LARGER UNITS:

Theater Army, Army Group,

Field Army

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CSI Historical Bibliography No. 4

LARGER UNITS: THEATER ARMY—ARMY GROUP—FIELD ARMY

by

LTC Gary L. Bounds

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Prepared for the Concept Development Directorate, Combined Arms Center

in support of

The Theater Army Concept Development Project

September 1984

85-1901

CONTENTS

Section Page

Preface . . 1

I. Books and Articles. . 2

II. Government Reports, Manuals, and Studies 10

PREFACE

In late 1983, the Concept Development Directorate (CDD) at the Combined

Arms Center queried the Combat Studies Institute (CSl) on the subject of

larger unit operations. In response, CSI agreed to prepare a three-part

study on larger units of which this annotated bibliography is a part. A

search of primary and secondary source material in the Combined Arms

Research Library (CARL) produced a substantial holding of subject-related

material. A follow-up search of the holdings of the Military History

Institute (MHl) revealed additional primary and secondary source material.

This bibliography includes holdings from both agencies.

The focus of this bibliography is on theater, army, army group, and the

field army during the 20th Century. It does not represent all the available

material at CARL or MHI. No classified material is listed in order to

ensure widespread distribution of the bibliography.

Some of the material, such as articles in Military Review and Armor

magazine, is available in public libraries in the United States. However,

the majority of the listings exist only in special holdings such as CARL

and/or MHI. In those instances the author has listed call numbers at the

end of the bibliographic citation. The abbreviations below are provided for

assistance.

CARL Combined Arms Research Library

Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center

Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA

MHI Military History Institute

Carlisle Barracks, PA

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Section I.

BOOK AND ARTICLES

Ash, Hughes L. , Col. "A Perspective of Larger Units.11 Military Review 38

(April 1958):51-64.

Colonel Ash, a CGSC faculty member in the Department of Larger Units and

Administrative Support (DLUAS), prepared this article to expand the CGSC

Commandant's series, "Keeping Pace with the Future.11 The article summarizes

the DLUAS Program of Instruction for the 1957-58 course. (DLUAS provided

instruction on the division, corps, and field army and included the

logistical systems and the theater administrative zone.) The article

discusses the instructional approaches used and the general content of the

1957-58 course. Although nuclear warfare considerations were voiced

throughout much of the instruction, the essential functions of the field

army remarked on are still valid. This article provides a quick overview,

without a detailed review of the 1957-58 Program of Instruction. Joint

operations and administrative functions are discussed as well.

Brown, Horace M., Lt. Col., and Lt. Col. Martin F. Massoglia. "Modern

Headquarters for the Field Army.11 Military Review 40 (April 1960):24-37.

Brown and Massoglia address a need to reduce the size of the field

army, independent corps, corps, division command posts, headquarters, and

rear echelon installations based on the nuclear threat of the period.

Although the article was specifically induced by the nuclear threat, the

data have applicability to todayfs battlefield and to operating with

personnel shortages.

Gate, Paul E., Maj. "Large Unit Operational Doctrine." Military Review 58

(December 1978):40-47.

This article was written shortly after the defensively oriented 1976

edition of FM 100-5 was published and discusses the doctrinal void that

existed at Echelons Above Division (EAD). The article correctly points out

the tactical nature of FM 100-5 and the lack of any doctrinal material for

EAD. The Corps manual was scheduled for 1979 release but, in reality, the

final draft was released in 1983, four years later. Field Manual 100-15

closed the gap somewhat, but a need for doctrinal material at the

operational level of war still exists, i.e., the field army.

Decker, Edward T. , 2d Lieut. "Retreat and Counter Stroke." Armor 72

(January-February 1963):8-12.

Decker uses the historical example of the Eastern Front battle/maneuver

of January-March 1943, during which time Manstein withdrew while under

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intense Soviet pressure and delivered a brilliant counterstrike, defeating a

Soviet force that outnumbered his forces by a ratio of 8:1. This article is

useful as an example of a field army level (operational art) defensive

operation. It illustrates positioning and the defensive counterstrike which

characterizes that level of war.

Dyke, Harold H., Maj. "The Armored Corps and Armored Army.11 Armor 62

(September-October 1953):34-36.

The article outlines organizations composed of armor-heavy forces which

were used to counter initial enemy threats in Europe. Mobile armor-heavy

thrusts are to be used to buy time for a buildup. Assuming that U.S. forces

need to concentrate greater mass, it points out that armor is the ideal

weapons system around which to build the force. The article also calls for

a stripped-down, highly mobile force that is flexible, has great shock

action and firepower, and is able to execute deep thrusts into the enemy's

vitals.

Eckhardt, George S., Ma j. Gen. Command and Control, 1950-1969. Vietnam

Studies. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1974.

This is one of a series of monographs prepared during the Vietnam

conflict describing U.S. military development. This work is an analytical

appraisal of the command and control structure that evolved during that

period. Major General Eckhardt commanded the 9th Division in combat and

served in a number of higher echelon commands. His service, though

interrupted, ranged from 1966 to 1971. The monograph covers, in detail, the

organization and function of the military structure in Vietnam. A number of

excellent charts show the organization of the Army in Vietnam at the various

levels.

Greenfield, Kent R., Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. The Organization

of Ground Combat Troops. The United States Army in World War II: The

Army Ground Forces. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military

History, United States Army, 1947.

This entry from the Center of Military History is, for the most part,

based on the AGF Studies prepared during and after World War II. This is

the best single source for information on Army ground forces for that

period. Initial chapters deal with early developments, such as the failure

to adopt the plans of 1921 and the mobilization of ground forces to support

the war. The most applicable portion of the book (for Echelons Above Corps)

is Palmer's contribution. Chapter 12 discusses the army and corps and

includes some of the rationale for their development. Palmer's contribution

is thorough and references are listed to guide the reader to the source

documents.

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Hepp, Leo. "The Twelfth Army in the Balkan Campaign of 1941." Military

Review 35. (February 1956):84-94. Translated and digested from an

article in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau (Germany), May 1955.

This article relates, from the German viewpoint, the German Twelfth

Armyfs campaign, under the command of Field Marshal List, to relieve

pressure on the Italians by invading Yugoslavia and Greece. Of interest is

Army-level operations from the viewpoint of the enemy, the army commander's

involvement with political negotiations for passage of forces through

"friendly countries11 (Bulgaria and Romania), and the political

considerations of enemy capitulation. The article focuses on a number of

potential, but little considered, areas that future U.S. field army

commanders may face, especially in a detached or contingency role away from

a developed theater.

Herberg, Harrison H.D., Col. "12th Army Group: Plans and Operations for the

Rhine Crossing and the Closing of the Ruhr Pocket." Military Review 32

(September 1951):26-34.

Herberg was a member of the 12th Army Group planning staff for the Ruhr

operation. This historical example covers the planning for and conduct of

the 12th AG's 1945 Rhine River crossing and campaign to invade Germany.

Upon rejection of Bradleyfs "Blueprint for Victory" plan, which would have

turned Patton's 3d Army loose, Eisenhower chose to support the British 21st

Army Group as the main effort, with U.S. 12th Army Group playing a

supporting role. After the 12th Army Groupfs crossing of the Rhine ahead of

the 21st Army Group (7 March 1945), the 12th Army Group planned operations

to help encircle the Ruhr, an operation in which 325,000 prisoners were

taken. The article articulates the phased planning of the Rhine Crossing

and many of the details for the Ruhr encirclement. This historical example

provides insight into the role of the army group, as well as the interaction

between army groups in a combined arena.

Hewes, James E. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and

Administration 1900-1963. Special Studies Series. Washington, DC:

Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975.

Hewes material gives the reader an insight into why many of the

organizational and administrative decisions occurred that affected the U.S.

Army during the 20th Century. Although concentrating at Headquarters,

Department of the Army level, the fallout from decisions at that level

prompted many of the changes at lower echelons. Of specific importance to

the understanding of larger unit organization was the influence of George C.

Marshall during the formulative years of the late 1930s and early 1940s.

This is a good secondary source and the biographical notes in the back of

the book present a significant listing of additional source material.

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Hoff, Stuart S. "Command Organization for an Overseas Theater of

Operations.11 Military Review 31 (August 1951): 10-20.

An excellent presentation from an organizational viewpoint of our

experience in World War II. This article provides a basis for thoughts on a

future theater of operations.

Metcalf, George T. , Col. "Trends in Organization of the Field Army.11 Armor

69 (September-October 1960):27-31.

This article was presented at the 6th Annual AUSA Conference a few days

after the Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR) concept was announced. It is a strong

statement by the CONARC Combat Development Group in support of a balanced,

highly mobile army. Salient trends were: smaller units from squad up; a

single, multiweaponed company with multipurpose, close support weapons that

include nuclear capability; wheeled or tracked armor capability;

semi-independent combined arms combat commands that would operate over the

same size areas as World War II divisions; functional logistics versus the

vertical basis of the past; heavy and medium division mix; increase in the

number of aircraft; and a streamlined staff (two functional elements). The

overall focus was a multicapacity force that could operate

semi-independently over broad areas for sustained periods of time.

Millet, John D. The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces. The

United States Army in World War II: The Army Service Forces.

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States

Army, 1954.

Prepared by an excellent scholar that served on the advisory staff that

organized the newly created Army Service Forces, this book presents material

essential to the understanding of the procurement and supply side of World

War II operations. Coverage in the text includes general information on the

Pershing Reorganization and War Department developments of the 1921-1941

period. Technical Services are addressed, but this is not of immediate

value to the researcher.

Palmer, Robert R., Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. The Procurement and

Training of Ground Combat Troops. The United States Army in World War

II: The Army Ground Forces. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of

Military History, United States Army, 1948.

Another of the U.S. Army l!Green Books,11 this work focuses on the

procurement and training of the ground forces during World War II. Detailed

material is presented on procurement of enlisted and officer personnel and

problems experienced in the placement and overseas movement of these

personnel. Of primary interest to the larger units researcher is the

material on the building and training of divisional and nondivisional units

and how they fit into the overall force structure.

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Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May

1941-September 1944. The United States Army in World War II: The

European Theater of Operation. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of

Military History, United States Army, 1953.

Volume I of Ruppenthal1 s work covers the period from May 1941 to

September 1944. The focus is on the logistical support in the European

Theater but includes North Africa and planning for Torch. This book

contains essential data enabling the force developer to understand what

transpired in the logistical arena during America's longest sustained

logistical exercise. This material, especially that focusing on the

Overlord preparation and execution, is essential to understanding the

logistical relationships at higher echelons (larger units). Rationale for

such major events as the consolidation of ETOUSA and SOS is also discussed.

This secondary source provides the reader with a basic working knowledge of

World War II logistics in the ETO.

Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support of the Armies. Volume

II; September 1944-May 1945. The United States Army in World War II:

The European Theater of Operation. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief

of Military History, United States Army, 1959.

Volume II covers the period from September 1944 to the end of the war in

May 1945. For the organizational planner, this volume is of less value, but

it rounds out the World War II experience. One may find the examination of

the problems resulting from the sustained operation to be of value. As this

was the United States1 most extensively organized and supplied theater, the

organization used to cope with these problems is of interest.

Seaman, Jonathan 0., Col. "Reduction of the Colmar Pocket: A 6th Army Group

Operation.11 Military Review 31 (October 1951):37-50.

This operation was conducted in southern France and was a combined

French-American operation with American forces under the French First Army,

which was, in turn, commanded by the American 6th Army Group. This classic

combined command operation illustrates the interworking of such command

relationships during both offensive and defensive operations. The author

makes a number of interesting points in his conclusion, e.g., justification

of certain major maneuvers, proper use of armor, etc., most of which reflect

favorably on 6th Army Group.

Stuckey, John D., Col. "Echelons Above Corps." Parameters 13 (December

1983):39-41.

This succinct article traces the evolution of Echelons Above Corps (EAC)

calling for the establishment of a command echelon above the corps. Colonel

Stuckey emphasizes the "joint" and "combined aspect" of EAC procedures and

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the role of the unified command. He strongly supports one or more echelons

above corps to enhance command and control capability of Army forces. To

fill the requirement, doctrine would have to be established, an organization

outlined, and JCS Pub 2 changed to reflect the new concepts.

"Sum and Substance11 Armor 60 (September-October 1951): 18-25.

The topic of the section in this issue was ''Mobility in the Field Army11

and Armor presents the views of the U.S. Army's army commanders on the

subject: Crittenberger of 1st Army; Hodges of 3d Army; Lutes of 4th Army;

Chamberlin of 5th Army; Swing of 6th Army; and Eddy of 7th Army (Europe).

The basic thrust of the comments includes the need for mobility in order to

fight future wars over widespread geographic areas. It states the need for

airborne forces, as a mobility asset for the field army, and armor forces,

for a mobile defensive striking force and as an exploitation force in the

offense. The article provides insight for the doctrine developer as to the

thoughts rff leading commanders that influenced army development.

U.S. Army Almanac. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

A section in the 1950 Army Almanac outlines some basic data on the World

War II army group and rationale for its establishment. It also discusses

the establishment, composition, and operation of the field army, including

an amended 26 October 1944 organizational and personnel strength chart.

This is a basic information source for quick reference.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. The Independent Corps and the

Corps in the Army. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1937. CARL M506 F3 A.73.

This booklet addresses the corps and provides insight on that unit as a

part of the army. Each section relates how the corps functions as part of

the army. This document is not particularly beneficial except for

understanding independent operations and the potential deployment of a field

army in such a role today.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. The Principles of Strategy for

an Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations. Fort

Leavenworth, KS, 1936. CARL - M501 D.73.

The service school issued a detailed consideration of the commander,

offensive maneuver, and defensive maneuver that is still pertinent to the

independent corps or army. The study outlines the principles which might

guide the commander of a separate force on an independent mission.

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U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. Tactical & Strategic Studies, A

Group of Armies. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1923. CARL M209 C.73 D43 7F9.

This is a historical overview with practical exercises. It also

contains the basic rationale as to the establishment of the Army Group. The

narrative covers the powers and limitations of army group commanders and the

organization and history of the development of the army group. This work is

a good overview of army group development, and the practical exercises have

value in that they reveal the nature of instruction on the subject in the

1920s.

Watson, S. J., Maj. "Field Armies of the United States, Russia, and

England.11 Military Review 30 (October 1950). Digested from an article

in Army Quarterly (Great"Britain), April 1950 87-89.

This is a short article by a British major that provides an

organizational chart of U.S. and British field armies followed by a chart

that compares British, American, and Soviet army elements, including

artillery, armor, engineers, small arms, signals, and vehicles. The article

reflects the status of the three nations as of mid-1950.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. The Macmillan

Company, New York, 1967.

In this standard reference on the United States Army, published in 1967,

Weigley addresses the Army as an institution, while considering its history

of campaigns and battles. Of particular interest are the chapters 17, 18,

and 19 that deal with the post-World War I and the World War II years.

Wilson, John B. "Army Readiness Planning, 1899-1917." Military Review 64

(July 84): 60-73.

Although this article addresses field armies, corps, and divisions, it

is primarily about the evolution of the division during the 1899-1917

period. In reference to large units, this overview interestingly describes

the establishment of the First Field Army in 1910 and the controversy over

abolishing the corps. This was a harbinger of many future attempts at

reorganization. The article provides background reading for understanding

the early stages of twentieth-century military reorganization in preparation

for war.

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Section II.

GOVERNMENT REPORTS, MANUALS AND STUDIES

Adams, Robert Hawkins. "Army Group Operations.11 Carlisle Barracks, PA:

U.S. Army War College, 1955. MHI AWC Z-A3.

This paper was prepared as background reading for a seminar to be

conducted by Lieutenant General Jenkins and Brigadier General Vittrup with

AWC students on 23 September 1955. In general, the paper discusses army

group, and specifically 6th Army Group, operations in the ETO during World

War II. Charts detail organization of the 6th Army Group as well as the

organizations of a Russian and a German army group.

Allied Forces. 21st Army Group. "High Command In War.11 By Field Marshal

Bernard Law Montgomery, June 1945. CARL N 15515.

This is one of a number of pamphlets prepared by Field Marshal

Montgomery setting forth his ideas on larger unit command and operations.

In this document Montgomery provides insight on the principles of war,

command and control, airborne operations, and staff operations. The

significance of this document is that a senior commander, speaking from

recent experience, recorded his thoughts on the subjects. The command

philosophy is good, details on chief of staff and staff operation and

interaction are beneficial, and his ideas on air power are still timely

today. This pamphlet, along wi»th the others by Montgomery, should be

reproduced and circulated among senior commanders.

Allied Forces. Supreme Headquarters. Memorandum, Eisenhower to Bradley:

"Organization of U.S. Forces on the Continent," 14 July 1944. MHI AWC

Doc D769.25 A61.

This memorandum from Eisenhower to Bradley directed Bradley, as 1st Army

commander, to assume responsibility for COMMZ activities pending the

establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) on

the Continent. In essence, Bradley assumed part of the role that he would

have as an army group commander.

Allied Forces. Supreme Headquarters. "Organization and Command of U.S.

Forces," 6 June 1944. MHI AWC Doc D769.25 A6.

This two-page letter outlined the three-phased establishment of SHAEF on

the Continent and was the basis for the establishment of the organizational

structure for the invasion of Europe. It depicts the duties of the 21st

Army Group commander and places control of all ground forces during the

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initial phases of Overlord under Montgomery. The letter also established

the Third U.S. Army, moved First Army to the continent to command all U.S.

ground forces, and established the COMMZ under the theater commander.

Almond, Edward M., Lt. Gen. (Ret.) "Command of Large Military Units."

Speech at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 February

1954. MHI AWC 53/54.

Lieutenant General Almond addresses the subject of command of larger

units with respect to four areas: leadership qualities, influence by

commanders on the outcome of military operations, historical examples, and

the principles of war. He ties these qualities together to show how they

unite to produce victory on the battlefield. This is more of a l!pep talk11

on command than a workbook on theater operations.

"Army Group Operations." Prepared by Committee no. 19, Course II, Part 3,

Study no. 5 (Operations), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,

20 February 1953. MHI AWC Log TS 53-2-18.

This study was prepared as part of a group requirement by AWC students.

It provides a historical picture of the evolution of the army group with

accompanying organizational charts. Specific comments include

recommendations to develop an army group TOE around the field army example

and for attaching elements specifically needed by the army group. In

addition, the committee supports a position to keep the army group as a part

of the organizational structure above corps. The study provides valuable

insight into the then current interpretation of larger unit organization.

Other student committees produced similar studies which are on file in the

MHI Archives.

Brom, J. R. "Narrative Description of an Analytical Theater Air-Ground

Warfare System." Rand research memorandum no. 1428. Santa Monica, CA:

Rand Corp., 10 February 1955. MHI RAND RM 1428.

This working paper, prepared for the USAF, is the nonmathematical

narrative of a computerized process outlined and published in a previous

Rand study entitled Analytic Formulation of a Theater Air-Ground Warfare

System (Rand study no. 1338). This early war gaming technique was to be

used to study a number of hypothetical theater wars or campaigns in a short

time. Study no. 1428 is divided into three parts: air operations, ground

operations, and logistical network operations. Although systems are more

complex today, a combination of Rand studies 1338 and 1428 may be of benefit

to war gamers and doctrine writers. This study provides data based on the

war gaming assumptions and conclusions.

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"Command of Large Military Units.11

 Committee reports prepared by Committees

21, 22, 23, and 24, Study no. 6, Course II, Part 3, U.S. Army War

College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 20 February 1953. MHI.

These committee reports, prepared by AWC students, study the

characteristics of command in large units. Report no. 21 presents a

philosophical approach to the problem-statement discussing national,

societal, and leadership influences on the exercise of command of larger

units. In report no. 22, the students use historical examples of leaders of

larger units from ancient to modern times to ascertain commonalities. No.

23 uses the organization of the Army group, theater army, and theater as the

basis for examining functions of each echelon. Annex 6 contains an

interesting chart reflecting the committee evaluation of the characteristics

required of a commander at various echelons and the students1 judgment as to

what degree the characteristics are deemed necessary. This annex will be

reproduced in the "Historical Perspective on Larger Units11 being done by

CSI. In report no. 24 the committee examines doctrine for command and

leadership, then gives short vignettes on various successful and

unsuccessful military leaders. One interesting characteristic listed for

the leader of larger units is political acumen, a rather unique

characteristic for a military leader, but nevertheless an essential one.

Bade, Lucian A. "Air Force and Army Relations in a Theater of Operations."

Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,

26 March 1965. MHI AWC IS.

Dade's student study addresses the relationship between Air Force and

Army units in the field. Through the use of historical examples, he

discusses the issue of by whom, and at what echelon, USAF assets should be

controlled. Basically this study concludes that USAF assets can best be

controlled by USAF personnel, and the Air Force/Army interface should take

place at the highest echelon that can best exploit the assets of both.

Ironically, much of Dade's arguments sound very similar to Air Force

positions on the recent exchanges between Army and Air Force personnel on

this same issue.

Devers, J. L., General. "Problems of Combined Planning." Conference

Address, U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 10 May 1948. MHI

AFSC 0-29.

Addressing the AFSC, General Dever commented on six major problems that

confront a theater commander in combined operations. Summarized they are:

lack of clarity and firmness of direction from the next higher combined

headquarters; conflicting political, economic, and military policies of each

allied power; differences in logistical capabilities, organizational

doctrine, and characteristics of each armed force; armament, training, and

tactical doctrine differences; personal intervention by members of the next

higher command; and the personalities of the senior commanders in the allied

powers. Devers discussed his personal experiences and gave a number of

examples illustrating the problems named. This source presents insight

based on personal experience.

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Hines, John Daniel. "Petroleum Supply to a Theater.11

 Address at the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 April

1949 MHI CGSC L-45.

This document addresses national policy levels and is not directly

applicable to the military force developer. ' Pages 25-32 of the address,

however, outline the procedures used for petroleum procurement in various

areas during World War II. Also, on page 28, the author begins the

discussion of four basic principles of military petroleum supply that

provide insight as to past wartime procedures at the theater level.

Holderness, Stephen W. , Col. "Responsibilities of High Command in Combat."

Individual study project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,

14 March 1955. MHI AWC IS.

This forty-seven-page document discusses the responsibilities of command

in larger units, including theater of operations, theater army forces, army

group, field army, and the corps. Using the army group and field army

commanders as a basis, Chapter 1 discusses the responsibilities of, and the

methods by which, these commanders influence battles. Other chapters cover

the importance of the staff, their interaction in the operational arena, and

the importance of clear, concise orders based on simple plans. Nuclear

aspects are briefly covered. Included in the study is a collection of

quotes by famous military and civilian personalities on leadership,

planning, command and control, operations, and logistics. Wiring diagrams

of a typical theater, army group, field army, and corps are in the

appendix.

Kapp, Ronald Augustine. "The Theater Army Personnel Replacement System in

Future War." Individual study project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, PA, 25 January 1960. MHI AWC IS 59/60.

Kapp discusses personnel replacement procedures for a theater of

operations. He advocates a centralized theater army replacement system and

touches on the value of wartime replacement by unit, as was practiced for

the peacetime Gyroscope operations (discontinued in 1957-58), in which units

were rotated to Europe to replace other units. He supports the theory of a

theater army replacement command as contained in the June 1955 FM 101-1

Staff Officers Field Manual, The G-l Manual.

Moenk, Jean R. A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United

States, 1935-1964. Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Branch, Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U.S.

Continental Army Command, December 1969. CARL N18668.125. DTIC.

CONARC initiated this study to record the Army's role in the planning,

conduct, and execution of large-scale exercises. The work covers the

-12-
history of maneuvers from the initial attempts in 1935 through the 1964

Desert Strike exercises. Areas addressed include exercise scope,

participating troops, exercise costs, training deficiencies, and command,

staff, and troop problems. The study also contains a number of maps,

charts, and tables depicting maneuver areas, organization, and structure.

The final chapter draws overall conclusions and relates lessons learned.

This should be read by exercise evaluators as many of the problems evident

then are valid today.

Ney, Virgil. Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967.

CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318. Fort Belvoir, VA: Prepared by Technical

Operations, Inc., Combat Operations Research Group, U.S. Army Combat

Developments Command, December 1967. DTIC AD 675414.

This study focuses on the theater level, depicting organizational

charts, background, and history. The rationale for the evolution of the

theater is explained. This study does not focus in detail on the theater

armyfs role in the overall picture. In reality, the 1963 and 1968 FM

100-15s were the first to do this adequately in a modern sense. Ney's study

terminated in 1967. Assuming a two year period of development, one can

understand the lack of specific data near the end years of this report.

"Operations and Intelligence Theater Command Relationship.11 Committee

Report prepared by Committee 14, Study no. 5, U.S. Army War College,

Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4 March 1955. MHI AWC L.

The student committee used World War II as a backdrop for discussing how

the theater operated in the past. In addition, the committee touched upon

the Far East Command, relating its uniqueness as an example of a unified

command that actually conducted combat operations. Part 2 is of less value,

as it discusses future implications with recommendations based on committee

findings. This is a good background document for command relationships.

Snyder, Otis W. "Evacuation of Casualties in a Theater of Operations."

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1954. MHI AWC

1953/54 FS.

This thirty-nine page document covers medical service planning to

include methods of transporting casualties (by air, motor, rail, and sea)

and their bearing on evacuation policy. The bibliography is useful to

Medical Service Corps planners.

U.S. Army. 3d Army. "Third Army Maneuvers, May 1940." CARL N2836.1.

This is a pre-World War II document describing the Sabine Area

(Louisiana) Maneuvers that pitted the XIV Corps against the IX Corps in a

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four-phase operation. The document outlines the requirements involved, but

there are no orders, plans, or SOPs in the packet.

U.S. Army. 7th Army. G-4 Staff Study: Field Army Logistics. 3 June 1959.

MHI.

Although focused on the atomic battlefield, this staff study provides

applicable data because it stresses the importance of mobility on the

battlefield—a viable concept of the 1980s and 1990s. The recommendation is

for all logistical assets to be within 100 miles of the forward edge of the

battlefield. Specific aspects of field army level logistical organization

are addressed. Although the staff study is technically dated, many points

are still valid.

U.S. Armed Forces Staff College. Medical Service in the Theater of

Operations and in Joint Overseas Expeditions, 1949-1950. Norfolk, VA,

nTcTMHI AFSC M.Sth OP JT O.OP 1949/50.

Prepared for instructional purposes at the AFSC, this 79-page booklet

outlines the scope and mission of medical service in a theater and includes

planning procedures for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Specialized

operations are also addressed, i.e., joint airborne expeditions and

amphibious expeditions. Heavy emphasis is placed on planning of joint

operations in the theater.

Army Combat Development Command: Institute of Combined Arms and Support.

"Echelons Above Division.lf(u) February 1970. CARL N-11162.44.

This study, done by the Institute of Combined Arms- and Support at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, developed operational and organizational concepts for

implementation in FY 72. Emphasis is on reducing the number of command

echelons above division and merging the theater army and the theater army

support command headquarters. The proposed concept envisions elimination of

the corps echelon and the design of a responsive field army organization to

replace the current three large corps, 12-division type field army. The

overall concept is depicted as the "current independent corps renamed a

field army.11 It is felt that the new organization would offer a number of

advantages, such as reduction in time required to pass material up and down

the chain, centralized responsibility for certain common, combat service

support functions, centralized responsibility for rear area protection, and

elimination of duplication of effort. Problems envisioned included: added

responsibility for mid-range planning and for direction of current tactical

operations, coordination of tactical air support, and implementation

problems.

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U.S. Army Combat Development Command. Final Report: "Prisoner of War

Operation in a Theater of Operations During the Period 1965-1970.fl Fort

Gordon, GA: U.S. Army Military Police Agency, June 1964. MH1 Army CDC

MPA 61-2.

This document was developed for use as interim doctrine for preparation

of FMs and TOEs for the 1965-70 period. Annex C specifically addresses POW

operations at theater level delineating responsibilities at brigade,

division, army corps, independent corps, and field army. The work appears

to be the basis of the doctrine that evolved during the late 1960s and

probably carried on into the 1970s. The small bibliography provides the

force developer with a starting point for the examination of theater POW

operations.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. "Theater Army Organization.11

CGSC project no. 56-7. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 July 1958. CARL

N17935.56A.

At the direction of the Commanding General, Continental Army Command,

this study was done by the Department of Larger Units at the Command and

General Staff College. The scope of the study includes the headquarters,

theater army; headquarters, army group; headquarters, theater army

logistical command; air defense; replacement and training command; civil

affairs; and major commands within the theater army logistical command. The

field army and its subordinate elements are not included. Part 1 of the

study sets forth broad concepts for theater Army forces. Part 2 discusses

organization of theater army forces, including the theater army, army group,

theater army logistical command, and numerous subordinate elements of each

group. Part 3 discusses operations in the theater administrative zone.

Letters from field agencies accompanying this document stated that many of

the innovative ideas had been removed from the study and that it reflected,

basically, current doctrine. Discussion of the effects of atomic weapons on

administrative support operations is covered. This study provides

interesting data on organizational concepts of the mid-1950s.

United States Army Europe (USAREUR), SOP U.S. Army Europe. "USAREUR Theater

Army Field Standing Operating Procedures.11

 September 1957. MHI.

Three-fourths of this two-inch thick, previously classified SOP for 7th

Army operation addresses logistics. The remainder covers administrative and

miscellaneous operational procedures of 7th Army. Researchers may find the

logistical SOPs of benefit for specific procedural functions. This

projection reflects the administrative and logistical nature of the theater

army headquarters.

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U.S. Army Field Forces, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Fort Monroe, VA, to

Combat Development Group, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Memorandum: "Organization, G-2 Section, Field Army.11

 4 November 1954.

CARL N 15073.19.

This 1954 memorandum was submitted to the Combat Development Group in

support of the preparation of new TOEs for the field army and corps

headquarters that were being prepared by CGSC. The six page memo details

the functions, positions, and branches necessary for G-2 support. The MI

battalion and MI Linguist Company are briefly discussed. A proposed

organization chart is attached to the memo.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Study no.l: "Origins of the Army Ground Forces:

General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-1942.lf Prepared by Lt.

Col. Kent Roberts Greenfield and Dr. Robert R. Palmer 1946. CARL N

15415-A.

This study was a postwar endeavor to record the evolution of the Army

Ground Forces while under the guidance of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair. The

work depicts the peacetime organization of the field forces and discusses

the transition to war. The field army is depicted in an organizational

chart. Much of this information is included in the Army Green Book, The

Organization of Ground Combat Troops.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Study no. 8: "Reorganization of Ground Troops for

Combat." Prepared by Dr. R. R. Palmer. 1946. CARL N-14792.

This study covers the formative years of 1942-1943 and specifically

reflects Lieutenant General McNairfs guiding philosophy on such areas as

experimental divisions, army and corps troops, theory of army and corps, and

the decision to abandon "Type Armies" and "Type Corps." The study also

addresses the Reduction Board's work in the streamlining and pooling of army

assets.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. General Board study no. 25: "Organization,

Functions, and Operations of G-3 Sections in Theater Headquarters, Army

Groups, Armies, Corps, and Divisions." CARL N12853.25.

Section 1 of this six section report describes the organization of G-3

sections in the ETO. Each of the additional five sections covers one of the

echelons listed in the title of the report.

U.S. Forces European Theater. General Board study no. 9: "Organization and

Functions of G-l Sections in Army Groups and Armies." CARL N 13007.9.

This is another of the studies produced by the General Board

commissioned immediately after World War II to record and analyze the

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strategy, tactics, and administration of U.S. forces in the ETO. The study

examines and reflects, via wiring diagrams, the organization of the 6th and

12th Army Groups and the G-l sections of the 1st, 7th, 9th and 15th field

armies. Analysis is presented and recommendations made.

U.S. Forces European Theater. General Board study no. 29: "Study of the

Administrative Functions of the Army Group Headquarters.11 CARL

N12861.29.

This report provides insight on the activation of the 1st, 6th, and 12th

army groups and discusses the administrative functions and presents

rec ommendat i ons.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Report no. 54. "Summer and Fall 1943." MHI

D731.1 N51.

Part 4 of this report relates information on corps and army based on

North Africa and Sicily operations. Referring to 7th Army notes on the

campaigns, it relates the composition of an army in general terms, i.e.,

minimum of two infantry corps of three divisions each, two armor divisions

to exploit breakthroughs and to stop counterattacks, horse cavalry, on a

ratio of a division for each army, and artillery, based on the tailored size

of the unit.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army - Tentative AGF." 28 March

1947. CARL N15413.2.

The Army Ground Force Headquarters, based on post World War II studies

and AGF staff recommendations, put together a "Type Field Army" concept for

planning and instructional purposes. This initial concept was circulated

for comments with a March 1948 suspense date. The study contains a proposed

organization with a breakdown of personnel and a basis for allocation in a

field army. Detailed discussion is presented in a 33-page narrative.

Organization is based on three corps of three infantry and one armor

divisions each. The total force was approximately 204,000 personnel in the

divisional- units coupled with approximately 155,000 additional support

personnel for a total structure of approximately 359,000 personnel. This

work is a good straw man that relates the organizational rationale for the

development of a Type Field Army.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army AGF." 24 November 1947. CARL

N15413.1.

This is an expanded version of the 28 March 1947 document. The report

was submitted to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for approval to be used as a

planning and instructional aid. The narrative discussion is expanded by

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about sixteen pages. Approximately 100 pages of annexes and tabs are

attached. These include comments received from the various schools, service

chiefs, and commanders. Tab B relates the data used in the original

analysis (average organizational figures for 1st, 3d, 7th and 9th armies as

of 1 April 1945). The thrust of the study is maximum support with minimum

personnel. This was prompted, in all likelihood, by postwar reduction in

the overall force structure. A basic question arises: how valid is World

War II support data considering the new field army concept based on newly

reorganized concepts for infantry and armor divisions?

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army." Office of Army Field Forces

Ltr dated 6 Apr 1949. CARL N15413.3A.

This letter was sent out prior to the release of the DA approved version

of the Type Field Army addressed above. Two key items in the document are,

first, the revised copies of the study would be out 1 July 1949, and,

second, all chiefs of technical and administrative services would not

arbitrarily be designated as commanders. Exceptions were artillery and

engineer chiefs who would be dual-hatted and command those elements under

their control. This applied to armies, corps, and divisions. The commander

of a unit that served as a staff officer on the next higher headquarters

would exercise command over all units attached or assigned to his unit

(i.e., a corps artillery commander would exercise command over all assigned

or attached corps artillery headquarters). All other special staff officers

would exercise such control over subordinates units as the commander

directed and only in the name of the commander concerned (i.e., the army

commander might direct the army signal officer to exercise operational

control over those signal units not assigned or attached to subordinate

units).

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army - Revised - 1949 AFF.lf 1 July

1949. CARL N15413.3.

This is the revised copy of the study released as an instructional aid

for the Type Field Army. It also contains CGSC's final comments on the

study. Only slight revisions appear in this copy as compared to earlier

copies. Of note is an August 1950 Army Field Forces letter stating that the

majority of the provisions of the study have been incorporated into the

existing FMs so material on the Type Field Army 1950 would not be

published.

U.S. Army Intelligence School. Instructor folder, subject: "Organization

and Mission of the Army Group." Fort Holabird, MD, April 1957. MHI

USAINS April 57.

This document was developed to serve as an instructional guide for

teaching the army group. Compiled in 1957, it contains an excellent summary

of the history of the army group. In part the data is the same as in the

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1923 Command and General Staff School publication, "Tactical and Strategic

Studies, A Group of Armies.11 This is a good source for an overview.

U.S. Army Intelligence School. Instructor folder, subject: "Organization

and Mission of Theater Army.11 Fort Holabird, MD, April 1958. MHI AINS

25794.

This USAIS instructor manual was used for instructional purposes at the

Intelligence School in 1958. It reflects the doctrinal views of FM 100-15

with Change 1 dated June 1950, the 1954 FM 100-10 with Change 1, FM 110-5

with Changes 1-6 (Joint Action Armed Forces) dated September 1951, and FM

101-5 dated November 1954. This seventeen page manual provides a general

overview and includes a number of wiring diagrams depicting schematic

organizations. It addresses in a general way such questions as: "When

would the Theater Army combat forces be organized into Army groups?"; "How

would they be commanded and administered?"; and "What units should be found

in the theater army reserve?"

U.S. Army Signal School. "Signal Operations, Theater of Operations." Fort

Monmouth, NJ, 1 January 1959. MHI SIGS ST 11 20-1.

This resident-course, instructional booklet states that the material is

applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare and addresses

organization, missions, and capabilities of signal assets at various

levels. Factors that affect that planning are addressed.

U.S. Army Transportation School. Reference text no. 84: "The

Transportation Service in a Theater of Operations." Fort Eustis, VA,

October 1965. MHI TS RT 84 1965.

This instructional text provides data on all echelons of the

transportation function in the theater, ie. , theater army, communications

zone, field army, corps, and combat division. Missions and functions are

addressed at each of these levels. A three-page glossary of terms is also

provided in Appendix II. A series of wiring diagrams clearly delineates the

organizational framework as well as command lines for each level of

transportation support.

U.S. War Department. Bureau of Public Relations. "The New Army of the

United States, 1941." MHI AWC Doc UA25 A298 1941/42.

Although this document deals with the U.S. Army as a whole, it points

out the status of forces at that time, i.e., in July 1939 a force of 188,000

officers and men was scattered over 130 locations. No large units existed,

units were at 50% strength, no corps/army troops were organized, and

equipment was obsolete. By July 1941, the Army had expanded to

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approximately 1,400,000 personnel. As expansion occurred, corps and field

army troops were brought on board from the reserve components. By August

1941, four field armies of nine corps and 29 divisions plus a four division

armor force had been established. The strength of the field army was to be

between 229,000 and 289,000 men. The source contains background data and

provides a better understanding of conditions in the U.S. Army prior to the

war and during mobilization.

U.S. War Department/Department of the Army. Field Manuals. (See notes

below).

A vital source of doctrinal data exists in archival holdings in the form

of U.S. Army Field Manuals (FM's). Review of these documents allows the

force developer to track the evolution of doctrine over a period of time.

Reflecting on this information, one can better understand the source of many

actions depicted in the doctrinal manuals. The Combined Arms Research

Library at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, and the Military History Institute at

Carlisle Barracks, PA, have copies of many of the manuals printed after

1920, and they are available to researchers.

Two early works are the 1914 Field Service Regulation with corrections

to 1917 and the 1924 Fort Leavenworth translation of the French manual on

Large Units. Bibliographical Sketches of these manuals are below.

U.S. War Department. Field Service Regulation, 1914. Corrected to 15 April

1917.

This FSR was the early edition of the all-encompassing "everything

book.11 It covers organization, operation, and administration. One small

section is allocated to the Field Army's organization.

France. Ministry of War. Provisional Instructions for the Tactical

Employment of Large Units. Translated from the French. Fort

Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1924. CARL M506 A

4.44.

After World War I, a French Army board headed by Marshal Petain

developed this work. The Commandant at Fort Leavenworth had the work

translated and it became the basis of future manuals on large unit

operations in the U.S. Army. In this manual, divisions, corps, and field

armies are depicted as large units. The manual includes a section on "how

to conduct operations11 as well as a short discussion of large unit

training. The French version appeared in 1921.

Other field manuals available include the following editions of FM 100-5

Operations; 1939, 1941, 1949, 1954 and 1962; FM 100-10 Administration;

1940,1954,1963; FM 100-15 Larger Units; 1930, 1942, 1950, 1963, 1968, 1973,

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and 1974 (test); FM 101-5 Staff Officers1

 Field Manual: 1928, 1932, 1940,

1954 and 1960; FM 101-10 Staff Officers1 Field Manual: Organization,

Technical and Logistical Data: 1941, 1943, 1944, 1945. CARL Archives.

In addition to the FMfs listed above, a number of TM's exist of which

two of the more applicable ones are depicted below:

U.S. War Department. TM 30-450. Handbook on German Military Forces. 17

December 1941. MHI UA712 H34 1941.

This manual was a War Department effort to provide U.S. military

agencies information on the German military machine. As an example, the

German World War II army group was not a fixed organization, but on the

western front, it usually consisted of two to four armies of two to five

corps each. Army groups were reinforced by combat troops from GHQ pools.

The structure presented allows comparison of German and U.S. force

structures.

U.S. War Department. TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces. 15

March 1945. MHI.

This is an updated version of the 1941 edition of TM 30-450. Of

interest in this manual is the German organization of higher echelons of

command. Charts depict army and staff organization. One chart shows German

staff officers at various levels of higher command as compared to U.S. Army

equivalents.

U.S. War Department. Office of the Chief of Field Artillery. Memorandum

for the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Organization of Corps and Army.11

Submitted by Maj. Gen. U. Birnie, U.S. Army Chief of Field Artillery.

MHI AWC Doc UA25 A58.

This memo contains the Chief of Field Artillery comments on a November

1935 Chief of Staff directive on the reorganization of the division and

higher units. The basic thrust was to reduce the division in size and send

the residue to higher levels. The corps was also to be streamlined (limited

administrative and supply functions) so as to make it capable of maneuvering

with the divisions. This was probably an early manifestation of the

lean-light maneuverable Army envisioned and propagated by McNair in the

early 1940s. Annex E shows a diagram of .a type field army of three

corps—emphasizing maximum mobility. Antitank cavalry would be attached, as

needed, from a General Headquarters reserve. The document has a variety of

other information on the duties of the Army Chief of Artillery.

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U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, to Commanding General,

Corps Areas and Departments. Subject letter: "Establishment of Field

Armies.11 9 August 1932. MHI File 52-55, "Comments upon Directive for 4

Army Organization (Tent).11

This action was initiated in 1932 under General MacArthurfs signature.

The file provides valuable insight on pre-war expansion within CONUS,

establishing a framework for general mobilization. The four field armies

were to be exercise and planning agencies, providing staff and commander

experience to take to the field. An attached letter suggested a

skeletonized army group should be established. Although MacArthur strongly

supported such an army group, it did not come about, due to manpower and

fiscal constraints.

Wendt, William R., Col., et al. "Organization and Command relationships

during World War II." Committee study, U.S. Armed Forces Staff College,

Norfolk, VA, 17 December 1951. MHI AFSC OCR WWII.

This study addresses the operational and administrative aspects of

interservice coordination, tracing the command lines used to effect

operations in World War II. The study is limited to U.S. forces only;

Allies are excluded due to the time and scope as stated at the start of the

study. Written by a four member committee consisting of USMC, USAF, USN,

and USA representatives, the six-chapter work addresses the Southwest

Pacific Area, Pacific Ocean Area, European Theater, and the Mediterranean

Theater. The scope of each chapter generally covers the mission,

organization, and operations to include command and staff. A number of

organizational charts are provided.

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