Commercial Newsgathering From Space

May 1987

NTIS order #PB87-235396
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Commercial Newsgathering From Space

—A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-40 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1987).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-619818

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form on p. 51)
Foreword

The news media have begun to increase the use of satellite imagery in reporting

on world events. This has led some to believe that the media will soon wish to own

and operate their own remote sensing systems dedicated to newsgathering. The media

have generally supported the idea of a dedicated “mediasat” because it could supply

a stream of timely and critical information, peering where repressive governments or

dangerous natural environments have heretofore kept the press at bay. However, the

mediasat concept has also generated concern. Some U.S. policy makers believe that the

media’s use of this potential] y intrusive technology could create national security problems, complicate U.S. foreign relations, and, perhaps, erode the average citizen’s expectation of personal privacy.

In order to become more fully aware of the opportunities and risks associated with

the media’s use of remote sensing technology, the House Committee on Science, Space,

and Technology requested the Office of Technology Assessment to examine this issue

in a technical memorandum.

This technical memorandum concludes that although the technology is available

to create a mediasat system, the high cost and current low demand for remotely sensed

data will limit media efforts to own and operate a dedicated remote sensing satellite

system. Nonetheless, government and commercial remote sensing activities will continue in this country and in other countries. These activities will provide the media with

an increasing variety of sophisticated and relatively inexpensive remotely sensed images.

As the media’s use of such images increases, conflicts are certain to arise between the

media’s first amendment rights and certain U.S. national security and foreign policy

interests. OTA concludes that such conflicts are ultimately manageable, but that the

existence of foreign remote sensing systems (which can only be indirectly affected by

U.S. laws) may require some international consultation.

OTA was assisted in the preparation of this technical memorandum by many outstanding advisors and reviewers. We express sincere appreciation to each of these individuals and organizations. As with all OTA reports, the content of this technical

memorandum is the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment and does

not necessarily represent the views of our advisors or reviewers.

- JOHN H. GIBBON S

Director

iii
Workshop Participants

Harvey Brooks (Chairman of the Workshop)

Professor of Technology and Public Policy

Harvard University

Bob Barker

Director, Commercial Applications

SPOT Image Corp.

Jerry Berman

Chief Legislative Counsel

American Civil Liberties Union

Mark Brender

Assignment Editor

ABC News

Dino A. Brugioni

Consultant

Stillman Chase

Assistant Manager

Space Sensors Laboratory

Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center

Craig Covault

Aviation Week and Space Technology

Peter Fend

President

Ocean Earth Construction and Development

Robert Filep

Program Development, FSD

Space Communications System

TRW, Inc.

Eilene Galloway

Honorary Director

International Institute of Space Law

William Headline

Vice President and Bureau Chief

Cable News Network

Roland S.

Consultant

John L. McLu

ow

c a s

President and Chairman of the Board

QuesTech, Inc.

Albert C. Pierce

Professor of National Security Policy

Department of Military Strategy

National War College

Rita Ann Reimer

American Law Division

Congressional Research Service

Gilbert Rye

President

COMSAT Government Systems, Inc.

Walter B. Slocombe

Caplin and Drysdale, Chartered

Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, USAF (Ret. )

Consultant

Matthew R. Willard

Director

Market Planning and Analysis

EOSAT

Thomas R. Wolzien

Vice President

Editorial Services

NBC News

Peter D. Zimmerman

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The

workshop participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility

for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

iv
OTA Project Staff on Commercial Newsgathering From Space

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, O T A

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, Program Manager

International Security and Commerce

Richard DalBello, F’reject Director

Ray A. Williamson

Gordon Law

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson
Additional Reviewers

Robert J. Aamoth, Esq. David H. Moore

Pierson, Ball and Dowd Natural Resources and Commerce Division

Kim Ford Coffman Congressional Budget Office

Presidential Management Intern Lt. Col. J. David Patterson

General Accounting Office

Paul Kreisberg

Director of Studies

Council on Foreign Relations

Phillip Kunsberg

Assistant Deputy

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy

Earl S. Merritt

Vice President

Earth Satellite Corp.

Air Force Fellow

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy

and Research

Charles Sheffield

Vice President

Earth Satellite Corp.

Paul Uhlir

National Academy of

Space Science Board

Sciences
Related OTA Reports

Civilian Space

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●

●

●

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Space Stations and the Law: Selected Legal Issues. OTA-BP-ISC-41, September 1986. GPO stock #052-

003-01047-0; $3.75.

international Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities. OTA-ISC-239, July 1985. GPO

stock #052-003-00958-7; $17.00.

U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space OTA-TM-STI-27, July 1985. GPO stock #052-003-01004-6; $4.50.

Civilian Space Stations and the

003-00969-2; $7.50.

Remote Sensing and the Private

#PB 84-180 777; $4.50.

U.S. Future in Space. OTA-STI-241, November 1984. GPO stock #052-

Sector: Issues for Discussion. OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984. NTIS order

Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983. GPO

stock #052-003-00937-4; $4.50.

UNISPACE ’82: A Context for lnternational Cooperation and Competition. OTA-TM-ISC-26, March 1983.

NTIS order #PB 83-201 848.

Space Science Research in the United States. OTA-TM-STI-19, September 1982. NTIS order #PB 83-166512.

Civilian Space Policy and Applications. OTA-STI-177, June 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-234444.

Radio frequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administration Radio Conference of 1979.

OTA-CIT-163, January 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-177536.

Solar Power Satellite Systems and Issues. OTA-E-144, August 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-108846.

Military Space

●

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Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control. OTA-ISC-281, September 1985. GPO stock

##052-003-01009-7; $6.00.

Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies. OTA-ISC-254, September 1985. GPO stock #052-003-01008-9; $12.00.

Arms Control in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984. GPO stock #052-003-00952-8; $3.00.

Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984. GPO stock #052-003-00948-O; $4.50.

NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20401-9325,

(202) - 783-3238: and the National Technical information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, (703) 487-4050,

vii
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Principal Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Remote Sensing Technology and the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Mediasat Described . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Media and the Uncertain Value of Satellite Imagery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Alternatives for the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

National Security and Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

National Security Concerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

The Effect of Foreign Remote Sensing Systems on U.S. Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4

National Security and the First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Mediasat Restrictions and the First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The 1984 Landsat Act..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Appendix A. The Technology of Newsgathering From Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9

Appendix B. Media Access to and Use of Remote Sensing Data: A Legal Overview 45

Boxes

Box Page

A. A Remote Sensing Satellite System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

B. Why Remote Sensing Can Be Useful for Newsgathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

C. Spatial Resolution and Spectral Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

D. The Challenge of Timely Global Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

E. Remotely Sensed Data and News Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

F. The Status of Land Remote Sensing in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

G. Remote Sensing and the Public

Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

H. Mediasat and Personal Privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Figures

Figure No. Page

1. Landsat-5 Spacecraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Artist’s Conception of the French SPOT Remote Sensing Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

3. A Remote Sensing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4. Data Processing and Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

5. Polar Orbit Provides Global

Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

6. The Orbital Path of Remote Sensing Satellite Is Sun Synchronous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

7. The Earth Revolves 2,752 km to the East Between Passes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

8. Adjacent Swaths Are Imaged 7 Days Apart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Tables

Table No. Page

I. Some Recent Uses of Remotely Sensed Images by the Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2. Remote Sensing Data Needs of Foreign and Domestic Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3. Summary of Applications of Landsat Data in the Various Earth Resources

Disciplines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

ix

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. news media’s’ recent use of satellite

images to cover such newsworthy events as the

Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Soviet “shuttle”

launch site at Tyuratam, and the progress of the

Iran-Iraq war has raised the possibility y that newsgathering from space could become a routine and

profitable commercial activity. Some media experts have supported the concept of a mediasat2

because it could supply a stream of timely and

critical information, peering where repressive governments or dangerous natural environments have

heretofore kept the press at bay.

The mediasat concept has also generated concern. Some U.S. policy makers believe that the media’s use of this potentially intrusive technology

could increase the visibility and risk of military

operations, complicate U.S. foreign relations by

angering allies and adversaries, and erode the average citizen’s expectation of personal privacy.

Believing that “the use of space technologies by

the media and the merging of traditional journalistic practices with long-held national space policies

has not yet been satisfactorily addressed, ” the

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology3 requested the Office of Technology AssessThis technical memorandum uses the terms “news media " or "media” interchangeably to refer to both the electr<ln]c and the print

media The bra riches ot the media are referred to separately () n 1 y

when the] r d it teren t need~ would appear t () d]~ta te u n]que tee-h no]-

og}r or polic } ch olcei. Except where otherwise i nd l{ a ted, the term

med]a reter~ only to the U. S media.

: hlediasat ” IS not an exlstlng satelllte system or buslnes~ (lrgan]zat ion, A+ used In thi~ techn ica] memorandum, the term “med]a -

w t‘ reter~ to the concept of a sa tel I I te System and business organ iza -

tlon that would routinely collect news and Intormat Ion t(lr media

uw t rom \pace.

‘I.etter trorn The Hon. Don Fuqua, Cha]rman, House Committee

on Sc]ence and Technology, to ](lhn H. Llbbons, D]rector, Office

ot Technolo~}’ Assessment, Oct 16, 1 Q80, letter trom The Hon. Bill

Nelson, Chairman, Subc(lmmlttee on Space S( ]ence and ApplIcat]on~, Houw Comrnlttee on Sc]ence and Technolog} to ]ohn Fi

Gibbons, Director, OttIce of Technology ,4ssessment, Oct 7 lQ8tI

ment to examine this issue. In response to the committee’s request, OTA contracted for papers on

remote sensing technology, the media’s needs and

desires, the national security implications, and the

legal issues associated with newsgathering from

space. 4 OTA held a workshop on December 18,

1986, to discuss these papers and to explore generally the opportunities and risks of the media’s

use of satellite imagery. This technical memorandum relies heavily on, but is not limited to, the

information found in the contract papers and the

workshop discussion.

Although the U.S. media currently make some

limited use of satellite imagery, OTA is unaware

of any serious planning to establish a mediasat

organization. The purpose of this technical memorandum is not to examine the feasibility of a specific satellite system or business plan, but rather,

to assess whether current government policy is

appropriate to accommodate both current activities and future developments. Because the mediasat concept is, for the most part, undefined, OTA

was forced in this technical memorandum to make

a series of assumptions regarding fundamental issues such as cost, markets, technical capability,

and utility of a mediasat. Although these assumptions are critical to OTA’s conclusions, they are

only “best guesses, ” based on the advice of experts in the media and in the field of remote sensing. With regard to specific issues—such as the

economic viability of a mediasat or its effect on

national security and foreign policy—altering these

underlying assumptions could dramatically alter

the conclusions reached in this technical memorandum.

(In lanuar} I q87, the committee’s name ~j~~ changed to th(’ C (~nv

m i ttee on Sc]ence, Space, and Tech no] og~. 1

‘A ~ummary of the paper+ on remote wnsing tec hn(~lox> and lt’-

ga] ]ssue\ are included ]n appi. A & B
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Finding 1

The media’s experience with satellite imagery

has thus far been extremely limited. Therefore,

the precise value of satellite imagery to the media

is uncertain and is likely to remain so until experience and a more robust remote sensing market combine to define a stable demand for these

data.

The media have used and continue to use satellite images in their news gathering activities.

Whether this limited use will blossom into extensive, routine use or even a dedicated “mediasat”

organization will depend on:

1. the cost of remotely sensed data;

2. the demand for, and therefore the value of,

“media-quality” images to the media and to

other users; and

3. U.S. and foreign government policies regarding the collection and distribution of highquality satellite images.

Much of the current writing on the mediasat

concept has stressed the desire for high resolution,

timely delivery, and assured access to data. Although these demands follow logically from current newsgathering practices, they are not the

product of detailed technical or economic research

or of experience. It is important to recognize that,

in the absence of such research or experience, the

news media can have only an imprecise understanding of the value of low- and high-resolution

data and the value of real-time and delayed information.

Finding 2

The current commercial remote sensing systems,

the U.S. EOSAT and the French SPOT, allow the

media to experiment with satellite imagery but lack

the high resolution, timely delivery, and assured

access to data that some media experts feel could

make satellite imagery an integral part of the newsgathering process.

EOSAT (figure 1) and SPOT (figure 2) provide

a relatively low-cost means by which the media

could practice both using satellite imagery and

working within current government policies. How2

ever, existing commercial systems do not provide

“timely access” or high resolution, primarily because these capabilities are expensive and unnecessary to meet the needs of the traditional purchasers of remotely sensed data. In addition, the

media’s access to data cannot be assured because

the remote sensing companies currently depend

on ground stations owned by other countries to

collect certain data. Experience gained with the

current commercial systems has shown that delivery of data considered by a foreign government

to be sensitive may be delayed or denied.

Finding 3

It is possible to build a mediasat system with

high resolution, timely global coverage, and assured access to data using current technology.

Experts generally agree that costs and market

uncertainties, more than technology, inhibit the

establishment of a mediasat system. Media experts

have identified high spatial resolution (5 meters

or less) as the principal performance requirement

for a mediasat. By comparison, the Thematic Mapper (TM) and the Multispectral Scanner (MSS) sensors on EOSAT’s satellite provide 30 and 80 meter resolution, respectively. The French SPOT

system provides 10 meter panchromatic (black and

white) as well as 20 meter multi-spectral (color)

imagery. Nonetheless, sensors capable of producing 5 meter images are readily available and could

be flown on existing spacecraft designs.

To be effective, a mediasat needs more than

high resolution; it must also be able to sense news

wherever and whenever it occurs and to transmit the news rapidly to the news agency. A mediasat system would need at least two satellites to ensure same day coverage of events around the globe.

In order to receive data in near-real-time, a mediasat system would need to have access to ground

stations all over the earth, use on-board tape

recorders, or use space-to-space communications

similar to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) partially complete Tracking Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). The

technology exists to obtain high-resolution, nearreal-time imagery; what is lacking is the clear financial justification for employing this technology.
Attitude

Figure 1.— Landsat-5 Spacecraft

Global positioning Antenna mast

system antenna

High gain antenna

(2) omni antenna

I

Multispectral scanner

/

control module I I I

H Solar array panel

/

 Sun Sensor s

S-band antenna

\

Thematic mapper

Wideband module

Instrument

module

SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admintstration

MISSION: Collect remotely sensed multispectral land data broadcast data for receipt

at ground stations operating under formal agreements

ORBIT. 705-mm sun synchronous 16 day repeat cycle

SENSORS AND FUNCTIONS

Mdtl-spoctrd Scmn.r (MSS).

Swath w)dth IS 185-km ‘eso(utlon IS 80- m

Sonwr

‘Ahvehngths

(Km) Prtmary U*

IO 5 13 6 ~ovement 01 swlment laden waler ,dellneatlon of snaltow

wafer areas

06 07 Cultural fealures

07.08 iegelattonbounaary between land arm water Iandforms

08-1 1 PenetraIlon of atmosphere naze vegetation ooundary

between land anO water Iandforms

ThornatIc M+por (TM): The TM IS designed 10 orOvlde 30-m resotut!on

except for 120-m resolutlor 1~ the thermal Infrared band

Sonun

Wvokrlgths

bin)

045 05 2

052 06 0

063 06 9

0 7’6 090

1 55 1 -5

1040 ! 2 w

2 0 8 2 3 5

Pr}mary (Jsoa

Coastal waler mapp(ng SOI( vage!atlon dlfferent!a[ton

dectduous coniferous Glfferentlatlon

Gram reflectance DY healthy vegelahon

Chbrophyll absorption for piant soacles dlfferentlallon

Btomass suweys waler OOdy dellneatton

Vagetatlon momture measurement

Plant heat stress management other thermal mapp(ng

Hydrothermal maopmg

OIRECT BROAOCAST Broadcasts are provtded for ground stations which hav e

entered Into formal agreements covering (he recelpl and dlsrrOut)on of these dara
4

Finding 4

Although cost and market research have yet to

be done, preliminary calculations indicate that the

costs of a mediasat might exceed the expected revenues of such a system.

To be financially viable, a mediasat would have

to generate revenue sufficient to offset the costs

of the system. Experts have estimated that a complete one or two satellite mediasat system (i.e.,

sensor, spacecraft, launch vehicle, data collection

facilities, and image processing facilities) capable

of.5 meters resolution, designed to operate about

5 years, could cost between $215 million and $470

million to establish and $10 million to $15 million a year to operate. Even if each network used

satellite images every day, only a few thousand

images would be used per year; hence the system’s

development and operating costs could only be

paid back if networks were willing to pay $35,000

to $73,000 per “story,” an order of magnitude more

than existing expenditures for daily news coverage.

Nonetheless, should it turn out that OTA’s cost

estimates for a mediasat are dramatically overstated (because the technology has become more

sophisticated and/or less costly) or a very high

demand (from the media and other data users5

)

were to develop for satellite images, mediasat

might become an economically viable concept.

Finding 5

A mediasat would probably compound problems inherent in the management of national security and foreign policy in a spirited democracy;

however, such problems would likely be manageable.

Experts generally agree that the media’s extensive use of high-resolution satellite imagery for

newsgathering could complicate certain U.S. national security activities and certain U.S. foreign

policies. Experts disagree, however, about the nature and seriousness of these “complications,” and

the extent to which they differ from traditional

tensions between the press and the national security and foreign policy communities.

Although each is the subject of some controversy, national security experts consulted by OTA

identified five areas where a mediasat could complicate U.S. national security and foreign policies.

The

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

— —

media could:

disseminate information regarding U.S. military operations, thereby depriving U.S.

troops of the critical element of surprise;

reveal information considered sensitive by

foreign governments, thereby prompting

them to retaliate against U.S. Government

activities, assets, or personnel;

provide valuable intelligence to countries currently lacking their own reconnaissance satellites;

reveal facts about an unfolding crisis, making it more difficult for government leaders

to act calmly and responsibly; and

misinterpret satellite data in such a way as

to precipitate a crisis.

5

Some of the costs of a mediasat could be offset by selling data

to map makers, geologists, agricultural planners, and other current

users of remotely sensed data.
k -

Photo uecfft Copyr/ght 1987 EOSA T Prov/ded L ourles } of E(3SA T

Washington, D. C., and Surroundlng area—Thematic Mapper band 4 is used, and illustrates major

areas an-d buildings of the downtown area. For exam pie, the Washington Monument, Pentagon

Capitol, and National Airport can be seen

The most common media response to all of these

allegations is that, although a mediasat could provide a substantial new source of data, the media’s

extensive contacts and information sources within

that aggressive actions would

throughout the free world.

Finding 6

be seen and reported

the United States and around the world already

provide the press with near-real-time information

concerning fast-breaking news stories. The U.S.

media are also proud of their “track record. ” They

Within a decade, many nations still have their

own remote sensing systems. It is unclear whether

the U.S. Government could effectively limit or

control media access to satellite imagery if foreign governments do not exercise similar controls.

The almost assured proliferation of sophisticated, government-owned, remote sensing systems

has caused many analysts to question the practicality of attempting to regulate the media’s use

of satellites to gather news. Some experts mainassert that where lives have been at stake or serious national security issues have been raised, they

have cooperated with the government by withholding information until the danger or sensitivity has passed. Finally, some national security and

media experts argue that granting the media access to high-resolution satellite data could halve

a stabilizing influence, in that nations would realize
6

—. —

tain that since U.S. laws would not be applicable

to foreign systems, U.S. news agencies could bypass U.S. restrictions by purchasing data from,

or investing in, foreign remote sensing systems.

Others disagree, arguing that foreign remote

sensing systems—either as a result of financial

constraints, less sophisticated technology, or a

country’s own domestic policies—might have limited resolution. Therefore, it is possible that, with

minimum intergovernmental coordination, the

United States could substantially delay the time

when the media would have access to very highresolution satellite images.

Finding 7

Government attempts to limit access to or use

of satellite imagery would likely result in first

amendment challenges to such limitations. The

outcome of these challenges would turn on the

exact nature of the government limitations and

the Supreme Court's ultimate determination of the

status of newsgathering activities under the Constitution.

Should the U.S. Government desire to inhibit

a media-owned satellite from gathering potentially

sensitive information it could—either permanently,

through the licensing procedures established in the

1984 Landsat Act, b or temporarily during a crisis

—attempt to limit:

1. the resolution of the satellite’s sensors;

2. the images that the satellite is allowed to collect; or

3. the images the media are allowed to disseminate.

The 1984 Landsat Act requires all remote sensing system operators to obtain a license from the

Secretary of Commerce, who is charged with the

duty of ensuring that applicants comply with the

“international obligations and national security

concerns of the United States. ” Some media representatives have argued that such licensing provisions should be declared invalid because they

are not drafted with the narrow specificity required

of statutes affecting first amendment interests. The

validity of this point of view will rest heavily on

’15 U.S.C. 4201-4292

the Supreme Court’s ultimate determination of the

status of newsgathering activities.

If newsgathering is given the degree of first

amendment protection afforded traditional speaking and publishing activities, the licensing procedure established in the Landsat Act and future restrictions on mediasat activities might be regarded

as impermissible “prior restraints” on free speech.

The doctrine of “prior restraint” holds that advance limitations on protected speech may not be

“predicated on surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result.”7 Prior restraints

are allowable only if necessary to prevent “direct,

immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation

or its people.”8 On the other hand, should the Supreme Court hold that news gathering was deserving of some lesser degree of protection than publication of information already obtained, the

government would have considerably more latitude to limit mediasat activities. Restrictions on

the dissemination of information already gathered

would, of course, receive the full protection of

the first amendment.

If the media do not own a satellite system, but

rather rely on a commercial company such as

EOSAT to provide them with data, it would be

less clear whether the media could successfully argue that licensing restrictions violate their first

amendment rights. Should the U.S. Government

ask EOSAT to stop distributing raw data for a

few days during a crisis and EOSAT agreed, the

news media might have a case against EOSAT for

breach of contract, but their case against the U.S.

Government for infringing their first amendment

rights would be less clear.

Finding 8

Should the U.S. Government wish to encourage

the eventual development of a U.S. mediasat industry, it should continue its support for the U.S.

Landsat system; such support would likely require

sizable subsidy for a period of years. 9

‘Justice Brennan concurring in, New York Times Co. v. United

States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971).

‘Justices Stewart and White, concurring, New York Times Co.

v. United States, ibid.

‘The funding problems and opportunities of the Landsat program

and EOSAT are beyond the scope of this paper. In reaching this

conclusion, OTA drew upon its previous work. See: U.S. Congress,
A mediasat industry is less likely to develop in

the United States if the media must shoulder the

entire cost of the “infrastructure” needed to supOffice of Technology Assessment, lnternational Cooperation and

Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA-ISC-239 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Off Ice, July 1985), p. 15, U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and

the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion —A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1984 ).

7

port its occasional use of satellite images. If, on

the other hand, there already existed in the United

States a strong “value-added” industry—small

firms expert in the interpretation and visual presentation of data—and a large pool of experienced

photointerpreters, the mediasat concept would become more viable. A robust value-added industry and a cadre of experienced photointerpreters

are more likely to develop if the United States has

a healthy land remote sensing industry catering

to diverse scientific and commercial needs.
REMOTE SENSING TECHNOLOGY AND THE MEDIA

Mediasat Described

At present, the news media obtain data from

two commercial remote sensing systems, EOSAT

—formerly the U.S. Government’s Landsat system

10—and SPOT, a French system.11 Neither of

these commercial systems was designed to meet

the specific needs of the media and neither firm

has plans to buy new satellites or alter its business structure to allow it to meet these needs. Consequently, media experts have begun to examine

the feasibility and desirability of a “mediasat;” a

spacecraft owned and operated—in whole or in

part—by the news media and dedicated to news

and information gathering activities [see box A

and figures 3 and 4; box B and figure 5]. Although

individual conceptions of a “mediasat” vary, as

it is most often described, a mediasat would differ from the current commercial systems in three

important ways:

1. Spatial Resolution: Spatial resolution of 5

meters or less [see box C] is often identified

as the principal performance requirement for

a mediasat.12 By comparison, the TM and

the MSS sensors on EOSAT’s satellite yield

30 and 80 meter resolution, respectively. The

French SPOT system provides 10 meter panchromatic as well as 20 meter multispectral

imagery. At present, neither SPOT nor

EOSAT has plans to fly sensors capable of

approaching the 5 meter resolution sought

by the media.13

1OFor a hi5tov of the U.S. Landsat system and the details Of its

somewhat stormy transfer to the private sector, see: U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and the Private

Sector: Issues for Discussion—A TechnicaI Memorandum, OTATM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

March 1984); National Research Council Space Applications Board,

Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space: A Program in Crisis (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985).

‘

] The French Government controls the SPOT satellite and a private French company, Spot Image, S. A., and its American subsidiary, Spot Image, Corp., market the data.

IZAt the workshop it Was clear that the media’s desire for sensors

allowing a resolution of s meters or less is not based on experience

or research. The exact number is flexible and could be more accurately

stated as “that degree of resolution which is better than either the

SPOT or EOSAT systems but which is still affordable. ”

lqIt is important t. note the relationship between resolution and

the width of coverage (swath width). Had the French chosen a 20

km by 20 km swath width instead of their current 60 km by 60 km

coverage, they would have had a resolution of 3.3 meters, assuming

the same number of minimum picture elements (pixels) in their senBox A.—A Remote Sensing Satellite System

A remote sensing satellite system consists of

four major components, each of which is critical to producing useful data:

1.

2.

3.

4.

The Spacecraft. Sensors, and Transmitters

The spacecraft provides a stabilized platform and power for the sensors and their

optics, the receiving and transmitting antennas, and the associated electronics necessary to control the spacecraft and to deliver data to Earth. Some remote sensing

spacecraft may also carry tape recorders to

store data until the spacecraft is within sight

of a receiving station.

The Receiving Station and Other Communications Components: A ground station

may receive data in digital form directly

from the satellite as it passes overhead, or,

if the satellite is not in a position to communicate with the ground station, through

a system equivalent to NASA’s 3-satellite

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System

(TDRSS).* In the latter case, data are passed

from the remote sensing satellite to a communication satellite in geosynchronous orbit

and then retransmi tted to a ground facility.

From the ground facility, the data are then

passed directly to a processing laboratory.

The Data Processing Facilities: Before the

raw data can be converted into photographic

images or computer tapes capable of being

analyzed by the end user, they must be processed to remove geometric and other distortions inevitably introduced by the sensors.

For the purposes of newsgathering, highspeed mainframe computers maybe required

to process the data from current spacecraft.

Interpretation of the Data: After the raw

data are processed and converted to computer tapes or photographs, they must be

interpreted. Part of the interpretation process may invoke merging or integrating other

data either directly on the computer tape,

or comparing such data with photographs.

At this stage, computer analysis could be

performed by micro-or mini-computer. A

variety of advanced techniques (see box G)

are available to turn remotely sensed data

into new products for different users.

*Only one TDRSS satellite is currently in orbit.

8
9

.

Figure 3.—A Remote Sensing System

Communication s

/

components

Spacecraft

Tape --1 : Rela y

: Satellite I

storage

I

Data

Sensor handling Transmitters

Data

interpretation

Tapes

- Receiver Data Image processing o

SOURCE Hughes, Santa Barbara Research Center

Figure 4.— Data Processing and Interpretation

Data I Information processing and

processing I

interpretation

I

I

●

Film Film recorder Information

t

1

Manual interpretation

I

Initia l ‘1

processin g

I

● Calibration

● Radiometric I

correction Displays

Ž Geometric

correction

● Formatting

Computer Information

I .

Computer

I

● Analysis

Print out • Interpretation

I

interpretation

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987
10

Figure 5.— Polar Orbit Provides Global Coverage

Mediasat remote sensing satellite

705 km height, 98.9 minute orbit

SOURCE: Hughes, Santa Barbara Research Center

2. Timely Global Coverage: To be most effective, a mediasat would have to deliver news

in a matter of hours from anywhere on the

globe [see box D and figures 6-8]. Neither

the satellites nor the business structures of

EOSAT and SPOT are designed to produce

imagery that quickly. Such timeliness would

require new ground processing techniques

3.

continued from page 8

sor array. Reducing swath width, however, would have greatly increased the time it takes to obtain global coverage with one satellite.

It would also have reduced the synoptic view desired for many other

uses of the data.

and delivery methods and at least two satellites and supporting communication facilities

to ensure that the media would have the opportunity to image every spot on Earth at

least once a day.

Media Control Over System and Products:

EOSAT and SPOT, although commercial

systems, receive substantial financial support

and guidance from their sponsoring governments and rely on the cooperation of those

countries that maintain ground stations (see

the following section, National Security and

Foreign Policy). As a result, issues such as
11

Box B.—Why Remote Sensing Can

Be Useful for Newsgathering

From the technical standpoint, remote sensing

from space provides data users with several key

features:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

ability to view remote, difficult, or denied

terrain;

view unaffected by political boundaries;

synoptic view of large portions of Earth’s

surface;

the possibility of near real-time data recovery;

signals suitable for digital storage and subsequent computer manipulation into newsready imagery;

repetitive coverage over comparable viewing conditions;

selected combinations of spectral bands for

identifying and analyzing surface features.

In addition, data from space provide the following advantages:

Convenient Historical Record, Stored on

Magnetic Media and Photographs: Each image establishes a baseline that is of critical

importance in recognizing the inevitable

environmental and other changes that occur over time.

Tool for Inventory and Assessment: Satellite images could be used whenever a major

natural or technological disaster strikes an

area and massive breakdowns of communication, transportation, public safety, and

health facilities, prevent the use of normal

means of inventory and assessment.

Predictive Tool: Properly interpreted imagery can be used to predict the onset of natural and technological disasters.

Planning and Management Tool Imagery

can be used for a variety of planning and

management purposes.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987.

limitations on sensor resolution and the release of sensitive data can be strongly influenced by government policy. A successful

U.S. mediasat would have to eliminate such

government intervention to ensure the degree of independence the media now enjoy

in their other news gathering activities.

The Media and the Uncertain Value

of Satellite Imagery

During the course of the OTA workshop, it became clear that with the exception of certain trade

publications and the magazine Aviation Week and

Space Technology, the media’s experience with

satellite imagery—excluding weather satellite

imagery-has been extremely limited (table 1). As

a result, the media—especially the major television

networks—have no clear idea of the type of imagery they want, how much they might need, or

how much they are willing to pay. In short, the

value of satellite imagery to the media is, at

present, uncertain and is likely to remain so until

experience and a more robust remote sensing market combine to define a stable market for these

data. ’4

Fundamental to this issue of uncertainty are

questions concerning the type and quality of data

needed by the media. Several of the media representatives at the OTA workshop brought examples of how SPOT and EOSAT data have been

used in recent news broadcasts. After viewing several such news stories, one workshop participant

commented that,

The pictures themselves are unremarkable . . .

most of these pictures are essentially illustrations

of a story that you have to make up.

This comment goes to the heart of the media’s

problem—does it need images that the viewer can

identify and interpret, or is there value in images

that, although not identifiable by the viewer, hold

important information when interpreted by an expert? One panelist noted,

It is important to distinguish between information that has to be interpreted and . . . material

the viewers at home . . . could draw their own

conclusions from. There is obviously much more

value in material that does not require interpretation.

14 It is interesting to note, however, that the media’s use of remote

sensing imagery has increased substantially since the launch of the

higher resolution SPOT satellite, This suggests that at even higher

resolutions, such as 5 meters, there could be another substantial increase in the demand for satellite imagery.
12

Box C.—Spatial Resolution and Spectral Resolution

Spatial resolution refers to the ability of an optical device, such as the sensor of a remote sensing spacecraft, to separate objects of a given size. An instrument of high resolving power can separate two small

objects very close together, or resolve the image of relatively small features on a larger object. For example,

a spatial resolution of 1 meter (approximately 39 inches) could allow a viewer to distinguish between an

automobile and a bus, but such resolution might not allow one to distinguish between an automobile and

a pickup truck.

The best resolution available on images formed by civilian remote sensing satellites is the lo-meter

resolution offered by the sensors and optical systems on the French SPOT satellite. * Such resolution allows

one to see individual buildings and streets in a city landscape. It also permits one to pick out semi-trailer

trucks on the streets or ships at a dock. It would generally not make it possible for the viewer to distinguish

between the image of two semi-trailer trucks parked side by side and a building of similar dimensions,

because the images of the two trucks would merge.

Overall resolution is limited by the resolving power of the sensor’s individual picture elements. The

minimum picture element, or pixel, of SPOT data, for example, corresponds to 10 meters (approximately

33 feet) on the ground. No amount of simple magnification of the remotely-sensed image will improve the

resolution beyond this minimum pixel size. For an object with dimensions less than 10 meters, the sensor

will effectively spread out the light emanating from such an object so that it is impossible to determine

the position of the object within the 10 meter pixel. Structural details of the object will also be spread out

in a similar manner.

However, knowledge of the general terrain, the detailed characteristics of particular objects, and experience in photointerpretation, can vastly improve an interpreter’s ability to understand the details of an

image. In addition, sophisticated and costly computer processing can improve on the theoretical resolution

of an image by as much as a factor of 2.**

Although the spatial resolution of a sensor provides a general guide to its ability to “see” objects on

the ground, photointerpreters are also concerned with spectral resolution. Since all objects reflect light differently, an object’s color or its contrast with the background environment can also be used to distinguish

it. For example, the Great Wall of China is wide enough to be detected on Landsat TM images (resolution

of 30 meters, or 98 feet). However, because the wall is nearly the same color as the surrounding countryside,

it is extremely difficult to pick out in certain Landsat spectral bands. On the other hand, it is often possible

to see a bridge or roadway of less than 30 meters wide when their contrast with the surrounding water

or earth is extremely high. In effect, the bridge or road tends to “fill” each pixel with its reflected light,

and because there are many such pixels spread out in a line across the scene, the eye links them together.

Because objects that appear to have similar color characteristics as seen by the naked eye reflect light somewhat differently in different parts of the spectrum, it is often possible to distinguish objects on the image

by subtracting the different color bands from one another. In this way, a field of corn can be distinguished

from a field of soybeans, even though the sensors are incapable of resolving individual plants.

● Early in their program, France considered building a system of higher resolution that could be used by both civilian and military data users. However, because of high costs and other priorities for research and development funds, it deferred such a program,

**See John A. Adams, “Counting the Weapons,” IEEE Spectrum, July 1986, pp. 46-56, for a general discussion of spectral and spatial resolution.
13

Box D.—The Challenge of Timely Global Coverage

The Landsat satellite travels in a near-polar orbit at a distance of 706 kilometers and circles the Earth

every 98.9 minutes. The SPOT satellite flies in a similar orbit, 832 kilometers above Earth, with an orbital

period of 101.5 minutes. Because Earth is spinning, as a satellite travels from pole to pole, it flies over

a different part of Earth on each orbit. Each of the two Landsat spacecraft, for example, passes over the

same portion of Earth at the Equator once every 16 days. (Near the poles, the “footprint” of its sensors

overlap in successive orbital passes, covering the same portion of Earth in as few as 8 days. ) SPOT repeats

its orbit only once every 26 days. However, because the SPOT sensors can be pointed to the side (offnadir), their ability to sense a particular area on Earth in successive passes is substantially increased. The

SPOT sensors can revisit a site 7 days out of 26. The ability to point its sensors also allows the SPOT

satellite to take quasi-stereo images.

For the purposes of a mediasat capable of providing daily coverage of the Earth, it is necessary to

have several identical satellites with pointable sensors to ensure that one is always in position to see the

area of interest.

Delivering the data collected to Earth for processing is an important part of the overall process of land

remote sensing. Because the satellite orbits the Earth, for some part of every orbit it will not be within

“sight” of national ground stations. A satellite system must have one or more of the following capabilities:

1. tape recorders to store data until they can be played back as the satellite passes over a ground station,

2. space-to-space communications such as NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRSS) to pass

the information around the globe and then to Earth, or

3. ground stations in many foreign countries to ensure that data collected over other countries are

eventually passed back to national territory.

None of these alternatives is without difficulty: high-capacity space-rated tape recorders have a high failure rate, historically, and are still not regarded as reliable; TDRSS cannot yet provide worldwide coverage

(the second of three critical satellites was destroyed along with the Shuttle Challenger in January 1986),

it is expensive to use, and commercial users currently receive very low priority; finally, receiving data from

foreign ground stations can be slow and subject to political interference.

One of the most substantial impediments to timely delivery of imagery is the effects of clouds. On

any one day, substantial portions of the Earth’s surface are covered by clouds. Some areas can be obscured

for weeks or even months at a time. Other areas are difficult to see even in “clear” weather as a result

of smog or other obscuring atmospheric problems.
14

Ground track 

A

Inclination=98.2

 Time of day=9:45 am 

 Direction

of travel

,

Each pass of the satelIite crosses the equator

at the same time (9:45 am)

SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Figure 7.—The Earth Revolves 2,752 km to the East (at the equator) Between Passes

, sensor swath

(25 km)

Satellite

around track

‘ 

SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
15

Figure 8.—Adjacent Swaths (moving westward) Are Imaged 7 Days Apart

orb

day

Table 1.— Some Recent Uses of Remotely Sensed Images by the Pressa

Television news

Date

April 1985

Janauary 1986

February 1986

April 1986

July 1986

July 1986

August 1986

October 1986

January 1987

April 1987

Event

Iran/Iraq border area—ABC.

Libyan military airfield and SA-5 sites—ABC.

Naval facility at Murmansk-ABC.

Chernobyl nuclear plant—all networks.

New York City harbor—ABC.

Soviet nuclear testing facility at Semipalatinsk some 1800 miles southeast of Moscow—ABC, CBS, CNN.

Soviet shuttle facility at Tyuratam in central USSR—ABC.

Soviet Submarine base at Gremikha—Swedish television.

Iran/Iraq war—ABC.

Soviet radar facility near Krasnoyarsk–ABC.

Newspapers, magazines

March 1986 Libyan SA-5 sites and military bases—New York Post

April, May 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant— many newspapers, magazines

September 1986 U.S.S.R. Kola Peninsula—Jane’s Defense Weekly

October 1986 Soviet cosmodromes at Plesetsk and Baikonur—National Geographic.

March 1987 Soviet Navy base at Murmansk and Soviet Air Force base at Severomorsk —Aviation Week and Space Technology. b

March 1987 Pakistani nuclear processing facility—London Sunday Observer

aTheSe c itat ions are representative only The news media have put remote sensing data to many other uses

bAv[atlon week ad Space Technology p!oneered the use of remotely sensed Images from space since 1974, the journal has publlshed more than 22 ma)or neWs .Storles

based on remotely sensed Images

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1987

71-284 - 87 - 2 : QL 3
16

Other panelists generally agreed with this comment and emphasized that material requiring interpretation is similar to a “source story;” that is,

a story based on inside or expert information but

lacking images to allow the viewer to draw his

or her own conclusions. Although useful in the

print media, “source stories” have a more limited

value in television news where the viewer expects

the picture to tell the story [see box E]. I

s

15One panelist felt that the attention given to the issue of “source

stories” was unwarranted. He maintained, “Those of us who have

lived through the technological developments that have affected the

media over the last ten or twenty years would never attempt to neatly

categorize the potential uses of remote sensing. Experience tells us

that every time a significant technological advance has been made,

its early planned uses either became secondary or were lost in the

huge quantity of additional applications that developed once experience had been gained. Remote sending will simply open up a

variety of options to illustrate all sorts of stories in different ways

and in different media. ”

One panelist commented that the media “clearly

had a lot of homework to do, ” but that this learning process could proceed in stages. First, he suggested that the media should gain as much experience as possible working with current satellite

images and within current government policies,

This would allow the media to define the kinds

of news stories that would gain from “eye in space”

graphics every day. Second, the news media

should test the ability of SPOT, EOSAT, or some

other source of data to meet their needs. Third,

examine the attitudes of readers and viewers

toward the use of these new graphic displays to

reach some conclusions regarding the comparative values of high- and low-resolution data. Finally, when they had gained sufficient experience

regarding both the value of current imagery and

the cost and future demand for high-resolution
17

imagery, the media could then make an informed

judgment regarding the practicality of pursuing

the mediasat concept.

The media’s difficulty in assessing the value of

satellite imagery is reminiscent of problems encountered by scientists in the 1970s when they first

began to experiment with the Landsat data. Many

experts believed then that with a little experience

and a little government support, remote sensing

could become a thriving commercial industry. It

is instructive to note that, after nearly 15 years

of experimentation, the overall market for remotely sensed data is still weak. This is true even

for applications such as minerals exploration, forestry, and agriculture, where the history of experimentation demonstrates that remote sensing from

space is cost effective compared to other means

of gathering similar information. l6

‘*See: Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion, op. cit., ch. 4, for a discussion of the development of the market

for remotely sensed data.

Alternatives for the Media

The media have at least two choices should they

decide to increase the use of satellite imagery in

their news coverage:

1. they could continue to use the images provided by the current commercial systems; or

2. they could fly their own satellite or a sensor

on a host satellite.

Although these choices are not mutually exclusive they vary drastically in cost and complexity.

Use of EOSAT and SPOT Images

Several panelists bluntly stated their belief that

the concept of a media-owned satellite system was

“just not economical” today, and that, “The best

way to go is to get the [EOSATs and SPOTs] of

the world to supply the data that the media need. ”

Although certainly the simplest and most economical path for the media to follow, the current com-
18

*

. . . .. 

Photo redit US. Department of Defense

Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam airfield. This photo, taken from an aircraft, was released Feb. 9, 1987, by the Department of Defense

to refute Soviet and Vietnamese denials of the existence of Soviet forward-deployment bases in Vietnam. Shown in this image

are Soviet TU-95 Bear aircraft, TU-16 Badgers, and Mig-23 Flogger aircraft. Photo resolution estimated to be about 1 meter.

mercial systems cannot provide timely access to

data, assured access to data, and high resolution

[see box F].

The workshop discussed two aspects of the timeliness issue: 1) the problem of getting the data from

the satellite to the media user; and 2) the need for

the human resources to interpret the data.17 On

17Both of these problems were illustrated by one newsman’s experience in trying to obtain and use the satellite images of Chernobyl. He recalled: “I remember working the phones all day trying

to get the Chernobyl images and finally at three in the afternoon

they arrived and everyone was excited and we looked at the images

and said, ‘what the hell are we looking at?’ So I called up EarthSat,

the image processing company, and 1 said, ‘Hey, can you send somebody down and help us interpret this stuff?’ He said, ‘Well, we can

do it next week. You know they’re used to dealing with geologists.

I said, ‘Next week? I’ll send a helicopter this afternoon. ’ “

the subject of timely access to data, one panelist

pointed out that neither SPOT nor EOSAT is designed to meet the particular needs of the news

media. The Landsat system, now operated by

EOSAT, had been a government-designed research

system that was never expected to-deliver data

rapidly. “If you call today and ask for a scene from

last year, EOSAT may be able to get it to you

within a week if it’s already been processed, ” the

panelist commented, but “if it’s unprocessed it

takes 4 to 5 weeks.” The panelist pointed out that

EOSAT had been able to provide the Chernobyl

images in 24 hours only because it was lucky

enough to have a satellite in position and it had

been willing to suspend all its other activities. Most
19

Box F.—The Status of Land Remote Sensing in the United States

The value of viewing Earth from space to provide crucial resource and environmental information

on the atmosphere, oceans, and land masses was recognized early in this Nation’s development of space

technology. Two years after the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was signed, the United States

received its first images from space, taken by the polar-orbiting weather satellite called the Television and

Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS).

Today the TIROS satellites, and their geostationary cousins, the Geostationary Orbiting Environmental

Satellites (GOES) continually monitor weather systems within their field of view. Originally developed

by NASA, both systems have been operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA) since 1970.

NASA designed and built the Landsat system in the early 1970s. Landsat 1 (originally called the Earth

Resources Technology Satellite) was launched in 1972, followed by Landsat 2 and 3 in 1975 and 1978. All

three satellites carried a multispectral scanner (MSS) capable of a spatial resolution of 80 meters in four

spectral bands. The output of this sensor, transmitted to Earth, then corrected and stored, constitutes the

primary archival library of Landsat data, extending back to 1972. Landsat 4, which NASA launched in

1982, carries both the MSS sensor and the more powerful Thematic Mapper (TM), capable of 30 meters

resolution in 6 spectral bands, and 120 meters resolution in the near infrared. An identical Landsat 5 was

launched in 1984, after Landsat 4 began to experience technical difficulties. Both satellites still provide both

MSS and TM data, although Landsat 4 is limited in the amount of TM data it can transmit.

In the late 1970s, believing that the development of land remote sensing would fare better in the private sector, the Carter administration began to plan for the eventual transfer of the Landsat system to private ownership. The first stage in that process was to transfer the control over the system to NOAA. *

Transfer to NOAA was completed in 1984. The Reagan Administration decided early in its tenure to hasten the process of transfer to the private sector. In January 1984, the Department of Commerce released

a request for proposal (RFP) designed to solicit offers from private industry to own and operate the Landsat and any follow-on civilian remote sensing system.

Concurrently, Congress began to develop legislation to promote the transfer to private ownership and

operation. The goal of both efforts was to assist the private sector in developing a self-sustaining, commercial land remote sensing enterprise. The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 was signed

into law on July 17, 1984.

In October 1984, after examining a total of seven RFPs, the Department of Commerce accepted the

proposal of EOSAT, a new company formed by RCA and Hughes Aircraft Corp. However, EOSAT and

the Department of Commerce had difficulty reaching agreement on the terms of the subsidy. After considerable discussion, involving the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Commerce, and

Congress, the principals agreed on a government subsidy of $250 million for two follow-on Landsat satellites. The government agreed to launch Landsat 6 and 7 on the shuttle. In addition, the government also

contracted with EOSAT (for a fee) to operate Landsat 4 and 5 and to market the resulting data. However,

although Congress has generally supported the subsidy, the Reagan Administration has proved reluctant

to complete the subsidy payments to EOSAT, believing that the private sector should shoulder a greater

share of the burden of providing the data. Neither the 1987 nor the 1988 proposed budgets contained funding for the subsidy. EOSAT recently submitted a new proposal and a new budget to the Department of

Commerce, which calls for a cost increase of nearly $50 million. In addition, space transportation costs

will certainly be greater than earlier envisioned.

Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the United States will lose its leadership in

remote sensing from space if the civilian program is allowed to die for lack of funding. However, as of

May 1, 1987, the issue of funding for Landsat 6 and 7 had not been resolved. The lack of a U.S. civilian

system and the attendent value-added industry could seriously inhibit efforts by the U.S. media to make

serious use of data taken from space for newsgathering and analysis.

*For a more detailed account of the early steps taken to transfer the Landsat system, see U. S. Congress, OTA, Remote Sensing and the Private

Sector: Issues for Discussion-A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1984), pp. 20-23.
20

Photo credit: Copyright © 1987 EOSAT. Provided courtesy of EOSAT

New York City and Harbor, 1986. This image utilizes Thematic Mapper band 4 to differentiate

urban and rural features of the City and Harbor. The detail of the 30 meter sensor allows clear

definition of roadways, docks and ships in the Harbor, and the infrared illustrates parks and

grassy areas in brighter shades, as opposed to the dark areas of urban New York downtown.

panelists felt that neither of these conditions would

be repeated very often. 18

Should the media decide that, even with their

limitations, SPOT and EOSAT data were still valuable, they might negotiate special agreements for

receiving raw data on a rapid basis and undertake the expense of doing their own ground processing and interpretation. One panelist estimated

18It is useful to note that most of EOSAT’s Thematic Mapper tapes

have never even been processed to image format. The rate of data

collection (100 scenes per day) far exceeds the rate of scene processing (20 scenes per day).

EOSAT’s future business plans do include improvements that

would allow a turn around time from acquisition to finished product of only one week. Although this is a substantial improvement,

for most news stories, a delay of one week would probably be unacceptable.

that a fully operational ground receiving and processing facility might cost on the order of $10 million to $15 million. Even if the media invested in

their own ground processing facilities, they would

still not have solved the problems caused by the

limited global coverage and resolution of current

satellites.

There was considerable disagreement at the

workshop regarding the press’ ability to interpret

satellite imagery correctly. One panelist stated that

the media had done a poor job of covering Chernobyl and contributed to the general hysteria by

announcing that two reactors were on fire instead

of one. The panelist argued that any competent

analyst looking at the images would have recognized that:
21

—.. —

Photo credit Copyright 1987 EOSAT Provided courtesy of EOSAT

Chernobyl, U. S. S. R., on Apr. 29, 1986. The first image collected by satellite of the nuclear reactor

is ilIustrated using band 7 of the Thematic Mapper. The reactor facility (circled) and surrounding

agricultural areas are clearly illustrated and defined, and the still-burning reactor can be identified

by a bright pixel—whose digital evaluation helped the United States determine the correct status

of the reactor during the incident. Evaluation of infrared and thermal imagery of the reactor

cooling pond also confirmed U.S.S.R. reports of plant shutdown and startup.

. . . nuclear powerplants must have cooling ponds

and effluents and no one looked at the imagery

to say, “where is the effluent for the second

reactor?”

Another panelist countered that it was one thing

to say that:

. . . any idiot knows that a nuclear reactor has

an effluent pond, but what makes the problem

hard is that you don’t know which idiot to hire.

If you’re going to do lots of stories about nuclear

reactors you hire people who know that nuclear

reactors have effluent ponds. If, on the other hand,

you are going to have a lot of stories about forest

degradation you need to have people who know

It was clear from the workshop discussion that

if the media intend to use satellite imagery extensively they must solve the interpretation problem.

This would mean either hiring photointerpreters

—much as they now hire meteorologists—or relying on outside contractors (the so-called “value-

-added” industry) to turn the raw satellite data into

newsworthy information. At present, the value-

-added industry is small and, like the commercial

remote sensing companies, is not organized to respond to the needs of the news media. But, as one

panelist pointed out, a news organization’s most

important asset is its credibility. Most panelists

thought that the industry would be able to solve

the interpretation problem once it had more exa lot about forests. perience with the technology.
22

Assuming the media could arrange to receive

most data in a timely fashion and arrange for their

interpretation, it might still be difficult to get assured access to politically sensitive data. Government support and control of the two existing commercial systems and the operational independence

of the foreign ground stations create at least the

possibility that governments could, on occasion,

prevent politically sensitive data from reaching

the media.

Both EOSAT and SPOT rely on foreign ground

stations to collect data when the satellite cannot

communicate with earth stations in the United

States or France. The owners of the Earth stations

pay an annual fee which allows them to collect

the data from their region and sell it. The Earth

station owners pay royalties on sales of the regional data. In the case of the Landsat Earth stations, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

is between the U.S. Government (with NOAA [the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] as the U.S. representative) and the foreign

government. Under the U.S. MOUs, foreign ground

stations are supposed to provide nondiscriminatory access to all purchasers. In practice, however, the ground stations can refuse to sell data,

delay the shipment of data, or deny that data even

exist .19 The only recourse after a ground station’s

refusal to honor the “nondiscriminatory access”

clause of their contract is for the U.S. Government to terminate service to that ground station.

This would mean a loss of the annual fee ($600,000

in the case of the U.S. MOUs) and, given the unreliability of on-board tape recorders and the uncertain status of NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS),20 the potential loss

of a great deal of data.

All of these problems notwithstanding, perhaps

the biggest difficulty the media have with current

systems is their limited resolution. Neither EOSAT

19When a buyer asks EOSAT for data that were collected by a

foreign ground station, EOSAT must request that the foreign ground

station sell EOSAT those data. One panelist pointed out that certain countries were notorious for refusing to release data. For example, the panelist said that it was very difficult to purchase data from

India, particularly if they contained scenes of the India/Pakistan

border.

20It is important to note that, as a result of the cost, complexity,

and limited access to TDRSS, EOSAT does not have plans to include TDRSS communication packages on its next two satellites.

nor SPOT has plans to provide the very high resolution sought by the news media. Several panelists

pointed out that focusing on high resolution was,

in some respects, misleading—the question is not

what is the best technology the media can buy,

but rather, what does the media need? If the media’s primary use of satellites is to show a typhoon

in Bangladesh, a volcano in Hawaii, or an oilspill

off the coast of England, then there is no reason

to incur the costs associated with very high resolution. If, on the other hand, the media wish to

count tanks in East Germany or show the effects

of street rioting in South Africa, then the news

media would probably want the highest resolution they could afford.21

Other panelists suggested that the media had

yet to make innovative use of the available lowresolution imagery. “Spatial resolution is only part

of the game, ” cautioned one panelist, “We are only

beginning to understand spectral [see box C] differences. ” Because different objects reflect light differently, certain objects are identifiable even though

they are smaller than the spatial resolution of the

sensor. For example, a road or a river might be

less than 10 meters wide and yet still appear on

an image of 30 meter resolution if the road or river

reflected light in a substantially different manner

than the surrounding area. One panelist recalled:

When we looked at the high spatial resolution

data from Chernobyl it was hard to tell how

many reactors were damaged, but on the spectral data the fact that one reactor was burning

popped out immediately.

Another panelist cautioned that, although spectral differences were important, when EOSAT

brought back images of China, the Great Wall was

not visible in certain spectral bands because the

Wall was made from, and therefore reflected light

in the same wavelength as, the surrounding rock.

Panelists agreed that each system has its own specific strengths and limitations, and that to date,

the media had not used the available images creatively.

21It is interesting to note that of all the remote sensing images used

in Aviation Week and Space Technology— including many mages

of the Soviet Union and of Soviet technology—the images that generated the most sustained interest were those of the Mount St. Helens explosion. Several panelists predicted that the media would find

a large demand for satellite images of major natural events.
23

Implement Mediasat Concept

If the media should decide that satellite imagery

was very valuable, but that the operating procedures of the current commercial systems were too

rigid or that access to high-quality data could not

be assured, then the media might be driven to develop their own system. The exact nature of this

system would be the product of two important

considerations. First, the media would have to decide on the appropriate level of technology, which

would include, but not be limited to, a choice of

the resolution of the sensors to be used (e.g., 5

meter, 3 meter, etc. ) Second, the media would have

to decide how much they could afford. These two

considerations are very closely related.

If a mediasat is to become a reality, the news

media must be able to assess the value of both

current satellite images and successive technical

improvements. As a result of the media’s inexperience using satellite imagery, the uncertainties

regarding the present market for data, and the lack

of credible cost estimates for high-resolution imagery, deciding how good is “good enough” is a

difficult task. During the workshop, several participants suggested that 5 meter resolution might

meet the needs of the news media. Yet, when one

panelist illustrated the effect of increased resolution by showing 10 meter and 5 meter images of

Washington, D. C., several panelists were noticeably unimpressed. “You say that 5 meter resolution will produce good pictures, ” commented one

participant, “1 still say it’s a source story [see box

E]. You show that picture and you will have people saying: ‘What is this? You’re telling me this

is Washington? It looked to me like New York. ’ “

Another panelist, familiar with satellite imagery

countered that, “You ought to take a look at this

under a magnifying glass. There is a great deal

more information in this 5 m picture than in the

10 m picture. ” This interaction highlighted one

of the basic dilemmas facing the news media—

how to assess the value of increased information

when that information can be transmitted to the

consumer only imperfectly .22

ZZFo]]oW,ing the workshop, OTA received a letter from Earl S,

Merrit, Vice President of EarthSat, a corporation specializing in the

“value-added” business of imagery processing. The letter, which called

into question the value of even very high resolution imagery, stated:

[T ]he satell~te-acquired Information WII[ always be source” material

even If the resol ut]on was I meter due to [ the need for expert ]nterpreIf cost were not a consideration, the media might

want the highest resolution pictures they could

get, but costs rise dramatically as resolution increases. This results, in part, from the fact that

the data rate23 rises as the inverse square of the

resolution. This means that, assuming the satellite is covering the same area, as resolution improves from 10 meters to 5 meters, the amount

of data that must be collected, transmitted, and

processed increases by a factor of 4. Similarly,

improving the resolution to 2.5 meters would increase the original 10 meter data rate by a factor

of 16. This led some panelists to conclude that

data rate could influence the ground segment costs

for the mediasat system more than any other

single element .24

Panelists cautioned that although increased data

rate was a “problem, “ it was possible to identify

some potential solutions. Data rate, it was argued,

could be greatly diminished by using the satellites

to take pictures of specific, pre-identified events

(e.g., an oil tanker beached on the California coast,

a hijacked airplane sitting on the tarmac in Tripoli),

rather than taking pictures of the entire Earth and

then sifting through the raw data in the hopes of

finding “news. ” In addition, data compression

techniques could be used to greatly diminish the

data flow problem .25

tation ]. This fact would seem to provide a ‘ damper” on the network

use of such source material since the number of “experts” in interpretation is limited. Thus, I see the networks eventually using the “source”

to highlight a story but not to provide the bottom line. . . humanintelligence gathering “journalism’ will continue to dominate news

gathering.

23Data rate refers t. the flow of information about the picture

“seen” by the satellite’s sensor. At higher resolutions the pictures

are more detailed and therefore contain more information. In order

to transmit more information about the same scene in the same time

period, the data rate must increase.

24EOSAT’s 30 meter TM sensor has a data rate of 85 million bits

per second (MBPS), The data rate for a 5 meter mediasat with the

same swath width would be 3,060 MBPS, By narrowing the swath

width (therby reducing the coverage) and using data compression

techniques, the data rate could be reduced to the 100 to 150 Mbps

range. Even this much reduced data rate would require more sophisticated data systems in both the sensor and the satellite than

we now possess.

25Data compression is a process that reduces greatly the amount

of data which must be transmitted from the spacecraft to the ground

station. Although there are many data compression techniques, most

operate by reducing or eliminating the redundancy that is inherent

in raw data, Where the quality of the resulting image is to be judged

by subjective criterion such as visual appearance—as may be the

case with media images—the transmitted data need only be sufficient to construct a facsimile of the orginal data. Under these

circumstances—and depending on the amount of redundancy in the

data–compression ratios of more than a factor of 2 could be achieved.
24

Photo credit Copyright © 1987 CNES Provided courtesy of SPOT Image Corp, Reston, V A

Baltimore city and Baltimore harbor. Ten meter panchromatic image taken by the SPOT satellite.

Increased data flow was not the only problem

identified by the panelists. One technical expert

noted that while a 5 meter sensor could be flown

on a “host” satellite or a relatively inexpensive satellite bus, at very high resolutions, spacecraft stability becomes a problem. Therefore, flying a sensor of 3 meter resolution or better would require

a more sophisticated and much more expensive

satellite. The combined effect of increased data

rate, more complex and expensive sensor systems,

and more rigorous demands on the satellite bus,

could mean that even slight increases in resolution could have a dramatic effect on costs. One

panelist estimated that an entire mediasat system

(i.e., sensors, satellite, communication links,

ground processing and distribution) with a 5 meter resolution might be obtained for as little as

$215 million for a one-satellite system. A comparable 1 meter system, on the other hand, might

require a multi-billion dollar investment. (See app.

A, table A-3, for alternative cost estimates. )

Throughout this discussion, panelists made clear

that cost, not the availability of advanced technology, was the limiting factor in achieving highresolution images. As one panelist put it, “3 meters

is do-able, just bring your checkbook. ”

One panelist argued that, in light of the financial resources of the television networks, the cost

issue was being exaggerated. He pointed out that

ABC “paid $309 million just to buy the rights to

the ’88 Olympics and will spend another $300 million to produce it. ” Others felt that the value of

such comparisons is doubtful, because such large

expenditures are made only in light of a carefully
25

Photo credit Copyright 1987 CNES Provided courtesy of SPOT Image Corp.. Reston, VA

Baltimore harbor area. Ten meter panchromatic image taken by the SPOT satellite.

calculated expectation that they will increase revenues at least as much.

The hard question, then, is “what value would

satellite images add to current news stories ?“ or,

more to the point, “what additional news stories

and revenue could be generated by the use of satellite imagery?” Obviously, satellite images would

not be useful in all of any given day’s news stories. Even assuming that ABC, CBS, NBC, and

CNN use one satellite image per evening every

day of the year, it is difficult to imagine how revenues could be generated to offset the cost of a

$215 million to $470 million satellite system. If

all four major networks used 1 satellite image every

night, this would mean that about 1,500 images

would be used every year, If one assumes that a

mediasat would cost approximately $215 million

to $470 million to build and launch, and another

$50 million to $75 million to operate over a period

of 5 years ($10 million to $15 million per year),

then the average cost over the 5-year period would

be $53 million to $1.09 million per year, Putting

these admittedly speculative figures together, one

concludes that each satellite image would have to

be worth about $35,000 to $73,000 to the networks (see app. A for cost assumptions). Given

that the average network news story is produced

for less than $5,000, it is hard to imagine how the

networks could justify this additional expenditure. 26

*’Several panelists felt that OTA cost and demand projections were

too pessimistic. One panelist stated:

I particularly want to challenge the assertion that each network

would not use images every day It reminds me only too well of the

similar statements made in the wake of the first Telstar feeds to

the United States from Europe and the confident predictions that there

was no possibility that such programming would ever become commonplace because the Intercontinental link would always be too costly.
26

There are ways that the news media might try

to reduce the cost of a mediasat system: they could

form a consortium—either domestic or international

—to share the cost, they could resell data to other

27 or, they migh t users to subsidize their own use,

wait until technical advances reduce the cost of

sensors, satellites, and launch vehicles.28 At present, it is unknown whether any of these measures,

or combinations of measures, would reduce the

cost of a mediasat to the point where it would be

economically viable today. Two points, should

however, be kept in mind: first, it is impossible

to estimate accurately the future demand for remotely sensed data; and second, simple calculations that compare the cost of a mediasat and potential mediasat revenues could be misleading. It

is difficult to describe the value of a press “exclusive, ” and, as banks have recently demonstrated

with their electronic teller machines, there is value

in providing new services .29

Some panelists expressed the view that interested governments should combine their resources

in an INTELSAT-like organization to ensure continued, cost-effective access to remote sensing data.

Inherent in this concept is the belief that a mediasat would not be economically viable even if

funded by a consortium of news agencies. In one

panelist’s opinion:

The money received from Chernobyl would

fit in a thin wallet. When will there be another

such accident located in a place where we cannot fly in with a good hand-held camera? An international governmental consortium is the best

way to ensure the continued availability of remote sensing data, It could begin to form when

EOSAT and SPOT get tired of throwing money

at the problem, when Congress takes GrammRudman-Hollings seriously, and when someone

27It is significant t. note that total remote sensing data sales between 1979 and 1984 only produced a little over $30 million. See:

“Landsat Data Users Notes,” No. 35, March 1986, p.7.

28Many of the technologies currently being investigated by the

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (i.e., inexpensive launch

vehicles, satellites, and sensors) could make mediasat a reality.

“One panelist, noting that the fortunes of the major networks

had been in decline recently, argued that a mediasat might be justified partly on the grounds that while a network might be able to

operate a mediasat, its affiliates could not do so on their own. Therefore, a network might want to operate a mediasat because it could

hold the network together, thereby preserving other revenues.

sees other countries as a set of partners eager to

help share costs, and more importantly, help promote the use of [remote sensing] systems.

Finally, it should be noted that some experts

see “mediasat” as one aspect of a more profound

transition of the news networks from the status

of news providers to a much broader role in the

information industry. As one panelist noted:

It is my belief that the largest market for

medisat data will not be the news divisions but

rather the secondary markets. Media companies

will sell the interpreted data to buyers around

the world . . . and will change their structure to

become huge value-added entities . . . The media [will never] be able to spend the amounts of

money for a mediasat without aggressively opening new markets around the world.

Should the networks undergo the radical transformation foreseen by this panelist, the assumptions and conclusions of this technical memorandum would have to be similarly modified. The

likelihood and prospects of such a transformation

are beyond the scope of this technical memorandum. Box G and tables 2 and 3 provide information on many of the possible uses for remotely

sensed data beyond newsgathering.

Table 2.—Remote Sensing Data Needs of

Domestic Users

Foreign and

Agriculture (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling areas chosen according to the crop; time-dependent

data related to crop calendars and the weather patterns

Forestry (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling

areas; twice per year at preselected dates

Geology and nonrenewable resources (Federal, State,

and private): wide variety of areas; seasonal data in addition to one-time sampling

Civil engineering and /and use (State and private): populated areas; repeat data required over scale of months

or years to determine trends of land use

Cartography (Federal, State, and private): all areas; repeat

data as needed to update maps

Coastal zone management (Federal and State): monitoring of all coastlands at selected dates depending on local seasons

Pollution monitoring (Federal and State): broad, selected areas; highly time-dependent needs both for routine

monitoring and in response to emergencies

Newsgathering (private): selected areas; highly time-dependent needs in response to fast breaking news stories

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment
27

Box G.—Remote Sensing and the Public Interest

U.S. land and meteorological remote sensing systems have from the beginning been intended to serve

the public interest, whether primarily for research, as in the case of the Landsat system, or for operational

weather forecasting and severe weather warning, as in the case of the meteorological satellite systems.

The Landsat system has demonstrated to a small but dedicated group of customers, both inside and

outside the government, that satellite data can be highly effective in meeting their resource information

needs. Land remote sensing systems serve a wide variety of data users (table z), most of whom require

satellite data of 10 to 100 meters resolution on time scales of weeks to months. However, the agricultural

community and those who monitor the courses of natural and manmade disasters have need for data on

a more timely basis.

It is clear from examining table 3 that the public interests and those of the media are often synonymous. Data from a mediasat could make an important contribution in warning of and assessing natural

and manmade disasters, as well as in managing disaster recovery.

The value-added industry has developed a number of techniques for converting data to information

that would serve the public good. Some of these would be of interest to the media:

. use of time lapse images to compare scenes over time;

. overlay of black and white imagery with spectral imagery to bring out features not visible in either;

. use of ground-based images to illustrate features close-up; and

● using stereo pairs to generate three-dimensional images from different perspectives.

As one expert on photointerpretation and remotely sensed imagery has pointed out:

. . . remote sensing technology, properly applied, could save countless lives and billions of dollars in property

damage each year. Few outside the military and intelligence [communities] are aware of this resource. Fewer

still know how to interpret that technology and even fewer know how and when to apply it. Yet it is the same

technology with which the United States monitors SALT and the Middle East Truce Agreement, observes and

predicts crop yields in the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, Argentina, and India, and assesses damage caused

by such catastrophes as the Italian, Guatemalan, and Alaskan earthquakes.

. . . If existing multisensory imagery had been analyzed, the plight of $150,000,000 in Ethiopia and other African

countries could not only have been predicted, but actions taken before disaster struck. *

● Dino Brugioni, Air Force Magazine, October 1985.

Table 3.—Summary of Applications of Landsat Data in the Various Earth Resources Disciplines

Agriculture

forestry and

range resources

Discrimination of

vegetative types

Crop types

Timber types

Range vegetation

Measurement of crop

acreage by species

Determination of

range readiness

and biomass

Determination of

vegetation vigor

Determination of

vegetation stress

Determination of soil

conditions

Determination of soil

associations

Assessment of grass

and forest fire

damage

Land use and

mapping

Classification of land

uses

Cartographic mapping

and map updating

Categorization of land

capability

Separation of urban

and rural

categories

Regional planning

Mapping of transportation networks

Mapping of landwater boundaries

Mapping of wetlands

Geology

‘Recognition of rock

types

Mapping of major geologic units

Revising geologic

maps

Delineation of unconsolidated rock and

sods

Mapping igneous intrusions

Mapping recent volcanic surface

deposits

Mapping land forms

Search for surface

guides to mineralization

Determination of

regional structures

Mapping linears

(fractures)

Water resources

Determination of

water boundaries

and surface water

area and volume

Mapping of floods

and flow plains

Determination of aerial

extent of show and

snow boundaries

Measurement of glacial features

Measurement of sediment and turbidity

patterns

Determination of

water depth

Delineation of irrigated fields

Inventory of lakes

Oceanography

and marine

resources

Detection of Iiving

marine organisms

Determination of turbidity patterns and

circulation

Mapping shoreline

changes

Mapping of shoals

and shallow areas

Mapping of ice for

shipping

Study of eddies and

waves

Environment

Monitoring surface

mining and

reclamation

Mapping and

monitoring of

water pollution

Detection of air

pollution and

its effects

Determination of

effects of

natural disasters

Monitoring environmental effects of man s

activities (lake

autrophication

defoliation,

etc.)

SOURCE N M Shwt P D Lowman Jr and S C Freden Msslon (O Earl/i Landsaf 14ews Me Wor/d NASA Sclentlflc and Twhnlcal Office 1976
28

Photo credit Copyright © 1987 EOSAT Provided courtesy of EOSAT

Portion of Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper image showing Augustine Volcano, Alaska during eruption on Mar. 27, 1986. Band 4,

i n the near infrared, clearly defines snow/cloud area from surrounding vegetation and terrain, with 30 meter ground resolution.
29

—

Photo credit Copyright : 1987 EOSA T Prowded coo lrtesy of EOSA T

The 120 meter thermal band on the Thematic Mapper displays the hot flow at the north end

of the Augustine Volcano through the smoke and cloud cover. By combining the spectral bands

of the Thematic Mapper, the clarity of 30 meter resolution

is complemented by thermal information,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

So far, this paper has examined the desirability

and feasibility of a mediasat from the perspective

of the press. It is also important to examine the

U.S. Government’s interests, attitudes, and concerns regarding this concept. The remainder of this

technical memorandum will focus primarily on

the tensions that are certain to develop between

this Nation’s commitment to freedom of the press

and its commitments to current national security

and foreign policies. As one author framed the

problem:

In a robustly pluralist society such as ours, free

speech is easy to accept and to enjoy, and in a

hostile, potentially lethal international environment such as the one in which we live, national

security seems a fundamentally worthwhile pursuit. The difficulty lies in making tradeoffs.30

In the preceding discussion, this technical memorandum concluded that, in the near-term, the high

cost of gathering and processing satellite imagery

would inhibit the news media’s attempts to establish a mediasat. Nonetheless, in the long run, the

media are likely to continue using satellite imagery

and gain access to increasingly sophisticated remote sensing technology. Accepting this fact, the

United States will eventually have to balance the

guarantees of free speech and the need for national

security with respect to media use of remotely

sensed data from spacecraft.

National Security Concerns

Experts generally agree that the media’s extensive use of high-resolution satellite imagery for

newsgathering could complicate certain U.S. national security activities and certain U.S. foreign

policies. They also agree that this Nation’s strong

and unwavering commitment to the principle of

freedom of the press has served it well. The task,

therefore, is to balance these two fundamental concerns. As the following discussion illustrates, the

arguments on both sides of this issue are strong

and clear choices are few.

Participants identified and discussed five sets

of national security and foreign policy concerns

during the workshop.

JoPau] 0. Stephens, T& First Amendment and National Security,

Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia, vol.

1:2, May 1984, p. 1.

30

1. Dissemination of Information Concerning

U.S. Military Operations

Some panelists expressed the concern that, without adequate oversight of a mediasat, the media

might disclose information concerning U.S. military operations under circumstances that could

result in casualties and/or frustrate U.S. objectives. The disclosure by the media of information

concerning U.S. troop movements, shipments of

materiel, or the location or heading of ships and

cargo planes could deprive U.S. troops of the element of surprise—a critical tactical advantage in

fast-paced, modern warfare.

The most common media response to such allegations is that, although a mediasat could provide a substantial new source of data, the media’s

extensive contacts and information sources within

the United States and around the world already

provide the press with real-time information concerning fast-breaking news stories. “The system

leaks like crazy anyway,” asserted one panelist,

“I find it hard to get excited over the incremental

damage that a mediasat could do. ” The media are

also quick to assert that their past record is a good

one. Where lives were at stake or serious national

security issues in question, they argue that the news

media have acted responsibly, often refusing to

release information that would seriously prejudice

national security .31

One media representative said that in 1986, his

network’s correspondent was flying in a chartered

airplane and saw the U.S. fleet turn south towards

Libya hours before the United States’ retaliatory

bombing. Although this information was radioed

to the network affiliate in Rome and then passed

back to the United States:

We did not go on the air with it because we

realized that specific lives were in jeopardy , . .

~lA1though the workshop participants generally accepted the Proposition that the news media acts responsibly, a minority of experts

and media pundits have argued the opposite. For example, analysts

at Accuracy in Media, Inc. (AIM), have argued generally that the

media’s “policy of publishing sensitive information . . . may jeopardize the lives of innocent peopIe. ” (See: “AIM Report, ” July-A,

1985, No. XIV-13, p.1) The media have been criticized for speculating about sensitive programs such as the launches of classified DOD

payloads on the Space Shuttle. More recently, the media were criticized because some felt that they were putting the lives of the Beirut

hostages in danger by speculating on the nature of U.S. efforts to

free them.
31 — — —

It is our policy that when there is a specific issue

of life or death we will not broadcast that informat ion.

Another panelist commented that although the

network’s restraint in the Libyan incident was commendable:

I assume you don’t have fancy cryptographic

communication equipment; therefore, you gave

Libya the message when you radioed it from the

airplane to the ground station.

This comment identifies two important problems:

1. the media have only a limited ability to protect sensitive information even if they desire

to do so; and

2. the national security community may have

to rely on the press’ restraint to withhold information that once was under the control

of the national security community.

Some media experts argue that a “newsgathering” satellite would work to the advantage of the

United States by providing additional reconnaissance capability. It would be more difficult for

nations to cheat on treaties or hide hostile activities if faced with frequent overflights by both

media- and government-owned satellites.

2. Retaliation by Foreign Governments for

Media Disclosures

Recent world events have demonstrated the

strange symbiotic relationship that exists between

the U.S. Government and the U.S. news media.

The taking of media hostages in Beirut and the

arrest and detention of Nicholas Daniloff in

Moscow are just two examples of the willingness

of certain foreign governments to use the U.S. media as pawns in their struggle with the U.S. Government. Mediasat raises the opposite concern—

that the U.S. Government might be held responsible for the actions of the news media .32 Some

workshop participants expressed the concern that

~ZTh~ LJ S. Government accepted ]ega] responsibility for the actions of its citizens in space in the Outer Space Treaty (18 U,S. T.

2410: T, I.A. S, 6347). Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty states:

States shall bear mtemational responsibility for national actiw

I t]es In outer space whether such activities are carried on by go\, -

ernmental agencies or by non-go vernrnenta I entlt]es, and for assur-

]ng that nat]ona] actlvtt]es are earned out m conforn-uty wvth ( th]s)

Treaty The act]wt]es of non-governmental entitles in outer space

shal I requ]re au thorlzat]on and cont]nulng supervision by the appropriate State party to the Treaty

friendly foreign governments might retaliate by

expelling diplomats or closing valuable U.S. military bases should the press reveal information that

embarrassed or threatened the national security

of those nations. Governments already hostile to

the United States could resort to terrorism or direct armed aggression .33

Some panelists felt that this was neither a significant nor a novel issue, and that although countries might initially complain, eventually they

would accept a mediasat as they now accept

EOSAT and SPOT.34 The Soviets, one panelist

noted, had complained bitterly through diplomatic

channels when the magazine Aviation Week and

Space Technology first ran pictures of its launch

facilities at Tyuratam, but over the years their

complaints gradually ceased .35 Other panelists

took an uncompromising view of threats of foreign retaliation. They maintained that this issue

was one that should now and always be nonnegotiable by the U.S. Government as it lies at

the heart of the principle of freedom of the press.

One panelist commented hotly:

When the Soviets or other countries call and

say, “why aren’t you stopping that story on the

evening news, ” you say, “we can’t, and that’s the

difference between our country and yours. ”

3. Loss of Control During a Crisis

Advances in transportation and communication

technologies have made the world smaller and reduced the time available to leaders to make decisions. Although far from perfect, the communi330ne panelist pointed out that some nations already have, and

others may eventually have, the capability to destroy or incapacitate satellites of the types likely to have commercial value.

“For many years after the U.S. Landsat program began, many

developing countries claimed that a state should not be “sensed

without its prior consent. It is significant to note that the Principles

Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space (A RES 41 05,

Jan. 22, 1987), recently published by the United N’ations, omits an}

reference to prior consent. This is at least some indication that as

nations become more familiar with this technology and as the technology becomes more widely available, countries ~vil 1 cease t o regard it with suspicion.

‘sThe initial Soviet complaints resulted in part because this was

the first publication of such images and, in part, because of the ttming of the release. The pictures appeared immediately before the IQ7S

Apollo-Soyuz U.S. Soviet link-up in space and may have been

regarded by the Soviets as a violation of the “spirit of cooperation”

which both governments were trying to project to the world, One

panelist noted, however, that the Soviet’s ability to disable satellites was far less in 1975 than it is today.
32

. 

.

Photo credit’ Copyright L 1987 CNES. Provided courtesy of SPOT Image Corp , Reston, VA

Soviet nuclear testing facility, Semi palatinsk, U.S.S.R. Visible are cable scars and access roads

connecting with drill holes. Ten meter panchromatic image taken by the French SPOT satellite.

cation and information assets available to world “grace period” could be reduced to zero and that

leaders have allowed them to stay just ahead of world leaders would be forced to respond to press

breaking events. This small grace period has given reports on which they had little or no informaleaders time to plan and confer with advisors be- tion. One analyst noted that President Kennedy

fore being forced to make critical decisions that had 6 days to formulate a response to the discovcould lead to confrontation or conflict. As medi- ery that Soviet missile sites were being built in

asats become more capable, some fear that this Cuba. How might the President have handled this
crisis had he been forced by media disclosures to

respond to Congress, the press, and the American people within the first few hours?

During the workshop, participants put forward

two responses to this issue. The first was similar

to the response to the issue of dissemination of

military information; that is, that a mediasat

would provide only an incremental increase over

current capabilities. The sophisticated communication equipment now employed by the media already forces world leaders to respond in real-time

to breaking news. Second, no matter how advanced the media’s assets were, they could never

rival the sophistication and timeliness of the entire intelligence apparatus currently available to

the superpowers, of which satellites are only a

small part.

4. Providing Valuable Intelligence

to Third Parties

The United States and the Soviet Union still hold

a virtual monopoly on sophisticated, global reconnaissance data. These data are, for the most part,

jealously guarded, although in certain circumstances discrete portions of these data have been

released to aid allies or confound adversaries.

Some panelists expressed concern that mediasat

activities, by making satellite images more generally available, would erode this important U.S.

advantage. Workshop participants were unable

to reach consensus on either the dangers posed

by this potential erosion or the nature of the supposed advantages now enjoyed.

The issue seems to turn on the judgment that:

1) there exists a sizable set of issues about which

the United States and the Soviet Union would have

a common interest in withholding or controlling

the flow of information, and 2) the fact that Soviet reconnaissance systems could detect something does not necessarily mean that they have

detected it. Some panelists simply discounted the

importance of the first concern, stating that, “the

situations where the United States wants to conceal something from a third country that the

Soviets wouldn’t cooperate with would be few and

far between. ” In response to the second concern,

certain panelists noted that the likelihood that

commercial news gathering satellites would find

out things that the Soviets didn’t

was, “conceivable but extremely

33

already know

unlikely. ”

5. Dangers of Media Misinterpretation of Data

The previous section has already discussed the

problems that the media have had in interpreting

the satellite imagery they have already obtained.

Some panelists expressed fears that inaccurate

reporting—caused primarily by the strong pressure to “break the news"—could precipitate a crisis. For example, one expert recently wrote that:

[S]everal networks showed SPOT photographs

of the Soviet nuclear proving grounds at Semipalatinsk and claimed that the Soviets were preparing to resume nuclear testing. They showed

photos of what was described as a “drill site. ”

Looking at the photo, any competent imagery

analyst would have pointed out that the arrangement and the cable scars terminating at the site

would have proved that it was not a drill site but

rather an instrumentation site, common to all nuclear proving grounds.36

It is conceivable that similar media misinterpretations on more serious issues such as troop movements or arms control violations could seriously

disrupt international affairs, Some media experts

discount this concern, arguing: first, that as the

media continue to use satellite data they will grow

more sophisticated and become less prone to error; and second, the common practice of verifying

major stories with multiple sources of information should reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation,

One panelist felt that the media should be forced

to use a common pool of qualified analysts to ensure that image misinterpretation was kept to a

bare minimum. Most panelists strongly disagreed

with this suggestion, claiming that:

It’s part of the process of free speech to permit

and encourage diverse interpretation. Attempts

to limit interpretation will have a direct impact

on the American people’s ability to get information and make their own judgments.

7*D. A, Brugioni, Satellite Images on T\’: The Camera Can [.ie,

Washington post, Ilec IJ, IQ86, p. HI, co]. 1 .
34

The Effect of Foreign Remote Sensing

Systems on U.S. Policies

Within a decade, many nations will have their

own remote sensing systems. The U.S. Government cannot effectively limit or control media access to satellite imagery if foreign governments

do not exercise similar controls. At present, the

only non-U. S. commercial remote sensing system

is France’s SPOT. However, research-oriented remote sensing systems are currently under development by Canada, China, the European Space

Agency, India, and Japan. Japan launched its first

Marine Observation Satellite (MOS I) in February 1987. In addition, instruments flown on the

shuttle and on the proposed international space

station and its related polar platforms will supply

another source of high-quality data with potential media application. All these systems, even

those not considered “commercial,” add to the pool

of data available for exploitation by the media.

The almost assured proliferation of sophisticated remote sensing systems has caused many

analysts to question the practicality—except for

minimal launch vehicle and payload licensing37—

of attempting to regulate the media’s use of satellites to gather news. The most obvious means for

controlling a mediasat organization would be to:

1) allow the launch of only certain types of satellites (e.g., limit the type and resolution of sensors); 2) control what the satellite takes pictures

of in orbit; and/or 3) limit the flow of data from

the satellite to the end user. Disregarding for the

moment the constitutionality of any of these proposals, U.S. laws attempting to accomplish one

or more of these tasks would not be applicable

“Both the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984

115 U.S.C, 4201-4292] and The Commerical Space Launch Act [49

U,S. C. 2601-2623] require licensing for private systems operated

within the United States.

to foreign systems. As a result, U.S. news agencies could purchase data from, or invest in, foreign remote sensing systems. In the opinion of

some panelists, the only effect of U.S. limitations

would be to stifle a domestic mediasat industry.

Others argue that foreign remote sensing systems—either as a result of high costs, less sophisticated technology, foreign government policies,

or a simple lack of need for high-resolution images

—may have only limited capabilities .38 Therefore,

with minimum international coordination, U.S.

policies could substantially delay the time when

the media would have access to very high-resolution satellite images. The U.S. Government might

attempt to negotiate agreements39 with other countries regarding sensor resolution or data dissemination. Such agreements would certainly be opposed by the news media and, given the U.S.

commitment to both the freedom of the press and

the “open skies” policy, 40 it is not certain how much

support such agreements would find in either Congress or the executive branch.

38The option of a satellite owned by a U.S. entity but launched

under a foreign “flag of convenience, ” to evade U.S. Government

regulation appears to be foreclosed by the recent 7 national agreement not to export rockets that could serve as long-range missiles—

and therefore also rockets capable of launching satellites into polar

orbits, See John H. Cushman, Jr., “7 Nations Agree to Limit Export of Big Rockets, ” The New York Times, Apr. 17, 1987, p. 1.

Jgsuch an “agreement” could be a formal treaty or a more flexible

set of gentlemen’s agreements concerning topics such as sensor resolution or data distribution. COCOM is a current example of such

an informal agreement. COCOM coordinates the export control regimes of the member nations but COCOM agreements have no legal standing in any of its member nations.

413T0 reduce tensions between the United States and the Soviet

Union, President Eisenhower in 1956 suggested to the Soviets that

each country should allow the other to overfly its territory on a

regular basis. Although the Soviets rejected this suggestion as a transparent espionage device, the United States’ continued commitment

to the principle of “open skies” allowed it to support its later assertion that spaceborne reconnaissance was a peaceful activity. See:

Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth (New York: Basic

Books, Inc., 1985), p. 127.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first amendment provides that “Congress

shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . .

of the press. ” Since the adoption of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed

the depth and breadth of its commitment to these

few powerful words, even when confronted with

serious national security concerns. Although it

would be possible to write a treatise on the legal

issues that a mediasat could generate, this paper

is concerned with merely outlining the issues related to two narrowly drawn questions:

1. Are there restrictions that the government

could impose in the interests of national security that would pass constitutional muster?

2. Is the licensing scheme established in the 1984

Remote Sensing Act a reasonable exercise of

U.S. domestic and international responsibilities and is it consistent with the firs t

amendment ?

Mediasat Restrictions and

the First Amendment41

Before one can assess the constitutionality of

mediasat restrictions, it is important to consider

the legal status of newsgathering. In Branzburg

v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that newsgathering qualifies for some first amendment protection, because “without some protection for

seeking out the news, freedom of the press could

be eviscerated. ”42 But, the Court in Branzburg did

not say—and has never said—that newsgathering is due the same degree of protection afforded

traditional speaking and publishing activities. Indeed, the Court has upheld restrictions on newsgathering where reporters sought access to government facilities or government information not

generally available to the public .43 The degree of

protection ultimately granted to news gathering

activities will determine which restrictions the U.S.

i IThl~ paper discusses only the first amendment issues raised by

a mediasat. Media owned satellites would, of course, be subject to

all the domestic laws and regulations (e. g., Federal Communication

Commission regulations, Space Launch Act of 1984) that would apply to other satellites, In addition, treaties that have been signed

and ratified, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Liability Convention, are legally binding on private sector activities.

J2408 us, fjtjs, 681 ( 1$’72).

“See: Pen v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co,, 417 U.S. 843 (1974 ).

Government could properly place on a mediasat.

Unfortunately, until the Supreme Court has occasion to rule on this specific issue, it will not be

settled decisively.

As noted above, should the U.S. Government

desire to inhibit a media-owned satellite from

gathering potentially sensitive information it

could—either permanently or during a crisis—

attempt to limit: 1) the resolution of the satellites

sensors, 2) the images that the satellite is allowed

to collect, or 3) the images the media may disseminate. If news gathering is granted the highest

degree of first amendment protection, all such restrictions might well be regarded as impermissible “prior restraints” on free speech. The doctrine

of “prior restraint” holds that advance limitations

on protected speech may not be “predicated on

surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences

may result .“44 Prior restraints are allowable only

if necessary to prevent “direct, immediate, and

irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. ”45

If newsgathering is given full first amendment protection by the Supreme Court, U.S. Government

restrictions would have to meet the strict tests required of allowable “prior restraints. ” On the other

hand, should the Court decide that news gathering was deserving of some lesser degree of protection, the government would have considerably more latitude to limit mediasat activities.

But even if the government could not meet the

strict “prior restraints” test, it could still enforce

post-publication sanctions.46 Federal espionage

laws prohibit gathering or transmitting defense

information, photographing defense installations,

publishing or selling photographs of defense installations and the disclosure of classified infor44Justice Brennan concurring in, New York Times Co. v. United

States (The “Pentagon Papers” case), 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971 ). The

ruling in New York Times was a brief per curium decision, but each

Justice elaborated on his views in a separate concurring or dissenting opinion. See also: Near v. Minnesota, 283 U, S. 697 ( 1931),

“Justices Stewart and White, concurring, New York Times Co.

v. United States, Id.; To date, the only case which upheld a prior

restraint in this context is a 1979 decision by a U, S. District Court,

United States v. The Progressive, Inc. (467 F. Supp. 990 (W, D. Wis, ~).

In that case the court issued an injunction against a magazine that

was planning to publish a detailed description of hydrogen bomb

technology.

i~A]though they do not involve issues of “prior rfXtI’aint, ” postpublication sanctions must still be consistent with the first amendment.

35
36

— —

mation. 47 Should the media violate any of these

laws by disseminating satellite images, the government could—subject to the limitations of the

first amendment—prosecute those responsible.”

If the media do not own the satellite system,

but rather rely on a commercial company such

as EOSAT to provide it with data, it would be

less clear whether the media could successfully argue that licensing restrictions violate their first

amendment rights. Should the U.S. Government

ask EOSAT to stop distributing raw data for a

few days during a crisis and EOSAT agreed, the

news media might have a case against EOSAT for

breach of contract, but its case against the U.S.

Government for infringing its first amendment

rights would be less clear.

If the media were buying their data from a foreign satellite system and the foreign government

decided, for political or national security reasons,

to halt or delay delivery of the data, the media

would have no constitutional protections. They

might, of course, be able to proceed with a breach

of contract action.

The 1984 Landsat Act

Under current international law” and in consideration of valid concerns about the national

security50 and the public welfare,51 there seems lit47 18 U.S.C . 792 to 799.

48Most of these statutes require that the person taking the proscribed

action have “reason to believe” it would have a harmful impact.

This would raise a number of difficult issues. For example, would

it be a violation to include accidently a defense installation in a series of satellite photographs, or to include information that was not

visible to the media but which was visible to a foreign power using

sophisticated processing techniques?

4* Outer Space Treaty, Article VI, Supra, Note 32; Some authors

have suggested that a state’s responsibilities under article VI are extensive:

( W)hile no one would doubt the need for government control over

space activity at its present stage, Article VI would prohibit, as

a matter of treaty obligation, strictly private, unregulated activity

in space or on celestial bodies even at a time when such private activity becomes most commonplace Although the terms “authorization”

and “continuing supervision” are open to different interpretations,

it would appear that Article VI requires a certain minimum of licensing and enforced adherence to government-] reposed regulations. Manual of Space Law, Jasentuliyana and Lee (eds.) (Oceana Publishing,

1979), vol. 1, p. 17.

50A rocket that can put a payload into polar orbit can also deliver

a warhead to any point on the Earth. As with other technologies

on the Munitions Control List, the government has a valid interest

in closely monitoring foreign access to this technology.

51 Launch vehicles and payloads present a potentially extreme safety

hazard to the citizens of this and other countries. In addition to curtle doubt that the U.S. Government has the right,

and indeed, the duty, to exercise its supervision

over the space ventures of its citizens. In light of

these serious concerns, some form of licensing and

regulation is required. The question, then, is

whether the specific licensing system requirement

in the 1984 Landsat Act is a proper exercise of government authority.

Among its other provisions, the Landsat Act

requires those seeking an operating license to

“operate the system in such manner as to preserve

rent international law, common sense would dictate that the U.S.

Government should play some role in ensuring that launch activities and payload do not cause injury.

Box H.—Mediasat and Personal Privacy

The media’s rights under the first amendment

are not the only rights that a mediasat would call

into question. As remote sensing satellites become more sophisticated, it is possible that the

average person’s expectation of privacy could be

eroded. Satellites are currently capable of spotting certain crimes, such as environmental pollution. Eventually, satellites may be able to

perform other law enforcement functions such

as identifying and locating marijuana fields. In

the far future, satellites may be able to monitor

the activities of individuals.

Under current law, a person is protected against

publicity given to facts of his or her private life.

Although this “right of privacy” is sometimes

hard to define in specific terms, it seems clear that

its protections are reduced when a person appears in public. * Mediasat could alter the current understanding of what the law regards as

“appearing in public.” Recently, in Califoria v.

Ciraolo the Supreme Court decided that aerial

reconnaissance was an acceptable law enforcement technique and that activities taking place

in the defendant’s back yard were in “plain view”

even though they were surrounded by a 10 ft.

high fence.** Applying Ciraolo’s logic broadly,

one could argue that citizens have no right of

privacy for any activity that might be seen from

an airplane or by a satellite.***

● I. Hanson, L&+ and Related Torts, sec. 26o (1%9).

**106 S,ct. 1s09 (1966).

● ** Ctiaolo was a ahninal law caae involving a warrantless search.

The case’s reasoning may not be relevant to civil suits involving invasion of privacy.
37

and promote the national security of the United

States.” 52 Some attorneys53 have argued that the

licensing provision of the Landsat Act should be

declared invalid because these provisions are neither “susceptible of objective measurement,“54 nor

drafted with the “narrow specificity,”55 required

of statutes affecting first amendment interests.

Given both the government’s valid national

security interest in regulating the use of launch

vehicles and payloads, and the necessarily changing nature of national security concerns, it is dif-

“15 us c 4242(b )( 1 )

‘See: Robert J. Aamoth, ‘From Landsat to Nled}asat, ‘ An7enc.3n

Enterpnw, the 1.act’ and the Commer<lal [~se~ ot Space (\l’a>hingt[)n, [>(-. INatlonal LeKal Center tt)r the I’ublic Interest, 1Q8.5), vol,

II, P 1

‘h’e~]sh]~n I, ~o~rd of Regents, 385 [J. S 584, ~o~ ( l~b7 I

‘Hjne\ L .Ifajor of Oradell, 425 L’ S blO, IJ20 ( lQ7d i.

ficult to assess how courts might respond to this

argument. The references to national security in

the 1984 Remote Sensing Act are certainly very

general. However, a court might choose instead

to focus on the specific facts of each case or on

past Government actions in granting or denying

licenses. The court could also decide that the regulations supporting the statute are sufficiently specific to supply both the necessary “objective measurement” and “narrow specificity. ”

Should a court decide that the licensing provisions of the act were not invalid on their face, then

the news media might still argue that the government’s use of license denials or license-imposed

system limitations was unconstitutional. As discussed above, the freedom the government would

have to impose restrictions would be directly related to the court’s final determination of the constitutional status of news gathering activities.
Appendix A

The Technology of

Newsgathering From Space1

Stillman C. Chase, Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center; and

Matthew Willard, Earth Observation Satellite Co.

Introduction

Remote sensing of the Earth from space began in

1960 with the launch of the first TIROS weather satellite. The U.S. environmental satellite program has

since expanded to provide low-resolution, broad-scale

data from both low-Earth polar orbits and from geosynchronous orbit. These data have been widely used

by the media for more than two decades to illustrate

the form and motion of large-scale weather patterns.

Higher resolution multispectral images of the Earth

from space first became available to the civilian user

in 1972, when NASA launched the first Landsat satellite into a near-polar orbit. ’ That spacecraft carried

a sensor called a multispectral scanner (MSS), which

produced experimental data in four spectral bands that

could be used to aid cartography; agricultural inventories; mineral, oil, and gas exploration; and land-use

planning. The media have found these images of little

interest primarily because the data provide a spatial

resolution of only 80 meters (262 feet). Although the

images generated with MSS data reveal some cultural

features, including large road ways such as the interstate highways, and even large buildings, such as the

Pentagon, or the shuttle assembly plant at Cape Canaveral, the identity of smaller features cannot be discerned. 3 In addition, because the first three Landsat

spacecraft passed over the same longitude at the Equator only once every 18 days, and because the interval

between data collection and subsequent delivery to the

user (the turnaround time) could be as great as 2

months, any information they might have provided

was not timely enough for media use.

In 1982 NASA launched Landsat 4, which, in addition to the MSS, carried an improved sensor, the

Thematic Mapper (TM). When Landsat 4 began to fail

in 1984, an identical Landsat 5 was launched. Landsats 4 and 5 are still providing data from both MSS

and TM sensors, although the ability to transmit data

from the TM on Landsat 4 is limited. The TM is capa-

‘Thls appendix [s adapted from a paper ,Jrlglnally prepared t(,r the CITA

workshop on Newsgatherlng From Space

‘It wa~ then called Earth Resources Technology Satelllte (ERTS)

‘Ohlects lust below the Ilmlt of resolution, generally can be discerned as

oblec ts on the Images, but their ldentlt} genera]]}, cannot

ble of providing images of 30 meters (98 feet) resolution in seven spectral bands. The TM senses a swath

185 kilometers (115 miles) wide directly under the

spacecraft. Its relatively high resolution provides images that have already proved useful for news reporting. Data are sold in the form of computer-compatible

tapes or black and white or color photographs.

Each spacecraft crosses any particular longitude at

the Equator only once every 16 days, 4 which means

that its chance of passing over a part of the world in

which a newsworthy event is taking place is low. However, because Landsats 4 and 5 are 8 days apart in their

cycles, the two together can provide better coverage.

For example, although the TM of Landsat 5 was able

to provide an important image of the failed Chernobyl

reactor, it passed above Chernobyl on April 29, 3 days

after the first explosion, and could not return until Soviet technicians had extinguished the fire. In other

words, it was unable to monitor the detailed progress

of the fire, although it did show that the fire had been

extinguished. The thermal band on the TM demonstrated that only one reactor had burned. Eight days

later, Landsat 4 was able to acquire an additional image of the reactor site.

Over the years, 11 other countries (table A-1) have

built data-receiving stations. Landsat 4 and 5 are capable of transmitting data directly to these foreign stations when the satellites are within range, or transmitting data to Earth via the Tracking and Data Relay

Satellite System (TDRSS). Basic processing by the EOSAT Corp. corrects the data for geometric and radiometric distortions.

The Landsat system, which was originally developed

and operated by NASA, was transferred to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in

1983. 5 In order to transfer land remote-sensing technology to the private sector, the Federal Government

turned over operation of the Landsat system and marketing of its data to the EOSAT Corp. in December

4Because the Landsat orbit IS a polar orbit ]t can ‘ rewslt’ areas north ot

the Equator more often The exact number ot day’s between overhead passes

vanes accordln~ to latitude

‘NOAA assumed t~peratlonal resp{lnslb[l[t} f(,r the TNI ~ensor In 1Q84

39
40

Table A-1 .—Foreign Landsat Ground Stations

Actively receiving data (MOU signed with NOAA):

Australia

Brazil

Canada

European Space Agency (Sweden, Italy)

India

Japan

Thailand

Peoples Republic of China

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

Not presently receiving data:

Argentina

Pakistan (under construction)

Indonesia (no signed agreement)

Bangladesh (no signed agreement)

SOURCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

1985. ’ In return for a government subsidy of $250 million, ’ EOSAT was to build and operate Landsat 6 and

7. However, because EOSAT has received only part

of the agreed-upon subsidy, it has been forced to stop

construction of Landsat 6. The future of civilian land

remote sensing in the United States is in serious doubt.8

In February 1986, France successfully launched its

own system, called the Systeme Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre (SPOT). SPOT provides 20 meter

data in three spectral bands, as well as 10 meter panchromatic (black and white) imagery of Earth’s surface. Although the SPOT satellite recrosses the same

longitude only once every 26 days, its sensor is capable of viewing at an angle, or off-nadir, making it possible to gather images from a particular surface area

7 out of 26 days. ’

A Mediasat System

Although attention generally focuses on the sensors

and their capabilities, the imaging instrument itself

would be a small component of an overall satellite system capable of providing the data for media use. A

‘See U S Congress, Ottlce of Technology Awes\ merit, Land Remote Senslrrg and the h vate Sector; Issues for Ilkuss)on (Washington, DC L1 S

Government Printing Otflce, March 1984, for an extens]ve discussion of the

hlstorv behind transfer of the Landsat svstem , to the nrivate sector. See also

In ferrr’ationa] Cooperation and Competition in Civdian Space Actlvltles

{Washington, DC U S. Government Pr]nting Ottice, July 1985; and U.S.

Congress, ‘The Comrnerclallzation of Meteorologlca] and Land RemoteSensing Satellites, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources

Agriculture Research and Fnwronment and the Subcommittee on Space Science

and Appl icatlons ot the House of Representatives Committee on Science and

Techn{>logy, 1Q83 [Nc> 53]

‘Not inclu&ng launch co5t5, wh]ch were estimated to be $50 mllllon to $70

mllllon

“Theresa XJl Foley,, “Reagan Asked to Intercede To Save Landsat Program,

Av]at]orr Week and Space Technology, Apr 6, 1987, pp 29-30.

‘Note that viewing ob]ects at an angle causes the resolution to decrease

In addltlon, ob}ects In the shadow ot tall structures WIII generally not be wslble

remote-sensing satellite system consists of four major

tasks, each of which is critical to producing useful

images:

1. data acquisition—the spacecraft, sensors, and

transmitters;

2. data collection and delivery—the receiving station and other communication components; and

3. initial image processing; and

4. interpretative analysis.

In addition, a launch vehicle is required to place the

spacecraft in orbit.10

Media proponents of using remotely sensed data

have suggested the following key requirements:

● high spatial resolution (5 meters or less);

● sensors operating in at least three spectral bands,

or colors;

● frequent revisit of each area (1 to 2 days);

. relatively narrow field of view (10 to 15 miles); and

● quick delivery time to the media (24 hours or less).

For purposes of discussion, OTA has selected a baseline system capable of 5 meters resolution that would

satisfy most of the conditions the media say they need

for a mediasat (table A-2 and table A-3). For comparison, OTA also selected a less capable, but less costly

minimum system capable of 10 meters resolution that

could serve the interim needs of the media (table A-4).

The sensor and associated electronics of the second,

less capable system might be carried as an auxiliary

package on a large spacecraft similar to the Omnistar

satellite proposed by EOSAT. This step would allow

news agencies to gain experience with using remotely

sensed data in preparation for constructing a much

more capable, but more costly, baseline system.

‘Until at least 1090 the ablllt> c~f the IJnited States to launch paylt~acls

will be severelv constralneci The first fllght ot the refurbished \huttle mav

not take place betc~re late 1 ~88 [ n addlt Ion, because bulldlng an expendable

l~unch veh]cle takes 2 }ear~ t~r more e~en It a I,iunc her were (~rdered In kla}

lq87 It would not be ready until mld t[~ late 1484

Table A-2.—Moderate and High-Performance

Concepts Drive Sensor Cost

Concept Minimum Baseline

Push broom optics--- . . . . . . . . Refractive Reflective

Focal length/f-number . . 60 cm; f/4 212 cm; f/6

Resolution at nadir . . . . . . 10m 5m

Number detectors and

spacing . . . . . . . . . 512, 7μM 5,120, 15 m

Swath width at nadir. . . . . . 5 km 25 km

Pointing mechanics . . . . . . One axis One axis

gimbel gimbel

System power/data rate . . . 10-30W 50-100W

8.3 Mbps 166 Mbps

Sensor size (1XWX H) . . . . 30“ X 30” x30” 60” x30” x30“

Sensor weight . . . . ... . . <100 Ibs -500 Ibs

Sensor cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5-10 million $60-80 million

SOURCE Hughes Corp Santa Barbara Research Center
41

Table A-3.—Estimates of Baseline Mediasat

System Costsa

Component One satellite-system Two satellite system

Sensor $60-80 million $100-140 million

Launch $35-50 million $70-100 million

Spacecraft $40-50 million $70-90 million

Data collection

(TDRS with dual tape

recorders ) $40-50 million $70-90 million

Ground segment

(data capture facility

Image processing

spacecraft management

and control $40-50 million $40-50 million

Total $215-280 million $350-470 million

aToese are ‘oug;-pslfmates– based OP gereal Knowledge of #-hal such syslem; mlgfit cost They

dre 001 base~ or + pa fi(cular ~nglneerlng dewgr Es[lmates co not include insurance or operaf

,nq ~.osts

S(JL RCF Off Ice of Technology Asses~ment 1987

tive enough and lack the appropriate field of view. A

mediasat would require specialized sensors and optics

similar to those being developed for the next generation Landsat or SPOT systems (so-called multispectral

linear arrays). The sensor itself would be simpler to

build and cheaper than the TM, as it would have no

rapid scanning or cooled detectors.

For purposes of illustration, OTA has selected a goal

of 5 meters spatial resolution at the nadir. This represents a factor of 6 improvement (or a factor of 36 in

areal resolution) over the resolution of the TM, or a

factor of 2 (4 in areal resolution) over SPOT. However, in order to revisit a spot on Earth within 2 days

of overflight, the sensor must have the capacity to point

off-nadir by at least 45 degrees (figure A-1).11 Therefore, the sensor chosen in this design would be capaTable A-4.— Estimates of Low-Cost, Minimum

Mediasat System Costsa

Component One satellite system Two satellite system

Sensor $5-$10 million $10-$15 million

Launch Not applicable

Spacecraft

(Incremental marginal

costs) $2 million $4 million

Data collection

(Incremental marginal

costs) $2 million $3 million

Ground segment

(image processing) $10-$20 million $10-$20 million

Total $19-$34 million $27-$42 million

dTh,s ~onceot a~~”~es that (he sensor( 5 would fly as an acdlt(onal sensor Op d remote senw

satellite It also assumes that a ded!cated ground system would be necessary 10 process data

n a Umely manner These are only rouqh esflmates based or general knowleage of what such

systems might cost They are ~ol based on a particular englneerlnq design Cost esllma!es do

not include Insurance or operating costs

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1987

Data Acquisition

The Spacecraft.—A relatively small three-axis stabilized spacecraft, equivalent in capability to the spacecraft used for the polar-orbiting TIROS environmental

spacecraft, could serve the needs of a mediasat. It

would be flown in a near-polar, Sun-synchronous orbit having Equator crossing times in the morning when

shadows are generally strong to provide good image

definition. To achieve daily coverage, two spacecraft

would be flown.

Sensor Design. —High spatial resolution is the princi pal performance requirement for a mediasat. Neither

a conventional television camera nor a specialized highresolution (875 or 1,200 line) camera are capable of

serving as the mediasat sensors, even when fitted with

adequate optics, primarily because they are not sensi1‘By increasing the off-nadir pointing angle to 58 degrees, lt IS possible to

achieve one-day rewstt capabdity, However, the resolution ot the image would

be degraded to a rather large 34 meters. In addltlon the haze and obliquity

of the viewtng angle would further degrade the Image and reduce the photc~-

Interpreter’s abillty to dellneate details

Figure A-1 .—Mediasat Two-Day Repeat Coverage

With One Satellite

Earth coverage at ±45° from 705 km orbit

Ž Footprint is 5 m (16.4 ft) at nadir, 12.2 m (40 ft) at edge

of field (450,

● Swath is 25 km (15.5 miles) at nadir, 60 km (37.3 miles)

at edge of field

SOURCE Hughes. Santa Barbara Research Center
42

Figure A-2.—The Baseline System Has High Performance

● Image footprint grows with off-nadir view

45* off-nadir angle

 100

Off-nadir distance (miles)

SOURCE Hughes, Santa Barbara Research Center

ble of resolutions from 5 to 13 meters in off-nadir viewing (figure A-2), At high latitudes, this design would

allow daily coverage, because the ground tracks of the

sensor would overlap from day to day (figure A-2 and

figure A-3)

The choice of sensor resolution constitutes a critical

design compromise, for the costs of bettering the resolution increase at a nonlinear rate. A system achieving

5 meters resolution at 45 degrees off-nadir would have

to be capable of reaching nearly 2 meters resolution

at the nadir. However, the costs of providing a system

capable of resolving objects as small as 2 meters are

much greater than five-halves of the cost of a 5 meter

system, because improvements in the resolution or sensitivity of the sensors would also require substantial

improvements in the other parts of the system such

as the data transmission components (see below). Overall costs of the system therefore are extremely sensitive to the capability of the sensors.

For television use, and for additional analytical capacity, the media requires sensors capable of producing images in three spectral channels in order to present

a color image to the public. In addition, the sensor

would provide a panchromatic (black and white) band

having the same resolution but higher sensitivity in order to sense the Earth at low light level. A 25-km by

25-km instantaneous field of view (approximately a

15-mile by 15-mile image) would provide approximately 10 television screens of data in each satellite

image.

Spacecraft Management and Control.—Either at the

receiving station, the image processing facility, or some

One-axis gimbal

East-west pointing

 16”

aperture

reflecting telescope

other location, a facility would have to be built to communicate with the satellite. This station would support the receiving facility, overall mission management

and spacecraft scheduling, including sending commands to the spacecraft, as well as monitoring spacecraft health and status. A facility of this sort could cost

on the order of $20 million to $30 million.

Data Collection and Delivery

Rapid data delivery from the spacecraft to the media (approximately 6 to 8 hours) is essential for timely

media use. The collection and delivery system is composed of two major components: transmission to a receiving facility; and delivery to the processing facility.

Transmission From the Spacecraft .—The transmission components of the spacecraft would consist of a

sophisticated special-purpose computer for organizing

the sensed data, a transmitter, and pointable antennas

for transmitting data to a communication satellite or

directly to Earth. Here again, the costs of a remotesensing system increase much faster than the increase

in resolution. In particular, costs could increase by as

much as the inverse square of the resolution because,

as the pixel size decreases, the number of pixels in an

area increase by the square of the change in pixel size.

Thus, halving the size of the resolution element quadruples the number of pixels in the image. Improving

the resolution to 5 meters (and reducing the area covered in each image frame) could lead to transmission

data rates of 100 to 150 megabits per second (Mbps).

For comparison, the current TM data rate is 85 Mbps,
43

40

30

w

10

Figure A-3.— Mediasat Revisit Time Improves at Higher Latitudes

600 Field of regard

(1 ,957 miles)

\

I

Washington,

DC I

n. I I I I

16 Day repeat

for nadir view

 4 5

0 for (934 miles )

 30” for (540 miles )

 Mosco w

 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Latitude (degrees)

SOURCE Hughes, Santa Barbara Research Center

and the SPOT sensors approximately 50 Mbps. However, data compression techniques used on the spacecraft could reduce the data rate well below 100 Mbps.

Data Collection.—Remote-sensing systems have

used three different methods for collecting global imagery from polar-orbiting satellites:

1. a system of ground stations spread around the

world,

2. the NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

(TDRS), or

3. tape recorders onboard the satellite to store data

until they can be transmitted to a single Earth

receiving station located on home territory.

A Worldwide System of Earth Receiving Stations.—

In developing the Landsat system, the United States

encouraged other nations to build and operate their

own data-receiving stations (table A-l). In part this

was an attempt to spread the use of remotely sensed

data to countries where conventional map and aerial

photographic techniques were limited. These stations

have also supplemented the acquisition of data from

the Landsat series of satellites, which have either carried tape recorders or a TDRS transmitter. For a fee,

EOSAT transmits data from the Landsat satellite as

it passes within range. In return, these stations are

licensed to sell data to customers, but must provide

it on the same nondiscriminatory basis as EOSAT.

However, because these stations are under the control

of foreign governments, in practice customers have

sometimes experienced considerable delays in receiving requested data.12 This fact, and the considerable

cost inherent in receiving timely data from a scattered

set of receiving stations, make this option infeasible

for a mediasat system.

The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite .—TDRS consists of two or three satellites in geosynchronous orbit

and a single Earth receiving station. The TDRS relays

data from the remote-sensing spacecraft to NASA’s

TDRS reception facility at White Sands, New Mexico. From there the data can be re-transmitted via a

domestic communications link to a processing center.

Using a system like TDRS allows a remote-sensing satellite to avoid reliance on onboard tape recorders or

“Interviews with NOAA oli]clals, 1985, Workshop paper by Peter Fenci

ocean Earth Corp , 1986.
44

foreign ground receiving systems. EOSAT currently

uses the TDRS system on a limited basis for collecting Landsat data of areas outside of the footprint of

EOSAT’s data capture facility at the Goddard Space

Flight Center.

Use of TDRS has several major drawbacks. First,

the annual cost for this service varies according to the

volume of data transmitted, and could reach $5 to $6

million per year. In addition, using the TDRS system

requires adding a TDRS communication package to

the spacecraft at a cost of approximately $25 million.

Second, because only one TDRS is currently operating, imagery cannot be relayed from the Far East or

Pacific Basin. A second TDRS is on the manifest of

the first shuttle scheduled to fly after shuttle flights are

resumed. 13 This will provide global coverage except

in a narrow zone of exclusion over India. However,

the currently operating TDRS has developed technical problems that may shorten its lifetime.

The third, and potentially most serious, drawback

is that because TDRS was developed primarily to serve

NASA and DOD missions, it operates on a priority

basis. Many of the system users have much higher priority than a private sector corporation would have.

Thus, during flights of the space shuttle and some DOD

space missions, the media might have little or no access to TDRS.

Tape Recorders. —Tape recorders can be used to

store data on the spacecraft until they can be transmitted to Earth. A space-rated tape recorder of the necessary data capacity currently costs about $5 million.

A fully redundant system would require three tape

recorders per satellite. Each tape recorder weighs about

150 pounds, and therefore also substantially increases

the weight of a spacecraft.

A receiving station is most effective when located

at a northern latitude so the data capture facility is

within transmission range of the satellite more often.

For instance, the receiving station EOSAT plans to

build in Norman, Oklahoma, will “see” about 34 minutes of data per day. A facility in Fairbanks, Alaska,

would “see” approximately 80 minutes of data per day

and therefore be able to receive substantially more

data, more frequently. A data-receiving station might

cost as much as $10 million.

A tape recorder system would be completely selfsufficient and the capital and operating costs would

be quite a bit less without the cost of the TDRS communication package. However, space-rated tape re13The first shuttle IIlght is scheduled to occur in spring 1988, but maY be

delayed unt]l late 1Q88 or possibly early 1989

corders capable of high data rates have proved unreliable in the past and have failed, or suffered operational

limitations, before the sensors failed. Moreover, in

some instances there would be delays in transmitting

data to the media, depending on the area of interest

being imaged and the time at which the satellite next

comes in view of the receiving station. Even at northern latitudes, for example, delays in transmitting data

to the receiving facility could be as much as 5 to 6

hours. Generally, most of these time delays would be

tolerable.

Delivery to the Image Processing Facility.—Once

collected, the data must be re-transmitted to the mediasat data processing facility where the raw data could

be transformed into usable images for television and

newspapers. Because the data would need to be transmitted quickly for media use, it is likely that they would

be sent via a domestic communication satellite. A dedicated transponder for this purpose would cost about

$2 million per year.

Image Processing

The cost and complexity of the processing system

depends on a variety of factors, including data rate,

the number of scenes to be processed per day, and the

speed with which data would need to be turned into

images usable by the media. These and other desired

data processing requirements must be considered before a detailed cost estimate of the image processing

facility can be made, A fully operational ground

processing facility might cost on the order of $10 to

$15 million.

Image Interpretation

Obtaining the image is only the first step in the

process of making use of imagery from space. The images are often of very little use until they are integrated

with other data, enhanced, and analyzed by expert

photo-interpreters. For example, computer processing

may make it possible to improve the image’s resolution, or to analyze one of the color bands for particular information. In the civilian realm the need for such

expertise in oil, gas, and minerals exploration; crop

assessment; land planning; map making; or archaeological research” has encouraged the development of

an industry (the so-called value-added industry) to

make the data more useful. The media will have to

rely on experts from the value-added industry to interpret mediasat images for the public.

“U.S. Congress, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Technologies for I’reh~storic and H~storic Preservation, OTA-E-319 (Washington, DC U S

Government Printing Office, September 1986)
Appendix B

Media Access to and Use of Remote

Sensing Data: A Legal Overview*

Rita Reimer, Congressional Research Service

The Constitutional Status

of Newsgathering

Although the Supreme Court stated in Branzburg

v. Hayes, a 1972 journalists’ privilege case, that “[it

is not] suggested that news gathering does not qualify

for first amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press

could be eviscerated, [,]"1the Court has not yet decided

whether newsgathering activities receive the same constitutional protection as traditional speaking and publishing activities. The only Supreme Court cases that

address this issue per se involve media access to prison

inmates, and thus are not directly analogous to a

mediasat.

In two 1971 companion cases, Pell v. Procunier 2 and

Saxbe v, Washington Post Co., 3 the Court rejected

arguments that the first amendment guaranteed the

press the right to interview individual prisoners. (The

press had argued that they had a constitutional right

to interview any willing inmate, which could only be

abridged if prison authorities made an individualized

determination that interviewing a particular inmate

would constitute a clear and present danger to prison

security or another substantial interest of the prison

system. )

This decision was affirmed 4 years later, in Hou -

chins v. KQED,4 a 3-I-3 decision that indicated that

the press should at times be given preferential treatment, including under the circumstances presented in

that case (where television station KQED sought access to a local jail to document allegedly unsafe and

unhealthy conditions).

The Pell v. Procunier Court cited with approval the

following statement from Zemel v. Rusk, < a 1965 case

that upheld the right of the State Department to refuse

to issue passports for travel to Cuba under specified

circumstances:

There are few restrictions on action which could not

be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased information flow, For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information

he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the

country is being run, but that does not make entry

into the White House a First Amendment right. The

right to speak and publish does not carry with it the

unrestrained right to gather information.

Again, none of these cases are analogous to a mediasat situation where various companies and organizations are likely to launch such satellites or attempt to

utilize government civilian satellites on a space-available basis. Denying the press access to such activities

would seem clearly to run counter to these cases.

U.S. restrictions on newsgathering are less likely if

the U.S. media should choose to buy its data from foreign remote sensing systems such as the French SPOT.

Here the issue is not the constitutionality of such attempts but rather their practicality. In the absence of

an intergovernmental agreement, U. S. laws could not

be used to influence the data acquisition practices of

foreign governments.

A more difficult problem is presented in attempting

to determine what restrictions could properly be placed

on use of the information that is so acquired.

The Doctrine of Prior Restraint

The doctrine of “prior restraint” holds that, except

in extraordinary situations, any procedure used to suppress protected speech must rely on a post-publication

sanction rather than on a pre-publication restriction.

The leading case in point is Near v. Minnesota, ’ a 1931

decision that struck down an injunction barring publication of a local newspaper, which had been adjudged

a public nuisance because it had printed allegedly

defamatory articles about some public officials.

In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court stated,

“NO one would question but that a government might

, ~~~ ( I < @3~ \ ] Qj } }

45
46

prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or

the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the

number and location of troops.”7

The concern most frequently expressed in connection with potential mediasat activities involves national

security. One commentator has summarized SPOT’s

potential in this context as follows:

If Iraq says it attacked a port in Iran, but Iran denies

it, satellite imagery could resolve the dispute. What

does the closed Soviet city of Gorki look like, or Kharq

Island or the hijacked Achille Lauro cruise ship? Did

an Afghan village really burn down? Satellite imagery

could provide the answers. . . The next time a Grenada

erupts, it may matter less that reporters and cameramen are not invited along; the spacecam will have it

covered. 8

Perhaps the most famous prior restraint case is that

involving the so-called “Pentagon Papers, ” a 1971 Supreme Court decision, New York Times Co. v. United

States,9 The “Pentagon Papers” came from a classified

47-volume Pentagon study, officially entitled “History

of U.S. Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy, ”

which described the origins of United States’ involvement in the Vietnam war. The material had already

been widely circulated and all of it was at least 3 years

old. The government originally sought to have publication curtailed under Section 793 of the Espionage

Act; ’” but when this statute was held inapplicable, they

also argued that “inherent [constitutional] powers” to

safeguard national security entitled them to an injunction prohibiting publication, However, their arguments

were rejected in a 6-3 decision. The ruling itself is a

brief per curiam decision but each Justice elaborated

on his views in a separate concurring or dissenting opinion. Of the six concurring opinions, Justices Black and

Douglas, both of whom held an absolutist view of the

first amendment,11 each stated that in his view prior

restraints were never permissible. Justice Brennan

thought that prior restraint was permissible to the extent described in Near v. Minnesota, but added that

“the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise

or conjecture that untoward consequences may result . “12

Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, stated

that, in the absence of applicable statutes, he would

permit prior restraints on publication only if necessary

to prevent “direct, immediate, and irreparable dam7

283 U S at 716 (footnote ornltted )

‘Mauro, ‘ The Puzzling Problems ot Pictures Fr[lm Space, Ii’ashlrrgton

)Ournalism Review (June 1986) 15

’403 Us. 713 (1971),

IOIfjL1 .S .C, Sec. 793(e).

“The first amendment in pertinent part provides, ‘Congress shall make

no law abridging freedom of speech, or of the press. JustIces Black and

Douglas interpreted this language [no law] literally and thus corwstently voted

agatnst any press restrictions

‘

2

403 U.S. at 725-26.

age to our Nation or its people.“13 Finally, Justice Marshall found prior restraint inappropriate in this case

because it had not been authorized by Congress.

The only case that upheld a prior restraint in this

context is a 1979 decision by the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, United

States v. The Progressive, Inc.14 In that case an injunction was issued against a magazine which was planning to publish an article that contained a detailed discussion of hydrogen bomb technology.

The Progressive court relied primarily on the Pentagon Papers case, noting that several of the majority

Justices in that decision had indicated that they might

be more favorably inclined toward the government’s

position if there was a specific statute, that is, a congressional enactment, that barred the challenged publication. The court noted that there was such a statute

in the Progressive case, 42 U.S.C. Section 2274. The

court also indicated that in its view the government

had met the standard laid down in the Pentagon Papers

case by Justices Stewart and White, in that the publication would result in “grave, direct, immediate and

irreparable harm to the United States.”15

When the United States invaded Grenada in 1983,

the government imposed a total news blackout on the

operation. Media representatives were prohibited from

accompanying the invasion forces in the initial landings on the island and members of the press who attempted to travel independently to the island were prevented from reporting news of the invasion. The ban

was lifted some days later, after the island had been

secured and most of the fighting had ended.

The press subsequently challenged the ban and

sought a permanent injunction against any future such

ban. However, the challenge was dismissed as moot

by the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, 16 which held that the plaintiffs had not

shown that they personally faced a specific, imminent

threat of irreparable harm, as required before the conduct of vital governmental functions, requiring the exercise of discretion in a myriad of unpredictable circumstances, will be enjoined. The court explained:

The invasion of Grenada was, like any invasion or

military intervention, a unique event. Its occurrence

required a combination of geopolitical circumstances

not likely to be repeated. In addition, it required a

discretionary decision by the President of the United

States as Commander-in-Chief to commit United States

forces. The decision to impose a temporary press ban

was also a discretionary one. It was made by the military commander in the field of operations because the

“{d. at 7 3 0

“467 F. Supp. 990 (W D. WM ), cfismmed mem 610 F 2d 819 (7th Clr 1979).

“467 F.Supp at 996

“Flynt v Wejnberger, 588 F. Supp. 57 (D. D C 1984).
47

safety of press representatives could not be guaranteed and in order to ensure that secrecy was maintained, thereby protecting the safety of United States

troops and promoting the success of the military operation. 17

The court also stated that a permanent injunction

against future press bans of this nature “would limit

the range of options available to the commanders in

the field in the future, possibly jeopardizing the success of military operations and the lives of military personnel and thereby gravely damaging the national interest." 18

It is likely that future cases of this nature, including

those involving images from space, would be resolved

on a case-by-case basis under reasoning comparable

to that set forth in the district court’s decision in Flynt

v. Weinberger.

No special rules would be needed to govern the use

of imagery obtained from foreign satellites. Attempts

to limit the media’s use of such imagery would be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as attempts to

limit imagery obtained from U.S. satellites. Material

of a foreign origin which was aired or printed in the

United States would, however, be subject to the same

constitutional and other restrictions as would material of a U.S. origin. For example, attempts to limit

its publication would be subject to the rules on “prior

restraint. ” Similarly, the dissemination of such information could serve as the basis for a defamation suit

in the United States. Most important, it could violate

various national security laws if sensitive information

were disclosed.

The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act

of 1984, its legislative history, and the proposed regulations intended to implement it19 all speak to national

security concerns in general terms and thus provide

little guidance as to how particular matters would be

handled. For example, the Act’s congressional findings

state that “land remote sensing by the Government or

private parties of the United States affects international

commitments and policies and national security concerns of the United States;”20 and its declaration of purposes notes that a purpose of the law is to “maintain

the United States’ worldwide leadership in civil remote

sensing, preserve its national security, and fulfill its

international obligations. “

21 Those seeking a license to

operate private remote-sensing space systems must

agree to “operate the system in such manner as to preserve and promote the national security of the United

States.” 22

‘ {(f at 5Q

‘“Id at 00

‘5 I Fed Reg QQ71 ( Mar 24 I Q&lo ~

‘ ‘15 L] S C %’C 4201(4 I

- ‘ 15 U S C Sec 4202~ b t “15 L’ S C &’C 4242( b )( 1 ‘

The proposed regulations similarly require applicants to submit “adequate operational information regarding the applicant’s remote-sensing space system

on which to base review to ensure compliance with

national security and international requirements.”23

The accompanying commentary states that the National

Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) recognizes that some prospective applicants may want greater certainty as to when a license

might be denied or conditions imposed to protect national security or foreign policy interests, but explains

that this is not feasible because “individual judgments

[will be] made in a context affected by rapidly changing technology and [therefore] must be made on a caseby-case basis.”24 The EOSAT contract similarly provides that the company will comply with all national

security requirements .25

The Secretary of Commerce is to consult with the

Secretary of Defense on all matters arising under the

Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act that affect national security,26 and with the Secretary of State

on all such matters that affect international obligation.

27 

Those secretaries are responsible for determining which conditions come within their respective areas

of concern, and notifying the Secretary of Commerce

promptly of any such conditions. Again, no specific

information is provided to limit or clarify precisely

what is covered by this broad language.

In sum, it appears that the standard of “grave, direct,

and irreparable harm to the United States” as cited in

the Pentagon Papers and Progressive cases would be

utilized in deciding whether pre-publication restraints

were appropriate with regard to Landsat-generated materials. Because the government and the press are likely

to disagree about when this possibility exists, judicial

intervention would seem necessary to determine what,

if any, restraints could appropriately be applied to particular sets of circumstances as they arise.

Subsequent Sanctions

The fact that material can constitutionally be broadcast or printed does not mean that those responsible

cannot subsequently be sanctioned for that action. Several Federal laws could be applied to the publication

or other release of classified information, depending

on its content, even where the doctrine of prior restraint

1 ~propo~e~ 15 CF[< Sec 960, ~ Spec]f]c technical Intormatlon and marh~t -

Ing plans for the data rece]ved, must & lnc I uded t{) help the I lcenslng a~enc},

make it~ cietermlnatl{>n

2’51 Fed Reg ‘J4R! ( Nlar 24 1 98~ 1 “EOSAT hearlnx, ~upra n 10, at 58 (The text {>f the c (~ntra( t )s not

prf~t,]ded}

‘h Is [1 S C Sec 4277( a }

‘-15 L“ s c. Sec 4277( b 1
48

precluded the government from prohibiting its dissemination.

Federal espionage laws are codified at chapter 37 of

the Federal criminal code.28 Specific prohibitions include gathering, transmitting or losing defense information; 29 gathering or delivering defense information

to aid a foreign government;30 photographing defense

installations; 31 using aircraft for photographing defense

installations; 32 publishing or selling photographs of defense installations; 33 and the disclosure of classified information .34 Most of these statutes do not require a

specific intent to injure the United States, but only that

the person taking the proscribed action have “reason

to believe” it will have a harmful impact.

Several Justices writing in the Pentagon Papers case

indicated that these laws could be invoked against those

who published classified material; see, for example,

the following statement from Justice White’s concurring opinion:

The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions

potentially relevant to these cases. Section 797 makes

it a crime to publish certain photographs or drawings

of military installations. Section 798, also in precise

language, proscribes knowing and willful publication

of any classified information concerning the cryptographic systems or communication intelligence activities of the United States as well as any information

obtained from communication intelligence operations.

If any of the material here at issue is of this nature,

the newspapers are presumably now on full notice of

the position of the United States and must face the consequences if they publish. I would have no difficulty

in sustaining convictions under these sections on facts

that would not justify the intervention of equity and

the imposition of a prior restraint .35

Justice Marshall similarly expressed the view that prosecutions under these laws would be acceptable if publications were found to have violated their prohibitions. 36 Even Justice Douglas, well known for his

opposition to any press restrictions, indicated that he

might be persuaded to apply Federal espionage laws

to the press under carefully drawn circumstances, as

when war had been declared pursuant to a declaration

of war (Vietnam was an undeclared war) .37 The three

dissenting Justices (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Harlan

and Justice Blackmun) supported the imposition of a

prior restraint in this case, so they presumably would

1“18 U.S. C Sects 7Q2 to 7Q9.

~“18 U. S C Sect 7Q3.

’

0

18 U SC. Sect 794.

‘i 18 U.S. C Sect 795.

“18 U S.C Sect 796.

“18 US C Sect 797.

“18 U S C Sect. 798

“4o3 U S at 735-37 (White, J , concurring )(tootn{>te~ omitted)

‘“Id at 745 (Marshall, J , concurring]

“ld at 720-22 ([lluglas, ] ~oncurrlng)

also have supported post-publication sanctions against

those who published the challenged material.

Other Federal laws that might encompass certain

land remote-sensing activities include .50 U.S.C. Section 783, which prohibits the communication of classified information by a government officer or employee, or the receipt of classified information by a

foreign agent or a member of a Communist organization; and 42 U.S. C. Section 2274, the statute utilized

in the Progressive case, a provision of the Atomic

Energy Act which prohibits the communication of restricted data which may be utilized to injure the United

States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation.

On the other hand, it is difficult to generalize as to

how these laws would apply to particular Landsat activities. For example, the prohibition on gathering or

transmitting defense information applies to “whoever,

for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the

national defense with intent or reason to believe that

the information is to be used to the injury of the United

States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation,” takes

any proscribed action .38 Those presenting satellitegenerated material could argue that their intent was

not to gather or transmit defense information, or that

they had no reason to believe that it would be used

to harm the United States, On the other hand, some

prohibitions would seem clearly to apply to these activities, such as those against photographing defense installations, 39 and publishing or selling photographs of

such installations.40 Even here, however, some ques -

tions would likely remain. For example, would the incidental inclusion of a defense facility in a series of satellite photographs encompassing many images come

within the purview of these prohibitions? What if the

system operator lacked the sophistication to identify

the prohibited image, but a purchaser using more advanced techniques ‘was able to do so? It is simply impossible to answer such questions at this time.

Material generated by- remote sensing activities

which is broadcast or published is subject to the same

restrictions as is similar material which comes from

more conventional sources. For example, to the extent

that it is obscene or defamatory, it can be challenged

on those grounds. However, as technology becomes

more advanced, a potential problem involving the right

of personal privacy could develop—if it has not already.

A person who appears in public ordinarily waives

his or her right to privacy, as long as the resulting photographs or commentary are accurate. ’l Aerial recon-

’“18 U S C. Sec 793(a)

’918 U S C Sec. 795.

4“18 U,S. C Sec. 797.

‘)l, Hanson, Lfbel and Related Torts, Sec 260 (1969). An action will lie

It a misleading impression IS given, however, as in the case of an innocent

child whose picture IS used to illustrate an article on juvenile delinquents

Lletzger L’ Dell I’ubi)shlng Co , 207 Misc 182, 136 N Y.S 2d 888 (Sup 1955)
49

naissance is an accepted law enforcement technique,

most recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in a 1986

decision California v. Ciraolo. ” On the other hand,

a person is protected against publicity given concerning facts of his or her private life.43 If, in fact, land

remote-sensing satellites were capable of determining

which newspaper a person is reading in his or her backyard, the potential for invasion of privacy would seem

to be quite high. Again, this possibility would not serve

as the basis for prohibiting printing or broadcasting

such material, but such dissemination could lead to

later lawsuits by those who felt their privacy had been

invaded.

International Considerations

At the international level, the Treaty on Principles

Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration

and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other

Celestial Bodies [Outer Space Treaty ],” which was

signed in 1967, declares that space “shall be free for

exploration and use by all States, ” and that it “is not

subject to national appropriation. ” Although states

have not agreed on the definition of where outer space

begins, ” they have agreed that civilian land remotesensing satellites operate in outer space and not within

the boundaries of any country.

While all countries have laws against espionage,

there is no rule or principle of international law that

prohibits a nation from observing activity within

another nation from beyond that country’s territory.46 

Indeed, the United States has consistently adhered to

an “open skies” policy, which states that no nation has

the right to control or prevent remote-sensing of its

own territory. This does not mean that no legal questions exist with regard to the practice of remote sensing from space.

In 1971, the United Nations’ Committee on the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPUOS] established

a working group on remote sensing to develop a set

of rules governing the operation of these systems. In

1987, COPUOS agreed on a set of 15 principles that

would serve as voluntary guidelines for national remote sensing activities .47 Although no requirement that

prior consent be obtained before one country could

“’54 U S L \\’ 4471 ( lq8e/

J‘ I Hanson, supra n 15, Sec 252

“Jan 27 1907, 18 U S T 2410, T I A S No tJ347, b10 U N T S. 205

“Note Expl[)rat[[)ns In Space I.aw An Examlnatlon ot the Legal Issues

Raised by Ge(wtatlonarY, Remote Sen\lng, and Dtrect Bmacicase Satellites,

N }’ L Sch I Ret’ 1 Q( 1985 J 724.

‘“IcI a t 723-24

‘ Prlnclples relat]ng to remote senslnK ok the Earth From Space, ‘ LIntted

Nations General Assembl> A RES 41 55 22 January 1987

survey another’s resources is included, the guidelines

promote international cooperation and access to data

on a nondiscriminatory basis.48 Interestingly, much of

the concern in this area has arisen not in the United

States or the Soviet Union, but among lesser developed countries who fear that they will be at an unending disadvantage if their needs and desires are not taken

into account at this relatively early stage of the planning process,’” While it is likely that over time a consensus will be reached as to some of these issues, national self-interest may make this a long and drawn-out

process, one in which the end results remain uncertain. Major deviations from the present practice could,

of course, affect the media’s ability to access and report on certain items generated by use of this technology.

Conclusion

There is apparent agreement on the usefulness of land

remote-sensing techniques in gathering a wide range

of information, where such gathering and dissemination is not likely to be challenged (primarily environmental and geological data ). Questions arise when the

material so gathered can be seen as a threat to national

security, personal privacy, or other protected interests.

At this time it appears that courts would likely uphold the right of the media to operate and/or utilize

land remote sensing satellites, and the media would

be allowed to broadcast or print any information which

was so obtained unless a pre-publication restriction was

justified to prevent direct, immediate, and irreparable

damage to the United States or its citizens (the standard employed in the Pentagon Papers case). However,

the media could subsequently be penalized for releasing information found to violate national security or

other pertinent statutes.

At the international level, there is currently no restriction on observing and photographing a country

from outside its borders, including by satellite, from

space. However, future international agreements may

limit somewhat the complete freedom which is currently enjoyed in this context .50

This entire situation involves a rapidly evolving technology, which is sought to be handled by a much more

slowly evolving state of the law. As such, it will likely

remain unsettled for the foreseeable future.

~r~nC,ple~ X11 and X111

“Stewart, “The New W’orld Intormatlon and Commun]catl[,n Order !n L@i

tlt [ I S Lledla [)ractlce lb ~’m% ~ ork L ‘nl~erwt}’ / {nfern<lt],~na~ & [’(,I

035 ( 1 Q84 1

‘L’h”tlte, Explorations In Space Law wpra n 45 ~ en t lre artlc Ie

o