RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE:

THE TROUBLED OUTLOOK FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

Donald E. Schulz

Strategic Studies Institute

and

Gabriel Marcella

Department of National Security and Strategy

March 10, 1994
*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)

245-4123 or DSN 242-4123.

*******

The authors wish to thank Drs. Luigi Einandi, Michel S.

Laguerre, Robert I. Rotberg, Brian Weinstein, Steven K. Metz,

Earl H. Tilford, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young; Lieutenant Colonel

William T. Johnsen; and Colonels John W. Mountcastle, William A.

Barry III, Robert B. Killebrew, and Fred E. Bryant for their

incisive comments on earlier drafts of this work. Needless to

say, any errors of omission or commission are entirely the

authors' responsibility.
FOREWORD

Few foreign policy issues have been more frustrating to the

U.S. Government during the past year than the Haitian crisis.

Thus, this report could not be more timely. The title is

suggestive. The authors describe different courses of action and

the steps that the United States might take to implement them.

None of the choices are attractive and none of them can guarantee

success. However, because the situation facing the Haitian people

continues to worsen, the sooner we come to terms with that

situation the better. Drs. Schulz and Marcella have made a major

contribution to that process through their careful delineation of

the "irreconcilable" elements in the Haitian "equation," their

careful analysis of the various options available to U.S.

policymakers, and the course of action which they have

recommended.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

report in the hope that it may facilitate a resolution of this

vexing problem through greater dialogue and debate.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DONALD E. SCHULZ is an Associate Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College. He has coedited books on Revolution and

Counter-Revolution in Central America and the Caribbean and

Political Participation in Communist Systems and has forthcoming

volumes on The United States, Honduras and the Crisis in Central

America (coauthor) and Cuba and the Future (editor). His articles

have appeared in Foreign Policy, Orbis, the Journal of

Inter-American Studies and World Affairs and Small Wars and

Insurgencies, as well as such media outlets as Newsweek, The

Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor.

GABRIEL MARCELLA is Director of Third World Studies with the

Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War

College. He holds a Ph.D. degree in History from the University

of Notre Dame. He has taught at Notre Dame, Temple, and St.

Joseph's Universities, and served as International Affairs

Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Panama,

1987-89. He has written extensively on strategy, low-intensity

conflict, and Latin American policy. His publications have

appeared in the Journal of Inter-American Studies and World

Affairs, Estudios Internacionales, Inter-American Economic

Affairs, North- South Analysis, Parameters, Air University

Review, and in various edited volumes. His most recent writing,

Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin

America, will be published in 1994. In addition, he has served on

policy study commissions dealing with Caribbean security, Central

American recovery and development, international terrorism, and

U.S. interests in Latin America.
SUMMARY

This study examines the socioeconomic and political

dimensions of the Haitian crisis and the attempts by the United

States and the international community to resolve that crisis.

The authors assess the prospects for restoring the deposed

Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the difficulties

that will attend any effort to promote sustained political and

economic development. Specific criticisms are made of

U.S./international community policy, options are evaluated, and

recommendations are set forth. Among the major conclusions and

recommendations are the following:

Lessons and Implications.

-- International sanctions have been a failure. They have

further devastated the Haitian economy without restoring

President Aristide. The Organization of American States (OAS) and

U.N. embargoes have accelerated environmental damage,

contributing to near-famine conditions in some areas and causing

(in conjunction with other factors) extreme hardship for ordinary

Haitians while only belatedly touching the elite. Indeed, many of

the latter have grown richer through smuggling and drug-running

operations.

-- U.S. policy has been marked by confusing actions that

have sent the wrong signals and are interpreted by Haitians as

indecisive. Haitian leaders have concluded that Washington can be

manipulated and outmaneuvered. Consequently, they have sought to

stretch out negotiations and prolong the crisis expecting that

the United States and the international community will back down

rather than inflict unacceptable suffering on ordinary Haitians.

-- The July 1993 Governors Island Agreement to restore

Aristide was inherently unworkable. By providing for the lifting

of sanctions before Aristide returned and at a time when General

Cedras, Colonel François and their allies still occupied key

positions of power, the accord enabled the latter to obtain

short-term relief while they restocked supplies and protected

foreign financial holdings in preparation for the longer struggle

to come. Moreover, the agreement had no enforcement mechanism

beyond the threat to reimpose sanctions. The foreign military and

police that were in the process of being introduced were

trainers, engineers, and observers rather than peacekeepers or

peace-enforcers. They were lightly armed and operated under

inadequate rules of engagement. Nor was there any provision for

purging the Haitian military and police of corrupt or abusive

elements. Under such circumstances, it was unlikely that

"training" would have much effect. Indeed, the signals that were

sent were interpreted to mean that the international community

was not serious and that the accord could be sabotaged with

minimum risk or cost.
-- In Haiti, the international community has been dealing

mainly with thugs rather than military officers. And what thugs

understand is power. One has to use it in a way that will be

credible, keeping in mind that a failure to apply leverage will

be interpreted as weakness and will encourage further

recalcitrant behavior.

-- The United States and the international community cannot

create democracy in Haiti. Only Haitians can do that. But for

that to happen, there would have to be a transformation of the

political culture. The restoration of Aristide would only be the

first step. Far more difficult would be the creation of

professional military and police forces that would be reasonably

competent and subordinate to civilian control. Equally important

would be the construction of an effective and fair judicial

system. This would require a substantial, ongoing U.S. and

international effort. U.N. peace-enforcers would have to be

introduced to provide political stability and security for all

sides. Haitian troops and police would have to be vetted and

human rights offenders removed. U.S. and other foreign sponsors

would have to provide much of the human infrastructure that would

assure that humanitarian and development aid would be used

effectively. A major, long-term educational and training program

would be necessary to enable Haitians to acquire the skills and

values that would gradually enable them to replace foreign

personnel.

-- Even if such a program were launched, there are no

guarantees that it would succeed. Cultures are hard to change,

and one must be prepared for considerably less than optimum

results. In addition, some Haitians will resent a large-scale,

indefinite foreign presence, no matter how well-intentioned. If

international forces should become involved in Haitian domestic

politics--as seems likely--the stage would be set for a

nationalistic backlash.

-- Nevertheless, to do much less would constrain the

prospects for success. The current crisis can be alleviated

through a massive, short-term humanitarian effort. But unless the

international community--and especially the United States--is

willing to stay the course, one must expect Haiti to again

descend into chaos or tyranny once the foreigners pull out.

Policy Options.

-- Some version of the Governors Island Agreement, which

would provide for foreign military and police observers,

trainers, and engineers, but not peacekeepers. While this may be

the most probable course of action, its prospects for success are

not good. Even if Aristide can be restored--no sure thing--

without a substantial number of international peace-enforcers and

a strong, reliable security force, his longevity could not be

expected to be great. Assassination is a possibility, and it

might plunge the country into massive violence.
-- A second option, military intervention, is often

dismissed as "unthinkable." It should not be, for there are

circumstances that might produce such a scenario. The

possibilities here range from a full-scale occupation (for which

the will does not presently exist) to a limited intervention

(much more likely). In either case, the international commitment

would have to be ongoing to be successful. The temptation will be

to try to do the job "on the cheap." The smaller the commitment

and the shorter the duration, the greater the chance of failure.

On the other hand, a "success" is problematic in any event. A

limited commitment would minimize the risks and costs.

-- Another variant of the military option is a nonpermissive

humanitarian intervention. The problem is that unless the basic

causes of the crisis are eliminated, it is likely to reemerge

once the peace-enforcers leave. A real solution would require an

extended foreign presence and the disarming of those elements

responsible for the crisis. The pitfalls of such an operation are

evident in the U.N. operation in Somalia.

-- Still another possibility is a nonmilitary humanitarian

option (permissive humanitarian intervention). The international

community is already engaged in such an effort through

nongovernmental organizations. This might be expanded even as

sanctions are tightened. If successful, a permissive intervention

would ameliorate the immediate humanitarian crisis. But it would

not address the larger political problem or long-range

socioeconomic needs. The Haitian military, moreover, might well

refuse to allow such deliveries, or might seize or siphon off

these resources. Only if the expanded operation were to be

accompanied by substantial concessions would the military be

likely to cooperate.

-- Finally is the option of disengagement. The international

community could accept defeat and lift the sanctions on the

grounds that they are unacceptably destructive. This would do

nothing to address the fundamental problems of the society. It

would consign the vast majority of Haitians to oppression and

poverty and deprive them of hope for the future. Pressures to

emigrate would continue. The United States would be faced with a

choice of indefinitely continuing forcible repatriation, with all

its objectionable moral overtones and economic costs, or

suspending it and inviting a sharp increase in boat people. At

the same time, there would be significant political costs to such

a policy change. Critics would denounce it as a sell-out of

democracy and a capitulation to thuggery. The credibility of the

Clinton administration, the United States, and the United Nations

would be damaged.

Recommendations.

-- This is a terrible menu of options. For that reason, the
United States and the international community have taken the

least painful course of action. But that tactic has now come up

against the limitations of reality, and hard choices have to be

made. Rather than trying more of the same (which no longer seems

feasible, given the humanitarian implications) or disengagement

(which would abandon the Haitian people to their tormentors) or

invasion (which has little political support), the United States

and the international community should get serious about

sanctions.

• A worldwide U.N. embargo, enforced by warships of the

United States and other interested nations, should be placed on

all trade and aid except for food, medicine, and other

humanitarian goods and services. Sanctions should be targeted

much more heavily on Haitian military and civilian elites than in

the past. This means striking not only at the very top of the

armed forces, but at the officer corps as a whole. Such measures

(for instance, the seizure of foreign financial assets, the

denial of visas, and the restriction of air traffic) should also

be applied more broadly against the economic elite. The object is

to create and aggravate divisions and provide the motivation for

dissidents to challenge the power and policies of the current

leadership.

-- Such moves would send the Haitian military and its allies

a powerful message and go a long way toward restoring the

credibility of the United States and the international community.

They might bring the Haitian military into line fairly quickly,

since they would coincide with the depletion of the country's

fuel reserves. But then again, nothing is guaranteed. In any

case, they would accelerate an already serious humanitarian

crisis. To avert a disaster on the ground, therefore,

humanitarian aid should be rapidly expanded:

• A "humanitarian corridor" should be opened to ensure

that the most essential human needs are met and guard against the

misuse of aid.

• Should the Haitian military refuse to allow this, it

should be put on notice that obstructionism and violence will not

be tolerated. The United States and the international community

must be prepared to back this up by stationing a sizable

contingent of appropriately armed U.N. guards to protect the

operation. Haitian military leaders should be told that (1) they

will be held personally responsible for any violence, (2) that

perpetrators of such actions will be subject to prosecution under

international laws dealing with the gross violation of human

rights, and (3) that should a full-scale intervention be

required, the Haitian armed forces would be dissolved.

-- Such a strategy contains very real risks and costs. It

would not end Haiti's problems or U.S. and other foreign

involvement in them. The country would need massive development

aid for the foreseeable future. Some peacekeeping presence would
almost certainly be necessary. But this course at least offers

the hope that the country's grave socioeconomic and political

ills might be seriously addressed. Under such circumstances, it

might be possible to reduce human rights abuses and normalize

migration. (The latter being by far the most important national

interest that the United States has in Haiti.) If successful, the

strategy would enable the United States to reclaim the moral high

ground and restore some of its currently tattered reputation as a

Great Power. It would also replace a policy of indecision with

one of consistency, while allowing the U.S. Government to fulfill

its obligations to those Haitians whom it encouraged to risk

their lives and who now feel abandoned.
RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE:

THE TROUBLED OUTLOOK FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

Violent deaths are natural deaths here. He died of his

environment.

Graham Greene

The Comedians

Misery in another country is prosperity in Haiti.

Anonymous Haitian

On October 11, 1993 the U.S.S. Harlan County carrying 193

U.S. and 25 Canadian troops, approached the dock in

Port-au-Prince. The contingent was an advance force in a

1,267-man U.N. military and police mission that was intended to

train the Haitian police and army and rebuild the country's

decimated infrastructure in accordance with the agreement signed

on Governors Island, New York, the previous July. As the ship

drew near the landing, it was met by a chanting, armed crowd of

about a hundred people. Several small craft blocked the dock so

that the vessel could not unload. When the U.S. charge d'affaires

arrived, the crowd gathered around her car and those of other

diplomats. Screaming "We are going to turn this into another

Somalia!", the protestors rocked and banged on the vehicles, as

uniformed police stood by. Meanwhile, a larger crowd of several

hundred people, shouting "Burn all foreigners!" and carrying the

red and black flag of the former dictatorship of François "Papa

Doc" Duvalier, set up barricades along some of the capital's

roadways. As the diplomats fled, armed thugs began firing into

the air, setting off a panic. Others, riding in the backs of

pickup trucks, careened wildly through the streets. Terrified

pedestrians, changing direction with each new burst of gunfire,

quickly emptied the commercial quarter.

The following day, the Pentagon ordered the Harlan County to

leave Haitian waters. On October 13, the U.N. Security Council

voted unanimously to reimpose the oil and arms embargo that had

been lifted in August. Thus ended another round in the seemingly

interminable negotiations and maneuvers designed to resolve the

Haitian crisis.

The withdrawal of the Harlan County dealt a devastating blow

to the international community's efforts to restore deposed

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The move underscored U.S.

irresolution and the weakness of its commitment to the Haitian

leader and encouraged the Haitian armed forces to continue their

defiance. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to impose a

full-scale embargo and other stringent sanctions only reinforced

the military's conviction that it could wait out the enemy--that

the international community did not have the stomach to inflict

indefinite suffering on the Haitian people. By year's end, the

crisis seemed as far removed from a resolution as ever, and
U.S./U.N./OAS policy was in a shambles.

Yet, no one should have been surprised by the collapse of

the Governors Island Agreement. Indeed, it had been foretold by

many veteran observers of the Haitian scene. Only those with a

vested interest in believing had continued to confidently predict

that the accord would be carried out and Aristide restored. Even

had Aristide been returned to office, the future of Haitian

democracy would have remained extremely tenuous. The fears and

hatreds that permeated the political culture made his survival

problematic. Nor could one be sure that the president and/or his

followers would not themselves destroy the nascent democracy if

they got the chance.

Moreover, beyond the problems of "restoring" democracy, were

the tasks of economic and social "reconstruction." In his joint

press conference with Aristide in March, President Bill Clinton

had pledged the United States to participate in a 5-year

multilateral, $1 billion development program to "rebuild the

Haitian economy" and "restore conditions of prosperity."1 U.S.

Government agencies would be enlisted, along with foreign

governments, international organizations (including the United

Nations, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank)

and various private groups, to repair Haiti's tattered political,

social, and economic structures. In the words of one senior U.S.

official: "We need to work on the court system and the

administration of justice, on an independent legislature, on

labor unions. And, most importantly, we have to professionalize

the Haitian armed forces and teach them to respect civilian

authority."2

But how does one "restore" a prosperity that has never

existed?3 Or "rebuild" an economy that has long been the most

underdeveloped and poverty-stricken in the Western Hemisphere?

And how does one teach Haitian soldiers, reared in an

authoritarian, corrupt, and violent culture, the virtues of human

rights, democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law? For that

matter, how do you teach such values to the civilians?

Listening to some of the rhetoric emanating from Washington,

one gets a sense of dejá vu. U.S. policy, it seems, is still

bound by the same chains of culture and ignorance that have so

long plagued our relations with this troubled land. It is as

though we have no historical memory. Whether one is speaking of

economic development or democracy, the problem is less one of

"rebuilding" or "restoring" than of starting from scratch. Lest

it be forgotten, the last time the United States became deeply

involved in Haiti, it did not reemerge for 19 years. And when it

did, the country quickly relapsed into dictatorship. About all

that was reaped were the interminable hatreds of a nationalistic

backlash.4

The Socioeconomic Dimensions of the Crisis.
The heart of the dilemma confronting the United States and

the international community is that there is almost nothing to

build on. Haiti's human and material resources are either in such

short supply or have been so degraded by poverty, illiteracy,

malnutrition, disease, violence, corruption, overpopulation,

rapid urbanization, deforestation, and soil erosion as to raise

serious questions about its continued survival as a society and

an independent nation-state.

To take just a few of the most telling indicators: Even

before the current crisis, Haiti had the lowest per capita income

($360) and life expectancy (48 years), and the highest infant

mortality (124 per 1,000) and illiteracy (63-90 percent,

depending on the criteria employed) rates in the Western

Hemisphere. At least 70 percent of the children suffered from

malnutrition, and about 33 percent were seriously malnourished.

(Extreme malnutrition made Haiti the only country in the region

with high incidence of kwashiorkor and marasmus.) With only 810

doctors and even fewer nurses to serve a population of over 6

million people, Haitians could not even begin to cope with their

severe health problems. To the traditional afflictions of

tuberculosis (affecting 10 percent of the population), malaria,

salmonellosis, venereal disease, and the endemic illnesses

associated with malnutrition has recently been added the

modern-day version of the plague: the AIDS virus. Currently, it

is estimated that as much as 9 percent of the population may be

HIV positive.5

Then, there is the problem of overpopulation. With perhaps

as many as 700 people per square kilometer of arable land, Haiti

has one of the highest ratios of population density in the world.

The rate of urban growth is equally imposing: Between 1971 and

1992, the population of metropolitan Port-au-Prince almost

tripled, from about half a million to almost a million and a

half.6 So crowded are the slums and so wretched the housing

conditions that people often have to sleep in shifts, with one

group sleeping for a few hours, then being replaced by another.

(This gives the impression that slum dwellers never sleep. In

fact, it is just that at least half of them are always awake.) In

the most crowded areas, people frequently sleep upright: One

person leans against the wall with his head in his arms, another

leans against him, and so on, sometimes as many as three or four

in a row.7

Overpopulation, of course, has ecological consequences:

Deforestation and soil erosion are quite literally destroying

Haiti physically. Too many people are working too little land,

and they are doing so in a destructive manner. Farmers do not

have the luxury of allowing their lands to lie fallow.

Consequently, the soil is overworked, loses its nutrients,

becomes barren, and eventually turns into dust. On top of this,

peasants, lacking the money to purchase kerosene and other

imported fuels, depend on wood for their home energy needs. They
get it by collecting brambles, brush, saplings, and other forest

products for firewood and charcoal. They also sell these products

for cash to purchase food and materials. This steady encroachment

on already partially barren slopes is the primary cause of

deforestation. As matters now stand, less than 7 percent of Haiti

is covered by forest. Most trees have long ago been cut, and

seedlings are not given a chance to grow. The upshot is further

erosion: Tropical rains sweep the topsoil off the deforested

hills leaving gullies and ravines. Some 20 percent of the

country's topsoil may already have been lost, with much of it

washed into the sea. Aerial photos of Hispaniola show a sharp

contrast between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with the

former appearing brown and barren in comparison to the lush

vegetation just across the border. Only 11 percent of Haiti's

land is now considered arable. At an estimated loss of one

percent of the arable land a year, the country risks mass

starvation by early next century. By then, according to some

estimates, there will be no more water. Haiti will be well on the

way to becoming a desert.8

During the past 28 months, this bleak panorama has gotten

considerably worse. Widespread repression and the impact of the

OAS and U.N. embargoes have combined to decimate the Haitian

socioeconomic structure. Unemployment has soared, as

labor-intensive export assembly industries have fled the

country.9 Deforestation has accelerated. (The unavailability of

butane gas has led to an increasing reliance on charcoal.)

Repression has all but destroyed a once flourishing civil

society. Grassroots organizations of all kinds have been

targeted. Several hundred thousand urban residents have fled to

the countryside, while many rural dwellers (mostly males) have

gone into hiding. Altogether, some 400,000 to 500,000 people may

have been displaced. Rural development projects have been

destroyed; crops have gone unplanted. The result, in some areas,

has been near-famine conditions. Only the presence of

international nongovernmental organizations, which have provided

food for well over half a million Haitians daily, has prevented

massive starvation.10

The point is that while a billion dollars may seem like a

lot of money, it is but a drop in the bucket when compared to the

magnitude of the problems faced. Haiti is among the 25 poorest

countries in the world. The public health crisis alone is

staggering. Will it now be the responsibility of the

international community (or the United States) to take on Haiti's

AIDS epidemic?

Complicating the problem further is the fact that there are

no strong institutions and few bases on which such structures

might be assembled. A professional class does not exist in Haiti

in the same sense that most countries have a substantial corps of

well-trained managers and technocrats, dedicated to the public

good. (This is not to say that there are no such personnel. But

as in any nation having Haiti's illiteracy rate, they are
relatively few in number; moreover, most of them have now left

the country.) Any government will be talent-thin. There will be

ministers without ministries (only payrolls). And what competence

there is will be largely neutralized by pervasive corruption. It

will be years before enough Haitians can be trained and/or lured

back from abroad to run the government and the economy in a

reasonably competent manner. And that will be the easy part. Much

more difficult will be the task of instilling the values of

honesty and professionalism that would give Haiti's politicians,

administrators, policemen, and military officers the will to

place the public interest above their own personal profit. For

that to happen, there would have to be a wholesale cultural

revolution.

Without such changes, no amount of aid will ultimately be

enough. One cannot simply pour money into Haiti and assume that

its problems will be solved. This is the proverbial bottomless

pit. The country has no capacity for absorbing large-scale

foreign aid. Without close foreign supervision-- amounting to at

least a partial suspension of national sovereignty--the

assistance will rapidly find its way into the pockets of Haitian

elites (old or new). Nor can one expect to be able to just go in

and set up an infrastructure and leave it. Roads and buildings

have to be maintained. If the United States and other foreign

donors are not willing to stay and perform such tasks, while

training the Haitians to take over in the longer run, then

international efforts will be largely wasted.

The Politics of Incompatibility:

Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Messianic Impulse.

Those who wish to transform Haiti socially and economically

must think in terms of decades, rather than years, for such

change will require more than one generation to accomplish.

Furthermore, it will take place within a political context that,

to put it mildly, is not likely to be conducive to socioeconomic

development. Under the best of circumstances, democracy is the

product of a long and difficult process. Rarely is this course

unilinear. There will be setbacks--periods of stagnation and

reversal, as well as periods of progress. Nor is there anything

inevitable about the result. The election that brought the

Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power was only the beginning

of the process. It should not be surprising that such alien

institutions and practices would encounter trouble in a political

culture marked by authoritarianism, demagogy, intolerance,

suspicion, intrigue, violence, corruption, and class hatred. Nor

should one expect democracy to flourish, even if Aristide is

restored, for he, too, is a product of that culture.11

Let us be clear. Father Aristide is a man of some virtue. He

is intelligent and courageous, a charismatic leader who

apparently continues to enjoy the support of the vast majority of

Haitians. He may also be the first president in Haitian history
who genuinely cares about his people.12 But his commitment to

democracy is suspect, and he is not above using violence to

pursue his aims. As president, he showed "little interest in

establishing a rule of law or abiding, himself, within

constitutional restraints." Rather, he governed as a "populist

demagogue, appealing directly to Haiti's impoverished masses

through fiery orations that inflamed class resentment and at

times condoned mob violence."13

This point deserves to be stressed. Aristide is a

revolutionary, and his politics are those of messianism and class

struggle. He perceives himself as "the crystallization of popular

demands, justice and respect," and in turn is viewed by his

followers as "a prophet, a sacred person, who will deliver people

from evil."14 To him, democracy means the "direct" democracy of

mass action, rather than the "representative" democracy of

parliamentary debate and compromise.15 The increasingly open

confrontation between the proponents of these two very different

notions of democracy seriously undermined the nascent

constitutional experiment and pushed many of the president's

natural allies into the opposition camp.

Nor did his tendency to surround himself with trusted

cronies from his Lavalas (Flood) political movement help matters.

Rather than choosing his advisors on the basis of competence or

the need to forge political alliances and a broad political

consensus, Aristide relied on an inner circle of "friends,"

chosen for their personal connections or ideological affinity.

This was a sectarian group, intolerant of criticism and

impervious to advice. Again, the effect was to alienate many of

those, especially from the middle-class left of intellectuals,

politicians, and unionists, who had supported him in the past and

had expected to share in the spoils of victory. Parliamentarians

who were members of the National Front for Change and Democracy

(FNCD), the coalition which had sponsored Aristide's candidacy,

resented being passed over in the competition for jobs and

influence. And they were further alienated when the president

proceeded to replace Supreme Court justices and make other

decisions without consulting Congress.16

By August 1991, barely six months into Aristide's term in

office, relations between the Executive and Legislative branches

had deteriorated to the point where the president's supporters

were openly threatening congressmen with "Pere Lebrun." And

Aristide, through his public pronouncements, seemed to be

encouraging it.

"Pere Lebrun"--also called "necklacing"--is the practice of

throwing a gasoline-soaked tire around the neck of your enemy and

setting it afire.17 In late July, a large crowd had gathered

around a courthouse where the notorious former leader of the

Tontons Macoutes, Roger Lafontant, was being tried for an

unsuccessful coup attempt. The protestors chanted and called for

a life sentence, though the particular crime of which Lafontant
was accused carried a maximum penalty of 15 years. Some of the

demonstrators carried tires on their heads. The threat was not

terribly subtle.

A few days after the verdict (Lafontant had been given the

life term), Aristide gave a pep talk to his followers. "For 24

hours," he said, "Pere Lebrun" had become "a good firm bed":

The Justice Ministry inside the courthouse had the law

in its hands, the people had their cushion outside. The

people had their little matches in their hands. They

had gas nearby. . . . If it had not gone well, would

the people have used 'Pere Lebrun?' [Audience yells:

'Yes.']18

There had been incidents of mob violence and intimidation

before. Following Lafontant's coup attempt the previous January,

Aristide supporters had gone on a rampage against the

conservative, anti-Aristide hierarchy of the Catholic Church. A

mob had burned down the capital's old cathedral and destroyed the

homes of the archbishop and the papal nuncio. The latter had been

stripped naked and barely escaped with his life. Subsequently

Aristide, in a radio speech, had seemed to endorse such

behavior.19

By early August, however, the conflict between pro- and

anti-Aristide forces was rapidly moving towards a climax. A

pattern of intimidation was becoming established; incidents were

becoming more frequent and more blatant. Haitian legislators were

by now debating whether to issue a vote of no confidence against

Aristide's prime minister, Rene Preval. During these sessions,

pro-Aristide demonstrators filled the public galleries. Some

openly threatened to lynch the opposition. On August 6, a deputy

was assaulted and beaten. The following day, a crowd stoned the

home of another. On August 13, a mob of some 2,000 people

surrounded the parliament building, screaming threats of "Pere

Lebrun" if the legislators voted to censure the prime minister.

Two deputies were attacked, one of whom was badly hurt. A mob

torched the headquarters of the Autonomous Federation of Haitian

Workers (CATH), then moved on to loot the offices of the

Confederation of Democratic Unity. Burning barricades were set up

in various parts of the city. Public transportation was halted;

business came to a standstill. Parliament adjourned without

issuing a vote on Preval.

The government eventually moved to halt the violence and

restore order, but the message had been understood: To oppose

Aristide was to court mob retaliation. In the weeks that

followed, political party members attempting to hold meetings

were threatened with necklacing, effectively bringing party

operations to a near halt.20

On September 27, at a rally of his supporters at the

National Palace, Aristide launched a bitter attack on the Haitian
bourgeoisie and the Tontons Macoutes (former members of the

Duvalier regimes' dread paramilitary militia). Urging the former

to invest in the economy "so more people can get jobs," he warned

that:

If you do not do so, I feel sorry for you. Really I do.

[Laughter from the crowd.] It will not be my fault

because this money you have is not really yours. You

acquired it through criminal activity. You made it by

plundering, by embezzling. . . . You made it under

oppressive regimes. . . . I give you one last chance. I

ask you to take this chance, because you will not have

two or three more chances, only one. Otherwise, it will

not be good for you.

If I speak to you this way, it is because I gave you a

seven-month deadline for making amends. This

seven-month deadline expires today. [Applause.] If I

speak to you this way, it does not mean that I am

unaware of my power to unleash public vindication, in

the name of justice, against all these thieves, in an

attempt to recover from them what is not theirs. . . .

As I told you, the deadline expires today. The . . .

ball is at your feet. If you want to shoot, go ahead.

[Applause.]

As members of the crowd brandished tires and machetes,

Aristide turned his attention to the Tontons:

You are watching all Macoute activities throughout the

country. . . . If we catch one, do not fail to give him

what he deserves. What a nice tool! What a nice

instrument! [Loud cheers from the crowd.] What a nice

device! [Crowd cheers.] It is a pretty one. It is

elegant, attractive, splendorous, graceful, and

dazzling. It smells good. Wherever you go, you feel

like smelling it. [Crowd cheers!]21

Two days later, in Les Cayes, a pro-Aristide mob necklaced

the Reverend Sylvio Claude, the head of Haiti's Christian

Democratic Party. The Reverend Claude, who had been a prisoner

under Papa Doc and was one of the country's foremost defenders of

human rights, had made the mistake of criticizing the president.

His burnt body was torn to pieces by people who later went

through the city displaying his remains. A justice of the peace,

who was making an on-the-scene report of the incident, was also

burned to death.22

About the same time, a coalition of military officers,

former Tontons Macoutes, and reactionary businessmen launched a

bloody coup. The government was overthrown. Only because of

last-ditch U.S., French, and Venezuelan appeals was Aristide able

to come away with his life.23
The point is that, contrary to the assertions of some of

Aristide's U.S. supporters,24 the president's enemies have ample

reason to fear his return. Notwithstanding his recent appeals for

nonviolence (which, after all, are a requisite for U.S. and

international support), many of his followers--and perhaps

Aristide himself--might very well be tempted to exact revenge

should they be restored to power.

Again, this is an intolerant society. Political and class

conflicts are so bitter that, no matter who is on top at any

particular moment, violence and terror are never far from the

surface. One recalls the fate of President Vilbrun-Guillaume Sam,

who in 1915 was hacked to death by his enemies, then ripped apart

by an enraged mob. Given such historical precedents and his own

political record, it should not be surprising that Aristide's

promises of amnesty are simply not believed. It is by no means

clear that he could control his followers, even if he wanted to,

and some of his enemies do not believe that he wants to. They

point to the fact that at the time of his ouster he was creating

his own presidential police, a move which they liken to "Papa

Doc" Duvalier's founding of the dreaded Tontons.

Yet, for all the fears of class warfare that he has

generated, Aristide's total record was mixed. During his months

in office, he displayed more moderation and flexibility than the

preceding paragraphs suggest, especially in his relations with

the United States and international lending agencies (which he

had often in the past accused of working in concert with the

Haitian elite to keep the country mired in poverty). If there

were instances in which he seemed to condone or encourage human

rights abuses, he also took measures to discourage such

practices. The overall level of violence dropped conspicuously

during his tenure. (Indeed, it seems almost minor compared to

what has happened since.) Claims that he was creating a new

Tonton Macoute in the form of his personal security guard appear

to have been greatly exaggerated, if not part of a deliberate

attempt by his enemies to sow fear in the military in the hope of

sparking a coup.25 His recent willingness to support a political

amnesty for the military and to appeal to his followers to

refrain from violence is a promising sign, though it must always

be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.

In perspective, Aristide may not be a very good bet, but he

is the only Haitian leader who can command legitimacy in the form

of widespread popular support; it is difficult to imagine a

lasting resolution of the crisis that excludes him and those he

represents.

The Politics of Incompatibility: The Military and Other MREs.

Aristide and his followers are integral parts of the Haitian

political equation. But are they, or can they be made, compatible

with the other parts--in particular, the military, the oligarchs,
and the attaches? Haiti has long been ruled by a shifting

coalition of groups whose record of rapaciousness and brutality

is as sordid as that of any ruling class in the world. A U.S.

Embassy official once dubbed them MREs--morally repugnant elites.

In the days of "Papa Doc," it was said that the torture chambers

of the Dessalines Barracks were painted brown so that blood would

not mar the walls.26 Since the September 1991 coup, they have

killed roughly 2,000 to 3,500 people.27

This power structure is by no means conflict-free. Indeed,

the Haitian political class often seems perpetually frozen in

irreconcilable schisms. The military is riven with factional

strife. Officers struggle over power and spoils. Loyalties are

based on opportunism rather than ideology; they can shift

quickly, depending on who is on top or moving up and who is

losing in the game of musical chairs that has been Haitian

politics since the fall of the Duvalier dynasty.

To take the most obvious points of conflict: There has been

rivalry between the army and the Port-au-Prince police; between

various commands and commanders (most notably, the CINC, General

Raoul Cedras, and the Chief of Police, Colonel Joseph Michel

François); between high and lower-level officers;28 between the

commissioned officer corps and the noncoms and enlistees (the

ti-soldats, or "little soldiers"); between the military

institution and the Duvalierists (who had subordinated it to the

Tontons and reduced it to a marginal role under Papa Doc);29 and

between the military and its traditional allies in the oligarchy.

Nor is this all. There are conflicts between different

factions of the oligarchy--the feudal landlords, or gwandon; the

traditional export (agriculture)-import (manufactured goods)

elite; and the more recently developed assembly-export sector.

When one adds to all this the legion of section chiefs (rural

bosses, essentially combining military intelligence, police,

political and judicial functions), attaches (hired guns, loosely

associated with the apparatus of repression, who do much of the

killing and thuggery), and various other zenglendos (a term

describing anyone with a gun, often used interchangeably with

Macoute and attache), one is left with the sense of a power

structure that is not only extremely violent, but which has no

real center. The only thing that binds these diverse elements

together is their hatred and fear of Aristide and "the mob."

Thus, even if it were possible to obtain the cooperation or

acquiescence of certain individuals or groups (most notably,

General Cedras, who is thought to be a relative moderate),30 it is

extremely improbable that this could be parlayed into a broad

consensus on such issues as Aristide's return, the

professionalization of the armed forces, and the creation of a

separate civilian police. The perceived threats are too great,

both personally and institutionally. On one level, military

officers worry about physical survival. Many are convinced that

Aristide and his supporters have already drawn up hit lists. On
another level, they fear that any move to professionalize the

armed forces would cost them their careers, since a renovated

structure would have to be purged of corrupt and abusive elements

and sharply reduced in size.

Beyond this, there is the threat to the institution itself:

Plans to create an independent police force would deprive the

military of its primary traditional mission--maintaining internal

order. (As matters currently stand, the police are part of the

armed forces.) And those new missions being discussed--coastal

patrolling, guarding borders, building roads--do not look

particularly attractive. Nor, given Haiti's historical

experience, can the military be happy about the prospect of

having to deal with another armed institution, under civilian

control, which would become a competitor for resources and, most

likely, power. By the same token, any attempt to create a "new"

police would constitute a direct threat to Colonel François and

the Metropolitan Police. Not surprisingly, they are even more

intransigent on these issues than the army.

Then, there is the question of booty. Currently, the

military receives about 40 percent of the national budget. In

recent years, moreover, it has taken over many state-owned

enterprises. The public sector has been especially infiltrated by

the proxies of the Port-au-Prince police chief, Colonel François,

who are thought to control the telephone company, the port, the

electricity company and many basic imports, including cement and

flour.31 Officers routinely use their positions for economic gain,

supplementing their regular salaries by extorting bribes and

favors, engaging in contraband, receiving free land and labor,

and so on.32

Any government that threatened these sources of wealth would

risk a coup. But the problem is complicated by the fact that

members of the high command are from the new-money upper class.

While some of the older, more established oligarchs might be

willing to take their money and relocate, this is much more

difficult for the nouveau riche, who have everything they own

tied up in Haiti. The issue is further compounded since much of

this new money has been acquired through the contraband and drug

operations that have flourished since the OAS embargo was first

imposed in October 1991. Narcotics bring in tens of millions of

dollars a year. This bonanza has not been limited to the high

command. Discipline has so disintegrated that officers down to

the rank of captain have become economic powers in their own

right. These younger officers have only begun to taste the riches

that can be obtained through these activities, and they are not

willing to give them up.33

For the ti-soldats and attaches, too, the international

community's plan to "restore democracy" and "professionalize" the

military and police represents more of a threat than an

opportunity. There has been talk in the State Department about

the need to offer something to the common soldiers to make
Aristide's return palatable. The idea is to provide them with

better living conditions, the opportunity for a real career, and

other benefits.34 But whether these inducements will be enough may

be doubted. If the army is cut by half and a new police force

created, many of these people will lose their jobs. This is

especially true of the attaches whose ranks now number in the

thousands and whose services would presumably no longer be

required.

Moreover, the lower-ranking elements in the apparatus of

repression are even more anti-Aristide than their commanders. It

is they, more than anyone else, who have had to bear the brunt of

Pere Lebrun. Some have seen their comrades torched by angry mobs.

They believe that Aristide has already given the orders to kill

them.35 Whereas officers can always flee into exile if things get

too hot, the enlistees and hired guns are not so fortunate. Their

ultimate nightmare is to be deserted--left alone to face the mob.

Given the intensity of these fears, it is by no means clear

that the high command would be able to control lower-ranking

officers, enlistees, and attaches should Aristide be restored.36

In recent years, the noncoms and rank and file have shown a

tendency to act on their own. They were at least partially

responsible for the coup of September 1988,37 and they could very

well move again. Haitian commanders are acutely aware of the

danger posed by their own "masses" (who could turn on them as

well as on the president). Since last July, Colonel François and

his colleagues have sought to placate the enlistees by assuring

them that Aristide will not be allowed to return. The Governors

Island Agreement, it is being said, was merely a tactical ploy

designed to obtain a lifting of international sanctions.38

One other group that must be mentioned is the oligarchy. The

military's civilian counterpart in the ruling class consists of a

handful of wealthy, mostly mulatto families--including the Mevs,

the Brandts, the Bigios, the Acras, and the Madsens--who rose to

wealth and influence under the Duvaliers through the acquisition

of monopolies on such commodities as rice, sugar, steel, and

cooking oil. For years, these groups enjoyed duty-free imports

and paid no taxes. Their labor costs were almost nil. They bled

the countryside through excessive taxation and unfair terms of

trade.39 Only recently has their economic domination been

challenged by newer groups, the most recent being the contraband

and drug smugglers (both military and civilian) who have

flourished since the imposition of the OAS embargo. These new

arrivals have cut into the traditional oligarchy's markets and

created intra-elite strains that became very significant

politically once the OAS sanctions were reinforced in 1993 by

more potent U.N. measures.40 Nevertheless, the fact remains that

the old elites risk losing their privileged position, and perhaps

much more, if Aristide returns. The State Department wants to see

their monopolies broken.41

The point is that the Haitian power elite is a multiheaded
monster. In addition to the power centers located within the

armed forces, there are a dozen or so outside the military, based

mainly in the drug/contraband/Duvalierist complex. Over the past

year, the latter have grown in number and size as extreme

right-wing exiles have returned to the country and begun

organizing their own private armies. (Hence, one reason for the

proliferation of attaches.) This has complicated the situation

considerably. Whereas institutions like the army and police are

easy to identify, these "occult groups" are shadowy, amorphous

entities, and are extremely difficult to deal with.42 What seems

to be emerging looks more like a warlord system than a

centralized repressive apparatus.

To return to the central issue: Can these seemingly

irreconcilable antagonists be reconciled? The instinctive answer

is "no." The two sides have little in common. The contending

social forces which they represent are divided by wealth, race,

and language (the upper-class, mulatto socioeconomic elite speaks

French and the lower-class black masses, Creole); they only

partially share the same culture and history. This is class

conflict in its most unadulterated form: a zero-sum game, in

which one side loses when the other wins. (Or at least that is

the perception. In Haiti, the state was developed as a

fundamentally predatory organism. It is not an accident that the

Creole word leta means both "state" and "bully."43) Under such

circumstances, the military and its allies worry that their

power, wealth, and lives will be endangered should Aristide be

restored. Aristide fears that he will be in constant danger of a

coup or assassination unless he can purge the Army and police and

bring them under his control. And both sides have ample reason to

be afraid.

The bottom line is that a restoration of the Haitian

president would have to be accompanied by the introduction of an

international peacekeeping force, capable of providing security

for both sides. Without that, Aristide's return would be an open

invitation to assassination, an act which in turn could well

spark massive violence.

Paved with Good Intentions:

The Tragic Course of U.S. and International Policy.

Good intentions are not enough. One must have clearly

defined and realistic goals, the means of attaining them, and the

will to persist. Unfortunately, these qualities have been largely

absent from the international community's policy to date. By any

standard, international sanctions have been a disaster. They have

further devastated the Haitian economy without establishing

democracy. The OAS and U.N. embargoes have accelerated

environmental damage, contributing to near-famine conditions in

some areas and causing (in conjunction with other factors) untold

hardship for the common people, while only inconveniencing the

military leadership and the elite. Indeed, many officers and
oligarchs have grown richer through smuggling, drug-running, and

other forms of corruption.44

Truth is sometimes a difficult thing to accept. But we are

at a moment of truth in U.S. policy toward Haiti. Unfortunately,

much of the responsibility for failure must be laid at the door

of the United States. From the very beginning of the crisis, U.S.

policy was marked by a seeming incomprehension of both Haitian

and international realities, a flight from leadership, and a

reluctance to take measures that might have convinced the Haitian

power elite of our seriousness of purpose. The result was that

all the wrong signals were sent. Haitian leaders came to the

conclusion that the United States and its international allies

could be manipulated and outmaneuvered. And they were right.

Part of the problem lay in the U.S. desire to avoid the

responsibility and blame for dealing with the problem

unilaterally. The United States had been subjected to

considerable criticism for Operation JUST CAUSE. Thus, still

desiring to promote democracy in the hemisphere, the Bush

administration had launched a concerted diplomatic effort to turn

the OAS into an instrument for dealing with future crises.45 The

culmination of this campaign was the "Santiago Commitment to

Democracy"--the June 1991 OAS commitment to act in the event that

a democratically elected government were to be overthrown

anywhere in the Americas.

Achieving an inter-American consensus with regard to the

collective defense of democracy was a remarkable feat, and

clearly it was a move in the right direction, but the problem was

with its enforcement. The OAS had neither the resources nor the

will to fulfill such an ambitious commitment. The organization

had no enforcement arm; moreover, it was largely composed of

countries with long histories of concern about foreign

intervention in their own internal affairs. Experience suggested

that it might play a useful mediational role, but that anything

more would require strong leadership on the part of the United

States. Lacking that, OAS multilateralism would be a prescription

for half-way measures, producing half-way, grossly inappropriate

results.

Part of the problem was that OAS sanctions, never compulsory

for nonmembers of that organization, were not even binding on its

members. Consequently, enforcement was lax. Reluctant to alienate

foreign friends and allies over Haiti, the Bush administration

always stopped well short of demanding that the embargo be

respected. Proposals to dramatically escalate the pressure on the

regime through a blockade were rejected as unworkable or unwise.

Such a move would have strained U.S. relations with the Europeans

at a time when Washington needed their cooperation in dealing

with the more important problems of economic dislocation and

turmoil in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The upshot

was that at least a dozen countries in Europe, Africa, and Latin

America (with the Dominican Republic being the most notorious
culprit) routinely ignored the sanctions. Crucial supplies

continued to reach Haiti, enabling the regime to obtain oil and

other necessities, and allowing the rich to maintain their

accustomed lifestyles.46

It was difficult to escape the impression that the Bush

administration was not all that serious about restoring Aristide.

Government spokesmen made little effort to disguise their

distaste for the Haitian president.47 At the same time, threats to

seize the foreign assets of wealthy Haitians involved in the coup

were never acted upon. Indeed, special exemptions to the existing

sanctions were made to allow U.S. businessmen with

export-assembly factories on the island to continue operations.

For humanitarian reasons, controls were relaxed on some goods

(seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) being shipped to Port-au-Prince

from the United States.48 For most of its final year in office,

the Bush administration took a passive stance on Haiti, issuing

mechanical statements not reflected in political initiatives,

while letting the OAS take the lead in the interminable and

ineffective diplomatic efforts that were underway. This was

especially the case after President Bush effectively defused the

refugee crisis by having the Coast Guard intercept and return

fleeing Haitians to their homeland without giving them a chance

to appeal for asylum.49 Not until the refugee threat was

resurrected following the electoral victory of Governor Bill

Clinton did Haiti again become a priority item in the U.S. policy

agenda. And even then, the American effort sometimes appeared to

be aimed at wooing the most reactionary elements in Haiti.50

To be sure, Aristide was himself partly to blame for this

lack of U.S. enthusiasm. His own questionable human rights record

made it imperative that the United States make its position known

on these matters. (Clearly, he could not be restored if he was

determined to incite mob violence, and he had to be made to

understand that. By the same token, a message had to be sent to

his foes in Haiti that they would not be endangered by his

return.) Beyond this, the rigidity which characterized the

Haitian military's negotiating position also marked his own

behavior. Thus, an OAS-mediated agreement in February 1992

collapsed when he reneged on its amnesty provision almost

immediately after having signed the accord.51 Needless to say,

such behavior endeared him to neither the international mediators

nor the Bush administration. Indeed, from this point his

relations with the latter went steadily down hill.

The problem was that U.S. vacillation and passivity not only

alienated Aristide (who continued to believe that the United

States had ample economic leverage to force the regime to

capitulate, if only it had the will), but--more importantly--it

undermined U.S. credibility with the Haitian military.

Consequently, when the Bush administration and the incoming

Clinton team began to ratchet up the pressure for a settlement in

late 1992, General Cedras and his colleagues could not be sure

how seriously to take them. In December, the United Nations
joined the negotiations, warning Cedras that the international

community might tighten the embargo and impose a blockade on oil

supplies if an agreement to restore Aristide was not reached

soon. The question was whether the international community and

especially the new, untested American president would be willing

to follow up such threats with action. Cedras decided to find

out.

