Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia 

Robert F. Baumann 

George W. Gawrych

 Walter E. Kretchik 

Combat Studies Institute Press 
Cover Photo Credits 

Top Photo: Department of the Army 

Overlay: Department of the Army 
Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia

Robert F. Baumann 

George W. Gawrych

 Walter E. Kretchik 

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Baumann, Robert F., 1952-

Armed peacekeepers in Bosnia / Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, Walter E. 

Kretchik.

 p. cm.

 1. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995--Peace. 2. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995--Bosnia and 

Hercegovina. 3. Peacekeeping forces--Bosnia and Hercegovina. I. Gawrych, George 

Walter. II. Kretchik, Walter E. (Walter Edward), 1954- III. Title. 

DR1313.7.P43B38 2004 

949.74203--dc22

 2004023005 
Foreword

By 1990, the Cold War was over and many Americans talked of the 

“peace dividend” that would befall the country once military spending 

and commitments could be reduced in what some referred to as the New 

World Order. Instead, world affairs proved as dangerous and intractable 

as ever, even more so perhaps than during the period 1945-1990 when 

the two competing superpowers managed to hold various tribal, ethnic, 

religious, and political conflicts around the world somewhat in check. 

Driving home how dangerous the world remained in the 1990s, the US 

military found itself fighting one major war, Operation Desert Storm, 

and participating in a variety of other military activities, including three 

major interventions: Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. The Combat Studies 

Institute has published scholarly accounts of the Gulf War (Lucky War), the 

Somalian venture (“My Clan Against the World”), and the involvement in 

Haiti (Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”), all of which can be found 

on the Internet at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp. The 

publication of Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia adds another case study to 

the Institute’s coverage of these post-Cold War US military operations. 

With the aid of a generous grant from the US Institute of Peace, Robert 

Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik were able to access and 

examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit 

US and NATO forces in Bosnia. As a result of their labors, they have 

provided the reader an analytical narrative that covers the background to 

the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the UN Protection 

Force to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace 

Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and 

consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment 

of US forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation 

Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force to the 

Stabilization Force a year later. 

The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that 

have emerged from the US experience in Bosnia—an involvement that 

continues as of this writing. In general, these cover the cooperation and 

contention present in virtually any coalition undertaking; the complexity 

of the local situation and the way in which strictly military tasks have 

political, social, economic, and cultural ramifications that the military 

cannot ignore or avoid; the inevitable adjustments peacekeepers have to 

make to dynamic and precarious situations; and the often unaccommodating 

i 
role history plays when confronted with concerns about force protection, 

“mission creep,” “end states,” and early exits. 

In Bosnia, as in countless other operations, a US military force trained 

and equipped to fight a highly technological, conventional war found itself 

making adjustments that resulted in performing tasks that many officers 

considered unconventional and unorthodox. The ability to make these 

adjustments and to perform these tasks has thus far leant to the success of 

the US/NATO involvement in Bosnia. Now the United States is engaged 

in the Global War on Terror and, in the process, has already embarked 

on stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The case of Bosnia is, 

of course, unique but the general lessons it provides are relevant to US 

officers fighting in the current war and should not be overlooked. 

THOMAS T. SMITH 

LTC, IN 

Director, Combat Studies

ii 
Preface

The incredibly complex drama of war and edgy peace that unfolded in 

Bosnia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, during the 1990s gave birth to a fascinating 

and instructive series of military operations that constitute the subject of 

this study. The nature of circumstances and missions in Bosnia poses a 

variety of challenges to the historian. First, given their recent occurrence, it 

is remarkably difficult to frame these events in historical perspective. This 

is in part because many outcomes and consequences reside somewhere 

in the future. The SFOR mission itself only came to a close late in 2004 

as this work was going to press. Equally significant is the fact that vast 

quantities of relevant documents remain classified. As a result, the chapters 

that follow necessarily form a preliminary attempt to capture the most 

important dynamics of the history yet unfolding in this unfortunate country. 

An additional hurdle is the chaos that attended the Bosnian Civil War 

and the nonlinear character of modern post-conflict operations, whether 

they emphasize peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement. In 

contrast to the story of most wars, peace operations in Bosnia did not 

unfold in a progression of events that yield a seamless narrative. Rather, 

the course of history in Bosnia was, and remains, a fitful affair. As the 

final chapter observes, success in peace operations is hard to measure and 

self-deception is a constant hazard. One critical aspect of this condition 

was the ceaseless rotation of U.S. and other units through Bosnia. In some 

respects, the mission began again with the arrival of each new commander, 

division, brigade, and battalion. 

History is most often told from the perspective of commanders, 

especially in official histories. More recently, interest has grown concerning 

the viewpoint of individual soldiers. If anything, this work emphasizes the 

middle ground, the vantage point of field grade officers. This is in part a 

function of happenstance, since majors and lieutenant colonels constitute 

a highly accessible population at the US Army Command and General 

Staff College. Nevertheless, it is the authors’ perception that these are 

most often the individuals best situated to comprehend simultaneously the 

view from above and below, in other words the whole picture. Regrettably, 

very senior officers frequently reside within a cocoon of obsequiousness 

created by military culture and well-meaning staff officers. Thus, all but 

the most discerning perceive developments through the filtering lenses of 

operations plans, briefing slides, and third-hand reporting. Conversely, 

ordinary soldiers, with some notable exceptions, frequently have no grasp 

of the strategic or operational context in which they carry out their duties. 

To be sure, no single perspective of modern operations is sufficient by itself. 

Indeed, if oral history interviews, upon which this study extensively relies, 

prove anything, it is that every participant has a distinctive experience. 

Historical truth, then, is at best a thoughtful approximation. 

iii 
Nevertheless, by virtue of extensive opportunities to interview 

and confer with participants in peacekeeping and peace enforcement 

operations in Bosnia, as well as to conduct research in the field, it has been 

possible discover much. Through the generous cooperation of so many 

who were directly involved, much information has surfaced that may not 

be adequately reflected in the complete documentary record whenever it 

becomes available. In any case, what follows is not a comprehensive or 

official history of the Bosnian saga, but may offer considerable insight into 

the business of contemporary conflict and military operations. 

Out of respect for the many men and women, soldiers and civilians, 

living through the episodes described in this book, the authors have not 

shirked their own responsibility to consider operations in Bosnia in a 

critical light. The intent is that this work not only analyzes recent history in 

the Balkans, but also prompts close examination and thoughtful reflection 

about contemporary approaches to peace operations. 

For whatever value this work may hold for its readers, the authors owe 

a tremendous debt to countless officers from all services and many nations 

passing through the Command and General Staff College who shared their 

experiences, journals, notes, maps, and impressions. Equally valuable 

was the extraordinary assistance rendered by soldiers of many different 

national contingents serving as members of the Stabilization Force in 

Bosnia. A special thanks is due the contingents from Britain, Canada, 

France, and Germany, which went well out of their way to facilitate our 

research and travel within Bosnia. They freely offered maps, documents, 

and photographs. In addition, a grant from the US Institute of Peace proved 

absolutely indispensable to the work of this project. 

Finally, a handful of individuals warrant mention for facilitating our 

research. Dr. Otto Orzech, the SFOR Historian in Sarajevo, assisted with 

many arrangements as did Dr. Curt King of the Command and General 

Staff College. Colonel (retired) Jerry D. Morelock, former Director of the 

Combat Studies Institute, encouraged our pursuit of this project from the 

beginning. In turn, his successor, Colonel Lawyn (Clay) Edwards, not only 

extended full support but joined in the research itself and lent the authors 

crucial assistance in the field in Bosnia. The many other individuals who 

gave selflessly of their time are too numerous for mention here but their 

names can be found liberally sprinkled throughout the text and endnotes 

of this work. Any strengths of this work are a result of their aid; the 

shortcomings are the responsibility of the authors alone. 

Robert F. Baumann, Command and General Staff College 

George W. Gawrych, Baylor University 

Walter E. Kretchik, Western Illinois University 

iv 
Table of Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................... i

Preface..................................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v

Illustrations ............................................................................................ vii

Chapter 1. Bosnian Truths .................................................................... 1

Regional Context.........................................................................2

Ottoman Rule (1463-1878) .........................................................5

Habsburg Rule, 1878-1918 .........................................................8

World War I and the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941) ....................9

World War II and Ethnic Cleansing (1941-1945) .....................12

Second Yugoslavia, 1945-1992 .................................................17

The Collapse of Communist Yugoslavia ...................................20

The Bosnian War, 1992-1995....................................................24

The Dayton Accords..................................................................28

Conclusion ................................................................................31

Chapter 2. From UNPROFOR to IFOR .............................................37

Chapter 3. Military Planning Before Operation JOINT

ENDEAVOR: An Initial Assessment .................................59

Planning Headquarters: An Overview.......................................59

Bosnia Planning in Context: The Cold War Aftershock ...........62

Response With Sea and Air Plans .............................................63

Response With Ground Force Plans..........................................67

Plans For Closure ......................................................................70

Chaotic Ground Plans ...............................................................76

Plans in Motion .........................................................................79

Plans Assessment ......................................................................83

Chapter 4. IFOR Redefines the Bosnian Situation............................... 95

The Civil-Military Agenda Under IFOR.................................100

IFOR Information Operations .................................................101

IFOR Case Study: The Serial Episodes At Mt. Zep................104

IFOR Overview.......................................................................113

v 
Chapter 5. Show of Force ................................................................. 119

An Evolving Mandate ............................................................ 120

Peace Enforcement in Bosnia ................................................ 124

Historical Baggage ................................................................. 128

Soldiering Without War.......................................................... 133

A Different Philosophy .......................................................... 139

Conclusion ............................................................................. 144

Chapter 6. Use of Force: The Brcko and Drvar Riots ....................... 149

The Brcko Riot: Background .................................................. 150

The Brcko Riot: 28 August 1997 ............................................ 153

The Drvar Riot: Background................................................... 158

The Drvar Riot: 24 April 1998 ................................................ 161

Conclusion .............................................................................. 167

Chapter 7. IFOR, SFOR, and Civil Implementation .........................171

Information Operations ........................................................... 171

Public Affairs .......................................................................... 185

Civil Affairs............................................................................. 192

Joint Commission Observers .................................................. 203

Conclusion. The Measures of Progress................................................ 215

Glossary ................................................................................................ 233

Index ..................................................................................................... 235

About the Authors ................................................................................. 243

vi 
Illustrations

Maps

Map 1. Map of Bosnia ........................................................................... ix

Map 2. The Expansion of Serbia, 1804-1913 ......................................... 7

Map 3. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 

1918-1929 ................................................................................. 10

Map 4. Partition of Yugoslavia in World War II ................................... 13

Map 5. Effects of Ethnic Cleansing in the Bosnian War....................... 15

Map 6. IFOR deployment .................................................................... 16

Map 7. Dayton Agreement Map............................................................ 30

Figures

Figure 1. US Forces Command Structure, Operation 

JOINT ENDEAVOR ...............................................................60

Figure 2. NATO Organization During IFOR ..........................................94

Figure 3. Task Force Eagle .....................................................................94

Figure 4. The SFOR information campaign remains relatively 

optimistic about ethnic conflict .............................................173

Figure 5. The SFOR information campaign linked crucial issues 

such as the right to travel and the conduct of

democratic elections..............................................................174

Photos

Photo 1. The village of Srebrenica became infamous 

for the events that occurred nearby in 1995............................41

Photo 2. Major General William Nash commanded the 1st Armored

Division and Task Force Eagle ...............................................62

Photo 3. US military personnel narrowly avoided disaster 

when the Sava River flooded in December 1995 ...................82

Photo 4. Remarkably, the Sava River flood cost US forces

only a brief delay with no loss of life .....................................82

Photo 5. Having made the difficult choice to commit forces

in Bosnia, President Clinton addressed US soldiers...............85

vii 
Photo 6. Clearing mines was a crucial task under IFOR ......................96

Photo 7. General Shalikashvili, US Army Chief of Staff, conferred 

with Major General William Nash of MND North ................99

Photo 8. Major General Sir Michael Walker, commander of the 

Allied Command Group Rapid Reaction Corps, advised 

General Shalikashvili of events on the ground in Bosnia ....105

Photo 9. Admiral Smith met the press on a frequent basis.................107

Photo 10. US personnel maintained security checkpoints as needed ...109

Photo 11. US forces from the rank of private to general officer

maintained a high force protection standard ........................128

Photo 12. US soldiers in body armor and helmets mingled on the 

treets of Bosnia.....................................................................135

Photo 13. Canadian soldier on patrol with translator............................135

Photo 14. A british soldier helps keep order in MND SW....................136

Photo 15. Bosnian Serb rioters challenged US military positions 

in Brcko ................................................................................155

Photo 16. An angry crowd assembled during tense moments 

in Drvar ................................................................................162

Photo 17. Angry Croat rioters in Drvar set fire to buildings 

and vehicles ..........................................................................163

Photo 18. Canadian soldiers establish a perimeter during disorder in 

Drvar ....................................................................................164

Photo 19. Bosnian Serbs protest SFOR attempts to gain control 

over Republike Srpske Television........................................178

Photo 20. Serb protestors gather to challenge SFOR seizure of a

television station...................................................................179

Photo 21. IFOR marked the first combined military operations with 

Russian units since World War II .........................................182

Photo 22. French soldiers bring gifts to a grammar school in 

MND SE...............................................................................198

Photo 23. Members of the French Battle Group in MND SE 

work to clear unexploded ordnance near an uninhabited 

dwelling................................................................................206

viii 
Map 1. Map of Bosnia

ix 
Chapter 1 

Bosnian Truths 

George W. Gawrych 

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment 

that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish 

. . . the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither 

making it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien 

to its nature. This is the first of all the strategic questions and 

the most comprehensive. 

Carl von Clausewitz1 

Being familiar with Balkan history is a significant advantage. 

Not only does it improve credibility with the locals, it also 

helps to cut through most of the information they provide. The 

alternative is to spend the tour being duped by the experts. 

Major D. G. Wilson, British Army2 

Over 150 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz offered sage advice: 

political and military leaders must understand the conflict into which they 

send their troops. This wisdom certainly applies to armies embarking on 

peace support operations. But as pointed out by Major D. G. Wilson, 

who served in Bosnia with the British army, knowing Balkan history is 

also important in being an effective peacekeeper. In December 1995, the 

US Army faced an intellectual challenge as it deployed ground troops 

with the mission of separating the warring factions in Bosnia and of 

helping create a secure environment for the conduct of civilian reforms. 

Understanding the character of Bosnian conflict and negotiating through 

the region’s myths proved no easy task. In fact, much of the US Army 

entered Bosnia with a general misconception of the conflict. 

The Bosnian war was a complex conflict, filled with myths generated 

in part by the propaganda machines of the participants themselves. The 

US media tended to portray images of the good and the bad, with Serbs 

emerging as the villains and Muslims as the innocent victims. Such a 

dichotomy stemmed, in large measure, from the horrific character of the 

war in Bosnia. Out of a prewar population of 4.3 million, 2.2 million 

Bosnians became refugees or displaced persons; between 200,000 and 

250,000 were killed. Most of the dead were civilians who fell victim 

to ethnic cleansing and acts of revenge. Stories of systematic rape and 

1 
murder in concentration camps added to the brutality of war. The dark 

side of human nature had raised its ugly head once again in history, and 

the Serbs appeared to bear responsibility for the phenomenon. How was 

an American Army to make sense of the Bosnian war as it deployed 

ground troops for the first time in December 1995, over three and a half 

years after the outbreak of the hostilities? 

One popular explanation for the Bosnian war argues for ancient tribal 

hatreds whose roots go back centuries, if not over half a millennium. 

Robert Kaplan popularized the intractable nature of the ethnic and 

religious conflict in his famous travel book Balkan Ghosts.

3 Too many 

American officers deployed to Bosnia armed with this book as their only 

professional reading on the region. The Kaplan thesis gained popular 

currency in the US, leaving most American officers and soldiers with 

little hope that their brief tour of duty could help build a bright future. 

Many officers expressed to the authors of this study that they would have 

benefited from a better and more balanced presentation of the region’s 

history prior to deployment. 

Bosnian history, like that of any region of the world, has its bright 

and dark sides. This chapter examines what the US Army should have 

understood about the character of the Bosnian war from a historical 

perspective before deployment. Ethnic cleansing, in fact, had more 

immediate causes. Moreover, a study of recent Bosnian history shows 

how the communist leader Jozef Tito was able to bring about some 

reconciliation among the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims despite the 

trauma of ethnic cleansing in World War II. 

Regional Context 

Deployment into a theater of operations requires some understanding 

of the local population and its history. The word Balkan means mountain 

range in Turkish, an appropriate name for a region noted for the numerous 

mountains crisscrossing the region in all directions. These mountains have 

served to fragment the peninsula, encouraging localism and regionalism. 

The degree of diversity in the Balkans is staggering, even by the 

standard of the European continent. Some 70 million people crowd into 

an area approximately the size of Texas. They speak at least nine different languages—Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, Bulgarian, 

Macedonian, Greek, Albanian, Turkish, and Romany (spoken by many 

Gypsies)—and identify with three major religions—Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam. Moreover, before the breakup of 

the Communist Yugoslav state in 1991, six independent states constituted 

2 
the Balkans: Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey 

(eastern Thrace). Yugoslavia’s demise resulted in the emergence of four 

new countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.4 

Even before Yugoslavia’s collapse, the Balkans gained a reputation for political fragmentation and internecine strife. In the English language, the 

verb “balkanize” means “to divide (a region or territory) into small, often 

hostile, units.” 

Within the context of all this religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity, 

Bosnia has often been called the “microcosm of the Balkans,” epitomizing 

all the peninsula’s communal differences. 5 On the religious level, this is 

quite true. Bosnia is home to the three civilizations of Western Christianity, 

Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam, all blending together in a cultural mosaic 

based on mutual influences. On the linguistic-cultural level, however, 

Bosnia is unique for the Balkans. Bosnians speak the same language while 

belonging to three different religions without any one possessing a clear 

majority. In 2002, for example, estimates placed the population of BosniaHerzegovina at approximately 40 percent Muslim, 31 percent Orthodox, 

15 percent Catholic, and 14 percent other. 

Geography and history help explain the complex character of Bosnian 

society. The landlocked and mountainous country of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

today consists of 19,741 square miles or 51,130 square kilometers, roughly 

the size of West Virginia, with some 4 million inhabitants. Technically, 

Bosnia refers to the northern, central, and eastern regions, including 

Sarajevo. Herzegovina encompasses western and south parts centered on 

the town of Mostar. Hercog comes from the German word Duchy, a term 

that first appeared in history in the 15th century. This study refers to the 

entire region as Bosnia, a geographic term first recorded in 958. The name 

comes from the Bosna River, which begins just outside Sarajevo and flows 

north to the Sava. Bosnia’s historic boundaries since the medieval period 

have generally been the Sava River in the north, the Drina in the east and 

southeast, the Dinaric Mountains in the west, and a mountainous border 

with Montenegro in the south. The mountainous character of the area 

has confined much of human habitation to the river valleys and mountain 

passes. 

History has consigned to Bosnia the status of a frontier sandwiched 

between competing civilizations and religious organizations. At first, 

Bosnia felt the tugs within the Western world. In 395 AD, the Roman 

Empire split into two parts. The western section remained under Rome’s 

control, while the eastern half became the Byzantine Empire, with 

its capital of Constantinople, today Istanbul. Bosnia fell between two 

3 
diverging civilizations represented in the Roman and Byzantine Empires. 

When Christianity made inroads by the ninth century, Bosnia emerged 

nestled between the pulls of Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. 

This border status helps explain the sizeable Catholic and Orthodox 

populations in Bosnia today cited earlier. 

The Slavic character of Bosnian society began in the late sixth and 

early seventh centuries when the Slavs began entering the Balkans as 

members of a single Slav federation called the Slaveni in medieval texts. 

The second quarter of the seventh century saw the settlement of two new 

tribes—the Croats and Serbs—into much of what became 20th-century 

Yugoslavia. Both tribes possessed an Iranian past, as evidenced from 

the names of their early tribal leaders. Either the Croats and Serbs were 

Iranians who absorbed Slavic culture and language while settling the 

Balkans, or they were Slavs who for a period had fallen under Iranian 

rule or influence before their migration to the peninsula. Today, close to 

99 percent of Bosnians identify themselves as Slavs: Serbs 37, Bosniacs 

48, and Croats 13 percent. 

The medieval period of Bosnian history eventually saw the 

establishment of two Slavic kingdoms, Croatia and Serbia. After the 

Great Schism splitting the Christian Church into two parts, Croatia fell 

under Rome’s influence and practiced Roman Catholicism. Serbia, on 

the other hand, looked to Byzantine cultural patterns and embraced 

Greek Orthodoxy. This division has shaped history today. Croats still 

adhere to the Catholic faith and the Latin alphabet; Serbs, for their part, 

continue their identification with Orthodox Christianity and use the 

Cyrillic script. 

Bosnia, for its part, had its own heyday. From 1180 to 1463, the 

region witnessed a period of independence. Her greatest ruler was Tvrtko 

(1353-91), who briefly ruled as king of Bosnia and Serbia, extending the 

boundaries of his state to include Croatia and Dalmatia. The inhabitants 

of Bosnia were referred to as Slavs, as Bosnia remained a geographic 

term. From approximately 1250 to 1342, Bosnia’s rulers sponsored an 

independent Bosnian Church, Christian in dogma but independent of 

the pope in Rome or the patriarch in Constantinople. But in 1342, the 

local ruler permitted the establishment of a Franciscan mission whose 

activities helped increase the influence of the Catholic Church. For 

the next century, Christianity in Bosnia suffered from rivalry among 

the three competing religious organizations, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, 

and the Bosnian Church. All three faiths lacked sufficient numbers of 

clergy and churches for the local population to develop strong ties to 

4 
any faith. The general weak state of Christianity in Bosnia helps explain 

the conversions to Islam that would gradually come with the Ottoman 

conquest in the latter half of the 15th century.6 

Ottoman Rule (1463-1878) 

The Ottomans conquered Bosnia in 1463. For the next four 

centuries, Bosnia experienced Islamic rule, resulting in the Islamization 

of Bosnian society. Rather than ushering a dark age as depicted in the 

literature and oral traditions, the Ottoman Empire brought law and order 

to the Balkan Peninsula, imposing a Pax Ottomanicum much like the 

Romans had imposed order on their subjugated peoples. Ottoman sultans 

allowed for a high measure of decentralization. Christians and Jews 

were free to practice their faith according to their religious traditions in 

such matters as worship, marriage, divorce, inheritance, and death. In 

addition to institutionalizing a system of religious tolerance, known as 

the millet system, the first sultans lightened taxes and fostered economic 

development so that, for example, Christian merchants thrived in 

international trade with Europe.7 

Ottoman rule changed medieval Bosnia irrevocably.8 The conquest 

caused the flight of many Catholics to Dalmatia and Croatia and the 

influx of numerous Serb Orthodox from Serbia. The Ottoman conquerors 

brought with them the new Islamic faith and settled relatively small 

numbers of Muslims in the region. But the major part of Islamization 

occurred over time with gradual and peaceful conversion of the local 

Slavic population to Islam over the next century. No major conversions 

occurred during the actual Ottoman conquest. After 150 years of Ottoman 

rule, however, government registers record a sizeable Muslim population 

in Bosnia. The vast majority of Muslims were not new settlers, but rather 

Slavs who accepted Islam. 

Local converts kept their Slavic culture and language, although 

Ottoman Turkish now functioned as the official tongue in administration. 

Members from all three religious communities naturally spoke the same 

language, now Serbo-Croatian. Today, extremists have tried to argue the 

existence of separate languages: Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian. But 

there is only one language, understandable by all Bosnians. To illustrate 

this point, at the conference in 1995, one translator handled the Serbian, 

Croatian, and Bosnian language channels.9 Participants had demanded 

three separate lines for political, not linguistic reasons. 

Officially, the Ottomans recognized religious, not ethnic affiliation. 

Tax registers identified individuals as Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, or 

5 
Jewish. As regards cultural identity, Bosnian Muslims generally referred 

to themselves as “Bosniacs,” Bosnaks in Ottoman Turkish, whereas 

their Christian neighbors often called them “Turks.” Today, Bosniac is 

interchangeable with Bosnian Muslim, whereas Bosnian generally refers 

to all three communities. 

During the Ottoman period, Muslims were naturally the privileged 

religious community. Bosnia thus saw the emergence in the towns of a 

ruling class of Muslim landowners and government officials. Christians 

and Jews were “second-class” subjects who paid an extra tax in lieu of 

military service and whose testimony in Islamic courts carried less weight 

than that of Muslims. But Bosnia was not a land of Muslim oppressors 

and oppressed non-Muslims. Muslims belonged to the peasantry and often 

shared the same fate as their Christian counterparts. Moreover, Christians 

and Jews acquired some status in society as merchants, moneychangers, 

and physicians. 

It is easy either to idealize or to condemn the Ottoman period in 

Bosnian history. In fact, both the good and the bad of human nature and 

society blended together into the complex web of Bosnian history. As 

underscored by the Bosnian writer Ivo Andric in his Nobel Prize-winning 

novel The Bridge on the Drina: “It is true that there had always been 

concealed enmities and jealousies and religious intolerance, coarseness 

and cruelty, but there had also been courage and fellowship and a feeling 

for measure and order, which restrained all these instincts within the limits 

of the supportable and, in the end, calmed them down and submitted 

them to the general interest of life in common.”10 Christians and Muslims 

learned to take from each other “not only women, homes and arms but also 

songs.”11 A common language helped foster a cultural mosaic among the 

three religious communities despite periods of oppressive government, 

foreign wars and internal conflicts, and economic hardship. 

Despite the existence of tolerance and harmony, violence also plagued 

the Balkans under Ottoman rule. The 19th and early 20th centuries 

were particularly violent. Beginning with the Serb Revolt of 1804, the 

Balkans witnessed numerous conventional wars, countless rebellions, 

and periods of sustained guerrilla warfare. These conflicts affected the 

civilian populations especially harshly. Massacres, destruction of homes, 

and forced migrations often accompanied armed conflict, touching 

all communities. Muslims and Christians both had to flee their homes, 

depending on the conflict. The Serb rebellion of 1804 to 1815, for 

example, saw the establishment of a small, semiautonomous Serbian 

state, and the victorious Serbs forced the exodus of all Muslims living 

6 
in the countryside. Over the next two centuries, Europe has consistently 

bemoaned the sufferings of the Christians, often to the culpable neglect 

of the plight of the Muslim populations. 

Bosnia had its epochal revolt against Ottoman rule in 1875. The year 

before saw Bosnia experience a major crop failure. Then in the summer of 

1875, Christian peasants in Herzegovina revolted against the imposition 

of taxes by local tax collectors. The revolt quickly spread to other parts 

of Bosnia and to Ottoman Bulgaria as well. Muslim peasants in Bosnia 

joined their Christian counterparts in opposing the local rule of Muslim 

notables. In Bosnia, the Ottoman government, supported by local Muslim 

notables, quelled the rebellions. Estimates vary considerably, but some 

5,000 peasants were killed and anywhere from 100,000 to 250,000 refugees 

created in the process. European newspapers naturally emphasized the 

Map 2. The Expansion of Serbia, 1804-1913

7
harsh suppression of the Christian population by Ottoman troops. Reports 

of the large loss of civilian life and a major refugee problem ignited the fire 

of public opinion in Europe. Finally, Russia, the self-professed protector 

of the Orthodox population, declared war against the Ottoman Empire. At 

the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Austria-Hungary used the 

Balkan crisis to occupy the Ottoman province of Bosnia with the purpose 

of establishing order and progress. With the Habsburg occupation, a new 

phase opened in Bosnian history.12 Bosnia now entered the political and 

cultural world of Central Europe, bringing with it a large Muslim population 

whose roots went as deep and far back as that of its Christian natives. 

Habsburg Rule, 1878-1918 

After 400 years of Ottoman rule, Bosnia suddenly became a part of the 

Habsburg Empire in 1878. 13 Though officially under Ottoman suzerainty, 

in fact, Bosnians found themselves as a veiled protectorate under 

Vienna’s control. Then in 1908, the Habsburg Empire formally annexed 

Bosnia, thereby cutting any legal ties to Istanbul. Forty years of Habsburg 

administration (1878-1918) brought significant changes to the province. 

Bosnia’s fate was now directly tied to Central European as opposed 

to Balkan history. In this strategic reorientation, the Bosnian Muslim 

community lost its political dominance over the Christians. Moreover, 

ethnic nationalism changed the way Bosnians viewed themselves. 

The Habsburgs occupied Bosnia in an era of Balkan nationalism. 

In 1878, there were five independent states in addition to the Ottoman 

Empire: Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Each state 

sported its own nationalism with irredentist designs on its neighbors. 

Nationalist currents infected Bosnia as well. A national identity now 

competed with religious and regional loyalties. Tensions between the 

three Bosnian communities now took on a more nationalist character. 

Catholics learned to regard themselves as Croats and the Orthodox as 

Serbs. Bosnian Muslims, for their part, embraced a separate political 

identity as well. 

Habsburg rule gave Bosnia 40 years of central European political 

culture. The new rulers established a highly centralized bureaucracy by 

Ottoman standards. In 1878, only 120 Ottoman officials administered 

the province; by 1910, Bosnia counted 9,533 civil servants. Every adult 

male, regardless of religious affiliation, had to perform military service 

in the imperial army, while children attended government schools with 

Western curricula. All three religious communities participated in the new 

political freedoms associated with Habsburg parliamentary government. 

8 
They founded political parties and elected representatives to serve in the 

provincial parliament (Sabor). To demonstrate fairness, Vienna allotted 

parliamentary seats according to religious affiliation. In 1910, for 

example, Muslims received 24 seats, compared with 31 for the Orthodox 

and 16 for the Catholics. 

Demographically and politically, the Muslim community saw a major 

reversal of position. Muslims constituted close to half the population 

in 1870; they rapidly dropped to 40 percent in 1879 as many fled the 

Habsburg occupation.14 Catholic Croats benefited most from Vienna’s 

rule. Over 200,000 subjects from other parts of the empire, many of them 

Catholics, settled in the province. The Jesuits joined the Franciscans in 

pastoral and educational activities. The Catholic population grew from 

18.08 percent in 1879 to 22.87 percent by 1910. Muslim proportions 

declined further, from 38.73 percent to 32.35 percent in the same period. 

Orthodox Serbs emerged as the largest religious group with over 40 

percent. Sarajevo, the provincial capital, saw the portion of the Catholic 

population increase from 3.3 percent in 1879 to 34.52 percent in 1910. 

Despite some favoritism to the Croats, Habsburg rule proved quite 

tolerant for the Muslim community. Vienna avoided any major land 

reform. This decision left the Muslim landowning class largely intact, 

a situation that remained through the outbreak of the Bosnian war in 

1991. The Muslim community adjusted to Christian rule and accepted 

European ways. Forty years of Habsburg rule saw the Europeanization and 

secularization of the Bosnian Muslim community at the expense of strong 

ties to the Islamic Middle East. By the end of the Habsburg Empire in 

1918, the Muslims had gained the reputation of being a bastion of loyalty 

to the imperial throne (Kaisertreue). In essence, they had tied their fate 

and future to Europe. For them, Muslim stood more as an ethno-political 

identity, and faith became more a private matter. This development was 

in part a direct response to the growing nationalism within the Bosnian 

Serb and Croat communities. Now, intercommunal relations, whether 

peaceful or not, took on an ethno-nationalist character. 

World War I and the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941) 

World War I proved the crucible that led to the creation of the First 

Yugoslavia.15 Great Britain and France, as victors, dictated the peace 

treaties, and both countries wanted to create a large Slavic state to 

replace the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans. Serbia presented a 

very strong claim for the spoils of war. Serbs had not only fought on the 

winning side, but they had also expended much blood and treasure for 

9 
10

Map 3. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 1918-1929

the Allied cause and therefore could negotiate in the postwar period from 

a position of strength. In fact, they could claim the highest percentage 

of loss of population of any participant nation in the war. On the other 

hand, Habsburg Slavs—Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnians—had fought on 

the losing side and stood dependent upon the good will of the victors.

France and Great Britain pushed for the establishment of a single 

South Slav state in the Balkans out of the ruins of the Habsburg Empire. 

Serbia’s prewar politicians had wanted a Greater Serbia without Slovenia, 

but the allies opposed such a move in the hope of creating more stability 

in the region with a larger state outside of either Austrian or Hungarian 

control. Therefore, they pushed the Belgrade government to accept a 

compromise with all the Habsburg Slavs to create the Kingdom of Serbs, 

Croats, and Slovenes on 1 December 1918. This new European state 
included prewar Serbia and added Slovenia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, 

Vojvodina, Bosnia, and Montenegro. The kingdom doubled Serbia’s 

prewar population from 6 million to 12 million people. No ethnic 

group, however, constituted a majority in the new state. Serbs formed 

approximately 39 percent of the population, with Croats hovering around 

23.7 percent, Slovenes 8.5 percent, Bosnian Muslims 6 percent, and 

Albanians 3.6 percent. Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, and other non-Serbs 

entered the union expecting equal partnership with the Serbs in a federal 

state. This expectation was soon dashed. 

Despite the rich demographic diversity, the new rulers in Belgrade 

defined the kingdom as constituting one nation, three peoples. The one 

nation was Serbo-Croatian, an official category that included all the Slavs: 

Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniacs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. 

Moreover, Belgrade refused to recognize the Albanians as a separate 

nationality but identified them as Serbs who had embraced Albanian 

culture and language. Such a policy left the Albanians as the most 

disenfranchised and hence most disappointed community in the kingdom. 

Serbs from prewar Serbia held a disproportionate amount of political 

power. The Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty remained in power, and 

Alexander returned from exile to assume the throne as king of the new state. 

He never assumed the mantle of a Yugoslav ruler but instead remained 

a Serb at heart and in policy. Serbs dominated the Yugoslav government 

and armed forces. During the period 1920 to 1939, for example, every 

chief of the army was a Serb, and only one non-Serb served as prime 

minister. Of 165 generals in the armed forces in 1941, 161 were Serbs, 

with two each for the Croats and the Slovenes. The disproportionate 

presence of Serbs in high positions of government and the army created 

some consternation among the other ethnic communities.16 

During the interwar period, Croat politicians generally led the 

opposition to Serb dominance. Bosnia was caught in the midst of the 

struggles between Serbs and Croats over the nature of the Yugoslav 

state. Bosnian Muslims formed their own party, the Yugoslav Muslim 

Organization, headed by Mehmed Spaho. In the 1924 Yugoslav 

parliament, all the Bosnian Muslim deputies, with one exception, 

identified themselves as Croats. This identification reflected 40 years 

of rule by the Catholic Habsburg monarchy. But this was not always a 

simple choice, nor was it one-dimensional. The Spaho family reflected 

the problem of ethnic identities. Mehmed insisted on calling himself a 

Yugoslav; of his two brothers, one referred to himself as a Serb and the 

other a Croat.17 

11 
Separated from the Ottoman Empire for more than 40 years, most 

Muslim political leaders learned the art of compromise from the Habsburg 

period. Before World War I, they had cooperated with Vienna, deservedly 

gaining the reputation of Kaisertrue. Now Belgrade functioned as the 

new power broker, and Muslim politicians sought to leverage their weak 

position with the central government as much as possible. Often, for 

example, Mehmed Spaho joined the Slovene leadership in an attempt to 

mediate tensions between the centralist Serbs and federalist Croats.18 In 

this, the Bosnian Muslims continued their role of loyalty to the central 

government. 

Non-Serbs experienced a setback in national development when King 

Alexander established a royal dictatorship in 1929. He also changed the 

name of the country from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 

to Yugoslavia, meaning the land of the South Slavs. The change in name 

represented further institutionalization of a unitary state based on Serb 

dominance. Alexander, for example, erased the historical boundary 

of Bosnia and instead divided the region among several banovinas, 

administrative units named after rivers. For the first time in over 400 

years, Bosnia disappeared as a name from maps. Bosnian Muslims 

now found themselves as minorities in several banovinas as a result 

of gerrymandering engineered by Belgrade, all designed to strengthen 

the power of the monarchy and to enhance the position of Serbs in the 

country. Bosnian Serbs dominated the local governments of former 

Bosnia. The king appointed each ban, who, in turn, filled positions in the 

local governments that previously had been elected. Only a global war 

broke the Serb dominance over Bosnia. 

World War II and Ethnic Cleansing (1941-1945) 

World War II unleashed an orgy of ethnic cleansing unprecedented 

in modern Balkan history.19 Foreign invasion and occupation proved the 

catalyst for this tragic turn of events. For Yugoslavia, World War II was 

both a war against foreign aggression and a civil war fought between 

Yugoslavs. Bosnia suffered the most from the fighting. 

In 1938, on the eve of World War II, Belgrade reached a historic 

agreement with Croatian leaders. Serb politicians agreed to the 

establishment of an autonomous banovina of Croatia that included Bosnia. 

Belgrade hoped to solidify Croatian support in the event of war. When 

war did come, the kingdom of Yugoslavia collapsed in rapid fashion. In 

April 1941, the Axis powers defeated the Yugoslav army in only 11 days. 

Unlike the one front facing Serbia in 1914, Yugoslavia was attacked from 

12 
13

and Germany divided Slovenia into two parts, each gaining its own fiefdom. 

Italy received Kosovo and incorporated it with Albania. Montenegro 

theoretically gained its independence, though the country fell under Italian 

tutelage. Bulgaria gained control of Macedonia and parts of southern 

Serbia, whereas Hungary grabbed Vojvodina. In addition to the Banat, 

Germany took Serbia and installed a puppet government under General 

Milan Nedic. Hitler and Mussolini also created the Independent State of 

Croatia (NDH), but Germany and Italy each established its own separate 

zone of influence. The new Croatian state included Croatia, Slavonia, 

and Bosnia. The Dalmatian coast, however, fell under Italian control.

Map 4. Partition of Yugoslavia in World War II

three directions, this time by coalition of German, Italian, and Bulgarian 

armies. The kingdom disappeared from European maps. 

The Axis Powers carved up Yugoslavia into nine different areas. Italy 
In dividing the spoils of conquest, the Axis powers opened the door for 

ethnic cleansing. Hitler and Mussolini placed Ante Pavelic, a fascist and 

racist, as the head of NDH. Born in Herzegovina in 1889, Pavelic drew 

sustenance from the ethnic and religious divisions in prewar Yugoslavia. 

In 1926, he founded in Italy a political party, the Ustashe, which on the 

eve of war numbered at most 12,000 hard-core members in Croatia. The 

party never gained a grassroots following. But, with Axis support, Pavelic 

could assume the reins of government without popular backing, and he 

proceeded to institute a reign of terror and ethnic cleansing. 

Pavelic preached a racist theory in line with that of Hitler and Nazi 

Germany. Croats were not Slavs but belonged to the Aryan race. Serbs, 

however, were Slavs and hence members of an inferior people. Pavelic 

wanted to establish a homogeneous state. Creating a pure Croatian 

homeland, however, presented a major challenge to Pavelic. Catholic 

Croats constituted only half of the 6,300,000 inhabitants of NDH. 

Approximately 1,900,000, or 30 percent, identified themselves as Serbs. 

Then there were the Bosnian Muslims. To create a pure Croatia required a 

policy of cleansing (ciscenje in Serbo-Croatian), that is removing all nonCroats from NDH. Mile Budak, the new education minister, provided the 

broad outlines of the Ustashe strategy of reaching that goal: “convert a 

third, expel a third, and kill a third.” 

Once in power, Pavelic moved immediately to implement his vision 

of a pure Croatian homeland. He denied citizenship to all Serbs, who 

were now required to wear blue armbands and were prohibited from 

using the Cyrillic alphabet. To achieve the goal of an ethnically pure state, 

the Ustashe regime turned to mass killings, mass deportations, and mass 

conversions of Serbs. Hitler helped Pavelic in his endeavor. On 4 June 

1941, for example, Nazi Germany reached an agreement with the NDH 

to accept Serb refugees in the German rump state of Serbia. By the end 

of the war, some 300,000 Serbs had fled or were expelled from Croatia to 

Serbia. Moreover, the Ustashe established concentration camps, the most 

famous being Jasenovac, where mainly Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies died 

from disease, malnutrition, labor accidents, and executions. Estimates of 

the number murdered in the concentration camps range from 160,000 

to over 500,000. Others met their deaths in mass killings conducted in 

their villages. In July 1941, for example, Ustashe troops executed 500 

Serb men, women, and children from the small town of Glina, some 65 

kilometers southeast of Zagreb. 

Both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy thus bear much responsibility 

for the ethnic cleansing that devastated Yugoslavia. First of all, Hitler 

14 
and Mussolini placed Pavelic in power and then allowed the Ustashe to 

remain in control until the Axis defeat. Hitler’s policy of exterminating 

the Jews complemented Pavelic’s own diabolical intentions toward 

the Serbs. Moreover, Nazi policies in Yugoslavia encouraged German 

soldiers to be ruthless and inhumane in putting down any armed resistance 

from the local population. On 13 October 1941, for example, Hitler 

ordered the execution of 100 prisoners or hostages for every German 

soldier killed, and 50 for every wounded German. Rather than resist such 

an order, the German regular army readily complied with the Führer’s 

wishes. In the worst incident of the war, German troops executed some 

7,000 townspeople—including women, children, and old men—from 

Kragujevac in retaliation for the killing of German troops. Such German 

atrocities both encouraged the Ustashe to do likewise.

Two resistance movements formed to oppose Germany, Italy, and 

the NDH. Colonel Draza Mihailovic created the Chetniks, who fought 

in the name of the Yugoslav monarchy and for Serb nationalism. Jozef 

Map 5. Effects of Ethnic Cleansing in the Bosnian War

Broz Tito (1892-1980), born of a Croatian father and a Slovene mother, 

founded the Partisan movement based on a Communist ideology. Rather 

quickly, Partisans and Chetniks turned to fighting each other rather than 

concentrating on defeating the Germans and Italians. War turned very 

ugly for all sides in the conflict as innocent civilians found themselves 

caught in the crossfire. There was little regard for the conventions of war. 

All sides practiced summary executions. The Chetniks and Partisans often 

killed German or Ustashe prisoners of war in revenge. Best estimates 

place the number of Yugoslavs killed in World War II at over 1 million; 

the majority of these deaths were Yugoslavs killing other Yugoslavs.20 

In other words, Ustashe, Partisans, and Chetniks engaged in a civil war, 

the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas; the Slovene Eduard Kardelj; the Jew 

15 
16

Tito’s accomplishment in World War II was truly amazing and 

carries some implications for both the Implementation Force (IFOR) and 

Stabilization Force (SFOR). Despite the horrors of ethnic cleansing of 

his time, Tito could rally individuals from all the ethnic and religious 

communities into a single movement opposed to the Axis powers and the 

Ustashe state. This occurred in the midst of war and ethnic cleansing. In 

this regard, Tito provided a hope that the new Yugoslavia would bring 

healing and reconciliation to Yugoslav society. Bosnia, as a microcosm 

of heterogeneity in the Balkans, would prove a showcase of Tito’s 

experiment.

Map 6. IFOR Deployment913

Moshe Piyade; and the Serb Aleksandar Rankovich. According to Tito, 

Serbs constituted 44 percent of Partisan troops; many Croats and Bosnian 

Muslims joined the ranks as well.22 Tito established many units based 

on regional compositions, such as the 16th Muslim Brigade, located 

in Bosnia, and the 10th Zagreb Corps, with its heavy representation of 

Croats. By the end of the war, the Partisans possessed at least 300,000 

soldiers, though official mythology placed the number at 800,000. Most 

important, Tito, by having the Partisans play a major role in liberating the 

country, was in an excellent position to create a new Yugoslavia, one not 

dominated by Serbs. 
Second Yugoslavia, 1945-1992 

Despite the ethnic cleansing of World War II in Yugoslavia, Tito 

ameliorated communal tensions over a period of 35 years in postwar 

Yugoslavia.23 In too many instances, he merely suppressed rather than 

healed the memories of the ethnic cleansing. But Communist rule, which 

lasted over two generations, resulted in a modicum of national harmony 

and reconciliation. Bosnia witnessed the new political and social order 

based on the slogan of unity and brotherhood. 

Upon the conclusion of World War II, Tito’s first priority was to 

secure his own political power. In 1945, his regime killed over 50,000 

Ustashe in captivity, in part to ensure firm control over the new state. 

Tito’s new government executed tens of thousands in the years 1946 

and 1947 and imprisoned many more. Eventually Tito granted a general 

amnesty, in part to provide additional labor to an economy desperately 

short of workers. By 1950, Tito felt secure enough to lighten considerably 

his reign of terror. 

Pragmatism gradually emerged as Tito’s approach to the postwar 

reconstruction of Yugoslav society. Rejecting the Serbian dominance of 

the interwar kingdom, Tito set out to balance federal power with republic 

rights. In this regard, Second Yugoslavia fostered cultural and religious 

diversity, perhaps to a fault. At the beginning, however, Tito kept the 

reigns of government tightly; he did, however, decentralize more as time 

went on in his long rule of 35 years. 

As promised during the war, Tito divided the postwar Yugoslavia into 

six federated republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

Macedonia, and Montenegro. Serbia, unlike the other five republics, was 

further subdivided into Serbia proper, the autonomous region (oblast) of 

Vojvodina with approximately a quarter Magyar (Hungarian) population, 

and the autonomous province of Kosovo with its Albanian majority of 65 

to 70 percent. Over time, more and more power devolved to the republics 

and autonomous regions. Each republic and autonomous region had its 

own communist party. The League of Yugoslav Communists, formed in 

1952, served as the umbrella communist party. A military reorganization 

in 1969 required each republic and autonomous area to establish its own 

Territorial Defense Forces. These functioned similar to the National 

Guard in the US, under some republic control but designed to augment 

the Yugoslav army in war. 

As the republics gained more political power, Tito increasingly assumed 

the role of final arbitrator who intervened in a timely fashion to settle dis17 
putes. To maintain his power, he relied on the secret police, the League of 

Yugoslav Communists, and the armed forces. All three were imbued with 

the ideology of Yugoslav ideal, brotherhood and unity of all South Slavs. 

To help keep the republics in line, Tito also practiced divide et impera 

wherever possible. He applied this principle in ethnically and religiously 

diverse republics but could not in homogeneous Slovenia. In Croatia and 

in Kosovo, however, Tito depended on the Serb minorities in each region 

to fill, in disproportionate numbers, positions in the local communist party 

and police. In this way, Croatian Serbs and Kosovar Serbs could leverage 

the majority population of Croats in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo. In 

the Croatian capital of Zagreb, for example, in 1971, Serbs made up 56.5 

percent of the police force, to 40.8 percent for the Croats, even though the 

Serb minority constituted only 15 percent of the republic’s population.24 

Tito accomplished much in 35 years of rule. “In a short period after 

the war, he established a kind of harmony among communities emerging 

from the bloodiest imaginable civil conflict. He instilled pride in a small 

country that, even by European standards, had suffered inordinately during 

the first half of the century. And for the first time in the region’s history, a 

majority of the population enjoyed economic prosperity under his rule.”25 

Yugoslavs could travel around the globe, as their passports allowed them 

to cross more borders without visa than any other passport in the world. 

Some 800,000 Yugoslavs worked outside the country and sent money 

back to their families. Tourists from the West flocked to Yugoslavia for 

vacations, taking advantage of Belgrade’s liberal policy toward tourism. 

Bosnia gradually emerged as an example of national harmony in 

Yugoslavia at its best. In the late 1940s, Bosnian Serbs formed 60 percent 

of the Bosnian Communist Party membership, with Muslims constituting 

only 20 percent of the total.26 Initially, Tito expected that the Bosnian 

Muslims would eventually abandon their religious identity and declare 

themselves either Croats or Serbs. The first Party Congress after the war 

stated that “Bosnia cannot be divided between Serbia and Croatia, not 

only because Serbs and Croats live mixed together on the whole territory, 

but also because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet 

decided on their national identity.”27 Belgrade did encourage the Bosnian 

political leadership to make a choice between Croat or Serb. In the first 

Yugoslav Who’s Who, published in 1956, 62 percent of those with Muslim 

names identified themselves as Serbs and only 17 percent as Croats. 

However, the general population was unwilling to reach such an easy 

accommodation as their politicians. In the 1953 census, for example, over 

80 percent of Bosnian Muslims preferred to see themselves as “Yugoslav, 

18 
nationally undeclared.”28 Most Bosniacs were unwilling to abandon their 

Muslim identity. 

Tito’s foreign policy of independence from the Warsaw Pact in the 

1950s eventually had its effect on the Muslim nationality issue in Bosnia. 

Having sacrificed much in World War II, Tito was determined not to fall 

under Stalin’s tutelage. In 1948, he broke with the Soviet Union. Having 

split with Stalin, Tito wanted to avoid falling under the West’s thumb. To 

help pursue an independent foreign policy based on neither East nor West, 

Tito joined forces with Nehru in India, Nasser in Egypt, and Sukarno in 

Indonesia to found the Non-Aligned Movement in 1954. 

To win favor among the Muslim states for his nonaligned foreign 

policy in the Third World, Tito presented Bosnia as a showcase of his 

regime’s religious tolerance. In the late 1950s, the Bosnian Muslims began 

receiving new rights and privileges. In 1969, Tito granted the Yugoslav 

Muslim community a separate status, and the 1971 census permitted 

Bosnians to identify themselves as Muslims rather than as Yugoslavs, 

Croats, or Serbs. No longer was there the pressure of having to choose a 

Serb or Croat identity. And the Muslim identity in Bosnia flourished in 

the 1970s and 1980s. Belgrade allowed increasing numbers of Muslim 

students to study at Arab universities. In 1977, Sarajevo University 

established a Faculty of Islamic Theology with Saudi money. All this 

type of activity helped nurture a Muslim ethnic identity among Bosnian 

Muslims. The forces for cultural pluralism were certainly strengthened 

by Tito’s policy. 

Bosnia appeared to travel a long way down the road of ethnic 

reconciliation after World War II despite the great diversity of its 

population. Of the six republics in Communist Yugoslavia, only Bosnia 

lacked a majority of any community. By the late 1960s, the Muslim 

population surpassed that of the Serbs for the first time since the eve 

of the Habsburg occupation of the province in 1878. In 1991, census 

figures showed a distribution of 43.7 percent Muslims, 31.4 percent 

Serbs, 17.3 percent Croats, and 5.5 percent Yugoslavs for a population of 

4,365,000 inhabitants. These figures are misleading. Approximately 20 

to 30 percent of the marriages in Bosnia were mixed. Catholics married 

Orthodox, Orthodox married Muslims, and Muslims married Catholics. 

Some families comprised members from all three religious communities. 

Marriage vows involving individuals from two different religious 

communities were much more prevalent in towns than villages, the latter 

tending to be homogeneous rather than mixed in population. Some cities, 

such as Sarajevo, Mostar, and Tuzla, claimed upwards of 30 to 40 percent 

19 
mixed marriages.29 This high percentage of mixed marriages stands as a 

major achievement of Tito’s regime in Bosnia, attesting to some healing 

in society after the traumas of World War II. 

Language and history played a part, no doubt. Bosnians spoke the same 

language, Serbo-Croatian, readily permitting cross-religious discourse. 

Moreover, the historical record had created a tradition of religious 

tolerance and coexistence alongside memories of internecine strife. Most 

important, however, Tito provided the political incentives and the cultural 

environment conducive to some reconciliation. The state indoctrinated 

and rewarded displays of unity and brotherhood while punishing certain 

nationalist behavior. Public education tried to foster a mind-set and value 

system of tolerance and coexistence. And Tito had 35 years in which to 

educate two generations born after World War II. 

In some regards, Bosnia represented the test of the Tito experiment 

to create social harmony while balancing the reality of ethnic, cultural, 

and religious diversity. Many Yugoslavs in general and Bosnians in 

particular grew up under Tito with limited and censored information on 

the ethnic cleansing of World War II. The Tito state only ennobled the 

Partisan effort and preached unity and brotherhood. Consequently, most 

Bosnians, especially in the cities and towns, felt at the beginning of 1992 

that war would not come to Bosnia. These individuals expressed surprise 

when the extremists used the media to develop issues centered on the 

ethnic hatreds of World War II.30 Perhaps Tito would have done better for 

future generations if he had squarely addressed the ethnic cleansing in 

World War II despite the explosiveness of the subject. Burying the issue, 

however, only left most Yugoslavs naively unprepared to marshal forces 

to prevent a similar occurrence. 

Despite his mistakes, Tito offers a compelling example of the 

possibility of some reconciliation among members of the three warring 

factions in the Bosnian war. A pluralistic society needs a fair arbitrator 

who can punish separatism and reward integration. It takes generations, 

however, to change attitudes and behavior, but Tito did accomplish much 

in less than two generations. NATO today has assumed the role of honest 

arbitrator, and a coherent and impartial strategy has possibilities of some 

success despite the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian war. 

The Collapse of Communist Yugoslavia 

For all his achievements, Tito left Yugoslavia with a number of major 

problems.31 The Yugoslav state proved too weak at the federal level to 

meet the challenges of the post-Tito era. Moreover, the economy began 

20 
to show signs of fundamental weakness in the last year of Tito’s reign. 

Despite the political and economic problems, Tito’s successors kept the 

state together until the collapse of the Cold War in 1989. 

To Yugoslavia’s political detriment, Tito had concentrated too much 

power in his person. He groomed no one to succeed him. More important, 

Tito unwisely bequeathed a weak central government to his successors. 

In 1974, he promulgated a new constitution that proved his last political 

testament. That document accelerated the devolution of power to the 

republics. It defined the six republics as nation-states endowed with 

sovereignty but united to Yugoslavia in a confederation. Such language 

implied that the republics possessed the right to secede on the basis of 

national self-determination (narodno samoopredeljenje). Moreover, the 

1974 constitution left power in the hands of an eight-member federal 

presidency—one representative from each of the six republics and one 

each from Vojvodina and Kosovo. The president of that body would be 

rotated annually among the six republics. Such an arrangement seriously 

weakened power at the center. As noted by one observer of Yugoslavia, 

“the 1974 Constitution . . . was based on a system of political musical 

chairs—senior positions would be rotated every year to prevent any 

single republic or politician from accumulating too much power.”32 

This arrangement also hindered the emergence of strong leadership 

and coherent strategy at the federal level, yet Tito knew fully well that 

Yugoslavia needed a strong center for unity and brotherhood. 

By the end of 1980s, Communist Yugoslavia faced a crisis of 

gargantuan proportions. The economy had embarked on a downward 

spiral, beset with a heavy foreign debt, hyperinflation, high unemployment, 

and a significant decline in the standard of living. A recession in Europe 

forced many Yugoslav workers to return home, drastically cutting off 

an important source of foreign exchange. Economic woes on the home 

front translated into social tensions and national discontent. At one point, 

inflation hit an unbelievable rate of 1,000 percent. Few societies possess 

the mettle to withstand such economic pressure without some serious 

political turmoil. In these troubled times, each republic saw the emergence 

of local leaders who turned the economic problems into burning national 

issues. The wealthier republics of Slovenia and Croatia complained 

of high taxes and waste of government spending on poorer areas such 

as Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. International financial aid could 

have provided critical help, but it was not as forthcoming as in Tito’s 

era. Instead, the West forced Belgrade to implement austerity measures, 

exacerbating social tensions further. But why the reduced Western aid? 

21 
In 1989, Yugoslavia’s strategic importance to the West changed 

dramatically with the Berlin Wall crashing down, signaling the end of 

the Cold War. Suddenly, the demise of the Warsaw Pact diminished 

Yugoslavia’s strategic value to NATO. As one scholar noted: “What 

counted for the West was denying Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union . . 

. once the Berlin Wall fell and the communist regimes in Central and 

Eastern Europe had collapsed, the purpose was gone. As communism 

dissolved and East-West cooperation developed, Yugoslavia ceased to be 

strategically significant.”33 Now the West proved unwilling to bail out 

Belgrade with easy aid as it had earlier. Problems in Yugoslavia failed to 

gain the same attention in the West. The US, in particular, was preoccupied 

with the Gulf War and its aftermath and possessed little energy to focus 

on what Washington now considered a European matter. The lack of firm 

will by the US and Europe to maintain Yugoslavia’s territorial unity and 

integrity contributed to the country’s disintegration. 

The collapse of the Iron Curtain unleashed democratic forces in 

Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In Yugoslavia, leaders in the republics 

gained the freedom to compete in parliamentary elections. Extremists 

turned to nationalism as the best vehicle for addressing political 

and economic problems. Their demagoguery poisoned the waters in 

communal relations. One Serb journalist, for example, described the 

poisonous propaganda in his own community thus: “As Yugoslavs, we 

had an oppressive communist regime, but we were reasonably tolerant of 

one another. As Serbs, Milosevic’s media have drilled into us how to hate 

our neighbors. Croats are ‘rabbits’ when we’re chasing them, or ‘pigs’ 

when they’re chasing us. Muslims are ‘dogs’ or ‘baby killers.’ Albanians 

are just ‘filthy rats.’”34 Information warfare roused people’s passions and 

fears, fueled in large measure by a worsening economy. 

Despite all the problems swirling around them, most Bosnians, 

especially in the Muslim community, supported the maintenance of the 

Yugoslav state. They had witnessed positive gains under the Tito system 

and stood to lose in a major political upheaval. Should Slovenia or 

Croatia gain independence, everything would change in the calculations. 

In either case, Alija Izetbegovic, who emerged as the head of the Muslim 

community, threatened to demand independence for Bosnia as well. Should 

the Muslims embark on this road, Bosnian Serbs threatened to demand 

union with Serbia, while Bosnian Croats would seek incorporation with 

Croatia. 

Even before the outbreak of the Yugoslav war, Milosevic and 

Tudjman began plotting to divide Bosnia. In March 1991, both presidents 

22 
of their respective republics, Serbia and Croatia, met in the former royal 

retreat of Karadjorjevo, where they agreed in principle to divide Bosnia 

between Serbia and Croatia. They proved, however, unable to reach any 

firm agreement on lines of demarcation, and all subsequent meetings of 

their aides failed to produce a settlement. Bosnia’s fate would have to 

await military events on the ground. 

A domino effect began when both Slovenia and Croatia declared 

their independence on 25 June 1991. The Yugoslav army moved to 

squash the Slovenian bid for independence, but Slobodan Milosevic, as 

the president of the Republic of Serbia, blocked the use of military force 

against the Slovenes. For him, there were too few Serbs in Slovenia to 

warrant a major military operation. In 1918, it might be recalled, Serbia’s 

politicians had generally opposed the incorporation of Slovenia into the 

new kingdom for the very same reason. Consequently, the Yugoslav 

army terminated military operations after only 10 days of fighting in 

which it suffered 43 killed and 163 wounded. Slovenia, for its part, lost 

a dozen killed and 144 wounded. The Brioni Agreement of 7 July ended 

the fighting in the republic, and Slovenia was secure in its newfound 

independence. Tito’s Yugoslavia essentially died with the Yugoslav 

army’s complete withdrawal from Slovenia by 19 July. 

War immediately spread from Slovenia to Croatia. There, Franjo 

Tudjman had embarked on a policy designed to create an independent 

Croatia. Croatian Serbs feared being second-class citizens. As mentioned 

earlier, Serbs, who composed 15 percent of Croatia’s population, held a 

disproportionate position in both the police and party. Tudjman moved to 

redress the imbalance. In response to Tudjman’s moves, Croatian Serbs 

declared autonomy for Krajina and Eastern Slavonia.35 The stage was set 

for an armed confrontation between the two communities. 

Unlike Slovenia, Milosevic and the senior command of the Yugoslav 

army were both determined to fight in support of the Serbs living in 

Krajina and Slavonia. War broke out between Croatia and the Yugoslav 

state. The Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitary forces cooperated closely 

in consolidating Belgrade’s control over a third of Croatia. Casualties for 

both military and civilians were high for the period between July and 

December 1991: over 10,000 killed and 30,000 wounded. Both Serbs 

and Croats sought to establish homogeneous areas by forcing the flight 

of people. Meanwhile, Milosevic had consolidated his control over what 

was left of Communist Yugoslavia: Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and 

Kosovo. Bosnia faced the danger of partition between Belgrade and 

Zagreb. 

23 
The international community was finally able to broker a cease-fire 

in Croatia. The Yugoslav Army withdrew its forces by January 1992. 

Meanwhile, the UN had authorized the dispatch to Croatia of a United 

Nations Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, for a period of 12 months. 

The force came into being on 21 February 1992. Consisting of 15,000 

personnel from 26 countries, its primary mission was to help maintain 

a cease-fire between Croatian and Serbian forces, mainly in Krajina and 

Eastern Slavonia, while the international community pursued a negotiated 

settlement to the conflict. In protecting the status quo on the ground, 

UNPROFOR underscored that violence and ethnic cleansing do pay. The 

Serb minorities thus gained a modicum of autonomy at the expense of 

the new state’s unity. This example proved attractive for extremists in 

Bosnia. 

