COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

FRANCIS C. BLOXTON, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1041-98-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MAY 4, 1999 

WENDY H. BLOXTON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 

John N. Clifford (Shirley L. Hennessy; 

Clifford & Duke, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

Robert C. Elliott, II (Rebecca E. Duffie; The 

Elliott Law Firm, on brief), for appellee. 

 In this equitable distribution appeal, Francis C. Bloxton 

(husband) contends the trial court erred (1) by dividing the 

marital assets equally between the parties, (2) by requiring 

husband to pay a portion of the credit card debt incurred by Wendy 

H. Bloxton (wife), (3) by crediting wife $2,000 for an air 

conditioning unit installed in the husband’s separately owned home 

with marital funds, and (4) in calculating the marital portion of 

the husband’s pension. We find that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by dividing the marital property equally between 

the parties, by ordering the husband to pay a portion of the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.
wife’s credit card debt, or by awarding the wife a $1,000 credit1

for her share of a marital asset traced from husband’s separately 

owned property. However, we hold that the trial court erred in 

calculating the marital share of husband’s pension plan and we 

reverse that ruling. 

BACKGROUND

 The Bloxtons were married for six years. They had no 

children born of the marriage. At the time of divorce, husband 

was fifty-one years old and wife was forty years old. At various 

periods during the marriage, wife’s three teenage children from a 

prior marriage lived with the Bloxtons. 

 From 1988 to 1990, wife contributed from $100 to $700 a month 

from her earnings into the marital account. Over the course of 

the six-year marriage, husband earned $231,678, all of which he 

deposited in the parties’ joint account. During the same period, 

wife earned $76,272, $11,014 of which she deposited in the joint 

account. After obtaining a job at a retail store in 1992 and 

until 1994, wife paid half the house payment, half the electric 

bill, and half the telephone bill. She also paid fully for her 

personal long distance telephone calls. Additionally, she 

purchased family groceries and incidentals including cleaning 

supplies. She estimated that bill payments and payments into the 

 1

Although husband contends the trial court erred by awarding 

wife $2,000, in fact the trial court merely classified $2,000 as 

marital and awarded wife $1,000. 

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marital account represented about seventy-five percent of her 

approximately $20,000 annual salary. Near the end of the 

marriage, the husband closed the joint account over a controversy 

surrounding a check that wife wrote to a grocery store for 

thirteen dollars. After husband closed the account, wife paid her 

share of the monthly expenses in cash. 

 During the marriage, the parties reduced the mortgage 

principal for husband’s separately owned marital residence by 

$15,449. The Bloxtons spent $2,000 of marital funds to install in 

the residence a central air conditioning system. The parties also 

expended marital funds on new windows and floor joists. 

 Husband retired at age fifty after 25.245 years of service 

with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. Husband had 3.863 

additional years of military service and 1.103 years of 

accumulated sick leave that were credited toward his retirement, 

resulting in a total of 30.211 creditable years. Husband had 

earned sick leave at the rate of four hours for every two weeks. 

He testified that during the marriage, he had missed only one or 

two hours of work. 

 Based on evidence concerning the character and nature of the 

debts, the trial court classified four of wife’s credit card debts 

and two of husband’s debts as marital. 

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ANALYSIS

I.

 Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

by ordering that the marital property be divided equally. 

 The division of marital property is committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court. See Amburn v. Amburn, 13 Va. 

App. 661, 666, 414 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1992). On review, a divorce 

decree based solely on depositions is not as conclusive as a 

decree based on ore tenus evidence; however, such a decree is 

nevertheless presumed correct and will not be reversed if 

supported by substantial evidence. See Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 

382, 384, 219 S.E.2d 898, 899 (1975). Code § 20-107.3(E) 

specifies the factors that a trial court must consider in 

deciding how to equitably distribute marital property. However, 

the trial court has broad discretion in the consideration it 

gives each statutory factor. “A trial court, when considering 

these factors, is not required to quantify the weight given to 

each, nor is it required to weigh each factor equally, though 

its considerations must be supported by the evidence.” Marion 

v. Marion, 11 Va. App. 659, 664, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991). 

 The trial court considered the evidence in light of the 

factors specified in Code § 20-107.3(E). On husband’s motion, 

the trial judge reconsidered the evidence in light of those 

factors. Although the judge did not articulate the process he 

followed in considering the statutory factors, such an 

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articulation is not required, and the evidence was sufficient to 

support the trial judge’s decision to equally divide the marital 

property. 

 The evidence shows that the husband’s monetary 

contributions to the acquisition of marital property exceeded 

the wife’s monetary contributions. However, we do not “sanction 

a disproportionate division of the assets in favor of one party 

simply because that party has been primarily responsible for the 

development of the marital assets.” Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 

387, 393 n.2, 382 S.E.2d 263, 266 n.2 (1989). Among the factors 

to be considered are the parties’ non-monetary contributions to 

the well-being of the family. See Bentz v. Bentz, 2 Va. App. 

486, 489, 345 S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (1986). 

 The evidence of wife’s non-monetary contributions to the 

well-being of the family, including housework, yard work, and 

activities incidental to those chores, was substantial. 

Additionally, the wife made significant monetary contributions 

of marital assets. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge, 

having considered and applied the factors of Code § 20-107.3(E) 

to the evidence, did not abuse his discretion by ordering an 

equal division of the marital assets. 

II.

 Husband contends that the trial court erred by ordering 

husband to pay a portion of wife’s credit card debt. Code 

§ 20-107.3(C) authorizes the court to apportion and order 

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payment of the debts of the parties that are incurred prior to 

the dissolution of the marriage. In apportioning debt, Code 

§ 20-107.3(C) requires that the court also consider the factors 

listed in Code § 20-107.3(E). The trial judge stated that he 

apportioned the debt after having considered the factors listed 

in Code § 20-107.3(E). Wife testified as to the nature and 

general character of the various debts. She excluded from the 

debt balances purchases she made after the dissolution of the 

marriage. Of the six debts about which she testified, the trial 

court determined that wife incurred four of these debts to cover 

marital expenses. She testified that some of the debt 

represented the cost of living expenses incurred as a result of 

marital turmoil, but before the date of last separation. Given 

the evidence in the record, we cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion by ordering husband to pay half of the 

four credit card debts. 

III.

 Husband asserts that the trial court erred by crediting 

wife $2,000 for central air conditioning installed with marital 

funds in the marital residence that husband owned separately. 

In fact, the trial court awarded wife a $1,000 credit after 

finding that wife traced $2,000 of marital funds that had been 

commingled with the husband’s separate property. 

 The trial court relied upon Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) to 

classify the $2,000 as marital. 

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When marital property and separate property 

are commingled by contributing one category 

of property to another, resulting in the 

loss of identity of the contributed 

property, the classification of the 

contributed property shall be transmuted to 

the category of property receiving the 

contribution. However, to the extent the 

contributed property is retraceable by a 

preponderance of the evidence and was not a 

gift, such contributed property shall retain 

its original classification. 

Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d). 

 The wife had the burden to trace the $2,000 contributed to 

or commingled with the separate real estate in the form of an 

identifiable asset, in this case the central air conditioning 

unit. See Rahbaran v. Rahbaran, 26 Va. App. 195, 207-08, 494 

S.E.2d 135, 141 (1997). However, in order to trace the $2,000 

as marital property contributed to and commingled with the 

separate real estate, Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) does not require 

that the marital portion be segregated from the whole. See id. 

Tracing involves the two-step process of (1) identifying a 

specific portion of hybrid property as either marital or 

separate, and (2) directly tracing that identifiable portion to 

either a separate or marital asset. Id. The wife proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the air conditioning unit was 

an identifiable and measurable portion of the marital residence 

and that $2,000 of marital funds was traceable to that portion 

of the hybrid property. See id. Accordingly, the trial court 

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did not err by awarding the wife $1,000 as her share of that 

marital asset. 

IV.

 Finally, husband contends that the trial court erred in 

calculating the marital portion of his pension plan. To 

determine the marital portion of the pension, the trial court 

employed the coverture fraction endorsed in Primm v. Primm, 12 

Va. App. 1036, 1038, 407 S.E.2d 45, 46 (1991). The marital 

share consists of a fraction in which the numerator represents 

the creditable years of employment husband accrued during the 

marriage and the denominator represents the total number of 

creditable years at the time of retirement. See id. The trial 

court correctly included in the denominator the 1.103 years of 

sick leave accrued during the course of husband’s employment and 

credited toward his retirement.2 In its opinion letter, the 

trial court stated its intention to add to the numerator of the 

fraction the amount of sick leave that husband acquired during 

the marriage. Although the trial court correctly articulated 

the method for calculating the numerator, the trial court used 

 2

On appeal, husband contends that the sick leave did not 

increase his retirement benefits but rather that the sick leave 

merely allowed him to retire earlier. However, husband makes no 

reference to the record to support this contention. In fact, 

husband testified that his retirement was calculated based on 

30.211 years of service, a figure which includes 1.103 years of 

sick leave. Thus, like the trial court, we treat the accrued 

sick leave as service creditable to husband’s retirement 

benefits. 

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an inflated figure for the sick leave acquired during the 

marriage. In calculating the numerator -- that is, the number 

of creditable years accrued during the six years of marriage -- 

the trial court added 1.03 years of sick leave. Where 1.103 

years represented the total acquired sick leave credit for 

25.245 years of service, husband acquired only a fraction of 

that amount during the marriage. Husband testified that he 

acquired four hours of leave every two weeks of service. He 

further testified that he missed only one or two hours of 

service during the entire marriage. Thus, husband would have 

accumulated 104 hours of service per year, or 624 hours during 

the entire six-year marriage. This figure represents .3 years 

of service. Accordingly, the trial court erred in using 7.03 

instead of 6.3 as the numerator of the coverture fraction. 

Therefore, upon remand, the wife’s marital share, based upon the 

Primm coverture fraction adopted by the trial court, shall be 

calculated as follows: 6.3/30.211 X 50% = 10.4% X amount of 

retired pay. 

 In summary, we find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by dividing the Bloxtons’ marital property equally, 

by ordering husband to pay for a portion of wife’s credit card 

debt, or by crediting wife $1,000 for the marital funds traced 

to the central air conditioning. Finally, although the trial 

court employed a proper mechanism for determining the marital 

portion of husband’s retirement account, the trial court erred 

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in calculating the creditable years of service accumulated 

during the marriage. 

 We find that the husband had reasonable grounds for appeal. 

Therefore, wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and 

costs of this appeal is denied. See Gayler v. Gayler, 20 Va. 

App. 83, 87, 455 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1995); Rule 5A:30. 

 Accordingly, the trial court’s final decree is affirmed in 

part, vacated in part, and remanded for the trial court to amend 

the decree in conformity with this opinion. 

 Affirmed in part,

vacated in part, 

and remanded.

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