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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

WENDY CHRISTINE WILLIAMS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-12244 

Trial Court No. 3AN-13-8491 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2642 — April 5, 2019 

Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, 

Anchorage, Leslie Dickson, Judge. 

Appearances: David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, 

under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan 

Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. 

Lawrence B. Monsma, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, 

and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Coats, 

Senior Judge. * 

Judge MANNHEIMER. 

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wendy Christine Williams was convicted of two counts of violating 

protective orders that prohibited her from contacting, communicating with, or stalking 

Kathleen Lansdale (the wife of Williams’s former husband, Robert Lansdale) and the 

other members of the Lansdale family. See AS 11.56.740(a). 

One of Williams’s convictions was based on her conduct at a football 

jamboree in August 2013. Williams’s other conviction was based on her conduct in an 

Anchorage parking lot a few months later. 

With respect to the conviction arising from Williams’s conduct at the 

football jamboree, Williams argues that she was denied her right to a unanimous verdict 

because the prosecutor openly argued to the jurors that Williams could be convicted of 

violating the protective order based on two different aspects of her behavior at the 

jamboree, and that the jurors did not need to reach unanimous agreement as to which 

aspect of Williams’s behavior formed the basis of their verdict. 

And with respect to both of Williams’s convictions, Williams argues that 

the trial judge committed error by allowing the prosecutor to introduce evidence of three 

prior occasions when Williams violated earlier court orders that prohibited her from 

contacting the Lansdale family. 

For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that neither of 

Williams’s claims has merit, and we therefore affirm Williams’s convictions. 

The State’s case against Williams 

Beginning in 2004, Williams and her former husband, Robert Lansdale, 

were embroiled in a bitter custody battle over their son, Israel. In 2010, Lansdale was 

granted sole custody of Israel (with Williams having a right of visitation). Throughout 

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these years, the superior court issued orders prohibiting the Lansdale and Williams 

families from contacting each other. 

Williams repeatedly violated the superior court’s orders by approaching or 

contacting Robert Lansdale and his new wife, Kathleen. 

In March 2013, Kathleen Lansdale went to court and obtained another 

protective order against Williams. This 6-month protective order prohibited Williams 

from approaching or confronting Kathleen, watching or following her, or otherwise 

stalking her. In addition, the protective order prohibited Williams from directly or 

indirectly communicating with any member of the Lansdale family — including Israel 

— except for communications that were consistent with Williams’s right of visitation. 

In early August 2013, while this protectiveorder was in effect, theLansdale 

family attended a football jamboree in Anchorage. Israel was playing in this jamboree, 

and Robert and Kathleen were there to support him. Williams, too, attended this football 

jamboree, accompanied by her other son, Diego. 

According to the testimony presented at Williams’s trial, Williams was 

sitting high in the bleachers of the football stadium, and both Robert and Kathleen 

Lansdale observed her taking photographs of them and Israel. In addition, according to 

Robert Lansdale’s testimony, Williams called out to Israel and beckoned him to come 

over to where she was sitting. Based on what transpired at this football jamboree, 

Williams was convicted of violating the March protective order. 1 

In early November 2013, Kathleen Lansdale went back to court and 

obtained another 6-month protective order against Williams. This second protective 

order contained the same provisions as the previous one. 

AS 11.56.740(a)(2). 

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Williams was convicted of violating this November 2013 protective order 

as well, based on events that took place on November 26, 2013 (about three weeks after 

the order was issued). 

According to the testimony presented at Williams’s trial, Robert Lansdale 

was sitting in his vehicle in a parking lot, waiting for his wife Kathleen to get off work. 

While Robert was waiting, he thought he saw Williams’s current husband crouched 

behind a nearby garbage can. 

Shortly thereafter, when Kathleen joined Robert, she observed Williams’s 

car parked nearby. Williams was sitting in this car, and there was a camera propped on 

the dashboard, emitting a red light (i.e., it appeared to be recording). Kathleen also saw 

Williams’s son, Diego, taking photographs of her and Robert. 

The facts underlying Williams’s claim that she was denied her right to jury 

unanimity 

As we indicated in the preceding section ofthis opinion, the State presented 

evidence that Williams’s conduct at the football jamboree violated the protective order 

in two different ways: first, because Williams took photographs of Kathleen Lansdale, 

and second, because Williams beckoned to Israel. 

