### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 26 , 200 8 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RA LP H LES TER NE LSON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Su llivan County

No. S53,313 R. Jerr y Beck, Judge

No. E2008-00128-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Septem ber 23, 2008

The De fenda

nt, Ralph L ester N elson, pled guilty to one count of violating a

motor vehicle ha

bitual offe nder or der, a

Class E felony ; one count of driving without a seatbe lt, a Class C mi sdemea nor; and one c ount of driving without proof of fina ncial responsibili ty , a C lass E misdemeanor. After a sentenc ing hear ing, the trial court sentenc ed the Def endant as a multipl e offe nder t o an ef fective sentenc e of thre e y ear s in the Tennesse e De partment of C o rr ection (TD OC). On appe al, the Def endant c laims that the t rial court err ed when it did not g rant him alternative sentenc ing. A fter
a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f t

he re c or d a

nd the a pp lic a ble law, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Terr y L . J ordan, B lountvill e, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Ralph L ester N elson. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Mic hael E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; De shea Dulany , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; H. Gre eley Wells, District Attorney Gene ral; J ulie R. Canter, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. F acts

A. P le a He ar ing

This case arises f

rom the De fenda

nt's a rre st on November 24, 2006, f or violating a habitual motor vehicle of

fende r orde r. In 1994, the Def endant wa s decla

red a habitual motor vehicle of fende r2

(her einaf ter an “HMVO ”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616. At the guilty plea he aring , the State g a ve the fo llo wi nga c c ount o f t he c ri me : [O] n Nov ember

24, 2006, Trooper

J ohn Taylor with the hig hway patrol obser

ved R a l p h Ne l s o n i n o p er at i o n o f a 19 9 4 C h ev ro l et

... . M r. Ne l s o n wa s n o t we ar i n g a s ea t b el t

. Up o ns t o p p i n g t h e ve h i cl e T ro o p er T ay l o r a s k edM r. Ne l s o nfo r h i s dri v er 's license. Nelson couldn' t pr esent one. Once a driver' s history was ra n [si c] it reveale d he wa s a h ab itual traff

ic offe nder. Mr . Nelson wa s also unable to produc e proof of insurance

. At the hea

ring , the Def

endant pled guilty

to eac h count of the indictment.

B. Se nt e nc ing He ar ing

At the sentenc ing he aring , the trial cour t hear d testimony from the Def endant’ s g irlfriend a

nd the Def endant; re ad a letter from the Defenda nt’s g irlfriend’ s mother; and re viewed the prese ntence
re po rt . T he De fe nd ant’ s g ir lf ri e nd , B re nd a

F le e no r t e sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd ant h a s r e fo rm e d h is behavior . Flee nor testified that duringthe two y ear s of their re lationship sh e h ad n o t seen the Def endant dr ive prior to the da y of t he viol ation. She testified t hat t he De fenda nt does not have a vehicle a nd that he was driving her vehicle on the day of t he viol ation. Flee nor said that she had not seen the Def

endant dr ink and that he ha d been steadily employ ed throughout their r elationship. She te sti fied th at sh e has dr ive n h im t o w or k a nd wo uld c on tin ue to d o s o. Al so , s he sa id s he wo uld tr ans po rt him to a nd fr om a ny pr ob a tio n o bli g a tio ns

. Flee nor told the court “ I ’ve r ead the probation re port , and that’s just not the man I know.” She explained that the Def endant play s a larg e role in maintaining a nd repa iring both their share d ho me and F le e no r’ s mo the r’ s ( B arb ara Sta llc up ’s ) h ome : He mows [S tallcup’s] yard. He’ s done–he does car repa irs for her and for me. He’ s moved furniture . He’ s installed windows. J ust what eve ry thing ne eds to be done [si c]. My mom say s he’s be en a g odsent [si c]. He’s be en a g odsent to both of us. I t’s just the–the repor

t is just–just not t he Ralph Ne lson that we know.

F leeno r sai d that sh e wa s in the pr oc e ss o f f

ili ngfo r d isa

bil ity ba se d o n a

“ ba d b a c k” and

c hr on ic obstructive pulmonary

disease, which re quires daily breathing treatments. She explained that “he’ s our 100% support. He helps my mother out. She’s a w idow.” F leenor conclude d by

informing the court that the D efe ndant attends c hurch w ith her and he r daug hter a nd is their “sole support.”

The De fenda

nt testified that he had not h ad a d ri nk in “over two and a ha lf y ear s” and attributed his sobriety

to his girlfr iend. I n response to de fense counsel’s inquiry into what happene d on the day

of the off

ense, the Def

endant sa id “My

stupid i t y

. . . T h e d ay

befor e I was c utting a tr ee and...my head g ot busted open and I had to go t o t h e hospital.” He went on to explain that upon returninghome from the hospital the ne x t day , his employ er’ s g randson c alled and a sked for a ride to t he sh op to p ic k u

p e qu ipm e nt. Th e De fe nd ant s tate d th a t al tho ug h h e wa s n ot w e ari nghis seatbe lt when the off

icer stopped his car , he had not be en drinkingor abusingany substance.3

The De fenda

nt’s prese ntence repor

t wa s als o enter ed into evidenc e. Ac cordingto the prese ntence repor

t, the then thirty -eig ht y ear old D efe ndant dropped out of high school during the te n th g r a d e

. H e b e g andr ink in g a lc o h o l wh e nh e w a s s e v e n te e ny e a r s o ld an d dr an k a b o u t o n e s ixpack of beer eac h night. B eg inning in 1988, whe n he wa s nineteen, the Def endant a ccr

ued a numbe r of driving or alc ohol -r el at ed o ffenses. He c urre ntly has: five c onvictions for drivingunder the influence ; four convic tions for public intox ication; four c onviction for driving on a revoked lice nse; thr ee convictions for violation of a n habitual traf

fic off ender order ; one conviction for possession of mari jua na ; on e c on vic tio n f

or po sse ssi on of dr

ug pa ra ph e na lia ; and

se ve ra l mi sc e lla

ne ou s tr a ff

ic of fe ns e s. The pre sent ence repor

t also indicated that the D efe ndant completed thr ee pr obationary periods with var

ying suc cess. In 1996, althoug h he tested positive for m ar i j u an a o n ce dur ing the probation per iod, he serve d a one- y ear supervised pr obation period, in which no violation r eport wa s filed. Howeve r, t he Defenda nt was inst ructe d to attend substance abuse a nd literac y

course s, but he did not complete either

prog ram. In 1999, the Def endant wa s order ed to serve eig hteen months, but he wa s relea sed on dete rminate re lease probation af ter six m onths. Howeve r, t he De fenda nt violated his relea se by

testing positive for

marijuana

. His probation was revoke d, and the trial court or dere d the Def endant to serve thirty day s. Howeve r, afte r his r elea se, he violated his pr obation ag ain by not only violating t h e HMVO order , but also driving unde r the influenc e. In 2002, the Def endant
succe ssfully serve d a term of probation. After servingsix months of a two-y ear term, the De fenda

nt
was re lease d on deter

minate re lease probation and c ompleted the re m ai n ing e ighte en months of pr ob a tio n w ith out in c ide nt.

I n the pre sentenc e re port, the De fenda nt stated that h e wa s in good he alth and had no handica p or disability . He state d that he has not a bused alcohol in ove r two and a half y ear s and that he lived with Fle enor a

nd her 10- y ear

old daug hter in a home they rente d from Stallcup. The Def endant wa s sporadica lly employ ed by Kwickwa y Construction since 1993, and he was e mploy ed by Mike Steadman Construction at the time of the hear ing.

The de fense introduced a letter pra ising the D efe ndant from Stallcup, the De fenda nt’s g irlfriend’ s mother. Stallcup stated that she had known the Def endant for two y ear s and conf irmed that she lea ses a home to he r daug hter a nd the Def

endant. Dur ing the two y ear s that she had know n the Def endant, Stallcup found him to be “a dependable and trustworthy friend.” Also, she stated that she had ne ver se en the De fenda nt drive, drink, or use drug s

. Stallcup concluded by calling the Def enda n t “God-se nt” and e x plaining that he does e very thing f rom mowing the lawn to re pairing
car s.
After

revie wing the ev i d en ce p rese nted, the trial c ourt denied the Def endant’ s motion for alternative sentenc ing. T he cour t expl ained that a lthough it was impre ssed with the Def endant’ s service to his girlfr iend’s fa mily , it remained trouble d by the Def endant’ s l en gt h y l i s t of prior of fe ns e s. Th e tria l c ourt

the n o rd e re d th a t th e De fe nd ant s e rv e his se nte nc e in c on fi ne me nt. I t is fr om t his jud g me nt t

hat th e De fe nd ant n owa

pp e a ls.

II. Ana lys isT he l egi sl at ure di d carve out an excep t i o n t o t hi s rul e where i f “ a d ef end ant wi t h at l east t hree (3) f el o ny 1

co nvi ct i o ns i s o t herwi se el i gi b l e, s uch a d ef end ant m ay st i l l be co nsi d ered a f avo rable candidate f

o r any al t ernat i ve sent enci ng t hat i s wi t hi n t he jur i sdi ct i o n of and de em ed ap p rop ri at e b y a drug co urt

. ” 2 0 0 7 T enn. Pub. Act s 512. 4 Th e De fe nd ant c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt imp ro pe rl y de nie d a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ingbe c a us e he had c hang ed his lifestyle duringthe per iod l ea d i n g up to the offe nse. He a sserts that, like the defe ndant in Sta te v . M

ar tin , 146 S.W .3d 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) , he had shown himself open to r e h a b il it a ti o n

. T h e St a te c la im s th a t t h e tr ia l court pro p e r ly

d e n ie d a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c in g

. We ag ree with the State. There fore , we a ffirm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.
Whe n a de fe nd ant a

pp e a ls the mann e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e imp os e d b y

a tr ia l c ourt , th is court c onducts a de novo revie w of the r ecor d with a presumption of cor

rec tness as to the trial cour t’s de te rm inatio n. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) (2 00 5)

. Ho we ve r, thi s pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss a ri se s o nly if the re cord a ffirmatively shows that the t rial j udg e considered both the s entenc ing pr inciples and all rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s. State v. Ashby , 8 2 3 S

. W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The appea ling pa

rty car ries the bur den of showingthe sentence is improper. T .C.A. § 40-35-401(d) , SentencingCommi ssion Com ments. Even if w e p ref er a differ ent re sult, we may

not disturb the sentenc e if the tria l court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa ct adequately

supported in the re cord, a nd g ave due consideration a nd proper weig ht to the fac tors and pr inc ipl e s th a t are re le va nt t o s e nte nc ingun de r t

he 19 89 Se nte nc ingAc t. State v. Fletcher , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court no te d re c e ntl y that, du e to t he 20 05 se nte nc ingame ndme nts , no de fe nd ant i s presumed to be a favor able candidate for alternative sente ncing

. State v. Carter , 254 S.W. 3d 33 5, 34 7 ( T e nn. 20 08 ) ( c iti ngT. C.A .§ 40 -3 5- 10 2( 6) (2 00 6) ). I ns te a d, a de fe nd ant n ot w ith in “the pa rame ters of subdivision (5) [of T.C.A. § 40-35-102], and who is an e specia lly mitigated or sta nd ard of fe nd e r c on vict e d o f a

Cla ss C , D , o r E fe lony , “ sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d” a s a fa vo ra ble candidate for a lternative se ntencingoptions in the absenc e of evidenc e to the contr ary .” Id. (f oo tno te omitted). Gene rally , defe ndants classified a s Rang e I Ior Rang e I I Ioffe nders a re not to be c onsidered
as fa v o rab l e can d i d at es fo r a l t ern at i v e s en t en ci n g. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 10 2( 6) ; 20 07 Te nn . Pu b. Ac ts 1 512.

The Te nnessee Code rec ommends that, when sente ncing a defe ndant to c onfinement, a trial court should consider

whether : (A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe ndant who has
a lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nec essar y to avoid depre ciating the s eriousness of the offe nse or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide an e ff e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Measures less re strictive than conf inement have fre quently

or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant.5

T.C.A. § 40-35-103 (2008). Als o, the trial cour t may consider the mitigatingand enha ncingfac tors
se t f or th i n T .C. A. §§ 40 -3 5- 11 3 a nd -1 14 . T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b )( 5) ; State v. Boston , 938 S.W .2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A trial court should also consider a def endant’ s potential or lack
o f p o tential for r ehabilitation when de termining if an a lternative se ntence would be appr opriate. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 10 3( 5) ; Boston , 938 S.W .2d at 438.

I nco n d u ct i n g de novo revie w of a sentenc ing de termination, we must cons i d er (1) the evidenc e, if a

ny , rec eived at the trial and s en t en ci n g hear ing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the cr iminal c onduct; (5) any mitigating or statutory enhanc ement fa ctors; (6) a ny statement that the de fenda nt made on his own beha lf; and (7) the potential f o r re h ab i litation or tr e a tme nt. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 10 2, -1 03 , - 21 0 ( 20 07 ); see State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991).

I n th is c a se , th e De fe nd ant i s n ot w ith in t he c la ss o f o ff

e nd e rs c on sid e re d to be fa vo ra ble candidates for a lternative s entencing. A s discussed above , in Tennesse e cour ts are to c onsider standard or

espec ially mitigated of

fende rs convicte d of Class C, D, or E fe lonies as “f avora ble for
a lte rn a tiv e sen ten cin g .” T. C.A .§ 40 -3 5- 10 2( 6) . H ow e ve r, the De fe nd ant i s a Rang e I Imul tip le offe nder. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 10 6( a )( 1) , ( c ) (2 00 5)

. Th e re fo re , the De fe nd ant ca nn ot av a il h ims e lf of the statutory

lang uag e that fa

vors alter nat i v e s en tence s for standa rd and e specia lly

mitigated offe nders. T.C.A. § 40- 35-102(6) (2007).

I n the prese nt case , unlike in Ma rti n , the t rial court’s deter mination merits a pre sumption of
corr ectne ss. I f the re cord a ffirmatively shows that the trial judg e conside red the sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fac ts a nd circ umstances, then a presumption of cor rec tness arises a s to the trial court’ s determinations. See A shby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. Her e, the rec ord aff irmatively

shows t h at t h e t ri al co u rt gav e d

u e co n s i d er at i o n an d we i gh t t o t h e e v i d en ce p re s en t edat t h e p l eah ea ri n g, the pre sentenc e re port, the principles of sentenc ing, mitigating fac tors, and the Def endant’ s potential for r ehabilitation. Takingall of these f actor s into c onsideration, the trial court de termined that the Def endant should ser

ve his sentenc e in conf inement. W e co n clude that the trial court’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e de nia l of an a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e wa s p ro pe r i s p re sumpt ive ly c or re c t.

I n Sta te v . M

ar tin , 146 S.W .3d 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) , a pane l of this court reve rsed the trial cour

t’s decision to deny alternative sentenc ing to an HMVO violator. The De fenda nt argues that the trial cour

t should have g rante d him alternative se nte n c in g b eca use Mar tin’s HMVO violation is s o f a c tu a ll y s im il ar to h is o w n H M V O v io lati o n

. A lt h o u g h th e r e s p e c ti v e f

a c ts o f eac h defe ndant’s underly ing violation are somewhat similar, the proc eeding s of the Ma rti n trial court a nd t h e t r i a l c o u rth e r e d i f

f e r s i g n i f i c an t l y.
Li k e t h e D e f

e n d an t , M art i nh a d

b e e nc o n v i c t e d

o f nu m e r o u s f

e l o n i e s an d

m i s d e m e an o r s

. In Ma rti n , w e ult imate ly

c on c lud e d th a t, g ive n M art in’ s b e havio r i n th e y e ars le a din g up to his arr e st and the c ircumstance s surroundinghis violation, he “deser ve[d] a sentence which [did] not involve total confineme nt.” Id. at 77. Howeve r, the trial c ourt in Ma rti n failed to c onsider two mitigating6

fac tors when it senten ced Martin. Id. at 69-70. This omission caused the Ma rti n denial of alternative sentenc ing to lose the presumption of cor rec tness that would ordinarily acc ompany

it.

Her e, the tria l court consider ed all mitigating fac tors in determining that incar cer ation was proper . The trial c ourt consider ed the c laims of the Defen d an t, Stallcup, and Flee nor that the Def endant wa s a cha

ng ed man ope n to reha

bilitation. Howe ver, while consider ing the evidenc e the trial court f

reque ntly commented that, althoug h it was im presse d with the Def endant’ s “treme ndous help,” it doubted the De fenda nt’s reha bilitative potential g iven his r epeated violations of the law a nd failure s t o co m p l y

with probation conditions. The trial cour t expl ained: “Y ou know, usually if a pe rs on ha s fi ve or

six pr ior fe lon ie s, ho pe fo r r e ha

bil itatio n is us ua lly

we a k.

.. .I ’m

jus t no t sure it would be in the best intere st of the public to ag ain place t h e De fe n dant on some type of nonincar cer ated [sentence ].” W e conc lude that, in de nying the Def endant a n alternative sentenc e, the trial court pr operly

considere d the Def

endant’ s g ood deeds as well as the D efe ndant’s extensive prior criminal history

and lac k of succ ess on probation.

The re cord a ffirmatively establishes th at the trial cour t based its denial of a lternative sentenc ing on both se ntencing principles and the rele vant fac ts a nd circ umstances. The ref ore, the tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y

re qu ir e d th e De fe nd ant t o s e rv e his se nte nc e in c on fi ne me nt. Th e De fe nd ant i s not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusi on
After a thoroug h revie w of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court prope rly

denied the D efe ndant alter native sente ncing . We affir m th e j u d gm en t of the trial court.

__________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER