* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines o f law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfa vors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 27, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN P. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. No. 05-1298 (D.C. No. 04-CV-2056-EWN)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , BRISCOE , andLUCERO , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Susan P. Williams, proceeding pro se, app eals the district court’s order upholding the Commissioner’s denial of her ap plication for social security disability benefits. She also appeals the districtcourt’s orders denying her1 We recognize that Ms. Williams maintains that the d istrict court improperly

recast her four issues as thirty separate claims, b ut she has not demonstrated that the district court erred in doing so. -2- post-judgment motions. We exercise jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Background Ms. Williams alleges disability since February 14, 2000, due to spinal arthritis, degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, hypoglycemia, carpal tunnel syndrome, peripheral neuropathy, headaches, temporo mandibular joint syndrome, and tinnitus. R. Vol. II, at 135. An administrati ve law judge (ALJ) held a hearing at which Ms. Williams appeared pro se and testified . A vocational expert also testified as to the exertional and nonexertional re quirements of Ms. Williams’ past jobs as a paralegal, legal secretary, and secretary . The ALJ determined that Ms. Williams retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform her past work as a secretary and a legal secretary. Accordingly, he denied benefits at step four of the five-part sequential evaluation process. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart , 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing five ste ps). The Appeals Council denied her request for review, making the ALJ’s decision issued on July 22, 2002, the final decisio n of the Commissioner. See Jensen v. Barnhart , 436 F.3d 1163, 1164 (10th Cir. 2005). The distri ct court issued an exhaustive order addressing each of Ms. W illiams’ thirty claims, 1 and-3-

affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Ms. Williams then sought reconsideration, relying on the new evidence provided in a March 23, 2005 report by Georgeanne Bley, Ph.D. After the district court denied that m otion, Ms. Williams again sought reconsideration, which the district court al so denied. Ms. Williams appeals. Legal Framework We review the Commissioner’s decision to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and to evaluate whether she applied the correct legal standards. Grogan v. Barnhart , 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere s cintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequ ate to support a conclusion.” Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or retry the case, but we “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything t hat may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if th e substantiality test has been
met.” Id. at 1262. In this context, “disability” requires both an “ina bility to engage in any substantial gainful activity” and “a physical or me ntal impairment, which provides reason for the inability.” Barnhart v. Walton , 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impairment must be a“‘medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has2 Ms. Williams requested this court to accommodate he r asserted difficulties

with written and verbal communications by accepting her district court briefs as her appellate brief. By an order dated September 2 6, 2005, this court granted the request in part. Accordingly, we have considered t hose portions of Ms. Williams’ district court briefs she incorporated by reference in her appellate briefs. -4- lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . .’” Fischer-Ross , 431 F.3d at 731 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) ). On appeal, Ms. Williams argues (1) substantial evid ence does not support the ALJ’s decision, (2) the ALJ failed to develop the r ecord, (3) the ALJ failed to explain the evidence he omitted from his decision, (4) the ALJ failed to follow the prescribed procedure to determine her RFC, and (5) the district court failed to consider new evidence obtained and submitted after the ALJ’s decision. 2
Substantial Evidence We do not repeat here the contents of the medical r ecords because the district court thoroughly reviewed them in its order. Moreo ver, Ms. Williams’ appellate arguments can be addressed without reciting all of the medical evidence. Ms. Williams asserts that the results of her medica l tests do not support the ALJ’s determination that she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. She maintains that the ALJ erred in relying on the various physicians’ reports of those tests, rather than conducting an i ndependent review of the meanings and significance of medical terminology. See, e.g., R. Vol. I, Doc. 25, at 11 (“Clearly, the ALJ selected documents containing la boratory findings that3 The district court also noted that Ms. Williams sou ght to rely on her own

“medical opinion of why her disc disease is disabli ng.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 37, at 21; see also id. at 23 (rejecting Ms. Williams’ attempt “to argue t hat her own medical opinions of the meaning of this MRI are more persua sive than Dr. Jatana’s opinions of this MRI”); id. at 24 (holding ALJ properly relied on treating physician’s well-supported opinion, especially when the contradictory evidence “is Plaintiff’s own ‘medical’ opinions about her co ndition”). Ms. Williams has not argued on appeal that the district court erred in holding that her medical opinions cannot trump those of her physicians. -5- constituted substantial evidence, he just did not d evelop them, that is, examine them in detail for meaning, look up the terms if he need s to, and carefully think through the results.”). Just as an ALJ cannot substitute his own medical op inion for that of a treating physician, Hamlin v. Barnhart , 365 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004), we conclude that the ALJ is not required to accept a claimant’s lay opinion on the meaning or significance of medical tests. 3 We turn to Ms. Williams’ argument that substantia l evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision. Ms. Williams claims that the ALJ failed to appreciate the changes in her C-spine MRI as shown by a comparison of her 1999 an d November 14, 2000 films. She further contends that the ALJ and the district court failed to recognize the significance of MRIs administered on April 6, 2001 and December 24, 2001. She maintains that these reports and the physicians’ re ports discussing them show that her back condition was worsening. That Ms. Williams had back problems substantiated b y medical evidence is-6-

undisputed. However, none of the reports or record s demonstrates that these problems were disabling. This is not to say that aclaimant must provide a physician’s opinion of disability. Indeed, such an opinion would not be binding on the Commissioner. Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994). Rather, to prove disability , a claimant “must furnish medical and other evidence of the existence of [a] disabili ty.” Branum v. Barnhart , 385 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision not to repeat in hi s decision all of the language in the medical test reports does not direc t a conclusion that his decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. To the contra ry, the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that he appropriately considered these reports. By arguing that the ALJ should have viewed the evidence differently, Ms . Williams asks this court “to reweigh the evidence; this we cannot do.” Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs. , 961 F.2d 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Ms. Williams also contends that the ALJ incorrectly evaluated her complaints of pain. The ALJ correctly recognized that he was required to evaluate Ms. Williams’ pain because she had fulfilled her bu rden to “prove by objective medical evidence the existence of a pain-producing impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disab ling pain.” Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations o mitted). The ALJ-7-

discounted her pain allegations, however, based on his finding that she was not fully credible. “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the prov ince of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supp orted by substantial evidence.” Hackett v. Barnhart , 395 F. 3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ’s cr edibility findings “should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). The ALJ discounted Ms. Williams’ pain allegations f or the following reasons: (1) her daily activities were not consistent with d isabling pain, (2) her use of pain-relieving medication did not support her claim of disabling pain, (3) she stopped working because she was terminated, not bec ause she was disabled, (4) she looked for work despite her claim that she was disa bled, (5) her condition apparently had not deteriorated since she stopped w orking, (6) her description of her symptoms and limitations appearing throughout the r ecord was “generally . . . so varied, specious, and inconsistent that it is unper suasive,” R. Vol. II, at 27, (7) she failed to follow recommended medical advice on seve ral occasions, and (8) her physicians suggested that she may be exaggerating h er symptoms. These credibility findings are closely and affirmatively linked to su bstantial evidence. We have meticulously reviewed the record in this ca se, including-8-

Ms. Williams’ briefs filed in the district court. We have reviewed de novo the district court’s thorough order. See Fischer-Ross , 431 F.3d at 731. For substantially the reasons stated in the district co urt’s order and memorandum of decision, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s ruling. Failure to Develop the Record Ms. Williams next alleges that the ALJ failed in hi s duty to develop the record because he did not order a consultative eval uation on her neurological impairments or her upper-extremity limitations. Sh e alleges that the record contains sufficient references to these impairments to trigg er the ALJ’s duty. In a social security disability case, the claimant bears the burden to prove her disability. Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). Disability hearings are nonadversarial, however, and the ALJ h as a duty “to ensure that an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues raised.” Id. (quotation omitted). “This duty is especially str ong in the case of an unrepresented claimant.” Carter v. Chater , 73 F.3d 1019, 1021 (10th Cir. 1996). “Ordinarily, the claimant must in some fashion rais e the issue sought to be developed which, on its face, must be substantial. Specifically, the claimant has the burden to make sure there is, in the record, eviden ce sufficient to suggest a reasonable possibility that a severe impairment exi sts.” Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1167-9-