The Bosnian War, 1992-1995 

The conflict in Croatia spilled over into Bosnia in April 1992.36 

Understanding the character of the Bosnian war and the manner of its 

conclusion was of vital importance to US ground troops deploying to 

Bosnia in December 1995. NATO inherited an independent Bosnia whose 

magnitude of killing, population displacement, and physical destruction 

dwarfed the other wars in the dissolution of Tito’s Yugoslavia. 

As Croatia plunged into war in the second half of 1991, Bosnia’s 

politicians jockeyed for power and position. Alija Izetbegovic emerged 

as the head of the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA). 

In December 1991, as president of the Bosnian government, he applied to 

the European Community (EC) for recognition as an independent state. 

On 9 January 1992, to undercut Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic, the 

head of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), declared the establishment 

of the Serbian Republic or Republika Srpska (RS), with its capital at 

Pale. Undeterred by this Serb action, on 28 February and 1 March, the 

Bosnian government held a referendum on the issue of independence. 

Mate Boban, the head of the Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ), 

supported Izetbegovic on the issue of sovereignty and independence. A 

vast majority of Bosnian Serbs, encouraged by their nationalist leaders, 

boycotted the event. Only 66.4 percent of eligible voters, mainly Muslims 

and Croats, cast their votes, and of these a whopping 99.7 percent favored 

independence. 

The West faced the dilemma of establishing clear goals and a 

coherent strategy for Bosnia. European countries tended to prefer a 

division of Bosnia into separate areas, each controlled by one of the 

24 
three communities. Washington, for reasons that lay outside the scope 

of this short chapter, opposed any agreement that attempted to divide 

Bosnia into cantons. In this, the US added to the Bosnian problem by 

undercutting European efforts in reaching a solution. On 18 March 1992, 

for example, Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and Boban signed an agreement 

that created three territorial units within an independent state of Bosnia. 

Washington, instead of putting its power and prestige behind the deal, 

expressed its disapproval to Izetbegovic who promptly backed away 

from the agreement.37 

On 5 April 1992, Izetbegovic declared the independence of Bosnia. 

The EC recognized Bosnia as an independent state on 6 April; the US 

followed suit the next day. Milosevic meanwhile led Serbia, Montenegro, 

Vojvodina, and Kosovo to declare the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 

27 April. For its part, the EC, after recognizing Bosnian independence, 

demanded the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) withdraw from Bosnia. 

Between 4 and 10 May 1992, the JNA complied by withdrawing 20,000 

troops but left behind 80,000, the vast majority of these being Bosnian 

Serbs. General Ratko Mladic, himself a Bosnian Serb, took command 

of most of these officers and soldiers, who now formed the Army of 

Republika Srpska. Moreover, Serb paramilitary organizations in Serbia 

joined Karadzic in helping to create a viable Republika Srpska as the 

first step toward a greater Serbia. The military balance in Bosnia clearly 

favored the Bosnian Serbs. 

Republika Srpska, with the help of the Milosevic government, 

embarked on an ambitious strategy of uniting all Bosnia Serbs in one 

state. Some 1.8 million Serbs lived in Croatia and Bosnia. Most were 

located in the eastern and southeastern parts of Bosnia. A large number 

resided in the northwestern region, bordering Krajina. Strategically, the 

Pale leadership set a priority to link up with the Serbs living in Krajina. 

This goal required establishing control over northern Bosnia stretching 

from Knin to Serbia through the Posovina Corridor. Muslim-dominated 

areas Bijejlina, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Bihac stood in the way; in addition, 

large numbers of Croats lived in the Posovina Corridor and the town 

of Brcko. Creating a homogeneous and contiguous Republika Srpska 

required cleansing these areas of non-Serbs. 

The Serbs focused their initial effort on northeastern Bosnia. Several 

ultra-nationalist paramilitary groups based in Serbia crossed the border 

to assist Karadzic. At the beginning of April 1992, Serb forces captured 

Bijeljina. Zeljko Raznjatovic, commonly known by his nom de guerre 

Arkan, and his irregular force called the Tigers massacred over 100 

25 
Muslims in town for the expressed purpose of causing a mass exodus 

of non-Serbs. By September 1992, the Republika Srpska controlled 

70 percent of Bosnia. Between 375,000 and 400,000 refugees, mainly 

Bosniacs, had fled northeastern and eastern Bosnia during this period. 

Ethnic cleansing had come to Bosnia on a grand scale. 

The Serb victories in northeastern Bosnia threatened the Croats and 

the Muslims, and both communities responded in kind. It is well known 

that Belgrade and Zagreb had started and helped direct the Bosnian war 

by providing weapons, training, and salaries to local leaders. But local 

leaders took their own initiative to implement the ethnic cleansing. Much 

less known is the role of Muslims in this regard. Izetbegovic, for his 

part, readily relied on criminals to bolster his forces. In the first weeks 

of the war, Muslim commanders perpetrated their own atrocities against 

civilians and forced the flight of many Serbs from their homes. Further, 

the Muslims rather quickly established their own infamous detention 

camps, such as Celebici.38 

On 5 July 1992, Mate Boban, the head of the Croatian Democratic 

Alliance, proclaimed the Croat Union of Hercog-Bosna with its base at 

Grude. His Croatian Home Defense managed to seize control of western 

Herzegovina. The Bosniacs in central Bosnia were thus sandwiched 

between Serb and Croat states. In January 1993, major fighting broke out 

between Croats and Muslims in Vitez. Both sides began practicing ethnic 

cleansing on each other. Though Milosevic and Tudjman bear much 

responsibility for the Bosnian war, the struggle turned into a civil war, 

with most deaths caused by Bosnians killing fellow Bosnians. 

Even after the outbreak of war in Bosnia, the Sarajevo government 

managed to reflect the pluralistic character of prewar Bosnian society. As 

late as February 1993, nearly one year after the outbreak of hostilities, the 

Bosnian cabinet still comprised nine Muslims, six Serbs, and five Croats. 

Moreover, Serbs formed fully one-third of the Territorial Defense Forces 

defending Sarajevo, and a Serb served as the deputy commander. The 

Croats, for their part, offered their own brigade for the defense of the city 

during the three years of fighting.39 Many Sarajevans were still willing 

to risk their lives for their homes and for a multi-religious, multi-ethnic 

Bosnia. But such heroism of cross-communal cooperation happened too 

infrequently in Bosnia as extremists pushed the division of Bosnia into 

separate and ethnically homogenous territories. 

Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia differed from the Holocaust of 

World War II. Nazi Germany sought to eliminate all Jews from Europe. 

In Yugoslavia, the aim was not to kill every member of a different 

26 
community in a systematic fashion. Rather, the extremists sought to 

create homogeneous areas by eliciting mass flight. Select massacres 

of villages followed by propaganda to cause a major exodus proved a 

preferred method for achieving that goal. Still, hundreds of thousands 

perished in camps or were massacred in their towns or villages. 

Though representing a minority, ethnic cleansers, with their rabid 

nationalism, played a dominant role in shaping the character of the Bosnian 

war. To survive in the lethal crossfire of militant nationalists, individuals 

and families from all three religious communities confronted difficult 

choices. Armed units in the countryside or towns became instruments of 

terror as they occupied new territory. They forced locals from their ethnic 

group to take up arms for the cause, or they found ready support awaiting 

them. Neighbors turned against neighbors. Many mixed marriages 

dissolved in the face of ethnic cleansing. Half of the prewar Bosnian 

population fled their homes. Those who stayed in the country often 

turned to their own respective communities for protection and survival 

and thus had to acquiesce to the demagoguery of their new leaders.40 

Despite the experience of wars in Slovenia and Croatia, the world 

community failed to take any solid measures to prevent armed conflict in 

Bosnia. It was only three months after the commencement of fighting that 

the UN Security Council extended UNPROFOR’s mission from Croatia to 

Bosnia under a separate command, at first headed by Lieutenant General 

Lewis MacKenzie, a Canadian. Initially, MacKenzie commanded four 

battalions with the main responsibility of keeping Sarajevo Airport open 

for humanitarian relief. In August, French General Philippe Morillon took 

command of a force that had grown to 7,000 and had bases in Sarajevo, 

Vitez, Mostar, Bihac, Kiseljak, and Banja Luka. Before its conclusion, 

UNPROFOR expanded to 38,000 troops from 37 countries. But the force 

was largely ineffective as the UN peacekeepers possessed very restrictive 

rules of engagement despite the mushrooming ethnic conflict around them. 

The Bosnian war dragged on for three and a half years until December 

1995. No side could claim to be the innocent victim, free of guilt. Each 

warring faction practiced ethnic cleansing to varying degrees and even 

staged attacks on its own civilian population with the aim of gaining 

propaganda advantage. Despite culpability on all sides, the Serbs certainly 

gained the most territory in the war and created the most refugees. They 

bear responsibility for the majority of ethnic cleansing. The US press, 

however, portrayed the Muslims as the victims and the Serbs as the guilty 

party. The Clinton administration, for its part, treated the Serb leadership, 

whether in Serbia or Bosnia, as the main stumbling block to a political 

27 
solution. Many American officers, therefore, deployed to Bosnia with 

images of the Serbs as the “bad guys.” 

The Dayton Accords 

The way the Bosnian war ended helped define the challenges facing 

US combat troops as they deployed as peacekeepers into Bosnia for the 

first time in December 1995. During the latter half of 1995, the Clinton 

administration gradually gained the political will to intervene militarily 

on the ground. Serious movement in this direction was evident by 

midsummer. A confluence of different factors helped make intervention a 

political necessity and militarily feasible. 

By May 1995, Europe showed signs of greater resolve. In that 

month, Britain, France, and the Netherlands had formed the Allied Rapid 

Reaction Corps (ARRC), a multinational corps staff headquarters that 

included American officers as well. In particular, the UK committed 

5,500 troops of the 24th Airmobile Brigade, France added 4,000 men and 

women, and the Dutch contributed 180. These were cohesive units, not 

the potpourri battalions of previous deployments.41 On 21 July, the day 

the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal indicted Karadzic and Mladic, 

the North Atlantic Council authorized an air plan against the Serbs. Four 

days later, advance elements of heavy artillery of the ARRC deployed on 

Mount Igman overlooking Sarajevo and quickly engaged in a fire fight 

with Bosnian Serbs. An aggressive air and artillery operation suppressed 

Serb shelling of Sarajevo. 

Meanwhile, new developments occurred on the ground. Washington 

had encouraged two of its retired generals, Carl E. Vuono and Crosbie E. 

Saint, to use their private corporation, Military Professional Resources 

Incorporated (MPRI), “to train and equip” the Croatian officer corps. This 

contracting firm helped shift the military balance to Croatia’s favor at the 

expense of the Republika Srpska and ensured an escalation in the armed 

conflict. On 2 May 1995, the Croatian army launched OPERATION 

Spark against the small Serb enclave in western Slavonia and captured it 

in just three days of fighting. 

Croatia’s military victory sparked Bosnian and Croatian Serbs into 

action. While the Serbs in Knin moved against the Muslim pocket in 

Bihac, the Bosnian Serb army led by Mladic mounted an attack on the 

safe haven of Srebrenica in July. Mladic captured Srebrenica on 11 July 

1995 before the watchful eyes of Dutch peacekeepers. His forces then 

proceeded to massacre 8,000 of the Muslim male population.42 Buoyed 

by this victory, Mladic next captured the town of Zepa. Meanwhile, 

28 
Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces attacked Bihac in a pincer move from 

Knin and Banja Luka. 

These Serb gains posed a serious threat to Croatia and to the other 

two warring factions. On 22 July, Tudjman and Izetbegovic signed an 

agreement to launch a combined military operation against the Serbs. 

Bosnian Croats and Muslims were also willing to join forces. They had 

already formed a union, with US pressure, called the Federation of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina one year earlier, on 1 March 1994. 

Croatia commenced OPERATION Storm with 10,000 troops 

assaulting Knin on 3 August 1995, while the Bosnian Croatian and Muslim 

armies attacked Serb positions in Bosnia. In three days, the Croatian army 

captured the Knin region and then proceeded against Bihac in cooperation 

with Muslim and Croat forces moving from the southwest and center of 

Bosnia. A NATO air campaign led by the US against the Bosnian Serbs 

supported ground operations. During the coordinated ground and air 

campaigns, approximately 150,000 Serbs fled from Knin, Bihac, Drvar, 

Mrkonjic Grad, and Jajce. This ethnic cleansing perpetrated against the 

Serbs failed to attract much notice or sympathy in the US. Clinton and 

the media already had branded the Serbs as the bad guys and Muslims as 

the victims. Hard facts on the ground would not change that reporting, 

especially after the horrors in Srebrenica. 

Then on 28 August, a mortar round, though some have argued it was 

a well-placed bomb, hit the Sarajevo market place, killing 37 civilians. 

The US blamed the Serbs for this atrocity, though some experts have 

speculated the ordnance was actually a bomb that could have been placed 

in the marketplace by the Muslims. Washington took this act as a direct 

affront to its emerging policy in Bosnia.43 It implemented a monthlong bombing campaign that signaled the beginning of new American 

resolve. NATO launched OPERATION Deliberate Force on 30 August, 

a day that saw 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles destroy the Bosnian Serb 

army’s command center near Banja Luka. This air campaign lasted three 

weeks, until 20 September. Eight countries flew 3,515 sorties, with the 

US contributing two-thirds of the flights. Meanwhile, Croatia and the 

Muslim-Croat Federation pushed the Serbs out of Bihac and threatened 

Banja Luka. 

In the end, the Bosnian Serb offensives of July 1995 had misfired 

strategically. Rather than changing the regional balance of power in the 

Serb favor, they had the opposite effect. The land offensives by the armies 

of Croatia and the Federation, bolstered by NATO air, had resulted in 

29 
30

had come to regard Karadzic, Mladic, and the Bosnian Serbs as liabilities. 

His own priorities were to end the UN embargo on Yugoslavia and to 

ingratiate himself with the international community. To achieve these two 

goals, Milosevic saw an opportunity to play the role of a statesman. For 

its part, Washington was willing to deal with the “bad guy” in Belgrade. 

Tudjman, for his part, wanted to gain eastern Slavonia and was willing to 

compromise on Bosnia.

The Clinton administration thus saw a more favorable strategic 

situation that warranted bringing negotiations to Dayton, Ohio. After 

Map 7. Dayton Agreement Map

substantial territorial losses for the Bosnian Serbs. Moreover, the pattern 

of defeat suggested a major crisis for the Pale leadership: army desertions 

continued as a major problem, and some units had abandoned positions 

without a fight. The Republika Srpska now faced the possibility of further 

reverses if Karadzic did not cut a political deal. Karadzic and Mladic had 

gravely miscalculated the world’s reaction of general condemnation and 

revulsion to the massacres at Srebrenica. Further isolated from the world 

community, the Republika Srpska could look only to Milosevic for help.44 

With his back to the wall, Karadzic expressed a willingness to negotiate 

a deal that gave the Bosnian Serbs half of Bosnia. Milosevic, for his part, 
several weeks of haggling, a historic agreement was finally reached 

on 20 November. Then, on 14 December all the key players signed the 

General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). For US ground troops 

deploying to Bosnia, what was most important was that the Bosnian war 

had culminated. Militarily, all three warring factions were exhausted 

with the onset of winter. Little fight was left in the practitioners of ethnic 

cleansing. Politically, all three warring factions faced diplomatic isolation 

should they desire to continue their internecine warfare. At Dayton, 

Tudjman gained eastern Slavonia; Milosevic received the promise of an 

end to the UN embargo against his country if he coerced the Bosnian Serbs 

into complying. Croatia and Serbia were ready for an end to hostilities and 

were willing to pressure their constituencies in Bosnia to cooperate. The 

Clinton administration and the EC had gained the political will to tackle 

the Bosnian problem. Most important, Washington had finally decided 

to commit ground troops. Now, American prestige was at stake with the 

Dayton Accords. 

Conclusion 

Bosnia witnessed two periods of major ethnic cleansing in the 20th 

century, but these two events were aberrations in Bosnian history and 

not the result of ancient tribal hatreds. In both cases, foreign meddling 

helped initiate hostilities. World War II saw Nazi Germany and Fascist 

Italy bring the Ustashe to power; some fifty years later, the Bosnian 

war witnessed Zagreb and Belgrade arming and directing co-nationals 

in pursuit of territorial aggrandizement. Each conflict thus degenerated 

into an ugly civil war in Bosnia as neighbors killed neighbors. To further 

their aims, militant nationalists on all sides distorted the past to justify 

ethnic cleansing. They emphasized the worst aspects of history to the 

point where even people in the Balkans came to believe in communal 

hatreds as the motive force of Balkan history for centuries. Tragically, 

many individuals acted on this myth as reality. 

Yet, the truth is that despite a history of wars and rebellions as in other 

parts of Europe, for five centuries, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs, or Orthodox, Catholics, and Muslims had learned to coexist in Bosnia. A vast majority of the inhabitants descended from the Slavs who settled the region 

in the medieval period. Moreover, a single language fostered social dialogue across religious lines. Finally, Habsburg rule integrated Bosnia into 

the mainstream of Central Europe, helping Westernize and secularize the 

Muslim population, a process that continued from 1918 to 1992. Despite 

the ethnic cleansing of World War II, the Communist era of 45 years saw 

a high percentage of marriages across religious lines. This example alone 

31 
should offer hope and purpose for American peacekeepers in Bosnia. 

As the US Army prepared to cross the Sava River into Bosnia, 

the strategic situation favored the American deployment. The warring 

factions were exhausted after three and a half years of fighting and 

inclined to hibernate for the winter. The Bosnian Croats and Muslims 

had made territorial gains changing the balance of power in Bosnia, but 

they lacked the means to continue without foreign backing. The Bosnian 

Serbs, on the other hand, lacked offensive punch to regain lost ground. 

More important, both Belgrade and Zagreb were convinced of the need 

to halt the fighting. Milosevic and Tudjman thus left their Bosnian conationals diplomatically isolated and vulnerable to NATO’s military 

wrath. In the community of nations, Dayton legitimized the US Army 

joining the peacekeeping mission with all the concerned parties. Over 

30 nations with close to 38,000 troops were already poised in Bosnia to 

assist the Americans in implementing the new mandate. In many ways, 

the US Army was set up for success. But American troops still faced the 

challenge of taking advantage of this favorable confluence of factors, and 

they rose to the occasion to fulfill their mission admirably. 

32 
Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88-89. 

2. This statement comes from a British after-action report dated 4 April 1997. 

I am unable to locate the citation. 

3. Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1993). A similar view appears in the now classic by Rebecca 

West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia (New York: 

Viking Press, 1941). 

4. Many Slovenes and Croatians today see themselves as part of central Europe 

and would reject placing their respective countries in the Balkans. 

5. The best general history of Bosnia is Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short 

History (New York: New York University Press, 1996). For a better appreciation 

of Bosnian history, it is important to gain some familiarity with Croatian 

and Serbian histories as well. See Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and 

the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) 

and Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 1997). 

6. John V. A. Fine, The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation (Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1975); Malcolm, Bosnia, 27-42. 

7. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National 

States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 3-25. 

8. Malcolm, Bosnia: 43-136; John V. A. Fine, “The Medieval and Ottoman 

Roots of Modern Bosnian society,” in The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 

edited by Mark Pinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 15-

21; Colin Heywood, “Bosnia under Ottoman Rule, 1463-1800,” in ibid., 22-53; 

W. G. Lockwood, “Living Legacy of the Ottoman Empire: The Serbo-Croatian 

Speaking Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” in The Mutual Effects of the Islamic 

and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern, edited by Abraham 

Ascher (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), 211-215. 

9. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 232. 

10. Ivo Andric, The Bridge on the Drina, translated by Lovett F. Edwards 

(Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1977), 283. 

11. Andric, Bridge on the Drina, 87. 

12. Malcolm, Bosnia, 132-135. 

13. Ibid., 136-155; Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 141-

157; Justin McCarthy, “Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878,” in Muslims in BosniaHercegovina, edited by Mark Pinson, 78-82; Mark Pinson, “The Muslims of 

Bosnia-Hercegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918,” in ibid., 84-

128; Robert Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia 

and Hercegovina, 1878-1914 (New York: Columbia Press, 1981); and Francine 

Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1996), 57-87. 

14. McCarthy, “Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878,” 81-82. 

33 
15. For a discussion of World War I and Yugoslavia between the two world 

wars, see Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History 

and Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Robert Donia and 

John V.A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1994), 120-135; Joseph Rothschild, East Central 

Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 

1974), 201-280; Wayne S. Vucinich, “Interwar Yugoslavia,” in Contemporary 

Yugoslavia, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich (Berkeley, CA: California University 

Press, 1969), 3-58. 

16. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 278-79. 

17. Malcolm, Bosnia, 165-66. 

18. Ibid., 168. 

19. For material on Yugoslavia in general, and Bosnia in particular, during 

World War II, see Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The 

Chetniks (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975); Walter Roberts, Tito, 

Mihailovic, and the Allies (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973); 

Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt, 1977); Donia and Fine, Bosnia 

and Hercegovina, 136-56; Malcolm, Bosnia, 174-92; Tanner, Croatia, 141-67. 

20. Malcolm, Bosnia, 174. 

21. Tanner, Croatia, 148-49. 

22. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 152. 

23. For the Tito era, see Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 157-93; 

Malcolm, Bosnia, 193-212; Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in 

Yugoslavia, 1967-1991, 2nd ed (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 

1992). 

24. Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-

1999 (New York: Viking, 1999), 591. 

25. Glenny, The Balkans, 574. 

26. Malcolm, Bosnia, 196. 

27. Ibid., 197. 

28. Ibid., 197-98. 

29. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 6. 

30. George W. Gawrych, discussions with officers from Bosnia, Slovenia, 

Croatia, and Macedonia attending the US Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996-2001; George W. Gawrych, discussions 

with Bosnians in Bosnia, April 2000 and July 2001. 

31. Numerous publications have appeared explaining the disintegration of 

Yugoslavia: see Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution 

after the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1995); Leonard 

J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in 

Transition, 2nd ed (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995); Warren Zimmerman, The 

Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Random House, 1996); Christopher 

Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences 

(New York: New York University Press, 1995); Laura Silber and Allan Little, 

Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1996); Misha Glenny, The 

34 
Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, 3rd edition (New York: Penguin, 

1996): Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 194-219. 

32. Glenny, The Balkans, 623. 

33. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1997), 26. 

34. Zoran Cirjakovic, “What It’s Like Being a Serb,” Newsweek, 19 October 

1998, 3. 

35. Tanner, Croatia, 223 ff. 

36. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 220-80; Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998); 

Malcolm, Bosnia, 213-71. 

37. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 85-88. 

38. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic 

Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 178-

80. 

39. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 9. For excellent firsthand account 

of Sarajevo’s resistance, see Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of 

Sarajevo (New York: Random House, 1998). 

40. For a brief but excellent treatment of the character of this war, see Woodward, 

Balkan Tragedy, 223-72. 

41. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 266. 

42. For the tragedy of Srebrenica see David Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and 

Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II (New York: 

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997). 

43. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 93. 

44. Norman Cigar, “Serb War Effort and Termination of the War,” in the War in 

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995, edited by Branka Magas and Ivo 

Zanic (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 200-235. 

35 
Chapter 2 

From UNPROFOR to IFOR 

Robert F. Baumann 

Amid the chaotic and bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, the UN 

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) episode was at once both a noble endeavor 

and a monument to the futility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 

early 1990s. To Americans, especially as US troops prepared to deploy 

to Bosnia as part of the Dayton Implementation Force, better known 

as IFOR, UNPROFOR’s principal relevance was that it demonstrated 

exactly how not to conduct a military intervention in the midst of civil 

war and humanitarian crisis. Although UNPROFOR strength in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina reached 38,000 in 1994, it was weaker than even its 

inadequate numbers implied.1 Its largest combat elements were battalions, 

and each of these answered to a different national chain of command. 

Moreover, UNPROFOR lacked the authority and all too often the 

firepower to use force in a proactive manner. The lessons that American 

observers drew from the experience found realization in December 1995 

as Task Force Eagle crossed the Sava River. Spearheaded by the 1st 

Armored Division, the US contingent arrived with overwhelming force. 

Colonel Greg Fontenot, who commanded the 1st Brigade, 1st 

Armored Division, later noted, “IFOR was not a peacekeeping force. 

It was an implementation force that specifically had the authority to 

compel compliance with the treaty.”2 In short, IFOR brought with it the 

military strength and an explicit mandate to employ force as necessary 

to achieve the goals set forth in the General Framework Agreement for 

Peace (GFAP) achieved at Dayton, Ohio during the preceding month. 

This conferred on Fontenot and his colleagues an inestimable advantage 

over their UNPROFOR predecessors—a clear purpose and the means to 

achieve it. 

However unfairly, UNPROFOR by contrast served as the poster 

child for international vacillation and the failure to match means and 

methods to political objectives. Although not a formal participant in 

UNPROFOR, the United States contributed to the climate of indecision 

that attended UNPROFOR operations and the UN decision-making 

process. In succession, the George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations 

loudly condemned the mounting brutality in Bosnia but sought to 

steer clear of involving the US military. Of the two, Bush was the 

37 
more skeptical about the wisdom of potential American involvement. 

Summarizing the president’s thinking, former Secretary of State James 

Baker reflected, “the Bush administration felt comfortable with the 

EC’s [European Community] taking responsibility for the crisis in the 

Balkans....Most important, unlike in the Persian Gulf, our vital interests 

were not at stake.”3 Having so recently authored the closing chapter of 

the Cold War and forged a grand alliance to liberate Kuwait, President 

Bush simply did not believe that Bosnia was America’s problem to solve. 

When President Clinton assumed office in January 1993, he carried 

with him the baggage of the electoral campaign, during which he suggested 

that the United States could do more. In a strikingly similar fashion, he 

had issued a public challenge to the distinctly nonactivist Bush policy 

toward Haiti, where the elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide 

had been overthrown. However, in constructing his own policies upon 

beginning his presidency, Clinton straddled the fence. While publicly 

committed to a more assertive policy in both cases, he was nonetheless 

by nature disinclined to employ military force. Ultimately, in both Haiti 

and Bosnia, the president found that he could not avoid the military 

option. Meanwhile, Clinton’s key advisers were deeply divided as to the 

proper course of action. Warren Zimmermann, the last US Ambassador 

to Yugoslavia, described the mixed messages emanating from the White 

House: “Depending on the degree of American activism desired at the 

time, Bosnia was variously described as a US strategic concern and a 

test for the post-cold war world and for American leadership, or else as 

a civil war, the result of ancient hatreds, and an issue for the Europeans. 

Everybody, however, could agree with Secretary [Warren] Christopher’s 

characterization of it as a ‘problem from hell.’”4 

To be sure, US politicians received no encouragement from the 

military to undertake a Balkans mission. Opinion in the US Army reflected 

minimal enthusiasm, and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, urged the president not to commit US forces to a difficult, openended mission.5 Indeed, events gave credence to his assertion. From 

the outbreak of war in Bosnia in 1992 to the truce negotiated by former 

president Jimmy Carter in December 1994, not less than 13 cease-fires 

were agreed upon and broken.6 Still, in the eyes of Ambassador Warren 

Zimmermann and others, American policy was paralyzed by a lingering 

“Vietnam syndrome,” which prevented recognition of the essential 

relevance of Bosnia to the global leadership role of the United States 

and its position as a moral champion. Among those in agreement was 

former Secretary of State George Shultz, who asserted “America’s most 

basic interests required the use of force on behalf of the Bosnians.”7 

38 
In any event, the European Community and the United Nations 

proceeded to act in the absence of US leadership or participation. 

UNPROFOR began as an attempt to curb wanton atrocities during the 

war between Serbia and Croatia with a headquarters established in 

still-peaceful Sarajevo. On 21February 1992, United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 743 created UNPOROFOR to secure three designated 

protected areas in Croatia. In short order, the waning war between Serbia 

and Croatia gave way to an equally brutal struggle over control of 

ethnically mixed territories in Bosnia. This resulted in an expansion of 

the UNPROFOR mandate. The cascading events reached a crescendo 

with a 29 February Referendum on Bosnian independence followed on 7 

April by a formal decision of the European Community to recognize the 

new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The self-proclaimed Assembly 

of the Serbian Nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina promptly answered by 

declaring an independent Bosnian Serb Republic, which later became 

the Republika Srpska or RS (though within different borders). 

On 30April, UNPROFOR moved 40 military observers from Croatia 

to the Mostar region, where violence soon reached such intensity that 

they were withdrawn after only two weeks. At about the same time, a 

majority of UNPROFOR personnel in the Sarajevo headquarters pulled 

out as well. As was often the case in Bosnia, a well-publicized episode 

of violence punctuated the steady descent into chaos and focused 

international resolve to act. A day after Serb shelling of Sarajevo killed 

dozens of civilians on 27 May, the UN Security Council imposed economic 

sanctions on what remained of Yugoslavia–Serbia and Montenegro. The 

UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo, Canadian Major General Lewis 

MacKenzie, subsequently succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire that 

enabled UNPROFOR soldiers to assume control of airport operations 

there. During the brief lull in the action around the Bosnian capital, other 

areas of the country burst into flames. 

The resultant escalation of violence led in turn to a 14 September UN 

decision authorizing UNPROFOR to provide security in support of the 

distribution of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. UNPROFOR subsequently 

divided BiH into five zones, with a battalion allocated to each. A further step on October 9 was UN Security Council Resolution 776 to ban 

military flights (other than UNPROFOR) over Bosnia. UNPROFOR’s 

tasks thus included ensuring the safe arrival of aid flights into Sarajevo, 

monitoring the pullback of heavy weapons from around the Bosnian 

capital, and preserving freedom of movement for aid convoys sponsored 

by the international community. On 17 April 1993, UNPROFOR troops 

assumed yet another task, the demilitarization of the newly proclaimed 

39 
“safe area” around the beleaguered town of Srebrenica. Similar designation as “safe areas” soon followed for Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, 

and Sarajevo. This decision, which signified a major increase in UNPROFOR obligations without commensurate means or resolve, was to 

prove a source of profound complexity and embarrassment as the mission continued. In this context, even a NATO agreement as of February 

1994 to provide air strikes on UNPROFOR’s behalf would not have 

a decisive impact. By 30 November 1994, total UNPROFOR strength 

reached 38,810, but this figure did not represent concentrated combat 

potential. Rather, it was a multinational hodgepodge of separate small 

units, nominally under UN control but in reality answering to different national chains of command. Additional civilian personnel deployed 

in support of the mission included 727 policemen and 1,870 staffers. 

UNPROFOR was thus the largest peacekeeping mission in UN history.8 

Over several years, despite valiant efforts to broker truces and 

coordinate the free passage of humanitarian aid to besieged areas, UN 

peacekeepers found that each step forward was greeted by one step 

backward somewhere else in Bosnia. Because of the fact that none of the 

three major ethnic groups operated as a political-military united front, 

negotiations remained endlessly complex, and agreements rarely stood 

for more than a few months. Often the equivalent of local warlords acted 

independently. Intrigue, deception, and ever-shifting alliances reflected 

the agendas of the moment. On one occasion in 1994, following a 

meeting with the leader of the Serbian extremist SDS party, Radovan 

Karadzic, Soviet envoy Anatoli Churkin reported to Major General Sir 

Michael Rose that “he had never been lied to so blatantly as he had been 

by the Bosnian Serbs.”9 A commerce of death flourished as factions often 

sold arms to one another. Many self-styled militias, even criminal gangs, 

participated in the fighting.10 

The main trouble for UNPROFOR, uncooperative warring factions 

aside, emanated from the very terms of its mandate. Unfortunately, that 

mandate enabled UNPROFOR soldiers to deter attacks on civilians 

but not to employ force except in self-defense. Denied the right to use 

military force in a proactive manner in support of international objectives, 

UNPROFOR lacked the leverage to enforce a peace that, in any case, 

did not exist. Even had it chosen to coerce the factions into compliance, 

most peacekeeping units would have found themselves outgunned by 

the warring factions. Consequently, they were subject to innumerable 

indignities—harassment by snipers, seizure as hostages, and general 

abuse. According to one internal assessment of the UNPROFOR mission 

in 1993, in order to enforce or restore a peace, UNPROFOR “must have 

40 
Photo 1. The village of Srebrenica became infamous 

for the events that occurred nearby in 1995 

the means, and authority to use such means, to: 1) credibly demonstrate 

its resolve; 2) mount a credible show of force; and 3) have the means 

to effectively protect those it has been tasked to protect against forces 

equipped with tanks and artillery.”11 

The factions, especially the Bosnian Serbs, routinely obstructed the 

movement of aid and even the peacekeepers themselves. The brutal and 

obstinate behavior of Bosnian Serb forces, which had a predominant 

position on the ground across most of Bosnia, helped fuel a widespread 

perception outside of Bosnia that they were “the problem.” A particularly 

41 
bitter irony lay in the fact that a majority of UNPROFOR casualties were 

believed to have been inflicted by Muslims, and secondarily Croatians, 

the very populations whose protection was initially deemed most urgent.12 

The rationale for such attacks, based on the assumption that blame would 

fall on the Bosnian Serbs, may have been to galvanize a more forceful 

and robust UNPROFOR intervention or even involvement by NATO. 

Evidence also began to accumulate that the Muslim Bosniacs at times 

fired on their own people in the belief that the foreign media would blame 

the Serbs.13 

Occasionally, acts against peacekeepers reflected a clear political 

motivation. In a particularly troublesome instance, a British Royal 

Marine working with the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) in Sarajevo was killed by Bosnian Muslim police for 

allegedly resisting arrest.14 This grim circumstance no doubt contributed 

significantly to a diminishing tendency among peacekeepers themselves 

to view the Serbs as the undisputed “bad guys” of the conflict. The Serbs, 

though openly belligerent, were at least predictable. British Major General 

Rose, UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia from January 1994 to January 

1995, publicly voiced concerns that Bosnian Muslims were manipulating 

international policymakers. 

In general, Rose did his best to champion the UN commitment to 

neutrality, a position that occasionally put him at odds with the view 

taken by NATO, to which his own country belonged. As he strained 

to maintain the lifeline to Sarajevo during the trying summer of 1994, 

Rose had to deal firmly with both factions. Following a Serb attack 

on a British convoy on the vital Mount Igman road on 27July, Rose 

requested air strikes on Serb positions, even if such action required the 

withdrawal of UN forces to proceed. Conversely, when forces of the 

Bosnian government used heavy artillery to fire on Serb troops situated 

within the designated heavy weapons exclusion zone, the British 

general cautioned that air strikes could be launched against either 

side. In an attempt to stabilize the situation, Rose offered to place UN 

peacekeepers between the factions around Sarajevo. In this instance, the 

BiH government proved reluctant out of fear that such a dividing line 

might achieve permanence out of political expediency.15 

The widening gap between appearances and reality in Bosnia led to 

widespread suspicion, for example, that the Muslim faction would on 

occasion shell its own people and blame the Serbs so as to retain an edge 

in the battle for international sympathy. The role of global media, above 

all CNN, in transmitting powerful images and impressions made them a 

42 
prime target of faction psychological operations. From the start, Western 

governments felt acute public pressure to respond to the inhumanity of 

the Bosnian war. The nature and timing of those responses—from air 

strikes to new diplomatic initiatives—often reflected outrage over the 

latest depredations. On several notable occasions, published reports of 

the scale of Muslim civilian casualties proved quite exaggerated.16 Not 

infrequently, the news transmitted from Bosnia reflected a conviction in 

the press corps that the world had to act to stem the tide of atrocities. 

Certainly, reports of wholesale executions and ethnic cleansing, normally 

well founded, contributed mightily to the sense of urgency. For their part, 

some journalists in Sarajevo grew to believe that UNPROFOR personnel 

turned a blind eye to the desperate plight of the civilian population there.17 

Perhaps the ultimate manifestation of the “truth problem” was the 

controversy that lasts to this day over who actually fired the infamous 

28 August 1995 mortar rounds that killed 37 civilians in Sarajevo’s 

Markala market. The incident—generally blamed on the Serbs at the 

time—played a major role in bringing the United States more fully into 

the diplomatic process that led directly to the deployment of American 

troops to Bosnia as part of IFOR for the purpose of shaping international 

opinion and the diplomatic environment. In any case, of five rounds that 

detonated in the marketplace, four were clearly determined by subsequent 

crater analysis to have originated from Serbian positions. The trajectory 

of the fifth, however, could not be determined to the mutual satisfaction 

of experts on the scene. This may have been the result of a ricochet 

off of a building or some other circumstance. According to Canadian 

Colonel Rick Hatton, who oversaw the crater analysis, the correct and 

professional assessment was that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible.18 

However, some others, including several British and French officers, 

suggested that Muslim forces were probably responsible for the final 

explosion. Hatton believed that there was no evidentiary basis for this 

conclusion, although he freely acknowledged that Muslim forces had 

not been beyond resort to such subterfuge on other occasions.19 

In any case, NATO and the UN soon weighed in officially that the 

Serbs were in fact responsible. Controversy continued, however, when 

Russian Colonel Andrei Demurenko, himself an artilleryman serving with 

UNPROFOR, publicly disputed the finding.20 His contention was not that 

the Muslims fired on their own people, but merely that no definitive conclusion was possible. Ultimately, this critical variance of opinion inevitably gave rise to a perception in some circles that the finding itself had been 

influenced by policy makers seeking to take a firmer hand of the situation. 

43 
Overall, given their predicament, UNPROFOR soldiers comported 

themselves well and laid claim to remarkable achievements as well as 

tragic failures. The thousands of lives saved in Bosnia by virtue of their 

efforts came at a severe price to the peacekeepers themselves. Over 200 

peacekeepers, the largest share French, were casualties during the war. 

That they were so often placed in an untenable situation was a source 

of endless frustration for UNPROFOR veterans. In fairness, according 

to Colonel Hatton, Canada’s director of Peacekeeping Policy from 1996 

to 1999, the problem lay not only with the flawed mandate but with the 

failure of the international community to provide all necessary resources, 

especially soldiers, to support mission requirements.21 Indeed, the mission 

to Bosnia-Herzegovina was funded not by the United Nations but by the 

eight troop-contributing nations. Predictably, perhaps, each contingent 

tended to some degree toward a “lassez-faire” approach in which national 

priorities took precedence over the concerns of UNPROFOR. The failure 

to establish any semblance of unity of command brought with it assorted 

negative consequences. The following two cases make the point although 

there are numerous others. For example, the Canadians were upset in 

1993 when French forces unilaterally withdrew soldiers from the town 

of Pancevo, thereby forcing a major reordering of Canadian logistics 

plans.22 Similarly, in the aftermath of the 5 February 1994 shelling of the 

market square in Sarajevo, a Russian battalion commander flatly declined 

to redeploy to the Bosnian capital when so ordered by an UNPROFOR 

general.23 

No mission requirement posed greater difficulties than the protection 

of so-called safe areas. Though eventually perceived as a creation of 

the United Nations, the safe area concept originated (at least in the 

public arena) with Cornelio Sommaruga, president of the International 

Committee of the Red Cross headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. 

However, he found little support aside from the Dutch government for 

the notion in 1992, at which time neither the UN nor the major states 

contributing to UNPROFOR regarded it as practical. At that time, in the 

view of most observers, the best hope for peace remained the initiative 

led by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, who co-chaired the International 

Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Each had deep misgivings about 

the implications of establishing safe areas. For example, the creation 

of such areas by definition labeled all remaining territory as unsafe. 

In addition, if the Muslim population, considered the chief potential 

beneficiaries of the plan at the time, acted on this perception and 

migrated in vast numbers to safe areas, the entire scheme would actually 

44 
facilitate the objective of Serb extremists to establish ethnically pure 

territories.24 

Deep into 1993, the picture changed as fighting around Srebrenica 

captured the international spotlight. As initially conceived in Security 

Council Resolution 819 of April 16, 1993, the intent was to establish 

zones “free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts that 

would endanger the well-being and the safety of their inhabitants and 

where the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian 

population.” Subsequently, resolution 836 spelled out the UNPROFOR 

role: “to deter attacks against the areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to 

promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those 

of the Bosnian Government and to occupy some key points on the ground, 

in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief.” To 

facilitate these tasks, the resolution authorized UNPROFOR to take all 

necessary defensive measures, including the use of force in response to 

bombardments, armed incursion, or deliberate obstruction of the freedom 

of movement of UNPROFOR or escorted relief convoys.25 In addition to 

Srebrenica, the safe area concept was extended to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, 

Gorazde, and Zepa. 

Some of those charged with providing security for the UN safe 

areas harbored grave misgivings from the start. British Colonel P. G. 

Williams, who commanded the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards in 

Bosnia from November 1993 to May 1994 (well before the tragic fall 

of Srebrenica) contended upon his return to his home base that “the UN 

has never been in the position to provide inhabitants of its designated 

Safe Areas with the security the concept appears to imply.” Having 

observed UNPROFOR’s great difficulty in finding a willing party to 

assume control of Srebrenica from the Canadian battalion, Williams 

was grateful that circumstances had dictated that this particular mission 

would not fall to a British unit. Indeed, the very selection of units, over 

which the local factions, the Serbs in this case, had considerable say, 

betrayed the weakness of the concept. As it turned out, the Bosnian 

Serbs would not accept any British unit that came with the highly 

capable Warrior or Scimitar armored fighting vehicles. In other words, 

they would not give their consent to the presence of any contingent 

that might effectively contest their control. Lacking sufficient combat 

power, UNPROFOR units in safe areas could not even ensure their 

own lines of communication. According to Williams, “[they] were, and 

remain, under effective control of the BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] where 

movement in and out, equipment approval and roulement are concerned. 

45 
Handing one’s men over to become in effect little better than hostages is 

an unenviable task...”26 

In a 1 December 1994 report to the United Nations Security Council, 

the secretary general not only acknowledged widespread difficulties 

experienced by UNPROFOR in securing the safe areas, but also offered 

a substantive analysis and tentative conclusions. Foremost among his 

concerns was the dilemma posed by the Bosnian safe areas of Zepa, 

Gorazde, and Srebrenica. First of all, the secretary general acknowledged 

that the safe areas were not in fact “safe.” Worse yet, as demonstrated 

in the case of Gorazde, the presence of many Muslim fighters in 

the presumed sanctuaries jeopardized the perceived impartiality of 

UNPROFOR peacekeepers. As noted in the secretary general’s report, 

“After the first use of air power at Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs regarded 

UNPROFOR as having intervened on behalf of their opponents.” This 

circumstance resulted in increased obstruction of humanitarian relief 

convoys by the besieging Serb forces, a form of retaliation that struck at 

the heart of the UNPROFOR mandate.27 In addition, it was proof positive 

of UNPROFOR’s lack of leverage with the armed factions. Interruptions 

of fuel deliveries crippled the peacekeepers’ ability to continue patrolling 

in the vicinities of Zepa, Gorazde, and Srebrenica. During an uneasy 

cease-fire in a 3-kilometer exclusion zone around Gorazde, UNPROFOR 

personnel found their movement restricted by both sides (Serbs and 

Muslims) and were frequently the targets of sniper fire.28 

A further complication was that not infrequently the predominantly 

Muslim Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina operated from headquarters 

located within designated safe areas. Such was the case, for example, 

in Bihac, which provided a haven for the command of the Fifth Corps. 

In fact, attacks on Serb positions occasionally launched from within 

safe areas, thereby conferring on those locations real tactical military 

significance. Even if inactive, government troops could exploit the safe 

areas for temporary sanctuary and a chance to maintain their equipment 

and prepare for future action. Consequently, the United Nations 

occasionally appeared to be in de facto alliance with the BiH government. 

Under such conditions, it could hardly have been surprising that Bosnian 

Serb forces saw little reason to exercise restraint. Thus, in November 

1993, having withstood an October offensive launched from the Bihac 

pocket, Krajina Serb forces did not hold back. They shelled the safe area 

and bombed it from the air. Even the threat of NATO air strikes, bound 

by the principle of “proportional application of force,” had relatively 

little deterrent effect. Only tactical strikes against positively identified 

46 
targets known to have violated cease-fire agreements were permissible. 

The strategic use of air power so as to curb the factions’ capabilities 

or force broad policy change was not authorized. In any case, the full 

employment of air power faced practical constraints. In particular, the 

challenging terrain and climate of the Balkans offered abundant cover 

and concealment. 

Sometimes the most useful step taken by UNPROFOR soldiers on 

the ground was simply to get out of the way. For instance, British Major 

General Rupert Smith found in 1995 that the withdrawal of military 

observers from Gorazde paved the way for effective NATO air strikes.29 

In general, peacekeepers were necessary to coordinate the movement of 

aid, and their presence in communities was regarded as insurance against 

wholesale acts of slaughter by entity armed forces (most often but not 

always Serb). Yet, they could be pawns as well in the hands of aggressors. 

Thus, despite NATO retaliatory air attacks against Serb airfields and 

missile sites on 18-19 and 21-23 November 1993, the situation actually 

deteriorated. The Bosnian Serbs immediately curbed UNPROFOR 

movement in the Sarajevo area, closed checkpoints to UNPROFOR 

and humanitarian aid traffic, and seized about 250 peacekeepers for use 

as human shields at selected weapons collection points. Bosnian Serbs 

proved adept at moving and disguising their heavy weapons, thereby 

denying pilots the confirmation of targets that their rules of engagement 

demanded.30 In similar fashion, following a 25 May 1995 air raid against 

Serb bunkers at an ammunition storage site near Pale, angry Serb forces 

seized UN soldiers and chained them as human shields at key weapon 

sites. The move temporarily paralyzed NATO air power and laid bare 

the dilemma that the force necessary to compel Serb compliance would 

inevitably exact a toll on its users that they were not yet politically 

prepared to pay. This circumstance created tension between the United 

States and other hawkish elements in NATO on one hand and Rose and 

other proponents of the UN approach on the other. 

In the absence of consensus, restrictive rules of engagement made 

the timely use of air strikes—which required the approval both of the 

Yasushi Akashi, the secretary general’s special representative to the 

Former Yugoslavia, and NATO as well—highly problematic. Only rarely 

could the key actors in such decisions reach an accord. For example, 

in May 1995 Major General Smith requested air strikes to enforce the 

heavy weapons exclusion zone but could not gain the support either 

of his superior, French General Bernard Janvier, or of Akashi based 

on apprehension that such actions would have an “escalatory” effect.31 

47 
The inertia of such logic could not be overcome. Summarizing the 1995 

failure to use air power effectively to save Srebrenica, author David 

Rhode stated, “Akashi and Janvier consistently upheld the view that 

NATO air power was a blunt, dangerous and generally ineffective tool 

that enraged Bosnian Serbs and put peacekeepers at risk.”32Consequently, 

UNPROFOR peacekeepers unfairly bore the brunt of international 

criticism in instances when they could not effectively protect cities such 

as Gorazde or Srebrenica. As General Rose put it concerning Gorazde, 

“I vaguely wondered if Siladzic, Izetbegovic and their supporters in the 

international press actually believed that the UN, which was doing the 

most in Bosnia to bring about peace, was responsible for the slaughter. I 

concluded, sadly, that they probably did.”33 

In reviewing the evolution of the problem, Boutros Ghali’s 

December 1 report returned to refusal of member states to sustain the 

recommendation put before the Security Council in 1993 that 34,000 

peacekeepers would be required to implement the Safe Area regime 

properly. For its part, the Security Council had seen fit to authorize a force 

of 7,600. Scattered about the country and often lightly armed, they were 

considered a credible down payment on the UN commitment to peace 

in Bosnia. In practice, they were utterly incapable of overawing battlehardened faction leaders. Remarkably, however, even had the more robust 

force been in place, it had never been the Secretary General’s intention 

that UNPROFOR peacekeepers would actually defend the Safe Areas. 

To do so, he concluded, would “prevent UNPROFOR from carrying out 

its overall mandate in the former Yugoslavia, turn it into a combatant 

and further destabilize the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”34 

Thinking along similar lines, General Bernard Janvier, who commanded 

UNPROFOR in 1995, suggested that the best solution from a military 

and political point of view would have been to have the Bosnian Army 

guard the “safe areas,” a task which it also did not want to assume.35 

To some, such as Warren Zimmermann, the UN view simply did 

not make sense. “In the hot war in Bosnia,” the ambassador contended, 

“these conditions [restricting the use of force] made the United Nations 

a symbol of weakness and a candidate for blackmail....The United 

Nations’ weakness reinforces its retreat to the concept that it must act 

“neutrally”, even though in a war of aggression neutrality inevitably 

favors the aggressor.”36 Put more simply, a force that will not fight 

possesses little or no deterrent capability. Moreover, a refusal to act to 

save lives in imminent danger because to do so might jeopardize the free 

movement of aid convoys whose ostensible purpose was to save those 

48 
same lives and ease suffering flew in the face of basic logic. 

Failure to deter the infamous attack on the safe area in Srebrenica 

in 1995 became emblematic of the crisis facing UNPROFOR and a 

principal reason why many critics considered it a failure. While diplomats 

and generals quarreled over means and ends in Bosnia, the situation on 

the ground in Srebrenica drifted dangerously. Having already changed 

hands twice during the ebb and flow of the war between Muslims and 

Serbs in eastern Bosnia by early 1993, Srebrenica had become the point 

of temporary settlement of thousands of Muslim refugees. Serb attacks 

on the city in April 1993 portended a terrible bloodletting that prompted 

the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo, French General Phillippe 

Morillon, on his own initiative to proclaim the United Nations’ interest 

there. On 18 April, following a flurry of negotiations, a company of 

lightly armed Canadian peacekeepers—about 170 personnel in all--

rolled into the UN camp at nearby Poticari. In theory, the Srebrenica 

“Safe Area” was demilitarized–that is devoid of assets or formations 

belonging to any of the armed factions; or at least that is what many 

perceived the agreement to mean. Sadly, the reality was more complex. 

UNPROFOR understood the arrangement to signify that demilitarization 

applied only to the town of Srebrenica itself, and not to the lightly settled 

surrounding area. In contrast, the Bosnian Serbs recognized no such 

limitation and would subsequently insist that Muslim militia operating 

from the surrounding environs violated the agreement. For his part, the 

Bosnian Muslim commander in the area instructed his forces to turn in 

only non-servicable weapons or those for which ammunition was scarce. 

In short, compliance was largely voluntary and Canadian peacekeepers 

did not conduct intrusive house-to-house searches to verify compliance. 

In spite of all this, an UNPROFOR Press Release of 21 April declared 

demilitarization a success.37 

Although neither the Canadians nor the United Nations possessed the 

means to verify demilitarization, Kofi Annan, the Under-Secretary General 

for Peacekeeping Operations, expressed confidence in compliance with 

the provision.38 For a time it did not matter and in 1994 the Srebrenica 

Safe Area was considered a success. Bosnian Government and Serb 

forces respected a cease-fire along the confrontation line, a fact for which 

UNPROFOR troops received appropriate credit. However, as was so often 

the case during the Bosnian civil war, the calm was illusory. 

Tragically, as in Bihac, Srebrenica served as a staging area for 

Muslim raids against Serbian positions. In spring1995, at which time 

an undermanned (though larger at about 600 personnel) and outgunned 

49 
Dutch battalion had replaced the Canadians, a new and even worse crisis 

loomed. By July, Serb forces under General Ratko Mladic systematically 

cornered the Dutch with the threat of superior force as reflected by the 

presence of tanks and artilery. During the preceding interval, they isolated 

the peacekeepers and incrementally pealed away their perimeter outposts 

so as to deny them any clear picture of what was to follow. Directed 

to deter attacks on the people within the enclave but not to defend the 

ground on which they resided (a nuance lost on most world observers), 

the Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers pulled back to avoid an engagement on 

unfavorable terms. In any case, they had never possessed the combat 

strength to secure the entire Srebrenica perimeter. The Dutch established 

eight Observation Posts, each occupied by seven soldiers, along the fiftykilometer boundary.39 In the meantime, they had been subject to frequent 

indignities by the Muslims as well. Dutchbat soldiers were clearly not in 

control of the enclave. In January 1995, following an attempt to enforce the 

demilitarization of the safe area, 100 Dutch peacekeepers were detained 

by Muslim forces.40 Despite their subsequent release, the weakness of the 

Dutch position was transparent. 

By August, just what the Dutch were doing in Srebrenica at all 

became increasingly open to question. As of June, Bosniac militiamen 

openly carried weapons within the Srebrenica enclave.41 Even if they had 

possessed the manpower to patrol the enclave actively, the Dutch lacked 

sufficient fuel. Surrounding Serbs forces prevented more than minimal 

amounts of fuel from reaching the adjoining village of Poticari, base of 

the Dutchbat Headuarters, and even restricted the flow of ammunition.42 

Thus lacking mobility, the Dutch added three Observation Posts, which 

were subsequently used as staging areas for foot patrols.43 

Again, the puzzling UNPROFOR charter came into play. According 

to the Secretary-General, “UNPROFOR‘s protection role is derived from 

its mere presence: UNPROFOR is neither structured nor equipped for 

combat and has never had sufficient resources, even with air support, to 

defend the safe areas against a deliberate attack or to hold ground.”44 The 

true deterrent effect of presence without capability, or the demonstrated 

will to use force, would soon be apparent. On June 3, 1995, just a day after 

the loss of one of the Observation Posts, the Dutch Battalion commander 

reported, “The Dutchbat is not able to execute any actions nor can it 

respond to the deteriorating situation.” Only three weeks later, he advised 

his chain of command of the complete isolation of Dutchbat by the BSA, 

no one having been permitted to enter or leave since April 26.45 

50 
A combination of factors contributed to the downfall of the enclave 

and became the source of bitter recriminations later on. First, neither UN 

personnel nor NATO anticipated either the scale of the attack to come or 

the murders that would ensue only days later. Despite the predicament in 

Srebrenica, UNPROFOR assessed the danger of BSA attacks to be greater 

elsewhere. On July 7, Dutch troops passed a report to Sarajevo asserting 

that the BSA lacked either the strength or intent to overrun Poticari and 

Srebrenica. When the assault came soon afterward, the seizure of 55 Dutch 

prisoners offered the attackers valuable leverage in the tense moments to 

come. As the situation deteriorated, Lieutenant General Janvier hesitated 

to call for NATO air attacks both because of confusion throughout the 

chain of command and the absence of any clear indication that his own 

personnel in the enclave were in immediate danger. Indeed, some felt 

that the principal risk to Dutch peacekeepers–particularly those held as 

hostages–might be aerial bombing itself. This was apparently the view 

of the Dutch government, which vetoed air attacks on more than one 

occasion. The Dutch were hardly alone in withholding consent, however. 

Among the few who actually lobbied hard for air attacks were French 

President Jacques Chirac and American envoy Richard Holbrooke. 

Ultimately, two close air support attacks occurred resulting in damage or 

destruction to two Serb tanks. Whether more extravagant use of air power 

could have made a difference remains problematic. Certainly, NATO had 

far greater force available but the highly dispersed Bosnian Serb attacks 

on the enclave would have offered few lucrative targets.46 

While many faulted poor intelligence or timidity on the part of the 

UN command for the disaster, others allocated significant blame to the 

Bosnian Army command itself. In contrast to Gorazde, for example, the 

Bosnian Muslims did not make a stand to defend Srebrenica but in fact 

pulled their troops out of harm’s way. Whether this was an act of military 

pragmatism or political cynicism remains a debated question. Some 

observers suspected that the Bosnian government was willing to let the 

enclave fall in order to intensify international opinion against the Serbs 

and bring direct NATO intervention in the conflict.47 Others speculated 

about secret deals involving the Bosnian government, the Serbs, NATO, 

the UN, Lieutenant General Janvier and others.48 Meanwhile, the 

humiliation of Lieutenant Colonel Thom Karreman’s Dutch battalion– 

whose position gradually became untenable--triggered minute scrutiny 

of the episode in the Netherlands. During the final act of the tragedy, 

Serb forces compelled the Dutch to open the Safe Area. General Mladic 

bullied the Dutch and proclaimed Srebrenica a gift to the Serbian people 

51 
marking an historic reversal of the Turkish conquest of the area.49 The 

mass execution of thousands of Muslim men that ensued only days later, 

served to focus the international spotlight on UNPROFOR’s deficiencies 

and tarnished the entire enterprise. In addition, the endless dickering over 

the application of even modest NATO air attacks underscored the hesitancy 

and lack of consensus that characterized the international quest from its 

inception. On July 11, a ludicrous situation occurred in which Dutchbat 

peacekeepers hunkered down in bunkers in anticipation of air strikes that 

never arrived. Meanwhile, officers farther up the chain of UNPROFOR 

command knew nothing of a specific request for help. In the end, more 

than seven hours after the initial request, two NATO aircraft dropped two 

bombs on two BSA vehicles entering the Srebrenica Safe Area.50 Also, 

to be sure, American advocates of more forceful application of air power 

suffered from the apparent anomaly of their own position. Because the 

United States was not an official participant in UNPROFOR–minus the 

low profile presence of a few staff officers and advisors–and thus did not 

have forces on the ground in Bosnia, it did not share in any consequences 

the more robust air attacks would necessarily have entailed. As the Safe 

Area disintegrated on July 11, Muslim refugees poured into the Dutchbat 

compound at Poticari. Dutchbat permitted 4-5,000 refugees to enter but 

had to close its gates to an additional 15-20,000 remaining outside. All 

the while, many combat-age males, fearing the worst, decided to try to 

slip through BSA lines in the direction of Tuzla. A desperate act, it turned 

out to be the best available option.51 

Much of the problem, then, boiled down to the paralyzing effect of 

the two principal tenets of the United Nations approach to ending the 

conflict in Bosnia: the minimal use of force and the preservation of 

neutrality. Dedication to minimal force guaranteed insufficient leverage, 

even had the military presence been larger, to deal effectively with 

the determined and typically ruthless faction army commanders. In an 

important respect, the commitment to use only proportional force and no 

more than absolutely necessary for self-defense reflected the refusal of 

the international community to understand that it was dealing with a war 

in Bosnia. Still, the principle of minimal force was an important pillar of 

neutrality, which was central to the UN methodology. Considered crucial 

to their role as peacemaker, the commitment to neutrality made UN forces 

reluctant to apply force in support of humanitarian ends if doing so would 

contribute to the appearance of taking sides. The problem with neutrality 

in the eyes of its detractors was that it presumed a certain symmetry in the 

conflict for which a solution could be brokered by splitting the difference 

between the objectives of the two sides. If, however, one side was the 

52 
clear aggressor–as many observers believed the Serbs to be–such an 

approach tended to condone bad behavior in fact even if it opposed it 

in theory. It meant in practice that UNPROFOR would not take direct 

action to prevent ethnic cleansing, a phenomenon it certainly opposed. 

Years later, in 1998, the UN Secretary General acknowledged the multiple 

failures attending the collapse of the Srebrenica Safe Area. While roundly 

condemning the actions of the BSA, the report placed fault most heavily 

on the reluctance to apply air power: “We were, with hindsight, wrong 

to declare repeatedly and publicly that we did not want to use air power 

against the Serbs except as a last resort, and to accept shelling of the safe 

areas as a daily occurrence.” While the report does not fault Dutchbat for 

its inability to defend Srebrenica, it did question the failure of Dutchbat 

to report in a timely way the many ominous developments that portended 

the massacre that ensued. Perhaps surprisingly, the report minimized the 

significance of the Bosnian Muslim attacks staged from the Safe Areas, 

asserting that they were inconsequential.52 

Ultimately, the UN mission suffered from the occasional 

incompatibility of the two broad and lofty purposes that brought it to 

Bosnia in the first place: to alleviate human suffering and facilitate an end 

to the war–both, incidentally, within the context of preserving BosniaHerzegovina as a sovereign political entity. At times, it was not possible 

to fulfill the humanitarian mission without being drawn in some measure 

into the conflict. In turn, assuming the role of the broker of peace without 

massive military leverage sometimes left the UN appearing confused 

and ineffectual in protecting civilian noncombatants desperately seeking 

sanctuary and a means to survive. 

In the end, the use of brute military power played a major role in 

ending the war. OPERATION Deliberate Force, triggered by outrage 

over the August 28, 1995 explosion in the Mrkala Market in Sarjevo, 

hit the Serbs hard and signaled unmistakably that the West had lost all 

patience with Serb aggression. Of course, the basic shift of military 

momentum attending Croatia’s summer ground offensive (supported by 

federation attacks) also made clear to the Serb leadership that it was time 

to seek peace on the most favorable terms possible. Indeed, Serb strategy 

assumed that 1995 would mark the end of the civil war in any case.53 

Consequently, the role of allied air power in bringing the Serbs to 

Dayton is problematic. However, it was instrumental in shaping the 

behavior of Bosnian Serb forces on the ground. Beginning on August 30, 

NATO aircraft struck fifty-six approved targets in the areas of Sarajevo 

and Pale. The bombing paused after two days, but resumed five days 

53 
later as the Serb forces had as yet failed to comply with an agreement to 

pull heavy weapons back from Sarajevo was not yet complete. Finally on 

September 14 General Mladic agreed to abide by NATO demands.54 For 

NATO, the outcome justified resort to the use of massive force. 

Many NATO observers, who had restively watched the UNPROFOR 

episode, were determined to set a different tone from the start and the 

latitude to do so was clearly set forth in the Dayton Agreement. Indeed, 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the national Security Council 

had actually come to view the presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia as 

a liability, and responsible for thwarting the proper employment of 

US air power.55 Accordingly, IFOR would be far more muscular than 

UNPROFOR and assume a far more assertive posture. 

54 
Notes

 1. For a full breakdown of UNPROFOR strength and nations of origin of its 

soldiers, see Annex I, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security 

Council Resolution 947, 29 March 1995.

 2. Colonel Greg Fontenot, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. George 

Gawrych, 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

 3. James A. Baker, with Thomas M. deFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy (New 

York: Putnam, 1995), 636.

 4. Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 

1999), 223.

 5. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995).

 6. Douglas Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency (New York: Penguin, 1998), 

451.

 7. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 217-18.

 8. “Former Yugoslavia–UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force,” 

compiled by the Department of Public Information, United Nations, September 

1996, 41.

 9. Sir Michael Rose, Fighting For Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: Harvill Press, 

1998), 114. 

10. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic 

Conflict and International Intervention (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 136. 

11. Major General M. Baril, OMM, CD Military Adviser for the Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Headquarters, New York, “UNPROFOR 

One Year Later Report,” 8 July 1993. 

12. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: 

Penguin, 1996), 201-02. 

13. Rose, Fighting for Peace, 197. 

14. Rose, Fighting for Peace, 117. 

15. Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 152. 

16. Ibid., 150-51; see also Rose, Fighting for Peace, 121.. 

17. Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 161. 

18. Colonel Rick Hatton, Canadian Army, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann 

and Colonel Lawyn Edwards, Banja Luka, MND-SW Headquarters, 15 

September 2000. 

19. Ibid. One alternative theory held that the Muslims either fired the round 

or that an explosive device was planted in the market. Given the fact of five 

explosions in total, however, the near simultaneity of the blasts would seem to 

suggest a common source. 

20. Demurenko, incidentally, was a graduate of the US Army Command and 

General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, KS, where his opinion was taken 

seriously by those who knew him. 

21. Colonel R. A. Hatton, Canadian Army, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann 

and Colonel Lawyn Edwards, Banja Luka, MND-SW Headquarters, 15 

September 2000. 

55 
22. Major General M. Baril, “UNPROFOR One Year Later Report.” 

23. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will : International Diplomacy and the 

Yugoslav War (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 147. 

24. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

(New York: Penguin, 1997), 99-100. 

25. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 

Resolution 844, 9 May 1994, 1. 

26. Colonel P. G. Williams, “Tactical Command in Bosnia: Operation Grapple 

III - November 1993-May 1994,” unpublished paper presented at Camberley on 

22 September 1994. 

27. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security 

Council Resolution 959 (1994), 1 December 1994, 7, 9. 

28. Ibid., 2. 

29. David Rhode, End Game (New York: Ferrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1997), 

366-67. 

30. Rose, Fighting For Peace, 116; Boutros-Ghali, Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Resolution 947, 22 March 1995, 7. 

31. Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 150. 

32. Rhode, 365. 

33. Rose, Fighting for Peace, 113. 

34. Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary General, 1 December 1994, 7, 

16-17; see also “Former Yugoslavia–UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection 

Force,” 13-14. The concept of “light” and “heavy” options for the protection of 

safe areas first saw the light of day in a tentative proposal drafted by the French 

government on 10 May 1993. 

35. Rhode, End Game, 364. 

36. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 242. 

37. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 

53/35 (1998), Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 59-62. <http://www.haverford.edu/ 

relg/sells/reports/Unsrebrenicareport.htm> accessed 18 February 2004. 

38. Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 106. 

39. Srebrenica Report, paragraph 226. 

40. Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 130. 

41. Srebrenica Report, paragraph 223. 

42. Honig and Both, Srebrenica, 128. 

43. Srebrenica Report, paragraph 229. 

44. Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 844, 

4. Honig and Both assert on page 114 that the governments of Britain, France, 

and Spain insisted on the qualification that the use of force be in self-defense. 

Their concern was that to do otherwise would drag them into the war. 

45. Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 233-35. 

46. Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force: The UN and NATO Campaign 

in Bosnia 1995 (Lancaster, UK: Center for Defense and International Security 

Studies, 1999), 142-45; Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The 

Modern Library, 1999), 68-71. 

56 
47. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 145-46. 

48. Rohde, End Game, 357-63. 

49. Holbrooke, To End a War, 69. 

50. Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 297-99. 

51. Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 297-305. 

52. Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 474, 479. 

53. Ivo Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” 

Foreign Service Journal, December 1998 at <GOTOBUTTON BM_1_ www. 

afsa.org/fsj/Dec98/Decisiontointervene.html, 2>. 

54. Briefing by Lieutenant General Mike Ryan on Deliberate Force, Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, February 12, 1996, as cited in Michael O. Beale, “Bombs 

Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia Herzegovina,” unpublished thesis, 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama, June 1996, 59.l 

55. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene,” 4. 

57 
Chapter 3

Military Planning Before OPERATION Joint Endeavor:

An Initial Assessment 

Walter E. Kretchik 

The United Nations Security Council is invited to adopt a 

resolution by which it will authorize Member States or regional 

organizations and arrangements to establish a multinational 

military Implementation Force . . .. 

General Framework Agreement for Peace1 

Histories of past military operations tend to avoid the planning phase 

because fathoming complicated military plans and the methodologies 

that produced them bedevils researchers. For that reason, negotiating 

the planning maze that culminated in OPERATION Joint Endeavor 

is an immense undertaking. Yet, some familiarity with the concepts 

underlying military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is essential for 

understanding what preceded the alliance-led operation. 

This chapter seeks to illuminate the causes and outcomes of military 

plans by examining headquarters activity through released documents, 

memoirs, and eyewitness accounts. The assessment is far from complete, 

for identifying every headquarters and plan over four years of international 

efforts to end the Balkan war exceeds the scope of this section. Limitations 

allow for shedding only some light upon certain NATO, US multiservice 

and US Army headquarters that devised plans to support diplomatic 

initiatives over the early to mid-1990s. Where appropriate, some judgment 

will be passed over what happened when selected plans were executed. 

Planning Headquarters: An Overview 

The numerous military headquarters planning for military coercive 

power in Bosnia constitute two categories, the first one consisting of 

multinational entities such as the UN and NATO. Within the UN, strategic 

planning occurred in a variety of departments to include the Department 

of Peacekeeping Operations. However, the requisite documents for 

elucidating the UN planning process remain sparse. It is easier to 

discern the results of planning as evidenced by the numerous resolutions 

authorizing the use of military power. 

In 1995, NATO represented 16 nations and was the UN’s military 

executor for conditions specified within the General Framework 

59 
60

The SACEUR also tasked the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction 

Corps or ARRC to develop supporting plans. Founded on 2 October 

1992, this operational/tactical headquarters was essentially British with 

subordinate multinational combat divisions and brigades. In 1995, British 

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker was the ARRC commander.3

Figure 1. US Forces Command Structure, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR

Agreement for Peace (GFAP).2 For military action, the North Atlantic 

Council (NAC) provides strategic planning direction through the Military 

Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). 

When OPERATION Joint Endeavor occurred, US Army General George 

Joulwan was SACEUR, exercising authority through Allied Command 

Europe (ACE) and a planning staff within Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe (SHAPE), Casteau, Mons, Belgium. For the Bosnia crisis, 

operational planning under SHAPE fell primarily to Allied Forces Southern 

Europe (AFSOUTH), led in 1995 by US Navy Admiral Leighton Smith. 
Complementing the multinational headquarters was a second 

organizational grouping, the national military headquarters. At this time, 

little has emerged as to what planning occurred within most of these 

entities.4 For the United States, military headquarters involved with 

Bosnia planning did so under a national chain of command, not the UN 

or NATO. Coordination outside of US channels certainly occurred, for a 

US military liaison cell existed within the UN headquarters in New York 

City. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a strategic headquarters located 

in Washington, DC also played a significant role in Bosnia planning, 

particularly in dealings with the SACEUR. 

In addition to his appointment as SACEUR, General Joulwan was also 

Commander in Chief, US European Command (CINCEUR) in charge of 

US European Command (EUCOM), a multiservice headquarters located 

in Stuttgart, Germany. This arrangement required Joulwan to answer 

directly to the president of the United States and the secretary of defense, 

with the JCS in an advisory and support capacity. However, the general 

was usually embroiled in NATO affairs, thus EUCOM’s daily operations 

rested with the deputy commander. Although the SHAPE and EUCOM 

staffs were not co-located and under separate command channels, the 

SACEUR/CINCEUR command method offered a nexus for NATO and 

US military planning in Europe. 

While EUCOM contained a number of entities, ground operations 

planning occurred within US Army Europe (USAREUR), an operationallevel, single-service headquarters commanded in 1995 by US Army 

General William Crouch in Heidelberg, Germany. Under USAREUR 

were several subordinate US Army headquarters. The 21st Theater 

Army Area Command (TAACOM), an operational level Army logistics 

headquarters, was situated in Kaiserslautern, Germany under Major 

General James Wright. An operational/tactical headquarters, V Corps 

under Lieutenant General John Abrams was situated in Heidelberg. 

Vicenza, Italy was the home of the Southern European Task Force 

(SETAF), a tactical headquarters commanded by Major General Jack 

Nix. Major General William Nash commanded the 1st Armored Division 

in Baumholder, Germany, a tactical force under V Corps.5 

This overview of but a few headquarters gives some appreciation 

for planning complexity concerning Bosnia. Planning spanned several 

continents, many headquarters, and numerous chains of command. A 

particular headquarters might have a strategic, operational, or tactical 

focus depending upon level of command and mission. In addition, the 

hundreds of officers involved held different views depending upon 

61 
Photo 2. Major General William Nash Commanded 

the 1st Armored Division and Task Force Eagle

culture, language, education, and experience. With a typical tour for a 

plans officer being two or three years, personnel turnover was a constant 

irritant. Officers departed with their knowledge and experience; new 

arrivals joined in with little, if any, comprehension as to what had 

transpired previously.6 

In theory, the various staffs coordinated activities among headquarters 

through the “nesting of plans” concept where a particular plan supported 

one published from above. However, peacetime workloads and priorities 

complicate coordination with a senior headquarters, let alone those below, 

laterally, and outside the chain of command. As this study argues, chaos 

ensued when divergent chains of command devised concepts unshared 

among the greater military planning and execution community. 

Bosnia Planning in Context: The Cold War Aftershock 

The Soviet Union’s demise in December 1991 ended the Cold War 

and tumbled a bi-polar world order 50 years in the making. Such a 

tumultuous occurrence prompted numerous security-based organizations 

and military headquarters to reexamine their charters and missions. The 

UN viewed the event as freedom to end future conflict through preventive 

diplomacy and, under the leadership of Secretary General Boutros Boutros 

Ghali, embarked on an aggressive scheme to do so. NATO also revised 

long-held views of how the alliance conducted military operations by 

62 
developing military staffs capable of planning peace operations and outof-sector deployments.7 In concert with this procedural housecleaning, the 

US military in Europe also revamped its planning procedures to prepare 

for future contingencies. 

One crisis that involved both NATO and US military planners was 

the developing war in the Balkans.8 Yugoslavia’s breakup and rapid 

plummet into civil war reflected the type of scenario for which military 

planners in Europe attempted to prepare.9 However, when the UN passed 

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713 on 25 September 1991 to 

enact an arms embargo to quell fighting between the former Yugoslavia 

and Croatia, NATO and US planners were focused upon OPERATION 

Provide Comfort in northern Iraq.10 Further UN efforts produced 

UNSCR 743 on 21 February 1992 to establish a UN protection force or 

UNPROFOR in Croatia. That action was followed by UNSCR 749 in 

April 1992, authorizing a full UNPROFOR in protected areas.11 

Response With Sea and Air Plans 

With the war a threat to NATO security at least through potentially 

destabilizing surrounding members, NAC members expressed concern in 

Rome, Italy on 8 November 1991.12 In July 1992, NATO leaders agreed 

to use naval force in the Adriatic to monitor UN sanctions imposed upon 

what remained of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro. International 

response also bore fruit later the same month through OPERATION 

Provide Promise. Under the direction of the UN High Commissioner For 

Refugees (UNHCR) and UNSCR 761 of 29 June, the US government 

led an international coalition of 21 nations to assist Bosnia’s besieged 

citizenry by air. The coalition planned its missions through a working 

group composed of contributing nation brigadier generals and their 

staffs. Between 2 July 1992 and 9 January 1996, NATO and non-NATO 

aircraft delivered nearly 200,000 tons of humanitarian aid to Bosnian 

cities, principally Sarajevo.13 Later, on 1 February 1993, AFSOUTH 

assumed command of a newly formed headquarters, Joint Task Force 

Provide Promise. The joint task force oversaw US activities in support 

of the UN mission from Kelly Barracks near Stuttgart, Germany. Two 

smaller headquarters detachments located in Naples, Italy and Zagreb, 

Croatia, also participated. About 1,200 US military reservists from 

various services were called to active duty, with some individuals serving 

as plans officers. 

These actions characterized the skimpy political will and unclear 

strategic military guidance that constrained NATO and US headquarters 

planners.14 Unwilling to take decisive measures to end the war or provide 

63 
a clear political end state, UN and NATO policy makers attempted to 

shape events through sea and air means when using military power. 

Further, the planning was reactive rather than proactive as the military 

headquarters slid into the Balkan quagmire through assorted UN 

resolutions. On 9 October 1992, UNSCR 781 established a no-fly zone 

over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In response, NATO military planners 

produced OPERATION Sky Monitor to assist UNPROFOR with 

detecting unauthorized flights. Later, on 10 November 1992, the UN 

approved SCR 786, sending 75 military observers to airfields in the war 

zone. NATO voiced its continued support in December 1992.15 

Additional UN actions against the belligerents came fast and furious 

in early 1993. UNSCR 807 extended UNPROFOR’s mandate until 31 

March 1993, the first of many renewals that culminated with UNSCR 

1026 in November 1995. The UN passage of SCR 816 on 31 March 

1993 expanded Bosnia and Herzegovina no-fly zone parameters to all 

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft flights without UNPROFOR approval. If 

violations occurred, UN members had authority to take certain measures. 

In support, the NAC approved a NATO ban on 8 April, with planners 

contriving OPERATION Deny Flight. The operation commenced on 12 

April 1993 under AFSOUTH OPLAN 40101, beginning with 50 fighter 

and reconnaissance aircraft supplied by France, the Netherlands, and the 

United States. Later, more than 200 aircraft would operate from Italian 

air bases and Adriatic-stationed aircraft carriers. 

UN sanctions and NATO interdiction operations came under scrutiny 

in May 1993 as the media saturated the airwaves with appalling scenes of 

Sarajevo existence. The once charming city that hosted the 1984 Winter 

Olympic Games was now a charnel house. In response to international 

pressure, UNSCR 824 of 6 May 1993 declared Sarajevo and five other 

Muslim enclaves as “safe areas” under UNPROFOR guardianship. The 

alliance later affirmed its readiness to respond to factional aggression 

against these locations with UN-approved air strikes. However, the ground 

combat power necessary to force a settlement remained politically taboo. 

With Vance-Owen Peace Plan meetings ongoing since 2 January 

1993, peace seemed certain as early as 2 May.16 However, premature 

celebrations ended in disappointment when international and primarily 

US backing failed to materialize. With the war continuing, NATO offered 

close air support to UN forces if attacked and upon request. NATO 

military planning also resulted in OPERATION Sharp Guard beginning 

on 15 June 1993, a maritime interdiction mission in conjunction with the 

Western European Union that monitored Adriatic ship traffic transiting the 

64 
Balkans.17 To increase pressure upon the warring factions, the UN passed 

SCR 844 on 18 June allowing for 7,500 troops to deploy to designated 

safe areas and authorized the use of air power to protect them. 

By late fall 1993, the NAC made preparations for stronger air 

measures against forces surrounding Sarajevo and to interdict troops 

interfering with humanitarian aid. Such measures not only reacted to 

SCR resolutions but also again resulted from a general international 

apathy toward using decisive ground force to cease hostilities. In truth, 

the war was a potential quagmire for the UN, NATO, European, and US 

policy makers. With little desire to undertake a lengthy peacekeeping 

mission, most nations were unwilling to act resolutely. In truth, sea and 

air power sought to chip away at belligerent will while also helping to 

quell growing political pressure to take action. 

In early 1994, diplomatic initiatives reached an impasse over 

belligerent territorial issues. NATO officials soon met in Brussels to 

confirm all previous UN and NAC resolutions and also threaten air 

strikes to open Tuzla’s airport for humanitarian aid. Yet, unsettling events 

continued that indicated NATO sea and air power alone were ineffective in 

altering warring faction behavior. In what Christopher Bennett described 

as a “jolting event” on 5 February 1994, an explosion in Sarajevo’s central 

marketplace killed 68 people, mostly Muslim civilians.18 In response, 

NATO warned Bosnian Serb forces to withdraw their heavy weapons or 

be subject to air strikes. The Serbs chose to comply for the time being 

but repeatedly violated the Sarajevo safe area later. The attack marked a 

historical turning point, for killing so many civilians in a single incident 

magnified global outrage. NATO remained active, for its aircraft shot 

down four GALEB / JASTREB aircraft violating the Bosnia no-fly zone 

in late February 1994. 

In spring 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and 

Germany established a five-nation contact group to settle the armed 

conflict between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs. The contact 

group sought a single-state status for Bosnia with both Federation and 

Bosnian Serb entities sharing constitutional principles and also a defined 

relationship with Serbia and Croatia. Later, in July 1994, the contact 

group proposed a map offering a 51-49 percent territorial compromise 

between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian, Croatian, 

and Serbian governments accepted the overture, but the Bosnian Serbs 

rebuffed it on 20 July. 

Throughout 1994, NATO planners had reacted to tepid international 

willpower with a policy of punishing belligerents for attacking UN 

65 
personnel and designated protected areas. On 19 November 1994, 

UNSCR 958 authorized NATO aircraft to attack Serb nationalist targets 

in Croatia when fighting erupted between the Bosnian government and 

antigovernment Muslims in Bihac. Soon thereafter, AFSOUTH plans 

resulted in aircraft bombing Udbina Airfield in Serb-held Croatia in 

response to hostile aircraft attacking a UN safe area at Bihac. Later, NATO 

aircraft destroyed surface-to-air missile sites in Bosnia-Herzegovina that 

had fired upon alliance airplanes.19 

With the UN allowing NATO more latitude to attack Bosnian Serb 

targets via air power, AFSOUTH planners formulated two retaliatory 

plans. The first was Dead Eye, a concept to disrupt Bosnia’s integrated 

air defense system. NATO aircraft struck the Pale ammunition storage 

depot on 25-26 May 1995 in response to Bosnian Serb artillery firing 

into Sarajevo from UN-monitored weapons collection sites. The plan 

was revamped to meet other situational developments: the seizure of 

UN peacekeepers, the loss of a NATO F-16 on 2 June, the overrun of 

Srebrenica on 11 July, and the fall of Zepa on 26 July.20 

On 25 July and again on 1 August 1995, the NAC specified that 

further Bosnian Serb offensive action meant continued NATO air power 

to deter future attacks on safe areas. Military planners responded by 

developing air attack plans for the defense of each UN safe area by again 

refining the Dead Eye plan and preparing another air strike plan labeled 

OPERATION Deliberate Force. OPERATION Deliberate Force was 

promoted as a peacemaking exercise designed to reduce warring faction 

military capability for threatening UN forces and safe areas. The plan, 

however, was not designed to end the war.21 

The AFSOUTH commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, presented the 

Deliberate Force concept to the NATO secretary general, the Honorable 

Willie Claes, and the SACEUR on 3 August 1995. Discussions focused 

on using air power to underpin UN resolutions and NAC decisions.22 On 

10 August 1995, Admiral Smith and Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier, 

commander of UN Peace Force (UNPF), signed a “dual-key” agreement 

containing UN-NATO arrangements for implementing air power in the 

Balkans.23 Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 caused 

Admiral Smith and Lieutenant General Janvier to authorize OPERATION 

Deliberate Force. AFSOUTH planners formulated a series of “strike 

packages” to first strip away Bosnian Serb air defense systems, then 

attacked ground targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo from 29 to 31 August. 

On 1 September, the UN requested a suspension of hostilities to allow 

negotiation with the Bosnian Serbs. An ultimatum failed to convince the 

66 
Bosnian Serbs, so air strikes resumed on 5 September. On 10 September, 

NATO used Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles to assail additional air 

defense sites in Bosnia.24 

Soon after these attacks, Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, the 

UNPROFOR commander, requested another cease-fire to assess Bosnian 

Serb intentions. That afternoon, following a Bosnian Serb attack on UN 

positions near the Tuzla airport, the UN asked for and received NATO close 

air support. Bosnian Serb command bunkers and an artillery position were 

subsequently destroyed. Additional NATO air strikes occurred against 

targets 11-13 September 95. On 14 September, offensive operations 

were again suspended when warring faction representatives agreed to 

conditions set out in a UN-brokered peace agreement.25 By 20 September 

1995, UN and NATO decision makers determined that OPERATION 

Deliberate Force had met its objectives.26 Air power was one piece of the 

innumerable diplomatic and military conditions that played out over the 

summer and fall of 1995 which compelled the warring factions to seeking 

a peace settlement.27 

Response With Ground Force Plans 

Although NATO sea and air power had played some role early in the 

Bosnian conflict, a number of ground forces options also arose in the early 

1990s. Vacillating political conditions rendered these efforts more a mental 

exercise than suitable courses of action. In 1992, USAREUR and V Corps 

tasked the US Army’s 1st Armored Division and 3rd Infantry Division 

to craft several scenarios, the details of which remain classified.28 It can 

be surmised, however, that the planning supported AFSOUTH OPLAN 

40101, developed in late summer of 1992 to support the proposed VanceOwen Peace Plan.29 The OPLAN envisioned replacing UNPROFOR with 

NATO troops under the ARRC commander but was never executed. 

Despite an UNPROFOR in Bosnia by October 1992 under 

OPERATION Grapple and other mission monikers,30 the Bosnian civil 

war threatened to destabilize surrounding countries through refugees 

and ethnic hatred. To counter this threat, the UN passed UNSCR 795 

on 11 December 1992 authorizing an additional UNPROFOR in 

Macedonia. Labeled as a UN preventive deployment force, a Nordic 

battalion consisting of Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish troops arrived 

in February 1993. In June 1993, American military plans resulted in the 

first US troops arriving under Task Force Able Sentry. The various troop 

rotations into Macedonia later became a separate mission under UNSCR 

983 of 31 March 1995.31 

67 
As political conditions changed, planners refined OPLAN 40101 

but under policy constraint. In 1993 for example, US State Department 

officials viewed the Balkans situation as a European affair alone, fearing 

that any US ground force might be drawn into years of peacekeeping 

duties.32 Such policy was typical of the international community at large, 

thus NATO and US military planners found it difficult to develop more 

decisive military options using ground power. 

By early 1993, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan seemed practicable 

enough for ending the war. As political circumstances sharpened in focus, 

circumstances demanded a more complete overhaul of OPLAN 40101. In 

the fall of 1993, 40101 became OPLAN 40103, now reflecting particulars 

where UNPROFOR would expand in size and necessitate a larger NATO 

force to replace it. At the time, there was sufficient confidence in the 

peace process to allow some staff officers a ground reconnaissance 

to seek possible headquarters locations in the Balkans. The political 

climate, however, proved too provisory to make Vance-Owen workable, 

so OPLAN 40103 was put on hold in 1994. 

Ground planning tapered off for several months but accelerated in 

November 1994 when Bosnian Serb military success and NATO sea and 

air power failed to prevent attacks on UN safe havens and personnel. 

Senior military officials on both sides of the Atlantic concluded that 

UNPROFOR was in a desperate situation. Political conditions now 

changed from considering a UNPROFOR replacement by NATO troops 

to an extraction of peacekeepers under extreme conditions.33 

The situation in Bosnia had further deteriorated to such a point by 

February 1995 that AFSOUTH staff officers underwent a computerdriven exercise to assist in developing the UNPROFOR extraction plan, 

now designated OPLAN 40104. Under this concept, ground command 

fell to the ARRC; its staff discerning that the NATO troops required to 

execute OPLAN 40103 were also necessary for 40104. As contrived, a 

mobile force of up to nine NATO brigades was to move simultaneously 

into the Balkans via air, road, and sea means to establish a covering 

force. In addition to ground forces, NATO naval assets secured the sea 

line of communications within the Adriatic, while air forces gained air 

supremacy over the region. Once the NATO forces were in position, 

AFSOUTH assumed operational control of all UNPROFOR units to 

direct their out-of-region movement. 

Plans are nothing but ideas and require people and resources to 

execute them. Unfortunately, as with previous ground options, NATO’s 

68 
membership showed little interest in offering up the means to implement 

them.34 Some NATO units rehearsed the UNPROFOR extraction mission 

nonetheless, and the OPLAN underwent several revisions. Eventually, 

a version made its way to the SACEUR and the NAC for debate and 

approval.35 SACEUR OPLAN 40104 “Determined Effort” emerged on 

21 July 1995 but without NAC execution approval. 

As NATO and US Army personnel devised OPLAN 40104, Bosnia 

was under a four-month cease-fire brokered by former US President 

Jimmy Carter in December 1994.36 When the arrangement expired on 

1 May, Bosnian Serb forces soon renewed attacks on Sarajevo and 

endangered the UN safe area of Srebrenica. These actions now made 

UNPROFOR extraction a distinct possibility, particularly when Bosnian 

Serb forces responded to NATO air strikes by taking more than 350 UN 

peacekeepers hostage.37 

Although the international community still remained irresolute over 

ground forces in Bosnia, the UN peacekeeper hostage crisis intensified US 

Army planning for the UNPROFOR extraction. But the hostage situation 

and UN peacekeepers scattered about the Balkans meant modifying 

OPLAN 40104. This variant envisioned using NATO ground troops to 

remove small groups of peacekeepers near simultaneously. USAREUR’s 

portion of the operation fell to Major General Jack Nix, the commanding 

general of SETAF, who trained his force for its expected mission.38 

Several years of UN resolutions, NAC decisions, NATO sea and air 

power plus US diplomatic push slowly changed international attitudes 

toward the possibility of committing ground troops. However, it was 

the UN hostage situation that shocked the international community 

into action. By taking so many UN soldiers hostage, the Bosnian Serbs 

directly challenged both UN credibility and NATO’s power to protect 

the peacekeepers via air means alone. On 16 June 1995, the UN passed 

SCR 998, authorizing 12,500 additional troops as a rapid reaction force 

to reinforce UNPROFOR. 

Representing about a division’s worth of combat soldiers, the reaction 

force authorization was a dramatic shift in what had been UN retaliation 

policy by sea and air means alone. US spokesmen, however, were 

careful to state that the French, British, Dutch, and Belgian force would 

not replace UNPROFOR, although OPLAN 40104 was certainly in the 

works.39 With US forces noticeably absent from the UN reaction force, 

USAREUR forces rehearsed their portion of the UNPROFOR extraction 

plan during Exercise Mountain Shield I. Grafenwöhr, Germany hosted the 

exercise 7-15 July 1995, bringing together a mixed group of forces.40 

69 
Apparently undismayed by SCR 998 and what it suggested, Bosnian 

Serb forces overran Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995.41 The Clinton 

administration soon heightened pressure on the UN and NATO to 

protect the remaining safe areas by force. Surprisingly, the United States 

found support within the London Conference of 21 July. With more 

resolve than previous conferences, the attending members condoned the 

continued use of NATO air strikes if UN safe areas were threatened.42 

The conference results encouraged US foreign policy makers to step up 

an all-out diplomatic effort to end the war in Bosnia, although President 

Clinton was still unable to gather strong congressional support to commit 

US ground power.43 NATO now “drew a line in the sand” around Gorazde 

but lacked the international will to commit ground forces and end the war. 

To show US resolve, President Clinton sent National Security Adviser 

Anthony Lake to Europe, where he presented a US peace initiative to 

NATO and non-NATO representatives.44 Peace was possible at the time, 

due in part to a Croat military offensive to recapture the Krajina region 

in August 1995. With training support supplied by US government 

contractors from Military Professional Resources Incorporated, the attack 

succeeded. Bosnian Serb forces suffered defeat for the first time in four 

years.45 The Croat ground offensive demonstrated that the once-dominant 

Serbs were now in a position where their victory was not certain. 

Given this new twist in the ground war, a diplomatic breakthrough 

seemed likely as the Croat faction consolidated its hold on the Krajina 

region in mid-August. Then, on 28 August 1995, a Bosnian Serb unit 

lobbed mortar rounds into the Sarajevo marketplace, killing 38 civilians 

and wounding at least 85 more. This flagrant disregard for yet another 

UN safe area and a NATO-designated heavy weapons exclusion zone 

triggered OPERATION Deliberate Force. 

Plans For Closure 

During OPERATION Deliberate Force, the Clinton administration 

further pressured all international parties to bring peace to the Balkans. 

With belligerents now willing to hold discussions, US policy makers 

urged European governments to accept that a peaceful removal of 

UNPROFOR was apropos given the reduced potential for armed conflict 

with belligerent forces. In light of ongoing peace talks and changing 

political conditions by early September, the NAC directed the SACEUR 

to devise a peace-enforcement operation in Bosnia using ground forces. 

That directive resulted in SHAPE OPLAN 40105 on 15 November 1995, 

with AFSOUTH subsequently publishing its own 40105 and the ARRC 

producing OPLAN 60105. 

70 
In developing these plans, the military planning process suffered 

from a lack of firm intelligence, especially concerning how the various 

combatants might react to a NATO ground presence. Although military 

planners had transited Bosnia to assess the situation for themselves, 

commanders and their staffs asked numerous questions that overwhelmed 

the intelligence community. To fill the information void and deal with 

changing conditions, the planners devised assumptions. However, even 

one wrong assumption invalidates the entire plan, thus the rule of thumb 

is to develop no more than five. As one indicator of the lack of certainty 

facing planners, AFSOUTH OPLAN 40105 contained 27 assumptions.46 

In truth, no plan could match Bosnian realties precisely, for political 

and military conditions changed continually. Although there was 

international agreement to provide a ground force if a peace treaty was 

signed, the military plans for doing so were “living documents” modified 

as additional information came to light. The fluidity of changing roles and 

missions over the fall of 1995 can be illustrated by one plan that called 

for training and arming Bosnian Federation forces. Lieutenant Colonel 

Peter J. Schifferle of V Corps was responsible for the plan. In mid-August 

1995, Schifferle was directed to design a contingency operation where the 

US 3rd Infantry Division would send forces into the Bosnian Federation 

to arm and train a national army.47 After many hours of work and briefings 

to various general officers, his concept found its way to Washington. 

There the plan was well received initially. Within days, however, the JCS 

abandoned the plan when the US government showed no support for it. 

With the contact group meeting faction foreign ministers and others 

in Geneva on 8 September 1995, events drove planning for a ground force 

option. USAREUR had turned its attention to Mountain Shield II from 8 

to 19 September; the exercise was yet another UNPROFOR extraction 

rehearsal and also periodic SETAF “normal training.”48 Sometime during 

the exercise, both General Crouch and Lieutenant General Abrams learned 

of the NAC’s direction to SACEUR to plan for a peace enforcement 

mission in Bosnia.49 Lieutenant Colonel Albert Bryant, Jr., the chief of 

plans for V Corps, was soon ordered to plan not only for a mission that 

“extended beyond a six-month window” but also one requiring a large 

sustainment force within the theater of operations.50 In effect, V Corps 

developed a plan for its higher USAREUR headquarters. By the end of 

September, the “USAREUR Campaign Plan” came into being.51 

The V Corps planners believed that US ground forces might enter 

Bosnia as early as 1 October. NATO, however, did not release the 

authority to begin extensive planning for such a force until that date. To 

71 
save time, US Army plans officers based their ideas upon the existing 

OPLAN 40104 and its variants. In Bryant’s mind, OPLAN 40104 was 

fairly mature conceptually and rehearsed enough to give commanders 

confidence in executing a mission in Bosnia. With EUCOM input, 

USAREUR now contrived a sizeable US force to enter Bosnia from the 

Adriatic coast. The force would then pass through expected French and 

German sectors to locate itself near Tuzla.52 

On 26 September1995 in New York City, US Assistant Secretary of 

State Richard Holbrooke met the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia, and 

Serbia (speaking for the Bosnian Serbs) to agree upon the fundamental 

principles for a settlement. The offing included a single Bosnian state 

with territorial division between the Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity 

using the contact group’s formula, plus the drafting of a constitution, 

free and fair elections, and respect for human rights. In support of the 

anticipated peace settlement, SHAPE drafted an implementation force 

or IFOR concept by 6 October.53 USAREUR and V Corps now prepared 

the 1st Armored Division for deployment into Bosnia as part of a UNsanctioned, NATO-led IFOR.54 

The planning activities ongoing within military channels were 

every bit as complicated as the political negotiations. NATO force 

contributions vacillated over size and missions, and non-NATO nations 

offered up various types of support. Consumed by numerous missions, 

USAREUR deferred much of the ground force planning to V Corps. To 

prepare themselves for Bosnia, both the V Corps and the 1st Armored 

Division participated in Exercise Mountain Eagle between 25 September 

and 15 November 1995.55 The exercise stressed probable IFOR missions, 

to include stability through treaty enforcement and separating former 

combatants so the peace process might move forward. 

Some critics have attacked the USAREUR staff actions of October 

and early November 1995 as less than attentive to the potential for ground 

operations in Bosnia.56 In evidence to support a critique of USAREUR’s 

lack of expediency, pundits submit that the headquarters failed to 

establish a staff crisis action cell for Bosnia until December 1995.57 In 

its defense, the USAREUR staff was involved with numerous projected 

and ongoing operations, with Bosnia being but one mission. For that 

reason, the headquarters had deferred much of the Bosnia planning to 

V Corps, a capable headquarters but by no means doctrinally organized 

and experienced to plan for a multinational and multiservice operation 

without expert augmentation from EUCOM. Regardless, it was V Corps, 

72 
not USAREUR, that sent 20 planners from within EUCOM to the ARRC 

for planning coordination. 

Meanwhile, Richard Holbrooke and other negotiators meeting with 

faction representatives in Dayton, Ohio were determined to produce both 

a permanent peace and consensus for a multiethnic Bosnian state.58 As 

the talks progressed under US leadership, some of the ongoing drama 

percolated downward to NATO and US military officers. Having NATO 

representatives attend the meetings meant that early preparation for an 

IFOR deployment was possible given a clearer definition of military 

tasks, as well as a more unified chain of command.59 Indeed, NATO 

military planners had consulted with the contact group negotiators both 

before and after the Dayton meetings to ensure that assigned military 

tasks were feasible. 

According to Major James Alty, Jr., the Dayton negotiations received 

a mixed reaction within USAREUR headquarters as late as 1 November. 

Rumors flew throughout Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg that the 

talks would indeed result in an IFOR with US force participation. Yet, 

some officers recalled that USAREUR had experienced such situations 

before without a ground force deployment due to fuzzy political will and 

“air strike diplomacy.” Moreover, since the alliance was not a formal 

participant in the talks, many of the military planners believed Dayton to 

be another false alarm warranting prudence.60 

Hesitancy soon gave way to pandemonium when the JCS alerted 

US forces in Europe on 2 November, signifying that a deployment into 

Bosnia was conceivable. Although US forces had been alerted, as of 4 

November, no alliance country but Luxembourg had committed forces— 

in this case 26 soldiers—to what was now known as OPERATION Joint 

Endeavor. Probably due to disbelief that a ground force deployment was 

possible given years of political hesitation, the EUCOM planners had 

yet to publish a plan for a NATO IFOR. USAREUR, however, was not 

waiting and by 7 November the V Corps planning cell had a detailed plan 

to deploy its 300-person headquarters to the theater of operations under 

the moniker of USAREUR Forward.61 

The advent of USAREUR Forward remains sketchy, although 

interviews suggest that both General Crouch and Lieutenant General 

Abrams had a hand in it. Regardless, USAREUR headquarters officers 

determined that a US Army command and control headquarters was legally 

necessary under Title 10 US Code to support US force deployment.62 

Using V Corps headquarters for that purpose also guaranteed that a 

73 
US Army maneuver headquarters was in proximity to the theater of 

operations “in case things went bad.” General Crouch had sufficient 

cause to think that possible.63 General Joulwan was too buried in NATO 

affairs to personally command the US force deployment. AFSOUTH 

was for many Army observers a NATO headquarters built around the US 

Navy’s USNAVEUR and lacked experience in deploying ground forces. 

As the US Army forces provider, General Crouch argued that USAREUR 

was in the best position to control the deployment.64 Doctrinally, V Corps 

headquarters had the command and control mechanisms and thus became 

USAREUR Forward. 

One may take umbrage with a US corps headquarters overseeing 

a single reinforced armored division. Indeed, the ARRC protested to 

AFSOUTH, for SHAPE OPLAN 40105 of 15 November 1995 placed the 

US 1st Armored Division under ARRC command upon NATO transfer 

of authority. In response, USAREUR noted that a US headquarters was 

legally necessary under Title 10 US Code to oversee the force before 

and after authority transfer, thus providing the legal basis for USAREUR 

Forward to monitor force protection and provide logistics. That aside, US 

Army planners also saw USAREUR Forward as keeping a service hand 

in the NATO operation.65 

As the Dayton meetings slogged through November, General 

Crouch directed Major General James Wright, the commander of the 

21st TAACOM, to conduct a reconnaissance of selected locations within 

Bosnia and Croatia. Wright was told to find an intermediate staging 

base to support the ground operation.66 Between 15 and 21 November 

1995, he and a small group tramped about Croatia, Hungary, and other 

countries looking for a suitable site. After rejecting several possibilities, 

USAREUR approved negotiations for the use of the military installation 

and airfield at Taszar, Hungary. 

Selecting the Hungarian air base came from practicality and US 

military parochialism. Taszar, an insignificant village located just outside 

the city of Kaposvar, offered a large airfield, barracks, and other facilities— 

albeit in need of renovation—to support the deployment.67 Conveniently, 

the air base was also outside of the NATO area of operations. US Army 

forces under USAREUR Forward thus avoided answering to NATO 

command. For example, if the US staging base lay within Croatia, then 

US Major General William N. Farmen, in command of the NATO rear 

area, had authority over US Army operations. While Taszar was clearly 

an ideal location to organize US forces prior to deployment into Bosnia, 

it also avoided NATO meddling. Farmen was a US Army general but 

74 
some considered him “much too NATO.”68 

On 14 November, EUCOM issued an alert order for subordinate 

headquarters to begin execution planning, with USAREUR taking a 

similar action with V Corps three days later. When the Dayton Accords 

were initialed on 21 November, USAREUR, V Corps, and the 1st Armored 

Division were already pressing hard for authority to enter Croatia and 

Bosnia to establish contracts with the local companies required for logistic 

support. As a former war zone, much of the Bosnian infrastructure was 

destroyed, and due to the force cutbacks of the early 1990s, the Army in 

Europe had insufficient force structure to perform building construction 

and road repair missions. Moreover, millions of unexploded mines and 

other ordnance lay about the area of operations, munitions that represented 

a significant threat to the force. The JCS, however, did not authorize early 

access to the area because the war continued until peace was formalized 

in Paris. 

The numerous headquarters continued to plan in earnest, and by late 

November the concept to deploy forces had solidified. Many UNPROFOR 

units from NATO countries were to remain in Bosnia and exchange their 

UN regalia for IFOR markings. Non-NATO countries such as Russia also 

offered up ground forces and were fit in under a NATO command structure. 

A NATO enabling force of just over 2,600 soldiers materialized to deploy 

ahead of the main body to establish critical life-support facilities, contract 

for assistance, provide security, and clear convoy routes. US force size 

was limited to 20,000 troops in Bosnia and 5,000 in Croatia. The US 

forces were now obliged to move overland from Germany as the Croatian 

ports became filled to capacity with other IFOR units. 

In mid-November, the US 1st Armored Division formed into Task 

Force Eagle, a multinational headquarters created around the divisional 

force structure.69 The planners soon produced OPLAN 95-425 or “Iron 

Endeavor”.70This concept called for a national support element to establish 

itself at Kaposvar and Taszar, Hungary, where US forces gathered and 

then organized for further movement into Bosnia via road and rail. Then, 

a line of communication-opening force and an aviation “strike package” 

moved next up to two weeks ahead of the main body. Headquarters, Task 

Force Eagle (Forward) was then designated to arrive in Tuzla, Bosnia to 

establish communications and control remaining forces transiting the area 

of operations. The 1st Brigade and the division’s cavalry squadron, 1st 

Squadron 1st Cavalry, moved next, followed by the 2nd Brigade, the 3rd 

Squadron 4th Cavalry, and the division main headquarters. The division rear 

with its logistical base then moved, followed by on-call troops to include the 

75 
2nd Battalion 15th Infantry. Ultimately, Task Force Eagle would establish 

a zone of separation between combatants and assist in the movement 

of opposing troops to garrison areas with much of their equipment.71 

The USAREUR staff envisioned that most US troops would use rail to 

keep financial costs to a minimum. Theater airlift was expensive; thus only 

the 1st Armored Division’s advance command post, a security company, 

and elements of the 3rd Battalion 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment from 

Vicenza, Italy would use air means. To assist the rail movement during 

the wintry month of December, the V Corps commander designated 

Brigadier General Samuel L. Kindred from the Corps Support Command 

to prepare the intermediate staging base in Hungary. Additional logistics 

assets prepared a tactical assembly area at Harmon, a temporary camp 

located on the north side of the Sava River near Zupanja, Croatia. There, 

Army engineers would live while emplacing pontoon bridges across the 

Sava River. Other forces could halt there temporarily before crossing, 

if necessary. Once the bridges were in place, Task Force Eagle forces 

would enter Bosnia and conduct their designated missions.72 

Chaotic Ground Plans 

On 6 December 1995, SACEUR published a final version of OPLAN 

40105, “Decisive Endeavor.” With the GFAP scheduled for signature in 

Paris on 14 December, Major General Daniel Petrosky, the USAREUR 

deputy chief of staff for Operations, briefed the USAREUR campaign 

plan to Admiral Smith, now designated the IFOR commander, in Naples, 

Italy. Admiral Smith took umbrage with portions of the plan for several 

reasons. As IFOR commander, he alone exerted operational command and 

therefore his headquarters was doctrinally obligated to produce a single 

campaign plan, not USAREUR. Moreover, USAREUR desired to conduct a tactical (combat-ready) road march across Croatia, a political faux 

pas since Croatia was a nonbelligerent country. Smith also noted that the 

SACEUR plan showed US forces falling under NATO command once 

they crossed the Drava River along Hungary’s southern border and entered northern Croatia en route to Bosnia. The USAREUR concept, citing 

Title 10 issues, designated that NATO transfer of authority occurred once 

US forces crossed the Sava River along southern Croatia. Moving the 

transfer of authority line farther south meant that USAREUR controlled 

US Army forces across Croatia until they crossed the Sava float bridges.73 

The discord over where NATO transfer of authority occurred 

reflected the stove-piped planning that preceded the movement of forces 

76 
into Bosnia. In truth, few planners knew of the Dayton Accords’ military 

aspects until the document was published, thus the IFOR/AFSOUTH 

concept and the USAREUR campaign plan were not nested concepts. 

Moreover, the AFSOUTH staff did not grasp the USAREUR campaign 

plan’s tactical nuances, for it was not coordinated with AFSOUTH 

OPLAN 40105. Consensus came when USAREUR was permitted to 

carve out a north-south corridor along the eastern side of the NATO rear 

area in Croatia. Because USAREUR was not under NATO command, the 

US Army units moving from Hungary to Bosnia had to provide their own 

security and logistics as they transited Croatia in buses and by convoy. 

On 1 December, NATO authorized an enabling force deployment 

to prepare the way for IFOR, followed the next day by a JCS execute 

order for US enabling forces to follow suit. SHAPE notified AFSOUTH 

of those decisions through a force activation order designating C-day; the 

day initial forces begin movement overseas, as 1 December, with ground 

deployment, G-day, as 14 December. Later, C-day was reinterpreted as 2 

December when G-day slipped to 15 December due to diplomatic delays, 

causing complications with troop movement schedules and transportation 

arrangements. Meanwhile, some logisticians dutifully moved IFOR 

equipment to European ports, then shipped the supplies to the Croatian 

coast based upon the initial C- and G-day schedules. 

In the haste to deploy, military planning became disjointed. Political 

incertitude, the lack of a single planning headquarters, and people trying 

to do the right thing created most of the confusion.74 For example, the lack 

of centralized planning caused numerous headquarters to devise their 

own uncoordinated concepts for moving Task Force Eagle into Bosnia.75 

Part of this was due to the military adage of “just do something” but also 

to gain an advantage within the Joint Operations Planning and Execution 

System (JOPES).76 To gain leverage in securing limited transportation 

resources, V Corps headquarters used Mountain Eagle exercise data to 

get the JOPES system moving. Unknown to V Corps, the 1st Armored 

Division had replaced the Mountain Eagle database with new information 

gleaned from another exercise with the ARRC. Neither V Corps nor 1st 

Armored Division planners were aware that two different USAREUR 

logistics headquarters had also devised separate databases for deploying 

US forces and had also entered that information into JOPES. Chaos ensued 

when different JOPES databases competed for the limited transportation 

assets necessary to move one US armored division and its supporting 

units to Bosnia. 

77 
The planning confusion was further compounded by a command 

decision to discount a directive. On 2 December 1995, the EUCOM staff 

published USCINCEUR OPLAN 4243 “Balkan Endeavor.” Two days 

later, EUCOM informed its USAREUR counterparts that the imminent 

deployment of US forces into the Balkans was to be considered a 

strategic movement, thus involving US Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM) for use of national-level transportation assets such as 

C-17 aircraft.77 Under US joint doctrine, EUCOM was tasked to prepare 

a troop movement list and send it to USTRANSCOM for the creation 

of Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data. For reasons that remain 

unclear, the USAREUR staff discounted EUCOM’s directive, choosing 

instead to view the deployment as an operational/tactical move, not 

strategic. That decision meant that USAREUR could not draw upon 

US national transportation assets but instead had to depend only upon 

those in Europe. This decision was allegedly made for two reasons: to 

keep USTRANSCOM out of the deployment process and thus speed up 

the movement of forces and also to retain USAREUR control over the 

deployment of US Army forces.78 

US Army enabling forces had moved to Kaposvar and Taszar by 8 

December 1995. Logistics units under USAREUR command commenced 

preparations to become a national support element, a headquarters that 

was supposedly capable of equipping and sustaining all US forces in 

the theater of operations. In truth, there was little “national” about the 

national support element, for the USAREUR logisticians were supporting 

primarily US Army forces. When walking along the freezing tarmac at 

Taszar, one could see a hodgepodge of US military forces that drew 

support from their parent services, not the national support element.79 

In early December 1995, many plans officers worked from NATO 

and USAREUR documents designed to move the enabling force into 

position two weeks prior to G-day. Delays in political action and acquiring 

permissions compressed that timeline to nine days. With some enabling 

force assets now unable to deploy fast enough to meet the new schedule, 

main body combat units were reshuffled in movement priority to act as 

security forces. Thus, the US 1st Armored Division’s 1st Squadron 1st 

Cavalry, which had been scheduled to move after the security forces, was 

pushed forward faster than anticipated. The deployment change meant 

that when the squadron arrived in Zupanja, Croatia on 16 December, the 

unit designated to offload its equipment had not yet arrived. Unable to 

offload and with no place to sleep in the freezing weather, many troops 

stayed inside the rail cars without heat.80 

78 
G-Day coincided with the signing of the GFAP on 14 December, with 

NATO main body forces then having until 19 December to assume the 

Bosnia mission. With the peace accord signed on time, the UN Security 

Council passed Resolution 1031, establishing IFOR. NATO, however, 

took two days to approve SACEUR OPLAN 10405, thus G-Day slipped 

from 14 to 16 December. D-day, or mission assumption, then moved to 

20 December. Political delays and revisions meant so many changes that 

military staff officers had difficulty keeping up. 

Plans in Motion 

On the revised G-day of 16 December, the majority of NATO and 

US forces commenced movement as about half of the UNPROFOR units 

prepared to trade their UN trappings for IFOR markings. The ARRC 

deployed to Sarajevo and assumed command of a multinational threedivision force that peaked at 55,000 troops from 35 nations. However, 

the troop movement now exposed US military planning deficiencies. 

The slippage in deployment dates clashed with USAREUR’s already 

competing unit databases in the JOPES system. The deployment turned 

disastrous and the EUCOM staff, which was accountable for moving US 

forces into Bosnia, worked in a state of continuous upheaval. 

Numerous USAREUR planners had expected most trains to take about 

24 hours to reach Kaposvar and the intermediate staging base at Taszar 

by rail from Frankfurt, Germany. Instead, the movement took four days, 

because military trains had less priority than civilian rail traffic under the 

privately owned German rail system. With the ongoing Christmas holiday 

season, military trains were relegated to sidings for hours on end to make 

room for other rail activity.81 Moreover, the US military rail deployment 

crossed a neutral country (Austria) and former Warsaw Pact countries 

where the trains came under suspicion from border guards. Once at the 

staging base in Hungary, the forces needed another 10 hours to move to 

Zupanja, then 2 more hours by road march to reach Tuzla. 

Although USAREUR plans called for rail as the primary means of 

movement for control purposes and to save money, it quickly became 

apparent that this was a mistake. USAREUR’s decision to view the 

deployment as operational/tactical instead of strategic had limited 

transportation asset flexibility. With so many changes in force flow due 

to political wavering, many deploying units arrived at their embarkation 

railhead sites in Germany to learn that some trains were not there, others 

were insufficient for the force size, and several had railcars designed to 

haul different equipment. Most of the required railcars were in France, 

79 
which at the time was under a national rail strike. Other difficulties arose 

because many US Army transportation officers had not formulated the 

USAREUR deployment plans and therefore did not understand them.82 

The transportation situation worsened when the European rail 

system proved unable to move 25,000 US troops. USAREUR planners 

had calculated that Task Force Eagle required 20 trains per day, a figure 

based upon data used during routine training exercises. Upon arrival at 

their destination in Hungary or Croatia, the trains remained loaded due to 

the lack of offloading equipment. Civilian rail managers were unable to 

shift other trains to different lines, and the swelling queue clogged the rail 

system. Indeed, some trains left Germany in the morning only to return 

the same night with the passengers and equipment still aboard due to rail 

congestion farther along the route. 

By 24 December, US Army force commanders were in serious trouble 

as the rail deployment ground to a halt. With possible mission failure 

looming, the USAREUR staff resorted to moving soldiers via buses, 

commercial trucks, and aircraft at great financial expense. Circumstances 

forced USAREUR to request C-17 aircraft as EUCOM had earlier 

directed. Because nationally controlled aircraft were now involved, Army 

planners had to use JOPES to notify USTRANSCOM of the requirement. 

Yet, many USAREUR officers were unfamiliar with such procedures and 

processing errors occurred. Moreover, at least since 20 December, the 

force flow and transportation priorities changed an average of 14 times 

per day, lending further chaos to an already disagreeable situation.83 

Changing priorities meant that some US Air Force aircraft arrived in 

Germany to discover that the passengers were not there. To complicate 

matters further, US Army general officers roamed the airfield flight line 

and changed Air Force equipment-loading precedence on the fly. As a 

result, the heavy equipment necessary for offloading trains in Taszar was 

set aside, which further slowed US Army force deployment. EUCOM 

interceded on 26 December by ordering USAREUR to cease managing 

the deployment until things settled down. 

With staff officers at numerous headquarters working to the brink 

of exhaustion, USAREUR requested additional planners from Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Campbell, Kentucky. These officers 

were graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies, a oneyear course that educated selected mid-grade officers in operational 

and tactical planning methods. Upon arrival they served as USAREUR 

troubleshooters, with General Crouch keeping one officer in Heidelberg 

while another went forward to unravel the confusion in the theater of 

80 
operations.84 Circumstances improved by 28 December as the JOPES 

network stabilized enough for US military aircraft to move a US 

mechanized infantry company to Belgrade from whence it convoyed 

to Tuzla. There, the unit met with elements of the 3rd Battalion 325th 

Parachute Infantry Regiment from Vicenza, Italy. 

As order slowly returned, the Balkan winter brought snowfalls 

and bitter temperatures that threatened the Sava River bridge crossing. 

Heavy snow caused the river to rise, altering the number of required float 

bridge sections. The US Army Corps of Engineers facility at Vicksburg, 

Mississippi had helped in figuring out how many sections were necessary 

based upon historical flood data.85 When the water level surpassed initial 

estimations, USAREUR engineers were forced to take additional bays 

from European war stocks in Belgium at increased costs.86 

In addition to Army engineers, US Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEALS) 

and US Air Force Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair 

Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) units worked long hours along the 

Sava River in anticipation of the float bridge crossing. However, the 

bridge sections were delayed in arriving. Too wide to transit Austrian 

railroad tunnels (as discovered by collisions), the bridge sections had 

to be hoisted from the railcars and onto wheeled trucks, then hauled to 

Zupanja. Upon arrival near the Sava, roads choked from snow and ice 

stymied the bridge-burdened vehicles from gaining access to the river. 

On 28 December, engineers were constructing a new roadbed to allow 

the bridge sections to reach the Sava. 

That same day, engineer commander Lieutenant Colonel Jack Sterling notified Brigadier General James P. O’Neil from Task Force Eagle 

that the Sava River was near flood level and in danger of overflowing 

its banks. After much ado, O’Neil gave permission to move the engineers to higher ground on the 29th. Sterling’s prediction came true in 

the early morning hours of 29 December when the Sava burst its banks, 

flooding the US military camp at Zupanja. USAREUR Forward personnel listened to the unfolding and terrifying events over their radios, fearing that numerous soldiers were drowned. Water rapidly reached 15 feet 

above ground level, washing away equipment and personal effects in the 

cataclysm.87 When dawn broke, however, every soldier was miraculously 

found alive and without serious injury. 

That morning, the relocated engineers resumed the task of emplacing 

float bridges as the new roadway came into being. But wintry conditions 

continued to bedevil them, for the floodwaters, mud, and ice prevented 

offloading the bridge sections. Fortunately, CH-47D helicopter crews 

81 
Photo 3. US military personnel narrowly avoided disaster 

when the Sava River flooded in December 1995. 

Photo 4. Remarkably, the Sava River flood cost US forces 

only a brief delay with no loss of life. 

82 
from Kaposvar, Hungary had rehearsed the airlifting of bridge sections 

the previous summer, so they were called forward to drop the sections 

into the river for assembly. That accomplished, the final bridge piece 

was locked in place at 1004 on 31 December 1995, and by early evening 

more than 140 1st Armored Division vehicles had crossed into Bosnia.88 

Task Force Eagle now poured into the Multinational Division-North 

area of responsibility to establish a zone of separation between former 

combatants. 

Plans Assessment 

This initial “brush clearing” to make some sense of military 

preparations for Bosnia confirms that diplomatic vagary directly affected 

planning. Between 1991 and 1995, political will caused some nations 

to seek ways to end a horrendous war, while others lacked the interest 

and resources and remained on the sidelines. In response to UN and 

NAC decisions, military planners generated a plethora of plans to meet 

wispy political circumstances. As this chapter illuminated, the plans 

for employing sea and air power attained mission success through 

interdiction and physical destruction but failed to coerce the belligerents 

to any great effect. Sea and air power coercion works when the targeted 

foe is susceptible to such measures.89 Ground power, however, is essential 

to impose will and demonstrate resolve. Lacking political support, most 

ground options developed over months of work ultimately were shelved 

or discarded. When political will to bring the war to closure finally gelled 

in the fall of 1995, a disparate grouping of NATO and US Army plans 

came to the fore, only to suffer from poor synchronization through a 

common headquarters. The flaws aside, the deployment phase succeeded 

more as a testament to the character of the men and women who executed 

the plans than a triumph of the planning system itself. 

It can be said that despite the flap surrounding plan development, 

military planners helped to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia. Yet, the plans 

themselves were but one contributor to the overall effort. Indeed, peace 

came about through a combination of UN resolutions, NAC decisions, US 

diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, sea and air power, the eventual 

threat of a credible ground force, and exhausted warring factions, among 

other influences. The military plans developed and executed between 

1991 and 1995 helped create conditions for the peace process to succeed 

but were not a panacea by themselves. 

This study also shows that UN, NATO and US military planners held 

little sway over civilian policy decisions. Where military doctrine of the 

83 
time called for a synchronized planning effort that went up, down, and 

laterally among headquarters in concert with stated political objectives, 

the lack of a clear political end state and policy inconstancy turned 

proactive military planning practice into a reactionary affair. What can be 

called “backlash planning” meant that diplomatic turbulence had placed 

the military plans officers in the ignoble position of having to wait for the 

next round of political machinations to see what had been wrought. Often 

the outcome of such meetings had little to do with previously developed 

concepts. 

While attaining commitment from civilian leaders remains 

problematic for military commanders and staffs, part of the Bosnia crisisplanning pitfalls stemmed from stress upon a flawed post-Cold War 

planning system within Europe, despite what some have said about it.90 

While a successful operation in the long term, NATO and US planning 

procedures were fraught with glaring deficiencies in coordination that 

nearly brought disaster. Despite attempts at system overhaul by 1995, 

the faults can be attributed to entrenched military culture and attitudes. 

In planning for this operation, officers worked within a new world 

order where multinational planning had become commonplace not only 

strategically, but also at the operational and tactical levels. Many officers 

were trained in the 1980s under Cold War truths where services seldom 

worked multinational plans at the operational or tactical level. That 

paradigm no longer fit Bosnian crisis realities. For the post-Cold War 

military, adjusting from a bipolar world to the post-Cold War disorder 

was a steep learning curve. 

The Bosnia crisis in late 1995 was a time of flux where old military 

mind-sets clashed with new truths. It took time-constrained duress once 

the Dayton Accords were agreed to bear this out. While planning under 

old views resulted in feasible concepts prior to 21 November 1995, 

the tremendous pressure generated by hourly changes in building an 

acceptable and suitable IFOR force structure fractured the planning 

effort after that date. Automation was of little help because the lack of 

a central headquarters to manage both the NATO and the US military 

planning effort strategically, operationally, and tactically left many 

officers to devise their own concepts. Without central control, general 

officers worked their staffs hard to get the mission accomplished. But 

constant change to time schedules and published plans baffled people so 

much that they simply could not keep up. In violation of the centralized 

planning-decentralized execution rule, the more aggressive headquarters 

84 
created chaos by taking initiative without weighing the consequences. 

Localized decisions dramatically affected coalition planning. 

As much as this study contributes something toward understanding 

what went on during years of planning, it can only scratch the surface of 

some headquarters while ignoring others. Indeed, much more is known 

about AFSOUTH and efforts within USAREUR at this point than what 

occurred within the UN, JCS, SHAPE, EUCOM, and contributing nation 

headquarters. The individuals involved in planning within these entities 

must come forward to tell their stories so a more complete assessment can 

be drawn. For their part, the historians working within each headquarters 

must gain release for the documents from their declassification authorities. 

In addition to assessing planning, this chapter argued that two critical 

events contributed significantly to the end of Bosnia’s war. The first was the 

mortar attack upon Sarajevo’s marketplace in February 1994 that heightened global outrage and prompted the Clinton administration to bring US 

diplomatic pressure to the fray. The second turning point was the Bosnian 

Serbs taking several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage in May 1995. 

That vile act so challenged UN and NATO credibility in protecting UNPROFOR and its interests that a division-size ground reaction force was 

authorized and planned for. Both events, ironically caused by the belligerents themselves, pushed the history of the conflict in a different direction. 

Photo 5. Having made the difficult choice to commit forces in Bosnia, 

President Clinton addressed US soldiers. 

85 
For all its foibles, the military planning effort that led to OPERATION 

Joint Endeavor and the deployment of military ground power to Bosnia 

over the winter of 1995-1996 was a success story. The scope and complexity 

of the undertaking rivaled OPERATION Desert Shield/OPERATION 

Desert Storm and thus warrants further scrutiny. If this chapter reveals 

anything, it is that flexible and persistent people can overcome political 

friction and planning fog to accomplish the mission at hand. 

86 
Notes

1. Dayton Peace Accords, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. Available on the Internet at http://www. 

state.gov/www.current/bosnia/dayframe.html. Accessed 2 February 1997. 

