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82–115 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–708

AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY,

AVOIDING CHAOS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 26, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 2

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 63

Grange, Brig. Gen. David L., U.S. Army (Ret.), Chicago, IL ............................... 46

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50

Tomsen, Hon. Peter, Special Envoy to Afghanistan (1989-1992) and former

Ambassador to Armenia, ambassador-in-residence, University of Nebraska

at Omaha, Omaha, NE ........................................................................................ 42

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Responses to additional questions for the record submitted by Senator

Biden .............................................................................................................. 63

(III)

(1)

AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY,

AVOIDING CHAOS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2002

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Wellstone, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Lugar,

Hagel, Chafee and Allen.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. We have

two very distinguished witnesses in our first panel, and I will get

to that in just a moment. I would ask unanimous consent, in the

interest of time, that my formal statement be placed in the record

at this moment as if read. Let me just very, very, very, very briefly

summarize it, because I want to have as much opportunity to get

to the issue of discussing Afghanistan with our first two witnesses.

Whenever anyone asks me about Afghanistan, and whether or

not we should be there, and should we expand the force, and so on,

I always say, ‘‘Everybody ought to try to think back why did we

go in the first place. Why did we go in the first place?’’ Interestingly enough, I think, as usual, the American people are way ahead

of the political leaders in both parties, the administration, the Congress throughout the country, in that in a recent Gallup poll, 80

percent think the United States should keep troops in Afghanistan,

while 16 percent of the U.S. population thinks we should take the

troops out. The bottom line is, they understand why we went in the

first place.

What I want to examine today, because I have had, and I want

to say it publicly, absolute cooperation, as chairman of this committee, from the State Department and from the White House. I do

not interface as well, and I always—anything with Secretary

Wolfowitz has always been responded to, but I do not interface

with Defense as much in my capacity as chairman of this committee. But two things have emerged, and I just want to give the

witnesses a heads-up of the direction I would like to take this hearing.

I know I am a broken record to both of them about the need to

expand the international security force. It seems as though we

have replaced the strategy—not replaced; we have, instead of a

strategy of an international security force being extended beyond

Kabul, that we basically have, my phrase, not yours, a warlord

strategy, which is, if there is peace and calm in any of the four

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major sectors of Afghanistan, even though it is imposed by and/or

is primarily accountable to the fact that a warlord is in charge,

that—that constitutes stability.

I also want to talk about the time needed to buildup an all-Afghan army and police force, its status, its personnel, its timing. Because as I understand the basic underlying premise of the administration, one that I do not disagree with, is that there is a need to

have a central government, have a security force that is made up

of all factions, all of the major tribes represented in Afghanistan,

and a police force, and that the notion would be that they would

be the ultimate stabilizers of a government.

But there is sometimes, as my grandmother would say, something missed between the cup and the lip, and we have to get to

that point. How long is it going to take us to get to that point, what

kind of progress are we making to get to that point, and what is

the structure for stability in the meantime? That is what I want

to talk about today.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Over the past half-year we have achieved great battlefield success in Afghanistan.

Our servicemen and servicewomen have defeated the Taliban, and gotten al-Qaeda

on the run. We haven’t yet captured bin Laden, but I’m confident that we’ll achieve

this goal.

As we reach the next stage in the war, several questions arise: What is status

ongoing operations against al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan? What is the humanitarian situation? What is our assessment of the loya jirga process?

Perhaps the most important question, however, is one of commitment: Will we

stay the course and build security in Afghanistan, or will we permit this country

to relapse into chaos?

President Bush has often promised that America will lead the way in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. His April reference to the Marshall Plan was particularly

apt: After World War II, America used its soldiers as peacekeepers and its dollars

as peacebuilders.

This may have been the wisest investment of the past century: We turned our

most bitter foes into our staunchest allies.

But if we’re going to talk about a new Marshall Plan, we should be willing to back

up our words with deeds. The original Marshall Plan cost $90 billion in today’s dollars. Our total pledge for

Afghan reconstruction is less than 1 percent of that, and we’ve only delivered a fraction of this pledge.

All the money in the world, however, won’t do much good without security. Absent

that, any reconstruction funds will be siphoned into the pockets of greedy warlords.

And that, in fact, is exactly what we’re seeing right now.

In Mazar-e Sharif recently, a U.N. worker was gang-raped by seven armed men— in a part of the country controlled by two warlords, one of whom serves as the government’s Deputy Defense Minister.

In the eastern portion of the country, a warlord named Bacha Khan seized control

of an entire province in April, and still stands in open defiance of the legitimate

government in Kabul.

In Herat, the warlord Ismail Khan has invited Iranian agents to help him consolidate power, while reports of human rights abuses skyrocket.

What do these cases—typical of the situation throughout the country—have in

common? These warlords are all on the U.S. payroll.

Maybe I’m missing something here, but I just don’t think this makes sense. Asking warlords to uphold law and order is like asking the Cali cocaine cartel to be

our partners in the drug war.

Warlords aren’t the solution to Afghanistan’s problems—they’re the cause of Afghanistan’s problems.

The long-term solution is to rebuild Afghanistan’s army and police force—but that

can’t happen overnight.

In the meantime—at least a year, and probably longer—there are only three alternatives:

3

Use American troops as peacekeepers. Build up a robust international force. Or

let Afghanistan revert to chaos.

U.S. forces seem to be involved in de facto peacekeeping right now. Wouldn’t it

be better to clarify the mission, and let our allies share the burden?

Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and nearly

every expert on the region has called for expansion of the U.N.-mandated security

force, ISAF, both in scope and tenure. In my view, this is clearly in our national

interest. We should view ISAF as a force-multiplier.

Without U.S. or U.N. peacekeepers, we’re left with the third option: letting Afghanistan degenerate into the state of lawlessness that made way for the Taliban.

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, America turned its back as the country disintegrated.

President Bush has rightly promised not to repeat this mistake. If we fail to uphold the President’s promise, Afghanistan will again become a den of terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and exporters of violent insurgency.

One other factor makes such a failure unacceptable to our national interest: Afghanistan is a test case for Iraq.

Anyone who wants to see Saddam Hussein removed from power in Iraq—as I do—

will be looking very closely at the administration’s game plan in Afghanistan. Simply put, if we can’t demonstrate long-term commitment in Afghanistan, nobody will

trust us to make a long-term commitment in Iraq.

Ousting Saddam, like ousting the Taliban, is only the first step in a long process.

Everyone knows we can remove an evil regime. The question is, are we willing to

expend the security, financial, diplomatic, and political resources to make the successor regime a success?

The U.S. has power—but do we have staying power?

We have with us today several highly distinguished witnesses.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has recently returned from a mission

to South Asia, where he successfully averted a nuclear war—not bad for a few days’

work.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has been one of the administration’s

leading architects of strategic planning for Afghanistan; I am particularly looking

forward to his detailed discussion of these plans for assuring Afghan security in the

months to come.

Ambassador Peter Tomsen knows the political landscape of Afghanistan insideout. As special envoy to Afghanistan for the previous President Bush, he dealt with

many of today’s power-brokers long before they had any real power to broker. He

is currently ambassador-in-residence at the University of Nebraska, Omaha.

Brig. Gen. David Grange earned three Silver Stars and two Purple Hearts during

his service in Vietnam, and has served in Delta Force, Ranger and other Special

Operations units during his 30-year military career. As commander of Task Force

Eagle in Bosnia, he is particularly well-equipped to comment on U.S. participation

in peacemaking operations.

Up to now, the administration’s plan has seemed to focus on the hope that warlords, if properly motivated with cash and weapons, will become reliable partners

for peace.

But as Secretary of State Powell once said, in his capacity as a military planner,

‘‘Hope is not a strategy.’’

Perhaps today’s hearing will give us a clearer picture of the strategy underlying

this hope.

The CHAIRMAN. I am anxious to hear from both our witnesses,

and with that, I will yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

would like to join you in welcoming Deputy Secretary of State

Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to this committee. I look forward to their testimony and reviewing with them

Afghanistan’s prospects for the future.

I am hopeful that we are witnessing the emergence of a free and

stable Afghanistan from more than two decades of war and instability, but it is clear that at least for the foreseeable future, Afghanistan’s evolution will be marked by both advances and setbacks. And since the commencement of offensive military operations in Afghanistan, I have urged the administration to think siVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
4

multaneously about what steps will be necessary to rebuild the nation after the Taliban and al-Qaeda were removed.

I was pleased that, early on, President Bush stated that the

United States would, and I quote, ‘‘Not just simply leave after the

military objective has been achieved.’’ The administration correctly

recognized that, without providing the people of Afghanistan with

an environment in which the construction of a democracy and market-based economy was not only possible, but likely, the country

would remain a source of insecurity and terror.

The United States’ international efforts have permitted the people of Afghanistan to begin rebuilding their economy, their government, and personal liberties, and I applaud the role that the international coalition has played in carrying out the reconstruction efforts, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately,

despite this strong record of success, the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain. Without a strong international commitment to

the reformation of a representative and effective government, our

efforts could go to waste.

The loya jirga recently completed its work, selected Hamid

Karzai to be President. Karzai continues to construct a broad-based

representational government to rule Afghanistan. Pundits here in

Washington and around the world are debating the criteria employed in selecting cabinet members of the new government, and

it is clear to most that the current security situation in Afghanistan was the primary determination in the selection process.

I am supportive of efforts underway to expand training and equip

a new Afghan national army. A successful transformation is one of

the most important elements of long-term security, but in the

meantime I continue to be concerned that the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, may not be up to the task of ensuring

the requisite amount of security for Afghan reconstruction to continue.

The ability of ISAF to maintain peace and security, and to

project power into the farthest region of Afghanistan, is vitally important if the international community is to assist Karzai in enforcing the rule of law, and defending the threat posed by extremists,

warlords, and terrorists. Only then can we replace Afghanistan’s

despair with a genuine future of hope.

Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts have benefited, for the moment, from the capture of major al-Qaeda operatives as well as the

dispersal of other major players around the world. Their likely

strategy is to prepare and to undertake suicidal attacks against

Western and Jewish targets, especially in Arab states allied with

the West, while larger operations are prepared for the United

States, such as the so-called ‘‘dirty bomb’’ plots.

Though relatively small and widely dispersed, the al-Qaeda

strikes appear to be coordinated by a senior group of leaders. In

short, al-Qaeda’s command structure may have survived the United

States’ military campaign in Afghanistan, even though its base in

the country was eliminated.

Instances like the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue and French

and American targets in Karachi do not have the profile or drama

of past military clashes in Afghanistan, but al-Qaeda attacks are

likely to occur at any time and almost anywhere, including AfghanVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
5

istan. Countering them has become as much a task for police and

intelligence as a military operation. Help from other governments,

especially in the Islamic world, is vital, as is effective monitoring

of potential targets, including infrastructure and weapon sources.

We know that a substantial number of al-Qaeda operatives managed to escape Afghanistan, and travel undetected, at least, at

first, to countries around the region. We also believe a substantial

number will look for opportunities to infiltrate back into Afghanistan. Most seriously, the alleged plot involving Jose Padilla, the alleged al-Qaeda recruit arrested in Chicago, has the evidence that

al-Qaeda is determined to strike with weapons of mass destruction,

and is actively seeking to procure or steal them.

It is that concern that has led a number of us to recommend to

the Bush administration that the United States formulate a new

global coalition designed to keep nuclear and bioweapons out of the

hands of al-Qaeda and other terrorists. In short, Afghanistan is not

out of the woods yet, any more than terrorist threats to the United

States involving weapons of mass destruction have lessened since

September 11.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the United

States can assist in bridging the gap in ISAF’s abilities and capabilities, and the threats posed to Karzai’s young and still fragile

government, even as the Bush administration focuses on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I

thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I might note that there are a number of people in the audience

who have been keenly interested in this subject. Among them, as

working with the President, have been women’s groups in the

United States, who have testified before this committee about the

security question, and today the Feminist Majority, now the Women’s Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan, and

NOW Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund, and the Equality

NOW, are all represented here in the audience, and have importuned this committee and this chairman on occasion, and I am sure

they have at the State Department. I know they have spoken with

the Secretary.

Today’s paper, the New York Times, and other major papers are

full of stories relative to the assertiveness of women in Afghanistan, taking significant risks to make sure they do not go back to

the Dark Ages that they just came out of. So I welcome them and

others that are here today.

We have two very distinguished witnesses. Deputy Secretary of

State Richard Armitage recently returned from a mission in South

Asia, where he successfully averted a nuclear war. Not bad for a

few day’s work. You did a hell of a job, Rich; congratulations. I

want to state again publicly, I think the administration, and you

in particular, played a very significant role in diffusing the single

most dangerous circumstance that exists at the moment.

We also have Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who

has been one of the administration’s leading architects of strategic

planning for Afghanistan. I am particularly looking forward to his

discussions on plans for sharing security in the months to come,

and I want to thank him again, not only for his being publicly

6

available, but privately available whenever we have sought, or I

have sought, at least, any information from him.

I invite you to make any comments you wish in your statements,

and do not worry about the clock. We are anxious to hear what you

have to say. So as fully as you think you need to speak, please feel

free. Do not worry about these lights going on. They will go on for

us, not for you. Mr. Secretary, you can begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,

DC

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senators.

Paul and I have, in our professional lives, spent a considerable

amount of time in this very room in front of this panel, and we

have come to realize, at least I have, that the patience of the committee is in inverse proportion to the length of my opening statement. So I am going to keep it very short, and I know you will

allow me to have my comments submitted for the record.

I just thought I would mention briefly the winners and the losers

in the recent loya jirga, and what is left to do. I think the winners,

first of all, are pretty easy to enumerate: the Afghan people and,

particularly, women. This committee—the whole Congress, but this

committee in particular, has been very interested in all the women

in Afghanistan. I think the newspaper article in the New York

Times, to which you referred, Mr. Chairman, is witness to the fact

that in 6 months’ time, women have gone from being held basically

in contempt in Afghan society to a role where they felt secure

enough to take part in a very robust and boisterous loya jirga. So

the Afghan people, and women in particular, are the first winners.

Second, Hamid Karzai is clearly a winner. He is a much better

politician than any of us knew 6 months ago, and he managed competing pressures very, very well. He has to be considered in the

winner’s category.

Another is a Tajik by the name of Fahid Khan, who is the First

Vice President and still the Minister of Defense. He would have to

be considered to have come out a winner.

Fourth, the international community has been a winner, because

we have been part of, thus far, what is a great success story, and

I think it far outstripped in pace any ideas that any of the pundits

had about the ability to resolve the questions of Afghanistan in

anywhere near this rapid timeframe.

The fifth winner are the coalition forces. Primary among them,

of course, the United States and the ISAF, because in the minds

of many in Afghanistan, there is not much difference between the

coalition and ISAF. And we are the ones who made it possible for

the Afghan people to eschew the role of the gun and the rule of the

gun.

Now, who are the losers? Well, I think you have to consider, at

least in the short term, that the conservatives are the losers. They

lost some serious altitude during the loya jirga. They were boisterous. There was some intimidation, or at least attempts at it,

mostly verbal, but they lost ground.

7

The second people who lost ground were some of the families of

Zahir Shah, who envisioned a much greater role, a more active role

for the former king, and they did not have their dreams realized.

I think, third, one has to realize that there are some in the

Pushtun community who feel that they lost ground, or they did not

command as many portfolios as they might have hoped. There is

a lot of misinformation in the public about what the makeup of Afghan society really is. In percentage terms, we have not had a census since 1979, so any numbers that anybody talks about are extrapolations from 1979. We do not know what percentage the

Pushtuns or the Tajiks really have in the overall population, but

I think it is fair to say that some in the Pushtun community are

a little disappointed.

Now, what is left for President Karzai to do? Well, I think, first

and most importantly, he has to consolidate the instruments of

power and he has to extend them out into the countryside to get

to the very thing you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and that is warlords and warlordism.

Second, I think Afghanistan’s society has to come to grips with

the role of Islam in their nation. Do they envision themselves as

a Turkey, or a Pakistan, or what? And I think that is a debate that

we are going to see and witness as we move to the future.

Finally, Mr. Karzai and the 29 ministers who make up his cabinet have to very definitely be seen in relatively rapid fashion, not

only formulating a constitution to be voted on in about 18 months,

but to be able to extend the fruits of the international community’s

largesse, particularly in terms of reconstruction aid to far-flung

areas in Afghanistan. Those are three pretty big challenges for any

cabinet and any President. Mr. Chairman, I will stop there, and

turn it over to my colleague and friend, Paul Wolfowitz.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Armitage follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on

recent developments in Afghanistan. We have a good story to tell. For hope is returning to Afghanistan. It is no longer the country it was on September 11—a haven

for terrorists, suffering from tragic social decline and serious abuses of human

rights, especially women’s rights.

There is still much work to be done but, as President Bush has emphasized, the

United States is committed to Afghanistan for the long haul. We will continue to

work closely with the international community to help the Afghans help themselves

in building a stable, broadly representative Afghanistan that can never again be a

haven for terrorists.

Our focus in Afghanistan continues to be on conducting the war on terrorism, putting in place security arrangements, fostering Afghanistan’s internal governance,

and providing humanitarian and development assistance.

Let me briefly review each in turn.

The war on terrorism is based on bringing the international community’s combined strengths to bear against terrorism in its many manifestations throughout the

world. In Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom is not over and will not be finished until the last remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban are flushed out and destroyed. Still, we are already taking up the tasks that will ensure that Afghanistan

is never again a base for terrorism.

With respect to security arrangements, the International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) is performing a very positive role by helping provide security in and

around Kabul—through joint patrols with local police; security for special events,

such as the loya jirga; and the rehabilitation and operation of Kabul International

Airport. ISAF includes some 5,000 troops from 19 countries, with Turkey having recently taken the lead from the United Kingdom.

8

The backbone of Afghanistan’s future security structure must be the new Afghan

National Army (ANA). The United States has taken the lead, working closely with

ISAF, the French, and other coalition partners, in training and equipping troops for

the ANA. Germany has the lead, with United States and other international assistance, on developing a viable police force.

Afghanistan has also made large strides in opening up its politics and improving

its governance. The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), which governed for the six

months before the loya jirga, was a multi-ethnic, broadly representative government

that succeeded in establishing a basis for a central government that will remain responsive to the will of the Afghan people.

The AIA ably performed the role that the Bonn Agreement laid out for it. It was

responsible for many successes, such as reopening schools, including schools that

educate girls; putting in place the starting points for building national security institutions; establishing judicial and human rights commissions; reintegrating women

and ethnic minorities into society; and announcing and beginning to implement a

ban on opium cultivation and harvesting. We will continue to work with the Afghan

Transitional Administration to protect the rights of women and encourage their effective participation in civic life.

Significant progress has also been made in creating an inclusive political process

that generates incentives for groups and individuals to give up armed struggle for

political goals. The Emergency loya jirga began the process of healing the country’s

wounds by bringing together Afghans from all ethnic groups, religions, and political

persuasions to discuss Afghanistan’s future. It elected Chairman Karzai to continue

to lead Afghanistan for the next two years, the cabinet has been selected, and steps

have been taken toward creating a National Assembly.

Nonetheless, the road ahead is long, as demonstrated by the sharp political disputes at the loya jirga and continuing concerns about the security of international

assistance workers, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

There has also been progress in meeting the humanitarian needs of Afghans and

beginning the process of reconstruction, but gaps remain. The new Transitional Authority faces major challenges, beginning with the need to fill the gap between

needs and pledged resources. The Afghan government predicts a $390 million budgetary shortfall this year.

The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP estimate reconstruction

needs of $1.7 billion over the next year, while humanitarian and security assistance

needs could raise this figure to $2.9 billion. The long term costs of this project over

the next five years are going to be tremendous, perhaps as much as $10 billion.

Refugees are returning at a faster rate than expected—more than one million to

date, with up to two million expected by the end of the year. While this is a welcome

sign of the return of normality, UN and other agencies tasked with helping refugees

and displaced persons are facing potentially crippling funding shortfalls as the higher refugee inflow has driven costs faster than predicted.

U.S. contributions to Afghanistan have already exceeded the $297 million pledged

earlier this year in Tokyo. Appropriated funds for fiscal year 2002, plus requested

funds for FY 2003 and a $250 million supplemental request currently before Congress, would boost official American assistance to over $900 million for FYs 2002

and 2003 combined. This does not include funding for U.S. military operations.

Mr. Chairman, the United States, the Afghan people and the international community have undertaken an enormous job, but one that I believe is critical to our

national goals and well worth the costs. We must stay the course, and with your

continued support, Mr. Chairman, and that of this Committee, I am confident we

will succeed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

This distinguished committee has long provided our country

strong leadership and bipartisan support, especially now that we

are waging this war on terrorism, and I thank you for that. I thank

you also for the opportunity to come here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s perspective on how the campaign in Afghanistan to kill, capture, and disrupt terrorists has helped us to protect

the American people, and also to discuss how we are helping the

9

Afghan people help themselves, to ensure that their country does

not, once again, become a terrorist sanctuary.

To chart the way ahead, Mr. Chairman, it is important to understand how we got to where we are, so let me spend a moment on

the early parts of the military operation. From the beginning of the

war on terrorism, President Bush emphasized that the United

States must apply, as he said, every resource at our command,

every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and the President concluded, every necessary weapon of war to the destruction

and defeat of the global terror network.

Each of those instruments has a role. Each one reinforces the

other. The military is only one of the instruments that we need to

wage this war on terrorism. The military cannot do its job without

the support of other elements, particularly intelligence and diplomacy, and its role is frequently to support the efforts of those other

instruments of national power.

This hearing is focused, and appropriately so, on Afghanistan

and on our military effort there, but it is important to emphasize,

as we have done from the beginning, that this campaign is not

about a single country or a single terrorist network. Al-Qaeda alone

has spread throughout the world. It is a network. A network by its

very nature is based on the idea that should one node be eliminated, the network can still continue to function.

Well before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had burrowed into

some 60 countries, including the United States, Germany, France,

Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines. It had critical nodes in

Hamburg, Germany, and Jacksonville, Florida, as well as in Afghanistan. The pilots who flew the suicide attacks were not trained

in Afghanistan. Many got their training right here in the United

States.

So Afghanistan was an important node in the network, but by its

nature, a network does not have a headquarters. So while we focus

on Afghanistan today, we must understand that it is only one node

of that terrorist network. The very name of the organization, alQaeda, which means ‘‘base’’ in Arabic, indicates that the entire organization is the base of terrorist operations. It is spread throughout the world, and it needs to be eliminated, root and branch.

In Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda’s plots and plans flourished

under the protection of the tyrannical Taliban, America’s Armed

Forces went to work to root out both. Our intention, as Secretary

Rumsfeld said, was not only to deprive the terrorists of a sanctuary

in Afghanistan where they could safely plan, train, and organize,

but also to capture and kill terrorists, and to drain the swamp in

which they breed.

Over the last 8 months, with our coalition partners, we have defeated a vicious regime that gave refuge to evil. We have killed or

captured many of its ringleaders, and we have others on the run.

Even in Afghanistan, however, our work is far from complete, but

we are encouraged by the many truly remarkable aspects of this

campaign to date.

Our military campaign in Afghanistan has had some striking features, some surprising, others less so. Not surprisingly at all, we

have seen America’s men and women in uniform conduct their opVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
10

erations with great bravery and great skill, as we saw at Mazare-Sharif and Tora Bora, and in Operations Anaconda and Mountain

Lion.

What may have been a surprise to some was the remarkable

speed with which the military plans were put together, the swift

success of the military operations, measured in weeks, rather than

months, and with relatively few troops on the ground. On September 11, let me remind you, there simply were no war plans on

the shelf for Afghanistan. General Franks was starting from

scratch on September 20, when he received the order from the

President to begin planning a campaign. Less than 3 weeks later,

on October 7, we commenced military operations, and less than 2

weeks after that, we had troops operating on the ground with General Dostam in the north. In many ways, it was a remarkable feat

of logistical and operational utility.

If you would permit me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from

an actual dispatch that we received from one of those Special

Forces captains on the ground, or more accurately, on horseback,

in northern Afghanistan. This is from October 25, shortly after he

and his unit were inserted: ‘‘I am advising a man on how best to employ light infantry and

horse calvary,’’ he said, ‘‘in the attack against tanks, mortars, artillery, personnel carriers, and machine guns, a tactic which I

thought had become outdated with the invention of the Gatling

gun. The Mujaheddin have done that every day we have been on

the ground. They have attacked with 10 rounds of ammunition per

man, little water, and less food. I observed one man who walked

10-plus miles to get to the fight, who proudly showed me his artificial right leg from the knee down. ‘‘There is little medical care if injured, only a donkey ride to the

aid station, which is a dirt hut, but the Muj are doing very well

with what they have. We couldn’t do what we are doing,’’ he went

on, ‘‘without the close air support. Everywhere I go, the civilians

and Muj soldiers are always telling me they are glad the USA has

come. They all speak of their hopes for a better Afghanistan once

the Taliban are gone. Better go,’’ he concluded, ‘‘General Dostam is

finishing his phone call with a Congressman back in the United

States. Yes, we had that element of this fight as well.’’

Another dispatch from one of his comrades on November 10,

after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, reads in part: ‘‘We rode on begged,

borrowed, and confiscated transportation. While it looked like a

ragtag procession, the morale into Mazar was triumphant. The

locals loudly greeted us, and thanked all Americans. Much waving,

cheering, and clapping, including from the women. The U.S. Navy

and Air Force’’—this from an Army man—‘‘did a great job. I am

very proud of my men, who performed exceptionally well in extreme conditions. I have personally witnessed heroism under fire

by two U.S. noncommissioned officers, one Army, one Air Force,

when we came under direct artillery fire last night, less than 50

meters away. When I ordered them to call close air support, they

did so immediately without flinching.’’

‘‘As you know, the U.S. element was nearly overrun 4 days ago,

but continued to call close air support and ensured the Muj forces

did not suffer defeat.’’ He concluded, ‘‘These two examples are typVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
11

ical of the performance of your soldiers and airmen. Truly, uncommon valor has been a common virtue.’’ In many ways, those two dispatches, I think, capture the ingredients of an extraordinary military success. But another element of

our success, which was undoubtedly a surprise to the terrorists but

barely noticed by many others, was something that did not happen,

something that calls to mind Sherlock Holmes’ famous observation

about the dog that did not bark. We did not become bogged down

in a quagmire, unlike the British in the 19th century, or the Soviets in the 20th. Nations that arrive in Afghanistan with massive

armies tend to be treated as invaders, and they regret it. Mindful

of that history, General Franks has deliberately and carefully kept

our footprint small to avoid just such a situation. On balance, our

partnership with indigenous forces has been very positive and continues to be so.

From the beginning of the war on terrorism, we have stressed

the importance of understanding the nature of our enemy as a network. Al-Qaeda is not a snake that can be killed by lopping off its

head. It is more analogous to a disease that has infected many

parts of a healthy body. There is no one, single solution. You cannot simply cut out one infected area and declare victory, but success in one area can lead to success in others, and our success in

Afghanistan has contributed to the larger campaign.

In Afghanistan itself, through actions there, somewhat less than

half of the top 30 or so leaders of the al-Qaeda organization have

already been killed or captured. Well over 500 enemy are currently

detained in Guantanamo or in Afghanistan as a direct result of our

operations in that country. But equally important, if not more so,

the worldwide efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in cooperation with more than 90 countries, have resulted in

the arrest of some 2,400 individuals.

Our military success in Afghanistan has contributed to that larger success, both indirectly, by encouraging others to cooperate, and

also more directly. Abu Zubayda, for example, one of bin Laden’s

key lieutenants, was driven out of his sanctuary in Afghanistan,

and as a result, was captured last March. His partial cooperation,

in turn, contributed to the detention of Jose Padilla, who came into

the United States with the intention of planning and coordinating

terrorist attacks.

A Moroccan detainee in Guantanamo led us to three Saudis planning terrorist attacks in Morocco, all of whom were subsequently

arrested, including one top al-Qaeda operative. In December, the

discovery of a videotape in a safe house in Afghanistan led to the

arrest of an al-Qaeda cell in Singapore that was planning to attack

a U.S. aircraft carrier and U.S. personnel in that country. The cooperation of Pakistan under the leadership of President Musharraf

has been extraordinary, leading to nearly 400 arrests in that country alone.

These developments are encouraging; however, it is important to

remember that al-Qaeda is still dangerous and active. This network still poses threats that should not be underestimated.

Let me talk now about our efforts to build a more stable Afghanistan in the long term. Because while our primary mission in that

country has been to kill or capture terrorists who threaten the

12

United States, or those who have harbored them, it is also important to help the Afghans establish long-term stability in that country, so that it does not once again become an outlaw country that

provides sanctuary for terrorists.

While the success of those efforts will depend most of all on the

Afghans themselves, the United States and its coalition partners

have a critical role to play in achieving that goal. In shaping that

role, and as in shaping the military campaign itself, we are very

mindful of that historical Afghan animosity to foreign armies and

foreign occupiers. We have always viewed our mission in Afghanistan as one of liberation, not occupation. So with this in mind, we

have tackled the challenge of striking the balance between keeping

Afghanistan from reverting back to a terrorist sanctuary, and at

the same time, keeping our footprint small.

Afghans are an independent, proud people, and we have worked

from the beginning to minimize the number of our troops there,

and to focus instead on helping the Afghan people to help themselves in their journey to representative self-government. We have

made it clear, and we need to continue to do so, we have no intent

of colonizing Afghanistan. We have been careful through our actions and our words to avoid creating the expectation that the

United States can solve all of that country’s problems, and we have

made a determined effort not to take sides in Afghanistan’s internal quarrels. But we have, in fact, seen that Afghans are good at

solving problems when they must, and we must help them to deal

with as many as they can.

There are positive signs that Afghans are making progress. Secretary Armitage described in his testimony how the Afghan people

made a significant step forward with the successful convening of

the loya jirga. But along with self-government must come self-sufficiency, in terms of Afghanistan’s security. That task is made more

challenging by the formidable geography of Afghanistan. It is a

country roughly the size of Texas, with peaks in the Hindu Kush

Range, which translated, by the way, means ‘‘Hindu Killer,’’ that

reach some 24,000 feet, 10,000 feet higher than the highest of the

Rockies.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put up a chart. When

we say that it is roughly the size of Texas, at least for those of us

who are not natives of Texas, it may not carry enough meaning.

I found it more meaningful to look at a map of Afghanistan superimposed on the southern United States, and you can see that it

would stretch from Washington, DC, down almost to New Orleans,

and from St. Louis, Missouri, down past Atlanta. It is huge.

It is not only large, but if I could show you another chart, it has

incredible terrain. This is a satellite photograph of Afghanistan,

and the neighboring regions of Pakistan. You can see the enormous

expanse of mountains, and down in the southwest corner, that formidable desert, which, in the Afghan language, is called the Desert

of Death.

The sheer size and unforgiving terrain of the country has been

a major factor in planning our military operations, and it must remain a key factor in planning long-term security arrangements;

but, encouragingly, the situation is becoming more stable. Out of

32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have experienced harassVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
13

ment mainly in only 5. The Taliban has so far failed to mount their

often predicted spring offensive, and loya jirga convened with no

serious security incidents, despite numerous threats.

Our coalition partners are contributing to stability through their

humanitarian work. It is especially worth noting that Jordanian

personnel have been running a field hospital, which by itself, to

date, has treated some 77,000 Afghan civilians. The overall improvements in conditions in the country are perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that people are voting with their feet. In just

the first 5 months of the year, 1.2 million refugees are recorded as

having returned to Afghanistan. That was the U.N.’s projection for

the entire year of 2002. The U.N. has now doubled its target to 2

million refugees that they hope will return in this calendar year.

On the security front, we are committed to working with the Afghan Transitional Authority and the international community to

find effective solutions to the remaining challenges to that country’s security. One of the most important pieces is training the Afghan army. At the beginning of May, U.S. Army instructors took

on the task of helping to build an Afghan national army by initiating the training of the first group of Afghan recruits. Coalition

partners are also assisting in this effort. France has already begun

training a battalion, and others, including the United Kingdom,

Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Korea, India, and Romania, are assisting

with personnel, or funding, or equipment.

I would appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, and all of the Members of

the Senate and of the House, to approve as rapidly as possible our

supplemental request for fiscal year 2002. It contains a request for

$50 million in FMF and $20 million in peacekeeping operations

funds that would permit us to accelerate the training and equipping of an Afghan army.

The biggest gap, I must say, in this effort has been the lack of

authorities for funding. Even though we have a lot of money for

other purposes, we have to scrape around and go to some of the

countries I just mentioned in order to get the funds for salaries or

equipment.

To further enhance regional stability, the 18-nation International

Security Assistance Force has been helping to stabilize the situation in the capital of Kabul. The British did a splendid job leading

that effort in its first 6 months, and we expect the same from our

Turkish allies who have now agreed to take over the lead.

Last month, the U.N. Security Council extended ISAF’s mandate

in Kabul until the end of the year. ISAF forces helped to train the

Afghan national guard that protected Kabul during the loya jirga.

Other important efforts to provide a more secure environment include the very important German-led effort to train a police force,

and British counterdrug operations.

However, the most important instrument that the Afghan Authority and we have to establish a stable security situation is the

leverage provided by economic assistance. It is in our interest to

provide such assistance, and to help the Afghans rebuild their

country after almost a quarter century of war so that it will not

once again become a haven for terrorists.

The leadership provided by the State Department, as described

by Secretary Armitage, has been key to that effort. Particularly imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
14

portant was the organization of the Tokyo Donors Conference that

Secretary Armitage described. In support of those reconstruction efforts, the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] is also executing a

plan to collocate personnel from the U.S. Agency for International

Development and the State Department besides our Special Forces

and civil affairs teams that are operating throughout the country.

This will allow USAID people to get out beyond Kabul and better

monitor U.S. assistance, while providing them some protection in

what remains an insecure environment.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the campaign in Afghanistan, along

with many other efforts now underway by many instruments of our

government, has contributed to the disruption of the global terror

network in tangible and far-reaching ways. Our task extends well

beyond Afghanistan, and even in Afghanistan it will still be a long

and difficult one, but the stakes are enormous.

As President Bush said, speaking to the cadets at West Point 2

weeks ago, ‘‘We have our best chance since the rise of the Nation

state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers

compete in peace, instead of prepare for war.’’ We can do this not by imposing our own model of human

progress on other nations of the world, but, as the President said,

‘‘we can support this effort when we reward governments that

make the right choices for their own people.’’

In our development aid, in our development efforts, in our broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will

promote moderation, tolerance, and human rights, and we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.

In Afghanistan today, we see a democratic spirit rising from the

remnants of a once-failed state that is trying to defy the ravages

of decades of war and misrule. Despite a beginning that will at

times be rocky, and no doubt suffer some setbacks, the Afghan people are hopeful for a new tomorrow, hopeful that they, too, can

have a chance at peace instead of war. We remain committed to

doing our part to help them on that journey, and we want history

ultimately to judge us as having been dedicated to liberation, not

occupation. We appreciate the continued leadership of this committee and the support of the Congress in these ongoing efforts.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee: This Committee has

long provided our country strong leadership and bipartisan support, especially now

as the United States wages the war against terrorism. I appreciate the opportunity

to discuss with you today the Defense Department’s perspective on how the campaign in Afghanistan to kill, capture and disrupt terrorists has helped us protect

the American people, and how we are helping the Afghan people help themselves

to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a terrorist sanctuary.

I. HOW THE CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN HAS HELPED PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

From the beginning of the war on terrorism, President Bush emphasized that the

United States must use ‘‘every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy,

every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war, to the destruction and defeat of the global

terror network.’’ Each has a role; each reinforces the others. The military is only

one of the instruments that we need to wage this war on terrorism. The military

cannot do its job without the support of other elements, particularly intelligence,

15

and its role is frequently to support the efforts of those other instruments of national power.

This hearing is focused—and appropriately so—on Afghanistan and our military

effort there, but it’s important to emphasize, as we have from the beginning, that

this campaign is not about a single country or a single terrorist network. Al-Qaeda

alone is spread throughout the world; it is a network. A network, by its very nature,

is based on the idea that should one node be eliminated, the network can still continue to function.

Well before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had burrowed into some 60 nations, including the United States and Germany, France and Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the

Philippines. It had critical nodes in Hamburg, Germany and Jacksonville, Florida

as well as Afghanistan. The pilots who flew the suicide attacks were not trained in

Afghanistan; many got their training in the United States.

Afghanistan was an important node in the network, but by its nature a network

does not have a headquarters. So, while we focus on Afghanistan today, we must

understand that Afghanistan is only one node of this terrorist network. The very

name of this organization, al-Qaeda, which means ‘‘base’’ in Arabic, indicates that

the entire organization is the base of terrorist operations. It is spread throughout

the world and it needs to be eliminated, root and branch.

In Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda’s malignant plots and plans flourished under the

protection of the tyrannical and corrupt Taliban, America’s armed forces went to

work to root out both. Our intent, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, was to deprive the

terrorists of a sanctuary in Afghanistan where they could safely plan, train and organize—not only to capture and kill terrorists, but to drain the swamp in which

they breed. Over the last eight months, with our coalition partners, we have defeated a vicious and repressive regime that gave refuge to evil. We have killed or

captured many of its ringleaders. And we have others on the run, where they are

more vulnerable.

Even in Afghanistan, our work is far from complete, although we are encouraged

by the many truly remarkable aspects of the campaign to date.

Our military campaign in Afghanistan has had some striking features, some surprising, others less so. Not surprisingly, we have seen America’s Armed Forces conduct their operations with great bravery and skill, as we saw at Mazar-e-sharif,

Tora Bora and in Operations Anaconda and Mountain Lion. What may have been

a surprise to some was the remarkable speed with which military plans were put

together, the swift success of the military operations—in weeks rather than months,

and with relatively few troops on the ground. On September 11th, there simply was

no war plan on the shelf for Afghanistan. General Franks was starting from scratch

on September 20 when he received the order to begin planning, but less than three

weeks later, on October 7th, we commenced the military operations. And less than

two weeks after that, troops were operating on the ground. In many ways, it was

a remarkable feat of logistical and operational agility.

Another element of our success, which was undoubtedly a surprise to the terrorists and barely noticed by many others, was something that did not happen, something that calls to mind Sherlock Holmes’ famous observation about the dog that

didn’t bark. We did not become bogged down in a quagmire—unlike the British in

the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th century. Nations that arrive in Afghanistan with massive armies tend to be treated as invaders, and they regret it. Mindful of that history, General Franks deliberately and carefully kept our footprint

small to avoid just such a predicament. On balance, our partnership with indigenous

forces has been very positive.

From the beginning of the war on terrorism, we have stressed the importance of

understanding the nature of our enemy as a world-wide network. Al-Qaeda is not

a snake that can be killed by lopping off its head. It is more analogous to a disease

that has infected many parts of a healthy body. There is no one single solution. You

can’t simply cut out one infected area and declare victory, but success in one area

can lead to success in other areas as well. The bottom line, as President Bush and

Secretary Rumsfeld have repeatedly cautioned, is that this campaign will be a long

and difficult one.

Coalition forces have eliminated the secure operating environment that al-Qaeda

enjoyed in Afghanistan and degraded cohesion of the worldwide network. Well over

500 enemy—including somewhat less than half of the top 30 leaders—have been

killed or captured—as a result of operations in Afghanistan and are currently held

in Guantanamo or in Afghanistan. Equally important, if not more so, the world-wide

efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in cooperation with more

than 90 countries, have resulted in the arrest of some 2,400 individuals.

Our military success in Afghanistan has contributed to that success by encouraging others to cooperate. Our efforts in Afghanistan have also helped law enforceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
16

ment actions more directly. Abu Zubayda, one of bin Laden’s key lieutenants, driven

out of his sanctuary in Afghanistan and was captured last March; his partial cooperation in turn contributed to the detention of Jose Padilla, who came into the

United States with the intention of planning and coordinating terrorist attacks. A

Moroccan detainee in Guantanamo told of three Saudis planning terrorist acts in

Morocco, all of whom were subsequently arrested, including one top al-Qaeda operative. In December, the discovery of a videotape in a safe house in Afghanistan led

to the arrest of an al-Qaeda cell in Singapore that was planning to attack a U.S.

aircraft carrier and U.S. personnel in that country.

President Musharraf’s leadership has made Pakistan a much less friendly environment for Taliban and al-Qaeda. Since last fall, the U.S. has sent the government

of Pakistan about 1,500 requests for assistance on terrorist suspects. They have responded to most of them and continue to work on others. In the course of numerous

raids on foreign terrorist suspects, some 370 arrests have been made.

These developments are encouraging. However, it is important to remember that

al-Qaeda is still dangerous and active. This network still poses threats that should

not be underestimated. However, when the network as a whole is under pressure

and on the run, it becomes harder for them to carry out their evil plans and more

likely that they will make mistakes that permit us to capture more of them.

II. HELPING TO BUILD A STABLE AFGHANISTAN

While our primary mission in Afghanistan has been to kill or capture terrorists

who threaten the United States or those who have harbored them, it is also important to help the Afghans establish long-term stability in that country, so that Afghanistan does not once again become an outlaw country that provides sanctuary

for terrorists. While the success of those efforts will depend most of all on the Afghans themselves, the United States and its coalition partners have a critical role

to play in achieving that goal. In shaping that role, as in shaping the military campaign itself, we have been very mindful of the historical Afghan animosity to foreign

armies and foreign occupiers.

We have always viewed our mission in Afghanistan as one of liberation, not one

of occupation. So with this in mind, we have tackled the challenge of striking the

balance between keeping Afghanistan from reverting back to a terrorist sanctuary,

and keeping our footprint small. Afghans are an independent, proud people. For

that reason, we have emphasized from the beginning that we intend to minimize

the number of troops there, and to focus instead on helping the Afghan people to

help themselves in their journey to representative self-governance.

We have made it clear, and we need to continue to do so: we have no intent of

‘‘colonizing’’ Afghanistan. We have been careful, through our actions and through

our words, to avoid creating the expectation that the United States is going to solve

all of the Afghanistan’s problems. We have made a determined effort not to take

sides in Afghanistan’s internal politics. In fact, we have seen that Afghans are good

at solving problems when they must; and we must let them deal with as many as

they can.

If a representative government is to take hold, Afghans themselves are the only

ones who can make self-government a reality. President Bush has said that the

United States does not intend to create the future government of Afghanistan. ‘‘It

is up to the Afghans themselves,’’ he said, ‘‘to determine their future.’’ As they do,

the United States and our allies will continue to support the new Transitional Authority and the people of Afghanistan. Their success will contribute, not only to the

long-term stability of Afghanistan, but to the peace and security of the world at

large.

There are positive signs that the Afghans are making progress. Just last week,

the Afghan people made a significant step forward when more than 1,500 delegates

from all 32 provinces and ethnic backgrounds came together under one roof. When

this traditional loya jirga, or Grand Council, elected Hamid Karzai president of the

new two-year transitional government based on Western-style ideas of control and

accountability. A Karzai senior advisor captured how extraordinary was this first

step, saying that, for the first time in 23 years, the people of Afghanistan are acquiring a voice.

Along with self-government must come self-sufficiency in terms of Afghanistan’s

security. That task is made more challenging by the formidable geography of Afghanistan. It is a country roughly the size of Texas, with peaks in the Hindu Kush

(or ‘‘Hindu Killer’’) Range that reach some 24,000 feet—ten thousand feet higher

than the highest of the Rockies. The sheer size and unforgiving terrain of the country has been a major factor in the planning of our military operations and remains

a key factor in planning long-term security arrangements.

17

Encouragingly, the situation is becoming more stable. Out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have experienced harassment attacks mainly in five provinces,

in the Taliban heartland of southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban have so

far failed to mount their often predicted spring offensive. The loya jirga convened

with no serious security incidents—despite numerous threats—and clashes among

militia leaders have been limited.

The Taliban regime collapsed quickly with no successor. Not surprisingly, criminal activity revived faster than police forces could be created. This activity tends to

be localized along routes through which international aid flows: from the North and

from Pakistan—incidentally, traditional areas for banditry.

Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure is another hindrance, not only to maintaining

security, but also to distributing humanitarian aid. From the beginning, humanitarian operations were a key part of our military operations—a concerted effort to

reverse the desperate conditions created by the Taliban regime. Just one week before September 11th, the U.N. warned that 5.5 million Afghans, surviving on cattle

feed, grass and insects, were facing death without immediate help. The defeat of the

Taliban and the ending of civil war conditions have brought food to more than five

million people who were facing famine last fall.

Even before last September, the United States was the largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. When military operations began last October, those

efforts were stepped up, and, from the beginning, humanitarian missions were an

integral part of our military missions. Today, the picture is vastly different. Easing

the plight of widespread starvation was a humanitarian duty before the war. Today

it is one of the keys to bolstering political and civil stability.

Coalition partners are also contributing to stability through their humanitarian

work. It is especially worth noting that Jordanian personnel have been running a

field hospital that, to date, has treated 77,000 Afghan civilians. The Spanish and

others have also provided assistance through their military hospitals. The Indians

have provided a contingent of military medical personnel.

The improvement in the situation is demonstrated by the fact that people are voting with their feet. In just the first five months of the year, 1.2 million refugees

are recorded as having returned to Afghanistan already, which was the UN’s projection for all of 2002. The UN has now doubled the target to two million.

One crucial factor in the success of a representative government in Afghanistan

is, first and foremost, a stable and secure environment in which it can gain a firm

hold and ultimately flourish. The U.S. is committed to working with the Afghan

Transitional Authority and the international community to find effective solutions

to the remaining challenges to Afghanistan’s security.

One of the most important pieces is training the Afghan army. At the beginning

of May, U.S. Army instructors took on the task of helping build an Afghan national

army, by initiating the training of the initial group of Afghan recruits for the new

Afghan National Army (ANA). Coalition partners are assisting in this effort. France

has already begun training a battalion, and other countries, including the U.K., Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Korea, India, and Romania, are assisting with personnel or

funding or equipment. In the process, we are also ‘‘training the trainers’’ so that the

process can become self-sustaining.

To further enhance regional stability, the 18-nation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been helping to stabilize the situation in the capital city of

Kabul since January. The British did a splendid job leading that effort in its first

six months, and we expect the same from our Turkish allies who have now taken

over the lead.

Last month, the United Nations Security Council extended ISAF’s mandate in

Kabul until the end of the year. ISAF forces helped train the Afghan National

Guard to protect Kabul during the loya jirga, which was held without incident.

Other important efforts to provide a more secure environment include the Germanled police training program and British counter drug operations.

However, the most important instrument that the Afghan Authority and we have

to establish a stable security situation is the leverage provided by economic assistance. It is in our interests to provide such assistance, and to help Afghans rebuild

their country after almost a quarter century of war so it will not again become a

haven for terrorists.

The leadership provided by the State Department as described by Secretary

Armitage, has been key to that effort. Particularly important was the organization

of the Tokyo Donors Conference that Secretary Armitage has described.

Our troops on the ground are also making a direct contribution to economic assistance, implementing humanitarian projects across Afghanistan that include repairing

hospitals, digging wells, and repairing irrigation canals. We repaired or built 48

schools in eight different regions of Afghanistan. And for over 30,000 children for

18

whom the sound of gunfire was a natural part of life, school is open, certainly one

of the most far-reaching ways we have helped shape their future. In Herat, with

just a few U.S. personnel, a U.S. Civil Affairs project, using local labor, de-silted

over 250 kilometers of irrigation canals, allowing thousands of farm families to do

their spring planting. The Department is allotting $10 million dollars for more than

75 such projects, anticipated to continue through the next 12 to 18 months. These

activities have been coordinated with civilian relief organizations and have already

begun to positively impact the lives of many Afghans.

In support of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, CENTCOM is also executing a plan to co-locate personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department with our special forces and civil affairs teams that

are operating throughout Afghanistan. This will allow USAID’s people to get out beyond Kabul and better monitor U.S. assistance, while also providing them some protection in what remains an insecure environment.

CENTCOM’s humanitarian efforts have been undertaken to reduce the suffering

of the Afghan people, and in the process, have helped build the conditions for a stable peace—an outgrowth of health, food, educational, and economic security. The.

U.S. military is proud of its contribution to the important efforts of USAID, the U.S.

Department of State, the U.N. and other international agencies and non-government

organizations to provide a better life and a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Along with the many other law-enforcement, diplomatic, financial and intelligence

efforts now underway, the campaign in Afghanistan has contributed to the disruption of the global terror network in tangible and far-reaching ways. But, our task

extends well beyond Afghanistan and will be a long and difficult one. The stakes

are enormous.

As President Bush said, speaking to cadets at West Point two weeks ago, ‘‘we

have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build

a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.’’ We

can do this is not by imposing our own model of human progress on other nations

of the world. But, as he said, we can support this effort ‘‘when we reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in

our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human

rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.’’

In Afghanistan today, we see a democratic spirit rising from the remnants of a

once-failed state that is trying to defy the ravages of decades of war and misrule.

Despite a beginning that will, at times, be rocky and no doubt suffer some setbacks,

the Afghan people are hopeful for a new tomorrow—hopeful they, too, can have a

chance at peace instead of war. We remain committed to doing our part to help

them on their journey. And we want history ultimately to judge us as having been

dedicated to liberation, not occupation. We appreciate this Committee’s continued

leadership and guidance in these ongoing efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will take 7-minute rounds so everybody gets in, and then if

you have time, we will try for a second round.

Let me begin by saying to you both that, speaking for myself, I

think it is a remarkable military undertaking. Having spent 4 or

5 days down on the ground, it was impressive. It continues to be

impressive, and I think, notwithstanding the fact that it is going

to be fairly easy to Monday morning quarterback everything about

every operation, I think we should all be very proud of what you

have put together, and what our fighting women and men did.

I must tell you, I have had this conversation with Secretary

Armitage. I wish every American could see those young women and

men. I mean they are incredible and will make everybody proud.

But what I want to talk about is not to second-guess anything

we have done so far, I want to figure out what we do from here.

Would one of you, or both of you—I will just ask a generic question,

rather than the finely tuned questions my staff have developed

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here, and that is: Explain to me what the role is of the warlords.

In Mazar, Dostam is obviously the guy in charge, but there is a

power struggle going on up there. In Herat, there is—obviously,

you have a guy named Ismail Khan, who is a tough actor, and

there seems to be some more to that. I am going to put a map up

here, in the absence of my ranking member. This is too hard to see

from here, but these various indications show armed clashes, attacks against minorities, attacks against refugees, attacks and intimidation of loya jirga candidates, and attacks and intimidation of

women, and attacks on international humanitarian NGOs.

Now, over in Iraq, there is not a lot happening there, which is

good, on the surface; but when I was there, the talk was that we

were all concerned about each of these warlords having their own

sponsors. In Herat, we were worried about the Iranians and their

cooperation with Ismail Khan. I spent hours, and hours, and hours,

literally, I mean 6 or 7 hours with the now officially near-term

elected President and his people, including Tajiks in the administration.

The concern was that these warlords all had their own agendas,

and that although they could maintain peace, there would not be

any loyalty to and/or allegiance to a central government. I

thought—and it may be able to be done anyway, I thought our purpose here was not only to drain the swamp, but as—the Congressional Research Service, we asked them to look at this for us, and

they came up with the following summary.

It says, ‘‘U.S.-led efforts to end Afghanistan’s role as a host for

Osama bin Laden and other anti-Western Islamic terrorists requires not only a defeat of the Taliban, but also the reconstruction

of a stable, effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan state.’’

Now, do we think that is true? I mean do we think—obviously,

defeating Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, everybody agrees on

that one, but is it important, is it important that we be responsible

for, the world community and us included, the reconstruction of a

stable, effective, ideologically moderate Afghan state? Is that part

of our charge? If it is, what role do these warlords play in bringing

that about?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Chairman, I will give it a go first. You asked

at the beginning what is the warlords’ agenda. In effect, it is the

same as it has been in the past. It is to hold on to power and be

able to collect revenues. They want to be a large factor in whatever

the future holds for Afghanistan.

No. 2, you would have a very good sense of this after your excellent trip in January out there. The warlords, particularly the one

to whom you referred, Mr. Dostam, feels that he and some of his

Tajik colleagues have had the majority of the burden in the fighting, and they want the majority of the spoils.

The latter question about is it our role to be involved in reconstruction, it seems to me that the President has made the decision

that it is. He said that we are going to be involved for a long time

and he made that very clear. We are going to be involved for a long

time, not just in the sphere, which Paul and Secretary Rumsfeld

are so responsible for in the military sphere, but in the reconstruction, along with the international conference.

20

I think the fact that it was the United States, which was the convener, if you will, of the Tokyo Conference, it indicated that we are

not going to have a half-measure. We are not going to make the

mistake we made in 1989 and allow what is a very nation-state to

backslide into becoming a swamp again.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will just add to that, I agree with everything

that Secretary Armitage said. I think the basic strategy here is,

first of all, to work with those warlords or regional leaders, whatever you prefer to call them, to encourage good behavior. I think

we have a number of means for doing so. Some of them include

local diplomacy. We have been engaging, particularly up in the

Mazar-e-Sharif area, where you pointed out there have been some

recent incidents, due to fighting between two different warlord factions, with our Special Forces who have considerable influence to

encourage better behavior.

As I mentioned in my testimony, we are arranging to have State

Department people out in some of the provincial areas with our

Special Forces, so that they can begin to exercise their good offices.

I think it underscores the importance of economic assistance. Because, as Secretary Armitage said, at the end of the day, what

these people want, among other things and perhaps most of all, are

money and resources to help their people.

The long term solution is to shift the balance of forces between

the central government and the regions—training the Afghan army

is a key element of doing that. Again, I cannot emphasize enough

how important economic assistance is, because the more real resources that flow through Kabul, through the Transitional Authority, the more those local leaders have to look to Kabul.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is it not flowing directly, some of it directly

to these warlords? In other words, one of the things we spent a lot

of time talking about in Kabul, in Afghanistan, and here, with you,

with the State Department, with the White House, is that Karzai’s

popularity and support rest on a couple of factors.

One, he is viewed by all the parties—and when I met with

Kanoni, and all the rest of these guys, they all said, basically, ‘‘We

are not crazy about the guy, but he is the best thing we have to

get aid. He is a magnet for us.’’ Two, he does not have an army.

He does not have any guys. He cannot control it by himself. No.

3, he is the guy who represents the majority, but is going to count

us in on the deal.

So I thought, initially, the notion was that in order to give him

some heft, we had to make sure that everybody understood that

they had to go through him to get that road built in Herat, go

through him to get that school reconstructed in Mazar, and as I understand it, that is not—let me just ask the question. Is that happening? How much goes directly, so that you have a guy like Birkat

Khan who seized control of the whole province, being the guy who

is building the road for the folks down the street?

Mr. ARMITAGE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, these warlords have

access to their own resources for a lot of different reasons, some of

them very bad, like drugs, and they can do anything with that,

such as build roads, or anything else that they are able to.

Our money goes into the central government, and we have relatively little, thus far, representation in the far-flung locations.

21

This is why I put a lot of stock in what Paul was saying, by attaching USAID and State officers to the Special Forces units, whether

they be in the number of a dozen or several dozen in various areas,

so they can give us better advice on what sort of projects might

reasonably be funded out of the central government’s coffers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will come back to that. My time is up.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As both of you

mentioned, the work of our military has been tremendous, and almost semi-miraculous from a standing start, as Secretary

Wolfowitz said. General Franks only started the planning on September 20, that part of the situation was unavoidable, but we

quickly picked up our pace and succeeded.

What is occurring now, it seems to me, does not necessarily have

to be improvised in the same way, but I have a sense that it is

being improvised. Let me review items that you both have discussed as objectives. One is democracy building respect for human

rights educational opportunities, and economic assistance. We hope

the latter leads to at least a reasonable economy, even if not a vibrant economy, as is often mentioned as the goal. It is not clear to

me how much of that is occurring in Afghanistan; but some may,

and probably a lot should.

There must be a security framework around, so that as the democracy, the economy, and public diplomacy begin to work, it does

not fall part at the fringes, outside of Kabul at the country’s extremities. Likewise, how this fits with what we are doing. Do we

have a plan or plans for Pakistan? Our commitments there are

very substantial, or at least have been implied that way. Similsrly

what are our commitments in Tajikstan, Uzbekistan and other

countries nearby.

My hope would be that at some point the administration would

be able to provide, if not a book, at least a report as to how all of

this is likely to be achieved over the course of an intermediate period of time. What I think we are getting, essentially, are reports

of very commendable activities, but I do not have a confident sense

of exactly where all of this leads, except that we are hopeful for the

best.

In part, there has to be improvisation. We have the 18 members

of ISAF, and they have their own agendas, although they are coincident by and large with ours. We are committed, as Secretary

Wolfowitz said, not to become bogged down, and there is a lot of

thoughtfulness about how you do this without becoming bogged

down. Likewise, how do we run military operations, the cleanup

situation, or the activities at the border, even as we try to establish

peace.

Can either one of you give some idea as to what the thinking is

in the administration pulling together State, Defense, Treasury, et

cetera, and in some coherent plan that all of us could understand

and support give some idea of what kind of financial commitments

are required, not just for this year, but for several years down the

trail?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator Lugar, I will commit to sending a letter

to the committee, outlining just this, but I want to respond directly

22

to your question, but it would be necessarily a lengthy response,

and we’ll do it.

To the extent we have well developed thinking, and I appreciate

your comments about the need for a little improv along the way,

security is the overarching necessity. And, underneath that, we

have agriculture, for the obvious reasons, and health, the next two

in order of priority, and the reasons are quite obvious, because one

half of the 26-plus million people in Afghanistan have a need either

in the health area or in the food area. They have malnutrition, et

cetera.

So that gives you a pretty good idea of your next two priorities,

and after that, education, which is right up next to it, and then infrastructure development. That is just sort of the priority, as we

see it, and we are trying to put our money against it.

Right now, Senator, in answer to your specific comments about

democracy, human rights, et cetera, we have 21 State people at our

embassy in Kabul, and seven USAID people, one person who covers

human rights, and one who covers religious freedom and democracy. So I think, given the 10 percent of our staffing there, that will

give you an idea of the emphasis we are putting on it.

In terms of public diplomacy, I am pleased with our story. You

are the ultimate judge, and I appreciate your comments about

Under Secretary Beers, but in the last 4 months, we have increased Radio Free Afghanistan broadcasting to 7 hours a day. We

have Voice of America, up from 2.5 to 6 hours a day. We have two

transmitters being built, which will provide 24/7 coverage for radio,

the principle means of communications in Afghanistan.

We have exchange programs, one ongoing now with young students, called the Seeds of Peace program, and we have 12 participants here in the United States, and in August, we will have 18

women from the Women in Government group visit. We could have

had it earlier, but we did not know who was going to be in government, and who was going to be around. So now that they have had

their loya jirga, we are bringing them in August.

We are dealing in the country with a literacy rate that is about

15 percent above the age of 15. So printed materials are not a desired medium across the board, unless they are very much pictographs. So I think we are alert to the problems of public diplomacy.

I will send a letter to the committee with our full thinking and the

numbers we think would be associated with this over the next several years, Senator.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that would be very helpful, because the letter apparently would be the plan.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Indeed.

Senator LUGAR It would illustrate the necessary elements that

are important in all of this, and have money attached to it. That

is important in giving us some idea of where we are headed in all

this.

Having said that, you mentioned you have an employee devoted

to democracy and one devoted to human rights. Granted, the State

Department might not have resources for more people there, but

organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy, or others can be engaged. We must utilize all the tools at our disposal.

It is extremely important, in terms of our national security, that

23

Afghanistan be a success, so that there is, in the Muslim world, a

success?

In other words, the overall public diplomacy message that keeps

coming to us is that polls of countries indicate people do not like

us, and in some cases, that understates it. To what extent does success in Afghanistan help turn that around, offer a model of a better

life for people, that represents our ideals and our country?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Sir, we are very bullish on the National Endowment of Democracy, as a general matter. We are going to make use

of them in many countries around the world. I have Ambassador

David Johnson with me here today, and he can provide the specifics about whatever contracts we may have with them right now.

I do not know.

Of the 21 people, as I mentioned, in the embassy now, we have

two devoted to the issues that you mentioned. We are going up to

31 State people over the summer. We are only limited by the fact

that they are living in trailers, and we have a chancery that partly

works and partly does not. We do not have any living quarters, et

cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the toilets flush yet?

Mr. ARMITAGE. They do, sir. I will not tell the story you told us

about it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. I want to make sure—well, do we

need to provide money so you can build something else? I mean——

Mr. ARMITAGE. We have the money in the supplemental, sir, for

that, and I am anticipating no problem, other than getting the supplemental voted on.

On the larger question of the necessity of a success, particularly

in the Muslim world; absolutely, but it is tied, I think, to the country you mentioned earlier, Pakistan. I do not think we are actually

going to have a success, unless we are successful in both countries.

President Karzai has informed us that he is quite convinced of

the sincerity of President Musharraf, and the fact that notwithstanding 10 or 11 years of a failed policy in Pakistan regarding

support for the Taliban, that right now, Pakistan is on the right

side of the ledger, President Musharraf is moving, I think, quite assiduously against madrasses, making them at least registered, if

not getting rid of those that are beyond the pale. You saw in today’s news broadcast that by virtue of the fact that he has ordered

his soldiers into the heretofore forbidden tribal areas, they are suffering casualties very much at our behest, but I think the success

has to be the success of both countries.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Lugar, if I might just make a point, on

the security front. We do have a plan to train 14,400 soldiers for

the Afghan army over the next 18 months, and quite frankly, we

are looking at whether that number might be increased. The two

biggest issues are recruitment and funding. I would appeal once

again for congressional action on the State Department supplemental, which contains $50 million for training and $20 million for

peacekeeping operation funds. The sooner we get that money, the

sooner we will be able to look at expanding recruitment. Also, in our request for fiscal year 2003, we requested $100 million in authority to move DOD funds, if appropriate, from other

programs or operational funds into this kind of training. I would

24

appeal to get—I think it is not so far made it through the budget

process up here—but I would appeal to you to try to consider that,

because I think it would give us a great deal more flexibility if the

opportunities develop to do more training.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you for those specific suggestions; we appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer has to leave, and Senator Nelson

has been gracious enough to—— Senator BOXER. Well, I got here before he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, but I go by the seniority rule; but go

ahead.

Senator BOXER. No; I am senior to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are.

Senator BOXER. So what is the problem?

The CHAIRMAN. No problem.

Senator BOXER. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought I was just being nice here.

Senator BOXER. Senator, you are always nice.

Senator BOXER. I just want to say to both of you, thank you very

much for your focus on this. I could not agree more with Senator

Lugar, as far as making Afghanistan a success, and it is in our

hands, and that is the burden of being the leader of the free world,

and we are, and in this particular case, we cannot afford failure.

It is not an option, as they say. I also wanted to note again the

presence of the women’s groups who are here today, and to thank

them from the bottom of my heart.

Mr. Chairman and our Ranking Member, Senator Lugar, I think

it is important to note what Bernard Lewis said, who is a great historian, and a pretty conservative one at that, and when asked by

Charlie Rose if he could name the one reason that the Muslim

countries have not been able to be successful, the answer came

back without a moment’s pause, ‘‘The women. They have not allowed the women to be part of the society.’’ This was quite an eloquent statement, I think, from him.

So what I want to spend my time doing, and I hope to be able

to do it on a one-on-one with you, Secretary Wolfowitz, if we have

a chance, is to plead the case, make the case for immediate expansion of the international force. That does not mean our troops. It

does not mean occupation. Of course, you are right on the point,

it means protection, and protection is not occupation.

When you have Hamid Karzai asking for this, and when you

have Dr. Sima Samar, who the President was so gracious to put

in the gallery, the First Lady’s box, during the State of the Union

Address, asking for this, and when you have the women coming to

us via these women’s organizations, and also in person, taking the

risks of travel, to tell us this is their highest priority, and I would

say, Secretary Armitage, you are right, they list security first, then

they talk about education, health, and the rest.

I just want to put into the record, Mr. Chairman, a couple of

third party quotes from my position here. The international think

tank, the International Crisis Group, wrote, ‘‘The security situation

outside Kabul remains tenuous, and roadside banditry and flareups of fighting between rival military factions have been common.

Many unemployed former fighters, with weapons and time on their

25

hands, represent a dangerous element.’’ And they say, ‘‘It is deeply

troubling that some Afghans are expressing nostalgia for the relative security and stability that were present before.’’ I think it is important, because we have to know history, that it

was this very lack of security that led to the Taliban coming into

power in the first place. The Taliban first gained the support of

Pakistan in 1994, when they rescued a 30-truck Pakistani convoy

that was hijacked by a warlord just south of Kandahar. The

Taliban gained popularity throughout Afghanistan at that time by

continuing to eliminate roadblocks that were set up by local warlords, where hijackings and extortion were common, and we know

what happened then. Osama bin Laden was given haven, et cetera.

None of us wants it to happen. You do not. We do not. It cannot

happen. But I say that there is this lack of security.

The International Crisis Group has recommended that force be

increased from its current level of 4,500 to 25,000 troops, and other

respective organizations, the Stimson Center called for 18,000

troops. I guess I am puzzled, because on this issue we have been

so close together, people from different sides of the aisle, why there

seems to be this hesitancy when it is not going to be American

troops. Karzai is asking for it, and we know in 2 years, hopefully,

the Afghan people can protect themselves. This is an interim kind

of solution.

During February and March of 2002, Human Rights Watch documented cases of sexual violence against Pushtun women, perpetrated by the three main ethnically based parties, and then militias in the north. Many women describe how they have to fight off

attackers, or hide young female relatives out of fear of rape. We

know Sima Samar herself had threats. She had to spend one night

at the United Nations guest house. And outside of Kabul, it is far

worse.

Reuters reported in April an acid attack on a female teacher in

Kandahar after handwritten pamphlets were found, circulating in

the city, warning men against sending their daughters to school or

their wives to work. I have heard first hand from Afghan women,

who call my office, who say that security is their No. 1 concern.

So I would say one more thing here. Bernette Rubin, an expert

on Afghanistan, wrote the following in the New York Times, ‘‘Both

Afghans and international officials see the refusal to expand the

international force as the start of American disengagement repeating the mistake of the 1990s, despite promising to learn from that

experience. Providing security for rebuilding Afghanistan is now

the front line in the war against terrorism. Failure here will undermine all other commitments, and many fear failure has already

started. There is still time to prove them wrong.’’

Now, I do not believe that failure has started. I see so many wonderful, good things, and when Secretary Armitage talked about the

loya jirga, and the women’s voice, and the fact that in this amazing

setting, things got accomplished, and got done, and Karzai was—

these are all wonderful things.

I am just concerned that for some doctrinaire reason—occupation, that is not what we are asking for. We are saying, protection

of the people. It is a short-term thing. I would hope we could get

past this idea that if we do support a larger troop deployment, it

26

is occupation, because I do not see that at all. I see it as an interim

measure, and I—in the time remaining, I wonder if you could comment, is your mind opened at all to this?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. First of all, let me say, I agree with a great deal

of what you said, particularly about the importance of women, both

in Afghanistan and in the Muslim world, in the larger sense. There

are a few things that are just factually wrong, and it is important

to start from the right set of facts.

Whoever referred to the relative stability and security that were

provided by the Taliban obviously did not read about the 5 million

people on the verge of starvation, or the civil war that was raging

in that country.

Senator BOXER. No, no. You misunderstood. Those were people

who were telling reporters this. Of course, it is ridiculous, but if

even some people think that, it is dangerous.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But there has been a huge improvement

in the situation. That it is not perfect is not surprising. It is a

country that has been through 25 years of civil war, and it is going

to take time. Things are not going to change immediately.

But the other one is, there is no refusal to expand the Afghan

force, whether it is referring to the Afghan army, where I have

been saying over and over again, we would like more money to be

able to expand it faster, or whether it is referring to ISAF, where

there is absolutely no doctrine. I mean, no one is saying that we

are opposed to expanding ISAF, or opposed to having it play other

roles. Our biggest problem so far has been sustaining ISAF in its

present role.

One of our big diplomatic challenges of the last few months,

which we were successful at, was finding someone to take over the

lead from the British in ISAF. When the Turks agreed to take it

over, they expressed extreme reluctance to take on missions outside

of Kabul. That does not mean that we are holding a doctrine opposed to looking at other roles, but it is important to remember

both the magnitude of the problems that this government has inherited, and the sheer size and unruliness of the country.

Are there going to be problems? We are going to make progress

on them, it seems to me, step by step. I think we are making

steady progress, but one of the reasons why we say it is going to

be a long road is that there is a lot of work to do. But there is no

doctrine involved here at all. We are trying to do whatever makes

sense to stabilize that country.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMITAGE. You have an exquisite understanding of the problems of women in Afghanistan, but I want to get on the record

about this. Security is the overarching one, but 23 years of war, the

years of Taliban rule, have all brought other things to the fore that

we have to be attacking simultaneously. It is not just a matter of

empowerment of women, which is important in and of itself. We

have an education problem.

During the Taliban rule, of those eligible for primary school, 39

percent of boys went to school, only 3 percent of women were enrolled in school. Right now, out of 4.4 million primary school-eligible kids, we have over 3 million enrolled, so almost 75 percent.

27

Now, women, or girls, lag behind boys, but we are well up to the

60 percentile mark of girls going to school.

If you look at the health care area, one in 15 Afghan women dies

as a result of a pregnancy, or a post-natal problem. That compares

to one in 3,000 here in the United States. One in four kids in Afghanistan die before they are 5 years old. So we have a whole

bunch of problems to attack at the same time, and not just the

ISAF ones.

Senator BOXER. Right. Mr. Chairman, I am going to end here

and just say this. I sense a little bit of spark of hope there when

you say there is no doctrinaire approach to this, you are going to

look at this. So I feel that it is hopeful.

Let me just say, you cannot go to the doctor, and you cannot go

to school, indeed, you cannot go out of your house if you do not feel

safe; so protection, it seems to me, is the key here. I hope we will

listen more to the voice of the women there, because that really is

the voice of the people, I think. And if we do that, I feel so confident that this will, in fact, be the model that Senator Lugar is

looking for.

I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Let me make sure about, I guess,

something factual. There is no doctrinaire position, but we did—I

met with the British one-star who was in charge of that operation,

and with our military there. We are not opposed to expansion of

ISAF, but we made clear we would be no part of it; is that right?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The ISAF leadership was held by the British

and then by the Turks, and we are trying to keep our forces focused on their job of finding terrorists and finding Taliban.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not my question, Paul. I know that. That

is our first job. But did we not—I was told by the Brits that we

explicitly said we would not be part of an ISAF force, period; is

that right or wrong?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And we are not part of ISAF.

The CHAIRMAN. No, not that we ‘‘are not,’’ we would not, under

any circumstances be part of an ISAF force; is that correct?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, actually, Secretary Armitage is reminding

me, we have 36 people in the headquarters helping to advise them.

There is a very close relationship between ISAF and CENTCOM.

We provide a lot of the basic support that makes them safe and secure. They are really two operations that are connected to one another.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say it another way, and you sound

like your State Department guy now; no offense, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. ARMITAGE. What does the State Department guy sound like,

Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Not like you.

Thank, God. I mean thank God, you do not sound like him.

Let me make sure I understand this. I was told the following,

with a U.S. colonel standing with me, who was a liaison to the

ISAF force, and a captain. After a 2-hour brief, I was told in February and then again in May, that we said we would not be a part

of an expansion of ISAF, no U.S. boots would be on the ground

with an ISAF force, if it expanded.

28

Second, I was told by, and I do not want to—I was told by ISAF

officers that they thought that would be all right, if we had made

a commitment to be an extraction force, if they expanded, or if we

were prepared to provide other guarantees of participation with

them. As the British one-star, whose name escapes me now, said,

‘‘Senator, how long do you think my Parliament will let me stay

here, absent your full participation with us?’’ I then met with Mr. Brohimi, who indicated that the Turks had

told him that they were looking forward to this command, as long

as the ‘‘big dog’’ was with them—us. When the President stated, as

I thought I heard him say, we would not be part of ISAF, the Secretary of Defense said, I thought, I stand to be corrected, we would

not be part of ISAF.

It is not at all surprising to me that the little dog said, ‘‘Well,

wait a minute. We are not interested in expanding.’’ So I am trying

to get that connection. Did we or did we not say we would be part

of ISAF, if it expanded? The way I got it was basically, ‘‘If you guys

want to expand, you go ahead, but do not count us in on the deal.’’ If that is what we said, there is no question no one is going to

expand ISAF. I am trying to get a sense here of what the real story

is.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we have been crucial to making that

operation work. The British were in at the beginning. They stayed

for 6 months. They did not leave because we were not participating. They left because they could not sustain it longer than 6

months, just as they cannot sustain some of their operations on the

other side with our coalition forces.

Our people have important work to do that only American forces

can do, or a few allies in small numbers, and that is rooting out

terrorists and capturing them. It is difficult work, and it is work

that is uniquely suited to the U.S. military. As you mentioned, the

Turks said they would not come in without the ‘‘big dog’’ around.

We gave them the assurances they needed to come in, and we will

give whatever assurances, if those are needed, for other countries

that want to participate.

Our biggest problem to date has been that even the countries

that started out there, like the U.K., cannot sustain those commitments for logistical or other reasons, and there is not a huge number of countries signing up to volunteer.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize to my colleague for interrupting.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I appreciate you

asking the question, because I think we could probably take that

down two or three more levels, and maybe some of our colleagues

will do that, and if I have time, I will come back to that.

Gentlemen, thank you both. As always, we are grateful for your

leadership.

Secretary Armitage, you mentioned that you believe the success

in Afghanistan and Pakistan was tied together. I assume what you

were referring to was our success in the overall region of our policies. My question is this: Does the administration have an integration of policies that, in fact, builds on your observation that you

just shared with us a few minutes ago, that would, in fact, enlarge

just the Afghanistan/Pakistan relationship?

29

For example, do you believe, do you have a policy, and is it so

integrated, and how are you doing it, that the success, and the relationship, and our involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan have

an impact on, are tied to, and coordinated with our policies in the

Middle East, Indonesia, other trouble spots in the world? Do you

believe, as we reverse the optics here, which has been mentioned

this morning, Senator Lugar talked about it, why is it people seem

not to care for us, some people?

Do we have an integrated policy that reverses those optics to say

the Muslim world is looking at us, or the Arab world, or any world,

through their optics, not America’s? Your comment led me to believe, and I want you to respond to this, that, in fact, the administration does have a policy to understand that these areas are all

linked together, Iran, Iraq, that you cannot, in fact, deal in this

universe without having some certainly spillover, symbolism,

words, deeds, actions, that, if you do one here in Afghanistan or

Pakistan, that it is tied, in fact, to how the world sees us and our

actions in the Middle East, or in Indonesia, or anywhere else.

So I would appreciate it if you could take that a little further and

explain to me if we have such a policy, and how it works.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator Hagel, I think Paul and I would say we

have an integrated policy and strategy. I think he would be a better judge of it, and you can tell us after you have examined this.

I mentioned two states, but I think you immediately could expand

it to the Central Asia region, the so-called front line states in the

war on terrorism. We have everything from the supplemental to

our appearances here in front of the committee and other committees. We have made it very clear that we see it as a total package.

I think when you talk about Indonesia and others, it gets back

to our joy and pleasure with Turkey leading the ISAF, because it

makes the point, here is a Muslim country that’s leading, not a foreign occupier trying to put some other religion on top of the nation’s religion. It was a very deliberate choice of ours to go after

Turkey, to make the point that we are trying to make through public diplomacy, that Paul was so eloquent about up there. We do not

want to occupy, we are not here to change your way of life, other

than a few items, and that once we have completed our task, we

will leave.

The public diplomacy aspects are, I think, the area where it is

almost tied together. We are able to make the point in the Muslim

world, and Indonesia, which you mentioned, is the largest Muslim

country in the world, that we are not opposed to the great religion

of Islam. We do this in a number of ways we think are integrated.

It is quite clear that terrorists themselves are not bound by any

geographic region. We have recently seen al-Qaeda—or have reports of al-Qaeda meetings in Indonesia. Malaysia has accomplished, I think, a magnificent endeavor on the arrest of the 15 terrorists, along with Singapore, and arrested a bunch more. So I

think we are pretty integrated.

We are not as far along in our public diplomacy strategy as we

ought to be, and I am sure Under Secretary Beers was quite open

about that. But if understanding is the beginning of wisdom, we

understand that, and then we will go ahead and try to get smarter

on it.

30

Senator HAGEL. Paul, would you like to respond to that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with everything that Rich just said. It

is important, the President has said this, not just to kill terrorists,

but to build a better world beyond this war on terrorism. And I

think a key part of that is reaching out to the Muslim world. My

own experience as an American Ambassador in Indonesia, with

some 200 million Muslims, the largest Muslim population of any

country of the world, convinces me that the great majority of the

world’s Muslims would like to be part of successful, free democratic, prosperous societies, those that embody what might be

called Western values, but that are, in fact, universal values.

I think whoever made the point earlier, that success in Afghanistan can be a useful model, I think was on the right track. I think

success in moderate countries, like Turkey or Indonesia, can contribute to a larger dynamic, but we need to work on the positive

side of this as well as the more negative side of fighting terrorists.

Senator HAGEL. A followup question to that point. Is it just our

interpretation or understanding, as you just said has been said

here, that the role model for Muslim countries really would be Turkey, for other nations? Is that not the designation of the other Muslims/Arabs to decide, rather than for us to decide for them, ‘‘Now,

you want to be like Turkey?’’

I have heard from other Arabs/Muslims from around the world

that Turkey is not necessarily the secular country that many Muslims would emulate. I happen to be a great supporter of Turkey.

My bigger question is: Are we making these determinations

through our optics, or trying to understand the optics of the others,

how they see it, and not just how the United States sees it?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think those lines I quoted from the President

indicate it is up to people to choose their own futures. I think

where they are going on paths that are embracing democracy and

freedom, then it is in our interest to support them. It is their decision, if they are Muslims, to decide what they think Muslim values

are.

My comment about Turkey, my comment about Indonesia—they

are very different countries, by the way. The Indonesians would

emphatically reject the idea that it is a secular country, but it recognizes five different religions, not just a single one.

Senator Boxer referred to Bernard Lewis—many years ago, he

came to visit me in Indonesia when I was Ambassador. We had a

long discussion late one evening with a group of some dozen Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. At the end of it, he said, ‘‘You are Indonesians. You are Indonesian Muslims. You have to decide for

yourselves the place of religion in society. But after what I have

heard this evening, I hope someday you will send missionaries to

other Muslim countries.’’ There are things that people have to decide for themselves, but

I think what we can decide for ourselves is that those countries

that choose to be on the path of democracy, that choose to be on

the path of freedom, that choose to be on the path of economic

growth, fueled by private enterprise, those are countries that I

think represent the future, and a future we want to support.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I think the way that I look at it, Senator, is there

is nothing necessarily contradictory about Islam and democracy,

31

and beyond that, I agree with Paul, that they can choose their own

brand or form, et cetera, but that is, I think, kind of the basic——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, sometimes people suggest that if Islam

is a state religion, that somehow that is inconsistent with our outlook. I ask people to stop and think how many European countries

have Christianity as an official state religion. There are many ways

to pursue paths that represent democracy and freedom. There are

many different ways, but I think we can tell the difference between

those who are on that path and those who are not.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Biden is temporarily out of

the room, and has asked that I preside temporarily, and in that

role, I recognize Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Both of you know how personally I am a fan of the job that both

of you are doing. I think you and your respective two bosses are

some of the finest appointees in the whole administration. I would

use this subject of Afghanistan just simply to say to Secretary

Armitage, as I have already said to Secretary Wolfowitz, let us do

not make the mistake that we made in Iraq when we left the

downed pilot, who happens to be from Jacksonville, Florida, who

was declared dead, Commander Scott Speicher.

We did not go back to get him. There were a series of mistakes.

Then after a live sighting, his status has been changed to MIA, and

there is consultation now going on as to whether or not his status

ought to be changed to POW. But in the meantime, a few weeks

ago, we have confirmed his appointment to captain. I take every

opportunity as I can to remind you all of this, on behalf of Senator

Pat Roberts, Senator Bob Smith, and myself. I will be offering an

amendment to the DOD authorization bill today, again, putting

this issue front and center.

Now, what I want to talk about Afghanistan, I would like you all

to respond, please, is that in my case, having been to Afghanistan

twice since the first of the year, having talked to our troops, having

seen that inhospitable kind of environment, having been so proud

of the phenomenal military success that our Nation had at the outset, as summarized by that photograph on the front pages of

marrying high tech and low tech of the special operations troops,

on horseback, with the Northern Alliance calling in the pinpoint air

strikes. We had this phenomenal success, to begin with, and then

we came to Tora Bora, and it looks like that we let the back door

stay open so that they could get out; and our prime objective of alQaeda, bin Laden himself, escaped, and part of trying to remedy

that is us trying to help close that border, or have hot pursuit.

I have spoken directly with the President of Pakistan about that

issue, and he has to say one thing publicly, and I understand that,

but it’s just like Bonnie and Clyde in the 1920s, they would rob a

bank, and they would go across the state line, and the sheriff that

was pursuing them could not go after them. He would have to stop

at the state line. Well, we need to be able to pursue. But there was

a lot more involved in Tora Bora.

There were questionable loyalties; why did we, for example, go

with a guy named Hazret Ali, instead of Ghamsharik, and then he

hired a guy named Ilyas Knel, and there is some question about

32

them actually giving cover to the retreating al-Qaeda, so that they

got across the border.

Can you enlighten us, in light of our phenomenal military success, how did we goof there? And then further answer the question,

if you would, I take it that we tried to correct some of our mistakes

when we went in on the Anaconda mission?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, as I understand it, there are a couple

of tactical considerations that have to be kept in mind, and then

a larger strategic one. From a tactical point of view, first of all, it

has to be underscored just how quickly everything was happening.

This operation in Tora Bora took place, I think, only 3 weeks after

the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, and even less time than that after the

fall of Kabul.

General Franks was assembling what he could assemble very

quickly. It was his judgment, and the judgment of tactical commanders, that to do that operation alone in that incredibly difficult

terrain would have required a massive highly visible buildup, and

a major logistic undertaking, which would have ensured the departure of many more enemy forces before we even arrived.

Second, and related to that point, is, I would like to go back to

my satellite photograph of Afghanistan. We are talking about an

incredible country. You do not seal borders there. It is not even

clear that if we had had an all-American operation, and the time

to assemble people, that we would have done a better job. It is

true, they would not have been bribed, that was a problem; but on

the other hand, they would not have known the terrain as well,

they would not have known the local people.

The net effect of that operation was, in fact, the capture—both

in Afghanistan and Pakistan—and killing of several hundred alQaeda, so I would not judge it a failure. In fact, under the circumstances, the speed at which it was put together, I think, is

pretty impressive. So when in Anaconda we relied more heavily on

American and coalition forces, it was not because we had, quote,

‘‘learned a lesson,’’ but we had more capability available.

I would also think that this discussion and many others would

benefit from recognizing the strategic point that I made in my testimony, which is that we deliberately did not plan an operation in

Afghanistan to put in 100,000 or 150,0000 American troops along

the model of the Soviets. I think that is what the terrorists expected us to do—they expected us to get bogged down, and to have

opportunities to kill us in great numbers, and for us to make a lot

of new enemies in Afghanistan.

Not everyone that we enlisted at Tora Bora were people we

wanted to enlist; but on the whole, we have had a good deal of success in enlisting local forces to do our work for us, and in the process, do some of their own. It is imperfect. I think anyone who sets

a standard of perfection really does not understand anything about

the history or the geography of that country. Against a reasonable

standard, I believe that General Franks and his people have been

remarkably successful and shown remarkably good judgment.

Senator NELSON. Well, as a matter of fact, in Anaconda, it is my

understanding that you actually ran a feint of the old Soviet model

of the frontal attack, and when that was repulsed, the al-Qaeda

were high-fiving about how they had done it again, just like they

33

had done to the Soviets over a decade earlier, but then you

swooped in on them from the rear, and you are certainly to be commended for that.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is our military that deserves to be commended, but I think they have learned either by studying or by intuition a great number of the lessons from the terrible experience

of the Soviets there; and I think, as you correctly point out, it took

the terrorists by surprise. I think they expected us to repeat some

of what they had seen 20 years ago, and we did not let them do

that.

Senator NELSON. Did over 1,000 al-Qaeda get away in Tora

Bora?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is very hard to determine numbers. The numbers I have seen are less than that. We think hundreds got away,

but many more hundreds were killed or captured. Even those estimates are a bit uncertain, because some of those killed people are

still buried in the bottom of caves and tunnels that we will never

find out about.

Senator NELSON. Did many get away in Anaconda?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would like to answer that for the record. My

impression and recollection from that time—and, again, let me

start out by saying that there was an awful lot we did not know

about that terrain and those conditions. Our estimates—and they

are estimates—I believe were much smaller.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the

chairman of this committee for holding this timely hearing.

And I want to thank both these gentlemen, these two Secretaries, for their just truly exceptionally, outstanding leadership. It

has been magnificent listening to you. I continue to be impressed

with your leadership, in that you have an understanding of situations. You are principled, but you are also very pragmatic.

In following up on part of the answer that was to Senator Nelson’s question, we are running into a lot of history here, history

and geography, and for everyone, and I am glad to hear your positive outlook, and it is good to be optimistic.

But let us recognize the history of the instability, and violence,

and the lack of democracy in this country just in the last 100 years

of Afghanistan. In the last 100 years, they have had 12 rulers,

most of which ended their terms being assassinated, deposed, or

exiled.

I could go through them. You ought to go through them all, from

1919, Durani Pashtun, Hadid Bula Khan, assassinated, because too

much British influence, Amanulah Khan, deposed and exiled in

1929 due to a revolt by the Ghilzias, in opposition to his modernization ideas; 1929, one that did not even last 1 year, another,

a Tajik overthrown and killed; another one assassinated; next one,

deposed and exiled; overthrown and killed after that; next one,

killed in a shoot-out.

From 1978 to 1979, Hafizullah Amin, overthrown and killed, invading Soviet military forces; Karmal, 1986, replaced and exiled.

Another Pushtun in 1992 overthrown and killed. The Mujahadeen

34

retreated to the extreme northeast. And, of course, Mullah Omar

fled in the face of the United States’ attacks and bombings, and

also attacks by anti-Taliban forces.

This is what you all are facing, as we are trying to bring some

stability and concepts of universal freedoms and human rights to

this country, which has no history of it. In fact, when it was ever

tried, it ended up being to the detriment, extreme detriment of

whomever was trying to move it that way.

Now, we are talking about draining this swamp. The people of

Afghanistan are fortunate that the good leadership and efforts of

our military forces have removed from that swamp the Taliban

forces, their repression and intolerance. What we now need to do

is fill in that swamp with soil, so that these concepts of security,

and freedom, and individual liberty can take root and grow.

Now, in doing so, we first have to install security and a structure

that will endure, so that you can have this concept of individual

rights, and a concept put into a constitution that one’s group

rights, or ethnic rights, or tribal rights are protected, and that individual rights are protected, and also, obviously, a constitution.

Now, how this is going to be formed? I would like to hear your

views as whether this is a federation or a confederation that secures security, No. 1. You talked about agriculture and health, economic development, education, and opportunities through individual freedom. Some of the more powerful warlords have expressed reservations about the loya jirga, and have intimated that

they would resist any control, centralized control, from Kabul. This

is not at all surprising, again, looking at Afghanistan’s history; but

it does certainly present a problem, as far as having a unified country.

So what we are going to end up with? And this is my concern,

and I would like you all to address it, is whether we are going to

end up with all of these—you will try to get a regional force, or a

national force, but you may end up with regional forces, and you

are either going to have this current regime being a transitional regime, hopefully, to a pluralistic democracy, with respect and protection of individual rights, thereby securing all ethnic groups; or you

are going to end up with a divided country, with the Northern Alliance group, the Tajiks, and the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks, and then

the southern part, generally by Pushtuns, or the third approach is

going to be a very long-term caretaker ward of the international

community of obviously all the bordering neighboring countries, as

well as others, which means a very, very long deployment, and

probably not very satisfactory.

Now, where do you see this moving? In the short term, I see this

as a Balkanized country. How do you see our ability to influence

people to actually join a national force, as opposed to being in a regional, or tribal, or warlord force, and how do you see us, as well

as our allies, trying to be James Madisons, in a different sense, in

structuring a constitution that has buy-in from all the people, and

all the factions, and the warlords of Afghanistan?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, Senator, neither Paul or I are people who

look at the world through rose-colored glasses; and if we were, your

short history would certainly take care of that. But there is one difVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
35

ference, and I will go through it now, and all of the 12 leaders who

you mentioned.

First, we are trying to bring about several things at once. We are

trying to reduce the availability of money to certain warlords, the

eradication of the poppy and heroin crop, which will have, I think,

a positive effect on the country. We are trying to develop simultaneously a national army, the French are training the battalion. We

are in the midst of our second battalion training, or will be on 1

July, to be a multi-ethnic national force. So that is part of it as

well.

I think on the diplomatic side, the one difference from the previous 100 years is that, at least for a time, and this is at play now,

the great powers play the great game as something other than

zero-sum. That was certainly the case in Petersburg, the Bonn

agreement, where the Russians, the United States, the Iranians,

the Pakistanis, all worked positively toward Afghanistan, rather

than in a more traditional way.

Now, our job in diplomacy is to try to make sure that prevails.

Now, there are some bad straws in the wind. The Iranians, as the

chairman mentioned, are busy in Herat. Thus far, the Russians

have been pretty good. We think the Pakistanis are playing the

game straight with us now, but it is something that is going to

take constant attention. Because if we are not successful in keeping

this as something other than zero-sum, then the Balkanization to

which you refer will be a fact.

Now, with regard to the constitution, over the next 18 months,

as the transitional government writes its constitution, I do not

know what they are going to come up with, but we are going to

make available to help them groups like the National Endowment

for Democracy. We have used the Asia Foundation for some activities, up through the loya jirga, NGOs such as that, to try to give

them exposure to the best possible advice; but I do not know what

they are going to come up with at the end.

Senator ALLEN. Well, will we be insisting that, regardless of how

they form this confederation, or federation, or constitution, that,

obviously, security matters, but also that these universal rights are

respected—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely, and—— Senator ALLEN [continuing]. By law.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. I think the two things we do not

want them, I think your phrase was to become a permanent ward

of the international community, and we do not want them to descend back into the kind of lawlessness and violence that made

them a sanctuary for terrorists. I do think it is important that we

help them find their own way, but while the history is important,

I believe in many places around the world, over time, the United

States has been able to use its influence to work with local people,

whether it is Korea, or the—I happen to think of Asian examples,

because Rich and I have worked a lot in Asia. But if you think

about Korea, or the Philippines, or Taiwan, American influence

over a period of time has greatly strengthened those people who

favor freedom, and democracy, and progress over those who do not,

and there is not an instant fix, especially not for a country with

Afghanistan’s problems.

36

I believe whatever fix they come up with is going to involve some

considerable degree of regional autonomy. We had it ourselves, especially in our founding. It does not mean lawlessness; but hopefully, even the regional governments will begin to be held to higher

standards, and standards of how they treat their people.

I would like to repeat again, I do not think it can be said often

enough, security is not just a matter of guns, it is also a matter

of money, that when people are rewarded financially for good behavior, or have those resources withheld when they do not. It is a

major instrument in the hands of a central government.

And that is why, at the same time that we in DOD are putting

a big emphasis on training an Afghan army, we support in every

way we can the efforts of the State Department and Secretary

Armitage to raise as much support as we can from the international community and the United States to give that central authority more leverage over the regions.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is important to note that those three

examples you gave, Korea, Philippines, and Taiwan, we invested

about 50 years, I hope we understand that we are in for a long

haul, and no one calls for a timetable for withdrawal.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this

hearing on building stability and avoiding chaos in Afghanistan. It

is a tall order, and as Senator Lugar said, it has the opportunity

to be a model, if we are successful. I commend you on the hard

work you are doing.

In reading through both your testimonies, and during the hearing thus far, I have not heard one mention of the United Nations

yet. Have we had a bad experience in our relationship with the

U.N.? Why has the U.N. not yet been mentioned here in our hearing?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, we make great use of the United Nations

Special Representative, Ambassador Brahimi, who has worked very

closely with us. Secretary Powell speaks to Kofi Annan, the Secretary General, regularly about Afghanistan. So we have not had

a bad experience.

We have found them very helpful in the political buildup through

Bonn, the Petersburg Agreement, and laterally, as we went

through the loya jirga. But the structures that exist for reconstruction, et cetera, are the G–8, the Afghan Support Group for Humanitarian Aid, and the Afghan Reconstruction Support Group, cochaired by the United States. So there are a bunch of ad hoc

groups that are responsible for the money, but there is no bad odor

associated with the United Nations, quite the contrary.

Senator CHAFEE. Secretary Wolfowitz.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I even mentioned them in my testimony. As the

Secretary of the Army said, Brahimi’s role is quite key as a coordinator of all international support to the Karzai government, and

we view him as really crucial in that effort. On the military security side, the ISAF operates under U.N. Security Council mandate,

in fact.

Senator CHAFEE. If I could take more of my time.

37

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator CHAFEE. We have talked about the size of Afghanistan,

trying to understand how an organization such as the Taliban

could control such a large amount of territory. Senator Lugar noted

the miracle of our successful military campaign naturally leads one

to wonder what happened to the Taliban. In your testimony, you

say we have arrested 2,500 al-Qaeda members worldwide. In the

worst-case scenario, did the enemy just melt into the mountains?

Are they currently intact in their sanctuaries they might have prepared there? Is that still a concern?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think they are all over the place. Some of

them just changed uniforms, and others did not even have to

change uniforms, because it was the same uniform. They changed

sides. It was inevitable, as in a country like that, that you lose

structure. We have tried to focus on those people that we really

think are hard core. Any number of people, I think, have actually

come over to the new authorities, which also is a warning. They

could be rented by a different side under different circumstances.

So you have the combination of people who have been killed and

captured, some numbers who were still very hostile to us, who were

in hiding, or in the mountains, and we have had rocket attacks,

which we assume probably come from people like that, but so far,

these attacks have been small scale.

But as I mentioned in my testimony, there has been a fear all

spring, and predictions from some quarters of our intelligence community, that there would be a major Taliban offensive. I think they

were trying to mount one. They were not successful. That does not

mean they are not out there, still trying.

I could not agree more strongly with what the chairman said.

This is a long-term project. There is still a lot of work to do, not

only in reconstructing a stable Afghanistan for the future, but also

in clearing out those bad elements that caused us so much grief.

Senator CHAFEE. You say they might have just changed uniforms. Is there also a fear that there are still sanctuaries in those

very rugged mountains that we saw from satellite images?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would not call them sanctuaries. I mean, if it

is large enough to be identifiable as a training area or a base of

operations, I think we can be pretty sure about finding them and

going after them; but for individuals to hide all over the place is

a fairly simple thing. We are accomplishing a lot also by keeping

them in that condition, as opposed to organizing and fighting.

Senator CHAFEE. So if they are not in sanctuaries in the mountains, are they then still amongst the general population?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. In some numbers, I am sure——

Senator CHAFEE. A followup question would be: You talked about

not being in a quagmire. In Vietnam, one of the problems was that

our enemy was everywhere. They were simply members of the general population. Is that a fear in Afghanistan?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not in most parts of the country. As I said in

my testimony, there are only 5 provinces today where we find significant pockets of hostile people, so that tells you that the problem

is confined geographically. I think it is confined in size, but most

importantly, regarding the allusion you made to Vietnam, these are

not, in the old guerrilla phrase, fish swimming in a friendly sea.

38

I think most of the population is not very friendly to them, and

one of the ways in which we find their hiding places is because

they are very frequently turned in by local people, and that is a

major part of our effort. Sometimes it is lubricated with money, but

sometimes I think it is simply because they earned the hostility of

a great many of the local populations around the country.

Mr. ARMITAGE. You will see, Senator Chafee, press reports of

some arms caches being identified by local populations, too; or the

coalition forces, or ISAF, and I think this is indicative of just what

Paul is saying.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Chafee, I might say, I think your questions bring out what a complex environment it is there. And I must

say that one of the things that was so impressive to me and Secretary Rumsfeld in the briefings that we got from our Special

Forces people who operated there, it was not only the extraordinary

level of military skill that they display, but their sophistication

about local customs, and local languages, and local politics; and

they have to have it, but they seem to have it, and they seem to

find their way through that complexity with a great deal of skill

and effectiveness.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, how many al-Qaeda do you estimate are left in Afghanistan or on the border with Pakistan?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I do not know of a reliable estimate. It is easier

to estimate the numbers that we have captured and killed than to

know how many are left. I can try to get you a classified answer

for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be helpful, if you could. Well, I will

refrain from any more questions. Do you have any questions? I

know that the Senator from Florida had another question. Go

ahead and finish.

Senator NELSON. The last time that I was in Afghanistan, I was

just struck with the enormity of the task that we have in trying

to bring about stability there, the lack of infrastructure, the lack

of law and order. The United States, in a heroic effort, not only in

our military operations, but then in our military operations as an

outreach to the community, helping them build institutions, you

know, it came foursquare.

To me, as we went from Baghram to Kabul, to visit with our Ambassador, and they were still trying to de-mine the grounds of the

U.S. Embassy, and as we proceeded from where we landed in the

helicopter to the embassy, suddenly someone stopped us in the

road and said, ‘‘Wait a minute, we just found a mine a hundred

yards up the road, on the side of the road.’’ And they blew it up.

We are in this now so much for the long haul, and yet it is so

important to us. They had a huge drought there when I was there

in January——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Still do.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. And that is going to make it difficult to try to get farmers to grow crops, instead of growing poppies, and so forth. Give me some reason to have optimism.

39

Mr. ARMITAGE. I wish you had not asked the question. You can

be optimistic, sir, if you stop the car in time.

Senator NELSON. I am grateful for the little things, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. ARMITAGE. That is a big thing. The point of our program is

to get people out of the poppy business and get them back in the

farming business, and we have supplied 7,000 metric tons of seed,

and 15,000 metric tons of fertilizer, getting ready for the fall planting season, which would be realized, of course, in the spring.

At the same time, USAID and the international community are

trying to put together, again, the infrastructure for the delivery of

water. The drought has continued and, at least in my building,

they say now it is a drought of almost biblical proportions; but

there was a water system that transferred water from the mountains, where there were snows, et cetera, at one time. We are trying to rebuild that.

Along with talking people out of growing poppy, there are other

ways to get them out of the business, and to dissuade them from

poppy cultivation. Some of it is covert, obviously, but part of it is

international. We have worked very closely with the Russians, who

realize they have a huge problem in Moscow, because that is where

the heroin goes first now, to have them do a better job with the

border control, and to be more of a prosecutorial mind set, in terms

of drug flow, and this is happening to some extent.

I do not want you to accuse us of being optimists. We realize just

what the chairman and others have said, this is a long, tough slog,

and we have started on the journey, and the good news is that the

President of the United States has said we are in it for the long

run. We realize it is not going to be a 1, 2, 3-year fix. If you look

at 23 years of war and 31⁄2 years now of drought, it gives you an

idea of the enormity of the task, and the fact that literally a generation is without education. So we are going to be at it for a long,

long time. It is not a matter of optimism or pessimism, I think,

Senator, it is a matter of just realism, and willingness to put the

shoulders to the grindstone.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, on the optimistic side, I am impressed

by that statistic about the 1.2 million refugees who have come

home, which was the goal the U.N. had set for the entire calendar

year, and they reached it in May. I think people are voting with

their feet, and there is still an enormous amount of work to be

done, but it is worth remembering how far that place has come in

a relatively short time.

Senator NELSON. When Senator Shelby and I were last there, we

found ourselves in the unusual situation—as we were having our

luncheon meeting with Chairman Karzai in the old king’s palace,

with the plaster cracking on the ceilings, and so forth, we found

ourselves in the unusual situation of impressing upon him the need

for him to be more careful about his personal security. We urged

the same thing when we met with President Musharraf.

What can you tell me about our attempts there to surround him

with troops that would be loyal, and to get him to stop from wading

in the crowds, and that kind of stuff?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. There is not so much I think we would want to

say here, other than the fact that we have noticed the same pheVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
40

nomenon, and we have been involved in some training. It is very

difficult to persuade natural politicians from wading into crowds.

We have seen that happen even closer to home. It is a natural impulse of a born politician, but we would be more than happy to provide on a classified basis just what efforts have gone into this, sir.

Senator NELSON. Well, I figured that Senator Shelby and I were

instruments to be used by you in trying to convey that message

when we were meeting with him. This was several months ago.

Let me ask again about how, Secretary Wolfowitz, did we get in

the situation where we were having to decide on the Tora Bora assault between two warlords, one of whom seemed not to provide the

closure of that rear exit, and what did we learn from that, that we

can avoid those kind of mistakes in the future? Tell me just what

you can for the record here, as we prepare for the future on trying

to go get the No. 1 guy, who we still do not have.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes, but I guess do not accept the premise that

General Franks’ people made a mistake. They made judgments in

circumstances, as I said earlier, of a very rapidly evolving tactical

situation. They obviously know things now about the particular individuals that they did not know at the time; and with that knowledge, they would rely on some of them and not rely on others.

But I think the notion that we somehow could have avoided relying on local forces is false. If we had not used local forces, I think

even more people would have gotten away. That is certainly General Franks’ judgment, and everything that I have seen reinforces

that.

If there is a lesson there, it is that you can never have enough

good intelligence on the people that you are working with. You

need to learn from experience. We were there basically for 3 weeks

when all of that happened. I think we have a much better read on

who we can work with and who we cannot work with now; but

look, betrayal is part of that culture, as well. People fight for one

side one day and another side the next day.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, may I followup with one additional comment? I want to commend you all for your success in the

diffusing the extremely high tensions—they are not completely diffused—between India and Pakistan.

But I bring that up, having been there myself, having gone from

Islamabad to New Delhi with Senator Shelby, arguing the same

things that you all have done very successfully recently, and I congratulate you on that. But I bring up this issue in terms of not only

what that would mean to world peace, were they to get into an exchange of nukes, but what that would do to our effort to go after

al-Qaeda. Because I believe that porous border of highly mountainous terrain, with Pakistan/Afghanistan, is where a lot of the alQaeda still are; and yet, we see the troops at least being threatened to be pulled off of there, the Pakistani troops, to the Kashmir

border, and, therefore, not guarding that rear door. Tell us what

you can about that.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. You are absolutely right in expressing that concern. I would say it is one of several reasons why we in the Defense

Department were very appreciative of Secretary Armitage’s diplomatic efforts. If that conflict breaks out into war, not only will it

be terrible for the people involved, but it will be a real setback for

41

our effort to get terrorists in some significant numbers, or in these

very wild tribal areas of Pakistan, where, by the way, the Pakistani

Government has never exercised a great deal of authority.

They have made significant efforts over the last few months to

put more people in there, but some of those people were diverted

by the building crisis on the Indian border. If it were to break out

into war, I think it would seriously degrade those efforts.

So far, I must say that the troops that are there seem to be doing

a very aggressive job of going after al-Qaeda. It is wild country, it

is difficult country, but I think they are making progress. We

would like to see that progress continue.

Mr. ARMITAGE. It is a generally held view, Senator Nelson, that

nothing would represent success in a greater way for al-Qaeda than

a dandy little war between India and Pakistan. They would be the

only beneficiary.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you

very much. We will have a few written questions, if that is OK. Let

me say in your parting here that I think you have done an incredible job. I do think, one area of disagreement, personally, is that

I think that U.S. leadership is still possible to expand ISAF beyond

Kabul. I think absent doing that, and relying on warlords as much

as we do while we are trying to set up this interim government,

is a judgment call. I respect the call, but I think we are making

some mistakes.

Every time I see the President, the first thing he says to me, ‘‘Do

you have anything to say, except about Afghanistan?’’ So I am a

broken record on this, but I appreciate your answers, and I appreciate you making yourself available.

You are excused, unless you have any closing comment either

one of you would like to make.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No. Thank you.

Mr. ARMITAGE. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You guys are like good trial lawyers. Never ask

a question to which you do not know the answer. Thank you both

very much.

We have a second panel, and I would like now, while some are

leaving the room, Ambassador Peter Tomsen knows the political

landscape of Afghanistan inside and out. As Special Envoy to Afghanistan for the previous President Bush, he dealt with many of

today’s power brokers long before they had any real power to

broker. He is currently the ambassador-in-residence at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. It seems to me, that in my former capacity as the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I kept calling

people from the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and I do not

know what the deal is here, but it must be a real sanctuary there.

Senator HAGEL. I am a graduate, believe it or not. It probably

takes that idea out of your mind, but——

The CHAIRMAN. No, no.

In my mind, that elevates it considerably.

The thing I know most about Omaha is that it is very close to

Iowa. It is a long story; it is an inside joke.

Brigadier General David Grange earned three Silver Stars and

two Purple Hearts during his service in Vietnam. He has served in

42

Delta Force, Ranger, and Special Forces operations during his 30-

year military career, and as commander of Task Force Eagle in

Bosnia, he is particularly well equipped to comment on U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.

Now, I would invite you, Mr. Ambassador, if you have an opening

statement, and then General Grange, and then we will go to questions. And I thank you for your patience.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. PETER TOMSEN, SPECIAL ENVOY

TO AFGHANISTAN (1989–1992), FORMER AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA, AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA, OMAHA, NE

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the

panel, too. I would also like to thank the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee staff, because we meet periodically, and I must say that

you have a lot of Afghan experts on your staff, on both sides of the

aisle.

There is an old American saying that posits, ‘‘The biggest enemy

of better is best,’’ and that applies to Afghanistan. If you go for the

best, as you, Senator, and others were commenting, you are not

going to get there. All we can hope for is steady, incremental improvement, given the horrendous situation after 25 years of war,

and the many problems, economic, security, et cetera, that rock

that country.

The loya jirga was, in my opinion, a success overall. There were

setbacks, there were complaints, and you can read about them in

the New York Times op eds; however, again, ‘‘the biggest enemy of

better is best.’’ Hamid Karzai was selected by secret ballot, which

he insisted on, by a great majority of the delegates. The cabinet

that he has represents diversity, the different ethnic groups, broadly speaking, in the country. Actually, probably not even the Almighty could satisfy all Afghan groups that they are fairly represented. But I think there is a broad representation of all ethnic

and religious groups in his cabinet. I think he has done very well.

The three Vice Presidents represent the main ethnic groups in the

country, Pushtun, Hazara, and Tajik.

The challenges of reconstruction now are before us. I wrote a

May 17 editorial published in the Wall Street Journal on some

problems in the reconstruction process. Hamid Karzai gave a VOA

interview yesterday, in which he says, ‘‘Foreign aid continues to be

a trickle, and now that the loya jirga is finished, we have to deliver. Our honeymoon is over,’’ is what he told VOA.

There has been a lot of talk about $4.5 billion going out there,

but, in fact, as I mentioned in that Wall Street Journal editorial,

a lot of it is captured and snarled in aid bureaucracies, the United

Nations, our own, British. It is not getting down to the lowest level.

In fact, the only reconstruction activity that we have seen has been

the Special Forces civil action teams out in the villages, building

wells, schools, roads. The money that is for reconstruction, that has

been promised and appropriated, is not there. The traction is not

there. Something has to be done.

The four strategic reconstruction goals are mentioned, I will not

go into them in my statement, which I would point to. The most

important by far is the revival and modernization of Afghan naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:01 Oct 31, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82115 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
43

tional self-governing institutions, democratic, economic, administrative, and military. There was a lot of—sort of skeptical comments

on Afghan’s ability to govern themselves in this session, but I

would underline that from 1933 to the Soviet invasion there was

stability in Afghanistan, there was progress along the democratic

path. Unlike South Korea, Taiwan, this did not come because of

sustained American pressure. It came from an Afghan elite in

Kabul, including the former king, Zahir Shah, who introduced a

democratic constitution in 1964, and then implemented that democratic constitution, including two parliamentary elections, which

were held in 1965 and 1969.

It was outside interference by the Soviet Union, primarily the

KGB operating through Communist parties inside Afghanistan,

who were situated in the military as well as the civilian side, that

overthrew this democratic process; but these institutions were

building in the 1960s and early 1970s. Well, we should go back to

them. Hamid Karzai’s father was Speaker of the Parliament during

that period.

Success or failure of the massive historic reconstruction process

in Afghanistan will depend mainly on implementation of this first

strategic goal. Revival of Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself when

foreign aid tapers off in 5, 7, or 10 years’ time.

Nation building, a la Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, is not necessary in Afghanistan. They were never nations. Afghanistan has

been a nation for 300 years. It was never colonized. In the 20th

century, it sprouted its own self-governing institutions. In my opinion, the centerpiece of the international community’s reconstruction

efforts should, therefore, be to aid and facilitate the reestablishment of Afghanistan’s governing institutions, equipping them to operate in today’s 21st century environment. The U.S.-led coalition

and the current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this

endeavor. The stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out and

render Afghan institutions effective is key. Failure would lead to

renewed fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted foreign

investment, and the resumed exploitation of Afghan territory by

terrorists.

Only an Afghan government, standing once again on its own two

feet, can keep the peace internally and resume a constructive role

in the international community. In this connection, I urge positive

consideration by the Senate for the Henry Hyde House bill, the

Freedom Support Act, which is modeled on the Freedom Support

Act for Newly Independent States, passed in the early 1990s by

Congress. You took the initiative; you should take it again. It is

going to establish, if it is approved, a separate budget, like the

Freedom Support Act budget.

It will have a separate budget for Afghanistan. It will not be, as

has been the case so far, taking money incrementally from different

pots around the Federal Government, but establish structurally a

budget, establish the position of coordinator, which Rich Armitage

first held in the early 1990s for the NIS Freedom Support Act

budget, and is now ably carried out by Bill Taylor, Ambassador

Taylor, in the State Department, a coordinator to bring together all

of the different agencies in the U.S. Government in a coordinated

44

way, who are involved in Afghanistan, and I believe there are over

20 today.

Let me just end by commenting that I support the expansion of

ISAF to regions inside Afghanistan, particularly Mazar-e-Sharif,

Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. I would underscore what you

said, Mr. Chairman, if you look at that area of Mazar-e-Sharif, the

Tajik commander, Atef Mohammed, and Dostam are at each other’s

throats. Mohakek is a Hazara warlord; he is also involved. They

have all agreed that they support the deployment of an ISAF contingent, and it only has to be a couple hundred to Mazar-e-Sharif.

That would definitely assist stability and security in the area,

and reconstruction in the area; otherwise, without this foreign sort

of referee presence, until the central government is able to establish the military with a reach across the country and security from

the center, the fighting in the region is going to continue, the attacks on refugees and also on women are going to continue, and

that applies, to a lesser extent, to Kandahar and Jalalabad.

It would not take much, you are not going to be deploying thousands to these different urban centers of Afghanistan. You are

going to be deploying tens or hundreds, but it would accomplish a

great deal in bringing security to these areas. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Tomsen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TOMSEN, AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE, UNI- VERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA; FORMER AMBASSADOR AND SPECIAL ENVOY TO

AFGHANISTAN

AMERICAN POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN

An old American saying posits: ‘‘the biggest enemy of better is best.’’ It is worthwhile for Americans to keep this practical guideline in mind when evaluating the

just-completed Afghan loya jirga. There were setbacks, unfulfilled objectives, and

many would argue harmful decisions at the loya jirga. In general, however, the positive outweighed the negative. And, in the months and years ahead, there will be

plenty of time to shave away the negative.

The December, 2001 Bonn accords laid out an ambitious roadmap to achieve

peace, stability, democracy, human and gender rights, and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The June, 2002 loya lirga, like the June, 2004 parliamentary elections, is a

critical milestone to realize these goals.

In Afghan history going back to the eighteenth century, the selection of a legitimate Afghan leader during times of trouble has been the principal mission of Afghan loya jirgas, with only a few exceptions—such as the 1964 loya jirga convened

to approve a democratic constitution. The just completed Afghan loya jirga accomplished that main task—selection of Hamid Karzai to head the Afghan transitional

regime until the June, 2004 parliamentary elections.

Criticism of the loya jirga by Afghans and non-Afghans has centered on non-selection of a mini-legislature called for in the Bonn accords, and correcting the imbalance in the cabinet stemming from the Northern Alliance’s unfortunate unilateral

seizure of Kabul last fall.

Mr. Chairman, each of these criticisms has some validity; however, demanding

the ‘‘best’’ in the current Afghan environment is folly. Not even the Almighty could

have satisfied all Afghans in the distribution of cabinet portfolios.

Overall, the loya jirga successfully maintained essential progress along the Bonn

roadmap. The expectation that 1,500 representatives of Afghanistan’s varied groups

and factions could agree on a mini-legislature in this brief period was, frankly, unrealistic from the beginning. The larger (but not majority) Pashtun group can point

to Pashtun Hamid Karzai at the top of the transitional regime, plus one of the three

Vice Presidents, Pashtun Abdul Qadir (the brother of renown Afghan commander

Abdul Haq), as substantial Pashtun representation in the Afghan leadership.

Pashtun Zahir Shah will play an important symbolic role as ‘‘father’’ of the nation.

Structural ethnic balance at senior levels is largely rounded out by a Tajik and

Hazara filling the other two Vice Presidential posts. Hamid Karzai’s twenty-eight

member cabinet also reflects broad Afghan ethnic-religious balance. A well-known

45

Afghan woman is Minister for Women’s Affairs. The outspoken Sima Samar will

head the Human Rights Commission.

Challenges of Reconstruction

There are four strategic reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. The goals should be

viewed—and implemented—along an integrated path. Each goal is linked with the

other three.

• Revival and modernization of Afghan national self-governing institutions; democratic, economic, administrative and military.

• Implementation of ‘‘bottom up’’ community-based reconstruction through Community Reconstruction Centers.

• Rebuilding Afghanistan’s macro-infrastructure, including roads, bridges, agriculture and telecommunications.

• Humanitarian relief for endangered sectors of the Afghan population.

Success or failure of the massive, historic reconstruction process in Afghanistan

will depend mainly on implementation of the first strategic goal: revival of Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself when foreign aid tapers off in five to ten years time.

Nation building a la Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor is not necessary in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been a nation for 300 years. It was never colonized. In the

20th century, it sprouted its own self-governing institutions, and slowly modernized

them during the forty years prior to the Soviet invasion.

The centerpiece of the international community’s reconstruction effort should

therefore be to aid and facilitate the re-establishment of Afghanistan’s governing institutions, equipping them to operate in today’s 21st century environment. The U.S.-

led coalition and the current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this endeavor. The stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out and render Afghan institutions effective is key. Failure would lead to renewed fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted foreign aid investment and the resumed exploitation of Afghan

territory for international terrorist and narcotics operations. Only an Afghan government standing once again on its own two feet can keep the peace internally and

resume a constructive role in the international community.

The Senate’s support of the House Henry Hyde bill will give a great boost to meeting the reconstruction challenge in Afghanistan. Even today, there is no American

reconstruction strategy, fund to support the strategy, and efficient executive branch

machinery to implement the strategy.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in December, 1991, Congress wisely established

the Freedom Support Act to give sustenance to our political rhetoric of support for

the transition to free market democracies by the Newly Independent States (NIS).

Deputy Secretary of State Armitage became the first NIS aid coordinator. He and

his successors, Ambassador Morningstar and Taylor, have extremely effectively piloted Freedom Support Act programs. The Senate’s support for the Henry Hyde initiative will fill the confusing vacuum in the Administration on strategy, funding and

program implementation for Afghan reconstruction. Congress rose to the occasion in

the 1990s by passing the Freedom Support Act. It is time to take a similar step in

2002 to accomplish U.S. interests in Afghanistan.

American Regional Diplomacy

There is need for a comprehensive U.S. diplomatic policy on Afghanistan and the

region. American goals of combating terrorism, promoting peace, stability, democracy, human and gender rights, and fighting narcotics trafficking must have a

broader regional scope. We need to remember that Afghanistan’s horrendous condition has mainly been created by outsiders—the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent

eight-year brutal occupation, followed by another invasion by foreign Muslim extremists from Pakistan and the Gulf, supporting their own Afghan surrogates to

reign from Kabul.

A creative American diplomatic architecture for the region should strive for a consensus among the ‘‘outer ring’’ of powers surrounding Afghanistan to respect Afghanistan’s independence, neutrality and sovereignty. Such an approach, perhaps

modeled on the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, could restrain the states in the ‘‘outer

ring’’ from attempting to manipulate Afghanistan to serve their competing strategic

objectives in the Central-South Asian region.

Afghan Legitimacy

Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by stressing the significance of avoiding ‘‘Mother

Hen’’ tactics toward Afghan politics. As you know, Afghans are a proud, independent

people, inured historically to resisting outside attempts to dominate Afghanistan.

They have recently, with our help, thrown off the yoke of first Soviet, then radical

46

1The enclosure is a chart that can be found on page 52.

Muslim, control. We must not establish an American image of just the next outsider

trying to dictate who rules in Afghanistan. Outside arm-twisting on behalf of preferred political power arrangements may be effective for days or a few months, but

it is doomed to failure in the long run.

The overarching intention of the Bonn accords has been to help the Afghans to

form the legitimate Afghan regime, chosen by Afghans, which has been missing for

a quarter century. Conflict will continue to tear Afghanistan as long as this void

in legitimacy exists. American and other outsiders can discreetly advise Afghans on

how to govern themselves. The decision-making in Afghan politics, however, must

be, and be seen to be, done only by Afghans.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. General,

welcome.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID L. GRANGE, U.S. ARMY

(RET.), CHICAGO, IL

General GRANGE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to share some thoughts today with the committee. I have no

access to any classified information on this subject, and, in fact, I

am serving now as a philanthropist for the McCormack-Tribune

Foundation in Chicago. Any free time I have—— The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we can talk after this.

General GRANGE. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I said, maybe we can talk after this.

General GRANGE. Yes; absolutely. But my free time is spent really on my John Deere tractor on my farm in Illinois. But I would

like to speak from experience serving in heavy, light, and special

operating units in combat and also in peace support operations, especially challenges after the main fight, where the entry into the

country has occurred.

I believe that you always have to back up and ask, like someone

said earlier, why are we in Afghanistan? What is the purpose of

the United States in this commitment? I understand that the mission is to disrupt, if not destroy, the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, to deny them the sanctuary in Afghanistan, and to remove the

Taliban from power.

Our military has removed the Taliban from power. I do not believe that we have destroyed, but we have disrupted the al-Qaeda

operations, and we have denied the sanctuary in Afghanistan,

though it has probably moved to Pakistan.

But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is to Afghanistan. Any military operations consolidation phase or a country at war reconstruction phase is the most difficult aspect of any

operation. If we expect to see some semblance of rule of law, democratic government, or a free market economy, and an institutional

capacity of Afghanistan, though not necessarily a replica of the

United States of America, we have a long way to go.

I have submitted enclosure one 1. It is the international community’s challenge to a peace support operation, and it was discussed

a little bit by the earlier panel about military objectives, and other

than military objectives to reach goals set by the national command

authority. It is something that can be discussed later during our

questions following this testimony; but this chart shows the challenge, and it has to do with not just the military, but it has to do

47

with money, it has to do with other organizations that have a very

big role in achieving our goals.

If these are the criteria to define winning, and that is the democratic society, a free market economy, some type of institutional capacity, then we must stay the course and commit the time and the

resources, and see the mission through. I believe that our responsibility is not only to destroy the enemy and make Afghanistan safer,

but I think we have a responsibility to make it better.

Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, to the honor,

and the credibility of the United States of America than not to accomplish what we have set out to achieve. We must fulfill what we

promised to others. In essence, I believe we must walk our talk.

Our Nation also has the responsibility to our military, and I really appreciate the remarks that Senator Nelson mentioned earlier

about leaving a fallen comrade in the status of a prisoner of war,

or an MIA. I think that is extremely important to our Armed

Forces. I do not think that we should ever send our Armed Forces

into harm’s way unless we maintain the will to win, and that

means to complete the mission.

It is very important to the American people that those who have

already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in vain. What

hurts a soldier more than austere conditions, fear, loneliness, and

even wounds, is the lack of will to follow a mission through.

It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick-start our form

of government. We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or any other

country, torn by war, to do so in 1 or 2 years. That is why we

should never put a time limit on an operation, but maintain the resolve for as long as it takes to reach our stated objectives. After

years of murder, rape, and destruction in any country that we have

been involved in, to love thy neighbor takes time. We Americans

are attuned to the 100-yard dash, not a marathon, and this particular operation is a long run.

The enemy has a vote when this victory is decisive. We are not

fighting a nation state in this case. The enemy is a terrorist organization. Who decides on surrender? Who decides that they are defeated? What are our measures for mission accomplishment? A very

tough situation.

This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists not only

sets the example for the world of America’s determination, and I

think Senator Hagel asked this question, but it is also critical to

the region’s stability. What is their perception of what we are

doing? What happens in Afghanistan affects the overall security of

southwest Asia. This fight is not defined only by Afghanistan’s national borders. If so, it would be like our fighting in South Vietnam,

which at times had total disregard for Laos, Cambodia, and North

Vietnam.

The enemy does not recognize the borders, but takes advantage

of the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and continually creates negative influences on our campaign; for example, one that

was brought up earlier were paramilitary operations in Kashmir,

to distract our efforts.

The United States and our coalition have deployed a powerful

military force in Afghanistan, and power does matter. But power

is relative to the situation at hand, especially in unconventional

48

warfare. Tangible power, bombs, tanks, infantry battalions, are

easy to quantify, but intangible power is hard to quantify, and

though relative to this kind of conflict, it must be considered. Propaganda, disinformation, black market payroll, and the manipulation of religious beliefs are as powerful as any B–52.

We must be able to apply various means of power, and not only

the physical and organizational domains of an operation, but particularly in the moral domain, where we achieve the most effect.

In your packet, I have enclosure two, and it talks about conflict

resolution and the time it takes to meet an objective, operating in

the physical, organizational, and moral domain. The biggest payback is in the moral domain, but the experts operate in all three

domains to achieve their objectives.

It is imperative that the coalition can strike hard with one hand

and provide humanitarian assistance with the other. The people of

Afghanistan, like any other people around the world, respect

strength, magnified by compassion. Our mission in Afghanistan requires a robust civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations,

and engineering effort to provide the humanitarian assistance, and

development projects critical to reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.

Operation Anaconda, I believe, got the attention of the enemy.

The Taliban and the al-Qaeda spent a lot of time preparing a

firesack to trap and destroy coalition forces in the valley. They

wanted to bloody Americans, to challenge America’s resolve to continue this fight. They lost the battle. They now have reassessed

their strategy and are now lying low, conducting reconnaissance

and small-scale guerrilla operations, influencing the peoples of remote villages, and waiting us out. In their minds, we will not stay

the course.

It is imperative that we sustain our efforts. In fact, I recommend

we increase them if we expect to win. It can be done, I believe,

without the appearance of an occupation force. Aggressive coalition,

and eventually combined with Afghanistan army patrolling must

continue to maintain pressure on the enemy, especially in the eastern provinces. Our forces and efforts must adapt to the various regions of Afghanistan, with a holistic strategy using military, other

government agencies, non-governmental agencies in a synchronized

campaign. We have had a hard time doing that in the past.

A robust, credible Afghanistan army cannot be built without

money, quality weapons, a multi-ethnic force mix, a sense of pride

of being a part of that army, and a sense of purpose in support of

the country. The army should have a fair representation of not only

Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also Pushtuns. The benefits of being a

part of this army must outweigh anything that the warlords, terrorists, or black marketeers can offer them. Our advisory efforts to

this army will be critical to success.

The international security force, along with the Afghan army,

eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no credibility

unless they do. To avoid confrontation, though there are always

risks involved in this strategy; this force must work as combined

patrols with the regional warlord militias. Regional coalition liaison

teams are critical to the success of these combined patrols, and

that includes Americans.

49

We must recognize the warlords have special powers, and the

Karzai government, as well as the coalition leaders, must establish

a cooperative relationship with them. It is like dealing with any

faction leaders in any other conflict we have been involved in.

Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The warlords’ militia

should be made an auxiliary part of the national army, paid to protect regional infrastructure, with emphasis on ‘‘we are all Afghans.’’

Without this cooperation, the road networks and bridges will

never truly be developed and open for trade, and the establishment

of a free market economy. Humanitarian relief aid will never get

to remote sites, and water wells, schools, hospitals, and communication infrastructure will never be constructed, critical to the refugee return.

Right now, the lifeline for coalition forces is the air bridge. This

cannot be sustained forever. As you all know, the wings are being

flown off our aircraft. Ground lines of communication must be

opened to continue military and non-military efforts in Afghanistan. The construction of major public works should not be done

with a Brown and Root model, though I must admit, I have had

great success with their support in other operations. It is very effective, but it does not facilitate the commitment of the Afghanistan people.

Reconstruction projects are a great opportunity, providing work

and a sense of pride to the local communities. What we want is an

employed work force, not trigger pullers carrying AK–47s. A series

of regional arsenals should be established to contain heavy weapons, still belonging to the regional warlords, as I think it would be

a mistake to try to take them away, and maintained and inspected

by the national government and coalition advisors. An inspection

program of these arsenals among warlords, supervised by the national army, should be instituted.

The U.S. military contribution to a sustained campaign to bring

a chance of lasting peace to Afghanistan and the region should be

as follows, and this is my summary: special operating teams, consisting of civil affairs, public affairs, psychological warfare, and engineers should be collocated with regional warlords, and tribal

chiefs at key villages and nodes.

Military advisors should be integrated throughout the Afghanistan army. Rapid reaction force to respond and support the coalition/national/Afghan army should be established and on hand. At

least a combined arms brigade, American, to continue search-anddestroy operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnant forces

should remain a robust infrastructure and institution support elements, i.e., civil affairs, public affairs, engineers, medical, communications, et cetera, need to be there to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction efforts.

In closing, our Nation has committed itself to the accomplishment of this mission. We have spent considerable resources to date,

and we have sacrificed human life. We are obligated to stay the

course and win this fight. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Grange follows:]

50

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID L. GRANGE, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

I appreciate the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today on a security

plan for Afghanistan. I have no access to classified information and my thoughts are

a result of my experiences serving in heavy, light and SOF forces around the world,

being a part of both victory and defeat.

Why are we in Afghanistan? What’s America’s purpose? I understand that the

mission is to disrupt if not destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, deny them

the sanctuary of Afghanistan, and remove the Taliban from power. Our military has

removed the Taliban from power. We have not destroyed but we have disrupted alQaeda operations. We have denied sanctuary in Afghanistan, though be it, it has

moved to Pakistan. But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is to

Afghanistan. Any military operations’ consolidation phase, or a country at war’s reconstruction phase is the most difficult aspect. If we expect to see some semblance

of rule of law, democratic government, free market economy, and institutional capacity—though not necessarily a replica of the U.S. model—we have a long way to

go. (Enc—IC Challenge During PSO) If these are the criteria to define winning, we

must stay the course and commit the time and resources and see the mission

through. I believe that our responsibility is not only to destroy the enemy and make

Afghanistan safer, but also to make it better.

Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, honor, and credibility of the

USA than not to accomplish what we set out to achieve. We must fulfill what we

promise to others—in essence, to walk our talk. Our nation also has a responsibility

to our military. Never send our Armed Forces into harm’s way unless we maintain

the will to win. It is very important to the American people that those who have

already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in vain. What hurts a soldier

more than austere conditions, fear, loneliness and even wounds is a lack of will to

follow a mission through.

It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick start our form of government.

We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or any other country torn by war to do so

in one or two years. That is why we should never put a time limit on an operation,

but maintain the resolve for as long as it takes to reach our objectives. After years

of murder, rape, and destruction, to love thy neighbor takes time. We Americans

are attuned to the 100-yard dash, not the marathon. In Afghanistan’s case this is

a long run.

The enemy has a vote on when victory is decisive. We are not fighting a nation

state; in this case, the enemy is a terrorist organization—who decides on surrender?

Who decides they are defeated? What are our measures for mission accomplishment?

This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists not only sets the example

to the world for America’s determination, but is critical to this region’s stability.

What happens in Afghanistan affects the overall security of Southwest Asia. This

fight is not defined by Afghanistan’s national borders; if so it would be like our

fighting in South Vietnam, which at times had total disregard for Laos, Cambodia

and North Vietnam. The enemy does not recognize borders but takes advantage of

the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and continually creates negative influences on our campaign, (i.e.—paramilitary operations in Kashmir, to distract our efforts). We have to conduct our campaign regionally as well.

The United States and our coalition have deployed a powerful military force in

Afghanistan. Power matters, but power is relative to the situation at hand. Tangible

power—bombs, tanks, and infantry battalions—are easy to quantify. But intangible

power is hard to quantify, though relative to this kind of conflict. Propaganda,

disinformation, black market payroll, and the manipulation of religious beliefs are

as powerful as a B–52. We must be able to apply various means of power in not

only the physical and organizational domains, but particularly in the moral domain,

where we achieve the most effect. (Enc—Conflict Resolution—PSO/Combat) It is imperative that the coalition can strike hard with one hand and provide humanitarian

assistance with the other. The people of Afghanistan, like any other people around

the world, respect strength magnified by compassion. Our mission in Afghanistan

requires a robust civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, and engineering effort to provide the humanitarian assistance and development projects critical

to reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.

Operation Anaconda got the attention of our enemy. The Taliban and al-Qaeda

spent a lot of time preparing a firesack to trap and destroy coalition forces in the

valley. They wanted to bloody Americans, to challenge America’s resolve to continue

the fight. They lost the battle. They have reassessed their strategy and are now laying low, conducting reconnaissance and small-scale guerrilla operations, influencing

remote villages, waiting us out. In their minds, we will not stay the course.

51

It is imperative that we sustain our efforts, in fact increase them, if we expect

to win. Aggressive coalition and eventually, combined Afghan Army patrolling must

continue to maintain pressure on the enemy, especially in the Eastern provinces.

Our forces and efforts must adapt to the various regions of Afghanistan with a holistic strategy using military, other government agencies, and non-government agencies in a synchronized campaign.

A robust, credible Afghan Army cannot be built without money, quality weapons,

a multi-ethnic force mix, sense of pride, and a sense of purpose. The army should

have a fair representation of not only Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also Pashtuns. The

benefits of being a part of this army must outweigh anything warlords, terrorists,

or black marketeers can offer. Our advisory efforts to this army are critical to success.

The international security force, along with the Afghan Army eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no credibility unless they do so. To avoid confrontation, though there are always risks involved, they must work as combined patrols with the regional warlord militias. Regional, Coalition Liaison Teams are critical to the success of these combined patrols.

We must recognize that warlords have special powers, and the Karzai government, as well as coalition leaders, must establish a cooperative relationship with

them. Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The warlords’ militias should be

made an auxiliary part of the national army, paid to protect regional infrastructure,

with emphasis on ‘‘we are all Afghans.’’ Without this cooperation, the road networks

and bridges will never truly be developed and opened for trade and the establishment of a free market economy; humanitarian relief aid will never get to remote

sites; and wells, schools, hospitals and communication infrastructure will never be

constructed. Right now, the lifeline for the coalition forces is the air bridge. This

cannot be sustained forever. Ground LOCs must be opened to continue military and

nonmilitary efforts.

The construction of major public works should not be done with a Brown & Root

model. Though effective, it does not facilitate the commitment of the Afghan people.

Reconstruction projects are a great opportunity providing work and a sense of pride

to the local communities. What we want is an employed work force, not ‘‘trigger

pullers’’ carrying AK–47s.

A series of regional arsenals should be established to contain heavy weapons, still

belonging to the regional warlords, but maintained and inspected by the national

government and coalition advisors. An inspection program of these arsenals among

warlords, supervised by the national army, should be instituted.

U.S. military contributions to a sustained campaign to bring a chance of lasting

peace to Afghanistan and the region should be as follows:

• SOF teams (SF, CA, Psyops, Eng) co-located with regional warlords and tribal

chiefs at key villages and nodes.

• Military advisors integrated throughout the Afghan Army.

• Rapid Reaction Force to respond and support the coalition/national Afghan

Army.

• At least a combined arms brigade to continue search and destroy operations

against al-Qaeda/Taliban remnant forces.

• Robust infrastructure/institution support elements (i.e.—civil affairs, public affairs, engineers, medical, communication, etc.) to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction efforts.

Our nation has committed itself to the accomplishment of this mission. We have

spent considerable resources to date, and have sacrificed human life. We are obligated to stay the course and win this fight.

52

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, general.

Mr. Ambassador, in my foray into Afghanistan and the region, as

well as following it very closely here, I have not met anybody in

uniform in place in Afghanistan, nor have I met anyone engaged

on the ground in Afghanistan in a civilian capacity, who says anything other than what both of you just said, there is a need to expand the security force.

53

Now, I think that the team the President has put together in his

administration is made up of an awful lot of bright people. What

is the disconnect here? What is the disconnect? How do you explain—and I am not suggesting you have any inside information,

but how do you explain this, at best, reluctance, and most probably

outright hostility to the notion of expanding ISAF?

Does it relate to the conviction that we do not have enough reliable partners, and we will end up having to do it all? Does it relate

to your opening comment, that the enemy of the good is the best,

or however you phrased it? Try to give me some insight, knowing

the country, and having worked in the last Bush administration.

I am not trying to be critical; I am really not.

Let me say one other thing. When I got back from Afghanistan,

like everyone who makes the trek, I wrote a report; my staff and

I wrote a report and discussed it with the administration. I was

initially very hopeful that the President’s assertions about a Marshall Plan, coupled with the recognition on the part of White House

personnel in the country and from the National Security Agency,

as well as folks at the State Department, that there is a recognition, there was a need for expanding any security—whatever you

want to call it, security force beyond Kabul. To tell you the truth,

I was a bit surprised when that battle seemed to be lost by those

proponents who said that is the way to go. Help me out. What is

this all about?

Mr. TOMSEN. I will try to. I want to repeat what you said,

though, echo what you just said there, that we have to give the utmost praise to our military for what they have done in Afghanistan, and this brilliant victory, and what they are doing now. I

mentioned the civil action groups that are right now out in the villages and towns, the only ones really in the whole international aid

establishment community that I have seen doing work at the village level, with villages, in a practical domain.

The CHAIRMAN. It is amazing.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes. It is also unfortunate that—that is why I think

this Henry Hyde Freedom Support Act initiative is so incredibly

important. It will give a framework to a Marshall Plan-type initiative for Afghanistan. It gives it focus, it gives it a budget, and it

gives it a coordinative mechanism inside the U.S. Government, like

Rich used to do, and Bill Taylor does today, to make sure that

those countries, 12 of the countries, which came out of the former

Soviet Union are getting assistance in a coordinated way from our

government.

I was asked to appear on Christiane Amanpour’s CNN show a

number of times, and one time she asked me, this was in November, ‘‘Why is CENTCOM, including General Franks, opposing the

deployment of ISAF to Kabul.’’ This was not to the other urban

areas. It was to Kabul.

I said, I think it is a mistake. You have just heard in the testimony division between, we have to go after the bad guys, which we

do, al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and on the other

hand, on this other track, we have to assist Afghanistan to come

back to the track of a normal country.

The fact of the matter is that there is a thick linkage between

these two, and you are only going to succeed in the first area if you

54

have a functioning government, with military security, economic,

political arms that work, which has the support of the people, and

that is the Bonn track, and it is working. The loya jirga worked.

They are going to have elections. Again, they are going to have parliamentary elections in 2004. That is the long-term answer, that is

the moral domain, as my colleague stated here in his testimony.

But I think what we are seeing, what the hangup is, it is from— within the Pentagon, there is this feeling that expanding ISAF is

going to interfere with going after Taliban and al-Qaeda. I think

that is mistaken, and also there is a problem, and I think the Pentagon has a point here, that we have to get support of our allies

to do this. But you are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman, unless the

United States shows leadership, there is no chance we are going to

get support of our allies.

We can do it, if we show leadership, and we should have done

it, in my opinion, 2 months ago. Indeed, the three commanders

squabbling among themselves around Mazar-e-Sharif, causing so

much friction up there, they have requested ISAF deployment to

their region, because they know that they cannot continue.

As the attacks were going on in November and December, some

French and Jordanian contingents were deployed up there, working

with these various groups, and their fighting stopped. Then the

French and Jordanians left, and now the friction has resumed. So

I just end up where I began. I think in answer to your question

that the problem is coming from our uniformed services, who have

performed so brilliantly and are still performing so brilliantly, I

just think here it is political, and I am afraid that they are able

to carry the day inside the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the irony is, and I do not—I mean you have

been there, in terms of an administration working on this, this

kind of reminds me, general, of, I was a broken record with the

Clinton administration about exercising force in the Balkans. I will

never forget, I came back from my first trip in 1992 having met

with Milosevic, where I had the interesting conversation, when he

asked what I thought of him, and I said, ‘‘I think you are a war

criminal and I am going to spend the rest of my career seeing that

you get tried as one.’’ It was a very nice conversation. I mean he

looked at me like, ‘‘lots of luck in your senior year,’’ and that was

it.

But I came back, and at least in the Oval Office convinced the

President that we should lift the arms embargo, and he turned to

Christopher, who did not think that was a good idea, and he said,

‘‘OK. We will do that, but we will not do it unilaterally, so Chris,

head to Europe and talk them into this.’’ Christopher went to Europe, he was a fine Secretary of State,

and a fine man, I am a great admirer of his, and basically said,

‘‘You guys really do not want to do this, do you? We think we

should lift the arms embargo, but you guys do not really want to

do this, do you?’’ Everybody said, ‘‘No, we do not want to do this,’’ and that was

the end of it. He came back and reported that no one wanted to

lift the arms embargo.

This reminds me of the same thing. I do not see, in my experience, where the uniformed military is objecting to expansion. I

55

think the civilian military is objecting to the expansion, in country,

in country. I am not going to get anybody in trouble, but in country, I could name you the highest ranking military officials, and

they all think we should expand ISAF. This idea of legitimate concern, of interfering with the efforts of going after al-Qaeda—the

remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, that is arguably true in one

of the three parts of the country.

You might be able to describe this policy as sort of paraphrasing

Julius Caesar, all of Afghanistan is divided into four parts. In one

part, that is arguably the case, but it sure as heck is not the case

over in the Iranian border. It sure in heck is not the case up in

Mazar. It is not the case in other places. So I am confused here as

to why, why there is this resistance, when on the ground with our

military, there is not resistance.

I mean I could—again, I do not want to get people in trouble, but

I spent hours, and they say, no, no, no, look, it has to be expanded,

and asking the Europeans and other allies to expand, and say we

are unopposed to expansion is very different than saying, ‘‘I want

to make clear to you, we are not going to be any part of it. We are

not going to supply any forces. We are going to stay here and concentrate on this, but we encourage you to expand.’’ It is sort of like

Christopher’s trip to Europe. So, I still am somewhat baffled.

I am going to come back in the next round, general, to you, I

want to talk to you about the Bosnia experience, and whether or

not it applies in any way. But, Mr. Ambassador, I do not—I think

it has to do with this overwhelming and overarching fear and concern, practically and politically, about nation building, and about

us being engaged there.

Mr. TOMSEN. Could I comment just briefly?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Mr. TOMSEN. I think the President himself has come out forcibly

in underscoring that we are going to stay, for a Marshall Plan. We

are in there for the long haul. What you are getting at, I think, and

what I was trying to get at is this misconception that there is an

internal contradiction between going after al-Qaeda and the

Taliban on the one hand, and helping the government develop the

institutions that it needs to in helping the country move back onto

a free market democracy track, which it was on in the 1960s and

early 1970s, that there is a contradiction here. And the answer to

this is, there is not a contradiction, and that is what I mentioned

on the Christiane Amanpour show, that one supports the other,

and ultimately if you have a central government that is functioning

with democratic institutions, it is going to help in the task of going

after al-Qaeda and the Taliban. There is a misunderstanding of

this.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was interested in

your support of Senator Hyde’s Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

I will look at his bill and see what he has done. It may help satisfy

the question I raised with the first panel, and that is, is there an

overall plan that lays out a course of action, at least one that is

coherent enough for us as lay people to read and understand? Secretary Armitage said that he would send a letter outlining these

elements, and he went through a number of prerequisites. So there

56

may be something there, but I am not sure, and that is why I have

asked the question. Now you are suggesting that this legislation,

may serve a similar purpose as the Freedom Support Act did at the

time of the fall of the Soviet Union. This might be helpful in laying

out a strategy and a plan.

I would like to see a small book, and maybe this would be just

for my own edification, in which we recite the very important history of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a sovereign state, unlike Palestine, or other states we are talking about at the current time.

Afghanistan seemingly governed itself reasonably well for much

of this century before disruptions occurred. So that is encouraging

as a background. Because most of us hearing all the testimony and

the current events see a chaotic situation of near anarchy, of warlords at each other’s throats. There is almost denial of the central

government, and you are saying that was not always the case, and

that there at least is some experience in this area, and the question

is how you get back to that.

Now, if we did get back to that, without knowing the history of

the country, my guess is that our expectations would be greater for

the people of Afghanistan. We have discussed the role of women,

democracy, freedom, education, health, and so forth. It is clear we

must help establish standards well beyond those that existed in the

1930s. This will require assistance, economic assistance, technical

assistance, and that must be part of the plan, and an Afghanistan

Freedom Support Act.

The problem with the former Soviet Freedom Support Act was

that ultimately most of the pieces sort of fell off the wagon, because

there was lack of support in Russia. The institutions there were so

forbidding that even though we were talking about agricultural reform, they were not, and we are still discussing this in a rudimentary way today. So even here, it is not skepticism, but some

sense of limitation as to how much occurs how fast. I ask this question as a preface.

Clearly, there is a debate going on in our administration on how

involved we should be in Afghanistan. It started with the war, and

the thought was that our role should be limited to the fewest people, helicopters, et cetera, instead we hoped to rely upon Afghans

on the ground, and others. This phobia may be well-founded, in the

past others had got bogged down, and we would not. So that is the

way we fought it, and it was successful. It was remarkable.

Now, the problem of governance after all this is a different sort

of issue. And the feeling is, still, you might get bogged down almost

in the same way, caught between warlords and ethnic leaders.

Many feel this is untenable, and would not be supported by the

American people for very long. Therefore, you keep walking around

the problem and studying it to determine how can you do this with

the least number of people on the ground, maybe even money?

I am trying to come to grips with how we move beyond that. I

share the chairman’s anxiety in many ways, that somehow or other

the Marshall Plan idea, the President’s commitment, all these

things have been enunciated in a fairly bold way. But I am still

looking for the plan, and a structure of how this occurs, and some

dollar amounts attached to it, with numbers of American military

57

forces as well as diplomatic presence in conjunction with allied contributions necessary to accomplish our goals.

Mr. TOMSEN. To answer the first part of your question, my testimony has three elements that are there in the Freedom Support

Act. One is what you were getting at earlier in the hearing, a strategy, a reconstruction strategy, which is missing, an umbrella, and

from democracy, to women’s rights, to infrastructure, to education,

you want to see a structure and a strategy, and if you look at the

material that has come with this Henry Hyde bill, it describes that

strategy objective.

Second, it is a separate budget. You will have a press conference

in the administration, and somebody wants to say something nice,

it is going to be on Afghanistan, so it is announced that $100 million has been allocated for refugee assistance, but it has already

been allocated; or say, $10 million is taken from another pot of

money in the administration for announcement of this press conference. There is not the overall coherence you need which would

come with something like the Freedom Support Act. Most important, and I noticed this when I was the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia for 3 years, the presence of this coordinator mechanism in the

State Department, not in one of the elements of the aid community,

but right there in the State Department, the last stop before the

budget goes to the Hill, the final budget, was of an advantage to

ambassadors, because we could talk to our staff, and I had 12 agencies at post, and put together an integrated plan, and then send

it to this coordinator mechanism, Ambassador Taylor now, and

then the budget would go up to the Hill.

So in the field, we were coordinated, and in Washington there

was coordination, because USAID and USIA, and other elements of

the aid community, had to be coordinated by this coordinator. So

you need that for Afghanistan, since so many agencies and departments now are involved in Afghanistan.

Congress took the lead on the Freedom Support Act. It did not

come out of the administration. You guys said, ‘‘Hey, there is a

problem here,’’ and you resolved it, and you did. So I would argue

that you should do it again.

Senator LUGAR. I applaud each of those three steps, because I

think that is really the heart of the strategy, to begin with, and not

improvisation with funds, and which somehow you—there is something from some other account, which we cannot possibly follow, as

you say, it was already there, maybe. It would be hard for us to

be bookkeepers. There just is not a discreet plan, or financing, or

coordination, so I really appreciate those answers, because they are

really a rifle shot, it seems to me what we ought to be about in

our questioning and our oversight.

General GRANGE. Mr. Chairman, can I add a quick comment to

that question?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

General GRANGE. Because I think Senator Lugar hit on two key

things that I associate with from my experience in the military.

One is this overarching strategy. In the military we have something called the commander’s intent, and that really sets the purpose, and what has to be done, what is the end state of any operation, and commander’s intent is something that goes to everyone

58

who is involved, and everyone then is supposed to understand it,

to execute it properly. So I think that that is essential, a strategy,

a commander’s intent.

The other piece that you mentioned was the phrase ‘‘bogged

down.’’ We are associating that with the Soviet experience when we

use that phrase. But if it has to do with time, we are going to be

there for some time. So the point is, why do it on the cheap? Why

not do it right, and set it up as an example for the world to see

that we do follow through with what we say we are going to do,

and complete the mission?

Mr. TOMSEN. Could I have 20 seconds to followup on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you. More than 20 seconds?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you. The Afghans want the United States to

be intrusive; they do not want thousands and thousands, say

10,000-20,000 U.S. troops with fire support, and bases like in Vietnam. I think General Franks and CENTCOM have, again, have

just performed brilliantly in keeping us at the 7,000 or below level,

but they want America there symbolically, and in substance.

And it does not matter how many Americans are there in an aid

capacity, or, say, nonmilitary capacity. They see us as having given

them the wherewithal to defeat the Soviets, which we did. They defeated the Soviets. They saw us as helping them throw off the yoke

of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which our military did. So we have

a very good image and reputation in Afghanistan. We should not

worry too much about intrusiveness, if we stay away from deploying tens of thousands of troops there, as the general and others

have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to each of you.

As you, Senator Lugar, and you, Chairman Biden, know each of

these individuals, I do, and I am a friend of each, and I am an admirer of each, and not just is it a result of my narrow parochial

interests that Ambassador Tomsen resides at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

I think these two witnesses have laid out the best dynamics of

understanding of what is going on that I have yet heard and have

yet read. I think both of you, each of you, have it right, exactly

right, and I am not sure I would disagree with a sentence in any

of this.

Now, with that, and I am just sorry that our two Deputy Secretaries are not here to hear this, and I am going to send them each

a note today with copies of your testimony, and request that they

take the time to read, which you have each written.

Senator Lugar is, I think, on track with his general question that

he has just proffered, and it resembles somewhat the line of questioning that I had for Secretary Armitage. When I asked the question, what is the integrated overall policy of this administration,

not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which he acknowledged are

interrelated, and when I developed that a bit, the Secretary did not

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give me a very good answer, and I had 7 minutes, so I did not have

a chance to come back and talk more about it.

But here is the point, I am concerned with what we are doing

in Afghanistan, because I fear it is being seen and will be seen as

kind of a glancing blow strategy, not our role, not our responsibility

kind of strategy, and we heard remnants of that from both the Secretaries this morning. That was not our intent when we went to

Afghanistan, be in for the cheap, get out for the cheap, and, of

course, we declare war on Iraq weekly, and threaten to invade, and

I am not sure that helps our overall focus and discipline and resources.

And it is like the general knows so well, resources matter; but

what matters most is where you apply those resources and how you

use those resources. Because even America—in America, we have

finite military capabilities and assets, and the general knows that,

as well as do you, Mr. Ambassador.

The general’s comments here about the blow to American prestige and honor, aside from what this would do, unravel our war

against terrorists, and our overall objective, and partly why I asked

Secretary Armitage that question about reversal of the optics. And

do you think that anything we do in that region, Afghanistan and

Pakistan is in any way interpreted by anybody else around the

world, that we may not just be, and I know this is a concern, trying

to do too much, in one sense, but at the same time, too little?.

I think there is a conflict, that my sense is that Senator Lugar

was getting to a little bit, as well as Chairman Biden, there is a

bit of a schizophrenic kind of approach to all of this. I am one who

believes and have believed, believe more today than I did a few

months ago, that our commitment in Afghanistan must include exactly what the two of you have laid out here, and it cannot be done

on the cheap.

There is just too much writing on this, and I would be interested

in your defining, each of you, a little bit deeper than your testimony in any way that you want to take this, numbers, aid. You

mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, that you have heard and know of in

your constant relationships and contacts with people over there,

that the aid is not getting done. That cuts right to the credibility

of our word, our commitment.

Now, we can come up and testify at all these fancy hearings, and

say, ‘‘Oh, no, we have $4.5 billion,’’ but, in fact, when you get on

the ground over there, do they really have $4.5 billion, and where

is it going? The unraveling process will come quickly, as each of

you know, because each of you had real-life experiences in these

kinds of things.

So I throw out to each of you, as I have made some comments

overall, but to take my thoughts, comments, questions, and proceed

in any direction you wish to go, because I do not think either one

of you overstates the concerns you have, based on not just your

own experience and knowledge, but on a perception and a perspective that few of us have.

So go ahead, Mr. Ambassador, you begin.

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you, and thanks for all your help, Senator,

at UNO, University of Nebraska, and our Center for Afghanistan

Studies, too.

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I want to answer the general question about what influence this

is having internationally and regionally, what we are doing in Afghanistan. I would give a positive and a negative side to that. On

the positive side, if we succeed in Afghanistan, we will be creating

a model of an American-led international operation, helping a Muslim population to throw off extremism, Muslim extremism, and returning to the road of democracy, and economic development, and

moderate Islam.

So Afghanistan could be a model for the Muslim world, and

internationally, a country that was sunk into the abyss of radical

extremism, al-Queda, and the Taliban, but its population did not

want it. Its population was moderate Islam, and we helped them

get back on the track, and prosper. So that would have a ripple effect, I think.

One of the reasons why the Iranian clerics—I would not say the

Foreign Minister or the President of Iran, I would say the Iranian

clerics—are interfering against Hamid Karzai, because they are

worried that this model might succeed.

Also, if Afghanistan, given its location, can get back on the right

track, it will be a crossroads for global corridors of trade, and commerce, and telecommunication connecting Europe, and China, and

Russia, and South Asia.

On the resources, doing it right, if you want to build a well, for

example, or reconstruct a school, or road as our Special Forces are

doing, it only cost $200 or $5,000. Not much, but we have to do it

right, and we will not be spending that much at the local level. Unfortunately, the way the aid bureaucracies are organized, internationally and in our own country, is that 80 percent of the money

gets sopped up by salaries for expatriates, the Americans, or U.N.

types, as the case may be, trips to the region, and in the end, there

is not much action on the ground, in terms of actual projects. The

Armenian Prime Minister used to complain to me all the time

about international aid projects in his country.

I guess I have run out of time, so I will stop there.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General GRANGE. I think that actually goes back to all the questions that have been brought up, and that is, I believe our concern

is three major things. One that I will just disregard right away is:

I do not think we are hung up on this aversion to have casualties

like we used to be. I do not think that is really the big issue now,

but I think these are the issues of maybe the hesitant nature of

what is going on.

One is that getting in a fight with others, as you expand out of

Kabul with a security force, no one wants to get into a fight with

others while we are still fighting the Taliban and the al-Queda. I

think that is a concern.

No. 2 is that the commitment, as this broad front with the war

on terrorists, it is a broad front. It is a global commitment. And I

believe, when I left the military at the end of 1999, we worked

pretty hard, and we did not have the war on terrorism yet. The division I commanded, when we went those 2 years—and some of you

visited our units. We were all over the map. And it is hard to say

what mission could be eliminated, and what you continue on with.

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But it was quite a lot of commitment, not only in time, but people, and, of course, resources, ammunition, equipment, et cetera. So

there is a concern on commitment with more in Afghanistan. I

think those are the two main issues of concern.

To solve that, one is that, in my mind, I would think Afghanistan

was the main effort. We are not fighting Iraq right now. I mean

we may be gathering intelligence and that in other places around

the world, and we have other things, the Republic of Georgia,

Yemen, Philippines, Colombia, et cetera, but the main effort in my

mind, I would think, would be Afghanistan. And if that is your

main effort, that is what you resource to accomplish the mission.

And I agree with what the ambassador said, if that is successful,

I believe through the optics of others in that region with different

cultures, that some of the other people we have problems with will

fall in line, because it will be a model, it will be a success story,

and success stories, people want to emulate.

So I really think there is something there, and if we win that,

it will have a great effect on what we are trying to do globally.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Gentlemen, we have kept you a long

time. I just want to make two relatively brief comments.

First, I think your experience in Bosnia showed you, general,

that all the protestations by elected officials up here turned out to

be wrong. From 1993, on, I heard from everyone that the American

public will never sustain the allocation of forces, and the deployment of forces in the Balkans. It will not happen. I do not know

anybody who ran a campaign for Congress or the Senate who won

or ran on the ticket, ‘‘Bring the boys home.’’ I have not had anyone

come up knocking on my door or out there saying, ‘‘The most important thing is get out of Bosnia, get out of Kosovo, bring the boys

home.’’

Second, the polling data overwhelmingly sustains the position

that the American people understand that we have to keep forces

in Afghanistan. The job is not done, and we have a long way to go.

They are pretty smart. They have it figured out.

I think that part of the problem here is that there is a disconnect

with some, both a hangup and a disconnect. Some of our—what is

left of the left, and what is the furthest of the right seem to have

gathered together to conclude that we are overextended, and nation

building is not something we should be involved in.

I had a long meeting with the President where he outlined for

me for an hour and 45 minutes what we had to do, and I was impressed. In walking out—I will not mention the official’s name, as

I got from the Oval Office out into the West Wing, but we were outside and this particular official came running down the hall and

said, ‘‘Are you going to stop at the stakeout?’’ Meaning where the

press is.

I said, ‘‘Not if you do not want me to,’’ and they wanted me to,

because it was a bipartisan effort here.

They said, ‘‘Not that we want you to, but you are not going to

mention nation building, are you?’’

I said, ‘‘You mean what the President has spoken to me about

for the last hour and 45 minutes?’’ I said, ‘‘No, I won’t mention

that.’’

62

There is an incredible hangup on this notion about ‘‘nation building,’’ just the use of the phrase, in my experience.

Second, I really do think that there is a disconnect among some

in the Congress and the administration, between our objectives

with regard to Iraq and the unfinished business in Afghanistan. I

have had numerous world leaders and counterparts in parliaments

in Europe say, ‘‘You want to go in and take down Saddam, and you

are not even going to stay in Afghanistan.’’ The greatest worry I find, Mr. Ambassador, is they are worried

about not whether we can take down Saddam, but what do we do

after we take him down? I facetiously say, ‘‘Your old boss stopped

for a simple reason. He didn’t want to stay for 5 years in Baghdad.’’ So I hope we can begin to articulate this correlation between getting the job done properly in Afghanistan and our flexibility and

ability to deal in other parts of the world, and what impact failure

to do that might have on interest in other parts of the world, but

both your testimonies have been extremely helpful.

General, you headed up Task Force Eagle in Bosnia. Do you

think it is time for us to get out of the Balkans and out of Bosnia?

General GRANGE. No, but I would like to—I think we can do it

better. I have looked back hard at peace support operations, whether they be chapter six peacekeeping, chapter seven peace enforcement, et cetera.

When I got to Bosnia, I believed we were in a reactive mode. You

do not win. You do not accomplish a mission in reactive mode. You

have to be proactive, and we moved to a proactive mode. But then

if you are really good, you then go to the next phase, which I call

interactive. And that is some of the things that I think the ambassador, and myself, and others laid out in our testimony, and that

is how you integrate with the communities involved in the operation, and with the people that you are dealing with, the people of

that nation.

You interact, so you really have a taste, a feel, you see what is

going on, and you know what to do, and when. And we got pretty

good at it at the end of our tour. But you cannot do that with a

base camp mentality, giving soldiers, hamburger joints, and cappuccino stands. You have to do that by getting out, not sitting in

base camps, but getting out with the society that you are dealing

with.

I would do the MFO different. I would use that as an emergency

deployment, readiness exercise, live-fire training, a dessert training

area for the United States Army. And if Israel and Egypt did not

like that, then I would pull out. I would tie the requirement into

some of the things we are supposed to be ready to do for war.

There is just a lot of things we can do to make these missions better, more effective for our readiness.

Any of these missions, any of these missions that I have been

on—and in Bosnia I had 29 different units working for me, not

counting the allies. Any of these missions, when some kid looks up

at the American flag on the right sleeve of the soldier, you know

you are making a difference, because a lot of people hate that flag,

but I think more love it, and it makes a difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your time, your testimony, and your input. Hopefully together—we are joined together

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bipartisanly here, and hopefully together with the administration

we can develop or be part of implementing that agenda, that plan,

but like the Senator from the great State of Indiana said, I have

not seen it yet, and I am anxious to see it.

I thank you both very much, and we are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:51 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene

subject to the call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I am pleased to be here today to consider the status of our efforts in Afghanistan.

In particular, I am grateful for the opportunity this hearing provides to discuss

some of the specific diplomatic and humanitarian efforts that will be necessary to

build a more secure and prosperous future for the people of Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, we have witnessed nearly all of the alarming characteristics of

many of the world’s weakest states. Such states attract terrorists and other international criminals who depend for their survival on manifestations of lawlessness

such as piracy, illicit air transport networks, and trafficking in arms, drugs, gems,

and people. The terror that accompanies these shadowy groups further weakens the

integrity of the host state, while encouraging grave human rights practices on an

ever larger scale. We saw this on September 11, but the suffering caused by such

terrorist groups runs much deeper. Indeed, such networks fuel conflict, inhibit legitimate economic development and provide a breeding ground for increasingly dangerous terrorist activities world-wide. Afghanistan proves why such weak states

must not be allowed to threaten our global order. But now, Afghanistan must also

stand as a testament of the international community’s commitment to securing and

rebuilding those same societies.

At the same time, no hearing on Afghanistan could overlook the rights of women

and girls who have suffered so ferociously under the Taliban regime. In recent

months we have watched with horror as the women of Afghanistan have emerged

from their enforced seclusion to describe years of abuse. The world has witnessed

few more egregious examples of institutionalized discrimination against women, although we must recognize that women in many other societies are living equally restrictive lives. Once again, our progress in promoting the re-integration of women

into the public life of Afghanistan will long be viewed as a test of our global commitment to the advancement of women’s rights.

I firmly believe that a secure future in Afghanistan depends on the ability of the

international community to promote human rights and democratic governance during this crucial transition period. This will not be an easy task in the aftermath of

so many years of segregation, violence, and institutional collapse. But our efforts in

Afghanistan will serve as a much larger measure of our commitment to building a

more secure global environment. We are a strong and prosperous nation. And we

must understand that our security ultimately depends on our ability to build similarly prosperous, democratic societies around the world.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN,

JR.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. Are there any circumstances under which the United States would be

willing to consider participation in the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)? If so, what are those circumstances?

Answer. The Bonn Agreement asserted the Afghans’ responsibility for providing

their own security, and established the International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) to assist them. The ISAF serves in Afghanistan under authorization of UN

Security Council Resolution 1386 (20 December 2001), which limits ISAF to Kabul

and its surrounding areas. UN Security Council Resolution 1413 extends the same

mandate under Turkish lead through December 2002.

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The United States already supports ISAF in several ways, including through our

position on the UN Security Council, which specifically authorizes the extension of

the ISAF operating mandate, most recently through December 2002. Through a liaison cell in Kabul, the U.S. Central Command assures deconfliction of military activities. The U.S., through a bilateral Letter of Arrangement with the ISAF lead nation

(currently Turkey), is committed to provide certain other kinds of backstopping support, as needed in emergencies and depending on available resources.

The U.S. is not opposed to ISAF expansion. However, other countries have not

been willing thus far to provide the resources, logistical support, and personnel sufficient to support expansion outside of Kabul. We have also believed that security

outside Kabul could be assisted through other means. We continue to monitor the

situation.

Question. Are there any circumstances under which the United State would be

willing to consider active diplomatic and military support for the expansion of ISAF?

If so, what are these circumstances?

Answer. The U.S. does not oppose ISAF expansion. However, other countries have

not been willing thus far to contribute the resources, logistical support, and personnel needed to support expansion of ISAF’s mandate outside of Kabul. We have

also believed that security outside Kabul could be assisted through other means. We

continue to monitor the situation.

ISAF operates in Afghanistan under authorization of the UN Security Council

(Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001). Should the UN decide to expand the ISAF

mission, the U.S. would work in the Security Council to craft a sustainable mission.

Complicated issues of command and control for ISAF deployments outside of Kabul

would also need to be resolved.

Question. Are U.S. forces currently tasked with the mission of upholding internal

security and maintaining law and order in Afghanistan? Are there any contingency

plans to task U.S. forces with this mission?

Answer. U.S. forces are not tasked with the mission to uphold security and law

and order. Maintenance of security is the responsibility of the Afghans. However,

small numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces and Civil Affairs teams have on

a number of occasions acted as intermediaries and exerted a constructive influence

to dampen conflicts among regional leaders. These personnel are stationed around

the country and interact with key regional leaders. They have proved extremely effective also at delivering humanitarian aid, getting infrastructure projects identified

and started, among other tasks.

Question. Have any government officials, or U.S. military personnel, instructed

Pacha Khan Zadran (and other recalcitrant warlords on the U.S. payroll) to accept

the authority of the central government?

Answer. Yes. Pacha Khan Zadran has been urged by U.S. Special Operations

Forces personnel on a number of occasions to accept the authority of the Afghan

Transitional Authority.

Question. There are numerous reports of interference with and attacks against

staff engaged in delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially in the area around

Mazar-e Sharif. In the wake of the rape of an aid worker and attacks on relief vehicles, international NGOs this weekend issued a strong plea for expansion of international peace keeping forces. What is the administration’s plan for dealing with

these law-and-order failures in the near term?

Answer. The Afghans acknowledge their responsibility for providing security in

Afghanistan. Law-and-order issues fall outside the DOD mission in Afghanistan.

The U.S., however, is fully engaged in addressing these issues and concerns. We

support the UN—in New York and through its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

(UNAMA)—in helping the Afghans to address these outrages.

UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi (UNAMA’s head, and in conjunction

with the Afghan government, and the international community) is working with regional leaders in Afghanistan to ensure they honor commitments to facilitate provision of assistance to communities in need.

As noted, the NGO community in northern Afghanistan has confronted local leaders about security conditions, and has undertaken a local media campaign to explain

the risks of decreased aid if these abuses continue.

Our Ambassador in Kabul and the Director of the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) have also expressed directly to regional leaders the U.S. government’s concern about the security situation in their areas, and have called on

them to fulfill commitments to provide proper security, and to hold accountable

those responsible for recent attacks.

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Training and deploying Afghan military and police forces will mitigate many of

these concerns.

Question. How long is the training and equipping of an independent Afghan national army and police force expected to take? How much money has the administration requested for these operations, and how much will be required in the coming

year?

Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) training program began in May 2002.

The U.S. Central Command projects that the U.S.-led effort will train over 14,000

soldiers in light infantry and border guard units in approximately 18 months (provided adequate numbers of recruits), creating the largest army in Afghanistan. In

December 2003, Afghan trainers—already being prepared—will take the lead in this

training program. The first ANA battalion will graduate on July 23, 2002. The State Department supplemental appropriation request seeks $70 million for

ANA training and recruits’ salaries ($50M in Foreign Military Financing and $20M

in Peacekeeping Operations funds). In the DOD supplemental, we requested authority to move up to $100 million in DOD funds from other programs or operational

funds into ANA training, if appropriate. Passage of DOD’s supplemental funding request will help ensure that the ANA training program can fulfill its mission of fielding a military force that can provide security in Afghanistan over the long term.

The German government has the lead for Afghan police reconstruction. Within the

U.S. government, the State Department manages U.S. contributions to the police reconstruction effort and can best address this issue.

Question. What provisions are in place to maintain security during the interim period before an Afghan army and police are fully operational? If the administration

does not support ISAF expansion, and if U.S. forces are not being used as peacekeepers, what is our strategy?

Answer. The Afghans acknowledge their responsibility for providing security in

Afghanistan. We are working with them to build their capacity to take on this responsibility. Through the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA), border

guards (included as part of the ANA training program), and police, the Afghan government will become better able to provide broader security on its own.

In those areas where trained Afghan national forces have not yet been deployed

(or will not be available for some time), local commanders are using their own men

and resources to provide security. That is the commitment they have made to the

Afghan Transitional Authority that emerged from the June loya jirga.

The U.S. and international community are working to give Afghans the training

and equipment they need to solve these problems on their own—effective military

and police forces.

The U.S. is not opposed to ISAF expansion. No nation has come forward with the

numbers of men and other resources necessary to support a sustained mission outside of Kabul however.

As an interim measure, the U.S. is using combined teams of Special Operations

Forces, Civil Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development and State Department personnel, working with regional and local leaders, to assist in maintaining

stability in the regions. On numerous occasions, these U.S. personnel, though few

in number, have exerted their influence effectively to help dampen conflicts among

regional leaders and to promote national unity.

Question. The current ethnic makeup of the Afghan army, under the control of

Marshal Muhammad Fahim, is overwhelmingly skewed toward Panjshiri Tajiks.

What safeguards will the United States put in place to insure that the Afghan army

we are training will adequately reflect the ethnic makeup of the country?

Answer. The Afghan government has made the commitment to provide Afghan

National Army recruits that reflect the ethnic mix of the country. This is an Afghan

responsibility, but one that we support as part of our efforts to help field a credible

national army. So far, the ethnic breakdown of the first two battalions trained by

the U.S. Central Command has roughly corresponded to the ethnic makeup of the

country.

Question. Throughout Afghanistan, many regional commanders allied with the

United States have perpetrated abuses on the Pashtuns, who form the largest ethnic group in the country. What actions are being taken to prevent a Pashtun backlash against the United States?

Answer. Ultimately, ethnic harmony in Afghanistan depends on the success of the

Afghan Transitional Authority, with its balance of ethnic, political, and regional

forces as developed by Afghans themselves in the June loya jirga. In the meantime,

the U.S. response to human rights abuses has been swift and vocal. Through our

embassy in Kabul, the U.S. government has sought to promote better human rights

66

observance across Afghanistan. Whenever and wherever abuses have been committed, the U.S. has denounced the acts publicly, to President Karzai, and to regional or local leaders where such abuses have occurred. The U.S. also supports

public awareness campaigns promoting human rights in Afghanistan, and highlighting our leading role in helping the Afghan government build a new, tolerant

state where such abuses are a relic of the past.

Unfortunately, many groups harbor long-standing feuds and hatreds against one

another, and some are tempted to settle old scores.

The U.S. has also supported UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi’s efforts

to bring such abuses to an end across Afghanistan.

Question. What is the United States doing in response to acts of violence against

women in the north and intimidation tactics against employment and education of

women in the south? What has the U.S. done to address the physical intimidation

of Sima Samar?

Answer. The U.S. response to human rights abuses—including abuse of women

and girls across Afghanistan—has been swift and vocal. Our embassy in Kabul has

been involved in efforts to promote better human rights observance across Afghanistan. Whenever and wherever abuses against women have occurred, the U.S. has

denounced the acts publicly, to President Karzai directly, and to regional or local

leaders where such abuses took place. We have also approached the Afghan government to improve security for women officials and international workers in Afghanistan.

In addition to policy pronouncements, the U.S. has sought to improve the material

lot of women and girls in Afghanistan through practical measures. The U.S. was actively involved in promoting the establishment of a cabinet-level Ministry of Women’s Affairs in the Afghan government, as well as a Human Rights Commission.

Through our aid and funding, the U.S. provides broad institutional and program

support that improve the lives of Afghan women and children. The U.S. is involved

in a public-private partnership activity—the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council—which

focuses attention on women’s issues in Afghanistan. The U.S. also supports public

awareness campaigns promoting human rights in Afghanistan, and highlighting our

leading role in helping the Afghan government build a new, tolerant state where

such abuses are a relic of the past.

Concurrent with our work with Afghan government officials, the U.S. has supported UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi’s efforts to bring such abuses

to an end across Afghanistan. In this, Brahimi is joined by the UN Commission for

Human Rights, which monitors violence in Afghanistan.

The State Department has released a report to Congress, ‘‘U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children and Refugees,’’ that addresses in greater detail U.S. government efforts in this area. See <www.state.gov/g/wi>.

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