(citations omitted). If she does so, then the ALJ’ s duty to order a consultative examination arises. Id. “Isolated and unsupported comments by the claiman t are insufficient, by themselves, to raise the suspicion of the existence of a nonexertional impairment.” Id. Ms. Williams argues that the evidence was sufficien t to require a consultative examination relating to her neurological impairment s. For objective medical evidence of these impairments, she relies on report s by Dr. Redosh. But Dr. Redosh did not diagnose any neurological impairments. Rat her, discussing an MRI performed to rule out multiple sclerosis, he sugges ted that an explanation for a “focus of abnormal signal would be an old injury, s uch as a shear injury of the gray-white matter junction,” or “a small old infarc t or injury.” R. Vol. II, at 318. Similarly, Dr. Redosh did not diagnose Ms. Williams with cerebellar syndrome; instead, he ordered tests to confirm or refute his initial impression that she “most likely” had this condition. Id. at 355. The record contains no other reference to cerebellar syndrome, indicating that the testing di d not confirm Dr. Redosh’s initial impression. Therefore, the record does not supportMs. Williams’ claim that the record contains diagnoses of brain damage, nor do t hese brief, isolated references establish that she had a severe neurological impair ment. Ms. Williams also argues that her complaints of thr oat constriction should have alerted the ALJ that she had a brain injury. But no physician stated that a-10-

brain injury caused Ms. Williams’ throat constricti on. To the contrary, Dr. Woodward stated that he “did not find any evide nce of neurological dysfunction to account for [her throat symptoms].” Id. at 423. Nor did Dr. Redosh link Ms. Williams’ symptoms of throat constriction to any neurological impairment; he described it as “globus hystericus.” Id. at 346. Ms. Williams’ own statements of her throat problems and her forgetfulness and diffi culty in concentrating were also insufficient to alert the ALJ to develop the record as to her alleged neurological impairment. Ms. Williams next contends that the ALJ was require d to develop the record on her claim of upper-extremity restrictions. She testified that she experienced weakness, numbness, and tingling in both arms. Id. at 76-77. She had used special arm rests at her past jobs. Id. at 92-93. She maintains that the permanent restrictions on using her hands and arms Dr. Fry id entified in 1993, id. at 232, triggered the ALJ’s duty to develop the record. Ho wever, Ms. Williams continued to work as a legal secretary and paralegal for oversix years after the permanent restrictions were imposed. Therefore, Dr. Fry’s 19 93 report was insufficient “to suggest a reasonable possibility that a severe impa irment exist[ed].” Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1167. The objective medical evidence in the record is ins ufficient to indicate the presence of a severe neurological or upper-extremity impairment. Consequently, the-11-

ALJ was not required to develop the record. Cf. Carter , 73 F.3d at 1021-22 (holding physician’s diagnosis of depression requir ed further development even though claimant’s application did not mention depre ssion).-12- Failure to Explain Evidence Omitted from ALJ’s Decision Ms. Williams contends that the ALJ failed to consid er relevant evidence and failed to explain the evidence he omitted from his decision. She asserts that he failed to consider evidence relating to her cervica l spine, neurological impairments, and permanent upper-extremity restrictions. In add ition, she complains that the ALJ interrupted her at the hearing, thus preventing herfrom presenting her evidence. “[W]hile [the ALJ] is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he ‘must discuss the uncontroverted evidenc e he chooses not to rely on, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects .’” Threet v. Barnhart , 353 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996)). Contrary to Ms. Williams’ contentions, the ALJ’s di scussion of the medical evidence is legally sufficient. It demonstrates a meaningful analysis of the full medical record and Ms. Williams’ testimony. In the decision, the ALJ recognized Ms. Williams’ medically determinable conditions, pa rticularly her history of spinal problems. In addition, the ALJ discussed the reports by Drs. Redosh, Donaldson, Hedberg, Wright, O’Brien, Woodward, Jatana, and Wie der. He further acknowledged Ms. Williams’ complaints to various physicians. To the extent Ms. Williams argues that the ALJ should have indepe ndently interpreted the diagnostic tests instead of relying on the doctors’ reports of those tests, we decline-13-

to impose such a requirement. Moreover, the ALJ wa s not required to discuss every piece of evidence. Further, as discussed above, th e ALJ was not required to accept Ms. Williams’ lay opinion on the meaning or signifi cance of the medical tests. Finally, the ALJ did not need to weigh conflicting medical evidence or to reject any “significantly probative evidence,” Clifton , 79 F.3d at 1010. Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the ALJ’s analysis. We also find no merit to Ms. Williams’ claim that t he ALJ interrupted her during the hearing, thus preventing her from explai ning her condition relating to her pain, physical therapy, and the effect on her injur ies of working at a computer. See R. Vol. I, Doc. 25, at 32. The hearing transcript reveals that the ALJ did ask clarifying questions, but he did not restrict Ms. W illiams’ testimony. Any interruptions by the ALJ did not deprive Ms. Willia ms of a “fundamentally fair” hearing. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Procedure to Determine RFC Next, Ms. Williams argues that the ALJ did not foll ow the applicable legal standards to determine her RFC. The ALJ must compl ete the following three phases of the step four analysis: In the first phase, the ALJ must evaluate a claiman t’s physical and mental residual functional capacity (RFC), and in t he second phase, he must determine the physical and mental demands of t he claimant’s past relevant work. In the final phase, the ALJ determi nes whether the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands fo und in phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations foun d in phase one. At-14-

each of these phases, the ALJ must make specific fi ndings. Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996)). At phase one, the ALJ found that Ms. Williams retai ned the physical RFC to perform less than a full range of light work based, in part, on his determination that she had no upper-extremity restrictions. For the s econd phase, he incorporated the vocational expert’s testimony about the demands of Ms. Williams’ past work. This was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the ALJ make specific findings. See Doyal , 331 F.3d at 761 (stating nothing improper in the ALJ’s quoting the vocational expert’s testimony to support his own fi ndings at phases two and three). At phase three, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Williams could perform her past jobs as a legal secretary and secretary based on his determ ination of her RFC. Ms. Williams challenges the ALJ’s phase-one determi nation, taking issue with his finding that she has no upper-extremity restric tions. She maintains that the ALJ failed to consider her neck constriction, numbness, tremors, weakness, tingling, restricted range of motion, and neurological impair ments. She relies on Dr. Fry’s 1993 permanent restrictions on using her hands and arms. In addition, she asserts her pain precludes her from doing her past relevantwork. We decline to disturb the ALJ’s RFC determination. The ALJ properly concluded that the permanent restrictions identifie d by Dr. Fry in 1993 did not-15-

prevent Ms. Williams from doing her past work as a legal secretary and secretary. As noted above, she continued to work as a legal se cretary and paralegal for six more years, despite those restrictions. This appro ach was reasonable, particularly because there is no objective medical evidence thather upper-extremity condition deteriorated since 1993. The ALJ also indicated th at the other alleged impairments that Ms. Williams asserts prevents her from doing h er past work were not supported by the medical evidence or by her daily activities. He also rejected her claims of disabling pain because he found her testimony on th is point not fully credible. These findings are supported by substantial evidenc e. Ms. Williams also contends that the ALJ erred in ap plying the “grid,” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, but his decis ion makes clear that he did not. Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Williams retained the RFC to perform her past work as a legal secretary a nd secretary is supported by substantial evidence in the record. New Evidence Ms. Williams asserts that new evidence, obtained an d submitted after the ALJ’s July 2002 decision, requires a remand to the agency. She relies primarily on a report by Georgeanne Bley, Ph.D., dated March 23, 2005, which describes Ms. Williams’ psychological limitations. She has a lso submitted a September 9, 2003 report by Dr. Hammerberg finding “a right long thoracic neuropathy,” and an4 Ms. Williams has abandoned her claim that a remand is warranted based on

her June 2003 back surgery in Australia.

5 Ms. Williams apparently has filed a new application for benefits based on the medical evidence obtained after the ALJ’s decis ion. Under these (continued...) -16- April 17, 2003 MRI by Dr. Solsberg. Attachs. to pl aintiff’s motion to correct omissions. 4 Sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes a dis trict court to remand to the agency when “new and material evidence comes to lig ht, and there is good cause for failing to incorporate such evidence in the earlierproceeding.” Nguyen v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1400, 1403 (10th Cir. 1994). A remand is n ot appropriate in this case because the new evidence does not demonstrate that the findings relate back to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision. Cf. Chambers v. Barnhart , 389 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that Appeals Council must consider evidence submitted with a request for review if it is “(a) new, (b) material, and (c) related to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision”) (quotation omitted). Moreover, Ms. Williams has not shown goo d cause for failing to present this evidence to the Commissioner. Accordingly, th e district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Williams’ Rule 59(e) moti on to alter or amend the judgment to remand to the agency. See Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co. , 431 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing Rule 59 (e) ruling for abuse of discretion). 55 (...continued)

circumstances, a new application was the proper pro cedure for Ms. Williams to claim entitlement to benefits based on a deteriorat ion in her condition. See, e.g., Jones v. Callahan , 122 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Additional evidence showing a deterioration in a claimant’s condition s ignificantly after the date of the Commissioner’s final decision is not a material basis for remand, although it may be grounds for a new application of benefits.”)

.

-17- Pending Motions Ms. Williams’ motions to proceed on appeal in formapauperis, and to correct omissions in the record are granted. Her motion to remand to the district court for further proceedings is denied. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge