United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

March 1996 AIR FORCE

MAINTENANCE

Two Level Maintenance

Program Assessment

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-86

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270867 

March 27, 1996

The Honorable William J. Perry

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We reviewed the Air Force’s implementation of the Two Level

Maintenance (TLM) program. Our objectives were to determine whether the

program (1) was achieving the anticipated benefits, (2) has resulted in

reduced repair turn around time,1

 and (3) will be an effective maintenance

program for supporting deployed forces.

Background The TLM program objectives were to save money by reducing maintenance

staffing, equipment, and base level support without sacrificing force

readiness. Under TLM, the number of maintenance levels was reduced from

three (organizational, intermediate, and depot) to two (organizational and

depot).2

 Maintenance previously performed at the intermediate level

would be performed at the depot level which, in turn, would allow the Air

Force to significantly reduce the number of maintenance personnel and

equipment at the base level. However, it also required that items sent to

the depots be repaired and ready for issue in a timely manner to

compensate for the longer repair pipeline between the customer and the

depot.

In implementing TLM, the Air Force decided that it would not increase

inventories. Inherent in this decision was the realization that it would have

to

• develop a responsive transportation system to quickly move items to and

from the point of repair,

• make necessary changes at the depots to absorb intermediate

maintenance work that was previously performed at the base level,

• achieve a balance between spare parts and mission capability rates (i.e.,

determine the acceptable level of risk), and

1

Repair turn around time is measured from the time an item is removed from the aircraft until it is

repaired and ready for reissue.

2

Organizational and intermediate level maintenance is performed at the base level. Organizational

maintenance is generally preventive maintenance with some capability to remove and replace

defective items. Intermediate maintenance, also done at the base level, involves fault isolation, repair

and replacement of defective items, and repair of electronic circuits. Depot maintenance involves

more extensive repairs and overhaul of major components and end items.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
B-270867 

• expand maintenance capabilities at the unit level to perform fault

diagnostics to avoid sending items to the depot repair facility for relatively

minor repairs.

The Air Force tested the program from July 1991 through September 30,

1993. The tests—Coronet Deuce, Coral Star, and Coral Thrust—involved

F-16 avionics items as well as several engines such as the F100-220,

TF33-103, and TF33-7A.3

 Based on the test results, the Air Force decided to

implement TLM Air Force-wide for selected avionics and engines.

Implementation began in fiscal year 1994 and is expected to be fully

implemented by fiscal year 1997.

Results in Brief The TLM program is not achieving the full extent of the intended benefits.

Between the time of the Air Force’s first cost and savings analysis in 1992

and the second analysis in 1993, the estimated costs to implement TLM had

increased and the expected net savings had decreased—from $385 million

to $258 million. In addition, all program costs have not been included in

the cost/savings analyses.

For avionics items, the repair turn around time under TLM generally met

the Air Force’s established repair turn around standard. For engines,

however, the repair turn around times are exceeding the standard by as

many as 87 days. For example, the repair turn around time standard for

the TF30-111 engine, used on the F-111 aircraft, is 41 days, but as of

August 1995, its average repair turn around time was 128 days.

The use of TLM to support deployed forces in times of conflict will add to

the airlift burden. Because the deployed forces will not have in-country

intermediate maintenance capability, the forces will be dependent on

airlift for their spare and repair parts. However, airlift priorities are

controlled by the theater commander not the Air Force. As a result, a

theater commander could decide that the need for combat power in the

early stages of the conflict has a higher priority than return of

unserviceable items to depot repair facilities and movement of items from

the depots to the theater of operation. The need for early sustainment

airlift to support TLM is an issue that has not been fully resolved and is one

that could affect sustainment of the deployed forces.

3

These engines are used on the F-15, F-16, B-52, and C-141 aircraft, respectively.

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Status of the Program The Air Force believed that between fiscal years 1994 and 1999, TLM would

result in reducing the number of authorized maintenance personnel

positions in the force structure by 5,888 (5,770 military and 118 civilians)

and saving about $385 million. The personnel reductions and savings were

predicated on the assumption that 2,023 TLM-designated avionics items and

13 aircraft engines would be TLM-designated and sent to the depots for

repair. These initial estimates proved to be overly optimistic. According to

Air Force documents, as of September 1995, the number of TLM avionics

items had been reduced to 1,171. Additionally, of all the TLM avionics items

removed from aircraft for repair, only 47 percent of them were sent to the

depots for repair. The remaining 53 percent are still being repaired on

base. It was expected that 80 percent of the items would be repaired at the

depots and 20 percent would be repaired at the base.

The Air Force also removed three engines from the program because the

engines were not as reliable as initially thought. Keeping the engines in the

program would have resulted in additional transportation costs to move

the engines to the depots for frequent repairs.

According to information provided by the Air Force, it plans to increase

the number of TLM-designated avionics items from 1,171 to 1,282 and is

considering adding 2 aircraft engines to the program during fiscal year

1996. At the time we completed our review, no decisions had been made

about increasing the number of avionics items and engines in the program

further. As of September 1995, the personnel authorizations had been

reduced by 1,852 to reflect anticipated TLM program savings.4

 However,

according to Air Force officials, this does not mean that 1,852 individuals

have left the Air Force or that these individuals have been removed from

base level maintenance positions. They said that some of the people may

still be at their same locations. The officials could not provide us the

number of personnel reductions actually achieved as a result of TLM.

Increased Costs and

Reduced Savings

The Air Force’s initial TLM cost and savings analysis in November 1992

showed that from fiscal years 1994 through 1999, program implementation

would cost about $1.043 billion and savings would be about 

$1.428 billion—a net savings of $385 million. The major element of cost

was due to the increased workload at the depots (i.e., performing

intermediate maintenance at the depots versus the base level), and the

major element of cost savings was due to maintenance personnel

reductions at the base level.

4

Through fiscal year 1999, the total reduction in planned personnel authorizations is 5,012.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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The Air Force later revised its initial analysis in December 1993. The

analysis showed that implementation costs had increased from 

$1.043 billion to $1.468 billion and that total savings had increased from

$1.428 billion to $1.726 billion. The program costs increased more than

savings. As a result, the net savings decreased from $385 million to

$258 million.

As shown in table 1, depot repair was the principal factor that accounted

for the major cost increase. This increase occurred because the scope of

depot intermediate maintenance work had increased. When an engine is

inducted into the depot intermediate maintenance facility, it is inspected

and all necessary repairs are performed. In addition, other maintenance is

performed to extend the operating life of the engine if the engine

components are within a certain threshold for overhaul. This increased

maintenance is referred to as jet engine intermediate maintenance plus

(JEIM +).

The increased savings was in the area of on-condition maintenance.

According to Air Force officials, as a result of JEIM +, the time interval

between engine overhauls will be extended. Thus, the savings increased

from $451 million to $821.8 million.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
B-270867 

Table 1: Projected Implementation Costs and Savings From Fiscal Years 1994 Through 1999

Dollars in millions

Category 1992 analysis 1993 analysis

Increase

(decrease) Reason for increase (decrease)

Cost

Depot repair $826.05 $1,233.41 $407.36 Increased scope of depot maintenance work. Additional

depot maintenance personnel and increased avionics

transportation costs as a result of using commercial

sources.

Transportation 13.65 31.39 17.74 To correct previous transportation cost estimate for TF-39

engine.

Defense Logistics

Agency

73.42 73.42 0 No change.

DMRD 904 129.76 129.76 0 No change.

Total cost $1,042.88 $1,467.98 $425.10

Savings

Military personnel $292.80 $237.10 $(55.70) Additional personnel to perform base level repair on the

three engines removed from the program.

Equipment

maintenance

20.40 15.00 (5.40) Need to retain test equipment for three engines removed

from the program.

Equipment

purchase

201.20 201.20 0 No change.

On-condition

maintenance

451.00 821.80 370.80 Reduced engine overhauls resulting from increased

scope of maintenance work at the depots.

Base operating

support

144.20 144.20 0 No change.

Training 157.20 157.20 0 No change.

Civilian personnel 160.80 149.78 (11.02) Additional personnel to perform base level repair on the

three engines removed from the program.

Total savings $1,427.60 $1,726.28 $298.68

Net savings $384.72 $258.30 $(126.42)

Even though the 1993 analysis continued to show a net savings by

implementing the program, it did not include all program costs. For

example, a 1993 Air Force analysis showed that the value of the mobility

readiness spares packages (MRSP) kits5

 would increase about $543 million

to reconfigure the kits from a three level maintenance configuration to a

TLM configuration for five aircraft types. Table 2 shows the value of the

reconfigured kits by aircraft type.

5

MRSP kits are supply kits that are intended to sustain a deployed unit for a certain numbers of days

until the resupply pipeline can be established into the theater of operation.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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Table 2: Value of Reconfigured MRSP

Kits for Five TLM Aircraft Dollars in millions

Aircraft

MRSP value under

three level

maintenance

MRSP value

under TLM Difference

B-52 $246.1 $691.0 $444.9

C-5 195.4 213.8 18.4

C-141 180.7 219.8 39.1

F-15C 401.3 423.7 22.4

F-111F 255.2 273.4 18.2

Total $1,278.7 $1,821.7 $543.0

Prior to TLM, the kits were configured with shop replaceable items that

would be used by intermediate maintenance units to repair the line

replaceable components. However, with TLM, there will not be any

intermediate maintenance capability in the theater of operation.

Consequently, there is no need for the shop replaceable items in the MRSP

kits. To make the kits compatible to TLM, the kits had to be reconfigured

with higher cost line replaceable components rather than the lower cost

shop replaceable items.

Air Force officials emphasized that the Air Force did not have to spend

any additional funds to achieve the kit reconfiguration. They pointed out

that the largest increase in MRSP kit value was for the B-52 aircraft, which

did not have MRSP kits prior to TLM. Air Force officials told us that when the

mission of the aircraft was changed from a nuclear to a conventional

mission, this necessitated a MRSP kit, even if the avionics items were not

designated as TLM items. The officials said that they were able to establish

these kits by redistributing excess inventory that was in the supply system

as a result of retiring the B-52G aircraft. Therefore, they did not consider

this to be a TLM program cost since they did not have to buy the inventory

needed for kit reconfiguration. In our opinion, although no additional

funds were spent to achieve the kit reconfiguration, the $449 million of

added value of the MRSP kits should be considered a TLM program related

cost because the added value was necessitated by the kit reconfiguration

to a TLM orientation.

A second example of excluded costs involved the assumption about how

many avionics items would be sent to depots for repair. The 1992 analysis

assumed that all TLM avionics items would be returned to depots for repair.

The 1993 analysis, however, reflected that about 67 percent of the items

would be repaired at the depot. Our review showed, however, that the

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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revised assumption was not occurring. As of September 1995, only

47 percent of the TLM avionics items removed from the aircraft for repair

were being sent to the depots. Because the avionics repair workload at

depots has not materialized to the extent it was anticipated, the amount of

depot repair costs shown in the second analysis category is overstated.

Air Force officials said that having less items being sent to the depots for

repair than expected did not mean that more items were being repaired at

the base level. They said that better screening processes at the base level

to identify those items that do not need to be sent to the depot for repair

and better fault diagnostic capability could account for the reduced

workload at the depots.

A third example was the cost for facilities’ renovations and minor

construction ($8 million) at the San Antonio and Oklahoma City depots.

Renovations and construction were required so that the depots could

handle the anticipated increased TLM workload.

Repair Turn Around

Times for Engine and

Avionics Items

The decision as to whether a TLM-designated item is repaired on base or

sent to a depot depends on the extent of maintenance required. The Air

Force criterion is that if avionics items and engines cannot be repaired at

the base level, they must be sent to a depot within 48 and 72 hours,

respectively. This criterion reflects the recognition that, under TLM, there is

a need to reduce the amount of time from when an item is removed from

the aircraft until it is repaired and ready for reissue. In this regard, the Air

Force has emphasized the use of express transportation to move items

from a base to a depot repair facility and to expedite the depot repair

process. The Air Force was concerned that without expedited

transportation and repair, operating bases might have to increase their

inventory levels.

The Air Force has established repair turn around time standards6

 for TLM

items. Our analysis showed that, for the month of October 1995, the

reported repair turn around times for avionics items averaged about 

10.9 days as compared to the Air Force standard of 8 days. Officials said

that a large percentage of the avionics items are being repaired at bases

rather than at depots as evidenced by the fact that, as of September 1995,

only 47 percent of the items are being sent to depots for repair.

6

The standards include the time for on-base processing, transportation to the depot, depot processing,

repair, and return to stock.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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At one depot, an official told us that this low workload has resulted in

about 40 people being transferred from the avionics repair shop to other

depot repair activities. The official said that in a contingency situation, the

higher generation of unserviceable items due to high operating tempo

coupled with reduced ability of field units to repair the items could cause

the depot workload to double or triple. In turn, this level of increase could

overwhelm the depots’ repair capabilities and result in increased repair

turn around times for avionics items.

With regard to engines, the reported repair turn around times show that

the standards generally are not being met. However, some officials said

that a better measurement of the depots’ response to TLM would be to

compare the actual repair turn around times to the average of the depot

and base level repair time prior to TLM implementation.

Other Air Force officials said that the pre-TLM averages are not realistic

because they were derived from a 1992 baseline7

 when the Air Force was

experiencing long maintenance delays due to a shortage of repair parts.

The officials said that it should be noted that after the Gulf War, the

returning aircraft underwent extensive maintenance and that it was this

period that was used to compute the averages. Consequently, they said the

averages are inflated. The results of our comparison of actual repair turn

around times to the Air Force standard and pre-TLM average are shown in

table 3.

7

The baseline included data for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1991 and the four quarters in fiscal year

1992.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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Table 3: Actual Repair Turn Around

Times Compared to Standard Repair

Time and Pre-TLM Averages for TLM

Engines (as of August 1995) 

Difference between

actual and

Repair turn around times (days)

Engines (aircraft)

Pre-TLM

average Standard

Actual as of

August 1995

Pre-TLM

average Standard

F100-220 (F-15, F-16) 26.2 19.5 51.0 24.8 31.5

T56 (C-130) 57.4 19.5 74.5 17.1 55.0

TF39 (C-5) 77.2 71.5 129.5 52.3 58.0

TF33-7A (C-141) 89.2 51.0 66.3 (22.9) 15.3

TF33-103 (B-52) 94.0 46.0 54.0 (40.0) 8.0

TF33-100 (E-3) 100.0 51.0 38.5 (61.5) (12.5)

TF33-102 (KC-135) 159.0 56.0 74.5 (84.5) 18.5

F108-100 (KC-135R) 158.0 41.0 44.0 (114.0) 3.0

TF30-109 (F-111) 115.0 41.0 93.6 (21.4) 52.6

TF30-111 (F-111) 115.0 41.0 128.0 13.0 87.0

Air Force officials told us that the primary reason that the repair turn

around time for engines exceeds the Air Force standard is that there is a

ready supply of engines. When there is a ready supply of serviceable

engines available for issue, there is no real requirement to rapidly turn

around the unserviceable engines. Therefore, when an unserviceable

engine or engine component is shipped to the repair facility, it could be

stored until there is a need to repair the item.

Our analysis of Air Force-wide engine requirements and available

inventory as of October 1995 confirms that, in most cases, there are

sufficient TLM engines available for issue to meet requirements. Our

analysis showed that for 8 of the 10 TLM engines there were enough

ready-for-issue engines to meet at least 90 percent of the requirements and

for 7 of the 10 engines, the number of ready-for-issue engines met or

exceeded the requirements (see table 4).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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Table 4: Comparison of TLM Engine

Requirements and Ready-for-Issue

Inventory (as of October 1995) 

Engines Requirements

Ready-for-issue

inventory

Inventory as a

percentage of

requirements

F100-220 64 42 65.6

T56 100 92 92.0

TF39 33 35 106.1

TF33-7A 103 105 101.9

TF33-103 32 18 56.3

TF33-100 19 19 100.0

TF33-102 25 27 108.0

F108-100 55 63 114.5

TF30-109 21 26 123.8

TF30-111 19 20 105.2

Another indication that the Air Force has a sufficient supply of TLM engines

is the fact that it has retired 114 of the TLM engines valued at $41.1 million

during fiscal years 1993 through 1995, as shown in table 5.

Table 5: Number of TLM Engines

Retired From Fiscal Years 1993

Through 1995

Dollars in millions

Engines

Number of

engines

retired

Value of

engines

retired

TF33-7A 49 $15.4

TF33-103 21 5.5

TF33-100 11 3.4

TF33-102 14 5.4

TF30-109 11 5.1

TF30-111 8 6.3

Total 114 $41.1

Although not meeting repair turn around times and relying on the current

supply of engines to meet customer needs may not cause a problem in the

short term, it could become a problem over the long term as more items

are designated as TLM items and as the ready available supply of engines is

decreased.

Air Force officials said that when the program is fully implemented in

fiscal year 1997, the Air Force will analyze the engine supply situation, and

some engines may be eliminated from the inventory. If this occurs, the

number of engines to be repaired will be reduced and the maintenance

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
B-270867 

focus will shift to meeting the repair turn around time or the Air Force will

have to buy additional stocks for the base level. In the interim, the

program has not been fully tested in the type of restrictive environment

that it may be required to operate.

Use of TLM to

Support Deployed

Forces

When Air Force units deploy overseas, they will not take intermediate

maintenance capability with them for the TLM avionics items and engines.

Instead, the units will have to rely on airlift to transport their

unserviceable TLM assets to the depot for repair. Likewise, they will have to

rely on airlift for replenishment stocks.

