THE MEXICAN MILITARY APPROACHES THE 21ST CENTURY:

COPING WITH A NEW WORLD ORDER

Stephen J. Wager

February 21, 1994
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.

*******

Research for this report was completed in December 1993.
iii

FOREWORD

In 1993, the Strategic Studies Institute and the University

of Arizona cosponsored a conference on "Mexico Looks to the 21st

Century: Change and Challenge." It brought together a

distinguished group of academic and government specialists to

discuss Mexico's future, particularly the changes likely to be

brought about by the North American Free Trade Agreement and

their implications for the United States. Participants made

presentations on Mexico's political future, the borderlands, the

environmental problem, migration, Mexico's civil society, the

labor and women's movement, and the military. The conference was

funded by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Outreach Program,

under the direction of Colonel John D. Auger, and the University

of Arizona. It was organized by Dr. Edward J. Williams of the

University of Arizona and Dr. Donald E. Schulz of the Strategic

Studies Institute.

Of the papers presented at the meeting, the one that struck

closest to the concerns of the U.S. Army was "The Mexican

Military Approaches the 21st Century: Coping with a New World

Order" by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Wager of the U.S.

Military Academy. The author's discussion of the roles and

missions of the Mexican armed forces has special salience in this

era of "alternative missions." Here is a classic case of a

military institution whose principal missions of civic action and

counternarcotics are those with which our own Army has had to

deal in recent years. Colonel Wager's study provides a timely and

instructive lesson on how our Mexican colleagues have wrestled

with these challenges.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

report as a contribution to understanding this important subject.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN J. WAGER is an Associate Professor of

History at the U.S. Military Academy. He has a Ph.D. from

Stanford University where he did his dissertation on the Mexican

military. His articles have appeared in the Journal of

Boarderlands Studies and Hemisphere and as chapters in Sergio

Aguayo Quezada and Bruce Bagley's En Busca de la Seguridad

Perdida and David Ronfeldt's The Modern Mexican Military: A

Reassessment.
1

THE MEXICAN MILITARY APPROACHES THE 21ST CENTURY:

COPING WITH A NEW WORLD ORDER

Introduction.

In speculating about the future of the Mexican military, a

clear understanding of that institution's past can prove

invaluable. As is the case with most institutions, the role of

the military will evolve in some form from the missions it has

performed in the past. The history of the army in the 20th

century, like that of the nation in general, has centered first

and foremost on the Mexican Revolution, which ravaged the country

for 10 years (1910-20) and cost the lives of close to two million

people. The army played a critical role in both the revolution

and its outcome. It forged most of the political institutions

that subsequently emerged and that provided Mexico with the

relative economic and political stability that the nation has

enjoyed since the 1920s.

Ironically, the country's political leaders--most of whom

were military in the two decades immediately following the

revolution--worked to eliminate the army's direct role in

politics as a way of promoting stability. The formation of a

dominant official political party in 1929 legitimized a formal

role for the military in this sui generis political system. The

founding of this predominant party, known today by the initials

PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), began the process of

institutionalizing civilian political power.1 The civilianization

of power took away the army's direct role in political

decisionmaking, and the country's new civilian leaders assigned

the military the role of guarantor and protector of the overall

system. Since the 1920s, the army hierarchy had begun to

inculcate its younger officers with an ideology replete with

values such as loyalty, a revolutionary heritage, and patriotism.

That unique ideology contributed significantly to the

enthusiastic acceptance by army leaders of their new mission,

which the military has proudly and jealously guarded to this

day.2

Historical events helped Mexico's new political elite

consolidate its preeminent position. As early as 1940, the armed

forces had begun to shift all their energies toward the

traditional military functions of protecting the national

sovereignty from a hostile enemy and preparing for war. In the

aftermath of World War II, Mexico elected the first in an

unbroken line of civilian presidents and dashed any military

hopes of regaining political power. Consequently, the army turned

its attention towards civic action and crisis management, where

it has remained focused to the present day. As the year 2000

approaches, it is logical to draw on this history when

considering the army's future missions, structure, and influence.

The Role of the Mexican Army.
2

The Mexican army's mission has generally remained the same

since the publication of the military's first organic law in

1926. The organic law, the legal raison d'etre of the

institution, defined the army's mission as follows: "to defend

the integrity and independence of the fatherland, to maintain the

rule of the Constitution and its laws, and to conserve internal

order."3 That mission remained in effect, although it had been

modified informally within the Defense Secretariat, until the

publication of a new organic law in 1971. The new organic law

eliminated the task of maintaining the rule of the Constitution

and its laws and replaced it with a mission of aiding the

civilian population in the case of public emergencies and helping

with social projects that contribute to the overall progress of

the nation.4 This new code simply legalized the civic action role

that the army had been performing as far back as the 1920s. A

subsequent change to the organic law in 1986 added greater

specificity to that civic action mission by subdividing it into

three separate missions: (1) providing aid to the civilian

population in case of public emergencies, (2) performing civic

action and social works that contribute to the progress of the

country, and (3) in the case of natural disasters, helping to

maintain public order and providing support to the affected

population and its property.5

These increases in the army's civic action role are unlikely

to decrease in the near future. On the contrary, greater emphasis

will be placed on it as the military moves into the next century.

More specifically, the National Development Plans of both

Presidents Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88) and Carlos

Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) called upon the army to increase

activities that relate directly to the welfare of the community.6

The army's future role in civic action grows clearer when

examined in the overall context of Mexican national security. In

1989, Mexican and U.S. experts met in Mexico City to discuss the

concept of Mexican national security. As a result, most of the

Mexican analysts concluded that their top political leaders did

not have a precise definition for national security. Instead,

they argued that the Mexican government had long confused

national security with internal security. They attributed this

confusion to the fact that the powers of both the government and

the nation have resided in one person, the President of the

Republic. For that reason, Mexican presidents have been more

attentive to internal security and have usually viewed the two

concepts as synonymous. Such an approach historically has helped

to reinforce the government's control of the country.7

Not surprisingly, the army has adopted a national security

philosophy very similar to that practiced by top government

leaders. In 1980, the then Secretary of National Defense

(SECDEF), General Felix Galvan Lopez, defined national security

as "the maintenance of social, economic and political equilibrium

guaranteed by the armed forces."8

 The SECDEF's definition sounded
3

very much like internal security. Despite the growing debate over

the meaning of national security and the formation of a National

Security Cabinet in 1988,9 the army most likely will continue to

direct its attention to internal as opposed to national security.

