Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 183

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV

No. CV-22-239

DAVID BRITO

APPELLANT

V.

OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT 

ENFORCEMENT AND RAQUEL 

DUNNING

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered April 5, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 72DR-21-569]

HONORABLE DIANE WARREN, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

David Brito appeals the Washington County Circuit Court’s order denying his 

motion for paternity testing. In the December 17, 2021 order, the circuit court found that 

Brito is the legal father of MC and that paternity was established. The court further ordered 

that all previous orders regarding child support would remain in effect. The court also found 

that Brito was “not entitled to paternity testing.” On appeal, Brito acknowledges that the 

circuit court denied his motion to set aside an acknowledgement of paternity and order 

paternity testing because he failed to prove that he signed the acknowledgment of paternity 

for MC on the basis of a mistake of fact but argues that the circuit court erred in denying 

his motion for paternity testing. We affirm. 

On April 22, 2021, Brito filed a petition for paternity testing. The petition asserted 

that Brito and appellee Raquel Dunning “were never married but engaged in a romantic 
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relationship which ended in 2016 but during which led to the birth of one (1) minor child,” 

who was born in 2011. The petition further stated that Dunning held out MC as Brito’s 

biological child, including, but not limited to, placing Brito’s name on the child’s birth 

certificate and assigning her rights to the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE). 

Brito asserted that he “reasonably believed” that MC was not his biological child and 

requested DNA testing to prove or disprove paternity.

On April 28, 2021, OCSE moved to intervene in the case, and an order granting 

OCSE’s intervention was entered on June 30, 2021. In a separate motion also filed on April 

28, OCSE prayed that Brito’s motion for paternity testing be denied because the court could 

grant Brito’s motion only upon an allegation of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact 

pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-115 (Repl. 2020), none of which had 

been pled by Brito. OCSE attached to the motion as an exhibit the acknowledgement of 

paternity executed by Brito and Dunning on March 2, 2012, in which Brito certified that 

he is MC’s biological father. 

In another motion filed April 28, OCSE, as Dunning’s assignee, pled for child 

support from Brito, alleging that Brito is MC’s father. On June 2, OCSE moved for default 

judgment against Brito. In an order entered on June 30, the circuit court found that Brito 

is MC’s father and ordered him to pay $415 a month in child support. 

On October 8, Brito filed a petition to modify, for DNA testing, and for a hearing. 

In the petition, Brito acknowledged that he had executed the acknowledgement of paternity 

for MC and that the court had ordered him to pay child support. Brito asserted that he 

executed the acknowledgment of paternity on the basis of a “material mistake of fact and/or 
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fraud” because Dunning had initially indicated that MC was Brito’s biological child but later 

indicated to him that MC was not his child and that Dunning wanted Brito to have MC’s 

name changed on the birth certificate.

A hearing was held on December 1, 2021. At the hearing, only Brito testified. Before

taking testimony, the circuit court stated, “So I believe the issue we need to take up is 

whether or not there was some mistake or fraud . . . that was incurred at the signing of the 

affidavit of acknowledgment.” Brito’s attorney agreed with the court’s characterization. The 

court further stated that it was Brito’s burden to move forward with regard to the issue of 

whether there was a mistake, to which Brito’s attorney agreed.

Brito testified that he met Dunning in 2009 or 2010 and had a relationship with her 

for four to five years. He acknowledged that his petition stated that he was first told by 

Dunning that he is MC’s father and that she later told him he is not the father and to have 

the birth certificate changed. He testified that, to his knowledge, Dunning had not changed 

her position that he is not MC’s father. He also acknowledged that if he had known he is

not the father, he would not have signed the acknowledgment of paternity. He testified that 

he does not believe he is MC’s biological father, and he requested DNA testing. Brito 

testified that he would pay child support if scientific testing established that he is the father. 

He further testified that Dunning told him, while they were living in Springdale, that MC’s

father is Wilfredo Mendoza. Brito submitted as evidence text messages between him and 

Dunning. 

On redirect examination, Brito testified that he signed the acknowledgement of 

paternity because Dunning told him that he is the father and he believed her, but then she 
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later told him that he is not the father and wanted his name off the birth certificate. He 

testified that when she said that to him, he did believe her. Upon further questioning, Brito 

testified that he has not had any relationship with MC because Dunning had stopped him 

from having visitation when she started dating another person, and she wanted that person 

to be MC’s father. Brito testified that he is willing to see MC, but Dunning had completely 

stopped him from having visitation rights. 

In its ruling from the bench, the circuit court stated as follows: 

The Court finds that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof to prove that 

there was a mistake of fact at the time of signing the acknowledgment of paternity. 

The testimony of Mr. Brito was that at the time in 2016 or in 2011 when the child 

at issue was born that he suspected his partner was being unfaithful and he read the 

acknowledgment of paternity, which advises the person signing of the consequences 

of signing the acknowledgment and despite his suspicions or questions, he signed the 

document knowing and understanding its import and the time is well past for the 

additional five years after the acknowledgment was signed, he raise[d] the child as if 

he were her father and the testimony today was that even after the split, he attempted 

and has tried to visit with the child and has only not continued to have a relationship 

with the child because of the actions of the mother. So the Court finds that there 

was––that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof that there is a mistake of 

fact that would overcome the consequence of signing the acknowledgment of 

paternity. Therefore, the finding of paternity that was established by Mr. Brito 

signing the acknowledgement of paternity at the birth of child still stands. He is the 

legal father to the child. He has the obligation to financially support the child and he 

is also entitled to visitation and a participation in the child’s life, given that he is the 

father. So Mr. Brito, the bad news is the Court’s finding that you’re obligated to pay 

child support. The good news is the Court also finds that you have a right to a 

relationship with MC.

Brito’s appeal is now properly before this court. On appeal, Brito asserts that the 

circuit court erred by not sua sponte raising and ruling upon two additional grounds for 

setting aside the acknowledgment of paternity executed by him—namely, fraud or duress. 

He argues, “As the court’s bench ruling and the written order make clear, the decision was 

based entirely upon the question of whether there had been a mistake of fact. That was the 
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only factor considered.” OSCE contends that it was Brito’s burden to argue and develop 

the issues of fraud and duress before the circuit court and then obtain a ruling from the 

circuit court on the issues. OCSE maintains Brito’s failure to argue and develop the issues 

to the circuit court and obtain a ruling precludes appellate review.

Brito further argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to set aside the 

acknowledgement of paternity and order paternity testing based on a mistake of fact. OCSE 

contends that Brito did not carry his burden of establishing a mistake of fact and that the 

circuit court’s decision was therefore not clearly erroneous. As such, OSCE maintains that 

the circuit court’s decision should be affirmed. 

The burden of proof is on the person challenging the establishment of paternity. Ark. 

Code Ann. § 9-10-115(d)(2) (Repl. 2020). Decisions rendered on matters of equity are 

reviewed de novo on appeal and are not reversed unless the appellate court finds that the 

circuit court’s decision is clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the 

evidence. See, e.g., Emis v. Emis, 2017 Ark. App. 372, at 3, 524 S.W.3d 444, 447. Due 

deference is given to the circuit court in judging the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

Pursuant to statute, any signatory to a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity may 

rescind the acknowledgment. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115(c) (Repl. 2020). The rescission, 

however, must be prior to the date that an administrative or judicial proceeding, including 

a proceeding to establish a support order, is held relating to the child and the person 

executing the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is a party; or within sixty days of 

executing the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, whichever date occurs first. Ark. 

Code Ann. § 9-10-115(c)(1)–(2). 
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Brito does not suggest that the rescission would occur within these time frames. 

Pursuant to the statute, if the rescission occurs beyond these limitations, a person may 

challenge a paternity establishment pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or 

an order based on an acknowledgment of paternity only upon an allegation of fraud, duress, 

or material mistake of fact. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115(d)(1). Thus, subsection (d) requires 

Brito to establish fraud, duress, or a mistake of fact.

We first turn to the fact that Brito’s arguments that the acknowledgement of paternity 

should be set aside because it is based on fraud or duress are not preserved for our court’s 

review. It has long been held that an appellate court will not take up issues raised and 

developed for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Watt v. Office of Child Support Enf’t, 364 

Ark. 236, 242, 217 S.W.3d 785, 788 (2005); Henyan v. Peck, 359 Ark. 486, 494, 199 S.W.3d 

51, 55 (2004); Brown v. Shipley, 2022 Ark. App. 246, at 10; Evans v. Carpenter, 2022 Ark. 

App. 83, at 7, 642 S.W.3d 235, 240. 

Moreover, we cannot reach these arguments because, as Brito admits, he never 

obtained a ruling on the issues. It is well established that the burden of obtaining a ruling is 

on the movant, and any objections and questions left unresolved are waived and may not 

be relied upon on appeal. See, e.g., Fisher v. Valco Farms, 328 Ark. 741, 748, 945 S.W.2d 

369, 373 (1997); Rhodes v. Farmers Ins. Co., 79 Ark. App. 230, 234, 86 S.W.3d 401, 403 

(2002). It was Brito’s burden to obtain a ruling, and the absence of a ruling constitutes a 

waiver of this issue on appeal. Because his arguments regarding fraud or duress were not 

preserved for appellate review, we need not consider these issues. 
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Brito further argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that he failed to prove 

a mistake of fact. He asserts that his testimony established that he signed the 

acknowledgement of paternity under a mistake of fact. He further relies on a text message 

he received from Dunning that he entered into evidence to support his argument.

In Madison v. Osburn,

1 this court found that an appellant failed to establish a mistake 

of fact. In Madison, the person challenging the acknowledgement of paternity (the mother) 

had signed it knowing that either the purported father was not the biological father, or at 

the very least, there was a chance that he might not be. The court of appeals concluded that 

the appellant failed to establish a mistake of fact because the parties were not mistaken as to 

any material fact when they signed the acknowledgement.

Similarly, Brito’s own testimony established that he suspected that Dunning was 

unfaithful to him when MC was born and, at first, questioned whether he was MC’s father 

when she was born, but he signed the acknowledgement of paternity because they were 

together. 

He further testified that he read the affidavit before he signed it and that he 

understood what he was signing. He acknowledged that because he had a question in his 

mind whether he was MC’s father, he did not have to sign the acknowledgment and could 

have requested testing at that time. Thus, Brito’s testimony established that, even though he 

had a question in his mind about his paternity of the child, he nevertheless signed the 

acknowledgement of paternity. 

1

2012 Ark. App. 212, 396 S.W.3d 264, overruled in part on other grounds by Furr v. 

James, 2013 Ark. App. 181, 427 S.W.3d 94. 
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In essence, Brito was aware when he signed the acknowledgement of paternity that 

he had only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake related, but 

he nevertheless treated his limited knowledge as sufficient. As in Madison, Brito failed to 

meet his statutory burden. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., agree.

Matthews, Campbell, Rhoads, McClure & Thompson, P.A., by: Sarah L. Waddoups, for 

appellant.

Gil Dudley, for separate appellee Arkansas Dep’t of Finance & Admin., Office of 

Child Support Enforcement.