According to Air Force officials, not deploying the intermediate

maintenance capability will reduce airlift requirements by the equivalent

of 175 C-141 aircraft during the first 30 days of a two major regional

contingency scenario. Before TLM, the plan was to airlift the intermediate

maintenance capability to the theater sometime after the initiation of

mobilization. TLM, however, will require airlift much earlier in the

contingency for returning and replenishing spare parts inventories.

Because airlift is not dedicated for these purposes, retrograde and

resupply will have to compete with other airlift users.

Airlift priorities and assignments are controlled by the theater commander.

In the early stages of a conflict, the commander could decide that airlift

priorities should be devoted to moving more combat power into the

theater rather than spare parts. If this occurs at the same time that the Air

Force units are seeking replenishment avionics and engines, sustainability

problems could arise.

U.S. Central Command officials told us that airlift has not been specifically

dedicated for returning unserviceable items from the theater of operation

to the United States and for resupplying units in the theater with needed

spare parts. Command officials, however, believed that there should be

sufficient airlift available for these purposes. Other Air Force officials told

us that they are not convinced that there will be sufficient airlift available

to meet TLM needs early in a contingency.

Recommendations In view of the unresolved TLM issues and the fact that the program has not

fully achieved its intended objectives and has not been fully implemented,

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Air Force to continue to periodically reassess the cost efficiency and

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
B-270867 

effectiveness of items already in the program as well as those planned for

the program to determine whether the avionics items and engines are the

most appropriate TLM candidates. To facilitate the reassessment, the

Secretary of the Air Force should develop

• a revised cost and savings analysis that reflects (1) the facilities and minor

construction costs incurred to ready depots for TLM and (2) the fact that

the anticipated workload at the depots has not materialized;

• an assessment of the depots’ ability to meet the repair turn around times

prescribed by the Air Force standard when the current inventory of

engines is reduced and TLM is fully implemented; and

• an action plan, in concert with wartime theater commanders, that assesses

the availability of airlift in the early stages of a conflict to fully support the

added airlift requirements of TLM.

Agency Comments The Department of Defense concurred with our findings and

recommendations. Officials agreed that there should be a continuing

reassessment of TLM candidates to ensure that the right ones are in the

program and that further assessments of capability and inventory should

be conducted. These assessments have been programmed through the TLM

end-to-end analysis and engine supply reassessment. The officials further

stated that the Air Force will continue to work with the Joint Staff and

Supported Commanders-in-Chief to determine effective use of airlift

allocation to meet service requirements. The full text of the Department’s

comments are included as appendix I.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine how the TLM program costs and anticipated savings were

computed, we reviewed Air Force studies and budget documents and held

discussions with Air Force headquarters officials responsible for program

development and implementation. Also, we compared the costs and

savings identified in the original cost/savings analysis to the revised cost

and savings analysis developed for the fiscal year 1995 budget. We then

held discussions with officials to ascertain the reasons for cost increases

and net savings decreases.

To determine whether the program has reduced repair turn around time,

we reviewed Air Force reports summarizing repair turn around time and

held discussions with depot officials who monitor and analyze the data.

For engines, we compared post-TLM repair time data to pre-TLM repair time

data and to repair standards developed by the Air Force. For avionics

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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items, we compared actual TLM repair turn around times to Air Force

repair standards.

To assess the use of TLM to support deployed forces, we reviewed

deployment plans, airlift requirements and held discussions with officials

who plan and implement deployment plans during military operations. In

addition, we obtained and analyzed cost data showing the effect of TLM on

the configuration of the war reserve kits.

Our review was performed at the

• U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;

• U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

• Air Force Logistics Management Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama;

• Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;

• Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

• Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;

• Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma;

• San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; and

• 1st Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

We performed our review from June 1995 to December 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, the head of a federal agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to

submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to

the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the

date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first

request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the

report.

We are also sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations,

House Committee on National Security, Senate Committee on Armed

Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, House Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight; and the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget. If you or members of your staff have any

questions or would like to discuss the matters in this report in further

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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detail, please call me at (202) 512-5140. The major contributors to this

report are shown in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 3.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 3-4.

Now on pp. 7-11.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 11.

Now on pp. 11-12.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Robert J. Lane

Dallas Field Office Kimberly S. Carson

Bonnie S. Carter

Norfolk Field Office Norman L. Jessup, Jr.

Jeanett H. Reid

(703102) Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-86 Two Level Maintenance
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