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AIRPORT BAGGAGE SCREENING: MEETING GOALS

AND ENSURING SAFETY—ARE WE ON TARGET?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 7, 2002

Serial No. 107–134

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on August 7, 2002 ............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

DeCosta, Ben, general manager, Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, GA ....................................................................................................... 8

Stefani, Alexis M., Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, U.S. Department of Transportation; Stephen J. McHale, Deputy UnderSecretary

of Transportation for Management and Policy; and Willie Williams,

Federal Security Director, Hartsfield International Airport ..................... 36

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 4

DeCosta, Ben, general manager, Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, GA, prepared statement of ................................................................ 13

McHale, Stephen J., Deputy UnderSecretary of Transportation for Management and Policy, prepared statement of ............................................... 61

Stefani, Alexis M., Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, U.S. Department of Transportation, prepared statement of ......................................... 39

(1)

AIRPORT BAGGAGE SCREENING: MEETING

GOALS AND ENSURING SAFETY—ARE WE

ON TARGET?

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

College Park, GA.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:04 p.m., in the

Council Chambers Room, College Park City Hall, 3667 Main

Street, College Park, GA, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton and Barr.

Staff present: Kevin Long and Gil Macklin, professional staff

members; and Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk.

Mr. BURTON. Good afternoon. A quorum being present, the Committee on Government Reform will come to order.

I ask unanimous that all Members’ and witnesses’ written and

opening statements be included in the record. Without objection, so

ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and tabular

material referred to be included in the record. Without objection,

so ordered.

We have two panels today. Mr. DeCosta will be the first witness

on the first panel. We want to try to keep the opening statements

between 5 minutes—we will have a little latitude, up to 10 minutes, but if you could stick close to that, we would really appreciate

it because we do have a lot of questions we would like to ask.

First of all, I would like to thank my vice chairman, Bob Barr,

for suggesting this timely and important meeting. Airport security

is one of the most important issues that Congress is facing and

that we have had to deal with in the last year. I cannot think of

any place in America where airport security is a more pressing

issue than here at the Nation’s busiest airport, Atlanta Hartsfield

International. And I want to tell you, when I got off the plane

today, I have no doubt that this is the busiest airport in the country.

I want to welcome our witnesses here today. We look forward to

hearing your testimony. Today’s hearing comes at a critical juncture in our national effort to improve aviation security and prevent

future terrorist attacks. It is important to reassure the flying public that our airports, our planes and our aviation system are safe.

Like my colleague, Mr. Barr, I fly at least twice a week almost

every week. We know first hand the impact that September 11th

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has had on our airports and on the travelers in particular. We

know that some of the critical elements of developing a seamless

transportation security system have not yet come together.

This hearing is being held to address the looming deadline that

we have before us for screening checked baggage. Before September

11th, we did not have a system for screening checked baggage for

bombs. We had a vulnerability that we were not addressing. For

more than a decade, I have advocated increasing our use of bomb

sniffing dogs at airports and we had a difficult time getting that

accomplished. But because we did not have a crisis, it was very

hard to get people to pay attention. After September 11th, everything changed.

Last fall, we passed the Aviation and Transportation Security

Act. It set a deadline of December 31st this year to have explosive

detecting machines up and running at every airport. This is an extremely tough deadline, these machines are very expensive. Construction will have to be done at the airports, people have to be

trained, and we are hearing from more and more airports that this

deadline simply cannot be met.

The House realized that there would be problems meeting this

deadline. I voted for that extension, not because airport security is

not a priority, but because the job has to be done correctly. The

Senate has not yet passed a similar extension.

What exactly will happen if the Senate does not act as we did?

It is my hope that our witnesses might be able to provide some insight into that. One thing is certain, the flying public should be reassured that aviation travel is still safe, even if the deadline is extended.

I have been told that there are a number of screening machines

already produced, but there has been little thought given to the

challenge of installing the equipment, who is going to pay for it and

even which airports or where in those airports we will be placing

these SUV-sized machines. Obviously, there is a lot of work yet to

be done and not much time left to do it.

During the intense debate we had in Congress last fall, I supported having the Federal Government assume the passenger

screening function with Federal standards, Federal supervision and

Federal oversight. However, at the end of the day, we went even

further than that. We required that all airport screeners become

Federal employees. So we have given the administration two herculean tasks to be done at the same time—hire tens of thousands of

Federal screeners and place thousands of bomb detection machines

in every airport in the country and all in about 12 months. And I

want to tell you, that is a big job.

As many of my colleagues predicted, the TSA has been consumed

with hiring an army of more than 30,000 Federal workers. Right

now, only nine airports are Federalized and only about 4,500 persons have been hired at this date. I am told that the TSA is working feverishly toward meeting Congress’ passenger screening mandate of November 19, 2002. But we must ask ourselves honestly

what happens if this bureaucracy is not in place by then.

It is now being estimated that as many as 67,000 Federal employees will be required and I understand 45,000 has been approved by the Congress and approved by the Office of Management

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and Budget. That includes 33,000 for passenger screening and

21,000 to run the explosive detection machines. I, for one, would

like to know why those numbers have gone up so much.

Finally, we must address these pending aviation security issues.

Airports want answers. Airlines need answers and we owe the

American traveling public answers. We cannot allow the prospect

of 3 and 4 hour passenger waits for security risks and checks. We

cannot further damage our aviation industry with the number of

major air carriers on the brink of bankruptcy. We have a responsibility to deploy the most effective aviation and transportation security system possible, and because of the terrorist activity and the

possibility of terrorist activity, we do not have any other choice.

One thing is very important. We have got to have local input. We

need to know how our decisions are affecting the people who are

going to have to run our airports and that is why hearings like that

are very important.

That is why I am glad we have Mr. DeCosta, the manager of the

Hartsfield International Airport here today—we appreciate you

being here, sir. We need to know what we can do to help you do

your job better. Can you meet the December 31, 2002 deadline or

even December 31, 2003? That is the deadline that we passed in

the House that has not yet been approved by the Senate. What

happens if the Senate does not extend the deadline, as we have?

And more importantly, what steps are being done right now—taken

right now to screen baggage.

In closing, I would like to once again thank my committee vice

chairman, Bob Barr, for inviting me down to his State and district

to hold this important hearing.

Mr. Barr, I understand you have an opening statement, we will

recognize you right now.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. BARR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Both personally

and as vice chairman of this subcommittee, I appreciate very much

your taking time during this district work period, in which your

time and expertise is demanded, not only in your home district, but

as chairman of this committee, in various locations around the

country. We appreciate very much your taking some time from that

very busy schedule to be with us here in Atlanta. I would like to

welcome you to the Atlanta area, to Georgia, you are always welcome here to enjoy some Southern hospitality, Mr. Chairman.

I would also like to extend a personal welcome to Ben DeCosta,

who manages not only the world’s busiest airport, but in many of

our opinions, the best airport in the world. We know that is a constant challenge to juggle the sometimes competing demands of running the world’s busiest airport, but in my experience, as Mr. Burton has said, somebody who frequents Hartsfield with far more frequency than a lot of our families would like, I really do appreciate

the manner in which Hartsfield has been run and continues to be

run, and the manner in which you are attempting to meet the very,

very difficult challenges that have presented themselves by the

aftermath of September 11th.

Since the events of last September, the administration and Congress have worked together to mobilize the necessary funds, intelligence and personnel to track terrorists at home and abroad, and

to strengthen the Nation’s security infrastructure to meet and neutralize the threat that they pose.

Many of the post-September 11th airline security issues were addressed in the Aviation Security legislation adopted several months

ago. This important legislation targeted specific security concerns,

including access to secure areas of airports; cargo security; use of

explosives detection equipment; baggage screening; training to improve the performance of security screeners; and background investigations of airport and airline employees. The House has approve spending over $1 billion for the physical

modification of commercial service airports, for the purpose of installing checked baggage explosive detection systems and other security upgrades.

The luggage screening plan for Hartsfield calls for an in-line system, with built-in enhanced and expanded baggage handling rooms

throughout the airport. This design allows the Transportation Security Administration [TSA], to install and operate the explosive

detection system without decreasing the public space available to

passengers in the airport terminals. The project provides a permanent solution, integrated with airline and airport operations, and

avoids any temporary or make-shift design or procedures, outstanding achieve 100 percent checked luggage screening.

This comprehensive security upgrade has proved to be a massive

undertaking for our country’s airports, including the Nation’s busiest, Hartsfield International. Hartsfield, in particular, as a major

hub in our Nation’s domestic aviation system, will be greatly affected by the requirements of this Federal legislation. The most recent statistics show this airport served over 6.5 million passengers

just through May of this year. Hartsfield officials are responsible

for redesigning and constructing new security checkpoints, deploying sophisticated new equipment, and hiring and training scores of

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new employees—all while attempting to minimize the inconvenience to passengers.

Today, we will hear from Hartsfield General Manager Ben

DeCosta, who has estimated the TSA will need to hire 1,500 people

to screen baggage at the checkpoint and at the gates. He has wellfounded concerns with the balance between deadlines, passenger

delays and meeting the substantive requirements of the law.

Mr. DeCosta is not the only aviation official who has communicated such concerns. Given the bill’s aggressive timetable and

deadlines, many airline officials have communicated similar concerns. In July, officials from 39 airports across the country wrote

Transportation Secretary Mineta, asking him to work with them to

achieve a more reasonable deadline. The letter warned of ‘‘harried

installations’’ of explosive detection machines in airports that have

little space for new equipment.

Moreover, the results of a recent survey conducted among airport

executives by the American Association of Airport Executives,

showed an overwhelming majority, some 78 percent, of the airport

executives surveyed, believed the Congress should move back the

December 31, 2002 deadline mandating all airports and airlines

screen checked luggage for explosives; not to avoid meeting the

substantive need for full screening of luggage, but to ensure a more

realistic timetable within which to meet the those substantive requirements.

Based on these concerns and the problems the Department of

Transportation is expected to encounter in meeting that second

deadline, the House approved an extension of the December 31,

2002 deadline. H.R. 5005, the bill to establish the Department of

Homeland Security, contains a provision to extend that deadline for

screening all checked airline baggage for explosives.

It is critical to note, however, this does not mean there will be

gaps or threats to air travel safety. On the contrary, if the deadline

extension is ultimately signed into law, airlines and airports will

have a number of options to choose from in the interim. These options include using explosive-detection machines, using bomb-sniffing dogs, increasing hand searches by security officers, and socalled bag matching, by which every bag is matched to an actual

passenger on the plane. While airports work toward full deployment of explosive detection machines, the TSA has assured the flying public that other screening measures will serve during the interim, and wherever the machines are available, they will be used

as close to full time as possible. This makes much more sense than

spending hundreds of millions of dollars right now, only to discard

such equipment in the near future, as the newer and better equipment is made available, and then have to spend all that money

again a second time.

In short, the deadline extension implies no vulnerability. We can

and must work together to provide the means and capability for

airports such as Hartsfield to meet the new security requirements.

Deadline or no deadline, the safety of the flying public is our ultimate goal.

I want to again thank Chairman Burton for calling this important hearing and for coming to Atlanta to chair this hearing personally. I also wish to thank General Manager Ben DeCosta for his

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continued leadership in this area. I look forward to hearing from

all the witnesses on the progress made here at Hartsfield, on the

outstanding demands, and what the Congress can do to assist airports in meeting aviation security needs.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Barr.

Before we go to Mr. DeCosta, I would like to thank the mayor

of College Park, GA, Mr. Longino, for being so hospitable by letting

us use this chamber today. And I would also like to thank Gary

Wade, who is the director of the Air Marshal Service for being so

hospitable to us, we really appreciate your help, and your staff,

Gary; thank you.

With that, would you rise, Mr. DeCosta, to be sworn?

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Do you have an opening statement, sir?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes, I do.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Well, I told you before the meeting that we

would like to stay close to 5 minutes, but I understand that you

may take a little longer, so we will try to be understanding.

Mr. DECOSTA. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF BEN DECOSTA, GENERAL MANAGER,

HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ATLANTA, GA

Mr. DECOSTA. I would like to thank Chairman Burton and Congressman Barr for hosting this hearing. This is an important national issue and we really appreciate your leadership on the issue.

As the world’s busiest airport, more than 75 million passengers

annually pass through our gates. With economic impacts of $16.8

billion annually, we are also the largest single economic engine in

the State of Georgia or the southeast. In short, Hartsfield is very

important to America. We want to do everything we can to ensure

the safety of our passengers and visitors and protect the viability

of Hartsfield for the Nation.

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today to share

our experience with enhanced security measures at Hartsfield. We

also would like to share our views regarding the best approach for

the Transportation Security Administration to meet the 100 percent bag screening requirements mandated by Congress.

In this post-September 11th environment, it is essential that we

do all we can to enhance security at our Nation’s airports and to

restore and maintain the confidence of the traveling public. Our

economy depends on it.

We have fully implemented all necessary security measures to

further enhance our security program at Hartsfield. On September

11th, we increased our law enforcement support by 300 percent,

thanks to the tremendous support received from the city of Atlanta

Police Department, Federal law enforcement agencies and other

local municipalities. The Clayton County Police Department, for example, actively patrolled the outer perimeter of the airport during

the initial stages of the recovery. The mutual aid received from

these agencies allowed us to quickly resume operations. We also

welcomed the deployment of the Georgia Sky Guards to assist in

the monitoring of security screening operations. We were also

pleased when Guardsmen were given authority to support our law

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enforcement officers in other areas of the airport such as the concourses.

The airport community has responded also very positively to our

increased security awareness through its involvement in our airport security consortium. Our consortium, under the leadership and

direction of our Aviation Security Manager, Mr. Richard Duncan,

who is here with me today, meets regularly to review security directives and assess their impact on airport operations. The consortium developed plans for revalidating security badges, searching incoming vehicles and reducing the number of access portals, while

maintaining our ability to provide quality customer service to our

passengers and to our employees. We have devoted a tremendous

amount of resources to ensure the full implementation of the additional security requirements at Hartsfield.

We believe that the Transportation Security Administration has

also made tremendous strides toward improving security at airports across the Nation. In short order, they stood up a brand new

agency, they moved out and made partners of airports and established these partnerships at many airports and others in the aviation industry to assess the status of security while planning a

course to fully implement the provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The organizing of a new Federal agency, the

establishment of recommendations, early appointments of Federal

security directors, the establishment of TSA go-teams and the passenger screening checkpoint redesign approach are all noteworthy

accomplishments done in record time by the TSA. At Hartsfield, beginning in March of this year, we provided TSA consultants with

the full support and cooperation of my employees and our consultants, to make sure that they would be successful or as successful

as they could be in meeting the November deadline for passenger

screening. They worked jointly with the TSA consultant team,

Accenture, during the ongoing checkpoint redesign. That redesign

is continuing and part of our checkpoint is actually undergoing reconstruction. So we have made some good progress.

We believe that under the able leadership of our Federal Security

Director Willie Williams, the Federalization of the passenger

screening operation will be both effective and timely.

The design for the passenger screening checkpoint reconfiguration is underway and we understand that the hiring of more than

1,400 TSA staff and supervisors is progressing. While we do not yet

have a firm date for the implementation—that is the Federalization

of the security checkpoint—the TSA should meet the November

19th date for passenger screening at Hartsfield, we believe. We are

still working out a few issues on the physical configuration and

who pays for what, but we think we will be successful in working

out those details on passenger screening.

With the appointment of Admiral Loy, we hope to strengthen our

partnership with the TSA as we forge ahead with the full implementation of the statute requirements.

The implementation of 100 percent baggage screening requirement is, unfortunately, not going as well. We continue to cooperate

with the TSA consultants, but with mixed results. The cooperation,

the attitude, the partnership is right, but the approach is wrong.

Rather than consider, in dialog with airport management and our

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consultants, the best approach to accomplish the baggage screening

and enhanced security at Hartsfield, TSA consultants have come to

town with a predetermined approach—the use of explosive trace

detection systems placed in our ticketing lobbies, rather than the

more effective x-ray type explosive detection systems [EDS], integrated into our airline baggage systems. We believe that the more

effective approach at the world’s busiest airport is to make the baggage screening part of the airline baggage system. However, TSA

has pushed placing this function in constrained ticket lobbies,

where they will undoubtedly lead to long lines and congestion.

What is needed is a more flexible approach by TSA. That we

think can only occur if Congress will provide the TSA and the U.S.

Department of Transportation with the guidance and appropriate

funding resources to accomplish this important goal—let us do it

right the first time.

The TSA has accelerated the planned implementation at Congress’ direction, of course. For the most part, congressional deadlines have been very, very positive indeed. You have energized the

government, the airports, the airlines to do a much better job and

I think the results are becoming more and more apparent. Except

for the baggage screening, the deadline tends to force us on an allegations path that leads us which, in our view, is the wrong direction.

Section 110(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,

enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the President on

November 19th of last year, directed the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security to take all necessary actions to ensure that

explosive detection systems are deployed as soon as possible to ensure that all U.S. airports have sufficient EDS to screen all

checked baggage no later than December 31, 2002—a very short

time indeed. All systems deployed are fully utilized. If EDS at an

airport is unavailable, all checked baggage is screened by alternative means.

So the Congress has given us a chance to use more than one approach and there is some flexibility. The alternative means include

the bag match program, manual search, K9 units and other means

or technology approved by the Under Secretary, which of course

would include the trace detection.

The safety and security of the traveling public should be the

overriding factor during the implementation of this section of the

act. We would propose to the TSA and its baggage screening consultants a solution that would enhance passenger safety and security while meeting the intent of the act. However, the TSA and its

consultants will not discuss or consider our recommendations. They

do not have time, they say.

At Hartsfield, we have proposed that the TSA develop and implement with us an integrated and automated in-line EDS solution

that would be transparent to the public. An integrated and automated EDS approach is the only workable solution to address our

large baggage volumes at the busiest airport in the world, in our

opinion.

We are developing plans to implement an integrated explosive

detection system for screening the bags. This system can be in

place, we believe, our planners are telling us—we are working out

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schedules as we speak—we think we can do it in between 18 and

21 months at a cost of probably over $100 million, maybe somewhere between $100 and $120. The numbers keep moving as we

are refining the approach. While an in-line system has a higher initial capital cost, the long-term benefits are significant. An automated in-line system, for example: Requires one-sixth the number

of employees to operate as compared to trace detection solution at

Hartsfield. Does not add congestion to already constrained

ticketing lobbies. Provides redundancy in the case of mechanical

failure. Does not force passengers to wait in additional lines for security screening. And allows flexibility to easily incorporate new security technologies in the baggage handling system as they become

available.

We support H.R. 5005 and the provisions recommended by Congresswoman Granger in the Homeland Security Bill that extended

the deadline for the EDS deployment to December 31, 2003. Of

course, from my testimony, you know that we would have difficulty

having 100 percent deployment under our solution by that date,

but certainly we could get a good head start on the right path rather than spending and wasting time on an interim solution which

we think is not as effective.

This provision in the Homeland Security Bill would allow the

TSA to consider our recommended integrated EDS approach and

would create a cost savings of about $25 million, or actually somewhat more if you consider the cost of the interim solution to TSA.

You would not have to spend money on an interim facility, demolish part of the terminal, which you would have to replace, and you

would end up saving the throw away cost on the interim solution

which would probably be more than $30 million.

In addition, the interim solution requires heavy staffing. We estimate that you would need between 1,000 and 1,200 people in the

interim approach, whereas less than 200 would be needed for the

in-line integrated EDS system approach. With a fully loaded cost

of between $45,000 and $50,000 per person, you can see that this

additional staffing would cost the Federal Government a considerable sum.

The TSA’s interim plan calls for a combination of EDS and explosive trace detection equipment in our crowded lobbies to meet the

deadline. This concept would result in higher screening personnel

requirements. And I mentioned that if it is somewhere between

1,000 and 1,200, maybe you could do it perhaps with somewhat

less, but the cost would exceed $40 million a year at Hartsfield.

And some analysts have estimated that it would be over $1 billion

nationwide.

Significant alterations to current check-in facilities and processes

that have a direct impact on passenger responsibilities and their

resulting travel experience would occur with this trace detection

system.

There also may be an increased requirement for explosive ordnance disposal response because of false positives that may result

in the ticketing office. That is an operational issue that needs to

be explored further with TSA.

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Additional and high density lines of passengers in and outside

the terminal building, which could conceivably create a new target

for terrorists.

We believe TSA should explore alternative means such as bag

match and emerging technology, to screen baggage while actively

pursuing—let me repeat—actively pursuing an integrated system

at the busiest of America’s airports. Currently the required number

of EDS machines is not available. The TSA has stated that it can

increase production, however, we have not seen an increase in the

deployment of these systems. Nationwide, TSA has deployed only

about 6 percent of the total devices that are needed for airports

and so you can press forward to meet the deadline but there are

some challenges and difficulty in actually meeting it in terms of the

availability of needed machines.

In order for the TSA to meet its schedule, it must purchase and

install EDS and ETD machines every 38 minutes between now and

December 31st of this year.

Let me skip over some of this, I know I am coming to the end

of my 10 minutes.

The Airport Alliance, consisting of 39 of the Nation’s airports has

gone on record to request an extension of the 2002 deadline. Our

intention is not to relax security, but to enhance security. We firmly believe that the interim measures to deploy the EDS equipment

in lobbies and other spaces just to meet the deadline is not the

right approach. In fact, this approach will create bottlenecks and

safety hazards for our customers. Simply stated, we may be creating a more lucrative target for terrorists and other criminals.

In closing, airports throughout the Nation are committed to protecting the safety and security of our passengers and we fully support the TSA in our goal of strengthening the security of aviation.

But in the case of the 100 percent baggage screening approach, the

TSA plans to implement a program at Hartsfield that will not give

us the best security or acceptable levels of customer service. The

TSA must revisit its solution for the world’s busiest airport. An integrated and automated checked baggage screening system is the

right solution for Hartsfield.

We fear that harried efforts will compromise efforts to enhance

security, frustrate our aims to increase capacity and slow the return of the industry to financial health. We should do the bag

screening right the first time. We may not be able to afford to do

it over again.

Again, thank you very much for this opportunity to share our

views with you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeCosta follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. DeCosta. It’s a little disturbing to

me that you are having this kind of disagreement with the TSA

people. Were they recalcitrant when they talked to you about your

suggestions?

Mr. DECOSTA. I would not use the word recalcitrant, because

they are highly professional people who are very smart and seem

to know their business. But they have been given a clear and definite mission and that is to do 100 percent explosive detection

screening by the end of this year and are not permitted, either by

budget or by timeframe, to consider various other modes of getting

the job done, like the in-line system.

Mr. BURTON. When you were talking about the in-line system, I

am not sure I understood you correctly, but you said it would take

one-sixth of the employees once it was on line; is that correct?

Mr. DECOSTA. If you have what we think would be roughly 26

or 20 EDS machines installed in line in the baggage systems, not

in the lobbies, but below the ticketing lobbies, you would run that

entire process with less than 200 people. But if you use the current

TSA approach of putting trace detection machines, of which there

are over 160, in the ticketing lobbies, you would need a work force

to cover the full operating day at Hartsfield of between 900 and

1,200 people.

Mr. BURTON. And—— Mr. DECOSTA. Of course, if you hired all of those people and then

you got the preferred approach implemented in 2 years or less,

then those people would have to be let go.

Mr. BURTON. So you would have duplicative costs and you would be wasting, what did you say, $30 million or—— Mr. DECOSTA. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. About $30 million?

Mr. DECOSTA. Or more, on the interim solution. Those would be

sunk costs that would be of no use to you in 3 years after you got

your other systems up and running.

Mr. BURTON. Well, when you discussed this with the TSA experts

that came down, what did they say about that? Is it just because

of the timeframe within which they have to work that they are

very concerned about getting on with it or is it——

Mr. DECOSTA. I think they are very committed to meeting Congress’ mandate of the deadline. The word has come down from Congress through Secretary Mineta to each and every person at TSA,

that this deadline must be met. And so they are following the directions they are given.

Mr. BURTON. But the deadline could not be met if your approach

was adopted by the end of this year.

Mr. DECOSTA. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. So long-term, your approach is far superior, but in

the short run, if we are going to protect the public as quickly as

possible, we ought to take a look at what they are suggesting.

Mr. DECOSTA. Well, I think what we should do is have a combination of methods. You know, security of airports is much better

than it was last September 11th, and so security across airports

around the Nation will increase month by month as we go forward.

There is nothing magical about the December 31, 2002 date. What

you should do is plan to increase security to its highest level and

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rather than take an interim, you know, step that will actually cost

you more money and not deliver what is in our view the highest

level of security.

Mr. BURTON. But you say there could be an amalgamation of the

two approaches that would be effective within a relatively short period of time?

Mr. DECOSTA. I think so.

Mr. BURTON. What timeframe are you talking about?

Mr. DECOSTA. I think if you start immediately on trying to take

care of your interim solution as the statute permits—the statute

does permit some flexibility. You use your hand searches, your K9s

and trace detection, but at the same time you work on the real solution, you do not wait.

Mr. BURTON. What I would like to have is a list of your recommendations and your recommendation on how these two could

be integrated to give maximum security as quickly as possible and

yet impose these cost savings you are talking about and still protect the flying public. So if you could get those to us, since our committee oversees the entire government, I will be very happy to

make sure that Mr. Mineta and the people at TSA get those and

we will ask questions as to why they do not see eye to eye with

you in the approach and maybe we will get some compromise that

might be more helpful to you. We have people from TSA here today

of course and we are going to be asking them questions about your

statement as well.

With that, I see my time has expired. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DeCosta, when you use the term in-line automated and integrated system, what exactly do you mean? And could you basically

just sort of walk us through how such a system would work, just

very briefly?

Mr. DECOSTA. You would have every bag that comes into the system go into the baggage system and go through a bank of somewhere between 10 and 13 CTX–9000 machines. Those machines, on

an automated basis, can detect whether or not there is an explosive

in the bag. And if the bag fails, then the bag comes off line and

is searched.

Now there are some false positives, and so the system is designed to take the bag and have it reviewed, the image reviewed,

by an operator. That operator would either clear the bag based on

their intelligence of how these machines work or then it goes into

a second series of machines in which the machine would then review it by x-ray technology to determine whether that bag has in

truth a bomb in it or whether it is a false positive.

If the bag clears, it then is shipped back into the baggage system

and ends up on an aircraft. If the bag fails, either because there

is a bomb in it or there is a false positive, the bag is taken off line

and searched.

And so in this system, you can get most of the bags through the

system in an automated system and some residue of bags would actually end up being searched by TSA officials to determine whether

the bag is safe.

Mr. BARR. Compare that walk-through with what TSA is proposing.

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Mr. DECOSTA. They are proposing that when the passenger

comes into the ticketing lobby carrying their bags, they will go to

ticketing and then after ticketing, they will get in a second line and

be shepherded to trace detection machines which are about this big

[indicating], they could sit on this table. A TSA official would then

swipe the bag on the outside or perhaps on the inside and it will

pick up a fine residue of an explosive material, if there is one in

the bag of the people who have handled the bag have handled this

material. This cotton or paper swab would then be placed into this

explosive trace detection machine, which would accept the vapor

from the materials. It is warm, if it detects certain chemicals that

you find in explosives, then it will alarm and you will know that

you have a problem.

Once that is done—and this takes a great deal more time, of

course, than through an automated system, then the bag will have

to be taken from that desk and then placed into the baggage system.

The difference is in the accuracy of the approach and in the time

it takes to handle large portions of bags. Our fear is that the trace

detection methodology, if used wholesale, would—for 100 percent—

would result in very long lines, especially if you were not able to

staff all of the machines available at the ticketing counters. And

one of our concerns is that of hiring this 1,000 people and keeping

them on the job is not a foregone conclusion. If you do not have this

part of the system which is labor intensive fully staffed, the lines

will back up, fill up our ticketing lobbies and people will be in line

out on the street.

Mr. BARR. Is this the same technology that currently is available

when you take your hand baggage through and there is a problem

or they, for whatever reason—you do not have to go into the details

of it here publicly—it is the same technology that is currently being

used for suspicious hand bags.

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes. We do a sampling of baggage, hand bags,

coming through and do the trace detection for explosives.

Mr. BARR. For a hand baggage, I have kind of a general impression of how long it takes, but how long does it take on average for

that process?

Mr. DECOSTA. Well, for carry-on bags, it is pretty quick, but for

checked baggage, it would take I think considerably longer.

Mr. BARR. Is that because of the size of the bags?

Mr. DECOSTA. Well, especially if you open the bag and you go

through the inside of the bag with it. There are several approaches—a closed bag approach, an open bag approach. One takes

more time than the other.

Mr. BARR. And this would be done—orient us to Hartsfield right

now, where would this be done, as you enter terminal A or—the

north or south terminal?

Mr. DECOSTA. The north or south terminal, you would approach

ticketing, handle your ticketing transaction and then move behind

the ticketing counters—of course in your travel through Hartsfield,

you know there is no space there now, there are offices behind

those ticket counters. Those offices would have to be demolished

and that space would then be used for——

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Mr. BARR. It is my impression even if you do that, you are still

not going to have very much space.

Mr. DECOSTA. Probably not, especially if the throughput is slow,

which we would expect.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just followup on Mr. Barr’s questions. You

indicated that they might have to open the bags to do that hand

check with the explosive detection device. Do I deduct from that if

the bag was closed, there could be a bomb inside that might not

be detected if you did not open it up?

Mr. DECOSTA. I would rather not speculate on this technical

area.

Mr. BURTON. OK, well, in a public forum, I can—OK, we will talk

about that later, but the point is that is very disconcerting because

if you have got thousands of bags going through and there is some

question about the detection capability of that system without the

bags being opened, my gosh, that would be like the Israeli system

where they go through everybody’s bag one at a time before an airline departure. I mean it would almost come down to that. So that

is something that we really need to look into and I would like to

talk to you about that problem probably privately in a closed session. But we would like to have you give us in writing some of the

concerns you have that will be transmitted through our committee

directly to Mr. Mineta and the Transportation people as well as

TSA. But that raises a real question as far as I am concerned.

Mr. Barr, if you have more questions, go ahead.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What are the benefits in the approach that you have just outlined, the TSA is proposing? Are there any?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes, there are. One of the benefits is that you can

meet the deadline with it. For those people who feel that is a sufficient benefit.

You could do this—you might be able to meet the deadline, let

me put it that way, because there is a lot of work to be done between today and the end of the year to even implement that option.

Mr. BARR. You say on page 13 of your testimony that TSA has

deployed only 6 percent of the total devices they will need at airports. Why is that figure so low?

Mr. DECOSTA. The manufacturers are trying to build as many

machines as they can as fast as they can and it is far from certain

that the manufacturing capacity is there, and then once you have

the machine, you also have to find a place to put it. As you know,

these are very large machines and you have to try to wedge them

into existing facilities, if you do not build out those facilities. Building them out will not be done by the end of the year, and so if you

use the current EDS machines in combination with trace, you will

have to wedge these machines into the present terminal.

Mr. BARR. Is there a demonstrably high false positive rate for the

current machines?

Mr. DECOSTA. The current EDS machines, we have heard by

some researchers and commentators, have a high false positive rate

of between 20 and 30 percent.

Mr. BARR. How much?

Mr. DECOSTA. Between 20 and 30 percent. I think my testimony

has the 30 percent number. That is what has been reported in reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Dec 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\82668.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cent studies by the Reason Foundation. But you could ask the TSA

what has been their experience on false positives.

But the system that the TSA and the airports are putting together will take into account the false positive characteristic of the

machine, to make sure that at the end of the system, that we are

sure that we can protect the public against explosives getting on

aircraft.

Mr. BURTON. If I might followup with a couple of questions.

Mr. BARR. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. The cost of buying the machines is going to be

borne by the Federal Government. The installation, as I understand it, is going to be borne by the local airport authority.

Mr. DECOSTA. We hope not.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I know, but—— Mr. DECOSTA. That is still an open question. We believe that—— Mr. BURTON. Just give me a rough idea what it would cost to install a machine or all the machines that you would require here at

Hartsfield.

Mr. DECOSTA. For an in-line system, our estimate is between $100 million and $120 million.

Mr. BURTON. To install them.

Mr. DECOSTA. Well, that’s an all in cost that includes both the

cost of the machines and the installation.

Mr. BURTON. Well, the machines themselves, as I understand

it—we are talking about cost of installation.

Mr. DECOSTA. Just bear with me 1 second. And these numbers

are spongy because we are in the planning phase, considering

various—— Mr. BURTON. While he is looking that up, let me ask you a couple

of other questions. You have a couple of machines here at

Hartsfield now?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes, we have an Envisions machine in the south

terminal in the baggage system and a CTX–5000 out on Concourse

E which is the international facility.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Now it was brought to our attention that those

in the past have not been utilized fully, some up to 10 percent, 20

percent, maybe 30 percent. Can you tell us what percentage of utilization is—— Mr. DECOSTA. The best information I have for you right now is

that they are used on all selectee bags.

Mr. BURTON. On all what?

Mr. DECOSTA. There is a certain percentage of passengers who

the computers will select for a more in-depth survey.

Mr. BURTON. It is random selection?

Mr. DECOSTA. Well, it is not just random, it is also a computer

algorithm that tries to assess the risk of a person being somewhat

of a threat.

Mr. BURTON. A profiling of some kind?

Mr. DECOSTA. I hesitate to use the word, but yes, there is a computer approach to determining what people are more likely to be

a risk rather than less likely and those people are selected in conjunction with the random selections. So you have both a random

selection and those people who meet a certain profile, like how you

buy your ticket, for example, which would spit you out and then

34

your bag is searched in some parts of the airport or goes through

one of these computer operated x-ray machines. And so this Envision machine is used for all selectees.

And then out on Concourse E, the CTX–5000, that is also used

in a like manner.

Mr. BURTON. But you don’t know the percentage of utilization at

this time?

Mr. DECOSTA. No, I do not know exactly what the utilization is.

Mr. BURTON. It would seem that you would probably be using

them almost 100 percent of the time, because you have so much

baggage and so many people coming through this airport.

Mr. DECOSTA. Well, if we have some time later, we can go down

and take a look at it.

Mr. BURTON. I think Congressman Barr and I would both like to

do that.

Do you have any more questions right now, Bob?

Mr. BARR. Just a couple here.

It is my understanding, Mr. DeCosta, that TSA’s contractor,

which I believe is Boeing, is supposed to complete site assessments

at all major airports by the end of this month to determine exactly

how many machines are needed. Has the site assessment for

Hartsfield been completed?

Mr. DECOSTA. We are in the final stages of the assessment. The

TSA used Ratheon to do the first series of assessments and recommendations. Once the contract with Boeing was finalized, then

Boeing fielded a team and we have worked very cooperatively with

them so they understand how the airport works, what the operations are like and we understand that they have a recommendation to TSA and we are hopeful soon to know more precisely what

their recommendation is and then give us an opportunity to respond to it. I believe that another site survey team is due at

Hartsfield this week—tomorrow.

Mr. BARR. And do you anticipate that it will be completed by the

end of the month?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes, certainly.

Mr. BARR. Is one of the benefits to the approach that TSA seems

to be taking that if there is a problem with the bag, you are assured of having the person whose bag it is right there with the bag

at the time the problem is identified?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yeah, I guess that would be a benefit of that, although you can work out procedures to make sure that if there is

a problem, that a person is available even if you are not in the

ticketing lobbies.

In answer to your question on the cost, the terminal modifications would cost over $80 million.

Mr. BURTON. $80 million in installation?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes, we would have to modify the terminal and

the north parking deck.

Mr. BURTON. Now you are talking—if the gentleman would

yield—you are talking about if they do the in lobby——

Mr. DECOSTA. No, in-line system.

Mr. BURTON. The in-line system itself that you are advocating,

would cost $80 million.

35

Mr. DECOSTA. Would cost over $80 million. And the balance of

the 120 that I mentioned is the cost of the equipment, which is

clearly a TSA cost and the over $80 million that is uncertain as to

who bears that cost.

Mr. BURTON. What is the cost of the equipment itself?

Mr. DECOSTA. $38 million.

Mr. BURTON. So you are saying that two thirds of the cost is

going to be borne by the local airport authority unless something

is worked out with the Transportation—— Mr. DECOSTA. Well, our position is that this is a national defense

issue and it should not be borne by the airports.

Mr. BURTON. I understand. We will talk to TSA about that a little bit.

Let me just ask one more question and I will yield back to Mr.

Barr. It sounds like your relationship with the TSA and their contractors has been kind of good and bad.

Mr. DECOSTA. I would say it has been professional with a good

attitude for the most part, and I—— Mr. BURTON. But you have disagreements.

Mr. DECOSTA. Yeah, the major disagreement is on the approach

taken and the approach is being taken because of their commitment to the deadline.

Mr. BURTON. But you indicated in your statement earlier I think

that they—when you told them that you thought there was a better

way to skin the cat, they were very adamant that their way was

the way it was going to be done.

Mr. DECOSTA. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. So there was no resiliency there.

Mr. DECOSTA. There was no dialog on this other approach because they are committed to a predetermined approach.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Well, what I would like to have, and I think

Mr. Barr would like to have, is your recommendations that we can

present to them and find out the reasons why they feel so strongly

that their position should not be changed. So if you could get that

to us, we will ask questions of Mr. Mineta and the TSA about that.

And also I have some other questions for the record that we

probably will not be able to get into today, we would like to get

those to you and if you would answer those, we would appreciate

it.

Mr. DECOSTA. Certainly.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. I do also, Mr. Chairman, and we will certainly coordinate those with you and have those submitted to Mr. DeCosta.

I very much appreciate your testimony today and, of course, your

continued service at Hartsfield. And hope that we can work this

out, because I agree with you that we do not need to rush into

something here, we do need to get it right the first time. If it takes

a little bit more time in order to do that, so long as, as you have

assured us, there are measures that will continue to be in place to

protect the traveling public in the meantime, that certainly does

seem to make a lot of sense.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. DeCosta, we really appreciate your

hospitality and your candidness, and we appreciate your staff as

36

well, and we will look forward to taking a little tour of the airport

and seeing what you do after we conclude the meeting.

Mr. DECOSTA. OK, thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. We will now hear from our second panel, Mr. Stephen J. McHale, the Deputy Undersecretary of Transportation for

Management and Policy and Alexis Stefani. And we also, I understand, will add to that panel, Mr. Willie Williams, who I guess was

a former police chief in Los Angeles—I saw you on television, good

looking fellow—and you are now the Federal Security Director, is

that correct?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Would you please stand to be sworn?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. I think we will start with Ms. Stefani.

We will start with you. Do you have an opening comment you

would like to make, or statement?

STATEMENTS OF ALEXIS M. STEFANI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR

GENERAL FOR AUDITING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; STEPHEN J. MCHALE, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

OF TRANSPORTATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND POLICY; AND

WILLIE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR,

HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Ms. STEFANI. Yes, I do.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Barr, I appreciate the opportunity

to testify before you today concerning the progress the Transportation Security Administration is making in implementing the

Aviation and Transportation Security Act.

We all recognize that ensuring our transportation systems are secure is a tremendous task, one that has never been undertaken before on a scale of this magnitude. TSA is making progress—for example, it has awarded three major contracts for hiring and training

all the passenger screeners and for deploying and installing the explosives detection equipment at over 400 airports nationwide.

However, the heavy lifting lies ahead. Today, the deadline to

have a Federalized screener work force in place is just over 3

months away, while the deadline to begin screening 100 percent of

all checked bags is less than 5 months away. While there has been

much debate as to whether these dates are achievable, we can attest that TSA and the Department are working diligently to meet

these deadlines and could not be working any harder. As we get

closer to the deadlines with only a fraction of the airports completed, the task ahead becomes more formidable.

It will become clear, in our opinion, in the next 30 days as to

what exactly must be done, airport-by-airport, to meet the deadlines. And this is based on two key factors. Site assessments are

really the driving force behind determining what equipment mix of

the explosives detection equipment must be put in each airport,

and as a result will also then determine the number of staff you

need for both the EDS and the trace equipment. Once these assessments are done in August at approximately 260 airports nationwide, we will have much better data.

TSA is also moving ahead and hiring up for the passenger

screeners. Consequently, in our opinion, we will be in a much betVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Dec 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\82668.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
37

ter position by the end of August to judge what is or is not feasible

by the deadlines.

I would like to provide you with some specific information on

where TSA stands on meeting the two main deadlines. First, on

hiring and training the passenger screeners. As of July 31st, nine

airports are currently operating with a full, complete Federal

screener work force. During July, the TSA contractor was at over

200 airports with 100 teams to determine if the passenger screener

checkpoints needed to be reconfigured and to determine the

amount of staff that would be needed at each of the checkpoints.

Over the last month, we can say the pace of hiring has increased

and is accelerating. TSA has almost tripled the number of screeners on the payroll, to about 4,400 with another 6,800 individuals

who have accepted employment with TSA. At the end of July, TSA

was accepting applications for 415 airports and had opened assessment centers for 119 airports. This compares to only three airports

under the assessment process in mid-June.

However, TSA estimates that it will need, in total, up to 33,000

passenger screeners. With just over 3 months left before the deadline, this means that TSA needs to hire and train approximately

8,000 passenger screeners per month. While TSA has made adjustments in its hiring process to respond to past events, we are concerned about its difficulties in hiring screeners in major metropolitan areas, your large cities. For example, TSA estimates it will

need about 2,300 passenger screeners for the airports near New

York City. Since June, 774 individuals have accepted offers for employment, or about 33 percent of the targeted amount.

These delays in hiring in the large cities have been largely due

to no shows. That is, individuals who have applied for a position

but do not show up at the assessment centers. That accounts for

about 25 to 35 percent. Of those that do show, approximately 50

to 60 percent fail the aptitude test at the centers.

I would like to move now to the screening of the checked bags.

This challenging deadline for TSA, to screen 100 percent of the

checked bags, is unprecedented. An effort of this magnitude has

never been done in any single country or group of countries. In

fact, the amount of explosives detection equipment necessary to

screen all checked bags, or approximately 7,000 units, is estimated

to be at least three times the amount deployed at airports worldwide.

To be successful in this effort, TSA must effectively manage

three concurrent activities. First, it needs to place the orders for

the remaining equipment of 75 EDS and 4,500 trace units. Because

of manufacturer long lead times, all orders must be placed by the

end of September if the equipment is to be delivered and installed

by the year’s end. Then the manufacturers must meet their delivery schedules.

Second, TSA must ensure it meets all the milestones on the deployment. As Mr. DeCosta spoke, they are currently in the first

phase of a six phase process looking at what equipment mix will

have to be done at each airport. Site assessments have been started

at 202 airports. Of these, 45 were completed by July 26.

The next 30 days, as I said before, will tell what can or cannot

be accomplished by the deadline.

38

After site assessments, stages of design, construction and actual

installation of the equipment must occur. For TSA, this will stretch

out over the remainder of the year with 43 of the largest airports,

including Atlanta, DFW and San Francisco, scheduled to be completed by the last week in December. Schedule creep in any one of

these phases will, of course, ultimately affect the December deadline and TSA’s ability to meet it.

Third, a checked baggage screener work force of 21,600 must be

hired and trained by December 31st. This is in addition to the

33,000 passenger screeners. As of July 16th, TSA had only 200 of

these baggage screeners hired and deployed.

Finally, I would like to discuss the usage of the EDS equipment

already in place. For many years, we have talked about this and

have requested that the use of these machines be increased. Today,

as of May of this year, the latest data we have available, over 82

percent of the machines that are in use, are, on average, screening

750 bags per day or less. In our estimate, these machines can easily do 1,250 bags per day. In our opinion, TSA needs to direct that

the current rate of machine usage pick up substantially or we are

going to miss out on a great opportunity to get more practice, to

learn more about how these machines operate in the airport environment, and to provide increased security.

Mr. Chairman, my statement also had information on cost controls. To save time, I will be glad to answer any questions, but I

will not talk about that right now.

That concludes my statement. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. You have created a lot of questions, Ms. Stefani.

Secretary McHale.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefani follows:]

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Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Chairman Burton and Vice Chairman Barr. I am pleased to represent

Admiral James Loy, the Acting Under Secretary of Transportation

for Security.

With me this afternoon is, as you have acknowledged, Willie Williams, the Federal Security Director of the Hartsfield Atlanta

International Airport. He is our leading representative at the airport and is in charge of all the Federal security responsibilities at

Hartsfield.

Mr. Williams has 30 plus years of service in law enforcement, he

was Police Commissioner of Philadelphia and Police Chief of Los

Angeles and he brings a wealth of excellence, talent and commitment to this important position.

Also, as you have acknowledged, with me today is Mr. Gary

Wade of the Federal Air Marshal Service, who also has many,

many years of law enforcement experience and brings that talent

to our greatly expanded air marshal service.

I would also like to mention that TSA has selected Mr. Quinton

Johnson to be the FSD responsible for the Valdosta Municipal Airport and the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport. The TSA is currently in the process of selecting an FSD for Savannah.

Since September 11th, the Department of Transportation and

TSA have worked intensely to tighten security throughout the aviation system. These efforts include enhanced screening measures,

hardening of cockpit doors, greatly increased deployment of Federal

air marshals and more intelligent use of technology. They have

dramatically increased aviation security for all passengers.

In addition to recognizing the hard work and perseverance of

hundreds of employees of the FAA and TSA, we owe a debt of gratitude to the thousands of airport security workers, law enforcement

officers, National Guard personnel and hundreds of thousands of

aviation industry employees who have contributed so much to our

efforts to increase security. Perhaps most importantly, we are especially grateful to the millions of travelers who continue to exercise

great patience with the enhanced security measures.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that all

passengers be screened by Federal employees by November 19,

2002 and that checked baggage be screened by explosive detection

equipment by December 31, 2002. This is an immense challenge for

TSA and for the Nation’s airports and airlines. From the beginning,

TSA has been committed to meeting these deadlines and all of the

other mandates of the act. We developed plans for doing so and

continue to move forward aggressively.

I am going to give you a few of our accomplishments and you will

hear the numbers that will be slightly different, slightly higher

perhaps, than Ms. Stefani just mentioned, partly because I think

my numbers are a few days sooner, and given the implementation

at TSA, every day adds a bit more accomplishments, we bring on

a few more people, we do a few more things.

We have met every deadline imposed by Congress in the ATSA

to date. The biggest one for us initially was taking over the responsibility for civil aviation security from the airlines on February 17.

At that time, TSA as an agency was really only about 40 days old,

and yet we were able to enter into contracts with all of the contract

59

screening companies to replace the airlines in that responsibility

that they had been exercising for many years.

In the southeast region and particularly here, that task was accomplished by the FAA personnel and civil aviation security, who

have come over now to TSA, headed by Jackson Smith, who is the

regional director for aviation security here and has been up until

this point. Now, we are migrating over to the full TSA structure.

We have appointed 118 Federal security directors who are responsible for security at over 300 airports around the country and

should complete the appointment of all the remaining Federal security directors by the end of this month.

We have implemented a rigorous training program for Federal

security directors—screeners that has more than tripled the length

of the one used before September 11th.

We have begun recruiting at all the Nation’s airports and we

have held 37 job fairs and our staffing contractor, MCS Pearson,

is operating 55 regional assessment centers.

Over 600,000 people have applied for jobs as screeners and we

have hired a little over 10,000 of them, about one-third of the number we need to reach the November 19th deadline.

Federal passenger screeners are now working at 19 airports and

they began working at Athens, GA just last week.

One hundred percent of all checked bags are being screened with

explosive detection equipment at four airports. We have orders

pending for over 1,000 EDS machines—that is the large explosive

detection system machines—and 119 of those have been delivered

so far.

We have also received about 200 trace detection machines and

have orders in place for in excess of 4,000.

Interim and final plans for the deployment of baggage screening

systems are being developed. Boeing, our explosive detection contractor, is working at more than 220 airports, including all of the

major airports. We have received a number of designs and should

have the remainder in about 4 weeks.

And this is only a partial list of our accomplishments for an

agency that did not even exist at the beginning of this year.

Here in Atlanta, we have recruited about half of the approximately 1,200 passenger screeners that we believe we will need. We

expect to begin deployment of those passenger screeners toward the

end of this month, possibly into September. Obviously we need to

work around the Labor Day weekend, we do not want to be doing

a major turnover that weekend, but we will work around that.

The assistance we have received from the airport, especially from

Mr. DeCosta, has been superb and we agree that Atlanta poses

unique problems for explosive detection deployment. But we will

continue to work with the airport over the next weeks and months

and years to get this system right.

No one expected it to be easy to implement the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act and it has not been easy. But Secretary Mineta, Admiral Loy and all of us at TSA remain strongly

committed to the mission.

Unfortunately, the recently enacted emergency supplemental appropriation is below the amount the President requested. Accordingly, we are now undertaking a fundamental re-evaluation of all

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our business plans to fit within the budget that Congress has given

us. Our preliminary evaluation suggests that we will be able to

meet the November deadline for passenger screening. However, we

are looking at whether we will have enough money to meet the

baggage screening mandate in the timeframe set by Congress. As

we complete that evaluation, as we look at exactly how we will proceed, we will keep you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee informed, as well as the Appropriations Committee and the T&I

Committee.

In the 261 days since President Bush signed the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act into law, we have accomplished a great

deal. In the 146 days between now and December 31st, we have a

lot more to accomplish and TSA employees around the country are

dedicated to the task. With your support, we can deliver on the

promise made last year in the ATSA.

Mr. Williams and I look forward to answering any questions that

you or other Members may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Williams, do you

have any comments you would like to make?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Very good.

It was a little disturbing to me, Mr. Secretary, that even though

he couched his concerns in diplomatic terms, that the administrator of the airport here said that there was a recalcitrance on the

part of the TSA officials that came down as far as working with

him to solve the problem in not only the most expeditious way, but

also in the most cost effective way.

Can you explain that to me?

Mr. MCHALE. Well, I will let Mr. Williams in a moment just talk

about the relationship that we have had with Mr. DeCosta and his

staff, which I think has been excellent, as well as our contractors.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me just 1 second. I know it has been excellent and I know that you are gentlemen and you do not hit each

other and that sort of thing. But it sounds like to me there is a

real difference of opinion in how to protect Hartsfield from the people who came down to Washington and made recommendations.

And I would like to know why and is there room for compromise

or is it, as he said, pretty much set in stone?

Mr. MCHALE. Talking and listening to Mr. DeCosta and also,

from what I know of our approach nationwide as well, I think the

issue here is not one of disagreement or unwillingness to talk about

a variety of solutions. What we are driving toward and what our

mandate is at this point is to come up with a plan, a system, for

100 percent explosive detection using explosive detection equipment by the end of this year. Mr. DeCosta’s proposal, as he outlined it here, is one that would take well beyond that deadline to

complete.

We are committed—this is a long-term commitment for us obviously, this is a long-term program to ensure permanent improved

security at airports. December 31st is a deadline that was in the

act that we are trying to meet, we are committed to try to meet

it. We have proposals to meet it.

But the equipment that is out there today, the systems that are

in place today, are—will improve over the years to come as we

apply good American ingenuity. I think what we are going to be

looking to is how do we continually upgrade these systems and

move toward more automatic or integrated systems.

One of the places where we do disagree with a number of people

from the aviation industry is whether the technology that is available today is at a state where it is really going to be as effective

and automatic within an in-line solution as we would like it to be.

The EDS equipment, these large machines today, require us, when

they alarm—and they alarm quite frequently—to actually remove

the bag from that machine and then take it over and do a trace

detection on the bag, take it to the second type of technology and

do that trace detection. It is not really an automatic process, and

given the type of false alarm rate we are hitting today, we do not

have a high degree of confidence that the systems will work fully

in line.

Mr. BURTON. What percentage of false alarms do you have?

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Mr. MCHALE. It is coming up in the range that Mr. DeCosta said,

it is over the 20 percent range, which we have to resolve.

Mr. BURTON. So 20 percent of the bags that would go through the

system, on the on-line system, would have to be taken off and rechecked.

Mr. MCHALE. Right. So one of the things we look at then

inputting in an in-line system is how can we do that. If we are

going to take—there are some airports where we are looking at inline solutions today, but they are ones where the costs are not as

high as they might be at an airport like Hartsfield. We are trying

to work with airports that are already doing construction work,

such as Jacksonville, which is building a whole new terminal and

baggage handling system, to try to work with them as they build

that new terminal out to work to do the in-line EDS systems and

pave the way for maybe improvements in the system that may be

a year, 2 years, 3 years away. We do not see a great improvement

coming down the line any time soon, but we need to be thinking

ahead 2, 3, 4 years out, as the technology improves.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask one more question. Ms. Stefani said

that—and this is my math, so I might be off just a little bit—that

about 60 percent of the machine time is being utilized, which

means that about 40 percent is not being utilized. Why is that? You

were talking about on-line machines, were you not?

Ms. STEFANI. I was talking about the ones currently in all the

lobbies.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. MCHALE. The machines are used today, they are operated

primarily by the contractor personnel. We are taking over these

machines, we have—as we are going to take them over, as we are

going to deploy the Federal screeners, we expect to be able to use

them close to 100 percent of the time. Ms. Stefani and I have discussed the fact that we need to continue to try to drive toward a

greater utilization.

Mr. BURTON. So it is because of the personnel changes that are

going to be required?

Mr. MCHALE. And the layouts of where the machines are. They

were not originally put in to really do the 100 percent baggage

checks, so they have to—we have to reconfigure things and things

like that. But we can use them more than we are using them today

and we will continue to work toward that.

Mr. BURTON. One last comment that I will make and then I will

yield to Mr. Barr and then I might have some more questions. It

seems to me that in airports, especially like Hartsfield here, where

the manager, Mr. DeCosta, is conversant with all the problems and

he is talking about you are going to have to tear out walls, you are

going to have to spend $30, $40, $50 million to reconfigure the airport, all that sort of thing, it just seems to me that there ought to

be—I understand that you have a plan and you want to stick to

your plan and you have to not deviate, but it seems to me that

there ought to be at least some open-mindedness to the needs of

the local airport authority in dealing with the problem. And I do

not like to use the word recalcitrant because it sounds like you do

have a fairly good working relationship with the airport authority,

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but it seems to me that there ought to be a little more openness

and a little more understanding of the problems they face.

With that, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

About a week and a half ago, the House passed the President’s

Department of Homeland Security Bill and while many Members

may have had some specific concerns about one thing or another

and certainly we exercised our prerogative and made some finetuning to it, the general feeling in the Congress was that the President, as essentially the CEO and the person tasked with the responsibility of implementing the mandate of the Congress reflecting the will of the people, ought to have the type of framework that

he, as the CEO, believes would best accomplish the task before

him. Do you think that’s a good approach to take, a good perspective?

Mr. MCHALE. Yes.

Mr. BARR. Why would that not apply then to Mr. DeCosta and

the heads of major airports, as the CEOs, if they come to you and

say we believe as the CEOs and the persons actually responsible

for carrying out and implementing in an appropriate way the mandates of the Congress, why would you not grant them the same deference that we believe is appropriate to grant the President, at a

higher level?

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, we actually believe we granted a lot

of deference and try to work very closely in partnership with the

airports as we develop these plans. Again, the disagreement between Hartsfield and TSA is over really the timing of when we are

going to be able to deploy explosive detection equipment to check

100 percent of the bags. I think Mr. DeCosta agreed that his plan

does not come close to meeting the deadline that we are currently

operating under. And really the only disagreement here is that we

have a plan that we are talking to him about, how to implement

it, but our plan is designed to meet the statutory deadline. There

is not really a disagreement, in my view, over the actual implementation of a plan to meet the statutory deadline in that sense.

Mr. BARR. What is the goal? Is the goal to meet a deadline or

is the goal to implement the very best plan over the long-term to

protect the traveling public in a way that is the most cost effective

at the same time?

Mr. MCHALE. I think the goal is a bit of a combination of both.

On the one hand, we believe, as I think the Congress does, that we

should have explosive detection equipment out there as soon as we

can, because of the level of threat against the United States, the

kinds of threats that we face. We have designed a plan that will

meet that deadline, try to provide that equipment by the end of the

year, as the Congress suggested, an appropriate deadline in light

of the threat. But that is only a marker on the way. I think we

have to continually——

Mr. BARR. So you are not saying that the very best system will

be the one that might get in place by December 31st.

Mr. MCHALE. That is correct. We should continue to study it,

continue to improve it, continue to replace it.

Mr. BARR. But if in fact substantial costs are incurred in meeting

that deadline, that then would have to be incurred all over again,

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and as a matter of fact might over the long term even be more expensive because then you would have to sort of undo what you

have already done in order to meet that deadline in order to get

in place the very best long-term integrated automated system,

would it not make at least some sense, would you concede, to

maybe take another look at that deadline and make sure that we

are doing the there thing, and that is a realistic deadline for the

long term?

Mr. MCHALE. I think we always have to look at how we proceed

on the security role, but we have to balance what is the technology

out there, what is available, how we can get it installed, what may

be over the horizon that might be better. The technology out there

today obviously can be improved, but the time line for doing that

is quite prolonged, unfortunately, from our look at it. So we need

to look at what we have today and see how we can get it in place

as soon as we can and then continue to improve it.

Mr. BARR. When we talk about it, you are not talking about a

one size fits all system though, are you?

Mr. MCHALE. Absolutely not. People always tell me that when

you have seen one airport, you have seen one airport.

Mr. BARR. Has that been communicated to Mr. DeCosta, that the

whole process of determining what is the very best system would

include consideration of an automated integrated system, such as

he has proposed and I think other major airports have proposed

also?

Mr. MCHALE. We have had a lot of conversations with the airport

directors as a community. Let me just turn to Mr. Williams for a

moment and let him talk about the conversations—— Mr. BARR. But as the policy director, I really would prefer for you

to answer that question first and then let Mr. Williams expand on

it.

Mr. MCHALE. I have not had that conversation with Mr.

DeCosta, I have had it with—I have had a number of conversations

with—— Mr. BARR. Are you communicating that to him today though at

this hearing?

Mr. MCHALE. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. BARR. Is that good news, Mr. DeCosta?

Mr. DECOSTA. Yes.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Mr. Williams.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I think you just about got your answer, but the

discussions have, to a great degree, as Mr. McHale just said, centered on the issue of getting the best system that we can in place

with the technology that is available today and meeting the congressionally mandated deadline, but also recognizing at the same

time that there have been discussions, perhaps not at Mr. DeCosta

and my level on a regular basis, but certainly with staff, that this

is really just the beginning, that as technology improves, that as

time and resources are available, there are probably better and

more economical, from the standpoint of dollars and cents and personnel to increase it in the future.

Mr. BURTON. Let me followup. I guess you are like our Defense

Department where we have new weapons systems coming on board

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that are going to make us less vulnerable to a military attack from

Saddam Hussein or somebody and because of that, we appropriate

money for new technologies and new weapons systems almost every

year, because there are new things coming on line.

Are you saying that in effect, we are going to have to be looking

at new technologies to detect terrorist threats at airports and elsewhere ad infinitum, each year have to take another look at it and

if there is new technology coming on that is superior, that Congress

is going to have to look at that like a national defense budget increase?

Mr. MCHALE. I think there is some truth in that. I think we certainly all hope that we will win this war on terrorism and decrease

the threat, but I think we do need to look at—there are obviously

new threats that come about that we need to respond to, but also

I think what is important to realize is that the security technology

that is available today was never really designed for the kind of

threat that we face today. It was designed for a very different kind

of era when we did not have to check every single bag.

But this is what we have, this is the technology we have. We can

look down the road, we have actually sought funding and Congress

has provided some funding for research and development to continue to see how we can improve this. But we do have to deal with

what we have available to us today. And given the nature of the

threat, we have to deal with trying to get that equipment installed

and also meeting the congressional mandate.

Mr. BURTON. Ms. Stefani, you raised a couple of questions—more

than a couple—that was kind of disturbing. You said that 50 to 60

percent of the people that apply as screeners fail the aptitude test

and you said that 20 to 25 percent after they make application do

not show up?

Ms. STEFANI. Correct, that from the time the people do the initial

application, which will do basic screening say for English, your proficiency, basic skills, basic information about the person, that they

will apply on line usually and then when they get notified to come

to an assessment center, they do not show up for the further tests.

Then once at the assessment center, TSA is also again having people drop out that they fail various parts of that assessment center

process.

Mr. BURTON. The percentage was what concerned me.

Ms. STEFANI. Yes, 50 to 60 percent.

Mr. BURTON. That fail the aptitude test.

Ms. STEFANI. It’s not just the—including the aptitude test, it

would be other things, such as the medical, drug testing, all different kinds of things, but in total what happens is—let me give

you an example. If 10 people applied at TSA on line and TSA will

call six people in for their assessment, and only four will show. And

then during the process, basically you whittle it down and you end

up with one person actually accepting the offer. And TSA has

adapted its processes to try to adjust for what was happening. This

is predominantly at your large cities that we are seeing this kind

of dropout rate as the process progresses.

Mr. BURTON. So it is a combination of educational ability and

physical problems and possible drug use.

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Ms. STEFANI. Or criminal record, those kinds of things that

would just, you know, automatically drop the person out.

Mr. BURTON. Is a large part of it the educational—— Ms. STEFANI. I would prefer—we can analyze the data and I can

give you a lot more information.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to have that, because you know, that

could be a real indictment of our education system if we are trying

to hire all these screeners and that people do not have the educational skills to do that job. That kind of bothers me a little bit

and we would also like to know about how the people who have

criminal backgrounds who are applying break down and those

that—do they give them a drug test? Is that right?

Ms. STEFANI. Correct, yes.

Mr. BURTON. So you give them a drug test, those that are failing

the drug test.

Ms. STEFANI. Let me get a record up of what the history has

been to date for TSA and provide it to you.

Mr. BURTON. OK, and then the question you raised about the

equipment that we have on line right now only being utilized to the

tune of about 60 percent. I think the Secretary indicated that was

probably because the personnel they have doing it right now is not

as well equipped to do the job as the ones that are being hired. Is

that your assessment as well?

Ms. STEFANI. It is in part. What we have is a requirement that

the airlines use it if their individual is a selectee and there is other

factors—there are other factors that go into that, but that is going

to be compared to 100 percent. We have said and testified numerous times—previously it was FAA and now it is TSA—they need

to increase this random factor, they need to get more bags into the

system and use those machines that we have out there.

Mr. BURTON. And Mr. McHale, is TSA planning to do that?

Mr. MCHALE. We are, Mr. Chairman, particularly as we get in

there to reconfigure these airports so that the machines are in the

right places and we get our trained people in there, but I think

there are certainly machines out there we can be using a lot more.

Mr. BURTON. When you talk about reconfiguring airports, you are

talking about putting these machines in the lobbies in close proximity to the ticket counter?

Mr. MCHALE. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. How do you deal with the problem that Mr.

DeCosta brought up awhile ago about long lines outside? This airport, I came in here today and I could not hardly get on the subway. I mean the amount of people is just phenomenal and I can

imagine if you get to a holiday season, that you are going to have

people standing in the parking lot trying to get in.

Mr. MCHALE. It is a challenge, but we have been working a number of different pilot programs around the country where we have

been doing 100 percent of the explosive detection system, running

the bags through EDS systems, 100 percent of the bags through

trace systems. And actually what we have found is that, particularly if those machines are located after the passenger checks in at

the ticket counter, that typically the wait is metered, measured by

the ticket counter wait. In other words, people tend to be waiting

at the ticket counter to actually check in and then they proceed to

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the machine to check their bag. There usually is not—there is virtually no wait time at the actual machines once they have been

through the checkpoint.

For example, at Norfolk airport, we had an average of about between 16 and 18 minutes that the passenger was waiting to check

in their bag. The wait time at the ETD machines, the trace machines, that the passengers then went to, was about 30 seconds and

the average processing time for a suitcase was a little over—about

a minute and a quarter. It was very short, again we did the outside

of the bag.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I hope you are correct, but I hope you will

work with Mr. DeCosta because I am not sure he would agree with

your time sequence there.

Mr. MCHALE. Right.

Mr. BURTON. And the last thing I would like to ask, and I do not

want you to answer this in public, and I probably should not have

asked the question in public, but I asked Mr. DeCosta about the

detection equipment now where they put that—when I go into Dulles or I go into Reagan National or here and you put your bags in

the machine and they run that cloth over it to put it in the machine, when I asked him—from his testimony it sounded like there

might be something in that that would not be detected. I would like

for you to give us some information on that because that would be

a problem if all those bags had to be opened in order to use that

equipment for that purpose.

Mr. MCHALE. We will be happy to arrange an appropriate briefing.

Mr. BURTON. OK, we would like that.

Mr. Barr, do you have any other questions?

Mr. BARR. Just a couple, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to the deadlines, I am not quite sure how you come

up with any degree of optimism that these could be met. You know,

I look at the figures here from Ms. Stefani’s testimony, with just

over 3 months left, TSA needs to hire and train more than 8,000

passenger screeners a month, that would be just to meet the November 19th deadline. That is basically about 400 a day over the

course of a 20-day work month and the number of machines to

meet the—you know, to be tested and installed and up and workable to meet the December deadline is several dozen per day.

I mean other than just sort of a rote commitment to saying we

have to meet a deadline, we will meet a deadline, by golly we will

meet a deadline, we have to meet a deadline, I mean how—I just

do not see any realistic way that those deadlines can be met unless

something gives in that process. And I am not quite sure what can

give if you insist on saying you can meet the numeric deadlines

other than quality.

Mr. MCHALE. We have built a system—as Ms. Stefani said, we

have actually tripled the rate at which we are hiring in the last

month. We are ramping up to do this.

Lockheed Martin is providing the training for the screeners, they

are committed to being able to train up to 7,500 per week if we

have to reach that point. We expect actually to be at about between

300 and 4,000 per week within the next couple of weeks. We

slowed this process down a little bit as we waited for the suppleVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:18 Dec 10, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\82668.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mental appropriation to come through. And Congress enacted it

last week, the President signed it and that is now available to us.

We are ramping up full speed now and we have tremendous confidence actually that we will meet the November 19th deadline.

The end of the year deadline is—we actually have worked with

the various manufacturers, we spent a lot of time going over their

production lines. One of Boeing’s jobs is to actually work on the

processes that those manufacturers have in place and to ensure

their capability of meeting the deadline and to look at additional

production capabilities. And through orders that we have placed,

we have caused the supply pipeline, all the various parts for these

machines, to be fully flowing, it actually has been fully flowing now

for several months, so the parts are actually—the long term lead

parts have actually been on order and are coming in now to the

manufacturing facilities.

So we have been working on this program with a lot of detail at

the plants, trying to address all these issues. We have known this

was going to be tough from day one and through the work of the

Deputy Secretary and a number of other people, we have worked

very, very hard to put ourselves in a position to do it.

The concern that we have, as I mentioned in my testimony, is

that we did get a lower amount of funding than we requested. And

we are now examining exactly how that is going to play out toward

the end of the year deadline. We will meet the November 19th

deadline. We have to see whether the—exactly how the money

plays out toward the end of the year deadline, how that will work

out also with the 2003 appropriation, which of course will be coming before the Congress.

Mr. BARR. The November 19th deadline is 104 days away. How

many passenger screeners still need to be hired?

Mr. MCHALE. We have about—the November 19th deadline? We

have about 20,000 to hire, 22,000. We have hired about 10,000.

Mr. BARR. So the figures, Ms. Stefani, of 33,000, that’s 13,000

less?

Ms. STEFANI. As Mr. McHale had spoken earlier, we are using

slightly different days, so we were looking at the end of July that

they had about 11,000 either on board or that they had accepted

our offer. So I will agree with his 22,000 figure.

Mr. BARR. So as of the end of July, there were 33,000 and as of

now, 6 days later, there are 20,000?

Ms. STEFANI. No, excuse me, I must have confused that.

The 33,000 is their goal that they must have on board by November 19th, and given that they have hired about 11,000 at this point,

either hired on board or they have accepted offers, we are looking

at approximately 22,000 more that must be hired in the remaining

3 months.

Mr. BARR. I do not think my confusion is misplaced. I am not

being critical but I am just trying to figure this out. Your testimony

is that it is pretty clear that with just over 3 months left, TSA

needs to hire and train more than 8,000 passenger screeners a

month.

Ms. STEFANI. Right.

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Mr. BARR. This is to hire the estimated 33,000 passenger screeners needed. I read that to mean that that testimony indicates we

need to hire 33,000 people before the November 19th deadline.

Mr. MCHALE. But we have already recruited 10,000. That is I

think where the difference is. We have to bring on—we have recruited 10,000, we have to recruit 8,000 more a month over the

next 3 months and that will bring us to—actually if we did that,

it would bring us to 34,000.

Mr. BARR. So are you saying there have already been how many

thousand already hired?

Mr. MCHALE. About 10,000. We have recruited 10,300. Not all of

those are in training yet. We have about close to 6,000 of them are

actually either trained or in training, the others are scheduled to

start training. And we have to recruit another 23,000 to meet the

33,000 goal, so it is about 8,000 a month, about 2,000 a week and

that is what we are—we are actually spooling to do more than that

because we want to achieve this goal a little ahead of the statutory

deadline of November 19th.

Mr. BARR. Now these are those that have actually passed

through and passed the first phase of the assessment.

Mr. MCHALE. The assessment, that is correct, they have either—

they are either on our rolls being trained, or trained and deployed

at airports, they have received job offers that they have accepted

and they are being scheduled for training. So they are at a variety

of different stages.

Mr. BARR. And you have every confidence that without making

any sacrifices in the quality of the standards that you will be able

to meet that November 19th deadline?

Mr. MCHALE. We are confident. The biggest problem, as Ms.

Stefani has said, is in some of the bigger cities. We had originally

hoped to be able to complete the recruitment process in about 3

weeks. We learned in our experience in Baltimore that we had to

stretch that out and we stretched it out quite a bit. We started recruiting in all of the cities actually sooner than we had intended

to, so that we are now trying to recruit everywhere in the country,

even though some of the big city airports and some of the airports

will not in fact roll out until the October-November timeframe, so

we really want to give ourselves the maximum amount to accommodate that.

Mr. BARR. With regard to hiring also, is there a concerted effort

being made to recruit former military personnel?

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, we—there is a veterans preference that is applied. Actually, as a practical matter, within the application process, we are actually trying to fill so many vacancies that we are

able to offer positions to veterans who pass the assessment with

no——

Mr. BARR. I am sorry, to what?

Mr. MCHALE. To offer positions to veterans who pass the assessment process. Even though they are veterans, they still have to go

through the testing and the assessment process and pass through

that process. If they pass that process, we are recruiting so many

screeners that is not a problem in the sense of getting positions for

them, there are more than enough positions.

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Mr. BARR. But is there an active effort being made, a conscious

active effort made to recruit military, former military personnel? It

would seem to me a tremendous pool of folks that already have

some familiarity and training in the sorts of skills that you would

be interested in.

Mr. MCHALE. I believe there is a program that we have in place

that works with the Armed Forces dealing with members who are

leaving the services. I am just not certain what our outreach is to

the veterans groups. I will look into that and get back to you.

Mr. BARR. Could we get some additional information on that? I

would be very curious to that.

Are there European airports that have already instituted the

type of in-line integrated and automated system that Mr. DeCosta

believes is the appropriate one for an airport such as Hartsfield?

Mr. MCHALE. No, not using the whole CTX—the EDS kind of

equipment we are using. There are European airports that do integrated systems using what is called vivid x-ray technology and

then following up with CAT scan technology. The vivid technology

is not certified in the United States as meeting the standards for

explosive detection.

Mr. BARR. But is—I am sorry, what is not certified, the system

that some of the European airports are using?

Mr. MCHALE. That is correct. It does not meet our explosive detections standards. And again, there are issues about that I would

be happy to brief you in a closed session.

Mr. BARR. I would appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, did you have any additional questions?

Mr. BURTON. I think we have covered it pretty well. Let me suggest that we have some other questions that we—I do not want to

be redundant, but we would like to submit them to you in writing.

Mr. MCHALE. Absolutely.

Mr. BURTON. And if you could respond to us, we would really appreciate it.

Do any of you have any final comments you would like to make

before we conclude the hearing?

Ms. STEFANI. No, sir.

Mr. MCHALE. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr, any further questions?

Mr. BARR. Just one. If in fact the Senate adopts the same provisions that the House did and that is what emerges out of the conference committee with regard to the action the House took on the

Homeland Security legislation, with regard to the deadlines, you

will certainly make every effort to meet those deadlines and comply

fully with the law as passed by the Congress and if that is signed

by the President.

Mr. MCHALE. Absolutely.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. If there are no further questions, I want to thank

you very, very much for being here. It has been very illuminating.

There are still questions that need to be answered, but hopefully

you will give us in writing some of the problems and solutions and

I know that Mr. DeCosta is going to give us some suggestions

which we will pass on to you and ask some questions about it in

written form.

74

If you would not mind sticking around just for a minute after we

conclude, because I would like to talk to you and Mr. DeCosta before we go on our tour.

Mr. MCHALE. Certainly.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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