2. The General Framework Agreement for Peace was signed in Paris, France 

on 14 December 1995. Three belligerent representatives—Alija Izetbegovic, 

Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodan Milosevic—signed the document and approved 

its entire contents. Representatives of the European Union, France, Germany, 

the United Kingdom, and the United States witnessed the event but were not 

signatories. 

3. Other headquarters included AFNORTH, which is not discussed here. 

For a detailed look at NATO organization, see “NATO Handbook,” [book 

online], accessed 18 November 2002; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/ 

handbook/2001/. 

4. For example, numerous countries provided forces to IFOR, yet we know 

nothing about what planning occurred within the military headquarters of Turkey, 

Sweden, Norway, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and many other countries. 

5. See “United States European Command,” [document online]; accessed 

27 March 2003; available from http://www.eucom.mil/index.htm?http://www. 

eucom.mil/Standard_tf.htm&0; Internet. Strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels of war are defined in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

Terms [publication online], accessed 3 April 2003; available from http://www. 

dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/; Internet. The US Army-led Task Force Eagle alone 

contained the US 1st Armored Division, brigades from Russia and Turkey, and 

a Nordic/Polish brigade formed from the soldiers of Norway, Poland, Finland, 

Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. 

6. Personnel turnover and personality nuances are often overlooked when 

examining planning. Yet they can have dramatic effects upon plans development. 

It often takes a new planner up to three months to settle in and understand what 

has happened previously, time not available during crisis. Strong personalities 

can either support or shut out even the most brilliant of ideas, an especially 

critical point when senior rank is involved. 

7. Will NATO Go East?: The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, 

David G. Haglund, ed. (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s Copyright in Right, 1996), 

18-25. 

8. Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and 

Consequences. (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 156-204. 

9. Interestingly, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the federation do 

not admit that the recent war was a civil war but prefer to explain it as a war 

of external aggression. One opinion was offered by Radko Mavraic, a noted 

journalist and the media adviser to the commander, Stabilization Force in Bosnia 

in 2001. In an interview, Mavraic noted that the war was started from the outside 

by Serbia. When pressed to explain how he accounted for Bosnians killing 

Bosnians, Mavraic offered that they were forced to do so by Serb aggression. 

87 
Interview with Radko Mavraic by author, Media Center Sarajevo, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, 12 July 2001. 

10. Gordon W. Rudd, “Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian Intervention 

in northern Iraq, 1991.” Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1993. 

11. The most expensive and complex UN peacekeeping mission to date, 

UNPROFOR consisted of about 38,000 troops from 37 nations, with the 

largest contingents coming from NATO members such as Britain and France. 

Approximately 15,000 troops were chartered to provide security for enclave 

minority groups located within Croatia. The remaining UN forces stationed in 

Bosnia monitored the peace and assisted in the delivery of humanitarian aide 

to suffering civilians. NATO force planners considered the consequences and 

response for NATO (although the soldiers would act under the UN) if one or 

more of the warring factions decided to attack them. General Sir Michael Rose, 

Fighting For Peace, Bosnia 1994 (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), 143. Lessons 

From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, Larry Wentz, cont. ed. (Washington, DC: 

Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University Press, 

1998), 16. 

12. North Atlantic Council, “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation Press 

Communiqué S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991.” [document online]; accessed 19 

April 2003, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a. 

htm; Internet. 

13. James J. Brooks, Operation Provide Promise: The JFACC’s Role in 

Humanitarian Assistance in a Non-Permissive Environment. Newport, RI, 

Naval War College, 1996. Robert H. King, NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force: 

Separable but Not Separate. Newport, RI, Naval War College, May 1995. Tony 

Capaccio, “Bosnia Airdrop.” Air Force Magazine, July 1993, 52-55. 

14. William B. Buchanan, Project leader, Operation Joint Endeavor-Description 

and Lessons Learned. (Washington, DC: Institute For Defense Analysis, 1996), 

III-2. 

15. North Atlantic Council, “Statement on Former Yugoslavia, document MNAC-2(92)108, 17 December 1992.” [document online], accessed 19 April 

2003; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c921217b.htm; 

Internet. 

16. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan sought to create the idea of multi-ethnicity into 

the Bosnian political system. The plan meant territorial division and the creation 

of 10 regions, nine of which had an ethnic majority of one people. One region, 

Sarajevo, would be mixed. The plan guaranteed ethnic minority representation 

within each region through a constitutional design fabricated by Finnish diplomat 

Martti Ahtisaari. In addition to the lack of international and US backing, the 

Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan. Moreover, various policy makers were reluctant 

to risk ground forces to overturn Serb military achievement. See David Owen, 

Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1995). 

17. “NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard,” [document online]; accessed 3 April 

2003; available from http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm; Internet. 

18. Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, 197-98. 

88 
19. AFSOUTH Fact Sheet “Operation Deliberate Force,” [report online], 

accessed 31 March 2003; available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/ 

docs/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm; Internet. 

20. David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s 

Worst Massacre Since World War II. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998. 

21. Robert C. Owen, editor, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air 

Campaigning. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000), xx. 

22. Robert C. Owen, Deliberate Force, 60. 

23. Ibid., 54-60. “Dual-key” imitates the nuclear release requirement for two 

authorities to give an order of mass destruction. 

24. Ibid., 131-75. 

25. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, revised edition. (New York: The Modern 

Library, 1999), 142-52. 

26. Steve Hurst, “Bosnian Serbs Escape More Airstrikes,” Cable News Network, 

20 September 1995. 

27. Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” 

Foreign Service Journal, December 1998. 

28. Conversations with Major J.D. Johnson and Major Victor Robertson by 

author between October 1992 and March 1996, Fort Leavenworth, KS and 

Heidelberg, Germany. 

29. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 31-88. 

30. Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict 

(London: HarperCollins, 1994). 

31. “UNPREDEP.” [report online], accessed 26 March 2002; available from 

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpredep.htm. 

32. Speech by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to House Foreign 

Affairs Committee, 18 May 1993. 

33. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of 

Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 43. 

34. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Al Bryant by Major Richard Thurston, 

90th Military History Detachment, February 1996, Heidelberg, Germany. 

Conversation with Bryant by author, March 1998, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

35. Institute For Defense Analysis, Operation Joint Endeavor, III-3. 

36. Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Operation Joint Endeavor 

USAREUR Headquarters After Action Report, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, GE: HQ, 

USAREUR, May 1997), vol. 1, 6. Nicolas Burns, “US Department of State 

Daily Press Briefing, 12 April 1995.” Washington, D.C.: US Department of 

State, Office of the Spokesman, 12 April 1995. 

37. Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest I, II, No. 103, 29 May 1995. 

38. Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Operation Joint Endeavor, vol. 

1, 138. 

39. Department of State, “US Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Friday, 

6 July l995.” [report online] accessed 17 April 2003; available from http:// 

www.hri.org/docs/statedep/95-07-06.std.html, Internet. Secretary of Defense 

William J. Perry to Senate Armed Services Committee and House National 

89 
Security Committee, 9 June 1995, [document online], accessed 8 April 2003; 

available from http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/t19950607-perry. 

html; Internet. 

40. Units included an airborne brigade commanded by Colonel James 

McDonough, along with the 12th Aviation Brigade, the 11th Aviation Regiment, 

and the 7th Corps Support Group. Interview with Brigadier General Burwell B. 

Bell III by author, March 1996, Taszar, Hungary. Linda D. Kozaryn and Casondra 

Brewster, “Supporting Balkan Peacekeepers,” Soldiers, August 1995. 

41. Tim Ito, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Overview” [document online] 

(Washington, DC: The Washington Post, October 1998, accessed 12 December 

2002); available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/ 

balkans/overview/bosnia.htm. 

42. Department of State, “US Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Friday, 

21 July l995.” [report online] accessed 25 April 2002; available from http://www. 

hri.org/docs/statedep/95-07-21.std.html, Internet. 

43. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 72. 

44. “US Envoy Lake Briefs Turkey on Bosnia Plan.” Turkish Daily News, 15 

August 1995. 

45. Robert Fox, “Fresh War Clouds Threaten Cease Fire.” Sunday Telegraph, 15 

October 1995. Nelson D. Schwartz, “The Pentagon’s Private Army.” Fortune, 17 

March 2003. 

46. Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe, OPLAN 40105, 20 December 

1995. Archive, Headquarters, NATO Stabilization Force Bosnia, Butmir, Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, accessed June 2001. 

47. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Schifferle by Major Richard 

Thurston, 90th Military History Detachment, 16 February 1996, Heidelberg, 

Germany. 

48. Heike Hasenaur and Geoff Janes, “On Call For Bosnia,” Soldiers, December 

1995. 

49. Schifferle interview. 

50. Bryant interview. 

51. Ibid. 

52. Ibid. 

53. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 185-98. 

54. Stanley F. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle.” Military Review, July-August 1997, 

63-72. 

55. Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Peace Enforcement Operations. 

Lessons Learned Newsletter 1-95, Mountain Eagle 95, USAREUR. Operation 

Joint Endeavor Initial Impressions Report. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army 

Center for Lessons Learned, July 1996. 

56. Institute for Defense Analysis, Operation Joint Endeavor, III-23. 

57. Ibid., VI-4. 

58. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 232. 

59. Interview with former US Political Adviser to SFOR by author, Butmir, 

Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 July 2001. The POLAD, who wished not 

90 
to be identified by name, also attended the peace talks where he observed that the 

Europeans were put on the sidelines. 

60. Interview with Major James Alty, Jr., chief of Plans and Operations, deputy 

dhief of staff for Personnel, USAREUR, by Bryce Benedict, 102nd Military 

History Detachment, 15 March 1996, Taszar, Hungary. 

61. Charles Kirkpatrick, “V Corps in Operation Joint Endeavor” [document 

online], accessed 31 March 2003; available from http://www.vcorps.army.mil/ 

www/News/2002/june14_endeavor.htm; Internet. 

62. For US military commander legal responsibilities, see http://www.access. 

gpo.gov/uscode/title10/title10.html. 

63. Comment by Schifferle. During my time as the USAREUR command 

historian, I observed conversations between General Crouch and Lieutenant 

General Abrams that made this point very clear. 

64. In actuality, USAREUR and V Corps could have remained in a force 

provider role. Admiral Smith at AFSOUTH was also in command of US Naval 

Forces, Europe (NAVEUR). Under joint doctrine of the time, EUCOM could 

have ordered USAREUR to provide ground forces to USNAVEUR to meet US 

Title 10 requirements. However, service parochialism was at play here, and 

Bosnia was, after all, the crisis of the moment. 

65. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Gilbert, deputy chief of staff For 

Operations, USAREUR Forward, by author, 19 April 1996, Taszar, Hungary. 

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Baggott, deputy chief of staff For 

Operations, USAREUR Forward, by Bryce Benedict, 102nd Military History 

Detachment, 4 March 1996, Taszar, Hungary. 

66. Bruce E. Akard, “Strategic Deployment: An Analysis of How The United 

States Army Europe Deployed VII Corps To Southwest Asia and the 1st Armored 

Division to Bosnia.” Masters Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff 

College, 1997, 44-45. Interview with Major General James Wright by author, 

April 1996, Taszar, Hungary. Charles Kirkpatrick, “V Corps in Operation Joint 

Endeavor.” 

67. “Taszar Airbase,” [document online], accessed 1 April 2003; available at 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/taszar.htm; Internet. The air base 

was filthy with rats running through the buildings and inadequate facilities for 

showers, billets, and dining, all of which required upgrading under Brown and 

Root Corporation. 

68. Interviews conducted by the author in 1996 with various members of the 

US V Corps staff indicate that some US Army general officers were not pleased 

with General Farmen, whom many thought had forgotten he was a US general. 

Clearly, various agendas and rivalries were at work here. 

69. Task Force Eagle contained a Russian brigade of two parachute battalions 

totaling almost 1,500 soldiers; a Turkish Brigade containing a large Turkish 

mechanized infantry battalion with its supporting tank company and artillery 

battery; and a Nordic/Polish Brigade composed of Nordic forces and a Polish 

parachute battalion. Task Forced Eagle totaled about 22,500 soldiers. 

70. Stanley F. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle.” 

91 
71. Headquarters, 1st Armored Division. “OPLAN 95-425 Iron Endeavor,” 

dtd 30 November 1995, Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Center For Army Lessons 

Learned Archive, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

72. See OPLAN 95-425 “Iron Endeavor,” Center for Army Lessons Learned 

Archive. 

73. Interview with Major Randall G. Cox, deputy chief, National Coalition 

Cell, EUCOM, by author, 22 May 1996, Zagreb, Croatia. 

74. It is important to note here that official government historians who have 

voiced the opinion that the planning was much more cohesive contest this point. 

Most historians, however, have never been planners. Those who worked the 

various actions continue to hold that trying to cross over between UN, NATO, and 

US planning channels was often a disjointed affair. See for example Department 

of the Army, “Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review Conference Report, 19-

23 May 1996.” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Peacekeeping Institute, 1996. 

75. Interview with Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, US Army, Retired, by 

Dr. Robert F. Baumann, February 2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

76. JOPES is an automated computerized database that contains unit 

designations, equipment and personnel readiness status, and locations. Planners 

use JOPES to determine which units must deploy and in what sequence to 

deconflict transportation requirements and the use of seaports, air terminals, and 

rail networks. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Users Guide For JOPES. [document 

online] (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 May 1995, accessed 19 April 

2003); available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jopes.pdf; 

Internet. 

77. The United States Transportation Command was established in 1987 with 

its headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. USTRANSCOM is tasked 

with coordinating the movement of people and transportation assets to allow 

the United States to project and sustain forces around the world for as long as 

necessary. It responds to the needs of the Department of Defense’s combatant 

commanders and is composed of three commands: US Air Force’s Air Mobility 

Command, US Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the US Army’s Military 

Traffic Management Command. The command uses both military and commercial 

transportation resources. See http://public.transcom.mil/. 

78. Institute For Defense Analysis, Operation Joint Endeavor, III-23. 

79. Personal notes taken as Army component command historian, Operation 

Joint Endeavor by author, Taszar, Hungary, 20 February 1996. My discussions 

with the Air Force elements there was that they were supplied through Air Force 

channels, not the NSE. Logistics is a service responsibility but USAREUR 

Forward was not a joint or multiservice command capable of coordinating 

service logisitcs. 

80. Interview with Major Bruce E. Akard, US Transportation Command by 

author, April 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Akard was sent to Europe to 

assist USAREUR with transportation planning and to sort out the confusion. 

81. The German rail system was operating under holiday conditions at 

approximately 30-percent staff. 

92 
82. Interview with Mr. Heinz Schneider, traffic manager, 39th Transportation 

Group, 21st TAACOM by Richard Thurston, 90th Military History Detachment, 

26 February 1996, Kaiserslautern, Germany. 

83. Institute For Defense Analysis, Operation Joint Endeavor, IV-11. 

84. Bell interview. 

85. US Army Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg District, Hydraulics Branch, “Water 

Control Management,” [website online]; accessed 14 April 2003, available from 

http://www.mvk.usace.army.mil/offices/ed/edh/watercontrol.htm; Internet. 

86. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/srsae.htm. 

87. Interview with Chief Warrant Officer 5 Patrick M. Endicott, senior 

maintenance warrant, 130th Engineer Brigade by author, 28 May 1996, Tuzla, 

Bosnia. 

88. Stanley F. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle.” 

89. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. (Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 209. 

90. George A. Joulwan, “SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of 

Tomorrow.” NATO Review, March 1996, 6-9. 

93 
94

Figure 2. NATO Organization during IFOR

Figure 3. Task Force Eagle
Chapter 4 

IFOR Redefines the Bosnian Situation 

Robert F. Baumann 

Two critical factors distinguished the so-called Implementation Force 

from its predecessor. The first was the presence of American troops. Far 

more than a token, the 1st Armored Division was a heavy force bristling 

with combat power. Observers inside and outside of Bosnia regarded 

American inclusion as proof that the new international force would 

be more than a symbolic presence. Further proof of this fact was the 

second distinction between UNPROFOR and IFOR. The Dayton General 

Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) guaranteed that IFOR would 

not be hamstrung by narrowly written rules of engagement that would 

effectively blunt its sword and vitiate its authority. Fully empowered 

to apply force in response to any acts of noncompliance, IFOR quickly 

commanded the respect of the heretofore uncooperative faction armies. 

Colonel Greg Fontenot, who commanded the 1st Armored Division’s 

1st Brigade as part of Task Force Eagle, observed that IFOR’s business 

was “peace enforcement.” US forces entered Bosnia in late December 

1995 in overwhelming strength and wary of the perils of their 

surroundings.1 American personnel crossed friendly Croatia in full battle 

gear, then proceeded to bridge the Sava River. There, an engineer battalion 

encamped in a relatively low-lying area, that, though free of mines, posed 

a serious natural hazard. The Americans paid the price for tempting fate 

as the waters of the Sava abruptly rose and engulfed tents and equipment. 

Remarkably, thanks to sound training and the determination of a number 

of small-unit leaders, no one was lost.2 Only slightly delayed, US forces 

pressed ahead with their mission. 

Initially, the Americans were uncertain of the attitudes of the so-called 

Entity Armed Forces—the international euphemism for the organized 

forces of the three warring factions in Bosnia—and were taking no 

chances. According to Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General 

Stan Cherrie, they did not really expect to fight hostile formations, as 

all early indications were that the locals had lost their taste for battle.3 

Nevertheless, the risk of snipers seemed real enough, and the intermittent 

percussion of celebratory fire and miscellaneous stray rounds served as a 

reminder of what conceivably could happen. Moreover, intelligence was 

limited and trained Army linguists were in short supply.4 In this climate of 

95 
Photo 6. Clearing mines was a crucial task under IFOR 

uncertainty, the command established a strict standard of force protection, 

requiring a minimum of four vehicles for any movement outside of Eagle 

Base and other US compounds. Patrols went out in strength, and fearsome 

M1A1 tanks made the intended impression.5 The first mission task was to 

clear the agreed zone of separation, or ZOS, between the Entity Armed 

Forces and establish secure routes of movement. This occurred in phases 

and without major incidents. 

This is not to say, however, that the situation was not complex and did 

not require an imaginative response by US forces. Clearing the ZOS not 

only implied the removal of forces and weapons, but also free movement 

96 
for refugees back to their homes. This process became especially dicey in 

the vicinity of Brcko, the strategically located town linking the two lobes 

of the Republika Srpska (RS). To monitor the situation there closely, 

the United States established an observation post not far from Camp 

McGovern, which was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tony 

Cuculo. As the first hardy Muslim returnees picked their way carefully 

through the mines and debris, repairs slowly began. The effort soon 

picked up momentum in mid-April as construction gangs with all manner 

of building materials became a conspicuous presence. This evidently 

alarmed local Serbs, who quickly responded by trying to match Muslim 

construction efforts. The Serb perception was that the Muslims were 

trying to establish control on the ground in the ZOS through habitation. 

Soon the international community had to establish ground rules to 

determine which refugees were actually entitled to live in the ZOS by 

virtue of prior residency.6 However, since most legitimate returnees were 

Muslims, cooperation from the Serb side was reluctant and slow. 

According to the terms of the GFAP, at D+90 the factions were 

supposed to park all their heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, surface-to-air 

missiles and so forth) in designated cantonment sites subject to periodic 

inspection and inventory by IFOR. By D+120 required storage applied 

further to all weapons over 20 mm in caliber. For practical reasons, the 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) extended the deadline 

to D+180 or 21 June 1996. According to President Clinton’s special 

envoy, Richard Holbrooke, the Pentagon consistently opposed the 

cantonment and supervision of the entity armed forces’ heavy weapons, 

presumably because it did not want US troops to assume responsibility 

for implementation of this mission on the ground. However, at 

Holbrooke’s insistence, the military reluctantly agreed to the inclusion of 

the cantonment plan in Annex 1-B of Dayton. In contrast to annex 1-A, 

which spelled out IFOR obligations, Annex 1-B established a series of 

general goals. The difference in nuance gave IFOR a bit of leeway in the 

event of unforeseen challenges. Once established in Bosnia, however, 

US commanders proved perfectly willing to impose this requirement on 

the factions. Because the factions in general were far more pliable and 

cooperative than was at first feared, this step posed only a moderate risk, 

and in fact would do much to foster a stable and secure environment 

in Bosnia. As Holbrooke summarized, “although compliance was never 

perfect, the cantonment provision proved to be extremely useful.”7 

Within the American sector, Multinational Division-North (MNDN), responsibility for execution of the cantonment regime fell to the S3 

Division Artillery of the lst Armored Division. With only a modest fire97 
support mission for the artillery in Bosnia, the division artillery drew two 

additional tasks: mine strike investigations and weapons site inspection. 

Major Richard Fisher, the assistant S3, played a prominent role in devising 

the protocol for the mission. The challenge in this instance was that such 

a mission was entirely new to the US Army, which had no established 

template for such operations. Therefore, a standard regime was built from 

scratch based largely on common sense. Fisher’s inspection team included 

two US Army Serbo-Croatian speakers and a weapons expert, an Army 

captain who had studied Russian in Zagreb. Of 425 sites in MND-N, only 

about 15 warranted the direct attention of division headquarters. Fisher’s 

team handled division-level inspections, which embraced all storage 

sites with roughly the battalion equivalent of tanks or artillery. Also of 

immediate concern to the division headquarters were four declared air 

defense sites at Zenica (in the Turkish sector), Bijeljina (in the Russian 

sector), and Oraje and Lipnica (US sector). So that Task Force Eagle

force protection requirements would not impede Fisher’s free movement 

to conduct his mission, the separate brigades in whose areas given sites 

were situated assumed responsibility for providing vehicles, security, and 

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel. Although IFOR reserved 

the right to conduct surprise inspections, command guidance was that 

about 90 percent of all inspections should be coordinated in advance.8 

From the start, faction compliance was generally good. This was in 

part because the factions themselves gained a measure of security from 

the knowledge that their rivals’ heavy weapons were being monitored 

by IFOR. Certain problems arose, however. In the main, these stemmed 

from questions of weapon identification and consequent discrepancies 

in inventories. Because the movement of weapons for the purpose of 

maintenance was permitted, there were on occasion legitimate reasons 

for discrepancies to occur. Overall, according to Fisher, the Bosnian 

Muslims were more proficient at accounting and maintenance and 

therefore encountered fewer difficulties than their counterparts. As for 

the inspection teams, the Russians had fewer weapons experts among 

their contingent and thus experienced more frequent discrepancies. Errors 

were especially common in the identification of weapons that had been 

improvised from non-matching parts. Moreover, the Bijeljina air defense 

site in the Russian sector was exceptionally large, thus raising the degree of 

complexity still further. Meanwhile, the world at large took considerable 

interest in the inspections, which rapidly became media events.9 

One important precursor not only to the weapons storage regimen 

but also the withdrawal of the former warring factions’ forces to the lines 

98 
prescribed at Dayton was the Joint Military Commission (JMC). US Army 

Colonel Hank Stratman developed the meeting structure as a forum for 

face-to-face communication among the major players. Brigadier General 

Stan Cherrie conducted the first JMC meeting on D-2 with representatives 

of UNPROFOR as well as the factions in attendance. The intent was to 

establish a common set of rules and expectations with regard to fulfillment 

of the military annex of Dayton. Within a short time, the meetings also 

provided a venue for Major General William Nash to issue passing or 

failing grades to the factions in terms of their compliance. Given a routine 

channel for communications with all parties, Task Force Eagle was able 

to orchestrate the separation of forces in MND-N and forge a climate of 

basic confidence. In this respect, the combination of sheer US power and 

a generally evenhanded approach proved invaluable. Therefore, progress 

in the implementation of the military annex of Dayton proceeded on 

schedule. According to Cherrie, “When I left Bosnia on 11 June 1995, 

we had an accurate count and location of each faction’s heavy weapons 

and were routinely inspecting those sites ourselves, as well as assisting 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in their official 

inspection efforts.”10 

The most conspicuous case in the American sector in which 

cooperation was not immediate transpired at Mt. Zep, the location of 

Photo 7. General Shalikashvili, US Army Chief of Staff, conferred 

with Major General Willaim Nash of MND North 

99 
Radovan Karadzic’s headquarters. When US personnel made their first 

visit to the compound to conduct an inspection, they were greeted by a 

defiant, angry mob that spat at IFOR soldiers and tried their patience to the 

limit. This would prove to be just the first of a number of occasions when 

American soldiers exhibited admirable restraint and declined to make 

a bad situation worse. (It also suggested that the Serb extremists knew 

the Americans were coming and planned a carefully measured response.) 

Ultimately, American inspectors gained access to the Mt. Zep site only 

on their third try (to be discussed later in this chapter). They gained entry 

through a passage in Karadzic’s garage that led into the underground 

storage area. Unfortunately, by this time scarcely any weapons were left 

at the location, at least in areas reached by inspectors. 

Inspections later led to occasional if less spectacular confrontations, 

and not only with the Serbs. Following the American seizure of weapons 

from a Bosniac Muslim cantonment site in Celic in early 1997, the 

US-led removal convoy encountered a hostile crowd at an important 

intersection. This case, too, suggested that the crowd was part of an 

organized response. In this instance, Captain Mike Slocum received 

a request from the ground commander to hover above the crowd in a 

helicopter and attempt to scatter the demonstrators with the downdraft 

of his rotor blades.11 The ploy seemed to help and gradually the convoy 

resumed movement. Overall, however, defiance concerning weapons 

inspections remained exceptional in Bosnia. 

The Civil-Military Agenda Under IFOR 

Whereas compliance with the military annex of the Dayton Accords 

occurred on schedule and with relatively little recalcitrance on the part 

of the factions, accomplishment of civil objectives proved tortuously difficult from the start. This was so for several reasons. First, the military 

objectives specified in the GFAP were on the whole clear, objective, and 

measurable. Moreover, compliance was directly susceptible to American military pressure. Second, the civil goals generally involved issues 

of “climate” that depended on the voluntary cooperation of the entire 

population, which for the most part did not belong to organizations with 

military chains of command. Third, for the local politicians, armies and 

weapons had been mere instruments of policy, instruments that could 

be set aside for the time being without sacrificing true strategic aims. 

Conversely, civil objectives such as reintegration of the Bosnia’s ethnic 

groups and the nurturing of common institutions threatened to undermine 

all that the hardened nationalist leaders had fought for. Fourth, noncom100 
pliance with Dayton’s civil agenda could assume many forms that would 

prove much more difficult to suppress than overt military resistance. 

Among those who embraced the challenge of advancing civil 

progress in Bosnia under IFOR was Lieutenant Colonel Cuculo, who 

commanded an infantry battalion designated Task Force 3-5. Selfdescribed as a “quasi-mediator,” Cuculo met regularly with local 

chiefs of police, politicians, and representatives of nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) in search of a modus vivendi that would permit 

the launching of badly needed social and infrastructure projects. As 

these meetings evolved into weekly gatherings, Cuculo searched for a 

common denominator among bitter enemies who on occasion had been 

former friends. Until he could convince the factions that all sides would 

benefit, NGOs would have minimal opportunity to begin their work. For 

example, before housing reconstruction could begin in the ZOS, it was 

necessary to concede the allocation of raw materials equally among Serb, 

Croat, and Bosniac civilians. Inevitably, even this Solomon-like solution 

could not please everyone: “The Serbs relaxed when they saw the first 

reconstruction target village was not in a contentious area. The Croats 

sighed in relief, as they were getting more than they expected. But the 

Bosnia[k]s balked at not receiving a fair share relative to need.”12 Such 

flawed compromises became familiar fare in Bosnia. 

The best basis for deals was common interest, as manifested over 

such issues as missing persons or grassroots economic exchange. A 

monument to the latter was the creation of the so-called Arizona Market, 

an inspiration of Colonel Fontenot, in the US brigade sector near one of 

TF 3-5’s checkpoints. After observing that the locals were attempting 

to establish informally some sort of trade area—an effort opposed by 

hard-line separatists who viewed an ethnically mixed marketplace with 

disdain—Fontenot pressed to give the market official sanction.13 The 

transforming effect was remarkable. On this relatively small patch of 

earth, members of Bosnia’s ethnic groups “interacted with each other as 

though there had never been a war.”14 

IFOR Information Operations 

The presentation of IFOR activities to the international public 

constituted a complex challenge for reasons that sometimes had little to do 

with the execution of IFOR operations in Bosnia. Initial troubles stemmed 

from the act of a NATO deployment itself. Perhaps because IFOR was the 

first major NATO operational deployment, it was to be expected that many 

practical issues would arise. The first of these related to the organization, 

101 
manning, and equipping of the public information mission. With IFOR’s 

commencement in December 1995, two skeletal information centers 

began operations, one in Zagreb and the other in Sarajevo. Functoning 

well below their authorized strength of 40 individuals for a time, the public 

information effort had a distinctly ad hoc quality. This condition owed 

much to the existence of parallel headquarters, AFSOUTH and the ARRC. 

Guidance was not always consistent. Moreover, approaches differed as 

AFSOUTH reflected American public information methodologies and 

the ARRC a predominantly British outlook. Eventually the consolidation 

of a single headquarters in Sarajevo brought about some reconciliation of 

the variance within a unified Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC). 

However, sub-CPICs within the MNDs were not always fully in line 

with higher headquarters. Still, in addition to the difficulty inherent in 

combining personnel from a number of NATO and non-NATO countries, 

the information centers at first lacked a full complement of resources, not 

to mention soldiers experienced in contracting matters who could resolve 

existing shortages. Consequently, “In June 1996 IFOR PI had still not all 

the equipment required in the OPLAN.”15 

Eventually, use of the Internet proved invaluable for the rapid 

dissemination of information, although not without occasional mishap. 

For example, sometime following US pilot Sean O’Grady’s rescue 

after being shot down over Bosnia in the fall of 1995, one participant 

in the mission provided a detailed account over e-mail to his home unit. 

Unfortunately, the account containing sensitive information found its 

way far beyond the intended audience. Nevertheless, the advantages 

of exploiting the internet from an information point of view were 

considerable. Soon, IFOR operated its own web page including almost 

daily reports and registered 4,000 queries daily.16 

Still, most dissonance in the information realm was a result of 

contrasting national perspectives. British doctrine as outlined in the 

“green book,” published by the Ministry of Defence, for instance, 

prohibits release of information about current or future operations. 

Consequently, following an October 1996 incident in MND-SW in 

which policemen of the Republika Serbska beat a reporter in the ZOS, a 

British officer refused immediate release of photographic evidence.17 US 

doctrine, conversely, advocates maximum transparency within the limits 

of classification concerns based on the assumption of the public’s right 

to information about governmental activity. Having learned to live under 

this requirement, US information officers typically regard rapid release 

of information, consistent with the need to verify accuracy, as a means 

102 
of support for the operational mission. One direct manifestation of this 

view was the American faith in the practice of “embedding” journalists 

with units operating in the field as long as the mission in question does 

not require an unusual level of confidentiality.18 Many other armies are 

uncomfortable with this approach. The logic behind it is that skeptical 

American (or international) journalists will be more satisfied with their 

level of access and thus more likely to provide friendly or neutral coverage 

if able to observe directly the work of armies in the field. Furthermore, 

as journalists become personally acquainted with ordinary soldiers, they 

tend better to understand—and thus more effectively to report—the 

military point of view. 

National differences in force protection rules (discussed at length in 

subsequent chapters) were another focal point of operational friction and 

clashing perceptions. Whereas rules in MND-SW and MND-SE gave 

authority to commanders at the lowest levels, the US sector conferred 

no authority on local commanders to make their own determination. 

Under guidance from above, the Task Force Eagle commander imposed 

a stringent four-vehicle minimum rule on forces in MND-N (though in 

reality only US personnel fully complied). In the information realm, 

rigid force protection in the eyes of many proved a liability. Because of 

the limited availability of vehicles, this seemingly simple requirement 

often significantly hampered the timely dissemination of psychological 

operations (PSYOP) products as did the highly centralized PSYOP 

approval process. In fact, civil affairs and PSYOP did not receive 

COMEAGLE approval to operate in two-vehicle elements until 1997.19 

In the interim period, Task Force Eagle found it necessary to consolidate 

small and disparate civil affairs, PSYOP, and counterintelligence elements 

into company and platoon-size formations. As acknowledged in the 1st 

Armored Division after-action review, “The external issue associated with 

extreme Force Protection measures from higher made it impossible for 

the specialized teams to operate as they had in the past—individually.”20 

At times the integrated approach worked well. 

Occasionally, of course, it was the subject itself that complicated 

the public information effort. Few if any issues during IFOR were more 

contentious among the participating states than the “train and equip” 

program, which was sponsored by the United States but not by NATO. 

The intent was to build up the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina so as to 

achieve rough parity with the armies of Croatia and Serbia based on the 

assumption that it would serve as a deterrent to future aggression. This 

solution conformed to a perception widely held among Americans and 

103 
many journalists who covered the war that the expansionism of Serbia, 

and secondarily Croatia, had been the chief cause of war. However, the 

British and others who had participated in UNPROFOR were not only 

skeptical of this historical interpretation but feared that the solution itself 

might encourage the Bosnian Muslims to use their newfound leverage 

in ways not conducive to regional peace. Given this divergence of 

viewpoints, it was difficult for IFOR to speak with a single voice. Indeed, 

for a time public relations guidance on this topic came directly from a 

spokesman for the secretary general of NATO.21 

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to infer from predictable and 

ever-present points of disagreement among IFOR states that the public 

information campaign was not, on the whole, well coordinated. Given the 

formidable mandate to inform not only the public of countries contributing 

soldiers to IFOR, but also to deal with the contentious host populations of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFOR enjoyed remarkable successes. Even the 

reticent American public remained on the whole satisfied with the course 

of the mission. 

IFOR Case Study: The Serial Episodes At Mt. Zep 

There were instances when public information had a visible impact 

at the operational level. The COMARRC (Commander Allied Rapid 

Reaction Corps), Major General Sir Michael Walker, happened to notice 

while traveling by helicopter in mid-summer 1996 that there were Serbian 

tanks on the ground in an unauthorized location near Mladic’s bunker 

at Mt. Zep and the town of Han Pijesak. As noted earlier, according 

to the Dayton rules, all heavy weapons of any sort were allowed only 

in designated cantonments. This discovery, incidentally, seemed to 

contradict reports reaching the ARRC from MND-N that all cantonment 

sites had been inspected. In fact, the Americans had not yet fully forced 

the question of inspecting the Mt. Zep site. The trouble was that Mt. Zep 

was especially sensitive for the Serbs and was under the protection of the 

65th Protection Regiment, which had sworn a blood oath to maintain BSA 

General Ratko Mladic’s personal security. Therefore, Serb forces at Mt. 

Zep showed no inclination to allow an inspection. Indeed, the atmosphere 

at the Mladic bunker could be described as paranoid. 

In fact, the serial crises of July and August followed a steady escalation 

of tensions around the Mt. Zep weapons storage site. As political pressure 

to inspect the Mt. Zep site mounted, a potential crisis loomed. An initial 

attempt to carry out an inspection met with rebuff in February 1996, 

prompting a show of force by 2nd Brigade. Inspectors gained admission 

but did not thoroughly examine the area.22 

104 
Photo 8. Major General Sir Michael Walker, 

commander of the Allied Command Group Rapid Reaction Corps,

advised General Shalikashvili of events on the ground in Bosnia

The commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Colonel John 

Batiste, whose sector included the nearby village of Han Pijesak, realized 

the delicacy of enforcing the Dayton rules to the letter. Several weeks 

before, Batiste in direct negotiations with Lieutenant Colonel Starovic, 

who commanded 65th Protection Regiment, had granted limited authority 

to the 65th to patrol a 50-kilometer square area around the Mladic bunker. 

His intent was to keep the situation calm around a potential flash point 

between US and Serb forces. Nonetheless, Lieutenant General Walker 

regarded the American move as an unauthorized infringement of Dayton 

and directed Major General Nash and Colonel Batiste to inform Starovic 

that IFOR would not allow such a blatant exception to the governing rules.23 

One week following Batiste’s reversal, Walker made his fateful flight, 

which was followed by a deliberate photo-reconnaissance mission. With 

that the makings of a confrontation were present. In light of what was 

to follow, there is merit in reviewing the actions of Batiste and Walker 

to this point. Batiste realized the potential volatility of the situation. 

Furthermore, he realized that the US Task Force Eagle command was 

under considerable pressure from its own national chain of command to 

105 
avoid a shooting engagement and the casualties that would most probably 

ensue. The colonel believed that a working arrangement with the 65th 

Protection Regiment was both a pragmatic option and the best way to 

preserve the peace. At the tactical level, the decision made some sense. 

Yet, Walker’s assessment that such a deal could undermine Dayton was 

correct from a strategic point of view. After all, the Mt. Zep site had not 

yielded to inspection and IFOR had yet to assert the right of unrestricted 

movement to ensure it. As ever, the importance of precedents loomed 

large. If the Serbs could create de facto “safe areas” for weapons and 

persons indicted as war criminals, certainly the other factions could do 

likewise. Or, the Croatians and Bosniacs might simply conclude that 

Dayton was toothless and resume the war they had been reluctant to stop 

in 1995 when the momentum had swung their way. 

In any case, the situation at Mt. Zep quickly escalated during 3-5 

July. Directed to meet with the commander of the 65th to coordinate 

reconnaissance flights and inspections, Batiste quickly found himself 

in a confrontation. The Bosnian Serb lieutenant colonel commanding 

the 65th threatened to fire on US helicopters. His rash gesture triggered 

a stern reply from Batiste, who assured him that such an act would be 

“the worst mistake of your life.”24 Batiste, who was fully prepared to 

unleash the formidable combat power at his disposal, put his artillery on 

alert and had his air controller guide a squadron of F-15s to his location, 

where they circled menacingly. Faced with this display of might, the 

Bosnian Serbs took no action to interfere with the aerial reconnaissance. 

Meanwhile, the photographic results on 5 July confirmed what everyone 

already knew—the presence of not less than eight Serb heavy weapons 

in protected positions. Batiste informed the Serbs of the evidence in his 

possession and advised them of his intent to conduct an inspection visit 

the following day.25 

During the brief intervening period, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Bill 

Seymour, who commanded the 40th Engineer Battalion and reported to 

Batiste, conferred quietly with his Serb counterpart, engineer Major Milenko 

Avramovic on a separate demining matter at a hotel in Vlasenica and was 

surprised to get an earful. Avramovic forecast the direst consequences 

for American forces if they attempted to lay a hand on Mladic. As 

Seymour summed up the encounter, “I believed that he was being sincere 

and that his comments were an accurate reflection of his perception.”26 

Avramovic’s warnings went right to the crux of the matter from the 

Serb point of view. US military operations, even including weapons 

inspections approved by senior Serb political authorities, appeared to 

106 
pose a direct threat to Mladic. Because the Serbs were well aware of 

the indictment published by the Hague and the International Criminal 

Tribunal for Yugoslavia, such an interpretation of events was not illogical. 

The reality, however, was that the Americans—and probably IFOR as 

well—wanted little part of the international hunt to punish war criminals 

and were not in any event required by Dayton to do so in a proactive 

manner. Moreover, it is surprising that the Serbs had not yet realized this. 

Perhaps their perceptions were influenced by mounting pressure from the 

international media and public to bring the architects of mass murder in 

the Bosnian civil war to justice. Even more likely is the possibility that 

Mladic and his entourage were jumpy and unsure of their situation. 

In the meantime, IFOR Commander Admiral Layton Smith initiated 

urgent high-level communications with Yugoslav President Slobodan 

Milosevic so as to secure his leverage in the matter. Although in theory, 

of course, Milosevic was not in the BSA chain of command, there was 

little question that the Bosnian Serb leadership looked to him for political 

and material support. Moreover, it was clear that Milosevic was not likely 

to cross NATO over the concerns of his junior associates in Bosnia. 

This is not to say that the initiative rested wholly with IFOR. Bosnian 

Serb radio and television outlets broadcast spurious allegations that IFOR 

had arrested unnamed senior BSA officers. Doubtless intended to incite 

the local Serbs, the messages also served as a signal to local political 

Photo 9. Admiral Smith met the press on a frequent basis 

107 
organizers to rally civil resistance against IFOR. Perhaps what the authors 

of the broadcasts did not realize was that their defiant response only 

increased the pressure on IFOR to take actions it had thus far avoided. 

During the 6 July IFOR press briefing held in Sarajevo, Western journalists 

openly challenged public affairs officers to indicate that IFOR would not 

back down. One reporter pointedly asked why, if heavy weapons and 

equipment had been located outside authorized cantonment sites, IFOR 

had not destroyed or seized them as it was legally entitled to do. The 

official reply was hedged and equivocal.27 

In reality, TF Eagle was about to cause a major fright. What the US 

1st Armored Division was ready to do in a most forcible manner was 

to compel the Serbs to accede to an inspection. The division and 2nd 

Brigade Combat Team staffs drafted a plan to break down the door to Mt. 

Zep. To be sure, OPERATION Gryphon 2 faced several serious military 

concerns. The Americans lacked crucial information on the presence of 

mines or other defenses, and they could not be sure that the Serbs were 

incapable of reinforcing the Mt. Zep site, although aerial reconnaissance 

could probably enable US troops to intercept any potential late arrival to 

the party. Thus, with American weapons bristling around the perimeter of 

the Serb compound, Colonel Batiste entered with a group of 16 soldiers 

in four armored HMMWVs. Among them was Seymour, who later 

recalled, “I was acutely aware of the possibility of being held hostage 

by a bunch of war criminals who were about to find themselves in a very 

tight box.”28 

At 1400 on July 6, as Batiste’s team rolled past the checkpoints and 

into the compound, they were under aerial surveillance and linked to Major 

General Nash by FM radio. Unfortunately, the scene that greeted them 

initially was anticlimactic. The Serbian guards insisted that no one above 

the rank of NCO was present and that they were not authorized to allow 

the US inspectors in. In response, Batiste took a firm line, maintaining not 

only that he would not leave but that he would not relinquish his weapon 

upon entry into a nondescript, single-story building on the compound. 

Greeted by a Serb colonel at the entrance, Batiste attempted vainly to 

assuage concerns that he was on a mission to capture Mladic. He would 

not back down on his intent to inspect, however, and a tense stalemate 

followed. The Serb colonel put on a show of bravado with a one-liner 

straight from the movies: “It’s a great day to die.”29 Batiste and Seymour 

had little choice but to assume that their brash adversary was in earnest. 

While Batiste awaited further instructions from Major General Nash, 

he learned to his surprise that Lieutenant General Walker had sent his 

108 
Photo 10. US personnel maintained security checkpoints as needed. 

deputy, Brigadier General Charleton Weedy, by helicopter to sort through 

the situation and defuse the developing crisis. During the wait for Weedy, 

Serb civilians began streaming to the scene, apparently hailed to the Mt. 

Zep area by Serb organizers. If IFOR had not yet come to appreciate the 

remarkable ability of Bosnians of all three major factions to mass in a 

hurry, this episode certainly made the point. Many of the local civilian 

demonstrators were in a state of intoxication, and as minutes passed the 

crowd slowly transformed into a hostile mob, convinced that it was on a 

mission to rescue General Mladic from arrest.30 Indeed, before Batiste’s 

crew returned to base, they had been shoved, spat upon, and threatened. 

Still, members of the crowd, apparently well coached, knew better 

than to commit outright violence, although theft of items such as 

binoculars and cameras was within bounds. The aim was to defeat IFOR 

and the Americans not by military engagement but in the propaganda war. 

Had the Serb provocateurs been able to elicit a disproportionate reaction 

by US soldiers, the implications could have been drastic. Fortunately, 

the military police who drove the HMMWVs are trained in the nuances 

of such potentially escalating situations and showed the professional 

restraint circumstances demanded. As frustrating as the situation was, it 

could have been far worse. As it was, the eventual pullback led at least 

one reporter on the scene to conclude that the crowd believed it had 

succeeded in its purpose. Further, the episode invited comparisons to 

UNPROFOR that IFOR had intended to avoid.31 

109 
At about 1800, Weedy had arrived and breezily strolled into the 

compound. His relaxed air notwithstanding, he was unable to lighten 

the mood. While the Serb officers who met him did permit a visit to 

one or more reported tank locations, he was allowed to travel there only 

while wearing a blindfold. During his separation from the main party, 

his treatment declined and he was subjected to threats and insults.32 

More to the point, his inspection tour hardly met the Dayton standard. 

Not only was he restricted at all times, but he never actually saw any 

heavy weapons. Thus, Weedy, too, failed in his effort to open the Mt. 

Zep compound. In the subsequent appraisal of Lieutenant Colonel Tom 

O’Sullivan, at the time a major working as a task force operations officer, 

“They won that one.” Though ready for a tactical fight, “We didn’t know 

how to respond to a loudspeaker,” he concluded.33 Still, if the day ended 

in a tactical defeat for IFOR, no final verdict had yet been rendered at the 

operational and strategic levels. 

Back at the ARRC, Lieutenant General Walker sized up the situation 

and decided to play his final cards short of forcible seizure of the Mt. Zep 

site. The plan that unfolded took careful account of the overall political 

situation in the Republika Serbska. Recognizing an opportunity both to 

affirm the credibility of Dayton and influence the balance in RS politics, 

Walker invoked the support of Serb President Madame Plavsic. As the 

representative of the more moderate Banja Luka faction of the dominant 

Serb political party, the SDS, Plavsic also perceived an opportunity to gain 

leverage against the extremist Pale crowd headed by Karadzic. In a hasty 

meeting, Walker and Plavsic agreed to join forces. Walker possessed the 

military might in IFOR that for once could give Plavsic the upper hand 

against Mladic’s forces. In turn, Plavsic, as the elected leader of the RS 

gave IFOR crucial political leverage among the Bosnian Serb population 

to help neutralize efforts by Karadzic and Mladic to mobilize a popular 

aggrievement against IFOR. 

On Saturday, 10August, Walker and President Plavsic visited the site 

in tandem and were refused access. Once again, the Serbs orchestrated 

a civil disturbance complete with women and children so as somehow 

to make a legal IFOR inspection attempt appear menacing to innocent 

civilians. Having made a final attempt at peaceful resolution, Walker 

withdrew. The challenge to IFOR authority presented what the ARRC 

G3, Lieutenant Colonel David Short (UK) later recalled as a “potentially 

defining moment.”34 At stake was IFOR’s credibility as well as that of 

President Plavsic, who met in Sarajevo with NATO Secretary General 

Javier Solana. She also received a direct communication from COMIFOR 

110 
Admiral Lopez emphasizing the need for full compliance with Dayton. 

Meanwhile, Walker worked through his options. Though he developed 

and briefed Major General Nash on a series of graduated responses to the 

situation that included even air strikes or the seizure of the Mt. Zep site, 

Walker’s winning gambit relied on the subtlety of public information. 

Rather than uttering explicit threats, Walker calmly launched 

OPERATION Fear Naught. Announced at a routine press briefing, the plan 

entailed an assortment of security measures including an IFOR advisory 

to members of the international community to evacuate positions in the 

RS. The UN-sponsored International Police Task Force (IPTF) declared 

a “code orange” condition, reflecting a state of heightened danger but 

continued to patrol the RS with IFOR escort on 13 August. As a further 

precaution, for the time being UN police monitors and most UN staffers 

either relocated to IFOR compounds in the RS or crossed the Inter-Entity 

Boundary Line into the federation. Not all agencies viewed developments 

the same way, however. The UNHCR regarded the elevated tensions 

less seriously and continued to conduct “business as usual” with the 

exception of its small staff in Brcko, which temporarily vacated its office. 

The UNHCR did, however, suspend the operation of buses for returnees 

between Tuzla and Bijeljina due to the lack of IPTF escort. In reaction, the 

High Representative, Carl Bildt, took strong exception to OPERATION 

Fear Naught, terming it “irresponsible.” Bildt did not want his people 

in the RS to relocate to the federation even temporarily out of fear that 

it might provoke an overreaction by the Serbs, such as the seizure of 

hostages, or otherwise disrupt the developing relationship with the RS.35 

Ironically, IFOR fully intended that the hard-line Serbs would recognize 

the extraordinarily serious nature of its actions. Accordingly, IFOR units 

either withdrew into secure locations or received reinforcements for 

movement around the RS.36 If these steps seemed suggestive of imminent 

military action, that was exactly the point. 

Interestingly, the press unintentionally played a part in building 

Walker’s crisis scenario by pounding IFOR press briefers that day with 

questions about IFOR’s resolve. One interrogator explicitly raised the 

concern over whether IFOR was actually in charge: “After this agreement 

yesterday, it appears it [IFOR] goes where the Serbs basically say and 

when they say it can and which escorts they say it can.” In response, the 

IFOR public affairs officer, Canadian Major Brett Boudreau, explained 

that previous inspection visits in Han Pijesak had deliberately been 

conducted by small teams to avoid the perception that their ulterior 

purpose was “to snatch Mladic.” The Mt. Zep site, after all, was not an 

111 
ordinary cantonment but a headquarters. He then added that IFOR was 

simply relying on a “graduated response” sequence until it would gain 

complete access. Madame Plavsic’s role, he continued, was merely to 

attend, not participate in the inspection itself. Boudreau’s bottom line 

was that IFOR had not ruled out the forcible seizure option.37 In sum, the 

briefing effectively conveyed the sense of urgency about the inspection. 

Curiously, members of the press in attendance did not seize on the part 

of the message aimed at Mladic—the removal of international personnel 

from the RS as part of OPERATION Fear Naught. Rather, they focused 

on IFOR’s apparent reluctance to capture Mladic even when they knew 

his general whereabouts. In fact, this line of reasoning might have helped 

soften Mladic’s stance. 

The unmistakable implication of Fear Naught for those who had 

experienced the bombing campaigns of 1994 and 1995 was that IFOR was 

clearing the area of potential hostages—or at least getting international 

assistance workers out of harm’s way—so that it would be free to take 

direct military action. The streetwise Mladic and Karadzic, who, like 

everyone else, monitored CNN broadcasts, understood the signal and 

quickly relented without forcing IFOR to take any steps that might have 

further exacerbated tensions.38 That same day, after tense hours of delay 

and a visit by NATO General Secretary Javier Solana, Walker and Plavsic 

made a seemingly uneventful but critically significant inspection visit to 

the Mt. Zep site. Dismissing earlier Bosnian Serb refusals of admission 

as a “small misunderstanding,” Plavsic played her role well. The robust 

presence of forces from 2nd Brigade was an appreciable factor as 

well.39 To be sure, crowds did gather but did not attack or impede IFOR 

inspection. 

Even so, Major General Nash kept a Predator observation aircraft 

aloft above the scene to monitor developments.40 Indeed, in a pattern 

characteristic of Bosnian operations, general officers did not hesitate 

to provide guidance to commanders on the ground. Also typical of 

IFOR operations, at least in MND-N, was an intensity of focus on the 

mission that generated a frenetic pace of staff work at all echelons of 

command. The reality across most of Bosnia, however, was that field 

operations were extremely decentralized. Thus, the substantive work of 

patrolling towns and villages, quelling disturbances, arbitrating disputes, 

and maintaining a muscular but restrained presence fell to battalions, 

companies, and platoons. Realization of this circumstance proved 

“enormously frustrating” to many staff officers at the division level 

whose daily regimen of endlessly writing and rewriting briefings seems a 

112 
little bit surreal and, at times, nearly irrelevant.41 

On 14 August, Major General John Sylvester stepped forward to 

explain to the press that OPERATION Fear Naught “was a deliberate act to 

ensure that our troops were protected in the event we executed something 

which we had planned to execute if we weren’t able to accomplish what 

we accomplished in the manner that we did it.”42 This affirmed in the first 

place that IFOR had not been bluffing and in the second that the Serbs 

had read Walker’s signals correctly. The result was that IFOR overcame 

a direct challenge to its mandate without resort to force, although it made 

liberal use of the implicit threat of force. IFOR thus defused the crisis on 

terms compatible with Dayton. 

To be sure, fortune smiled on IFOR during the stalemate. As one 

journalist at the 14 August IFOR press conference suggested, not all 

civilian agencies heeded the call of OPERATION Fear Naught and it 

would still have been possible for the Serbs to seize hostages. That they 

did not attempt to do so probably indicates that Karadzic and Mladic took 

Walker’s and Lopez’s warnings seriously and feared that crossing the line 

this time might permanently brand them as outlaws in the eyes of IFOR as 

well as the International Criminal Tribunal. Furthermore, IFOR’s military 

seizure operation against Mt. Zep might well have gone forward in any 

event. As General Sylvester observed afterward, “...there was thorough 

coordination with all of those civilian agencies in the first place. They told 

them that they needed for their own protection to get out of the Republika 

Srpska based on our warning to them. A number of them chose not to.... 

There have been a great number of civilian agencies that have chosen to 

stay in harm’s way, and you know, it’s kind of you pays you money, you 

takes you chances.”43 

IFOR Overview 

In the end, IFOR succeeded not only because of the skillful use of 

information, although that was critical. US forces in MND-N amply 

demonstrated their preparedness to tackle the issue with overwhelming 

combat power. Major General Nash realized that his credibility was on 

the line and was ready to execute the plan to seize the Mt. Zep compound. 

Finally, Lieutenant General Walker’s intuitive grasp of how to orchestrate 

a winning scenario employing threat of force, public information, 

patience, and diplomacy not only averted a possibly disastrous setback 

but also strengthened IFOR’s hand in the RS and Bosnia as a whole. Still, 

in point of fact, this inspection was not as complete as needed, a fact to be 

confirmed by a subsequent, more thorough look a year later. 

113 
In light of this and similar experiences, Task Force Eagle embraced 

a coordinated, broad-based and proactive approach to confront the kinds 

of public disorder that plagued the mission throughout 1996 in the form 

of a Counter-Demonstration Workgroup chaired by the G3 or division 

operations. This effort brought together representatives from public 

affairs, intelligence, and civil affairs, as well as chaplains and the division 

surgeon to consider the implications of anticipated or scheduled events 

such as demonstrations or commemorations that could potentially result 

in riots or confrontations. Task Force Eagle could then initiate measures 

to prevent events from spinning out of control. Especially significant 

was the dissemination of news about upcoming events. Frequently, 

high-ranking IFOR commanders lent their voices to television or radio 

transmissions aimed at calming the public and reminding both citizens 

and officials or their respective rights and responsibilities under the 

Dayton agreement. Moreover, civil affairs officers directly contacted 

local officials and representatives of NGOs to reinforce the message on 

a personal level.44 

Meanwhile, IFOR enjoyed great success in implementing the military 

annex of the GFAP. Within a year, IFOR established at least minimal 

security and order, improved freedom of movement, established and 

cleared the ZOS, enforced the cantonment of heavy weapons, conducted 

inspections, successfully supported elections, maintained a visible 

presence across the country, and arbitrated disputes among the former 

warring factions up and down the chain of command. In so doing, IFOR 

also made important discoveries about areas in which it needed to improve. 

Less than fully prepared to tackle numerous noncombat scenarios, IFOR 

planners and trainers sought advice wherever it could be found. One 

source of information was the recently published US Army Field Manual 

100-23-1, HA Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance 

Operations, but also invaluable were Nordic and UN manuals that dealt 

with greater specificity on the kinds of ambiguous, low-level encounters 

that abounded in Bosnia.45 To its credit, the Army rapidly adjusted its 

training to place more emphasis on complex scenarios requiring junior 

officers to respond immediately and with minimal guidance from above 

in negotiation, crowd control, and arbitration of disagreements, just to 

name a few. 

114 
Notes

 1. Colonel Greg Fontenot, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. George 

Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2000. Many participants felt that 

the combat-ready posture demonstrated while crossing Croatia—an ostensible 

ally—was wholly unnecessary. The intent, however, was to make an indelible 

impression upon arrival in Bosnia.

 2. Major Fred Drummond, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 2000.

 3. Brigadier General Stan Cherrie, US Army, Retired, interview with Dr. 

Robert Baumann and Dr. George Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000. 

4. Task Force Eagle After-Action Review, 1328. The Defense Language 

Institute in Monterrey, CA began full-length courses in Serbo-Croatian only after 

the deployment began. Prior to that time, any Slavic linguist available received 

nine weeks of focused training in Serbo-Croatian. According to the Task Force 

Eagle After-Action Review, “The native speaker was worth their weight in 

gold.”

 5. Major Simuel Shaw, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, February 2000.

 6. Randolph Ryan, “On Brcko and Eastern Slavonia,” draft chapter for 

Rebuilding War-Torn Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be 

published by Harvard University Press, 10-13.

 7. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 

278.

 8. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Fisher, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 April 2001.

 9. Fisher interview. 

10. Brigadier General Stan Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle,” Military Review (JulyAugust 1997), 70-72. 

11. Major Mike Slocum, Interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, November 2, 

2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

12. Lieutenant Colonel Tony Cucolo, “Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning 

There Were Only Soldiers,” Parameters (Spring 1999), 118-20. 

13. Fontenot interview. As commerce thrived, however, the Arizona Market 

attracted increasing attention from criminal gangs whose presence in coming 

years would prove troublesome. 

14. Cuculo, “Grunt Diplomacy,” 121. 

15. IFOR Final Analysis Report, Chapter 2, Public Information Activities, 2 - 2 

- 1-15.

16. Ibid., 2 - 2 - 16, 17. 

17. Ibid., 2 - 2 - 27; Pascale Siegel, “Information Activities,” in Lessons From 

Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (Washington, DC: INSS/CCRP, 

1997), 182. Evidently, the “green book” was not well known to all British 

officers. One British lieutenant colonel with whom I spoke had never heard of it. 

115 
18. Major Perry Rearick, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 25 April 2001. Of course, this has not always been the US approach. In the 

aftermath of the Vietnam War, which was characterized by maximum freedom but 

increasingly critical coverage, the Army withdrew as far as possible from media 

scrutiny. However, the process of press pooling during OPERATION Desert 

Storm provoked such a journalistic outcry that the Army revised its position in 

favor of greater openness. 

19. Mark Jacobson, “Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle,” Lessons 

From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, ed. Larry Wentz (Washington, DC: INSS/ 

CCRP, 1997), 200-01, 210-12. 

20. 1st Armored Division After-Action Review, 341, 343-44. During the 

spring information offensive of 1996, heavy company teams worked alongside 

the “information company” to keep the lid on a potentially volatile situation. 

During this period, Bosnian political and religious leaders elevated customary 

and authorized visits to gravesites on opposite sides of the Inter-Entity Boundary 

Line to stage impromptu political theater. Thus combined, US forces headed off 

trouble before it began. 

21. IFOR AAR, Chapter 2, Public Information Activities, 2 - 2 -32 and Lieutenant 

Colonel David Short, United Kingdom, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann and 

Dr. George Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 August 2000. 

22. After-Action Review, 450. 

23. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Seymour, commander, 40th Engineer Battalion, 

“Standoff at Mt. Zep: A Confrontation Between 2nd Brigade, 1st Armoreded 

Division (IFOR) and Bosnian Serb General Mladic’s Protection Force,” 2, 

unpublished paper. These are the author’s recollection of events concerning Mt. 

Zep. 

24 . Lieutenant Colonel Bill Seymour, “Standoff at Mt. Zep,” 2. 

25. Ibid., 3. 

26. Ibid. 

27. IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of the Press Briefing, 6 July 1996. 

28. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Seymour, “Standoff at Mt. Zep,” 4; Lieutenant 

Colonel Rich Dixon, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 23 May 2003. 

29. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Seymour, “Standoff at Mt. Zep,” 5-6. 

30. IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of Press Briefing, 7 July 1996. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Seymour, “Standoff at Mt. Zep,” 8-9 and Short 

interview. 

33. Tom O’Sullivan, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Joint Forces Staff 

College, Norfolk, VA, 4 November 2003. 

34. Short interview. 

35. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: 

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998), 304; Siegel, “Information Operations,” 181. 

36. IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of the Press Briefing, 13 August 1996, 1-2. 

116 
37. Ibid., 3-4. It is worth noting that tensions were in a high state in locales other 

than Han Pijesak on 12 August. Indeed, the 12 August press briefing revealed 

the shooting of an American State Department Foreign Service officer during 

the preceding night on the road between Sarajevo and Kiseljak. In addition, 

reports surfaced of threats in Pale directed at the IPTF should any steps be taken 

to capture Karadzic. See IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of the Press Briefing, 

12August 1996. At the 14 August press briefing, British Brigadier Cooke 

stressed that Solana’s meeting with Plavsic had not been to negotiate but to be 

certain she understood the Dayton terms and IFOR’s determination to enforce 

them. It is probable that she bowed to this reality and made a virtue of necessity 

by playing her part in the inspection visit with Lieutenant General Walker. See 

IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of Press Briefing, 14 August 1996. 

38. Short interview. 

39. Daniel Williams, “Bosnia Peacekeepers on Alert After Threat,” The 

Washington Post, 13 August 1996. 

40. Dixon interview. 

41. O’Sullivan interview. The author has spoken with numerous other staff 

officers whose recollections essentially concur with this view. 

42. IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of Press Briefing, 14 August 1996. 

43. Ibid. 

44. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Bosnia-Herzegovina: Task Force Eagle 

Continuing Operations, B/H CAAT 3/4 Initial Impressions Report (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: March 1997), B-12-13, 32. 

45. O’Sullivan interview. Indeed, Americans who were disposed to listen found 

the advice of those who had served under UNPROFOR to be invaluable. 

117 
Chapter 5 

Show of Force 

George W. Gawrych 

I went to Srebrenica to stay with the [American] troops. 

Their camp stood on a hilltop above the town. The 

soldiers had gone there expecting to rough it a few days, 

but no sooner had they arrived than a Brown & Root 

convoy had pulled up, and, to their amazement, a crew of 

Bosnian civilians had emerged to set up two heated tents 

with electric lights and cots, a line of portable toilets, 

and a big collection of white-plastic chairs. Rather than 

feeling grateful, the soldiers were a little annoyed. In their 

disgust many of them chose to sleep outside, crammed 

into their vehicles or stretched out in sleeping bags on 

the cold ground. 

William Langewiesche, 20011 

US troops wear helmets and body armor—hence their 

nickname, “ninja turtles.” They travel in convoys with 

guns manned and ready. When they stop, they disperse 

to over watch positions, ready to apply defensive force. 

At night most retire to fortified camps or outposts as 

Romans did on campaigns, cut off from the people they 

came to protect. 

Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia, US Army, 20012 

The US Army and other NATO troops successfully achieved the 

military tasks of the Dayton Accords within the first year. But the initial 

mandate was extended another 18 months and then indefinitely. These 

extensions forced the NATO-led peacekeepers to expand their tasks 

in support of the civilian implementation of the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace (GFAP). In the expansion of its tasks, the US 

Army clearly emerged out of step with its allies in how it interpreted and 

implemented the Dayton Accords. Ultimately, the manner in which the US 

conducted peace support operations said more about American military 

culture than about the actual threat to its military forces. Compared with 

the British, French, Dutch, Canadians, and Scandinavians, the US Army 

appeared more cautious, risk-averse, rigid in its military patrols designed 

119 
to establish a secure environment for the civilian reformers. Part of the 

overall reticent mind-set among Americans stemmed from a general 

reluctance on the part of the top brass to embrace peacekeeping as an 

essential mission in the raison d’etre for the US armed forces. 

An Evolving Mandate 

The GFAP was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. On the next 

day, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031 authorized NATO 

to carry out its military mission under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter for 

peace enforcement. IFOR’s mandate commenced on 20 December 1995 

when the UNPROFOR commander, British Lieutenant General Rupert 

Smith, transferred authority to the IFOR commander, US Admiral 

Leighton Smith. Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the 

Peace Settlement, provided the NATO-led Implementation Force with 

clear and concrete tasks attainable during the mandate’s one-year duration. 

The Clinton administration claimed that the US would pull out of Bosnia 

in a year’s time; few believed the attainability of that claim. Over the next 

five years, the military’s mandate would evolve considerably. 

The Dayton Accords provided IFOR with the authority to employ 

force to carry out its tasks. IFOR had the mandate of peace enforcement 

rather than peacekeeping. Peacekeepers had “complete and unimpeded 

freedom of movement by air, ground, and water throughout Bosnia and 

Herzegovina.” If anyone resisted, IFOR had the authority for “the use 

of necessary force to ensure compliance.” Robust rules of engagement 

(ROE) went with peace enforcement so that field commanders could 

be proactive rather than reactive as had been much the case during 

UNPROFOR days. GFAP, for example, empowered IFOR with the right 

to inspect any military installation and use force, if necessary, to carry 

out its inspection. All three Bosnian armies were required to establish 

command posts at IFOR brigade, battalion, and other headquarters so that 

the peacekeepers could control movements within 10 kilometers of the 

zone of separation (ZOS). 

NATO unequivocally backed its written mandate with military 

muscle. IFOR increased UNPROFOR’s troop strength of 38,000 to 

60,000. The US deployed Task Force Eagle, some 17,500 troops, backed 

by an impressive lethal arsenal of heavy weapons and all marshaled 

to provide more effective deterrence than possessed by UNPROFOR. 

In particular, the 1st Armored Division, under the command of Major 

General William Nash, formed the main force. The division brought its 

entire force structure as well as additional echelons above corps assets. 

120 
Bosnia was divided into three division-plus sectors: the Americanled Multinational Division North or MND-N headquartered at Tuzla; 

the British-led Multinational Division Southwest (MND-SW) centered 

in Gronji Vakuf, later transferred to Banja Luka; and the French-led 

Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE) with its command located 

in Mostar. MND-N comprised four sectors: American division at Tuzla; a 

brigade of Nordic forces and a Polish parachute battalion in Doboj; a large 

Turkish mechanized infantry battalion with a tank company and artillery 

battery in Zenica; and two Russian parachute battalions in Ugljevik near 

Srebrenica. MND-N possessed some 22,500 troops.3 IFOR located its 

ground headquarters in the Sarajevo district of Ilidza. SFOR continued 

operations in Ilidza until moving to the Butmir district of Sarajevo in 

2000. 

IFOR’s year mandate was broken into two phases. Phase I gave 

the Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats 30 days (D+30) after the transfer of 

authority, to 19 January 1996, to withdraw their forces to behind a ZOS 

on either side of the cease-fire line. The ZOS extended 2 kilometers on 

either side of the boundary separating the warring factions. The city of 

Sarajevo, however, required only 1 kilometer. During this first phase, 

each entity had to “disarm and disband all armed civilian groups, except 

for authorized police forces.” Phase II affected only those areas where the 

Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) differed from the agreed cease-fire 

line. By D+45 (3 February 1996), all combatants would withdraw from 

areas designated for transfer to another entity. For the remainder of the 

year, IFOR would patrol the demilitarized ZOS, some 1,400 kilometers 

in length. All three Bosnian armies had until D+120 to deploy into their 

barracks and place their heavy equipment in cantonments. American 

General George Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

(SACEUR), later revised the date for cantonment of heavy weapons to 

D+180. After achieving these tasks, IFOR faced the task of security and 

logistic support for national and municipal elections. 

In addition to clear and attainable military objectives within a 

reasonable timetable, the GFAP gave IFOR more open-ended tasks. In 

particular, NATO-led forces were to ensure a cessation of hostilities and 

to create a peaceful and secure environment for the implementation of 

nonmilitary reforms. These two tasks involved the holding of free and 

fair elections, the continuation of humanitarian missions, the protection 

of refugee returnees, and the supervision of the clearing of minefields 

and obstacles. One year proved woefully insufficient time for creating a 

secure and stable environment in Bosnia. 

121 
Part of the problem lay with the Dayton agreement itself, the terms 

of which left room for continuing mischief by faction extremists. The 

international community recognized the division of the Republic of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina into two separate entities: the Federation of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS). Each entity possessed its 

own regional government, parliament, police force, and army. Moreover, 

the federation essentially represented the union of Bosniac (Muslim) and 

Bosnian Croat areas, but even in the federation the Bosniacs and Croats 

garnished their own separate governmental structures and armies. NATO 

thus faced an uphill battle in establishing common institutions across 

the board in Bosnia. Despite the initial acceptance of military facts on 

the ground, the architects of Dayton provided peacekeepers with several 

instruments intended for undermining Bosnia’s partition and eventually 

establishing common institutions. 

The West viewed elections as a key instrument for rebuilding Bosnia. 

By prohibiting indicted war criminals such as Karadzic from campaigning 

for public office, Washington expected to witness the transfer of power 

to more moderate and compliant political leaders. The electoral process 

would thus lead to establishing common institutions. More important, 

Washington and NATO viewed elections as an essential component of an 

exit strategy.4 Any delay in holding elections meant the country lacked 

the political stability necessary to justify NATO’s departure. “Elections 

would demonstrate the degree to which aspects of the Accords, such as 

inter-entity co-operation, freedom of movement and the right of displaced 

persons to return to the places of origin” were successful.5 

Unfortunately, Bosnia was not ready for elections after having just 

experienced a bloody civil war with ethnic cleansing. But Washington 

pushed for early elections regardless. Voting at the national level took 

place on 14 September 1996. IFOR provided support so that officials from 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could secure 

ballot boxes and certify the conduct of elections as free and fair. The 

international community prohibited indicted war criminals from seeking 

office but permitted all three prewar nationalist parties to compete for 

votes. The results proved very disappointing to NATO. 

Although some voter fraud marred the elections, the ethnic parties 

won by such large margins that any corrections would have had little 

effect on the final outcome.6 For the common Presidency of BosniaHerzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic (Party of Democratic Action or SDA) 

won 80 percent of the vote among Bosniac candidates. Momcilo Krajisnik 

(Serbian Democratic Party or SDS), Karadzic’s man, received 67.3 

122 
percent of the vote in the Serb community; Mladen Ivanic, an economist, 

managed a respectable 29.96 percent for his multiethnic coalition. In this 

regard, the Republika Srpska could claim the most contested election in 

Bosnia. Among Croatian voters, Kresimir Zubak (Croatian Democratic 

Alliance or HDZ) carried the vote with a whopping 88.7 percent. For 

the 42 seats in the common Parliamentary Assembly, SDA won 19 seats, 

SDS 9, and HDZ 3. The remainder went to smaller parties. Izetbegovic 

won the vote for the common Presidency with 730,592. Krajisnik came 

in second with 690,646 and Zubak received 330,377. By gaining the 

most votes, Izetbegovic became president of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

The election results clearly demonstrated that one year was insufficient 

time for bringing peace and stability to Bosnia. Each nationalist party 

played on people’s fears to garner votes, an appeal that carried some 

credence given IFOR’s one-year mandate. Many voters feared an early 

NATO pullout would leave them vulnerable to the extremists in other 

warring factions; their own hard-liners appeared the best bet for security. 

Bosnian prewar leaders remained in power, some behind the scenes. These 

individuals were quite willing to continue the struggle for their personal 

and ethnic interests, although they resorted to means other than the army. 

Popular wisdom pointed to a high probability of a return to violence 

should NATO leave with IFOR’s expiration date of 20 December 1996. 

Shortly after the September national elections, the North Atlantic 

Council agreed to the inevitable, the extension of NATO’s mandate 

with the replacement of IFOR with the Stabilization Force or SFOR. 

The command structure for Bosnia changed with SFOR. Both Allied 

Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps and the Allied Forces Southern 

Command disappeared from the theater of operations. The SFOR 

commander took over the headquarters of the latter in Ilidza, Sarajevo. 

He wore two hats, commander of SFOR and the US Commander, Europe. 

This reorganization ensured that all peacekeeping troops came under 

an American army general, who reported directly to Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe, who also was an American general. The US Army 

wanted control over what was essentially a mission for ground forces. No 

longer would a US naval admiral command ground forces until 2001. 

On 12 December 1996, the UN Security Council Resolution 1088 

authorized SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR for conducting peace 

enforcement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The mandate was set to 

last for 18 months. SFOR’s primary mission was to stabilize the safe and 

secure environment created by IFOR. Its specific tasks were 1) prevent 

123 
the resumption of hostilities; 2) promote a climate conducive to pushing 

the peace process forward; and 3) provide selective support to civilian 

organizations within its capabilities. This mandate clearly engaged SFOR 

in nation building. Among the civilian issues requiring military protection 

were the right of return of all refugees and displaced persons to their 

prewar homes, the capture of indicted war criminals, and the creation of 

common institutions. 

SFOR assumed control on 20 December 1996 with a mandate of 18 

months. Because the first 12 months of IFOR saw no combat deaths of 

peacekeepers and no major civil upheaval, the North Atlantic Council 

reduced troop levels from 60,000 to 32,600: 12,400 in MND-N, 9,800 

in MND-SE, 7,400 in MND-SW, and 3,000 in Croatia. Each division 

had four battle groups, essentially reinforced battalions instead of 

brigades. US troop strength fell from 17,500 to 8,500 with SFOR. On 

10 November 1996, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) under Major 

General Montgomery Meigs replaced the 1st Armored Division in MNDN. In December 1997, NATO decided to extend the mission in Bosnia 

indefinitely, and Washington once again reduced its contribution, this 

time from 8,500 to 6,900. By 1999, the number of SFOR troops dropped 

to 20,000, including 4,000 Americans. 

Peace Enforcement in Bosnia 

The Bosnian war failed to end the ethnic conflict; the struggle just took 

on a different form with the entry of NATO. Bosnian political leaders and 

military commanders from the three warring factions were all naturally 

disposed to test the resolve of IFOR and its successor, SFOR, always 

with the intent of gaining some advantage. Generally speaking, Serb 

hard-liners sought to maintain the status quo, which meant keeping the 

Republika Srpska as separate an entity as possible. Bosniac nationalists, 

for their part, wanted to restore prewar Bosnia but with Muslims in charge. 

Croat radicals, like the Serbs, preferred the status quo and resisted all 

attempts to dissolve the Croat Republic of Hercog-Bosna as a separate 

ministate. NATO faced the challenge of helping overcome resistance to 

the creation of common institutions for all Bosnians without distinction 

of religion or ethnicity. 

NATO deployed to Bosnia with UN authority for peace enforcement 

rather than peacekeeping. Instead of being encumbered with more don’ts 

than dos, NATO peacekeepers could be proactive. As a result, commanders 

had authority at lower levels to employ force if necessary. It was important 

for IFOR to demonstrate its robust mandate for implementing the Dayton 

124 
Accords. While the entry of US ground troops suggested a world very 

different from that of UNPROFOR, Bosnian political and military leaders 

still figured to put IFOR resolve to the test. IFOR commanders, for their 

part, were determined to set the tone for the entire peace operation. 

Forcing compliance was not always easy, however. 

For the execution of peace operations at the operational and tactical 

levels, GFAP established the Joint Military Commission (JMC) to serve 

as the central body through which the IFOR commander could fulfill the 

military tasks of Dayton. JMCs required the senior military commander 

of each warring faction’s army to meet with the IFOR, and later SFOR, 

commanders. At these regular meetings, held at least once a month, 

the NATO commander resolved military problems and then demanded 

compliance where infractions took place. The JMC proved an important 

instrument for implementing military aspects of the Dayton Accords. 

The first JMC meeting took place at Sarajevo Airport on 21 December 

1995. In attendance were the High Representative Carl Bildt, IFOR 

Commander Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander of the Allied Rapid 

Reaction Corps Lieutenant General Michael Walker, and the Bosniac, 

Serb, and Croat army commanders. The Bosnian participants formally 

declared their willingness to comply with the Dayton Accords, while 

IFOR explained the procedures for conveying military instructions.7 For 

IFOR’s duration, Admiral Smith delegated routine meetings to Walker. 

For their part, the MND commanders, as well as their brigade and 

battalion commanders, used the JMC concept at their command level. 

Most of the work for the implementation of the Dayton Accords took 

place at these local JMCs. 

In MND-N, Major General Nash, the commander of Task Force 

Eagle, made great use of the JMC. At meetings, he regularly provided 

each military faction’s commander with a report card grading most recent 

performance. To ensure compliance in its sector, the US Army relied on 

two American strengths: superiority in firepower and technology. Nash 

attended meetings with a heavy escort to underscore to his Bosnian 

counterparts his ability to employ overwhelming force if necessary. When 

disputes occurred over the veracity of field reports, he readily produced 

satellite photos demonstrating violations. In such instances, the offending 

Bosnian commander lost the wind to his sails.8 Later, Nash noted the 

effectiveness of information technology: “We don’t have arguments. We 

hand them pictures and they move their tanks.”9 Compliance thus became 

the order of the day or one faced quick punishment. 

125 
MND commanders behaved as conquerors occupying a defeated 

country. If a faction commander missed a JMC meeting, the IFOR 

commander could confine that army to barracks; or NATO could cancel 

a training exercise in an instant with no court of appeal for the injured 

party. In this sense, GFAP provided NATO commanders in theater with an 

effective instrument. Still, peace enforcement and peacekeeping present 

unique challenges to officers mainly schooled for conventional war. 

Trained to kill in combat, tactical commanders now had to practice 

the art of street diplomacy and a graduated escalation in the use of 

force according to strict rules of engagement. Words became bullets in 

negotiations, because using weapons was to be a last resort. As Colonel 

Greg Fontenot, commander of the 1st Armored Brigade of the 1st Armored 

Division in IFOR, emphasized to his troops, firing a weapon constituted 

a tactical defeat.10 Before and during deployment, officers and soldiers 

learned that killing a civilian would have strategic implications and would 

certainly create a martyr for the enemy. One Army officer explained the 

phenomenon as “the Boston Massacre Complex.” Shots fired in anger 

by regular troops could mobilize a people to commit heroic sacrifices 

for their cause, and the US Army wanted to avoid such an occurrence at 

all costs.11 Such indoctrination resulted in amazing restraint by American 

soldiers when threatened by mob violence (discussed in a later chapter). 

Key tasks for tactical commanders included establishing the ZOS, 

dismantling of police checkpoints to ensure freedom of movement, 

inspection of weapons sites, support of police operations as needed, and 

mine clearing. Initially, NATO commanders wanted to avoid having to 

capture indicted war criminals or to quell civil disturbances. IFOR and 

SFOR preferred the Bosnian police handle these tasks. 

Young company and platoon commanders, usually in their early 30s 

or mid 20s respectively, faced challenges in executing their missions, 

especially in the first year. Often, they had to confront potentially explosive 

situations by judiciously balancing negotiation with intimidation, 

depending on circumstances. In one case, for example, Captain Fred 

Drummond, a company commander of the 16th Engineer Battalion, 

confronted two checkpoints on opposite sides of a bridge, one manned 

by Bosniacs and the other by Serbs. The respective commanders were 

both in their 50s, clearly hardened war veterans. In negotiating with them 

separately, Drummond discovered to his dismay that they threatened to 

kill the other person if they met face-to-face. The young captain, never 

seriously trained in the art of negotiations to meet such a challenge, used 

the Dayton Accords to demonstrate the correctness of his demands. To 

126 
his relief, both commanders dismantled their checkpoints, and they even 

shook hands, though somewhat awkwardly.12 

Setting up checkpoints proved no easy task during politically tense 

periods. In September 1997, for example, Lieutenant Colonel James 

Greer, commander of the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment, was at 

police headquarters in Brcko when suddenly a group of buses passed 

by the station headed west. He immediately called Camp McGovern 

and ordered Lieutenant Greg Sharpe, platoon commander in the 22nd 

Infantry, to establish a checkpoint on a main road leading to Banja Luka 

and inspect the convoy of buses for weapons. Unknown to Greer, the 

buses were en route to Banja Luka to stage a rally or riot against the proDayton government of Biljana Plavsic.13 

Sharpe established his position at an intersection of two main 

roads in an open field. Later, he admitted that it would have been better to 

locate his position on a nearby bridge, where he could maintain a distance 

between his soldiers and the Serbs. Rather suddenly, some 30 to 40 buses 

drove up to his checkpoint. All the buses stopped and approximately 

1,000 Serbs filed off them and began interspersing among the American 

troops. Using a radio from Camp McGovern, Lieutenant Colonel Mark 

Corda, the task force commander, ordered Sharpe to immobilize the 

buses by shooting their tires, an order rescinded once Sharpe informed 

them that discharging weapons would most certainly incite the travelers. 

The young platoon commander also remembered that he did not want to 

create a martyr for the cause. A Serb camera crew was on hand, ready 

to film any incident. Having lost control of his unit, Sharpe decided on 

withdrawing his troops to a safe distance. Only with some difficulty 

did Sharpe manage to extricate himself and his soldiers. After a brief 

standoff, headquarters ordered Sharpe to withdraw and establish a second 

checkpoint. After holding Sharpe there for a couple of hours, headquarters 

ordered a pullback 5 to 6 miles down the road. There, military police 

showed up with riot gear that included protective shields. This time, the 

Serbs began throwing rocks and other objects.14 

Greer was finally able to stop the buses a couple of kilometers east of 

Modrica. He decided to gather his vehicles and drive very slowly in front 

of the buses. Then, the Americans stopped where it was impossible for 

the caravan to get off the road to bypass. Here, the standoff lasted into the 

early hours of the next day. By slowing the buses down, the Americans 

were able to prevent the caravan from reaching Banja Luka in time to 

participate in a violent demonstration.15 Other national contingents used 

the tactics of block, withdraw, and block again to slow down buses en 

127 
route to the same demonstration in Banja Luka. 

Historical Baggage 

Peace support missions present challenges to the US Army. Soldiers 

are trained to be killers in defense of their country’s national interests when 

ordered to wage war by the political leadership. In peace enforcement and 

peacekeeping, however, an army embraces essentially a police action and 

therefore must show restraint and use lethal force only as a last resort after 

having gone through a proper graduated response defined in its ROE. In 

Bosnia, however, the US Army showed itself much out of step with other 

Western armies as it practiced peace enforcement and later peacekeeping. 

The American military establishment brought its own unique mind-set to 

the theater. 

Secretary of Defense William H. Perry ordered the 1st Armored 

Division to posture itself for mid-intensity conflict.16 On 19 December 

1995, he personally told officers of the division to be “the meanest dog 

on the block.”17 Put another way, the warring factions needed to know 

that “there was a new sheriff on the block.”18 This political guidance was 

prudent for two reasons. First, while indications on the ground suggested 

that the warring factions had exhausted themselves and were ready for 

winter hibernation, there still loomed the distinct possibility of combat. 

Better to be well prepared than found deficient. Second, as a counter to 

UNPROFOR’s weak mandate and general ineffectiveness, IFOR needed 

to demonstrate to the warring factions that Western resolve had changed 

dramatically. Rolling into Bosnia fully dressed for combat sent that 

message. 

Other Western armies took a similar approach. UNPROFOR soldiers 

took off their soft blue caps and put on helmets for patrolling. For the next 

couple of months, every national contingent maintained a high level of 

force protection. American soldiers were virtually indistinguishable from 

fellow soldiers in other armies. Most contingents sooner or later reduced 

their force protection posture. The US kept it the longest, exhibiting the 

least inclination to change its combat mind-set toward peace support 

operations. 

Unambiguous intimidation was the order of the day. American displays 

of firepower were intended to impress war-weary Bosnian fighters on all 

sides, many of whom looked for a legitimate excuse to cease fighting. 

In support of his field commanders, Admiral Smith felt it important to 

underscore his own resolve. On 19 February 1996, he held his first JMC 

as IFOR commander on board the aircraft carrier George Washington in 

128 
Photo 11. US forces from the rank of private to general officer 

maintained a high force protection standard 

the Adriatic Sea to display American naval firepower to the commanders 

of the three warring factions’ militaries. As the theater commander, 

Smith was intimidating at the operational level by demonstrating IFOR 

capabilities. He expected the Bosnian generals to counsel their political 

leaders to comply with the directives of the High Representative.19 At 

the tactical level, NATO armies invited local Bosnian commanders to 

view military exercises to demonstrate their own determination and 

professionalism. 

One can exaggerate the military effectiveness of demonstrations of 

overwhelming firepower. It certainly did not work when Nazi Germany 

invaded Yugoslavia in World War II. But the situation in 1995 was very 

different from that in 1941. In 1995, the leaders of the three warring 

factions, as well as the countries of Croatia and Serbia, had signed the 

Dayton Accords. Moreover, the Muslim, Croat, and Serb armies were 

war weary from fighting, and the cold winter added to the desire of many 

soldiers to end three years of fighting, however intermittent. In addition, 

the US and Russian entries into Bosnia brought virtually the entire world 

into a commitment to peacekeeping. For one warring faction to take on 

129 
such a global coalition without a strong ally would have smacked of sheer 

folly. Finally, the Dayton Accords represented a partial victory for the 

ethnic cleansers because they gained, at least for the immediate future, 

safe havens under their control or influence. A more relaxed posture 

appeared most appropriate. 

Despite a pattern of general compliance on the part of Bosnian 

militaries, American senior commanders held firm to maintaining combat 

dress and behavior as signs of professionalism throughout the deployment. 

For Americans, a statement by one Bosniac corps commander underscored 

the correctness of this attitude: “All of my men out there are fighters, not 

yet soldiers. You Americans are soldiers. You all dress alike, you all have 

discipline, you have clean weapons at the ready, you always travel in 

four vehicle convoys, even your helicopters fly in formation. Soldiers 

do that and we notice it.”20 As one American junior officer noted rather 

sarcastically, “the Kevlar helmet became the dome of discipline.” 

American politics helped drive this military mind-set. The Clinton 

administration committed ground troops to Bosnia reluctantly, and the 

political leadership in Washington wanted matters to go as smoothly 

as possible to avoid any negative reactions from the American public. 

Perry underscored this concern to General George Joulwan, the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe, and other senior American officers when he 

stated in a meeting with them that Washington wanted no casualties.21 

Commanders in attendance understood that success of the operation 

depended on keeping casualties to a minimum, and they communicated 

this aim down the chain of command by a heavy emphasis on force 

protection. American ground troops deployed into Bosnia with a clear 

mission statement: “On order, Task Force Eagle deploys to SECTOR 

TUZLA, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and conducts peace enforcement 

operations to compel compliance with the peace accord; ensures force 

protection.”22 Defining force protection as an essential task represented a 

recent development in American military culture. 

Force protection emerged as a hot topic in the US military by the early 

1990s. Before then, the mission came first, but inherent in any military 

operation was a concern for casualties. Force protection, however, 

reflected an increased concern for loss of life, more for political reasons, 

placing it in potential conflict with mission accomplishment. The Gulf 

War had already provided clear indications of this development. In his 

semiofficial study, retired Army Colonel Richard Swain, Third Army’s 

historian in this conflict, argued that plans for Desert Storm placed the 

highest priority on minimizing allied and civilian casualties. This goal 

130 
had become ingrained from the Vietnam era when Walter Cronkite weekly 

updated American casualties for his viewing audience. In the Gulf War, 

the Army avoided night operations to limit friendly fire and methodically 

advanced with three divisions in VII Corps in mass rather than exploit 

success with a rapier-like thrust. Consequently, the US Army approached 

the Gulf War with a growing desire for a tidy battlefield, reflecting a 

primary concern over casualties.23 

The tragedies of Mogadishu in Somalia and Khobar Towers in Saudi 

Arabia helped transform a general concern for casualties into the concept 

of force protection. Somalia created a myth that public will in the US was 

a fragile commodity that would easily turn against military operations 

once American soldiers were killed in action, especially when disturbing 

images appeared on television. This reasoning became known as the 

“Somalia Syndrome,” the false view that the American public has little 

tolerance for casualties. The bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 

for its part, ended the career of the Air Force general in charge of the 

base. This incident underscored for commanding officers the imperative 

for maintaining a high vigil of force protection. As one syndicated writer 

heard from a senior officer in Bosnia, “But I’ll tell you what: if you as 

a commander take casualties for any reason, the first question that gets 

asked is ‘What level of force protection did you take?’”24 Both soldiers 

and officers readily admit to the underlying principle for commanders in 

never letting down one’s defenses: “CYA. Cover your ass.” 

By making force protection part of the mission statement for 

deployment into Bosnia, the US Army created an aim that competed 

with the ostensible purpose of the mission. Stationed in Bosnia in 

2000, Colonel Chris Baggott, commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, underscored the inherent problem of force protection as part of 

the mission. As he observed, successful command has come to mean, in 

large part, returning home with no casualties. Commanders are pressured, 

unconsciously or consciously, into taking a short-range approach to 

their assignment and therefore are reluctant to take risks. Exit strategy 

becomes personalized— don’t get anyone killed.25 American political 

advisers (POLADs), senior State Department officials assigned to advise 

the SFOR and MND-N commanders on political matters, observed this 

tension.26 Force protection can become a way of soothing a commander’s 

conscience and the concern of his superiors. 

The political culture back in the US reinforced this military mind-set. 

The Clinton administration sought a quick exit and thus wanted minimal 

commitments and short-range perspectives. They were, furthermore, 

131 
leery of casualties. All this was not lost on commanders in the field.27 But 

the roots of the problem went deeper than just the current administration 

or political traditions to overseas deployments. 

From a historical perspective, the Vietnam War had left a scar on the 

military psyche. The US Army developed an aversion to unconventional 

missions. In particular, the military establishment resisted embracing 

peacekeeping as part of its raison d’etre. Consequently, the Army top 

brass went into Bosnia determined to interpret its military mission 

in a narrow sense. Getting involved on the civilian side smacked of 

nation building, and Vietnam veterans remembered how that mission 

complicated the combat effort in Indochina. Subsequently, a foremost 

“lesson learned” from Somalia held that nation building leads to mission 

creep, and expansion of a military’s role into civilian affairs has deleterious 

effects. Therefore, the US interpreted the military clauses of the Dayton 

Accords narrowly and, like the Clinton administration, wanted to get 

out as quickly as possible. High Representative Carl Bildt discerned 

two different approaches toward Bosnia, observing that “a pattern was 

established right from the onset: the US would focus on military matters 

and limit its involvement in the civilian arena, while the Europeans 

were wary of a peace effort that was too military in a narrow sense, and 

too limited in terms of the time element.”28 General Wesley Clark, who 

became Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in July 1997, concurred 

with part of Bildt’s evaluation. “The Pentagon wanted success, too, but 

sought to keep the mission as limited and as risk-free as possible.”29 

One area outside the military’s purview was pursuing persons indicted 

for war crimes, commonly referred to as PIFWCs. The US Army’s senior 

leadership considered this task as counter to the peace enforcement or 

peacekeeping mission. Pentagon officials argued that this was a matter 

for the Bosnian police. General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, underscored his guidance to 

American troops in Bosnia: “I made it clear that I would not support 

using the military to hunt down war criminals. We weren’t going to take 

them unless we stumbled upon them. I felt that the military had a horrible 

track record in chasing these kinds of criminals. Look at Mogadishu.”30 

American soldiers would arrest individuals only if encountered on 

patrols. Or the Bosnian police would conduct the operation, with IFOR 

or SFOR providing support by sealing off the surrounding area. Such 

a dynamic brought a political benefit. Local police chiefs could excuse 

their participation to their political heads by blaming coercive pressure 

from NATO. 

132 
During 1996 and the first half of 1997, NATO failed, for the most 

part, to detain any indicted war criminals. Then from 10 July 1997 to 

2 October 1998, SFOR captured nine, though others were seized by 

Americans.31 But the Americans could not escape the fallout of actions 

in other MNDs. On 10 July 1997, when the British captured one Serb 

indicted war criminal and killed a second, MND-N expected to feel Serb 

wrath. And it did. On 12 July, a bomb exploded in Zvornik before several 

international offices. Nearly two weeks later, an antitank rocket struck 

a parked IPTF vehicle. No one was hurt in either incident. American 

patrols, for their part, suddenly experienced several incidents of bottle 

throwing, spitting, and obscene hand gestures.32 

In summary, the US Army embarked on peacekeeping in Bosnia with 

some reticence. Based on the experiences of Vietnam and Somalia, the 

senior leadership wanted to avoid nation building at all cost, lest Bosnia 

turn into a quagmire. American commanders needed prodding from the 

highest levels of command to broaden their actions in support of the 

mission. Moreover, force protection carried a major importance within 

the context of the overall mission of securing a peaceful environment. 

This general mind-set made for some controversial and questionable 

practices and behavior by the US Army. 

Soldiering Without War 

At the small-unit level, the Americans took extraordinary precautions 

to ensure the safety of American soldiers as required by the mission 

statement cited earlier. In fact, compared with the other national 

contingents, the US Army has adopted the most extreme approach to 

force protection in Bosnia. Much debate has occurred over the wisdom 

of its practices. 

During IFOR, American commanders regarded patrolling as a combat 

mission. This made sense given the initial uncertainties. Policy required 

American soldiers to wear Kevlar helmets and flak jackets at all times. 

Machine guns on vehicles were in a position ready to fire. Foot patrols 

had soldiers sporting rifles in their hands. Any movement or patrol off 

the camp required a minimum of four vehicles. This ensured a “buddy 

system.” If one vehicle broke down, two could go for help while one 

remained with the disabled vehicle.33 All this was intended to protect 

soldiers and intimidate the locals. The rationale for such an approach, 

especially during IFOR, was not hard to grasp. 

Practices on base were rather extreme, however. American soldiers 

had to wear “full battle rattle” at all times, including a Kevlar helmet 

133 
and flak vest. They carried their rifles on their shoulders while outdoors. 

Soldiers brought their weapons to the mess hall. The three authors of this 

study ate on Eagle Base in Tuzla in September 2000 and saw rifles parked 

in holders at the end of tables while soldiers ate. Other armies prohibited 

weapons in dining facilities. 

Force protection during IFOR carried some contradictions. Officially, 

a soldier could jog on base in running gear but a guard with full body 

armor had to be in an overwatch position on the route. Requiring full 

battle rattle in camp struck many as odd, especially since initially the 

soldiers slept without their gear in tents that offered no protection from 

mortar or sniper fire.34 Meanwhile, American special forces working 

in local communities kept a low force protection posture so as not to 

create unnecessary barriers between themselves and the people. Rather 

comically, they had to put on the full body armor to enter American 

bases, which were obviously more secure than their own neighborhoods 

in town. 

A great disparity in practice existed between American soldiers 

serving in Sarajevo and those in MND-N. In Sarajevo, the Americans, with 

a rare exception, fell under NATO regulations with a very different force 

protection policy. Here, Americans wore soft caps and could visit the city 

and eat in restaurants. Moreover, Americans did not wear the SFOR patch 

but the conspicuous US flag on their uniforms. This practice contradicted 

the argument for high force protection because it made Americans very 

easily identifiable for any terrorist bent on killing an American soldier. 

Here it seemed excessive American patriotism outweighed concern for 

safety of troops. 

One story brings out the sharp contrast in peacekeeping styles in 

evidence during IFOR. An American base at Lukavac just west of Tuzla 

had a small contingent of approximately 20 British soldiers. The base 

commander required that the British drink their beer behind an 8-foot 

covered fence so that American soldiers, dressed in full body armor both 

outside and inside buildings and sporting weapons, could not observe the 

regular festivities. But the fence could not hide the alcohol smell or the 

presence of empty beer cans in the trash the next day. The British could also 

receive permission to eat in town, while the Americans were confined to 

base unless on patrols or special assignments, all requiring four vehicles. 

The American soldiers were a bit demoralized by the restrictions. One 

American officer later joked about this arrangement: “our [American] 

stiffness entertained them [the British] to some extent.”35 

134 
Photo 12. US soldiers in body armor and helmets 

mingled on the streets of Bosnia 

Photo 13. Canadian soldier on patrol with translator 

135 
Photo 14. A British soldier helps keep order on MND SW 

Gradually, the Army softened its policy, but it took years for changes 

to occur. In June or July 1997, for example, General William Crouch, then 

SFOR commander, visited Camp McGovern and heard complaints from 

soldiers about having to wear a helmet while on base (the requirement to 

wear a flak jacket had been removed). That evening, MND-N changed 

its force protection policy. On base, soldiers could wear soft caps instead 

of Kevlar helmets. Morale went up on the bases as a result. Apparently, 

there had been some discussion about relaxing force protection on bases, 

but the general’s intervention ensured an earlier implementation of the 

change. Full battle rattle attire remained operative for outside the base, 

however.36 Eventually, a two-vehicle requirement replaced the fourvehicle convoy. 

Some senior commanders advocated change but found it difficult 

to implement because of an ingrained mind-set. General Meigs, SFOR 

commander from October 1998 to October 1999, encouraged his American 

division commanders to permit their troops on patrols to use soft caps and 

keep their flak jackets and Kevlar helmets in their vehicle when the threat 

was very low. Meigs felt a lower force protection posture, such as soft 

caps and no flak jackets while on foot patrols, provided flexibility and 

enhanced a sense of normalcy. A shift from soft caps to helmets on foot 

patrols, for example, sent a clear signal to the local population of increased 

seriousness. But his generals resisted the suggestion. According to Meigs, 

136 
Major General Kevin Byrnes, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, 

contended that it was “too late in his tour” for such a major change. 

His replacement, Major General James Campbell of the 10th Mountain 

Division, expressed no desire “to break tradition.”37 Interestingly, Meigs 

had failed to take such a step earlier when he had commanded the 3rd 

Infantry Division in 1997. 

Later, Campbell admitted to receiving pressure from senior officers 

to change his force protection policy. “They thought I was too far in the 

past.” He was clearly aware that “in some cases, they [allies] laughed at 

us.” In his defense, Campbell argued that it was far better to adhere to 

a stricter policy than have to inform parents of the death of a loved one. 

But he did modify the policy a little. On patrol, the battalion commander 

could allow his soldiers to leave their flak vests in their vehicle but keep 

them “within arm’s reach.” Some officers took advantage of this new 

policy; others did not. Later, Campbell admitted a little disappointment 

when he discovered that some commanders rigidly adhered to the former 

policy requiring soldiers on patrol to wear flak jackets at all times.38 

After Campbell’s departure in March 2000, Major General Robert 

Halverson, commander of the 49th National Guard (Texas) Armored 

Division, replaced him. The 49th staffed the headquarters while a regular 

Army unit, the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, conducted field operations. Despite 

a reduced force structure from 5,400 to 3,900, Halverson implemented the 

use of soft caps in certain safer areas. Again, it was the local commander’s 

call, and some commanders took advantage of this new flexibility. From 

Halverson’s vantage point, soldiers appeared to embrace and like the 

change where it was applied. Halverson believed that soft caps projected 

an image of a kinder and more caring soldier than did full combat attire. 

He also understood that, irrespective of force-protection levels, killing 

an American soldier was not a difficult task for a determined adversary. 

In any case, the threat was insufficient to warrant a high level of force 

protection.39 One National Guard officer noted, perhaps with a bit of 

exaggeration, that the police blotter in Houston had more incidents in 

a day than all of Bosnia in a month. The year was 2000, five years after 

the initial American deployment, a period that witnessed no combat 

casualties. 

Although the former warring factions seemed determined to avoid 

inflicting fatal casualties, to some degree, IFOR and SFOR were lucky 

that no soldiers fell in combat or in armed attacks. In July 1997, for 

example, Serb extremists launched a series of bombings and rocket 

launchings to protest the capture of the first indicted war criminal and 

137 
the killing of a second by British forces. Despite the increase in violent 

incidents, one unit history noted that “We . . . felt an attack directed 

at SFOR personnel and installations would be highly unlikely. . . . It 

became clear that the individuals or groups responsible were very careful 

to ensure no one would be injured by their terrorist attacks and may 

have launched a campaign of terror [only] to intimidate SFOR and the 

International organizations in the RS.”40 

The concern for casualties affected all aspects of the deployment. 

Commanders naturally fell into restricting the social life of their troops 

as much as possible. For the first five years, General Order #1 prohibited 

officers and soldiers from drinking alcohol except under very restrictive 

circumstances. A reporter described life on Eagle Base during the 2000-

2001 tour of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) thus: “The soldiers 

live in surprising isolation. Those who go out on patrol are generally 

forbidden to sit in cafes, to shop in the local markets, or to socialize with 

the Bosnians. Two thirds of the soldiers never even go out on patrols, and 

live almost entirely restricted to the base, where they serve in ‘support’ 

roles as guards and office workers, and seem to spend most of their leisure 

time eating and then trying to lose weight. . . But when soldiers talk about 

tough duty in Bosnia, they usually mean General Order #1—a nearly total 

prohibition on alcohol for American troops.”41 MND-N finally relaxed 

the restrictions on drinking by 2001, permitting one or two beers on a 

more frequent basis. 

To address boredom on base, MND-N began to permit escorted trips 

to Tuzla and Sarajevo. In May 1997, morale, welfare, and recreation 

specialist Michaela Vance had to work three entire months to arrange an 

outing to Sarajevo from Eagle Base. Her achievement was so noteworthy 

that The Stars and Stripes published an article on the experience titled 

“Seeing the Sights of Sarajevo: M[orale] W[elfare] R[ecreation] tour gets 

SFOR troops off base and to somewhere new.” Vance found, much to 

her dismay, that “there was no prior history of how to get it arranged.”42 

When her small group finally arrived in the Bosnian capital, the troops 

could shed their bulky flak jackets and leave them behind. Unlike their 

American counterparts stationed in Sarajevo, the “tourists” from Tuzla 

had to take their rifles with them, locked but not loaded. Sergeant 

Thomas White found the excursion invigorating: “It feels good just to 

mingle with the people, to get out with the country. That seems what the 

Bosnians wanted to see. I guess they can’t understand why we’re in the 

camps and not out doing a lot of things like going out to eat like we did 

today, helping the economy a little bit.”43 

138 
Some division commanders permitted a limited number of such 

excursions. Under his watch, Halverson encouraged his troops to do such 

visits. He felt it helped morale and gave the soldiers a sense of mission.44 

Major General Walter Sharp, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, 

permitted this policy, but “not many” soldiers seemed to take advantage 

of this opportunity.45 American military culture did not encourage such 

outreach as an essential part of the mission of peacekeeping. The contracting 

firm of Brown & Root sought to make life on base self-sufficient. In this, 

the Army differed from other national armies in Bosnia. 

By 2000, force protection had become a non-issue, taboo to discuss.46 

There was therefore little reflection of one’s own behavior, even among 

American generals. Strange behavior can result from non-reflection. One 

such area pertained to travel methods of senior American commanding 

officers when they arrived by helicopter at MND-SW or MND-SE. 

Usually, they traveled with a huge security detail that reflexively fanned 

out on the landing site as if securing unknown terrain. Such behavior is 

both humorous and insulting to a foreign MND commander, humorous 

because it appears so inappropriate for the situation, insulting because 

it suggests other national contingents lack secure bases. Such behavior 

smacks of exaggerated self-importance and unnecessary individual 

protection.47 In professionalism, both big and little things matter. 

It didn’t take much for Americans to raise their force protection 

levels. Some reaction bordered on the absurd. When the US bombed 

Afghanistan in 1998, for example, MND-N immediately went a high alert 

status. All military personnel had to wear full combat gear at all times. 

In one instance, officers and soldiers were required to watch movies in a 

theater on base dressed in Kevlar helmets and flak jackets.48 World War II 

veterans shook their heads in disbelief when I shared this story with them. 

The US military assigned a greater priority to the appearance of 

physical force protection when compared with other national contingents. 

Over the first six years of deployment, the American senior command in 

MND-N consistently maintained a higher level of force protection than in 

the other two sectors. A case study of Bosnia thus provides an excellent 

opportunity for employing the comparative method. Such comparison is 

essential if the US military institution is to conduct serious reflection of 

its own behavior. Know thyself, and know thy enemy. 

A Different Philosophy 

Other Western armies possess a philosophical approach to peace 

operations very different from that of the US Army. The comparative 

139 
method shows that the US Army has not embraced peacekeeping as one 

of its raisons d’etre. The military establishment therefore suffers a bit 

from a weak and ambiguous tradition for peacekeeping. Its senior Army 

leadership has tended to embrace peace missions rather reluctantly and 

has drawn too much attention to its harmful effect on combat readiness. 

Other Western armies possess a different peacekeeping philosophy 

and place great importance on the gathering of human intelligence by 

the regular forces. They talk more of “social patrolling,” a concept that 

seemed more appropriate to Bosnia than force protection. To be effective 

in their mission, according to this philosophy, peacekeepers need to foster 

an ambiance of normalcy as much as possible. Dress and the manner of 

patrolling play a critical role in the pursuit of this goal. As early as the 

IFOR period, European armies began to adopt some combination of a 

soft cap, no flak jackets, and the weapons slung over the shoulder on 

patrols. In theory, this approach would appear less menacing and foster 

approachability. Soldiers could stop and have a coffee as a means for 

initiating dialogue with locals. Bosnia possesses “a café culture.” Patrol 

commanders needed to exploit this gathering place for the exchange of 

ideas and information, taking time to sit with the locals and talk. A relaxed 

posture on patrol, again in theory, enhances force protection rather than 

detracts from it. Soldiers become more approachable and therefore better 

able to gather intelligence from locals. Through an interface with the 

local population, peacekeepers gain a sense of purpose.49 

American special forces and counterintelligence operatives accept 

the above philosophy. But the US Army’s senior leadership has resisted 

its application to regular forces and instead prefers to emphasize the 

combat nature of patrolling in peacekeeping. Indeed, advocates of 

the US style of force protection maintained that in war-torn Bosnia, it 

did not prevent contact with the people or stop the flow information.50 

Though patrol commanders conducted intelligence gathering, the US 

Army placed greater reliance on technology and on special units, such as 

special forces and counterintelligence, that worked semi-independently 

outside the normal command structure. This reliance on specialized units 

resulted in some uneven patrolling methods by conventional forces. As 

noted by one reporter, “some patrols did talk to the Bosnians. Some 

of the patrols did not. Some of the patrols had been restricted by their 

immediate commanders from doing such a thing.”51 Campbell saw a 

similar inconsistency when he learned that not all of his commanders 

were willing to demonstrate flexibility in force protection when offered 

the opportunity. This disparity reflects a weak peacekeeping tradition. 

140 
It is difficult to determine if either the European or American 

approaches are more effective in creating a secure environment for 

civilian reformers. Much certainly depends on the disposition of the local 

population and historical circumstances. Captain Jet Hayes, American 

liaison to the NORDIC Battle Group in Doboj, noted that regular patrols 

in his sector provided similar information as that gathered by special 

forces or counterintelligence units.52 The difference in philosophy, 

however, is markedly clear. The European-Canadian method involves 

regular soldiers in intelligence gathering much more. Patrols can be more 

meaningful for individual soldiers if they have more responsibility and 

have more social contact with people. Situational awareness can only be 

enhanced with greater engagement, so goes the argument. 

The Canadian army reflects the European philosophy regarding peace 

operations. Canadian peace operations in Drvar, a center of Croatian 

extremism, stand as a good example. In 1996, still under IFOR, Captain 

Ian Hope, the company commander in charge of the Drvar sector, initially 

adopted a high force protection posture but changed it rather quickly. He 

assessed that full body armor only aggravated relations with the local 

Croats. So Hope lowered the force protection within two to three weeks 

of his tour on his own authority. His soldiers did not wear helmets or flak 

jackets when on foot patrols, and they began emphasizing talking with 

people on the streets.53British practice was similar to that of the Canadians. 

In his Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Series to the student body at the US 

Army Command and General Staff College, General Sir Rupert Smith 

noted that a platoon commander in the British army had the authority to 

adjust force protection for his patrol. American officers in the audience 

expressed surprise and dismay at this state of affairs.54 Such flexibility 

and decentralization down to platoon level were generally nonexistent in 

MND-N, the American sector, among conventional units. 

The French example in Gacko helps illustrate a different philosophy 

in using the regular army in peace operations. Gacko is both a town and 

region located in MND-SE within the Republika Srpska. Before the war, 

the Gacko region numbered 10,844 inhabitants, of whom 62.4 percent 

were Serb and 35.3 percent were Bosniac. Serbs cleansed the region of 

non-Serbs, so that the population became almost exclusively Serb. The 

town subsequently had 8,000 Serbs and only 30 Bosniacs. Radical Serbs 

controlled the town; but Bosniacs did have three seats on the 12-member 

town council. In August 1999, the first Muslims returned to the county; 

SFOR had expected 600 but only 80 arrived. In January 2000, the French 

army decided to locate an infantry platoon in town and selected a house 

141 
with one bathroom on a busy street just opposite a school. Soldiers rotated 

every seven days, while the company commander stayed for six months. 

The aim was both to better monitor conditions in Gacko and demonstrate 

a commitment to stability and security by means of a lasting, visible, and 

neighborly presence. The American division refused to expose its regular 

troops to such a situation. 

In September 2000, Captain Michel Magne commanded the French 

platoon in Gacko. He never had expected to find himself in such a mission 

when he joined the army. His two main missions were to protect the Muslim 

refugees and to patrol the border with Montenegro. Approximately 80 

percent of his company had seen service in Bosnia before. Magne stressed 

to his men that they needed to maintain two attitudes: friendly in the town 

but on guard when on patrol. Patrolling the border with Montenegro was 

a pure combat mission, providing a nice change of pace for himself and 

his soldiers. Interfacing with the population carried great importance. 

Soldiers played volleyball with the local children, for example. They 

were allowed to frequent a restaurant, but in groups of four with at least 

one soldier armed. Despite living among the people, Magne saw little 

progress. Gacko was a hard nut to crack. The region had the lowest rate of 

voluntary return of weapons in the division sector during OPERATION 

Harvest. Serb extremists controlled the town. Local Serb police visited 

Muslim returnees only when they knew an international official would 

inspect the area. Despite the difficulties of working in an area controlled 

by radicals, Magne remained committed to the French tradition for 

peacekeeping.55 

Despite the emphasis on social instead of combat patrolling, 

commanders from other national contingents expressed concern about 

their soldiers becoming complacent. Soldiers need to be vigilant, for 

violence can occur at any moment. The transition from social patrolling 

to mortal combat is quick and not easy. In Doboj, for example, the Danes 

still used Leopard tanks in 2000 on select patrols to reinforce the message 

of deterrence, both to themselves and for the Bosnians.56 Other Western 

armies carry the memories of losing soldiers to combat in Bosnia during 

UNPROFOR days. They stress to their soldiers that complacency can kill. 

Soldiers must always remember that they are soldiers, and Bosnia needs 

their professional soldiering for the maintenance of peace and security. 

But what was the actual threat to American forces to warrant 

maintaining a high force protection level? The US Army generally 

assessed a low probability of major combat. Shortly before entry of Task 

Force Eagle, Colonel Greg Fontenot, commander of the 1st Armored 

142 
Brigade, concluded, based on his own reconnaissance of Bosnia, that 

all sides were exhausted and posed little threat to US troops.57 Brigadier 

General Stanley Cherrie, assistant division commander in the 1st Armored 

Division, admitted that the division initially assessed mines or the odd 

sniper as the greatest threats.58 Initially, it was quite prudent to err on the 

side of caution and enter Bosnia ready for combat, especially since there 

was serious concern about the possibility of a terrorist act. But rather 

quickly, it became apparent that the threat to IFOR was minimal. And 

history bears witness to this. From December 1995 to September 2002, 

not one American soldier in Bosnia was killed in combat from enemy 

fire. 

Despite the lack of combat fatalities of a seven-year period, the 

US Army put forward many arguments to justify its higher-level force 

protection policy. None, however, silenced the growing number of 

sceptics. One argument stated that an American soldier carries more 

political value than a soldier from any other country. Therefore, the threat 

to American forces is always greater, by definition, than that to other 

national contingents. Still, an army must adjust its tactics to the threat, 

otherwise American soldiers would never remove their full battle rattle, 

and over time they did so in Bosnia. 

There is a common view in the Army that the public is highly sensitive 

to casualties and would therefore quickly lose heart once some American 

soldiers were killed. But national commitment to military deployments is 

partly a function of the importance of the mission. Some Americans echoed 

the suspect argument that American generals care about their soldiers more 

than generals in other armies. Force protection, as has been argued in this 

chapter, has historically been driven as much by political and cultural as 

by professional considerations. Finally, some Americans have argued that 

their sector posed the greatest threat to SFOR. Hot spots included Brcko, 

Srebrenica, and Han Pijasek. Other MNDs, however, have their own 

troubled areas as well. MND-SW, for example, had responsibility for the 

towns of Mostar and Foca. MND-SE, for its part, included Prijedor and 

Drvar. Overall, no fully satisfying argument has been made to justify the 

US Army’s history of force protection in Bosnia. 

A handful of American officers interviewed for this study attest to the 

efficacy of having a lower force protection posture when attempting to 

engage the population while conducting patrols. One officer, for example, 

noticed a very different response from locals depending on his dress. 

In full battle rattle, the American intelligence officer found that adults 

and kids ignored his movement through the neighborhood. Several days 

143 
later, a similar tour in the same neighborhood, but this time with a soft 

cap, resulted in kids stopping their soccer game and waving to him.59 

The second experience was more conducive to restoring normalcy in a 

traumatized society as well as gathering information. 

Conclusion 

By limiting social life to military camps with the excuse of force 

protection, the senior leadership denied its officers and soldiers a strong 

sense of purpose. By adhering to a combat mind-set for patrolling with 

its concomitant attire and behavior, the US Army unnecessarily erected 

barriers between itself and the local population, although locals learned 

to adjust to their new masters. Despite its shortcoming, the US Army 

admirably performed its mission of creating a secure environment for 

civil reforms. 

The US Army’s conduct of peace support operations indicates more 

about American military culture than anything else. In comparison with 

other Western armies in Bosnia, the US Army generally exhibited a 

cautious, risk-averse, more rigid, and less flexible mind-set among its 

regular forces. Military wisdom says that armed forces should train as they 

expect to fight. In this way, an army undergoes training that is intended to 

relate directly to combat. Might not the same hold true for peacekeeping? 

Practice peacekeeping in ways that develop the appropriate combat 

skills and mind-set. Army doctrine for conventional warfare stresses 

flexibility, audacity, and initiative. Yet the practice of peacekeeping in 

Bosnia reflected opposite tendencies. There is always the danger that this 

military culture in peacekeeping will carry over into conventional war. 

The warrior ethos does demand moral courage and risk taking, even in 

peace operations, and habits learned in one area can easily transfer into 

another area of military activity. 

144 
Notes

1. William Langewiesche, “Peace is Hell,” The Atlantic Monthly (October 

2001), 79. 

2. Richard R. Caniglia, “US and British Approaches to Force Protection,” 

Military Review (July-August 2001), 73. 

3. Stanley F. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle,” Military Review (July-August 1997), 

65-66. 

4. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey, The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: 

Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), 262. 

5. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the 

Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 292. 

6. Bildt, Peace Journey, 270. 

7. Ibid., 172. 

8. Colonel Ed Kane, interview with Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and 

Walter Kretchik, 2 April 2000, Tuzla, Bosnia. 

9. Larry K. Wentz, “Summary,” in Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, 

edited by Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: Command and Control Research 

Program, 1998), 412. 

10. Colonel Greg Fontenot, US Army, Retired, interview with Robert Baumann 

and George Gawrych, 17 November 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

11. The concept comes from an informal discussion with Major Joseph W. Ryan, 

Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS. 

12. Major Fred Drummond, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 24 April 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

13. Colonel James Greer, discussion with Dr. George Gawrych, 15 November 

2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

14. Captain Greg Sharpe, interview with Robert Baumann and George Gawrych, 

24 October 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

15. Greer discussion, 15 November 2001. 

16. Walter Kretchik, “Force Protection Disparities,” Military Review (JulyAugust 1997), 73. 

17. Major Michael Kasales, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 18 January 2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

18. Fontenot interview. 

19. Larry K. Wentz, “Intelligence Operations,” in Lessons from Bosnia: The 

IFOR Experience, edited by Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: Command and 

Control Research Program, 1998), 57. 

20. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle,” 72. 

21. Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, US Army, Retired, discussion with 

George Gawrych, 19 August 2001, Leavenworth, KS. Kretchik was present at 

the meeting. 

22. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle,” 65. 

145 
23. Richard Swain, “Lucky War”: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 336-37. 

24. Langewiesche, “Peace is Hell,” 72. 

25. Colonel Chris Baggott, interview with Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, 

and Walter Kretchik, 2 April 2000, Tuzla, Bosnia. 

26. Several unnamed political advisers, interviews with Robert Baumann and 

George Gawrych. 

27. Major James Dugan, informal discussion with George Gawrych, 17 July 

2003, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

28. Bildt, Peace Journey, 109. 

29. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of 

Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 91. 

30. Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s 

Military (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 46. 

31. United States General Accounting Office, Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, 

Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO’s Stabilization Force (Washington, 

DC: GAO/NSAID, October 1988), 6. 

32. Task Force 1-41 Infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Operation Joint Guard, 

April – October 1997 (Fort Riley, KS: 1998), 23-24. 

33. Brigadier General Robert Wood, interview with Robert Baumann and 

George Gawrych, 17 March 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

34. Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, casual discussion with George Gawrych, 

no recorded date, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

35. Major Joe Diminick, interview with George Gawrych, 3 May 2000, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS. 

36. Greer discussion; Soller interview; Sharpe interview. 

37. General Montgomery Meigs, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 1 November 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

38. Major General James Lowell Campbell, interview with Robert Baumann, 9 

February 2001, Fort Drumm, NY. 

39. Major General Robert Halverson, interview with Robert Baumann and 

George W. Gawrych, 25 January 2001, Austin, TX. 

40. Task Force 1-41 Infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 24. 

41. Langewiesche, “Peace is Hell,” 53. 

42. Darrell Lewis, “Seeing the Sights of Sarajevo: MNR Tour Gets Troops Off 

Base and To Somewhere New,” 18. 

43. Ibid., 19. 

44. Halverson interview. 

45. Langewiesche, “Peace is Hell,” 53. 

46. Robert Baumann and George Gawrych, discussions with several political 

advisers (Polads). The Polad is a senior State Department official of general rank 

who acts as adviser to the commanders of SFOR and MND-N. 

47. Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik, discussions with 

senior and junior officers from other national contingents, September 2000, 

Bosnia. 

146 
48. Major Robert Timm, interview with Robert Baumann and George Gawrych, 

11 January 2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

49. Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Makulevich, interview with Robert Baumann, 

George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik, 16 September 2000; Lieutenant Colonel 

Sjir Hanssen, interview with George Gawrych, 17 September 2000, Banja Luka, 

Bosnia; Lieutenant Colonel Michael Griffiths, interview with Robert Baumann, 

George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik, Mrkonjic Grad, Bosnia. Makulevich 

and Griffiths commanded the Canadian and British battle groups respectively. 

For written treatment of social patrolling, see A. P. Watson, “Social Patrolling: 

A Discussion of Humint Gathering at the Company Level,” Bulletin 7 (March 

2001), 5-9. 

50. Fontenot interview. 

51. Langewiesche, “Peace is Hell,” 73. His observations have been confirmed 

in a number of interviews by the authors of this study. 

52. Captain Jet Hayes, interview with George Gawrych, Doboj, Bosnia, 5 April 

2000. 

53. Major Ian Hope, interview with Robert Baumann, 18 August 1999, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS. The Canadians took a similar approach elsewhere, Captain 

Deren Coombs, phone conversation with George Gawrych, 3 October 2000. 

54. General Sir Rupert Smith, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, 24 September 

2001, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; 

student and faculty comments to George Gawrych, 24-27 September 2001, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS. 

55. Captain Michael Magne, interview with Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, 

and Walter Kretchik, 20 September 2000, Gacko, Bosnia. 

56. Danish officers, interviews with George Gawrych, Doboj, Bosnia, 5 April 

2000. 

57. Fontenot interview. 

58. Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, US Army, Retired, interview with 

Robert Baumann and George Gawrych, 26 October 2000, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS. 

59. Interview with a dozen officers at the US Army and Command and General 

Staff College who served in Bosnia, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1998-2001. 

147 
Chapter 6 

Use of Force: The Brcko and Drvar Riots 

George W. Gawrych 

They [the Serb rioters] were deliberately trying to 

provoke us by calling us names (in English), making 

obscene gestures to my women soldiers, using racial 

name calling to provoke any kind of response out of the 

soldiers. The soldiers showed a tremendous amount of 

restraint—nobody made any faces, said anything back to 

the crowd, or even moved when apples, bell peppers or 

small rocks were lobbed. . . . Sergeant First Class Garcia 

got hit in the groin. . . . We saw 3 Molotov Cocktails 

being prepared. We were concerned about the crowd 

throwing them. Because it was considered deadly force 

against us, “should we shoot them?” was the big question 

in our minds. 

Second Lieutenant Anna Maria Ford, platoon leader 

2nd Platoon, 1st MP Company 

US Army, Brcko1 

I drew, cocked my pistol and took aim towards the 

lead person in the crowd. They [the Croatian rioters] 

advanced to within six to seven meters of me. I then fired 

a warning shot into the soft ground at the leader’s feet 

as I was not sure where the bullet would land if I fired 

it in the air. They stopped prior to the point of impact, 

drew slightly back, screamed and taunted me and then 

promptly sacked and set fire to the ITI warehouse next 

to the school. 

Major Howard Coombs, company commander 

Charles Company, 1st Battalion 

Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, Drvar2 

A riot presents a serious challenge to Western armies. Use of deadly 

force against civilians must occur as a last resort, in self-defense. Training for conventional warfare, however, fails to prepare officers and 

soldiers to employ restraint when confronted with verbal and physical 

abuse. Both the US and Canadian armies underwent special training for 

149 
including the rules of engagement (ROE), but neither was prepared for 

a major riot. On the other side of the ledger, those opposed to the NATO 

mandate resorted to civil protest in an attempt to stop or arrest reforms. 

The adversary thus developed the riot into an organized display of “reasonably” controlled violence. Bosnian police were expected to handle minor 

disturbances, but local police were not readily inclined to confront fellow 

citizens. In the five years of US and Canadian peacekeeping involvement 

in Bosnia, two major riots each caught peacekeepers ill prepared for the 

challenge. This chapter examines these two incidents: Brcko and Drvar. 

The Brcko Riot: Background 

Competition between two rival political leaders in Republika Srpska 

formed the background to the Brcko riot of 28 August 1997. In July 1996, 

Carl Bildt, the High Representative, brokered a deal to have Radovan 

Karadzic, an indicted war criminal, step down as president of the Republika 

Srpska. Biljana Plavsic, Karadzic’s protégé and vice president since 1992, 

became the acting president until the national elections held in September 

1996. She won the election for the office of president in the Republika 

Srpska with 59 percent of the vote. Karadzic, however, continued to hold 

the reins of power from Pale and tried to relegate Plavsic to obscurity in 

Banja Luka. Refusing to be a puppet, Plavsic fought back, criticizing the 

Pale leadership as corrupt. More important, she agreed to cooperate with 

NATO in implementing the Dayton Accords. 

A fierce competition between the Plavsic and Karadzic camps flared 

with the approach of municipal elections scheduled for 13 and 14 September 

1997. At the end of June 1997, Plavsic returned from meetings in London 

only to be arrested in Belgrade. Slobodan Milosevic then had her shipped 

to the Bosnian border, where Serb hard-liners intended to whisk her off to 

Pale. Fortunately for her and the international community, SFOR foiled 

the kidnapping attempt at the border crossing. Escaping Pale’s clutches, 

Plavsic now stepped up her attack on Karadzic and his cronies. In July, 

she dissolved parliament and moved slowly to wrest control of the entity’s 

police force away from Karadzic’s control. NATO was determined to help 

Plavsic in her endeavor. 

On 10 July 1997, General Wesley Clark assumed his double-hatted 

position of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Commander 

in Chief, US European Command. In late July, General Eric Shinseki 

became the commanding general of SFOR. With the encouragement of 

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, Clark set out to provide active 

support to assist the civilian authorities in implementing the Dayton 

150 
Accords. Determined to support Plavsic in her struggle with Karadzic and 

Krajisnki, he ordered Shinseki to aggressively pursue the restructuring 

of the police forces and to gain control of the Interior Ministry’s Special 

Police (MUP).3 Encouraged by this new SFOR determination, Plavsic 

moved on her own initiative to seize control of the police station in the 

town of Banja Luka on 17 August and appoint her supporter as the new 

chief of police. She also agreed to the restructuring of the Republika 

Srpska’s entire police force and even called for the removal of the interior 

minister, Dragan Kijac, a strong supporter of Karadzic.4 These moves 

portended ill for Karadzic in Pale. 

In late August, Shinseki ordered Major General David Grange, the 

commander of Multinational Division North (MND-N), to help police 

loyal to Plavsic gain control of the police station in Brcko.5 Moreover, 

Grange would assist the International Police Task Force (IPTF) officers 

in their effort to inspect the Interior Ministry building in Bijeljina. Serb 

hard-liners got wind of the operation several days in advance and prepared 

an appropriate response. Later, in early September after the Brcko riot, 

Milosevic would embarrass Clark in a meeting held in Belgrade. The 

Serb president produced a copy of Clark’s letter to Shinseki ordering 

SFOR to “split the Serbs.”6 

Lieutenant Colonel James Greer, commander of the 1st Battalion, 

77th Armor Regiment, received the mission for the two towns of Brcko 

and Bijeljina. Scheduled to conduct his operation on the morning of 28 

August, Greer designated Bijeljina as his main effort. Before the war, 

Bijeljina had 37,200 inhabitants, the majority of whom were Bosniacs. 

Ethnic cleansing had created a city of Serbs, with only a handful of Muslims left. The region was hard-core Serb. The city hosted the Interior Ministry of the Republika Srpska. Dragan Kijac, the interior minister, was the 

most powerful member of the cabinet and a strong supporter of Karadzic.7 

Anticipating possible opposition, Greer personally deployed with an 

M1 tank company, two mechanized infantry companies, and an engineer 

company to Bijeljina. His force ringed the outskirts of the city with 

checkpoints to prevent the entry of any busloads of demonstrators. Greer 

took a small force with him as a possible escort for the IPTF monitors 

who would inspect the interior ministry building. He also dispatched a 

tank company of M1s and an engineer unit to Janja, home to the RS’s 

special police brigade under the command of Goran Saric. This brigade 

belonged to the MUP. As part of its arsenal, the MUP possessed rocketlaunched grenades, antitank guns, tanks, and antiaircraft guns. In sending 

a force to Janja, Greer prevented the special police from coming to 

151 
Bijeljina. For Brcko, Greer dispatched a mechanized infantry company, deployment into Bosnia,

reinforced by a mechanized infantry platoon and an MP platoon.8 Finally, 

a task force seized the radio tower west of Ugljevik to prevent the hardliners from using the airwaves for mobilizing people.9 

To its debit, the US Army had decided against becoming involved in 

civil disturbances. American troops lacked shields and batons as standard 

gear in Bosnia and instead decided that responsibility for civil disturbances 

lay with the police. Bosnian police forces, however, were, for the most 

part, disinclined to engage angry crowds out of sympathy or fear. In fact, 

on 28 August 1997, local police forces were the target of inspections, and 

therefore many officers welcomed crowds demonstrating on their behalf. 

The US Army had thus willed away the problem, leaving Greer with a 

force ill equipped and ill trained for confronting well-organized and wellcoordinated civil disturbances.10 

Serb hard-liners had prepared for civil disturbances to oppose the 

moves in Bijeljina and Brcko. In Bijeljina, a number of Serbs had camped 

out around the interior ministry building. There, the town’s air raid sirens 

went off at 0430. Within a half-hour or so, a crowd began forming in 

anticipation of the IPTF inspection. At 0800, Greer dispatched a company 

of infantry in Bradleys to secure the interior ministry building for the 

IPTF. The crowd turned back the Americans. At this point, Greer decided 

to accompany the IPTF officers. As the group walked toward the structure, 

500 or so demonstrators moved forward to engage the party. They had set 

up barricades, using trucks to prevent vehicles from traveling on the road. 

When confronted by the large crowd, Greer decided to abort the operation 

and withdrew from the scene. He later returned to the area and tried to 

negotiate his way through, but he failed to achieve a breakthrough. By noon, 

it was clear that the IPTF would have to try an inspection another day.11 

At this point, Greer decided to drive to Brcko to assess personally the 

riot, already in progress. Arriving at the city after over an hour of driving, 

Greer suddenly found his road blocked by angry demonstrators. Rather 

than negotiate through the maze of streets to link up with his units, he 

returned to Camp McGovern to monitor events in Brcko. Grange was 

already there.12 To gain some direct observations of tactical situation on 

the ground, Granger and Greer flew over the riot areas in helicopters. 

Meanwhile, Brcko had turned into MND-N’s biggest headache, so 

much so that the entire day’s events have become known in history as 

the Brcko Riot. The city of Brcko was located in the Posavina Corridor, 

an area of strategic importance linking western and eastern Republika 

Srpska. So contentious was the city and corridor to all three factions that 

152 
the negotiators at Dayton avoided reaching any final decision on Brcko 

and instead left it for arbitration with a decision due in a year’s time. 

Before the war, the population of the Brcko opcina (county) stood at 

87,627, including 38,617 Muslims; 22,252 Croats; 18,128 Serbs; and 

5,731 Yugoslavs. The city itself numbered 41,406 inhabitants. Among 

these were 2,894 Croats; 22,994 Muslims; 8,253 Serbs; and 5,211 

Yugoslavs. In the war, the Serbs had cleansed the town of its Bosniac and 

Croat populations. 

Captain Kevin D. Hendricks was responsible for the Posavina Corridor 

and the town of Brcko. His mission for 28 August was vague. He was 

to ensure that policemen loyal to Plavsic secured control of the police 

station during the midnight shift by deploying a blocking force around 

the building. Oddly enough, Hendricks’ superiors failed to provide him 

with the identity of the loyal police officer in charge of the operation.13 

The company, for its part, experienced some confusion about the mission. 

Many thought there was a hostage situation. As noted by one sergeant, 

“the circumstances surrounding much of the mission were vague and we 

were told on a need to know basis.”14 

For the operation, Hendricks commanded Delta Company of the 

2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two military police 

platoons, a mechanized infantry platoon from the 1st Battalion, 18th 

Infantry Regiment, and a fourth platoon commanded by Lieutenant Greg 

Sharpe from Camp Colt as the quick-reaction force. The first platoon of 

Alpha Company from the 1st Battalion under Lieutenant Schumacher 

guarded the Brcko Bridge connecting Croatia with Bosnia over the Sava 

River. Hendricks always had to keep a platoon on the bridge. A squad of 

military police each established a checkpoint on the western and eastern 

entrances into Brcko. Three Bradleys with four military policemen each 

guarded the three bridges in the western part of the city. Lieutenant Anna 

Ford, with a squad of military police, established a blocking position on 

an intersection just west of the police station. A squad of infantry from 

Delta Company did the same for an intersection just east of the police 

station. The second platoon under Lieutenant Bill White kept watch over 

the regional police station, a weapons storage site, and the special police 

post. Hendricks took a platoon and two squads from another platoon to 

secure the Brcko police station.15 

The Brcko Riot: 28 August 1997 

By 0330 on 28 August, all the American units deployed to their assigned 

positions in Brcko. Hendricks then entered the police station, where he 

met with the Serb officer in charge. Unsure this individual’s loyalty, the 

153 
young company commander carried on a casual discussion, hoping to 

obtain some hint of the police officer’s identity. After 15 minutes or so, 

Hendricks, unable to establish communications with higher headquarters, 

decided to depart and visit the regional police station. There, he found the 

chief of the local special police, local IPTF head, and an unknown US 

Army officer. After killing more time in conversation, Hendricks decided 

to return to the city station.16 

Then at 0420, the city’s sirens went off. Suddenly, hundreds of 

demonstrators emerged from surrounding buildings, swelling the crowd to 

what seemed like 1,000. Many appeared quite drunk. The American force 

numbered approximately 80 soldiers. The crowd quickly closed in on the 

Americans, separating squads from each other. With such disadvantageous 

odds, Hendricks quickly decided on an orderly withdrawal of all units to 

the Brcko Bridge. It took his troops some 20 minutes to move across the 

street and regroup facing the police station. 

To help Ford with her military police detachment at the intersection 

west of the police station, Hendricks had already dispatched a first 

sergeant with a squad. There the Americans were outnumbered 20 to 200. 

The Serbs were pelting the Americans with all sorts of objects, including 

bricks as noted in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. Unfortunately, 

Ford had turned off the motors of her five Humvees, and one developed 

vapor lock. Starting it required opening the hood and pouring water on 

the starter. As she opened the hood and began pouring water on the starter, 

an object hit the back of her head. When the Humvee started, the driver 

backed it out hastily and hit the vehicle behind, locking bumpers. After 

disengaging the two vehicles, Ford ordered a retreat in the five Humvees. 

She managed to extricate her force to the Brcko Bridge.17 

The squad guarding the intersection east of the police station faced 

overwhelming odds as well. Eight or nine soldiers in two Humvees faced 

about 100 rioters. Two soldiers were hurt. One American was cut on the 

head by a 2-by-4 with a nail in it. A second soldier suffered a concussion, 

as well as nose and eye damage. Fortunately, the entire squad managed 

to drive off to safety, join White’s platoon, and then head straight for a 

hospital with the injured.18 

With all his forces together or accounted for, Hendricks commanded 

an orderly retreat. Soldiers had to keep their line firmly tight. The rioters 

closed in on the Americans and began pushing, shoving, and hitting the 

soldiers. Hendricks ordered his men to “butt stroke liberally” but also 

encouraged them to be cautious about shooting anyone. He felt the Serbs 

were looking for a martyr. Buoyed by their commander’s order, the 

154 
Photo 15. Bosnian Serb rioters challenged US military postion in Brcko 

American soldiers fought back with fists and weapons. As his men pulled 

back, Hendricks could see numbers of Serbs lying on the ground injured 

by Americans fighting in self-defense. Fortunately for the Americans, 

many Serbs were quite drunk and thus possessed “beer muscles.” The 

platoon had not been in mortal danger, but no one knew that for certain 

and the situation could have easily deteriorated. Fortunately, Hendricks 

was able to get his men back to the Brcko Bridge in one piece.19 

By dawn, the crowd of over 1,000 began fanning out to confront 

other SFOR units in the city. Unlike in Bijeljina, the day would see much 

violence in Brcko. This was due in large measure to MND-N’s refusal 

to abandon the Brcko Bridge. Hendricks had to make his stand there 

and not withdraw from harm’s way as Greer could in Bijeljina. Several 

days after the riot, however, Grange would gain approval to remove the 

checkpoint on the Brcko Bridge, a move that the Serb hard-liners hailed 

as a victory. Militarily, the decision made sense; politically, it appeared 

as a setback for NATO.20 

Having lost control of parts of the town, SFOR now scrambled to 

evacuate all international personnel in the city. White had to return to 

the city several times to remove joint commission observers, some 40 

IPTF officers, and the mysterious Army officer at the regional police 

headquarters. The Americans were able to use a helicopter provided by 

Grange, the MND-N commander, to direct a relief force through various 

streets to avoid crowds so that they could reach the IPTF office and 

rescue approximately 20 civilians there. The American soldiers engaged 

155 
in shoving matches and even fought with demonstrators.21 Grange used 

his own helicopter to crash the antenna of the local Serb radio station that 

was inciting people to violence.22 

At the Brcko Bridge, Hendricks took command of his forces for the 

remainder of the day. He employed ROE in a graduated response, and the 

rioters never got inside the defense perimeter in front of the bridge. After 

ordering his men to chamber their rounds, he had them take ammunition 

out behind the line when a lull occurred. Loading and unloading the 

weapons gave soldiers a sense that they were responding to heightened 

tensions when they occurred and not just fixed in one position. Troops 

rotated through Croatia on the other side of the bridge to gain some rest 

during the standoff. Several times soldiers fired warning shots from their 

Bradleys. For their part, the rioters, whenever possible, threw back the 

American tear gas canisters. One Molotov cocktail caused a fire on an 

M113 vehicle.23 

Around 0600, a very tense situation occurred when the crowd 

commandeered a fuel truck from a Muslim driver and a Serb drove it 

right up to the bridge. The rioters had earlier blown up a truck. Observing 

the approach of the fuel truck, Hendricks immediately grabbed his 

interpreter and a Serb policeman and marched to the truck. He put his 

pistol to the mouth of the driver and ordered him to drive the vehicle 

away or face certain death. The Serb quickly complied, much to the relief 

of the Americans.24 

Hendricks spent the entire day at the Brcko Bridge, isolated from 

other troops. Sharpe had arrived with his quick-reaction force, but the 

mob had already interjected itself between him and the bridge. Separated 

by 200 to 300 meters, Hendricks ordered Sharpe to pull back and establish 

a checkpoint and prevent traffic from reaching the bridge. During some 

17 hours of tension and confrontation, the crowd went through typical 

phases of confrontation followed by partying. Women came, went, and 

returned, serving food and liquor to help empower the crowd for more 

displays of violence. At times, Sharpe thought that he was witnessing a 

social event.25 

Riots in Bosnia tended to fit a pattern with set tactics and strategy. 

There was a leader who orchestrated the organized event. Meanwhile, 

instigators relied on cell phones to coordinate action, for example to 

reposition the crowd. A camera crew stood on hand, looking to film an 

incident, preferably one offering a martyr for the cause. To augment local 

riots, buses brought outsiders to swell the ranks. Women and children, 

armed with rocks, bricks, and other projectiles, positioned themselves 

156 
in front, while men and crowd instigators stood behind them. Speakers 

played patriotic music very loudly to stir the crowd into action and then 

toned down the decibel level when it was time to relax. Rioters understood 

NATO’s ROE and therefore knew how to push the right buttons and 

then withdraw.26 The Bosnians had developed the organized riots into 

somewhat of a science. 

In response to the troubles in Brcko and Bijeljina, Grange gave Greer 

use of a cavalry squadron and a company of tankers riding in Humvees. 

Grange remained in support but let Greer handle the situation.27 By 2000 

that evening, a calm descended on Brcko. Krajisnik came to the city to 

congratulate the rioters on their noble effort and urged them to return to 

their homes.28 Order came to Brcko the next day. 

Throughout the ordeal, American officers and soldiers had maintained 

their composure and showed amazing restraint. Five soldiers received 

Purple Hearts for wounds received. No American soldier wounded a 

demonstrator with a firearm. While standing their ground, they understood 

that firing into the crowd would have potentially created a strategic 

incident. Hendricks had been indoctrinated and had trained his troops to 

avoid creating martyrs. Some fellow officers later criticized him for not 

firing into the crowd in self-defense, which according to the ROE would 

have been perfectly justifiable in his situation. According to Hendricks, 

this was not so easy. Often it was unclear who threw an object. Moreover, 

firing into a crowd at close range might have incited the rioters even more, 

an escalation that could have proved more dangerous to his soldiers. The 

Serbs had film crews on hand just to record such an occurrence.29 

Looking back, Hendricks felt that he had helped prepare his company 

for the riot. On his own initiative, he had his company conduct mock drills 

of soldiers engaging angry rioters. Soldiers rotated between both roles. 

He also implemented boxing, wrestling, and shoving matches designed 

to prepare his soldiers for direct physical contact. Such training proved 

sagacious.30 

But it was not easy to show restraint when facing bodily harm from a 

group of rioters. One staff sergeant noted the emotions running through 

him. His checkpoint in Celopek clashed with 120 demonstrators en route 

to help the Serb rioters in the north. 

In Desert Storm, your enemy was far away and you never really ‘felt’ 

the combat. Here, it was definitely in your face. I was a little scared, mostly 

worried about my soldiers’ safety, but I was also pissed and wanted to kill 

them. Once they advanced, I butt stroked one of the guys who instigated 

157 
the crowd action. Once he saw blood, he took off. I remember SGT Bellis 

getting water and juice poured on him and others throwing punches. 

Almost immediately, we locked and loaded and the crowd backed off. 

At one point, I could feel a car bumper pressing against my knees and 

the crowd pushing it, but I wasn’t moving. Just kept thinking I wanted to 

win, to show force and show that we were in control.31 

Soldiers had to dismiss “natural” impulses and react in a professional 

manner despite the physical and verbal abuses. 

The Brcko Riot taught the US Army that it had to be prepared to 

engage civil disturbances. After the incidents in Bijeljina and Brcko, for 

example, Grange ordered batons and shields from the US to distribute 

to his troops in MND-N in the event of similar disturbances. Task Force 

Eagle also implemented a new training program with emphasis on the 

use of nonlethal weapons such as foam batons, pellets, foam grenades, 

and dye markers. Soldiers gained confidence in dealing with future civil 

disturbances.32 The US Army was now at least better equipped to confront 

a riot. 

The Drvar Riot: Background 

With the transfer of command from IFOR on 20 December 1996, 

SFOR faced increased pressure for helping implement civil aspects of 

the GFAP. One major issue was repatriation. GFAP awarded the right of 

return to their homes to “all refugees and displaced persons.” Restoring 

Bosnia’s prewar demographic diversity, it was thought, would help defeat 

the attempt by the extremists to create ethnically pure areas. 

NATO received the task of creating a secure environment for returning 

refugees. This proved a formidable undertaking. Most abandoned or 

destroyed homes were in areas occupied by the ethnic group that had 

forced the exodus in the first place, and members of the other ethnic 

group already lived in the area. It was highly questionable how successful 

NATO could be in turning back the clock to prewar ethnic and religious 

population distributions. The year 1998 was proclaimed to be the year of 

the return of refugees, and Drvar turned into the international community’s 

showcase. 

The city and region of Drvar in western Herzegovina fell under MNDSW. Drvar was the most heavily Serb-populated area of prewar Bosnia. 

Serbs constituted 97 percent of the population of 17,000.33 The town of 

Drvar had 9,000 inhabitants, with the remainder living in the numerous 

villages in the surrounding Drvar-Glamoc valley. Drvar had escaped the 

158 
ravages of ethnic atrocities until the very end of the civil war. In August 

1995, the Bosnian Croat Home Defense (HVO) seized the town in 

conjunction with OPERATION Storm conducted by Croatia. Expecting 

ethnic cleansing, Drvar’s prewar Serb population, with the exception of 

approximately 120 individuals, fled the city and the region. Some 6,000 

displaced Croats occupied the vacated homes and apartments in the town, 

along with 250 Bosnian Croatian Army troops and their families. Drvar 

was thus transformed into a Croat town and region virtually overnight. 

The hard-line HDZ gained control of the local political system 

and economy and ran the area much like a mafia organization. Drago 

Tokmakcija, the deputy mayor and president of the local HDZ, held real 

political and economic power, much like a Mafioso. He had strong ties 

to the military and controlled the police. FINVEST, a commercial firm 

based in Croatia, began investing heavily in lumber, panel boards, and 

construction, offering livelihood to 500 workers. The company restricted 

hiring to Croats, refusing to hire any returning Serbs.34 Only outside 

intervention could reverse the Croatization of Drvar. 

The Canadians received control of this sector and assigned a rifle 

company to the area. The international community was determined to 

force the issue of repatriation. In May 1997, Serbs began returning in 

small numbers to the outlying region, raising fears among the Croat community. Initially, local Croats dissuaded the first returnees from remaining in the district by setting fire to their homes. But aggressive Canadian 

patrolling helped ensure a steady flow of Serbs into the Drvar region. 

Architects of the Dayton Accords designed elections to serve as a 

major instrument for reversing the gains made by ethnic cleansers. 

Specifically, Annex 3 allowed displaced persons and refugees to vote 

in their prewar municipality even though they resided elsewhere. This 

arrangement permitted displaced Drvar Serbs to vote in the local election 

of 13 and 14 September 1997 and elect a Serb, Mile Marcetta, as mayor in 

a virtually homogeneous Croatian city. Serbs now dominated the town’s 

executive council and began to fill positions in the civil administration. 

The local police force, however, remained exclusively in Croat hands. 

Local Croats, all recent settlers, feared the Serbianization of the town 

and region. They felt that it was only a matter of time before they would 

be displaced. Canadian troops had to ensure the Serb mayor’s safety 

whenever he came into town to conduct business. Marcetta lived in Banja 

Luka, so it was a strange arrangement. Political authority lay in the hands 

of Serb outsiders, while real power resided with Croat locals. 

159 
Drvar turned into a test case of the returnee problem. More Serbs 

were returning to Drvar than any other place in Bosnia with the exception 

of Sarajevo. General Clark visited Drvar and urged the Canadians to 

adopt a “hammer” approach whenever necessary. The Office of High 

Representative was determined to push hard the return of refugees and 

displaced persons.35 On 23 February 1998, Lieutenant General Sir Hew 

Pike, deputy commander of operations at SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, 

underscored that “the International Community will not tolerate anything 

less than a Serb led Canton, with Drvar a Serb town.”36 Nongovernment 

Organizations were just as determined to succeed in this endeavor. By 

April 1998, approximately 1,600 Serbs and 6,000 Croats lived in the town 

of Drvar; moreover, 450 Croatian soldiers were stationed there as well. 

The international community became obsessed with helping the Serbs to 

the culpable neglect of the Croats, fueling resentment and fears among 

the Croatian community.37 

Suddenly, the Canadians found themselves engaged in what they 

considered a counterinsurgency but one without direct combat between 

the conventional force and irregular forces. Between February and the riot 

of 24 April 1998, an arson campaign conducted by local Croats resulted 

in the burning of approximately 50 Serb homes and properties. Some 

evenings witnessed two to three house burnings. 

The Canadians could not be everywhere. Major Howard Coombs 

commanded Charles Company of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian 

Regiment Battle Group, a force of 120 Canadian infantry soldiers 

reinforced with about 80 soldiers from other branches. Normally, 

Coombs was able to put 12 to 18 soldiers on patrols per shift. Each patrol 

required a minimum of six soldiers in an armored vehicle. This force 

structure allowed for four soldiers to conduct a dismounted foot patrol 

while two watched the vehicle. With only a reinforced company, the 

Canadians could deploy at best three to four patrols on a shift. Lieutenant 

Colonel P.J. Devlin, the Canadian battle group commander, periodically 

provided an additional rifle company to patrol the countryside so that 

Coombs could concentrate his troops on the city of Drvar. From Coombs’ 

point of view, civilian authorities in Banja Luka understood the security 

risk but still kept pushing for more Serb returnees nevertheless. Coombs 

expressed concern several times to his superiors that the rate of returnees 

was moving too fast for his small force to provide at least the semblance 

of adequate security.38 

Tensions escalated a notch after the announcement that the Croatian 

(HVO) 1st Guard Brigade troops and their families would be removed 

160 
from Drvar. On 9 April 1998, Easter weekend, 150 Serbs moved into 

a downtown apartment complex, the former barracks for the Croatian 

brigade, amid a ceremony and press conference. The international media 

painted the event as a NATO success. Local Croats, however, tended to 

regard the announcement as a Croatian defeat and a Serb victory. The 

local Croats were determined to fight back. “Local Croat thugs began to 

taunt [Canadian] soldiers and to use their vehicles aggressively against 

foot patrols.”39 

On 16 April, unknown assailants murdered a Serb couple, Vojislav 

Tminic (age 62) and his wife Mileva (age 59) and set fire to their house. 

Shortly after 0100, a Canadian patrol happened to arrive on the scene and 

discovered the bodies before the fire had engulfed the structure. Soldiers 

pulled the couple from the house. Local police investigators arrived at 

about 0237 and left the bodies outside for 14 hours. When word reached 

Sarajevo of what had happened, the double murder suddenly became 

an incident of strategic import. The Office of the High Representative 

reacted swiftly, if perhaps irrationally. Deputy High Representative 

Jacques Klein, a retired US Air Force general, arrived in Drvar by 

helicopter. At the crime scene, he promptly dismissed the deputy mayor 

and demanded the removal of the chief of police and the cantonal interior 

minister, all Croats. To Coombs, Klein had acted like a bull in a china 

shop.40 Depending on one’s perspective, his knee-jerk or decisive action 

obviously upset the Croat community, providing radicals with the excuse 

they needed to mobilize a civil disturbance. In eight days, mob violence 

would hit the streets of Drvar. 

The Drvar Riot: 24 April 1998 

The riot was no doubt a planned event. An unusual number of cars 

bearing plates from outside the area were seen in and around town the 

day of the riot. That morning, local business establishments and factories 

let out their workers for a demonstration. Schools closed as well so that 

students could participate with adults. There was a clear leader. The mob 

avoided looting but instead concentrated on burning. Finally, a Croatian 

film crew appeared with the apparent intent of looking for an incident to 

broadcast to the world.41 

The Canadians were even less prepared for riot control than the 

Americans had been in Bijeljina and Brcko. Canadian national policy 

prohibited the army from engaging in putting down civil disturbances. 

Consequently, Canada failed to provide its soldiers with training and 

equipment for handling crowd disturbances. For example, the Canadian 

161 
company in Drvar was without any tear gas, batons, or shields with 

which to engage a crowd in a nonlethal manner. Coombs thus lacked the 

nonlethal weapons necessary for a graduated response to dealing with 

civil disturbance. Ottawa had left its troops vulnerable to mob passions. 

The Drvar Riot occurred 24 April 1998. 42 At 1130, Coombs, who was 

on patrol in a Humvee with two soldiers and an interpreter, received word 

of a small crowd of 30 to 40 persons gathering in the center of town. He 

immediately dispatched an armored vehicle for observation. At 1140, 10 

minutes later, a crowd now 70 strong suddenly began pelting the municipal 

building with rocks, breaking windows. Then the demonstrators entered 

the building, wreaking damage inside. Finishing in a matter of minutes, 

they rushed across the street and severely damaged the local offices of the 

High Representative, the IPTF, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 

and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 

At 1200, upon learning of the civil disturbance, Coombs ordered 

the implementation of OPERATION Medusa, the evacuation of all 

international personnel to Camp Drvar. Some UN officials were already 

fleeing on foot or in vehicles toward the Canadian compound. Fire trucks 

dispatched to the scene turned back after being pelted by rocks, bricks, 

and stones. Canadian soldiers on the scene intervened to help the firemen 

escape with their vehicles. 

Photo 16. An angry crowd assembled during tense moments in Drvar 

162 
Coombs proceeded to the riot scene. His immediate goals were to 

extract international workers back to Camp Drvar and protect the Serb 

population. By now the crowd had grown to 500, including women and 

children. As he entered the town, Coombs ordered his company sergeant 

major, Derek Ingersoll, to cock his weapon and be prepared to fire warning shots. Just then, a Croatian policeman approached the jeep with news 

that the crowd had badly beaten up the Serb mayor. Coombs quickly 

proceeded to the site and managed to extract the official. The Serb mayor looked dead, no life in him. Ingersoll later received a British award 

for his heroism related to this incident. Coombs hurried to Camp Drvar 

with the injured mayor to organize a relief force. Fortunately for him, a 

bus had just arrived at the camp with some 20 soldiers returning from 

leave. He gathered a force of 32 soldiers to return to the center of town. 

Meanwhile, the Serb mayor unexpectedly began to show signs of life. 

At 1245, Coombs arrived back at the riot scene and surveyed the 

situation. Around him cars, trucks, and buildings were ablaze. Seventeen 

Canadian soldiers under the command of Captain Brian Bedard had 

just evacuated the 100 to 150 Serb returnees in the apartment complex 

and transported them to a nearby school. Fifty-one Canadian soldiers 

confronted a crowd of 300 to 500 angry men, women, and children armed 

Photo 17. Angry Croat rioters in Drvar set fire to buildings and vehicles 

163 
with baseball bats, knives, rocks, and other lethal objects. Some rocks 

proved “as big as cantaloupes.”43 Two Canadians had been hit in the face, 

one by a rock and the other by a brick. Bedard had already fired a warning 

shot to keep the rioters at a distance. 

Coombs immediately proceeded to the school, where he assumed 

command. Though events happened rather quickly, for Coombs 

everything seemed to be in slow-motion. Some soldiers had instinctively 

drawn and fixed bayonets, but his sergeant major ordered them removed 

unless authorized by the commanding officer. With his additional troops, 

Coombs deployed the platoon to establish a defensible perimeter. Some 20 

Canadians occupied the school building, manning the windows to prevent 

anyone from throwing gasoline into the structure. Some rioters tried to set 

the school’s generator on fire with gasoline but two warning shots scared 

them away. Another 12 to 15 Canadians formed a very porous line, with 

soldiers standing approximately 10 to 15 feet apart. Approximately 12 

soldiers blocked the area between the school and the warehouse. This 

troop deployment left Coombs with no reserve. 

Coombs decided that he would not allow the Croat crowd to close on 

his troops. There were not enough Canadian troops to form a defensive 

line, shoulder-to-shoulder. Especially vulnerable were the Canadians 

standing 10 feet apart from each other. Moreover, Coombs feared for the 

lives of the Serbs. The brutal beating of the Serb mayor attested to the 

potential danger facing the Serb men, women, and children returnees. 

The Canadian major therefore designated all returnees under military 

Photo 18. Canadian soldier establish a perimeter druing disorder in Drvar 

164 
protection and sanctioned ROE in their defense. Coombs ensured that 

every soldier understood to show restraint, to use proportional force, and, 

if necessary, to fire in self-defense.44 

Fortunately for the Canadians, Coombs possessed a light helicopter 

that overflew the riot area. The helicopter proved ineffective when it 

made a low pass trying to push the crowd back. But the crew did provide 

valuable intelligence on the crowd’s movement behind the front line. 

Coombs learned that some rioters were armed with AK-47s. 

The helicopter warned Coombs that the crowd was shifting its mass 

toward a 15-foot passage separating the school from the warehouse. The 

major quickly moved to the area with his sergeant major. As the crowd 

closed in on his position, Coombs realized a warning shot in the air would 

have no effect. The crowd noise would have drowned the discharge. And 

only 8 to 10 meters separated the two groups. In the background, just 

behind the crowd, the Canadian major could see apartment buildings on 

fire, and a couple of cars had just exploded behind the rioters. The area 

looked like a war zone with the perpetrators of the destruction closing on 

a small group of Canadian soldiers and Serb returnees. 

So Coombs quickly pulled his 9mm pistol and cocked it to his side 

in such a conspicuous manner that the crowd could see his movement. 

Then he pointed his 9mm revolver at the leader’s chest. Suddenly, instead 

of shooting him, Coombs decided at the last second to fire a shot just in 

front of the leader’s feet. At this point, the rioters were only 6 to 7 meters 

distance from him. As soon as the bullet hit the ground centimeters in 

front of him, the mob leader stopped his advance. Meanwhile, Coombs 

returned his pistol back to pointing directly at his opponent’s chest. The 

crowd leader took a couple of steps backward while raising his hands 

into the air. The crowd suddenly stopped its advance too, and then the 

rioters proceeded to clap their hands. Coombs had won this important 

confrontation with the crowd. He, his troops, and the Serbs were safe 

from bodily harm for the moment, at that spot 

Before deploying to Bosnia, Coombs made a very important decision. 

If his troops had to fire into a crowd of civilians, he would have to fire 

the first shot. It was too much to ask young 18- or 19-year-old soldiers 

to take such a step without the example of their commanding officer 

to lead them. Conventional military wisdom, however, argues for the 

officer ordering soldiers to fire so that the commander is free to assess the 

situation. Contrary to this institutional reasoning, Coombs had decided 

that it was both a moral and ethical question, and he needed to lead by 

example. He had his sergeant major right with him, and Ingersoll was 

165 
trained to assume command. So Coombs believed firing a warning shot 

would not compromise the integrity of his command.45 Perhaps his 

weapon discharge worked so effectively precisely because it was an army 

commander facing off with a mob leader. 

Though suffering a setback, the angry Croats were determined not 

to admit defeat. After a bit more verbal taunting, the crowd turned back 

and proceeded to burn a warehouse next to the school. Despite this 

destruction, the soldiers of the 1st Canadian Battle Group had won the 

face-off. At 1400, Delta Company and a reconnaissance unit arrived from 

another camp of the Canadian battle group. Within an hour, the crowd 

had largely dispersed, although groups of 20 to 30 roamed the streets 

until evening. 

As the crowd began to disperse away from the school, word reached 

Coombs that five international officials were trapped in their office. 

He immediately dispatched a section of six to seven soldiers under the 

command of Warrant Officer George Laidlaw, who accomplished his 

mission. He also ensured the complete evacuation of UN personnel in the 

apartments opposite the school. Laidlaw later received a Canadian award 

for bravery. 

In its press conference several days later, SFOR headquarters admitted 

that the riot represented “a tragic reversal of the progress made in Bosnia 

since the end of the war.” SFOR reiterated that its mandate was not to stop 

the initial incidents. That responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of 

the civil authorities. SFOR’s task was to prevent any escalation and limit 

the loss of life and property. The Drvar police, however, had fallen far short 

of their responsibilities. They had failed to respond to the riot and might 

have even been accomplices to the event. The SFOR briefer confessed 

to some mistakes having been made by the international community. The 

town’s police force, for example, had been left completely in the hands 

of Croats. SFOR addressed this problem immediately by setting a 48-

hour deadline for the appointment of a Serb as deputy chief of police and 

for the assigning of 15 Serbs to the police force. The presence of Serb 

policemen would help calm some fears among the Serbs living in the 

Drvar region. In the press conference, the official from the Office of the 

High Representative noted that the percentage of returnees in Drvar had 

been high compared with other localities, and that this had resulted in “a 

lot of incidents in Drvar” before the riot itself.46 The Canadians had been 

right in urging a slowdown in the rate of returnees. On 28 April, just four 

days after the riot, officials of Canton Ten signed an agreement in Livno 

for creating a multiethnic police force.47 

166 
The Drvar Riot forced SFOR to reevaluate its military strategy and 

force structure. As a general rule, Western armies are disinclined to 

engage in handling civil unrest and are thus not trained or equipped to 

handle rioters. Aware that local police might prove inadequate to handle 

civil disturbances, the North Atlantic Council agreed to the creation of a 

force gendarmerie or paramilitary forces called the Multinational Security 

Unit (MSU). The Italian Carbinieri and Spanish Civil Guard would play 

a major role in training the new organization, some 800 strong. The MSU 

filled the gap between the regular army and the local police, serving as the 

first choice for handling civil disturbances or hostage situations should 

local authorities prove inadequate. 

The damage had been done in Drvar, however. Of the 160 or so 

Serbs who had moved into the apartment complex near the school, 

only about 20 remained in town; the others left. The Office of the High 

Representative decided on a cooling off period and temporarily stopped 

pushing returnees to Drvar. Clearly, the riot might have been avoided 

with better coordination between the civilian and military authorities 

so that one side could avoid getting up on a high horse and pushing 

matters beyond the other’s capabilities to support. For his part, Coombs, 

as part of a larger battle group strategy, devoted more time and energy to 

meeting with local officials, trying to draw the religious leadership into 

helping in the reconstruction of town life. But after the riot, “everything 

was on thin ice.”48 

Conclusion 

The Brcko and Drvar riots together demonstrated that whether an 

army wears soft caps or Kevlar helmets on patrols has little to do with 

preventing a local population from rioting. SFOR was, and still is, an 

occupation army to many Bosnians, and radicals found its presence 

a threat to their interests. There was no magical formula for effective 

employment of force to ensure total compliance from the local political 

leadership and the population. A number of war criminals remained in 

parallel structures of power, determined to enhance their power and derail 

the Dayton Accords. These individuals were able to inflame the passions 

of the people by appealing to fears and mistrust generated by the civil 

war. Hard-liners learned how to mobilize rioters on order and how to 

control the civil disturbance. SFOR today still resembles an occupation 

army that ensures a NATO protectorate over the country. 

The Brcko and Drvar riots placed soldiers at risk and put company 

commanders in the precarious position of making difficult decisions in 

167 
riot control. In each case, the field commander thought through possible 

scenarios and made some wise preparations. Hendricks prepared his 

company with exercises designed to prepare soldiers for possible fighting 

matches with rioters. Coombs decided he would have to lead by example 

if shots had to be fired into a crowd. His action certainly averted serious 

harm and fatalities. Both men had given some serious thought to when 

they would have to resort to deadly force. This, their own military 

institution could not, in the final analysis, determine for them. 

Amazingly, in Brcko and Drvar, American and Canadian soldiers 

performed in exemplary fashion, eschewing the use of deadly force 

against civilians, even against those who seemed intent on inflicting 

serious bodily harm. Each company commander sought a different goal, 

based, in large measure, on differing circumstances. Hendricks wanted 

to prevent the creation of a martyr for the Serb cause, something his 

leaders had indoctrinated in him. For him, the Brcko Bridge served as 

a defensible position and one that the senior commander expected held. 

Coombs, on the other hand, was determined to prevent the rioting Croats 

from overwhelming his soldiers and thus threatening them. He also had 

the Serb civilians under his protection and thus lacked an easy retreat 

route. Only last-second thinking on his part averted the use of lethal force. 

Each riot, by its occurrence, set back reforms, however temporarily. Both 

men testify to the imperative of armies having to be prepared for civil 

disturbances in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. 

168 
Notes

1. Second Lieutenant Anna Maria Ford, notes on Brcko Riot, provided to 

author by Captain Kevin Hendricks, commander, Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 

2nd Infantry Regiment. Henceforth cited as Delta Company Notes. 

2. Major Howard G. Coombs, memorandum, Account of Warning Shot of 

24 August 1998, 2 May 1999. Copy of memorandum provided by Coombs to 

author. 

3. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of 

Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 80-84. 

4. SFOR Joint Press Conference, 18, 19, 20 August 1997. 

5. Clark, Waging Modern War, 86. 

6. Ibid., 92-93. 

7. Colonel James K. Greer, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 23 August 2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

8. Greer interview. 

9. Major Daniel E. Soller, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 28 August 2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

10. Greer interview. 

11. Greer interview; Soller interview. 

12. Greer, discussion, 15 November 2001. 

13. Major Kevin D. Hendricks, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 17 September 2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

14. Sergeant Nicholas Garner, rifle team leader, Delta Company Notes. 

15. Hendricks interview. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Master Sergeant Mark Schult and Private First Class Todd Edwards,” 

“Soldiers Fend Off Rioters,” Talon Vol. 3, No. 36, 5 September 1997, <www. 

rrmtf.org/first division/society/bridgehead/bhs97/riot.htm>; Hendricks interview; and Delta Company Notes. 

18. Hendricks interview; Delta Company Notes. 

19. Hendricks interview. 

20. Clark, Waging Modern War: 87-88; Soller interview. 

21. Soller interview. 

22. Greer interview, 15 November 2001; Clark, Waging Modern War: 87. 

23. Hendricks interview; Delta Company Notes. 

24. Hendricks interview. 

25. Captain Greg Sharpe, interview with Robert Baumann and George Gawrych, 

24 October 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

26. Greer interview. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Ibid. 

29. Hendricks interview. 

30. Major Kevin D. Hendrick, interview with George Gawrych, 29 April 2002, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

169 
31. Task Force 1-41 Infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Operation Joint Guard, 

April – October 1997 (Fort Riley, KS: 1998), 33. 

32. Task Force 1-41 Infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 36. 

33. For a published treatment of the riot, see United Nations Mission in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, “Recent Violence Against Bosnian Serb Returnees in Drvar,” 

July 1998, www.unmbih.org/news/hrrep/drvar.htm. 

34. Lieutenant Colonel P. J. Devlin, commander of the Canadian Battle Group, 

to Colonel R. R. Romses, “SFOR Reaction to Civil Disturbance,” letter dated 25 

May 1998. 

35. Major Howard Coombs, interview with Robert Baumann and George 

Gawrych, 12 October 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

36. Lieutenant General Sir Hew Pike to Major Howard Coombs, 23 February 

1998. Copy provided to George Gawrych by Coombs. 

37. Lieutenant Colonel William Sinnott, Master Sergeant Michael Hall, 

and Lance Corporal Lynne Blanke, interview with, 5 October 1998, High 

Commissioner Residence, Sarajevo. All three Americans worked in the Civil 

Military Cooperation element during the Drvar Riot. This evaluation was made 

with the benefit of hindsight. 

38. Major Howard Coombs, Canadian Army, interviews with Robert Baumann 

and George Gawrych, 12 and 19 October 2000, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

39. Devlin to Romses, letter. 

40. Howard Coombs, interview, 12 October 2000. 

41. Lieutenant Colonel William Sinnott, Master Sergeant Michael Hall, and 

Lance Corporal Lynne Blanke, US Marines, interview with retired US Navy 

Captain James Orzech, 5 October 1998, High Commissioner Residence, 

Sarajevo. All three Americans worked in the Civil Military Cooperation element 

during the Drvar Riot. 

42. General material on the Drvar Riot is based on Howard Coombs, interview, 

19 October 2000; Howard Coombs, discussions with George Gawrych, 15 and 16 

November 2001; Sinnott, et al., interview; Devlin to Romses, “SFOR Reaction 

to Civil Disturbance.” 

43. Sinnott, et al., interview. 

44. Coombs, interview, 19 October 2000. 

45. Coombs, discussions, 15 and 16 November 2000. 

46. SFOR, Joint Press Conference, 27 April 1998. http://www.nato.int/sfor/ 

trans/1998/t980427a.htm. 

47. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Recent Violence 

Against Bosnian Serb Returnees in Drvar,” July 1998, www.unmbih.org/news/ 

hrrep/drvar.htm. 

48. Coombs, interview, 19 October 2000. 

170 
Chapter 7 

IFOR, SFOR, and Civil Implementation 

Robert F. Baumann 

After one year, the Clinton administration proclaimed the IFOR 

mission a success. However, rather than marking the close of international 

peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Bosnia, 1997 ushered in a new 

phase of operations referred to as the Stabilization Force or SFOR. To 

those who had assumed from the beginning that the one-year IFOR 

mandate was unrealistically brief, the renaming of the mission provided 

political cover for the indefinite extension of US and NATO involvement 

in the Balkans. 

Not long after the transition from IFOR to SFOR, the focus of military 

effort began to shift toward the civil agenda of Dayton. This implied greater 

involvement in supporting such objectives as refugee returns, creating a 

political climate in which nonextremist political groups could flourish, 

and building confidence in the future of an ethnically integrated Bosnia. 

To some degree, SFOR could advance these aims through the conduct of 

normal military operations such as patrolling towns and roads, escorting 

refugees, and deterring resistance through displays of strength. At the 

same time, however, the role of less traditional military operations such 

as public information and PSYOP (psychological operations) campaigns, 

as well as civil affairs, assumed increasing importance. This also called 

for a more nuanced tone depending less on the implied threat of force 

to ensure cooperation and move on to constructive engagement of the 

faction leaders.1 

Information Operations 

Many participants in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission concluded by 

the end of their tours that the main battle to implement the terms of the 

General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) was being waged in 

the information realm. Compelling evidence to this effect was the effort 

made by hard-line faction representatives to dominate public perceptions 

and inflame fears and animosities. If successful in this endeavor, they 

could mobilize enough of the population to resist the civil implementation 

of the terms of Dayton and paralyze the international will to oppose 

them in a scenario not vastly different from that which vitiated the moral 

authority of UNPROFOR. Furthermore, opponents of the normalization 

171 
of Bosnian society enjoyed significant advantages in the competition to 

shape the public mind. First, they were veterans of the propaganda and 

disinformation campaigns that attended the brutal civil war in Bosnia. 

Consequently, the information battlefield had already been molded to 

their liking. Naturally, the brutality and atrocities of the war—for which 

they bore heavy responsibility—provided deeply felt memories and 

antagonisms which they could and did exploit to arouse violent passions 

at every opportunity. The extremists had elaborate networks of contacts 

and a wide variety of established official and unofficial outlets for their 

messages. In addition, they had already driven most competing voices 

from the field through intimidation or worse. This reality was not lost on 

the leaders of IFOR and SFOR. 

Reduced to its simplest terms, the IFOR-SFOR information strategy 

was twofold. First, the information warriors had to overcome or neutralize 

the advantages of the opponents of Dayton. Second, they had to bring 

to bear their own technologies and professional training to maximize a 

critical edge in their favor—Bosnians of all ethnic groups were on the 

whole terribly war weary. Thus, it was incumbent on the information 

specialists to energize the long-suppressed hopes of the population for 

security, normalcy and a better life. 

Broadly speaking, the information campaign embraced two linked 

approaches: public information and PSYOP. The Joint Information 

Bureau assumed the role of coordinating agency for authorized news and 

messages emanating from both PSYOP and public affairs. In addition, it 

supported public information efforts of the State Department and other 

organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) and World Bank. From a US doctrinal perspective, public 

information embraced all dealings with the media, whether international 

or local, and disseminated a clear, authoritative, and factual picture of 

IFOR-SFOR activities as widely as possible. In turn, PSYOP, separate 

and distinct at least in American doctrine, entailed an active effort to 

promote positive perceptions of the IFOR-SFOR mission in Bosnia and 

to influence public behavior in ways favorable to the Dayton process. 

Despite the fact that PSYOP consciously aims to influence chosen 

audiences, it, like public affairs, must be based on factual information. 

It therefore is distinguished in doctrinal terms from enemy propaganda, 

which is free to distort the truth or “invent” it altogether. 

A classic instance of propaganda and distortion, at which all three 

former warring factions had exhibited unrelenting skill, was the 

performance of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic as he orchestrated 

172 
Figure 4. The SFOR information campaign remains 

relatively optimistic about ethnic conflict 

the massacre of the inhabitants of the Srebrenica safe area. There in 

1995, following the capture of the Dutch military compound at Poticari, 

Mladic acted the part of a beneficent and compassionate conqueror for 

Serbian print and television reporters. Warm and gregarious, he had 

his soldiers dispense bread, water, and even candy to terrified Muslim 

173 
Figure 5. The SFOR information campaign linked crucial issues such as the 

right to travel and the conduct of democratic elections. 

refugees while offering fervent assurances that no one had any cause 

to be fearful.2 Though ghastly, it was a propaganda triumph, at least in 

the short term, for a man who would soon be reviled as a war criminal. 

Though apprehensive, the international community stayed its hand and 

did not immediately retaliate for the fall of Srebrenica. Overall, the 

record suggests that Mladic possessed a far superior understanding of the 

behavior of the international community than it had of him. 

In contrast, lacking a deep appreciation of the Balkan cultural 

landscape, IFOR’s early attempts to mold public perceptions were 

tentative and slightly wide of the mark. One example of PSYOP was the 

early attempt to employ quotations of the former Yugoslav leader Broz 

Tito to invoke a spirit of unity and tolerance associated with his nearly 

four decades in power. In contrast to crude propaganda, the purpose was 

not to deceive; the statements were faithfully reported and their intent 

was transparent. Neither, however, did the symbolic use of Tito reflect the 

purpose of public information to inform.3 Tito’s views were well known 

to anyone who cared. Rather, the purpose was to affect the social climate 

in a way that would make it more conducive to the fulfillment of the 

Dayton agenda. 

Whether or not SFOR achieved its intended effect is problematic 

since Tito’s memory resonated favorably primarily among elements 

of the populace who were already positively disposed toward Dayton. 

174 
Some other historical figures employed in early PSYOP were a good deal 

more curious and, from a Balkan historical perspective, obscure. In 1997 

leaflets featured pro-democracy quotations from such persons as Thomas 

Jefferson, John Locke, Plato, and even Immanuel Kant.4 The messages 

were laudable even if in the eyes of the local populace–not steeped in the 

traditions of classical and enlightenment democratic political philosophy— 

the moral authority of the individuals quoted was at best doubtful. 

Beginning under IFOR, PSYOP struggled to find its way in an 

unfamiliar, ambiguous and delicately nuanced environment. Indeed, 

early failures alerted IFOR to the need to re-examine prior assumptions. 

Among the first challenges facing Commander IFOR (COMIFOR) 

Admiral Leighton Smith, was to convince Serbs living in the suburbs of 

Sarajevo not to flee into the newly created Republika Srpska following the 

consolidation of the federation territorial control. Serb hard-liners in Pale 

had other ideas, however. Early in 1996, large numbers of young thugs 

infiltrated Sarajevo to herd their fellow Serbs out by force if necessary. To 

expedite the process, they issued warnings, then carried out intimidation 

and beatings and occasionally resorted to arson. 

Serious civil disturbances attended the official transfer of jurisdiction 

over five Sarajevo suburbs such as Grbavica, which had remained under 

Bosnian Serb control at the end of the civil war. The change of authority 

was in full compliance with the Dayton mandate, but if legal control of 

designated real estate was relatively easy to establish, jurisdiction over 

the populace was another matter altogether. In the weeks preceding 

implementation of the new internal boundaries of Bosnia, radical Serb 

nationalists resolved to compel a withdrawal of Serb residents. One 

apparent aim was to prevent the restoration of a cosmopolitan civil 

society that characterized life in Sarajevo before the war. An even more 

pragmatic objective, perhaps, was to relocate displaced Serbs to strategic 

locales in the Republika Serbska formerly inhabited by pockets of 

Muslim or occasionally Croat victims of ethnic cleansing. By so doing, 

RS authorities had in mind to prevent minority refugee returns. 

Street violence and burning buildings inflicted by Serbs upon Serbs not 

only seemed to take IFOR by surprise, but provoked what many observers 

felt was a tepid and dilatory response from peacekeepers deployed to 

Sarajevo. This perception constituted a major public relations defeat. 

Typical of the public reaction was that of a spokesperson for the United 

Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), who exclaimed, 

“We’re seeing a multiethnic Bosnia being flushed down the toilet.” John 

Pomfret, a correspondent for the Washington Post, reported that French 

175 
and Italian soldiers on patrol in the streets of Grbavica were reluctant to 

get out of their vehicles. A disgusted American UN employee commented 

derisively, “NATO is only concerned with protecting NATO.”5 No less 

disconcerting was the evident disinterest on the part of local Muslim 

officials in attempting to stem the outflow. In fact, in the wake of 

departing Serb mobs, Muslim looters entered the shattered neighborhood 

unimpeded by federation police.6 

To the bitter consternation of observers such as Richard Holbrooke 

and Robert Gelbard, then assistant secretary of state for International 

Narcotic and Law Enforcement, neither IFOR nor the International Police 

Task Force (IPTF) personnel intervened despite their ample presence in 

the Bosnian capital. In fact, as reported by Holbrooke, General Michael 

Walker refused to intercede even upon the personal urging of Michael 

Steiner, the Deputy High Representative. Finally, under direct pressure 

from Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense 

William Perry, Admiral Smith directed IFOR to act.7 The result was a 

simple case of “too little, too late.” Somewhat belatedly, Italian soldiers 

arrested a dozen Bosnian Serb thugs on 17 March, just two days prior 

to the transfer of authority. The action was inconsequential in the great 

scheme of events. That same day flames raged across Grbavica, destroying 

a market, a restaurant, and even a UNHCR warehouse.8 The subsequent 

exodus of Serbs from the capital region was a major blow to the Dayton 

policy and a barrage of criticism followed. 

PSYOP took its share of the blame. For weeks it had proclaimed 

widely that Dayton would guarantee the rights of all citizens of Bosnia 

and urged Serb residents to remain. The effort was to no avail, however. 

Still, General Walker was a believer in PSYOP, chaired meetings of the 

Information Coordination Group on a daily basis, and actively shaped the 

IFOR information campaign.9 Fortunately, other PSYOP campaigns of 

1996 proved more effective. Notable among them was the mine awareness 

campaign, highlighted by the production of messages in a special edition 

of a Superman comic book published by DC Comics. Other publications 

targeting a youthful audience followed under SFOR, including MRCKO 

and Mostovi. These glossy periodicals appeared in both the Latin and 

Cyrillic alphabets, interspersing messages about nonviolence and 

tolerance amid discussion of popular themes. 

Perhaps the grandest and most challenging endeavor was to operate 

through the electronic media in Bosnia. For PSYOP personnel, Bosnia 

represented a new and more complex environment than those of other 

recent deployments. According to US Army Major Steve Larsen, PSYOP 

176 
methods by 1996 had been adapted to work primarily in third world 

countries without extensive electronic media outlets. Bosnia, for all its 

troubles, was well developed in terms of television and radio transmissions. 

This meant that the usual techniques such as the manufacture of relatively 

simple handbills or even basic radio messages (such as those employed 

in Haiti in 1994) were not likely to be effective. The essence of the 

problem was not merely to disseminate SFOR messages, but to get 

people to listen. In competition with recent Western-produced television 

programs—“Deep Space Nine” and so forth—that now penetrated the 

Bosnian market, the old stuff simply would not do. Unfortunately, due in 

large part to a lack of familiarity with the Bosnian media environment, 

the 6th PSYOP Battalion from Fort Bragg had brought along its own 

relatively outdated equipment. Furthermore, the television systems they 

did have were designed for US production and incompatible with local 

technology. In any case, standard VHS tapes were well below the quality 

standard for recording in the former Yugoslavia.10 

Within a short time, IFOR hired a civilian professional, Karen 

Holman, formerly of the BBC, to handle production. Although she was 

accustomed to working with more proficient technicians than the Army 

could supply, television production rapidly showed improvement. Once 

armed with more or less state-of-the-art technology, IFOR PSYOP dealt 

with a variety of messages aimed at carefully chosen audiences. One large 

concern was the mine threat, particularly in light of the regular incidence 

of deaths among Sarajevo children. Based on its audience analysis, Radio 

IFOR showered local youths with mine awareness messages during the 

preschool hours of the early morning. To ensure that the selected audience 

was tuned in, it emphasized contemporary rock and rap music during 

that time slot in its programming. To reinforce the theme, civil affairs 

officers passed hand bills and other printed material at local schools. 

Mine awareness slogans even appeared on specially made soccer balls 

distributed to local kids at playgrounds.11 

While IFOR PSYOP had a national focus, it also devoted much of its 

effort to the Sarajevo locality. At the same time, each MND included an 

embedded PSYOP company to work at the tactical level. Unfortunately, 

at least in the experience of MND-N, the US division had comparatively 

little prior experience with PSYOP and therefore knew little either of 

its capabilities or limits.12 This inevitably slowed the delivery of printed 

PSYOP messages. Initially IFOR, and then SFOR, dealt with a relatively 

small number of media outlets. Of course, in the former state run media 

system of Yugoslavia, few stations were required since there was little 

177 
latitude for dissenting opinion. Moreover, in the early days of IFOR 

and SFOR, most media outlets in the RS were implacably hostile. One 

response was the employment of the EC-130E Commando Solo airborne 

broadcast system. Capable of transmission on AM, FM, high frequency 

and television bands, Commando Solo not only offered SFOR a means to 

disseminate its message but also provided the capability to override the 

signals of strident Bosnian Serb broadcasts.13 

In late September 1997, with the expressed approval of the High 

Representative and the North Atlantic Council, SFOR exercised 

the authority of its mandate to seize five Bosnian Serb television 

transmission stations. This step occurred in response to the unremitting 

anti-Dayton tone of hard-line broadcasters who gave their allegiance 

to Karadzic. Moreover, it became necessary despite the agreement of 

Momcilo Krajisnik, the Serbian member of the BiH Joint Presidency and 

chairman of the board of directors of Serb Radio and Television (SRT), 

that SRT would “refrain from inflammatory reporting against SFOR and 

International Organizations supporting the Dayton Peace Agreement.”14 

Particularly disturbing to the international community were false and 

Photo 19. Bosnian Serbs protest SFOR attempts to gain 

control over Republike Srpske Television 

178 
provocative allegations that SFOR employed low-intensity nuclear 

weapons, images comparing SFOR soldiers to Nazis, and references to 

Bosnia’s Muslim President, Alija Izetbegovic, as a “Muslim murderer.” 

Within a year, SFOR returned four of the five stations to local control 

with the understanding that they provide more balanced coverage, 

include special programming on the peace-building process in Bosnia, 

and comply with periodic inspections. When in October, unidentified 

saboteurs succeeded, at least temporarily, in disabling transmitters 

in the eastern RS, SFOR was able to respond by using its Commando 

Solo aircraft to explain the interruption of service and counter hard-liner 

propaganda claims that SFOR itself was at fault.15 

US Army Major John Venhaus, who managed radio and television 

operations in Bosnia as a PSYOP officer in 1998, found that the pool of 

television stations in particular swelled during his tenure as local media 

Photo 20. Serb protestors gather to challenge SFOR 

seizure of a television station 

179 
entrepreneurs discovered that telecasts could make money. Indeed, in 

the space of six months from January through June 1998, Venhaus noted 

that the number of television outlets grew from 34 to 41. In fact, SFOR 

contributed mightily to the process by paying attractive rates for broadcast 

time even though the terms of Dayton granted it the right to air time on 

demand. Again, during the first half of 1998, SFOR spent 2.5 million DM 

for broadcast time, primarily on television.16 

Of course, air time was meaningless without messages. In addition to 

endlessly polishing SFOR’s image, broadcasts focused on pivotal events. 

Arrests of persons indicted for war crimes (or PIFWCs–pronounced pifwiks) commanded priority attention from SFOR, at least in the public 

relations arena. Of foremost concern was the prevention of violence, 

which experience painfully proved often followed high-profile arrests by 

SFOR personnel. Thus, it was imperative to get facts before the public as 

quickly as possible. Failure to do so created a window of opportunity for 

extremist elements to spread claims of arbitrary detention and mistreatment.17 To preclude such disinformation, SFOR emphasized the grounds 

for arrest as spelled out in indictments from the Hague as well as the 

humane terms of confinement and the right of the accused to a fair trial. 

Given the secrecy surrounding plans to capture indicted war criminals, 

the information campaign to explain and justify events was necessarily 

reactive. A quick response demanded speedy investigation and scripting 

of a message. Moreover, if violence ensued, a more thorough treatment of 

public issues was called for. Fortunately, many events such as organized 

refugee returns or commemorative rallies such as the annual Women of 

Srebrenica assembly occurred on a relatively predictable basis. Under these 

circumstances, SFOR PSYOP planners could prepare the environment in 

advance. The proactive dissemination of key messages made it possible 

on many occasions to head off trouble before it could occur. In addition to 

the purchase of time through local media outlets, SFOR operated its own 

Radio Mir (mir being the word for peace in the local languages) out of 

Sarajevo, Tuzla, Brcko, and Dvornik. The latter station, situated in MNDSW, had previously been based in Banja Luka and the Mrkonicgrad. One 

favored television outlet in Sarajevo was a station called Studio 99 that 

catered to a young audience with music videos and typically did not charge 

to air SFOR messages. Better still, its new programming was independent 

and enjoyed a reasonably high degree of credibility with its viewers.18 

Still, complications were a routine aspect of doing business. When 

the Women of Srebrenica scheduled their rally in 1997, two years after 

the infamous massacre, their planned route of march ran directly into 

180 
Serb-dominated territory across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) in 

the RS, thereby creating the likely possibility of violence. Adding to the 

tension, on 10July, just one day before the anniversary of the infamous 

massacre, SFOR soldiers carried out a raid in the volatile municipality of 

Prijedor to seize two indicted Serbian war criminals, killing one of them 

in a shootout. The Serbian Democratic Party immediately launched a 

media assault on SFOR.19 Consequently, SFOR confronted a dilemma. To 

permit the march to proceed as its organizers hoped was bound to inflame 

tensions and possibly destabilize the whole environment in the eastern 

reaches of MND-N. However, not to allow the march would undermine 

the democratic principle of free assembly that the civil implementation 

agenda of Dayton was pledged to support. In its effort to balance civil 

liberties against the risk of public disorder, the SFOR PSYOP campaign 

consistently supported the right of assembly and expression, while adding 

the reminder that no one had the right to resort to violence in support of or 

in opposition to a given point of view. Striking this moderate stance as a 

matter of practical policy on the ground was a complex matter. Caught in 

this delicate situation, US and Russian soldiers working together in MNDN let the march go forward, but resort to simple subterfuge prevented the 

marchers from reaching the mass grave site, where an angry mob of Serbs 

had gathered to meet them. One key act in this scenario was the simulated 

temporary breakdown of a Russian armored vehicle so as to block the 

movement of buses along a key access route. Yet, the rally itself went 

forward at an alternative venue and, as reported by SFOR media, the 

principle of free expression was preserved.20 

On one occasion in 1998, Venhaus discovered that the force protection 

policy at Eagle Base in Tuzla impeded a timely response. In this instance, 

Venhaus, along with Major Sue Lambert, was visiting Tuzla when the news 

of both an arrest and a mob reaction reached him. The incident occurred 

in MND-SW, which meant no TF Eagle forces were sent in response. To 

proceed to the scene, Venhaus and Lambert needed to muster the requisite 

four vehicles with additional personnel and a crew-served weapon before 

they were allowed to leave the American compound. Normally, either 

assembling the requisite armed caravan or gaining an exemption was a 

slow process that took 6 to 8 hours. Luckily, a group of Dutch military 

police who happened to be at Eagle Base agreed to form a hasty escort to 

the divisional border. Paradoxically, Venhaus and Lambert were able to 

abandon their escort when they entered MND-SW, the zone in which the 

episode of violence was actually occurring.21 Ironically, in other words, 

the closer they got to the site of the disorder, the less force protection they 

required. 

181 
Photo 20. IFOR marked the first combined military operations 

with Russian units since World War II 

Broadly speaking, Venhaus was concerned that the American approach 

to force protection constrained the effective execution of PSYOP. To 

illustrate his point, he drew a contrast with the British approach in MNDSW. There British and Canadian soldiers actively engaged the populace 

on a daily basis, stopping in cafes, holding casual conversations in the 

street, and making themselves seem both familiar and accessible figures. 

Among their routine tasks was the distribution of the local SFOR-produced 

publication called Mostovi, or bridges. In contrast, attempts to undertake 

182 
a similar project in MND-N never got off the ground because the TF 

Eagle command concluded that the manpower requirements associated 

with US force protection standards would make it impractical.22 

Only during SFOR 6, when the 10th Mountain Division under the 

command of Major General James Campbell assumed the role of Task 

Force Eagle in Tuzla, did force protection begin to make significant 

accommodation to the needs of PSYOP and other staff functions. In the 

first place, until then (and even afterward to a slightly lesser degree), force 

protection demands consumed up to 50 percent of the division’s combat 

power at any given time. With gentle encouragement from Lieutenant 

General Montgomery Meigs, then commander of SFOR, the 10th began 

to relax the rules slightly. According to the SFOR 6 After-Action Report, 

“The decision was eminently sensible; it made us more accessible to the 

public, allowed us to increase our presence in the AOR, increased the 

staff’s ability to go to subordinate units, and relieved our soldiers of an 

unnecessary personal burden.”23 

Despite episodic complications, SFOR managed to dominate the news 

agenda from time to time. In 1998, one of SACEUR Commander General 

Wesley Clark’s priorities was to convince the population of Bosnia 

that the reduction of the SFOR strength in that republic was not to be 

construed as a sign of slackening resolve or military weakness. As a public 

demonstration of this point, NATO staged a strategic reserve deployment 

exercise, a multinational endeavor including a US Marine expeditionary 

unit and the flow of converging forces into Bosnia. The combined display 

of air, land, and sea power constituted a powerful deterrent to any persons 

inclined to underestimate international resolve in support of the SFOR 

mission. Of course, SFOR could not guarantee that the local media, 

especially hostile outlets, would transmit its message and therefore was 

prepared on this occasion to exercise its authority established by Dayton 

to compel dissemination of its message and accompanying video images. 

In fact, compulsion was generally unnecessary. As Venhaus put it, “The 

news was for sale in Bosnia.” The generous allotment of SFOR funds 

with which to buy time on the air normally guaranteed access. Despite 

the obvious advantages of this situation, Venhaus found this reality a bit 

disquieting for its subtly anti-democratic implication that the truth was 

the property of the highest bidder.24 Overall, however, SFOR realized the 

impossibility of achieving both stability and democracy overnight in a 

land that recently had experienced neither. 

Under the terms of Dayton, SFOR enjoyed the right to seize hostile 

media outlets in Bosnia and did so as in 1997 at Udrigovo.25 Similarly, 

183 
the OHR enjoyed the prerogative to fire duly elected or appointed public 

officials if they were deemed an obstruction to progress in Bosnia. Though 

clearly at odds with classic Western democratic practices, such action 

did not lack practical justification. In light of Bosnia’s recent past, which 

demonstrated how demagogic politicians could exploit their freedom of 

expression to inflame hatreds and ignite civil war, such curbs dampened 

the risks of street violence. Moreover, they were perceived to operate in 

the interests of the safety of international peacekeepers, aid workers, and 

UN personnel. Still, it was difficult to dismiss perceptions that freedoms 

in Bosnia were being abridged. 

Meanwhile, SFOR information operations drew criticism on other 

grounds as well. Some observers were skeptical of the logic both of 

centralized control of PSYOP from Sarajevo and the utility of the artificial 

doctrinal barrier separating PSYOP and public affairs. According to the 

SFOR 6 After Action Report compiled by the 10th Mountain Division 

for OPERATION Joint Forge, “Throughout the SFOR 6 rotation, there 

was no comprehensive SFOR Info Ops concept for BiH.... As a result, it 

is almost impossible to ‘nest’ an MND Info Ops concept with SFOR’s. 

Additionally, lack of an overall strategy has two immediate results: a 

tendency to over-react to short-range objectives coupled with a passive 

approach to most other events.” To give greater clarity to its own efforts, 

SFOR 6 sought to coordinate its work more closely with agencies such 

as the OCE and UNHCR, which in any case had the lead on tasks such as 

elections and refugee returns. The 10th Mountain Division further made 

a conscientious effort to arm its soldiers on patrols with “talking points” 

based more on cutting-edge issues at the local level rather than on fairly 

broad, abstract themes promulgated from SFOR headquarters.26 The 

SFOR 6 After-Action Report further maintained that products emanating 

from the Combined/Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (CJPOTF) 

in Sarajevo occasionally reflected a lack of sensitivity for local conditions 

out in the division areas of operations. For example, a poster disseminated 

by SFOR depicting two churches and a mosque representing the three 

major faiths in Bosnia side by side over a Bosnian flag contradicted other 

general guidance to avoid religion as a topic. In this case, the SFOR 

theme proved susceptible to manipulation. Local Serbs began printing an 

adapted version of the poster showing a much-enlarged mosque, thereby 

implying that SFOR was giving preferential treatment to the Bosniac 

Muslims.27 

Of course, each of the factions in Bosnia played the information game. 

Although Serb nationalists took second place to none when it came to 

184 
galvanizing opinion among their own population, they were clumsy in the 

public relations with SFOR and the international community. According 

to Major Paul Schmidt, the Bosniacs postured publicly in a manner bound 

to earn sympathy. Bosniac leaders typically echoed the SFOR party line 

of tolerance and understanding, even if their deeds did not always match 

their words. In contrast, Serb spokespersons seldom struck a conciliatory 

note.28 US Army Major Rob Timm, who served as an LNO to the Russian 

Brigade, concurred with Schmidt that Bosniac resettlement efforts tended 

to focus inordinately on strategically sensitive areas such as Brcko and 

the Posavina Corridor. Given the sensitivity of these locations, Bosnian 

Serbs commonly overreacted to such initiatives and appeared to be the 

instigators of violence.29 

The SFOR 6 After-Action Report also expressed concern that the 

doctrinal distinction between PSYOP and public affairs was not as clear 

in the context of peace operations and required careful delineation. The 

AAR concluded: “Co-mingling of PA and PSYOP assets, bearing in mind 

the PSYOP mission to overtly co-opt and influence various population 

target sets, will significantly degrade PA’s ability to maintain its ‘just 

the facts’ persona.... If operational necessity required PSYOP to actually 

conduct missions other than truth projection, and if prior to that time PA 

and PSYOP were co-mingled, then the PA mission would quickly fail and 

be viewed by the populace as a propaganda machine.”30 

Public Affairs 

From the near fiasco at the Sava River in December 1996 to the turmoil 

of the war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, IFOR and SFOR were deeply 

concerned about international press coverage of the mission in Bosnia. 

According to Major Perry Rearick, who served as a public affairs officer 

in Sarajevo, the most effective means of getting favorable coverage was 

to have reporters embedded in units in the field.31 Given the opportunity 

to interact freely with ordinary soldiers and junior officers in the course of 

doing their jobs, most journalists came to respect both the quality of the 

force and the nature of the mission. 

Colonel Lee Hockman, who served as chief of public information 

for SFOR in 1998 and 1999, found that two themes dominated public 

affairs efforts during his tenure: the nature of the SFOR mandate and 

the apprehension of war criminals. The former was simple enough but 

required endless repetition: “SFOR is there to provide a safe and secure 

environment so that the international community can go about the process 

of civil implementation of Dayton.”32 

185 
The latter issue came up only intermittently but was always the 

object of great controversy. The problem began with SFOR’s ambiguous 

mandate regarding war criminals. Strictly speaking, SFOR’s mission 

as spelled out in the GFAP did not specifically include the location and 

capture of war criminals, generally referred to as PIFWCs. In other words, 

they were not to operate as a police or detective agency; nor would they 

actively seek opportunities to apprehend war criminals. However, SFOR 

was authorized to seize and arrest PIFWCs when they came upon them 

in the normal course of business. In point of fact, most SFOR personnel 

wanted little or no part in the hunt for war criminals. Certainly, this 

feeling resonated widely at the Pentagon, where memories of manhunts 

were generally bad. During OPERATION Urgent Fury in Panama, US 

personnel had conducted a long, trying and well-publicized search for 

president Manuel Noriega. Worse still was the experience in Somalia 

when US Army Task Force Ranger attempted to capture the rogue clan 

leader Mohamed Farrah Aideed in Mogadishu. This ill-fated episode 

ended in a fierce firefight resulting in hundreds of Somali and 18 American 

dead. The final consequence in Somalia was a reversal of US policy and 

the withdrawal of American forces. The lesson taken to heart by most 

military observers was that hunts for renegade faction leaders tend to be 

difficult, ineffective, costly, and dangerous. Thus, the last thing the Army 

wanted to tackle was the roundup of large numbers of war criminals in the 

politically explosive environment of Bosnia. 

The US joint chiefs withheld their approval of the GFAP until the 

language was purged of any implicit requirement to capture war criminals. 

When questioned about the matter later, Task Force Eagle Commander 

William Nash reflected, “The war crimes thing ...was one of those things 

we hoped would go away.”33 To be sure, the Americans were not the 

only ones to practice PIFWC avoidance. Widespread suspicion attended 

French involvement in Bosnia as well. Some critics related this to a 

general reluctance to punish the Serbs, while others attributed the passive 

French posture to a quiet deal to secure the release of a captured French 

pilot in 1995.34 

However, the international outcry for justice that brought UN, IFOR, 

and SFOR peacekeepers to Bosnia in the first place generated considerable 

pressure to capture those responsible for mass atrocities during the civil 

war. During IFOR, the press repeatedly hounded the allied command 

over the perceived failure to move against the murderers of Bosnia’s civil 

war. Scrutiny spiked especially following reported close encounters with 

Mladic. For example, following the highly public confrontation with the 

186 
Serb 65th Protection Regiment related to a planned weapons inspection 

at Mt. Zep in August 1996, journalists attempted to corner General John 

Sylvester into acknowledging that IFOR personnel had come face to face 

with Mladic and done nothing. As one challenged, “Here is one of the 

world’s most wanted war criminals at your disposal ...and you drop the 

ball. Why?” Without conceding that Mladic had actually been present, 

Sylvester argued that even if Mladic had been there, a 24-man inspection 

team would have been in no position to seize an unwilling general 

from “two to three hundred armed men who have sworn to protect this 

guy...” In other words, stumbling upon a person indicted for war crimes 

did not mean that IFOR must take him whatever the cost.35 IFOR and 

subsequently SFOR were not going to pursue high-profile fugitives at the 

risk of numerous casualties. 

Louise Arbor, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal 

for Yugoslavia at the Hague, objected strenuously to what she regarded as 

SFOR’s passivity with regard to the goal of arresting PIFWCs. Hockman 

himself noted that SFOR only nabbed one PIFWC during his half-year 

tenure in Sarajevo.36 Although IFOR/SFOR were not specifically held 

to account for catching war criminals, the signatories of Dayton had 

pledged their countries to the effort. Given that the local police in Bosnia 

were hardly likely to take up the challenge, it was inevitable that IFOR/ 

SFOR would play a role. SFOR did pick up mostly mid-level criminals 

at a modest rate from 1997, when the British made the first arrest, but 

suspicions remained that it was doing as little as it could manage.37 

Yet, in fairness to SFOR, arrests of criminals are not normally the 

business of armies—especially armies of democratic countries. US law, 

for example, contains extensive prohibitions against involvement in 

domestic law enforcement. The historic reason is that the framers of the 

constitution considered militaries to be easily subject to misuse by wouldbe tyrants. Hence, in American tradition, the role of the Army on the whole 

has been to focus on foreign threats, although it has occasionally been 

called upon to support the preservation of domestic order. In any case, 

the import of this legacy for American soldiers is that they are not trained 

as conventional city policemen and do not welcome the assumption of 

law enforcement responsibilities. Indeed, the only reason that soldiers 

are deemed more equipped for such tasks than diplomats or government 

bureaucrats, for instance, is simply that armies possess and know how 

to use powerful tools of coercion. However, the US and other armies 

are structured on the whole to engage in combat and destroy heavily 

armed foes with an implicit understanding that collateral damage and 

187 
casualties occur. Police officers, in most countries at least, though able 

in the employment of light weapons, are taught to work surgically and 

patiently root out individual miscreants without any endangerment to the 

general public. US Army military police, though trained to operate up 

and down the spectrum of violence, are principally employed in such 

functions as crowd handling, providing security, manning check points, or 

conducting search and seizure missions. In these roles, they have proved 

themselves effective in peacekeeping missions in Haiti and elsewhere. 

They are not, however, organized for general community policing. To be 

sure, some countries, such as France and Spain, possess national police 

organizations—the Gendarmerie and Carbinieri—more adept at such 

functions, but they were not committed to the mission in Bosnia until the 

late 1990s. 

In the meantime, Colonel Hockman made it his goal to hold the public 

relations initiative as much as possible. One means of accomplishing 

this aim was to get COMSFOR Lieutenant General Meigs on Bosnian 

television with regularity. Recognizing the importance of the information 

mission, Meigs was ever ready to do his part. Indeed, Meigs was willing 

to enter the spotlight more perhaps than any commander since Major 

General Rose during UNPROFOR. This, incidentally, reflected a more 

proactive media approach than Meigs himself had employed when 

serving as the commander of Task Force Eagle.

38 Meigs was also more 

willing than most of his counterparts to assume the “prudent risk” that 

accompanied a proactive public profile. According to Major Rearick, who 

served as a public affairs officer in Sarajevo, the bolder tone began when 

General Wesley Clark replaced General George Joulwan as Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe in 1997. Indeed, owing in part to his own direct 

knowledge of the Dayton negotiations, Clark directed SFOR to assert its 

prerogative to shut down several hostile and defiant Bosnian news outlets. 

Whereas critics among all factions viewed these actions as arbitrary and 

undemocratic, Clark was simply striking a blow against what he considered 

an asymmetric threat. At the COMSFOR level as well, approaches 

often came down to the personality of a given commander. Rearick 

observed that although General William Crouch did many interviews 

while COMSFOR, his successor, General Eric Shinseki did few.39 

In any case, as the chief of public information, Hockman was pleased 

with Meigs’ approach. The nationalist Serb media, in contrast, were far 

less cooperative. Indeed, according to Hockman, “The biggest challenge– 

getting COMSFOR on Serb television was a big challenge.”40 The most 

resistant outlet was Serb national television, which remained under great 

188 
pressure from nationalist hard-liners not to cooperate with SFOR. In fact, 

Hockman was never successful in getting air time for the COMSFOR on 

Serb national television but did succeed in gaining access to a smaller 

station in the Republika Srpska. 

In addition to contrary factions, events often took a hand in dominating 

the news agenda. Within 1 hour following an attack on several US Army 

special forces soldiers in 1999, during which one of them shot and killed 

a Serb, Belgrade media described the incident as an unprovoked murder. 

Hockman realized the urgent need to issue a statement to the press but 

had to get the facts first. That required an additional 21/2 hours. Once 

he had what he believed to be “ground truth,” Hockman made it his first 

priority to get word directly to the Associated Press, Reuters, United Press 

International, and the French Press Agency. Despite this quick response, 

Meigs expressed frustration that SFOR’s enemies had gained an early 

edge in the information battle. Of course, as Hockman explained, “Well 

sir, I have particular criteria—I have to tell the truth. They don’t.”41 

Hockman thus put his finger squarely on a seemingly insoluble 

dilemma. How could SFOR assemble information that was both timely 

and accurate? Based on a methodological template tested under IFOR, 

SFOR relied on what it termed “single source reporting,” according to 

which accounts of breaking events were to be transmitted directly from 

the field to the TF Eagle battle captain at headquarters. From there the 

division public affairs officer would write a news summary for approval 

by the Joint Information Bureau. Of course, even under the best of 

circumstances, this system entailed a modest delay in the release of 

information and depended on the accuracy of accounts from the field.42 

As the aftermath of the Brcko Riot of 28 August 1997 revealed, 

sometimes the system came up just a bit short on both counts. That 

morning, even as events in Brcko were taking place, an SFOR major in 

public information had the unenviable task of dealing with a group of 

news-hungry reporters whose information from the scene surpassed his 

own. When challenged to comment on reports from various wire services 

that American soldiers were under assault by a throng of angry Serb 

civilians, the major could only reply that no confirmation had yet come 

from the field and that available reports remained sketchy. Spokesmen for 

the OHR and the IPTF participating in the press conference had little to 

add. Next a persistent journalist from the BBC insisted that corroboration 

had already been provided by another source within SFOR. Worse still, the 

word was out that the Americans had withdrawn under a barrage of sticks 

and stones.43 This incident suggested that the major not only was behind 

189 
the curve of events but appeared to have been kept in the dark by his own 

organization. In reality, the reasons for the major’s predicament may have 

been both numerous and unavoidable. Perhaps it was even attributable 

to simple bad luck. Whatever the case, the consequences were twofold. 

First, the episode cast the SFOR public information command in a poor 

light and could only encourage eager journalists to rely on competing 

sources of news. Second, it ensured that the SFOR account of the Brcko 

incident—entailing not only the facts of what occurred but why certain 

decisions were made—would trail behind the impressions left by other 

accounts, whether accurate or not. 

The point is not to suggest that SFOR’s public information priority of 

accuracy over haste was wrong. Indeed, it was almost certainly sensible 

considering the greater damage that might have been done as a result of the 

dissemination of erroneous reports. The question remains, however, as to 

whether SFOR as a whole or TF Eagle did all that it could to facilitate the 

rapid flow of information. Should greater assets have been committed to 

the collection of information from the field? Does single source reporting 

operate primarily in the interest of accuracy or is its primary function that 

of information regulator? 

The press conference also left the spokespersons for SFOR, the OHR, 

and the IPTF wriggling on the hook of the delicate question of neutrality. 

In short, had SFOR soldiers intruded themselves into the dispute between 

police forces loyal to Plavsic and those devoted to Karadzic? All three 

spokespersons insisted that the international community had not become 

an active player in the political struggle, but rather was acting only in 

support of the requirements of Dayton and the BiH constitution. When 

pressed, however, Duncan Bullivant, speaking on behalf of the Office 

of the High Representative, conceded that although Plavsic possessed 

no clear legal authority to remove local police officials, the intransigent 

attacks of Karadzic’s hard-line Pale faction on the Dayton process and 

human rights imperatives necessitated presidential action. As Bullivant 

finally put it, “The rule of law is not the point of debate, it’s the president 

doing the right thing at the right time.”44 

In the end, SFOR suffered still another political setback over public 

perceptions in the aftermath of the Brcko riot. The decision of TF Eagle 

commander Major General David Grange to pull the US platoon off 

the Brcko Bridge was widely construed as a retreat. Yet, as reported 

by SACEUR General Clark, who personally approved the decision, a 

tactically sound choice conveyed the wrong impression. Clark resolved 

190 
to avoid such misleading appearances in the future.45 

Ambiguity was the ever-present companion of the Dayton process. 

In the absence of effective institutions and the requirement for ad hoc 

arrangements at every turn, the role of personality assumed special 

significance. According to Lieutenant General Meigs, the ability to 

establish a personal working rapport with a wide variety of individuals 

was indispensable.46 As a matter of necessity, COMSFOR bet heavily on 

his credibility not only in the information fight but occasionally within 

the coalition itself. The value of this currency may have proved critical 

in dealing with the largest crisis of 1999, the outbreak of the air war over 

Kosovo and the response of the Russian Airborne Brigade. As conflict 

over Kosovo loomed as a result of the ethnic cleansing unleashed by 

Belgrade’s forces, the Russian commander advised SFOR in advance 

that he was likely to receive an order to cross the Drina and seize the 

airport in Pristina. This act of trust may have helped prevent a spasmodic 

reaction during a most delicate situation. Most important, “the Russian 

commander signaled it [this action] did not convey an intent of Russia to 

pull out of SFOR.”47 

Ultimately, most of the brigade remained in Bosnia, a fact vital to 

the continuing integrity of the coalition at a time when relations between 

NATO and Russia were terribly strained. Furthermore, developments in 

Kosovo were of utmost significance to Bosnia lest the wounds of civil 

war so recently closed should open again. Thus, the essence of the SFOR 

message to the populace was that the war in Kosovo had nothing to do 

with Bosnia.48 SFOR would not be involved in any way but would remain 

on the job in Bosnia. The object of this line was not merely to calm the 

populace but to head off possible Serb attacks against SFOR personnel. 

In sum, as strange as it sounded, SFOR troops belonging to the same 

NATO states that were conducting war in the adjoining region of Kosovo 

were to be regarded as neutral, uninvolved observers in Bosnia. 

Perhaps under these circumstances, the local Bosnian press, generally 

uninitiated in the ways of their eagerly questioning Western counterparts, 

served SFOR particularly well. Speaking of the local reporters, Hockman 

reflected, “They come to the press conference, they sit, they take what 

you say, they don’t ask probing questions, they don’t press you for 

information, so they’re very malleable and easy to deal with.”49 Luckily, 

at the time most Western correspondents turned their attention away from 

Bosnia toward the suddenly more compelling unfolding drama to the 

south in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. 

191 
Civil Affairs 

During IFOR and the first year of SFOR, the role of civil affairs in 

the military mission remained nebulous. For the first 45 days, IFOR 

concentrated on assembling its focus in Bosnia and implementing the 

objectives of Dayton’s military annex. During this time, the Office of the 

High Representative was not fully operational and therefore was not yet 

pressing civil implementation.50 This also contributed to initial confusion. 

Many IFOR officers apparently presumed that the OHR would operate as 

a parallel headquarters for civil implementation. At the same time, lacking 

even a common NATO doctrine, the different national contingents had 

yet to arrive at a shared definition of civil affairs operations. However, 

with the theater calm by D+120 and military objectives largely fulfilled, 

the ARRC and HQ IFOR looked to press ahead with civil progress. By 

this time, the IPTF was running and providing the ARRC with invaluable 

information on local affairs.51 

In addition to an SFOR civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) element 

in Sarajevo, each MND organized its own CIMIC in conformity with 

prevailing national norms and command relations. MND-N, a US 

command embracing component forces from Scandinavia and Poland 

(the NORDPOL Brigade), Turkey, and Russia, established a CIMIC on 

the Task Force Eagle compound in Tuzla, where American CA officers 

supported not only US units down to battalion level, but NORDPOL and 

the Russians as well. The Turkish Brigade conducted civil affairs on its 

own through its G5 staff section. Meanwhile, in MND-SW, the British 

formed a civil affairs team to coordinate within the division and keep 

CIMIC activities in view of the command. Finally, in MND-SE, the CIMIC 

effort operated through the military police elements (Gendarmes, Guardia 

Civil, and Condottieri) as well as logistics, medical, and communications 

units.52 

Under Commander SFOR General William Crouch, IFOR and 

SFOR focused on implementation of the military annex of Dayton, 

largely in conformity with the view in Washington. In fact, when certain 

nongovernment organizations (NGOs) sent delegations to Heidelberg 

to brief the staff at HQ LANDCENT, military personnel neither availed 

themselves of the opportunity to learn more nor promptly reciprocated 

by conducting return visits.53 Despite the sluggish start, this approach 

began to broaden as it became apparent that SFOR would not come to 

an end in 1997. The new sense of direction owed much both to a change 

in personalities and a clear understanding that the SFOR mission would 

not end until civil objectives of the GFAP were met. Thus, as summarized 

192 
in a report prepared for the US Congress by the US General Accounting 

Office in 1998, “In mid-1997, SFOR intensified its support for the civilian 

aspects of the Dayton Agreement...”54 

To be sure, the various national contingents did not entirely neglect 

civil affairs during the first year of the mission. In fact, some, such as the 

British, treated it as an important aspect of their effort virtually from the 

start. This was in large measure a function of their range of past experience 

in peacekeeping operations in Northern Ireland. There they discovered 

that soldiers cannot afford to apply themselves exclusively to traditional 

military tasks but must interact with the community in positive ways 

that both assist the population and cast the force in a favorable light. Of 

course, the lengthy record of British activity in Belfast also demonstrated 

that even this might not bring complete success. Still, the British retained 

a deep-seated faith in the validity of their approach. The British also 

enjoyed an additional advantage in terms of the interagency dimension of 

their experience. The British Department for International Development 

came to Bosnia prepared to allocate funds for worthwhile projects. This 

support included a modest allowance for each battle group to undertake 

simple projects such as purchasing soccer balls for local schools and so 

forth. The Canadians enjoyed a similar relationship with the Canadian 

International Development Agency. In the main, however, civil affairs 

projects undertaken by the British and Canadians in MND-SW did not 

fit into any overarching plan from SFOR. Rather, they were low level or 

tactical in significance. The French, in turn, took a distinctive approach 

of their own, beginning with a project to rebuild the telecommunications 

infrastructure of the RS. 

In contrast, the Americans at first lacked a systematic, integrated 

approach to civil affairs although there had been a dedicated contingent 

in Bosnia. In general, CA in MND-N labored under restrictive force 

protection requirements that to some degree impeded the mission. First, 

by situating its CIMIC within its highly secure compound, MND-N made 

direct access by representatives of international organizations (IOs) and 

NGOs far more difficult than in the other division areas, which conducted 

CA operations from within local communities. At the end of the first 

year, an IFOR-directed study concluded that relations with the UNHCR, 

OHR, IPTF, and other organizations were “much closer” in MND-SW 

and MND-SE.55 To be sure, the overall SFOR relationship with civilian 

organizations in Bosnia sometimes left much to be desired. A basic 

problem was to define and systematize the roles of liaison officers to 

nonmilitary organizations. Moreover, no central figure or cell monitored 

193 
interaction to avoid redundancy or contradiction when civilians dealt with 

more than one military unit or headquarters. 

Thus, when US Army Lieutenant Colonel Dana Eyre arrived in May 

1997 as part of a composite CAunit out of the 351st Civil Affairs Command, 

he was surprised by the prevailing state of CA in Bosnia. Equally startling 

was the lack of any coordinated handover of the mission. Indeed, while 

Eyre was training prior to deployment, the link to CA personnel in theater 

was, in his words, “beyond weak—it was nonexistent.”56 

Questions remained about CIMIC integration into SFOR 6 in 

1999. The 10th Mountain Division found, according to its AAR, “The 

relationship between the MND G5’s and the CJ9 in Sarajevo is weak 

at best.” Meanwhile, Major General Campbell tightened staff linkages 

within Task Force Eagle by bringing the G5 into the division operations 

center. Staffed by personnel from the CIMIC battalion, the G5 proved to 

be an outstanding source of information on the work of the international 

community and the progress of civil implementation of Dayton goals.57 

Still, if the military had difficulty with integration, it was not alone. 

At the very least, military institutional culture recognizes a broad 

requirement for unity of effort and command. Therefore, it was able in 

most instances to establish communications links to forge more unified 

plans and operations. In contrast, international aid organizations tend 

to function in a highly decentralized fashion, and their employees 

and volunteers are fully accustomed to this mode of operation. Each 

organization has a comparatively narrow focus and works in relative 

isolation. Individually, unlike their military counterparts, civilian aid 

workers do not belong to a highly disciplined culture in which individual 

operatives are required to subordinate themselves completely to the 

will of a command hierarchy. In many cases this may be advantageous, 

especially when the individual initiative of just a few persons can make 

a difference. Sometimes, however, a spirit of self-reliance ossifies into 

a single-minded pursuit of narrow agendas. To some SFOR observers, 

the vision of many NGO operatives did not reach beyond today and 

tomorrow.58 More seriously, NGOs often fail to collaborate because they 

are competing against one another for funding. Under IFOR no less than 

300 registered NGOs were active in Bosnia.59 Not all came prepared to 

work directly with military peacekeepers. For example, according to the 

Task Force Eagle After-Action Review, during election planning in 1996, 

timely information from the Organization for Cooperation and Security 

in Europe (OSCE) was not forthcoming, and its members often did not 

attend meetings.60 Consequently, persuasion and informal leadership are 

194 
of paramount significance in directing international aid efforts toward a 

common purpose. To forge a greater degree of cooperation, international 

organizations in Bosnia formed the International Council of Volunteer 

Organizations, which met monthly under the chairmanship of Mike 

Young of the United States. Unfortunately, in the estimate of Lieutenant 

Commander Hans Ligtenbarg, a Dutch officer who served on the SFOR 

staff as liaison to NGOs in 2001, the council itself does not function 

effectively.61 Similarly, according to one Canadian assessment, “Although 

it was clearly not an SFOR responsibility the only effective coordination 

that took place was when SFOR took the lead.”62 

Civil affairs officers could occasionally assist in bringing them together, 

but some NGO and IO personnel preferred to keep SFOR soldiers at arm’s 

length, tending to view the international military mission as an occupation 

force that had no further constructive role to play.63 Another basic clash 

in operational cultures stemmed from the classified nature of military 

planning. On occasion, SFOR could not share plans that depended on 

effective linkages with NGOs or private volunteer organizations. Under 

such circumstances, it is understandable that some civilian humanitarian 

workers did not readily view themselves as operating in partnership 

with SFOR. This further eliminated any possibility of joint rehearsals 

of anticipated operations. Conversely, information provided to SFOR 

by civilian agencies sometimes did not receive appropriate attention 

from SFOR staffers because it did not come through familiar military 

channels.64 

Certainly, breaking down barriers between the two groups was more 

difficult by virtue of the rapid turnover among the military contingents. 

Hence, there was little opportunity to build continuity in terms of working 

relationships, and SFOR personnel necessarily at times adopted a sixmonth perspective on the situation in Bosnia. In their perception, civilian 

agencies too often came to them with requests for support beyond the 

authorized scope of their mandate to fulfill. In contrast, by virtue of their 

presence in the communities, many NGO personnel possessed exceptional knowledge of the social and political dynamics of Bosnian society. 

Yet, senior commanders seldom expressly sought out this knowledge.65 

To be sure, civilians employed by IOs in Bosnia often lacked familiarity with military terminology, staff procedures, or chains of command, a 

condition that hindered communication and made it more dependent on 

the establishment of personal rapport. Additional confusion flowed from 

the fact that SFOR, IPTF, UNHCR, OSCE, and the OHR did not observe 

the same operational boundaries. Thus, in any given situation, it might 

195 
be necessary to secure cooperation from multiple representatives of the 

same organization. Sadly, this problem was identified in operational assessments throughout SFOR’s presence from 1996 to 2001.66 

Of course, SFOR encompassed not a single military culture, but 

many. Each national military contingent possessed its own doctrine, terminology, organizational structure, and outlook based on different experience. (The shared experience of NATO armies mitigated this problem 

to a degree but not in every way.) Specifically, these differences were on 

display in terms of approaches to force protection or civil affairs. The 

US Army was widely perceived to be obsessive about the former and 

cautious about the latter. Such peculiarities, normally based on sound 

organizational logic reflecting both habit and national concerns, also had 

a bearing on interaction with NGOs in the field. 

According to a study conducted by Dr. Susan Archer in March-April 

2000, IO and NGO personnel expressed frustration with the multiple 

vehicle and armed personnel requirements for US troops moving about 

the theater to attend meetings or otherwise work with non-military personnel. The effect of US force-protection policy was to create both a 

psychological distance and real practical obstacles—such as the need to 

organize a small caravan to move from point to point in MND-N—to 

achieving the mission. Archer concluded, “[US military] Training needs 

more emphasis on cultural expectations and social interactions, negotiation and conflict management at a number of levels of intensity/hostility.” Indeed, one civil affairs major suggested that the concentration of 

vehicles, weapons, and personnel at civilian meeting sites actually created an increased threat.67 A separate study commissioned by IFOR in 

1996 reached the same broad conclusion: “Procedures were regarded as 

excessive and hampered CIMIC operations in particular, in that it made 

them less accessible to the population; meetings were missed when four 

vehicles were not available; the ability to respond in a timely fashion to 

rapidly emerging situations or needs was reduced.” The report further 

contended, in light of the extravagant self-imposed requirements, that the 

US Army should have provided CIMIC with the vehicles to function.68 

Meanwhile, US units preparing to deploy continued to focus training 

on worst-case scenarios for potential combat in a hostile environment. 

According to Major Walt Piatt, who served as a battalion S3 in Bosnia 

with the 10th Mountain Division, the reality he actually encountered was 

quite different from the one he trained for. On the job in Bosnia, he found 

himself most concerned with supporting refugee returns and coordinating 

196 
with NGO personnel. Remarkably, despite the limited training focus on 

such activities, Piatt felt that a cooperative relationship with many NGOs 

prevailed in the US sector. Moreover, the 10th made a concerted effort to 

understand and support the NGO agendas. They even took to heart advice 

to appear as nonthreatening as possible, and platoon leaders in particular 

gave great attention to meeting the public while on patrol. In turn, 10th 

units received ample help. For example, members of the IPTF came and 

taught classes on their role in Bosnia.69 

Reflecting yet another source of cultural dissonance, some NGOs 

and IOs refused to admit armed military personnel into their offices. 

Of course, NGO and IO personnel were themselves multinational, and 

therefore culturally diverse, and many were ideologically committed to 

nonviolence. Fortunately, mission training for American soldiers bound 

for Bosnia increasingly incorporated scenarios involving working with 

NGO and IO operatives. 

In fact, beginning in 1997 American civil affairs officers, as well as 

special forces (who were never subject to the force-protection standard 

while in the field) and intelligence personnel, appreciated their relative 

freedom from many of the force-protection restrictions. This exemption 

from the uniform requirement for body armor and helmets at all times 

was based on a frank recognition by the command that a less forbidding 

appearance was essential for soldiers whose missions relied on direct 

communication with the populace.70 

Many other national SFOR contingents in Bosnia assumed that the 

art of communication was so important to successful peacekeeping that, 

unless a specific threat condition compelled them to don their battle gear, 

it was best to adopt a less combat-ready posture. In particular, British, 

Canadian, French, and German soldiers became involved in civil affairs 

aspects of the mission on a routine basis. In so doing, they assumed that 

they were in no way compromising their “force protection.” Ordinary 

soldiers routinely contributed their labor to civil projects. In fact, a belief 

prevailed among these contingents that closer contact with the populace 

was itself invaluable to mission accomplishment and subscribed to the 

view expressed in an official German briefing that civil affairs was a direct 

contributor to force protection.71 In the same spirit, the French maintained 

platoon houses of ordinary infantrymen in residential neighborhoods, 

where they routinely interacted with locals in all kinds of informal ways. 

In contrast, especially in the beginning, US conventional soldiers kept 

direct contact with the population to a minimum. 

197 
Photo 22. French soldiers bring gifts to a grammar school in MND SE 

Under the best of circumstances, the standard six-month rotation 

period for most SFOR personnel complicated communication with the 

public simply by guaranteeing a certain level of discontinuity. Meanwhile, 

international aid organizations were performing their principal function 

in areas such as Bosnia and normally kept their personnel in place for 

years instead of months. Consequently, they were often better able to 

determine when they were accomplishing something, at least on a local 

level. They could measure their work in terms of funds spent, quantities 

of food distributed, or schools repaired. For Army civil affairs, the 

measurement of progress was more problematic, particularly since its 

role consisted extensively of coordination and building liaisons between 

providers of services and worthy recipients rather than direct action. To 

be sure, especially under IFOR, military engineers repaired a number of 

bridges and roads in Bosnia and conducted demining training, but these 

tasks were undertaken for military as much as societal reasons. 

In the meantime, in some fundamental ways, Bosnian society itself 

proved resistant to progress. Ligtenbarg believed, for example, that 

much of the population was disposed toward a “welfare psychology,” an 

expectation that others would simply help them while they stood by. In 

this respect, the Dutch officer cited USAID for special praise for stressing 

198 
the principle of self-help. Furthermore, he said, “When they take on a 

project, they do it right,” taking into account the larger picture and factors 

such as project sustainability. The absence of such “systemic thinking,” 

he believed, was one of the problems hampering refugee returns. For 

example, villages that had tractors and livestock before the war presently 

had none. Under such circumstances, people would be unlikely to return 

even if the environment were relatively secure. The failure to achieve 

project integration was a direct reflection of the inability or unwillingness 

of NGOs to work together.72 

A host of converging factors contributed to sharpen the focus on the 

civil affairs mission in 1997. Personalities changed at the highest levels. 

Madeleine Albright replaced Warren Christopher as secretary of state 

and General Wesley Clark took over as SACEUR. In turn, General Eric 

Shinseki replaced General William Crouch, who construed the mandate 

more narrowly, as COMSFOR. Collectively they brought a more activist 

philosophy to a situation in Bosnia that itself had become increasingly 

stable. In turn, the civil affairs component in Bosnia formed a Combined 

Joint Civil Military Task Force (CJCMTF) under Brigadier General 

William Altschuler, who was determined to define the CA mission. Yet 

another development was the arrival of a German contingent in Bosnia, 

marking the first foreign deployment of German soldiers since World War 

II. Driven in large measure by a need to prepare the way for the return of 

Bosnian refugees temporarily in Germany, German participation simply 

added to the impetus for support of civil implementation of the Dayton 

Accords. 

Thus, the first key task of the CJCMTF was integrative, that is to 

integrate civil affairs into the larger SFOR mission and to mold the 

multinational CA presence into a cohesive organization. Second, there 

was a need to draft an overall campaign plan for CA in Bosnia. Third, the 

CJCMTF had to find ways to measure the progress of the mission, with 

particular emphasis on tasks such as housing construction and refugee 

returns. The new approach did not produce an overnight transformation 

of CA goals and methods but did gradually help SFOR focus on key 

aspects of the mission. 

As with public affairs and PSYOP, the media played an integral part 

in the civil affairs mission. Particularly troublesome in this arena was 

the persistent and insidious activity of Serb radio and television, most 

notably RSTV, which steadily saturated the airwaves with anti-SFOR 

messages. Thus, in 1997, Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein 

became so infuriated with unceasing efforts to undermine Dayton that 

199 
he pushed an initiative to seize the microwave repeating tower on which 

RSTV depended. More proactive than his boss, Karl Westendorp, Klein 

found a kindred spirit in General Clark, whose willingness to assume 

greater risks would have a powerful impact on SFOR. 

Of course, as is often the case, the solution to one problem only 

revealed new ones. Suddenly in control of the television tower, SFOR had 

to forge a plan to use it. Concern was immediate that simply to deny the 

population their customary television entertainment would hardly endear 

SFOR to already skeptical Serbs. Unfortunately, RSTV had been in the 

habit of simply telecasting pirated programs from the West, a practice 

that SFOR correctly concluded it could not continue. Remarkably, the 

SFOR CIMIC had Donna Hinton of Universal Studios on its staff but 

nonetheless had failed at first to anticipate a use for her professional 

skills; nor had anyone given advance consideration to the problem of 

coordinating programming with the overall SFOR mission.73 

Meanwhile, relations with the Serbs caught the attention of SFOR in 

still another way. Opinion sampling had consistently shown that the Serbs 

perceived SFOR to be entirely one-sided in its activities, and upon serious 

reflection, SFOR civil affairs officers and others concluded that they and 

the international community overall had inadvertently done much to 

justify this perspective.74 To a great extent, this problem stemmed from 

the widespread tendency to reward cooperation with Dayton policies and 

withhold assistance in return for noncooperation. Given the persistent 

activities of Serb hard-liners, the consequences were inevitable. Providing 

services for the Serbs often struck aid workers as a diversion of resources 

away from where they were needed most. In practice, this meant that 

Bosnian Muslims, and to a lesser degree Croats, benefited from SFOR’s 

presence, while Serbs did not. Thus, for example, Serbs could hardly fail 

to notice the active flow of aid to Muslim-dominated Gorazde, which in 

fairness had justifiably been an object of international interest.75 In the 

eyes of many, especially in the NGO and IO community, such a result 

was perfectly reasonable. Still, the recognition dawned slowly that more 

had to be done to reach out to the Serbs in the hope that they, too, might 

be induced to accept Dayton. 

Lieutenant Commander Ligtenbarg agreed that there was substance to 

the Serb perception that only Bosniacs received help from the international 

community and furthermore that it posed an impediment to acceptance of 

the Dayton process. He noted, for example, how after a visit to a needy 

Serbian school in the RS, he sought money from international organizations 

but found funds were scarce because donors would only provide support 

200 
for multiethnic educational institutions. While acknowledging the virtue 

of the goal to encourage the establishment of multiethnic schools as part 

of building a more tolerant society, Ligtenbarg also reflected, “These 

kids also need a future.”76 At the very least, this experience reflected that 

engagement with the Serbs remained a problem even early in 2001. It 

further illustrated a continuing operational disconnect between SFOR 

and many IOs and NGOs. 

Despite a gradually widening concern that the Serbs were being 

treated as the “odd man out” in Bosnia, the fact of Serb intransigence 

with regard to the civil implementation of the Dayton Accords was 

inescapable. In Serb-dominated areas, the international goal to construct 

a democratic, tolerant civil society in Bosnia depended on progress in a 

number of discrete areas. Most important among them were the return of 

victims of “ethnic cleansing” to their former domiciles, the construction 

of a functioning police and judiciary, the conduct of free elections, 

and support for free and responsible media. In addition, many viewed 

economic revival as an implicit precondition to broad success. 

Well-planned Bosnian Serb acts of resistance to Dayton occurred with 

regularity and assumed many forms—from attacks on returning refugees, 

to the destruction of residences, to orchestrated civil disturbances 

calculated to cast IFOR and SFOR in a negative light. This is not to 

say that Serbs were responsible for all of the obstruction of the Dayton 

process. In many places where the Serbs constituted a minority, and 

especially in hot spots such as Croatian-dominated Drvar, progress was 

slow, painful and occasionally accompanied by anti-Serb violence. 

The most consistent flashpoint in Bosnia was the return of refugees 

to their former residences, especially in areas whose demographics had 

been drastically altered by “ethnic cleansing.” Those who had perpetrated 

ethnic cleansing were not willing to sit by idly and watch the reversal of 

their efforts. Moreover, the dwellings of many refugees from any given 

community were frequently inhabited by other refugees of the now 

locally dominant ethnic group, who had in turn been driven from their 

original homes. Thus, the return of any group of refugees to their former 

homes typically entailed the displacement of others who had nowhere 

else to go in what amounted to a grand and tragic Balkans version of 

“musical chairs.” Predictably, inflamed passions led to trouble. 

Sabotage of minority resettlement plans took several common forms. 

The most subtle was the concealment or destruction of local property 

records so as to make it impossible for potential returnees to provide 

legal proof of ownership of their former dwellings. As the populace of a 

201 
given locale rallied to prevent returns, public demonstrations and acts of 

intimidation typically occurred. Thugs might visit returnees at any time 

to issue a “final warning.” Last, the most direct method, particularly if 

dwellings to be occupied by returning refugees were uninhabited, was 

simply to destroy or mine them. Such instances occurred throughout 

Bosnia and were not easily subject to SFOR control. 

In one such case, officers in MND-N realized that rebuilding efforts 

by Muslims in the ZOS were encountering determined opposition. While 

by day in the winter of 1997 Muslims conducted repairs, by night Serbs 

slipped into the same area to carry out house demolitions. Consequently, 

in an effort to put a stop to this, MND-N organized a night watch in 

the ZOS to thwart or capture the perpetrators. According to Major Mike 

Slocum, then a US Army aviator, two Apache helicopters would hover 

from diverging viewing angles at a distance of about 2 kilometers from 

the observed area. They would thus always be sufficiently removed 

not to be heard but close enough to observe the area with night vision 

capability. Meanwhile, a patrol on the ground stood nearby to intercede 

when so directed. At one stretch, US forces maintained the watch for 

nine consecutive nights during which time they observed no one and 

no demolitions occurred. On the 10th day, when US forces suspended 

the mission to attend to safety and maintenance concerns, demolitions 

resumed. What was striking about this episode was that Serb observers 

had discerned what the Americans were doing and knew how to avoid 

being caught in the act.77 

Of course, the joint responsibility of SFOR, the IPTF, and local 

police was to preserve security based upon an inherently defective 

division of roles. Unfortunately, local police bore sole responsibility for 

the investigation and arrest of persons responsible for acts of violence 

against returnees. All too often, they were unable or unwilling to perform 

these tasks. SFOR units were prepared to lend support to local police in 

the event of large-scale public disorders but not to substitute themselves 

for a functioning police force. The IPTF, in turn, also played an auxiliary 

role that consisted chiefly of advice and support. The problem of local 

law enforcement transcended training, however. The influence of 

ethnic politics, corruption, and criminal connections was pervasive and 

corrosive. The European Union had assumed the task of training local 

police departments but through 1997 provided an insufficient number 

of experts to do the job.78 In some instances the failure to execute their 

responsibility under the law became so blatant that the high representative 

took it upon himself to fire local officials. Meanwhile, efforts to forge 

202 
ethnically mixed police departments, another significant indicator of 

progress, proceeded at a glacial pace. 

Joint Commission Observers 

Among the least visible but nonetheless vital missions performed 

in Bosnia was that of the JCO teams, which were instituted by Major 

General Michael Rose in 1994. Initially consisting of British special 

operations personnel, the team gradually became Americanized with 

the infusion of US Army SF personnel, occasionally supplemented by 

Navy Seals, into Bosnia. Living in groups of about six to eight men, JCO 

teams typically occupied residences in important communities for the 

purpose of maximizing their access to the population and especially local 

leaders.79 A “strategic asset for COMSFOR, their objective was to work 

with key local figures and report the “ground truth” back to the CJSOTF 

in Sarajevo at SFOR headquarters. 

The American JCO mission got rolling in 1997 in relief of the British, 

who had built the JCO network several years earlier. Lieutenant General 

Meigs was anxious to saturate the MND-N sector with teams operating 

as his eyes and ears in the field. Because of the high priority of the 

mission, senior SF leadership personally selected members of the initial 

six teams.80 Major John White, who had served as a civil affairs officer in 

Bosnia during UNPROFOR, commanded the advanced operational base 

in MND-N, during which time the number of JCO teams expanded to 

14. The goal was to maximize the flow of information from the streets 

as well as to influence the behavior of the factions.81 At least initially, the 

JCO teams did not coordinate particularly well with Task Force Eagle. 

A central component of the problem was the command and control 

arrangement that centralized authority over all teams at the combined 

joint special operations task force (CJSOTF) at SFOR headquarters 

in Sarajevo. This meant that division or battalion commanders could 

not control teams operating in their own areas of operations. This was 

particularly true during the period when JCO teams were British and 

clearly were not answerable to the US chain of command. The arrival of 

US Army SF soldiers as JCOs muddied this picture. Resultant confusion 

manifested itself in two ways. Sometimes local commanders believed 

they had authority over JCO teams when they did not. Conversely, local 

commanders often did not seek assistance from the JCOs that might 

readily have been given.82 

An additional element of complexity at one time was simply the luck of 

the assignment process that put Major Darren Bender in the Special Opera203 
tions Command and Control Element in Tuzla attached to the US division. 

At this particular moment in the winter of 1997, the US division was the 

3rd ID, with whom Bender had previously served—unhappily. Still, there 

was more to the question than this inauspicious circumstance, although 

by Bender’s own admission the relationship probably improved following 

his departure at the end of March.83 Like most conventional units, 3rd ID 

had relatively little experience working directly with Army special forces. 

As during the early phase of OPERATION Uphold Democracy 

in Haiti, friction born of profound differences in branch cultures and 

training manifested itself between SF and conventional troops. Unlike 

Haiti, however, the difference did not surface as a command-level issue. 

Most conspicuous, and therefore contentious at the soldier level, was the 

gap in force protection styles. Whereas US conventional forces through 

1998 unfailingly wore kevlar helmets and body armor anytime they left 

Eagle Base (and for a time even while on Eagle Base), SF normally wore 

garden-variety BDU camouflage. This seeming trifle often surfaced as 

an issue because SF soldiers resented having to don the cumbersome 

battle gear during visits to Eagle Base. Indeed, the situation was richly 

ironic. Permitted to work without body armor and helmets in the field, 

SF personnel had to comply with Task Force Eagle force protection 

requirements to wear those very items upon entering the ostensible 

security of Eagle Base.84 

SF branch culture tended to regard all the extra gear not only 

as unnecessary and uncomfortable, but as a genuine impediment to 

accomplishing the mission. Conversely, conventional troops sometimes 

viewed their SF counterparts as prima donnas who felt themselves above 

the rules. Of course, the nature of JCO business differed sharply from 

the standard patrolling and security tasks that constituted the focus of 

division activity. Because JCO tasks required daily intermingling with 

the local population, SF teams regarded anything that might create 

artificial distance between themselves and their neighbors as undermining 

progress. They moved in relatively unobtrusive small groups and 

often dined in local restaurants.85 To further enhance trust, they asked 

questions openly, making no secret either of their purpose or the use to 

which information would be put.86 For this reason, JCO teams initially 

wore civilian clothes but subsequently switched to generic camouflage 

BDUs without designation of rank.87 Some, such as Bender, believed 

that even this concession to force protection concerns hampered mission 

effectiveness.88 In any case, such issues seemed to some conventional 

soldiers to be petty and reflecting a superior attitude. More than a few 

204 
officers at MND-N thought of the SF soldiers as “cowboys.” Still, SF to 

some degree reveled in its independent image—notwithstanding efforts 

by its chain of command to emphasize a “one Army” approach.89 

Other sources of difficulty between the JCOs and division were 

more practical. For example, when Bender arrived he found that the 

regular reports flowing from the JCO houses were detailed but often not 

coherently written. Though superbly trained in field craft and independent 

operations, many SF NCOs were not practiced writers and it showed. As 

a consequence, the rich information ore they were mining was devalued 

in transit to the division headquarters. Later in 1997, while he was 

commanding a JCO house of his own in Bijeljina, Bender found himself 

spending 2 to 3 hours daily as editor of the team situation reports. In 

fact, he often had to interview team members to make certain he fully 

understood the nuances that they had been unable to communicate.90 

Like many of his SF counterparts, Bender was passionate about his 

work. Upon learning that he would lead a JCO team following his tour in 

the SOCCE, Bender wanted to be sure he knew what there was to know 

about his environment. Thus, prior to arriving in Bijeljina, he gathered all 

of the JCO after-action reports from the city and studied them carefully. 

In addition to time to prepare, he also enjoyed the luxury that about half 

of his team members from 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group had previously 

served on JCO teams in Bosnia. Moreover, like all US military personnel 

deploying to Bosnia, SF soldiers went through obligatory training for 

a week at Grafenwoehr, Germany. Parts of the mandatory checklist, 

such as observing mine explosions were nothing new but the refresher 

on NBC training struck Bender as prudent and useful. Within his JCO 

house, Bender formed four two-man teams, each with a specific focus. 

The first, which he headed himself, zeroed in on the local Serb Army 

Corps headquarters as well as the headquarters of the so-called Special 

Police Brigade. Meanwhile, the second team concentrated on the Ministry 

of Defense and regular police in the Bijeljina area. The third team liaised 

with local political parties and their leaders, and the fourth team with 

members of aid organizations from the international community.91 Major 

Paul Schmidt, who successively commanded JCO teams in Zvornik 

and Brcko, deployed his teams in a similar pattern. In Brcko, Schmidt 

assigned one pair each to focus on the respective minority Croat and 

Muslim populations, for example, and regularly passed information to 

Brcko Arbitrator Robert Farrand.92 

The range and nature of JCO tasks made it abundantly clear why their 

experiences differed so much from those of conventional US soldiers in 

205 
Photo 23. Members of the French Battle Group in MND SE work 

to clear unexploded ordnance near an uninhabited dwelling 

theater and why SF depends inordinately on individuals who are both 

self-reliant and self-disciplined. Bender found, for instance, that much 

of his time involved meetings with army and special police commanders 

and that these meetings consistently entailed the liberal consumption of 

alcoholic beverages such as rakiya or sliivowitz. To be sure, this was 

very much in the line of duty. Staying in communication with key local 

figures, winning their trust and, to the extent possible, their cooperation 

depended in some measure on respect for their habits—among which 

was occasionally indulging their proclivity to get drunk by noon. If local 

commanders would not speak with him, Bender could not accomplish 

his mission. At the same time, of course, the consumption of alcohol, 

even in modest quantities, was forbidden for US troops at MND-N in 

accord with General Order #1.93 This duty-related exemption became 

one of the small perquisites of the job, as was the authorization to travel 

about the country more freely.94 Conversely, troops at Eagle Base who 

were not actively patrolling seldom ventured outside the compound 

under any circumstances. Certainly, they never socialized with Bosnian 

faction leaders. In any case, the trust gained by the JCO approach yielded 

advantages early and often. On one occasion in 1997, a JCO was able 

206 
to head off a civil disturbance by proving to a Bosnian Serb military 

commander that a rumored Muslim mobilization was not in fact occurring.95 

As liaison to General Saric and the Serbian Special Police Brigade, 

Bender had an extraordinary opportunity to monitor one of the crucial 

organizations in the Bijeljina area. With respect to the special police, 

SFOR had two interests. First, it was necessary that the organization 

cooperate insofar as possible with the Dayton agenda for Bosnia. Second, 

the organization itself needed a role that would keep it out of mischief. That 

meant at the very least keeping individual policemen employed, thereby 

giving them some stake in normalcy. SFOR arranged for some police 

training under the auspices of the IPTF but, for the most part, prohibited 

the sort of tactical training to which the brigade was accustomed.96 

Of course, the broader mission of the JCO team in Bijeljina encompassed dealings with many of the community’s figures and activities. On 

the whole, Bijeljina had endured relatively little destruction by the war 

in physical terms, although most of the Muslim population had been ethnically cleansed in the early stages of fighting. What particularly struck 

Bender was the rich social atmosphere of the community, despite the fact 

that perhaps two-thirds of the populace had resettled from other areas. 

During the evenings Bijeljina came alive with young people filling the cafes. Bender and his team managed to fit in. He even spent Christmas with 

one local family that turned out to be rather representative of the Bosnian 

dilemma.97 Driven from its own home in Tuzla, the family resided in the 

house of a Muslim family that had escaped to Tuzla. Remarkably, the families kept in touch, perhaps offering a glimmer of hope for Bosnia’s future. 

Overall, JCO teams not only worked well with key elements in 

local communities, but also fed a wealth of information to the chain of 

command. The JCO mission, which came to an end in May 2001, called 

for the very kind of cross-cultural engagement for which SF personnel 

specially train. This is not to say that such a mission could never be 

undertaken by US personnel from other branches, although in fact it was 

not in Bosnia. What is noteworthy in this regard, however, is that some 

other armies—in particular the British, French, and Canadian armies— 

routinely expected that their ordinary infantrymen could effectively tackle 

some of the engagement-related tasks that in the US Army are reserved 

for SF. Canadian and British infantrymen as a matter of routine engaged 

in “social patrolling” during which they would relax in cafes or shop, 

all the while rubbing elbows with the locals. In this manner, they both 

disseminated the views of their command to the locals and were able 

to take the pulse of the communities where they worked. Similarly, the 

207 
French distributed small units into towns in MND-SE. These platoonsize elements occupied residences and interacted extensively with the 

neighbors. Informal fraternization took the form of volleyball games 

or sharing meals. The result was both a calming community presence 

and a wealth of insight.98 Beyond that, like American SF, they were able 

to establish the kind of personal rapport that could provide a valuable 

conduit for information in the future. 

208 
Notes

 1. Major Mark Solomon, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, 27 October 

2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

2. For a splendid account, see David Rohde, Endgame, The Betrayal and 

Fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massacre since World War II (New York: 

Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1997), 187-91 and William Shawcross, Deliver Us 

from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 2000), 164-65. 

3. Not all nations participating in IFOR-SFOR shared the US doctrinal 

approach. However, because the commander of IFOR and SFOR was always a 

US general officer, American practice generally prevailed.

 4. Thomas Adams, “Psychological Operations in Bosnia,” Military Review 

(December-February 1999). 

5. John Pomfret, The Washington Post, 18 March 1996. 

6. Chris Hedges, “Bosnia’s Checkerboard Partitions: Instability More Likely,” 

The New York Times, 20 March 1996.

 7. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 

316. 

8. Chris Hedges, “NATO Forces Have to Watch As a Sarajevo District Burns,” 

The New York Times, 18 March 1996.

 9. Major Steven Collins, “A War of Words: The Media Clash in BosniaHerzegovina and the Impact of U.S. Army PSYOP,” unpublished manuscript, 8 

June 1998, as cited in Stephen C. Larsen, “Conducting Psychological Operations 

in Sophisticated Media Environments“ unpublished Master of Military Arts and 

Science thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, 26-27. 

10. Major Steve Larsen, interview with Major Don Phillips and Dr. Robert 

Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 1999. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Thomas Adams, “Psychological Operations in Bosnia,” Military Review 

(December-February 1999). 

14. Office of the High Representative press release, Sarajevo, 2 September 

1997; Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 

100-01. According to Clark’s account, the proximate cause of the move was 

Serb editing of an interview of a representative of the ICTY so as to make it 

appear complimentary toward Karadzic. Clark, as SACEUR, felt it essential 

for SFOR credibility to enforce the terms of the media agreement. The high 

representative, Carlos Westendoerp, had urged just such a step. Some, however, 

such as COMSFOR General Eric Shinseki, were convinced that seizure of the 

TV towers constituted an overreaction. Unable to dissuade Clark, Shinseki 

asked for a written order to conduct the mission. Clark further asserts that this 

action set the stage for setbacks suffered by Bosnian Serb hard-liners in the local 

elections that followed. 

209 
15. Information Operations: “IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment,” Center 

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No. 99-2, January 1999, 16-17, 

21. 

16. Major John Venhaus, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 15 February 2001. 

17. Colonel Lee Hockman and Major Ian Hope, as interviewed by Dr. Robert 

Baumann in Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia: The Paradoxical Mission, a 

documentary film, 2003. Also Hope interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 25 March 1998 and Hockman interview with Dr. Robert 

Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 September 1999. 

18. Steve Larsen interview. 

19. Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnia Peace 

Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 16 October 1997, 

10. 

20. Major Greg Cook, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, March 2001. 

21. Venhaus interview. 

22. Ibid. 

23. SFOR 6 After-Action Report, Operation Joint Force (circa 1999), 3-16. 

24. Venhaus interview. 

25. SFOR transcript, joint press conference, 2 September 1997; OHR SRT News 

Summaries, 28 August 1997. 

26. SFOR 6 After-Action Report, Operation Joint Forge, 3-72/74. 

27. Ibid., 3-77. 

28. Major Paul Schmidt, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 31 March 2003. 

29. Ibid. and Major Rob Timm interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 11 January 2001. 

30. SFOR 6 After-Action Report, 3-75/76. 

31. Major Perry Rearick, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 25 April 2001. 

32. Colonel Lee Hockman, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 21 September 1999. 

33. Chuck Sudetic, “The Reluctant Gendarme,” The New Yorker, April 2000, 

93. 

34. Ibid., 94. 

35. IFOR AFSOUTH, transcript of press briefing, 14 August 1996. 

36. Hockman interview. 

37. Clark, 79-81. Clark noted that at about this time NATO Secretary General 

Javier Solana began pressing for a more active role by SFOR in support of civil 

authorities. Clark explains that this decision, combined with a more assertive 

posture concerning special police units, constituted a “significant departure” 

from past NATO practice. 

38. Solomon interview. 

39. Rearick interview. 

210 
40. Hockman interview. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Operation Joint Endeavor Bosnia-Herzegovina: Task force Eagle Continuing 

Operations, B/H CAAT 3/4 Initial Impressions Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

March 1997), 13. 

43. Transcript, joint press conference, SFOR, 28 August 1997. 

44. Ibid. 

45. Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 87-

88. 

46. Lieutenant General Montgomery Meigs, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann 

and Dr. George Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 November 2000. 

47. Hockman interview. 

48. Ibid. 

49. Ibid. 

50. IFOR Final Analysis Report, CIMIC Operations, (undated, circa January 

1997), 1-5-1. 

51. IFOR Final Analysis Report, 1-5-9. 

52. Ibid., 1-5-12,13. 

53. Memorandum for Commander, SFOR: HQ LANDCENT IFOR/SFOR 

After-Action Review (Draft), Chief CJ5, 28 July 1997, 19. 

54. “Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of 

NATO’s Stabilization Force” (Letter Report, 10/08/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-19), 6. 

55. IFOR Final Analysis Report, 1-5-22, 23. 

56. Lieutenant Colonel Dana Eyre, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. 

George Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 October 2000. 

57. SFOR 6 After-Action Report, Operation Joint Forge, 3-62/63. 

58. Solomon interview. 

59. Lieutenant Colonel Dana Eyre, “Working with NGOs: What Every SOF 

Soldier Should Know,” Special Warfare, spring 1998, 15. 

60. Task Force Eagle After-Action Review, 1354. On the other hand, IFOR 

force protection requirements complicated the ability of military representatives 

to get out and attend meetings hosted by other organizations. 

61. Lieutenant Commander Hans Ligtenbarg, Holland, SFOR CIMIC LNO to 

NGOs, HQ SFOR, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Camp Butmir, 16 July 

2001. 

62. Operation Palladium Lessons Learned, Canadian Army, 1997, Question 

Series 81-3. 

63. Ligtenbarg interview. 

64. Memorandum for Commander, SFOR: HQ LANDCENT IFOR/SFOR 

After-Action Review, 28 July 1997, 19-20. 

65. Ligtenbarg interview. 

66. Memorandum for Commander, SFOR: HQ LANDCENT IFOR/SFOR 

After-Action Review, 28 July 1997, 19; Eyre interview; Operation Paladium 

Lessons Learned, Question Series 81-4, 81-5. 

67. Susan Archer, “Feedback Interviews from 49th ID at Camp Eagle Tuzla, 1-3 

211 
April, 2000,” Bosnia Report, March-April, 2000, 1, 5. 

68. IFOR Final Analysis Report, 3-4-17. 

69. Major Walter Piatt, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, 8 February 2001, 

Fort Drum, NY. 

70. Major Yvette Hopkins, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, January 2000; also Hopkins as interviewed by Dr. Robert 

Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia: The 

Paradoxical Mission, a documentary film, 2003. Major Dan Larsen, interview 

with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 November 2000; Eyre 

interview. In fact, this observation was made by many interviewees. 

71. German Civil Affairs Briefing, Camp Rajlovac, 22 September 2000. 

72. Ligtenbarg interview. 

73. Eyre interview. 

74. Solomon interview; Ligtenbarg interview. 

75. Eyre interview. 

76. Ligtenbarg interview. 

77. Major Mike Slocum, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, 2 November 

2001, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

78. Barbara Crossette, “UN Members Slow to Send Police,” The New York 

Times, 21 March 1996; Lester Brune, The State and Post Cold War Intervention: 

Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia 1992-1998 (Claremont, CA: 

Regina Books, 1998), 128. 

79. Major Dan Larsen, A644 briefing, US Army Command and General Staff 

College, February 2002. 

80. Lieutenant Colonel Roy Hawkins, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 August 2000. 

81. Major John White, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 22 February 1999. 

82. Hawkins interview; Major Richard Rhyne, interview with Dr. Robert 

Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 May 2004. One consideration in selecting 

this arrangement was the desire on the part of US Army special forces not to 

decentralize authority over its personnel. See Lieutenant Colonel Michael 

Finley, “Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division North in BosniaHerzegovina,” unpublished AYSOF SAMS monograph 1997-98, 40-49. 

83. Major Darren Bender, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. George 

Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 February 2001. 

84. White interview, Hawkins interview. 

85. For a published description, see Richard Newman, “Living with the Locals: 

A Very Public Mission,” US News and World Report, 6 July 1998, 48-49. 

86. Hawkins interview. Above all, the JCOs did not want to be publicly associated 

with military intelligence. In fact, the CJSOTF and the SOCCEs did not want 

JCOs to be viewed as an intelligence asset in the strict sense even by US or 

SFOR headquarters. They did not accept taskings through military intelligence 

channels but operated independently. 

87. Hawkins interview. According to Hawkins, the concern with visible 

212 
manifestations of rank was that they might interfere with optimal relationships 

in the streets. All SF personnel, irrespective of rank, had to be able to interact 

effectively with the natives. 

88. Bender interview. 

89. This observation is based on the general tone imparted in a number of 

separate interviews both at MND-N and Fort Leavenworth. While it would be a 

mistake to make too much of such “culture classes” among convention soldiers 

and SF, this phenomenon was to some extent in evidence both in Somalia and 

Haiti as well. 

90. Bender interview. 

91. Ibid. 

92. Schmidt interview. 

93. Bender interview. 

94. Hawkins interview. According to Hawkins, the preceding British teams 

took to the use of alcohol on duty a bit more naturally than their American 

counterparts. Of course, British soldiers were never subjected to US General 

Order Number One prohibiting alcohol consumption. 

95. Newman, 49. In another instance reported to Newman by Robert Farrand, 

the American arbitrator in Brcko, information from JCOs proved crucial to 

overcoming political resistance to issuing identification cards to returning 

Muslim refugees. 

96. Bender interview. 

97. Ibid. 

98. Lieutenant Tom Arsenault, “Community a Platoon House in a Theatre of 

Operations,” Infantry Journal (Canada), April 2000, 6-8. Perhaps the presence of 

platoon houses in MND-SE helps explain why, according to Lieutenant Colonel 

Roy Hawkins, US JCO teams in the French sector attracted little interest from 

the French. 

213 
Conclusion 

The Measures of Progress 

Robert F. Baumann 

Today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three de 

facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three 

separate police forces, and a national government that 

exists mostly on paper and operates at the mercy of the 

entities. 

(From “Is Dayton Failing:

Bosnia Four Years After The Peace Agreement” 

by The International Crisis Group,

Balkans Report No. 80, 28 October 1999.) 

At the dawn of the new millennium, following five years of 

international engagement in Bosnia, some observers were slowly 

coming around to the conclusion that the Dayton process was failing, 

indeed congenitally flawed. Such expressions of fundamental doubt 

were seldom heard previously. The reason for the striking shift stemmed 

from an important difference of perspective. Prior to Dayton, the focus 

of the international community was to bring peace to Bosnia and broker 

a balanced arrangement for democratic power sharing among the three 

warring factions within a unified state. The process of achieving initial 

aims was infinitely complicated. The international community understood 

that it could not impose a durable solution from outside but would have 

to seek agreement by the Bosnian faction leaders and other influential 

actors such as Slobodan Milosevic. Inevitably imperfect, the Dayton 

Accords served as a compromise that solved some issues of dispute but 

deferred the resolution of others on which no common position seemed 

possible. Unfortunately, the accords, perhaps the best deal that could have 

been achieved under the circumstances of the time, created a Byzantine 

political system of checks and balances, a virtual formula for paralysis 

in the hands of fiercely entrenched constituencies. Epitomizing the 

logical inconsistency of Dayton is the simultaneous recognition of two 

entities—the Federation and the Republika Srpska—but three nations, 

namely those of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs. By 2000, one 

result of this apparent contradiction was the emergence of a “third entity 

movement” among Bosnian Croats, who constitute the minor partner in 

the Federation dominated by Moslem Bosniacs. Though making no less 

215 
sense than creation of the Republika Srpska, the splitting off of a selfgoverning Croat entity within the Bosnian state would undermine Dayton 

and open the door to unforeseen and possibly destabilizing consequences. 

To be sure, despite the superficial calm throughout the country, Bosnia’s 

foundation was shaky even by the most favorable appraisal. More to the 

point, few observers in 2001 believed that the uneasy peace would last 

more than a few months if SFOR abandoned Bosnia.1 

Reduced to its essentials, the international agenda for progress in 

Bosnia from 1995 to 2000 focused on five broad tasks: establishing 

and maintaining general peace, engineering the return of refugees and 

internally displaced persons to their homes, facilitating elections, forging 

common governmental institutions, and assisting the reconstitution of the 

economic infrastructure. According to the plan, measurable and sustained 

progress toward those objectives would provide essential benchmarks for 

success and pave the way for a fully functional, independent Bosnian 

state. With a particular focus on the role of the military, this discussion 

examines the achievements of the international community to date and 

considers whether success, if it is properly understood in the first place, 

can be attained by the means chosen in Bosnia. 

The military instrument of power, beginning with IFOR and 

continuing as SFOR, was the principal player in achieving the first 

task, integral to the second and third, and limited to a supporting role 

in the remaining two tasks. Indicative of the general course of progress, 

SFOR mission requirements shifted gradually over several years from 

conventional military tasks to support of the civil annexes of Dayton. 

To be sure, not all elements of SFOR’s organization could effect this 

transition comfortably. For example, intelligence priorities were slow to 

adjust from normal military “targets” to support for the information and 

presence missions that by 2000 constituted the focal point of activity.

2 

By consensus assessment, IFOR fulfilled the objectives stated in the 

military annex of the Dayton Peace Accords before the close of 1996. 

The warring entity armed forces quickly ceased to be a dominant factor 

in Bosnian affairs although their activities remained subject to constant 

monitoring. Above all, they did not interfere with the general peace that 

IFOR and SFOR were charged to ensure. Some military planners and 

leaders wanted to construe their mandate narrowly so as to consider their 

mission virtually complete at this stage.3 Among Americans serving in 

IFOR/SFOR, this view manifested itself as avoiding dreaded “mission 

creep.” In the eyes of critics, it reflected “the fear of body bags.”4 Of 

course, approaches varied among each multinational division and indeed 

216 
among the various national contingents. As noted in the preceding chapters, 

these differences reflected diverging national interests, perceptions of the 

problem in Bosnia, and distinct military cultures. 

Whatever their differences, however, in terms of completion of the 

international mission in Bosnia, it soon was clear that fulfillment of the 

military annex of Dayton was but a first step in the eyes of the High 

Representative and the international community. Therefore, the collective 

effort of the OHR, assorted NGOs and IOs, and SFOR soon focused on 

reversing the results of ethnic cleansing and establishing an internationally 

recognized government by means of free and fair elections. Although 

these tasks lay well beyond SFOR’s ability to fulfill on its own, they did 

constitute areas in which armed peacekeepers could make a substantive 

contribution. For instance, IFOR and SFOR supported the conduct of 

elections by providing security and logistic support. 

The first statewide election in Bosnia under the auspices of the 

international community occurred on schedule in December 1996. IFOR 

and SFOR provided security in conjunction with the United Nations 

International Police Task Force (IPTF), as well as transportation and 

staff support to the OSCE, which could not manage the election solely 

on its own resources. For a first attempt, the election went well. There 

was little violence despite fears that some hard-liners might attempt to 

prevent voters from crossing the IEBL to cast their ballots. Fortunately, 

the IPTF received cooperation from local police in most instances. 

Predictably, however, coordination among the various agencies involved 

could have been smoother. Still, the experience provided lessons, such 

as the need to reach earlier decisions, that were applied to good effect in 

subsequent rounds of voting.5 Unfortunately, the meaning of the event 

was problematic. Indeed, many would later argue that its very conduct 

had been an error.6 The structure of the existing electoral system itself 

was a key piece of the problem. The political climate of Bosnia in the 

wake of warfare and widespread acts of genocide was hardly conducive 

to the spirit of accommodation essential to democracy. With the division 

of the electorate into mutually exclusive ethnic camps, the vote in each 

individual district ultimately resulted in a “winner takes all” scenario in 

which the defeated were left entirely out in the cold.7 

The first municipal elections in Bosnia took place on 13-14 

September 1997. Once again, calm and order prevailed. To be sure, 

political wrangling among the entities over procedures and participation 

proved troublesome but did not either delay the voting or significantly 

diminish the turnout. Following the event, the OHR arrived at a positive 

217 
assessment: “As elections are the confirmation of the constitutional 

system envisaged in the Peace Agreement, future elections in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina will be of paramount importance for the implementation of 

the Peace Agreement.”8 

Meanwhile, at the highest level, the system of entities and nations 

brokered at Dayton, though intended to balance the influence of the three 

sides, actually confirmed the isolation of the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs 

into separate voting blocs by requiring the election of one member of 

each to the shared presidency. Policy logic translated into practice was 

equally flawed at the local level. Electoral laws permitted citizens to vote 

either in their place of current or former residence, a provision conducive 

both to confusion and abuse. Not surprisingly, the International Crisis 

Group concluded in 1999 that the rules written by the Provisional 

Election Commission (under the leadership of the OSCE) virtually invited 

gerrymandering that allowed ethnic groups to establish a political grip on 

areas where they had not been dominant prior to the war.9 Even after the 

April 2000 elections, hard-line parties retained considerable influence 

and continued to oppose the further consolidation of the Bosnian state. 

Above all, they hindered “the unification of the command structures of 

the three armies, the implementation of a recent Constitutional Court 

decision on the constituent peoples [of BiH] and the creation of a single 

economic space in Bosnia.”10 

Even in 1996 the inherent instability of the political formula was 

apparent, but the international community did not believe that it could 

retreat from its commitment to early elections. In reality, the reverence 

for elections as integral to the legitimacy of any international intervention 

was important to the mission. Other political imperatives played a role as 

well, such as the reluctance of the United States to indefinitely extend its 

troop commitment to Bosnia beyond IFOR. The quest for rapid results 

perhaps accorded with the goals of contributing states and international 

organizations but could only do so much to improve the situation in 

Bosnia. In a postwar environment where the very extremists who 

brought war and civil strife to Bosnia retained a tight grip on all levers 

of power, the election did little more than affirm a status quo judged 

wholly unacceptable by the world at large. Some subsequent electoral 

results proved more to the liking of the international community but fell 

far short of demonstrating that Bosnia had a functioning civil society. 

At heart, the question was whether Bosnia was to enjoy democracy in 

form or in substance. The latter, most concluded, would require far more 

preparation of societal conditions as a whole. Necessary steps included 

218 
the capture of war criminals, the reigning in of extremist politicians 

and dismantling their monopolies over means of the dissemination of 

information, and resolving a host of complex problems of residency and 

voter registration. 

Beginning in 1997, the OHR concluded that the situation required 

more active intervention by the international community. As the OHR 

acquired new prerogatives such as the authority to fire elected officials, 

some described Bosnia as a protectorate of the international community.11 

Given the presence of an OHR equipped with extensive powers to 

dictate compliance with the GFAP and the presence of SFOR military 

contingents to guarantee the peace, this conclusion had a degree of merit. 

Still, the power to change—or prevent change in—Bosnian society lay 

with the squabbling factions, who actually learned in time to exploit the 

very structure of Dayton to resist achievement of its stated goals. 

If elections defined the political process prescribed by Dayton, 

reversing ethnic cleansing was the animating principle of international 

intervention. The Dayton Peace Accords established unequivocally the 

right of refugees and displaced persons “freely to return to their homes of 

origin.”12 Progress, however, proved painfully slow. By mid-1997, only 

about 300,000 Bosnians had found their way home, leaving as many as 

900,000 displaced within their national borders and an equal number still 

living abroad.13 Even these figures masked the full depth of the problem 

since over 90 percent of the returns were to areas where the refugees’ own 

ethnic group predominated.14 From the end of 1996, the OHR and the 

United Nations Human Rights Commission focused increasing attention 

on this problem. Attempted solutions had to take account of extraordinary 

obstacles. Particularly intractable were the intense animosities and 

profound sense of personal insecurity resulting from the brutal ethnic 

warfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under such circumstances, to expect 

minorities to return to their former communities and live calmly side by 

side with people who only months earlier had been willing to drive them 

away forcibly or worse was just short of utopian. 

SFOR support to minority returns began with a direct role in 

establishing and protecting freedom of movement. This entailed providing 

armed backup for international police monitors, who conducted their 

duties unarmed. In addition, SFOR patrols shut down illegal checkpoints 

established by the former warring factions across Bosnia. Beginning 

in the summer of 1997, SFOR patrolled neighborhoods as minority 

returnees inspected or repaired their former homes. Still, lending a more 

direct hand, such as logistic support, in assisting the OHR’s Return and 

219 
Reconstruction Task Force or RRTF rested largely with the discretion 

of each national contingent. Although SFOR did not normally conduct 

demining operations except to clear main routes of movement or its own 

encampments, it did establish training centers for Bosnian deminers. 

On a purely practical level, a housing shortage resulting from 

wholesale destruction compounded the effects of massive population 

displacement. Those driven from their homes, whatever their ethnicity, 

found whatever housing they could in their place of refuge. Not 

infrequently, they occupied dwellings belonging to members of another 

ethnic group who had themselves been forced to flee. Unfortunately, the 

early response of the international community to the housing crisis was 

inadequate. According to Carl Bildt, “By the end of 1996, all the money 

that had been allocated and cited in the media had barely managed to 

build a single house in Bosnia. There were explanations for this miserable 

state of affairs, but they bordered on the scandalous.”15 Generally, ethnic 

cleansing policies practiced in some measure by all sides tended to create 

areas that were overwhelmingly Serb, Bosniac, or Croatian. Hard-line 

nationalist political leaders frequently urged fugitives of a given ethnic 

group to settle in communities captured by their side in the war. This 

served both to concentrate their own ethnic population and consolidate 

their political grip on territory acquired during the war. Then, having 

gathered refugees of their own ethnic group in an area under hard-liner 

control, the politicians erected obstacles to prevent the new settlers from 

returning to their original homes. As a final barrier to resettlement, local 

hard-liners often insisted that no minority refugees should come in unless 

the very refugees that they themselves were not permitting to leave were 

returned to their homes. The result was paralysis. 

Still, SFOR made headway. When the 10th Mountain Division arrived 

in 1998, it counted a significant increase in the number of “new” return 

sites. To further ascertain the level of progress, the division monitored 

the number of families returning with children, the arrival of construction 

materials to building sites, and the number of NGOs actually working 

on reconstruction projects in any given area. In short, the more secure 

environment established by SFOR seemed to be conducive to positive 

results. Still, the 10th regularly re-examined its measures of progress to 

avoid the possibility of self-delusion that all was going well.16 

Even so, inextricable linkages between the objectives of the 

international community meant that progress in one area could only be 

sustained if commensurate gains were made elsewhere. Restoration of 

the demographic status quo ante demanded in turn a functioning legal 

220 
system capable of fairly adjudicating property claims. Unfortunately, 

impartial justice was a scarce commodity in the postwar BiH. So, too, 

in many cases were property records, either as a result of destruction 

or deliberate withholding by noncompliant officials. Over and over 

again, local officials failed to honor bargains freely entered into with 

agencies such as the UNHCR. For example the “Open Cities Initiative” 

constituted the core of the UNHCR effort in 1998 to stimulate minority 

returns. The concept was that municipalities declaring their willingness 

to accept minority returnees would benefit from the focused channeling 

of assistance projects. In 1998, the UNHCR dedicated 80 percent of its 

Bosnia funds to this purpose.17 Accordingly, the UNHCR selected eight 

municipalities, six in the Federation and two in the Republika Srpska. The 

results were extremely disappointing. Close scrutiny by the International 

Crisis Group detected not only that the rate of returns was far below 

projections but that so-called open cities were doing no better than other 

municipalities.18 Even the municipality of Konjic in the Mostar region, 

considered the most favorable case, could not succeed in integrating eight 

Serb families during the first quarter of 1998. Many critics cited a lack of 

political will on the part of local authorities, but willful noncompliance 

might have been a more appropriate description. Especially distressing 

in this instance was the fact that the prospective Serb returnees faced not 

only obstruction by Konjic officials, but also from Serb officials in the 

Republika Srpska who wanted to prevent their departure, which of course 

would only lead the international community to invite the return of nonSerbs.19 For 1998 as a whole, approximately 35,000-40,000 minority 

returns took place—a notable improvement over 1997—but made just 

a small dent in the problem. In 1999, to systematize administrative 

procedures for returns, the OHR mandated the establishment of housing 

offices in cantons and municipalities.20 Perhaps for that reason, minority 

returns increased sharply in the first half of 1999.21 

Often the most effective refugee return programs were self-organized 

efforts undertaken by displaced persons themselves. In such cases, groups 

of displaced persons formed political parties, aggressively lobbied, took 

part in elections in the municipalities to which they wished to return (as 

specifically provided for in the Dayton Peace Accords), coordinated with 

international NGOs, and arranged trips to conduct damage assessments 

and repairs of their former homes. 

The city of Drvar, site of one of Bosnia’s worst civil disorders under 

SFOR in April 1998, served as a perfect example of how such grassroots 

efforts worked and the risks that they ran in the process. The quest to 

221 
return to Drvar began within months of the establishment of IFOR in 1996 

under the leadership of the Drvar Association, headed by future mayor 

Mile Marceta. The Association actively engaged the Coalition for Return 

and other support organizations. Then, in the fall of 1997, the association 

took advantage of Dayton’s absentee voting rules to capture a majority 

in the Drvar Municipal Council. The elected remained absentee office 

holders, however, as they were in no position to immediately assume their 

prescribed duties. Whatever the electoral outcome, Drvar remained hostile 

territory for Serbs, who once constituted the majority there. According 

to Major Ian Hope, who commanded a Canadian company in Drvar in 

1997, the city at that time was regarded as an extremely difficult case.22 

Still, with minimal financial or practical assistance from international 

organizations, the association achieved its first returns to Drvar before 

the end of 1997. The number of Serbs resettled in Drvar reached 1,600 

early in 1998. As the trickle of returnees to Drvar expanded, international 

organizations began to take notice and provided modest assistance. 

Unfortunately, local HDZ (the Croat hard-line nationalist party) leaders 

regarded the flow of returns as dangerous to their control of the city. In 

the meantime, they attempted to place Croatian refugees coming back 

from Germany in homes formerly owned by Serbs so as to block Serb 

returns. Conversely, the international community managed to secure the 

removal of a modest number of Croat Defense Council soldiers from 

apartments in Drvar to create space for an additional 160 Serb returnees 

early in 1998.23 

On 15April, conditions in Drvar abruptly took a turn for the worse 

when Croat extremists murdered an elderly Serb couple. Presuming the 

complicity of local Croatian officials whom he regarded as accountable 

for the security of Serb returnees, the High Representative fired the local 

police chief and suspended the mayor. The subsequent investigation of 

the deaths by Croatian police was a charade in the opinion of Canadian 

Major Howard Coombs.24 Amid heightened tensions the infamous Drvar 

riot followed. 

The response of the international community to the disturbance 

evoked controversy. In the first place, a vacuum continued for several 

weeks at the level of municipal government when Serb officials were 

driven out and no replacement was promptly named for the chief of police. 

Meanwhile, with encouragement from SFOR, the UNHCR temporarily 

suspended support for returns, thereby fostering the impression of a retreat 

in the face of violence. More serious in the eyes of critics was the fact that 

the international community, and the United Nations in particular, was 

222 
unwilling to face either the gravity of the event or its implications. Instead 

of regarding the riot as a well-planned assault on the returnees, it treated 

the matter as a spontaneous eruption reflecting Croatian frustrations at 

the enormous difficulties facing Croatians seeking to return to the RS. As 

efforts to reform the Drvar police force sputtered, all forward momentum 

in Drvar seemed to have evaporated.25 

Events in Drvar cast a sobering light on contradictions evident in the 

amalgam of approaches by various international organizations. Where 

reversing the effects of ethnic cleansing was concerned, guaranteeing 

the personal security of persons seeking to return to their homes in 

communities now dominated by a rival ethnic group posed virtually 

insurmountable difficulties. The only agency with the assets to address 

the problem in the near term was SFOR, which already was heavily 

committed to a host of missions and rightly feared the drastic broadening 

of its mandate that 24-hour policing would entail. The stretching of SFOR 

assets became more acute with force reduction and the commitment of 

NATO countries to a peacekeeping effort in Kosovo, known as KFOR, in 

1999. 

In light of these conditions, the approach of SFOR and the international 

agencies working in the BiH evoked frustration and criticism. One stern 

appraisal came from the International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent 

organization composed of experts from the international community. 

Specifically, in a report dated 1 May 1997, the ICG faulted the illogic 

of relying on local authorities, many of them former ethnic cleansers, to 

provide security for returnees. The assessment also took SFOR to task for 

a failure “to interpret its mandate in a more robust manner” caused by a 

“near phobia about mission creep” and an acute aversion to casualties.26 

The latter critique, widely echoed in NGO circles, held SFOR could 

assume greater responsibility for maintaining public security. Similar 

criticism followed in the wake of violence in Drvar. 

SFOR spokespersons, in contrast, emphasized not only that their 

mandate did not extend to community policing, but also that they lacked 

the trained personnel and resources to undertake such a mission. In 

principle, the only international agency with even a limited responsibility 

for police functions was the UN-sponsored IPTF. Recruited from among 

police forces around the world, IPTF personnel acted as advisers and role 

models for the police in BiH. While their work was often laudatory, they 

were in no way a realistic substitute for a properly functioning domestic 

police force. They were neither armed nor thoroughly grounded in the 

languages and cultures of the BiH. Consequently, they were unable to 

223 
serve as a true investigative agency. Indeed, because of the diversity of its 

makeup, IPTF lacked a unified operational culture of its own. Nevertheless, 

the IPTF served as an invaluable conduit for information by virtue of its 

role in communities in Bosnia, especially where the activities of local 

police were concerned. Moreover, when the IPTF did become directly 

involved in officially authorized duties, such as the inspections of police 

compounds, they could expect SFOR reinforcement. Nevertheless, the 

creation of professional police forces in the Western sense—apolitical, 

impartial and fundamentally honest—remained the only viable long-term 

solution, and by 2000 it was little more than a distant dream. Central to 

this process was the ethnic integration of police units, a goal occasionally 

achieved in form if not in substance. It was one thing to employ members 

of different ethnic groups together but quite another to get them to 

cooperate. Further, in the context of a corrupt and inefficient judiciary, it 

was but one part of a more deeply entrenched problem. 

Once again, many in the international community hoped that SFOR 

could step into the breach created by a failing justice system to provide 

law enforcement. However, the expectation that SFOR could become an 

antiterrorist and neighborhood police force in addition to operating as the 

watchdog over the entity armed forces and special police units reflected 

a poor understanding of military organization and culture, and especially 

US military organization and culture. Trained, structured, and equipped 

for high-intensity combat, modern armies could not always adjust easily 

to missions that emphasize the restraint and almost superhuman patience 

often required for street-level peacekeeping. Even the Military Police 

Corps, though highly trained and well attuned to the handling of delicate, 

potentially escalating situations, could not begin to assume this burden. 

Its ranks were too few and it lacked personnel with specific linguistic and 

cultural tools to take on the job. Of course, some specialized units such 

as the Italian Carabinieri were brought in to provide investigative skill 

and muscle to the process of rooting out some of the worst of Bosnia’s 

criminal class, but they, too, were overmatched by the sheer magnitude of 

the endeavor. 

Still, SFOR did incrementally intensify its efforts in one crucial 

aspect of law enforcement, the pursuit of war criminals. Overall, SFOR 

showed little inclination to engage in manhunts during the early years of 

the mission. This was especially true for the Americans, whose recent 

peacekeeping experiences in Somalia and Haiti had in turn proved tragic 

and tiresome. The death of 18 Army Rangers in Mogadishu on 3-4 

October 1993 had the indelible impact of touching a hot stove. Reluctantly 

224 
sent to Africa, the Army’s return was humiliatingly precipitous. For a 

generation of senior officers who endured the bitterness of the Vietnam 

War, there was a gnawing perception that they were being ordered to 

take on inappropriate missions and, when things went wrong, would be 

unceremoniously yanked. The special operations raid that went wrong 

in Somalia overshadowed two years of patient and effective work in 

a situation that hardly lent itself to successful intervention. Then, in 

OPERATION Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, the Army’s extreme 

caution and a preoccupation with force protection marked the conduct 

of operations in Port-au-Prince. One veteran observer referred to the 

prevailing psychology as “Vietmalia syndrome.”27 

However, by the new millennium, thinking on the matter began 

to evolve rapidly. Perhaps one cause was the advent of the Global War 

on Terror, launched by President George W. Bush in the wake of the 

attacks of 11 September 2001. Numerous commentators had already 

observed that as long as the most infamous criminals of the Bosnian civil 

war remained at large, reformist forces in Bosnia would have trouble 

mastering widespread grassroots support. 

Certainly, by 2002 a shift in SFOR thinking seemed in evidence. As 

explained by Major General Kenneth Quinlan, former assistant chief of 

staff for Operations in 2002, war criminals constituted an integral part of 

a “parallel power structure” that thwarted broad progress. In Quinlan’s 

words, “If this [Bosnia] is a garden where we’re growing democracy, 

then what we need to do is plow the ground and pull the weeds out.... 

Some of these weeds are called PIFWCs.” Enjoying greater operational 

latitude than in the past, SFOR became more aggressive. As Quinlan put 

it, “‘safe and secure’ is not getting it done!”28 

One vitally important influence on the change in approach was the 

new High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, himself a former British 

Royal Marine. Frustrated with the slow pace of progress and aware of 

the international community’s mounting impatience, Ashdown was 

prepared to ask more of SFOR even though its multinational divisions 

had shrunk to brigades. Fortunately, in SFOR Commander Lieutenant 

General John Sylvester, he found a willing partner. SFOR brought more 

of its intelligence resources to bear on the problem. 

In October 2002, SFOR staged a raid on an aircraft facility in Bijeljina, 

which in addition to a variety of activities in violation of Dayton, had been 

secretly selling material to Iraq in violation of international agreements. 

Within the facility, intelligence officials found a number of computers, 

225 
one of which Quinlan characterized as a “lodestone” leading to a series 

of related raids and apprehensions. In all, SFOR arrested six indicted 

war criminals from June 2002 to June 2003.29 This compared favorably 

with the total of 23 PIFWC arrests, an average of just over three per year, 

during the first seven years of the IFOR/SFOR mission.30 

Despite its cultural baggage, by 1997 the US Army was becoming 

reconciled to assisting in the implementation of the civilian annexes of 

the DPA. Task Force Eagle commanders from the start had direct dealings 

with area commanders and officials of the three entities but the range 

of issues increasingly transcended military affairs. As the international 

community grew more frustrated over its inability to advance the return 

of internally displaced persons and refugees, the various agencies looked 

ever more to SFOR to lend a hand. SFOR units routinely patrolled areas 

of resettlement and, in coordination with the UNHCR and other organs, 

met busloads of prospective returnees during home visitations to ensure 

their protection. 

In dealing with the situation, SFOR had to be aware of the 

occasionally conflicting principles inherent in its mandate. The need 

for protection and the avoidance of violence was self-evident. To let 

the caravans go forward as planned virtually guaranteed hostilities that 

might further inflame Serb-Bosniac antagonisms. To call a halt to the 

event, on the other hand, would mean curbing the rights of free assembly 

and free movement asserted in the DPA. This represented a serious 

concern in view of ongoing criticisms that SFOR had yet to establish 

open movement across the IEBL. As stated in a 17 July 1997 report of 

the US General Accounting Office, “Bosnians of all three ethnic groups 

could not freely cross ethnic lines at will or remain behind to visit, work, 

or live without facing harassment, intimidation, or arrest by police of 

other ethnic groups.31 

Still, SFOR planners were taking nothing for granted as the Women 

of Srebrenica planned their annual pilgrimage in 2000. In addition 

to maintaining a security presence, SFOR conducted an elaborate 

information campaign entailing bilateral meetings among key leaders as 

well as a media barrage to stress the importance of both tolerance of 

differing viewpoints and the preservation of basic civil order. Specifically, 

the information operations annex to the overall plan prepared by the US 

49th Division headquarters emphasized impressing upon the Women 

of Srebrenica and other involved groups the need “to refrain from 

inflammatory or political rhetoric and statements designed to increase 

tensions among BiH citizens and to be tolerant of others who want to honor 

226 
their war victims.” Significantly, the annex took full account of likely 

contingencies, including the chance that the Women of Srebrenica buses 

might have to be diverted, and outlined “talking points” for explaining 

breaking events to the press. Careful coordination with the Office of the 

High Representative, the UNHCR, UNCA, and the IPTF kept all key 

international agencies “in the loop” as preparations progressed. Presence 

on the ground was entrusted primarily to the 3rd Battalion 3rd Cavalry 

Regiment, which moved efficiently and proactively to head off trouble.32 

Ultimately, preparation paid off. Despite legitimate fears of violence, 

the events associated with the fifth anniversary of the fall of Srebrenica 

passed without incident. 

Whether such initiatives could alter the political, social, and 

economic climate in Bosnia remained to be seen. Despite years of peace, 

many young Bosnians had given up on their country’s prospects. Major 

General James Campbell, commanding the 10th Mountain Division in 

Bosnia in 1999-2000, recalled a sobering encounter with a local high 

school assembly at which his attempt to strike a hopeful note ran smack 

into the demoralizing realities of Bosnian life. Trying to inspire his 

audience, Campbell told the students, “You are Bosnia’s future.” He 

added that any one of them might be the next mayor or chief of police. 

In reply, one student remarked skeptically, “You don’t know anything 

about us” and proceeded to detail the depressing futility of economic and 

political life in her country.33 The incident reminded Campbell how hope 

had worn thin in Bosnia, especially for the young. 

Sadly, building an efficient government and revitalizing the economy 

are goals that do not lend themselves in any but the most indirect ways to 

military solutions. On the other hand, SFOR’s absence would disastrously 

impair the prospects for advancement of these ends, both of which must 

be based on broad confidence in a secure future. Such faith, some believe, 

is not likely to arise until the foremost Bosnian Serbs indicted by the 

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia—Karadzic and Mladic in 

particular—are brought to justice. In the meantime, though in hiding, they 

wield subtle influence behind the scenes. Were they captured and taken 

to the Hague, moderate Serb politicians would be in a position to operate 

more freely and chart a new course. In the meantime, SFOR continues to 

adhere to a policy that keeps it out of the manhunt business. Yet, arrests 

have occurred, and Lord Robertson, chairman of the North Atlantic 

Council, warned in July 2001 that Karadzic and Mladic had nowhere left to 

hide. Whatever its limitations, SFOR’s presence remains a crucial symbol 

of international commitment to an independent, democratic Bosnia. 

227 
Certainly the assorted international organizations in Bosnia, aside 

from Bosnians themselves, must play the most direct role in advancing 

civil development. This will not become easier. Indeed, the extent of the 

international commitment to Bosnia has recently been in decline and 

will almost certainly diminish further.34 The reasons for this are twofold. 

First, there are other urgent cases such as Kosovo, and subsequently 

Afghanistan and Iraq, which have commanded increasing attention and 

resources. Second, the international community may well be experiencing 

a form of “donor fatigue” after a decade of involvement in the BiH. 

Consequently, resources in the future must be carefully focused. 

Some observers now believe that any future solution in Bosnia will 

require modifications to the Dayton Accords. This will be particularly 

difficult from a political standpoint in light of the fact that Dayton has 

been treated as a sacred cow by the international community up to this 

point. Indeed, it has repeatedly been invoked to legitimize actions by 

the OHR and SFOR to shape the behavior of the three entities. As a 

result, there is legitimate cause for concern that a retreat from the terms 

of Dayton might destabilize Bosnia. Despite such objections, some key 

figures have concluded that necessary progress cannot occur within the 

terms of the GFAP. Lieutenant General Michael Dodson, COMSFOR in 

2001, publicly described the Dayton terms as “a floor, not a ceiling.”35 

The implication, subtly stated but evident to careful listeners, was that 

Dayton by itself is not a satisfactory blueprint for Bosnia’s future. 

In Major General Quinlan’s estimation, the customary indicators 

of success that for years have served as the international community’s 

benchmarks for progress may have meant little in the absence of a 

concerted assault on the “parallel power structure.”36 By focusing on data 

such as returnees, patrols, housing, elections, schools, and economic 

output—all highly relevant to be sure—the international community and 

SFOR may have been monitoring the symptoms while failing to confront 

the underlying disease. The nexus of violence, corruption, and nationalist 

politics that stunts development in Bosnia will not wither away on its 

own. Perhaps even continued arrests of war criminals as well as common 

criminals will prove insufficient to overcome the many ills that plague 

this fragile state. 

In fairness, the Office of the High Representative, SFOR, and the 

numerous NGOs working in Bosnia have to date made great strides 

in reversing the effects of ethnic cleansing and civil war in BosniaHerzegovina. Sarajevo once again has a flicker of cosmopolitan vibrance 

and other glimmers of hope can be seen as well. Yet, there is room to 

228 
question whether a truly stable state can ever emerge within the framework 

of the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace. Though clearly 

necessary, and probably the best deal that could be reached at the time, 

the political structure to which it gave birth ever more resembles a great 

albatross. Flaws in its design often abet the behavior of nationalists who 

oppose its implementation. The weakness of central structures, beginning 

with the presidency, at the very least ensure that future gains will come 

at a pace that will exhaust the patience of the international community. 

The very plan that laid out a path to success in time has become an 

impediment to fulfillment of some of its own stated objectives. This does 

not mean that Dayton is the core problem in Bosnia. Rather, it may be 

time for new, creative approaches that could necessitate a new agreement 

better tailored to changing circumstances. With the advent of more recent 

crises in Kosovo, Iraq, Africa, and elsewhere, the attention and resources 

of the international community are moving. The application of effort to 

salvage Bosnia must become more economical and focused to the greatest 

possible effect. 

229 
230
Notes

 1. This conclusion is based upon approximately 200 interviews conducted by 

the authors of this study with military and civilian participants in the peacebuilding process in Bosnia.

 2. Future SFOR Targeting Process, information brief to COMSFOR, 5 January 

2000.

 3. Lieutenant Colonel Bud Bowie, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, August 5, 1999.

 4. “Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement,” ICG 

(International Crisis Group) Balkans Report No. 80, 28 October 1999, 6.

 5. Elections 1996 After-Action Review, briefing slides, United Nations 

International Police Task Force, Peter Fitzgerald, Police Commissioner.

 6. See, for example, “Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the Peace 

Agreement,” 11. The authors also heard this view expressed by a number of 

observers on the ground in Bosnia.

 7. For an excellent discussion of this dilemma, see a report titled “Doing 

Democracy a Disservice,” International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 42, 9 

September 1998, 4-5.

 8. Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace 

Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 16 October 1997, 

9.

 9. “Is Dayton Failing?,” 12. 

10. “Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles,” ICG Balkans Report 

No. 104, 18 December 2000, 9. 

11. Ibid., 5-6. 

12. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Article II, Paragraph 5, Annex 4, signed 21 November 1995. 

13. UNHCR, “Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia,” Box 4.4, www.unhcr.ch/ 

refworld/pub/state/97/box4_4.htm. 

14. International Crisis Group, “Dayton: Two Years On, A Review of Progress 

in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia,” ICG Bosnia Project, 

Report No. 27, 19 November 1997, 7. According to this report, by November 

1997, only 1,200 Bosniacs had returned to the zone of separation on the 

Republika Srpska side of the border. 

15. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: 

Weidenfelt and Nicolson, 1998), 215. 

16. Major Walter Piatt, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, 8 February 2001, 

Fort Drum, NY. 

17. International Crisis Group, “Minority Return or Mass Relocation?,” ICG 

Bosnia Project, Report No. 33, 14 May 1998, ii. 

18. Ibid., 15-18. In particular the ICG reported that project accountability was 

weak and that in any case open cities did not appear to be receiving greater aid. 

19. Ibid., 18. 

231 
20. Brad Blitz, “USIP Special Report: An Overview of Refugee Returns and 

Minority Registration,” 21 December 1999, 7. 

21. International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the 

International Community Ready?,” Balkans Report No. 95, 30 May 2000. 

22. Major Ian Hope, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 11 January 1999. 

23. International Crisis Group, “Minority Return or Mass Relocation?,” 25-26. 

24. Major Howard Coombs, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. George 

Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5, 19 October 2001. 

25. International Crisis Group, “Minority Return or Mass Relocation?,” 27-28. 

26. International Crisis Group, “Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” ICG Bosnia Report No. 23, 1 

May 1997, iii, 9. 

27. Richard Rinaldo, “Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do 

MOOTW?,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 113. 

28. Major General Kenneth Quinlan, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, Joint 

Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 7 November 2003. 

29. Ibid. 

30. SFOR Fact Sheet. Persons Indicted for War Crimes. NATO/SFOR Informer. 

At <http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/warcrime/too1161.htm>. Accessed 18 

February 2004. 

31. United States General Accounting Office, “Bosnia Peace operation: Progress 

Toward Dayton Agreement’s Goals–An Update,” (Testimony, 07/17/97, GAO/TNSIAD-97-216), 4. 

32. Annex P (Information Operations) to IMPIN XXXX to OPORD XXXX, 49th 

Division Headquarters; Annex Q (Public Affairs) to IMPIN XXXX to OPORD 

XXXX, 49th Division Headquarters; Annex R (Psychological Operations) to 

IMPIN XXXX (Gallant Vigil) to OPORD XXXX; Briefing by Major Harlan 

Harris, 49th Division After-Action Review, January 2001, Austin, TX. 

33. Major General James Campbell, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, 9 

February 2001, Fort Drum, NY. 

34. Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Barr, “Update on Op Palladium Roto 6: Extract 

from End-Tour Report, September 2000,” The Bulletin, The Army Lessons 

Learned Centre, Canada, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2001, 17. 

35. Press Conference with Lord Robertson and Lieutenant General Michael 

Dodson, Coalition Press Information Center, Sarajevo, Bosnia, July, 2001. 

36. Quinlan interview. 

232 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 

ACE Allied Command Europe 

AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe 

ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 

BiH Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

BSA Bosnian Serb Army 

CA Civil Affairs 

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation Center 

CPIC Coalition Press Information Center 

CJCMTF Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force 

CJPOTF Combined/Joint Psychological Operations Task Force 

EC European Community 

EU European Union 

GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace 

HDZ Croatian Democratic Alliance 

IFOR Implementation Force 

IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line 

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 

IO Information Operations 

IPTF International Police Task Force 

JNA Yugoslav People’s Army 

JCO Joint Commission Observer 

JMC Joint Military Commission 

MND-N Multinational Division North 

MND-SE Multinational Division Southeast 

MND-SW Multinational Division Southwest 

MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated 

NAC North Atlantic Council 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NGO Nongovernmental Organization 

OHE Office of the High Representative 

OPLAN Operations Plan 

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

PSYOP Psychological operations 

RS Serb Republic 

RSRT Republika Srpska Radio and Television 

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

SF Special Forces 

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

SFOR Stabilization Force 

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 

USAREUR United States Army Europe 

233 
INDEX

Abrams, John, 61, 71, 73 

Afghanistan, 139, 228 

Akashi, Yakushi, 47-48 

Albright, Madeleine, 51, 199 

Allied Command Europe (ACE), 60, 123, 150 

Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), 60, 63-64, 66-68, 70-71, 74, 77, 

85, 123, 125 

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), 28, 60, 67, 69-70, 73-74, 77, 79, 104-105, 

123, 192 

Altschuler, William, 199 

Alty, James, Jr., 73 

Andric, Ivo, 6 

Annan, Kofi, 49 

Arbor, Louise, 187 

Archer, Susan, 181, 196 

Baggott, Chris, 131 

Banja Luka, 27, 29, 110, 121, 127-128, 150-151, 159-160, 180 

Batiste, John, 105-106, 108-109 

Bender, Darren, 203-207 

Bihac, 25, 27-29, 40, 45-46, 49, 66 

Bijejlina, 25 

Boban, Mate, 24-26 

Bosnian Croat Home Defense (HVO), 159, 161 

Boutros Ghali, Boutros, 48, 62 

Brcko, 25, 97, 111, 127, 143, 150-159, 167-168, 180, 185, 189-190, 205 

Brown & Root, 119, 139 

Bryant, Albert, Jr., 71-72 

Bullivant, Duncan, 37-38, 225 

Bush, George, 37-38, 225 

Byrnes, Kevin, 137 

Byzantine Empire, 3-4, 215 

Camp Colt, 153 

Camp Drvar, 162-163 

Camp McGovern, 97, 127, 136, 152 

Campbell, James, 137, 140, 183, 194, 227 

Canadian International Development Agency, 193 

Carter, Jimmy, 69 

Cherrie, Stan, 95, 99, 143, 

Chetniks, 15 

Chirac, Jacques, 51 

235 
Christopher, Warren, 38, 176, 199 

Churkin, Anatoli, 40 

Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC), 192-194, 196, 200 

Claes, Willie, 66 

Clark, Wesley, 132, 150-151, 160, 183, 188, 190, 199-200 

Clinton, Bill, 29, 37-38, 70, 85, 97, 120 

Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC), 102 

Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force (CJCMTF), 199 

Combined/Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (CJPOTF), 184 

Commander, in Chief, US European Command (CINCEUR), 61, 78, 151 

Constitution of 1974, 20-21 

Corda, Mark, 127 

Croat Union of Hercog-Bosna, 26, 124 

Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ), 24, 26, 123, 159, 222 

Crouch, William, 61, 71, 73-74, 80, 135, 188, 192, 199 

Cuculo, Tony, 97, 101 

Dayton Implementation Force, 37 

Dayton Agreement, 54, 114, 122, 193 

Dayton Peace Accords, i, 28, 31-32, 73-75, 77, 84, 97, 99, 101-102, 104-107, 

110-111, 113-114, 119-120, 122, 124-126, 129-130, 132, 150, 153, 159, 

167, 171-172, 174-176, 178, 180-181, 183, 185, 187-188, 190-194, 199-

201, 207, 215-218, 221-222, 225, 228-229 

Demurenko, Andrei, 43 

Drummond, Fred, 126 

Drvar, 29, 141, 143, 150, 158-163, 166-167, 201, 221-223 

Eagle Base, 96, 134, 138, 181, 204, 206 

Eastern Orthodoxy, 23 

Ethnic cleansing, 1-2, 12, 14, 16-17, 20, 24, 26-27, 29, 31, 43, 53, 122, 151, 

159, 175, 191, 201 

European Community (EC), 24-25, 31, 38-39 

European Union (EU), 3, 64, 202 

Eyre, Dana, 194 

Farmen, William N., 74 

Farrand, Robert, 204 

Fisher, Richard, 98 

Fontenot, Greg, 37, 95, 101, 126, 142 

Force Protection, 74, 96, 98, 103, 128, 130, 131, 133-134, 136-137, 139-144, 

181-183, 193, 196-197, 204, 225 

Gelbard, Robert, 176 

General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), 31, 37, 59-60, 76, 79, 95, 

97, 100, 114, 119-121, 125-126, 158, 171, 229 

236 
General Order #1, 138, 206 

Gorazde, 40, 45-48, 51, 70, 200 

Grange, David, 151-152, 155-158, 190 

Grbavica, 175-176 

Greer, James, 127, 151-152, 155, 157 

Haiti, i, 38, 177, 188, 204, 224-225 

Halverson, Robert, 137, 139 

Han Pijesak, 104-105, 111, 143 

Habsburg Empire, 8-10 

Hatton, Rick, 43-44 

Hayes, Jet, 141 

Hinton, Donna, 200 

Hitler, Adolf, 13-15 

Hockman, Lee, 185, 187-89, 191 

Holbrooke, Richard, 51, 72-73, 97, 176 

Holman, Karen, 177 

Implementation Force (IFOR), i, 16, 37, 43, 54, 59, 72-73, 75-77, 79, 84, 95, 

97-98, 100-114, 121, 137, 140-141, 143, 158, 171-172, 174-178, 185, 187, 

189, 192-194, 196, 198, 201, 216-218, 221, 226 

Information Operations (IO), 101, 184, 217, 226 

Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), 111, 121-122, 181, 217, 226 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 44 

International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 44 

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 107, 112, 187, 189 

International Crisis Group (ICG), 218, 221, 223 

International Organizations (IO), 10, 138, 179, 193, 195-197, 200 

International Police Task Force (IPTF), 111, 133, 151-152, 154-155, 162, 176, 

178 

Islam, 2-3, 5-6, 9, 19 

Izetbegovic, Alija, 22, 24-26, 29, 48, 122-123 

Janvier, Bernard, 47-48, 50-51, 66 

Joint Commission Observer (JCO), 203-207 

Joint Information Bureau, 172, 189 

Joint Military Commission (JMC), 99, 125, 128 

Joint Operations Planning and Execution, 77 

Joint Task Force Provide Promise, 63 

Joulwan, George, 60-61, 74, 121, 130, 189 

Kaplan, Robert, 2 

Karadzic, Radovan, 25, 28, 30, 40, 101, 110, 112-113, 172, 150-151, 178, 190, 

227 

Karadjordjievic Dynasty, 11, 23 

237 
Karreman, Thom, 51 

Khobar Towers, 131 

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 10, 12 

Kiseljak, 27 

Klein, Jacques, 161, 199-200 

Kosovo, 11, 13, 17-18, 21, 23, 25, 185, 223, 228-229 

Krajina, 23-25, 46, 70 

Krajisnik, Momcilo, 122,-123, 157, 179 

Lake, Anthony, 70 

Lambert, Sue, 81 

Larsen, Steve, 176 

League of Yugoslav Communists, 17-18 

Ligtenbarg, Hans, 195, 198, 200-201 

MacKenzie, Lewis, 27, 39 

Magne, Michel, 142 

Markala market, 43 

Mihailovic, Draza, 15 

Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), 28, 70 

Milosevic, Slobodan, 22-23, 25-26, 30-32, 107, 150-151, 215 

Mladic, Ratko, 25, 28, 30, 50-51, 54, 104-113, 172-174, 186-187, 227 

Mogadishu, 130, 132, 187, 224 

Montenegro, 3, 8, 11, 13, 17, 23, 25, 39, 63, 142 

Morillon, Philippe, 27, 49 

Mostar, 27, 39, 121, 143, 221 

Multinational Division-North (MND-N), 83, 97-99, 103-104, 112-113, 121, 

124-125, 131, 133-134, 136, 138-139, 141, 150, 152, 155, 158, 177, 181, 

183, 192-193, 196, 202-203, 205-206 

Multinational Division-Southeast (MND-SE), 103, 120, 124, 139, 141, 143, 

192-193, 208 

Multinational Division Southwest (MND-SW), 102-103, 120, 124, 139, 143, 

180-182, 192-193 

Multinational Security Unit (MSU), 167 

Nash, William, 61-62, 99, 105, 108, 111-113, 120, 125, 186 

Nix, Jack, 61, 69 

Non-Aligned Movement, 19 

Nongovernmental Organization (NGO), 101, 114, 160, 192-197, 199-201 

North Atlantic Council (NAC), 28, 60 63-66, 69-71, 83, 123-124, 167, 178, 227 

O’Grady, Sean, 102 

O’Neil, James P., 81 

O’Sullivan, Tom, 110 

238 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), 184, 189, 190-192, 217, 219, 221, 

227-228 

OPERATION Deliberate Force, 29, 53, 66-67, 70, 161, 166-167 

OPERATION Deny Flight, 64 

OPERATION Desert Shield, 86 

OPERATION Desert Storm, i, 86 

OPERATION Fear Naught, 111-113 

OPERATION Grabble, 67 

OPERATION Gryphon 2, 108 

OPERATION Harvest, 142 

OPERATION Joint Endeavor, i, 59-60, 73, 86 

OPERATION Joint Forge, 184 

OPERATION Medusa, 163 

OPERATION Provide Comfort, 63 

OPERATION Provide Promise, 63 

OPERATION Sharp Guard, 64 

OPERATION Sky Monitor, 64 

OPERATION Spark, 28 

OPERATION Storm, 29, 159 

OPERATION Uphold Democracy, 205, 225 

OPERATION Urgent Fury, 187 

OPLAN 95-425, 75 

OPLAN 4243, 78 

OPLAN 40101, 64, 67-68 

OPLAN 40103, 68 

OPLAN 40104, 68-69, 72 

OPLAN 40105, 70-71, 74, 76-77, 79 

OPLAN 60105, 70 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 99, 122, 162, 

172, 194-195, 217-218 

Ottoman Empire, 5-8, 13 

Pale, 24, 25, 30, 47, 53, 66, 112, 150-151, 175, 190 

Partisans, 15-16 

Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 24, 122-123 

Pavelic, Ante, 14-15 

Perry, William H., 128, 130, 176 

Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs), 132, 180, 186, 187 

Petrosky, Daniel, 76 

Piatt, Walt, 196-197 

Plavsic, Biljana, 110, 112, 127, 150-151, 153, 190 

Political Advisor (POLAD), 131 

Pomfret, John, 175 

Posovina Corridor, 25 

239 
Powell, Colin, 38 

Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 43, 103, 171, 186, 188 

Raznjatovic, Zeljko, 25 

Rearick, Perry,185 

Republika Srpska (RS), 25-26, 28, 30, 39, 97, 110-113, 122-124, 138, 141, 150-

152, 175, 178-179, 181, 189, 193, 199-200, 215-216, 221 

Republika Srpska Radio and Television (RSRT), 199-200 

Revolt of 1804, 6 

Rhode, David, 48 

Roman Catholicism, 2, 4 

Roman Empire, 3 

Rose, Sir Michael, 40, 42, 47-48, 189, 203 

Russian Airborne Brigade, 191 

Sarajevo, 3, 9, 19, 26-29, 39-40, 42-45, 47, 49, 51, 53-54, 63-66, 69-70, 79, 85, 

102, 108, 110, 121, 123, 125, 134, 175, 177, 180, 184-185, 187-188, 192, 

194, 203 

Sava River, 3, 32, 37, 76, 81, 05, 153, 185 

Schifferle, Peter, 71 

Schmidt, Paul, 185, 203 

Serb Radio and Television (SRT), 107, 178-179, 199 

Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), 24, 40, 111, 122-123, 181 

Seymour, Bill, 106, 108 

Shalikashvili, John, 99, 105, 132 

Sharp, Walter, 139 

Sharpe, Greg, 126, 127, 153, 156 

Shinseki, Eric, 150-151, 188, 199 

Short, David, 110 

Shultz, George, 38 

Slocum, Mike, 100, 202 

Smith, Leighton, 60, 66, 76, 107, 125, 128, 175-176 

Smith, Rupert, 47, 67, 120, 125, 141 

Solana, Javier, 110, 150 

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 61, 69, 71 

Spaho, Mehmed, 11, 12 

Srebrenica, 25, 28-30, 40, 45-46, 48-53, 66, 69, 119, 121, 143, 173-174, 180, 

226-227 

Stabilization Force (SFOR), i, 16, 121, 123, 124-126, 131-134, 136-138, 141, 

143, 150-151, 155, 158-160, 166-167, 171-172, 174, 176-178, 203, 207, 

216-17, 219-28 

Stalin, Joseph, 18-19 

Steiner, Michael, 176 

Sterling, Jack, 81 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 60, 97, 121, 130, 132, 150, 

188, 190, 199 

240 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 60 

Swain, Richard, 130 

Sylvester, John, 113, 187, 225 

Task Force Able Sentry, 67 

Task Force Eagle, 37, 74, 76-77, 80-81, 83, 95, 98, 103, 105, 114, 120, 125, 130, 

142, 158, 183, 186, 188, 192, 194, 203-204, 226 

Task Force Ranger, 186 

Timm, Rob, 185 

Tito, Jozef Broz, 2, 15-24, 74 

Tudjman, Franjo, 22-23, 26, 29-32 

Tuzla, 19, 25, 40, 45, 52, 65, 67, 72, 75, 79, 81, 111, 121, 130, 134, 138, 180-

181, 183, 192, 204, 207 

Ugljevik, 121, 151 

United Nations, 37, 39, 44, 46, 48-49, 52 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 42, 63, 111, 175, 

176, 184, 193, 195 

United Nations Human Rights Commission, 219 

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), i, 24, 27, 37, 39-40, 42-54, 63-

64, 67-70, 79, 85, 120, 125, 128, 142 

United Nations Security Council, 27, 39, 46, 48, 59 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 713, 63 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, 39 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 776, 39 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 819, 45 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031, 78, 120 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1088, 123 

United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 28 

United States Army Europe (USAREUR), 61, 67, 69, 71-81, 86 

United States European Command, (EUCOM) 61, 72-73, 75, 78-80, 85, 150 

Ustashe, 14-17, 31 

Vance, Cyrus, 44 

Vance, Michaela, 138 

Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 64, 67-68 

Venhaus, John, 179-183 

Vitez, 26-27 

Vojvodina, 11, 13, 17, 21, 23, 25 

Vuono, Carl, 28 

Walker, Sir Michael, 60, 104-106, 108-110, 113, 124, 176 

Warsaw Pact, 19, 22, 79 

Weedy, Charleton, 109-110 

Westendorp, Karl, 200 

White, John, 203 

241 
White, Thomas, 138 

Women of Srebrenica (WOS), 180, 226-227 

World War II, 2, 12, 15-17, 19-20, 26, 31, 129, 139, 199 

Wright, James, 61, 74 

Young, Mike, 195 

Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), 24 

Zimmermann, Warren, 38, 48 

Zone of Separation (ZOS), 76, 83, 96-97, 101, 102, 114, 120, 121, 126 

Zubak, Kresimir, 123 

Units

1st Armored Division, 37, 61, 67, 72, 74-78, 83, 95, 103, 108, 121, 124, 126, 128, 

49

24

21

6

3

3

1

143 

1st Battalion Cold Stream Guards, 45 

st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 67, 71, 124 

rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 131, 137, 227 

rd Infantry Division, 67, 71, 137-39, 204-205 

th PSYOP Battalion, 177 

10th Mountain Division (Light), 137, 183-184, 194, 196-197, 202, 220, 277 

10th Special Forces Group, 205 

10th Zagreb Corps, 16 

16th Engineer Brigade, 126 

16th Muslim Brigade, 16 

18th Infantry Regiment, 153 st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), 61, 74 

th Airmobile Brigade, 28 

th Armored Division, 137, 226 

49th National Guard (Texas), 137 

65th Protection Regiment, 104-106, 187 

77th Armored Regiment, 127, 151 

325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 76, 81 

351st Civil Affairs Command, 194 

V Corps, 61, 67, 71-77 

242 
About the Authors

Robert F. Baumann is the Director of the Graduate Degree Program and 

Professor of History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 

He received a B.A. in Russian from Dartmouth College (1974), an M.A. 

in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University in 1976, and 

a Ph.D. in History from Yale University (1982). From 1979-1980 he was a 

graduate exchange student at Moscow University with grant support from 

the Fulbright-Hayes Program and the International Research and Exchanges 

Board. Baumann was subsequently a Research Associate at Leningrad State 

University during the summers of 1990 and 1991. In addition to over 20 

scholarly articles and book chapters, Baumann is the author of RussianSoviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan 

(Combat Studies Institute [CSI], 1993), as well as coauthor of Invasion, 

Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation 

Uphold Democracy (CSI, 1998) and My Clan Against the World: A History 

of US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 (CSI, 2004). A 1999 

recipient of a research grant from the United States Institute of Peace in 

Washington, DC, Baumann is the writer-producer of a documentary film 

on the US and multinational peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. In addition to 

Russian military history, he has also written extensively on the history of the 

Bashkirs and taught briefly as a visiting professor of history at the Bashkir 

State University in Ufa, Russia in the fall of 1992. 

George W. Gawrych received his PhD in late Ottoman history from 

the University of Michigan in May 1980. He joined the Combat Studies 

Institute in July 1984. During the 2002-2003 academic year, Gawrych was 

a visiting professor in the history department at West Point. In August 2003, 

he accepted a position as associate professor of Middle East History at 

Baylor University. In addition to a number of professional articles, Gawrych 

published The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy between Egypt 

and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. 

Walter E. Kretchik is Assistant Professor, Department of History, Western 

Illinois University, where he specializes in US military history and foreign 

relations. He has taught at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, and the 

Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College. 

A retired US Army lieutenant colonel, he served for six months in 1996 as 

the US Army Component Command Historian with USAREUR Forward in 

Taszar, Hungary, having responsibility for gathering the historical record 

for all US Army units in theater. He was awarded a Ph.D. in History from 

the University of Kansas in 2001 and is a resident graduate of the US Army 

Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military 

Studies. His research interests include US Army doctrine, US military 

interventions, and foreign relations. 

243