THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Polly Thompson, Respondent, 

v. 

Cathy Swicegood, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-001860 

Appeal From Oconee County 

Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge 

Ellis B. Drew, Jr., Master-in-Equity 

Opinion No. 5736 

Heard September 18, 2019 – Filed July 1, 2020 

 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

John G. Reckenbeil, of Law Office of John G. 

Reckenbeil, L.L.C., of Mauldin, and J. Falkner Wilkes, 

of Greenville, for Appellant. 

Margaret A. Chamberlain, of Chamberlain Law Firm, 

LLC, of Greenville, and Melissa Hope Moore, of Law 

Office of Melissa H. Moore, LLC, of Fountain Inn, for 

Respondent. 

LOCKEMY, C.J.: Cathy Swicegood appeals the master-in-equity's order of 

partition, arguing the master erred by (1) refusing to consider the issue of the 

parties' alleged common-law marriage and stay the action pending a resolution of 

that issue in family court, (2) excluding evidence proving her contributions to 

jointly owned real property, (3) determining her contribution to such property, and 
 

 

(4) failing to apply the correct analysis when determining the parties' interests in 

the property. We affirm as modified. 

FACTS 

Polly Thompson filed this action in circuit court for partition and ouster in March 

2014. She alleged she and Swicegood held title to two properties—a home in 

Westminster, South Carolina (the Lake Hartwell home) and a condominium in 

Hilton Head, South Carolina (the Hilton Head condo)—as joint tenants. 

Thompson alleged she was entitled to sole ownership and title as to both 

properties. 

Swicegood then filed a summons and complaint in family court alleging a 

common-law marriage existed between the parties and seeking, among other 

things, recognition of the separation of the parties, an award of separate support 

and maintenance, and equitable division of marital property.1

 Swicegood moved to 

dismiss or, alternatively, stay the partition action, arguing she sought an order from 

the family court declaring she and Thompson were married by common law. 

Thereafter, the family court dismissed Swicegood's complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, finding that pursuant to the then-existing laws banning 

same-sex marriage in this state, no common-law marriage existed as a matter of 

law. Swicegood appealed the family court's order.2 Meanwhile, in October 2014, 

the circuit court denied Swicegood's motion to dismiss or stay the partition action, 

finding there was no just cause for granting a stay. The court reasoned in part that 

Thompson filed her petition in circuit court first and Swicegood's subsequent filing 

in family court did not remove jurisdiction from the circuit court. 

The partition action proceeded to a hearing before the master-in-equity in March 

2015. At the outset of the hearing, Thompson moved to exclude any evidence or 

argument concerning whether the parties were married and any evidence regarding 

"sweat equity" in any property other than the two properties at issue in the partition 

action. Swicegood again moved to stay the proceeding, arguing that after the 

family court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the 

circuit court denied her previous motion to stay, the United States District Court 

1

 The couple's primary residence was not a property at issue in the partition action. 

2

 We decided this appeal in Swicegood v. Thompson, Op. No. 5735 (S.C. Ct. App. 

filed July 1, 2020), which includes a complete procedural history of the family 

court matter. 
 

had overturned South Carolina's statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage.3 The 

master denied Swicegood's motion to stay and granted Thompson's motion to 

exclude evidence of the alleged marriage, reasoning he expressed no opinion as to 

whether there was a marriage, and even if there were, the matter was "still a 

partition action" according to the pleadings. Swicegood argued she was entitled to 

sweat equity because during the thirteen-year relationship, a significant amount of 

assets and sweat equity culminated into the purchase of these properties and she 

"and others" took actions to bring value to these properties. However, the master 

granted Thompson's motion to exclude evidence of any sweat equity Swicegood 

may have had in any property other than the Lake Hartwell home or Hilton Head 

condo. 

Thompson purchased the Hilton Head condo in June 2013 for $372,500. The deed 

listed both parties as owners. Thompson paid the down payment with an 

inheritance she received from her parents, and Swicegood contributed no funds. 

The mortgage on the Hilton Head condo was in Thompson's name only, and she 

paid all of the mortgage payments on the property as well as all regime fees, 

insurance premiums, utility bills, and fitness club fees. According to Thompson, 

the Hilton Head condo required some improvements, such as wallpaper removal, 

painting, plumbing repair, and replacing light fixtures, switches, and the washer 

and dryer. She stated she paid for all of the labor and construction associated with 

these improvements, and although she acknowledged Swicegood performed some 

of this labor, she stated she paid Swicegood for her work. Thompson explained 

she rented out the Hilton Head condo when possible and had earned $22,000 in 

rental income since purchasing the home. Thompson testified she contributed 

$142,477.01, less the rental income, to the Hilton Head condo. 

The Lake Hartwell home consisted of two lots: Lot 58 and Lot 59. Thompson 

purchased the first lot, Lot 59, in May 2010 for $38,500; she paid a down payment 

of $10,209.98 and obtained a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price. 

Thompson purchased the second lot, Lot 58, in July 2012 for $35,000 and paid the 

full purchase price with her inheritance. Thompson then had a home constructed 

on the lots. Swicegood contributed $22,000 of the total $28,678.43 down payment 

on the construction of the home, and Thompson contributed the remaining 

$6,678.43. Thompson obtained a mortgage for the remaining $151,500 of the 

purchase price. She testified the $10,209.98 and $6,678.43 she paid for the 

purchase and construction of the Lake Hartwell home came from her checking 

3 See Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587 (D.S.C. 2014) (striking down 

South Carolina's ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional). 
 

account, and none of those funds came from Swicegood. Additionally, Thompson 

paid all mortgage payments, homeowners' association fees, taxes, and insurance 

premiums on the property. She explained she hired a builder to build the home and 

paid for other construction and improvements to the property. Thompson stated 

she paid $42,735.41 for the construction and improvements, including $7,000 paid 

on Swicegood's Lowe's credit card and several checks for Swicegood's labor. 

Thompson again acknowledged Swicegood performed some labor and agreed she 

was often present during the building of the Lake Hartwell home but insisted she 

paid Swicegood for this work. 

Swicegood moved into the Lake Hartwell home in December 2013 after the couple 

separated. Thompson alleged Swicegood changed the locks and denied her entry 

to the home thereafter. During this time, Thompson continued to pay the 

mortgage, homeowner's association fees, insurance, and taxes on the home. She 

claimed $14,143.77 in damages due to Swicegood's ouster but later stipulated she 

sent Swicegood a letter in December 2013 giving her permission to live there. 

Thompson stated that in exchange for Swicegood's work on the Hilton Head 

condo, she gave her a 2009 Buick and paid her with checks. She conceded 

Swicegood paid her $9,500 for the Buick but stated it was worth "at least $18,000." 

Thompson acknowledged she previously owned a villa in Hilton Head, which she 

purchased in 2003 with proceeds from the sale of stock she owned. She stated she 

sold this property in December 2013, it was titled in her name only, and no funds 

from its sale were applied to any other purchase. Thompson admitted Swicegood 

transferred title in property she owned to Thompson by quitclaim deed in 2010. 

Although the master refused to admit evidence concerning this transfer, Thompson 

acknowledged the $22,000 Swicegood contributed to the purchase of the Lake 

Hartwell home came from the sale of that property. 

Swicegood testified she operated a business that provided landscaping and interior 

design services. She stated she and Thompson continually tried to "flip" properties 

in order to have "nice places" to live in upon retirement. Swicegood attempted to 

explain she contributed labor to the villa that Thompson previously owned, and 

Thompson objected. Swicegood conceded, acknowledging the master's earlier 

ruling. Swicegood explained she removed carpet, painted, changed outlets and 

switches, created window treatments, covered cornice boards, and replaced new 

toilets, faucets, and towel racks in the Hilton Head condo. She stated she had 

furniture reupholstered, purchased bedding, and decorated. Swicegood testified it 

took seven days to flip the condo. She stated she paid someone $1,300 to complete 

plumbing and electrical work. Swicegood testified she also touched up paint and 
replaced light bulbs when she stayed at the Hilton Head condo. She provided an 

"invoice," consisting of a summary of the work she completed at the Hilton Head 

condo, which totaled $17,490. Of this amount, Swicegood estimated she was 

owed $5,910.91. However, she admitted the invoice was not created at the time 

the work was done; rather, she "rewrote" all of her invoices for use at the hearing. 

Swicegood confirmed she had no documentation showing her payment for any of 

the materials listed on the invoice. She averred the refurbishing of the Hilton Head 

condo allowed the parties to earn higher rental income on the property. Swicegood 

testified she "drew the plans" for the Lake Hartwell home and was present at the 

home "every single day" during its construction. She agreed Thompson had paid 

her for work on the Lake Hartwell home and the Hilton Head condo, but she 

denied she had been paid for all of her work. Swicegood identified several checks 

she received from Thompson. She agreed the checks ranged from $1,000 and 

$5,000 but stated some checks were for materials. She acknowledged Thompson 

paid her "to handle the affairs" during the building of the Lake Hartwell home in 

Thompson's place. Swicegood admitted she changed the locks at the Lake 

Hartwell home after she moved in because Thompson continued to come to the 

home even though their attorneys had asked her not to. 

Swicegood also presented the testimony of Stephanie Computaro, who testified 

Swicegood did "the majority of the work" during the refurbishing of the Hilton 

Head condo, and "as far as the hands on construction" and "the vision, buying of 

the materials to do those jobs, that was a hundred percent [Swicegood]." 

Following the partition hearing, the parties made their offers to purchase the 

properties. They agreed the mortgage balance for the Lake Hartwell property was 

$143,407.75, with equity of $67,742, and the mortgage balance for the Hilton Head 

condo was $269,100.57, with equity of $120,599. Thompson offered to purchase 

the Hilton Head condo for $275,100.57, and the Lake Hartwell home for 

$188,407.75, while Swicegood offered to transfer title of the Hilton Head condo to 

Thompson in exchange for Thompson transferring title of the Lake Hartwell 

property to Swicegood. The master found Thompson made the greater offer to 

purchase. Because the remaining balance on mortgage for the Hilton Head condo 

was $269,100.57, the master determined there was $6,000 in proceeds from the 

Hilton Head condo to be divided between the parties. Likewise, because the 

remaining balance on the Lake Hartwell home was $143,407.75, the master 

determined there was $45,000 in proceeds from the Lake Hartwell home to be 

divided between the parties. 
The master concluded that with respect to the Hilton Head condo, Thompson paid 

the entire down payment on the property, every mortgage payment, all regime fees, 

all homeowner's insurance premiums, all taxes, and all fitness club dues and cable 

fees. He found Thompson's contribution totaled $129,838.70, and though 

Swicegood contributed sweat equity in the form of interior decorating, the amount 

of work she performed was disputed, and Thompson presented evidence she paid 

Swicegood for her labor and materials. The master found the equity in the condo 

was $120,325, and Swicegood contributed nothing financially to the property and 

was entitled to no right, title, or interest in that property. With respect to the Lake 

Hartwell home, the master concluded Swicegood paid $22,000 of the down 

payment on the home and Thompson paid $45,679.21 for the two lots and 

$6,678.43 of the down payment on the home. The master determined Thompson 

paid every mortgage payment, all property owners' association dues, all 

homeowner's insurance premiums and all taxes. He found Swicegood contributed 

sweat equity in the form of interior decorating and design, but the amount of work 

she performed was disputed and Thompson presented evidence she paid 

Swicegood for her labor and materials. He concluded Thompson contributed 

$129,838.70 and Swicegood contributed $22,000 towards the Lake Hartwell home, 

and the equity in the home was $67,742.25. The master found Thompson's 

contributions far exceeded both Swicegood's contributions and the equity in the 

property. The master found there was a tremendous disparity between the parties' 

contributions to the property and Swicegood had no right, title, or interest in the 

Lake Hartwell property. 

As to both properties, the master found the disparities between the parties' 

contributions to the acquisition and maintenance of the properties was in favor of 

Thompson and awarding Swicegood any interest in the property would be unjust 

and inequitable. Thus, the master awarded Thompson full right, title, and 

ownership of both properties, and awarded the remaining $6,000 and $45,000 to 

Thompson. The master denied Thompson's claim for ouster, finding although 

Swicegood committed ouster Thompson failed to establish damages. Swicegood 

filed a motion to reconsider, which the master denied. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Porter v. Labor 

Depot, 372 S.C. 560, 567, 643 S.E.2d 96, 100 (Ct. App. 2007). "This Court 

reviews all questions of law de novo." Fesmire v. Digh, 385 S.C. 296, 302, 683 

S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2009). "A partition action is an equitable action and, as 

such, we may review the evidence to determine facts in accordance with our own 
view of the preponderance of the evidence." Zimmerman v. Marsh, 365 S.C. 383, 

386, 618 S.E.2d 898, 900 (2005). "However, this broad scope of review does not 

require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the trial 

judge was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses." Laughon 

v. O'Braitis, 360 S.C. 520, 524-25, 602 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2004). On the 

other hand, "evidentiary and procedural rulings of the family court are reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion." Brown v. Odom, 425 S.C. 420, 429, 823 S.E.2d 183, 187 

(Ct. App. 2019). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial 

court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." Burke v. 

Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 421 S.C. 553, 558, 808 S.E.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 

2017) (quoting State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006)). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. Denial of Motion to Stay 

Swicegood argues the circuit court erred by refusing to consider the issue of 

marriage and stay the partition action pending a resolution of the marriage issue. 

She contends that if the courts were to determine she and Thompson were married, 

the order of partition would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 

the family court would have exclusive jurisdiction to determine their respective 

interests in the properties. Swicegood further asserts the court's refusal to stay the 

matter prejudiced her because the family court would have applied a different 

analysis in determining the parties' interests in the properties. We disagree. 

"The granting of a motion for a stay of proceedings rests entirely within the 

discretion of the trial [court]." City of Spartanburg v. Belk's Dep't Store of Clinton, 

199 S.C. 458, 20 S.E.2d 157, 167 (1942). Section 63-3-530(A)(2) of the South 

Carolina Code (2010 & Supp. 2019) provides, 

The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to hear 

and determine actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii, 

separate support and maintenance, legal separation, and 

in other marital litigation between the parties, and for 

settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties 

in the actions in and to the real and personal property of 

the marriage . . . . 

(emphasis added). "[M]arital property" is defined as "all real and personal 

property which has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and which is 
owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation . . . ." S.C. 

Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A) (2014). "The [family] court does not have jurisdiction 

or authority to apportion nonmarital property." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(B) 

(2014); see also Tipton v. Tipton, 351 S.C. 456, 459, 570 S.E.2d 195, 196 (Ct. 

App. 2002) (holding the family court "lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 

determine the parties' property rights in any way" when the family court found no 

common-law marriage existed between the parties and the appellant did not appeal 

that finding). 

"Under South Carolina law, the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction in all 

cases of real and personal estates held in joint tenancy or in common to make 

partition in kind or by allotment." Eichor v. Eichor, 290 S.C. 484, 487, 351 S.E.2d 

353, 354 (Ct. App. 1986). "[P]roperty held in joint tenancy is subject to partition." 

Smith v. Cutler, 366 S.C. 546, 551, 623 S.E.2d 644, 647 (2005). "An action for 

partition of undivided interests is not marital litigation, and thus is not within the 

jurisdiction of the family court." Gilley v. Gilley, 327 S.C. 8, 10, 488 S.E.2d 310, 

312 (1997) (quoting Eichor, 290 S.C. at 487, 351 S.E.2d at 355). 

As a threshold matter, we find the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to 

hear the partition action. See Eichor, 290 S.C. at 487, 351 S.E.2d at 354 ("Under 

South Carolina law, the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction in all cases of real 

and personal estates held in joint tenancy or in common to make partition in kind 

or by allotment."). In Swicegood, Op. No. 5735, we concluded no common-law 

marriage existed between the parties as a matter of law and affirmed the family 

court's dismissal of Swicegood's complaint based on lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Absent a marriage, there can be no marital property. The family court 

therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to divide the parties' property. Thus, 

the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the partition action. 

Next, we find the master was not obligated to grant a stay of the partition action 

under the circumstances of this case. See City of Spartanburg, 199 S.C. 458, 20 

S.E.2d 157 ("The granting of a motion for a stay of proceedings rests entirely 

within the discretion of the trial [court]."). The parties' marital status in and of 

itself does not affect the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction over a partition 

action between such parties. See Gilley, 327 S.C. at 10, 488 S.E.2d at 312 ("An 

action for partition of undivided interests is not marital litigation, and thus is not 

within the jurisdiction of the family court." (quoting Eichor, 290 S.C. at 487, 351 

S.E.2d at 355)). Here, the family court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, finding the parties had no common-law marriage as a matter of 

law pursuant to state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, which were still in effect 
 

at the time. See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15 (2014) ("A marriage between persons 

of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of this State."); see 

also S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 ("A marriage between one man and one woman is 

the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State"); 

S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10 (2014) (stating "[a]ll persons, except . . . persons whose 

marriage is prohibited by this section, may lawfully contract matrimony"); id. 

(stating "[n]o man shall marry . . . another man" and "[n]o woman shall 

marry . . . another woman"). Thus, at the time the circuit court and master ruled 

upon Swicegood's motion to stay, the family court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction to determine the parties' property rights. Under these circumstances, 

we find the master did not err by refusing to stay the partition action pending 

resolution of the family court matter. 

II. Partition 

Swicegood argues the master erred in determining the value of each party's 

contribution to the properties. She asserts the master erred by excluding evidence 

of the value she contributed to each property, including evidence relating to 

properties other than the Lake Hartwell home and Hilton Head condo. Swicegood 

contends she and Thompson purchased and "flipped" multiple properties, 

culminating in the purchase of the Hilton Head condo. She asserts her efforts in 

renovating properties the couple formerly owned attributed to the appreciation 

realized from the sale of those properties, and the "net gain" therefrom was 

"funneled into" the funds Thompson used to purchase the Hilton Head condo and 

Lake Hartwell home. Swicegood argues the master excluded evidence of the chain 

of sales that would have demonstrated such accumulation of equity. Further, she 

contends the master erred by failing to "adequately consider" her contribution of 

"sweat equity" of $20,000 in the Lake Hartwell home. Thus, she argues the 

master's decision should be reversed and remanded for a determination of the full 

value of her contributions to and interest in the properties based on all of the 

relevant evidence. We disagree. 

A. Exclusion of Evidence 

"The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound 

discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding 

evidence upon a showing of a 'manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by 

probable prejudice.'" Burke, 421 S.C. at 558, 808 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting State v. 

Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 262-63, 721 S.E.2d 413, 417 (2011)). "An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary 
 

 

 

support or are controlled by an error of law." Id. (quoting State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 

201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006)). "The general rule is that a joint tenant 

who, at his own expense, places permanent improvements upon the common 

property, is entitled in a partition suit to compensation for the improvements 

whether the co-tenants assented thereto or not." Shumaker v. Shumaker, 234 S.C. 

421, 425-26, 108 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1959) (emphasis added) (quoting Dalgarno v. 

Baum, 30 S.E.2d 559 (Va. 1944)). "In the absence of consent . . . the amount of 

compensation is estimated by and limited to the amount by which the value of the 

common property has been enhanced." Ackerman v. Heard, 287 S.C. 626, 629, 

340 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 1986). 

First, we find the master did not abuse his discretion in excluding evidence of 

Swicegood's contributions to former properties. See Shumaker, 234 S.C. at 

425-26, 108 S.E.2d at 685 ("The general rule is that a joint tenant who, at his own 

expense, places permanent improvements upon the common property, is entitled in 

a partition suit to compensation for the improvements whether the co-tenants 

assented thereto or not." (emphasis added) (quoting Dalgarno, 30 S.E.2d 559)). 

Here, the only properties at issue in the partition action were the Lake Hartwell 

home and the Hilton Head condo. Swicegood testified she and Thompson 

"flipped" several properties and ultimately purchased the Lake Hartwell home and 

Hilton Head condo; however, she proffered no evidence as to any specific value 

realized from her work on previous properties. Neither did she proffer evidence 

that Thompson used proceeds from any prior sale of such properties to purchase 

the Lake Hartwell home or the Hilton Head condo. Rather, Thompson testified she 

paid the entire down payment on the Hilton Head condo and the entire purchase 

price for Lot 58 with the inheritance she received from her parents. She stated the 

$10,209.98 and $6,678.43 she paid on the Lake Hartwell home came from her 

checking account. Thus, we find the master did not err by excluding evidence of 

any indirect contributions Swicegood made to properties other than the two 

properties at issue in this case.4 

Further, as evidenced by the master's order, the master admitted and considered 

evidence of Swicegood's direct contributions to the Lake Hartwell Home and the 

4

 We note Thompson admitted Swicegood's direct contribution of $22,000 for the 

purchase of the Lake Hartwell home came from the sale of property Swicegood 

owned. However, the master considered this direct contribution in reaching its 

conclusion, and we likewise consider this contribution in our review of the master's 

findings. 
 

Hilton Head condo, which consisted of testimony as well as exhibits documenting 

her contributions of labor and materials. 

B. Swicegood's Contributions5 

Although we review actions in equity de novo, we are not required to disregard the 

findings of the circuit court or its superior position to assess witnesses' credibility. 

See Zimmerman, 365 S.C. at 386, 618 S.E.2d at 900 ("A partition action is an 

equitable action and, as such, we may review the evidence to determine facts in 

accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence."); Laughon, 

360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 110 ("However, this broad scope of review does 

not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the trial 

judge was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses."). 

The court of common pleas has jurisdiction in all cases of 

real and personal estates held in joint tenancy or in 

common to make partition in kind or by allotment to one 

or more of the parties upon their accounting to the other 

parties in interest for their respective shares or, in case 

partition in kind or by allotment cannot be fairly and 

impartially made and without injury to any of the parties 

in interest, by the sale of the property and the division of 

the proceeds according to the rights of the parties. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-61-50 (2005). "The general rule is that a joint tenant who, at 

his own expense, places permanent improvements upon the common property, is 

entitled in a partition suit to compensation for the improvements whether the 

co-tenants assented thereto or not." Shumaker, 234 S.C. at 425-26, 108 S.E.2d at 

685 (quoting Dalgarno, 30 S.E.2d 559)). 

We find the master did not err in determining Swicegood was not entitled to any 

interest in the subject properties based upon her indirect contributions. Here, 

Thompson admitted Swicegood purchased some materials and contributed some 

labor to the improvement of the properties; however, Thompson also presented 

evidence she paid Swicegood several thousand dollars for this labor and material. 

Additionally, Thompson testified she paid $42,735.41 for construction and 

improvements to the Lake Hartwell home. Swicegood admitted Thompson paid 

her but denied she completely reimbursed her for her work. Swicegood did not 

5

 We have combined Swicegood's third and fourth issues under this heading. 
 

 

dispute Thompson paid all of the mortgage payments, utilities, insurance 

premiums, taxes and other dues on both properties. We find the evidence supports 

the master's findings that Thompson's contributions to both properties significantly 

outweighed Swicegood's. Although Swicegood performed some labor at both 

properties, we find the evidence shows Thompson reimbursed her for her 

contributions. 

However, we find the master erred by concluding Swicegood was not entitled to a 

portion of the $45,000 remaining on the Lake Hartwell home. The master 

correctly concluded Thompson made the greater offer to purchase the properties 

and determined the remaining amounts to be divided between the parties was 

$6,000 in the Hilton Head condo and $45,000 in the Lake Hartwell home. The 

evidence shows Swicegood contributed nothing financially to the Hilton Head 

condo and therefore the master did not err by concluding Swicegood was not 

entitled to a portion of the $6,000 remaining therein. As to the Lake Hartwell 

home, the master concluded Thompson contributed $129,838.70, Swicegood 

contributed $22,000, and the equity in the home was $67,742.25. We acknowledge 

Thompson's contributions exceeded Swicegood's. Nevertheless, because 

Swicegood contributed $22,000 to the purchase of the home, we find the master 

erred in failing to apportion any of the $45,000 remaining in the Lake Hartwell 

home to Swicegood. Swicegood is entitled to a percentage of the $45,000 

proportionate to her financial contribution of $22,000 to the purchase of the 

property and Thompson's contribution of $129,838.70. Swicegood's contribution 

of $22,000 was 14.49 percent6

 of the parties' total contributions of $151,838.70 

toward the purchase price. Thus, we find she is entitled to 14.49 percent of the 

$45,000 remaining in the Lake Hartwell home for a total of $6,520.50.7 

Accordingly, we affirm the master's finding Thompson was entitled to sole 

ownership, title, and interest in both properties and to the $6,000 remaining in the 

Hilton Head condo. We modify the master's order by awarding Swicegood a 

portion of the $45,000 remaining in the Lake Hartwell home. According to our 

calculations, Swicegood is entitled to $6,520.50, which is equal to 14.49 percent of 

$45,000. 

6

 The actual figure was 14.489, which we rounded to two figures for simplicity. 

7

 Thompson argues we should affirm the master's findings as to this issue because 

he found Swicegood committed ouster. However, the master denied Thompson's 

claim for ouster—a ruling Thompson did not appeal. Therefore, we decline to 

affirm the master's findings on this basis. 
CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the master's order of partition is 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.