www.9-11commission.gov 

Second Interim Report of the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

Thomas H. Kean, Chair, and Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chair 

September 23, 2003 

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—the 9-11 

Commission—continues to work, and we intend to report to the nation no later than our 

statutory deadline of May 27, 2004. We will speak this afternoon about our access to 

documents, what we have done, and what we plan to do. We will outline some of the 

investigative and policy questions before us.

ACCESS 

We turn first to the issue we left open at the time of our July 8 report. Are we getting the 

help we need so that we can complete our job in the time allotted to us by law? 

 Since our July report, Executive Branch agencies have significantly improved 

their performance in responding to our document requests. There are still pending 

requests, and many documents have yet to be produced. Key agencies have 

assigned additional people to produce documents. Agencies initially slow in 

responding, including the Department of Defense, have worked hard to assist the 

Commission. 

 While there have been some unnecessary delays, we now have over 10,000 

documents in hand, and have access to documents from the Executive Branch 

numbering more than two million pages. This is already more than four times 

what was provided to the Congressional Joint Inquiry. The flow of documents to 

us continues. 

 Production appears to be nearing completion in the critical area of high-level 

agency records on policy deliberations if all current commitments are met. The 

Executive Branch agencies have agreed to produce these records. Some have 

been slow. We have received many of these documents only recently. We have 

been assured that the remainder will be made available in the next two weeks. If 

they are not, we will not hesitate to inform the public. 

 The Commission has obtained access to many of the key White House and 

National Security Council documents we have sought from this administration 

and its predecessor. The access we already have is on a unique breadth and scale. 
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Pending requests seek additional sensitive documents. We have been conducting 

extensive negotiations so that the Commission gets the additional information it 

needs. Although we have received certain assurances, we are still negotiating 

with the White House. We will inform the public promptly if the Commission 

does not receive the access it needs. 

 The CIA and the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security 

have generally been responsive to the Commission’s requests. In many cases this 

has required some extraordinary efforts, which we appreciate. In the case of some 

particular requests, agencies have been unable to locate any responsive 

documents, or only a few where we would have expected there to have been 

more. In all cases, we will obtain certifications by senior responsible officials as 

to the completeness of their production. 

 The FBI has provided the largest amount of material to the Commission. It also 

has the largest number of documents relevant to our work. We have needed to 

create very unusual working arrangements to facilitate the Commission’s access 

to the remaining FBI information we need to receive. The Bureau has agreed to 

these procedures and, from the top, has expressed a firm commitment to make 

them work. 

 There are many more agencies we could mention in the public sector, including at 

the regional and local level. We have also been obtaining documents from some 

private firms. Again, in general, these agencies and firms have been responsive to 

our requests. 

WHAT WE HAVE DONE 

We have just passed the second anniversary of the attacks. No one has waited for 

answers longer than the families of the victims. We thank them for their patience and 

support. We are working to earn their patience. Let’s talk about what we have been 

doing.

 We and our staff of 65, in two offices in Washington and one in New York City, 

have been evaluating the mountain of documents in our possession. 

 We have received 87 briefings from agency officials. 

 We have conducted more than 200 interviews of individual witnesses. 

 We have heard from 58 policy and fact witnesses in our public hearings.

Our interviews are not just in Washington. We are going to FBI Field Offices, military 

bases, airports, air traffic control facilities, and immigration checkpoints, and 

interviewing first responders from across the country. 
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WHAT WE PLAN TO DO 

 Our public hearings will continue, although we will defer the factual hearings in 

order to permit the staff work necessary for those hearings to be fruitful. Instead, 

we will focus the remainder of our hearings in this calendar year on important 

policy issues. 

 In October we will explore questions of organization and leadership. Should we 

restructure the intelligence community and create a Director of National 

Intelligence? Should we change the way we prepare and issue warnings of 

terrorist attacks? 

 In November we will hear testimony on best practices for emergency 

preparedness.

 In December we will examine reforms by the FBI and whether we need a new 

agency to gather intelligence in the United States, what some have called an 

American version of Britain’s MI-5. We will look at whether our nation is 

striking the right balance of security and liberty. 

Based on what we learn in our document review and classified interviews, we will begin 

a series of public hearings on factual issues in January with the principal figures of the 

Bush and Clinton administrations. We will hear testimony, including from Cabinet-level 

officials, on how they did their jobs in the run-up to the 9-11 attacks and—in the case of 

current officials—how they see their jobs today.

 We will hold a hearing in January on the immediate response to the hijackings by 

those responsible for our air security system and by our nation’s leaders. 

 We will hold a two-day hearing at the end of January on border and transportation 

security issues. We will look at watchlists, visas and foreign visitors, immigration 

law enforcement, and aviation security. 

 We will hold a three-day hearing in February on law enforcement and intelligence 

collection inside the United States. We will hear from the Justice Department, the 

FBI, Homeland Security, and state and local officials. 

 Later in February, we will hold two more days of hearings, on terrorist safe 

havens and permissive environments, then and now, and we will look at broader 

issues of international cooperation.

 In March, we will hold four days of hearings. We will hear from senior officials, 

then and now, at Defense, CIA, the State Department, Treasury, and the National 

Security Council staff. 
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 In April, we will hold hearings telling the story—as authoritatively as we can—of 

the 9-11 plot and what happened on that day. We will look at emergency 

response, at the local and national level.

Taken together, our plan is for 14 days of hearings between January and April. We will 

hear from some 55 senior officials, past and present. 

At the end of May we will release a report to the nation. We will want it to be as widely 

available as possible. That public report will be backed by a number of volumes of 

detailed monographs. 

QUESTIONS

As we get access to so much information, many are anxious to hear what we have 

learned. We understand their impatience. Yet we are engaged in what may be the largest 

investigation of U.S. government actions and policy in American history. Waiting for the 

right answers is better than rushing to judgment with the wrong ones. 

The questions we must answer begin with the past. 

 We are developing a full depiction of the conspiracy to attack this country; how 

the plotters analyzed our weaknesses, the strategies they developed, the actions 

they took, and those who helped them. 

 We must understand the enemy that chose war against America. 

 We are seeking to understand militant forces within the Islamic world, and the 

religious, governmental, and financial institutions—and ideologies—that support 

them. 

 We are evaluating the events and policies that may have contributed to the 

development of this threat. 

 We are considering how we collected and analyzed foreign intelligence. The CIA 

was created in part to avoid another Pearl Harbor. Generations of experts worked 

on better ways to warn against surprise attacks. We are exploring how, or 

whether, those methods were employed to warn against this one. We are also 

exploring the way intelligence efforts were conducted within the United States, 

and how well our foreign and domestic agencies combined their efforts against a 

transnational enemy. 

 We are analyzing the policies our leaders crafted to combat terrorism and prevent 

such a devastating attack. What actions were chosen, or readied, with the tools of 

diplomacy, military power, or more secret means—whether against terrorist 

sanctuaries or terrorist finance? 
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 We are assessing how America’s other defenses performed as well, looking at 

how terrorists penetrated our borders and how they boarded and seized four 

commercial airliners. 

 We are reconstructing the events of September 11, minute by minute, so that we 

can see the strengths and weaknesses in the way the air traffic control system, our 

air defenses, the national command authorities, and local emergency responders 

understood and responded to the attack. 

In addition to describing the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack, our report 

will emphasize the most important policy recommendations. We want recommendations 

that can be implemented, work in the real world, and make a difference. And we will not 

go away the day after we release our report. We will work hard to explain our 

recommendations and win support for them. 

We do not bring our recommendations before you today. That work remains to be done. 

However, we are clear about some of the central policy questions we will need to 

address:

 Is the Intelligence Community organized properly to carry out the war on 

terrorism? Does the Director of Central Intelligence need greater authority over 

agencies and resources?

 Is our military properly organized to defend us at home as well as defeat our 

enemies abroad? 

 Do we have a government-wide, unified strategy for counterterrorism with the 

best balance of diplomacy, law enforcement, financial measures, military action, 

covert action, and public diplomacy? Are we meeting the challenge today and are 

we postured well for the future? 

 What are the best methods of identifying, tracking, and disrupting terrorist 

funding, and how effective have we been in getting cooperation from key foreign 

governments? 

 Which reforms in our immigration and border system since September 11 have 

made Americans more secure, and which hold the most promise for the future? 

 Has the FBI carried out enough reform and the right reforms? Or do we need a 

new domestic intelligence agency? 

 Do we have the proper policies, resource levels and risk management priorities to 

protect our aviation and other transportation systems? 
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 What measures have been taken to improve agency cooperation across federal, 

state, and local levels, how effective are they, and what more needs to be done to 

respond to future attacks? 

We certainly will take up additional questions as our work progresses, but we know that 

these key policy questions are before us.

LOOKING BACK—AND FORWARD 

The Commission is not choosing between examining the past or the future. We are doing 

both. We are looking backward in order to look forward. 

We will try to learn how and why America was attacked so that we can suggest ways to 

keep such a tragedy from happening again. You have our dedication to that effort. 

Thank you for your time and attention, and we would be pleased to respond to your 

questions.