IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-92,406-01

EX PARTE SAMUEL DENNY ROBINSON, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 976148-A IN THE 351ST DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which SLAUGHTER, J. joined.

CONCURRING OPINION

Applicant, Samuel Denny Robinson, was convicted of murder and sentenced to 

sixty-five years’ imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. 

Robinson v. State, No. 01-12-00198-CR, 2014 WL 700760 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Feb. 20, 2014) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Applicant filed this 

application for the writ of habeas corpus alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective at 

the guilt and punishment phases of his trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07. 

Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court for an evidentiary 

hearing. I agree that this application should be remanded, and so I join the Court’s order 
ROBINSON — 2

doing so. But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches 

and its possible application to this case. 

Laches is a common-law doctrine, defined as 

neglect to assert right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and 

other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar 

in a court of equity. Also, it is the neglect for an unreasonable and 

unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do 

what in law, should have been done. 

Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY). Whether laches applies to bar a claim is determined on a case-by-case 

basis, by giving consideration to the length of the delay in seeking equitable relief, the 

reasons for the delay, and any prejudice to the opposing parties that results from the delay. 

Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). And, importantly, the

court may consider and determine whether an applicant’s claims should be barred by laches

sua sponte. Id. at 667.

In Ex parte Smith, we set out some of the principles that justify a court’s sua sponte

consideration of the doctrine of laches. We explained: 

. . . the path to a habeas corpus remedy is a costly one, exacting enormous 

societal and administrative costs. Protracted habeas corpus litigation defers 

convictions’ finality, undermines confidence in the integrity of our 

procedures and inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of 

justice. This in turn weakens the criminal law’s deterrent and rehabilitative 

functions. There must come a time when a criminal conviction is final, when 

the deterrent effects of certainty and immediacy of punishment outweigh an 

inmate’s right to endlessly litigate an appeal of his conviction. Moreover, a 

significant amount of judicial time, effort, and resources is expended in 

addressing the nearly 5,000 applications for writs of habeas corpus this Court 

received just last fiscal year, to say nothing about the equally taxing 

obligations of the lower courts in conducting proceedings, entering findings 

of fact and conclusions of law, and making recommendations on an 

applicant’s request for relief. When a court is called upon to issue equitable 

relief, the State’s failure to formally plead laches does not restrict a court’s 
ROBINSON — 3

ability to balance equities beyond those that the parties advocate. A court 

may consider sua sponte the interests of the judicial system and society 

generally because they implicate values that may stretch beyond the concerns 

of the parties. Permitting courts to freely inquire about an applicant’s delay 

broadly effectuates the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity.

Id. at 667-68 (internal quotations and citations to authority omitted).1

The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant’s 

conviction became final in 2014, but this application was not filed until approximately six 

years later. In addition, the record is silent with regard to circumstances that may excuse 

Applicant’s delay.

Consistent with this Court’s precedent, the trial court may, sua sponte, give 

Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay. It may also give the State 

and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant’s delay has 

caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant’s claims. And ultimately, 

the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine 

of laches in its response to this Court’s remand order. 

With these additional thoughts, I join the Court’s order. 

FILED: April 14, 2021

DO NOT PUBLISH

1 The Court also explained, however, that “the habeas court should act on its own sparingly, 

questioning only those applications demonstrating an excessive delay that undermines or obstructs 

the principles and virtues the criminal-justice system promotes.” Id. at 668.