With the end of the cold war, the Mexican armed forces no longer

feel themselves being squeezed between the United States and the

former Soviet bloc. Reinforced in part by the current

international situation and increased domestic tensions as a

result of expanding political reform, the Mexican government

continues to see the major threats to its stability emanating

from within the country and not from some external source.

Accepting such a premise, the Mexican army, in its role as

guarantor of the political system, most likely will focus the

brunt of its effort on internal security. Consequently, at times

certain civic action tasks may be performed under the guise of

national security.

Mexican army officers have been educated and trained to

respect the country's revolutionary heritage and to attach

special importance to nationalism and patriotism. These values

have buttressed the army's civic action role for decades. Civic

action has been the preferred role of the army's leadership

because it has enhanced the institution's image among the Mexican

people. Political leaders, however, have felt compelled to call

upon the army for assistance in infrequent but highly volatile

crises. Since the 1940s, a clever crafting of the military has

insured compliance with the directives of the ruling elite, no

matter how unpleasant those orders might be. This has led to the

army's participation in crisis management, which has almost

always marred its reputation. Nevertheless, because it has

remained an integral part of the ruling system, the military has

been unable to extricate itself from that mission. Through the

years, the juxtaposed roles of civic action and crisis management

have at times, to the chagrin of army leaders, impugned the

military's image. In 1968, for instance, soldiers were

transformed from patriotic nation-builders into the "butchers of

Tlatelolco." Since the 1940s, there has been an underlying

struggle within the institution to remain focused on civic

action, while political leaders at times have felt the need to

channel army efforts into crisis management.

For the most part, the military's active participation in

crises has been fairly restricted over the past 50 years. The

army has four general sets of defense plans, which carry the

classifications of DN-I, DN-II, DN-III, and DN-IV. Plan DN-I

encompasses war plans aimed at defending the nation against a

foreign enemy. Plan DN-II focuses on eliminating internal

security threats. DN-III provides for disaster relief. Recently,

Plan DN-IV was added to organize and legitimize the army's role

in the antidrug campaign.10

With the exception of World War II, Mexico's foreign policy,

guided mainly by the principles of nonintervention, respect for

self-determination, and a general disdain for military solutions
4

to international problems, has virtually eliminated foreign

military involvement or membership in alliance systems. Not

surprisingly, therefore, the army primarily has focused on

preserving internal security. Political and military leaders have

long associated civic action with the conservation of internal

security. The army had been performing its traditional role of

civic action, or labor social as Mexicans call it, when World War

II forced the military back into what the Constitution of 1917

had assumed would be its principal role--namely, defending the

nation against a foreign enemy. The execution of that task was an

aberration. After the war, political leaders favored the army's

resuming civic action tasks in hopes of distancing military

officers from politics.11

The Mexican army has a rich tradition of assisting the

civilian population. As far back as the early 1920s, the military

engaged in such tasks as building roads, constructing irrigations

works, and repairing railroad and telegraph lines. The 1926

organic law (Ley Organica del Ejercito y la Armada) formally made

civic action a part of the army's mission. Article 81 provided

for the use of military resources in the construction of

communications networks and public works that had some

correlation with the overall needs of the institution.12

President Cardenas (1934-40) assigned the army a definite role in

forjando la patria (nation-building) attempting to depoliticize

it in the late 1930s. He envisioned the military as an instrument

for expanding the central government's control throughout

Mexico's more isolated regions. As an added advantage for

political leaders, civic action kept officers busy, leaving them

little time to mingle in politics. The Mexican military became an

army of workers that plowed fields and built roads, and its size

and organization were regulated accordingly.13 By the 1940s, the

formal adoption of this role had contributed substantially to the

governing civilian coalition's ability gradually to edge the

military out of the political limelight.

The Mexican Revolution was unique to the region, and the

army's revolutionary heritage has given legitimacy to its civic

action mission. The military has labored, especially in the

country's more remote areas, to bring to fruition the

revolutionary principles of economic and social justice that many

patriots sacrificed their lives for during the revolution. Civic

action programs have been the principal tools employed in the

ongoing mission of maintaining internal peace.14 The attention

that the army has given to civic action has coincided neatly with

its visibly nationalist philosophy.

The lack of a real external threat has also facilitated the

army's commitment to civic action, and its social role has

evolved since the 1920s, becoming dominant as the need for a

strictly military role declined precipitously after World War II.

In an interview with the author, a high-ranking politician from

the administration of President Luis Echeverria (1970-76)

underscored the significance of the army's civic action role
5

since the war. Instead of sustaining a static defense, he said,

the military decided to act more dynamically to serve the Mexican

people or, in his own words, "to preserve the peace."15 That

decision has brought a good deal of prestige to the army. The

relatively small defense budgets resulting from the absence of an

external menace and the implicit strategic defense by the United

States have made the military's increasing focus on civic action

a natural evolution.

In tracing the development of civic action programs, the

army's priorities readily adapted to the changing complexion of

the nation. As far back as the 1920s, the military devoted

considerable effort to building roads and schools. By the late

1940s, road construction had been contracted out to civilians,

with the army relegated to building secondary roads in outlying

rural areas. While the military has continued to build small

rural schools, its role in road construction and repair mostly

has disappeared. By the 1970s, its literacy campaign, which had

reached its apex in the 1940s and 1950s, had little impact within

either the military or civilian society. In the 1950s, the army

had a major role in the eradication of livestock plagues and

epidemics. The natural evolution of modern medical science has

eliminated that once vital mission. Social brigades that employed

military medical personnel to vaccinate and offer basic medical

care to individuals living in some of the country's more isolated

regions reached their apex in the 1970s. Since then, their effect

has been considerably reduced.16

Despite the gradual exclusion of certain civic action

duties, the army has continued to perform many important roles in

this area. Reforestation, a concern since the 1930s, gained new

impetus in the late 1970s and 1980s because of growing national

concern over environmental issues. In the Federal District alone,

soldiers have planted over 11 million trees. One can assume that

the army will retain an active role in improving the environment,

and in more ways than simply planting trees. It is not

far-fetched to assume that the military might eventually

contribute to major environmental clean-up projects, of which

Mexico has her share. In recent years, disaster relief has been a

major responsibility. The army established a program for

providing such relief in 1966. That mission became formal in the

new organic law of 1971, and the military will work in this area

well into the future. However, based on the events surrounding

the relief dispensed during the 1985 earthquakes in Mexico City,

it would appear that its contribution will be principally in

rural areas where soldiers will be visible and not give the

slightest hint of the imposition of martial law.

Protection of government installations also will carry over

into the next century. For decades after the revolution, the army

furnished escorts for railroads and government pay agents. By the

1970s, however, it had abandoned those duties and begun providing

security at vital installations such as petroleum refineries and

airports. Briefly, the army protected banks that had been
6

threatened by the short-lived guerrilla movement of that period.

Finally, it became committed to a formal water distribution

program in the early 1970s and has since been delivering potable

water to many of the country's arid and drought-stricken regions.

Both the security and water distribution duties will continue

past the year 2000.17

The most visible role that the military will play currently

and beyond is in the antidrug campaign. The significance that

army leaders have attached to this mission can be seen in their

decision to create a new category of defense plans (DN-IV) to

deal with this problem. This task historically has been

considered a civic action function, since it directly correlates

to internal security. More recently, it has assumed political

dimensions, given the expanding severity of the problem and the

growing number of accusations of governmental corruption. This

issue has also adversely affected Mexican relations with the

United States. A general misconception has existed that the

Mexican army did not get involved in antidrug operations until

the United States began to pressure the Mexican government in the

late 1960s. In fact, the opposite was the case because the army

had reported drug eradication activities in the state of Durango

as early as May 1946.18 The following year, the U.S. Embassy

received instructions from the State Department to urge the

Mexican government to prevent the cultivation of illegal drugs.

Ambassador Walter Thurston advised Washington that he had learned

that the Mexican Attorney General's Office had been planning an

extensive program to impede the cultivation of poppy fields.

Mexico launched a major antidrug campaign in the northwestern

part of the country in 1948, which entailed occasional raids and

search-and-destroy missions into the heavy drug producing areas.

Army personnel assisted agents from the Attorney General's Office

in locating and eradicating poppy fields. The campaign has

continued at different levels of intensity to the present.19

Although virtually nothing has been written about the army's

role in the antinarcotics campaign during the 1950s and 1960s,

the military worked with agents from the Attorney General's

Office to locate and destroy drug crops in some of the more

rugged regions. Official army sources reported the destruction of

crops and the apprehension of traffickers in Chihuahua, Durango,

and Sinaloa during the 1950s.20

The military persevered in the antidrug campaign during the

1960s. Indeed, its operations expanded slightly. The army

conducted joint search-and-destroy missions with agents from the

Attorney General's Office in eight different states and increased

the surface area coverage over that of the previous decade.21 But

despite some gradual improvement, the overall intensity of the

effort remained relatively low until the 1970s.

Mexico's "Permanent Campaign Against Drug Trafficking"

increased considerably towards the end of 1969 as a result of

pressure from Washington. The United States implemented Operation
7

Intercept along the U.S.-Mexican border in October, ostensibly to

induce Mexico into devoting more resources to antidrug

activities. U.S. officials believed that the drug problem in the

United States had reached crisis proportions, and they partially

blamed Mexico as a major supplier. Operation Intercept prohibited

Mexican goods from entering the United States as a means of

coercing Mexico to destroy drug crops by chemical means. That

policy eventually proved counterproductive, but the U.S. pressure

did seem to affect the amount of resources that Mexico would

later commit to the permanent antidrug campaign.22 The new

emphasis that Mexican officials placed on antidrug efforts had a

major effect on the army's participation in the campaign.

Military leaders, on orders from the President, immediately

assigned more troops to the war against drugs.

Operation Condor proved to be the army's most prominent

contribution to the permanent antidrug campaign. By the

mid-1970s, growth in the drug trade forced the military to act

more definitively against growers and traffickers. Shortly after

becoming SECDEF in 1976, General Galvan Lopez directed the

general staff to formulate a plan aimed at significantly

curtailing drug cultivation in Mexico. The general staff of the

National Defense Secretariat (SDN) subsequently developed Plan

Condor to deploy troops permanently to the country's heaviest

drug producing area. The army set up headquarters outside the

town of Badiriguato, Sinaloa. The plan called for approximately

3,000 soldiers to locate and destroy marijuana and poppy plants

in an area comprising the confluence of three states: Chihuahua,

Durango, and Sinaloa. The task force that served in the region

drew troops from all over the Republic. The first force reported

for duty on 16 January 1977. A new task force has since replaced

the previous one every 6 months up to the present.23

The army hierarchy had established a Plan Canador in the

early 1970s, which directed each military zone to conduct

antidrug operations within its area of responsibility according

to the extent of the threat. Drug cultivation occurred with

greater frequency in the coastal states, and the military zones

in those regions began to devote a substantial portion of their

resources to eradication. The land-locked states tended to

earmark less resources for the campaign and focused more on other

civic action programs. Richard B. Craig, who did considerable

research on Mexico's antidrug campaign, wrote about several

problems the army had encountered. He described an unfavorable

ratio of soldiers to land surface. He also noted that the army

lacked sufficient resources and equipment (especially

helicopters) to do a thorough job. Craig acknowledged the

presence of corruption among some of the zone commanders as well

as some interagency friction. It seemed that most military

commanders resented being ordered about by what they perceived to

be incompetent federal agents, and as the army became more

involved with the antidrug campaign, this duty grew more

unpopular. Officers viewed this mission as a no-win situation,

which carried the potential of seriously disparaging the
8

military's reputation because of corruption charges. Despite

these impediments, the army has posted considerable success in

the campaign. Its destruction statistics have been especially

impressive and far outdistance the contributions of any other

federal agency.24 The antidrug campaign continued to command

increasing army resources throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

The Salinas de Gortari administration has added

significantly to the military's role in the antidrug campaign.

The administration has defined narcotics trafficking as a threat

to national security.25 Although certain "experts" envision the

drug scourge as a problem of public order rather than national

security, Salinas has given this issue the highest priority.26

Shortly after taking office in December 1988, President

Salinas directed the army to move against Miguel Angel Felix

Gallardo, a major drug trafficker. Gallardo and his organization

have operated extensively in the West Coast state of Sinaloa. The

army subsequently captured him and one of his top lieutenants. In

October 1989, President Salinas told a joint session of the U.S.

Congress that Mexico intended "to eradicate drug trafficking at

its very roots."27 Even the army, previously considered by many

to be a "sacred cow," has not escaped close scrutiny. Incidents

implicating top-level officers in protecting suspected drug

trafficking have received widespread attention in both Mexico and

the United States. In one case, an army general, alleged to have

offered protection to drug flights landing in Mexico from South

America in route to the United States, was relieved of command

and reassigned to Defense Headquarters, ostensibly to place him

under close supervision by senior officers.28 In another case,

Salinas ordered the National Commission on Human Rights to

investigate the killing of seven Mexican narcotics agents by army

soldiers at a remote landing strip in the southern state of

Veracruz. The incident occurred in November 1991, and two army

generals and three other officers were detained and subsequently

imprisoned.29 These responses suggest that the Mexican government

takes narcotics trafficking seriously. Even though the army

devotes considerable resources to the antidrug campaign, it will

be expected to do even more until such time as more of these

responsibilities can be transferred to civilian law enforcement

agencies.

There is also another critical consideration with regard to

the army's role in the antidrug campaign. Placed within the

context of current U.S.-Mexican relations, this troublesome issue

could become a major impediment to economic integration. The drug

issue assumes an added dimension when discussed in connection

with the recently-signed North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA). Signs or perceptions of a soft counterdrug policy in

Mexico could jeopardize future development of trade. A few years

ago, then-California Senator Pete Wilson wrote that an inadequate

response to international drug trafficking could pose the

greatest threat to improved U.S.-Mexican relations. The

underlying implication was that Mexico's policies might have a
9

major impact on the country's economic prosperity.30 All this

points toward the Mexican army continuing its role in the

antidrug campaign.

The military's civic action programs have not only

highlighted the social consciousness of the Mexican government,

but they have also eased socioeconomic tensions. Thus it seems

logical that civic action will remain the predominant mission of

the Mexican army. The rationale is simple: The government has

correlated national security with internal security. Civic action

contributes directly to maintaining internal order. Moreover, the

responsibilities that the military has assumed in this role leave

little time for political adventurism, a benefit political

leaders find especially valuable.

The Structure of the Mexican Army in the 21st Century.

The army's mission will be the principal factor in

determining its structure into the next century. Other elements

that will bear on its structure include available funding, U.S.

and regional defense policies, and the general political climate

in Mexico. The present uncertainty with regard to the army's

structure and organization centers on the still unmeasured

influence that each factor will have.

After the student demonstrations and public unrest in 1968,

the army experienced its first significant increase since World

War II.31 For the most part, political desires to preclude a

recurrence of civil strife mandated this growth. The oil boom in

the late 1970s proved instrumental in planning a large-scale

modernization program. The economic crash which followed closely

on the heels of that short-lived resurgence disrupted that

grandiose scheme. As a result, since the early 1980s, the army's

modernization has proceeded fitfully, the result of a shortage in

funds rather than a lack of desire on the part of military

leaders.

Midway into the Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado administration

(1982-88), the National Defense Secretariat (S.D.N.) proposed a

major reorganization of the army that shifted the focus on

structure away from political considerations and more towards

operational features. This new structural plan proposed

reorganizing the long-standing military zone system into a more

tactically-suited corps organization. Although this

reorganization sought to reshuffle the 36 military zones into

seven corps, by the time de la Madrid left office in 1988 only

one corps could be considered fully functional, while another two

had only a skeleton headquarters. The new S.D.N. administration

(1988-94) remained committed to the reorganization, but it has

made minimal progress in implementing the planned changes.32 It

seems likely that the restructuring process will continue into

the subsequent administration (1994-2000). On the positive side,

this reorganization points toward a more operationally functional
10

army by the year 2000. It appears doubtful that the military

hierarchy--or political leaders for that matter--would sanction

any new structural changes while the institution finds itself

enmeshed in a partially completed reorganization. Nor is it

feasible to expect that vast amounts of funds would be available

to support a structure different from the corps system.

The emphasis on mobility is another trend that will continue

to receive attention. One of the first stages in the

modernization program started in the early 1980s with motorizing

cavalry units that previously had relied on horses. The S.D.N.

followed that reform in the late 1980s by purchasing six C-130

troop transport planes from the United States. The Mexican

airborne brigade added them to its inventory to provide rapid

response for emergency situations.33 The army's internal security

mission often dictates a quick reaction.

President Salinas responded to a less than successful

presidential campaign and a questionable popular mandate by

projecting an image of a "no-nonsense" president. Almost

immediately after assuming office, he ordered a military strike

force to apprehend the corrupt leader of the national petroleum

workers' union, Joaquin Hernandez Galicia, nicknamed "La Quina."

The force launched a surprise attack in January 1989 against the

union leader's well-fortified compound in the northern state of

Tamaulipas, easily capturing La Quina and confiscating a large

cache of illegal weapons in the process.34 Shortly thereafter,

the president employed army forces in a country-wide dragnet to

capture the nation's leading drug trafficker, Felix Gallardo,

which they eventually did. A few months later, Salinas ordered a

few thousand troops to take control of the historically renowned

Cananea copper mine in northern Mexico. This was done as a

preemptive measure against striking mine workers who might have

used violence to gain their demands.35 The increased "political

visibility" of the military at the outset of Salinas' term sent a

strong message to the administration's opponents and helped the

new president gain the solid political footing that has set the

upbeat tone of his presidency.

These successful operations would not have been possible

without the recently added mobility of the army. Since the

Salinas inauguration, the military has continued to focus on

enhancing that mobility. In the early 1990s, the army began

purchasing a fairly large number of U.S. surplus jeeps and small

cargo vehicles, which had been recalled from Europe, to replace

and upgrade its increasingly outmoded inventory. One Mexican

analyst related that high-ranking Mexican officers had been

extremely impressed with the effectiveness of U.S. forces during

Operation Desert Storm. The U.S. success reinforced the

perception in the upper echelons of the Mexican military command

that self-contained, highly mobile, rapid-response forces were

the future of the Mexican armed forces.36 In light of the general

demilitarization that has been occurring across the globe, a

growth in the size of the armed forces seems to be an impractical
11

approach, especially for a traditionally pacifist country like

Mexico. However, added mobility can act as a force multiplier if

employed effectively.

The changing situation in the Mexican countryside also calls

for greater mobility. The gradual abolition of the ejidos

(state-leased farms) probably signals the end of the guardias

rurales (rural guards). This paramilitary force has served

traditionally as the "eyes and ears of the army" in some of the

more isolated areas. The military provided many ejido members

with a rifle and a modest work uniform, and they in turn helped

maintain order in the countryside. Commanded by a small cadre of

active officers, the rurales have not only served as an important

source of intelligence, but also as a key link between the army

and the peasants.37 As privatization takes root in the

agricultural sector, the rurales will most likely disband,

leaving the military with less advanced warning of potentially

volatile situations. Consequently, the ability to respond rapidly

to a developing crisis should become even more critical.

The future structure of the Mexican armed forces will also

be influenced in part by U.S. military policy. Although the

United States will almost certainly remain a regional power, the

reduction in U.S. forces will be felt throughout Latin America.

The end of the cold war has made demilitarization the preferred

policy. In the past, Mexican political leaders have not reacted

to the asymmetry that existed between the two countries' armed

forces. The prevailing climate both regionally and worldwide is

not likely fundamentally to alter that asymmetry, although the

latter will probably be reduced somewhat over the next few years

in Mexico's favor, given the large cuts in U.S. forces. The

military budget as a percentage of Mexico's Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) has experienced very minor fluctuations over the

past 15 years.38 This trend most likely will continue, and the

funds allocated to the army should allow it to complete its

reorganization under the corps system by the beginning of the

next century.

The Future Influence of the Mexican Military.

Given the backdrop of the military's influence in Latin

America during the 20th century, many outsiders have assumed that

the Mexican military has played a more significant political role

than has actually been the case. Most of the political influence

the military has attained since World War II has derived from its

crisis management role, which has been fairly limited. However,

that role has more often served as a double-edged sword for the

army, rather than the distinct advantage some experts have

perceived. Since the unfortunate incidents during the student

uprisings in 1968, military leaders have been reluctant to

participate in crisis situations, preferring to leave police

actions to local and state authorities. The irony is that only by

defending the state in a major crisis can the army substantially
12

augment its power and prestige within the Mexican system.

The army has only infrequently manifested its physical

presence in a major way since World War II. Over the past 30

years, the military has responded to only three critical

challenges to internal security. Those responses included the

student movement in 1968, the rural insurgency in the early

1970s, and, more recently, the continuing struggle against the

narcotics growers and traffickers. The first episode seriously

tarnished the army's paternalistic and patriotic image. The

"Tlatelolco Massacre" of October 1968 discouraged the army's

involvement in large-scale social demonstrations where soldiers

might be forced to repress the populace.39 Otherwise, the

military has maintained a relatively low physical profile. Even

though its visibility has increased at times when Salinas has

engaged in what one historian has called "Mexican Thatcherism,"

those surges in influence have been fleeting, given the limited

duration of the military's actions.40

This strategy of "Thatcherism," named after the former

British Prime Minister, refers to the state's use of excessive

resources or force to control certain social groups or sectors.

The government action at the Cananea mine, noted earlier,

provides a good example. In that instance, the army played a

prominent role, and it yielded favorable results by subduing a

potentially volatile conflict.41 But because its role in these

episodes has tended to be short-lived, its leaders have not been

able to convert their contributions into long-term gains for the

institution. Instead, the hierarchy seems content to continue

with its traditionally cautious approach, since the army's

growing presence in the antidrug campaign places it in a more

precarious position with regard to image, given the propensity

for increased allegations and rumors of military corruption. As

with the Cananea incident, the flare-ups in the war on drugs also

tend to be transitory and not conducive to augmenting the army's

influence.

In short, "Thatcherism" is more of a political phenomenon

aimed at increasing the influence of the ruling party. Although

political leaders seem willing to call on the military to support

the status quo, they do not necessarily want it to gain added

stature. As they guide the country into the next century, they

will most likely try to ensure a continuing low public profile

for the armed forces. The opposite would not reflect favorably

upon the system that has evolved from the Mexican Revolution,

since it might suggest an inability to maintain control.

Other factors also inhibit a substantial growth in military

power. One has to do with the public perception of the army.

Since the massive bloodletting of the revolution, an undercurrent

of antimilitary sentiment in Mexico has always existed. The

public traditionally has viewed the armed forces as a necessary

vice to be tolerated but little more. Through the years, this

veiled discontent has remained a psychological impediment to the
13

military's accretion of power. A recent example of this

resentment has emerged in the unlikely form of new history

textbooks. In September 1992, the Education Ministry announced

the publication of the books for use in Mexico's public school

system. A mild furor arose over the texts' treatment of the 1968

student movement. More specifically, the official history now

described the military as having repressed the students. Military

leaders took exception, and the President moved quickly to

assuage them.42 Nonetheless, the text remains in circulation and

should contribute to inculcating Mexican youth with a less than

admirable opinion of the armed forces.

The economic integration that NAFTA promises for Mexico and

the United States might suggest a closer military-to- military

relationship as well which would seem to offer opportunities for

Mexico to develop a more professional institution, thereby

enhancing the stature of the armed forces at the national level.

However, a strong argument against the desirability of such

relations can also be presented.

One analyst, who has maintained close ties with the army,

has related that high-ranking military leaders are not entirely

in favor of NAFTA. Within the institution, the trade agreement

has aroused suspicion about U.S. motives. Historical fears with

regard to U.S. infringement on Mexican sovereignty have been

resurrected, though this time such violations would occur through

economic duplicity rather than traditional political or military

means.43

Many U.S. citizens are reluctant to admit that most Mexicans

have viewed the United States as a potential enemy. The mission

of the Mexican armed forces has never been de facto to defend

against foreign incursions. Realistically, if the United States

ever decided to invade, the Mexicans could only hope to impede it

for a very limited amount of time. The army has always focused on

preserving internal security, a mission that has never required

extensive military equipment purchases from the United States.

The end of the cold war further obviates the need for

sophisticated hardware and thus removes one reason for developing

closer military ties.

Since 1990, there has been little appreciable improvement in

military-to-military relations. One U.S. official close to the

situation grudgingly concurred with this assessment. He added

that while cordiality has increased, the status of major issues

such as joint training exercises and joint defense plans has

witnessed virtually no change.44 Military leaders from both

countries formed the Joint U.S.-Mexican Defense Commission

(JUSMDC) during World War II as a forum for discussing vital

defense issues. Although this body worked effectively during the

conflict and in the immediate post-war period, Mexican leaders

have neglected the organization since the 1960s. While the United

States has attempted to reinvigorate the JMUSDC on various

occasions, Mexico has opted to use it almost exclusively for
14

organizing symbolic ceremonies and social activities. At present,

nothing indicates that the JMUSDC will reassume its original

charter soon.

Since the 1930s, presidents have played the predominant role

in Mexican politics. Nevertheless, while presidents and their

policies and programs change every 6 years, the military as an

institution has retained a great deal of continuity. The army

does not place a high value on change. Military leaders have

relied heavily on traditional values and principles, rather than

on innovative approaches to old problems. The Constitution of

1917 designated the armed forces as the protector of national

sovereignty. The military will continue to perform that mission.

In so doing, it will try to assure that there will always be a

"safe distance" from the powerful neighbor to the North.

As for generating increased influence from within the

military itself, the prospects seem slim. Here again, the issue

of traditional values plays a critical role. Unwavering loyalty

to the revolution and the system begotten by it have been

cardinal features of the Mexican armed forces. One insider places

a different twist on this by suggesting that, in a sense, the

system has bought the military's loyalty. He notes that certain

benefits accrue to army officers, especially as they advance in

rank. They have access to low interest loans for homes and cars.

Home loans are most often used to purchase housing built for

active duty officers under the auspices of the Defense

Secretariat. Benefits such as these, which can also include

scholarships to private universities for offspring, can increase

an officer's salary by more than 30 percent. More significantly,

these perquisites further commit officers to the army and make

them more dependent on the institution as the primary means of

fulfilling their financial responsibilities.45 Indirectly, these

benefits make them staunch supporters of the system and much less

willing to buck it or risk expulsion by deviating from the highly

centralized decision-making process. Strict compliance with the

commander's directives ensures continued access to benefits.

Because most officers believe that civilian government has shown

concern for their needs, there will be no sudden groundswell to

drastically alter the system.

The issue that always generates a lively debate is the

likelihood of a military coup. After the unexpected 1973 coup in

Chile, there has been a general reluctance to use the word

"never" when discussing the Latin American armed forces.

Nevertheless, the probability of a coup in Mexico soon is

virtually nil. Aside from the loyalty that the military

traditionally has displayed, officers collectively lack the

requisite political skills needed for efficacious government

management. More importantly, the army has direct ties only with

the state. It lacks strong links to any major interest group that

could fortify a military move to take political power.46

Moreover, the military has no forum within which it could
15

exert its influence and perhaps energize key groups to support an

attempt to take power from civilian leaders. The one area where

the military might have the ability to project its influence is

national security. However, at the outset of the Salinas

administration a national security cabinet was formed to manage

these issues. Although the SECDEF is a member, the president

exerts tight control over this cabinet and determines what

constitutes a security issue. Thus, while the military may

contribute input on vital national security matters, its

principal role has been to carry out presidential directives in

lieu of making policy.47

Perhaps more importantly, tradition will continue to play a

major role in the military's behavior. Army leaders have long

considered their institution to be a pillar of the system that

emerged from the revolution. In fact, military officers nurtured

the system in its formative years. A military president founded

the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, which to this day has

been the country's sole ruling party. These precedents have

solidified the army's position as an integral part of the

"revolutionary" system. Since the 1950s, it has worked hard to

cultivate the image of a paternalistic and responsible

institution dedicated to improving the welfare of the people.

Notwithstanding a few untoward incidents, in the more than 60

years following the revolution the army has been able to create

an image that has set it apart, in a favorable way, from the vast

majority of its Latin American counterparts. Military leaders

have been intent on maintaining that generally benign posture,

perhaps influenced in part by the widespread political failures

of their regional counterparts.

Some Final Thoughts.

The general deemphasis on the military that has taken place

worldwide over the last few years has also had a direct effect on

the Mexican armed forces. While post-1950 Mexico has shown little

tolerance for fat military budgets, the lack of even a remote

external threat to national security in the post-cold war era

offers even less reason to enlarge the already "meager" budget.

Since the mid-1980s, military leaders have talked about an

ongoing modernization process, but they have also emphasized that

this program will give priority to quality over quantity. In

other words, bigger does not necessarily equate to better, and

that reinforces the speculation about continued modest military

budgets.

While analysts search for reasons that might indicate

changes within the military, there presently is little to satisfy

their desires. Traditionally, the Mexican armed forces have been

adverse to change. Since the 1950s, the armed forces have relied

heavily on political leaders for guidance in such matters. A

strong partnership has been established between the government

and the military, and the former will continue to pay attention
16

to the army's interests and needs because it wants to keep the

military in its corner. If the government, dominated by the PRI,

continues to retain a healthy consensus, it should have no

problems maintaining the army's support. One long time expert on

Mexican politics, George Grayson, writes that the centralized

authority employed by the government nurtures stability.48

Military leaders have long been cognizant of that reality and

historically have felt comfortable with the political system.

That should not come as too much of a surprise since their

predecessors founded it.

Structurally, the Mexican army of the 21st century will

stress greater mobility and quicker reaction. Given the further

reduced threat of foreign interference in the country's internal

affairs, streamlined, mobile, quick-reaction forces will be best

suited for confronting the government's most pressing challenges,

which most likely will come from social disturbances emanating

from economic problems and from increasingly brash drug lords.

The current structural transformation to the "corps system" will

probably be accomplished by the turn of the century. At some

point over the next decade, this new system will supersede the

traditional military zone structure, making the army less

politically sensitive to disruptions within individual states. It

is still too early to predict the long-range political

ramifications of this new structural remodeling. On the surface,

the corps organization would seem to reduce the political

influence of the military zone commanders. However, it might also

convert seven or eight corps commanders into major power-brokers

within the regions under their purview.

As for the future of U.S.-Mexican military relations, they

are most likely to remain cordial but distant. As guardians of

the nation's sovereignty, the Mexican army works to preserve its

independent and self-reliant image. Most armed forces adhere

fervently to tradition, and the Mexican military is no exception.

It has found no justification for significantly altering its

traditional policy of maintaining a safe distance from the United

States. The latter was unsuccessful in establishing a military

base or conducting joint exercises during World War II and the

cold war, and security interests in the United States no longer

justify the need for such policies.

Civic action or labor social has been the constant mission

of the Mexican military in the post-revolutionary period. This

mission has always been the underpinning of the army's role in

society. Through civic action, the military, as a national

institution, has reaped its greatest rewards. Nothing suggests

that it will reduce or abandon this responsibility. On the

contrary, most of its leaders would like to devote greater effort

to that mission, believing that they can best enhance the army's

prestige by performing those assorted tasks.

Finally, counternarcotics operations will remain a key

mission. In this case, however, many commanders cringe at the
17

thought. In recent years, allegations of military corruption in

the drug wars have impugned the army's paternalistic

reputation.49 At the same time, however, the government has

bolstered civilian security services to allow law enforcement

agencies to play a larger role in the war on drugs. The military

will become less influential in this area as the Attorney

General's Office and federal and state police forces augment

their assets. This partial shifting of responsibility for the

antidrug campaign may relieve the military of some of the

allegations of wrongdoing that it has been subjected to. But

although this policy change may take away some of the army's

influence in the political arena, it will not affect its role as

a loyal servant of the Mexican people and an ardent supporter of

the legitimate government.

POSTSCRIPT

Dr. Donald E. Schulz

On January 1, 1994, a guerrilla group calling itself the

Zapatista National Liberation Army seized four large towns and a

number of smaller villages in the impoverished southern state of

Chiapas. The assault took the Mexican goverment and military

completely by surprise. At the time, the army had less than 4,000

troops in Chiapas, and many of them were on leave for the

holidays. For 24 hours, the rebels held San Cristobal de las

Casas--a city of 90,000 inhabitants--before retreating into the

mountains. At a nearby military battalion headquarters, troops

came under steady attack for 8 straight days. As the army assumed

the offensive, casualties mounted. In the days that followed,

well over 100 people, many of them noncombatants, were killed.

Some villages were bombed, some captured guerrillas summarily

executed.

The rebellion raised many questions about Mexico's future,

and not the least of these had to do with the future of the

military. The army had little experience with this kind of an

operation; its only previous counterinsurgency experience had

been during a small-scale peasant uprising in Guerrero in the

1970s. The sudden appearance of a serious domestic security

threat--estimates of guerrilla strength were generally between

one and two thousand armed fighters--suggested the need for

changes in the military's command and intelligence structures and

mission. The new reality seemed likely to lead to at least a

partial shift away from the traditional roles of civic action and

counternarcotics toward a greater focus on counterinsurgency. But

how far that pendulum would swing no one could say.

ENDNOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing

Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 255-257

and 318; Alejandra Lajous, Los Origenes del Partido Unico en

Mexico, 3d ed. (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
18

Mexico, 1985), pp. 25-27; Daniel C. Levy, "Mexico: Sustained

Civilian Rule Without Democracy," in Politics in Developing

Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry

Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne

Rienner, 1990), pp. 464-465 and 472-474; and Jorge Alberto

Lozoya, El Ejercito Mexicano, 3d ed. (Mexico City: Jornadas 65,

1984), pp. 59-62.

2. See Chapter 3 of Stephen J. Wager, "The Mexican Army,

1940-1982: The Country Comes First" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford

University, 1992) for a detailed explanation of the factors that

comprise this unique military ideology.

3. Ley Organica del Ejercito y la Armada Nacionales, 15

March 1926.

4. Ley Organica del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos, 18

March 1971.

5. Ley Organica del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos, 8

December 1986.

6. Luis Herrera-Lasso and Guadalupe Gonzalez, "Balance y

Perspectivas en el Uso del Concepto de la Seguridad Nacional en

el Caso de Mexico," in En Busca de la Seguridad Perdida, ed.

Sergio Aguayo Quezada and Bruce Bagley, (Mexico City: Siglo

Veintiuno Editores, 1990), pp. 400-401.

7. Sergio Aguayo Quezada, "Los Usos, Abusos y Retos de la

Seguridad Nacional Mexicana: 1946-1990," in Aguayo Quezada and

Bagley, En Busca, pp. 114-123; and Herrera Lasso M. and Gonzalez,

Balance y Perspectivas, pp. 397-399.

8. Roberto Vizcaino, "La Seguridad del Pais, Fin Primordial

del Estado," Proceso, September 22, 1980, p. 6.

9. Diario Oficial, December 7, 1988, pp. 3-4; Peter Reuter

and David Ronfeldt, "Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US Drug

Issue in the 1980s," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World

Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 111-112; and Aguayo

Quezada and Bagley, En Busca, pp. 120-121.

10. Raul Benitez Manaut, "Las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas y su

Relacion con el Estado, el Sistema Politico y la Sociedad," paper

presented at the Consejo Latinamericana de Ciencias Sociales in

Guatemala, November 11-13, 1992, pp. 4-7; and Jose Luis Pineyro,

"Presencia Politica Militar Nacional en el Distrito Federal:

Propuestas de Analisis," in D.F. Gobierno y Sociedad Civil, ed.

Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and Juan Manuel Ramirez Saenz (Mexico

City: Ediciones El Caballito, 1987), pp. 69-76.

11. Luis Alamillo Flores, "La Nacion en la Segunda Guerra

Mundial," in Seis Anos de Actividad Nacional, ed. Manuel Avila

Camacho (Mexico City: Secretaria de Gobernacion, 1946), pp.
19

101-102.

12. Guillermo Boils, Los Militares y la Politica en Mexico,

1915-1974 (Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito, 1975), pp.

127-129; Bruno Galindo Trejo, "Del Civismo en el Ejercito,"

Revista del Ejercito, September 1970, pp. 41-43; Lyle N.

McAlister, Anthony P. Maingot, and Robert P. Potash, eds., The

Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case

Studies (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems,

1970), pp. 209-210; and Virginia Prewitt, "The Mexican Army,"

Foreign Affairs 19 (April 1941), pp. 613-616.

13. Lyle N. McAlister, "The Military," in Continuity and

Change in Latin America, ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1964), pp. 136-142 and Alamillo Flores, "La

Nacion," p. 81.

14. Boils, Los Militares, pp. 45-46.

15. Interview, January 1991. All individuals interviewed for

this paper requested anonymity.

16. The information provided on the Mexican army's civic

action functions has been compiled from many different sources.

The principal ones include various editions of the Revista del

Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos from 1940-92; Jose Luis

Pineyro, Ejercito y Sociedad en Mexico: Pasado y Presente

(Puebla: Universidad Autonoma de Puebla, 1985), pp. 90-108; Jesus

Leon Toral, et al., El Ejercito Mexicano (Mexico City: Secretaria

de la Defensa Nacional, 1979), pp. 520-528; Boils, Los Militares, pp. 127-136; and McAlister, et al., The Military, pp. 209-210.

17. Perhaps the most up-to-date summary of the army's civic

action activities can found in Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional,

Social Labour (Mexico City: Taller Autografico de la S.D.N., May

1993).

18. Revista del Ejercito, May 1946, pp. 66-70.

19. Richard B. Craig, "La Campana Permanente, Mexico's

Antidrug Campaign," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World

Affairs 20 (May 1978), pp. 107-108; and U.S. Department of State,

Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, Vol. XIII, The

American Republics (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1965), pp. 838-839.

20. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, Memoria de la

Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, Septiembre de 1949-Agosto de

1950 (Mexico City: Taller Autografico, 1950), p. 116. Hereafter

cited as SDN Memorias with appropriate years. Information also

obtained from SDN Memorias, 1950-51, p. 34 and 1958-1959, p. 30.

21. Revista del Ejercito, July 1962, p. 15; and SDN

Memorias, 1960-61, p. 28, 1962-64, p. 26, 1965-66, p. 24,
20

1966-67, pp. 33-34 and 1967-68, p. 42.

22. Samuel I. del Villar, "The Illicit U.S.-Mexico Drug

Market: Failure of Policy and an Alternative," in Mexico and the

United States: Managing the Relationship, ed. Riordan Roett

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 196-201; and Craig, "La

Campana Permanente," pp. 109-112.

23. Francisco Ortiz Pinchetti, "La Operacion Condor, Letania

de Horrores," Proceso, October 9, 1978, pp. 6-8; Revista del

Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos, February 1977, pp. 61-62; and

"Campana Contra Enervantes," Revista del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea

Mexicanos, May 1981, pp. 18-20. While assigned to the U.S.

Embassy in Mexico City during 1985-1988, I received numerous

briefings from the National Defense Secretariat (SDN) concerning

the army's antidrug campaign, and both Condor and Canador were

discussed extensively. Over the years, different Secretaries of

Defense have made minor modifications to these operations, but

for the most part these programs have experienced little

significant change. For example, General Juan Arevalo Gardoqui

(1982-1988) changed the name Plan Condor to Plan Marte when he

took over as Secretary of Defense. The most current source of

information on the Mexican army's efforts in the national

antidrug campaign can be found in Secretaria de la Defensa

Nacional, Campaign Against Drugtrafficking (Mexico City: Taller

Autografico de la SDN, May 1993).

24. Craig, "La Campana Permanente," pp. 116-118. The SDN

Memorias and other official army publications often contain

numerous graphs and tables depicting the army's contribution to

the eradication of drugs. Publicizing the military's efforts

began to receive growing emphasis after 1976. Newspapers in

Mexico City regularly publish army drug destruction statistics.

Reuter and Ronfeldt ("Quest for Integrity," pp. 108-110) discuss

the army's preference for capturing and eradicating drugs rather

than the individuals involved in trafficking those drugs, leading

one to conclude that the army's resources seem best suited for

eradication as opposed to criminal arrests and prosecutions.

25. Aguayo Quezada and Bagley, En Busca, pp. 119-120; and

Reuter and Ronfeldt, "Quest for Integrity," pp. 110-111.

26. Maria Celia Toro, El Narcotrafico Como Amenaza a la

Seguridid Nacional," in Aguayo Quezada and Bagley, En Busca, pp.

382-385; and Herrera-Lasso and Gonzalez, "Balance y

Perspectivas," pp. 403-405.

27. "Mexican President Vows War on Drugs," Chicago Tribune, October 5, 1989, p. 8; and "Mexico Will Press Drug War, But

Without Any U.S. Troops," The New York Times, October 5, 1989, p.

20.

28. William Branigin, "Mexican Crackdown on Drugs Steps

Lightly Around Military," The Washington Post, August 15, 1989,
21

p. 12.

29. Tim Golden, "Mexican Army Officers Held in Drug Agents'

Deaths," The New York Times, December 7, 1991, p. 3; "SDN y PGR:

el Tiroteo Entre Soldados y Agentes Federales, por una

Confusion," Uno Mas Uno, November, 13, 1991, p. 1; Carlos Marin,

"Los Judiciales Iniciaron el Tiroteo Contra los Soldados,"

Proceso, December 9, 1991, pp. 6-10; and Instituto Mexicano de

Estudios Politicos A.C., Politica Mexicana, January 17, 1992, pp.

1-3.

30. Clark W. Reynolds and Stephen J. Wager, "Integracion

Economica de Mexico y Estados Unidos. Implicaciones para la

Seguridad de Ambos Paises," in Aguayo Quezada and Bagley, En

Busca, pp. 223-226. A useful explanation and summary of the key

points of NAFTA can be found in George W. Grayson, The North

American Free Trade Agreement, Headline Series No. 299, Summer

1992 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1993).

31. Ramiro G. Bautista Rosas, "El Ejercito en el Mexico

Actual--Mision y Perspectiva" (Thesis for Licenciado en Derecho,

Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, 1976), pp. 152-160; Arturo

Sanchez Gutierrez, "El Estado y Los Militares en Los Anos

Ochenta," in El Nuevo Estado Mexicano, Tomo II, Estado y

Politica, ed. Jorge Alonso, Alberto Aziz Nassif and Jaime Tamayo

(Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, Nueva Imagen, CIESAS,

1992) pp. 21-25; and Pineyro, Ejercito y Sociedad, pp. 86-87.

32. Interview, June 1989.

33. Interview, August 1989.

34. Herrera-Lasso and Gonzalez, Balance y Perspectivas, p.

395; and Sanchez Gutierrez, El Estado, p. 35.

35. Lorenzo Meyer, "Ejercito y Cananeas del Futuro,"

Excelsior, September 6, 1989, p. 1.

36. Interview, July 1991.

37. "Empleo y Actuacion de los Cuerpos de Defensas Rurales,"

Revista del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos, February 1973, pp.

44-46; Bautista Rosas, El Ejercito, p. 61; and Lozoya, El

Ejercito Mexicano, pp. 110-115.

38. Sanchez Gutierrez, El Estado, pp. 37-41.

39. Benitez Manaut, Las Enerzas Armadas, pp. 7-9. Alan

Riding, a long time correspondent in Mexico City, suggested that

political leaders also prefer not to use military force to

resolve an internal conflict because of the political cost

involved. He cites the rumors of a coup in the aftermath of

Tlatelolco and during the Luis Echeverria administration

(1970-76) as examples of these costs. See Alan Riding, Distant
22

Neighbors (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 92.

40. Lorenzo Meyer, "Ejercito y Cananeas del Futuro,"

Excelsior, September 6, 1989, p. 1.

41. Ibid.

42. Grupo Consultor Indisciplinario, S.C., Carta de Politica

Mexicana (Mexico City, September 18, 1992), pp. 4-7.

43. Interview, September 1992.

44. Interview, October 1992.

45. Interviews, September 1992 and July 1993.

46. Herrera Lasso and Gonzalez, Balance y Perspectivas, pp.

402-403; and Levy, "Sustained Civilian Rule," pp. 471-472.

47. Aguayo Quezada, "Los Usos, Abusos y Retos," pp. 120-122;

and Diario Oficial, December 7, 1988, pp. 3-4.

48. Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement, p. 71.

49. The most recent and sensationalistic accusations have

implicated the army in the assassination of a Roman Catholic

cardinal in the city of Guadalajara on May 24, 1993. Official

Church sources had accused certain military officials of being

involved with the drug traffickers who were responsible for the

murder. The facts still have not been officially disclosed to the

public. See Alberto Aguirre, Felipe Cobian and Guillermo Correa,

"Los Asesinos Forcejearon con el Cardenal y su Chofer antes de

Acribillarlos," Proceso, May 31, 1993, pp. 6-13; and Rodrigo

Vera, "Acusa el Clero al Ejercito, Adultera Documentos y Se

Divide ante las Marchas," Proceso, July 5, 1993, pp. 26-28.
23

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Wager

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Deloris A. Hutchinson

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple