If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JUAN CARLOS NEGRON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 12, 2020

v No. 350016

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

ASHUNTUS LADAWN WATTS, LC No. 18-109614-DC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this child custody action, defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s final custody and 

parenting time order granting plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of plaintiff and defendant’s 

children, JIN and JJN. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion 

for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and her motion for reconsideration because the 

trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under MCL 

722.1201(1). We disagree. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the summer of 2017, the parties were residing together in Alabama with JIN and JJN. 

The parties agreed to send the children to Michigan to live with their maternal grandmother, 

Valerie Owens, so that the children could attend school in Michigan for the 2017-2018 school 

year. The children moved into Owens’ home in July 2017. Plaintiff came to Michigan to visit the 

children and in September 2017, decided to stay in Michigan to live with Owens and help care for 

the children.

The children moved back to Alabama to live with defendant in July 2018. Plaintiff 

remained in Michigan. The children resided with defendant and her boyfriend, Steven Weaver in 

Alabama. Defendant admitted to Weaver in July 2018, that she hit JIN with a coat hanger, and 

Weaver noticed marks on JJN’s leg that also appeared to be caused by a coat hanger. On a separate 

occasion, Weaver returned from work and found that defendant left a loaded firearm on the coffee 

table while the children were unsupervised. In August 2018, Weaver contacted plaintiff and told 
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plaintiff that he feared for the children’s safety. On August 1, 2018, plaintiff filed a custody 

complaint and an ex parte motion in Wayne Circuit Court seeking emergency temporary custody 

of the children based upon allegations of abuse. The trial court granted plaintiff’s ex parte motion, 

and the children returned to Michigan to live with plaintiff in August 2018. 

On October 9, 2018, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(4), arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 722.1201(1) 

to make a custody determination. The trial court took defendant’s motion under advisement. No 

order was entered by that judge. The case was re-assigned from the original judicial officer to 

another judge who convened an evidentiary hearing regarding the contested issues of parenting 

time and custody in May 2019. The court determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under 

MCL 722.1201(1) because although the children were in Alabama at the time plaintiff filed the 

motion for custody, the majority of the children’s time during the six months prior to that filing 

was spent in Michigan. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary disposition was denied. 

The court granted plaintiff sole physical and legal custody of both children. A final order granting 

plaintiff custody was entered on June 7, 2019. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration that 

was denied on July 12, 2019.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and her motion for reconsideration because the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under MCL 722.1201(1). We

disagree. 

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. 

El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Summary 

disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(4) when the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the 

subject matter of a claim. Daystar Seller Fin, LLC v Hundley, 326 Mich App 31, 34; 931 NW2d 

15 (2018). “Whether a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law 

that is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, MCL 722.1101 et 

seq., a Michigan court has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: (1) 

Michigan is the home state of the child on the date of commencement of the proceeding, or was 

the home state of the child within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the 

child is absent from Michigan but a parent continues to live in Michigan, (2) a foreign court does 

not have jurisdiction by reason of the child’s residency, or the court of the home state has declined 

to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that Michigan is the more appropriate forum, and the child and 

his parents have a significant connection with Michigan other than mere physical presence, and 

substantial evidence is available in Michigan concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and 

personal relationships, (3) all courts having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction on 

the basis that Michigan is the more appropriate forum, or (4) no court of another state has 

jurisdiction. MCL 722.1201(1); Foster v Wolkowitz, 486 Mich 356, 364-365; 785 NW2d 59 

(2010). The physical presence of a party or child is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish 

jurisdiction. MCL 722.1201(1)(3); Foster, 486 Mich at 365.
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A home state is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting

as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a childcustody proceeding.” MCL 722.1102(g). At the evidentiary hearing, several witnesses testified

that the children lived in Michigan for a period of 12 consecutive months from July 2017 to July

2018. The children began living in Michigan with Owens in July 2017. During that period, Owens

was acting as a parent because she provided for all the children’s needs on a daily basis. Several

witnesses also testified that plaintiff lived in Michigan with the children for a period of 10

consecutive months from September 2017 to July 2018. Thus, the children lived with a parent,

the plaintiff, for at least six consecutive months immediately before the child custody proceeding

was commenced in August 2018. Accordingly, Michigan was the children’s home state under

MCL 722.1102(g). These uncontested facts also support the Michigan court’s jurisdiction under

MCL 722.1101(1). Michigan became the children’s home state in January 2018, more than six

months before plaintiff’s motion for custody was filed in August 2018. Further, while the children

were absent from Michigan when the proceeding was commenced in August 2018, plaintiff

remained in Michigan and continued to reside there. Accordingly, because Michigan was the

children’s home state within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, the children

were absent from Michigan when the proceeding commenced, and plaintiff continued to live in

Michigan, the trial court did not err when it determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to

make the initial child custody determination.

Defendant also asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this matter because

plaintiff’s ex parte motion for emergency custody was based upon a fabrication of the facts, and

plaintiff did not provide any supporting documents or information to prove that the children were

being abused when the prayer for ex parte relief was filed. We find this issue abandoned for want

of supporting legal analysis. “An appellant may not merely announce [her] position and leave it

to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor may [s]he give only cursory

treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Houghton ex rel Johnson v Keller,

256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “An

appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of [her] assertion of error constitutes

abandonment of the issue.” Id. at 339-340 (citation omitted). 

However, even assuming arguendo that defendant has not abandoned her claim, we find

that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter after considering plaintiff’s ex

parte motion for emergency custody. MCR 3.207(B)(1) provides:

Pending the entry of a temporary order, the court may enter an ex parte order if the 

court is satisfied by specific facts set forth in an affidavit or verified pleading that 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effect 

notice, or that notice itself will precipitate adverse action before an order can be 

issued.

“[A] pleading may be verified merely by the declaration that the statements in the pleading are 

true and accurate to the best of the signer’s information, knowledge and belief[.]” Miller v 

Rondeau, 174 Mich App 483, 487; 436 NW2d 393 (1988). When plaintiff filed the ex parte motion 

seeking emergency custody of his children, he alleged that the children were being emotionally, 

physically, and verbally abused. Plaintiff also averred, “I declare that the statements above are 

true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief,” and plaintiff signed the motion. 
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Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations of abuse constituted specific facts set forth in a verified 

pleading. Id. For this reason, the trial court properly considered plaintiff’s allegations in 

accordance with MCR 3.207(B). Thus, the trial court did not err when it granted plaintiff’s ex 

parte motion for emergency custody of the children. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto