16 June 1995

Joint Doctrine for

Military Operations

Other Than War

Joint Pub 3-07
JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The range of military operations,

first established in Joint Pub 3-0,

described military operations extending

from war to military operations other than

war (MOOTW). While we have

historically focused on warfighting, our

military profession is increasingly

changing its focus to a complex array of

military operations — other than war.

This publication describes the basic

tenets of MOOTW — from a general

description of all types of operations to

planning considerations necessary for

effective execution. It serves as the springboard into a series of publications

on tactics, techniques and procedures that provide additional detail on the

more complex MOOTW.

Participation in MOOTW is critical in the changing international security

environment. Although the goals and endstates may not be crystal clear,

you should spare no effort in planning and executing MOOTW. Your support

of national security interests in today’s challenging environment is as crucial

as it is in war.

You should become familiar with the information contained herein — our

Nation and its independence may depend upon your knowledge.
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication explains how military

operations other than war (MOOTW)

differ from large-scale, sustained combat

operations. It addresses purpose, principles,

types of operations and planning

considerations. A doctrinal basis is

provided for related joint tactics,

techniques, and procedures (JTTP)

publications which address specific types

of MOOTW.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under

the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to

govern the joint activities and performance

of the Armed Forces of the United States in

joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis

for US military involvement in

multinational and interagency operations.

It provides military guidance for the

exercise of authority by combatant

commanders and other joint force

commanders and prescribes doctrine for

joint operations and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed

Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

It is not the intent of this publication to

restrict the authority of the joint force

commander (JFC) from organizing the force

and executing the mission in a manner the

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity

of effort in the accomplishment of the

overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in

this publication apply to the commanders

of combatant commands, subunified

commands, joint task forces, and

subordinate components of these

commands. These principles and guidance

also may apply when significant forces of

one Service are attached to forces of another

Service or when significant forces of one

Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or

JTTP) will be followed except when, in the

judgment of the commander, exceptional

circumstances dictate otherwise. If

conflicts arise between the contents of this

publication and the contents of Service

publications, this publication will take

precedence for the activities of joint forces

unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, normally in coordination with the

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

has provided more current and specific

guidance. Commanders of forces operating

as part of a multinational (alliance or

coalition) military command should follow

multinational doctrine and guidance ratified

by the United States. For doctrine and

procedures not ratified by the United States,

commanders should evaluate and follow the

multinational command’s doctrine and

procedures, where applicable.
ii

Preface

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

• Purpose...................................................................................................................... I-1

• Military Operations Other Than War ....................................................................... I-1

War ........................................................................................................................ I-1

MOOTW ............................................................................................................... I-1

• Primacy of Political Objectives ................................................................................ I-2

• Strategic Aspect ........................................................................................................ I-3

Deterrence ............................................................................................................. I-3

Forward Presence .................................................................................................. I-4

Crisis Response ..................................................................................................... I-4

• Range of Military Operations Other Than War ........................................................ I-5

MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force ................................................... I-5

MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force ............................................ I-6

Simultaneous Operations ...................................................................................... I-6

• Duration of Operations ............................................................................................. I-7

• Conclusion ................................................................................................................ I-7

CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1

• Principles of Military Operations Other Than War ................................................ II-1

Objective ............................................................................................................ II-1

Unity of Effort ..................................................................................................... II-3

Security ............................................................................................................... II-3

Restraint .............................................................................................................. II-4

Perseverance ........................................................................................................ II-4

Legitimacy........................................................................................................... II-5

• Principles in Action ................................................................................................ II-5

Objective ............................................................................................................. II-5

Unity of Effort ..................................................................................................... II-6

Security ............................................................................................................... II-7

Restraint .............................................................................................................. II-7

Perseverance ........................................................................................................ II-7

Legitimacy........................................................................................................... II-7

• Conclusion .............................................................................................................. II-8
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Joint Pub 3-07

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General ................................................................................................................... III-1

• Types of Operations ............................................................................................... III-1

Arms Control...................................................................................................... III-1

Combatting Terrorism ........................................................................................ III-2

DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations ......................................................... III-3

Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations ................................ III-3

Enforcing Exclusion Zones ................................................................................ III-4

Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight .............................................. III-4

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) ......................................................................... III-4

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) ................................................ III-8

Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency ............................................ III-9

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) ............................................... III-11

Peace Operations (PO) ..................................................................................... III-12

Protection of Shipping ..................................................................................... III-14

Recovery Operations ........................................................................................ III-14

Show of Force Operations ............................................................................... III-14

Strikes and Raids ............................................................................................. III-15

Support to Insurgency ...................................................................................... III-15

• Conclusion ........................................................................................................... III-15

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General ................................................................................................................... IV-1

• Planning Considerations ........................................................................................ IV-1

Unit Integrity ...................................................................................................... IV-1

Intelligence and Information Gathering ............................................................ IV-2

Multinational Operations ................................................................................... IV-4

Command and Control (C2)............................................................................... IV-4

Public Affairs ..................................................................................................... IV-6

Civil Affairs (CA) .............................................................................................. IV-6

Psychological Operations................................................................................... IV-6

Coordination with NGOs and PVOs ................................................................. IV-7

Interagency Operations ...................................................................................... IV-7

Legal Requirements ........................................................................................... IV-8

Logistics ............................................................................................................. IV-9

Medical Operations.......................................................................................... IV-10

Active/Reserve Mix ......................................................................................... IV-11

Transition from Wartime Operations to MOOTW ......................................... IV-11

Termination of Operations .............................................................................. IV-12

• Education and Training ...................................................................................... IV-13

• Conclusion ........................................................................................................... IV-14
v

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APPENDIX

A Administrative Instructions ............................................................................ A-1

GLOSSARY

Part I—Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................GL-1

Part II—Terms and Definitions ............................................................................GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations ........................................................................ I-2

I-2 MOOTW Contributions to the Attainment

 of National Security Objectives.................................................................. I-3

II-1 Principles of Military Operations Other Than War ..................................... II-2

II-2 Principles in Action ..................................................................................... II-6

III-1 Types of MOOTW Operations ................................................................... III-1

III-2 Combatting Terrorism ................................................................................. III-2

III-3 Humanitarian Assistance ............................................................................ III-5

III-4 Nation Assistance Programs ....................................................................... III-9

IV-1 Multinational Operations Considerations ................................................... IV-4

IV-2 Areas Requiring Legal Expertise ................................................................ IV-9

IV-3 Reserve Units Needed in MOOTW .......................................................... IV-11

IV-4 Post-Conflict Activities ............................................................................ IV-12

IV-5 Termination of Operations Actions .......................................................... IV-13

IV-6 MOOTW Education and Training ............................................................ IV-14
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Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank
Military operations other

than war (MOOTW)

encompass the use of

military capabilities across

the range of military

operations short of war.

Political objectives drive

MOOTW.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) can be

applied to complement any combination of the other

instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it

is useful to understand how they differ from operations in

war. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar

in action, MOOTW focus on deterring war and

promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale,

sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives

or to protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitive

to political considerations and often the military may not

be the primary player. More restrictive rules of

engagement and a hierarchy of national objectives are

followed. MOOTW are initiated by the National Command

Authorities and are usually, but not always, conducted

outside of the United States.

All military personnel should understand the political

objective and the potential impact of inappropriate

actions. Commanders should remain aware of changes not

only in the operational situation, but also of changes in

political objectives that may warrant a change in military

operations. One goal of MOOTW is to deter war through

intervention to secure US interests. Overseas presence

activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to

our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis

response capability while promoting US influence and

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

vii

Compares Military Operations Other Than War

(MOOTW) with War

Explains the Relationship between MOOTW and Political

Objectives

Discusses MOOTW Principles

Outlines Types of MOOTW Operations

Describes Planning Considerations

Political Objectives

General
viii

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-07

The wide range of

MOOTW provides the

National Command

Authorities with many

possible options during

unsettled situations.

There are six principles

that must be considered in

order to achieve the

desired objectives of

MOOTW.

access. Crisis response may include employment of

overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single

precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.

When other instruments of national power are unable to

influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation,

military force or threat of its use may be required to

demonstrate US resolve and capability. This is a risk that

may result in a combat situation. Should deterrence fail,

force may be required to compel compliance in the form

of strikes, raids, peace enforcement, counterterrorism,

enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and

counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants. The

use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the dayto-day tensions between nations below the threshold of

armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in

foreign lands. These operations include humanitarian

assistance, disaster relief, some nation assistance, foreign

internal defense, most support to counterdrug operations,

arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of

noncombatants in a permissive environment, and

peacekeeping. Noncombat MOOTW often can be a

simultaneous operation with combat MOOTW.

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfighting

doctrine. Application of these principles helps ensure

success and minimize losses by focusing on aspects of

MOOTW that deserve careful consideration. They are as

follows: 1. Direct every military operation towards a clearly

defined, decisive and attainable objective. 2. Unity of

effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to

a common purpose. 3. Security is always important and

depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a

military, political, or informational advantage. 4. MOOTW

may require restraint in order to apply appropriate military

capabilities prudently. 5. Perseverance allows for

measured, protracted application of military capability in

support of strategic aims. 6. Committed forces must sustain

the legitimacy of the operation and the host government,

where applicable.

Range of MOOTW

Basic Principles
ix

Executive Summary

The types of operations are

extensive and represent

MOOTW in which US

forces may be involved.

Plans for MOOTW are

prepared in a similar

manner as plans for war.

These operations include: arms control; combatting

terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug

operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept

operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom

of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance;

military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/

support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation

operations; peace operations; protection of shipping;

recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and

raids; and support to insurgency.

The mission analysis and command estimate are vital in

MOOTW. Of particular importance in the planning

process is the development of a clear definition,

understanding, and appreciation for all potential

threats. Commanders should always plan to have the right

mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat

operations or evacuate. Unit integrity allows for quick

deployment and continued operations. Intelligence and

information gathering needs to be multi-disciplined and

utilize fused intelligence from all sources within the military

including spaced-based intelligence, human intelligence,

counterintelligence, and mapping, charting and geodesy.

Multinational operations need special attention and

require increased liaisons and advisors. Command and

control are overseen by the joint force commanders (JFCs)

and their subordinates and should remain flexible to meet

specific requirements of each situation and promote unity

of effort. Public affairs, including media reporting,

influences public opinion and may ultimately be a principle

factor in the success or failure of the operation. Civil affairs

may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist

in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison

between the military and various outside groups.

Psychological operations provide a planned, systematic

process of conveying messages to, and influencing selected

target groups. Coordination with nongovernmental,

private voluntary organizations and interagency

operations allows the JFC to gain greater understanding

of the situation and the society involved. MOOTW may

present unique legal issues. The logistics element may

precede other military forces or may be the only forces

deployed. Medical operations support MOOTW to protect

US personnel and enhance mission capability. MOOTW

Types of MOOTW

Planning Considerations
x

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-07

may require reserve units and individuals not found in the

active component or may require deployment of more units

or individuals possessing a capability than are available in

the active component forces. A commander’s campaign

plan should include a transition from wartime operations

to MOOTW to ensure that desired political objectives

continue. The termination of operations includes actions

to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. Such

actions encompass transitioning to civil authority, marking

and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, preredeployment activities, redeploying forces and numerous

other actions depending on the specific operation.

This publication provides basic concepts and principles to

guide the Services and combatant commands to prepare for

and conduct MOOTW. It describes those military

operations and provides general guidance for military forces

in the conduct of joint MOOTW.

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I-1

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new

strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in

concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving

US objectives around the globe.”

General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.

US Army, Retired

1. Purpose

This publication supports Joint Pub 3-0,

“Doctrine for Joint Operations,” by

providing basic concepts and principles to

guide the Services and the combatant

commands to prepare for and conduct

military operations other than war

(MOOTW). It describes these military

operations and provides general guidance

for military forces in the conduct of joint

MOOTW. Detailed information on

planning for and employing forces in

MOOTW is provided in joint tactics,

techniques, and procedures (JTTP)

publications within the Joint Pub 3-07

series and other joint and Service

publications.

2. Military Operations Other

Than War

MOOTW encompass the use of

military capabilities across the range of

military operations short of war. These

operations can be applied to complement

any combination of the other instruments

of national power. To understand

MOOTW, it is useful to understand how

they differ from operations in war.

a. War. When instruments of national

power are unable to achieve national

objectives or protect national interests any

other way, the US national leadership may

decide to conduct large-scale, sustained

combat operations to achieve national

objectives or protect national interests,

placing the United States in a wartime

state. In such cases, the goal is to win as

quickly and with as few casualties as

possible, achieving national objectives and

concluding hostilities on terms favorable

to the United States and its multinational

partners.

b. Military Operations Other Than

War. MOOTW focus on deterring war,

resolving conflict, promoting peace, and

supporting civil authorities in response

to domestic crises. As Figure I-1 indicates,

MOOTW may involve elements of both

combat and noncombat operations in

peacetime, conflict, and war situations.

MOOTW involving combat, such as peace

enforcement, may have many of the same

characteristics of war, including active

combat operations and employment of most

combat capabilities. All military

operations are driven by political

considerations. However, MOOTW are

more sensitive to such considerations due

to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt,

or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW,

political considerations permeate all

levels and the military may not be the

primary player. As a result, these

operations normally have more restrictive

rules of engagement (ROE) than in war.

As in war, the goal is to achieve national

objectives as quickly as possible and

conclude military operations on terms

favorable to the United States and its allies.

However, the purposes of conducting

MOOTW may be multiple, with the

relative importance or hierarchy of such
I-2

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

purposes changing or unclear; for example,

to deter potential aggressors, protect

national interests, support the United

Nations (UN) or other regional

organizations, satisfy treaty obligations,

support civil authorities, or provide

humanitarian assistance (HA). The

specific goal of MOOTW may be peaceful

settlement, assistance rendered to civil

authorities, or providing security for HA.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is

often in a support role to another agency,

such as the Department of State (DOS) in

HA operations. However, in certain types

of operations DOD is the lead agency,

such as in peace enforcement operations

(PEO). These operations usually involve

interagency coordination and may also

involve nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) or private voluntary organizations

(PVOs). Finally, although MOOTW are

generally conducted outside of the United

States, some types may be conducted

within the United States in support of civil

authorities consistent with established law.

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

3. Primacy of Political

Objectives

Political objectives drive MOOTW at

every level from strategic to tactical. A

distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW

is the degree to which political objectives

influence operations and tactics. Two

important factors about political primacy

stand out. First, all military personnel

should understand the political

objectives and the potential impact of

inappropriate actions. Having an

understanding of the political objective

helps avoid actions which may have

adverse political effects. It is not

uncommon in some MOOTW, for example

peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make

decisions which have significant political

implications. Secondly, commanders

should remain aware of changes not only

in the operational situation, but also to

changes in political objectives that may

warrant a change in military operations.

These changes may not always be obvious.

Military

Operations

War

Military

Operations

Other

Than

War

Fight

&

Win

Deter War

&

Resolve

Conflict

Promote

Peace

&

Support

US Civil

Authorities

Large Scale Combat Operations

Attack / Defend / Blockade

Peace Enforcement

Counterterrorism

Show of Force/Raid/Strike

Peacekeeping/NEO

Nation Assistance

Counterinsurgency

Freedom of Navigation

Counterdrug

Humanitarian Assistance

Protection of Shipping

US Civil Support

C

O

M

B

A

T

N

O

N

C

O

M

B

A

T

General

US Goals

Representative

Examples

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
I-3

Introduction

However, commanders should strive,

through continuing mission analysis, to

detect subtle changes which, over time,

may lead to disconnects between political

objectives and military operations. Failure

to recognize changes in political objectives

early may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations.

4. Strategic Aspect

MOOTW contribute to attainment of

national security objectives by supporting

deterrence and crisis response options.

These contributions are shown in Figure

I-2 and discussed below.

a. Deterrence. In peacetime, the Armed

Forces of the United States help to deter

potential aggressors from using violence

to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems

from the belief of a potential aggressor that

a credible threat of retaliation exists, the

contemplated action cannot succeed, or the

costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a

potential aggressor is reluctant to act for

fear of failure, cost, or consequences.

Although the threat of nuclear conflict has

diminished, proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) and conventional

advanced technology weaponry is

continuing. Threats directed against the

United States, allies, or other friendly

nations — ranging from terrorism to

WMD — require the maintenance of a

full array of response capabilities.

Various MOOTW combat options (such as

peace enforcement or strikes and raids)

support deterrence by demonstrating

national resolve to use force when

necessary. Other MOOTW (such as

humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping)

support deterrence by enhancing a

climate of peaceful cooperation, thus

promoting stability.

MOOTW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

ATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

OBJECTIVES

DETERRENCE

FORWARD PRESENCE

CRISIS RESPONSE

Potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost,

or consequences

Demonstrates commitment, lends credibility to alliances, and

enhances regional stability

Responding rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to

potential or actual crises

Figure I-2. MOOTW Contributions to the Attainment of National Security Objectives
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Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

b. Forward Presence. Forward

presence activities demonstrate our

commitment, lend credibility to our

alliances, enhance regional stability, and

provide a crisis response capability while

promoting US influence and access. In

addition to forces stationed overseas and

afloat, forward presence activities include

periodic and rotational deployments, access

and storage agreements, multinational

exercises, port visits, foreign military

training, foreign community support and

military-to-military contacts. Given their

location and knowledge of the region,

forward presence forces could be the first

which the combatant commander commits

to MOOTW.

c. Crisis Response. US forces need to

be able to respond rapidly either

unilaterally or as a part of a

multinational effort. Crisis response may

include, for example, employment of

overwhelming force in peace enforcement,

a single precision strike, or emergency

support to civil authorities. The ability of

the United States to respond rapidly with

appropriate MOOTW options to potential

or actual crises contributes to regional

stability. Thus, MOOTW may often be

planned and executed under crisis action

circumstances.

Presence is a military mission option on the lesser end of the application of

force spectrum and is common in military operations other than war situations.

Between 1981 and 1983, a series of US maneuvers in Central America allowed

the US to further its interests without involving US troops in direct combat.

This indirect application of US military power manifested itself in the

establishment of US military presence in Central America, particularly in

Honduras, and thereby maintaining steady pressure on the belligerent

Sandinistas across the border in Nicaragua.

The United States conducted a series of military exercises to establish a

presence in Central America that could not escape the notice of Nicaragua.

Beginning with the relatively low-key HALCON VISTA, in Oct. 1981 and ending

with a large exercise, BIG PINE II in Aug. 1983, the United States evaluated

US-Honduran ability to “detect and intercept hostile coastal incursions,” using

a range of techniques from the combined/joint movement of small numbers

of forces in support of the Honduran Army to more extensive exercises

including drills in naval interdiction, aerial bombings, airlifts, amphibious

landings and counterinsurgency techniques. The approved exercise plans did

not envisage any immediate combat role for United States forces, but called

for making preparations so that American forces could be swiftly called into

action if necessary. As a result, the exercises also included improving runways

and providing for access to several key airfields in Honduras.

The threat of US military intervention played on the Sandinistas’ acute fear

of the US military. This psychological pressure has been described as

“perception management.” It recognizes the truth of Ambassador Gerald

Helman’s observation that “it is very difficult and I think probably mistaken

to separate the military from the political from the psychological in lowintensity conflict.” This relationship is apparent in an American official’s

description of BIG PINE I: “a substantial feint” designed to convince the

Sandinistas “that they will be finished if they do not bend to the general line

adopted by Washington.”

PRESENCE OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
I-5

Introduction

US efforts to this end were very effective. America’s military power relative to

Nicaragua’s was unquestionably superior, but this alone was not enough. To

be of value, a resource must be both mobilized in support of foreign policy

objectives and made credible. Recognizing this, the National Security Council

stated, “No threat should be made [without] willingness to follow through

[with] military force.”

Daniel Ortega was in fact convinced of this willingness. At the height of BIG

PINE II in November 1983, just days after the successful US invasion of Grenada,

the Nicaraguan government mobilized the population to defend the country.

Thousands of Nicaraguans were pulled from their jobs to participate in

emergency militia training, causing production to come to a standstill. The

government ordered citizens to dig air-raid shelters, and 1,000 Cuban advisers

were ordered back to Cuba “to remove any pretext for an invasion.” Ortega

was obviously worried, and these actions diverted scarce Nicaraguan

resources and manpower from economic and social programs to defense.

The pressure brought on by increased US presence in the region and the

invasion of Grenada had a marked impact on Nicaraguan politics. The

government announced an amnesty program for certain Miskito Indians who

had taken up arms against the Sandinistas and a “safe conduct” program for

the other members of the armed opposition. The senior Salvadoran guerrillas

in the Managua area maintained a substantially lower profile, and Nicaragua

canceled plans to airdrop logistic support to guerrillas in the Olancho area

of Honduras. There was a temporary relaxation of press censorship, and

Bayardo Arce Castano (coordinator for the political committee of the

Sandinista National Liberation Front) cited US pressure as a reason for the

scheduling of the 1984 Nicaraguan elections.

It should be noted that the US achieved these results in a very cost-efficient

manner. Some say that if the United States invaded Nicaragua it would have

taken months of relatively high-intensity fighting and years of US military

occupation to pacify the Nicaraguan country side. This almost certainly would

have cost thousands in American casualties and untold amounts of dollars.

However, by establishing a US military presence by means of combined

exercises, coupled with the careful use of perception management, the same

objectives were realized without firing a shot.

SOURCE: Kevin J. Dougherty, “The Indirect Application of Military Power:

US Policy Toward Nicaragua,” Military Review, October 1994.

5. Range of Military Operations

Other Than War

MOOTW focus on deterring war,

resolving conflict, supporting civil

authorities, and promoting peace (see

Figure I-1). These operations provide the

National Command Authorities (NCA)

with a wide range of possible

response options, ranging from

noncombat operations such as HA to

combat operations such as peace

enforcement and strikes and raids.

a. Military Operations Other Than

War Involving the Use or Threat of Force

• In spite of efforts to promote peace,

conditions within a country or region

may result in armed conflict. When
I-6

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

other instruments of national power are

unable to influence a deteriorating or

potentially hostile situation, military

force or threat of its use may be

required to demonstrate US resolve

and capability, support the other

instruments of national power, or

terminate the situation on favorable

terms. The focus of US military

operations during such periods is to

support national objectives—to deter

war and return to a sustainable state

of peace. Such operations involve a

risk that US forces could become

involved in combat.

• Combatant commanders, at the

direction of the NCA, may employ US

forces to deter an adversary’s action.

The physical presence of these forces,

coupled with their potential

employment, can serve as a deterrent

and facilitate achieving strategic aims.

Should this deterrence fail, force may

be required to compel compliance,

for example, in the form of strikes,

raids, and other contingency

operations. Other such operations

include peace enforcement,

counterterrorism, some foreign

internal defense (FID), enforcement of

sanctions, support to insurgency and

counterinsurgency, and evacuation of

noncombatants.

• The use of force introduces the fear,

physical strain, and uncertainty which

are among the hallmarks of the nature

of warfare. Although there are

important political, diplomatic, and

legal differences between war and

military operations other than war,

there exists a singularly important

threshold which may be crossed by

use (or threat of use) of military

force of any kind. In the range of

military operations, this threshold

marks the distinction between

noncombat and combat operations.

b. Military Operations Other Than

War Not Involving the Use or Threat of

Force. Use of military forces in peacetime

helps keep the day-to-day tensions between

nations below the threshold of armed

conflict or war and maintains US

influence in foreign lands. Such

operations include HA, disaster relief, some

nation assistance, FID, most support to

counterdrug operations, arms control,

support to US civil authorities, evacuation

of noncombatants in a permissive

environment, and peacekeeping. Such

operations are inherently joint in nature.

Although these operations do not normally

involve combat, military forces always need

to be prepared to protect themselves and

respond to changing situations.

c. Simultaneous Operations.

MOOTW often involve simultaneous

operations. Noncombat MOOTW may

be conducted simultaneously with

combat MOOTW, such as HA in

conjunction with PEO. It is also possible

for part of a theater to be in a wartime state

while MOOTW is being conducted

elsewhere within the same theater. For

example, during the final stages of

Operation DESERT STORM, US Central

Command conducted a noncombatant

evacuation operation (NEO) in Somalia. In

such situations, geographic combatant

commanders should pay particular

attention to integrating, coordinating, and

synchronizing the effects and activities of

their operations with US ambassadors,

DOS, and other agencies. Furthermore,

whenever a possibility of a threat to US
I-7

Introduction

forces exists, even in a noncombat

operation, commanders should plan for and

be prepared to either transition to combat

operations or leave the area.

6. Duration of Operations

Many MOOTW may be conducted on

short notice and last for a relatively short

period of time (for example, strikes and

raids). On the other hand, some types of

MOOTW may last for an extended period

of time to achieve the desired end state.

For example, the United States has been a

partner with ten other nations in the

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

in the Sinai since 1982. Short duration

operations are not always possible,

particularly in situations where

destabilizing conditions have existed for

years or where conditions are such that a

long term commitment is required to

achieve objectives.

7. Conclusion

MOOTW include a wide range of

challenging operations for which US

forces need to be prepared. It is expected

that Armed Forces of the United States will

increasingly participate in these operations.

However, commanders must remember that

their primary mission will always be to

prepare for, fight and win America’s

wars. This is the US military’s most

rigorous task and requires nothing less than

top priority when training and equipping

our forces.

Units deploying on Military Operation Other Than War must be prepared and

equipped for a range of challenging operations.
I-8

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally blank
CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

II-1

 “Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control,

you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to

interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your

operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center.”

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF

2. Principles of Military

Operations Other Than War

Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine For Joint

Operations,” delineates six MOOTW

principles: objective, unity of effort,

security, restraint, perseverance, and

legitimacy. While the first three of these

principles are derived from the principles

of war, the remaining three are MOOTWspecific. These principles are shown in

Figure II-1 and discussed below.

a. Objective. Direct every military

operation toward a clearly defined,

decisive, and attainable objective.

• JFCs must understand the strategic

aims, set appropriate objectives, and

ensure that these aims and objectives

contribute to unity of effort. Inherent

in the principle of objective is the need

to understand what constitutes mission

success, and what might cause the

operation to be terminated before

success is achieved. As an example,

excessive US casualties incurred

during a peacekeeping operation

(PKO) may cause abandonment of the

operation.

1. General

MOOTW encompass a broad range of

military operations and support a variety

of purposes, including: supporting

national objectives, deterring war,

returning to a state of peace, promoting

peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between

nations below the threshold of armed

conflict, maintaining US influence in

foreign lands, and supporting US civil

authorities consistent with applicable law.

Support of these objectives is achieved by

providing military forces and resources to

accomplish a wide range of missions other

than warfighting. The principles of war,

though principally associated with large

scale combat operations, generally apply

to MOOTW, though sometimes in

different ways. Strikes and raids, for

example, rely on the principles of surprise,

offensive, economy of force, and mass to

achieve a favorable outcome. However,

political considerations and the

nature of many MOOTW require an

underpinning of additional principles

described in this chapter. MOOTW that

require combat operations (such as some

forms of peace enforcement, or strikes and

raids) require joint force commanders to

fully consider principles of war and

principles of MOOTW.
II-2

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Joint Pub 3-07

Figure II-1. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive,

and attainable objective

Seek unity of effort in every operation

Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or

informational advantage

Apply appropriate military capability prudently

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military

capability in support of strategic aims

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and

of the host government, where applicable

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

OTHER THAN WAR

• Although defining mission success

may be more difficult in MOOTW, it

is important to do so to keep US forces

focused on a clear, attainable military

objective. Specifying measures of

success helps define mission

accomplishment and phase transitions.

• The political objectives which military

objectives are based on may not

specifically address the desired

military end state. JFCs should,

therefore, translate their political

guidance into appropriate military

objectives through a rigorous and

continuous mission and threat

analysis. JFCs should carefully

explain to political authorities the

implications of political decisions on

capabilities and risk to military forces.

Care should be taken to avoid

misunderstandings stemming from a

lack of common terminology.

• Change to initial military objectives

may occur because political and

military leaders gain a better

understanding of the situation, or it

may occur because the situation itself

changes. JFCs should be aware of

shifts in the political objectives, or

in the situation itself, that necessitate

a change in the military objective.

These changes may be very subtle, yet

they still require adjustment of the

military objectives. If this adjustment
II-3

Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

is not made, the military objectives

may no longer support the political

objectives, legitimacy may be

undermined, and force security may be

compromised.

b. Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effort

in every operation.

• This MOOTW principle is derived

from the principle of war, unity of

command. It emphasizes the need for

ensuring all means are directed to a

common purpose. However, in

MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is

often complicated by a variety of

international, foreign and domestic

military and non-military participants,

the lack of definitive command

arrangements among them, and varying

views of the objective. This requires

that JFCs, or other designated directors

of the operation, rely heavily on

consensus building to achieve unity of

effort.

• While the chain of command for US

military forces remains inviolate

(flowing from the NCA through the

combatant commander to the

subordinate joint force commander

(JFC)), command arrangements

among coalition partners may be

less well-defined and not include

full command authority. Under

such circumstances,

commanders must establish

procedures for liaison and

coordination to achieve unity of effort.

Because MOOTW will often be

conducted at the small unit level, it is

important that all levels understand the

informal and formal relationships.

c. Security. Never permit hostile

factions to acquire a military, political,

or informational advantage.

• This principle enhances freedom of

action by reducing vulnerability to

hostile acts, influence, or surprise.

• The inherent right of self-defense

against hostile acts or hostile intent

applies in all operations. This

protection may be exercised against

A Cuban refugee undergoes a security check at Guantanimo Bay, Cuba before

boarding a transport to safe haven in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.
II-4

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

virtually any person, element, or group

hostile to the operation: for example,

terrorists, or looters after a civil crisis

or natural disaster. JFCs should avoid

complacency and be ready to

counter activity that could bring

harm to units or jeopardize the

operation. All personnel should stay

alert even in a non-hostile operation

with little or no perceived risk.

Inherent in this responsibility is the

need to plan for and posture the

necessary capability to quickly

transition to combat should

circumstances change.

• In addition to the right of self-defense,

operations security is an important

component of this principle of

MOOTW. Although there may be no

clearly defined threat, the essential

elements of US military operations

should still be safeguarded. The

uncertain nature of the situation

inherent in many MOOTW, coupled

with the potential for rapid change,

require that operations security be an

integral part of the operation.

Operations security planners must

consider the effect of media coverage

and the possibility coverage may

compromise essential security or

disclose critical information.

• Security may also involve the

protection of civilians or

participating agencies and

organizations. The perceived neutrality

of these protected elements may be a

factor in their security. Protection of

an NGO or PVO by US military forces

may create the perception that the

NGO or PVO is pro-US. Therefore,

an NGO or PVO may be reluctant to

accept the US military’s protection.

d. Restraint. Apply appropriate

military capability prudently.

• A single act could cause significant

military and political consequences;

therefore, judicious use of force is

necessary. Restraint requires the

careful balancing of the need for

security, the conduct of operations, and

the political objective. Excessive force

antagonizes those parties involved,

thereby damaging the legitimacy of the

organization that uses it while possibly

enhancing the legitimacy of the

opposing party.

• Commanders at all levels must take

proactive steps to ensure their

personnel know and understand the

ROE and are quickly informed of

changes. Failure to understand and

comply with established ROE can

result in fratricide, mission failure, and

national embarrassment. ROE in

MOOTW are generally more

restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to

political concerns than in war,

consistent always with the right of selfdefense. Restraint is best achieved

when ROE issued at the beginning of

an operation address most anticipated

situations that may arise. ROE should

be consistently reviewed and revised

as necessary. Additionally, ROE

should be carefully scrutinized to

ensure the lives and health of military

personnel involved in MOOTW are

not needlessly endangered.

e. Perseverance. Prepare for the

measured, protracted application of

military capability in support of strategic

aims. Some MOOTW may require years

to achieve the desired results. The

underlying causes of the crisis may be

elusive, making it difficult to achieve

decisive resolution. It is important to assess

possible responses to a crisis in terms of

each option’s impact on the achievement of

the long-term political objective. This

assessment does not preclude decisive
II-5

Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

military action, but frames that action

within the larger context of strategic aims.

Often, the patient, resolute, and

persistent pursuit of national goals and

objectives, for as long as necessary to

achieve them, is a requirement for

success. This will often involve political,

diplomatic, economic, and informational

measures to supplement military efforts.

f. Legitimacy. Committed forces must

sustain the legitimacy of the operation

and of the host government, where

applicable.

• In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition

based on the perception by a specific

audience of the legality, morality, or

rightness of a set of actions. This

audience may be the US public, foreign

nations, the populations in the area of

responsibility/joint operations area

(AOR/JOA), or the participating

forces. If an operation is perceived

as legitimate, there is a strong

impulse to support the action. If an

operation is not perceived as

legitimate, the actions may not be

supported and may be actively resisted.

In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently

a decisive element. The prudent use

of psychological operations (PSYOP)

and humanitarian and civic assistance

(HCA) programs assists in developing

a sense of legitimacy for the supported

government.

• Legitimacy may depend on adherence

to objectives agreed to by the

international community, ensuring

the action is appropriate to the

situation, and fairness in dealing with

various factions. It may be reinforced

by restraint in the use of force, the type

of forces employed, and the disciplined

conduct of the forces involved. The

perception of legitimacy by the US

public is strengthened if there are

obvious national or humanitarian

interests at stake, and if there is

assurance that American lives are not

being needlessly or carelessly risked.

• Another aspect of this principle is the

legitimacy bestowed upon a

government through the perception of

the populace which it governs.

Because the populace perceives that the

government has genuine authority to

govern and uses proper agencies for

valid purposes, they consider that

government as legitimate.

3. Principles in Action

The following discussion applies the

principles of MOOTW against the

backdrop of Operation PROVIDE

COMFORT, the 1991 operation which

provided humanitarian assistance to the

Iraqi Kurds. Subsequent to Operation

DESERT STORM, the Iraqi Government

directed its military to brutally put down

Kurd insurgencies and drive the Kurds

from their homes into the mountains.

World reaction to this indiscriminate

brutality and oppression prompted aid for

the Kurds. The UN passed Security

Council Resolution 688 condemning Iraq’s

oppression of the Kurds and appealed for

HA efforts. This appeal prompted the US

to establish operation PROVIDE

COMFORT. The following discussion,

along with the illustration in Figure II-2,

demonstrates the principles of MOOTW in

action during an actual operation.

a. Objective. The US Commander in

Chief, Europe established Joint Task Force

(JTF) PROVIDE COMFORT in April 1991

to assist Kurds suffering from hunger,

disease, and exposure to harsh elements.

The initial objective was to provide HA

by airdropping food and other necessities,

establishing relief centers, supervising

distribution of food and water, and
II-6

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

Figure II-2. Principles in Action

consensus through mutual trust,

cooperation, and coordination of common

interests. Unity of effort was enhanced

through US efforts to ensure that all the

multinational partners agreed to the

mission’s objectives. Diplomatic efforts,

established political objectives, and US

European Command developed clear

military objectives to support political

objectives. Operation PROVIDE

COMFORT exhibited unity of effort in

the joint, multinational and interagency

arenas.

improving sanitation and medical care.

Later the operation expanded to returning

the Kurds from temporary shelters to their

previous homes. This expanded the HA

operation to include providing protection

from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s

oppressive actions.

b. Unity of Effort. Relief supplies were

distributed throughout the ravaged

region by a unified, multinational, and

nongovernmental effort. US leadership

effectively orchestrated the

multinational and civilian-military

PRINCIPLES IN ACTION

PRINCIPLES PROVIDE COMFORT

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Clearly defined Humanitarian Assistance

Seek team effort Unified Action

Never a hostile advantage Combat Units / Exclusion Zones

Apply capability prudently Rules of Engagement

Enduring military support Until Mission Completion

Perception of operation UN Backing / Popular Support
II-7

Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

• US military forces included: Special

operations forces (SOF), US Army

infantry and attack helicopter

battalions, an Amphibious Ready

Group with an embarked Marine

Expeditionary Unit, combat support

units, combat service support units, and

US Air Force (USAF) airlift units.

• Multinational cooperation was

demonstrated when 11 countries

increased operations. US leadership

and command efforts established

informal agreements with many North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

countries working toward the

operation’s common purpose.

• Interagency consensus building

efforts were exemplified by interaction

between DOD and the Office of

Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),

as they jointly managed the Kurdish

relief and relocation effort. OFDA’s

Disaster Assistance Response Team

deployed and managed Cooperative for

American Relief to Everywhere and

International Rescue Committee camp

management and food distribution.

Furthermore, civilian-military liaison,

cooperation, and consensus building

efforts were enhanced by establishing

a civil-military operations center

(CMOC). The CMOC provided a

mechanism for maintenance of

military, governmental, NGO or PVO

coordination and consensus building to

improve unity of effort.

c. Security. As operations expanded and

became more complex, Commander, JTF

(CJTF) PROVIDE COMFORT formed two

subordinate JTFs. JTF Alpha provided the

HA, while JTF Bravo provided the security

required for the operation. As part of JTF

Bravo, US and coalition ground combat

and combat support units provided area

security. They were joined by

multinational air forces operating from

Incirlik, Turkey, that established and

maintained air deliveries and enforced an

air exclusion zone. JTF Bravo capitalized

on the experience of Royal Marines,

directly out of Northern Ireland, for

expertise in patrolling urban areas. This

introduced relevant experience into a

challenging environment, and provided

resources necessary for security.

Additionally, the psychological effect of

this force helped deter aggression against

PROVIDE COMFORT participants. The

presence of a capable, disciplined force was

an effective deterrent.

d. Restraint. Restraint kept a

potentially explosive situation with Iraqi

armed forces in check. US forces adhered

to strict ROE which went into effect when

the ground exclusion zone was expanded

in concert with the air exclusion zone,

allowing the Kurds to return home from

temporary shelters. As the security zone

expanded, US forces demonstrated

increased readiness, but used restraint

when confronting the Iraqi forces. ROE

were balanced between the need for security

and restraint.

e. Perseverance. US perseverance has

been demonstrated by the continued

provision of HA and security to the Kurds.

JFCs developed and executed plans that

enabled US forces to continue the mission

indefinitely. By forming subordinate

JTFs when needed, CJTF PROVIDE

COMFORT demonstrated the flexibility to

adjust operations as required to achieve

overall mission success.

f. Legitimacy. Legitimacy of the

operation can be perceived from numerous

points of view. The international

community initially deemed the

operation legitimate in the passage of UN

Security Council Resolution 688. The US

public believed the operation to be
II-8

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

legitimate based on the perceived threat

posed by Iraq’s actions. The Kurdish

population welcomed the assistance and

security provided by the operation. The

forces involved in the operation also

perceive it as legitimate. As a further

evidence of legitimacy, continuation of

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT is

endorsed by the Turkish parliament every

six months. Perceptions by the various

elements involved are interdependent.

Three factors contribute to the overall

sense of legitimacy: a consistent

demonstration of restraint, risk to US

personnel has been kept to the minimum

essential for mission accomplishment, and

tangible evidence of successfully aiding the

Kurds. Furthermore the role of the Joint

Psychological Operations Task Force in

legitimizing the military effort in Northern

Iraq through well-planned and executed

information management was an

instrumental element of national power

projection. Aggressive information

management on the international level

is absolutely necessary in influencing

world political opinion and legitimizing US

efforts in MOOTW.

4. Conclusion

MOOTW principles are an extension of

warfighting doctrine. Embodied in these

principles is the dominance of political

objectives at all levels of MOOTW.

Application of these principles helps

ensure success and minimize losses by

focusing on aspects of MOOTW that

deserve careful consideration. When these

principles are ignored, JFCs increase the

risk to their forces and the possibility of

failure.
1. General

The following discussions on types of

MOOTW are listed in alphabetical order.

Generally, these 16 types of operations (see

Figure III-1) are integrated into the series

of JTTP supporting this publication.

2. Types of Operations

a. Arms Control. Arms control is a

concept that connotes any plan,

arrangement, or process, resting upon

explicit or implicit international

agreement. Arms control governs any

aspect of the following: the numbers,

types, and performance characteristics

of weapon systems (including the

command and control, logistic support

arrangements, and any related intelligence

gathering mechanism); and the numerical

strength, organization, equipment,

deployment or employment of the armed

forces retained by the parties (it

encompasses disarmament). Additionally,

it may connote those measures taken for

the purpose of reducing instability in the

military environment. Although it may

be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the

military can play an important role. For

example, US military personnel may be

involved in verifying an arms control

treaty; seizing WMD (nuclear, biological,

and chemical or conventional); escorting

authorized deliveries of weapons and other

materials (such as enriched uranium) to

preclude loss or unauthorized use of these

assets; or dismantling, destroying, or

There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peacekeeping 

depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental al

the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it 

reaction and immediate response that the success of the operati

Brigadier M. Harbottle, UN Force

TYPES OF MOO

OPERATION

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

Arms Control

Combatting Terrorism

DOD Support to

Counterdrug Operatio

Enforcement of Sanct

Maritime Intercept

Operations

Enforcing Exclusion

Zones

Ensuring Freedom of

Navigation and Overf

Humanitarian Assistan

Military Support to Civ

Authorities (MSCA)

Nation Assistance /

Support to

Counterinsurgency

Noncombatant Evacua

Operations (NEO)

Peace Operations (PO

Protection of Shipping

Recovery Operations

Show of Force Operat

Strikes and Raids

Support to Insurgency

TYPES OF MOO

OPERATION

Figure III-1. Types of MOOTW 
III-2

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

disposing of weapons and hazardous

material. All of these actions help reduce

threats to regional security. Other

examples include military support for the

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Treaty by conducting and hosting site

inspections, participating in military data

exchanges, and implementing armament

reductions. Finally, the US military’s

implementation of Vienna Document 1992

confidence and security building measures

such as unit/formation inspections, exercise

notifications/observations, air and ground

base visits, and military equipment

demonstrations are further examples of

arms control.

b. Combatting Terrorism. Combatting

terrorism involves actions taken to oppose

terrorism from wherever the threat. It

includes antiterrorism (defensive

measures taken to reduce vulnerability to

terrorist acts) and counterterrorism

(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,

and respond to terrorism). See Figure III-2.

• Antiterrorism programs form the

foundation for effectively combatting

terrorism. The basics of such

programs include training and

defensive measures that strike a

balance among the protection desired,

the mission, infrastructure, and

available manpower and resources.

The US Government may provide

antiterrorism assistance to foreign

countries under the provisions of

Chapter II of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTP

for Antiterrorism,” provides detailed

guidance on this subject.

• Counterterrorism provides response

measures that include preemptive,

retaliatory, and rescue operations.

Normally, counterterrorism operations

require specially trained personnel

capable of mounting swift and effective

action. DOD provides specially

trained personnel and equipment in

a supporting role to governmental

Figure III-2. Combatting Terrorism

ANTITERRORISM

Defensive measures taken

to reduce vulnerability of

terrorist attacks

Includes training and

defense measures that

strike a balance among the

desired protection,

mission, infrastructure,

and available manpower

and resources

COUNTERTERRORISM

Offensive measures taken

to prevent, deter, and

respond to terrorism

Provides response

measures that include

preemptive, retaliatory, and

rescue operations

COMBATTING TERRORISM
III-3

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

lead agencies. Counterterrorism is a

principal special operations mission

(see Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for

Joint Special Operations.”). DOS,

Department of Justice (DOJ)

(specifically, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation), or the Department of

Transportation (DOT) (specifically the

Federal Aviation Administration)

receive lead agency designation

according to terrorist incident location

and type. DOS is the lead agency for

incidents that take place outside the

United States; DOJ is the lead agent

for incidents that occur within the

United States; and DOT is the lead

agent for incidents aboard aircraft “in

flight” within the special jurisdiction

of the United States. The Assistant to

the President for National Security

Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the

designation of lead agency or

responsibilities.

c. DOD Support to Counterdrug

Operations. In counterdrug operations,

DOD supports federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies in their efforts to

disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into

the United States. The National Defense

Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three

major counterdrug responsibilities to

DOD:

• Act as the single lead agency for

detecting and monitoring aerial and

maritime transit of illegal drugs into

the United States by emphasizing

activities in the cocaine source

countries, streamlining activities in the

transit zone, and re-focusing activities

in the US to concentrate on the cocaine

threat at critical border locations;

• Integrate the command, control,

communications, computer, and

intelligence assets of the United States

that are dedicated to interdicting the

movement of illegal drugs into the

United States;

• Approve and fund State governors’

plans for expanded use of the

National Guard to support drug

interdiction and enforcement agencies.

In addition, the 1993 DOD

Authorization Act added the authority

for the DOD to detect, monitor, and

communicate the movement of

certain surface traffic within 25

miles of the US boundary inside the

United States. Other DOD support to

the National Drug Control Strategy

includes support to law enforcement

agencies (federal, state, and local) and

cooperative foreign governments by

providing intelligence analysts and

logistical support personnel; support

to interdiction; internal drug

prevention and treatment programs;

and research and development. An

example of DOD support to

counterdrug operations was the

establishment of JTF 6, in 1989, to

provide counterdrug support along the

Southwest border of the United States.

Joint Pub 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug

Operations,” provides detailed

guidance concerning counterdrug

operations.

d . Enforcement of Sanctions/

Maritime Intercept Operations. These

are operations which employ coercive

measures to interdict the movement of

certain types of designated items into or

out of a nation or specified area. These

operations are military in nature and serve

both political and military purposes. The

political objective is to compel a country

or group to conform to the objectives of

the initiating body. The military objective

is to establish a barrier which is selective,

allowing only those goods authorized to
III-4

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Joint Pub 3-07

enter or exit. Depending on geography,

sanction enforcement normally involves

some combination of air and surface

forces. Assigned forces should be capable

of complementary mutual support and

full communications compatibility. An

example of sanctions enforcement is

Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY

conducted off the coast of Haiti beginning

in 1993.

e. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. An

exclusion zone is established by a

sanctioning body to prohibit specified

activities in a specific geographic area.

Exclusion zones can be established in the

air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on

land. The purpose may be to persuade

nations or groups to modify their behavior

to meet the desires of the sanctioning body

or face continued imposition of sanctions,

or use or threat of force. The measures

are usually imposed by the UN, or other

international bodies of which the United

States is a member. However, they may

also be imposed unilaterally by the United

States. Exclusion zones are usually

imposed due to breaches of international

standards of human rights or flagrant

abuse of international law regarding the

conduct of states. Situations which may

warrant such action include: (1) the

persecution of the civil population by a

government; (2) to deter an attempt by

a hostile nation to acquire territory by

force. The sanctions may create economic,

political, military, or other conditions

where the intent is to change the behavior

of the offending nation. Examples of

enforcement of exclusion zones are

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq,

initiated in 1992, and Operation DENY

FLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993.

f. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation

and Overflight. These operations are

conducted to demonstrate US or

international rights to navigate sea or air

routes. Freedom of navigation is a

sovereign right according to international

law.

• International law has long recognized

that a coastal state may exercise

jurisdiction and control within its

territorial sea in the same manner

that it can exercise sovereignty over

its own land territory. International

law accords the right of “innocent”

passage to ships of other nations

through a state’s territorial waters.

Passage is “innocent” as long as it is

not prejudicial to the peace, good

order, or security of the coastal state.

The high seas are free for reasonable

use of all states.

• Freedom of navigation by aircraft

through international airspace is a

well-established principle of

international law. Aircraft threatened

by nations or groups through the

extension of airspace control zones

outside the established international

norms will result in legal measures to

rectify the situation. These norms are

developed by the International Civil

Aviation Organization. An example

is the Berlin air corridors that existed

from 1948 until 1990, allowing air

access to West Berlin. The ATTAIN

DOCUMENT series of operations

against Libya in 1986 are examples of

freedom of navigation operations, both

air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

g. Humanitarian Assistance (HA).

HA operations relieve or reduce the

results of natural or manmade disasters

or other endemic conditions such as

human pain, disease, hunger, or privation

in countries or regions outside the United

States. HA provided by US forces is

generally limited in scope and duration;
III-5

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

it is intended to supplement or

complement efforts of host-nation (HN)

civil authorities or agencies with the

primary responsibility for providing

assistance. DOD provides assistance when

the relief need is gravely urgent and when

the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the

ability of normal relief agencies to

effectively respond. See Figure III-3.

• The US military can respond rapidly

to emergencies or disasters and

achieve order in austere locations.

US forces can provide logistics;

command, control, communications,

and computers; and the planning

required to initiate and sustain HA

operations.

• HA operations may be directed by

the NCA when a serious international

situation threatens the political or

military stability of a region considered

of interest to the United States, or when

the NCA deems the humanitarian

situation itself sufficient and

appropriate for employment of US

forces. DOS or the US ambassador

in country is responsible for

declaring a foreign disaster or

situation that requires HA. Within

DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense

for Policy has the overall responsibility

for developing the military policy for

international HA operations.

• HA operations may cover a broad

range of missions. An HA mission

could also include securing an

environment to allow humanitarian

relief efforts to proceed. US military

forces participate in three basic types

of HA operations: those coordinated

by the UN, those where the United

States acts in concert with other

multinational forces, or those where

the United States responds unilaterally.

Figure III-3. Humanitarian Assistance

TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

þ

þ

þ

þ

To relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or

other endemic conditions

Limited in scope and duration

Supplements or complements efforts of host nation

May cover a broad range of missions

l

l

l

Coordinated by the UN

US acts in concert with other multinational forces

US responds unilaterally

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
III-6

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

• Examples of humanitarian

assistance are Operations SEA

ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and

SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992,

to provide assistance in the aftermath

of devastating natural disasters in

Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature’s favorite targets. Tornadoes,

cyclones, and monsoons occur with alarming regularity in this country, which

contains the world’s second largest delta region at the confluence of the

Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Magma rivers. While this tremendously fertile

region supports over 120 million people, damage from natural disasters is

often severe, mainly due to the low terrain, the high density of the population,

and a poorly developed infrastructure.

Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the evening

of 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between

15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless.

Over 1 million cattle (essential for pulling plows and providing transportation)

died. Crops on 74,000 acres of land were destroyed; another 300,000 acres

of cropland were damaged, and fields were covered with salt water,

contaminating the soil and corrupting the drinking water.

Infrastructure destruction was widespread. Bangladesh’s major port,

Chittagong, was severely damaged and was nonoperational for several days.

Damaged/sunken ships, many of them belonging to the Bangladeshi Navy,

blocked the port. Several key bridges, including the main bridge to Chittagong,

were washed out or otherwise damaged. Throughout the storm-affected area,

sea walls collapsed, jetties disappeared, dirt roads were flooded, buildings

were ravaged, and transportation was virtually destroyed.

For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have come

at a worse time. After years of military rule, Bangladesh had installed its

first civilian government, under Prime Minister Zia, less than two months

earlier. Therefore, the young, inexperienced government, sensitive to

appearing weak or incompetent and struggling domestically to develop

bureaucratic cohesion, faced serious problems in reacting to the cyclone.

Strangely, one of the problems was not one of relief supplies availability.

Adequate emergency supplies existed either in government storage houses,

called “Go Downs,” or stored and owned by nongovernmental organizations

(NGO) such as Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Red

Crescent. The GOB, however, was hindered by the lack of cooperation from

the NGO, which remembered martial law and were wary of the new regime.

Further, the bureaucrats that controlled the grain in the “Go Downs” were

similarly reluctant to hand over control to other agencies.

Notwithstanding these political hurdles, the most serious problem was one

of distribution. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure and

the havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for several

days. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB

OPERATION SEA ANGEL
III-7

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coast

where needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarian

assistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force (CJTF) was immediately formed

under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, commander

of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Okinawa. A US Navy

Amphibious Task Force (ATF) returning from the Persian Gulf war was

redirected to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh citizen, spotting the ATF approaching

from the water, allegedly called them “Angels from the Sea.” Regardless of

whether this incident ever occurred, news of it spread and Operation Sea

Angel had begun.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenous

GOB forces and the international and local NGO, several countries joined

the United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply ship

with four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India,

Pakistan, and China also provided assistance.

Two days after the President’s order, LtGen. Stackpole arrived with a small

CJTF element. A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Disaster Assistance

Response Team (DART) arrived later that day. The next day five UH-60

Blackhawk helicopters arrived from Hawaii, along with a Navy Environmental

and Preventive Medicine Unit. Other joint assets continued to flow into the

area, as required. Fifteen soldiers of B Company, 84th Engineer Battalion,

already deployed to Bangladesh to construct schools, were diverted to

Chittagong. The bulk of US forces were from the ATF consisting of the 4,600

Marines of the 5th MEB, 3,000 sailors of Amphibious Group 3, and 28

helicopters. The MEB also brought four Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC)

vehicles, which proved invaluable in delivering aid to isolated islands.

Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole

began an assessment of the situation, and identified three critical concerns:

First, the intelligence needed to adequately assess the situation was

unavailable; Second, the problem of distribution quickly became apparent,

and was considered the most pressing by the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff;

Finally, the issue of Bangladeshi sovereignty required that the GOB be clearly

viewed by the populace as being “in charge”.

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three

phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week)

entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and

medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the

situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control

of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which

the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take

complete control of all relief efforts.

The distribution problem clearly was the most demanding task and it’s

accomplishment was most critical to the success of the operation. There

were two aspects: first, supplies had to be moved from Dhaka to Chittagong;

second, these supplies then had to be moved to the devastated islands. The
III-8

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

decision was made to fly supplies by fixed-wing to Chittagong, then via

helicopter to the islands. The MC-130 aircraft that brought the special

operations forces provided the fixed-wing capability until Air Force C-130s

arrived. A JTF augmentation cell (including the five Blackhawk helicopters)

was dispatched from Hawaii. The 5th MEB and its helicopters and LCACs

arrived three days later.

In the final analysis, Operation Sea Angel proved to be unique in several

respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 service

members on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; no

weapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried by

guards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine airground task force (MAGTF) was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, a

unique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize the

efforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese non-governmental

organizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for International

Development (AID) and a Chinese assistance element.

SOURCE: McCarthy, Paul A., “Operation Sea Angel, a Case Study,”

 RAND, 1994.

• Limitations on military forces in

providing support to civil authorities

include, among others, the Posse

Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code

Section 1385--Use of Army and Air

Forces as Posse Comitatus. This Act

prohibits the use of federal military

forces to enforce or otherwise

execute laws unless expressly

authorized by the Constitution or

Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions

to the Posse Comitatus Act which

allow active duty military members to

respond to civil disturbances are

included under Title 10 Sections 331

to 333: Request from a State (331),

Enforcement of Federal Law (332),

and Protection of Civil Rights (333).

Additional important exceptions to

Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10

Sections 371-380.

• Examples of military support to civil

authorities are disaster relief provided

during Hurricanes Andrew in Florida

and Iniki in Hawaii in 1992, and

deployment of troops during a civil

disturbance in California in 1992.

h. Military Support to Civil

Authorities (MSCA). These operations

provide temporary support to domestic

civil authorities when permitted by law,

and are normally taken when an emergency

overtaxes the capabilities of the civil

authorities.

• Support to civil authorities can be as

diverse as temporary augmentation

of air traffic controllers and postal

workers during strikes, restoration of

law and order in the aftermath of

riots, protection of life and federal

property, or providing relief in the

aftermath of a natural disaster.

Authority for additional support to law

enforcement officials is contained in

DOD Directive 5525.5, “DOD

Cooperation with Civilian Law

Enforcement Officials,” and permits

such support as loan of equipment, use

of facilities, training, and transfer of

information. Support is constrained

in some instances by the Economy Act

(31 US Code Section 1535) which may

require the requesting agency to

provide reimbursement.
III-9

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

Under DOD Directive 3025.1,

“Military Support to Civil

Authorities,” the Secretary of the

Army is designated the Executive

Agent for MSCA.

i. Nation Assistance/Support to

Counterinsurgency. Nation assistance is

civil or military assistance (other than

HA) rendered to a nation by US forces

within that nation’s territory during

peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war,

based on agreements mutually concluded

between the United States and that nation.

Nation assistance operations support an

HN by promoting sustainable development

and growth of responsive institutions. The

goal is to promote long-term regional

stability. Nation assistance programs often

include, but are not limited to, security

assistance, FID, and HCA (see Figure

III-4). All nation assistance actions are

integrated through the US Ambassador’s

Country Plan.

• Security Assistance. Security

assistance refers to a group of

programs by which the United States

provides defense articles, military

training, and other defense-related

services to foreign nations by grant,

loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance

of national policies and objectives.

•• Some examples of US security

assistance programs are Foreign

Military sales, Foreign Military

Financing Program, International

Military Education and Training

Program, Economic Support Fund, and

commercial sales licensed under the

Arms Export Control Act.

•• Security Assistance Surges.

Security assistance surges accelerate

release of equipment, supplies, or

services when an allied or friendly

nation faces an imminent military

threat. Security assistance surges are

Figure III-4. Nation Assistance Programs

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

Provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises.

Must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create

humanitarian benefits to the local populace.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The total political, economic, informational, and military support

provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion

and insurgency.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

A group of programs by which the United States provides defense

articles, military training, and other defense-related services.

NATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
III-10

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

An example of nation assistance/

support to counterinsurgency was

Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in

1990, following Operation JUST

CAUSE in Panama.

“The severity of human suffering in

Somalia caused commanders to try to

alleviate the situation on their own.

Units were deployed to the field to

provide security for the humanitarian

relief agency convoys of food. Upon

seeing the appalling conditions, and

realizing they were not tasked to give

food or provide direct support to the

population, local commanders took it

upon themselves to try to arrange for

or speed up relief supplies. While wellintended, this activity diverted the

commanders’ attention from their

primary mission.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Newsletter, 93-8.

• Humanitarian and civic assistance

programs are provided under Title 10

US Code Section 401. This assistance

is provided in conjunction with

military operations and exercises,

and must fulfill unit training

requirements that incidentally create

humanitarian benefit to the local

populace. In contrast to emergency

relief conducted under HA operations,

HCA programs generally encompass

planned activities in the following

categories:

•• Medical, dental, and veterinary

care provided in rural areas of a

country;

•• Construction of rudimentary

surface transportation systems;

•• Well drilling and construction of

basic sanitation facilities; and,

•• Rudimentary construction and

repair of public facilities.

military in nature and are focused on

providing additional combat systems

(weapons and equipment) or supplies,

but may include the full range of

security assistance, to include financial

and training support.

• Foreign Internal Defense. FID

programs encompass the total

political, economic, informational,

and military support provided to

another nation to assist its fight

against subversion and insurgency.

US military support to FID should

focus on assisting HN personnel to

anticipate, preclude, and counter these

threats. FID supports HN internal

defense and development (IDAD)

programs. US military involvement

in FID has traditionally been focused

on helping another nation defeat an

organized movement attempting to

overthrow the government. US FID

programs may address other threats to

an HN’s internal stability, such as civil

disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and

terrorism. These threats may, in fact,

predominate in the future as

traditional power centers shift,

suppressed cultural and ethnic

rivalries surface, and the economic

incentives of illegal drug trafficking

continue. US military support to FID

may include training, materiel,

advice, or other assistance, including

direct support and combat operations

as authorized by the NCA, to HN

forces in executing an IDAD program.

Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign

Internal Defense,” provides further

details on this subject. FID is a

principal special operations mission.

For further details on special

operations forces (SOF) involvement

in FID, see Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine

for Joint Special Operations,” and

Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special

Operations Operational Procedures.”
III-11

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

j . Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations (NEO). These operations

normally relocate threatened

noncombatants from a foreign country.

Although principally conducted to evacuate

US citizens, NEOs may also include

selective evacuation of citizens from the HN

as well as citizens from other countries.

• NEO methods and timing are

significantly influenced by

diplomatic considerations. Under

ideal circumstances there may be

little or no opposition; however,

commanders should anticipate

opposition and plan the operation like

any combat operation.

• NEOs are similar to a raid in that the

operation involves swift insertion of

a force, temporary occupation of

objectives, and ends with a planned

withdrawal. It differs from a raid in

that force used is normally limited to

that required to protect the evacuees

and the evacuation force. Forces

penetrating foreign territory to

conduct a NEO should be kept to the

minimum consistent with mission

accomplishment and the security of the

force and the extraction and protection

of evacuees.

• Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the

DOS is responsible for the protection

and evacuation of American citizens

abroad and for guarding their property.

This order also directs the DOD to

advise and assist the DOS in

preparing and implementing plans for

the evacuation of US citizens. The US

Ambassador, or Chief of the

Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for

the preparation of Emergency Action

Plans that address the military

evacuation of US citizens and

designated foreign nationals from a

foreign country. The conduct of

military operations to assist

implementation of Emergency Action

Plans is the responsibility of the

geographic combatant commander.

Selected Haitian noncombatants board a US C-130 bound for safe haven

camps in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.
III-12

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Joint Pub 3-07

• Evacuation operations are

characterized by uncertainty.

Evacuation operations may be directed

without warning because of sudden

changes in a country’s government,

reoriented political or military

relationship with the United States, a

sudden hostile threat to US citizens

from elements within or external to a

foreign country, or in response to a

natural disaster. Joint Pub 3-07.5,

“JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations,” provides detailed

guidance.

• Examples of NEO are EASTERN

EXIT, conducted in 1991, when US and

foreign national personnel were

evacuated from Somalia, and QUICK

LIFT, also conducted in 1991, when

personnel were evacuated from Zaire.

k. Peace Operations (PO)

• PO are military operations to

support diplomatic efforts to reach

a long-term political settlement

and categorized as peacekeeping

operations (PKO) and peace

enforcement operations. PO are

conducted in conjunction with the

various diplomatic activities necessary

to secure a negotiated truce and resolve

the conflict. Additional types of

MOOTW (e.g., HA and NEO) may

complement peace operations. Military

PO are tailored to each situation and

may be conducted in support of

diplomatic activities before, during, or

after conflict.

•• Peacekeeping Operations. PKO are

military operations undertaken with

the consent of all major parties to a

dispute, designed to monitor and

facilitate implementation of an

agreement (cease fire, truce, or other

such agreements) and support

diplomatic efforts to reach a longterm political settlement. An

example of PKO is the US commitment

to the Multinational Force Observers in

the Sinai since 1982. Joint Pub 3-07.3,

“JTTP for Peace Operations,” (in draft)

provides additional information on

peacekeeping.

Joint forces support Peace Enforcement Operations to compel compliance with

measures designed to establish an environment for truce or cease fire.
III-13

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

•• Peace Enforcement Operations.

PEO are the application of military

force, or threat of its use, normally

pursuant to international authorization,

to compel compliance with resolutions

or sanctions designed to maintain or

restore peace and order. PEO

missions include intervention

operations, as well as operations to

restore order, enforce sanctions,

forcibly separate belligerents, and

establish and supervise exclusion zones

for the purpose of establishing an

environment for truce or cease-fire.

Unlike PKO, such operations do not

require the consent of the states

involved or of other parties to the

conflict. Examples of PEO are

Operation POWER PACK conducted

in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and

the secondary effort in Somalia

(UNITAF), 1992-1993.

• Relationship of Peace Operations to

Diplomatic Activities. US military

peace operations support political

objectives and diplomatic objectives.

Military support improves the chances

for success in the peace process by

lending credibility to diplomatic

actions and demonstrating resolve to

achieve viable political settlements. In

addition to PO, the military may

conduct operations in support of the

following diplomatic peace activities:

•• Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive

diplomacy consists of diplomatic

actions taken in advance of a

predictable crisis to prevent or limit

violence. Military support to

diplomacy may, for example, take the

form of a preventive deployment. An

example is Operation ABLE SENTRY,

where US Forces deployed in 1993 to

Macedonia in support of the UN effort

to limit the fighting in the Former

Republic of Yugoslavia.

•• Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the

process of diplomacy, mediation,

negotiation, or other forms of peaceful

settlements that arranges an end to a

dispute, and resolves issues that led

to conflict. Military activities that

support peacemaking include militaryto-military relations and security

assistance.

Joint forces in Military Operations Other Than War are often deployed in support

of the United Nations in multinational peace operations.
III-14

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

•• Peace Building. Peace building

consists of post-conflict actions,

predominantly diplomatic and

economic, that strengthen and

rebuild governmental infrastructure

and institutions in order to avoid a

relapse into conflict. Military support

to peace building may include, for

example, units rebuilding roads,

reestablishing or creating government

entities, or the training of defense

forces.

l. Protection of Shipping. When

necessary, US forces provide protection

of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether

embarked in US or foreign vessels), and

their property against unlawful violence

in and over international waters. With

the consent of the flag state this protection

may be extended to foreign flag vessels

under international law. Protection of

shipping includes coastal sea control,

harbor defense, port security ,

countermine operations , and

environmental defense, in addition to

operations on the high seas. It requires

the coordinated employment of surface,

air, space, and subsurface units, sensors,

and weapons, as well as a command

structure both ashore and afloat, and a

logistics base. Protection of shipping is

accomplished by a combination of

operations. Area operations, either landbased or sea-based, are designed to prevent

a hostile force from obtaining a tactical

position from which to attack friendly or

allied shipping. This includes ocean

surveillance systems that provide data for

threat location and strike operations against

offending bases or facilities. Threats not

neutralized by area operations must be

deterred or addressed by escort operations.

Generally, escorts are associated with

convoys, although individual ships or a

temporary grouping of ships may be

escorted for a specific purpose. Mine

countermeasures operations are integral

to successful protection of shipping and are

an essential element of escort operations.

An example of protection of shipping

is Operation EARNEST WILL, the

reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987.

Environmental defense operations provide

for coordinated Coast Guard/DOD

response to major pollution incidents both

at home and overseas. These incidents

have the potential for grave damage to

natural resources, the economy, and

military operations.

m. Recovery Operations. Recovery

operations are conducted to search for,

locate, identify, rescue, and return

personnel or human remains, sensitive

equipment, or items critical to national

security. These operations are generally

sophisticated activities requiring detailed

planning in order to execute them,

especially when conducting them in denied

areas. They may be clandestine, covert,

or overt. Other recovery operations may

be conducted in friendly areas, particularly

when the HN does not have the means to

provide technical assistance in conducting

the recovery. An example of a recovery

operation is Operation FULL

ACCOUNTING conducted to account for

and recover the remains of US service

members lost during the Vietnam War.

n. Show of Force Operations. These

operations, designed to demonstrate US

resolve, involve increased visibility of US

deployed forces in an attempt to defuse

a specific situation that if allowed to

continue may be detrimental to US interests

or national objectives.

• US forces deployed abroad lend

credibility to US promises and

commitments, increase its regional

influence, and demonstrate its

resolve to use military force if

necessary. In addition, the NCA order

shows of force to bolster and reassure
III-15

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

friends and allies. Show of force

operations are military in nature but

often serve both political and

military purposes. These operations

can influence other governments or

politico-military organizations to

respect US interests as well as

international law.

• A show of force involves the

appearance of a credible military

force to underscore US policy interests

or commitment to an alliance or

coalition. Political concerns

dominate a show of force. Military

forces conduct these operations within

legal and political constraints. The

force coordinates its operations with

the country teams affected. A show of

force can involve a wide range of

military forces including joint US

military or multinational forces.

Additionally, a show of force may

include or transition to joint or

multinational exercises.

• As an example of a show of force,

Operation JTF-Philippines was

conducted by US forces in 1989 in

support of President Aquino during a

coup attempt against the Philippine

government. During this operation, a

large special operations force was

formed, USAF fighter aircraft

patrolled above rebel air bases, and two

aircraft carriers were positioned off the

Philippines.

o. Strikes and Raids. Strikes are

offensive operations conducted to inflict

damage on, seize, or destroy an objective

for political purposes. Strikes may be used

for punishing offending nations or groups,

upholding international law, or preventing

those nations or groups from launching their

own offensive actions. A raid is usually a

small-scale operation involving swift

penetration of hostile territory to secure

information, confuse the enemy, or destroy

installations. It ends with a planned

withdrawal upon completion of the assigned

mission. An example of a strike is

Operation URGENT FURY, conducted on

the island of Grenada in 1983. An example

of a raid is Operation EL DORADO

CANYON conducted against Libya in

1986, in response to the terrorist bombing

of US Service members in Berlin. Joint Pub

3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious

Operations,” provides specific guidance on

amphibious raids.

p. Support to Insurgency. An

insurgency is an organized movement

aimed at the overthrow of a constituted

government through the use of subversion

and armed conflict. The US Government

may support an insurgency against a

regime threatening US interests. US forces

may provide logistic and training support

to an insurgency, but normally do not

themselves conduct combat operations. An

example of support to insurgency was US

support to the Mujahadin resistance in

Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion.

3. Conclusion

The operations discussed in this chapter

are representative of the wide range of

MOOTW. Although each type of operation

has unique aspects that influence planning,

there are some considerations that are

applicable to most MOOTW. These

planning considerations, along with

education and training requirements for

MOOTW, are addressed in Chapter IV,

"Planning for Military Operations Other

Than War."
III-16

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

PLANNING FOR MILITARY

 OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

IV-1

1. General

Key planning factors are addressed in

this chapter, along with education and

training implications of MOOTW.

2. Planning Considerations

Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a

similar manner as plans for war. The

mission analysis and command estimate

processes are as critical in planning for

MOOTW as they are in planning for war.

Of particular importance in the planning

process for MOOTW is the development

of a clear definition, understanding, and

appreciation of all potential threats.

Oftentimes the threats may be unique and

disproportional or have the appearance of

being asymmetrical to the US operations

being conducted. For this reason, efforts

should be made to include an intelligence

element in the first deployment package.

Although the possibility of combat may be

remote in many types of MOOTW,

commanders should always plan to have

the right mix of forces available to

quickly transition to combat operations

or evacuate. Additionally, when conducting

noncombat operations, commanders must

consider the feasibility and means of

redeployment, possibly to another theater,

to conduct other operations.

a. Unit Integrity. Planners should

attempt to maintain unit integrity. US

forces train as units, and are best able to

accomplish a mission when deployed

intact. By deploying as an existing unit,

forces are able to continue to operate under

established procedures, adapting these to

the mission and situation, as required.

When personnel and elements are drawn

from various commands, effectiveness is

decreased. By deploying without

established operating procedures, an ad hoc

force is less effective and takes more time

to adjust to requirements of the mission.

This not only complicates mission

accomplishment, but may also have an

impact on force protection. Even if

political restraints on an operation dictate

that a large force cannot be deployed intact,

commanders should select smaller

elements for deployment that have

established internal structures and have

trained and operated together.

Additionally, when deploying into a

situation which may involve combat

operations, commanders should deploy

with appropriate joint force combat

capability, including elements that have

had the opportunity to train together and

develop common operating procedures. In

order to provide JFCs with needed

versatility, it may not be possible to

preserve unit integrity. In such cases,

units must be prepared to send elements

which are able to operate independently of

parent units. Attachment to a related unit

is the usual mode. Units not accustomed

to having attachments may be required to

provide administrative and logistic support

to normally unrelated units.

“British troops getting ready for duties in Northern Ireland and Nordic soldiers

preparing for deployment to Macedonia are specifically retrained to use

minimum force rather than maximum force to deal with threats they face.”

Special Warfare, April 1994
IV-2

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

b. Intelligence and Information

Gathering

• MOOTW requires multi-disciplined,

all-source, fused intelligence. A

single source approach cannot support

all requirements.

• Manned and unmanned aerial

intelligence sensors, to include

space-based, can provide valuable

information where other intelligence

infrastructure is not in place. Remote

sensing systems can provide

information on terrain, weather and

other environmental factors essential

to MOOTW. Data from space

systems can be used to update

antiquated maps and provide up-todate locations of facilities and

obstacles. Sensors on space and

aerial platforms can also monitor

terrestrial force movement and assist

in treaty verification. In addition,

communications systems using

space-based resources can provide

secure, reliable dissemination of

intelligence and other information

where there is little or no existing

communications infrastructure.

• In MOOTW conducted outside the

United States, human intelligence

(HUMINT) may provide the most

useful source of information.

However, a HUMINT infrastructure

may not be in place when US forces

arrive; therefore, it needs to be

established as quickly as possible.

HUMINT can supplement other

intelligence sources with

psychological information not

available through technical means.

For example, while overhead imagery

may graphically depict the number of

people gathered in the town square,

it cannot gauge motivations or

enthusiasm of the crowds.

Additionally, in underdeveloped areas

belligerent forces may not rely heavily

on radio communication, denying US

forces intelligence derived through

signal intercept. HUMINT is

required to supplement signals

intelligence and overhead imagery

which we typically rely upon to

produce the most accurate products.

• Specific essential elements of

information which drive collection

management process in MOOTW may

differ in focus from those targeted in

war. In war, intelligence collection

includes an entire range of factors with

a major emphasis on the enemy’s

military capability. Intelligence

collection in MOOTW, however,

might require a focus on

understanding the political, cultural,

and economic factors that affect the

situation. Information collection and

analysis in MOOTW must often

address unique and subtle problems

not always encountered in war. It will

require a depth of expertise in (and a

mental and psychological integration

with) all aspects of the operational

environment’s peoples and their

cultures, politics, religion, economics,

and related factors; and any variances

within affected groups of people. It is

only through an understanding of the

values by which people define

themselves, that an intervenor can

establish for himself a perception of

legitimacy and assure that actions

intended to be coercive, do in fact have

the intended effect. In addition,

intelligence collection must focus

quickly on transportation

infrastructure in the AOR/JOA, to

include capabilities and limitations of

major seaports, airfields, and surface

lines of communications.
IV-3

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

• In MOOTW involving in-depth

coordination or interaction with NGOs

and PVOs and most UN operations,

the term “information gathering”

should be used rather than the term

“intelligence.” The term

“information gathering” is also

appropriate in peacekeeping

operations because peacekeepers must

be overt, neutral, and impartial. Nonmilitary organizations may resent

being considered a source of

intelligence. These organizations may

perceive that US forces are seeking to

recruit members of their organizations

for collection efforts, or turn the

organizations into unknowing

accomplices in some covert collection

effort. NGOs and PVOs, by the very

nature of what they do, become

familiar with the culture, language,

and sensitivities of a populace. This

information is very valuable to

military commanders as they seek to

accomplish missions which focus not

on destroying an enemy, but on

providing aid and assistance to the

populace of a foreign country. By

using the term “information

gathering,” military forces may be

able to foster better communications

with other agencies, and thereby

benefit from their valuable knowledge.

• Counterintelligence (CI) operations

are as important in MOOTW as they

are in war. Even though there may

not be a well-defined threat,

protection of the force requires that

essential elements of friendly

information be safeguarded. In

MOOTW, this is particularly pertinent

in countering belligerent HUMINT

efforts. Members of NGOs and

PVOs working closely with US forces

may pass information (knowingly or

unknowingly) to belligerent elements

that enables them to interfere with the

mission. Members of the local

populace often gain access to US

military personnel and their bases by

providing services such as laundry and

cooking. The local populace may

provide information gleaned from

interaction with US forces to seek

favor with a belligerent element, or

they may actually be belligerents.

JFCs must consider these and

similar possibilities for compromise

of operational information, and take

actions to counter this compromise. CI

personnel can develop an estimate of

the threat, and recommend appropriate

actions. Equally important is their

critical role during multinational

MOOTW in establishing procedures

and safeguards regarding the

protection, handling, and release of

classified or sensitive information to

coalition partners, allies, and

supported elements. Because of the

possibly tenuous relationships between

the US and coalition partners during

a particular MOOTW, JFCs must be

alert to the possibility that covert

intelligence operations may be

conducted against them by a

coalition partner. CI planning and

operations must deal with this

contingency, but in a uniquely

sensitive way.

• Additionally, the importance of

mapping, charting, and geodesy

should not be overlooked. This is

particularly true in multinational

operations, where it is essential that

maps, charts and support data (to

include datum and coordinate system

to be used) are coordinated in advance.

The accuracy, scale, and currency of

foreign maps and charts may vary

widely from US products.

Additionally, release of US mapping

materials may require foreign

disclosure approval.
IV-4

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

 c. Multinational Operations

Multinational operations planning

should take into account the considerations

shown in Figure IV-1.

• When planning for operations

involving multinational partners,

JFCs should assign missions based

on each multinational partner’s

capabilities. Each nation’s political

considerations will influence its degree

of involvement in a specific MOOTW.

Some multinational partners may not

be traditional allies of the US. Others

may harbor long-standing animosities

towards other participating nations.

These factors create unique

interoperability, foreign disclosure and

counterintelligence issues. Early

determination and resolution of

these issues with partner nations

during the planning process is

critical for retaining the cooperation

of multinational partners and ensuring

they have the resources necessary to

accomplish their assigned missions.

• JFCs should plan for increased liaison

and advisory requirements when

conducting multinational operations.

Language barriers, varied cultural

backgrounds, and different military

capabilities and training may

detract from effective coordination

with multinational partners.

Interoperability of equipment and

coordination of different logistic

support systems must be considered

in assigning missions and areas of

operations. Liaison and advisory

teams must be adequately organized,

staffed, trained and equipped to

overcome these detractors. Although

commanders may not normally

provide a liaison team to a particular

unit, in multinational operations

deployment of a team may be critical

to effective coordination and mission

accomplishment SOF-unique

capabilities in language and crosscultural training, their regional

orientation and forward deployment,

and focus on independent small unit

actions make them one of the

principal forces of choice to

complement and support

multinational operations objectives.

Chapter VI of Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine

For Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub

3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational

Operations” (under development),

provide guidance for multinational

operations. Effective options for

command and control of multinational

forces are covered below.

d. Command and Control (C2). No

single C2 option works best for all

MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates

should be flexible in modifying standard

arrangements to meet specific

requirements of each situation and promote

unity of effort. Communications planners

must be prepared for rapid changes in

mission that alter the types and priority of

MULTINATIONAL

OPERATIONS

CONSIDERATIONS

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l

Political Considerations

Language Barriers

Cultural Backgrounds

Military Capabilities and

Training

Equipment Interoperability

Logistic Support System

Coordination

Figure IV-1. Multinational Operations

Considerations
IV-5

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

support provided. Interoperability of

communications systems is critical to the

success of the operation.

• In US unilateral operations, C2

arrangements may vary based on

necessary coordination with US civil

authorities, or federal, state, and local

agencies involved in domestic and

foreign operations. For example, C2

arrangements during support to US

civil authorities must be planned

with unity of effort in mind, and

provide communications links to

appropriate US agencies. In a disaster

situation, routine communications

may be disrupted. Civil authorities

might have to rely on backup

communications systems, or if civilian

backup systems are disrupted, the

military may have the only

communications equipment available.

Military leaders should be prepared

to establish communication linkages

with these authorities. Outside the

United States, even when US forces

operate unilaterally, some

communications links will be

required with local civil authorities

or international agencies, depending

on the situation. Additionally,

communications planning must

consider the termination of US

involvement in MOOTW and the

transfer of responsibility to another

agency such as the UN or an NGO.

Systems may have to be left behind to

support the ongoing effort. This must

be addressed early in the planning

effort.

• There are several options that may

be employed for the C2 of

multinational forces; however,

planners must be prepared to extend a

communications umbrella over the

multinational force. Effective options

for C2 of multinational forces

include:

•• In the lead nation option, a nation

agrees to take the lead in the

accomplishment of an international

mandate. The lead nation generally

provides the preponderance of forces

and the commander and basic staff to

control operations. Other nations

place forces under the operational

control of the lead nation’s military

commander and augment the staff of

the controlling headquarters. This

simplifies unity of command, and

allows the lead nation to set military

objectives in cooperation with other

military forces, approve the

composition of the force, and assure

mutual understanding of the mandate

by all partners.

•• The parallel option allows

multinational partners to retain greater

operational control of their forces. The

mandating organization (e.g., UN)

selects a commander for the force. A

staff, proportionally representing all

contributing nations, is assembled on

an ad hoc basis. The force commander

has operational control of forces of the

multinational partners, but generally

to a lesser degree than that exercised

in the lead nation option.

•• The regional alliance option

depends on the ability of regional

nations to lead a coalition effort.

Regional alliance C2 approaches may

also hinge on the influence exerted by

a nation in a regional leadership

position. Existing alliances may serve

as a basis for C2 of forces involved in

MOOTW. For example, the C2

structure of NATO was designed for

war, but may also be effective in

MOOTW.
IV-6

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

e. Public Affairs

• The worldwide media coverage

provided by satellite communications

makes planning for public affairs

more important than in the past.

This is especially critical in MOOTW,

where there can be significant political

impact. Media reporting influences

public opinion, which may affect the

perceived legitimacy of an operation

and ultimately influence the success

or failure of the operation. The speed

with which the media can collect and

convey information to the public

makes it possible for the world

populace to become aware of an

incident as quickly as, or even

before, JFCs and US Government

decisionmakers. JFCs should develop

a well-defined and concise public

affairs plan to minimize adverse effect

upon the operation and include their

public affairs officer early in the

planning process.

• Public affairs plans should provide

open and independent reporting,

respond to media queries which

provide the maximum disclosure with

minimum delay, and create an

environment between commander and

reporters that encourages balanced

coverage of operations. An effective

plan provides ways to communicate

information about an operation and

fulfills the US military’s obligation to

keep the American public informed.

Additionally, a public affairs plan

enhances force protection through

security at the source and operational

security awareness, to include the

possibility of media attempts to acquire

and publicly disseminate classified

information. Public affairs plans

must also anticipate and pre-plan

response to possibly inaccurate

media analysis and promulgation of

disinformation and misinformation by

US, coalition, and other media sources.

Joint Pub 1-07, “Doctrine for Public

Affairs in Joint Operations” (under

development), provides further

guidance.

f. Civil Affairs (CA). CA units contain

a variety of specialty skills that support

MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally

tailored to support particular

operational requirements. CA units may

provide assessments of the civil

infrastructure, assist in the operation of

temporary shelters, and serve as liaison

between the military and various NGOs and

PVOs. Establishing and maintaining

military to civil relations may include

interaction among US, allied or coalition,

host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and

PVOs. CA forces can also provide

expertise on factors which directly affect

military operations to include: culture,

social structure, economic systems,

language, and host-nation support

capabilities. CA may also include forces

conducting activities which are normally

the responsibility of local or indigenous

governments. Selection of CA forces

should be based upon a clear concept of

CA mission requirements for the type

operation being planned. Joint Pub 3-05,

“Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,”

provides specific guidance on the principal

special operations missions, and Joint Pub

3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,”

provides specific guidance for employment

of CA forces.

g. Psychological Operations. PSYOP

forces can provide significant support in

MOOTW. Military PSYOP constitute a

planned, systematic process of conveying

messages to and influencing selected

target groups. The messages conveyed by

military PSYOP are intended to promote

particular themes that can result in desired

attitudes and behaviors. This information
IV-7

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

may include safety, health, public service,

and messages designed to favorably

influence foreign perceptions of US forces

and operations. Although Joint Pub 3-53,

“Doctrine for Joint Psychological

Operations,” provides specific information

regarding employment of PSYOP forces,

JFCs should be aware that successful

MOOTW may hinge on direct control of

or direct influence over the operational

area mediums of mass communication

(radio and television).

h. Coordination With NGOs and

PVOs. In MOOTW, JFCs should be

prepared to coordinate civilian and

military actions. One method to build

unity of effort and conduct this liaison is

to establish CMOC. There is no

established structure for a CMOC; its size

and composition depend on the situation.

A doctrinal layout of a CMOC organization

can be found in the Handbook for CMOC

Operations, published by the US Army JFK

Special Warfare Center and School.

Members of a CMOC may include

representatives of US military forces and

US Government agencies, other countries’

forces involved in the operation, HN

organizations (if outside the United States),

and NGOs and PVOs. US Army civil

affairs personnel are ideally suited and

trained for CMOC duties. Civil affairs

teams should be considered by the JFC to

establish the core of the CMOC. Through

a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can

gain a greater understanding of the roles

of NGOs and PVOs and how they

influence mission accomplishment.

Although formal agreements are not always

necessary, such agreements between

military and civilian organizations may

improve coordination and effectiveness.

Such agreements can take the form of

memorandums of agreement or

understanding as well as terms of reference.

i. Interagency Operations. MOOTW

will often involve other departments and

agencies.

• Within the United States, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency

normally leads the response to a natural

disaster, while the DOJ or DOT could

be expected to lead in a counterterrorist

operation. Effective liaison with the

lead agency enables the JFC to

effectively support the political

objectives of the operation.

One hundred and sixteen persons lost their lives in the 27 March 1964,

earthquake in south central Alaska, and property damage was over $300

million. The affected communities included Anchorage, Seward, Valdez,

Kodiak and Whittier, with Anchorage being the largest of these.

The Alaska earthquake resulted in one of the most extensive involvements

of the military in a civilian disaster in the history of the United States. The

military operation which was labeled “Operation Helping Hand,” involved

principally the Army and Air Force of the Alaskan Command, and the Alaska

National Guard. Headquarters for the Alaskan Command is located just

outside of Anchorage at Elmendorf Air Force Base. This large air base is

also the headquarters for the Alaskan Air Command. Headquarters for the

United States Army, Alaska is at Fort Richardson, adjacent to Elmendorf Air

Force Base. At the time of the disaster, some 25,000 military personnel resided

EARTHQUAKE IN ALASKA
IV-8

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

in the Anchorage area. Described here is the involvement of the military in

the Anchorage area, its participation in disaster operations in the other

communities notwithstanding.

Since Elmendorf AFB and Ft. Richardson are in such close proximity, the

military is well integrated into the community of Anchorage. The military in

Anchorage, for example, played an important role in the economic life of the

city and was interwoven with civilian organizations and groups in many ways.

The wives of military personnel stationed in the Anchorage area taught in the

Anchorage schools, and their children attended school in the city. The military

and civilian organizations cooperated with one another in numerous ways;

for example, Anchorage area fire departments had mutual aid agreements

with military fire departments. Also, upon retirement from active military

life, former military personnel sometimes assumed positions in Anchorage

organizations. Thus, there was a spirit of cooperation and interdependence

between the military and civilian communities of Anchorage prior to the 1964

catastrophe. It was not surprising then that the military provided considerable

assistance to the community in its hour of need.

The earthquake occurred around 5:30 p.m., and about 6:30 p.m. the first contact

was made between the military and civilian officials. At this time, the Army

Provost Marshall from Ft. Richardson—who had been sent into the city to

see if military assistance would be needed—made initial contact with civilian

authorities at the downtown Public Safety Building, which became the

emergency operation center for the city. Throughout the period, the provost

marshall acted as the Army liaison officer between the Army headquarters,

the city police department and the Anchorage Civil Defense with the function

of coordinating requests for assistance. At 8:00 p.m., the police requested

Army troops to assist in securing Anchorage against possible looting and to

control the movement of people in the affected areas. Because of the

magnitude of the earthquake, officers at the base had anticipated the need

for assisting the civilian community; thus they were well mobilized when the

official request was received. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the first contingent

of troops departed from Ft. Richardson for Anchorage. From this initial point

of involvement, the assistance from the military in the disaster-struck

community of Anchorage expanded considerably.

SOURCE: William Anderson, “Military-Civilian Relations in Disaster

Operations,” USA Office of Civil Defense, 1968.

• For MOOTW outside the United

States, the lead agency will normally

be the DOS and the US Ambassador

will coordinate US activities through

an established Country Team with

representation from all US

departments and agencies in that

country, including DOD. In countries

which lack US embassies, a special

Presidential Envoy may be designated

to direct the operation.

• That a non-DOD agency may have the

lead on a given operation does not alter

the military chain of command

established in the appropriate order

issued by the NCA.

j. Legal Requirements. MOOTW may

present unique legal issues. In addition to

traditional skills necessary in military

justice, legal personnel may require

expertise in areas such as those shown in
IV-9

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

Figure IV-2. Commanders should ensure

that their supporting Staff Judge

Advocate, or civilian legal counsel, has

the resources available to respond to the

variety of complex international and

operational legal and regulatory issues that

may arise during MOOTW. HN legal

personnel should be integrated into the

command legal staff as soon as practical to

provide guidance on unique HN domestic

legal practices and customs.

AREAS REQUIRING

LEGAL EXPERTISE

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Refugees

Displaced and detained

civilians

Fiscal law

Rules of engagement

Psychological operations

Civil affairs

Medical support

Local culture, customs,

and government

International law and

agreements (such as Statusof-Forces Agreements and

environmental initiatives)

Military and political liaison

Claims

Figure IV-2. Areas Requiring Legal

Expertise

k. Logistics

• In MOOTW, logistics elements

may be employed in quantities

disproportionate to their normal

military roles, and in nonstandard

tasks; planners must be aware that

overextending such forces may

jeopardize their ability to support

combat operations. Logistics

elements may precede other military

forces or may be the only forces

deployed. Logistics personnel may be

deployed to a foreign nation to support

either US or multinational forces.

Logistics forces may also have

continuing responsibility after the

departure of combat forces, in support

of multinational forces or PVOs and

NGOs. In such cases, they must be

familiar with and adhere to any

applicable status-of-forces agreement

to which the US is a party. Logistics

personnel must also be familiar with

and adhere to any legal, regulatory, or

political restraints governing US

involvement in the MOOTW. The

commander must be alert for potential

legal problems arising from the unique,

difficult circumstances and the highly

political nature of MOOTW such as

disaster relief and humanitarian

assistance operations. Logistics

planners should analyze the capability

of the HN economy to accommodate

the logistic support required by the US

or multinational forces and exercise

care to limit adverse effects on the HN

economy. Logistics units, like all

other units, must be capable of selfdefense, particularly if they deploy

alone or in advance of other military

forces.

• Early mission analysis must also

consider transportation

requirements. Airfields and ports

must be assessed, particularly those in
IV-10

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

underdeveloped countries where status

will be in question. Delay in

completing the assessment directly

impacts the flow of strategic lift assets

into the region. Additional support

forces may be required to build

supporting infrastructure. This

impacts follow-on force closure as well

as delivery of humanitarian cargo.

Also procedures must be established

t o coordinate movement

requirements and airfield slot times

with other participants in the

operation. Availability of fuel and

other key support items may impinge

on transportation support.

• Fundamental logistics principles apply

across the range of military operations.

Refer to Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for

Logistic Support of Joint Operations,”

for additional specific guidance

regarding logistics.

l. Medical Operations

• There is usually a requirement to

provide medical support to US forces

engaged in MOOTW. Medical

operations teams brought by US forces

are intended to support those forces.

The US military has unique, rapidly

deployable, mobile medical

personnel and units which are

frequently called upon to provide a

large portion of the medical support.

Rapid and early integration of

preventive medicine units and

practices is perhaps the most

important medical operation that

must be planned. Medical support

operations protect US personnel and

enhance mission capability by

reducing the threat of uncontrolled

disease problems. Planning to provide

medical services for US forces and

designated individuals should include

hospitalization, preventive and

veterinary medicine, medical logistics,

blood, medical regulating, and

aeromedical evacuation planning. For

a complete discussion of medical

planning, refer to Joint Pub 4-02, “Joint

Doctrine for Health Service Support in

Joint Operations.”

A deployed US medical specialist examines an X-ray in support of efforts to

reduce the spread of tuberculosis and identify preventative medicine requirements.
IV-11

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

• When planning for MOOTW, the

potential to treat the HN indigent

population or allied military

personnel must be considered. The

respective capabilities of allied,

civilian relief, or other supporting

medical forces should be considered

prior to finalizing the medical support

concept.

• Medical examination of indigenous

and coalition personnel and their

environments will frequently provide

unique operational insights to the JFC

during MOOTW. Presence and use of

drugs, threat development of WMD,

and other critical evidence are often

first identified or verified through this

valuable intelligence source.

Continuous coordination is necessary

between the medical and intelligence

elements.

m. Active/Reserve Mix. MOOTW

may require units and individuals not

found in the active component or may

require deployment of more units or

individuals possessing a capability than are

available in the active component.

Examples of these types of units are shown

in Figure IV-3. Mobilization of any reserve

component units may be difficult if war is

not imminent or declared. Consequently,

most reserve component participation

will be through volunteer support. To

take advantage of volunteers, planners

should select roles and tasks for reserve

forces that can be supported by a rotational

force -- tour requirements in excess of three

weeks will discourage and limit volunteers.

If time permits, planners should

determine what reserve component

capabilities are required, and how long

it will take for the units to be trained and

ready for deployment. Planners should also

review personnel and equipment

authorizations for reserve component

units to ensure compatibility with active

forces. For example, a reserve unit

equipped with commercial cargo vehicles

would not be able to operate as well in

rough terrain as an active unit equipped

with tactical vehicles. On the other hand,

use of active forces, especially in functional

areas heavily reliant on the reserve

component, may impact on those forces’

ability to respond to their wartime taskings

in the near term because of the time needed

to redeploy and repair or replace

equipment.

n. Transition from Wartime Operations

to MOOTW. A commander’s campaign

plan should include a transition from

wartime operation to MOOTW.

Commanders plan for this transition at the

very outset of hostilities. This ensures

desired political objectives continue to be

pursued after the cessation of wartime

operations. Figure IV-4 shows postconflict activities.

RESERVE UNITS

NEEDED IN MOOTW

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l

Civil affairs

Psychological operations

Airlift

Linguist units and FOAs

Medical

Port security

Engineers

Figure IV-3. Reserve Units Needed in

MOOTW
IV-12

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

• JFCs may need to realign forces or

adjust force structure to begin postconflict operations. The JFC’s

planning and continuous development

of the estimate of the situation will

reveal the nature and scope of these

activities and the forces required.

These forces may be available within

the joint force or may be required from

another theater or from reserve

components.

• As post-conflict operations progress,

military forces may largely be in

support of other US and

international agency efforts. Postconflict activities typically begin with

significant military involvement, then

move increasingly toward civilian

dominance as the threat wanes and

civil infrastructures are reestablished.

• Typical post-conflict activities

include transition to civil authorities,

support to truce negotiations, CA

support to reestablish a civil

government, PSYOP to foster

continued peaceful relations, and

continuing logistic support from

engineering and transportation units.

o. Termination of Operations

• As in war, MOOTW operational

planning includes actions to be taken

as soon as the operation is complete.

These actions depend on the specific

operation and may include the items

listed in Figure IV-5. The manner in

which US forces terminate their

involvement may influence the

perception of the legitimacy of the

entire operation, and application of

this principle of MOOTW requires

careful planning for this phase.

Additionally, proper accountability of

funds and equipment facilitates

disbursement of funds and

reimbursements against any

outstanding claims.

• Planners should schedule

redeployment of specific units as

soon as possible after their part in the

operation has been completed. This is

critical for maintaining readiness for

Figure IV-4. Post-Conflict Activities

Activities include:

Transition to civil authorities

Support to truce negotiations

Civil affairs support to reestablish a

civil government

Psychological operations to foster

continued peaceful relations

Continuing logistic support from

engineering and transportation units

SIGNIFICANT

MILITARY

INVOLVEMENT

CIVILIAN

DOMINANCE

POST-CONFLICT ACTIVITIES
IV-13

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping

operations) warfighting skills are not

always appropriate. Therefore, to be

effective in these types of MOOTW, a mind

set other than warfighting is required.

a. Readying forces to successfully

conduct MOOTW requires a two-pronged

approach (see Figure IV-6). The first prong

is the professional military education of

all officers and noncommissioned officers

(NCOs). Their formal MOOTW education

begins with basic leadership training and

culminates at the senior service or academy

level. The focus of MOOTW education is

t o ensure leaders at all levels

understand the objectives, principles

and characteristics of MOOTW, and can

plan and conduct these operations. As

leaders progress, they will learn about

MOOTW at a level applicable to their

current and next grade. Leader education

will include discussions, lessons learned,

and situational exercises, and should

culminate with senior leaders performing

in a command or staff position during a

MOOTW exercise.

b. The second prong is the training of

individuals, units, and staffs. The focus

of this training is to ensure that

individuals and units have the necessary

skills for a given MOOTW, and that the

staffs can plan, control, and support the

operation. Depending on the anticipated

operation, predeployment training could

include individual skill training, situational

training exercises, field training exercises,

combined arms live fire exercises, mobility

exercises, command post exercises, and

simulation exercises to train commanders,

staffs, and components. If there is sufficient

time prior to actual deployment for an

operation, units should culminate their

predeployment training in a joint training

exercise based on the anticipated

operation. The unit tasked for the operation

should participate in the exercise with the

future operations in either the

primary role of fighting the nation’s

wars or deploying for subsequent

MOOTW. Forces that have been

performing noncombat types of

MOOTW, such as PKO, may be

degraded in combat proficiency. If the

MOOTW tasks are significantly

different from their combat tasks,

forces may require proficiency training

prior to being deployed as warfighters.

3. Education and Training

“A well-trained and disciplined military

unit is the best foundation upon which

to build a peacekeeping force.”

LTG T. Montgomery, USA

SR MILREP to NATO

Readying forces for MOOTW requires

building on the primary purpose of the

Armed Forces -- to fight and win the

nation’s wars. For most types of

MOOTW, military personnel adapt their

warfighting skills to the situation.

However, for some MOOTW (for example,

May include but are not

limited to:

TERMINATION OF

OPERATIONS ACTIONS

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Transition to civil authority

Marking and clearing

minefields

Closing financial obligations

Pre-redeployment activities

Redeploying forces

Figure IV-5. Termination of Operations

Actions
IV-14

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

supporting units with which it normally

deploys, and if possible, with the next

higher headquarters for the actual

operation. Once deployed, and if the

situation allows, military skills training

at individual and unit level may occur.

Training following redeployment should

again focus on the unit’s wartime missions.

c. There will most likely be

insufficient time to train for a specific

operation, which is why a two-pronged

approach to preparing for MOOTW is

critical. A well-trained force can adapt

to MOOTW under the leadership of

officers and NCOs educated in the

principles and types of MOOTW. The

lack of opportunity to train for a specific

Figure IV-6. MOOTW Education and Training

operation is in large part overcome by

military leaders who have a solid

foundation of MOOTW provided through

the military education system.

4. Conclusion

In MOOTW, commanders should rely on

their knowledge of warfighting and training

doctrine, but must understand the

demands of MOOTW and be prepared

to tailor warfighting skills to meet the

MOOTW situation. Forces engaged in

noncombat MOOTW should always

prepare for transition to combat. Finally,

success during MOOTW is founded in

professional, skilled, trained, educated, and

disciplined Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,

Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

MOOTW EDUCATION AND TRAINING

GOALS

Ensure all leaders

understand the

objectives,

principles, and

characteristics of

MOOTW

Ensure individuals

and units have the

necessary skills for a

given MOOTW and

that the staffs can

plan, control, and

support the

operation

OFFICERS

AND NCOS

INDIVIDUALS,

UNITS, AND

STAFFS

METHODS

Discussions

Lessons learned

Situational exercises

Individual skill

training

Situational exercises

Field exercises

Combined arms live

fire exercises

Mobility exercises

Simulation exercises

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö
IV-15

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

An 11 year-old Haitian girl comforts her

younger sister during operation UPHOLD

DEMOCRACY. US forces must be prepared to deal with a spectrum of situations

when engaged in Military Operations Other

Than War.
IV-16

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

A-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the

Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,

VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,

consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor

for this publication is the Director, J-5, Strategic Plans and Policy.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//

FROM: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and

Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested

to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in

this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________
A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication

centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or

foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)

to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C.

20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned

administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,

“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office

Distribution Division (Code 03443)

5801 Tabor Avenue

Philadelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base

Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AOR area of responsibility

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CI counterintelligence

CJTF commander, joint task force

CMOC civil-military operations center

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

FID foreign internal defense

HA humanitarian assistance

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance

HN host nation

HUMINT human intelligence

IDAD internal defense and development

JFC joint force commander

JOA joint operations area

JTF joint task force

JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

MFO Multinational Force and Observers

MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War

MSCA military support to civil authorities

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Command Authorities

NCO noncommissioned officer

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NGO nongovernmental organization

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PEO peace enforcement operations

PKO peacekeeping operations

PO Peace Operations

PSYOP psychological operations

PVO private voluntary organization
GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07

ROE rules of engagement

SOF Special Operations Forces

UN United Nations

USAF United States Air Force

WMD weapons of mass destruction
GL-3

Glossary

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

arms control. A concept that connotes: a.

any plan, arrangement, or process, resting

upon explicit or implicit international

agreement, governing any aspect of the

following: the numbers, types, and

performance characteristics of weapon

systems (including the command and

control, logistics support arrangements,

and any related intelligence-gathering

mechanism); and the numerical strength,

organization, equipment, deployment, or

employment of the Armed Forces

retained by the parties (it encompasses

disarmament); and, b. on some

occasions, those measures taken for the

purpose of reducing instability in the

military environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including

antiterrorism (defensive measures taken

to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts)

and counterterrorism (offensive measures

taken to prevent, deter, and respond to

terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism

throughout the entire threat spectrum.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

DOD support to counterdrug operations.

Support provided by the Department of

Defense to law enforcement agencies to

detect, monitor, and counter the

production, trafficking, and use of illegal

drugs. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

end state. What the National Command

Authorities want the situation to be when

operations conclude — both military

operations, as well as those where the

military is in support of other instruments

of national power. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub

1-02)

ensuring freedom of navigation.

Operations conducted to demonstrate US

or international rights to navigate air or

sea routes. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

exclusion zone. A zone established by a

sanctioning body to prohibit specific

activities in a specific geographic area.

The purpose may be to persuade nations

or groups to modify their behavior to

meet the desires of the sanctioning body

or face continued imposition of

sanctions, or use or threat of force.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs

conducted to relieve or reduce the results

of natural or manmade disasters or other

endemic conditions such as human pain,

disease, hunger, or privation that might

present a serious threat to life or that can

result in great damage to or loss of

property. Humanitarian assistance

provided by US forces is limited in scope

and duration. The assistance provided

is designed to supplement or complement

the efforts of the host nation civil

authorities or agencies that may have the

primary responsibility for providing

humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war.

Encompasses the use of military

capabilities across the range of military

operations short of war. These military

actions can be applied to complement

any combination of the other instruments

of national power and occur before,

during, and after war. Also called

MOOTW. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07

military support to civil authorities.

Those activities and measures taken by

the DOD Components to foster mutual

assistance and support between the

Department of Defense and any civil

government agency in planning or

preparedness for, or in the application of

resources for response to, the

consequences of civil emergencies or

attacks, including national security

emergencies. Also called MSCA.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military

assistance rendered to a nation by foreign

forces within that nation’s territory

during peacetime, crises or emergencies,

or war based on agreements mutually

concluded between nations. Nation

assistance programs include, but are not

limited to, security assistance, foreign

internal defense, other US Code Title 10

(DOD) programs, and activities

performed on a reimbursable basis by

Federal agencies or international

organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations.

Operations conducted to relocate

threatened noncombatants from

locations in a foreign country. These

operations normally involve US citizens

whose lives are in danger, and may also

include selected foreign nationals. Also

called NEO. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Refers

to transnational organizations of private

citizens that maintain a consultative

status with the Economic and Social

council of the United Nations.

Nongovernmental organizations may be

professional associations, foundation,

multinational businesses or simply

groups with a common interest in

humanitarian assistance activities

(development and relief).

“Nongovernmental organizations” is a

term normally used by non-US

organizations. Also called NGO.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace building. Post-conflict actions,

predominately diplomatic and economic,

that strengthen and rebuild governmental

infrastructure and institutions in order to

avoid a relapse into conflict. (Approved

for inclusion in the next edition of Joint

Pub 1-02)

peace enforcement. Application of

military force, or the threat of its use,

normally pursuant to international

authorization, to compel compliance

with resolutions or sanctions designed

to maintain or restore peace and order.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations

undertaken with the consent of all major

parties to a dispute, designed to monitor

and facilitate implementation of an

agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such

agreement) and support diplomatic

efforts to reach a long-term political

settlement. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy,

mediation, negotiation, or other forms

of peaceful settlements that arranges an

end to a dispute, and resolves issues that

led to conflict. (Approved for inclusion

in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. Encompasses

peacekeeping operations and peace

enforcement operations conducted in

support of diplomatic efforts to establish

and maintain peace. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub

1-02)
GL-5

Glossary

preventive deployment. The deployment

of military forces to deter violence at the

interface or zone of potential conflict

where tension is rising among parties.

Forces may be employed in such a way

that they are indistinguishable from a

peacekeeping force in terms of

equipment, force posture, and activities.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions

taken in advance of a predictable crisis

to prevent or limit violence. (Approved

for inclusion in the next edition of Joint

Pub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private,

nonprofit humanitarian assistance

organizations involved in development

and relief activities. Private voluntary

organizations are normally US-based.

“Private voluntary organization” is often

used synonymously with the term

“nongovernmental organization.” Also

called PVO. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

protection of shipping. The use of

proportionate force by US warships,

military aircraft, and other forces, when

necessary for the protection of US flag

vessels and aircraft, US citizens (whether

embarked in US or foreign vessels), and

their property against unlawful violence.

This protection may be extended to

foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons

consistent with international law.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale,

involving a swift penetration of hostile

territory to secure information, confuse

the enemy, or to destroy installations. It

ends with a planned withdrawal upon

completion of the assigned mission.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

recovery operations. Operations

conducted to search for, locate, identify,

rescue, and return personnel or human

remains, sensitive equipment, or items

critical to national security. (Approved

for inclusion in the next edition of Joint

Pub 1-02)

sanction enforcement/maritime intercept

operations. Operations which employ

coercive measures to interdict the

movement of certain types of designated

items into or out of a nation or specified

area. (Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

show of force. An operation, designed to

demonstrate US resolve, which involves

increased visibility of US deployed forces

in an attempt to defuse a specific

situation, that if allowed to continue, may

be detrimental to US interests or national

objectives. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

strike. An attack which is intended to

inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an

objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

support to counterinsurgency. Support

provided to a government in the military,

paramilitary, political, economic,

psychological, and civic actions it

undertakes to defeat insurgency.

(Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

support to insurgency. Support provided

to an organized movement aimed at the

overthrow of a constituted government

through use of subversion and armed

conflict. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and CINCS

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones,

and who will develop

drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, CINC, or Joint

Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub and

begin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality

of each pub and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each pub is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision

l

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff

to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

CINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

l

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STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy

as shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.

The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-07 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNEL

and

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINT

WARFARE

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formal

staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority

(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,

and Joint Staff

l

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STEP #3

Two Drafts

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0