At Williams’s trial, the jury was instructed that Williams should be found 

guilty if the State proved either of these two things beyond a reasonable doubt — and 

that the jurors did not have to unanimously agree on which of these two things had been 

proved, so long as all the jurors agreed that one or the other was proved. 

On appeal, Williams argues that this was constitutional error —that Alaska 

law required the trial judge to instruct the jury that Williams could not be convicted 

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unless the jurors reached unanimous agreement as to which of the two things had been 

proved. 

Here is the factual background of Williams’s claim: 

At Williams’s trial, both Robert Lansdale and Kathleen Lansdale testified 

about the events at the football jamboree. 

During his direct examination, Robert explained that Williams was sitting 

in the bleachers at the jamboree and that, at one point, he observed Williams taking 

photographs of his family — him, Kathleen, and Israel — while the three of them were 

together. 

Robert also mentioned, in passing, that Williams waved at Israel and called 

out to him, beckoning him to come over to where she was sitting. Robert did not specify 

whether this act of waving and beckoning occurred at the same time that Williams was 

taking the photographs, or at some different time during the jamboree. 

WhenWilliams’s attorneycross-examinedRobert,shedevotedonly asmall 

portion of her examination to the topic of the football jamboree. In that portion of her 

cross-examination, the defense attorney asked Robert only general questions about the 

jamboree; she did not ask Robert to describe the specifics of Williams’s behavior. 

At three points during this cross-examination, Robert again asserted that 

Williams took photographs of him and his family, but he did not repeat his assertion 

about Williams’s waving and calling out to Israel. Robert’s comments did not evoke any 

particular response from the defense attorney, and she moved on to other areas of crossexamination. 

Later, when Kathleen Lansdale took the stand, she too testified that she saw 

Williams taking photos of her and Robert and Israel while they were together at the 

jamboree. Kathleen stated that Williams had her camera pointed at the three of them for 

two or three minutes. The prosecutor did not ask Kathleen any questions about Williams 

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calling out to Israel or beckoning him to come over to her, and Kathleen gave no 

testimony concerning this aspect of Williams’s behavior at the jamboree. 

On cross-examination, Williams’s attorney asked Kathleen several 

questions about the incident at the football jamboree. During this cross-examination, 

Kathleen reiterated that Williams was taking photographs of her, Robert, and Israel. But 

the defense attorney (like the prosecutor) did not ask Kathleen any questions about 

Williams’s act of waving and calling out to Israel. 

Thus, at the end of Williams’s trial, the only testimony about Williams’s 

waving and calling out to Israel was Robert Lansdale’s passing reference to this 

occurrence. 

When the trial judge and the attorneys met to discuss jury instructions, the 

prosecutor informed the judge and Williams’s attorney that he would be arguing two 

different theories as to how Williams violated the protective order at the football 

jamboree. Specifically, theprosecutor argued that Williams violated the protective order 

by (1) photographing Kathleen Lansdale (one of the people protected by the order) and 

by (2) communicating with Israel (another person protected by the order). 

A little later, the prosecutor gave the judge and the defense attorney copies 

of his proposed jury instructions on this issue. 

The prosecutor’s first proposed instruction, which was ultimately given to 

the jury as Instruction 11(a), informed the jurors that, under the terms of the protective 

order, (1) Williams was prohibited from approaching, watching, confronting, or 

otherwise stalking Kathleen, and (2) Williams was also prohibited from contacting or 

communicating with Israel (other than in connection with her court-ordered visitation). 

The prosecutor’s second proposed instruction, which was ultimately given 

to the jury as Instruction 11(b), informed the jurors that Williams could be found guilty 

if her conduct at the football jamboree violated either of these two provisions of the 

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protective order — and that the jurors did not need to reach unanimous agreement as to 

which of these two provisions Williams violated: 

With respect to the crime of violating a protective 

order described in Instruction 11(a), if you find that the state 

has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the acts listed 

the first sentence OR each of the acts listed in the second 

sentence, then you must find the defendant guilty. 

On the other hand, if you find that the state has not 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the acts listed in 

the first sentence AND that the state has not proved beyond 

a reasonable doubt each of the acts listed in the second 

sentence, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 

To return a verdict of guilty, each of you individually 

must find the defendant guilty, but you need not agree among 

yourselves which of the two sets of elements the state has 

proved. 

Williams’s attorney objected to this instruction — but not because of its 

substantive content. The defense attorney voiced no objection to the idea that the jurors 

did not need to reach unanimous agreement as to whether Williams violated the 

protective order by photographing Kathleen or by communicating with Israel. Instead, 

thedefenseattorney objected that the prosecutor’s proposed instruction did not makethis 

concept clear enough. 

The defense attorney told the trial judge that she thought the prosecutor’s 

wording was “confusing”, and that she was concerned that the jurors would not be able 

to understand the instruction. The defense attorney then offered her own suggestions for 

rewording the instruction to make the prosecutor’s ideas clearer. 

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A little later, when the prosecutor delivered the State’s summation, the 

prosecutor explicitly argued that the jury did not need to reach unanimous agreement as 

to whether Williams (1) photographed Kathleen Lansdale or (2) beckoned to Israel. 

The prosecutor noted that both of these actions were violations of the 

protective order. And the prosecutor told the jury that, so long as each member of the 

jury found that Williams did either of these two things, then the jury should find 

Williams guilty —even if some of thejurors found that Williamsphotographed Kathleen 

and other jurors found that Williams communicated with Israel. 

Consistent with the position she had taken during the earlier discussion of 

the jury instructions, Williams’s attorney made no objection to any of the prosecutor’s 

statements on this issue. 

During her own summation to the jury, the defense attorney took the 

position that Williams had not violated the protective order at the football jamboree 

in any fashion. Rather than discussing and trying to rebut the details of Robert and 

Kathleen Lansdale’s testimony, the defense attorney simply argued that Robert and 

Kathleen were not credible witnesses, and she urged the jurors not to credit their 

testimony. The defense attorney told the jurors, “Your decision comes down to [this]: 

Do you believe Kathleen Lansdale and Robert Lansdale beyond a reasonable doubt?” 

Williams’s argument on appeal, and why we reject it 

On appeal, Williams takes the opposite position from the one espoused by 

her trial attorney: she now argues that it was constitutional error to tell the jury that they 

did not have to reach unanimous agreement as to whether Williams (1) photographed 

Kathleen Lansdale or (2) beckoned to Israel. More specifically, Williams argues that 

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these were two distinct criminal acts, and that she was therefore entitled to require the 

jury to reach factual unanimity as to which of these acts was proved. 

In her briefs to this Court, Williams asserts that her attorney failed to object 

to Instruction 11(b) — the jury instruction that Williams now attacks — and Williams 

refers to her claim as a claim of “plain error”. 

But as we described in the preceding section of this opinion, Williams’s 

trial attorney did object to this instruction. She objected on the ground that the 

instruction, as worded, failed to adequately convey the principle that the jurors did not 

need to be unanimous as to which aspect of Williams’s conduct at the jamboree violated 

the protective order. 

In other words, Williams’s attorney endorsed the substance of the jury 

instruction, and she asked the court to rephrase the instruction to make that substantive 

principle even clearer. Given the defense attorney’s actions, any error in the jury 

instruction was likely “invited error”, not “plain error”. 

Williams’s case is analogous to our decision in Schlosser v. State, 372 P.3d 

272, 278 (Alaska App. 2016), where we concluded that any error in a trial judge’s 

response to a jury question was invited error. In Schlosser, the defense attorney did not 

merely fail to object to the substance of the judge’s response to the jury; rather, the 

defense attorney urged the judge to be more emphatic in his wording. This is essentially 

what occurred in Williams’s case too. 

Viewing Williams’s case as an instance of invited error, we would reverse 

Williams’s conviction only if his case presented an “exceptional situation where reversal 

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is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process or to prevent a miscarriage 

of justice.” 2 Williams’s case does not present that kind of exceptional situation. 

But even if we viewed Williams’s claim as an assertion of “plain error”, 

there are two reasons why we would not find plain error here. 

First, as we have explained, Williams’s trial attorney adopted an “all or 

nothing” approach to the State’s allegations concerning Williams’s conduct at the 

football jamboree. The defense attorney never cross-examined Robert and Kathleen 

Lansdale about the details of what happened at the jamboree. Instead, the defense 

attorney argued that the Lansdales’ testimony, taken as a whole, should not be trusted, 

and that the State had failed to prove its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In other words, given the way this case was litigated, there is no reasonable 

possibility that the jurors would have reached a different verdict if they had been told that 

they had to reach unanimous agreement as to whether Williams took photographs of 

Kathleen or beckoned to Israel. 

Second, and more importantly, Alaska law does not provide a clear answer 

as to whether factual unanimity was required in Williams’s case. 

In order to resolve Williams’s factual unanimity claim — to answer the 

question of whether the jurors were required to reach factual unanimity regarding 

Williams’s conduct at the football jamboree — we must ascertain whether Williams’s 

conduct would have supported two separate convictions for violating the protective 

order. 

Johnson v. State, 328 P.3d 77, 86 (Alaska 2014), quoting Parson v. Alaska Housing 

Finance Corp., 189 P.3d 1032, 1038 (Alaska 2008). 

– 10 – 2642
 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is ultimately a question of statutory interpretation — a question of 

determining the applicable “unit of prosecution”. 3 As we explained in Taylor v. State, 

400 P.3d 130, 134 (Alaska App. 2017), the requirement of factual unanimity only applies 

when “the State presents evidence that a defendant committed different acts that could 

each separately support a criminal conviction”. 4 

If the variation in the evidence concerns only the theory under which the 

defendant’s actions constitute the charged crime, then our law does not require the jurors 

to reach factual unanimity. For instance, in State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Alaska 

1985), the Alaska Supreme Court held that when a statute defines a crime as an act 

performed with one of multiple culpable mental states, the jury need not reach 

unanimous agreement as to exactly what culpable mental state the defendant had. As the 

James court explained, “where the alleged criminal deed is restricted to a single incident, 

any potential difference in the jurors’ findings of intent versus wilful disregard is not 

significant”. Ibid. 

Nor is this doctrine of non-unanimity restricted to differences in culpable 

mental states. In Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 911 (Alaska 1970), the supreme court 

expressly approved the practice of having a jury return a general verdict on the crime of 

first-degree murder, even though (under Alaska’s former criminal code) this crime was 

defined in the disjunctive — as either a premeditated killing or an intentional killing 

performed during the commission of a felony. The supreme court explained that even 

though there may be several ways of committing a crime, if the defendant’s conduct 

3 Thessen v. State, 508 P.2d 1192, 1199 & n. 9 (Alaska 1973). 

4 See, e.g., Ramsey v. State, 355 P.3d 601, 602 (Alaska App. 2015); Anderson v. State, 

289 P.3d 1, 4 (Alaska App. 2012); Castillo v. State, 821 P.2d 133, 136-37 (Alaska App. 

1991); Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440 (Alaska App. 1985). 

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constitutes “only one crime”, then “multiple theories [can] be presented to the jury”, and 

the jury “[need] not ... choose between them.” Ibid. 5 

Returning to the facts of Williams’s case, the State presented evidence that 

Williams’s conduct at the football jamboree violated the protective order in two ways: 

Williams photographed Kathleen Lansdale, and she beckoned to Israel. But only Robert 

Lansdale testified about the act of beckoning — and he mentioned this conduct only in 

passing, during his detailed description of the photographing. Neither the prosecutor nor 

the defense attorney asked Robert to explain whether Williams’s act of beckoning to 

Israeloccurredin conjunction with Williams’s act ofphotographing theLansdalefamily, 

or whether this act of beckoning occurred at some other discrete time. 

Thus, the record does not clearly reveal whether the photographing and the 

beckoning were distinct acts that Williams performed at different times during the 

football jamboree, or whether the photographing and the beckoning were simply 

different aspects of one transaction between Williams and the Lansdale family. 

And if the photographing and the beckoning were simply different aspects 

of one transaction, then it is unclear whether these acts would support separate 

convictions for violating the protective order. 

There is no Alaska decision that defines the applicable unit of prosecution 

for violating a protective order in situations where a defendant has potentially violated 

See also Taylor v. State, 400 P.3d 130, 135 (Alaska App. 2017) (no unanimity 

required regarding the different conduct that raised the defendant’s act of eluding the police 

to a felony); Nicklie v. State, 402 P.3d 424, 427 (Alaska App. 2017) (no unanimity required 

regarding the various ways in which the defendant attempted to strangle the victim during 

a single attack); State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 655 (Alaska App. 1994) (no unanimity 

required regarding whether the defendant personally committed the murder or, instead, aided 

or abetted another person’s commission of the murder). 

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different provisions of a protective order during a single encounter or transaction with 

the people who are protected under the order. 

Conceivably, the law might allow a separate conviction for each Lansdale 

family member whose interests were violated. Compare Cooper v. State, 595 P.2d 648, 

649-650 (Alaska 1979), where the supreme court upheld separate assault convictions 

when a defendant’s threatening conduct with a weapon placed three people in fear of 

imminent serious injury. 

On the other hand, since the basic purpose of the protective order was to 

protect the Lansdale family fromWilliams, the law might view Williams’s conduct at the 

football jamboree as a single violation of this order, committed in different ways. 

Compare Baker v. State, 22 P.3d 493 (Alaska App. 2001), a case in which 

the defendant was charged with “interference with official proceedings” (basically, 

attempting to unlawfully influence a witness) based on a series of telephone 

conversations with the witness. We held that factual unanimity was not required 

regarding whether the defendant threatened the witness or, instead, offered a bribe to the 

witness during this series of conversations. Id. at 500-01. 

In sum, Alaska law does not currently provide a ready answer to the 

question of whether Williams’s conduct at the football jamboree would support two 

separateconvictions. And Williams has failed to adequately brieftheseissues. Although 

Williams argues that her case should not be analogized to Baker, she offers no significant 

analysis of why our decision in Baker is inapplicable — no significant analysis of what 

the unit of prosecution should be in cases like this. 

For these reasons, we conclude that even if the jury instruction in 

Williams’s case is not viewed as an instance of invited error — so that we must analyze 

Williams’s claim under the rubric of plain error — the challenged jury instruction does 

not present an instance of plain error. 

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The admission of evidence concerning earlier occasions when Williams 

violatedprotectiveorders thatprohibited her fromcontacting theLansdale 

family 

As we explained earlier, the background of this case is that, for over a 

decade, Williams and her ex-husband Robert Lansdale engaged in a bitter custody battle 

over their son Israel. During this time, Kathleen Lansdale obtained several protective 

orders against Williams — and Williams repeatedly violated those protective orders. 

In the present case, the prosecutor asked the district court to admit evidence 

of nineteen of these prior violations. In response to the prosecutor’s request, the court 

conducted extensive hearings to assess the admissibility of this evidence. Ultimately, the 

court concluded that most of these prior incidents were not admissible. But the court 

allowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of four prior incidents in which Williams 

violated court orders that prohibited her from contacting the Lansdales. 

With respect to one of these incidents, Williams’s own attorney asked the 

court to admit the evidence (because this particular incident resulted in Kathleen 

Lansdale’s being charged with assault). But Williams now challenges the court’s 

decision to admit evidence of the other three incidents. 

Williams argues that these prior incidents lacked any relevance, other than 

to show her propensity to violate court orders. Thus, Williams contends, the evidence 

was barred by Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). 

But this is not a case where Williams’s prior acts were introduced to show 

her general propensity to violate court orders. Rather, the fact that Williams had 

repeatedly violated court orders protecting the Lansdale family was relevant to show the 

depth of Williams’s antipathy toward a specific group of people — the Lansdales. 

This antipathy was relevant to the issues litigated at Williams’s trial, 

because Williams’s defense was that the Lansdales had misinterpreted innocent actions 

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on her part, and that her son Diego was actually the one who photographed the 

Lansdales. Thus, the challenged evidence had a case-specific relevance, and it was not 

barred by Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). 6 

Even though Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) did not categorically bar this 

evidence, the trial judge was nevertheless required to weigh the probative value of this 

evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice under Evidence Rule 403. 

But as we have already explained, the trial judge carefully considered the 

entirety of the State’s proposed evidence, and the judge ultimately limited the State to 

three of those prior incidents. (Evidence of a fourth incident was admitted, but this was 

at the request of Williams’s attorney.) We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her 

discretion in this matter. 

Conclusion 

The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

See, e.g., Riggins v. State, 101 P.3d 1060, 1063 (Alaska App. 2004) (upholding the 

admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior assaults on his girlfriend in a prosecution for 

a more recent assault on the girlfriend). 

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