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[Senate Report 107-335]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                       Calendar No. 747

2d Session                                           Report 107-335
                                 SENATE
                                                     ======================================================================
 
                      NUCLEAR SECURITY ACT OF 2002

                                _______
                                

               November 12, 2002.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Jeffords, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [to accompany S. 1746]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was 
referred a bill (S. 1746) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to strengthen 
security at sensitive nuclear facilities, having considered the 
same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and 
recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                    General Statement and Background

    This bill amends current law\1\  to enhance safety and 
security at our nation's commercial nuclear facilities, and to 
protect against terrorist use of radiological materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\This legislation amends various sections of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.). It also amends Title II of the 
Energy Reorganzation Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5841 et seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The events of September 11, 2001, have required our nation 
to reevaluate the adequacy of our existing security measures. 
The attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. invalidate 
many of our past assumptions about the likelihood and method of 
terrorist attack. It is clear that we must take new measures to 
protect against those who would target American citizens and 
domestic infrastructure. We have a particular responsibility to 
ensure that our commercial nuclear resources, including our 
nuclear reactors and radioactive materials used for research, 
medical and industrial purposes, are not used as weapons of 
destruction against us.
    The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assigned to the Atomic Energy 
Commission responsibility for protecting public health and 
safety from the hazards of radiation produced through nuclear 
technology. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the 
Atomic Energy Commission and created a new agency, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), to take over its 
regulatory functions.
    The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has 
jurisdiction over the nonmilitary environmental regulation and 
control of atomic energy. This includes both legislative and 
oversight authority pertaining to the operations of the NRC.
    Among the responsibilities entrusted to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission are regulation of the nation's commercial 
nuclear power plants, along with most other civilian uses of 
radioactive materials. The mission of the NRC is to conduct an 
effective regulatory program that promotes the safe use of 
nuclear energy and materials, in a manner that protects the 
public health and safety and the human environment, and 
promotes the common defense and security.
    As stated in the Atomic Energy Act:

     . . . the development, use and control of atomic energy 
shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the 
general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount 
objective of making the maximum contribution to the common 
defense and security . . .\2\ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Atomic Energy Act of 1954, section 1a, 42 U.S.C. 2011a.

    As of December 2000, there were 104 commercial nuclear 
power reactors licensed to operate by the NRC in 31 States. 
Additionally, NRC has regulatory responsibility over seven fuel 
fabrication and production facilities; two gaseous diffusion 
uranium enrichment facilities; and 14 other facilities that 
possess significant quantities of special nuclear material 
(other than reactors) or process source material (other than 
uranium enrichment facilities). The NRC also administers 
approximately 5,000 licenses for medical, academic and 
industrial uses of nuclear materials; and has agreements under 
which States will administer approximately 16,000 additional 
such licenses.
    While prevention of accidents necessarily remains a key 
component of nuclear safety, the events of September 11th bring 
a new urgency to the need to deter and protect against attacks 
at our nation's nuclear facilities, and against attempted theft 
of radioactive materials.
    Following the events of September 11th, the NRC took 
immediate action to respond to heightened threat levels and 
concerns. It undertook intensive consultation with other 
Federal entities, including the FBI, the Office of Homeland 
Security, the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation 
Administration and others to evaluate general and specific 
threats to NRC licensed facilities, and to coordinate planning 
and responsive actions. The NRC has consulted with Governors 
regarding the deployment of State assets, including the 
National Guard. It has issued a series of Orders to licensees 
to enhance security at nuclear facilities. The NRC is also in 
the process of conducting what it describes as a comprehensive 
review of NRC policies and regulations relating to safeguards 
and security.
    Since September 11th, the committee has worked closely with 
the NRC to monitor changing circumstances and to oversee 
activities of the NRC and its licensees. The committee will 
continue to work with the agency to ensure that all actions 
necessary to protect the public are taken in a timely and 
thorough manner.

                     Objectives of the Legislation

    The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 is an important step in 
ensuring protection of the public against potential terrorist 
activities against commercial nuclear facilities or potential 
theft of nuclear materials. While the NRC has voluntarily 
undertaken a number of actions, these have been ad hoc 
responses to emergency events. The purpose of this legislation 
is to codify those actions necessary to protect against attack 
on our nation's nuclear reactors and against theft or terrorist 
use of radioactive materials, such as for so-called ``dirty 
bombs.''
    The legislation directs the NRC, in consultation with other 
Federal agencies having experience in matters related to 
national security, emergency preparedness, and radioactive 
response, to undertake a series of actions to upgrade security 
at nuclear power plants and to prevent the theft or terrorist 
use of sensitive radioactive materials. It also requires the 
NRC to update hiring and training standards for plant 
employees; conduct and document security response evaluations 
at each nuclear facility; and to ensure adequate emergency 
planning, evacuation, and other public safety measures in the 
event of a radiological release from a sensitive nuclear 
facility. It also directs the President to ensure coordinated 
Federal action to prevent a terrorist attack.
    The legislation gives clear and permanent direction to the 
NRC and its licensees, and will provide greater assurance that 
NRC will receive the funding it needs to fully implement 
essential security measures. The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 
will assure the American public that these nuclear facilities 
are as safe as they can reasonably be, and will clearly signal 
to would-be terrorists that our nuclear facilities are heavily 
protected, hardened structures that will make neither easy, nor 
desirable, targets.
    The committee has worked closely with the NRC since 
September 11th to develop this legislation. The committee has 
taken extensive testimony on the issues involved and has worked 
with industry, public interest groups, private security guards 
employed at nuclear facilities, and members of the public. This 
legislation represents a carefully considered, bipartisan 
response to the threat of U.S. nuclear resources being employed 
as weapons of destruction.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short Title
    This section provides that the Act may be cited as the 
``Nuclear Security Act of 2002.''
Sec. 2. Definitions
    This section amends section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 to provide definitions for ``Homeland Security Officer,'' 
``Private Security Force,'' and `` Sensitive Nuclear 
Facility.''
Sec. 3. Nuclear Facility Security
    This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act by 
adding a new section 170C, ``Protection of Sensitive Nuclear 
Facilities.''
    New subsection 170C(a) provides definitions for 
``Antiterrorism Team,'' ``Federal Security Coordinator,'' 
``Task Force,'' ``Threat,'' and ``Threat Level.''
    New subsection 170C(b) establishes a task force, chaired by 
the Chairman of the NRC, to examine and provide recommendations 
and findings regarding a broad spectrum of security issues 
surrounding nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC, and the use 
of nuclear materials licensed by the NRC.
    Paragraph (b)(2) specifies the membership of the task 
force. The agencies included in the task force are intended by 
the committee to include those which have expertise in 
intelligence; defense of air space and waterways; road and 
transportation access; radiological response; and emergency 
preparedness. The committee recognizes that not every one of 
these agencies will have expertise in all of the issues 
addressed in this subsection. The committee assumes that the 
Chairman of the NRC, as chairperson, will structure the task 
force so as to best utilize the expertise of each agency in 
relation to those issues within their respective jurisdiction. 
However, the committee also expects that the task force's 
report to Congress and the President will reflect and 
incorporate the views of all agencies on the task force, as 
appropriate, and if necessary should provide for minority or 
dissenting views.
    The committee is aware that, since September 11th, the NRC 
has been in close consultation with most, if not all of these 
agencies. The committee intends that the work of the task force 
established in this subsection shall build upon, rather than 
duplicate or interfere with, the process of consultation and 
coordination that the NRC has already begun with these and 
other agencies.
    Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the duties of the task force. 
The overall duty of the task force is to examine issues 
surrounding the protection of sensitive nuclear facilities 
against potential terrorist threats, and to report to the 
President and Congress with its findings and recommendations. 
This paragraph directs the task force to consult with other 
Federal, State and local agencies, stakeholders and members of 
the public, as appropriate, in making its examination.
    This paragraph sets out in detail the matters which the 
task force is to examine. These are: how threats to sensitive 
nuclear facilities should be classified; how Federal, State and 
local security efforts for protection of land, water, and 
ground access to sensitive nuclear facilities should be 
coordinated; the adequacy of existing emergency planning zones; 
the adequacy of Federal, State and local emergency planning and 
evacuation zones, and other measures to protect the public 
health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against a 
sensitive nuclear facility; the specific threats against which 
security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities shall be 
required to protect; creation of a system of threat levels 
appropriate to sensitive nuclear facilities; the development, 
implementation and revision of security plans for sensitive 
nuclear facilities; the establishment of an antiterrorism team; 
the hiring and training standards that should be applied to 
private security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities; how 
Federal resources should best be coordinated to expedite and 
improve the process of performing employee background checks; 
and the creation of a program to provide technical assistance 
and training for the National Guard, State law enforcement 
agencies, and local law enforcement agencies, to respond to 
threats against a sensitive nuclear facility.
    Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(III) requires the task force to 
examine the adequacy of all existing emergency planning zones 
in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear 
facility. The committee intends for this to be a full 
examination in light of experiences derived from September 
11th, including whether any planning zones should be facility-
specific to take into account population densities or special 
obstacles to successful emergency evacuation. The committee 
recognizes that concerns have been raised that existing 
emergency planning and evacuation zones may not be adequate and 
could require expansion, perhaps up to 50 miles. In light of 
the increased potential for a terrorist attack, it is expected 
that the task force will examine whether such a change is 
warranted.
    Subparagraph (b)(3)(i)(IV) requires the task force to 
evaluate the adequacy and coordination of Federal, State and 
local emergency planning, evacuation, and other measures to 
protect the public health and safety in the event of a 
terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility. The 
issues of specific interest to the committee include whether 
actual capabilities are adequate for: warning the public; 
facilitating movement of populations; transporting populations 
that are trapped without ground escape routes; providing 
shelter and medical care to those who have been relocated; 
providing radiation monitoring to both individuals and the 
environment; assuring the availability of properly trained 
medical providers and emergency responders; and adequately 
quarantining contaminated food and water supplies in the 
ingestion zone where radiation has been deposited.
    Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(V) requires the task force to 
examine the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must 
protect against to prevent acts of radiological sabotage and 
theft of special nuclear material. The committee intends that 
this constitute a thorough and comprehensive review of the 
types of threats that are appropriate for sensitive nuclear 
facilities to protect against in light of September 11th. The 
committee expects that this would include aerial, ground or 
water-based attacks. The committee also intends that the task 
force consider, as part of its examination, appropriate changes 
to sensitive nuclear facilities in order to protect against 
acts of radiological sabotage, including means to reduce the 
vulnerability of spent fuel storage and the consequences of a 
spent fuel fire.
    New subsection 170C(c) requires the NRC, based on and 
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task 
force, to promulgate regulations identifying the threats that 
sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against to prevent 
acts of radiological sabotage and the theft of special nuclear 
material. The committee is aware that the design basis threats 
are currently the NRC's primary regulatory framework for 
protecting against acts of sabotage at sensitive nuclear 
facilities. The committee therefore assumes that this section 
will result in a revision to the NRC regulations covering the 
design basis threats. However, it is the intent of this section 
that regulations promulgated by the NRC pursuant to this 
section will also address any other regulatory or programmatic 
changes as are necessary.
    Paragraph (c)(2) addresses the recognition by the committee 
that post-September 11th, the need may arise to reduce the 
amount of specific information contained in regulations open to 
public dissemination, which address the design basis threat or 
other security matters. For example, the NRC is considering 
revising current regulations to remove certain details that may 
now be considered safeguards information under section 147 of 
the Atomic Energy Act, and include such details, as revised, 
instead in Orders to licensees. This paragraph is intended to 
clarify that the requirements of section 147 continue to apply 
in full, including the need as appropriate under existing law 
to protect safeguards and other sensitive information.
    New subsection 170C(d) requires the NRC to promulgate 
regulations establishing a system for the determination of 
multiple threat levels to describe the threat conditions at 
sensitive nuclear facilities. It is the intent of the committee 
that in meeting this requirement the NRC will utilize the 
Homeland Security Advisory System; or such other information or 
guidance provided by the Office of Homeland Security, other 
Federal agencies or other entities; as appropriate.
    New subsection 170C(e) requires the NRC to review the 
security plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. It 
specifies the aspects of the review, requires the NRC to 
establish a priority schedule for conducting reviews, requires 
the NRC to report to the President and Congress, and requires 
the NRC to ensure that licensees upgrade security plans as 
necessary.
    New subsection 170C(f) requires the NRC to review the 
emergency response plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. 
It specifies the aspect of the review, requires the NRC to 
establish a priority schedule for conducting the reviews, 
requires the NRC to report to the President and Congress, and 
requires the NRC to ensure that licensees revise emergency 
response plans as necessary.
    Paragraph (f)(3) requires the NRC to establish a priority 
schedule for conducting reviews of emergency response plans 
based on the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive 
nuclear facilities and the proximity of sensitive nuclear 
facilities to large population areas. Consequently, the 
committee anticipates that facilities near major metropolitan 
areas such as New York City will be at the top of this priority 
schedule.
    New subsection 170C(g) requires the NRC to promulgate 
regulations establishing the circumstances under which the NRC 
shall request the President to deploy the Coast Guard or the 
antiterrorism team created under subsection 170C(h) to a 
sensitive nuclear facility, or provide for the protection of 
air space in the vicinity of a sensitive nuclear facility.
    New subsection 170C(h) requires the President to establish 
a Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team, the purpose of 
which shall be to provide protection for the perimeter of 
sensitive nuclear facilities against the threats identified 
under subsection (c), in coordination with other Federal, 
State, local, and private entities, as appropriate, and 
consistent with the security plan for each sensitive nuclear 
facility.
    The nature, structure and specific duties of this Federal 
team are left to the discretion of the President, with the 
caveat that they shall be based on and consistent with the 
findings and recommendations of the task force created under 
subsection 170C(b). This includes whether such ``team'' shall 
be regional or national in nature or shall be specific to each 
sensitive nuclear facility. The committee however intends that 
the team will consist of existing agency structures and 
personnel, operating under existing Federal authorities. The 
committee does not intend for the Nuclear Infrastructure 
Antiterrorism Team to be an NRC entity or under the control of 
the NRC.
    New subsection 170C(i) requires the President to establish 
a program to provide technical assistance and training for the 
National Guard and State and local law enforcement agencies in 
responding to threats against a sensitive nuclear facility. 
Such program may include grants to State and local governments.
    New subsection 170C(j) requires the NRC to review and 
upgrade hiring and training standards for employees at 
sensitive nuclear facilities, and to establish qualifications 
and procedures to ensure that no individual that presents a 
threat to national security is employed at a sensitive nuclear 
facility.
    New subsection 170C(k) requires the NRC to promulgate 
regulations for the hiring and training of Federal security 
coordinators, and to assign a Federal security coordinator at 
each sensitive nuclear facility. The subsection sets forth the 
duties of the Federal security coordinator.
    New subsection 170C(l) provides that nothing in the section 
shall be construed to supersede any existing law governing the 
disclosure of classified or safeguards information.
Sec. 4. Fingerprinting and Background Checks
    This section was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and added at the NRC's request. It amends Chapter 12 
of the Atomic Energy Act by adding specific requirements for 
the performance of fingerprinting, and criminal history and 
other background checks for persons having access to sensitive 
nuclear facilities.
Sec. 5. Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
    This section amends Title II of the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 by adding a new section 212, which establishes an 
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This new 
office is intended to codify the office created by the NRC 
following the events of September 11th.
    New subsections 212(a) and 212(b) provide definitions for 
the new section and establish the Office of Nuclear Security 
and Incident Response.
    New subsection 212(c) provides for the appointment of a 
Director to head the office, and specifies the duties of the 
Director.
    New subsection 212(d) establishes a Security Response Unit 
within the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to 
be headed by an Assistant Director for Security Response. The 
section details the functions of this unit, which shall include 
establishment of a mock terrorist team, and a program for 
security response evaluations to assess the ability of each 
sensitive nuclear facility to defend against threats in 
accordance with the facility security plan. It details elements 
of the security response evaluation program, including 
requiring the NRC to establish performance criteria for judging 
the security response evaluations. It is the assumption of the 
committee that the Assistant Director for Security Response 
would have primary responsibility for carrying out this 
program. This would include making recommendations as required 
under this paragraph on the timing, conduct and evaluation of 
the security response exercises, including the establishment of 
performance criteria for judging the evaluations.
    New subsection 212(e) requires the NRC, in coordination 
with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
to conduct emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability 
of Federal, State and local emergency response personnel to 
respond to a radiological emergency at the sensitive nuclear 
facility. It sets forth the factors which the emergency 
response exercises shall evaluate, requires revisions to 
emergency response plans as necessary, and requires periodic 
reports to the President and Congress on the results of the 
exercises and each revision to an emergency response plan.
    The committee notes that in section 3 of the Nuclear 
Security Act of 2002, under new subsection 170C(b)(3)(i)(III) 
of the Atomic Energy Act, above, the task force is required to 
examine the adequacy of all existing emergency planning zones. 
Section 3 of the Nuclear Security Act of 2002, under new 
subsection 170C(f)(1), also requires the Commission, based on 
and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the 
task force, to review the emergency response plans for each 
sensitive nuclear facility. New subsection 170C(f)(5) of the 
Act, above, requires the Commission to ensure that the licensee 
of each sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, the 
emergency response plan for the sensitive nuclear facility. 
Therefore, the committee intends that the emergency response 
exercises conducted by the Commission in coordination with FEMA 
under this new subsection 212(e) will reflect the 
determinations made by the task force under new subsection 
170C(b)(3)(i)(III).
    New subsection 212(f) provides that nothing in the section 
shall limit any authority of the Department of Energy relating 
to the safe operation of facilities under the jurisdiction of 
the Department.
Sec. 6. Carrying of Weapons by Licensee Employees
    This section amends Chapter 14 of Title I of the Atomic 
Energy Act.
    It permits the NRC to authorize guards at certain NRC-
licensed or certified facilities, and guards transporting 
special nuclear materials, to carry and use firearms to prevent 
sabotage of such facilities or theft of nuclear explosive 
material. The section also authorizes the NRC to issue 
regulations shielding guards against State prosecution for 
discharge of firearms in the performance of official duties. 
These changes would enhance national security by providing NRC 
facilities and transport with authority equivalent to the 
authority currently possessed by the Department of Energy for 
the protection of its nuclear facilities and transport.
    This provision was included at the request of the NRC, and 
is similar to language that passed this committee and the 
Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627
Sec. 7. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security
    This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 to add a new section 170E at the end.
    New subsection 170E(a) contains definitions. Paragraph 
170E(a)(1) defines ``sensitive radioactive material.'' This 
language is broadly written to comprise material which could be 
used by a terrorist in a radiological dispersal device, or 
material that in any other way could threaten the health or 
safety of the public due to its radiological properties. It is 
the committee's intent primarily to improve protections on 
those radioactive materials that are in common industrial, 
medical, or research applications. The committee specifically 
urges the task force to carefully examine protections on source 
material, byproduct material or special nuclear material which 
is stored in a sealed container to prevent leakage (otherwise 
known as ``sealed sources'') and any other types of radioactive 
material that NRC license holders have reported lost or stolen. 
The committee also specifically encourages the task force to 
consider radioactive materials that are not currently regulated 
by the United States for their radioactive properties, such as 
naturally occurring or accelerator produced radioactive 
materials (NORM).
    New subsection 170E(b) expands the duties of the task force 
established under new section 170C(b), above, to include 
evaluation of sensitive radiological material. It delineates 
the additional matters the task force should consider. The 
committee is aware that there are a broad range of radioactive 
materials in public use and not all present a significant 
threat to public health. As such, this subsection requires the 
task force to identify and categorize those materials that 
should be classified as sensitive radioactive material. The 
committee expects that the development of improved security 
recommendations under this section will be based on this 
categorization, providing the greatest security to those 
categories of sensitive radiological material which present the 
greatest threat. In developing recommendations for methods to 
ensure the return and proper disposal of sensitive radiological 
materials required in paragraph 170E(b)(F), the task force may 
consider financial incentives for achieving this goal.
    New subsection 170E(c) requires periodic reports to the 
President and Congress describing administrative and 
legislative actions recommended by the task force.
    New subsection 170E(d) requires the NRC to take such 
actions as are appropriate to revise the system for licensing 
radioactive materials and to ensure that States have entered 
into appropriate agreements establishing compatible programs.
Sec. 8. Unauthorized Introduction of Dangerous Weapons
    This section expands section 229a of the Atomic Energy Act 
to include facilities, installations or real property subject 
to the licensing or certification authority of the NRC.
    This would allow NRC to apply the provisions of section 
229a to NRC licensed or certified activities, thereby allowing 
the NRC to prohibit a person who has not obtained prior 
authorization from carrying, transporting, or otherwise 
introducing or causing to be introduced any weapon, explosive, 
or other dangerous instrumentality into any facility, 
installation or real property regulated or subject to 
certification by the NRC. This provision was included at the 
request of the NRC, and is similar to language that passed this 
committee and the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.
Sec. 9. Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel
    This section amends section 236a of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 to expand existing Federal criminal sanctions for 
sabotage or attempted sabotage of production or utilization 
facilities to include sabotage or attempted sabotage during the 
construction stage of those facilities, if the damage could 
affect public health and safety during facility operation. This 
section also expands the sanctions to include sabotage or 
attempted sabotage of operating fuel fabrication facilities. 
This provision was included at the request of the NRC, and is 
similar to language that was reported from the committee and 
passed the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.
Sec. 10. Evaluation of Adequacy of Enforcement Provisions
    This section requires the Attorney General and the NRC to 
submit to Congress a report that assesses the adequacy of the 
criminal enforcement provisions in Chapter 18 of the Atomic 
Energy Act.
Sec. 11. Protection of Whistleblowers
    This section amends section 212(a) of the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 to extend whistleblower protection 
to NRC contractors and subcontractors.
Sec. 12. Technical and Conforming Amendment
    This section provides technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 13. Authorization of Appropriations
    This section provides that there are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act.

                          Legislative History

    On November 1, 2001, the committee held an oversight 
hearing on nuclear security. On November 29, 2001, Senators 
Reid, Clinton, Lieberman, Jeffords and Torricelli introduced S. 
1746. It was referred to the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works. The committee held a hearing on June 5, 2002. The 
committee held a classified hearing on June 20, 2002. On July 
25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. The committee 
voted to report the bill to the Senate with amendments. 
Sections 6, 8 and 9 of the bill as agreed to are similar to 
provisions reported by the committee and passed the Senate in 
S. 1626 in the 106th Congress.

                                Hearings

    On November 1, 2001, the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works recieved testimony concerning infrastructure 
security, recieving testimony from Michael Brown, Deputy 
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Joe Moravec, 
Commissioner, Public Building Service, General Services 
Administration; Dr. David Sampson, Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Development, Economic Development Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce; Dr. Richard Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission; Herbert Mitchell, Associate 
Administrator for Disaster Assistance, Small Business 
Administration; and Marianne L. Horinko, Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 
Environmental Protection Agency.
    On June 5, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works held a hearing to receive testimony on S. 1586, a bill to 
amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the carrying 
of firearms by employees of licensees, and for other purposes, 
and S. 1746, a bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to 
strengthen security at sensitive nuclear facilities. For this 
hearing the witnesses were Hon. Edward J. Markey, U.S. 
Representative from Massaschusetts; Hon. Richard A. Meserve, 
Chairman, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; David 
Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, Washington, DC; Jack Skolds, Chief Nuclear Officer, 
Excelon Corp., Washington, DC; Danielle Brian, Executive 
Director, Project on Government Oversight, Washington, DC; 
Donna J. Hastie, Emergency Planning Consultant, Marrietta, GA; 
and Irwin Redlener, M.D., F.A.A.P., President, Children's 
Health Fund, New York, NY.
    On June 20, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works held a classified hearing, receiving testimony from 
Federal Government witnesses.

                             Rollcall Votes

    On July 25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. 
The bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute offered 
by Senators Reid, Smith, Jeffords, Inhofe, Clinton, and 
Lieberman was adopted for purpose of further amendment. An 
amendment offered by Senator Smith, two amendments offered by 
Senator Clinton, and an amendment offered by Senator Reid were 
agreed to by voice vote. The committee voted by voice vote to 
report the bill, as amended, to the Senate.

                      Regulatory Impact Statement

    In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee finds that S. 1746 
does not create any significant additional regulatory burdens, 
nor will it cause any adverse impact on the personal privacy of 
individuals.

                          Mandates Assessment

    In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(P.L. 104-4), the committee finds that the bill may require 
additional costs to the NRC, part of which may be passed along 
to ratepayers under existing law. The committee believes that 
such costs have been kept to the minimum necessary to ensure 
adequate security at sensitive nuclear facilities and adequate 
protection of sensitive nuclear materials. There will not be 
significant additional costs to State and local governments.

                          Cost of Legislation

    Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the 
reported bill, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be 
included in the report. That statement follows:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, October 25, 2002.

Hon. James M. Jeffords, Chairman,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1746, the Nuclear 
Security Act of 2002.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Lisa Cash 
Driskill, who can be reached at 226-2860.
            Sincerely,
                                            Dan L. Crippen.
                              ----------                              

Nuclear Security Act of 2002, as ordered reported by the Senate 
        Committee on Environment and Public Works on July 25, 2002
Summary
    S. 1746 would establish several new security programs for 
the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Programs would include 
Federal security coordinators for designated nuclear 
facilities, antiterrorism teams to protect nuclear facilities, 
mock terrorism drills, new rules on security compliance at 
nuclear facilities, and a program to classify, track, and 
monitor radioactive sources throughout the country.
    Based on information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a 
gross cost of $486 million over the 2003-2007 period. However, 
the NRC has the authority to offset a substantial portion of 
its annual appropriation with fees charged to the facilities it 
regulates. Accounting for such collections, CBO estimates that 
implementing S. 1746 would result in a net cost of $126 million 
over the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation of the 
necessary amounts.
    The bill also would require all employees at nuclear 
facilities to undergo background checks. Because the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) would charge the applicant a fee to offset the 
cost of background checks required by the bill, we estimate 
that this provision would have a negligible impact on direct 
spending.
    In addition, S. 1746 would establish new criminal penalties 
for the sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste 
storage facilities and for noncompliance with certain employee 
background checks that would be established by the bill. CBO 
estimates that these penalties would increase revenues and 
subsequent direct spending of those collections by less than 
$500,000 a year.
    S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-
sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA) by:

      Effectively increasing the annual fees collected 
from NRC licensees;
      Requiring new security standards and procedures 
at sensitive nuclear facilities; and
      Expanding the system for licensing sensitive 
radioactive materials.

    Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future 
actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not 
available, CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of 
all mandates contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that 
the costs to the private sector would likely exceed the annual 
threshold for private-sector mandates ($115 million in 2002, 
adjusted annually for inflation) in fiscal year 2004, primarily 
because of the increase in annual fees imposed on NRC 
licensees. CBO expects that the aggregate costs to public 
entities of all mandates would not exceed the intergovernmental 
threshold ($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
Estimated Cost to the Federal Government
    The estimated budgetary impact of S. 1746 is shown in the 
following table. The costs of this legislation fall within 
budget function 270 (energy) and 750 (administration of 
justice).
Basis of Estimate
    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be 
enacted by the end of calender year 2002, that the necessary 
amounts will be appropriated for each year, and that outlays 
will occur at historical rates for similar programs.
Spending Subject to Appropriation
    S. 1746 would establish several new security programs to be 
implemented at the nation's sensitive nuclear facilities, 
including creating antiterrorism teams, running mock terrorism 
drills, and establishing Federal security coordinators at each 
site. For this estimate, we assume that 84 commercial nuclear 
sites in 35 States would meet the bill's definition of a 
``sensitive nuclear facility'' and thus would be subject to its 
requirements. In addition, the bill would require the 
registration and tracking of radioactive material, several new 
Federal rules concerning nuclear security, and it would 
establish a training and grant program for the National Guard 
and State and local law enforcement personnel.

                                     By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       2003     2004     2005     2006     2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION\1\
Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................       73       88       64       64       64
    Estimated Outlays..............................................       58       85       69       64       64

National Guard and Law Enforcement Training:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................       11       17       14       14       14
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        9       16       15       14       14
Sensitive Radioactive Materials:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................        9       17       10        8        8
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        7       15       11        8        8
Security and Emergency Response Plan Review:.......................
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................        8        9        1        1        1
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        6        9        3        1        1
Security Rulemakings:..............................................
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................        3        3        1        1        1
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        2        3        1        1        1
Estimated Gross Authorizations for the NRC under S. 1746:..........
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................      104      134       90       88       88
    Estimated Outlays..............................................       83      128       99       88       88
Offsetting Collections\2\..........................................
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................      -98     -124      -81      -29      -29
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      -98     -124      -81      -29      -29
Net New NRC Spending Under S. 1746:
    Estimated Authorization Level\1\...............................        6       11        9       59       59
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      -15        5       18       59       59
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.
\1\ A full-year appropriation has not yet been enacted for the NRC; in 2002, the agency received a gross
  appropriation of $553 million, and offsetting collections totaled $474 million.
\2\Collections are authorized at declining percentages of the NRC's budget: 94 percent in 2003, 92 percent in
  2004, 90 percent in 2005, and 33 percent after 2005.

    Based on information from the NRC and other Federal 
agencies, CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a 
gross cost of $486 million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming 
appropriation of the necessary amounts. However, the NRC has 
the authority to offset a substantial portion of its annual 
appropriation with fees charged to facilities it regulates. 
After accounting for such collections, we estimate that the net 
cost of implementing S. 1746 would be $126 million over the 
2003-2007 period.
    Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities. S. 1746 
would authorize funding for Federal antiterrorism teams, mock 
terrorism teams, and security coordinators for the nuclear 
facilities covered by the bill. We estimate that implementing 
these three programs would have a gross cost of $340 million 
over the 2003-2007 period for additional staff, equipment, 
training, and consulting.
    Antiterrorism Teams. Although the bill does not specify the 
scope of the antiterrorism teams, for this estimate, we assume 
the NRC would establish 16 antiterrorism teams of 10 people 
each (four teams for each of NRC's four regions). Those teams 
would be trained in local topography, geography, nuclear 
infrastructure, and security tactics and would be available to 
respond to security incidents 24 hours a day. Based on 
information from the NRC, we estimate that it could cost as 
much as $500,000 per person, initially, to provide such 
specialized training, equipment, and staff support. We expect 
that annual costs would be reduced by half that amount once the 
program is established. CBO estimates that implementing this 
provision would have a gross cost of $232 million over the 
2003-2007 period.
    Federal Security Coordinators. S. 1746 also would require 
that the NRC hire and train security coordinators to be 
stationed at each of the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities that 
would be covered by the bill. They would coordinate all 
security programs at the nuclear facility. We expect that it 
would take NRC 1 year to issue rules and establish this new 
program. We assume that the agency would need 110 additional 
people to staff and manage the Federal security coordinator 
program at a cost of $11 million a year beginning in 2004 and 
that NRC would spend an additional $3 million a year on 
training and equipment. CBO estimates that implementing this 
provision would cost $54 million over the 2003-2007 period.
    Mock Terrorism Teams. Under S. 1746, mock terrorism teams 
would be deployed to perform security drills at each nuclear 
facility every 3 years. We estimate that the NRC would 
establish a team of 30 people to conduct such drills at a cost 
of about $3 million a year. In addition, we estimate the NRC 
would need $10 million for support personnel, equipment, and 
travel over the 2003-2004 period, and that the initial cost for 
training and equipment would drop by about half after the teams 
are established. We also would expect the NRC to contract with 
private security firms or the Department of Defense for staff 
support and assistance in designing the drills at a cost of 
about $5 million per year. We estimate that this program would 
cost $54 million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming 
appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    National Guard and Law Enforcement Training. S. 1746 would 
require the President to establish a program to provide 
technical assistance and training to the National Guard and 
State and local law enforcement agencies to respond to threats 
against the nation's nuclear facilities. Under this program, we 
expect that the NRC would provide training at each of the 
covered 84 nuclear facilities four times a year at a cost of 
about $120,000 a year (or a total cost of about $10 million per 
year). In addition, we expect that the 35 States with sensitive 
nuclear facilities would receive grants of $100,000 per year 
for technical assistance and training. Assuming appropriation 
of the necessary amounts, we estimate that implementing these 
training and assistance programs would cost on average $14 
million a year.
    Sensitive Radioactive Material. S. 1746 would require the 
NRC to establish a program to register, track, and control 
sensitive radioactive material. Currently, the NRC spends about 
$1 million per year to regulate certain radioactive material 
used for industrial purposes. S. 1746 would significantly 
expand that program to include a wide variety of sources and 
uses of radioactive material.
    Based on information from the NRC we estimate this program 
would cost an average of $10 million per year for evaluating, 
classifying, and tracking of such materials. Funds would be 
used for establishing new computer programs, hiring of 
additional staff, and auditing sites with radioactive 
materials. Overall, we estimate that implementation of this 
program would cost about $50 million over the 2003-2007 period.
    Security and Emergency Response Plan Review. S. 1746 would 
require the NRC to review the emergency response plans for each 
of the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities in the United States 
within 9 months of enactment and their security plans within 21 
months of enactment. In addition, the bill would require the 
NRC to conduct emergency response exercises every 2 years at 
each facility. After each review and exercise, the NRC would 
submit a report to the Congress and work with the facilities on 
any necessary improvements to plans and procedures. Based on 
information from the NRC, we estimate those reviews would 
require 60 additional staff at a cost of about $6 million in 
2003, and that costs would drop significantly in the following 
years as the reviews and follow-up inspections are completed. 
We estimate that the agency would need about $3 million in 2003 
and 2004 for travel and contract services to accomplish the 
reviews in the timeframe established in the bill. We estimate 
emergency response exercises would cost about $1 million a 
year. In total, we estimate that implementing the security and 
emergency response plan reviews required by the bill would cost 
$20 million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation 
of the necessary amounts.
    Security Rulemakings. S. 1746 would require the NRC to 
establish several new rules to enhance security at the nation's 
nuclear facilities. The rulemakings would cover threat levels 
and threats that facilities would be required to defend, the 
coordination of Federal agencies during a nuclear threat or 
attack, background checks for employees at nuclear facilities, 
and weapons policies for security personnel at nuclear 
facilities. We estimate that the NRC would need an additional 
25 people at a cost of about $2.5 million a year to complete 
these rulemakings over the 2003-2004 period. We expect that 
staff needs would diminish as the rulemakings are completed, 
thus reducing the cost to about $1 million per year. CBO 
estimates all of these rulemakings would cost $8 million over 
the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary 
amounts.
Direct Spending and Revenues
    CBO estimates that enacting S. 1746 would increase both 
offsetting receipts and direct spending of those receipts by 
$2.3 million in 2003 for background checks on nuclear security 
personnel required by the bill; thus, the net budgetary impact 
of this requirement would be negligible. In addition, it would 
establish criminal penalties for noncompliance with such 
background checks and penalties for the sabotage of nuclear 
facilities. We estimate that any increase in penalties would be 
less than $500,000 per year.
    Fingerprinting and Background Checks. S. 1746 would require 
that all employees of covered nuclear facilities undergo 
fingerprinting and background checks within 60 days of passage 
of the bill. Such checks would be performed by the Department 
of Justice. Based on information from DOJ, we expect most 
checks would cost about $22 per person. On average, about 1,250 
people work at each of the 84 covered facilities. Because DOJ 
would charge a fee of $22 for each person that applies for a 
background check, we estimate that the agency would collect 
about $2.3 million in 2003. DOJ is authorized to spend such 
fees without further appropriation, and we expect that most of 
the money would be spent in the year in which it is collected. 
Thus, the net impact on DOJ spending would be negligible.
    Penalties. S. 1746 would strengthen the criminal penalties 
for the sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste 
storage facilities and for noncompliance with the background 
checks established by the bill. CBO estimates that enacting 
these new penalties would increase governmental receipts by 
less than $500,000 a year. Any criminal fines collected would 
be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and spent in subsequent 
years. Any resulting change in direct spending from the fund 
also would amount to less than $500,000 annually.
Intergovernmental and Private-Sector Impact
    S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA by:

      Effectively increasing the annual fees collected 
from NRC licensees;
      Requiring new security standards and procedures 
at sensitive nuclear facilities; and
      Expanding the system for licensing sensitive 
radioactive materials.

    Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future 
actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not 
available, CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of 
all mandates contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that 
the costs to public entities would not exceed the 
intergovernmental threshold ($58 million in 2002, adjusted 
annually for inflation), while the cost to the private sector 
would likely exceed the annual threshold for private-sector 
mandates ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually for 
inflation) in fiscal year 2004.
Increasing Annual Fees for NRC Licensees
    Under current law, the NRC collects annual fees from its 
licensees, both public and private, to offset a major portion 
of its general fund appropriation. Because S. 1746 would 
require the NRC to engage in a variety of initiatives to 
augment security at licensed facilities, CBO expects that 
additional fees would be collected from the licensees to cover 
the cost of such initiatives. The duty to pay those fee 
increases would be considered both a private-sector and an 
intergovernmental mandate under UMRA, as it results in an 
increase in the cost of an existing mandate. Assuming an 
appropriation level of amounts necessary to cover the costs of 
the NRC's security initiatives starting in 2003, CBO estimates 
that the increment in fees would total approximately $98 
million in fiscal year 2003, $124 million in fiscal year 2004, 
$81 million in 2005, and drop to around $29 million in 
subsequent fiscal years. Because less than 5 percent of nuclear 
facilities are publicly owned, CBO estimates that the increase 
borne by public nuclear facilities would not be significant.
Security Procedures at Sensitive Nuclear Facilities
    S. 1746 would establish new security procedures for nuclear 
facilities in order to prevent acts of radiological sabotage 
and the theft of special nuclear material. Accordingly, the 
bill would require the NRC to promulgate rules revising:

      The threats sensitive nuclear facilities must 
protect against;
      The threat levels at which each facility must 
operate; and
      The hiring and training standards for employees 
of the facilities.

    Compliance with each of the rules would constitute a 
mandate as defined by UMRA. The extent of those mandates would 
be based upon future actions of the NRC, which would track the 
recommendations of an interagency task force on nuclear 
infrastructure security. At this time, the NRC could not give 
any indication as to the scope of the rules to be issued and 
accordingly, CBO cannot determine the cost of compliance.
    In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
issued interim security measures for sensitive nuclear 
facilities, while further analysis regarding future regulatory 
action was undertaken. The interim measures, which included 
determinations as to the types of threats nuclear facilities 
must protect against, became binding prior to, or in August of 
this year for the vast majority of sensitive nuclear 
facilities. In addition, the NRC issued voluntary guidelines on 
the threat levels at which facilities could operate, which 
parallel the threat levels established by the Office of 
Homeland Security. The NRC indicates that most, if not all, NRC 
licensees adopted those guidelines. According to 
representatives of the nuclear industry, sensitive nuclear 
facilities have already spent about $90 million to upgrade 
security to comply with the NRC's interim security measures. To 
the extent that future security and threat level regulations 
mirror those that are currently in place, sensitive nuclear 
facilities would not bear substantial additional costs 
associated with the mandate.
    In addition, S. 1746 would require that employees of 
sensitive nuclear facilities undergo more extensive background 
investigations that would include checks of fingerprint records 
located in the National Crime Information Center data sets, the 
United States National Central Bureau of Interpol, the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check system, and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service data sets. Employees are currently 
fingerprinted for an FBI criminal history check. According to 
the Department of Justice, the incremental cost of the expanded 
check would be approximately $22, and based upon the number of 
individuals employed by the industry, CBO estimates that the 
cost that would be borne directly by licensees would be roughly 
$2.3 million in 2003.
Licensing System for Sensitive Nuclear Materials
    The bill would require the NRC to revise and expand the 
system for licensing certain radioactive materials, such as 
those used in industrial, medical, and research applications, 
based on the recommendations of an interagency task force. 
Information from the NRC suggests that some regulatory changes 
for sensitive radioactive material are already underway and 
that the agency does not intend to impose a heavy burden on the 
entities affected. Consequently, CBO expects that the costs 
relating to this mandate would not be significant.

Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Lisa Cash Driskill; Impact 
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Angela Sietz; Impact 
on the Private Sector: Lauren Marks.

Estimate Approved By: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.
   Additional Views of Senators Smith, Inhofe, Voinovich, and Chafee

    We appreciate the leadership of the chairman to report out 
a bipartisan bill aimed at ensuring our nations nuclear power 
facilities remain among the most secured commercial facilities 
in the world. We believe that this bill takes important steps 
in achieving that goal. We are pleased with the inclusion of S. 
1586, sponsored by Senators Inhofe and Smith, in the bill 
reported by the committee. S. 1586, provides enhanced security 
authority that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 
specifically requested for many years. We note that in the 
106th Congress a nearly identical bill to S. 1586 was reported 
out of this Committee and passed the Senate by Unanimous 
Consent.
    In the days following the committee ordering S. 1746 to be 
reported, the committee received detailed comments from the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the amended version of S. 
1746. These constructive comments identified specific areas 
where the bill should be improved in order to maximize security 
without delaying or impeding current security efforts already 
undertaken by the NRC and its licensees. We believe these 
comments warrant our attention and consideration prior to S. 
1746 being voted on by the full Senate. It is our hope to 
continue to work with the chairman and members of the Committee 
to improve S. 1746 in order to ensure that the goals we all 
support will be achieved in an effective and timely manner. We 
thank the chairmen of the full committee and subcommittee for 
their leadership and for the bipartisan manner in which they 
have undertaken this very important security matter. We look 
forward to continuing to work in a bipartisan manner to 
adequately address issues that have been raised.
                        Changes in Existing Law

    In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill 
as reported are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in [black brackets], new matter is printed 
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman:
                              ----------                              

                     ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 \1\

        An Act for the development and control of atomic energy.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ This Act consists of the Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 724, as 
amended by the Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073 (68 stat. 921) and by 
subsequent amendments. The Act appears generally in the United States 
Code at 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq. Bracketed notes are used at the end of 
each section for the convenience of the reader to indicate the United 
States Code citation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         TITLE I--ATOMIC ENERGY

             Chapter 1. Declaration, Findings, and Purpose

Sec. 1. Declaration.
           * * * * * * *
Sec. 149A. Access to nuclear facilities.
           * * * * * * *
Sec. 170B. Uranium supply.
Sec. 170C. Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities.
Sec. 170D. Carrying of weapons.
Sec. 170E. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                         CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS

    Sec. 11. Definition.--The intent of Congress in the 
definitions as given in this section should be construed from 
the words or phrases used in the definitions. As used in this 
Act:
    a. The term ``agency of the United States'' means the 
executive branch of the United States, or any Government 
agency, or the legislative branch of the United States, or any 
agency, committee, commission, office, or other establishment 
in the legislative branch, or the judicial branch of the United 
States, or any office, agency, committee, commission, or other 
establishment in the judicial branch.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [jj.] ii. Legal Costs.--As used in section 170, the term 
``legal costs'' means the costs incurred by a plaintiff or a 
defendant in initiating, prosecuting, investigating, settling, 
or defending claims or suits for damage arising under such 
section.
    (jj) Homeland Security Officer.--The term ``Homeland 
Security Officer'' means a Federal official with responsibility 
for coordinating efforts to maintain homeland security against 
acts of terrorism, and designated by the President to perform 
the duties of the Homeland Security Officer under this Act.
    (kk) Private Security Force.--The term ``private security 
force'', with respect to a sensitive nuclear facility, means 
personnel hired or contracted by the licensee of the sensitive 
nuclear facility to provide security at the sensitive nuclear 
facility.
    (ll) Sensitive Nuclear Facility.--
            (1) In general.--The term ``sensitive nuclear 
        facility'' means a facility licensed by the Commission 
        (or the portion of a facility used in the conduct of an 
        activity licensed by the Commission).
            (2) Inclusions.--The term ``sensitive nuclear 
        facility'' includes--
                    (A) an operating commercial nuclear power 
                plant;
                    (B) an independent spent fuel storage 
                facility;
                    (C) a commercial nuclear power plant that 
                is being decommissioned or a portion of a 
                commercial nuclear power plant that contains 
                material licensed by the Commission;
                    (D) a category I fuel cycle facility; and
                    (E) a gaseous diffusion plant.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

      Sec. 149. Fingerprinting for Criminal History Record 
Checks.--
      [a. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (in this section 
referred to as the ``Commission'') shall require each licensee 
or applicant for a license to operate a utilization facility 
under section 103 or 104 b. to fingerprint each individual who 
is permitted unescorted access to the facility or is permitted 
access to safeguards information under section 147. All 
fingerprints obtained by a licensee or applicant as required in 
the preceding sentence shall be submitted to the Attorney 
General of the United States through the Commission for 
identification and a criminal history records check. The costs 
of any identification and records check conducted pursuant to 
the preceding sentence shall be paid by the licensee or 
applicant. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Attorney General may provide all the results of the search of 
the Commission, and, in accordance with regulations prescribed 
under this section, the Commission may provide such results to 
the licensee or applicant submitting such fingerprints.
      [b. The Commission, by rule, may relieve persons from the 
obligations imposed by this section, upon specified terms, 
conditions, and periods, if the Commission finds that such 
action is consistent with its obligations to promote the common 
defense and security and to protect the health and safety of 
the public.]
    a. Fingerprinting and Background Checks
            (1) In general--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
        (referred to in this section as the `Commission') shall 
        require the fingerprinting of each individual that is 
        permitted--
                    (A) unescorted access to a facility, 
                activity, radioactive material, or property; or
                    (B) access to safeguards information under 
                section 147.
            (2) Performance of fingerprinting.--The Commission 
        shall require fingerprinting under paragraph (1) to be 
        performed by--
                    (A) a person that is licensed or certified 
                by the Commission;
                    (B) a person that is an applicant for a 
                license or certificate; and
                    (C) a person that is otherwise permitted--
                            (i) to operate a utilization 
                        facility under section 103 or 104b.; or
                            (ii) to possess, use or transport--
                                    (I) radioactive material; 
                                or
                                    (II) other property 
                                regulated by the Commission and 
                                determined by the Commission to 
                                be of significance to the 
                                public health and safety or the 
                                common defense and security.
            (3) Repetition of fingerprinting.--Fingerprinting 
        shall be repeated for each individual described in 
        paragraph (1) at least once every 5 years.
            (4) Submission of fingerprints--
                    (A) In general.--A licensee, certificate 
                holder, or applicant shall submit to the 
                Attorney General, through the Commission, all 
                fingerprints obtained under paragraph (2)--
                            (i) for identification and 
                        comparison against all categories of 
                        individuals whose fingerprints appear 
                        in--
                                    (I) the National Crime 
                                Information Center data sets;
                                    (II) the United States 
                                National Central Bureau of 
                                Interpol;
                                    (III) the National Instant 
                                Criminal Background Check 
                                system; and
                                    (IV) the Immigration and 
                                Naturalization Service data 
                                sets (including the Student and 
                                Exchange Visitor Information 
                                System); and
                            (ii) for use to conduct a criminal 
                        history background check to determine 
                        past criminal history and any 
                        outstanding arrest warrants on record 
                        with the Federal Bureau of 
                        Investigation.
                    (B) Cost.--The cost of a background check 
                conducted under this paragraph shall be paid by 
                the licensee, certificate holder, or applicant.
                    (C) Provision of results.--
                            (i) Attorney General.--
                        Notwithstanding any other provision of 
                        law, the Attorney General shall provide 
                        the pertinent results of the search to 
                        the Commission.
                            (ii) The Commission.--In accordance 
                        with regulations promulgated under this 
                        section, the Commission may provide a 
                        licensee, certificate holder, or 
                        applicant submitting the fingerprints 
                        the results of an identification and 
                        record check under this paragraph.
    b. Relief from Obligations.--
            (1) In general.--The Commission may, by regulation, 
        relieve any person from the obligations imposed by this 
        section, under terms and conditions and for periods of 
        time specified by the Commission, if the Commission 
        determines that the provision of relief is consistent 
        with the responsibilities of the Commission--
                    (A) to promote the common defense and 
                security; and
                    (B) to protect the health and safety of the 
                public.
            (2) Requirements of another agency.--A person that 
        is subject to the fingerprinting requirements of 
        another agency of the United States shall not be 
        subject to the obligations imposed by this section, if 
        the Commission determines that those fingerprinting 
        requirements afford security protection similar to that 
        resulting from the application of this section.
      c. For purposes of administering this section, the 
Commission shall prescribe, subject to public notice and 
comment, regulations--
            (1) to implement procedures for the taking of 
        fingerprints;
            (2) to establish the conditions for use of 
        information received from the Attorney General, in 
        order--
                    (A) to limit the redissemination of such 
                information;
                    [(B) to ensure that such information is 
                used solely for the purpose of determining 
                whether an individual shall be permitted 
                unescorted access to the facility of a licensee 
                or applicant or shall be permitted access to 
                safeguards information under section 147;]
                    (B) to ensure that the information is used 
                solely for the purpose of determining whether 
                an individual shall be permitted access to a 
                facility or radioactive material or property of 
                a licensee, certificate holder, or applicant, 
                or shall be permitted access to safeguards 
                information under section 147;
                    (C) to ensure that no final determination 
                may be made solely on the basis of information 
                provided under this section involving--
                            (i) an arrest more than 1 year old 
                        for which there is no information of 
                        the disposition of the case; or
                            (ii) an arrest that resulted in 
                        dismissal of the charge or an 
                        acquittal; and
                    (D) to protect individuals subject to 
                fingerprinting under this section from misuse 
                of the criminal history records; and
            (3) to provide each individual subject to 
        fingerprinting under this section with the right to 
        complete, correct, and explain information contained in 
        the criminal history records prior to any final adverse 
        determination.
      d. (1) The Commission may establish and collect fees to 
process fingerprints and criminal history records under this 
section.
      (2) Notwithstanding section 3302(b) of title 31, United 
States Code, and to the extent approved in appropriation Acts--
            (A) a portion of the amounts collected under this 
        subsection in any fiscal year may be retained and used 
        by the Commission to carry out this section; and
            (B) the remaining portion of the amounts collected 
        under this subsection in such fiscal year may be 
        transferred periodically to the Attorney General and 
        used by the Attorney General to carry out this section.
      (3) Any amount made available for use under paragraph (2) 
shall remain available until expended.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                     CHAPTER 14. GENERAL AUTHORITY

    Sec. 161. General Provisions.--* * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            [k. authorize such of its members, officers, and 
        employees as it deems necessary in the interest of the 
        common defense and security to carry firearms while in 
        the discharge of their official duties. The Commission 
        may also authorize such of those employees of its 
        contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in 
        the protection of property under the jurisdiction of 
        the United States and located at facilities owned by or 
        contracted to the United States or being transported to 
        or from such facilities as it deems necessary in the 
        interests of the common defense and security to carry 
        firearms while in the discharge of their official 
        duties. A person authorized to carry firearms under 
        this subsection may, while in the performance of, and 
        in connection with, official duties, make arrests 
        without warrant for any offense against the United 
        States committed in that person's presence or for any 
        felony cognizable under the laws of the United States 
        if that person has reasonable grounds to believe that 
        the individual to be arrested has committed or is 
        committing such felony. An employee of a contractor or 
        subcontractor authorized to carry firearms under this 
        subsection may make such arrests only when the 
        individual to be arrested is within, or in direct 
        flight from, the area of such offense. A person granted 
        authority to make arrests by this subsection may 
        exercise that authority only in the enforcement of (1) 
        laws regarding the property of the United States in the 
        custody of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission, or a contractor of the 
        Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
        or (2) any provision of this Act that may subject an 
        offender to a fine, imprisonment, or both. The arrest 
        authority conferred by this subsection is in addition 
        to any arrest authority under other laws. The 
        Secretary, with the approval of the Attorney General, 
        shall issue guidelines to implement this subsection;]
    k. authorize--
            (1) to carry a firearm in the performance of 
        official duties such of its members, officers, and 
        employees, such of the employees of its contractors and 
        subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in the protection 
        of property under the jurisdiction of the United States 
        located at facilities owned by or contracted to the 
        United States or being transported to or from such 
        facilities, and such of the employees of persons 
        licensed or certified by the Commission (including 
        employees of contractors of licensees or certificate 
        holders) engaged in the protection of facilities owned 
        or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate 
        holder that are designated by the Commission or in the 
        protection of property of significance to the common 
        defense and security located at facilities owned or 
        operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder 
        or being transported to or from such facilities, as the 
        Commission considers necessary, in view of site-
        specific conditions, in the interest of the common 
        defense and security; and
            (2) to carry and use any other weapons, devices, or 
        ammunition in the performance of officials duties, any 
        employees of persons licensed or certified by the 
        Commission (including employees of contractors of 
        licensees or certificate holders) who are trained and 
        qualified as guards and whose duty is the protection of 
        facilities or property described in paragraph (1), 
        regardless of whether the employees are Federal, State, 
        or local law enforcement officers;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 170C. PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Antiterrorism team.--The term `antiterrorism 
        team' means the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism 
        Team established under subsection (h).
            (2) Federal security coordinator.--The term 
        `Federal security coordinator' means the Federal 
        security coordinator assigned to a sensitive nuclear 
        facility under subsection (k).
            (3) Task force.--The term `task force' means the 
        task force on nuclear infrastructure security 
        established by subsection (b).
            (4) Threat.--The term `threat' means a threat 
        identified under subsection (c).
            (5) Threat level.--The term `threat level' means a 
        threat level determined under subsection (d).
    (b) Task Force on Nuclear Infrastructure Security.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established a task 
        force on nuclear infrastructure security.
            (2) Membership.--The task force shall be comprised 
        of--
                    (A) the chairman of the Commission, who 
                shall serve as chairperson of the task force;
                    (B) the Secretary of Defense;
                    (C) the Secretary of Transportation;
                    (D) the Administrator of the Environmental 
                Protection Agency;
                    (E) the Attorney General;
                    (F) the Secretary of State;
                    (G) the Director of the Central 
                Intelligence Agency;
                    (H) the Secretary of Health and Human 
                Services;
                    (I) the Director of the Federal Emergency 
                Management Agency; and
                    (J) the Homeland Security Officer.
            (3) Duties.--
                    (A) In general.--The task force, in 
                consultation with other Federal, State, and 
                local agencies, stakeholders, and members of 
                the public, as appropriate, shall examine the 
                protection of sensitive nuclear facilities from 
                potential terrorist threats.
                    (B) Security review.--
                            (i) In general.--The task force 
                        shall examine--
                                    (I) the classification of 
                                threats as--
                                            (aa) an act--
                                                    (AA) by an 
                                                enemy of the 
                                                United States 
                                                (whether a 
                                                foreign 
                                                government or 
                                                other person); 
                                                or
                                                    (BB) 
                                                otherwise 
                                                falling under 
                                                the 
                                                responsibilities
                                                 of the Federal 
                                                Government; or
                                            (bb) an act 
                                        involving a type of 
                                        risk that the licensees 
                                        of the Commission 
                                        should be responsible 
                                        for guarding against;
                                    (II) coordination of 
                                Federal, State, and local 
                                security efforts for protection 
                                of land, water, and ground 
                                access to sensitive nuclear 
                                facilities in the event of a 
                                terrorist attack or attempted 
                                terrorist attack;
                                    (III) the adequacy of 
                                existing emergency planning 
                                zones to protect the public 
                                health and safety in the event 
                                of a terrorist attack against a 
                                sensitive nuclear facility;
                                    (IV) the adequacy and 
                                coordination of Federal, State, 
                                and local emergency planning, 
                                evacuation, and other measures 
                                to protect the public health 
                                and safety in the event of a 
                                terrorist attack against a 
                                sensitive nuclear facility;
                                    (V) the threats that 
                                sensitive nuclear facilities 
                                must protect against to prevent 
                                acts of radiological sabotage 
                                and theft of special nuclear 
                                material;
                                    (VI) the system of threat 
                                levels, consistent with the 
                                Homeland Security Advisory 
                                System, used to categorize the 
                                threats against a sensitive 
                                nuclear facility, including--
                                            (aa) procedures to 
                                        ensure coordinated 
                                        Federal, State, and 
                                        local responses to 
                                        changing threat levels 
                                        for sensitive nuclear 
                                        facilities;
                                            (bb) monitoring of 
                                        threats against 
                                        sensitive nuclear 
                                        facilities; and
                                            (cc) procedures to 
                                        notify licensees of a 
                                        sensitive nuclear 
                                        facility of changes in 
                                        threat levels;
                                    (VII) the development, 
                                implementation, and revision of 
                                security plans for sensitive 
                                nuclear facilities;
                                    (VIII) the establishment of 
                                the antiterrorism team under 
                                subsection (h);
                                    (IX) the hiring and 
                                training standards for members 
                                of private security forces at 
                                sensitive nuclear facilities, 
                                in accordance with subsection 
                                (i);
                                    (X) the coordination of 
                                Federal resources to expedite 
                                and improve the process of 
                                performing background checks on 
                                employees with access to 
                                sensitive nuclear facilities; 
                                and
                                    (XI) the creation of a 
                                program to provide technical 
                                assistance and training for the 
                                national guard, State law 
                                enforcement agencies, and local 
                                law enforcement agencies to 
                                respond, as appropriate, to 
                                threats against a sensitive 
                                nuclear facility, including 
                                recommendations for the 
                                establishment of a grant 
                                program for State and local 
                                governments to carry out any 
                                recommended requirements under 
                                this section.
                            (ii) Threats.--The threats to be 
                        examined include--
                                    (I) threats comparable to 
                                the events of September 11, 
                                2001;
                                    (II) cyber or biochemical 
                                threats;
                                    (III) attacks on a 
                                sensitive nuclear facility by 
                                multiple coordinated teams of a 
                                large number of individuals;
                                    (IV) attacks from several 
                                persons employed at the 
                                sensitive nuclear facility, 
                                some of whom may have 
                                sophisticated knowledge of the 
                                operations of the sensitive 
                                nuclear facility;
                                    (V) attacks from 
                                individuals willing to commit 
                                suicide to carry out the 
                                attacks;
                                    (VI) water-based and air-
                                based attacks;
                                    (VII) attacks using 
                                explosive devises of 
                                considerable size and modern 
                                weaponry;
                                    (VIII) fire, especially 
                                fire of long duration; and
                                    (IX) any combination of 
                                those threats.
            (4) Report.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 120 days 
                after the date of enactment of this section, 
                the task force shall submit to the President 
                and Congress, in classified form and 
                unclassified form, a report with 
                recommendations and findings.
                    (B) Revision.--The task force shall revise 
                the recommendations periodically, but not less 
                than once every 3 years.
    (c) Threats to Sensitive Nuclear Facilities.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 150 days after the 
        task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), 
        the Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on 
        and consistent with the findings and recommendations of 
        the task force, identifying the threats that sensitive 
        nuclear facilities must protect against to prevent acts 
        of radiological sabotage and the theft of special 
        nuclear material at sensitive nuclear facilities.
            (2) Protection of safeguards information.--In 
        promulgating regulations under this subsection, the 
        Commission shall ensure protection of safeguards 
        information in accordance with section 147.
    (d) Threat Levels.--Not later than 150 days after the task 
force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the 
Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and 
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task 
force, establishing a system for the determination of multiple 
threat levels to describe the threat conditions at sensitive 
nuclear facilities.
    (e) Security Plans.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        date on which the Commission establishes the threats 
        under subsection (c), the Commission shall review, 
        based on and consistent with the findings and 
        recommendations of the task force, the security plan 
        for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure that each 
        sensitive nuclear facility protects against those 
        threats.
            (2) Aspects of review.--The Commission shall ensure 
        that the security plan provides for--
                    (A) the deployment and capabilities of the 
                private security force at the sensitive nuclear 
                facility for each threat level;
                    (B) coordination between the private 
                security force and the antiterrorism team for 
                the sensitive nuclear facility, as appropriate 
                for each threat level;
                    (C) secure operation of vital equipment, 
                such as control room equipment and backup 
                warning systems;
                    (D) access restrictions;
                    (E) security cameras, fire protection 
                barriers, and other physical security measures;
                    (F) protection of spent fuel, including 
                options such as placement of spent fuel in dry 
                cask storage;
                    (G) background security checks for 
                employees and prospective employees; and
                    (H) coordination among licensees of 
                sensitive nuclear facilities and appropriate 
                Federal, state, and local emergency response 
                personnel.
            (3) Schedule.--The Commission shall establish a 
        priority schedule for conducting reviews of security 
        plans based on the vulnerability of each sensitive 
        nuclear facility and the proximity of the sensitive 
        nuclear facility to large population areas.
            (4) Findings.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 30 days 
                after the review of each security plan, the 
                Commission shall submit to Congress and the 
                licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility 
                recommendations, findings, and a schedule for 
                implementation of changes to security that 
                shall be made not later than 18 months after 
                completion of the review of the security plan.
                    (B) Form.--The report submitted to Congress 
                under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in 
                classified and unclassified form.
            (5) Upgrades to security plan.--Not later than 30 
        days after the review of each security plan, the 
        Commission shall ensure that the licensee of each 
        sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, its 
        security plan consistent with the findings under 
        paragraph (4).
            (6) Upgrades to security.--The Commission shall 
        ensure that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear 
        facility makes any changes to security required by the 
        security plan according to the Commission schedule.
    (f) Emergency Response Plans.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 150 days after the 
        task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), 
        the Commission shall review, based on and consistent 
        with the findings and recommendations of the task 
        force, the emergency response plans for each sensitive 
        nuclear facility to ensure that each emergency response 
        plan provides protection for persons living in the 
        emergency response planning zones.
            (2) Aspects of review.--The Commission shall ensure 
        that each emergency response plan provides for--
                    (A) the protection of public health and 
                safety, including the ability to implement 
                protective measures;
                    (B) clear definition and assignment of 
                responsibilities of emergency response 
                personnel;
                    (C) notification procedures;
                    (D) communication and coordination among 
                emergency response personnel;
                    (E) dissemination of information to the 
                public, including both pre-emergency education 
                and in the event of a radiological emergency;
                    (F) adequate emergency facilities and 
                equipment at and around the sensitive nuclear 
                facility;
                    (G) the use of methods, systems, and 
                equipment for assessing and monitoring actual 
                or potential impacts of a radiological 
                emergency;
                    (H) appropriate evacuation and sheltering 
                and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide;
                    (I) means for controlling radiological 
                exposures;
                    (J) appropriate medical services;
                    (K) plans for recovery and reentry; and
                    (L) radiological emergency response 
                training.
            (3) Schedule.--The Commission shall establish a 
        priority schedule for conducting reviews of emergency 
        response plans for sensitive nuclear facilities based 
        on the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive 
        nuclear facilities and the proximity of sensitive 
        nuclear facilities to large population areas.
            (4) Findings.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 30 days 
                after the review of each emergency response 
                plan, the Commission shall submit to Congress 
                and the licensee of each sensitive nuclear 
                facility recommendations and findings.
                    (B) Form.--The report submitted to Congress 
                under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in 
                classified and unclassified form.
            (5) Upgrades to emergency response plan.--Not later 
        than 30 days after completion of the review of each 
        emergency response plan, the Commission shall ensure 
        that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility 
        revises, as necessary, the emergency response plan for 
        the sensitive nuclear facility consistent with the 
        findings under paragraph (4).
    (g) Federal Coordination.--Not later than 90 days after the 
task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the 
Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and 
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task 
force, establishing the circumstances under which the 
Commission shall request the President to--
            (1) deploy the Coast Guard to a sensitive nuclear 
        facility;
            (2) provide for the protection of air space in the 
        vicinity of a sensitive nuclear facility; or
            (3) deploy the antiterrorism team.
    (h) Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team.--
            (1) Establishment.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), 
        the President shall establish, based on and consistent 
        with the findings and recommendations of the task 
        force, the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team.
            (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the antiterrorism team 
        shall be to provide protection for the perimeter of 
        sensitive nuclear facilities against the threats 
        identified under subsection (c), in coordination with 
        other Federal, State, local, and private entities, as 
        appropriate, consistent with the security plan for each 
        sensitive nuclear facility.
    (i) Training Program.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        task force submits the report under subsection 
        (b)(4)(B), the President shall establish, based on and 
        consistent with findings and recommendations of the 
        task force, a program to provide technical assistance 
        and training for the National Guard and State and local 
        law enforcement agencies in responding to threats 
        against a sensitive nuclear facility.
            (2) Grants.--The President may provide grants, 
        consistent with the findings and recommendations of the 
        task force, to State and local governments to assist in 
        carrying out this section.
            (3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated such sums as are 
        necessary to carry out this subsection.
    (j) Employee Security.--
            (1) Review.--Not later than 90 days after the task 
        force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the 
        Commission, taking into consideration recommendations 
        of the task force, shall review and update the hiring 
        and training standards for employees of a sensitive 
        nuclear facility.
            (2) Disqualification of individuals that present 
        national security risks.--The Commission, based on and 
        consistent with the findings and recommendations of the 
        task force, shall establish qualifications and 
        procedures, in addition to any background check 
        conducted under section 149, to ensure that no 
        individual that presents a threat to national security 
        is employed at a sensitive nuclear facility.
    (k) Federal Security Coordinators.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the 
        task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), 
        the Commission, based on and consistent with findings 
        and recommendations of the task force, shall promulgate 
        regulations for the hiring and training of Federal 
        security coordinators.
            (2) Assignment of federal security coordinators.--
        Not later than 60 days after the Commission promulgates 
        regulations under paragraph (1), the Commission shall 
        assign a Federal security coordinator, under the 
        employment of the Commission, at each sensitive nuclear 
        facility.
            (3) Responsibilities.--The Federal security 
        coordinator shall be responsible for--
                    (A) communicating with the Commission and 
                other Federal, State, and local authorities 
                concerning threats, including threats against 
                the sensitive nuclear facility;
                    (B) ensuring that the sensitive nuclear 
                facility maintains security consistent with the 
                security plan in accordance with the 
                appropriate threat level; and
                    (C) ensuring full and active coordination 
                of security measures among--
                            (i) the private security force at 
                        the sensitive nuclear facility;
                            (ii) the antiterrorism team; and
                            (iii) other Federal, State, and 
                        local authorities, as appropriate.
    (l) Classified Information.--Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to supersede any existing law (including a 
regulation) governing the disclosure of classified information 
or safeguards information.

SEC. 170D. CARRYING OF WEAPONS.

    (a) Authority To Make Arrest.--
            (1) In general.--A person authorized under section 
        161k. to carry a firearm, other weapon, device, or 
        ammunition may, while in the performance of, and in 
        connection with, official duties, detain or arrest an 
        individual without a warrant for any offense against 
        the United States committed in the presence of the 
        person or for any felony under the laws of the United 
        States if the person has a reasonable ground to believe 
        that the individual has committed or is committing such 
        a felony.
            (2) Limitation.--An employee of a contractor or 
        subcontractor or of a Commission licensee or 
        certificate holder (or a contractor of a licensee or 
        certificate holder) authorized to make an arrest under 
        paragraph (1) may make an arrest only after the 
        Commission, licensee, or certificate holder has applied 
        for and been granted authorization from the 
        Commission--
                    (A) when the individual is within, or is in 
                flight directly from, the area in which the 
                offense was committed; and
                    (B) in the enforcement of--
                            (i) a law regarding the property of 
                        the United States in the custody of the 
                        Department of Energy, the Commission, 
                        or a contractor of the Department of 
                        Energy or Commission or a licensee or 
                        certificate holder of the Commission;
                            (ii) a law applicable to facilities 
                        owned or operated by a Commission 
                        licensee or certificate holder that are 
                        designated by the Commission under 
                        section 161k.;
                            (iii) a law applicable to property 
                        of significance to the common defense 
                        and security that is in the custody of 
                        a licensee or certificate holder or a 
                        contractor of a licensee or certificate 
                        holder of the Commission; or
                            (iv) any provision of this Act that 
                        subjects an offender to a fine, 
                        imprisonment, or both.
            (3) Other authority.--The arrest authority 
        conferred by this section is in addition to any arrest 
        authority under other law.
            (4) Guidelines--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary and the 
                Commission, with the approval of the Attorney 
                General, shall issue guidelines to implement 
                section 161k. and this subsection.
                    (B) Effective date.--The authority to carry 
                and use weapons, devices, or ammunition 
                provided to employees described in section 
                161k.(2) and the authority provided to those 
                employees under this subsection shall not be 
                effective until the date on which guidelines 
                issued under subparagraph (A) become effective.

SEC. 170E. SENSITIVE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SECURITY.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Sensitive radioactive material.--
                    (A) In general.--The term `sensitive 
                radioactive material' means--
                            (i) a material--
                                    (I) that is a source 
                                material, byproduct material, 
                                or special nuclear material; 
                                and
                                    (II) that is any other 
                                radioactive material 
                                (regardless of whether the 
                                material is or has been 
                                licensed or otherwise regulated 
                                under this Act) produced or 
                                made radioactive before or 
                                after the date of enactment of 
                                this section; and
                            (ii) that is in such a form or 
                        quantity or concentration that the 
                        Commission determines, based on and 
                        consistent with the recommendations of 
                        the task force, should be classified as 
                        `sensitive radioactive material' that 
                        warrants improved security and 
                        protection against loss, theft, or 
                        sabotage.
                    (B) Exclusion.--The term `sensitive 
                radioactive material' does not include nuclear 
                fuel or spent nuclear fuel.
            (2) Security threat.--The term `security threat' 
        means--
                    (A) a threat of sabotage or theft of 
                sensitive radioactive material;
                    (B) a threat of use of sensitive 
                radioactive material in a radiological 
                dispersal device; and
                    (C) any other threat of terrorist or other 
                criminal activity involving sensitive 
                radioactive material that could harm the health 
                or safety of the public due primarily to 
                radiological properties of the sensitive 
                radioactive material, as determined by the 
                Commission based on and consistent with the 
                recommendations of the task force.
            (3) Task force.--The term `task force' has the 
        meaning given the term in section 170C(a).
    (b) Duties.--
            (1) In general.--The task force shall--
                    (A) evaluate the security of sensitive 
                radioactive material against security threats; 
                and
                    (B) recommend administrative and 
                legislative actions to be taken to provide the 
                maximum practicable degree of security against 
                security threats.
            (2) Considerations.--In carrying out paragraph (1), 
        the task force shall make recommendations to--
                    (A) determine the radioactive materials 
                that should be classified as sensitive 
                radioactive materials;
                    (B) develop a classification system for 
                sensitive radioactive materials that--
                            (i) is based on the potential for 
                        use by terrorists of sensitive 
                        radioactive material and the extent of 
                        the threat to public health and safety 
                        posed by that potential; and
                            (ii) takes into account--
                                    (I) radioactivity levels of 
                                sensitive radioactive material;
                                    (II) the dispersibility of 
                                sensitive radioactive material;
                                    (III) the chemical and 
                                material form of sensitive 
                                radioactive material; and
                                    (IV) other appropriate 
                                factors;
                    (C) develop a national system for recovery 
                of sensitive radioactive material that is lost 
                or stolen, taking into account the 
                classification system established under 
                subparagraph (B);
                    (D) provide for the storage of sensitive 
                radioactive material that is not currently in 
                use in a safe and secure manner;
                    (E) develop a national tracking system for 
                sensitive radioactive material, taking into 
                account the classification system established 
                under subparagraph (B);
                    (F) develop methods to ensure the return or 
                proper disposal of sensitive radioactive 
                material;
                    (G) modify current export controls on 
                sensitive radioactive materials so that, to the 
                extent feasible, exports from the United States 
                of sensitive radioactive materials are made 
                only to foreign recipients that are willing and 
                able to control the sensitive radioactive 
                materials in the same manner as recipients in 
                the United States; and
                    (H) establish procedures to improve the 
                security of sensitive radioactive material in 
                use, transportation, and storage.
            (3) Procedures to improve security.--The procedures 
        to improve the security of sensitive radioactive 
        material under paragraph (2)(H) may include--
                    (A) periodic audits or inspections by the 
                Commission to ensure that sensitive radioactive 
                material is properly secured and can be fully 
                accounted for;
                    (B) evaluation by the Commission of 
                security measures taken by persons that possess 
                sensitive radioactive material;
                    (C) imposition of increased fines for 
                violations of regulations relating to security 
                and safety measures applicable to licensees 
                that possess sensitive radioactive material;
                    (D) conduct of background checks on 
                individuals with access to sensitive 
                radioactive material;
                    (E) measures to ensure the physical 
                security of facilities in which sensitive 
                radioactive material is stored; and
                    (F) screening of shipments of sensitive 
                radioactive material to facilities that are 
                particularly at risk for sabotage to ensure 
                that the shipments do not contain explosives.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this section, and not less frequently than once 
every 3 years thereafter, the task force shall submit to the 
President and Congress a report in unclassified form (with a 
classified annex, if necessary) describing the administrative 
and legislative actions recommended under subsection (b)(1).
    (d) Administrative Action.--Not later than 60 days after 
the date of submission of the report under subsection (b), the 
Commission shall, based on and consistent with the 
recommendations of the task force, take such actions as are 
appropriate to--
            (1) revise the system for licensing sensitive 
        radioactive materials based on and consistent with the 
        recommendations of the task force; and
            (2) ensure that States that have entered into an 
        agreement under section 274b. establish compatible 
        programs in a timely manner.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 229. Trespass Upon Commission Installations.--
            a. The Commission is authorized to issue 
        regulations relating to the entry upon or carrying, 
        transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be 
        introduced any dangerous weapons, explosive, or other 
        dangerous instrument or material likely to produce 
        substantial injury or damage to persons or property, 
        into or upon any facility, installation, or real 
        property subject to the jurisdiction, administration, 
        or in the custody of the Commission. Every such 
        regulation of the Commission shall be posted 
        conspicuously at the location involved or subject to 
        the licensing authority of the Commission or to 
        certification by the Commission under this Act or any 
        other Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 236. Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel.--
    a. Any person who intentionally and willfully destroys or 
causes physical damage to, or [who intentionally and willfully 
attempts] or who attempts or conspires to destroy or cause 
physical damage to--
            (1) any production facility or utilization facility 
        licensed under this Act;
            (2) any nuclear waste [storage facility] storage, 
        treatment, or disposal facility licensed under this 
        Act;
            (3) any nuclear fuel for such a utilization 
        facility, or any spent nuclear fuel from such a 
        facility; [or]
            (4) any uranium enrichment [facility licensed] a 
        utilization facility licensed under this Act by the 
        Nuclear Regulatory Commission[.] ; or
            (5) any production, utilization, waste storage, 
        waste treatment, waste disposal, uranium enrichment, or 
        nuclear fuel fabrication facility subject to licensing 
        or certification under this Act during construction of 
        the facility, if the destruction or damage caused or 
        attempted to be caused could adversely affect public 
        health and safety during the operation of the facility;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more 
than ten years, or both.
    b. Any person who intentionally and willfully causes or 
attempts to cause an interruption of normal operation of any 
such facility through the unauthorized use of or tampering with 
the machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, 
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more 
than ten years, or both.
           * * * * * * *
                              ----------                              

                   ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974

                          [Public Law 93-438]
           * * * * * * *

SEC 203. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

      (a) Establishment; appointment of director.--There is 
hereby established in the Commission an Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards under the direction of a 
Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, who shall 
be appointed by the Commission, who may report directly to the 
Commission as provided in section 5849 of this title, and who 
shall serve at the pleasure of and be removable by the 
Commission.
      (b) Functions of Director.--Subject to the provisions of 
this chapter, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards shall perform such functions as the Commission shall 
delegate including:
          (1) Principal [licensing and regulation involving] 
        licensing, regulation, and, except as otherwise 
        provided under section 212, carrying out safety 
        reviews, safeguards, and physical security of all 
        facilities and materials, licensed under the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 
        seq.), associated with the processing, transport, and 
        handling of nuclear materials, [including] not 
        including the provision and maintenance of safeguards 
        against threats, thefts, and sabotage of such licensed 
        facilities, [and materials] and materials, to the 
        extent that the safeguards and security functions are 
        delegated to the Office of Nuclear Security and 
        Incident Response under section 212.
          (2) Review safety [and safeguards] of all such 
        facilities and materials licensed under the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954, [as amended, and such review shall 
        include, but not be limited to--
                  [(A) monitoring, testing, and recommending 
                upgrading of internal accounting systems for 
                special nuclear and other nuclear materials 
                licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
                as amended;
                  [(B) developing, in consultation and 
                coordination with the Administration, 
                contingency plans for dealing with threats, 
                thefts, and sabotage relating to special 
                nuclear materials, high-level radioactive 
                wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from 
                all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy 
                Act of 1954, as amended;
                  [(C) assessing the need for, and the 
                feasibility of, establishing a security agency 
                within the office for the performance of the 
                safeguards functions, and a report with 
                recommendations on this matter shall be 
                prepared within one year of the effective date 
                of this chapter and promptly transmitted to the 
                Congress by the Commission] (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 
                seq.).
          (3) Recommending research to enable the Commission to 
        more effectively perform its functions.
      (c) Responsibility for safeguarding special nuclear 
materials; high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way 
the functions of the Administration relating to the 
safeguarding of special nuclear materials, high-level 
radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all 
activities within the jurisdiction of the Administration 
pursuant to this chapter.
           * * * * * * *

SEC. 211. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION

      (a) Discrimination against employee
          (1) No employer may discharge any employee or 
        otherwise discriminate against any employee with 
        respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
        privileges of employment because the employee (or any 
        person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) -
                  (A) notified his employer of an alleged 
                violation of this chapter or the Atomic Energy 
                Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
                  (B) refused to engage in any practice made 
                unlawful by this chapter or the Atomic Energy 
                Act of 1954, if the employee has identified the 
                alleged illegality to the employer;
                  (C) testified before Congress or at any 
                Federal or State proceeding regarding any 
                provision (or proposed provision) of this 
                chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
                  (D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is 
                about to commence or cause to be commenced a 
                proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic 
                Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding 
                for the administration or enforcement of any 
                requirement imposed under this chapter or the 
                Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
                  (E) testified or is about to testify in any 
                such proceeding or;
                  (F) assisted or participated or is about to 
                assist or participate in any manner in such a 
                proceeding or in any other manner in such a 
                proceeding or in any other action to carry out 
                the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic 
                Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
          (2) For purposes of this section, the term 
        ''employer'' includes -
                  (A) a licensee of the Commission or of an 
                agreement State under section 274 of the Atomic 
                Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2021);
                  (B) an applicant for a license from the 
                Commission or such an agreement State;
                  (C) a contractor or subcontractor of such a 
                licensee or applicant; [and]
                  (D) a contractor or subcontractor of the 
                Department of Energy that is indemnified by the 
                Department under section 170 d. of the Atomic 
                Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210(d)), but 
                such term shall not include any contractor or 
                subcontractor covered by Executive Order No. 
                12344[.] ; and
                    (E) a contractor or subcontractor of the 
                Commission.
           * * * * * * *

SEC. 212. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Antiterrorism team.--The term `antiterrorism 
        team' has the meaning given the term in section 170C(a) 
        of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
            (2) Assistant director.--The term `Assistant 
        Director' means the Assistant Director for Security 
        Response.
            (3) Director.--The term `Director' means the 
        Director of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 
        appointed under subsection (c).
            (4) Mock terrorist team.--The term `mock terrorist 
        team' means the mock terrorist team described in 
        subsection (d)(3).
            (5) Office.--The term `Office' means the Office of 
        Nuclear Security and Incident Response established by 
        subsection (b).
            (6) Sensitive nuclear facility.--The term 
        `sensitive nuclear facility' has the meaning given the 
        term in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2014).
            (7) Threat.--The term `threat' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 170C(a) of the Atomic Energy 
        Act of 1954.
            (8) Unit.--The term `Unit' means the Security 
        Response Unit established under subsection (d)(1).
    (b) Establishment of Office.--There is established in the 
Commission the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 
Response.
    (c) Director.--
            (1) Appointment.--The Commission may appoint and 
        terminate a Director of Nuclear Security and Incident 
        Response to head the Office.
            (2) Duties.--The Director shall perform any duties 
        delegated by the Commission to the Director, 
        including--
                    (A) carrying out security, safeguards, and 
                incident responses relating to--
                            (i) any facility owned or operated 
                        by a Commission licensee or certificate 
                        holder;
                            (ii) any property owned or in the 
                        possession of a Commission licensee or 
                        certificate holder that--
                                    (I) is significant to the 
                                common defense and security; or
                                    (II) is being transported 
                                to or from a facility described 
                                in clause (i); and
                            (iii) performing any other activity 
                        of a Commission licensee or certificate 
                        holder that is significant to the 
                        common defense and security;
                    (B) for a facility or material licensed or 
                certified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
                (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)--
                            (i) developing contingency plans 
                        for dealing with threats, thefts, and 
                        sabotage; and
                            (ii) monitoring, reviewing, and 
                        evaluating security and safeguards;
                    (C) recommending upgrades to internal 
                accounting systems for special nuclear and 
                other materials licensed or certified under the 
                Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 
                seq.);
                    (D) developing and recommending standards 
                and amendments to the standards of the 
                Commission relating to the duties described in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
                    (E) carrying out any other safeguards and 
                physical security functions that the Commission 
                determines to be appropriate.
            (3) Consultation.--In carrying out the duties under 
        paragraph (2), the Director shall, to the maximum 
        extent practicable, consult and coordinate with--
                    (A) other officers of the Commission; and
                    (B) other Federal agencies.
    (d) Security Response Unit.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established in the 
        Office the Security Response Unit.
            (2) Head of unit.--The Unit shall be headed by an 
        Assistant Director for Security Response.
            (3) Mock terrorist team.--The personnel of the Unit 
        shall include a mock terrorist team comprised of--
                    (A) a number of individuals, consistent 
                with the threat, who have advanced knowledge of 
                special weapons and tactics comparable to 
                special operations forces of the Armed Forces;
                    (B) nuclear engineers, as appropriate;
                    (C) individuals with knowledge of the 
                operations of the sensitive nuclear facility 
                who are capable of actively disrupting the 
                normal operations of the sensitive nuclear 
                facility; and
                    (D) any other individual that the 
                Commission determines should be a member of the 
                mock terrorist team.
            (4) Security response evaluations.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year 
                after the date of enactment of this section, 
                the Commission shall establish a security 
                response evaluation program to assess the 
                ability of each sensitive nuclear facility to 
                defend against the threats in accordance with 
                the security plan for the sensitive nuclear 
                facility.
                    (B) Frequency of evaluations.--Not less 
                than once every 3 years, the Commission shall 
                conduct and document security response 
                evaluations at each sensitive nuclear facility 
                to assess the ability of the private security 
                force, in cooperation with the antiterrorism 
                team, at the sensitive nuclear facility to 
                defend against the threat.
                    (C) Security exemption.--The Commission may 
                suspend activities under this section if the 
                Commission determines that the security 
                response evaluations would compromise security 
                at any sensitive nuclear facility in accordance 
                with a heightened threat level.
                    (D) Activities.--The security response 
                evaluation shall include force-on-force 
                exercises by the mock terrorist team against 
                the sensitive nuclear facility that simulate 
                air, water, and land assaults, as appropriate.
                    (E) Performance criteria.--The Commission 
                shall establish performance criteria for 
                judging the security response evaluations.
                    (F) Corrective action.--
                            (i) In general.--When any of the 
                        performance criteria established under 
                        subparagraph (E) are not satisfied--
                                    (I) the licensee shall 
                                promptly correct any defects in 
                                performance identified by the 
                                Commission in the security 
                                response evaluation; and
                                    (II) the Commission shall 
                                conduct an additional security 
                                response evaluation within 6 
                                months to confirm that the 
                                licensee satisfies the 
                                performance criteria 
                                established under subparagraph 
                                (E).
                            (ii) 2 consecutive failures to 
                        satisfy all performance criteria.--
                                    (I) In general.--If a 
                                sensitive nuclear facility 
                                fails to satisfy all of the 
                                performance criteria 
                                established under subparagraph 
                                (E) in 2 consecutive security 
                                response evaluations, the 
                                Commission shall issue an order 
                                specifying the corrective 
                                actions that must be taken by 
                                the licensee of the sensitive 
                                nuclear facility.
                                    (II) Failure to take 
                                corrective action.--If the 
                                licensee of a sensitive nuclear 
                                facility does not take the 
                                corrective action specified by 
                                the Commission within 30 days 
                                after the date of issuance of 
                                an order under subclause (I), 
                                the Commission shall assess a 
                                civil penalty under section 
                                234.
                    (G) Reports.--Not less often than once 
                every year, the Commission shall submit to 
                Congress and the President a report, in 
                classified form and unclassified form, that 
                describes the results of each security response 
                evaluation under this paragraph for the 
                previous year.
    (e) Emergency Response Exercises.--
            (1) In general.--Not less than once every 2 years, 
        the Commission, in coordination with the Director of 
        the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall conduct 
        emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability of 
        Federal, State, and local emergency response personnel 
        to respond to a radiological emergency at the sensitive 
        nuclear facility in accordance with the emergency 
        response plans.
            (2) Activities.--The emergency response exercises 
        shall evaluate--
                    (A) the response capabilities, response 
                times, and coordination and communication 
                capabilities of the response personnel;
                    (B) the effectiveness and adequacy of 
                emergency response and evacuation plans; and
                    (C) the availability of potassium iodide or 
                other prophylactic medicines.
            (3) Revision of emergency response plans.--The 
        Commission shall ensure that the emergency response 
        plan for a sensitive nuclear facility is revised to 
        correct for any deficiencies identified by an 
        evaluation under this subsection.
            (4) Reports.--Not less than once every year, the 
        Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a 
        report, in classified form and unclassified form, that 
        describes--
                    (A) the results of each emergency response 
                exercise under this subsection conducted in the 
                previous year; and
                    (B) each revision of an emergency response 
                plan made under paragraph (3) for the previous 
                year.
    (f) Effect.--Nothing in this section limits any authority 
of the Department of Energy relating to the safe operation of 
facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department.
           * * * * * * *

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