determine the structural adequacy of the 

bridge. The problem arose due to Skanska’s inability to 

properly secure barges or move them to a safe haven. The 

first barge that hit the bridge occurred when the local airport 

registered winds of 29 mph, not exactly tropical force winds.

This is totally unacceptable!

FDOT has now paid Skanska for a new bridge but due to 

poor management decisions on Skanska’s part, has a bridge 

with unknown structural deficiencies.

I am asking Skanska to assist in providing answers to the extent 

of damage, repair procedures and most importantly the

structural integrity of the damaged structure.

An expedient answer is of the utmost importance.[Doc. 16-5, p. 

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2]

103. Later, after 11:00 p.m., a construction barge with a pile driving rig 

struck both the replacement bridge and the Escambia County Fishing Pier.

104. On Wednesday, September 16th at 4:45 a.m., Hurricane Sally made 

landfall near Gulf Shores, Alabama as a Category 2 hurricane with maximum 

sustained winds of 105 mph.

105. As the center of the storm moved inland across the state line into 

northern Escambia County, passing directly north of Pensacola, then moving again 

into southern Alabama around Flomaton then Brewton, winds over Pensacola Bay 

veered from an east-southeasterly then southeasterly direction before dawn, to 

southerly at landfall and finally to a southwesterly direction.

106. Each of the construction barges that destroyed portions of the Pensacola 

Bay Bridge were outfitted with the same equipment that civil contractors, like 

Skanska, commonly employ during inland civil construction projects, such as 

highway construction. 

107. Span 92, for example, was critically damaged upon its impact with a 

crane boom that came to rest across all four lanes. This crane is the same type used 

for inland construction projects.

108. Pier 62 was damaged upon impact with not only a construction barge, 

but the Genie S-85 HF man lift upon it. Like the crane, this man lift is used for 

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inland construction projects. 

109. Another bridge span was damaged when a pile-driving boom on a 

construction barge crashed onto the Pensacola Bay Bridge, contributing to its 

closure. Pile-driving is just as commonly used for driving piles into dry land and 

driving piles into water.

110. Additional bridge spans were damaged when struck by other Skanska 

construction barges, such as those intended to hold its construction debris.

111. In addition to the damage caused to the Pensacola Bay Bridge, another 

of Skanska’s construction barges, M-8002, impacted and damaged the Garcon Point 

Bridge at the southwest portion of Garcon Point near the north abutment. 

112. The resulting damage to the Pensacola Bay Bridge was catastrophic. 

The damaged spans could not be repaired, but need to be replaced. Skanska is now 

undertaking partial or full demolition and replacement of 25 spans (each weighing 

approximately 2 million pounds), removal and replacement of 14 half-million pound 

“trophy pieces” holding bridge spans, and casting 84 new piles measuring between 

80 to 120’ in length and weighing up to 180,000 pounds to be driven to a depth of 

60’ to 100’. As a result, the Pensacola Bay Bridge remains closed to all traffic.

113. The Pensacola Bay Bridge closure is akin to severing the artery feeding 

the region’s economy. The region’s businesses are now separated from their 

customers. Employees are separated from its employers. And the detour – Garcon 

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Point Bridge – has seen an unprecedented amount of traffic, with the Trustee 

receiving virtually no toll revenue due to the toll suspension.

114. As a result of the Pensacola Bay Bridge and Garcon Point Bridge 

closures, Claimant’s toll revenue is virtually nonexistent so the principal and interest 

on the Bonds are not being repaid. 

115. The Trustee claims damages for past and future economic losses as a 

result of Skanska’s negligence. The past economic losses sustained by claimant are 

approximate and quantified from September 16, 2020 until the date of the claim 

deadline. Because the Pensacola Bay Bridge has not yet been completely repaired 

and reopened, the economic losses are continuing and will continue in the future 

beyond the claim deadline until such time as the Pensacola Bay Bridge is repaired 

and fully operational at the pre-Hurricane Sally level of traffic flow. The value of 

claims for past and future economic losses exceed the value of any specific barge or 

the aggregate value of all of the barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge.

Skanska’s Actions Caused Not Only Direct Physical Damage to the Garcon 

Point Bridge but Also the Complete Suspension of Garcon Point Bridge Tolls 

116. On September 14, 2020 – due to the threat posed by Hurricane Sally –

Governor Ron DeSantis, pursuant to his emergency powers under Section 252.36, 

issued Executive Order Number 20-224, titled “Emergency Management –

Hurricane Sally” (the “Executive Order”), which declared a state of emergency in 

Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. A true and correct copy of the Executive Order 

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is attached hereto as Exhibit “D” and incorporated herein by this reference.

117. Under Section 4(E)(1) of the Executive Order, Governor DeSantis 

authorized FDOT to “[w]aive collection of tolls and other fees and charges for the 

use of the Turnpike and other public highways, to the extent such waiver may be 

needed to provide emergency assistance or facilitate the evacuation of the affected 

counties[.]”

118. Prior to Governor DeSantis’ Executive Order, users of the Garcon Point 

Bridge were subject to a $5 toll for a two-axle vehicle, with each additional axle 

subject to an additional $5 toll. 

119. On September 15, 2020, FDOT issued an advisory suspending the tolls 

on the Bridge, purportedly pursuant to the Executive Order. A true and correct copy 

of FDOT’s September 15, 2020 advisory is attached hereto as Exhibit “E” and 

incorporated herein by this reference.

120. By September 17, 2020, Hurricane Sally moved out of Florida and was 

no longer a threat to the affected counties in Florida.

121. Each of FDOT’s advisories were purportedly issued pursuant to the 

Executive Order and its Amendment, and stated that the extensions of the toll 

suspension were needed to facilitate repairs on the Garcon Point Bridge and the 

nearby Pensacola Bay Bridge.

122. From the time the tolls were suspended, traffic on the Bridge has been 

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at an all-time high.

123. FDOT intends to suspend the tolls until repairs on the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge are finished.

124. Whether FDOT has the authority to lift toll collection from the Garcon 

Point Bridge is the subject of ongoing litigation before Florida Circuit Judge John 

Cooper of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, 

Florida, Case Number 2018-CA-002677. To be clear, the Trustee’s claim does not 

require this Court to determine the propriety of the State’s decision to lift toll 

collection for the Garcon Point Bridge, and, by filing this claim, the Trustee does 

not waive any of its arguments, claims or defenses with respect to the issue. The 

Trustee does not seek relief from this Court or in this action in the form of reinstating 

the collection of tolls for the Garcon Point Bridge.

125. It is indisputable, however, that the State of Florida suspended toll 

collection for the Garcon Point Bridge due to the Pensacola Bay Bridge outage that 

is the subject of this litigation. As FDOT provided in their October 9, 2020 notice 

to Skanska: 

Due to damage the barges caused the Pensacola Bay Bridge, the 

Department was required to suspend the tolls on the Garcon Point 

Bridge, under the authority of Section 4(E) of Executive Order No. 20-

224, in order to provide emergency assistance to the citizens living in 

the area of the Pensacola Bay. It is the Department's intent to pursue 

recovery from Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc., for any claims that 

the Trustees for the bondholders of the Garcon Point Bridge may assert 

against the Department for lost toll revenues. But for the barges 

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rendering the PBB impassable, there would have been no need to 

suspend the (Garcon Point Bridge) tolls. 

Ex. F, Oct. 9, 2020 Letter from FDOT Director of Transportation Operations to 

Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc. (emphasis added).

126. By sending this letter, FDOT acknowledges the certainty that the 

Trustee is owed lost toll revenue as a result of Skanska’s failure to secure its 

construction equipment that led to the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s ongoing closure, the 

Garcon Point Bridge’s temporary closure, and the State’s decision to lift Garcon 

Point Bridge’s tolls. 

127. As FDOT and the Trustee continue to litigate the issue of whether 

FDOT even has the authority to lift toll collection indefinitely for the Garcon Point 

Bridge, there is no disputing that, had Skanska secured its construction barges and 

avoided the damage resulting in the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s closure, FDOT would 

have continued to collect tolls for the Garcon Point Bridge and remitted the same to 

the Trustee.

128. Under these facts, then, there exists no just reason that the Trustee 

should bear the sole burden of foregoing toll revenue indefinitely when it was 

Skanska’s conduct that led to the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s closure as well as the 

suspension of toll collection for Garcon Point Bridge.

129. Rather than hold itself accountable for the loss of toll revenue, Skanska 

has instead shifted the burden to the bondholders and the Trustee to ease the financial 

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pressure on the region’s commuters by foregoing their deserved toll revenue. 

Skanska – as the party whose conduct led to the toll suspension –should bear the 

financial burden of the tolls owed to the Trustee.

130. Skanska’s total lack of accountability and its outright failure to 

intervene with an economic solution to a huge problem it and only it clearly created, 

has pressured and caused the Governor and State of Florida Department of 

Transportation to temporarily waive or suspend the tolls and forced the Trustee to 

bring this action for what it has lost and continues to lose and Skanska, therefore, 

should bear the burden of all of the losses of toll revenue sustained by the Trustee. 

Skanska’s Construction Barge Damaged the Garcon Point Bridge

131. The Trustee expressly files this claim as a “direct impact” claimant in 

light of its property interest in receiving Garcon Point Bridge toll revenue, which 

arises from a vested contractual right to receive per-vehicle toll revenue.

132. According to Skanska, construction barge M-8002 was “being used by 

Skanska Southeast in connect with the Project. Doc. 4, 3:21-cv-00056 (Jan. 8, 

2021). Skanska not only owned M-8002 but also allowed it to careen into the Garcon 

Point Bridge causing physical damage to the Garcon Point Bridge structure that 

required its closure as FDOT inspected the damage. This is in addition to Skanska’s 

failure to secure not only M-8002, but also KS 5531, 46007, CBR 758, KS 6011, 

and 450020 which were not only owned by Skanska but allowed to strike and destroy 

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significant portions of the Pensacola Bay Bridge, through Skanska’s negligent and 

deliberate failure to implement its hurricane plan. The Trustee’s right to receive 

Garcon Point Bridge toll revenue, then, has been cut off by Skanska’s conduct as 

alleged herein.

133. At or around 5:44 p.m. (CDT) on Wednesday, September 16, 2020, the 

Construction Engineering and Inspection (CEI) firm learned that “Barge M-8002 

was found to have impacted / damaged the Garcon Point Bridge at the southwest 

corner of Garcon Point (near north abutment, west side).” The CEI firm noted that 

the Garcon Point Bridge would remain closed pending damage assessments.

Exterior photo. of M-8002 after having 

impacted the Garcon Point Bridge.

Picture taken inside the Garcon Point 

Bridge.

134. On Thursday, September 17th, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. (CDT), Garcon Point 

Bridge partially re-opened for only two-axle vehicles following inspection of the 

damage caused by the impact of Skanska’s construction barge, M-8002. This 

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restriction remained in place until Sunday, September 20 at 12:00 p.m. (CDT), when 

FDOT lifted all traffic restrictions on the Garcon Point Bridge. As reflected by the 

chart immediately below, between Wednesday, September 16, 2020 and Saturday, 

September 19, 2020, alone, the lost toll revenue was approximately $238,157.

Toll Suspension Period Actual Traffic Lost revenue based on 

Actual traffic

Sept. 15, 2020 (noon 

start) 2, 140 $11,021

Sept. 16, 2020 330 $1,700

Sept. 17, 2020 7,744 $39,882

Sept. 18, 2020 19,051 $98,113

Sept. 19, 2020 16,979 $87,442

135. Since FDOT’s partial and complete reopening of the Garcon Point 

Bridge, it has served as the region’s primary detour established while the Pensacola 

Bay Bridge is closed. Toll collection for the Garcon Point Bridge has not been 

reinstated since Hurricane Sally. Despite this, traffic volume across the Garcon 

Point Bridge has risen beyond any point in the Garcon Point Bridge’s lifespan with, 

at times, bumper-to-bumper, idling traffic on either both or one lane atop its spans. 

Given that the toll revenue suspension will extend until the repairs of the Pensacola 

Bay Bridge are complete, the total loss toll revenue will be in excess of 

$41,000,000.00. 

Skanska’s Failures Continued Even After the Passing of the Storm

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136. On October 19, 2020, Skanska Vice President, Thomas J. Fulton, 

executed an Emergency Field Authorization (“EFA”). The EFA was necessary 

because “Hurricane Sally ran 23 construction barges aground in the Pensacola and 

Escambia Bay area.” That EFA addressed those areas impacted by Skanska’s 

wayward construction barges and specifically authorized Skanska as follows: “The 

vessels may be recovered, and the impacted areas shall be restored to their previous 

conditions and configurations.”5

 The EFA further addressed the potential need to 

rebuild impacted structures: “Any structure(s) rebuilt pursuant to this Emergency 

Field Authorization must comply with all applicable local, state, and federal building 

standards, and the requirements of the Federal Emergency Management Act 

(FEMA).” The EFA also contemplated the need for “shoreline stabilization” and set 

forth the specifications for “rip rap” and “filter cloth.” Finally, the EFA attached a 

table listing the 23 construction barges and its locations as well as color pictures of 

each of the construction barges at the location they were discovered after the passage 

of Hurricane Sally. 

137. While Skanska has now recovered its construction barges, Skanska has 

abandoned its EFA obligations and, other than its work on the Pensacola Bay Bridge, 

has made no attempt to restore impacted areas to its previous conditions and 

 5 Emergency Field Authorization, Field Authorization Number: 0324977-014-

EE/17, October 20, 2020. [Doc. 60-2].

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configurations, rebuild any structures or even conduct necessary and vital shoreline 

stabilization.

138. Skanska’s indifference towards meeting its EFA obligations and its 

responsibility to restore private and public property reflects the same indifference it 

continues to show the Trustee, whose substantial losses are an undeniable result of 

Skanska’s deliberate refusal to secure its construction equipment that directly led to 

the Pensacola Bay Bridge’s closure. Indeed, Skanska’s agreement to terms of the 

EFA comprise an implied contract that Skanska has breached by its failure to meet 

the obligations it agreed to within the EFA. 

139. Skanska’s pattern of conscious, deliberate indifference continues even 

with respect to its obligation to prevent its construction equipment from causing 

further devastation to the Pensacola region. On the evening of December 19, 2020, 

KS 6010, a construction barge that is the subject of a Skanska limitation action (3:20-

cv-05984) and that comprises material evidence in this matter, broke free from its 

mooring again before impacting a portion of the Gulf Breeze’s Baybridge 

Condominium’s boardwalk that is approximately 1,500 feet from the Gulf Breeze 

side landing of the Pensacola Bay Bridge. Had the winds blown differently that 

evening, yet another Skanska construction barge would have caused even more 

destruction to the Pensacola Bay Bridge. 

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COUNT I

Claim for the Negligence of 

Skanska Within Its Privity and/or Knowledge

140. Claimant hereby adopt and realleges paragraphs 1-139 of this Claim as 

if fully set forth herein.

141. Skanska’s negligence in failing to properly secure or move its 

construction barges from Pensacola Bay to the designated “safe harbor”—as 

provided for in Skanska’s own Hurricane Preparedness Plan—upon being informed 

of Hurricane Sally’s likely path directly and proximately caused Claimant’s damages 

described herein.

142. Specifically, Skanska negligently failed to secure or remove 

construction barges before Hurricane Sally made landfall. 

143. At all relevant times, Skanska was under a duty to Claimant, to act with 

reasonable care in maintaining safe and proper construction operations and ensuring 

the security of all equipment.

144. Skanska breached this duty by:

a. Failing to reasonably heed meteorological warnings related to Tropical 

Depression Nineteen, Tropical Storm Sally, and Hurricane Sally;

b. failing to properly secure its construction barges upon learning of 

Tropical Depression Nineteen, Tropical Storm Sally and Hurricane 

Sally’s projected path;

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c. placing its own corporate profits over safety and directing its employees 

and agents to continue construction well beyond the time required for 

initiation of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan’s timeline for evacuation;

d. instructing its employees and agents to continue construction of the 

Pensacola Bay Bridge well past the reasonable time for initiation of the 

Hurricane Preparedness Plan; 

e. failing to have sufficient corporate resources to accomplish the safe and 

timely activation and completion of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan;

f. failing to devote adequate corporate resources to the safe and timely 

activation of the Hurricane Preparedness Plan; 

g. negligent hiring managers and officers who placed corporate profits 

over safety;

h. negligent supervision of its managers and officers;

i. termination of crucial subcontractors, including but not limited to 

Atlantic Meridian Contractors, who would have otherwise been employed 

to secure these construction barges;

j. negligent retaining managers and officers who placed corporate profits 

over safety; 

k. failing to remove its construction barges, including the construction 

barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge, from Pensacola Bay upon 

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learning of the projected path of Tropical Storm Nineteen/ Tropical Storm 

Sally/ Hurricane Sally; 

l. failing to adequately account for the unsecured construction barges, 

including the construction barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge, or 

provide any guidance for how to secure them before causing damage,

m. failing to employ any mitigating efforts after its construction barges, 

including the construction barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge, 

became unsecured; 

n. failing to prevent foreseeable and preventable damage to the Pensacola 

Bay Bridge;

o. failing to create, implement, or enforce reasonable policies, procedures, 

or practices for securing, moving, or repositioning of its construction 

barges, including the construction barges that struck the Pensacola Bay 

Bridge and Garcon Point Bridge, before, during, or after dangerous 

weather conditions; 

p. failing to have reasonably sufficient personnel and equipment to 

properly secure, move, or reposition its construction barges, including the 

construction barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge and Garcon 

Point Bridge; and

q. failing to warn third parties, including Claimant, of the dangers of the 

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unsecured construction barges, including the construction barges that 

struck Pensacola Bay Bridge and Garcon Point Bridge.

145. Skanska, by and through its officers, managers, and supervising 

employees, implemented, condoned, ratified, participated in, and perpetuated these 

negligent acts and omissions.

146. At all relevant times, Skanska’s construction barges, including the 

construction barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge, did not qualify as 

“seagoing vessels.” 

147. Skanska was engaged in a highway construction project, and not in 

traditional maritime activities.

148. Maritime and/or admiralty law does not apply to this action.

149. Skanska’s negligence directly caused Claimant’s damages. But for 

Skanska’s negligence in failing to secure or remove its construction barges, 

including the construction barges that struck the Pensacola Bay Bridge and Garcon 

Point Bridge, Claimant would not have sustained damages, and Claimant would not 

be subjected to this unplanned financial loss. 

150. Skanska’s negligence proximately caused Claimant’s damages, as the 

damages were reasonably foreseeable. 

151. As a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s negligence, Claimant 

suffered, and continues to suffer, economic damage including but not limited to loss 

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of revenue and income, loss of use, costs associated with mitigation, costs of 

temporary measures to prevent further damage, associated incidental expenses and

delay costs, diminution of value, and other incidental expenses Claimant otherwise 

would not have incurred.

152. Further, also as a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s negligence, 

Claimant suffered, and continues to suffer losses due to the direct impact of 

Skanska’s construction barge with the Garcon Point Bridge. This includes the 

temporary closure of Garcon Point Bridge until FDOT completed its inspection of 

damage to its spans from an impact with Skanska-owned construction barges as well 

as the decision of the State of Florida to suspend the collection of tolls collected and 

paid to Claimant.

153. The aforesaid acts of negligence occurred or were occasioned within 

the privity and knowledge of Skanska and its agents, servants, and/or employees.

154. Claimant demands that after due proceedings are had that:

a. The Complaint seeking Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability be 

dismissed and the injunction or restraining order granted in this matter be 

dissolved; 

b. There be judgment rendered herein in favor of Claimant, and against 

both Skanska petitioners, both jointly and severally, for all damages as 

are reasonable, together with the maximum legal interest thereon from 

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the date of the destruction of the Pensacola Bay Bridge and/or the damage 

to the Garcon Point Bridge, attorneys’ fees, and for all costs of this 

proceeding;

c. Claimant be allowed to proceed and prosecute its claim without 

prepayment of costs; and,

d. For all such other and further relief to which Claimant may be entitled 

under law and in equity.

WHEREFORE, Claimant prays for judgment against Skanska for compensatory 

damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, and for any other relief as this Court deems 

necessary and appropriate under the applicable law.

COUNT 2

Gross Negligence 

155. Claimant hereby adopts and realleges the foregoing paragraphs of this 

Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

156. Skanska acted grossly negligent by blatantly and knowingly 

jeopardizing the Pensacola Bay Bridge and surrounding property, including the 

Garcon Point Bridge, by making the intentional and deliberate decision to take no 

action to adequately secure or remove its construction barges, and its deliberate and 

intentional failure to comply with its own Hurricane Preparedness Plan. 

157. Skanska acted grossly negligent when it failed to properly prepare for 

Hurricane Sally by securing its construction barges or moving them from Pensacola 

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Bay. Skanska knew or should have known that its failure to undertake reasonable 

and prudent measures would probably and most likely would result in damage to 

persons, property, and economic interests.

158. Skanska chose profits over safety by gambling that Hurricane Sally 

would not impact the Pensacola Bay Bridge Site or the Garcon Point Bridge and by 

choosing to continue to engage in construction activities and failing to move and 

secure its construction barges.

159. Skanska knew or reasonably should have known that the approach of

Tropical Storm and then Hurricane Sally represented circumstances constituting an 

imminent or clear and present danger amounting to more than normal or usual peril.

160. Skanska’s failure to act evidenced a conscious disregard of the 

consequences.

161. As a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s gross negligence, 

Claimant suffered, and continue to suffer, economic damage including but not 

limited to loss of revenue and income, loss of use, costs associated with mitigation, 

costs of temporary measures to prevent further damage, associated incidental 

expenses and delay costs, diminution of value, and other incidental expenses 

Claimant otherwise would not have incurred.

162. Further, also as a direct and proximate result of Skanska’s gross 

negligence, Claimant suffered, and continues to suffer, losses due to the direct 

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impact of Skanska’s construction barge with the Garcon Point Bridge. This includes 

the temporary closure of Garcon Point Bridge until FDOT completed its inspection 

of damage to its spans from an impact with Skanska-owned construction barges as 

well as the suspension of the tolls collected on the Garcon Point Bridge and paid to 

Claimant.

163. The aforesaid acts of gross negligence occurred or were occasioned 

within the privity and knowledge of Petitioners and its agents, servants, and/or 

employees.

WHEREFORE, Claimant prays for judgment against Skanska for 

compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, and for any other 

relief as this Court deems necessary and appropriate under applicable law. 

RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

Claimant hereby expressly reserves its right to proceed to a trial before a jury 

in a state court action. 

/s/ E. Samuel Geisler

E. SAMUEL GEISLER, FL Bar # 83817

BRYAN F. AYLSTOCK, FL Bar # 78263

Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC

17 East Main Street, Second floor

Pensacola, Florida 32502

Office: (850) 202-1010

Fax: (850) 916-7449

sgeisler@awkolaw.com

baylstock@awkolaw.com

sallyteam@awkolaw.com

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Attorneys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of May 2021, I electronically filed 

the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send 

a notice of electronic filing to all attorneys of record. 

/s/ E. Samuel Geisler

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