The months since then have witnessed a concerted effort by

the Haitian regime to drag out the negotiations and, in the

process, test the mettle of the Clinton administration, the

United Nations, and the Organization of American States. In early

February 1993, in a blatant act of bad faith, Haitian authorities

rejected previously agreed-upon plans for the deployment of

hundreds of international human rights observers. The Haitians

demanded a long list of conditions that they knew would be

unacceptable. Among other things, they demanded the immediate

lifting of the embargo, the effective recognition of the

military-backed government of Prime Minister Marc Bazin, and

numerous restrictions on the international observers. From the

moment of his arrival in the country, U.N. mediator Dante Caputo

was hounded by demonstrators and showered with insults by the

Haitian negotiators, who denounced him as an "imperialist" and a

"dirty foreigner." Eventually, Caputo had to be escorted to the

airport through an angry mob. In response Secretary of State

Warren Christopher met with Aristide for a few minutes in a

symbolic show of support and issued a "stern warning." A

tightening of sanctions, he suggested, would be considered down

the road.52

But the breakdown in negotiations was only temporary. As

pressure for a return to civilian rule was renewed, General

Cedras agreed to allow international observers to enter the

country. In mid-March, President Clinton pledged a "much more

aggressive effort" to restore Aristide and promised to help

"rebuild" the Haitian economy. When both Caputo and the Clinton

administration's special advisor on Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo,

told the Haitian military rulers that they would have to go, it

once again seemed like a settlement might be reached. In early

April, Cedras agreed in principle to resign in return for

guarantees of amnesty and safety for himself, his family, and the

other members of the high command. Subsequently, Aristide agreed

to extend a political amnesty to military officers and to refrain

from initiating criminal actions against them. As an additional

guarantee, he pledged not to oppose any effort by the Haitian

parliament to grant a broader amnesty.53

This was where matters stood when Dante Caputo returned to

Haiti in mid-April, for the fifth time in four months, amid high

hopes that a "definitive solution" to the crisis could at last be

reached. But again he was destined to be disappointed. After

delivering a written summary of the terms to the Haitian leaders,

Caputo was forced to wait for the next day and a half for an

answer. And when it came, it was negative. The proposal was
rejected outright. "Some very bad things were said," the U.N.

envoy later remarked, but he declined to give any details.54

By now it was abundantly clear that the Haitians were toying

with Caputo. In the words of one diplomat close to the

negotiations: "They have decided to say, `We are staying.... If

you want us, come and get us.' This, however, is not the way

things work with this effort, and they may soon find that they

have a very high price to pay for their decision." Highly

selective sanctions ("something like microsurgery") would soon be

announced to step up the pressure. Meanwhile, a few things would

be tried right away.55

The problem, again, was that Cedras and the high command

simply did not trust Aristide; moreover, they did not believe

that the United Nations and United States would follow through on

their threats. Pressure on the Clinton administration to take

stronger action to resolve the refugee problem had lessened as a

result of the president's decision to continue his predecessor's

policy of forcible repatriation. The obvious reluctance of

Washington and its allies to intervene militarily or even to

substantially tighten the embargo (thus inflicting even more

punishment on the Haitian people and perhaps destroying the

economy beyond repair) gave hope to the Haitian rulers that, when

push came to shove, their foreign adversaries would back off.

Meanwhile, General Cedras and his colleagues sought to

stretch out the process and deprive the international community

of any pretext for increasing economic sanctions or intervening

by force: Within a matter of days after having rebuffed the

settlement, the Haitians indicated that they wanted to continue

the negotiations. This apparent turnaround was received at the

State Department as evidence that international pressure was

working and that the military was desperately seeking a way out.56

To many Haitians, however, it seemed like the Clinton

administration was unwilling to use anything more than the threat

of economic sanctions. In the words of one authoritative State

Department source: "We are preparing to tighten them, but there

is no need to do that yet. The military is negotiating. If we

tighten the sanctions now, it would ruin everything."57

Increasingly, indeed, it seemed that the United States was

relying on carrots, rather than sticks. Diplomats talked about

the need to provide an "attractive exit" for the military. When

asked about the problem of corruption and how Haiti could absorb

all the aid that would flow into the country in the event of a

settlement, some professed indifference: "We aren't all that

concerned if some of this is diverted into the pockets of the

military and the elite. They need a stake if we are to get their

cooperation."58

Governors Island: The Making of a Fiasco.
But carrots alone were not enough. Only the imposition of

sanctions--real sanctions--would get the Haitian military to

bargain seriously. As this became clearer, the United Nations

increased the pressure: On June 16, in a resolution that was

binding on all U.N. members, the Security Council voted to impose

a ban on all petroleum and arms sales to Haiti and ordered a

freeze on the foreign financial assets of top officials and

businessmen. On June 23, the sanctions took effect. Four days

later, General Cedras and President Aristide met separately with

U.N. and U.S. mediators on Governors Island, New York, and began

to hammer out a compromise.

On July 3, the two sides signed an agreement outlining a

series of steps culminating in Aristide's restoration. Following

the president's nomination of a prime minister and the latter's

confirmation by parliament, international sanctions would be

suspended and foreign aid resumed. Amnesty would be granted to

those who had been involved in the September 1991 coup. Towards

the end of the transition, General Cedras would retire. Other key

members of the high command would be transferred to less

sensitive posts. The president would appoint a new military

commander, who would select a new General Staff. Finally, on

October 30, Aristide would return to his homeland.59

Unfortunately, the Governors Island Agreement was fatally

flawed. Aristide accepted it only reluctantly, under pressure

from U.N. and U.S. mediators. Indeed, it had been presented to

him as something of a fait accompli: Cedras had already signed it

and was on the way back to Haiti, leaving Aristide with the

choice of either rejecting the accord--in which case the

negotiations would end and the embargo would be lifted--or

acquiescing to it.60

The agreement has been examined in detail elsewhere,61 and

only a few of its most serious shortcomings need be noted here. 

 One major flaw was the provision to lift the embargo and resume

economic aid before Aristide's return, at a time when General

Cedras, Colonel François and their allies still occupied their

positions of power. Aristide had wanted to postpone the

negotiations until the full impact of the embargo could take

effect. He wanted the army cowed when it came to the bargaining

table. The United States, the U.N. and the OAS, however, insisted

that the talks be held almost immediately upon the imposition of

sanctions. Under these circumstances, the regime's only real

goals appear to have been (1) to get the measures lifted before

they seriously hurt the military; and (2) to buy time by taking

advantage of the resumption of oil shipments to restock supplies

and protect foreign financial holdings in preparation for a

possible longer siege to come.

Equally serious, the agreement had no enforcement mechanism

beyond the threat of renewed sanctions in the event of

noncompliance. While there was a provision for the introduction

of international military and police personnel, their numbers
would be inadequate to cope with the magnitude of the problems

faced. Moreover, these were trainers and engineers rather than

peace-enforcers. Foreign soldiers were to be lightly armed at

best, and under strict orders not to intervene if they

encountered human rights abuses or other violence. International

observers were to be just that--observers. In the words of one

official, the U.N. mission had "a narrow mandate to be there and

rub off on the police and the army, who magically by osmosis are

supposed to behave themselves. . . ."62

Along these same lines, there was no provision for purging

the Haitian military and police of corrupt or abusive elements.

Only Cedras was to be retired, and he was to receive a pension.

Though the Clinton administration pledged that no human rights

offenders would receive U.S. training, it had no practical plans

to vet participants. (Indeed, Lawrence Pezzullo, the

administration's special envoy on Haiti, had told Congress that

it should be up to the Haitians to decide whether or not to rid

the army of abusive members.) Lacking the will to instill

accountability in the armed forces and the police, it was

unlikely that mere "training" would have much effect. In the

words of one observer: "No message from the head of a classroom,

no matter how eloquently delivered, will prevail over the lesson

of impunity that is shouted each day that those responsible for

murder and torture retain their official positions."63

At the time, this was not widely understood in the United

States. Editorial writers competed with one another to heap

praise on the Clinton administration for its foreign policy

victory. Haitians, however, were more skeptical. They had reason

to be. The weeks that followed the Governors Island Agreement

witnessed the worst wave of politically related violence since

the aftermath of the September 1991 coup. Between early July and

mid-September, hundreds of people disappeared. In Port-au-Prince

alone, there were over 100 killings. Pro-Aristide activists were

repeatedly intimidated, beaten and arrested, sometimes in full

view of international monitors. The poorer districts of the

capital were subjected to nightly raids, where residents were

intimidated by wild sprees of automatic weapons fire and leaders

of grass-roots organizations were targeted for assassination. By

early September, bullet-ridden corpses had become a common sight

along the city's roadways.

By now it was abundantly clear that the military had no

intention of abiding by the Governors Island Agreement. It was

systematically destroying Aristide's political support network,

with a view to creating an ungovernable situation and making the

president's restoration impossible. During these weeks, some of

the most notorious Duvalierists returned to the country, where

they began to form political groups and organize attaches, often

in league with the powerful commander of the Metropolitan

Military District, Colonel François, and the Chief of Staff,

General Biamby. François, in particular, was rapidly emerging as

the regime's most powerful figure, with control over the Army's
heavy weapons unit (including armored personnel carriers),

command of the 1,500-man Port-au-Prince police force, and his own

private army of attaches. His position on Aristide's return was

uncompromising: "When my life is in danger, I am capable of

anything."64

In September and October, he proved it. On September 8,

dozens of municipal employees, armed with guns, clubs and knives,

ran amok outside City Hall after Mayor Evans Paul, an Aristide

ally, reclaimed the post he had lost after the September 1991

coup. Five people were killed and 31 wounded. Three days later,

plain-clothes police assassinated Antoine Izmery, a prominent

Aristide financial supporter, after he had organized a Mass

commemorating those who had been killed during an attack on St.

Jean Bosco Church 5 years earlier. By mid-month, the government

of Aristide's prime minister, Robert Malval, was under a

full-scale siege. The minister of information dared not go to his

office because of threats against his life; the finance minister

was besieged in her office by armed civilians; gun-toting

demonstrators broke up the foreign minister's swearing-in

ceremony; under threat of death, the government prosecutor

investigating the violence resigned. Even the National Assembly

was forced to postpone its sessions because the legislators were

afraid to convene.

In the face of this spiralling terror and chaos, the

international community seemed paralyzed. Aristide's calls for a

reimposition of sanctions fell on deaf ears. Preparations for his

return proceeded slowly. Only on September 23 did the U.N.

Security Council authorize the sending of 1,267 police and

military personnel, and only in early October did the first

sizable contingents of American and Canadian troops begin

arriving. By then, however, there were only a few weeks left

before Aristide's scheduled return, not nearly enough time to

obtain meaningful results from any training that might be

imparted to the Haitian security forces.

On October 3, moreover, 18 U.S. Army peacekeepers were

killed and several score wounded in Somalia. The incident

traumatized the U.S. public and Congress, intensifying fears of

further involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations. By now,

also, the Pentagon was leery of becoming involved in Haiti.

According to press reports, Secretary of Defense Aspin and DOD

planners sensed, quite correctly, that the small, lightly armed

international force that was scheduled to go into the country

would be incapable of preventing violence. Indeed, it might well

become a magnet for it. American troops would be placed in harm's

way, with only handguns to defend themselves and highly

restrictive rules of engagement. This was a prescription for

disaster and led to an unseemly spate of public bickering between

the State and Defense Departments.65

Once again, all the wrong signals were being sent. Haitian

leaders watched in fascination as U.S. Congressmen debated the
deployment of American soldiers on Sunday news programs. They

could not fail to notice that many representatives opposed

sending any troops at all. The message was unmistakable, and so

were its implications: The United States was weak and irresolute.

If the Americans could be persuaded that Haiti was "another

Somalia," the Clinton administration would be forced to back

down.

Nor was this conclusion discouraged by the statements of

certain Western spokesmen during these weeks. Thus, one senior

official proclaimed that, in case of trouble, U.N. police and

soldiers had been instructed to "run the other way." Up until the

very end, U.N. military representatives continued to

optimistically profess their "confidence" that the Haitian armed

forces would "provide the security that they promised." When

asked why, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, he was so

sure of this, the deputy commander of the mission praised the

"professionalism" of the Haitians.66 Such proclamations did

nothing to bolster confidence in either the competence or

steadfastness of the United Nations. On the contrary, they gave

the impression that the international community was whistling in

the dark, closing its eyes to frightening realities that it did

not have the courage to face. In the end, this only fostered

further violence.

By now the streets of Port-au-Prince were in the hands of

recently reconstituted Duvalierist forces, operating with the

support of the police and the attaches, who enforced their calls

for armed strikes with ruthless violence. Mayor Evans Paul and

human rights activist Jean-Claude Bajeux were being hunted by

assassins. Prime Minister Malval, along with many in his

government, had been reduced to working out of his home for fear

of venturing to the office. Pro-Aristide legislators were going

into hiding or fleeing to the United States.

The climax of the drama came on October 11, when the U.S.S.

Harlan County was prevented from docking by an angry mob. The

subsequent decision to withdraw the ship from Haitian waters was

taken without consultation with or even notification of the

United Nations, President Aristide or Prime Minister Maval. It

left the impression that the United States had cut and run;

worse, that it had been frightened away by a few hundred unruly

thugs. The Haitian military and its supporters were ecstatic.

Diplomats, human rights observers and other foreigners still in

the country were alarmed, fearing that the withdrawal might spark

a wave of xenophobic violence as well as endanger those Haitians

who had cooperated with them. U.N. and Haitian government

officials were outraged. In the words of one U.N. observer: "The

United States has been using the U.N. as a fig leaf to carry out

its policy, but obviously has no respect for the institution."67

Nor, in the short run, did things get any better. On October

13, at the urging of the United States, the U.N. Security Council

reimposed sanctions. The next day, President Clinton, seeking to
send a "clear signal" to the Haitian military, warned that the

United States was "very concerned" about the safety of Prime

Minister Malval and the members of his government. The message

was broadcast over Haitian radio. Less than 2 hours later, he was

given a response: Malval's minister of justice, Guy Malary, was

gunned down in the streets of Port-au-Prince.68

The Credibility Gap.

On October 16--one day after Cedras was supposed to have

resigned in preparation for Aristide's restoration--the United

Nations imposed a naval blockade on Haiti. U.S. warships

immediately began moving into position to enforce it; other

countries soon joined the action. By now, however, the United

States and the international community were locked in a

credibility trap largely of their own making. No matter how

committed they might be in their own minds to the restoration of

Aristide, they were no longer taken that seriously by the Haitian

military. In the words of one diplomat: "The Harlan County

changed the whole psychology. It showed a lack of resolve that

flipped the process around in a second."69

The U.S. retreat had strongly reinforced the Haitian armed

forces' intransigence by demonstrating in the most dramatic

possible manner Washington's evident unwillingness to intervene

militarily. Nor, apparently, was it ready to impose much harsher

sanctions than those that the United Nations had already levied

on oil and arms. A French move to expand the embargo was rejected

on the grounds that it would create undue hardship for the

Haitian people. Instead, the United States tried a more selective

approach, freezing the assets of 41 individuals and 34

organizations said to be obstructing the restoration of democracy

and urging other countries to do the same. Even some U.S.

officials, however, conceded that such measures would have

limited effect, since the targeted Haitians had ample time to

relocate or hide many of their assets.70 As the weeks passed, fuel

continued to trickle in from across the Dominican border. Members

of the elite continued to travel to Miami to stock up on consumer

goods. In the short run, at least, there were few signs that they

were suffering much more than inconvenience.71

By this time, moreover, the Washington policy community had

become so deeply divided over Haiti that a coherent policy seemed

all but impossible. In October, the CIA publicly joined the

fight. At the request of Senator Jesse Helms and the House

Intelligence Committee, briefings were held in which agency

analysts portrayed Aristide as psychologically unstable,

drug-addicted, and prone to violence. While legitimate doubts

existed about the Haitian president, this testimony put the worst

possible interpretation on the fragmentary evidence available.72

Indeed, much of this "information" was based on materials and

testimony provided by Aristide's enemies. Subsequently,

investigators from The Miami Herald were able to seriously
undermine, if not disprove, some of the most damaging charges (in

particular, the claim that Aristide had undergone psychiatric

treatment in a Canadian hospital).73

Meanwhile, other reports were surfacing: Some of the very

officers who had overthrown Aristide and were still in power--

including General Cedras--had been paid CIA informants prior to

the coup. In the mid-1980s, the agency had formed a Haitian

intelligence service that had become involved in political terror

and drug trafficking. Even after September 1991, some Haitian

officers had continued to receive U.S. military training.

Notwithstanding allegations that top commanders were involved in

drug trafficking, U.S. law enforcement agencies were still

providing the Haitian military with intelligence on narcotics

trafficking.74 These revelations raised doubts as to the

reliability of the CIA's intelligence and the propriety of its

political activities both in Haiti and the United States. They

suggested that the hopes that Washington placed on retraining the

Haitian military and police were unrealistic. Most important,

however, they called into question the steadfastness of the U.S.

commitment. In the words of one observer:

. . . There is a long record of closeness between U.S.

military and intelligence agencies and Haitians who

have turned out to be the country's tyrants and

plunderers. That history makes [Haitians] wonder

whether the American Government is really committed to

the return of President Aristide...or whether verbal

support is merely a cover under which key figures in

Washington are working against his return.75

Nor was U.S. credibility aided by growing indications of the

Clinton administration's disenchantment with Aristide. These

weeks witnessed a concerted effort to pressure the Haitian

president to broaden his government by bringing in opposition

elements, including moderate military leaders. When Aristide,

fearing that such concessions would reduce him to the status of a

figurehead, resisted, administration sources began to openly

complain about his rigidity and unwillingness to compromise.

These criticisms became especially loud in mid-December after

Aristide vetoed a plan for a national reconciliation conference

that had been proposed by Prime Minister Malval, with U.S.

support. Subsequently, Malval resigned, venting his frustration

by accusing Aristide of having ego problems and "playing with our

lives, playing with the future of Haiti."76

U.S./U.N. policy now seemed perilously close to collapse.

Malval had been a stabilizing force. A moderate who could command

respect from at least some elements on both the right and the

left, he had been one of the keys to U.S. efforts to build a

political center in Haiti. Now he was going, and it was not clear

who or what would replace him. At the same time, relations with

Aristide had become increasingly tense. There was growing fear

that the Haitian president might go public with his criticisms of
U.S. policy. With diplomatic efforts stalled and relief agencies

predicting that starvation might soon break out, administration

officials saw themselves heading toward another public relations

disaster. Accordingly, they let it be known that they were

relaxing the drive to restore Haitian democracy while they

rethought their options.77

In turn, this led to public expressions of alarm that the

United States was abandoning Haiti. On December 22, the Clinton

administration sought to alleviate these fears by reconfirming

its commitment: Haitian military leaders were told that the

embargo would be expanded unless they stepped down by January 15.

But such threats no longer carried much persuasive force. There

had been too many such warnings, followed by too little action,

in the past. General Cedras and his colleagues had concluded that

they could wait out the enemy. To all appearances, the United

States and its allies had neither the resolution for military

intervention nor the will to inflict massive suffering on the

Haitian people. The gamble was that, in the end, the

international community would back off. Meanwhile, the military

continued the task, already well underway, of developing a

network of political organizations that would enable it to

consolidate its power for years to come.78

Lessons and Implications.

With the collapse of the Governors Island Agreement, the

protagonists seemed to be back on Square One. Yet, this was

something of an illusion. Much had changed over the preceding 2

years, and not for the better. U.S./U.N./OAS policy was

undergoing a funnel effect, with the options diminishing as time

went on. As moderate means of persuasion were found wanting and

discarded, it seemed that the United States and its allies might

soon be faced with the very choices they most wanted to avoid.

Before such decisions are made, it is advisable to step back

and reconsider where we are going and with what consequences. The

United States and the international community still have several

options, but unless we understand the lessons of our recent

experience with Haiti, we will not be able to properly evaluate

them.

The first thing that must be said is that one must be

realistic. This may be a banal observation. Yet, considering the

extraordinary absence of realism in U.S./U.N./OAS policy so far,

it requires special emphasis. The United States and the

international community have suffered from an inability to

fashion an effective Haiti policy in the absence of strong U.S.

leadership. We have seriously misread the Haitian military and

its allies, ascribing to them a degree of reasonableness and

flexibility that does not exist. Thus, rather than using our

bargaining leverage firmly, we have resorted to incremental

pressures that have stretched out the crisis and inflicted far
more damage (mostly on innocent people) than would have been the

case had an effective embargo been imposed from the beginning.

In short, in Haiti we have been dealing not with military

officers (which implies a degree of professionalism) but mainly

with thugs.79 And what thugs understand is power. One has to use

it in a way that will be credible, always keeping in mind that a

failure to apply leverage that is so obviously available will be

interpreted as weakness and will simply encourage further

recalcitrant behavior.

Secondly, Haiti is not a graduate seminar on political

development. The international community cannot "create"

democracy there on the basis of certain preconceived social

science theories. Only Haitians can democratize Haiti. But for

that to happen, there would have to be a wholesale transformation

of the political culture. The restoration of Aristide would be

only the first step. Much more difficult would be the creation of

professional military and/or police forces that would be

reasonably competent and honest and subordinate to civilian

control. Equally important, moreover, would be the construction

of an effective and fair judicial system. All this would require

a substantial, ongoing U.S. and international effort.

Sound policy must be founded on a realistic appraisal of the

situation. The Governors Island Agreement was based on the

extraordinary notion that all that would be necessary to maintain

peace was a small, lightly armed international force that would

be under strict orders not to become involved if violence broke

out between rival Haitian factions. Given the depth of the hatred

and fear that separates the Aristide forces from their enemies,

this was not realistic. Within a few months, moreover, this

international force was to transform the Haitian military and

police into professional organizations which would respect human

rights and democracy and submit to civilian control--all without

being purged of the corrupt and violent elements that had done so

much to create the Haitian crisis in the first place. In a way,

Aristide may have been fortunate that the agreement collapsed. To

have returned to office under such circumstances would have been

an open invitation to assassination.

The implication, of course, is that a substantial

peace-enforcement/peacekeeping mission would have to be

introduced to provide political stability and security for all

sides. Haitian troops and police would have to be vetted and

human rights offenders removed. These forces would have to be

retrained and resocialized--no easy task when the subjects do not

want that training. Clearly, it would take years--perhaps

generations--before the process could be completed. (If, indeed,

it could be successfully completed at all.)

A related point is that U.S. and other foreign sponsors

would have to provide most of the human infrastructure that would

assure that humanitarian and development aid would be used
effectively. One cannot simply give money and other resources to

the Haitians and expect that they will be used efficiently or for

the purposes intended. This means that a substantial

international presence would be required for the indefinite

future. Beyond the tasks of administering aid, providing medical

care, building roads and schools, planting trees and so on, there

would have to be a major, ongoing educational and training

program to enable Haitians to acquire the skills and values that

would gradually enable them to replace foreign personnel.

Obviously, this would not be a "quick and easy" operation.

Nor are there any guarantees that it would succeed in its most

ambitious objectives. Political cultures are notoriously

difficult to change, and one must be prepared for considerably

less than optimum results. Haitians will not suddenly begin

behaving like we want them to behave. The old values, habits,

hatreds, and fears will endure. At the same time, one should

anticipate that some Haitians will resent a large-scale,

indefinite foreign presence (military or civilian) as an

infringement on sovereignty. Whatever the benefits, that presence

will offend nationalistic pride. If, in addition, the

international forces should become heavily involved in Haitian

domestic politics--as seems inevitable--the stage would be set

for a serious backlash.

Yet, to do much less would seriously constrain the prospects

for success. The current crisis can be alleviated through a

massive, short-term humanitarian effort. But unless the

international community--and especially the United States--is

willing to stay the course, one must expect Haiti to once again

descend into chaos or tyranny after the foreigners pull out.

But is the international community willing to make such a

commitment? Probably not. The Haitian crisis comes at a time of

declining resources and multiplying commitments. The U.S.

Congress and public are likely to especially resist such appeals.

The end of the cold war has raised expectations of a "peace

dividend." The military is rapidly downsizing; its budget is

being slashed. The United States is already committed to one

peace-enforcement operation (in Somalia) that has gone sour.

Bosnia still looms on the horizon. If one adds the continuing

potential threat from Iraq, the need for a massive economic

commitment to Russia, the turmoil in Angola, Cambodia and parts

of the former Soviet Union, and possible explosions in Cuba and

elsewhere, one has to wonder how many crises the United Nations

and the United States can handle simultaneously. The resources

and the will of the American people must be considered.

This brings us to another question: What are our

limitations? This is critically important in an era of "New World

Disorder." One cannot intervene everywhere. If we try and fail,

it may discredit the whole notion of peacekeeping. After its

recent experience in Somalia, the United States is particularly

vulnerable on this point. An intervention in Haiti--especially if
it ended badly, as it well might--could so sour the U.S. public

and its political leaders that they would reject peacekeeping (or

peace-enforcement or humanitarian) missions even when they were

clearly in the interests of U.S. and international security.

Along these same lines, one of the greatest pitfalls in the

Haitian crisis is the temptation to fall prey to zealotry. It is

natural to feel moral outrage over what is happening in that

country. Unfortunately, anger is not a reliable guide for making

foreign policy. Especially when combined with ideology, it tends

to distort perceptions and cloud judgment. Moreover, there is a

danger of personalizing the conflict to the point where one

becomes convinced that there is "no choice" but to take certain

actions. The definition of the situation is extremely important:

If the Haitian hardliners continue to defy the international

community, U.N. and U.S. leaders may conclude--if they have not

already done so--that they cannot back down. Their reputations

and credibility (not to mention their self-concepts) are at

stake. Evil must not be allowed to go unpunished.

But the problem is that Haitian reality is not quite as

clear-cut as Father Aristide's partisans like to claim. And it is

not General Cedras and Colonel François who are bearing the brunt

of the embargo. Ordinary Haitians are doing that, and they are

paying a high price. Some human rights, medical and religious

sources have estimated that 10,000 people may have perished from

malnutrition and disease as a result of the OAS embargo and other

factors.80 A recent report by public health experts at Harvard

University paints an even gloomier picture, concluding that up to

20,000 children may have died due to Haiti's multidimensional

political, economic, and social crisis and the international

sanctions that are exacerbating it.81 While such estimates are

more conjecture than anything--no one really knows how many

"silent deaths" have occurred--they are not implausible. Even a

much more conservative toll--on the order of several thousand,

for instance--would indicate that a lot of suffering is being

inflicted.

The United States should avoid the temptation to punish

other peoples for the sins of their leaders. It has sometimes

been argued that in the past this has happened with regard to

such countries as Nicaragua, Panama, Iraq, and Cuba. Is it now

Haiti's turn? If the U.N. embargo is tightened, destroying what

is left of the economy and severely restricting the shipment of

food and medical supplies to the countryside, social pain will

further accelerate. If General Cedras, Colonel François and their

supporters can hang on long enough, there is likely to be an

enormous human tragedy.82 At that point, the will of the American

public, Congress and even the Clinton administration to continue

the sanctions, with all their attendant suffering, may well

evaporate, leaving only two unpalatable options: capitulation or

invasion. Again, the strategy of the Haitian military seems to be

based on a gamble that the United States and its allies will not

have the stomach for the latter.
One final point. Earlier we noted the devastating impact of

the crisis--including the international embargoes--on Haitian

civil society. These are precisely the groups and individuals

most crucial to Haiti's future. If democracy and socioeconomic

development have any chance at all, it will be because ordinary

Haitians can be organized and educated to participate

constructively in the political, economic and social life of

their country. The longer the crisis continues and the more

desperate the situation becomes, the less likely these elements

are to survive in a form that can be harnessed to meet Haiti's

development needs.

As this is being written, there are unmistakable signs that

the political center of gravity has shifted towards the extreme

right. The reemergence of thousands of Tontons Macoutes in the

form of the attaches and Duvalierist groups such as the Haitian

Front for Advancement and Progress bode ill for the future. In

this highly fluid and volatile situation, one of the greatest

challenges facing the international community will be to avoid

making an admittedly awful situation even worse. The evidence

presented in the preceding pages suggests that, to date,

U.S./international policy has been largely counterproductive: it

has had precisely the opposite effect from what was intended. Put

another way, we began with the most laudable of intentions only

to become part of the problem. The question now may be less how

to bring about an idealized solution (democracy, economic

development, social justice) than how to limit the damage already

done and still growing.

No Easy Choices.

It is within this context that one must evaluate the options

that the United States and the international community now face.

Current policy essentially represents a temporary, tactical

retreat. Economic sanctions have been reimposed to force the

Haitian military back to the bargaining table. But this does not

tell us much about the end state being sought or the means by

which it might be attained once an agreement is in hand.

There are several obvious options. One would be to stick

with some version of the Governors Island Plan, which would

provide for the introduction of foreign military and police

observers, trainers and engineers, but not heavily armed

peacekeepers. Given the reticence of the United States and the

United Nations to either intervene militarily or to forsake their

commitment to restore President Aristide, this may well be the

most probable course of action. However, because of the

strategy's inherent weaknesses--not the least of which is the

lack of adequate force protection--one cannot be sanguine about

its prospects for success.83 Indeed, one can almost anticipate the

day when the Harlan County once again approaches the docks of

Port-au-Prince. The same policy could well produce the same--or
at least similar--results.

There are, to be sure, some things that could be done to

prevent such a "repetition" of history. Economic sanctions could

be maintained until General Cedras, Colonel François and their

colleagues step aside (preferably retire) and Aristide returns.

Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that this would solve the

problem. Aristide has little visible support within the military.

The new leaders could very well turn out to be just as disloyal

as the current ones.84 (Remember that Cedras was considered a

moderate.) For their part, the ti-soldats appear to be even more

opposed to the president than is the officer corps. Even if

Aristide can be restored, without a substantial number of

international peacekeepers and a strong, reliable security force

to protect him, his longevity could not be expected to be very

great. Getting him back is one thing; keeping him alive and in

office quite another. Assassination is a very real possibility,

and it could well plunge the country into truly massive violence.

A second option is military intervention. This is often

dismissed as "unthinkable" by U.S. policymakers. It shouldn't be,

for it is entirely plausible. The circumstances that might lead

to such a course vary: One likely precipitator would be the

Aristide assassination/massive violence scenario, especially if

it were to be accompanied by a new wave of boat people fleeing

for their lives to the United States. Another possibility would

be the outbreak of xenophobic violence, particularly if directed

against U.S. citizens. A third would be a violent collapse of a

peacekeeping effort that might trigger an intervention to restore

order. A fourth would be a major humanitarian crisis, as might

occur in the event of widespread famine. Nor, given the region's

history, can one entirely discount the possibility that the

United States or the United Nations might intervene proactively

to punish the Haitian military, restore Aristide, or prevent the

developments mentioned above. (Among other things, one should not

underestimate the racial dimension of the political debate. It is

not difficult to imagine a situation in which the U.S.

Government, sensitive to charges that its failure to act

effectively is racially motivated, might be pressured into "doing

something" to prevent an impending catastrophe.)

Assuming that an intervention did occur, what then? The

alternatives range from a full-scale, lengthy occupation to a

much smaller and more short-term action. In the case of a

full-scale occupation, it is possible that Haiti might be placed

under some form of international (presumably U.N.) trusteeship.

The growing turmoil of the post-cold war era has once again

brought to the fore the issue of "ungovernability." Certain

societies, it is argued, simply lack the prerequisites of a

stable nation-state, and it may be up to the international

community to maintain the peace until such time as those peoples

are capable of governing themselves.85

For obvious reasons, this option is unlikely to be chosen.
The notion of a trusteeship is a bit too close to colonialism for

the comfort of most U.N. members. In any case, few are anxious to

assume the enormous burdens and responsibilities that would go

with such an undertaking. As matters currently stand, the will

does not exist.

Much more probable would be a limited intervention that

would be less ambitious in both scale and duration. But even

here, as we have seen, the obstacles would be formidable. To be

successful, the international commitment would have to be

ongoing. Even after the peace-enforcers withdrew, a substantial

foreign presence would have to remain to train Haitian

government, security and private sector personnel, and help

administer foreign aid. Again, there is very little to build on.

The temptation will be to do the job "on the cheap"--a modest

effort on behalf of immodest objectives. The smaller the

commitment and the shorter the duration, the greater will be the

chance of failure. On the other hand, since a "success" is

problematic in any event, a limited commitment would minimize the

risks and costs. This is no small consideration.

Another variant of the military option is a nonpermissive

humanitarian intervention. But again, there is a basic problem:

If all that is intended is to relieve immediate human suffering,

that can be done. However, unless the basic causes of the crisis

are eliminated, it is likely to reemerge once the international

peace-enforcers leave. A real solution would require an extended

foreign presence, accompanied by an active peace-building and

nationbuilding program. Among other things, that would mean

disarming those elements that are responsible for the crisis. The

pitfalls of such an operation are painfully evident in the U.N.

operation in Somalia.

But might not a nonmilitary humanitarian option (permissive

humanitarian intervention) be possible? The United States and the

international community are already engaged in such an effort

through a variety of nongovernmental organizations, most notably

CARE. This aid might be greatly expanded even as the sanctions

are tightened. (Indeed, if the sanctions are tightened, and

expansion of humanitarian aid would be necessary in order to

prevent a social disaster.) The problem is that Haitian military

leaders might well refuse to allow such deliveries--or they might

seize or siphon off these resources (especially petroleum) for

themselves.86 Only if such an expanded operation were to be

accompanied by substantial concessions--for instance, a partial

lifting of the sanctions--would the military be likely to

cooperate. (One variant of this, however, might be a scenario in

which the military might cooperate providing the sanctions were

ineffective. This would enable it to continue to stretch out the

crisis while socioeconomic conditions deteriorated even further,

putting more pressure on the international community to back off

down the road.)

If successful, a permissive intervention would ameliorate
(though not solve) the immediate humanitarian crisis and ease the

economic pressure on Haitians to flee to the United States. But

it would not address the larger political problem or the

long-range socioeconomic needs of the country. The Haitian

military would remain in power. Indeed, one could expect General

Cedras and Colonel François to claim that they had forced the

United States and the United Nations to back down. They would

likely come away from such a "victory" in a stronger position

than ever. Moreover, no matter how hard the United States tried

to present the operation in a favorable light (a "moral victory,"

etc.), such assertions would have a hollow ring.

Finally, there is the option of disengagement. The

international community could accept defeat and lift the

sanctions on the grounds that they have become unacceptably

destructive. This would "normalize" the situation in the sense

that the existing political and socioeconomic structure would be

allowed to remain intact. But again, this would do nothing to

address any of the fundamental problems of the society. It would

consign the vast majority of Haitians to oppression and poverty

and deprive them of hope for the future. Pressures to emigrate

would continue. (Indeed, if the U.S. policy of forcible

repatriation were to be suspended, there would almost certainly

be a sharp increase in the number of boat people.) Such a policy

would also have significant political costs. Critics would

denounce it as a sell-out of democracy and a capitulation to the

worst kind of thuggery. The credibility of the United States and

the United Nations would be seriously damaged, as would the

political prestige of President Clinton.

This is a miserable menu of options from which to choose.

For that very reason, the United States and the international

community have taken the easiest way out: They have avoided

coming to terms with Haitian realities and the implications of

their own behavior. In a very real sense, they have been trapped:

They have been able to go neither forward (intervention) nor

backward (disengagement) without incurring unacceptable costs.

Thus, the resort to economic sanctions.

Unfortunately, sanctions have never really been applied in a

concerted and rigorous manner. Rather, they have been embraced as

a bromide. For both the United States and the international

community (though most assuredly not for the Haitian people),

this was the easiest and least painful course of action;

moreover, it gave the appearance that something was being done.

But procrastination is no substitute for a coherent policy.

The tactic has come up against the constraints of political

reality, and real choices now have to be made. Rather than trying

more of the same (which no longer seems feasible, given the

humanitarian implications) or opting for disengagement (which

would abandon the Haitian people to the tender mercies of their

tormentors) or invasion (for which there is little political

support), it would seem advisable to do what should have been
done a long time ago--namely, get serious about sanctions. The

problem with the current strategy is not so much with its

objectives as with its half-hearted implementation and the

consequential ineffective results.

The bottom line is that a worldwide U.N. embargo, enforced

by warships of the United States and other interested countries,

should be placed on all trade and aid except for food, medicine,

and other humanitarian goods and services. This policy, moreover,

would have two corollaries: First, sanctions must be targeted

much more heavily on Haitian military and civilian elites than

has been the case in the past. This would mean striking not only

at the top of the armed forces pyramid, but at the officer corps

as a whole. There are some 900 officers and senior

noncommissioned officers in the Haitian military. As long as

these people are able to escape the effects of the sanctions,

they will have little incentive to challenge the policies or

leadership of the Cedras-François team.87 The objective should be

to inflict as much pain as possible on the power elite in order

to create and aggravate divisions and provide the motivation for

change. Such sanctions should also be applied more broadly

against selected economic and political elites to accelerate the

growing disenchantment with the current military leadership and

its policies.88 While some measures have already been taken, these

can be broadened: Many more bank accounts and properties could be

frozen or seized, both in the United States and in other member

countries of the United Nations. Many more visas could be

cancelled or denied. (These measures could be applied not only to

the targeted military, political, and economic leaders but to

their families as well.) Plane and boat traffic to and from Haiti

could be severely restricted. Loopholes in the embargo could be

closed. As matters stand now, many members of the elite still

travel to Miami to shop, bringing home consumer goods and other

items that cannot be purchased in Haiti. Exemptions to the OAS

embargo have enabled companies in the assembly sector to order

large quantities of goods under the guise that they are

"necessary supplies." These materials then find their way into

the hands of third parties (usually the military and its

friends).89 Such abuses must be stopped.

Such moves would send the Haitian military and its allies a

powerful message and go a long way toward restoring the

credibility of the United States and the international community.

They would assure that it would not be poor Haitians alone who

would bear the costs of the sanctions. Beyond this, pressure

should be put on the Dominican Republic to choke off the

cross-border trade that has been ameliorating the impact of the

embargo. If necessary, economic sanctions could be applied to

gain the Balaguer government's cooperation.

These measures might bring the Haitian military into line

fairly quickly, since they would roughly coincide with the

depletion of the country's fuel reserves. But then again, nothing

is guaranteed. What can be said with certainty is that an
escalation of sanctions would accelerate an already serious

humanitarian crisis. To avert a disaster on the ground,

therefore, a second strategic corollary is needed: Humanitarian

operations should be expanded. One of the major weaknesses in the

U.S./U.N./OAS policy to date has been the lack of any clear

strategy for dealing with the human suffering aggravated by

sanctions. In the words of one group of researchers:

The human toll over this crisis period has resulted

from a myriad of factors including government

mismanagement, economic and agricultural disruptions,

population movements, economic sanctions, and

humanitarian neglect. Yet, the extension of the crisis

has not been accompanied by the articulation of a

policy or plan by the United States or the

international community to mitigate the suffering and

to protect the lives of innocent civilians. A

`humanitarian corridor' should be opened by the

international community to proactively ensure basic

provisions for the Haitian people, especially the poor.

The `corridor' should have the simple but critical goal

of meeting the people's requirements for water, food,

medicines, and other essentials. Meeting such goals

would require mobilizing NGO, UN, and key

nongovernmental and public sector operations in Haiti,

for childhood immunization, food distribution, and

other critical public functions.

In opening such a corridor, four basic humanitarian

objectives should be advanced.

1. Non-interference or exemption in the free movement

of life-saving supplies, including food and medicines;

2. Protection of human security by ensuring access of

the most essential human needs (water, food, shelter,

clothing, and physical security) by the most vulnerable

populations, especially women and children;

3. Assessment and monitoring of the `human situation'

with impartiality and independence using early warning

indicators on human survival, the quality of life, and

the satisfactory nature of policy and program

interventions; and

4. Maintenance of the purity of the humanitarian

engagement, guarding against misuse, abuse, diversion,

or other illegitimate uses of humanitarian assistance.90

This is an ambitious program, and it is not without risk.

The opening of a humanitarian corridor at a time when Haitian

rulers are being subjected to greatly intensified economic

pressure might lead to violence against the relief workers and

monitors. Moreover, it is entirely possible that the military
would refuse to allow such an operation. For these reasons, the

Haitians must be put on notice that obstructionism and violence

will not be tolerated. The United States and the international

community must be prepared to back up this message with military

force, if necessary, by stationing a sizable contingent (about

1,000 to 1,500) of appropriately armed and equipped U.N. guards

to protect the operations. General Cedras, Colonel François and

other key figures in the regime should be told that (1) they will

be held personally responsible for any violence that might occur,

(2) that any perpetrators of such actions will be subject to

prosecution under international laws dealing with the gross

violation of human rights, and (3) that should a full-scale

intervention be required, the Haitian armed forces would be

permanently dissolved.

This might very well do the trick. In the past, Haitian

military leaders have shown that they understand that the one

thing that would be most likely to trigger a massive intervention

is U.S. concern for the safety of its citizens. It is for

precisely this reason that foreigners have been largely spared

the violence that has ravaged Haitian society. The country's

rulers also know that they have little popular support. Indeed,

the vast majority of Haitians--including Aristide and most of his

supporters--would undoubtedly welcome such a humanitarian

operation, especially if it were part of a larger strategy to

restore their president.91 In this respect, Haiti and Somalia are

very different. (Yet another dissimilarity is that the Somalis

have a well-deserved reputation as fierce fighters. Haitian

soldiers and attaches, in contrast, have shown bravery only

against unarmed civilians.)

Such a strategy would not, of course, end Haiti's problems

or U.S. and international involvement in them. The country will

need massive development aid for the foreseeable future. Some

peacekeeping or peace-enforcement presence will also almost

certainly be necessary if Aristide is to survive his term in

office. But this is still probably better than the alternatives:

The Haitian president's restoration offers at least the hope that

the country's grave socioeconomic ills might at last be seriously

addressed.92 A sizable international involvement may create

dependency in the short run, but it also offers a means of

restraining Aristide and holding him accountable, and that

suggests that there might be some hope on the human rights front

as well. Under such circumstances, it might be possible to

normalize and control migration. This is by far the most

important national interest that the United States has in the

Haitian crisis. Failure to ameliorate the problem would leave us

with the unpalatable alternatives of either (1) allowing hundreds

of thousands (eventually millions) of Haitians to immigrate to

the United States within a very short period of time or (2)

turning forcible repatriation, with all its repugnant moral

implications and heavy financial costs, into a permanent policy.

Finally, if successful, the strategy outlined above would enable

the United States to both reclaim the moral high ground and
restore its currently tattered reputation as a Great Power. It

would replace a policy of weakness with one of strength, while

allowing us to fulfill our obligations to those Haitians whom we

have encouraged to risk their lives and who now feel betrayed and

abandoned.

But let there be no illusions. This course is fraught with

serious risks and costs. Those looking for a quick and easy

"foreign policy success" would be well advised to search

elsewhere. No doubt some will find this hard to accept. Americans

are an optimistic people; they have been conditioned to believe

that every problem has a solution. But this is an illusion. In

the real world, there are often no-win situations, where the

choice is not between winning and losing but between different

ways of losing, some more unacceptable than others. In Haiti, we

are torn between the bad and the terrible. The sooner we

understand this and come to terms with it, the better.

POSTSCRIPT

In the two months following the completion of this study,

relations between the Clinton administration and President

Aristide continued to deteriorate until they were close to the

breaking point. In large part, this was the product of U.S.

unwillingness to bite the bullet of economic sanctions. True,

some tightening occurred. After the Haitian military ignored

another ultimatum (a January 15 U.N. deadline) to step aside, the

State Department prohibited Haitian officers from travelling to

the United States. The Treasury Department added the names of 523

officers, along with members of their families, to the list of

those with frozen assets. But after initially agreeing to seek

greatly expanded U.N. sanctions that would have led to a

near-total embargo (save for food and medicine), the

administration once more drew back out of fear that such measures

would inflict undue suffering on the Haitian people, further

radicalize the far right, and devastate the economy beyond

repair.93

And so the syndrome continued: Half-way sanctions produced

ineffective results. The Haitian military and its allies gained

more time to adjust and blunt the shock of the sanctions. By

February, indeed, the embargo was hemorrhaging badly as truck

after truck carrying forbidden gasoline crossed the Dominican

border en route to Port-au-Prince. It became clear that the

Haitian leaders had been able to acquire access to enough

supplies to meet their basic needs for some time to come.94

Meanwhile, Aristide grew increasingly frustrated and

resentful of the U.S. unwillingness to do what was necessary to

restore him to power. Rather than raising the pressure on the

military and the oligarchy in a decisive and comprehensive

manner, the United States pressured Aristide to form a broad

coalition government that would include some of his political

enemies. In turn the Haitian president, fearing that these moves
were intended to restrict his powers and prerogatives and reduce

him to the status of a figurehead, fought back. During these

weeks, Aristide and his partisans began to play the "immigration

card" in an effort to deflect U.S. pressure and increase their

leverage on Washington. In February, following a tragedy at sea

which claimed the lives of several Haitian boat people, Aristide

lashed out at the U.S. policy of forcible repatriation. Comparing

such actions to a "floating Berlin Wall" and questioning their

legality, he threatened to revoke the 1981 agreement that allowed

U.S. authorities to intercept boat people within Haitian waters.

The statement caused consternation among U.S. officials who had

been counting on Aristide's cooperation to prevent a massive

outpouring of Haitians. Some professed to be "mystified" by his

attitude. In the words of one: "Whenever something gets going

that looks like it has any chance, Aristide always pulls some

stunt."95

By now the Clinton administration was backing a variant of

the Governors Island Plan that called for Aristide to appoint a

civilian prime minister who would form a broad-based government

with enough support in Parliament to approve an amnesty for the

military. The amnesty, in turn, would be followed by the

retirement of General Cedras and reassignment of Colonel

François, the lifting of sanctions and, finally, the working out

of arrangements for Aristide's return. Unfortunately, the plan

lacked both deadlines and penalties for noncompliance. The

open-ended timetable allowed for the possibility that

international sanctions would be lifted even if Aristide were

never restored. Not surprisingly, the latter viewed the proposal

with extreme suspicion, regarding it as little more than a

disguised capitulation and a formula for his own indefinite

exile.96

There, as of late February, matters stood. The Clinton

administration declined to impose tighter sanctions unless

Aristide agreed to political concessions; the latter continued to

resist. In the meantime, socioeconomic conditions continued to

rapidly deteriorate and violence surged. Now, however, there was

a new dimension to worry about. After weeks of warning that armed

resistance was in the offing, fighting broke out in the remote,

mountainous region on the southwestern tip of Haiti. While the

skirmish was a minor one--limited, it seems, to a few dozen

guerrillas--there was no way of knowing whether this was an

isolated and futile episode or the tip of an iceberg.97

In perspective, it can be said that the Haitian crisis is

still evolving and taking on new dimensions. For the moment, the

most significant new development is probably the ability of

Haitian military and business leaders to subvert the embargo via

the Dominican connection. Arrangements have clearly been made to

regularize the shipment of fuel across the border at levels that

can meet the basic needs of the elite for the indefinite future.

If the embargo is to work, that flow must be stopped. Foreign

companies that have sold or are continuing to supply fuel in
violation of the U.N. sanctions must be identified and legal

action taken. If there are storage facilities in the Dominican

Republic--as seems likely--they must be detected and closed down.

Finally, much more serious efforts must be made to patrol the

Haitian-Dominican border. While the Dominican government has

recently stepped up its efforts in this respect, those measures

are still woefully inadequate. Accordingly, more pressure--

including sanctions if necessary--should be brought to bear on

the Balaguer government to get it to fulfill its obligations.

The Dominicans, of course, have a major, legitimate interest

in preventing the spread of instability to their country. They

are now at a point, however, where the leaky embargo itself

threatens to become a destabilizing factor. If it enables the

Haitian elite to continue resistance while imposing even more

hardship on ordinary people and if avenues of escape by sea

remain closed, there will be a growing stream of desperate

Haitians crossing the border into the Dominican Republic. And

should internal war break out in Haiti, that stream could well

become a flood. Then we would no longer have merely a Haitian

crisis on our hands, but a crisis of all Hispaniola.
ENDNOTES

1. Transcript, press conference of March 16, 1993.

2. John M. Goshko and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Details of

Clinton's `Democracy' Program Slowly Begin to Emerge," The

Washington Post, May 5, 1993.

3. At least not in recent memory. Back under French rule,

Saint-Domingue had been perhaps the most profitable colony in the

Western world, setting international production records for both

sugar and coffee. But this wealth never filtered down to the

slaves who worked the plantations and who constituted almost 90

percent of the population. Subsequently, the revolution which

brought independence also destroyed the country's profitable

agricultural base. And while there were times earlier in this

century that were far more prosperous than today, one must

remember that prosperity is a relative term. What are considered

good times in Haiti would be considered bad times almost anywhere

else.

4. For critical assessments of the U.S. occupation of Haiti

(1915-34), see Robert I. Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor,

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971, pp. 109-146, and

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, "Haiti's Nightmare and the Lessons of

History," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 27, No. 4,

January/February 1994, pp. 49-50.

5. William W. Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," Military

Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 1994, p. 50. There are very few

reliable statistics on Haiti. The data presented here should be

considered estimates. Compare, e.g., Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the

World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment Since 1700,

Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p. 184; Patrick Bellegarde-Smith,

Haiti: The Breached Citadel, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp.

129-130; Frederick J. Conway, "Haiti: The Society and Its

Environment," in Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies,

Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1991, pp. 264, 274-276; William W. Mendel and

Stephan K. Stewman, Planning for Haiti, Fort Leavenworth, KS:

Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, June 1,

1993, pp. 7-8; Pamela Constable, "Deadline Haiti: Caribbean

Stalemate," Foreign Policy, No. 89, Winter 1993, p. 177; and

Inter-American Foundation, Haiti: Country Programming Paper, Washington, DC: 1993. Perhaps the most comprehensive and

scholarly account of Haitian socioeconomic conditions may be

found in Simon M. Fass, Political Economy in Haiti: The Drama of

Survival, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988.

6. In 1950, Port-au-Prince had 152,000 residents. By 1971,

that had grown to 507,000. By the early 1990s, the population was

between 1.2 and 1.5 million, or almost three times the city's

carrying capacity.
7. Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti Since Duvalier, New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 18.

8. Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal, Haiti: The Failure of

Politics, New York: Praeger, 1992, p. 132; Wilentz, The Rainy

Season, p. 245; Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti, p. 115.

9. Prior to the September 1991 coup, 145 companies,

employing 35,000 workers, operated export-assembly plants in

Haiti. Two years later, only 87 firms, employing 15,000 people,

remained. Most of the lost companies relocated to the Dominican

Republic. Harold Maass, "Haitian Premier Swears in New Cabinet,"

The Miami Herald, September 3, 1993. Some individuals place the

number of lost jobs even higher. Aristide, for instance, recently

referred to 30,000 export-sector jobs lost. And, of course, this

covers only one sector of the economy. The Association des

Industries d'Haiti estimated that 138,000 workers--almost half

the formal sector labor force--were laid off in the months

immediately after the coup. Some of these, however, were later

hired back. Moreover, the number of employees in the public

sector has increased as many have been hired for political

reasons. On these matters, see Claudette Antoine Werleigh, "Haiti

and the Halfhearted," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.

49, No. 9, November 1993, pp. 22-23; and Harvard Center for

Population and Development Studies, Sanctions in Haiti: Crisis in

Humanitarian Action, Cambridge: Harvard School of Public Health,

1993, p. 15. Aristide's estimate is from his address to the U.N.

General Assembly, October 28, 1993, and may be found in Foreign

Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), Daily Report:

Latin America, October 29, 1993.

10. By November 1993, NGOs were feeding some 800,000

Haitians daily. Conversation with Nancy Jackson, Haitian Desk

Officer, U.S. Department of State. On the effects of the coup,

see especially America's Watch and the National Coalition for

Haitian Refugees, Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil

Society in Haiti, New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1993;

Robert E. Maguire, "Haiti: An Examination of Grassroots

Mobilization and the Effects of the Coup," Paper presented to the

17th Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, May

26-29, 1992; and Harvard Center for Population and Development

Studies, Sanctions in Haiti.

11. On the cultural roots of the Haitian crisis, see

Lawrence E. Harrison, "Voodoo Politics," The Atlantic Monthly, June 1993, and Robert I. Rotberg, "Haiti's Past Mortgages Its

Future," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1, Fall 1988.

12. For a highly complementary portrait of Aristide, see

Wilentz, The Rainy Season; also Jean-Bertrand Aristide and

Christopher Wargny, Aristide: An Autobiography, Maryknoll, NY:

Orbis Books, 1993. Perhaps the most balanced treatment may be

found in Mark Danner's articles in The New York Review of Books. See "Haiti on the Verge," Vol. 40, No. 18, November 4, 1993; "The
Prophet," Vol. 40, No. 19, November 18, 1993; and "The Fall of

the Prophet," Vol. 40, No. 20, December 2, 1993.

13. Nina Shea, "Human Rights in Haiti," in The Haitian

Challenge: U.S. Policy Considerations, Georges A. Fauriol, ed.,

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,

1993, p. 26.

14. The first quote is from Aristide's autobiography, the

second from human rights activist Jean-Claude Bajeux. Both are

cited in Anna Husarska, "Priest and President," The New York

Times Book Review, September 12, 1993.

15. Aristide: "Elections have always been a tool in the

hands of powerful countries, in the hands of the traditional

bourgeoisie." Indeed, he and his most radical partisans opposed

the ratification of the 1987 constitution, as well as the

election process itself, until Aristide became a presidential

candidate in the autumn of 1990. Radio Metropole, September 16,

1991, in FBIS, Daily Report, September 19, 1991.

16. Admittedly, Aristide was in a difficult position.

Haitian politicians tend to be rigid and irresponsible, more

interested in power and spoils than anything else. Moreover, the

president, who had no political party of his own, lacked a

majority in Congress. But this made political flexibility and

coalition-building all the more important. For a discussion of

messianism and sectarianism in Aristide's political movement, see

George Packer, "Choke Hold on Haiti," Dissent, Summer 1993, esp.

pp. 302-304.

17. Pere Lebrun is a major retailer of automobile tires in

Haiti. His television advertisements used to show him popping his

head through one of his products.

18. Radio Metropole, August 5, 1991, in FBIS, Daily Report,

August 8, 1991.

19. "I understand your desire to catch the powerful Macoutes

today so that they do not destroy you tomorrow. This is

legitimate." Haiti Radio-Inter, January 9, 1991, in Ibid., January 10, 1991. See also Danner, "Haiti on the Verge," p. 27. 

In all fairness, these rhetorical excesses occurred under

traumatic and highly provocative conditions. Roger Lafontant was

one of Haiti's most notorious killers. Moreover, the Roman

Catholic hierarchy had long been "Haitianized." In 1966, the

Vatican had granted François Duvalier the power to approve

promotions. Thus the church, in effect, became a partner of the

regime. For his part, Aristide considered Archbishop Ligonde to

be "a zealous servant of Macoutism." Indeed, on January 2, just

before the Lafontant coup attempt, Ligonde had publicly raised

the specter of an Aristide dictatorship, asking his parishioners

whether "socialist Bolshevism [was] going to triumph?" In the

audience were some of the most powerful military and civilian
figures in Haiti. On Aristide's troubled relations with his

superiors, see especially Danner, "The Prophet" and "The Fall of

the Prophet." The Aristide quote is from the former (p. 30), the

Ligonde quote from the latter (p. 48).

20. Radio Soleil, September 13, 1991, in Ibid., September

19, 1991.

21. Radio Nationale, September 27, 1991, in Ibid., October

7, 1991.

22. Madrid EFE, October 1, 1991, in Ibid., October 1, 1991;

also Shea, "Human Rights," pp. 29-30. The latter suggests that

Claude's death preceded the coup of September 29 by several hours

and may have triggered it. But Professor Michel Laguerre tells us

that the coup was already in progress and that the killing may

have been in reaction to it. The causal relationship remains

unclear.

23. Roger Lafontant was not so lucky. He was killed in

prison. Later, the penitentiary commander told U.S. authorities

that he had been personally ordered by Aristide (by phone) to

kill Lafontant. The enlisted man who actually did the killing

told American officials that he was aware of the reported order

from Aristide. The latter, of course, denies the charges. See

U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices for 1991, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1992, p. 422. This "information" is suspect. The Haitian

military has a very strong interest in discrediting Aristide, and

U.S. officials have no independent sources. Moreover, these

"orders" were allegedly issued at a time when Aristide was

besieged and presumably had other things in mind. Still, some

U.S. officials believe the charge.

24. Here, for instance, see the extraordinary statement of

Representative Corrine Brown that "no facts buttress the

contentions" that Aristide used "his command of violent crowds to

intimidate" those who challenged him or that the "military pushed

him out because it feared he and his followers were out to settle

accounts." Letter to the Editor, The Washington Post, August 17,

1993.

25. See, especially, America's Watch and the National

Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Caribbean Rights, "Haiti: The

Aristide Government's Human Rights Record," Vol. 3, Issue 12,

November 1, 1992. The president had invited U.S., Swiss, and

French authorities to reform the Haitian police force and in the

interim to train police guards to protect his security.

A more important factor in Aristide's overthrow, perhaps,

was his penchant for meddling with military appointments and

promotions. He had moved to shake up the high command by

replacing older generals with younger officers. But then he never

made those appointments permanent. One of those alienated by this
tactic was Raoul Cedras, named provisional commander-in-chief in

June 1991, but then left in limbo, his name never submitted to

the legislature for more permanent approval. In addition,

Aristide had brought back a number of officers who had been

cashiered. One of these, Pierre Cherubin, was made head of the

police. Most were highly unpopular with the other officers.

Furthermore, when enlisted men revolted against their commanders

in summer 1991, Aristide intervened on their behalf, provoking

even more suspicion.

26. Ian Thomson, "Bonjour Blanc": A Journey Through Haiti,

London: Hutchinson, 1992, p. ix.

27. Human rights groups estimate that at least 2,000 people

have been killed; Aristide's most recent estimate is 4,000. See

his speech to the U.N. General Assembly, October 28, 1993, in

FBIS, Daily Report, October 29, 1993; also Harold Maass, "Malval

to Discuss New Peace Initiatives with Aristide," The Miami

Herald, December 2, 1993.

28. Technically, the police are part of the military and are

therefore not an independent force. In reality, however, Colonel

François has been able to turn them into a political base which

he has used, along with his control over certain paramilitary

elements and economic resources, to establish himself as a

powerful figure in his own right--perhaps even more powerful than

General Cedras. For a recent article on the conflict between the

two men, which also discusses the growing split between senior

and junior officers, see Howard W. French, "Cracks in Haiti's

Military Widen, Aiding Efforts to Restore Aristide," The New York

Times, February 7, 1994. On conflicts between various commands,

see also Mendel and Stewman, Planning for Haiti, pp. 11-12.

29. Recently, of course, the military and the Duvalierists

have become close collaborators, but their interests are not

always identical and the potential for conflict (perhaps violent)

still exists. As for the Tontons Macoutes, François Duvalier's

civilian militia was never really a coherent structure. The

Macoutes were separate from the military but also overlapped with

it, spied on it and ultimately, in large part, supplanted it. On

the origins and evolution of the Macoutes under the Duvalier

regimes, see Michel S. Laguerre, The Military and Society in

Haiti, Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1993, pp.

110-123.

30. This is based largely on appearance and speculation. It

could be that Cedras has played the role of the "good cop" to

Colonel François' "bad cop" as a tactical ploy in dealing with

the international community. On the other hand, the CIA's Brian

Latell has described Cedras, in a 1992 report, as one of the most

promising Haitian leaders to emerge since the overthrow of the

Duvalier dynasty. See Tim Weiner, "Haiti Leaders on CIA Payroll,"

International Herald Tribune, November 2, 1993; Douglas Farah,

"Defiant Tactics of Haitian Military Drive Off Collaborators
Among Elite," The Washington Post, October 15, 1993; and

Constable, "Dateline Haiti," p. 184.

31. Howard W. French, "In Haiti's Army, Business is the

Order of the Day," The New York Times, November 12, 1993; Don

Bohning, "Controlling the Armed Forces," The Miami Herald,

September 20, 1993.

32. See, for instance, Laguerre, The Military and Society in

Haiti, pp. 148-161.

33. Howard W. French, "Drug Money Snags Haiti Peace Talks,"

The New York Times, April 25, 1993; Douglas Farah, "Standoff Pits

Defenders of Haiti's New Rich Against Its Poor," The Washington

Post, June 25, 1993.

34. Conversation with Department of State Haitian Desk

Officer Ed Archer, May 1993.

35. See Farah, "Standoff."

36. According to one "highly reliable" State Department

source, the attaches "do not follow orders or answer to police or

military. They instinctively act as they see fit." Thus, they are

largely "uncontrollable." U.S. Department of State,

ARA/NEA/REEARCS, December 1993, p. 2.

37. In summer 1991 enlisted men and sailors again rebelled

against their commanders at several bases around Port-au-Prince.

Danner, "The Fall of the Prophet," p. 50. For a discussion of the

September 1988 coup, see Wilentz, The Rainy Season, p. 359ff. The

ti-soldats were not initially hostile to Aristide. Indeed, their

spokesmen took pains to stress that theirs was a "people's

movement." Their attitude changed, however, once they began to be

"necklaced."

38. Douglas Farah, "Haitian Military Plans Years in Power,"

The Washington Post, November 28, 1993.

39. For details, see Trouillot, "Haiti's Nightmare,"

pp.47-51; Robert Maguire, "The Peasantry and Political Change in

Haiti," Caribbean Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, April-June 1991, p. 3;

and Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy, pp. 99-113.

40. See, e.g., Howard French, "Haitian Business Leaders

Pressing Army to Yield," The New York Times, February 9, 1994;

Douglas Farah, "Defiant Tactics of Haitian Military Drive Off

Collaborators Among Elite," The Washington Post, October 15,

1993; Andres Oppenheimer, "Haiti's Elite Start to Sweat U.N.'s

Embargo," The Miami Herald, October 22, 1993.

41. Conversation with Ed Archer.

42. In the words of Aristide's former prime minister, Robert
Malval, "the principal leaders are invisible." Paris Le Monde,

November 3, 1993, in FBIS, Daily Report, November 4, 1993.

43. Trouillot, "Haiti's Nightmare," pp. 48-49.

44. See, e.g., French, "In Haiti's Army, Business is the

Order of the Day" and "Drug Money Snags Haiti Peace Talks";

Farah, "Standoff Pits Defenders of Haiti's New Rich Against Its

Poor"; and Herbert Gold, "Haiti's New and Old Rich," The New York

Times, April 3, 1993. Hard data are, of course, impossible to

come by. Estimates of cocaine revenues, for instance, range from

$50 million to $500 million annually. (Joseph B. Treaster, "Drug

Flow Through Haiti Sharply Cut by Embargo," Ibid., November 4,

1993.) But even the lower figures are substantial, especially

when they are combined with other opportunities for profit.

45. Stephen A. Horblitt, "Multilateral Policy: The Road

Toward Reconciliation," in Fauriol, ed., The Haitian Challenge,

p. 67.

46. Werleigh, "Haiti and the Halfhearted," p. 22; Harvard

Center for Population and Development Studies, Sanctions in

Haiti, pp. 19-20; Constable, "Dateline Haiti," pp. 182-183.

47. Following his ouster, the CIA. prepared a classified

psychological profile of Aristide, depicting him as unstable and

prone to violence. The study has since been criticized as

amateurish and a caricature, but there is no question that it has

strongly affected the view of Aristide in U.S. Government

circles. On the Bush administration's disenchantment with

Aristide, see Clifford Krauss, "In Policy Shift, U.S. Criticizes

Haitian on Rights Abuses," The New York Times, October 7, 1991;

Thomas L. Friedman, "The White House Refuses to Link Aristide's

Return and Democracy," Ibid., October 8, 1991; Howard W. French,

"U.S. Presses Ousted Haitian Chief to Negotiate a Return from

Exile," Ibid., June 27, 1992; Howard W. French, "U.S. Keeps Eye

on Haiti, But Action is Scant," Ibid., October 8, 1992.

48. Werleigh, "Haiti and the Halfhearted," p. 22; Harvard

Center for Population and Development Studies, Sanctions in

Haiti, p. 20; Constable, "Dateline Haiti," p. 184.

49. French, "U.S. Keeps Eye on Haiti;" Barbara Crossette,

"Hamstrung Over Haiti," The New York Times, May 19, 1992.

50. See, especially, Don Bohning and Christopher Marquis,

"Powerful Haitian Clan's Ties to Peace Process Criticized," The

Miami Herald, March 2, 1993.

51. Radio Metropole, February 25 and 26, 1992, in FBIS,

Daily Report, February 26 and 27, 1992.

52. To make matters worse, only the previous week, elections

had been held in an attempt to pack the Haitian legislature and
bolster the legitimacy of the Bazin government. The vote was

rejected as fraudulent by the United States and the United

Nations. Howard W. French, "Mediation Effort in Haiti Collapses,"

The New York Times, February 5, 1993; Steven A. Holmes, "All

Sides Get Message: Haiti Is a Top U.S. Priority," Ibid., February

6, 1993.

53. Howard W. French, "Offer of Amnesty Removes Obstacle to

Accord in Haiti," Ibid., April 14, 1993.

54. Howard W. French, "Haiti Army Spurns Offer of Amnesty,"

Ibid., April 17, 1993.

55. Ibid.

56. See, e.g., Howard W. French, "Diplomats, and Aristide,

See an End to Haiti Impasse," Ibid., April 30, 1993; and

Christopher Marquis, "Haiti's Junta Wants a Deal, Envoys Think,"

The Miami Herald, April 22, 1993.

57. To one of the authors, May 1993.

58. To one of the authors, May 1993.

59 Madrid EFE, July 3, 1993, in FBIS, Daily Report, July 6,

1993.

60. Kim Ives, "The Unmaking of a President," NACLA Report on

the Americas, Vol. 27, No. 4, January/February 1994, pp. 25-26;

Elaine Sciolino, "Haiti's Man of Destiny Awaiting His Hour," The

New York Times, August 3, 1993; "Necklacing Haiti," The Nation,

August 9-16, 1993, pp. 159-160; Cajuste Lexiuste, "Painful

Experience Sends a Message: Don't Rush to Lift Haiti Sanctions,"

The Miami Herald, August 20, 1993.

61. See, especially, "Necklacing Haiti"; and Danner, "Haiti

on the Verge," pp. 26-27, and "The Fall of the Prophet," p. 53.

62. Quoted in Steven A. Holmes, "U.N. Force to Rely on

Haitians to Keep Order," The New York Times, October 1, 1993.

63. Kenneth Roth, "The Task of Purging Haiti's Army," The

Washington Post, September 20, 1993.

64. FBIS, Daily Report, September 27, 1993. See also French,

"In Haiti's Army, Business is the Order of the Day."

65. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, "Pentagon and State

Department at Odds Over Sending of Soldiers to Haiti," The New

York Times, October 8, 1993; Christopher Marquis, "Despite

Pentagon's Doubts, Advisers Sail for Haiti," The Miami Herald, October 9, 1993; "Haitian Assistance Group, Rules of Engagement,"

unclassified.
66. See, e.g., Julia Preston, "Haiti Embargo Revived," The

Washington Post, October 14, 1993; Christopher Marquis, "U.S.

Troops Bound for Haiti Told: Don't Fight," The Miami Herald,

September 30, 1993; Howard W. French, "Diplomats Flee Port to

Escape Protesters," The New York Times, October 12, 1993.

67. Preston, "Haiti Embargo Revived;" Howard W. French,

"U.S. Adviser Meets Haitian But Sees No Breakthrough," The New

York Times, October 16, 1993; Garry Pierre-Pierre, "Rights

Monitors Are Pulled Out of Haiti," Ibid.; Douglas Farah, "U.S.

Ships Set for Embargo," The Washington Post, October 17, 1993.

68. Howard W. French, "Haiti Justice Minister Slain in

Defiance of U.S. Warning to Military to Keep Peace," The New York

Times, October 15, 1993.

69. Farah, "Haitian Military Plans Years in Power"; John M.

Goshko, "Clinton Bow to Haitian Mob May Have Sealed Fate of

Aristide," The Washington Post, January 2, 1994. This was also

Caputo's judgment. See Paul Anderson, "Clinton Orders 2nd Look at

Haiti Embargo," The Miami Herald, November 13, 1993.

70. Christopher Marquis, "U.S. Blocks Assets of Aristide

Opponents," The Miami Herald, October 23, 1993; "U.S. Seeks

Narrower Embargo on Haiti," Ibid., November 2, 1993.

71. Farah, "Haitian Military Plans Years in Power"; Tim

Johnson and Harold Maass, "Haiti Keeps Going with Help of Gas

Smuggling Across Lake," The Miami Herald, November 11, 1993; U.S.

Department of State, ARA/NEA/REARCS.

72. To be sure, Aristide is high-strung and susceptible to

debilitating "nervous crises" and depression which have been

treated by valium and other drugs. But the CIA briefer reportedly

went farther than this. In the words of one administration

official familiar with the presentation: "He made it the most

simplistic, one-dimensional message he could--murderer,

psychopath." Steven A. Holmes, "Administration Is Fighting Itself

on Haiti Policy," The New York Times, October 23, 1993.

73. See, especially, Christopher Marquis, "CIA Report on

Aristide was False," The Miami Herald, December 2, 1993; and R.

Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Profile Debated," The Washington Post, November 5, 1993.

74. Anthony Lewis, "Signals to Haiti," The New York Times, December 13, 1993. See also Weiner, "Haiti Leaders on CIA

Payroll"; Tim Weiner, Stephen Engelberg and Howard W. French,

"CIA Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade," The New

York Times, November 14, 1993; and Douglas Farah, "U.S. Shares

Anti-Drug Data with Haiti's Military," The Washington Post, October 24, 1993.

75. Lewis, "Signals to Haiti."
76. Christopher Marquis, "Malval Seeks to Launch Dialogue to

Restore Aristide," The Miami Herald, December 7, 1993; "Clinton

Adviser Urges Sharing Power with Some in Haitian Military,"

Ibid., December 8, 1993; Daniel Williams and Julia Preston, "U.S.

Policy on Haiti Includes Search for Moderates," The Washington

Post, December 8, 1993; Howard W. French, "Premier of Haiti

Criticizes Aristide," The New York Times, December 20, 1993;

Steven A. Holmes, "Exiled Haitian Rebuffs Diplomats," Ibid.,

December 22, 1993.

77. Indeed, at one point The Los Angeles Times reported,

prematurely, that the United States and the international

community had given up efforts to restore Aristide. See Kenneth

Freed, "U.S. Said to Drop Bid to Reinstate Haiti President," The

Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1993; Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S.

Relaxes Its Drive for Haitian Democracy," The Washington Post,

November 17, 1993; Christopher Marquis, "U.S. Fears Haiti Tactics

Backfiring," The Miami Herald, December 22, 1993.

78. Farah, "Haitian Military Plans Years in Power."

79. There are honorable military men in Haiti, but clearly

they are not in control.

80. Radio Metropole, October 19, 1993, in FBIS, Daily

Report, October 20, 1993.

81. Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies,

Sanctions in Haiti. This is a highly controversial study. The

authors intended this as an "order of magnitude" estimate rather

than as a precise calculation. But even this is questionable. The

figure is a projection based heavily on data from a single town,

Maissade, where an aid group has been tracking births and deaths

for several years. One cannot confidently generalize from such an

unrepresentative sample to the entire country.

82. Already, indeed, the oil embargo is seriously hampering

humanitarian relief activities. In mid-October when the sanctions

were imposed, CARE was providing Haitians with 560,000 meals

daily. By mid-January, that number had fallen to under 200,000

daily meals. Signs of malnutrition are becoming increasingly

difficult to ignore. See Howard W. French, "U.N. Sanctions

Against Haiti Are Hampering Relief Efforts," The New York Times, January 11, 1994; and John Donnelly, "Health Workers: Haiti's

`Last Ray of Hope,'" The Miami Herald, December 24, 1993.

83. In the words of one State Department officer, "Governors

Island is unimplementable, but we have committed ourselves to

it." To one of the authors (not for attribution).

84. Under the 1987 constitution, the president can appoint a

commander-in-chief (given Senate approval) only from among those

general officers on active duty. Currently, there are only three
such officers besides Cedras, and none of them appears

sympathetic to Aristide. While, theoretically, Cedras could

promote someone more to the president's liking, under present

circumstances this seems improbable.

85. See, e.g., Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner,

"Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, No. 89, Winter 1991-92,

pp. 3-20.

86. See, e.g., French, "U.N. Sanctions."

87. The incentives, however, are growing. In the words of

one analyst, there are maybe 100 officers "making out like

bandits, with another 100 living pretty comfortably. The rest of

them are having an increasingly difficult time scraping by...."

French, "Cracks in Haiti's Military Widen."

88. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis, "Aristide Hints He'd

Back Raid on Haiti," The Miami Herald, January 5, 1994; French,

"Haitian Business Leaders Pressing Army to Yield."

89. Extensive documentation of instances in which companies

have abused their exemptions has been provided to the U.S.

Treasury, but no action has been taken. U.S. Department of State,

ARA/NEA REARCS, p. 1; John M. Goshko and Julia Preston, "U.S. to

Ask Tougher Sanctions on Haiti," The Washington Post, January 28,

1994; Bob Herbert, "An Embargo in the Dark," The New York Times,

January 30, 1994.

90. Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies,

Sanctions in Haiti, p. 27.

91. There would be dissenters, of course. In addition to the

ultra-right wing supporters of the military, some of the radicals

in Lavalas (in the so-called "popular sector") could be expected

to denounce the move. The latter, however, are largely unarmed.

Lately, moreover, some of Aristide's supporters have hinted at

the need for a peace enforcement operation. Even the president

himself has indicated that he would welcome a military

intervention (though "I cannot ask for it....I would be

impeached"). See Marquis, "Aristide Hints He'd Back Raid in

Haiti"; Mary McGrory, "The Trouble with Haiti," The Washington

Post, January 6, 1994; and "U.S. Insists Plan to Restore Aristide

Remains on Track," The Miami Herald, September 22, 1993. On the

problems of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Haiti, as well

as noncombatant evacuation and civil-military operations, see

Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," pp. 53-57.

92. Here one of the most important tasks will be to reverse

the "brain drain." Haiti's talent is mostly abroad. Incentives

will have to be provided so that many of these people will return

to their homeland and contribute to national development.

Otherwise, Haiti will be dependent on foreign largess for a very

long time.
93. John M. Goshko and Julia Preston, "U.S. to Ask Tougher

Sanctions on Haiti," The Washington Post, January 28, 1994;

Goshko and Preston, "Aristide Stance `Mystifying,' U.S. Says,"

Ibid.; Howard W. French, "U.S. Tells Aristide to Bend on Plan,"

The New York Times, February 23, 1994.

94. Howard W. French, "Explosion of Black-Market Fuel

Exposes Leaks in Haiti Embargo," The New York Times, February 14,

1994.

95. Christopher Marquis, "Aristide Rips Repatriation as

`Floating Berlin Wall,'" The Miami Herald, February 9, 1994;

Marquis, "Ties Between Aristide and U.S. Are Growing Increasingly

Strained," Ibid., February 10, 1994.

96. Christopher Marquis, "A New Try at Haiti Solution,"

Ibid., February 14, 1994; John M. Goshko, "Rejection of

U.S.-Backed Plan Deepens Conflict with Aristide," The Washington

Post, February 15, 1994.

97. John Donnelly, "Talk, Signs of Uprising Stir in Troubled

Haiti," The Miami Herald, January 17, 1994; Susan Benesch,

"Reported Firefight Brings Haiti Reprisal," Ibid., February 16,

1994; Michael Tarr, "Armed Haitian Rebels Said to Battle

Soldiers," The Washington Post, February 15, 1994.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Donald E. Schulz

Dr. Gabriel Marcella

Editor

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Deloris A. Hutchinson

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler