UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4570

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

IMOUDU IZEGWIRE, a/k/a David, a/k/a Imoudu Igewire,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., 

District Judge. (2:05-cr-00153-WDK-JEB-3)

Submitted: January 14, 2010 Decided: March 22, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DAVIS, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Warren E. Gorman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, for Appellant. Dana J. 

Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, 

Darryl J. Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Imoudu Izegwire appeals from his jury convictions for 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 

one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 846 & 841(a)(1) (West 1999) (Count I), and conspiracy to 

launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 1956(h) & 1956 (West Supp. 2009) (Count II), as well as from 

the 120-month concurrent sentences imposed by the district court 

for these convictions. We affirm.

I.

On November 18, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted 

Izegwire and two of his co-conspirators, Tolulope John and 

Fatoumata Toure, on one count of conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute heroin, and one count of 

conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.1

 1 John and Toure were also charged with numerous substantive 

money laundering offenses.

 Izegwire was 

arrested and made his initial appearance on March 8, 2006. 

John, who had left the United States in late 2000, was living in 

the United Kingdom. He was arrested there on March 1, 2006, but 

successfully fought extradition to the United States until March 

8, 2007. He subsequently pled guilty prior to trial. Toure was 
3

arrested in the United States but also pled guilty prior to 

trial.

Following a series of pretrial motions, including motions 

to continue filed by both Izegwire and the government, trial 

commenced on February 26, 2008. On February 29, 2008, the jury 

convicted Izegwire of both counts. Using a special verdict 

form, the jury found that the United States had established, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, “that at least one act 

committed in furtherance of the alleged conspirac[ies] occurred 

in the Eastern District of Virginia.” S.J.A. 178, 179-80. The 

jury also found that Izegwire “conspired to distribute and/or 

conspired to possess with intent to distribute . . . [s]ome 

amount less than ‘100 grams’ of a mixture or substance 

containing a detectable amount of heroin.” S.J.A. 179. This 

finding of drug quantity resulted in a statutory maximum 

sentence of 20 years imprisonment for the drug conspiracy 

charge. The statutory maximum for the money laundering charge 

was 10 years imprisonment.

At sentencing, the district court attributed 500 grams of 

heroin to Izegwire, resulting in an offense level of 28 for the 

heroin conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6) (2007).2

 2 The money laundering conspiracy conviction resulted in an 

offense level of 22.

 With a 
4

three-level enhancement for his role in the offense, Izegwire’s 

guideline range was 108 to 135 months imprisonment. The 

district court sentenced Izegwire to concurrent 120-month 

sentences on each count, followed by three years of supervised 

release.

II.

A.

Izegwire first appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the five-year 

statute of limitations. We review de novo the trial court’s 

denial of the motion. See United States v. Uribe-Rios

Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282(a) (West Supp. 2009), “no person 

shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not 

capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is 

instituted within five years next after such offense shall have 

been committed.” In conspiracy offenses, the “statute of 

limitations . . . runs from the last overt act during the 

existence of the conspiracy.” 

, 558 F.3d 

347, 351 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Fiswick v. United States, 329 

U.S. 211, 216 (1946); see also United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 

363, 373 (6th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, the conspiracy, once 

established, “is presumed to continue unless or until the 

defendant shows that it was terminated or he withdrew from it.” 

United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43, 49 (4th Cir. 1986). The 
5

“mere cessation of activity in furtherance of the conspiracy is 

insufficient. The defendant must show affirmative acts 

inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated 

in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators. 

The burden of proving withdrawal rests on the defendant.” Id

We find no error in the district court’s rejection of 

Izegwire’s motion to dismiss the charges against him based upon 

the statute of limitations. Izegwire and his co-conspirators 

were indicted on November 18, 2005. Izegwire does not argue 

that the indictment was not filed within five years of the 

termination of the charged conspiracies. However, he contends 

that he withdrew from the conspiracies more than five years 

prior to the indictment, 

(citations omitted).

i.e., before November 18, 2000. 

Izegwire, however, has failed to demonstrate that he withdrew 

from the conspiracies prior to November 18, 2000, or that the 

conspiracies ended before that date. On the contrary, the 

government’s evidence indicates that neither occurred. There 

was evidence that members of the conspiracies continued to 

commit overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy well after 

November 18, 2000. In addition, there was evidence that between 

December 1, 2000, and February 22, 2001, Izegwire directed 

Helena Hollo, his girlfriend at the time, to conduct several 

wire transfers of drug proceeds to John in the United Kingdom, 
6

in furtherance of both the drug conspiracy and the money 

laundering conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court did not 

err in denying Izegwire’s motion to dismiss on this basis.

B.

Izegwire next appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss the charges against him for improper venue and 

its submission of the venue determination to the jury for its 

consideration.

“[A]ny offense against the United States begun in one 

district and completed in another, or committed in more than one 

district, may be . . . prosecuted in any district in which such 

offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C.A. 

§ 3237(a) (West 2000). “[A] conspiracy may be prosecuted in any 

district in which the agreement was formed or in which an act in 

furtherance of the conspiracy was committed.” United States v. 

Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1057 (4th Cir. 1992). “To establish 

venue, the government need only show that an act occurred in the 

district by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. 

Al-Talib

While we normally review the issue of venue 

, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1995).

de novo, see

United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 320 (4th Cir. 2001),

“[s]ubmitting the venue question to the jury is an appropriate 

procedure for resolving a factual dispute relating to venue,” 

United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 526 n.10 (4th Cir. 
7

2005). Here, the jury found that the government had proven 

“that at least one act committed in furtherance of [each] 

alleged conspiracy occurred in the Eastern District of 

Virginia.” S.J.A. 178, 179-80. This finding was supported by 

the evidence. At a minimum, the government presented evidence 

that a co-conspirator collected drug money from Izegwire and 

another co-conspirator for John after John left the United 

States, and that at least one wire transfer of drug proceeds was 

sent by the co-conspirator from Alexandria, Virginia in the 

Eastern District of Virginia to John in the United Kingdom. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying 

Izegwire’s motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of 

venue or in submitting the issue to the jury for its 

determination.

C.

Izegwire next appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss the charges against him based upon an alleged 

violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (West 

2000 & Supp. 2009). We review the district court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 

See United States v. Stoudenmire

The Speedy Trial Act provides that the trial of a defendant 

charged in an indictment “shall commence within seventy days 

, 74 F.3d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 

1996).
8

from the filing date . . . of the . . . indictment, or from the 

date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the 

court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last 

occurs.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c)(1) (West Supp. 2009). Pertinent 

to the case at hand, however, the Act provides for a number of 

excludable delays, including delay resulting from the granting 

of a continuance based on a finding that “the ends of justice 

served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2009). Factors to be considered in 

deciding whether to grant such a continuance include the 

defendant’s need for “reasonable time to obtain counsel,” for 

“continuity of counsel,” and for “reasonable time necessary for 

effective preparation” of counsel. 18 U.S.C.A. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Additional excludable periods of delay 

include “delay resulting from any proceeding, including any 

examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical 

capacity of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(1)(A), and 

“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of 

the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other 

prompt disposition of, such motion,” 18 U.S.C.A.

§ § 3161(h)(1)(D). The time from the filing of a motion until 

the conclusion of the hearing on the motion is excluded, even if 

the delay in holding the hearing was not reasonably necessary. 
9

See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330 (1986). “In a 

case involving several defendants, time excludable for one 

defendant is excludable for all defendants.” United States v. 

Jarrell, 147 F.3d 315, 316 (4th Cir. 1998). “There is a strong 

preference for trying codefendants together as it promotes 

judicial efficiency by avoiding successive trials involving the 

same evidence.” United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 972

(11th Cir. 1990). Thus, “reasonable delay attributable to the 

fugitive status of a co-indictee is excludable as to those 

defendants awaiting trial.” 

Having reviewed the record, including the numerous motions 

filed by both sides that resulted in delays as well as the 

extradition proceedings pursued against John, we find no 

reversible error by the district court in denying Izegwire’s 

motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. The district 

court ordered six continuances of Izegwire’s trial, some at the 

request of the defendant for various reasons, and some at the 

request of the government while it was attempting the 

extradition of John. In each case, the continuances and delays 

were authorized by the Act as excludable periods of time and the 

district court made the requisite finding that the ends of 

justice served by the continuances outweighed the best interests 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, as required 

Id.
10

by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Accordingly, Izegwire is not 

entitled to relief under the Speedy Trial Act.

III.

Izegwire also challenges his sentence, contending that the 

district court erred in finding that he was responsible for 500 

grams of heroin when the jury had made a finding that he was 

responsible for less than 100 grams of heroin, and erred in 

applying a three-level enhancement for his role as a manager or 

supervisor.

As noted earlier, the jury returned a special verdict form 

at the conclusion of the trial finding that Izegwire had 

“conspired to distribute and/or conspired to possess with intent 

to distribute . . . [s]ome amount less than ‘100 grams’ of a 

mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin.” 

S.J.A. 179. This finding set the statutory maximum sentence for 

the drug conspiracy at 20 years. The statutory maximum sentence 

for the money laundering conspiracy was 10 years.

The district court subsequently found, based upon a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Izegwire was supplied with a 

total of 500 grams of heroin by his co-conspirator John and 

applied a three-level enhancement for Izegwire’s role in the 

offense. This resulted in a guideline sentencing range of 108 

to 135 months imprisonment. The district court then imposed a 
11

sentence of 120 months, which was within the guideline range and 

statutory maximum for each conviction. On appeal, Izegwire 

contends that the district court erred by attributing a drug 

quantity to him for purposes of sentencing that exceeded the 

jury’s findings on the special verdict form.

Since Apprendi v. New Jersey, drug quantities that increase 

the statutory maximum sentence are elements of the offense and 

thus must be charged in the indictment and submitted to the jury 

for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See 530 U.S. 466, 490 

(2000). While Apprendi affects the calculation of the statutory 

maximum sentence that may be imposed, it does not affect the 

calculation of the applicable sentencing guideline range. 

“Sentencing judges may find facts relevant to determining a 

Guidelines range by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as 

that Guidelines sentence is treated as advisory and falls within 

the statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict.” United 

States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. 

denied 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009); see also United States v. Perry, 

560 F.3d 246, 258 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that, after United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), district courts may 

“continue to make factual findings concerning sentencing factors 

. . . by a preponderance of the evidence” and consider acquitted 

conduct when applying the guidelines in an advisory fashion). 

As long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum 
12

sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict, the district court 

does not violate the Sixth Amendment by imposing a sentence 

based on a higher drug quantity than was determined by the jury. 

See United States v. Webb

Here, the 120-month sentence imposed by the court was well 

within the statutory maximum of 20 years authorized by the 

jury’s findings on drug quantity. Accordingly, the sentence 

does not violate the Sixth Amendment. To the extent Izegwire 

contends that the district court’s factual finding was otherwise 

in error, we are unpersuaded. Drug quantity determinations are 

reviewed for clear error. 

, 545 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2008).

See United States v. Fullilove

We likewise reject Izegwire’s contention that the district 

court erred in finding that he was a manager or supervisor and 

applying the three-level increase in Izegwire’s offense level

for his role in the offense. 

, 388 

F.3d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 2004). The district court found the 

testimony of John, Izegwire’s co-conspirator, to be credible and 

found that John had supplied Izegwire with a total of 500 grams 

of heroin. Having reviewed the record as a whole, we cannot say 

that these findings were clearly erroneous. 

See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) (2007). 

The enhancement was based upon evidence that Izegwire directed 

Hollo to conduct wire transactions involving drug proceeds on 

several occasions. Izegwire did not contest the evidence, but 

argued that the enhancement should not apply in light of his 
13

romantic relationship with Hollo and because Hollo had made 

other, legitimate wire transfers for him during this same time 

period. 

The district court’s “ruling regarding a role adjustment is 

a factual determination reviewed for clear error.” United 

States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2009). A 

defendant qualifies for the three-level enhancement if he “was a 

manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the 

criminal activity involved five or more participants or was 

otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).3

 “Leadership over 

only one other participant is sufficient as long as there is 

some control exercised.” United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 

160, 166 (4th Cir. 2003); see also

The district court found that Izegwire played a managerial 

role because he directed Hollo to make the money wire transfers 

to John in furtherance of the conspiracies. Izegwire provided 

her with the money, along with the names and addresses of the 

recipients, and instructed her to use an alias each time she 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2 

(“To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant 

must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 

one or more other participants.”).

 3 Izegwire does not argue that the criminal activity 

involved fewer than five participants.
14

made an illegitimate transfer. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not clearly err in finding that Izegwire 

acted as a manager or supervisor with respect to Hollo and in 

applying the three-level role enhancement on this basis.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Izegwire’s convictions 

and sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED