United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 1996 U.S. COMBAT AIR

POWER

Reassessing Plans to

Modernize Interdiction

Capabilities Could

Save Billions

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-72

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260147 

May 13, 1996

Congressional Committees

The military services plan to spend more than $200 billion on aircraft and other interdiction

weapons over the next 15 to 20 years to add to their already extensive capabilities to interdict

an enemy. The current national military strategy asserts that modernizing U.S. forces is vital to

preserving the combat edge they now have, but it also challenges the Department of Defense

(DOD) to make investments only “where there is clearly a substantial payoff.”

To determine the reasonableness of planned enhancements, we evaluated the military’s current

aggregate interdiction assets for striking enemy targets and the contribution of planned

modernization programs to total interdiction capabilities. This report contains a

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that would enhance DOD’s requirements processes.

This review was part of our broader effort to assess how DOD can better adapt its combat air

power to meet future needs. We are addressing this report to you because of your responsibility

for the issues discussed and your interest in the subject.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
B-260147 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
B-260147 

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Purpose In recent years, the U.S. military’s interdiction and other combat mission

priorities have changed. During the Cold War, the enemy was more clearly

identified and defense forces were geared to fight that enemy. The threat

has changed dramatically, from a single global threat to smaller, less easily

defined regional threats, and the size and structure of defense forces are

changing as well. The military is challenged to ensure that its funding is

directed to the most critical priorities as the forces are reduced and

reshaped to meet future national security needs. Yet the services plan to

spend more than $200 billion on aircraft and other weapons over the next

15 to 20 years, adding to their already extensive capabilities to interdict an

enemy. To determine the reasonableness of these planned enhancements,

GAO evaluated (1) the military’s current and future aggregate interdiction

assets for striking enemy targets and (2) the effect of the services’ planned

modernization programs on total interdiction capabilities and alternatives

to those programs. This review was part of GAO’s broader effort to assess

how the Department of Defense (DOD) can better adapt its combat air

power to meet future needs.

Background During the Cold War era, the armed forces of the United States were

trained, organized, and equipped to counter the global Soviet threat.

Extensive modernization of the forces during the 1980s provided the

nation with immense military power. With the collapse of the Soviet

Union, a single enemy no longer poses an immediate threat to U.S.

survival. Instead, America faces a broad range of less serious challenges

such as regional strife, insurgencies, and civil wars. DOD now requires that

its smaller force be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major

regional conflicts (MRC)—one in the east, another in the west. Part of the

national strategy for fighting and winning our nation’s wars is to have

weapons that can interdict—divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy—enemy

targets before they can be used against U.S. forces, thus better controlling

the battlefield and minimizing U.S. and allied casualties. During two MRCs,

U.S. forces may confront more than 100,000 targets. They include artillery,

tanks, personnel carriers, bridges, and fuel storage sites.

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines primarily use their combat

aircraft to strike these ground targets. The Navy also uses sea-launched

missiles, and the Army can use Apache helicopters and ground-launched

missiles. In addition, all the services use precision-guided munitions. While

these weapons can be used for interdiction, almost all of the combat

aircraft and helicopters can be used in other roles such as close fire

support. DOD’s national military strategy, considers modernization, where

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

there is “substantial payoff,” to be vital to preserving the U.S. forces’

current combat edge and ensuring future readiness. The Defense Planning

Guidance for fiscal years 1997-2001 also highlights DOD’s commitment to

an affordable long-term modernization program. The DOD-sponsored

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (the

Commission) issued a report in May 1995 on current and future

capabilities, including those used for interdiction.1

In weighing the merits of the services’ weapon modernization

proposals—including those for interdiction, various entities within the

Office of the Secretary of Defense provide independent analyses as needed

to the Secretary. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

examines military requirements from a joint perspective in advising the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary on these

modernization proposals. To support the JROC, a Joint Warfighting

Capabilities Assessment process was set up in 1994 to examine joint

warfighting requirements from a mission area perspective.

Results in Brief The services have aggregate forces capable of hitting interdiction targets

in numerous overlapping, often redundant, ways during two MRCs. They

have designated at least 10 ways to hit nearly 65 percent of the total

expected ground targets, and some targets could be hit by 25 or more

combinations of aircraft, missiles, bombs, or precision-guided munitions.

Yet the services’ modernization plans would increase to over 85 percent

the number of targets that could be hit 10 or more ways.

Given the services’ ample interdiction capabilities and continuing

questions over future defense spending, some planned modernization

programs may not be sound investments. Each service has proposed

upgrades or new weapons that may offer little additional interdiction

capability. For example, the Air Force’s planned upgrade to the B-1B

bomber and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F procurement add more redundancy at a

high cost. The effect of other planned modernization—the Army’s purchase

of more Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), Comanche helicopters

and its upgrade to the Apache helicopter as well as the services’ purchases

of more precision-guided munitions—on interdiction capability is unclear.

DOD does not assess interdiction modernization proposals in terms of the

adequacy of aggregate capability. Without such an assessment, DOD has

1

Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,

(Washington, DC: GPO, May 1995), which is referred to in this report as Directions for Defense.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

little assurance that its interdiction capabilities are properly sized to meet

mission needs, or whether more cost-effective alternatives exist.

Principal Findings

Services Have Abundant

Interdiction Capabilities,

Yet Plan to Add More

GAO’s and others’ analyses showed that the services have more than

enough capability to hit identified ground targets for the two MRCs. Combat

air power has been and is expected to remain a primary interdiction force,

as it was during the Persian Gulf War. The forces available today, however,

significantly exceed those used during the Gulf War, and other weapons

that could also contribute to the mission—the Navy’s Tomahawk Land

Attack Missile, the Army’s Apache and Comanche helicopters and ATACMS,

and all the services’ precision-guided munitions, for example—are

increasingly available. Additionally, the services’ responsibilities for hitting

targets overlap and exceed 100 percent. For example, to interdict

80 percent of one target type, a Commander in Chief (CINC) allocated a

percentage of the targets to each service so that in total, the allocation

exceeded the total number of targets by 140 percent. Further, the services

have multiple ways to hit the same target. For example, 1 target type can

currently be hit with 21 combinations featuring 6 different aircraft, 

1 type of missile launcher, and 10 types of munitions. Moreover, the

number of options in this example is not unusual—some targets can be hit

by at least 25 combinations.

Despite the numerous interdiction capabilities, the services plan to spend

over $213 billion to modify some of their weapons and buy others. This

cost does not include over $72 billion for the F-22 or the cost of the Joint

Strike Fighter aircraft, which will affect the budget to 2010 and later. Six of

the programs will cost an estimated $188 billion over the next 15 to 

20 years: the Air Force’s modification of the B-1B for conventional use, the

Navy’s purchase of 1,000 F/A-18E/F aircraft, the Army’s upgrade of about

750 Apache helicopters and purchase of about 1,300 Comanche

helicopters and 2,800 ATACMS, and all the services’ purchase of 

260,000 precision-guided munitions. Implementing all of the services’

planned modernization programs could pose problems for DOD. According

to GAO’s analysis of DOD’s Future Years Defense Program, these

modernization initiatives will cost at least $45 billion during fiscal years

1995-2001.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Assessment of Total

Capabilities Offers

Opportunity to Seek

Alternatives to

Modernization Programs

The environment in which the services develop modernization plans does

not encourage them to take into account the aggregate capabilities

available in the other services. Rather, each service maintains its own view

about how it can ensure that its interdiction targets are hit. For example,

GAO reported in 1993 that the Navy had not justified the need for the

F/A-18E/F aircraft based on threat and had not explored options other

than Navy fixed-wing aircraft.2

 Recognizing the need for oversight in

developing requirements, JROC was established to assess service

modernization initiatives. However, to date the Council has not focused on

the possibility of making trade-offs among major weapons. Moreover, the

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process is too new to evaluate

its contributions to the debate over modernization proposals. Additionally,

the Commission on Roles and Missions recommended that DOD do a

cost-effectiveness study to determine the appropriate combination and

quantities of attack capabilities in its current inventory as well as those

under development by all the services. The study is expected to be

completed by mid-1996.

During this review of DOD’s interdiction capabilities, GAO assessed the

relative contribution of all the services’ weapons. This analysis served as a

basis for determining whether planned modernizations will provide

substantial payoff and for developing options for DOD to consider when

assessing investments in some of these modernization programs.

B-1B Rather than modify and sustain the B-1B force, the Air Force could retire

its B-1Bs as soon as possible, based on the presumption that their targets

could be hit by other available interdiction weapons. It could then use the

resulting savings—nearly $4 billion in modernization costs and nearly

$1 billion in annual operating costs—for other initiatives.

Several factors make the continued need for B-1Bs questionable. DOD

considers its current capability sufficient to successfully meet its

requirement to interdict enemy targets identified in two MRCs. Also, GAO

and the Air Force estimate that the modified B-1B would strike a very

small percentage of the Air Force’s designated enemy targets, and Unified

Command officials stated they would use far fewer B-1Bs than are cited as

necessary by DOD. In addition, other Air Force and Navy aircraft can

launch the same munitions as the modified B-1B as well as others. Finally,

although their impact is not yet known, new or improved weapons such as

2

Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives Before Proceeding With the F/A-18E/F (GAO/NSIAD-93-144,

Aug. 1993), which is referred to in this report as Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

helicopters, ATACMS, and other precision-guided munitions could be used to

strike interdiction targets as well.

F/A-18E/F The Navy could reconsider its F/A-18E/F aircraft procurement plans and

instead consider procuring more F/A-18C/Ds. These aircraft could be used

for interdiction until the next generation strike fighter achieves

operational capability. The Navy proposes spending almost $90 billion for

1,000 F/A-18E/Fs to replace the A-6, F/A-18C/D, and the F-14 as they are

retired. We believe that this plan appears to contradict the national

military strategy, which cautions against making major new investments

unless there is “substantial payoff.” Based on recent assessments, the

operational capabilities of the E/F model may only be marginally improved

over the F/A-18C/D model, yet would cost substantially more. The C/D

model, which proved its capabilities in the Gulf War, is still in production

and is being improved at a cost of $1.5 billion.

ATACMS and Army Attack

Helicopters

The Army investments in ATACMS and improved Army helicopters could

affect the future force structure. However, the value of these weapons for

interdiction is unknown because the services have not determined how

they fit into the mission. While these weapons add redundancy to

aggregate interdiction capabilities, they also add new capability that could

reduce the need for some aircraft. An examination of their value as part of

the military’s total interdiction capabilities could aid in deciding how

much money to invest in each.

The Army plans to spend about $63 billion to purchase ATACMS and

Comanche helicopters and to modify its Apache helicopters. With these

modernizations, the Army could independently interdict ground targets,

and when added to the aggregate capability, these weapons could

minimize the risk associated with some of the options to Air Force and

Navy modernization programs discussed previously. The Army, for

example, has suggested that the ATACMS may be useful in hitting 27 to

40 percent of the interdiction target types, depending on the enemy.

However, the services have not resolved how the ATACMS should be

coordinated with other services’ assets to interdict such targets.

Furthermore, the Army plans to limit the use of the Apache and the

Comanche helicopters to supporting its ground maneuver operations.

Although Army officials said they will be used for maneuver warfare, they

were used in interdiction roles during the Gulf War. Until these doctrinal

and operational control issues are resolved, the potential utility and

interdiction contribution of these weapons are unknown.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Precision-Guided Munitions The services plan to spend over $40 billion to develop and buy

precision-guided munitions with improved accuracy, some with the

capability to be launched hundreds of miles from interdiction targets,

thereby reducing the risk to aircrews and aircraft. For example, GAO’s

analysis shows that by 2002 the Air Force and the Navy will require about

28 percent fewer flights to successfully hit their targets because of these

munitions’ enhanced accuracy. However, future force structure plans do

not indicate that the services expect to reduce the force below that cited

in DOD’s bottom-up review because of the greater use of precision-guided

munitions. Should these munitions prove as effective as anticipated, it may

be possible to reduce some force structure without reducing overall

capability or, as the services suggested, to minimize the risks to pilots and

aircraft.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense routinely review service

modernization proposals based on how they will enhance the current

aggregate ability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction mission.

Such a process should prioritize funding for those capabilities that

contribute most to meeting joint operational requirements and assist in

determining the appropriate mix and quantities of interdiction capabilities.

Moreover, proposals that add redundancy—such as the B-1B and Apache

modifications and the purchase of F/A-18E/Fs, ATACMS, attack helicopters,

and precision-guided missiles—should be examined in the context of the

additional interdiction capability they offer. This analysis could serve as

the basis for deciding funding priorities, the sufficiency of investment, and

the future force structure. GAO recognizes that some weapon systems are

multimission and that this recommended assessment should consider the

potential contribution to those other missions.

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

In written comments (see app. III) on a draft of this report, DOD agreed

with GAO’s recommendation that the Secretary of Defense routinely review

service modernization proposals based on how they would enhance the

current aggregate capability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction

mission. DOD noted that changes were needed to its requirements

determination process in order to assess the need for modernization

proposals in terms of the threat, the adequacy of current aggregate

capabilities to conduct interdiction, and the contribution that the

modernization proposal would make to aggregate interdiction capabilities.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

DOD did not believe that it should initiate another process to review service

modernization proposals. It said that these reviews were best implemented

by making changes to their existing process. GAO agrees with this

approach. GAO’s intent was not to institute a new process, but rather to

incorporate the necessary analysis required to assess the aggregate

capabilities of the services to perform interdiction before deciding on the

need for force modernization.

DOD disagreed that the services planned to add more interdiction capability

at high cost, despite the fact that they had ample forces to meet current

and future interdiction needs. However, DOD acknowledged that its deep

attack/weapons mix study is being done to identify cost-saving reductions

to current plans. This study was recommended by the Commission on

Roles and Missions because of its concern that DOD may have greater

quantities of strike aircraft and other deep attack weapons than it needs.

GAO also points to the recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Program

Assessment, in which he states that tactical aircraft procurement plans

call for greater than expected resources. To reduce the strain on

resources, the Chairman recommends that the services identify programs

that could be slowed or terminated.

DOD partially concurred with other issues discussed in the report. Its

comments were considered in finalizing this report.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Contents

Executive Summary 4

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

The National Military Strategy 14

The Four Phases of U.S. Combat Operations 15

The Services’ Interdiction Mission 16

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18

Chapter 2 

Services Now Have

Enough Interdiction

Capabilities and Plan

to Add More

21

The Services Are Confident They Have Sufficient Forces to Hit

Expected Targets

21

Our Analyses Confirm That Services Have Abundant, and

Sometimes Redundant, Capability

23

Services Plan to Add More Interdiction Capability at High Cost 27

Others Conclude That the Services Have More Than Enough

Interdiction Capability

29

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Chapter 3 

An Assessment of

Aggregate Interdiction

Capabilities Yields

Alternatives to

Proposed

Modernization

31

Requirements Process Encourages Services to Propose

Modernization Individually

31

Services’ Proposed Modernization Programs Have Budget

Implications

33

The Services Face a Less Serious Threat 33

Some Planned Modernizations May Not Be Sound Investments 33

Conclusion 45

Recommendation 45

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46

Appendixes Appendix I: U.S. Military Interdiction Platforms’ and Weapons’

Current and Future Capabilities

48

Appendix II: Precision-Guided Munitions 50

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 52

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 60

Tables Table 1.1: Flights for Interdiction During the Gulf War 18

Table 2.1: DOD’s 1995 and Gulf War Interdiction Platform and

Missile Types

22

Table 2.2: Current Ways to Hit One Type of Target 26

Table 2.3: DOD’s 1995, 2001, and 2010 Interdiction Capabilities 28

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Contents

Table 3.1: Multiple Ways to Hit B-1B’s Most Frequent Target

During the First 7 Days of a Conflict

37

Table 3.2: Multiple Ways to Hit One Type of F/A-18E/F Target 40

Figures Figure 2.1: Redundant Targets Apportioned in One Major

Regional Conflict

25

Figure 2.2: Multiple Ways to Interdict Designated Targets 27

Figure 3.1: Target Types to Be Hit by Each Type of Air Force

Aircraft

36

Figure 3.2: Other Ways to Hit B-1B Targets Throughout a Conflict 38

Abbreviations

ATACMS Army tactical missile system

BAT brilliant anti-armor

CBMR Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements

CEM Combined Effects Munition

CINC Commander in Chief

DOD Department of Defense

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

MLRS Multiple-Launch Rocket System

MRC major regional conflict

SFW Sensor Fuzed Weapon

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

WCMD Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

During a war, the U.S. national leadership expects the military forces to

conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations with the goal of winning

quickly with as few casualties as possible. Interdiction missions are part of

the strategy for achieving this goal. These missions are part of the effort

aimed at denying the enemy sanctuary and freedom of action. Targets may

include such things as tanks, bridges, and factories that when destroyed

make opponents easier to attack and defeat. Combat aircraft have

predominately been used to fulfill interdiction missions because they

generally offer the versatility and capability to strike at the enemy when

and where needed.

In recent years, U.S. military services’ interdiction and other combat

mission priorities have changed. During the Cold War, the enemy was

more clearly identified, and defense forces were geared to fight that

enemy. The threat has changed dramatically, from a single global threat to

smaller, less defined regional threats, and the size and structure of defense

forces are changing as well. As the services draw down their forces, the

Department of Defense (DOD) is grappling with questions about how to

maintain technological superiority over potential adversaries within

expected budgets.

The National Military

Strategy

During the Cold War, the national military strategy was to contain

communism through nuclear and conventional deterrence. DOD

emphasized aspects of military power most useful for that purpose,

including standby nuclear forces that combined bombers and land- and

sea-based missile systems, forward-deployed forces in Europe and

Northeast Asia, and reinforcements ready to deploy from the United

States.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the

United States faces no immediate threat to its survival. Therefore, the

national military strategy is being altered to meet new, lessened threats.

For example, the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

Secretary of Defense identified the involvement in two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) as the most demanding

threat—one in the east, another in the west. In addition to preparing to

counter these threats, DOD will more likely be distracted by less easily

defined and smaller contingencies. The modernization of U.S. forces is

considered vital to preserving the combat edge they now enjoy and to

ensuring future readiness. The strategy cautions against making major

modernization investments unless there is “substantial payoff.”

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

DOD’s Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1997-2001 states its

commitment to developing an affordable, long-term modernization and

recapitalization program. This program is to (1) inject new technologies to

modernize existing platforms and upgrade mission capabilities,

(2) introduce modernized replacements for existing systems that

substantially upgrade capabilities and lower operation and support costs,

and (3) field new systems for which there is no like item in the inventory.

DOD asserted that introducing these capabilities should better leverage

joint warfighting capabilities and, in some instances, allow consideration

for making compensating reductions elsewhere in the force.

In November 1993, Congress established the Commission on Roles and

Missions of the Armed Forces1

 to study the way the services allocate roles

and missions, to consider alternatives, and to recommend changes to the

process to better meet future needs. The Commission comprised civilian

and retired military officials appointed by the Secretary of Defense in

consultation with Members of Congress. In Directions for Defense

(May 24, 1995), the Commission reported that while each service develops

valuable capabilities, considering these capabilities jointly is key to

effective future unified operations.

The Four Phases of

U.S. Combat

Operations

As part of the national military strategy and as reported in the Secretary of

Defense’s January 1994 Annual Report to the President and the Congress,

the military services have planned for four phases of operations: halting

the invasion, building up U.S. combat power while reducing the enemy’s,

defeating the enemy, and providing post-war stability. Interdiction may

play a role in the first three phases. The significance of the role may vary

according to the circumstances.

During phase 1, the services seek to quickly minimize the territory and

strategic facilities the invader can capture and ensure that the threatened

ally can continue its crucial role in the collective effort to defeat the

aggressor. High priority missions for U.S. forces during this phase include

direct attacks on advancing enemy forces; air defense and ballistic missile

defense to protect rear areas; attacks on selected high-value strategic

assets, such as centralized command and control sites; interdiction of lines

of communication critical to the enemy’s offensive; and suppression of

enemy air defenses.

1

The Commission was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 

(P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Once the enemy attack has been stopped, phase 2 begins, and U.S. and

allied efforts focus on continuing to build up combat forces and logistics

support in theater, reducing the enemy’s capacity to fight and ensuring

that the enemy does not regain the initiative.

During phase 3, U.S. and allied forces may mount a large-scale, air-land

counteroffensive to defeat the enemy by attacking its centers of gravity,

retaking territory it occupies, destroying its war-making capabilities, and

successfully achieving other operational or strategic objectives. In many

cases, U.S. forces would also threaten or carry out amphibious assault

landings in the enemy’s rear areas.

Following a U.S.-coalition victory, military forces remain in theater to

ensure that the conditions that resulted in conflict do not recur. These

forces may also help repatriate prisoners, occupy and administer some or

all of the enemy’s territory, assist in reestablishing friendly governments in

liberated areas, or ensure compliance with the provisions of a cease-fire

agreement or peace accord.

The Services’

Interdiction Mission

Under DOD Directive 5100.1, the Air Force is primarily responsible for air

interdiction missions, but the Army, the Navy, and the Marines are

expected to interdict enemy forces as a collateral mission. While the

services do not limit interdiction to any particular area on the battlefield,

they generally strike at targets beyond the close fire support area to avoid

hurting friendly forces.

In line with the changes proposed by the Commission on Roles and

Missions, the services are working out how to better conduct joint

operations. Joint commanders can use interdiction to divert, disrupt,

delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can

effectively be used against friendly forces. Military guidance on joint

interdiction operations is still evolving, however. Joint Publication 3-0,

entitled Doctrine for Joint Operations and issued in 1995, states that the

services should fight together and cites examples of joint interdiction

missions. The Air Force and the Army have draft joint doctrine

publications that provide more details on how joint interdiction operations

would work. Joint Publication 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction

Operations, drafted by the Air Force, describes how the services should

coordinate the use of their forces during the joint missions. The Army’s

draft of Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, describes

how the services might better synchronize the use of firepower in all

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

missions to ensure success. According to an official in the Office of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, these publications may be approved in the fall of

1996.

Interdiction Targets During two major regional conflicts, U.S. military forces expect to

encounter over 100,000 mobile or fixed targets. Mobile targets include

tanks, personnel carriers, artillery, trucks, and missile launchers. Fixed

targets include bridges, highways, railyards, fuel storage sites, and power

production sites. Striking at various targets becomes more critical at

different times during a war, depending on how the targets support the

enemy or threaten friendly forces. For example, during phase 1 of a war,

halting the enemy’s movement may make it critical for the services to

interdict mobile targets such as tanks and artillery.

Interdiction Weapons The services’ weapons for interdicting targets include aircraft, missiles,

and helicopters. Each service traditionally has individually determined the

capabilities it needs to fulfill its missions. The Air Force, the Navy, and the

Marines expect to use large portions of their combat aircraft for

interdiction missions. These aircraft can also be used for other roles, such

as close air support or air superiority. During the Gulf War, however, most

of the combat sorties by U.S. attack aircraft were flown for interdiction

missions (see table 1.1).

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Flights for Interdiction

During the Gulf War Aircraft

Service Type Use (percent)

Air Force F-15E 92

F-16 84

F-111 70

F-117A 100

A-10 79

B-1B a

B-2 a

B-52 95

Navy/Marine Corps A-6 49

AV-8B 52

F-14A/D b

F/A-18 42

aThe B-1B and B-2 were not used in the Gulf War.

bThe F-14’s contribution to interdiction was not specified.

In addition to fixed-wing aircraft, weapons such as the Navy’s Tomahawk

Land Attack Missile (TLAM), the Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)

and attack helicopters, and the services’ precision-guided munitions can

also be used to interdict targets.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

To illustrate the need to compare the services’ plans for improving their

interdiction capabilities, we evaluated (1) the services’ current and future

aggregate interdiction assets for striking identified enemy targets and

(2) the effect of the services’ planned modernization programs on total

interdiction capabilities and alternatives to those programs. This report is

one of a series of reports assessing how DOD might better adapt its combat

air power to meet future needs. Other reports in this series address close

fire support, air superiority, suppression of enemy air defense,

surveillance and reconnaissance, and aerial refueling.

To assess the services’ aggregate interdiction capabilities, we identified

how the services plan to hit expected targets now and in the future. We

relied on threat assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the

military services to identify the number and type of targets. We also

reviewed doctrine of the Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force

Doctrine Center, the Navy Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Training

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

and Doctrine Command to identify how the services have been authorized

to perform interdiction missions.

Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the Air

Force, the Army, the Marine, and the Navy headquarters provided

information on current interdiction capabilities and modernization plans.

Additional views on capability and operational perspectives were provided

by the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, the Army’s Training and

Doctrine Command, the Navy’s Commander in Chief (CINC) Atlantic Fleet,

and the Marine Forces Atlantic.

We also obtained data on how each service plans to hit interdiction targets

identified for two MRCs now and in the 2002 time frame. Air Force

headquarters officials provided an extract from the database it uses to

determine wartime conventional munition requirements. This data linked

targets to the likely munitions and the aircraft to be used against them.

The Air Force’s analyses ensure it has sufficient capability to interdict the

targets it is apportioned by the Unified CINCs. Navy headquarters officials

provided a similar database for the targets that the Navy and the Marine

Corps are assigned to hit with their fixed-wing aircraft. In addition,

information on the targets that might be hit by the TLAM was also provided

by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In compiling their data, the

Air Force and the Navy assumed the availability of all munitions in the

inventory and suppression of enemy air defense aircraft. The U.S. Army

Field Artillery and the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center also

provided information on the targets that the ATACMS and Apache and

Comanche helicopters might hit.

We compiled the services’ data to determine aggregate capabilities to

interdict ground targets (see app. I for the aircraft and missile launch

system combinations). We analyzed this data in several ways to identify

redundant capabilities in the services. We then assessed whether various

service modernization proposals would add new capability or more

redundancy to the ways the services have to hit the targets.

The database we developed had the following limitations:

• The data represents a snapshot of capability at points in time. Changes in

threat, force structure, budget, or national military strategy could

significantly alter its validity.

• We did not validate the Air Force’s and the Navy’s models linking targets

to munitions and aircraft.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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Introduction

• We added Navy TLAM and Army ATACMS data to show the targets they might

hit, even though the services had not used the weapons in their model for

determining their sufficiency to interdict designated targets.

• We could not evaluate the full impact of some modernization proposals

because they will not be completely implemented by 2002, the last year of

the services’ data.

We discussed the modernization proposals and some alternatives with

officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services’

headquarters, and the U.S. Atlantic Command, Central Command,

European Command, and Pacific Command. We also interviewed officials

at the Air Combat Command; the U.S. Air Forces and Army Europe; and

the U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Army, and Navy. We also reviewed documents

they provided relevant to our analysis.

In our analysis of current capabilities and future force options, we

considered information from our prior reports, the Commission on Roles

and Missions of the Armed Forces, RAND, the Institute for Defense

Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the

Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office.

We conducted this review from April 1994 to November 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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Services Now Have Enough Interdiction

Capabilities and Plan to Add More

When viewed in the aggregate, the services’ weapons constitute a major

force capable of interdicting targets in numerous overlapping, and often

redundant ways during two MRCs. The services have concluded, and we

concur, that they have enough capability to carry out the national military

strategy. Furthermore, the Congressional Research Service reported

concern about and the Commission on Roles and Missions concluded that

the United States may have more than enough interdiction capabilities.

Nevertheless, the services are proposing to add to their interdiction

capabilities by modernizing some weapons and buying more of others

between 1995 and 2010.

The Services Are

Confident They Have

Sufficient Forces to

Hit Expected Targets

Combat air power has been and is expected to remain the primary

interdiction force, as it was during the Gulf War. However, other weapons

are increasingly available for interdiction missions—the TLAMs and ATACMS

and potentially the Army’s Apache helicopters. As shown in table 2.1, the

interdiction forces available in 1995 significantly exceed the combat air

power and missiles used during the Gulf War.

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Capabilities and Plan to Add More

Table 2.1: DOD’s 1995 and Gulf War

Interdiction Platform and Missile Types

Service

Platform/missile

typea

Available

in 1995

Used in

Gulf Wara,b

Air Force

Fixed-wing aircraft F-15E 138 48

F-16 765 215

F-111 54 66

F-117 36 42

A-10 144 146

B-1B 60 0

B-2 7 c

B-52 74 66

Navy/Marine Corps

Fixed-wing aircraft A-6E 119 116

AV-8B 185 84

F-14A/D 268 109

F/A-18A/C/D 799 167

A-7E 0 24

Missile TLAM 2,100 298

Army

Helicopter Apache (AH-64A) 758 245

Missile ATACMS 1,197 32

aGulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V: A Statistical Compendium and Chronology (U.S. Air Force,

Washington, D.C.:1993).

bAdditional U.S. weapons were available.

cNot in inventory.

DOD and the services assert that current interdiction forces are sufficient to

successfully execute the national military strategy, that is, to fight in

concert with regional allies and decisively win two nearly simultaneous

MRCs. They base this assertion on target and other information that served

as the basis for several analyses testing the sufficiency of the U.S. forces

proposed in DOD’s bottom-up review and to support future requirements.

According to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s recent

“Nimble Dancer” extensive war games included an air campaign exercise

that tested the ability of the 1997 and 2001-05 forces to win two conflicts

based on hitting the designated targets. The results of these tests,

according to the Secretary of Defense, validated the ability of these forces

to meet the challenge.

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Services Now Have Enough Interdiction

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Our Analyses Confirm

That Services Have

Abundant, and

Sometimes

Redundant, Capability

Our analyses of the services’ data show that they have more than enough

capability to hit the identified ground targets for the east and west MRCs. In

fact, we found that in the aggregate, the services’ responsibilities for

hitting targets overlap considerably, and the services have many ways to

hit the same target.

In doing our analyses, we assessed information from a variety of sources,

including the Air Force and the Navy data used in their Capabilities Based

Munitions Requirements (CBMR) development process. Following DOD’s

CBMR process, the Air Force and the Navy assessed the munitions needed

to defeat the threat from 1995 through 2002. Using Defense Intelligence

Agency target data, they matched the interdiction targets to be hit to the

services’ 29 munition and 14 combat aircraft types. The Unified CINCs

associated with the east and west regional conflicts determined the

percentage of targets each service would be expected to hit. The sum of

munitions required to adequately destroy each region’s targets became

part of the basis for the services’ total munitions requirements.1

The Air Force and the Navy databases linking targets to munitions and

combat aircraft were of particular value because they allowed us to assess

the adequacy of the expected combat air forces to meet mission needs

based on the Unified CINCs’ apportionment of targets to the services. Our

databases confirmed that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines have

sufficient munitions and aircraft in 1995 and 2002 to interdict the targets.

By adding target information on the Navy’s TLAM and the Army’s ATACMS to

the combat air forces’ target data, we identified the services’ aggregate

interdiction capabilities available for each MRC. This approach also enabled

us to identify redundancies in interdiction capabilities. These

redundancies were expressed two ways: as overlapping service

responsibility for the same targets, and as multiple ways to hit the same

target.

Services’ Coverage of

Targets Overlaps

The Unified CINCs apportion more than 100 percent of the targets to the

services. For example, one CINC assigned the Army 5 to 10 percent, the

Navy 20 to 30 percent, the Marines 15 to 25 percent, and the Air Force 65

to 75 percent of one target type—a total apportioned range of 105 to

140 percent coverage—even though the CINC’s objective was to destroy

only 80 percent of the target quantity. This over-apportionment creates a

margin of safety and allows flexibility to ensure targets will be hit even if

1

The results of these assessments were reported in the Air Force’s Nonnuclear Consumables Annual

Analysis and the Navy’s annual report Nonnuclear Ordnance Requirements.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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Services Now Have Enough Interdiction

Capabilities and Plan to Add More

some expected capabilities are not available. However, it also establishes

the expectation that the services would acquire and maintain sufficient

forces to provide this level of target coverage and thus would be

maintaining a significant amount of redundancy. Figure 2.1 shows the

apportionment of targets for one MRC (providing specific target names

would require the figure to be classified).

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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Services Now Have Enough Interdiction

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Figure 2.1: Redundant Targets Apportioned in One Major Regional Conflict

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Targets

Percentage

CINC OBJ CINC Margin of safety Apportioned range

Services Have Numerous

Ways to Hit the Same

Targets

Redundancy can also be expressed in the number of ways the services

have to hit targets. As an example, table 2.2 shows the number of aircraft

or other means of delivery and the munition combinations the services

designated to interdict one type of target (the specific name of the target is

classified).

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Services Now Have Enough Interdiction

Capabilities and Plan to Add More

Table 2.2: Current Ways to Hit One Type of Target

Platform

Munition A-6 A-10 F-16 F-14A/B F-14D F/A-18A/C MLRSa

AGM-65D Maverick X

AGM-65G Maverick X X

IIR Maverick X X

Laser Maverick X X

Walleye X X

MK-83 X X X

MK-84 X X X X X

MK-82 X

MK-82R X X

ATACMS X

aMultiple-launch rocket system.

All 21 combinations involving 6 different aircraft types and a missile

launcher shown in table 2.2 might not be used, but the services assume

that these combinations will be available. Moreover, the number of

options represented is not unusual. The services currently have 10 or more

ways designated to hit nearly 65 percent of the Defense Intelligence

Agency-identified ground targets. By adding the additional ways

envisioned in 2002 to those ways designated in 1995 that would continue

to be available, 86 percent of the targets can be hit 10 or more ways. As

shown in figure 2.2, some targets can be hit more than 25 different ways.

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Capabilities and Plan to Add More

Figure 2.2: Multiple Ways to Interdict Designated Targets

25+ 20 - 24 15 - 19 10 - 14 5 - 9 2 - 4

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Services Plan to Add

More Interdiction

Capability at High

Cost

Despite the fact that the services have ample forces to meet current and

future interdiction missions, they plan to add even more capability by

modernizing some platforms, missiles, and munitions and buying more of

others over the next 15 to 20 years, at a cost exceeding $213 billion. The

services expect these improved weapons to interdict targets with more

accuracy and lethality and to increase aircraft and pilot survivability. Each

service has proposed the following:

• The Air Force plans to (1) upgrade its B-1B bomber for conventional use,

(2) buy and develop more conventional precision-guided munitions, and

(3) retire the F-111 aircraft (due to an Office of the Secretary of Defense

decision) and buy the new F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft to

replace other aircraft.

• The Navy plans to replace and/or retire its A-6, F/A-18A/C/D, and F-14

aircraft with the new F/A-18E/F and the JSF aircraft and to continue to buy

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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Services Now Have Enough Interdiction

Capabilities and Plan to Add More

and develop more of the improved TLAMs and precision-guided munitions.

The Marines plan to replace the AV-8B and F/A-18C/D aircraft with a short

takeoff and vertical landing version of the JSF aircraft.

• The Army plans to buy 2,800 improved ATACMS, upgrade its Apache

helicopters, and buy nearly 1,300 new Comanche helicopters.

• All services plan to buy more precision-guided munitions.

In total, these plans will affect the current mix of aircraft and missile types

in 2001 and 2010 (see table 2.3).

Table 2.3: DOD’s 1995, 2001, and 2010

Interdiction Capabilities Platform and missile types

Service 1995 2001 2010

Air Force

Fixed-wing aircraft F-15E F-15E F-15E

F-16 F-16 F-16

F-111

F-117 F-117 F-117

A-10 A-10 A-10

B-1B B-1B B-1B

B-52 B-52 B-52

B-2 B-2 B-2

F-22

JSF

Navy/Marine Corps

Fixed-wing aircraft A-6E

AV-8B AV-8B AV-8B

F-14A/D F-14A/D F-14A/D

F/A-18A/C/D F/A-18A/C/D F/A-18A/C/D

F/A-18E/F F/A-18E/F

JSF

Missile TLAM TLAM TLAM

Army

Helicopter Apache (AH-64A) Apache (AH-64A) Apache (AH-64A)

Apache Longbow Apache Longbow

Comanche

Missile ATACMS (Block I) ATACMS (Block

I,Ia,II)

ATACMS (Block

Ia,II,IIa)

Precision-guided munition

types

14 20 20

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Capabilities and Plan to Add More

Others Conclude That

the Services Have

More Than Enough

Interdiction Capability

According to the Congressional Research Service and the Commission on

Roles and Missions, the services have more interdiction capabilities than

may be needed now and in the future. They based their conclusion on their

assessment of the current forces and their view that the services’

requirements development processes tend to yield competing, sometimes

redundant, service-specific solutions.

The Congressional Research Service reported in 1993 and again in 1995

that critics complained about the overlap in the services’ airpower and the

excessive costs incurred to provide that capability. It also expressed the

belief that duplicative capabilities should be eliminated but may remain

because the services are reluctant to rely on each other.2

The Commission was more pointed in its conclusions. It reported in

May 1995 that DOD may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and other

deep attack weapons than it needs and noted that the total capability is

increasing. The Commission attributed the increase to the addition of

conventional bombers, growing inventories of improved precision-guided

munitions, and plans to buy stealth aircraft. Because of these concerns,

the Commission recommended the prompt initiation of a DOD-wide

cost-effectiveness study focused on finding the appropriate combination

and quantities of deep attack capabilities currently fielded and under

development by all services. This effort, entitled “The Deep Attack

Weapons Mix Study,” is now under way at the direction of the Secretary of

Defense.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed that the services appear to have an abundant interdiction

capability but said that these capabilities must be viewed in terms of

flexibility, multimission capability, and availability. We agree that these are

considerations in assessing the sufficiency of assets in relation to expected

requirements. However, independent analyses and DOD’s own statements

suggest that it also believes that aggregate capabilities could be excess to

requirements. For example, the most recent program assessment by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff concluded that procurement plans

included more than tactical aircraft resources could pay for and therefore

recommended that the services identify programs that could be slowed or

terminated. Taken together, we believe that the conclusions of both

external experts and statements by DOD suggest that there may be

cost-saving alternatives to planned modernization programs.

2

Four U.S. “Air Forces:” Overlap and Alternatives (Congressional Research Service, 93-823 F, Allan W.

Howey, Sept. 10, 1993) and Military Roles and Missions: A Framework for Review (Congressional

Research Service, 95-517 S, John M. Collins, May 1, 1995).

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DOD also noted that we had overstated available interdiction assets by

adding together all the possible weapons that a single aircraft might

employ. We acknowledge that a single aircraft can deliver only the

munitions it carries on a single sortie. However, the services would not

expect to attack all targets at the same time. Given the likelihood of

multiple sorties by many aircraft, we do not believe that our analysis

overstates the services’ capabilities.

Finally, DOD said that today’s interdiction forces exceed those used during

the Persian Gulf War because that war represented a single major regional

contingency, whereas current assets are geared for two such

contingencies. We do not agree with this line of reasoning in that the

interdiction assets available at the time of the Gulf War were those

planned to counter the former Soviet Union in a possible global war—a

much more demanding scenario than the current two MRC strategy.

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Capabilities Yields Alternatives to Proposed

Modernization

Given questions about future defense spending levels, the diminished

threat to U.S. security, and the services’ statements that they have ample

interdiction capability, some modernization proposals may not be sound

investments. Some of these investments offer limited or unknown

additional capability to the current abundant interdiction assets. For

example, the Air Force’s planned upgrade to the B-1B bomber and the

Navy’s F/A-18E/F procurement appear to add more redundancy at a high

cost. Also, it is uncertain what value the Army’s ATACMS and Apache

Longbow and Comanche helicopters and the services’ thousands of

precision-guided munitions will add to interdiction capabilities.

The Commission on Roles and Missions concluded, and our analysis

confirms, that the appropriate combination and quantities of capabilities

should be assessed because the services plan to add more redundancy to

that which already exists. We have included options in this chapter based

on our analysis of the services’ total capabilities to hit targets designated

by the CINCs. While the options presented here are not the only ones

possible, they illustrate the kind of trade-offs DOD should find useful when

evaluating whether the investments called for in current and future service

modernization plans provide substantial payoff. Consideration of the

services’ capabilities in the aggregate, with an understanding of how the

weapons will be used and how that use will affect other services’ forces,

could yield more cost-effective alternatives to the services’ current

proposals.

Requirements Process

Encourages Services

to Propose

Modernization

Individually

Modernization plans such as those currently proposed evolve from each

service as its solution to a perceived need. Because each service proposes

improvements to its capabilities separately, the services do not necessarily

recognize that, together, their improvements result in substantial,

sometimes redundant, military capabilities. The services’ modernization

plans are developed through a requirements generation process that also

encourages each service to maintain its own view of how its own

capabilities should be enhanced to ensure interdiction targets are hit. As

noted by the Commission in its 1995 report, “each Service is fully engaged

in trying to deliver to the CINCs what the Service views as the best possible

set of its specific capabilities—without taking into account the similar

capabilities provided by the other Services.” The Commission report states

that, on one hand, this is desirable because “competition among the

Services produces innovation in weapon systems, forces, doctrine, and

concepts of operations that yield the dramatically superior military

capabilities we need.” However, this decision process does not ensure that

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Capabilities Yields Alternatives to Proposed

Modernization

the services consider the capabilities available in the total force. For

example, in a 1993 report, we asserted that the need for the F/A-18E/F had

not been adequately justified based on threat or as a cost-effective solution

to a recognized military need. Furthermore, the Navy had not explored

options other than Navy fixed-wing aircraft.1

 While analyses of capability

based on threat or cost-effectiveness are advantageous, a DOD examination

of the contribution of a new capability in the context of the total force

could yield a different investment decision. Because DOD and the services

do not routinely assess the services’ capabilities in the aggregate, there is

no assurance that modernization proposals will yield substantial payoffs.

This acquisition environment has existed for some time. In a 1992 report,2

we noted the similarity of major acquisition issues addressed in work over

the preceding 15 years. The report noted that acquisition programs begin

as individual service solutions to mission needs. The organizations

responsible for developing requirements for new weapons generally

represent individual branches within the services that analyze their own

mission area deficiencies and recommend solutions in terms of their own

type of assets. Therefore, while the general threat may be legitimate and

individual program analyses objective, the processes for developing

weapon system requirements tend to narrow consideration of alternatives

and favor the promotion of particular weapons that may be the services’

preferred solution, not the best solution to a valid need. These service

organizations’ institutionalized advocacy of the weapons under their

purview helps perpetuate the funneling of successor weapons into the

acquisition process.

In leading up to its recommendation that DOD conduct a cost-effectiveness

study of the appropriate combination and quantities of deep attack

capabilities by all services, the Commission indicated the environment

described above still exists. Also, the Commission pointed out that no one

in DOD has specific responsibility for making this decision.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was established, led by

the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to oversee the services’

requirements generation processes. JROC assessed 10 joint warfighting

areas, such as “strike” and “air superiority,” to determine whether the

effectiveness of existing and planned capabilities can be enhanced. These

joint warfighting capability assessments became the basis for the

Chairman’s program and budget recommendations to the Secretary of

1

Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives (GAO/NSIAD-93-144, Aug. 1993).

2

Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change (GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Dec. 1992).

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Modernization

Defense. Most of the Chairman’s 1995 guidance concerned the financial

implications of the services’ current plans, but the assessments did not

explore ways to reduce costs by suggesting specific trade-offs among

major modernization proposals.

Services’ Proposed

Modernization

Programs Have

Budget Implications

With a high level of uncertainty surrounding future defense spending, the

services’ proposed modernization of interdiction capabilities—at a

projected cost of more than $213 billion over the next 15 to 

20 years—could pose a significant problem. According to our analysis of

DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) data, the services’ modernization

programs will cost at least $45 billion in fiscal years 1995-2001. Moreover,

the services’ planned $213 billion plus modernization costs do not include

the $72 billion that the F-22 is estimated to cost or the eventual cost of the

JSF aircraft. These costs will affect DOD’s budgets out to 2010 and later.

The Services Face a

Less Serious Threat

The Commission and others conclude that today’s threat is considerably

different from the Soviet threat that previously dominated U.S. military

force planning, preparation, and funding. A single enemy no longer poses

an immediate, nuclear threat to U.S. survival, and no one is expected to

achieve military capabilities challenging those of the United States during

the next 20 years. Overt attacks on the United States and its strategic

interests are unlikely because few nations will have the resources to

succeed in such attacks. Instead, America faces a broad range of less

serious but more likely challenges such as regional strife, insurgencies,

civil wars, and operations other than war. While the proliferation of

weapons and technology is expected to allow some nations to buy

state-of-the-art systems or upgrade those they have, the extent of their

investment will be limited by budget constraints. In addition, an

investment in a few improved systems does not equate to an integrated,

modernized force.

Some Planned

Modernizations May

Not Be Sound

Investments

By comparing the expected contribution of weapons resulting from the

services’ modernization plans to current total U.S. military interdiction

capability, we assessed the significance of their impact on the forces’

ability to hit targets associated with two MRCs. Our analysis indicated that

some proposals may not be sound investments. For example, the Air

Force’s B-1B upgrade and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F procurement may add

more redundancy at a high cost. Others, like the Army’s ATACMS, the

Apache Longbow and Comanche initiatives and the services’

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Capabilities Yields Alternatives to Proposed

Modernization

precision-guided munitions proposals, may add expensive new capabilities

without a clear understanding of the extent they are needed or their

potential impact on other services’ forces.

We determined how the services’ plan to hit interdiction targets for the

two MRCs based on Air Force and Navy CBMR data, possible TLAM and

ATACMS targets, and CINC target allocations. After aggregating this data, we

assessed the interdiction contribution of various weapons. We identified

which targets each weapon was designated to hit in 1995 and 2002, how

these designations changed between those points in time, and other

possible ways to hit those same targets. This allowed us to focus on the

interdiction contribution of those weapons if they are modified or added

to the services’ capabilities. Our analysis caused us to question whether

some investments yielded a substantial payoff, and to develop options for

some modernization proposals. We recognize that some systems have

multimission capabilities and that in making decisions impacting them, the

potential contribution to those other missions should be considered.

Air Force Could Save

Billions by Retiring the

B-1B

In light of the ample capability to hit the few targets assigned the B-1B,

retiring the aircraft could save almost $4 billion in modernization costs

and nearly $1 billion annually in operating costs that could be used for

other initiatives. Retirement of the aircraft would increase U.S. forces’

dependency on other capabilities and therefore the risk that some targets

might not be hit as quickly as desired. However, it is reasonable to expect

that the targets could be hit by other U.S. military assets, including

missiles such as ATACMS and TLAM.

Should the risk associated with retiring the B-1B be unacceptable, another

option is to use the nearly $4 billion to buy up to 80 more F-15Es.

Considered the Air Force’s premier air-to-ground fighter, the F-15E

launches a wide variety of munitions, adds flexibility to air operations, and

would still save operating funds.

B-1B Modification to Improve

Conventional Capability

The Air Force plans to spend nearly $4 billion to increase the conventional

capability and sustainability of the B-1B to make it the backbone of its

conventional bomber force. Currently, the B-1B’s ability to conduct

conventional missions is limited because it can carry only the 500-pound

unguided, general-purpose bomb. The Air Force therefore plans to

(1) upgrade the avionics to enable the B-1B to drop cluster bomb units and

mines, (2) improve the electronic countermeasures system to ensure that

the B-1B is not vulnerable to sophisticated enemy air defenses, and (3) add

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Modernization

a global positioning system and other modifications to integrate the use of

precision-guided munitions with its other systems.

By 2002, the improved B-1B will be expected to deliver several

precision-guided munitions: the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and

the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), with either the

Combined Effects Munition (CEM) or the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).

Eventually, the B-1B will also deliver the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW).

Many other aircraft are also expected to launch these and other more

potent weapons.

The nearly $4 billion modernization also includes $400 million for the

B-1B’s sustainment modifications. Changes include engine upgrades to

correct safety and high maintenance problems, enhancements to simulator

systems used by flight crews and maintenance personnel for initial

qualification and continuation training, and improvements to the antenna.

B-1B Plays a Minor Role in

Interdiction

According to Air Force modeling, even after the proposed modifications,

the B-1B’s contribution to interdiction is expected to be minor when

compared to the services’ total interdiction capability. The specific

percentage of targets to be destroyed by the B-1B is classified. However,

figure 3.1 shows the B-1B’s expected contribution in 2002 compared to

other Air Force aircraft in terms of target types it is designated to hit.

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Figure 3.1: Target Types to Be Hit by Each Type of Air Force Aircraft

A-1O B-1B B-2 B-52 F-15E F-16 F-117

0

10

20

30

40

Platforms

Target types

East MRC West MRC

Unified CINCs Would Use

Fewer B-1Bs Than Bottom-Up

Review Required

According to the Air Force, the B-1B’s greatest contribution would be to

halt enemy aggression during the early days of a conflict. While officials in

the Unified Commands agreed that bombers would be valuable, they also

said they expect to use far fewer than the 100 bombers the bottom-up

review cited might be necessary for a MRC. Furthermore, the Air Force’s

analysis of its bomber force in the years 2001-05 shows that the B-1B does

not make a unique contribution because other bombers or fighters hit the

same types of targets it hits in the first 7 days of a conflict. As shown in

table 3.1, the target the B-1B would most frequently strike in 2001 can be

hit 20 other ways.

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Table 3.1: Multiple Ways to Hit B-1B’s

Most Frequent Target During the First

7 Days of a Conflict

Munition B-1B B-2 B-52 F-15E F-16 MLRS

GBU-12 X X

GBU-15 X

GBU-24 X X

MK-82 X X X

MK-82R X

MK-82R/B-1B X

MK-84 X X

MK-84R X

M-117 X

JDAM/MK-84 X X X X X

AGM-65G X

AGM-130/BLU-109 X

ATACMS-Block I X

ATACMS-Block IA X

Air Force modeling shows that, as the conflict continues, the B-1B’s

relative contribution to the war becomes even smaller. Moreover, service

data shows that as in the first 7 days, the B-1B’s targets are not unique, and

in 2002 the services are expected to hit the same 18 target types numerous

(one over 35) other ways (see fig. 3.2).

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Figure 3.2: Other Ways to Hit B-1B Targets Throughout a Conflict

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

0

10

20

30

40

Targets

Ways to hit

MRC East &

West Targets

Eight of the target types designated for the B-1B in 2002 were different

from those assigned in 1995. These new B-1B targets are already

designated to be hit in 1995 by 4 to 21 other combinations. The two B-1B

target types hit the fewest other ways in 2001 are currently designated to

be attacked at least four other ways. With the exception of one aircraft, all

missiles, aircraft, and munitions comprising these four ways are still

expected to be available in 2002, but they are not the preferred way

designated for hitting these targets.

In direct response to a draft of this report, DOD said that our cost for the

B-1B upgrade appeared to include operations and maintenance items other

than the specific cost required for the upgrade. However, the $4 billion

cited is the expected total program cost for modernizing the B-1B. In

addition to funds for the Conventional Munition Upgrade Program, it

includes the amounts for modifications to enhance the B-1B’s

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sustainability and to upgrade equipment in the squadrons. If the B-1B were

retired, more of the associated costs would be avoided.

The Navy Could Save

Billions by Reducing Its

Purchase of F/A-18E/F

Aircraft

As an option for saving funds and at the same time retaining interdiction

capabilities, the Navy could reconsider its F/A-18E/F aircraft procurement

plans and instead consider procuring more F/A-18C/Ds to meet its needs.

The Navy is still purchasing the C/D model, and ongoing and planned

modifications costing about $1.5 billion will improve the aircraft’s

survivability and ability to acquire and accurately strike targets. Changes

in the F/A-18 procurement plans could save billions of dollars.

The Navy Plans to Replace

Existing Aircraft at a Cost

of Nearly $90 Billion

The Navy plans to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft at a total estimated

cost of nearly $90 billion. The Navy will buy the first E/Fs in fiscal year

1997 and expects to own almost 700 by 2010. The E/F was designed to

replace the A-6, F/A-18C/D, and F-14 aircraft as they reach the end of their

service lives and are retired. Compared to the C/D, the E/F was projected

to perform the same mission but to be more survivable, carry more

weapons, and have greater range. However, more recent assessments

show that F/A-18E/F capabilities will be marginally improved over the

F/A-18C/D model.

The E/F’s Contribution to

Interdiction Does Not

Appear Substantially

Greater Than That of the

C/D

Our analysis of the Navy’s target database shows the F/A-18C/D’s

interdiction role is virtually identical to that of the F/A-18E/F. Both aircraft

are expected to hit the same targets with the same type weapons. The C/D

can carry all the Navy’s current strike weapons and is expected to carry

precision-guided munitions such as the JDAM and the JSOW. While the E/F’s

range advantage could allow it to more effectively employ the additional

weapons it can carry, a Congressional Budget Office memorandum

reported the Secretary of the Navy as stating that about 85 percent of the

service’s targets are within 200 miles of shore and are therefore within the

C/D’s range. According to the Gulf War air power survey commissioned by

the Air Force, the F/A-18C/D proved its combat capabilities and

effectiveness during Operation Desert Storm when it dropped more than

17,500 tons of ordnance on a variety of ground targets. It was the only

aircraft that during a single mission acquired, identified, and in air-to-air

combat destroyed two enemy aircraft and then delivered munitions to a

ground target. Further, the E/F’s contribution to the interdicting ground

targets is not expected to be unique relative to the services’ total

capabilities. For example, table 3.2 shows the expected interdiction

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contribution of the E/F in 2002 against one of its targets and the 20 other

ways also expected to be available to hit that target.

Table 3.2: Multiple Ways to Hit One Type of F/A-18E/F Target

Platform

Munitions B-2 B-52 A-10 F-15E F-16 F-14 A/B F-14D F/A18 A/C F/A18 E/F MLRS

WCMD/CEM X X X X

WCMD/SFW X X X

AGM-65D X

AGM-65A/B X

CBU-87 X

CBU-97 X X

ROCKEYE

(FMU-140) X

MK-83 X

MK-84 X X

JSOW

(BLU-108) X X X

JSOW/CEB X

ATACMS X

The difference in the unit cost of the two models is substantial. The Navy

plans to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft for the Navy and the Marine

Corps at an estimated total program cost of nearly $90 billion. Based on

total program costs, each F/A-18E/F would cost about $89 million under a

1,000-aircraft buy while the current unit procurement cost of the

F/A-18C/D is about $51 million based on procurement of 12 aircraft.3

However, if the Marine Corps does not buy F/A-18E/Fs, the Navy could

reduce the E/F procurement quantity. The C/D model, which proved its

capabilities in the Gulf War, is still in production and is being improved at

a cost of $1.5 billion.

In its comments on our draft report, DOD said that we should use the

expected flyaway costs rather than total program costs in comparing the

costs of the two aircraft. Although we acknowledge that DOD often uses

flyaway costs in this manner, we believe that it is appropriate to use the

total program costs for the F/A-18E/F since the focus of our comparison is

3

These cost figures are adjusted for estimated inflation for the years of the procurement. Cost

comparisons vary widely based on assumptions about the quantities procured, annual production

rates, and the specific costs included.

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on future budgetary impacts.4 In contrast to the C/D model that the Navy

has procured for a number of years, most of the research and development

costs and the investment in operations and support for the E/F model have

not yet been incurred.

Army Weapons and All

Services’ Precision-Guided

Munitions Hold Potential

for Use in Interdiction

When considered in concert with other interdiction capabilities, the

ATACMS and Army helicopters as well as the services’ planned

precision-guided munitions could affect the future force structure.

However, the potential value of these weapons is unknown because the

services have not resolved how they fit into joint interdiction operations.

At a minimum, these weapons appear to introduce more redundancy into

the services’ aggregate interdiction capabilities, but they could also add

new capability that would reduce the need for some aircraft. Even if the

force structure cannot be reduced, a further examination of their value to

interdiction in light of the total capability could help in deciding how much

money to invest in each.

The Army and the Air Force have not yet resolved doctrinal differences

about the use of Army weapons for interdiction. The ATACMS, as well as

Army helicopters, could provide significant, sometimes unique,

capabilities to interdiction missions. However, how the Army should use

these weapons, unilaterally or in support of joint interdiction operations,

must be resolved before the contribution of these weapons can be

calculated. Decisions about the joint use of Army interdiction weapons

could also better define the amount of these capabilities the Army actually

needs to buy.

Planned purchases of precision-guided munitions could allow for other

force options in the future. DOD’s bottom-up review cited the use of

precision-guided munitions as a means of minimizing risk as the force size

is reduced.5

 However, the extent to which current procurement plans meet

or exceed this expectation is not clear. Since precision-guided munitions

are expected to be more accurate, aircraft would be required to fly fewer

sorties, fewer aircraft may be needed, and survivability is expected to

increase. Should these attributes be realized, weighing their potential

contribution instead of modernizing or purchasing some aircraft could

save money.

4

A forthcoming GAO report on the F/A-18E/F program will provide a more detailed analysis of the

relative flyaway costs of these two aircraft.

5

Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 1995).

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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ATACMS and Helicopter

Modernization to Give the

Army Deep Attack Capabilities

While acknowledging that the Air Force’s air power dominates interdiction

missions, the Army plans to increase and improve its deep battle

capabilities at a cost of about $63 billion. The Army’s modernization

programs are intended to give ground commanders the ability to rapidly

detect, select, and destroy targets in support of ground maneuvers through

the depth of the battlefield. Planned expenditures include

• $4.6 billion for 2,800 ATACMS, including over 20,000 brilliant anti-armor6

(BAT) and BAT pre-planned product improvement submunitions;

• $8.4 billion for improvements to its 758 Apache helicopters; and

• more than $50 billion for the development and acquisition of 

1,292 Comanche helicopters.

ATACMS is a family of munitions that will be phased in through 2008; all will

be fired from the MLRS M270 launcher. The Block I munition has an

antipersonnel, antimaterial warhead with a range exceeding 

150 kilometers. The Block Ia munition, scheduled for delivery in fiscal year

1998, will carry a smaller warhead but attack the same targets as the 

Block I munition, with increased accuracy over 300 kilometers away. The 

Block II munition, with a range of 140 kilometers, will be fielded in fiscal

year 2001. It will carry 13 BAT submunitions effective against moving or

stationary hard targets plus mobile surface-to-surface missile launchers.

Last, the Block IIa munition, scheduled to be delivered in fiscal year 2004,

will deliver improved BAT submunitions to ranges greater than 

280 kilometers. It will be used against the same targets as Block II at

greater ranges.

In addition to the ATACMS, the Army plans to upgrade its 758 AH-64A

(Apache) helicopters to the AH-64D (Apache Longbow) model during

fiscal years 1997 through 2013. The upgraded Apaches will be easier to

navigate; have the Longbow’s Global Positioning System; improved

communication, survivability, and reliability; and the millimeter-wave

radar. In addition, 227 of the 758 Apaches will also be equipped with the

Longbow fire-control radar and upgraded engines. This upgrade will give

the Army its first fire-and-forget missile capability. The fire control radar

will detect, classify, and prioritize targets at night, through smoke and dust

and in adverse weather. The Apache Longbow could be effective against

most interdiction targets and will continue to be capable of firing the

Hellfire and Longbow Hellfire missiles.

6

BAT is an unpowered, gliding, terminally guided, top attack anti-armor submunition designed to

locate, attack, and kill moving armored combat vehicles such as tanks and fighting vehicles.

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The Comanche is expected to be a multimission helicopter capable of

armed reconnaissance and attack. It features technology that will make it

less detectable, enable it to engage multiple targets simultaneously with

high lethality, and provide day/night, adverse weather fire-and-forget

capability. Under current plans, the Comanche will be fielded starting in

fiscal year 2006. It can be used against almost all of the Apache’s targets

plus radar sites and will fire the Hellfire, Longbow Hellfire, and Stinger

missiles.

ATACMS Contribution to

Interdiction Is Unclear

The extent to which ATACMS are needed is not clear because the services

have not resolved how they will be used and who will control them. The

Army is developing ATACMS to interdict enemy targets because of its unique

attributes. It can hit enemy targets up to 200 kilometers away less than 

12 minutes after target acquisition, day or night, in any weather, with

increased survivability over manned systems. Based on the Army’s ATACMS

target data, these missiles would be appropriate to employ against up to

27 percent of the target types in one MRC and 41 percent of the target types

in the other. The services have not yet resolved disputes over the control

and coordination of deep battle assets such as ATACMS; however, the Air

Force and the Army disagree about whether the Joint Force Air

Component Commander (usually Air Force) or the Land Component

Commander (usually Army) can best control the deep battle and

consequently operational use of ATACMS. Army officials believe the Joint

Force Commander should address the question of control during the initial

planning for a conflict. Until these issues are settled through doctrine or

some other means, the expected battlefield contribution or the possible

force structure implications of buying 2,800 more ATACMS is in question.

Army Attack Helicopters’

Potential May Not Be Realized

for Joint Operations

The Army is buying significant interdiction capability with the acquisition

and modernization of its helicopters. The Apache helicopter can perform

multiple roles and missions, including deep attack operations and

suppression of enemy air defenses. The Comanche will also be able to

perform multiple roles, including armed reconnaissance and air combat.

Both helicopters are capable of attacking most interdiction targets, but no

interdiction targets have been designated for helicopters.

The Army considers attack helicopters to be responsive, precise, highly

lethal deep strike systems. However, because the Army considers

helicopters maneuver assets, it has restricted their use from joint

interdiction operations. The extent to which the helicopters could be used

for joint interdiction missions is therefore unclear because the same

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dispute about who should control the use of ATACMS appears to also apply

to the Army’s attack helicopters.

Precision-Guided Munitions to

Improve All Services’

Interdiction Capabilities

The services have invested or plan to invest over $40 billion to acquire 23

different types of precision-guided munitions (including the TLAM) and over

260,000 total munitions (see app. II). They expect these munitions to offset

reductions in force size by increasing their accuracy and lethality through

the use of target location information from inertial navigation systems,

laser guidance systems, Global Positioning System satellites, or a

combination of these and other sources.7

 The services identified a specific

need for increased munitions accuracy during Operation Desert Storm,

when 37 percent of the Air Force’s and the Navy’s strike sorties were

ineffective due to bad weather.

The services expect precision-guided munitions such as JDAM to add

accuracy and lethality against ground targets and increase aircraft

survivability. Some of these munitions can be dropped from higher

altitudes with greater accuracy than conventional gravity bombs, and

some can be launched from outside the effective range of enemy defenses.

An Air Force-sponsored analysis of JDAM operational effectiveness, for

example, shows that the use of the munition could result in a decrease of

16 to 20 percent of aircraft lost to enemy fire. It is also expected to allow

each aircraft to accurately attack a greater number of targets during each

sortie. The increased standoff capability provided by the WCMD and the

JSOW are also expected to enable fighters and bombers to hit targets more

effectively and thereby increase aircraft survivability. WCMD provides

increased high-altitude accuracy and the capability for all-weather

operations and independent targeting. The JSOW is likewise expected to be

effectively launched outside enemy point defenses during day or night and

in adverse weather conditions.

Precision-Guided Munitions

Offer a Unique Capability With

Force Structure Implications

The services consider precision-guided munitions the asset they need to

offset the reduced force structure and to sustain their lethal capability.

DOD’s bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided munitions are

one of the improvements needed to ensure that U.S. forces can operate

successfully in future MRCs. However, the services’ future force structure

plans do not indicate that they expect the increased use of these munitions

to reduce force structure any more than that cited in the review.

7

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development

(GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 1995).

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Our analysis of the Air Force and the Navy munitions requirements shows

that, by 2002, the two services expect to reduce the number of sorties

flown during two MRCs by about 28 percent. Most of this reduction is

attributable to precision-guided munitions, which can correct errors in

flight, resulting in the same or higher levels of success as could be

achieved with larger numbers of unguided weapons. In addition, the

services expect precision-guided munitions’ accuracy and lethality to

increase aircraft survivability. For example, as cited above, the number of

aircraft lost to enemy fire could decrease by up to 20 percent with use of

the JDAM. According to the analysis, aircraft are less vulnerable to enemy

air defense when using JDAM than when using other weapons like the

GBU-24, AGM-130, or AGM-65G (Maverick). Moreover, JSOW is expected to

hit several targets with its multiple submunitions; consequently, the

services would need to fly fewer sorties to hit the desired number of

targets. Therefore, in addition to ensuring the adequacy of the current

force to meet warfighting needs, further reductions in sorties appear to

raise the possibility that the number of aircraft to be modernized,

purchased, or retained in the force could be reduced.

Conclusion While modernization may be vital to preserving U.S forces’ edge and

ensuring future readiness, modernizing or buying capability that adds little

or unknown value to the interdiction mission and costs more than

$213 billion may not be a sound investment. The upgrade to the B-1B and

the purchase of additional F/A-18E/Fs, Apache and Comanche helicopters,

and precision-guided munitions constitute a significant investment. Some

of these modernization programs may be worth the cost if they materially

strengthen interdiction capabilities, but until DOD’s decision processes give

sufficient attention to interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can

be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapon

systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction

missions. If they do materially improve capabilities, then, as suggested in

the Defense Planning Guidance, their acquisition may also allow DOD to

consider reductions elsewhere in the force. The need for such an

assessment has been borne out by the Commission and our analysis of the

services’ interdiction capabilities and proposed modernization.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense routinely review service

modernization proposals based on how they will increase the current

aggregate ability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction mission.

Such a process should prioritize funding for those capabilities that

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contribute most to meeting the joint operation requirements and assist in

determining the appropriate mix and quantities of interdiction capabilities.

Moreover, proposals that add redundancy—such as the B-1B and Apache

modifications and the purchase of F/A-18E/Fs, ATACMS, attack helicopters,

and precision-guided missiles—should be examined in the context of the

additional interdiction capability they offer as well as the contributions

they make to other mission areas. This analysis could serve as the basis for

deciding funding priorities, the sufficiency of investment, and the future

force structure. We recognize that some weapon systems are multimission

and this recommended assessment should consider the potential

contribution to those other missions.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense

routinely review service modernization proposals based on how they

would enhance the current aggregate capability of the U.S. military to

perform the interdiction mission. It further agreed that assessing total

capabilities offers opportunities to seek alternatives when modernizing.

DOD acknowledged that there are problems regarding joint-service

planning and agreed that it needs to modify its requirements determination

process to assess modernization proposals in terms of threat, adequacy of

current aggregate capabilities, and the contributions of the proposed

modernization to this aggregate capability. However, DOD said that (1) it

could best accomplish this goal by making changes to its existing process,

rather than creating an entirely new process and (2) it was already acting

on some of the criticisms of its joint-service planning. On this latter point,

DOD cited its deep attack weapons mix study, whose first phase results are

due in the summer of 1996.

Our intention was not to suggest an entirely new and separate process to

conduct the envisioned assessments. Rather, our intent is that DOD’s

process incorporate the necessary analysis to assess the aggregate

capabilities of the services to perform interdiction before deciding on the

need for force modernization.

DOD disagreed with our finding that it plans more interdiction capability at

high cost despite the fact that it has ample forces to meet current and

future interdiction needs. DOD asserted that its planned acquisitions are

necessary to keep its modernization program proactive rather than

reactive. In making this point, it said that the portion of the acquisition

budget devoted to interdiction-capable assets is not excessive given their

multirole capabilities.

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We acknowledge the multiple roles that some interdiction assets are

expected to perform and agree that their contributions to other missions

must be considered in performing the broad assessments that we

recommend. However, DOD officials and external experts have achieved a

consensus that current interdiction capabilities are already adequate. For

example, the most recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs program

assessment points out that tactical aircraft procurement plans call for

more resources than may be forthcoming. Accordingly, he recommended

that the services identify programs that could be slowed or terminated.

The deep attack weapons mix study that DOD cites is in fact being done to

identify how plans can be modified to achieve such savings.

Given the high cost of planned upgrades and questions about whether

funding will be forthcoming to cover all of them, DOD is likely to be faced

with difficult trade-off decisions on which enhancements it can pursue.

The broad assessments of aggregate capabilities that we recommend

compared to the contribution of planned upgrades to this capability

should assist the Secretary in making these difficult choices.

DOD partially concurred with other issues discussed in the report. We

considered its comments, which appear in appendix III.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

U.S. Military Interdiction Platforms’ and

Weapons’ Current and Future Capabilities

Air Force

Weapons A-10 F-16 F-111 F-15E B-52

Mark 82 X X X X

Mark 84 X X X X X

Mark 83

M-117 X

Mk 20 X X X X

Rockeye

CBU-58 X X X

CBU-87 (CEM) X X X X

CBU-97 (SFW) X X X

GBU-10 X X X

GBU-12 X X

GBU-15 X X

GBU-24 X X X

GBU-27

GBU-28 X

AGM-65 X X X

AGM-130 X X

AGM-142 X

JDAM X X X

JSOW X

CALCM X

MAVERICK X X

WCMD X X X

LGB

SLAM-ER

Walleye

TLAM

ATACMS-B1

ATACMSB1A

ATACMS-B2

ATACMS-B2/BAT P31

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

U.S. Military Interdiction Platforms’ and

Weapons’ Current and Future Capabilities

Marine

Corps Navy Army

Platform

2 F-117 B-1B B-2 F/A-18 A-6 AV-8B F-14 F/A-18AC F/A-18EF Ships/ Subs MLRS

X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X

X X X X X X

X

X X X X X X

X

X

X

X X X X

X

X

X X X X X X X X

X X X

X

X X X X X X

X X X

X X X X

X X X

X X X X

X

X

X

X

X

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Precision-Guided Munitions

Dollars in millions

Munition Total acquisition costa Quantitya

AGM-130 $ 647.47b 502

AGM-142 200.70 130

CALCM c c

GBU-10 271.34d 11,329

GBU-12 620.23d 32,636

GBU-15 774.50 2,823

GBU-24 729.14d 13,114

GBU-27 176.72d 3,213

GBU-28 18.20 125

JDAM 4,650.60 74,000

JDAM PIP 76.50e 5,000e

JSOW/Baseline 3,327.60 11,800

JSOW/BLU-108 2,033.50 4,200

JSOW/Unitary 5,608.30 7,800

Longbow Hellfire 2,158.00f 13,311f

Maverick, Air Force 3,063.50 23,689

Maverick, Navy 653.00 4,115

GBU-97(SFW) 1,827.10 5,000

SLAM 1,138.80 767

SLAM-ER 550.30 700g

TLAM 8,426.80 3,405

TLAM Baseline Improvement Program 2,578.60 1,181g

Walleye 372.00 3,200

WCMD c 40,000h

Total $ 39,902.90 260,859

(Table notes on next page)

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Precision-Guided Munitions

aWeapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development

(GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 1995).

bAcquisition cost for the AGM-130C includes development cost only.

cCost information and quantity are classified.

dCost includes only production; development cost was not available.

eThe Air Force did not provide complete costs for the JDAM product improvement because the

seeker technology has not been decided. However, the Air Force has programmed $76.5 million

through fiscal year 2001 for the program. Also, quantities for the product improvement are not

included in the total because 5,000 of the baseline JDAMs will be equipped with the terminal

seeker.

f

Data supplied by the U.S. Army.

gQuantities for the SLAM-ER and TBIP are not included in the total because these munitions are

improvements and remanufactures of existing SLAMs and TLAMs.

hData supplied by the U.S. Air Force.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 5-6 and

23-27.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 6-9 and

27-28.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7-9 and

31-46.

Now on pp. 9 and 45-46.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 9 and 45-46.

Now on pp. 9 and 45-46.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

William C. Meredith, Assistant Director

Norfolk Field Office Richard G. Payne, Evaluator-in-Charge

George O. Morse, Evaluator

Bonita P. Anderson, Evaluator

Mary Jo LaCasse, Evaluator

Susan J. Schildkret, Evaluator

Paul A. Gvoth, Operations Research Analyst

(701039) Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-96-72 U.S. Combat Air Power
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